

**AWM52**  
**2nd Australian Imperial Force and**  
**Commonwealth Military Forces unit war**  
**diaries, 1939-45 War**

Item number: 8/2/20

20 Infantry Brigade  
Messages 1945, part 3 of 4



ADDRESS BY BRIG W J V WINDEYER, CBE, DSO, ED

on the occasion of

A SERVICE OF THANKSGIVING FOR VICTORY

KUALA BELAIT 21 AUG 45

We have come here to give thanks for victory. It is a time of gladness and thankfulness and of rest and relief after long years and many anxious days -- and for us all it is a time of high hopes for the future.

For all that victory means to each of us, every man in his own way will feel grateful to his God. For we know that the war was not won by material things alone, by bombs and guns and bulldozers. Victory was won by unselfishness and sacrifice, by the endurance and unshaken faith of a people through times when defeat seemed coming, by the courage and steadiness of men in battle, by their confidence and determination to go forward and to conquer -- and all these are qualities given of God.

We have had great experiences in the past five years. Memories go back to the time when <sup>we</sup> first assembled in camp - men in civilian clothes carrying suitcases and parcels all earnest and eager, with little idea of what lay before them - to the farewells when we left home - to the Middle East - Palestine - weary and dangerous months in Tobruck - Syria - the rush to the desert - members of a proud team when the 8th Army was threatened outside Alexandria - then our own proud place with that Army in one of the great battles of history when along the front tanks were numbered by their hundreds and men by tens of thousands - to New Guinea - Lae - Finschhafen - Sio - wet and gloomy jungle - hard rations, bombing on Scarlet Beach - long and weary marches.

Then to Borneo.

And suddenly it is all over.

And with our thankfulness one memory comes to the front for us all - of those many men who shared with us good times and bad times - but who are no longer here to share with us joy in the victory which they helped to win. For them and their loved ones there will not be the happiness of homecoming.

I shall later ask you to be still and silent for a moment in remembrance - thinking the same thoughts which we had when we prayed in the cemetery in Tobruck in 1941, when we gathered for church parade on the saltmarshes near the sea after Alamein, when the last post was sounded on the great parade at Gaza, when we assembled at the dedication of the cemetery at Finschhafen.

Many of these men were very dear to us and we know that they would have lived good lives in our land. The nation is the poorer by their passing. But it can yet be the richer if we remember.

The real quality of a people is shown not only by their resolution in the times of danger - but also by their conduct in the hour of victory. When we are in our homes knowing that those homes, once threatened, are now secure, let us still remember. [OVER]

Note.

*privately*  
This was printed for distribution to officers and others some time after Brig Windeyer left HQ to administer command of 9 Div.

*April May*  
By 20 Aust Inf Bde



It is the simple things we have respected in our friends in the Army - speaking truth, taking a fair share of the work, cheerfulness, doing a good job and being ready to help the other man do his job, not letting the show down.

Those are the things which have kept whole units together - and made victory possible. They have been greater than many differences of rank and of opinion and of feeling. In our different interests and different tasks in civil life we may remember that those things were good.

The enemy has been beaten. We know our cause was worthy. We render our thanks to God.

-----

The parade will stand silent in memory of fallen comrades -----



*War Diary*

SECRET

GOC's CONFERENCE

HQ 9 Aust Div  
G.763/55/4  
4 Aug 45

Copy /

Comd 20 Aust Inf Bde  
Comd 24 Aust Inf Bde  
CRA  
CRE  
CO Sigs  
Comd BPCA  
CASC  
ADMS  
ADOS  
CEME  
DAFM

Copies to - CTG 75.15  
AOC 1 TAF RAAF  
OC A Gp Adv HQ SRD  
OC FELO  
GSO 1  
AA and OMG  
File  
War Diary

1. GOC 9 Aust Div is holding a conference at 0945 hours on 11 Aug 45 in the War Room at HQ 9 Aust Div.

2. Purpose of conference

- (a) To outline the initial concept of a SURRENDER PLAN in the event of the surrender of JAPAN.
- (b) To consider matters arising from this PLAN.
- (c) To consider any other matters that may be raised.

3. Attendance

- (a) Action addressees will attend. Brigade Commanders may bring one member of their staff.
- (b) Information addressees are requested either to attend personally or send a senior representative.

4. Matters for inclusion in agenda

- (a) Matters which addressees may desire to be included in agenda will be submitted to reach this HQ by 1200 hours 9 Aug 45
- (b) Submissions will take the form of definite proposals which their sponsors may be required to explain to the conference.
- (c) The agenda will be issued PM 10 Aug 45.



5. Movement of Brigade Commanders

(a) Arrangements are being made for accommodation of Brigade Commanders and staff officers at HQ 9 Aust Div on night 10/11 Aug, and for such further time as may be necessary.

(b) Special arrangements for movement of Brigade Commanders are being made and will be advised by signal message.

6. Security

(a) This conference is being held to prepare for a possible contingency. It is emphasised that there is at present NO official instruction that the surrender of JAPAN is likely.

(b) This matter could easily become the subject of widespread and dangerous rumours. Pending further instructions, addressees will ensure that the subject of this conference is known to the smallest possible number of officers and other ranks.

Acknowledge on the form below.

*A G Wilson*  
(A G WILSON) Colonel  
GS 9 Aust Div



SUBJECT: CIVILIAN LABOUR EMPLOYED BY THE ARMY

*War Diary*

HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde  
A14/ 4120  
16 Aug 45

2/13 Aust Inf Bn  
2/15 Aust Inf Bn  
2/17 Aust Inf Bn  
2/3 Aust Fd Coy (for all engr unite)  
2/8 Aust Fd Amb ( for med units etc)  
2/118 Aust Bde Wksp (for all AEME units)

1. In order to determine correctly the cost which the AMF has to bear for employment of labour COs of units which have civilians employed will carefully re-examine the commitments to ensure that all such civilians are engaged for military purposes.
2. (a) Although all labour is actually hired by BBKAU, TS4s have to be signed for all employed by the army.  
(b) It is therefore important that the cost of labour really required for civil purposes is not borne by the AMF.
3. (a) For example while interpreters needed and regularly employed on full time duty for units may be a proper military charge, an interpreter employed to assist AMF personnel who are directing native labour on primarily civil work (e.g. oilfield restoration, civilian road maintenance etc) would not be a proper military charge.  
(b) Other examples are electricians and similar technicians who are employed by wksp and RAE. These are not necessarily a proper military charge. They may be so in special circumstances. But ordinarily the WE of the unit provides enough tradesmen to cope with its purely military work.
4. Units with civilian labour employed whether skilled or unskilled will therefore furnish a return shewing what duties each employee who was included in the last weeks schedule is actually performing and where.
5. It appears in some cases that civilians who were originally employed to meet a military need are being still charged to the army although their services are no longer required.
6. (a) Road maintenance is in most places now a civilian rather than a military charge except where it becomes necessary mainly for the benefit of the army.  
(b) Labour employed on the construction of new roads required for military purposes is properly an army charge.

*E. J. Miles*  
Capt  
S<sup>c</sup>20 Aust Inf Bde



SERVICE OF THANKSGIVING FOR VICTORY

SPORTS GROUND - K BELAIT - 0930HRS 19 AUG 45

ORDER OF SERVICE

1. National Anthem (sung by parade first verse only. Offrs will NOT salute.)
2. Prayer of Thanksgiving followed by Lord's Prayer in unison.
3. Psalm 103 (selected verses)
4. Address - Bde Comd
5. Prayer of Remembrance
6. Last Post and Reveille (~~Offrs salute, parade stands to attention~~)
7. Hymn No 3 - "All people that on ~~earth do dwell~~"
8. Benediction
9. March Past



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REPORT ON OP OBOE SIX

2/15 Aust Inf Bn  
30 Jul 45  
Ref:

PRELIMINARY

1. Towards the end of Apr 45 2/15 Aust Inf Bn left RAVENSHOE on the first stage of its journey to MOROTAI and eventually to BRUNEI BAY. The bn had been on the ATHERTON tableland for almost exactly a year, having disembarked after ops in NG early in Mar 44.
2. During the year major changes had occurred in the constitution of the unit, the most significant of which was the absorption of between 300 and 400 reinfts from the disbanded 62 Aust Inf Bn. These men - young, keen, well trained and all Queenslanders - proved ideal reinfts and were quickly assimilated.
3. Officer changes were many, - new offr's being taken on strength up to May 45. The bn in the period under reference lost two fd offr's (Maj's STRANGE and SUTHERS) and 17 others, in addition to those seconded to trg establishments.
4. Many new NCOs were also posted to the unit and the prospects of promotion for old soldiers became progressively more remote.
5. In these circumstances it was a new and to a large degree an untried bn that sailed in Apr 45. However the long trg period had enabled adm systems to be overhauled, new offr's and NCOs to be trained on TEWTs, and ~~for~~ all ranks to get to know the unit and each other. Esprit de corps was as high as it had been at any stage of the bn's history.

PLANNING

6. A bn planning team (CO, Adj't, IO, int cpl, clerk, batman) left AUSTRALIA a fortnight before the remainder of the unit and disembarked at MOROTAI on 20 Apr. Owing to the necessity of clearing camp sites and setting up a planning area planning did not begin until 25 Apr.
7. Between 25 Apr and 10 May planning on the bde and bn levels proceeded. It was a harassing and trying period for bn planning teams as well as for those above them. In this respect conditions differed markedly from those during the planning of the LAE ops. At MILNE BAY unit comds were in touch with the comds of APDs and other vessels that were to carry their tps from a fairly early stage and difficulties were surmounted as they were met. At MOROTAI owing to the semi-centralised nature of the planning bns had no access to naval reps and naval decisions that affected bn plans were made without reference to the units concerned. Moreover, these decisions were not always quickly communicated, which meant that a good many inf plans had to be unmade or amended, making for overwork and lost time.
8. Planning within the bn, by contrast, worked with the utmost smoothness. This planning did not begin until 14 May, when the bn had arrived in MOROTAI, and by that date practically all matters affecting the bn plan had been settled firmly, so that sub-units were spared the vicissitudes that inevitably occur at the beginning of a planning period.



- Planning by sub-units was practically complete a week later and the bn op order was issued on 22 May, having been dealt with in draft previously. Within the next few days plans were completed and issued by coys, pls, and secs and all tps had been thoroughly briefed with the aid of air photos, sand and plaster models, and tactical discussions.
10. Reps of 727 Amphibian Tractor Bn were present at COs and coy comds' conferences and every man in each tractor crew was briefed together with the inf who were to travel in his LVT. This constant and direct personal liaison was of the greatest value.

#### THE PLAN

11. The bn's task was to land on WHITE Bch, MUARA Is, and capture the island. The composition of the bn landing team is given at Appx A and the allotment to craft at Appx B.
12. Air photos and interpretation reports disclosed the existence of numerous diggings in the WHITE Bch-RED Bch area. It was appreciated that any resistance that might be met would be encountered in the triangular open area between WHITE Bch, RED Bch, and the Eastern edge of the thick rain forest that covers the centre of the island.

As time went on and more photos were obtained there seemed good reason to believe that these posns were not manned, but planning proceeded on the same basis in order to provide for the worst case.

13. It was decided to attack with two coys fwd, which were to carry out the first phase - the knocking out of posns on WHITE Bch and the capture of RED Bch. These coys were to be followed in Wave 2 by a tp of fd arty (landed to sp the ops of 2/17 Aust Inf Bn) and a third coy. The reserve coy and elements of HQ Coy not allotted to rifle coys were to constitute Wave 3. The landing diagram is shown at Appx C and the plan for action on landing at Appx D.
14. In addition to its main task the bn was to be ready to detach a force incl a coy with hy weapons and a tp of fd arty to move by LCM up the BRUNEI River and land to establish a gun position. It was considered unlikely that LCMs would be available for this op before D + 1. B Coy, the res coy in the initial landing, was designated for this task.

#### EMBARKATION AND APPROACH

15. Embarkation went smoothly except in the pre-embarkation area, where clear directions as to unit areas were lacking, insufficient space was available, and co-ordination and ~~see~~ control were not as good as elsewhere.
16. For the approach voyage the bn gp less its LOB dets was embarked in three LSTs. Conditions aboard these varied considerably, especially in regard to messing and water. Some vessels produced three meals a day, others only two. Some made plenty of water available, others restricted it. In all ships living conditions for tps were uncomfortable, most of the men being wet almost every night. The steel decks of LSTs have no scuppers and are awash after rain.

However all discomforts were endured with the utmost cheerfulness, as is invariably the case when soldiers believe that they are approaching an engagement.

#### LANDING

17. The arrangements for Z-Day worked without a hitch. All tps were in their LVTs on the tank decks of the LSTs in ample time and the tractors left the ships promptly when the signal to land the landing force was made. There appeared to be some delay in marshalling the waves and Wave 1 left the line of departure four minutes after the time ordered.



18. LVTs of the leading wave were unable to keep station and the landing was far from simultaneous. The tractors in succeeding waves were however aligned as though on a parade ground. As foreseen, the interval of 3 min between waves was not nearly sufficient to enable wave 1 to clear the beach before wave 2 arrived, and for a few minutes there was a congestion that would have been costly had the beach been defended.
19. There was some wild firing as craft approached the beach. Orders were that no weapons were to fire except the HMGs of the leading wave, which were not to open until within 300 yards of shore. The Australian and US personnel manning these weapons had been carefully briefed and were clear as to their tasks.

However some weapons in the right flank of Wave 2 fired and a member of 2/8 Aust Fd Regt was killed. An inspection of the tractors in wave 2 showed that their 50-cal and 30-cal weapons had full belts and no spent cases could be found. An investigation by the OC arty tp was ordered, the result of which was to be communicated to 2/8 Aust Fd Regt and is not known to this unit. However the impression was gained that there had been careless handling of the weapons of the tps embarked.

20. As the first wave approached the beach there appeared to be scattered fire from the shore, a burst of white tracer (which is not carried by LVTs) being seen. However the coy that landed on that flank reported that there was no opposition and no sign of enemy.

SUBSEQUENT OPS

21. The landing complete, coys reached their objectives for phase 1 as follows:

A Coy	-	1400 hrs
B Coy	-	1135 hrs
C Coy	-	0950 hrs
D Coy	-	0957 hrs

A coy was delayed by bad swamp approx one mile from the landing beach. This was eventually by passed by the use of LVTs.

22. At 1723 hrs A coy completed phase 2 and MUARA Is was declared clear of enemy with the reservation that small parties might possibly be hiding in the swamp inside the thick rain forest in the middle of the island, which there had not been time to search exhaustively. No resistance was encountered at any stage and the island showed no signs of any recent occupation.
23. On 11 Jun at 1215 hrs B coy, in accordance with proposed plan, was ordered to make a landing and establish a beach-head on the west bank of BRUNEI River (see Appx E). At 1510 hrs B coy landed unopposed. The beachhead was established and local patrols pushed out without making contact.
24. At 1400 hrs A coy left MUARA Island for YELLOW BEACH (BROOKETON) for employment on unloading stores from craft for BMA which was being established there.
25. 12 Jun was uneventful. B coy patrolled further up river towards BRUNEI town without making contact. Disposition of remainder of bn remained unchanged.
26. On 13 Jun at 1445 hrs 2/17 bn entered BRUNEI following which B coy was ordered into that area.



27. The occupation of BRUNEI completed the capture of 20 Bde first objective. With some preliminary alterations the following plan was adopted for subsequent operations.

2/13 Bn to come under comd HQ 9 Div for operations in LUTONG area.

2/15 Bn to attach two coys to 2/13 Bn for LUTONG operations.

Bn less two coys probable role -

- (i) Assft 2/17 Bn in adv along rd to TUTONG
- (ii) Detach a force to occupy LIMBANG.

Bn to establish a block on rd to LIMBANG via PANDAN

2/17 Bn to continue adv to TUTONG along main rd.

28. Consequently at 0715 hrs <sup>14 Jun</sup> Bn less A and B coys and 4 pl, which remained for security duties, embarked from MUARA Island for YELLOW Bch.
29. At 0900 hrs A Coy embarked from YELLOW Bch for BRUNEI area. On arrival there coy was disposed with Coy HQ and two pls on the PANDAN track and one pl under comd 2/17 Bn in BRUNEI town area. Bn HQ followed, arriving at 1900 hrs. B Coy had already moved into BRUNEI area following occupation by 2/17 Bn. C and D coys remained at YELLOW Bch under comd Bn 2 i/c to await further orders.
30. At 1130 hrs 15 Jun B coy, which was patrolling inland, "bagged" the first Jap for the bn in this campaign.
31. A Coy on the track to LIMBANG pushed on towards PANDAN with instructions to reach it as soon as possible. At 1550 hrs fwd pl was caught in a Jap ambush and sustained the first casualties for the campaign - two killed, one wounded. Enemy casualties one killed. Although not known at this time A Coy was making contact with the rear elements of the bulk of the Jap forces from BRUNEI, which included a complete bn, 367 11B, who evacuated by this route and eventually reached the TRUSAN River.
32. At this stage 200 Japs were reported in LIMBANG and 2/15 Bn was ordered to capture this area. The initial plan to accomplish this involved dispatch of one pl to TERUMI to hold that posn while remainder of Bn Gp moved by tr through PANDAN. However the state of this tr was declared bad and it appeared even at this stage that the job would have to be done by water.
33. Late on night of 15/16 Jun report was received that guerillas had captured UKONG where it was anticipated fleeing Japs were heading and that 400/500 Japs armed with rifles and LMGs were now in the LIMBANG area. 2/15 Bn was ordered to exploit down the rd to LIMBANG and clear the enemy as far as possible.
34. To effect this on Jun 16 A Coy continued adv down tr to PANDAN. Some enemy were sighted, engaged with arty and SA fire and withdrew. B Coy moved into area from BRUNEI to patrol to East. Two tanks were also moved over during the afternoon but cut up the tracks badly and generally, on that account, were of little value.
35. At 0900 hrs a pl was despatched to TERUMI as planned, arrived at 1110 hrs on 17 Jun and established posns on TERUMI feature. No opposition was encountered and patrols were sent out towards LIMBANG. Reports of enemy but no contact.



36. At 0900 hrs on 18 Jun A Coy patrols reached PANDAN and declared it clear of enemy, also reported that tr in that area was impassable swamp.
37. As it would therefore be impossible to maintain a force moving to LIMBANG by this route it was decided to implement the original plan and at 1200 hrs B Coy left by LCM to occupy LIMBANG. At 1740 hrs a patrol from pl at TERUMI reached LIMBANG without making contact and at 1915 hrs B Coy landed and occupied wharves area unopposed.
38. The following day 19 Jun pl from TERUMI moved by LCM to LIMBANG to be followed at 1800 hrs by Bn HQ to hoist the British flag after almost four years of Jap occupation. A few sick Japs abandoned by the main body were found, others were killed by the natives but no large bodies of Japs were encountered in the area. During the day B Coy patrolled South along tracks from LIMBANG but made no contact.
39. At 0730 hrs on 19 Jun A det embarked with 2/13 Bn for LUTONG operation. Their role was purely support. In the event of their being required to land they were to take over the beach-head from 2/13 bn otherwise they would remain water-borne and be returned immediately released, to BRUNEI. The latter course eventuated.
40. On 20 Jun local patrolling continued in the LIMBANG area and a river patrol was sent out to UKONG to investigate a report received by Chinese messenger of Australian PW being in that area, which on investigation proved to have no foundation.
- Reports continued to come in from native sources of Jap mov in large bodies on what later proved to be the evacuation route South from MENGATAI through KUBONG, but no contact was made by our patrols to the south.
41. On 21 Jun a patrol along tr North from LIMBANG made contact with a party of 5 Japs, killing two. At 1230 hrs A Coy was lifted by LCM from PANDAN to take up defensive posn to the North of LIMBANG while B Coy was disposed astride the track running South.
42. Having gained the immediate objective it was decided to establish Bn in this area and patrol from it as a base. Patrol boundaries were LAWAS River from mouth to LAWAS, LIMBANG River to UKONG all incl. Patrolling was begun on 22 Jun when patrols were sent to PANDARUAN River to reach KUBONG, thence return and patrol along tr through BANGAR to BATU APOI, to MENGATAI and along track East of the TERUMI feature.
43. At 1230 hrs on 22 Jun A det arrived at BRUNEI having taken no active part in the LUTONG operation, to relieve det of 2/17 bn and become responsible for protection and local patrolling in the area.
44. Patrols to MENGATAI and KUBONG confirmed the fact that a large body of Japs had evacuated from BRUNEI along the route which ran through MENGATAI and KUBONG (See Appx E). Reports, subsequently confirmed, revealed that patrol to KUBONG had missed them by one day.
45. At 1615 hrs on 25 Jun coy patrol was sent out to bn Eastern boundary (LAWAS). This patrol reached a point 5 miles along tr to TRUSAN from LAWAS, and examined LABU and BATU APOI on return, obtained further evidence of mov of large body of Japs to TRUSAN River but saw no sign of enemy.
46. At this stage it was becoming clear that the enemy had evacuated from BRUNEI generally in three bodies. One party, whose mov has already been mentioned, evacuated by way of MENGATAI, KUBONG, ANGGUN, SELEPAN River, to TRUSAN River. This route was established quite conclusively by our patrols to ABOT (5 Jul) KUBONG (23 Jun-9 Jul) BIANG-ANGGUN (3 Jul) SELEPAN River (21,22 Jul). Contact was lost with this force in the PANDAN area. With the exception of a few sick it is considered this force were all clear of the PANDARUAN River by 23 Jun and eventually reached the TRUSAN area comparatively intact.



47. The other/<sup>two</sup> enemy parties comprised 366 IIB who, with a few miscellaneous personnel, were left to fight what rear guard action there was in BRUNEI area.

One party comprised 3 Coy 366 IIB which withdrew from BROOKETON to JERUDONG hills, thence South through SENKURONG along the line of the TUTONG Rd to approx area of KIUDANG before being diverted East to the LIMBANG River.

366 IIB less 3 coy left BRUNEI across the BRUNEI River to BERAMBANG, LIMPAKU, RANGAU thence into LIMBANG area.

It was with the annihilation of these two bodies that future patrols by 2/15 Bn were concerned. Meanwhile A Det patrols mopped up stragglers in the BRUNEI area.

48. First contact with 3 coy was made by patrol from 58 Bty 2/8 Fd Regt, which was under comd A det ~~comd~~ for patrol work in the area South of SENKURONG. An engagement took place as a result of which own casualties were one killed, two wounded, one of whom later died of wounds - enemy one killed. 2/15 Bn patrol came to assistance of this patrol but except for sniper enemy had withdrawn. The mov of this body was traced to TERABANG area where they were engaged by arty with 2/15 bn patrol 2 Jul, then to KIUDANG where they were sought unsuccessfully by D coy patrol on 5 Jul. From here they withdrew to LIMBANG river where they were identified on 12 Jul thus coming into territory operated by guerilla forces who from numbers subsequently claimed have accounted for this force.
49. On 5 Jul it was decided to move D Coy into the ABANG Rd junc area which up to this time had served as a patrol base for one of D coy pls. From this area after 5 Jul D coy patrols reached as far South as RAMBAI on TUTONG River but no contact with enemy was made.

Following move of D coy, C coy took over area vacated by D coy in BRUNEI area.

50. First move to make contact with enemy party reported moving East to RANGAU was made by a D coy patrol on 23 Jul to BERAMBANG Island who killed two Japs and established the fact that the main body had already moved on to LIMPAKU.
51. Acting on a report received from a Jap officer, who left this force on LIMPAKU, and surrendered to our tps at LIMBANG, that the majority of the force there would surrender if given the opportunity a patrol in LCM was ordered to LIMPAKU on 29 Jun. Two PW who had previously been put on to island to organise this surrender were taken off again by patrol. They reported that remainder of force had evacuated.

On 3 Jul following a further report that there were still Japs on LIMPAKU, C coy landed on the island and accounted for 20 Japs counted dead before returning the following day.

52. Those who had escaped from LIMPAKU were reported on 1 Jul to have crossed the RANGAU River headed South towards LIMBANG. Our patrols to investigate this report found sufficient evidence to confirm this mov. For the next week small parties of Japs ranging in number from one to five were contacted and killed by our patrols. No contact with any large party was made till 7 Jul when a patrol from A coy took by surprise a party of approx 40 enemy in a swamp on the west bank of the PANDARUAN River East of LIMBANG. A total of 29 enemy dead were ultimately counted as a result of this encounter. A party of 8/11 escaped South along tr towards KUBONG, thought to have included Maj SATO 366 IIB comd. Although no definite evidence could be produced there was sufficient to assume that this party ultimately were killed by guerilla forces or natives in the BERAWAN area.



53. This completed the annihilation of 366 IIB none of whom it is considered crossed the PANDARUAN River. Patrolling continued, mopping up any stragglers left in the BRUNEI and LIMBANG areas. Natives and guerilla forces accounted for others.

54. Total enemy casualties reported by 2/15 Bn to 29 Jul 45:-

Confirmed killed	-	116
Unconfirmed killed		45
PWs		31
Wounded		12

(These totals include casualties caused by natives and confirmed)/

Total own casualties to 29 Jul 45:-

Killed	-	2
Wounded	-	3

55. Commencing on 16 Jul disposition of Bn was re-organised. A coy remained in LIMBANG area where they were joined by D coy from ABANG Rd junc. B coy moved to LAWAS. C coy remained BRUNEI to be responsible for security of that area and all patrolling.

#### CO-OPERATION WITH OTHER SERVICES AND ARMS

56. As stated in para 10, relations with the amphtrac bn were excellent and the fullest degree of mutual understanding was achieved.

57. Some troubles of a minor character were experienced aboard the LSTs. In one ship signals affecting tps embarked were not passed to OC tps and it was difficult to obtain decisions from the ship's captain and executive offr. This was particularly so in regard to the arrangements for rehearsal in MOROTAI harbour. However there was great willingness to assist and relations were cordial.

58. The necessity for co-operation with own or allied air forces scarcely arose during the ops. An ALP att to the bn did valuable work in supplementing wireless comms.

59. Co-operation among all arms of the AIF was as usual excellent.

#### EQUIPMENT

60. In general the eqpt available for the landing was adequate and satisfactory. An inf bn however requires more L-phones than the present WET allotment of 12. At least 20 are needed. Extra L - phones were asked for at MOROTAI but were unavailable. As in previous campaigns the enemy helped to make good the deficiency by allowing a number of his telephones to be captured.

61. The most serious shortage of any type of eqpt was the lack of water craft, which became noticeable as ops proceeded. By the middle of Jul this unit controlled approx 200 miles of waterways and had dets stationed as far apart as BRUNEI, LIMBANG, and LAWAS. L&Ms were at times insufficient for supply and patrol work and none were available for other adm work or for commanders. Wksp and RAE personnel were fully engaged in other duties and were not available to put salvage craft into commission.



LESSONS

Tactics

62. No new tactical lessons arose from the ops. The only new development was the use of LCMs for the carriage of patrols, and these were not used tactically but were regarded merely as vehs to take tps to the areas to be patrolled.

Comns

63. The lesson of the importance of comns, already well learned in previous campaigns, was again patent. Wireless comn at night was exceptionally difficult and where water obstacles delayed or prevented line laying the bn was on many occasions out of touch with Bde HQ and its own sub-units during the hrs of darkness. Line is the only thoroughly reliable means of intercomn and line MUST be laid as early as possible in spite of any difficulties.

Planning

64. Planning on the unit level would be more efficiently carried out if there were liaison from the beginning between offrs of all services on all grades, so that each could gain a knowledge of the others' methods and requirements before decisions were reached. Planning in "watertight compartments" for a combined op is unsatisfactory.

Embarkation

65. Experience at the Div Embarkation Area indicated that if only an ad hoc organisation is available to staff this area the most careful briefing and control is required, and it is suggested that this area should be supervised by an adm SO of the Div staff.

Adm

66. A number of new adm problems were created by the unusual dispersion of tps over a wide area served by water-borne instead of land comns. ~~Civil-affairs-and-ether~~ Special problems arose in regard to civil affairs and relations with the native population. Most of these were overcome, some by improvisation. One clear lesson however was that written orders from a distant HQ are not an adequate substitute for visits by SOs of senior fmns, particularly those of "A" and "Q" Branches. In this regard the teaching of FSR Vol 1 is still sound.

*C. H. Mace* Lt-Col.  
Comd 2/15 Aust Inf Bn.

1 Aug 45



Appx "A"  
2/15 Aust Inf Bn  
Report on Operations  
OBOE SIX

Following extract from 2/15 Aust Inf Bn op order 1

For the assault landing 2/15 Aust Inf Bn Gp is constituted as follows :-

ARTY

15 Fd Bty 2/8 Aust Fd Regt ( after landing  
is in support of 2/17 Aust Inf Bn Gp)  
One SFCP.

ENGRS

det 2/3 Aust Fd Coy  
det 2/1 Aust Mech Sqd Coy.

SIGS

det 20 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec .

INF

2/15 Aust Inf Bn

INT

det B Aust FS Sec.  
det 34 Aust FS Sec (EE)

S&T

det 2/27 Aust Sup Depot Pl.

MED

One coy 2/8 Aust Fd Amb.

BEACH GP

det RAN Cdo  
det 3 Aust Bch Sig Sec.

MISC

Air Liaison Party  
det 9 Aust Pro Coy  
det H. 20 Aust Inf Bde  
det 9 Aust Div Sal Unit  
one coy 727 Amp Trac Bn (for aslt ldg).  
det BBCAU  
det Directorate Public Relations



2/15 AUST INF BN LANDING CRAFT TABLE  
Att as Appx "A" to 2/15 Aust Inf Bn 00 1.

TOP SECRET

SHEET NO 1

Ldg Craft Ser No.	LANDING CRAFT		PERSONNEL		LOADING		LANDING		REMARKS
	NO.	TYPE.	SUB-UNIT	Marchi -ing	On Vehs.	Guns	Vehs	Stores Beach Time	
1	11	LVT	D Coy	17 Pl less one sec SB	1-26 -1 <u>1-27</u>			Res amn WHITE JIG Hr " water 28 FOR's	
2	12	LVT	D Coy	one sec 17 Pl Pl HQ 18 Pl one sec 18 Pl Int sec (ROSS) SB	8 1-5 10 1 <u>1</u> <u>1-25</u>			Res amn " water 26 FOR's	
3	13	LVT	D Coy Coy HQ	one sec 18 Pl SB Sigs Int sec 3 Pl	9 1- 3 1 2 1 <u>8</u> <u>1-24</u>			1x3" mor Res amn Res water 25 FOR's Stretcher Flame thrower Sig gear	
4	14	LVT	HQ Coy	one sec 4 Pl Coy HQ RAE 2/3 Aust Fd Coy	10 <u>3</u> <u>13</u>	1x2 pdr Tk A		72 rds 2 Pdr, two PITS's Engr Recce Party 18 rds PITA amn 13 FOR's 6x2 gal tins	
5	15	LVT	D Coy	one sec 16 Pl one sec 18 Pl Coy HQ Sigs	9 10 1- 4 2 <u>1-25</u>			Res amn " water 26 FOR's Stretcher Two flame throwers Sig gear	



2/15 AUSTRALIAN INF BN LANDING CRAFT TABLE (contd)

TOP SECRET

SHEET NO 2

Ldg Craft Ser No	LANDING CRAFT		PERSONNEL		LOADING			LANDING		REMARKS
	NO	TYPE	SUB UNIT	March- ing	On Vehs	Guns	Vehs	Stores	Beach Time	
6	16	LVT	D Coy 16 Pl less one sec SB	1-26 <u>1</u> 1-27				Res amn " water 28 FOR's	WHITE JIG hr	
7	17	LVT	C Coy 18 Pl less one sec SB	1-26 <u>1</u> 1-27				Res amn Res water 28 FOR's		
8	18	LVT	HQ Coy 4 Pl less one sec 2/8 Aust Fd Regt	1-12 <u>3</u> 1-15			1x2 pdr TR A	2x2 rds Two PITA's 18 Rds PITA amn Res amn " water 16 FOR's		Recce Party
9	19	LVT	C Coy 14 Pl less one sec SB	1-26 <u>1</u> 1-27				Res amn " water 28 FOR's Flame thrower		
10	110	LVT	C Coy one sec 13 Pl Coy HQ Sigs Int sec Det 3 Pl	10 1-3 3 1 <u>8</u> 1-25				1x3" mor 48 rds 3" mor amn Flame thrower Sig gear Res water Stretcher		
11	111	LVT	C Coy one sec 15 Pl one sec 14 Pl Coy HQ Sigs SB Det 2/8 Aust Fd Coy	8 9 4 2 1 3 <u>27</u>				Res amn " water Flame thrower stretcher 28 FOR's		



E/15 AUST INF BN LANDING CRAFT TABLE (contd)

TOP SECRET

SHEET NO 2

Lug Craft Ser No	LANDING CRAFT		PERSONNEL	LOADING				LANDING			
	NO	TYPE	SUB UNIT	March- ing	On vehs	Guns	Vehs	Stores	Beach	Time	REMARKS
12	112	LVT	C Coy 15 Pl less one sec SB	1-26 <u>1</u> 1-27				Res amn " water Flame thrower stretcher 25 FOR's	WHITE	JIG plus 5 min	
13	21	LVT	A Coy 8 Pl less one sec	1-27				Res amn " water 28 FOR's			
14	22	LVT	A Coy one sec 7 Pl one sec 9 Pl Coy HQ Sigs SB	8 8 5 8 <u>2</u> 26				Res amn " water 26 FOR's Sig gear Stretcher			
15	23	LVT	A Coy 9 Pl less one sec	1-27				Res amn " water 28 FOR's			
16	24	LVT	A Coy one sec 8 Pl Coy HQ Int sec Sigs SB Det 3 Pl 2/8 Aust Fd Regt	9 1- 2 1 2 2 7 <u>1- 2</u> 1-25				1x3" mor 48 rds 3" mor, sig gear, Res water Stretcher 27 FOR's		FOO and party	
17	25	LVT	A Coy 8 Pl less one sec	1-27				Res amn " water 28 FOR's			
18	26	LVT	HQ Coy 3 Pl less two secs RAP sgt (AAMC) SB	1-25 1 <u>1</u> 1-25				1x3" mor 7 1/2 rds 3" mor amn reswater sig gear 26 FOR's			
	27	LVT's	2/8 Aust Fd Regt one tp	44		4x25 par					
19			15 Bty								
to 20	to 213										



## 2/15 AUST INF BN LANDING CRAFT TABLE ( contd )

TOP SECRET

SHEET NO 4

Ldg Craft Ser No	LANDING CRAFT		PERSONNEL		LOAD			LANDING			
	NO	TYPE	Sub units	March- ing	On vehs	Guns	Vehs	Stores	Beach	Time	REMARKS
26	31	LVT	HQ Coy 5 Pl RAN Cdo Navy Sigs	1-17 1- 5 4				Res amn " water 28 FOR'S 2x610 sets Bch marks	WHITE	NOT before JIG + 10	
27	32	LVT	HQ Coy 2 Pl QM batman and Q clerk RSM and batman (Bn HQ) RP Bn sigs Det 2/3 Aust Fd Coy	12 1- 2 2 1 2 1-6				Two MMG's 4000 rds stripless 27 FOR's Res water Spear point pump canvas tank			
28	33	LVT	HQ Coy 2 Pl 5 Pl	1-15 12 1-27				two MMG's 4000 rds stripless 28 FOR's res water			
29	34	LVT	B Coy 12 Pl less one sec SB	1-26 1 1-27				Res amn " res water 28 FOR's Stretcher			
30	35	LVT	One sec 12 Pl Coy HQ Int sec Sigs 20 Bde LO and batman BBCAU and batman FS Sec Bn sigs	8 1- 5 1 2 1-1 1- 1 1 4 3-24				Res amn " water 27 FOR's sig gear			
31	36	LVT	B Coy 10 Pl less one sec SB Bn sigs	1-24 1 2 1-27				Res amn " water 28 FOR's			



2/15 AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BATTAL LANDING CRAFT TABLE ( contd )

TOP SECRET

SHEET NO 5

Ldg Craft Serial No	LANDING CRAFT		PERSONNEL		March- ing	On vehs	LOAD		LANDING		REMARKS
	No	Type	Sub unit				Guns	Vehs	Stores	Beach	
32	37	LVT	B Coy	One sec 10 Pl One sec 11 Pl Coy HQ Int (Bn HQ) PB EE Sec	12 10 2 1 1 18				Res amn " water 27 FOR's	WHITE	NOT be- fore JIG + 10
33	38	LVT	B Coy	11 Pl less one sec SB	1-26 1-1 1-27				Res amn " water 28 FOR's		
34	39	LVT	2/8 Fd Amb	20 Aust Inf Bde Sig sec Bn sigs	12 3		1 jeep		Sig gear tent fly 8 stretchers		
35	Free Boat 1	LVT	Bn Cmd and batman Adjut and batman Int sec RP's LMG No SB's Bn sigs Bch sigs 20 Bde Sig sec 2/8 Aust Fd Regt BC Party Air Support Party	1-1 1-1 2 3 1 2 1-3 3 1 1-3 3 4-23					1x22 set 1x108 set 1x46 set 1x300 set		
36	Free Boat 2	LVT	Bn 21/c and batman RMO and batman IO and batman Int sec RP's SB's Bn Sigs Bch Sigs SFCP Det 2/c Aust Fd Amb	1-1 1-1 1-1 2 2 2 4 1 1-7 1-1					1x108 set 1x46 set 1xTBX set		



2/15 AUST INF BN LANDING CRAFT TABLE ( contd )

TOP SECRET

SHEET NO 6

Ldg Craft Ser No	LANDING CRAFT		PERSONNEL		LOAD			LANDING			
	NO	TYPE	Sub unit	March- ing	On vchs	Guns	Vchs	Stores	Beach	Time	REMARKS
		LCI 701	2/8 Aust Fd Rgt 2/8 Aust Fd Amb 1 Aust Bch Gp	8-78 2-45 7 8-128					RED	On call	
		LSM 188	2/8 Aust Fd Regt 2/84 Aust LAD 2/8 Aust Fd Coy 2/1 Aust ME Coy 2/8 Aust Fd Amb	17 2 2 2 2 19	2-18 3 4 2 2-267				Do	Do	
		LSM 203	2/8 Aust Fd Coy 2/1 Aust ME Coy 20 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec 2/15 Aust Inf Bn 2/16 Aust Gen Tpt Pl	7	14 2 3 1-22 2		12 jeeps 11 trlrs	16 tons unit	Do	Do	
		LST 667	2/15 Aust Inf Bn 2/8 Aust Fd Coy	1	13 4 17			3 tons packs	Do	Ferry Service	
		LST 584	2/15 Aust Inf Bn		23			3 tons packs	Do	Do	
		LST 751	2/15 Aust Inf Bn		29			4 tons packs	Do	Do	




LANDING DIAGRAM OBOE SIX

ISSUED AS APPX "B" TO 2/15 AUST INF BN 001.


WAVE	TIME	COMPOSITION	CRAFT	UNIT
		<p>RED BEACH</p> <p>BOWEN</p> <p>WHITE BEACH</p> <p>ANVIL</p> <p>1100 yds</p>		
1	JIG HOUR	<p>11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 110 111 112</p> <p>D Coy C Coy</p> <p>CRAFT EVENLY DISTRIBUTED ALONG BEACH FRONT</p>	12 LVT ex LST 1	2/15 AIB
2	JIG + 5	<p>21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 310 211 212 213</p> <p>A Coy Tp 15 Bty 2/8 Aust Fd Regt</p> <p>CRAFT EVENLY DISTRIBUTED ALONG BEACH FRONT</p>	13 LVT ex LST 2	2/15 AIB 2/8 Aust Fd Regt
3	NOT BEFORE JIG + 10	<p>FREE BOATS</p> <p>1 2</p> <p>Comd Group</p> <p>B Coy - Det HQ Coy Comd jeep</p> <p>INTERVALS BETWEEN CRAFT AS FOR WAVES 1 AND 2</p>	11 LVT ex LST 3	2/13 AIB 2/8 Aust Fd Regt
4	ON CALL	<p><u>TO LAND ON RED BEACH</u></p> <p>LSM 1 LSM 2 ICI 1</p> <p>Nos 168 203 701</p>	2 LSM 1 LCI	2/15 AIB Jeeps stores 2/8 Fd Regt 4 guns 2/8 Fd Amb
5	ON CALL	<p>LST 1 LST 2 LST 3</p> <p>12 LVT 13 LVT 11 LVT</p> <p>LST 1 - No 667 LST 2 - No 584 LST 3 - No 751</p>		



APPX 'D' TO 2/15 AUST INF BN  
REPORT ON OPERATIONS  
OBOE SIX







LEGEND

- 1 A COY
- 2 B COY
- 3 C COY
- 4 D COY
- 5 ENEMY ESCAPE ROUTES
- 6 FIRST LONG RANGE PATROLS



2/17 AUST INF BN REPORT ON OPS OBOE SIXPART 1 - LESSONS FROM OPSPLANNING

1. From unit viewpoint a more flexible and less centralised planning method would have been helpful. Outline plans submitted on outline instructions assumed such rigidity that adjustments necessary for a sound final plan could only be made, if at all, after considerable delay. As a result on final orders being settled the Bn had to be committed on a plan which was not considered the best practicable.
2. No scope existed for liaison between unit comd and the comds of craft and control of craft during the planning stage, and no discretion as to adjusting details of landing. As a consequence it was found that craft comds had little knowledge of the plan. It is felt that some liaison with comds control craft might have avoided the anomaly of the force being landed 1000 yards EAST of correct location when it was evident to section comds an error was being made. This mistake would have cost the unit dearly had the enemy opposed the landing from the high ground.

ORDERS, BRIEFING AND REHEARSAL

3. Detachment of planning team proved helpful and enabled the op to be more effectively stage managed within the unit. This being done by the withholding of the plan till stability had been reached and a clear presentation could be made.
4. Usual aids to putting all ranks in the picture were employed, viz, sand tables, maps, photos, plaster models, lectures. This continued on LSI. All ranks were obliged to view vertical photos through universal stereoscope.
5. A hastily arranged rehearsal of the landward aspect proved of considerable value.

EMBARKATION, SEAWARD REHEARSALS AND ASSAULT LANDING

6. Embarkation of tps was satisfactory. It was found impracticable to embark tps in full marching order by scrambling nets and arrangements were made to have packs lifted in slings. The usual difficulties in embarking small attachments, public relations gps etc, were met.
7. Loading of stores was unsatisfactory. Slotting area was too congested. Craft comds ignored written instructions as to correct hold and sequence to be used in loading ship. This rendered nugatory dispatching of stores in correct sequence from shore and entailed considerable difficulties in reloading subsequently. Accordingly larger loading staff is required to supervise stores from shore to ship.
8. Craft loading and seaward rehearsals proved of great value but prescribed number of rehearsals of move to net stations during voyage exceeded that considered by OC ship and OC tps to be required for complete efficiency.
9. Maximum efforts were made to keep tps hardened during voyage. Full weight eqpt was worn for at least one hour on all days. Boots were worn at all times. LSI deck space was most useful.
10. News of preliminary moves in relation to the landing was received by all ranks with interest and appreciation.
11. Disembarkation to craft went smoothly and ahead of time schedule. Heavy stores were preloaded. Thirty-two (32) personnel to each craft did not prove excessive.



12. It is recommended that there be no absolute directions that tps keep down during approach to shore. When standing:
- (a) physically less cramped and more air anti sea sickness
  - (b) psychologically less disturbing
  - (c) appeases natural curiosity and proper interest in effects of bombardment, mov of other craft, nature of the shore incl recognition of objectives, and distance from beach.
  - (d) no special safety advantage (tps can crouch in event of fire) except during very last stages before beaching when tps should be down and braced to take jolt.
13. No water gap was encountered so arrangements for flotation of heavy weapons and eqpt proved superfluous, but in no way embarrassing. Adoption of these arrangements to meet a water gap as a matter of routine is worth consideration. Quasre re 75 mm guns owing to time taken unpacking.
14. The possibility of being landed incorrectly was scarcely contemplated during planning in view of the obvious land marks, though allowance was made for possible enemy action. Flexibility of plan incl adm and intercomm arrangements, with subordinate comds clear on intention and objectives are requirements. Difficulties were experienced as a result of very great increase in requirement of sig cable and a break in communications ensued. Coys proceeded to maintain the object and used orderly to phone-head.
15. One coy moving to secure BROOKETON attempted a too rigid adherence to the initial coy plan. As a result it failed to exploit the early success in reaching the northern limit of YELLOW BEACH delaying the completion of its task considerably.
16. Quick exploitation by another coy in the FOO CHOW area enabled killing of Japs attempting escape.

#### ADVANCE TO BRUNEI

17. Conventional adv guard principles were applied. Previous trg proved of special worth.
18. Following factors assisted in maintaining momentum:
- (a) preplanning action at certain localities.
  - (b) constant relieving fwd elements of flanking responsibilities by det parties from main guard or main body to search trs and wider approaches from flanks.
  - (c) restricting searching to flank to that necessary to ensure safe passage of main body. Parties moving on L of C having to watch their own security.
  - (d) making full use of infm from natives as to enemy mov.
  - (e) ferrying with tps to carry heavy weapons also eqpt of adv guard above drill order.
19. D plus 1 day was extremely hot and still and many tps suffered from heat exhaustion, especially those more heavily loaded. The burden of the preceding six (6) weeks practically all spent at sea or in transit without hard marching was felt. Strict march and water discipline were necessary. To quote the report of one coy comd, "It is doubtful whether this extract from FSR II referring to march discipline 'the longer and more trying the march and the worse the conditions the more strictly must be enforced' has had great implications in the Bn's history."
20. In contact with the enemy good fieldcraft, maintenance of pressure, and instinctive firing by individuals proved effective. Value of jungle courses and trg of soldier to act quickly was proved. On several occasions



Japs encountered actually aiming at an individual were shot by him before they could fire.

21. Normal defensive positions were established by night. The value of normal locality as distinct from perimeter style defense was again indicated when an enemy party attacking the rear coy at BRUNEI airstrip were annihilated, efforts to avoid one post placing them in the fire of others. Strict fire discipline by night was maintained and foiled some enemy attempts to locate our positions.

22. Patrolling introduced no new factors. Practically none was done by night though frequently at first light to clear ground in anticipation of further adv. By day, especially after capture of BRUNEI, large number of pl patrols with FOO or mortar MFC with sig line were dispatched.

#### ADV BRUNEI - SERIA

23. An attempt was made to increase mobility and regain contact with enemy. All available tpt was used, jeeps being sandbagged for fwd elements. System generally was for adv guard coy to move to a major bound (approx 4 - 6 miles) pause, search and secure, and tpt move back to lift fwd second coy. Fwd coy then re-embussed and resumed adv. Arty bty moves normal though generally establishing gun posns in rear coy locality by night. ~~Details of order of march, method of move and lessons brought out are contained in extracts from coy comd's reports appx "A".~~ <sup>as follows.</sup> Fwd jeeps moved by bounds similar to the recognised method with carriers along a road with one jeep covering the fwd jeep to the next viewpoint. Where the ground warranted closer investigation scouts in fwd jeeps dismounted then called the jeep fwd when the ground was clear. This was necessary where road blocks incited suspicion. However on long stretches of flat road it was possible to move at a good speed, the pl comd using his tactical knowledge and knowledge of enemy methods in determining where reasonable risks could be taken. The main body moved continuously, halts controlled by Coy Comd, who was in turn moving from viewpoint to viewpoint behind the point pl. An interval of 100 yards was maintained by vehs.

24. Although the approach to this type of operation was not tested by enemy action definite lessons were apparent. It is necessary to strike a balance between the requirements of speed and security. It should be noted that the speed of mov was made possible by the availability of reliable infm from the native population. It is desirable therefore that an interpreter move with adv guard pl.

25. A detailed study of maps and air photographs is essential prior to mov to determine likely enemy posns by as many people as possible, in particular the scout gp of the adv guard pl. It follows that tps should be trained in Map Reading at speed. Tps in leading vehs must be detailed to specific tasks of observation. The scout gp should use a pair of binoculars in addition to the pl comd on the sp jeep.

26. Mov of scout veh between observation points to be at a maximum thus allowing time for observation with glasses whilst the sp veh moves up to cover further adv. IMGs on sandbagged jeeps must be mounted firmly, but not fixed. Weapons in all vehs must be readily available to counter ambush.

27. There is a necessity for all tps to be conversant with a drill for dismounting to engage the enemy. Pl Sjt of adv guard pl continually studies the terrain to appreciate routes for mov fwd of res secs if required.

28. MT drivers should be trained in selecting best cover for vehs when approaching observation point.

29. Need for close liaison with arty to ensure continual arty sp without delaying column.

30. A tpt NCO and RP would be valuable additions to the force for co-ordination of tpt mov. A TCP must be established to control veh dispersion when tps are deployed in a defensive locality.



31. If the road is narrow and a system of ferrying fwd tps is necessary due to shortage of tpt, the requirement of a veh circuit will influence selection of bounds.
32. Mortar MFC is required to be well fwd in the order of march adjacent to coy cmd, continually selecting mortar posns along the route thus shortening the period required to give quick sp. The MMG NCO should ride on the MMG jeep so that he can move fwd without delay if required.
33. Walkie-talkies should be distributed evenly in the column to keep constant communication by relay along its entire length. Bicycle communication provides a satisfactory alternate means particularly if the road is narrow.
34. O Gp personnel not adjacent to coy cmd should be close to a Walkie-talkie. It will be noted in the order of march the second pl cmd and MFC ride in a veh next to the coy cmd whilst the rear pl cmd remains with his pl at the tail of the column. This was considered necessary due to its length and the possibility of action by by-passed enemy.
35. If frequent reports are required by the higher cmd and the LOS set is out of range as it mostly was, it would be necessary for the line jeep to move further fwd in the order of march. This was satisfactory on the first day of the adv when the rate of the adv did not cause delay in the main body due to a line jeep in the centre of the column. For this reason it moved at the rear of the column on the second day. The line should continue fwd at halts for use by coy cmd, if required, reverting to the tail of the column when it moves off. The line party can keep up if the line is not poled. This is unsatisfactory as the amount of traffic causes breaks. Additional sigs are required for poling at the earliest.
36. River obstacle at TUFONG prevented further trial of this experiment. An adv of over 20 miles was achieved in one day.
37. After capture of SERIA operations were mostly long range patrols and up river mov which were subject of separate report.

#### CO-OPERATION

38. LSI KANINBLA good. Being EMAS ship liaison was easier.
39. RSB co-operation not up to standards previously obtained.
40. Naval bombardment: SFCP was of great value and did effective shoots mainly provided harassing tasks. Clear proof of accuracy of fire, casualties and damage inflicted. Doubtless hastened any withdrawal. Co-operation excellent.
41. Air: Most successful when fwd elements could contact aircraft direct through ASP attached. Appear to be great limitation in ability of aircraft to identify targets. The practice of regarding any building in the area as the target required to be hit is wrong. When directed on target area sp was of great value.
42. RAA: Provided all sp requested and preferred useful suggestions. Changes in arty LO att should be as few as possible. Imperative that orders or instructions be handed over fully.
43. RAB: Most satisfactory sp and co-operation in all regards.

#### EQUIPMENT

44. Unit eqpt generally satisfactory. Usual difficulties over shortage of tpt, both MT and water craft (incl outboard motors). Considerable *improvement* from local sources and captured vehs helped. Jungle carts have been most useful in the LABI area.
45. Cooking eqpt on a reduced scale was used at a reduced B Keh during the op. Hot dinner and breakfast were provided throughout the adv from evening D plus 1. Hot boxes, Fowler stoves and hydro burners used extensively.



46. Signals eqpt:

(a) Wireless:

- (i) SCR 536. A great many required replacement. New sets worked very well and are a constant requirement.
- (ii) 108 Set: Over ranges prevailing in the adv these sets proved inadequate though effective when working to a 22 set.
- (iii) 22 sets: Owing to extreme distances between coys in out-post posns sets of this strength are required. It is not a satisfactory system to operate to coy outstations through Bde Sig centre.

(b) Line and great distances covered created a supply difficulty. Old civilian lines were used to maximum. 60 miles of wired combat ~~SD~~ 3 cable now extend from Bn HQ to fwd coys at LABI and MARUDI. Freddy phones provide satisfactory ~~res~~tion but require to be kept clear of other lines on account of terrific induction. *Establishment* ~~Employing~~ of ~~the~~ phones for use within Bn was again proved inadequate. Owing to dispersal many phones were required by pl out-posts. Arty switches would have been most useful for lines fwd of coy HQ.

ENEMY EQUIPMENT

47. Enemy were not well equipped even in small arms. Some tps lacked firearms of any sort. A good deal of trg eqpt, wooden rifles and bayonet training dummies, body padding etc were seen.

ENEMY METHODS


- 48. Subject of attempted and successful demolitions is left to RAE report.
- 49. Generally enemy showed extraordinary lack of initiative.

GENERAL

50. Throughout the whole operation the unit strove to apply the generally accepted principles and methods studied and practiced so fully during trg. In all cases they proved worthy of the confidence placed in them. Many incidents created in trg found their counterparts during the adv. Though some speed in adv was obtained it was not at expense of good scouting and local security.

51. Distances which sub-units are detached and the precarious nature of communications have necessitated the placing of considerable responsibility on subordinate comds. In general they have reacted very well. Op instructions rather than orders should usually be given and subordinates must be allowed a wide discretion as to methods to be adopted, use of sp arms etc to attain the object. Where possible they should be relieved of problem of re-supply.

52. Natives have proved a valuable source of infm both of enemy and topography though reliability varies. Study of Malay language by tps has helped considerably.

  
Lt-Col  
Comd 2/17 Aust Inf Bn  
3 Aug 45



Maj Pike, for perusal + return

HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde  
31 Jul 45

REPORT ON OPERATIONS

1. MOV FROM TABLELANDS

- (a) Pers. Mov tables as submitted by units to HQ 9 Aust Div were not accurate, due to daily amended figures not being submitted. As rolling stock at the time was very limited this resulted in train space being wasted and in other cases trains being unnecessarily overloaded. Also these discrepancies disrupted all other arrangements at the point of detrainment and the Staging Camp.
- (b) Stores. Escorts were not sufficient in numbers to allow them to carry out the tasks expected of them.

In allotting tonnage of stores to trains the cubic measurements were not fully appreciated necessitating last minute reallocation of available rolling stock and "shut outs" of unit stores and eqpt which could have been avoided.

More liaison is required between entraining offrs, RTO's and stationmasters and it is suggested that units appoint offrs who have had previous experience when appointing OC trains, entraining offrs etc.

2. EMBARKATION CAIRNS

- (a) Pers. Nominal rolls were not accurate nor were they compiled as detailed in 9 Aust Div Adm Order No2. Inaccuracy and illegibility of nominal rolls proves that units do not appreciate the functions of Records in the event of an accident occurring during the voyage.

On arriving at the staging area, OC's of units and dets appeared to consider that their responsibilities ceased, as far as control of their tps was concerned. This resulted in the security set-up being disorganised, which at such times is so important.

- (b) Stores. When crating stores units failed to appreciate the amount of handling such stores would be subjected to during the move resulting in many crates being damaged before even reaching the ships side. This then was accentuated by the careless handling by wharf labourers. It should be appreciated that these labourers handle army eqpt similar to any other, so as to avoid damage, personal supervision should be made of their work by army personnel. When put into practice at Cairns this proved quite effective. Certain delay was caused by wharf labourers in loading, mainly due to their refusing to work during rain though such delay was in the interests of the army as the ships holds were sealed down and thus prevented stores already loaded becoming waterlogged. There were no Docks Op Coys employed at Cairns during this time.



- (c) Vehs. The staging area chosen was not suitable to cater for the concentration of vehs and ~~trailers~~. *cars.* The latter therefore had to be cut down to a minimum which made the security and maintenance problem of vehs very difficult. There was not sufficient supervision of the loading of vehs resulting in unnecessary damage.

In some cases stores such as explosives and acids were loaded carelessly into jeep trlrs. This increased the danger of fire and damage to eqpt during the voyage.

### 3. EMBARKATION MOROTAI

- (a) Pers. When transport is limited as was the case at Morotai, it is imperative that the pre-embarkation AA be located much closer to the ships AA. A decided improvement was noticed when the pre-embarkation AA was moved to within one mile of the ships AA for the loading of the follow up convoy. This allowed the embarkation programme timings to be adhered to, and a continuous flow of pers in and out of the ships AA assisting greatly the control problem. The same applies to vehs.

The staff of the pre-embarkation AA was not sufficient to cope with the situation, and they were constantly hampered by personnel, who contrary to instrs, moved direct to the ships AA.

- (b) Stores. Units did not conform with the instr which laid down that no crate would exceed 60lbs. This caused both difficulty and delay in loading stores. Stores were carelessly marked and in some cases not marked at all, resulting in delay and loss of stores by units on the far shore.

Unit escorts were sufficient in number but were not organised by the OC's, so that portion of them could accompany the stores during all stages of the move.

The Stores slotting area was badly located and no provision made for dry stacking or covering of stores whilst in the area. Sufficient time was not given the offr in charge to become established before the arrival of stores, which was again hampered by the lack of transport.

The plan adopted for the handling of unit stores was quite good but the implementation failed miserably.

Where heavy eqpt and stores are involved such as engr and mech eqpt attention must be given to the method and eqpt available for unloading them at the ships side or in the ship itself. Too much reliance was placed on the finger lift, of which only portion of the LST's are fitted, and the fact that they can handle only three ton DWT was completely overlooked.

Such heavy stores and eqpt to avoid delay in loading should be loaded on cargo ships other than LST's.



(c) Vehs. Correct markings on vehs is essential and units should give more consideration to the overall measurements, with particular reference to out of gauge vehicles to enable stowage and loading to be carried out both speedily and effectively.

Overloading of vehs caused a lot of delay, in some cases winches had to be used to haul the vehs up the ramp to the Main Deck. Also delay was caused through vehs having chains fitted, contrary to instrs. Such results in loss of traction when traversing the steel ramp and decks.

A good deal of delay was caused in the ships AA, inspecting and completing the water-proofing of vehs. In some cases as much as fifteen minutes had to be spent on each veh. Though these vehs had been inspected and passed at the pre-embarkation AA, where sufficient time was available for a thorough inspection, the AEME representative at the ships AA demanded more work done on them. The only conclusion to gather from this is that the policy of AEME in regard to waterproofing was not definite, proved by the number of last minute amendments, and was not known by all AEME personnel. It is suggested, to ensure consistency and correct water proofing, that a central waterproofing centre manned by a permanent staff be established in the vicinity of the ships AA, through which all vehs must pass just prior to being loaded. This is laid down but for the move dealt with not put into effect. Instead the vehs were subjected to three different inspections (i) unit lines (ii) pre embarkation AA and (iii) ships AA.

More training of drivers and provost is required on the system of hand signs used for directing vehs on to craft. The lack of training in this caused much delay and in some cases, damage to vehs and ships. This applies, in particular, to RAAF.

When an emb is to take place it is considered that closer liaison be maintained between Army and Navy to ensure full and up to the minute information of the type and peculiarities of ships available, to enable units to plan on a firm basis, and so, avoid large scale, last minute, alterations having to be made.

 Lieut.



H.Q. Comd.,  
20 AUST. Inf. Bde.

ENGINEER ASPECT - OBOE 6

FROM 13 June - 3 Aug. 45

1. GENERAL

After the capture of BRUNEI, the engineer works were confined to the crossing of rivers and the maintenance of roads. When the situation became stable the engineer resources were turned to civilian rehabilitation and to the formation of Maintenance Areas at BRUNEI, BELAIT and LUTONG. Further to the report already submitted, the following observations are made together with the lessons learnt.

2. RIVERWORK

- Crossings*
- (i) Ferries. The amount of bridging equipment to do assault <sup>crossings</sup> was sufficient with the exception of outboard motors. This does not include the BARAM where LCMs <sup>would be</sup> desirable. It is considered that three outboards should be available at each ferry if the service is to be continuous. If motor stoppages are to be accepted then two outboard motors is the absolute minimum. A generous supply of spare parts should be allowed, especially gaskets and spark plugs so that isolated detachments on ferries may make repairs on the spot.
- (ii) Patrols. The scale of equipment to be provided will depend on the number and size of patrols to be undertaken. It is considered that it is unsound to depend on ferrying equipment to do river patrols. For an operation of this character it is considered that each bn requires 4 folding boats each capable of carrying 16 fully equipped soldiers. This would allow 2 platoon patrols or 4 section patrols to be carried out simultaneously. Five outboard motors should be provided to each bn.
- (iii) LOCAL Resources. It is reasonable to assume in planning that local river craft would be available but this should be used only to supplement military equipment. Such local craft should not be considered available for assault crossings but available only for later patrolling. The types of craft which have become available during this operation are praus, civilian outboard motors which had been used by natives in river work, Japanese boats and sunken civilian motorboats. These have imposed mechanical tasks beyond the capacity of the Fd Coy. It is thought that AEME should, as has been done in this operation, make available detachments whose task it is to refit and maintain such recaptured boats. Inf Bns should provide crews for such craft as operate in their area and the Fd Coy operate army outboard motors. Bde should control salvage craft and Engineers should advise on the best use of such craft in supplementing military equipment.

3. MECH EQUIPMENT.

With a Mech Equipment Platoon not engaged on the task of mass moving of earth and road making, but spread over a brigade area doing small maintenance ~~tasks~~ tasks from time to time, the maintenance is not easy. It is considered sound to divide the maintenance section of the Platoon H.Q. into two subsections placed to best carry out their work with the Platoon Commander to co-ordinate their work.

4. AUSTER STRIPS.

- (i) Recce. In open well drained country the recce is relatively simple, but in close country such is not the case. In close country a close liason should be maintained with the RAAF so that work is not started on sites which will later be condemned. A good beach is a satisfactory site although limited by tides.
- (ii) Construction. In country where the ground is doubtful some stores should be carried to enable a strip to be constructed quickly. The order of preference of the type of stores is -
- (a) Marsden Mat
  - (b) ARC Mesh
  - (c) Bamboo Mat manufactured on the spot.



5. OIL FIRES.

- (i) General. A Divisional Fd Coy is not designed to attempt such tasks as extinguishing Oil Fires and it is essential that adequate preparation be made by persons interested in conserving such resources.
- (ii) Responsibility. It is desirable that in the event of no such preparation being made that the responsibility of the Fd Coy in this regard be laid down and expert personnel and equipment be included in its OOB.. If this has not been done then a Fd Coy should do whatever is possible without prejudice to the support of the Bde, until relieved by a responsible party.

*Wearne*.....Major  
O.C. 2/3 Aust. Fd. Coy. R.A.E.

DISTRIBUTION

- 1 Comd 20 Aust Inf Bde
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2/17 AUST INF BN SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

OBOE SIX TO 31 JUL 45

The Bn planning team left RAVENSHOE for MOROTAI on 9 Apr 45, embarking at CAIRNS on 12 Apr 45.

The unit received notice to move within four hours on 1 May and by the following day the complete unit had moved out for TOWNSVILLE where they embarked on the DAVID SHANKS on 6 May 45. The DAVID SHANKS reached MOROTAI on 16 May 45 and the tps were disembarked the following day. Two days later they were moved out to the 9 Div staging area where a brief period was spent in the preparation of a camp site. As soon as the camp site was cleared hardening trg was commenced.

By 20 May 45 coy comds had been given the outline of the operation and the location of where it was to take place. At this stage the briefing of tps began but they were not given the location of the intended operation. By the time the tps were embarked on HMAS KANIMBLA on 29 May 45 they were all well versed in their roles.

Rehearsal of the deployment from landing craft and mov to first objective was held on 26 May 45. This exercise was carried out without landing craft.

A ship to shore rehearsal was held on 3 May 45. From this exercise valuable lessons were learned and improved loading methods were evolved. During the voyage numerous tp deck to boat stas and loading exercises were carried out.

The KANIMBLA sailed from MOROTAI harbour in convoy on 1 Jun 45. During the voyage further briefing was carried out in detail.

Encouraging messages were received from the navy, who were carrying out mine sweeping operations in the BRUNEI BAY area, during the later stages of the voyage. These messages stated that there were few signs of enemy activity in the vicinity of the selected landing beaches.

At 0800 hrs on 10 Jun the tps began to move to nets stas and half an hour later the naval and air bombardment began. After a most effective bombardment of the landing beach and the high ground of BRUNEI BLUFF and COWIE RIDGE which overlooked it, by one cruiser, two destroyers and four LCI rocket sp craft, the first wave landed at 0915 hrs unopposed. The beach had been incorrectly marked and the Bn was landed 1000 yards EAST of the selected area. This meant an additional 1000 yds for D Coy to move to their objectives and might have proved serious had they been occupied by the enemy. It did disrupt comn as D Coy was for a time out of touch with Bn HQ through having insufficient cable.

In less than one hour after the first wave reached the shore a tp of MATILDA tanks had been landed. The tp of 75 mm was in posn and ready to fire one hr and 20 mins after the first wave was ashore.

D Coy and 4 Pl moving towards the BLUFF and COWIE RIDGE found the going slow and difficult. C Coy reached YELLOW BEACH at 1115 hrs but did not make the most of their opportunities, withdrawing from the beach in an attempt to achieve strict compliance with their plan which had been based on landing at the correct location. When instrs were received they pushed on and secured the whole of YELLOW BEACH by 1215 hrs.

B Coy which had landed as a reserve was pushed through between C and D Coys to the rd junc known as FOOCHOW. On meeting no opposition they moved on to their second objective. By pushing forward quickly they were able to contact the only enemy party in the area and inflicted casualties on them as they withdrew towards Bt PISANG. By 1230 hrs the whole of the BROOKETON area was cleared and the 2/13 Bn had landed on GREEN BEACH and was preparing to take over responsibility of the area to enable 2/17 Bn to advance to BRUNEI.



Following a rapid reorganisation by the Bn A Coy set off as adv guard along the BRUNEI RD at 1400 hrs. This quick forward move was possible through the issue of orders prior to disembarkation.

During the adv on 10 Jun no opposition was met and by 1900 hrs the Bn was in posn 4000 yds along the rd from BROOKETON.

At 2250 hrs an enemy  $2\frac{1}{2}$  ton truck drove into our FDLs and was met by hy MG and LMG fire. Five of the eight occupants were killed and one who was badly wounded was captured. Two enemy and two natives who were on the truck escaped.

On 11 Jun C Coy took over the role of adv guard and moved off at 0800 hrs. Although signs of recent enemy occupation were found at frequent intervals no contact was made.

A number of natives were questioned and freely gave infm which later proved to be quite accurate.

After the main elements of the Bn were well on the move a JUKI MG opened on the area which had been occupied by Bn HQ. The gun was located on Bt PISANG. Just after the gun opened up an airstrike went in on the feature and the gun ceased fire.

While carrying out a recce, accompanied by two scouts, for a defensive posn for the night, the CO and his party sighted one enemy who made off towards BRUNEI. The party opened fire and the Jap was seen to be wounded. The Bn took a defensive posn for the night after an adv of tharteen thousand yards.

At first lt next morning C Coy pushed forward recce patrols along the rd and at 0945 D Coy moved forward as adv guard. D Coy reached the junc of BERAKAS and BRUNEI rds at 1110 hrs. At this point it was found that naval harrassing fire the previous night had been extremely accurate and that two enemy had been killed. One enemy was sighted but made his escape before he could be engaged by fire. Two trucks were captured at the rd junc. They were being driven by Indian RASC pers who had been captured at SINGAPORE.

B Coy took over adv guard from the BERAKAS rd junc at 1230 hrs and secured the airstrip without opposition. The rd south of the air strip was found to be mined with 50 kg aerial bombs and incomplete rd blocks erected. At 1430 hrs B Coy made contact with the enemy 800 yds SOUTH of the air strip. 11 Pl moved quickly to the right flank and secured the high ground killing 3 and wounding two enemy. 10 Pl pushed forward to the high ground on the left of the rd and drove the enemy from the posn. Five enemy were killed. During the action B Coy had one killed and three wounded. Seven more Japs were killed during the exploitation and consolidation and the posn was secured by 1600 hrs. The main body of the Bn was then moved to the SOUTH end of the air strip when it was deployed for the night.

At 1920 hrs enemy parties attempted to infiltrate and opened fire on the posn held by 4 Pl. Casualties were suffered by our tps. At 2015 hrs a number of hy mortar bombs fell in the vicinity of D Coy HQ and again we suffered casualties.

Just prior to dawn on 13 Jun a party of enemy 13 strong was seen moving across the airstrip. They were engaged by C Coy and when they attempted to withdraw they encountered fire from another posn and all of the party were killed. We had one officer killed.

During the night 4 Pl had suffered 4 cas, one being killed.

At 0925 hrs an airstrike requested on the enemy posns 1000 yds fwd of our FDLs fell 600 yds short of the objective and dangerously close to our own tps.

An A Coy pl patrol had set out along the line of the river towards GADONG ferry and at 1030 hrs A Coy began to move fwd along the rd.



A second bomb strike at 1100 hrs fell on the objective allotted the first strike. This strike later proved to be most effective as together with arty fire it was responsible for the withdrawal of the 336 Indep Inf Bn less one coy from the posn. The posn had been very well prepared and had the enemy held it they would have been difficult to dislodge.

At 1120 hrs D Coy moved forward on the left flank to secure the ridge 4747'. At the same time the A Coy pl had secured the GADONG ferry. After the leading pl of A Coy had passed the ridge in 4741 A Coy HQ came under light fire. A pl from C Coy was sent to mop up and killed two enemy.

After securing the ridge D Coy sent a patrol to contact C Coy on the main rd. This patrol encountered a party of enemy killing two and wounding one. The bulk of the enemy force was withdrawing in the direction of the TASEK resevoir.

The A Coy pl at GADONG ferry crossed the river and moved to the GADONG Estate where a native prison compound was found. Five dead natives were found chained to posts and a number of others nearly dead were found also chained to posts. The compound was in the charge of a Javanese police serjeant major who had to be forcibly brought in by the patrol.

A D Coy patrol to KUMBANG PASANG village found an abandoned enemy CCS and took one prisoner. A second patrol met 5 Japs moving from the direction of BRUNEI and killed two of them. The remaining three escaped, one of them being badly wounded. By 1430 hrs D Coy had reached TASEK reservoir killing one more enemy on the way.

C Coy who had pushed through A Coy reached the water front at BRUNEI AT 1455 hrs without further contact. Half an hour later while mopping up the town area a section of C Coy encountered a party of 8 Japs led by an officer at the SOUTH EAST corner of the town. When the enemy party sighted our sec they made a Banzai charge. The sec displayed considerable coolness and killed all of the Japs and suffered no cas themselves.

A pl of B Coy had moved to the EAST bank of the river at CLIFFORD BRIDGE and reported enemy mov on the far bank at 1625 hrs. The bridge had been prepared for demolition by piling 50 kg bombs and boxes of picric acid in the centre. At 1900 hrs under cover of MG and arty fire and assisted by engr B Coy pl crossed the bridge and removed the demolitions.

The Bn was disposed for the night with Bn HQ on the WESTERN outskirts of the town with B Coy less one pl. C Coy was holding the water front area, A Coy in the vicinity of GADONG ferry and D Coy near TASEK reservoir. One pl of B Coy was holding the CLIFFORD BRIDGE.

On 14 Jun a methodical search of the town area was made for enemy documents. Documents were so numerous that they had to be collected in jeeps and trailers. Much mech eqpt was found.

A pl patrol from C Coy encountered enemy in strength on a razor backed ridge just EAST of the town at 1355 hrs. The enemy attacked and five were believed to be killed. Our patrol ran out of amn and had to withdraw. The posn was engaged by arty and mortars. D Coy was carrying out patrols in the reservoir area and two Japs were killed. One large party of Japs was sighted running away in a NE direction. This party was too far away and moving too fast to be engaged. An A Coy patrol to KUMBANG PASANG village met natives who told them of enemy ahead. The patrol moved on and killed 5 Japs who were occupying a dug posn. The patrol then moved further on and killed two more Japs. The patrol was in comn with Bn HQ by 108 set and was ordered to return at 1645 hrs. At 1755 hrs B Coy killed one Jap near their coy posn. C Coy began to move forward to the ridge where the enemy had been met in str earlier in the day at 1820 hrs. It was found that following the shelling and mortaring that the enemy had withdrawn from the posn. Two enemy only were seen who withdrew at speed as our tps approached.

Arty of enemy moving through the town at 0630 hrs on 14 Jun bayon-



eted an ASC driver sleeping in his truck at the roadside. A second driver sleeping in the back of the truck killed two of the enemy and the remaining ten made their escape. At 0900 hrs Dyaks brought in two Jap PW whom they had captured six miles up river. The Dyaks bound them and carried them in on poles.

B Coy began to advance to TUTONG shortly after 1000 hrs and the adv guard killed one Jap soon after starting. The main body of B Coy moved off at 1150 hrs. Part of B Coy was moving by MT and a sandbagged jeep was being employed by the adv guard pl.

Coys in the BRUNEI area were carrying out extensive patrolling and a recee patrol by D Coy killed one Jap near the TASEK reservoir.

Bn HQ moved into the residential area of the town at 1730 hrs and est in a two storey bungalow.

During the day B Coy had advanced ten miles.

A local patrol by C Coy killed one Jap.

At 2300 hrs Bde advised that the Bn less a 2 coy gp has now come into Bde res.

The next day C Coy left by MT to join B Coy in the advance to TUTONG. The gp was under comd of Maj P H PIKE. B Coy was continuing the adv and although numerous rd blocks were met no contact was made. TUTONG was secured by B Coy at 1850 hrs without opposition.

The following day B Coy patrolled to DANAU ferry and reported NMS.

At BRUNEI active patrolling was being carried out and one patrol sent out following a native report of Japs in the vicinity of KUMBANG PASANG killed one Jap. A later patrol to the same area also killed one Jap.

Serviceable pontoons were found at DANAU ferry but the motor boat which had been used to tow them had been destroyed. Natives reported that there was a serviceable craft 8 miles up the TUTONG R and a patrol was sent to secure it.

A patrol was also sent from C Coy to ABANG by MT. This patrol found a number of abandoned and destroyed trucks. A large number of enemy had withdrawn from TUTONG through this area.

Comm between the TUTONG force and BHQ at BRUNEI had not been very satisfactory. This was mainly due to natives cutting lengths of line for their own use.

Bn HQ left BRUNEI to join the TUTONG force at 1000 hrs on 18 Jul. Bn HQ was est at the EASTERN bank of DANAU ferry at 1200 hrs.

C Coy had crossed the ferry and were pushing along the beach towards SERIA. DANAU had been occupied without contact. At 1435 hrs the fwd elements of C Coy sighted a party of 20 Japs  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles along the beach ~~xxxxxx~~ from DANAU. The enemy withdrew so rapidly that it was not possible to make contact. By 1800 hrs C Coy had advanced three miles along the beach towards SERIA. By last lt one tp of 25 prs had crossed DANAU ferry and were in posn at DANAU. The lt ADS and pnr pl had also crossed to DANAU. The advance had been limited due to the bottle neck at the ferry. C Coy was advancing on foot using jeeps to carry fwd the hy gear.

On 19 Jun C Coy continued the adv along the beach and B Coy began to cross the ferry during the morning. After crossing the ferry B Coy began to move along the beach in rear of C Coy. Bn HQ was moved across the ferry in the late afternoon and est at DANAU. C Coy covered  $7\frac{1}{2}$  miles during the day's adv.

Bn HQ and the pnr pl began to move along the beach by MT to join



C and B Coys at 0930 hrs on 20 Jun. By 1513 hrs C Coy had reached the outskirts of SERIA and found the oil fields in that area intact although the field further on was burning furiously. At 1630 hrs C Coy made 1st contact near the BIRA R. The coy was pushed fwd to secure the two bridges over the river and nine enemy were killed during the adv. Our own cas were two wounded. A further three enemy were killed before first light the following morning.

At first light the following morning patrols were pushed fwd but all reported NMS. At 0930 hrs a pl was sent from C Coy to cut the light rly to BADAS and the remainder of the coy was disposed securing the BIRA R bridges. At 1130 hrs B Coy was passed through C Coy and moved into SERIA. The area to SERIA R had been secured by 1500 hrs and Bn HQ was moved fwd to the B Coy area. At this stage infm was received from natives that the Japs had withdrawn from the whole of the SERIA - BELAIT area and that they had massacred a large number of Indian PW who were being held in a compound at K BELAIT.

An early start was made to extinguish the oil fires and three were extinguished by the engrsr on the first afternoon.

The following day the first four escaped Indian PW were recovered. Extensive patrols were carried out during the day but no contact was made.

On 23 Jul Bn HQ and B Coy moved fwd to the WESTERN outskirts of SERIA. At 1215 hrs A Coy arrived from BRUNEI and were pushed fwd half way to K BELAIT. Escaped Indian PW continued to come in in increasing numbers.

A Coy entered K BELAIT on 24 Jun and found it to be completely free of enemy. The prison compound was found where the massacre of the Indian PW had taken place. It was not possible to make an accurate estimate of the number of victims but it was evident from the large quantity of charred bones and corpses that it had been a large number. At 1305 hrs a patrol from C Coy reached BADAS and reported the pump sta to be in fair order. In the afternoon a patrol from A Coy crossed BELAIT R and moved for a distance of 1500 yds along the coast rd without making any contact.

On 25 Jun D Coy arrived from BRUNEI by MT and took up a posn at the PENAGA golf course.

A demonstration of force to impress the locals of our ability to hold the area was made at K BELAIT on 26 Jun. This had quite a surprising effect on the natives as when the mortars and arty opened up they made for the jungle. A pl patrol from A Coy left for K BARAM at 1330 hrs by MT. At K BARAM contact was made with a patrol from 2/13 Bn at LUTONG.

Capt P K MURPHY left with a sec and a party of DYAKS for K BALAI on 27 Jun to est a patrol base.

The ferry was restored over BELAIT R and on 28 Jun was supplemented by a batwing raft.

A pl from C Coy had est an outpost at BADAS and reported on 28 Jun that the enemy were still in occupation of Bt PUAN. We shelled the area.

7 Pl left for K BALAI on 29 Jun. The following day 8 Pl joined 7 Pl at K BALAI.

Bt PUAN was occupied by C Coy on 1 Jul. One hy Browning MG was captured and patrols 600 yds SOUTH along the LABI tr failed to make contact.

An A Coy patrol to SEMBURU and along the DAMIT R near TERIAM reported NMS.

A Coy HQ moved to K BALAI on 2 Jul and D Coy moved to K BELAIT to take over their area of responsibility.

A patrol which had est at SEMBURU moved fwd to TERIAM on 3 Jul. 7/



est midway between SEMBURU and TERIAM. 8 Pl moved by canoe to MENDARAM to est an ambush. 7 Pl moved on to SIMPANG on 4 Jul and commenced patrolling in the LABI area. The following morning they were contacted by a pl of C Coy which had moved SOUTH along the tr from Bt PUAN. The next day a sec of arty moved into posn at SEMBURU. On the same day A Coy HQ was moved fwd to SIMPANG and joined 7 Pl. A patrol from A Coy on 8 Jul moved through MENDARAM as far SOUTH as Bt TERAJA without making contact. The next day a patrol set out for RIDAN and 2 Pl less one sec est as a base for them at MANDARAM. This patrol found many signs of recent enemy activity but no contact was made.

On 12 Jul C Coy and the tp from 16 Bty were withdrawn to the SERIA area and B3 Pl 2/2 MG Bn took over responsibility of BADAS. 13 Pl moved from BADAS along the BELAIT R by canoe to K BELAIT taking two days for the trip. No movement was seen throughout the patrol.

D Coy plus a det of Mortars, sigs, arty recce party, air sp party, engrs and a med det left K BELAIT for MARUDI in LCMs escorted by one LCM gunboat and the armed SRD launch HMAS TIGERSNAKE. On the same day a pl of A Coy moved to RIDAN to est a patrol base.

While moving up the BARAM R on 15 Jul D Coy received reports from natives that there was a party of 40 Japs at K RIDAN. Following a strike by 6 Spitfires and a rocket bombardment by the gunboat two pls landed unopposed and moved across country to MARUDI. The remaining pl moved to MARUDI by LCM. Both parties reported NMS. Natives reported that the enemy party had withdrawn up the RIDAN R. D Coy est in MARUDI and late in the afternoon captured one Jap.

One D Coy pl set out from MARUDI on 16 Jul to contact the A Coy pl at RIDAN. At 1200 hrs they sighted a party of 12 Japs who made off in the direction of K RIDAN. The enemy party moved too quickly to be engaged by our patrol. Two and a half hours later contact was made with a party of 40 enemy who were armed with 4 LMGs. This evidently was the party which had withdrawn from K RIDAN the previous day. At the time of the contact our pl was moving through swamp, and the enemy was in well sited posns on firm ground overlooking them. Our pl attacked but due to the unfavourable nature of the ground and by fire was unable to dislodge the enemy. After a protracted fire fight our pl broke off contact. Five enemy were killed and we suffered one man and one DYAK killed and two wounded. The pl was accompanied by DYAKS who were acting as scouts. The pl made a difficult return to MARUDI carrying their wounded men. They did not reach MARUDI until 2300 hrs.

A pl patrol was despatched by D Coy up the BAKOENG R on 17 Jul. This patrol moved by LCM and was escorted by the ESB gunboat. BAKOENG was occupied without opposition. When natives reported a party of 18 Japs moving down stream a waterborne ambush was set, but the enemy did not appear. Evidently they had heard the motors of the LCMs. The patrol then moved further upstream and as they rounded a bend near K ARANG they came under MG fire from both banks. This fire penetrated the ramp of the gunboat and one man was killed. The gunboat engaged the enemy posns and silenced them. Due to the swampy nature of the Nipa fringed banks it was impossible to effect a landing at this point. Accordingly the patrol put about to return to BAKOENG. As the craft turned they were again engaged by enemy fire. This time the fire was ineffective. The patrol returned to MARUDI the following day.

The enemy party of 40 was again met on 18 Jul. This time by a patrol from the A Coy pl near RIDAN. When contact was made the patrol attacked and drove in the enemy outpost killing 4. The main posn was then attacked ~~and~~ but the superior enemy fire power brought our tps to a halt. After a short fire fight our patrol broke off contact and returned to their base. The enemy party moved off into the swamp NORTH of the RIDAN R where natives found two more dead the following day. They had died of wounds inflicted by our patrol.

At MARUDI large stocks of rubber were found by D Coy. This is mostly owned by Chinese dealers who are anxious to dispose of their stocks.



Local patrols at MARUDI on 19 Jul found three dead natives who had been killed by the Japs. One of them was a woman who had had one breast cut off. Three Jap heads were brought in to the pl at RIDAN by the DYAKS. One was claimed to be an officer. The DYAKS also handed in documents taken from the bodies.

Another pl from D Coy left MARUDI on 20 Jul to make contact with the pl at RIDAN. This pl reached RIDAN the following day without seeing any signs of enemy movement.

The enemy party which had been moving in the RIDAN area was again contacted on 21 Jul. On this occasion they were met by a ration party moving from MENDARAM with sups for the outpost at RIDAN. They were engaged by our tps and withdrew WESTWARD into the swamp. The ration party returned to MENDARAM and a fighting patrol was sent out to make contact but was unable to do so. Where the enemy entered the swamp a considerable amount of blood was seen and some abandoned eqpt.

A second patrol to BAKOENG was sent from MARUDI on 21 Jul moving again by LCM.

On 22 Jul a pl from A Coy was moved from SIMPANG to take over the base at MENDARAM. The relieved tps returned to A Coy HQ area. Patrols between MENDARAM and RIDAN found the tr to be clear of enemy. In the afternoon natives reported that the enemy was at a point 800 yds SOUTH of MENDARAM. This posn was engaged by arty and the enemy made off to the EAST. When last reported they were one and a half days march EAST of LABI.

The recce patrol to BAKOENG returned to MARUDI on 23 Jul and reported that the enemy had vacated the posns from which they had engaged the previous patrol to the area. Natives reported that they had seen four enemy wounded in the area following the encounter with the previous patrol.

An escaped Indian PW was brought in to D Coy by DYAKS on 24 Jul. He had escaped from the Japs at LINEI and declared that they were beginning to move off towards LIMBANG.

A pl from B Coy which had been guarding the Auster Strip at TUTONG received a report from natives that there were five Japs at TAUNGGLIANG. Acting on this infm a patrol was sent by MT from TUTONG. At TAUNGGLIANG they took into custody three Formosans and what are believed to be two Japs. The latter claimed to be FORMOSANS.

17 Pl at BAKOENG patrolled 3½ hrs paddle up the ARANG R on 25 Jul but found no signs of enemy. The next day they patrolled SOUTH of ARANG village along the banks of the BAKOENG R and found that the enemy had not re-occupied the village.

18 Pl left RIDAN to rejoin D Coy at MARUDI on the morning of 27 Jul and arrived at MARUDI in the afternoon. Daily contact patrols had been maintained between MARUDI and RIDAN and at all times the tr had remained clear of enemy.

Acting on a report by natives that a party of enemy were in ARANG village a 2 sec patrol was sent from BAKONEG to investigate. On arrival at the village it was found that the enemy had moved off. The patrol was divided and one sec returned to BAKOENG via the river tr and the other sec moved along the inland tr. After moving a short distance the inland sec was ambushed by a party of enemy who had allowed the bulk of the patrol to pass. One Dyak who was with the patrol was killed when the enemy opened fire. One other DYAK speared one Jap near the tr and then the enemy party charged. The officer and one OR was killed and the remainder withdrew to the high ground which they had previously occupied. During this engagement one of our tps was wounded and another killed. While looking for the man who had been killed the sec comd killed one more Jap. The patrol then made a difficult withdrawal through swamp, returning to their base at 2300 hrs. Later in the night at 2330 hrs natives reported the approach of 2 enemy parties and the




patrol comd decided to withdraw from BAKOENG to the coy posn at MARUDI.

The pl which withdrew to MARUDI moved out again the following day and est at K BAKOENG. At the same time a recce patrol was sent across country to BAKOENG and found that the enemy had not occupied the village. The pl at K BAKOENG was then moved forward to a point 2000 yds upstream from K BAKOENG.

By the end of the month D Coy had been connected by power phone with Bn HQ. Line had been laid to SIMPANG and A Coy was in line comd by 6 Jul. This line was later extended to MENDARAM and then on to RIDAN. On 28 Jul 9 miles of cable was sent to D Coy and then laid from MARUDI to connect with the A Coy line at RIDAN.

The B Coy pl at TUTONG was relieved by a pl from 2/15 Bn on 31 Jul.

At the end of the month NO enemy were known to be in the Bn area and during the last week the only contacts had been by patrols outside the div bdy.

  
II-Col

Comd 2/17 Aust Inf Bn



REPORT ON OPERATIONS

This report is based on my observations as 1 Aust Corps Liaison Officer (personnel) during the period 9 Mar to 6 May 45.

Embarkation CAIRNS

(i) Rail Movement

This was hampered throughout by adverse weather conditions. Personnel trains were seldom loaded to capacity causing minor problems in feeding and accommodation and over a period this necessitated extra trains being allocated. This could be avoided by early advice to ETOs of any change in strength.

(ii) Staging

On arrival at Staging Camp units were required to continue with internal adm only. This was not carried out and units repeatedly made independent arrangements for pay, mail canteen stores etc without reference to Liaison Staff or Staging Camp Staff. This caused considerable confusion delay and duplication of work which could be handled by Liaison Staff.

(iii) ESCORTS

In most cases escorts provided were insufficient to adequately safeguard stores during movement. In many cases escort parties were not provided with sufficient rations to allow for any emergency and in many cases men were left at "sidings" without rations. NCOs IC escorts had received no specific instructions regarding supervision of malaria precautions and in many cases had NO supplies of atabrin.

(iv) Stores

Generally all units stores were seriously marked crated and packed. Segregation of stores was not carried out in accordance with instructions issued for loading of rail trucks. This made it impossible in many cases to stow ships as desired i.e., bulk and unit stores bottom stowed - accommodation stores top stowed for early discharge. Also stores which came in the category of "dangerous cargo" when stacked with other stores were just pushed aside by wharf labourers and in many cases were completely lost.

(v) Security

Throughout the move units were not security minded as men were not kept under control or occupied whilst in staging areas. This resulted in a great volume of AWL which some units disregarded entirely.

In TOWNSVILLE area, local units were not subject to "blanket" censorship and mail was passed to members of these units for forwarding. Also men who went AWL were able to use trunk line interstate telephone.

(vi) Ships Staffs

The appointment of the senior combatant officer as OC TPS as laid down in Standing Orders for Movement was not always adhered to. The OC Tps then selected his own staff, and this in many cases was from some small unit or group. The result was that major units aboard the same ship had little or no say in the movement or administration during the voyage. Some of the staff chosen had no experience in embarkation and were insufficiently inefficient whereas travelling on the same ship



were personnel who had been trained as ships adjt and ECOs without a job.

Despite detailed instructions to the contrary some Ships Staff worked directly with the Ship's Offrs before embarkation. This resulted in considerable confusion and delay which might have been avoided had MC Staff had complete control. Unit COs and QM also made unauthorised visits to the wharves and issued instructions for the loading of stores which in one case resulted in a strike by waterside workers. This work must be controlled by the Port MCO (Cargo) and all instructions should come through him.

(vii) Embarkation TOWNSVILLE

The facilities at TOWNSVILLE were better in all respects for security staging and movement of personnel.

In regard to stores there was no shed space available at the wharves and stores were left for long periods in open rail trucks exposed to the weather.

(viii) General

It is considered that the following points were the main reasons for delay and counter orders during the move:

- (a) Inaccurate information from US authorities of ships allocated in
  - (i) Personnel capacity (Offrs and ORs)
  - (ii) Cargo capacity (No of holds and dimensions)
  - (iii) E T A

This resulted in some cases of entire ship loads being altered after the ship had berthed and the tps were in the staging areas. Also stores and personnel were split and "shut out" and in one case 120 men were moved back to CAIRNS to embark.

- (b) Use of civilian labour.

On two occasions when permission was granted for the use of army labour (unskilled) the loading rate was doubled over 24 hrs.

- (c) Adverse weather conditions

(ix) Tactical Loading of LSTs at MOROTAI

The <sup>sighting</sup> sighting and preparation of the Ships Assembly area for vehs and pers was well organised and throughout the embarkation worked without any serious delay. The slotting area for stores was badly sighted and prepared with resulting delay and damage to stores.

It is considered that the Pre-embarkation Assembly Area was situated at too great a distance from Ships Assembly Area. This increased the communication difficulties to such a degree that control between these two points was a major problem. Also the distance which vehicles had to travel after final waterproofing caused many mechanical breakdowns.

The actual embarkation went very smoothly but the following points may be noted:

- (a) Confusing instructions from AEME regarding waterproofing procedure
- (b) Drivers not sufficiently trained in "backing" and working to hand signals



(3)

(c) Excessive loading of v ehicles.

This caused numerous delays as vehicles for loading on weather deck had to be winched up. Some vehicles were fitted with chains which also caused trouble with weather deck loading.

(x)

The use of permanent experienced loading parties from the 2/3 Tk A Regt proved very successful as all bulk cargo was handled and stacked with maximum speed.



(PH PIKE)

Maj



(3)

Warblair

8-8-1945.

Seria Oilfield, } future  
(Main Office) } address

C-D-C.  
Officer-in-Charge

Sir;

I beg leave to submit some statements to  
against Japs' guerillas for your considerations  
and references.

Being an aged Chinese has a long period  
staying at Borneo; and knew more or less the  
circumstances of the state and the populations; therefore,  
I have proposing some measures and wish to provide  
some little helps to any allied army since China was  
knowing as an allied country.

If you think such measures are worth to  
take into consideration then please keep the papers for  
reference; if not please tear them off.

As I am on hurry to take my journey  
to transfer to Seria Oilfield to work there per official order;  
So, please excuse me for writing in pencil and submit  
to you in draft.

I have the honour to be  
your <sup>Sir</sup> obedient servant,  
Lee Ho Chong 2845



Sir, I beg to submit the following statements for your consideration and reference: (1)

Plans to defence and preventing Japanese guerillas in formation etc.  
Fore words and ambition of proposing these plans:-

As China is our allied country to fight with Japanese; henceforth, every Chinese should have to share the responsibilities of benefits and dangers to any allied army. If Japs have succeeded to form their guerillas and plan to re-attack any of the allied army; then every Chinese will suffer more or less the same dangerous and damage. as any allied army or may be have more troubles.

Being a Chinese who has a long period residing at the colony of Borneo, and knew more or less the circumstance of the state and the habits or the behaviourism to each race of Chinese; or natives and aliens. therefore, I have thinking and proposing some plans how to prevent Japs' guerillas in formation and make precautions of secret attacking by such Japs. Though it is not a valuable measures; but, it may be expected to give at least a little assistance to the allied army and Military Government.

The following measures are proposing to be adopted:-

A. Pay an attention and carefully guard to the Hokien Chinese.

As parts of the Japs soldiers (rumour says about 1000 over at Brunei & Kuala Belait) are the subjects of Formosa. These Japanese-Formosa-soldiers are the subject of China "Hokien-ese" before Japs: taken over Formosa from China on about 50 years ago; therefore, their appearance are the same as Hokien Chinese, and can speaking Hokien dialect quite well as a real Hokien Chinese. Similarly that some of the real Japanese soldier can speak Hokien dialects as well as a Hokien Chinese (Some of them can speak mandarin, and Cantonese dialects; but very few, and seldom who knows speaking Khek). Besides, it may be taken as a private conversation that some part of the Chinese at Brunei, especially to some of the Hokien Chinese, most are money digger, greedy and selfish. These Chinese are only expecting to seek more and more money,

plan to found an opportunity for their own or relations, or friends benefit. they don't mind whether they have given the shameful to their own nation, and they don't the meaning of looting own country; they didn't know the history of China; even they didn't

P.T.O.



know how to help and give benefits to the allied armies, or for the majority of population. If Japs offer a heavy bribe and frighten them, they will come to Japs side and act as a traitor or spy to give a military reports to Japs or try their best, cunning or trickery plans to get the provisions to support the Japs' guerrillas. There have evidences and actions to prove this statements. While Japs landed to this state few months later, such kind of Chinese befriended well to Japs by given them more plans of assistances, such as applied and tendered higher and higher prices (Commenced from \$4000 to \$20000 over a month at Prumei town area only for establish gambling farm. Tried their best ways to help Japs to dispose lotteries for several times. Persuaded or forced Chinese to subscribe funds to buy bomber for Japs to against allies. Submitted tricks and agent for Japs to obtain the food-stuffs - Paddy & vegetables from the poor and hard working Chinese gardeners and natives of "Kadain". Such manner of actions are not only gave annoyances to the poor Chinese and natives, also sucking their blood by robbing their goods and money to support the financial and living aids to the enemies. Before, I conclude to this item I must pronounced and must be known to every one that not every Hokien Chinese or every other Chinese are bearing such bad behavior, but of them only; and I may say that the more rich Chinese the more greedy. I also, may plain declare that I have no idea to against Hokien Chinese or any other races of Chinese, besides those are a trickier, money digger, selfish, flatters, and common senseless Chinese only.

on the other hand, if some of Formosa Japanese soldiers, or real Japanese force, speaking Chinese, disguising as a Chinese and will set out some dangerous to the allied army; on such case, it is rather hard to identify who is true between real Chinese and the disguising Japanese. To precaution this, any army should pay attention and careful investigate and consideration before trust and give or appoint such Hokien speaking Chinese with important service or give them secret information. These kinds of Chinese should be under suspecting and secret guard them.

(continue)

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well as to every Aliens and native for distinguish, whether acq-  
-ainted dweller or a stranger; And whether real Chinese or disguised  
Chinese by Japs.

7. Do not allow any stranger to stay at each district unless permission  
is obtained, and who can provide a security Bond or approved  
certificate.

8. Any stranger come to each district from other station should bear a  
security bond signed and approved by such station's officer who  
stationed at the district where he left. This passport should be  
registered at every station's officer while he is on the journey to  
come or leave this district; and should be reported himself to the  
officer on the station where he is arrived. The officer-in-charge of  
such affair at each station should be warned with careful  
investigation and make sure before endorse or issuing such  
passport; otherwise, if any defaults being discovered on such  
stranger, then he will suffer punishment.

9. To engage strange Chinese as a labourer, or enlist as a volunteer, or  
policeman, should make an interview and investigate to each man; especi-  
-ally pay attention to those Chinese speaking Hokien and Nankaim  
dialects. Arrange standing union security to every several persons; and  
give them the same explanation as mentioned in item 5. Old dweller  
and families Chinese stand for his security are preferable. Strange  
Chinese acted as friends to stand security between each friends are  
treated as dangerous. The guarantors should be warned and told that  
if any defaults being found on each certain man; then the penalty will be-  
-come to all of them as well as to their relations. This is to have a frighten  
and let the guarantors or their relations to think the matter over before they  
stand security of honour to certain strange Chinese, or aliens. If  
possible arrange a separate building for living such strangers.  
This is to stand as a compound confined like. And arrange  
secret guard to them. This measure is to prevent the Japs  
disguised as a Chinese to work with military government

and planning to set dangerous to the army or allied  
Subjects.

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B. As a fact that the natives of Borneo known as "Kadain" "Ibang" and "susun" were skilful of planting paddy on every years. These races of natives are in customs to stock their paddy in a separate store hut which was built at their paddy fields where selected at different places on every years and about one or two miles far beyond their own villages and near the jungle. Under this circumstances, if there was any Japs' guerrillas around or on the way passing by their paddy store hut at the paddy fields then those Japs may have the chance to steal or rob off the natives' paddy, and thus they keep on of living for some times without starves. In preventing the Japs' guerrillas to obtain their living food stuffs, I think this matter should be taken into consideration; and I would suggest that all native chiefs of every villages should call in; give them the explanation; warning and order them to demand every one of their villagers to remove all the quantity of paddy or food stuffs from their store huts at the paddy field to stock at a house as near as possible to their own village and give attention and properly guard by whole villagers union together.

C. I understood and being informed that a large quantity of food-stuffe, such as Rice, Paddy, Sugar, and Salt etc; which could last more or less one or two months' rations for whole Borneo populations (this may be not true, estimated), were disappeared and being taken off by every races of population. If this occasion is true, and, am I not wrong, I think this may be dealt as one of the sources that Japs may obtain their living food stuffs by using their trickiness to buy such losing food stuffs from the population who possessed it, through the traitors acted as agent for Japs; or the Japs' spies, who by chance have obtained such losing food-stuffe, may directly support the Japs' guerrillas with such stuffs for living. Thus the Japs will last some more longer time for starvelers. For trying to cut short life of Japs' guerrilla, I suggest a step should be adopted to re-collect these losing

金	額	數	量	金	額	數	量	金	額	數	量	金	額	數	量	金	額	數	量	金	額	數	量
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food stuffs from the populations by issuing a strict proclamation writing in English, Chinese, Malay and Indian, to persuading, warning, and demanding them to return such food-stuffe to the Government, otherwise, any of them may be serious punished. at the same time offer a good reward. P.T.O.																							



(6)

to the informers; and reserve a heavy penalty to any one who try to conceal such <sup>Secrets</sup> informations against his friends, relations, or neighbours.

D. Try to cut into short period of supplying rations to Labourers, or Populations on any scale. For the longer period of supplying rations to any one, the more food-stuffs are stocking by the populations; then it is may be said to open a source for the Japs to get the food stuffs through their agents or <sup>the</sup> traitors by buying such goods, especial of Salt, Sugar, biscuits, and canned meats, from the population. This is also giving a chance for the Japs' guerrilla without starving; and it should be taken as a matter for consideration. It is a fact that any race of population especially to those sea Malay, Indian, or some un-honest Chinese should not be so trustworth during this extraordinary time.

E. Learned and cunning sea-malays and Indian as well as to some money digger and dishonest Chinese or Malayan Policemen should be under suspecting and secret guard, for there has a pronouncement given by the Japs, while they controlled here, to seduce such races of population to loyal to Japs' empire <sup>and against the allies.</sup> The facts have been proved that all the Indians at Borneo (Promei, Kuching, Seria, Miri, & Jesselton) has formed a society by named of "Indian Independent Association", and a special flag was presented to them by the Japs' government. Some of Indian youths were sent to Singapore to train as a volunteers or soldiers to fight with allied army. As regard to the learned Malays, and Malay youths; or policemen, most of them are very aimed and keen to learn Japanese writing, character and speaking. Some of them have also pronounced to against all allied countries; and have ill and cruel treated to Chinese. It has a matter, should give attention that some of the native chiefs are self willing to let their young sons to be brought to Kuching, or Tokio to learn the Japanese education and train up as a soldier or a naval crew. Some of such Malay youths are still in the Japs powers; some of them may be left behind on purpose or being sent back by Japs (which I am rather doubtful) to act as Japs' spies. Therefore, these are the matters not to be

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neglected. It should be strictly prohibit such races of population to come in and out or wandering around and near any of the military camps or offices. Consider and investigate before trust and appoint such races of population with secret <sup>品名</sup> important, and respectable position under the military government. Continued



F. Any population especial to Chinese who once being kept in prisoners during Japs' times and have not received any bitter treatments and released afterwards by Japs' officers or being rescued by Australian army when captured the state. Such person's term don't mind short or long period sentenced; and such person should, try to think it over and consider before give him a chance of trustworth. As a fact and every body knew that the Japs' officer whenever received any secret reports against any person arrest the victim and treated badly, cruelty, and beaten hard at once without first trial and giving evidences. Though such person was innocenced and must consent the criminal; yet he shall receives starving and cruel beaten or wild treatment once at each several days as according to the wishes of the Japs' officer's wishes. There are very few of Chinese prisoners being released from Japs' gaol without beaten hurt until up to nearly half death of their health. Therefore, if any person kept in Japs' gaol and released or being rescued with rather good health, such person must have promised or have acted some secret services to Japs, or will give some helps to Japs.

G. Any Chinese mandore who recruit any new or strange Chinese as a labourer, should responsible such labourer's good behaviour and security as a real Chinese. This is to avoid the Japanese-Formosa-soldier disguised as a Chinese. Such Chinese mandore should also under investigate before allow him to recruit labourers.

H. Call and gather up all "Kadain" and "Dusun" native chiefs; warning and persuade them to form jungle patrols with their own villagers. Support them with shot guns & few cartridges; order them to search Japs in the jungle, and guard their paddy or food-stuffs. They may kill the Japs if happen there are one or two being met in the jungle and under their strength. If groups of Japs were met and out of their strength to kill such Japs, they should report the matter at once to the army camps nearby after

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good rewards to any native who was hurt or has killed Japs. Such forces should be patrolled night by night in the Jungle. I think the "Kadain" and "Dusun" villagers may willing to form such patrol gang; as they are more or less hating the Japs, as Japs have adopted a scheme to rob



and demand them to support Japs with unreasonable percentages of paddy. The Kadain or Sasum's jungle patrol force will so good results as Ibongs; yet such races of natives are also got in habits at jungle life. Besides, such races are more in number and living nearby to the towns as Brunei, Tutong, Seria, Miri, Jesselton etc; and some are near at the beach. Such news once being spreaded out to the public, or become into effect may give frightens to Japs, and more or less may have helps to the military Government. To trust the "Kadain" and "Sasum" native are better than to trust the Malay natives.

I. Enlist Chinese, Kadain, Sasum, Ibong and Malay youths to form mix races of Volunteers, Policemen, or Secret detectives. Don't <sup>enlist</sup> one race of population, <sup>only</sup> to form policemen or detectives. Don't allow any mix races' force to serve and stay at a same station for a longer period.

J. Try to form some leaflets writing in Japanese language to seduce Formosa-Japanese-Soldiers for surrender. Promise them with good treatments, and will send them home after war. If any special actions have been formed against those real Japs' forces, such Formosa-Japanese-Soldiers will receive merits and give extra good treatments. Those leaflets should bear a promise note and certificate for surrender but allow to Formosa Japs. soldiers only; Warn the head hunters "Ibongs" don't cut the head off or kill those soldiers if they present such certificates after they have disarmed. These leaflets should be dropped plenty by air-plane to the Japs. guerrilla's area. This plan is not so aim for the Formosa-Japs' soldiers of surrendering, but the very main point is to expect the real Japs' forces raise the doubtfulness amongst the Formosa-Japs-Soldiers. Thus they may fight

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among themselves, and the strength of Japs guerrilla may be cut and become short lives

(continued)



K. Some methods to identify of real Japs:-

1. most Japs' upper lip are shorted, and can be seen few of the front upper teeth.
2. the main toes and the second toe on both left and right feet most are separated while, <sup>Japs</sup> standing and barring foot. they are not closed together like ours; as it is due to the customs of Japs' inhabitants to wear their own and particular fashion of sandal by putting a soft strings between the spaces of the first and second toes.
3. while Japs walking commonly; the thighs are rather closed, the steps are rather shorted. the feet are rather straight forward; the upper body is rather seems perpendicular, but the two shoulders <sup>upper arms</sup> are rather closed to the chest and <sup>a little</sup> front forward; These appearances are due to their customs by kneeling down on the floor instead of seating on the chairs. they closed their legs, thighs and feet to kneel down and seat on the back of the legs and heels; with straight body and head, and put their palms on the thighs and the arms closed attaching to the chest. This is their one of the polite customs; otherwise will be neglected.
4. more of the middle aged or youth Japanese are short sighted.
5. Japs speaking Malay language are not so fluency as Chinese; their pronounces are seems rather hard to utter out.

L. Japs forces are in habit of fonding Sugar, sweets, or any kind of sweeted stuffs than other salted goods. most are smoking tobacco or cigarettes. therefore, these kinds of goods should be undered controlment.

Before concluding to my submits, it seems to me that I have thinking too much matters and brought up too much statements that may be confused one's idea. But as I have said and well known to every one that the Japs are the most <sup>計</sup>trickish, <sup>計</sup>trustworthless and <sup>計</sup>cruelty nations in the world. On now a day the allies are <sup>出</sup>facing the fighting with them, <sup>排</sup>so on every sides or on every points should bring up some doubtfulness, or suspicious, and try to adopt some plans for precaution to prevent allied soldiers' <sup>P.T.O</sup>

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dangerous and to break the Japs' cunning and the traitors' secrets.  
 I have, also, wish to say that I have no idea to take a revenge  
 against any one individual or any one race of natives, or nations.  
 But, I have the only main ambition to submit an information and  
 wish to give some assistances to the Allies. Hoping that this  
 will be taken as a consideration.

I have the honou. to be

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Lee Ho bheung.

8-8-45

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年	月	日	摘要	買受	保管轉換	雜受	合入
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品名



RETURN TO INT OFFICE

TO FORMA MESSAGE FORM

2692

FROM : 9 DIV

TO : 20 INF BDE: 24 INF BDE: REAR DETAILS 24 INF BDE: 2/9  
CAV CDO REGT: 2/11 CDO SQN: RAA 9 DIV: 2/3 TK A REGT:  
RAE 9 DIV: SIGS 9 DIV: AASC 9 DIV: 2/2 MG BN: 3 OP REPORT  
TEAM: 2/9 ARMD REGT: 1 BEACH GP: 8 BASE SUB AREA: 593 EB  
AND S REGT: 4 VISITORS AND OBSERVERS SEC: CTG 75.15:  
CTU 80.1.7: 1 TAF RAAF: ALO 1 TAF RAAF (10): ALO 83 ARMY  
COOP WING: ALO 4 TAC R SQN: BBCAU: US NAVAL PORT DIRECTORAT  
SRD: COMD: G: AQ: ADMS: DAPM: ADOS: CEME

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G02135 (.) SECRET (.) sitrep 102 to 090900I (.) 20 inf bde (.)  
movement observed on RIAM road approximately 455780 (.) artillery  
engaged and rounds fell in target area (.) 24 inf bde (.) 2/28 inf  
bn patrol following air strike to vicinity 429885 came under fire  
from estimated 3 rifles 1 LMG from enemy defensive position (.)  
patrol killed 2 enemy (.) other 2/28 inf bn patrols report NO enemy  
seen (.) 2/43 inf bn patrol MEMBAKUT area NO enemy seen (.) 2/32 inf  
bn patrols BONGAWAN KIMANIS PAPAR areas NO enemy seen (.) 2/9 cav  
(cdo) regt (.) patrol investigating native report found 1 enemy dead  
in hut 778912 (.) death caused by suicide with rifle (.) 2/11 cdo  
sqn patrols SABANG BINSULOK NO enemy seen (.) BALIKPAPAN (.)  
dispositions (.) 2/3 cdo sqn 617757 617756 (.) 2/1 pnr bn HQ 469785  
A coy 433813 B and D coys 515800 C coy 469785 (.) 2/9 inf bn HQ  
518628 A coy 515629 B coy 494639 C coy 354754 D coy 513627 (.)  
long range patrol SAMBODJA to MILFORD HIGHWAY 666925 heard consider-  
able MT movement (.) patrols along MILFORD HIGHWAY engaged enemy  
at 618762 and 619759 (.) patrol based 616764 engaged enemy 617765  
killing 3 (.) some enemy stragglers killed 631759 (.) following  
artillery concentration patrol occupied enemy position 383854 and  
PAMALOEAN village (.) total enemy casualties to date counted dead  
1739 estimated killed 247 PW 61  
-----

2/13  
2/15  
2/17  
arty  
BMB.

If liable etc

Capt

29220

SDS



RETURN TO  
INT OFFICE

PRO FORMA MESSAGE FORM

2624

OP

05 / 1 / 51

FROM: 9 DIV

TO : 20 INF BDE: 24 INF BDE: REAR DETAILS 24 INF BDE: 2/9  
CAV (CDO) REGT: 2/11 CDO SQN: RAA 9 DIV: 2/3 TK A REGT:  
RAE 9 DIV: SIGS 9 DIV: AASC 9 DIV: 2/2 MG BN: 3 OP REPORT  
TEAM: 2/9 ARMD REGT: 1 BEACH GP: 8 BASE SUB AREA: 93 EB  
AND S REGT: 4 VISITORS AND OBSERVERS SEC: CTG 75.15:  
CTU 70.1.7: 1 TAF RAAF: ALO 1 TAF RAAF (9): ALO 83 ARMY  
COOP WING: ALO 4 TAC R SQN: BBCAU: US NAVAL PORT DIRECT-  
ORATE: SRD: COMD: G: AQ: ADMS: DAPM: ADOS: CEME

G02077 (.) SECRET (.) sitrep 98 to 050900I (.) 20 inf bde (.) 2/13  
inf bn patrol TANUKI river moved to 559821 then on foot to 576795  
(.) NO enemy seen (.) 2/15 inf bn patrol up PANDURAN river reached  
KUBONG then moved overland to TRUNIU square 5515 (.) NO enemy  
seen (.) dispositions 2/17 inf bn platoon D coy returned to SERIA  
from TUTONG ferry (.) 24 inf bde (.) 2/28 inf bn patrol to track  
junction 446891 encountered 2 enemy killing one (.) standing patrol  
432887 killed 1 enemy vicinity 431885 (.) patrol at 437881 engaged  
3 enemy armed with rifles and 1 IMG (.) enemy escaped (.) active  
patrolling areas BEAUFORT MEMBAKUT KIMANIS PAPAR NO enemy seen (.)  
2/11 cdo sqn (.) patrol by prahu from BINSULOK to 315055 NO  
enemy seen all informed

2/13  
2/15  
2/17  
alt  
BMB

051700

If liable etc

*[Signature]* Capt

*[Signature]*

SDS except  
1 Beach Gp  
8 Base Sub Area



2900

PROFORMA MESSAGE FORM

01 1200I

FROM : 9 DIV

TO : 20 INF BDE: 24 INF BDE: REAR DETAILS 24 INF BDE: 2/9 CAV  
(CDO) REGT: 2/11 CDO SQN: RAA 9 DIV: 2/3 TK'A REGT:  
RAE 9 DIV: SIGS 9 DIV: AASC 9 DIV: 2/2 MG BN: 3 OP REPORT  
TEAM: 2/9 ARMD REGT: 1 BEACH GP: 8 BASE SUB AREA:  
4 VISITORS AND OBSERVERS SEC: CTG 75.15: CTU 70.1.7:  
1 TAF RAAF: AIO 1 TAF RAAF (10): ALO 83 ARMY COOP WING:  
ALO 4 TAC R SQN: BBKAU: SRD: US NAVAL PORT DIRECTORATE:  
COMD: G: AQ: ADMS: DAPM: ADOS: CEME:

-----  
GO 2457 (.) SECRET (.) SITREP 123 to 010900I (.) 20 inf bde (.)  
2/15 inf bn patrol from LIMBANG reached UKONG 302000I (.) sec  
patrol to RHUMA GANI 4495 NO report yet (.) chinese report states  
jap force now concentrated MENTAKONG 4480 (.) NO further  
move from there for last 2 days (.) 24 inf bde (.)  
small number japs seen vicinity house and b ridge 427880 (.) all  
informed

If liable etc

SDS except -  
1 BEACH GP  
8 BASE SUB AREA

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten signature]*



PRO FORMA MESSAGE FORM

FROM : 9 DIV

311015J

TO : 20 INF BDE : 24 INF BDE : 2/9 CAV (CDO) REGT : 2/11 CDO SQN :  
RAA 9 DIV : 2/3 TK A REGT : RAE 9 DIV : SIGS 9 DIV : AASC 9 DIV :  
2/2 MG BN : 3 OP REPORT TEAM : 3/9 ARMD REGT : 1 BEACH GP :  
8 BASE SUB AREA : 4 VISITORS AND OBSERVERS SEC : CTG 75.15 :  
CTU 70.1.7 : 1 TAF RAAF : ALO 1 TAF RAAF (10) : ALO 83 ARMY  
COOP WING : ALO 4 TAC R SQN : BB3AU : SRD : US NAVAL PORT  
DIRECTORATE : COMD : G : AG : ADM : DAPM : ADOS : CEMET

GO 2439 (.) SECRET (.) sitrep 122 to 310900 (.) 20 inf bde (.)  
D coy less platoon 2/15 inf bn moved from LIMBANG to UKONG following  
SRD report of japs operating in area SOUTH of UKONG (.) 24 inf bde (.)  
40 enemy seen in area bridge and house 427880 (.) one INDIAN one NEI  
PW reported in to 2/32 inf bn PAPAR (.) all informed

If liable etc

SDS except -

- 1 Aust Beach Gp
- 8 Aust Base Sub Area

*[Handwritten signature]*

2899

*[Handwritten initials]*



PRO FORMA MESSAGE FORM

301010I

FROM : 9 DIV

TO : 20 INF BDE : 24 INF BDE : REAR DETAILS 24 INF BDE : 2/9 CAV  
 (CDO) REGT : 2/11 CHO SQN : RAA 9 DIV : 2/3 TK A REGT : RAE  
 9 DIV : SIGS 9 DIV : AASC 9 DIV : 2/2 MG BN : 3 OP REPORT  
 TEAM : 2/9 ARMD REGT : 1 BEACH GP : 8 BASE SUB AREA : 4  
 VISITORS AND OBSERVERS SEC : CTG 75.15 : CTU 70.1.7 : 1 TAF  
 RAAF : ALO 1 TAF RAAF (10) : ALO 83 ARMY COOP WING : ALO  
 TAC R SQN : BBCAU : SRD : US NAVAL PORT DIRECTORATE : COMD :  
 G : AQ : ADMS : DAPM : ADOS : CEME : 3 OP REPORT TEAM

-----  
 GO 2424 (.) SECRET (.) sitrep 121 to 300900I (.) 20 inf bde (.)  
 sitnor (.) 24 inf bde (.) 25 enemy sighted vicinity 430885 and  
 house 427880 (.) all informed

2881

-----  
 GO 2424 (.) SECRET (.) sitrep 121 IF LIABLE ETC (.) 20 inf bde  
 sitnor (.) 24 inf bde (.) 25 enemy sighted vicinity 430885 and  
 house 427880 (.) all informed

*Jlu*

311500

*[Handwritten signature]*

SDS EXCEPT  
1 BEACH GP  
8 BASE SUB AREA



Return to 2nd

2870

PRO FORMA MESSAGE FORM

290950

FROM: 9 DIV

TO: 20 INF BDE: 24 INF BDE: REAR DETAILS 24 INF BDE: 2/9 CAV (CDO)  
REGT: 2/11 CDO SQN: RAA 9 DIV: 2/3 TK A REGT: RAE 9 DIV: SIGS  
9 DIV: AASC 9 DIV: 2/2 MG BN: 3 OP REPORT TEAM: 2/9 ARMD REGT:  
1 BEACH GP: 8 BASE SUB AREA: 4 VISITORS AND OBSERVERS SEC:  
CTG 75.15: CTU 70.1.7: 1 TAF RAAF: ALO 1 TAF RAAF (LO): ALO  
83 ARMY COOP WING: ALO 4 TAC R SQN: BBCAU: SRD: US NAVAL PORT  
DIRECTORATE: COMD: G: AQ: ADMS: DAPM: ADOS: CEME

-----  
GO 2410 (.) SECRET (.) sitrep 120 to 290900I (.) 20 inf bde (.) sitnor  
(.) 24 inf bde (.) some enemy movement vicinity house 427880 otherwise  
NO movement seen (.) all informed  
-----

End party

If liable etc

SDS Except -  
1 Aust Beach Gp  
8 Aust Base Sub  
Area

*As*

*Alvin Newman*  
*Pepe*

301200



*Return to sub*

PROFORMA MESSAGE FORM

2869

281100I

FROM: 9 DIV

TO : 20 INF BDE : 24 INF BDE : REAR DETAILS 24 INF BDE : 2/9 CAV (CDO)  
REGT : 2/11 CDO DCN : RAA 9 DIV : 2/3 TK A REGT : RAE 9 DIV :  
SIGS 9 DIV : AABC 9 DIV : 2/2 MG BN : 3 OP REPORT TEAM : 2/9 ARMED  
REGT : 1 BEACH GP : 8 BASE SUB AREA : 4 VISITORS AND OBSERVERS  
SEC : CTG 75.15 : CTU 70.1.7 : 1 TAF RAAF : ALO 1 TAF RAAF (10):  
ALO 83 ARMY COOP WING : ALO 4 TAC R SQN : BBCAU : SRD : US NAVAL  
PORT DIRECTORATE : COMD : G : AQ : ADMS : DAPM : ADOS : CEME :

GO 2397 (.) SECRET (.) sitrep 119 to 280900I (.) 20 inf bde (.) SITNOR  
(.) 24 inf bde (.) some movement japs vicinity house 427880 bridge  
427881 (.) otherwise NO movement seen (.) air (.) mosquito net over  
KUCHING saw one jap a/c on strip displaying red pennant and staff car  
with pennant which drove from KUCHING to LINTANG barracks (.) all  
informed

If liable etc

SDS except -

- 1 Aust Beach Gp
- 2 Aust Base Sub Area

*Gene Newman*  
*Brp*

*ens party*

*Den*

*301200*



RETURN TO INT

2741

PRO FORMA MESSAGE FORM

FROM : 9 DIV 11/11/51

TO : 20 INF BDE; 24 INF BDE; REAR DETAILS 24 INF BDE: 2/9  
 CAV (CDO) REGT: 2/11 CDO SQN: RAA 9 DIV: 2/3 TK A REGT:  
 RAE 9 DIV: SIGS 9 DIV: AASC 9 DIV: 2/2 MG BN: 3 OP  
 REPORT TEAM: 2/9 ARMD REGT: 1 BEACH GP: 8 BASE SUP AREA  
 4 VISITORS AND OBSERVERS SEC: CTG 75.15: CTU 70.1  
 1 TAF RAAF: ALO 1 TAF RAAF (10): ALO 83 ARMY COOP WING:  
 ALO 4 TAC R SQN: BRC AU: US NAVAL PORT DIRECTORATE: SRD:  
 COMD: G: AQ: ADMS: DAPM: ADOS: CEME

GO2157 (.) SECRET (.) sitrep 104 to 110900I (.) 20 inf bde (.)  
 2/13 inf bn (.) 1255 hours one enemy sighted at 455779 (.) artillery  
 shelled general area (.) later patrol to 456779 reported NO enemy  
 seen (.) 2/15 inf bn patrol to UKONG returned LIMBANG 9 aug NO  
 enemy seen (.) 24 inf bde (.) relief of 2/28 inf bn by  
 2/43 inf bn continued (.) 2/43 inf bn assumed command PADAS river  
 area (.) standing patrol 431887 engaged and killed 2 enemy vicinity  
 430884 (.) patrols BEAUFORT MEMBAKUT PAPAR areas NO contact (.)  
 air 24 kittyhawks dropped belly tank bombs and strafed enemy positions  
 vicinity 430884 (.) bombs in target area (.) strafing very accurate  
 (.) dispositions 2/28 inf bn HQ 372894 B coy 367903 (.) 2/43 inf bn  
 HQ 411893 A coy less platoon 427895 platoon 428890 (.)  
 7 div (.) BATOCHAMPAR sector (.) active patrolling continues (.)  
 TEMPADONG sector (.) patrol PAMALEOAN square 4188 engaged 4  
 indonesians wearing enemy uniforms some casualties inflicted 1 PW  
 taken (.) enemy casualties to date counted dead 1764 estimated  
 killed 249 PW 62 all informed

If liable etc

*M. Collins Capt.*

SDS - except:

1 Beach Gp

8 Base Sub Area

4/13  
 2/15  
 2/17  
 arty  
 Bomb.

131030



RETURN to INT SEC

2707

PRO FORMA MESSAGE FORM

1011101

FROM: - 9 DIV

TO: 20 INF BDE: 24 INF BDE: REAR DETAILS 24 INF BDE: 2/9 CAV (CDO)  
REGT: 2/11 CDO SQN: RAA 9 DIV: 2/3 TK A REGT: RAE 9 DIV: SIGS  
9 DIV: AASC 9 DIV: 2/2 MG BN: 3 OP REPORT TEAM: 2/9 ARMD REGT:  
4 VISITORS & OBSERVERS SEC: CTG 75.15: CTU 70.1.7: 1 TAF RAAF:  
ALO 1 TAF RAAF (10): ALO 83 ARMY COOP WING: ALO 4 TAC R SQN:  
BBCAU; US NAVAL PORT DIRECTORATE: SRD: COMD: G: AQ: ADMS: DAPM:  
ADOS: CEME:

-----  
GO 2148 (.) SECRET (.) sitrep 103 to 1009001 (.) 20 inf bde (.) disposi-  
tions 2/13 inf bn C coy from PUJUT relieved A coy on CANADA feature (.)  
8 aug 2/17 inf bn patrol route 687717 to 676722 to track junction 676732  
on well defined track report NO sign reported telephone lines or recent  
enemy movement (.) 24 inf bde (.) relief of 2/28 inf bn by 2/43 inf bn  
commenced (.) C coy 2/43 inf bn relieved C coy 2/28 inf bn (.) 2/28 inf  
bn standing patrol at 431887 killed 3 enemy vicinity house 431884 (.)  
other patrols NO enemy seen (.) 2/43 inf bn patrols BEAUFORT MEMBAKUT  
areas NO enemy seen (.) 2/32 inf bn local patrols BONGAWAN KIMNIS PAPAR  
areas NO enemy seen (.) total enemy casualties 3 killed (.) dispositions  
last light 9 aug (.) 2/28 inf bn C coy 375891 (.) 2/43 inf bn C coy less  
platoon 435889 standing patrol 431887 (.) 2/11 cdo sqn (.) patrols SABANG  
to KARUKAN and in BINSULOK area NO enemy seen (.) 2/3 tk A regt (.) 2 day  
reconnaissance patrol by FBE to LAKATAN river returned WESTON NO enemy  
seen (.) BALIKPAPAN (.) SEPINGGANG MANGGAR sector (.) dispositions 2/16  
inf bn D coy 798887 (.) patrol AMBORAWANG to trig 73 690785 encountered  
9 enemy 689786 killed 7 (.) BATOCHAMPAR sector (.) dispositions 2/6 cdo  
sqn area 615744 (.) patrol from 609819 cut MILFORD HIGHWAY 609835 (.)  
reported two 25mm AA guns engaged patrol from area 604840 and 2 enemy  
seen on highway (.) patrol from 617757 killed 1 enemy 616766 (.) standing  
patrol 618762 engaged by enemy from 618764 (.) enemy position 619765  
engaged with artillery and mortar fire (.) TEMPADONG PENADJAM sector (.)  
2/1 pnr bn patrol to 562836 located abandoned bunkers moved to 563837  
and encountered approx 30 enemy freshly dug in (.) 3 enemy killed and  
position engaged with artillery fire (.) total enemy casualties to date  
counted dead amended progressive total 1752 estimated killed 249 PW 61  
(.) all informed  
-----

If liable etc

SDS, except 1 Beach Gp  
and 8 Base Sub Area

*William B. A.*

2/13  
2/15  
4/17  
Bunk



RETURN to INT OFFICE

2691

PRO FORMA MESSAGE FORM

FROM: 9 DIV

TO: 20 AUST INF BDE: 24 INF BDE: REAR DETAILS 24 INF BDE: 2/9 CAV (CDO) REGT: 2/11 CDO SQN: RAA 9 DIV: 2/3 TK REGT: RAE 9 DIV: SIGS 9 DIV: AASC 9 DIV: 2/2 MG BN: 3 OP REPORT TEAM: 2/9 ARMD REGT: 1 BEACH GP: 8 BASE SUB AREA: 593 EB & SR: 4 VISITORS & OBSERVERS SEC: CTG 75.15: CTU 70.1.7: 1 TAF RAAF: ALO 1 TAF RAAF(10) ALO 83 ARMY COOP WING: ALO 4 TAC R SQN: BBKAU : US NAVAL PORT DIRECTORATE: SRD: COMD: G: AQ: ADMS: DAPM: ADOS: CEME

GO 2104 (.) SECRET (.) sitrep 100 to 070900I (.) 20 inf bde (.) 2/13 inf bn patrol to house 411785 returned reported NO enemy seen (.) 2/15 inf bn patrol BATU APOI river reached KUBONG NO contact (.) 2/17 inf bn patrolling BAKONG area NO further report (.) 2/2 MG bn relief of B coy by A coy now complete (.) 24 inf bde (.) 2/28 inf bn patrol found 2 enemy dead at 432887 (.) patrol to area 439906 NO enemy seen (.) dispositions standing patrol at 424885 withdrawn to coy area 408891 (.) 2/43 inf bn patrolling BEAUFORT MEMBAKUT area NO enemy seen (.) 2/32 inf bn patrolling BONGAWAM KIMANIS PAPAR area NO enemy seen (.) natives report 1 enemy dead dressed in native clothes found at 658376 believed enemy wounded 2 aug in tunnel area (.) BALIKPAPAN (.) SEPINGGANG MANGGAR sector (.) patrols encountered enemy at 898012 900016 inflicting casualties (.) dispositions 2/27 inf bn A coy 722700 B coy 753682 (.) BATOCHAMPAR sector (.) patrol encountered 3 enemy 617757 killing 2 (.) further enemy party engaged 619759 (.) dispositions 2/33 inf bn (.) HQ 595649 A and D coys 599647 B and C coys 595646 (.) TEMPADONG sector (.) patrols encountered enemy at 534807 and 533792 inflicting casualties (.) total enemy casualties to date counted dead 1700 estimated killed 242 PW 62 (.) all informed

If liable etc

SDS except

1 Beach Gp  
8 Base Sub Area

Capt

092200

2/13  
2/15  
2/17  
arty  
Kump



ONLY COPY. PLEASE RETURN  
TO I OFFICE.

gpo

2672

FROM : 9 DIV

TO : 20 INF BDE : 24 INF BDE : REAR DETAILS 24 INF BDE : 2/9 CAV  
(CDO) REGT : 2/11 CDO SQN : RAA 9 DIV : 2/3 TR A REGT : RAE  
9 DIV : SIG 9 DIV : AASC 9 DIV : 2/2 LG BN : 3 OP TROOP TEAM  
2/9 ARMD REGT : 1 BRANCH GP : 8 BASE SUB AREA : 593 50 AND S  
REGT : 4 VI INFORS : 1L OBTIVIS SPC : CTG 75.15 : CTU 70.1.7  
1 TAF RAAF : ALO 1 TAF RAAF (10) : ALO 83 ARMY COOP TING :  
ALO 4 T/C R SQN : BBCAU : 13 NAVAL POL : 11 P/COI ATE : SED :  
COMD : G : AQ : ADMS : DATA : ADOS : CURE

GO 2123 (.) SECRET (.) sitrep 101 to 080900I (.) 20 inf bde (.)  
2/13 inf bn patrol with FOO moved from 422851 to 424818 along track  
to 437803 to 441796 thence 448793 and along track to 453780 to 441784  
thence NORTH to RIAM road 457802 and back to SP NO enemy seen (.)  
patrol from 401813 along NIAH road to 405795 412799 thence via track  
along LOAK river to SOUTH BOLL NO reports as yet (.) 2/15 inf bn  
patrol BATU APOI river last reported RUBONG has now arrived LIMBANG (.)  
1 dead jap found RUBONG (.) patrol returned LIMBANG from TIEHAK  
KIGATAI area NO details (.) 2/17 inf bn patrol returned from BAKING  
NO enemy seen (.) total enemy casualties to date counted dead 235  
estimated killed 51 PW 69 (.) 24 inf bde (.) 2/28 inf bn disposition  
A coy standing patrol re-established 424835 (.) standing patrol fired  
on 2 enemy vicinity house 431885 killed 1 (.) other patrols NO enemy  
seen (.) 2/43 inf bn patrols BEAUFORT MEMBATUS area NO enemy seen (.)  
2/32 inf bn patrols BONGAWAN KIMANIS PAPAR areas NO enemy seen (.)  
enemy casualties 1 killed (.) 2/11 cdo sqn patrols 180154 to SABANG  
and PILPIG to BINSUBON NO enemy seen (.) 2/3 tk A regt 2 day recce  
patrol to LAKATAM river returned NO enemy seen (.) BALIKPAPAN (.)  
L PINGGANG MANGGAR sector long range patrol SALBODJA area last report  
enemy encountered 690898 killed 2 (.) other patrols NO enemy seen (.)  
BATOCANJAP sector coy patrol encountered enemy 619759 1 killed (.)  
enemy ambush located 616766 own casualties 1 wounded (.) TITPADEONG  
PINDJAM sector active patrolling contact made 530853 (.) patrol to  
428855 released 63 indian PW (.) 5 indian PW arrived SALBODJA (.)  
total enemy casualties to date counted dead 1730 estimated killed 247  
PW 61

If liable etc

SIS except 1 Branch Gp  
8 Base Sub Area

1900



PROFORMA MILITARY REPORT FORM  
RETURN to INT SEC

2641

FROM : 9 DIV

only copy

TO : 20 INF BDE : 24 INF BDE : REAR DETAILS 24 INF BDE : 2/9 CAV  
(CDO) REGT : 2/11 CDO SQN : RAA 9 DIV : 2/3 TK A REGT : RAE  
9 DIV : SIGS 9 DIV : AASC 9 DIV : 2/2 MG BN : 3 OP REPORT  
TEAM : 2/9 ARMD REGT : 1 BEACH GP : 8 BASE SUB AREA : 593 EB  
AND S REGT : 4 VISITORS AND OBSERVERS SEC : CTG 75.15 : CTU  
70.1.7 : 1 TAF RAAF : ALO 1 TAF RAAF (10) : ALO 83 ARMY COOP  
WING : ALO 4 TAC R SQN : BBCAU : US NAVAL PORT DIRECTORATE :  
SRD : COMD : G : AQ : ADMS : DAPM : ADOS : CEME

-----  
G02088 (.) SECRET (.) sitrep 99 to 060900I (.) 20 inf bde (.) 2/13 inf  
bn patrol up the TANIKU river reached BT KUBOR 559758 (.) 3 enemy seen  
this area (.) natives report track runs EAST from BT KUBOR to ARANG  
river (.) patrol returned FUJUT 5 aug (.) platoon patrol with FOO from  
SOUTH KNOLL down RIAM road to 437776 (.) patrol saw 1 enemy vicinity  
house 441784 (.) arty engaged (.) NO further movement seen (.) 1620I  
patrol left SOUTH KNOLL to investigate report of 9 enemy vicinity  
house 411785 (.) 2/15 inf bn patrol up PANDARUAN river reached KUBONG  
returned overland through TRUNKU 5515 to LIMBANG (.) report NO enemy  
in area (.) patrol up BATU APOI river reached SELEPAN last reported  
vicinity 6711 NO enemy seen (.) dispositions 2/17 inf bn D coy less pl  
688716 pl 7960 (.) 2/2 MG bn pl A coy relieved pl B coy 905039 (.)  
24 inf bde (.) 2/28 inf bn patrol encountered enemy vicinity 439906 (.)  
following artillery concentration patrol moved forward probably killed  
1 enemy (.) patrol engaged by enemy from flanks NO casualties (.)  
patrols BEAUFORT MEMBAKUT PAPAR areas NO contact (.) BALIKPAPAN (.)  
SEPINGGANG MANGGAR sector (.) dispositions B coy 2/14 inf bn AMBORAWANG  
(.) BATOCHAMPAR sectors (.) night 4/5 aug enemy attempted infiltration  
artillery positions 639695 638694 (.) 4 enemy killed (.) dispositions  
2/5 cdo sqn 634718 (.) 2/1 pnr bn 616755 (.) 2/31 inf bn C coy 645689 (.)  
TEMPADEONG sector (.) patrol contacted 3 enemy 509813 who withdrew (.)  
patrol to 537805 encountered approximately 50 enemy (.) all informed  
-----

If liable etc

SDS except

1 BEACH GP

8 BASE SUB AREA.

*Albion's Capt.*

06/800

2/13 -  
2/15 -  
2/17 -  
BMB  
arty



RETURN

TO INT SEC

PRO FORM MESSAGE FORM

2604

FROM: 9 DIV

TO: 20 INF BDE; 24 INF BDE; REAR DETAILS 24 INF BDE; 2/9 CAV (CDO)  
REGT: 2/11 CDO SQ; RAA 9 DIV; 2/3 TK A REGT; RAE 9 DIV; SIGS  
9 DIV; AASC 9 DIV; 2/2 MG BN; 3 OP REPORT TEAM; 2/9 ARMD REGT;  
1 BEACH GP; C BASE SUB AREA; 93 EB & SR; 4 VISITORS & OBSERVER  
SEC: CTG 75.15; CTU 70.1.7; 1 TAF RAAF; ALO 1 TAF RAAF (C);  
ALO 83 ARMY COOP WING; ALO 4 TAC R SQN; BBCAU; US NAVAL PORT  
DIRECTORATE; SRD; COMD: G: AQ; ADMS; DAPM; ADOS; GEME;

GO 2060 (.) SECRET (.) sitrep 97 to 040900I (.) 20 inf bde (.) 2/15  
inf bn patrol from LIMBANG by LCM to limit navigable BATU APOI river  
then by prahu to K SELEPAN WEST along track to ANGGUN 6709 to KUBONG  
5911 to return LIMBANG 6 aug (.) patrol from LIMBANG by LCM up PANDUR-  
AN river to KUBONG then NW along track to PUASH 5217 then return LIM-  
BANG (.) patrol from LAWAS to MERAPOK 0946 SINDUMIN MALAMAN to return 6  
aug (.) 2/17 inf bn patrol from 689715 to 693697 thence inland track  
to 699691 (.) patrol demolished previously reported enemy built tunnels  
(.) returned same route NO enemy seen (.) 24 inf bde (.) 2/23 inf bn  
listening post at 436887 engaged 4 enemy killing 2 (.) later patrol  
moved EAST encountered 16 enemy at 437887 killing 6 (.) further patrol  
found 2 enemy dead in same area (.) patrolling continues in areas  
BEAUFORT PAPAR KIMANIS (.) KIMANIS railway bridge now open to light  
traffic (.) BALIKPAPAN (.) SEPINGGANG MANGGAR sector (.) 2/16 inf bn  
dispositions HQ 801888 A coy 793882 B coy 795871 C coy 801877 D coy  
803883 (.) minor patrol (engagements reported at 695748 694750 696715 (.)  
TEMPADEONG sector (.) patrol encountered enemy approx one platoon at  
521808 (.) artillery shelled position (.) total enemy casualties to  
date counted dead 1687 estimated killed 240 PW 60 (.) all informed

2/13  
2/10  
2/17  
arty  
amb

If liable etc

Capt

SDS except

1 Beach Co

8 Base Sub Area

aug 1850



RETURN TO INT SEC

2603  
03 11 51

PRO FORMA MESSAGE FORM

FROM : 9 DIV  
TO : 20 INF BDE: 24 INF BDE: REAR DETAILS 24 INF BDE: 2/9 CAV  
(CDO) REGT: 2/11 CDO SQN: RAA 9 DIV: 2/3 TK A REGT: RAE  
9 DIV: SIGS 9 DIV: AASC 9 DIV: 2/2 MG BN: 30P REPORT TEAM:  
2/9 ARMD REGT: 1 BEACH GP: 8 BASE SUB AREA: 593 EB AND S  
REGT: 4 VISITORS AND OBSERVERS SEC: CTG 75.15: CTU 70.1.7:  
1 TAF RAAF: ALO TAF RAAF (9): ALO 83 ARMY COOP WING: ALO  
4 TAC R SQN: BBCU: US NAVAL PORT DIRECTORATE: SRD: COMD:  
G: AQ: ADMS: DAFM: ADOS: CEME

-----  
G020-7 (.) SECRET (.) sitrep 96 to 030900I (.) 20 bde (.) 2 aug  
2/13 inf bn platoon patrol from PUJUT by canoe up MIRI RIVER then  
TANIKI RIVER to search for track leading BAKONG (.) 1210I patrol  
reported at 533878 NO enemy seen (.) 2/15 inf bn river patrol to  
UKONG returned LIMBANG NO enemy seen (.) 2/17 inf bn patrol from  
SIMBANG along track to KAMPAR 9581 thence along track NORTH bank  
REMPAYUH RIVER to TELINGAN returned NO enemy seen (.) patrols BAKONG  
MARUDI area NO contact (.) 24 bde (.) 2/28 inf bn OP observed 4  
enemy digging in at 430884 (.) position engaged with mortars (.)  
enemy still in position (.) patrol to 440903 came under fire from  
estimated 12 enemy (.) 1 enemy killed 1 wounded and artillery engaged  
area (.) 2/32 inf bn (.) standing patrol at 632362 observed what  
appeared to be native with walking stick moving SOUTH along railway  
line (.) patrol to investigate was fired on from side of railway line.  
(.) area engaged with SAA and grenades (.) patrols BEAUFORT MEMBAKUT  
area NO enemy seen (.) 2/2 MG bn patrolling areas BENTUKA KARUKAN NO  
enemy seen (.) 2/3 tk A regt patrol to 353756 returned NO contact (.)  
BALIKPAPAN (.) SEPINGGANG MANGGAR sector (.) dispositions coy HQ  
and one platoon NEI 803876 platoon LAMA platoon BAROE (.) 2/16 inf bn  
(.) A coy 801883 C coy 801880 (.) all patrols throughout sector NO  
enemy seen (.) BATOCHAMPAR sector (.) 2/5 cdo sqn maintain contact  
area 617757 all informed  
-----

2/13  
2/15  
2/17  
arty  
Bmb

If liable

M. H. ...

SDS

04/1850



2580

PRO FORMA MESSAGE FORM

021451

FROM : 9 DIV

TO: 20 INF BDE : 24 INF BDE : REAR DETAILS 24 INF BDE : 2/9 CAV  
(CDO) REGT : 2/11 CDO SQN : RAA 9 DIV : 2/3 TK A REGT :  
RAE 9 DIV : SIGS 9 DIV : AASC 9 DIV : 2/2 MG BN : 3 OP REPORT  
TEAM : 2/9 ARMD REGT : 1 BEACH GP : 8 BASE SUB AREA : 593 E B  
& S REGT : 4 VISTORS AND OBSERVERS SEC : CTG 75.15 : 1 TAF  
RAAF : ALO 1 TAF RAAF (9) ALO 83 ARMY COOP WING : ALO 4 TAS R  
SQN : BBKAU : US NAVAL PORT DIRECTORATE : SRD : COMD : G : AQ :  
ADMS : DAPM : ADOS : CEME:

-----  
G02023 (.) SECRET (.) sitrep 95 to 020900I (.) 20 bde (.)  
2/13 inf bn patrol down RIAM rd to 436793 to 438780 returned  
NO enemy seen (.) 2/15 inf bn patrol to RAMBAI returned BRUNEI  
NO movement seen (.) dispositions 2/17 inf bn D coy less two pls  
less one sec 7960 two pls and one sec 688716 (.) 24 bde (.)  
2/28 inf bn patrol engaged 7 enemy at 430885 killed 3 (.) enemy  
returned fire with one HMG two LMG and rifles from same area (.)  
2/43 inf bn patrol BEAUFORT MIM BAKUT area no enemy seen (.)  
2/32 inf bn standing patrol killed 3 enemy moving south at  
633363 (.) other patrols PAPUA KIMANIS BONGAWAN areas no enemy seen  
(.) 2/3 tk A regt active patrolling LUMADAN ESTATE area and down  
BUKAU river (.) BALIKPAPAN (.) SEPINGGANG MANGGAR sector (.)  
report of 100 enemy moving from MOEARAJOWA square 0304 to BAROE  
square 8987 (.) patrol NEI coy moved to BAROE (.) dispositions  
2/16 inf bnA coy AMBORAWANG (.) coy SAMBODJA (.) BATOCHAMPAR  
sector (.) 2/5 cdo sqn maintain contact at 617758 (.) TEMPADEONG  
sector (.) approx 50 enemy attacked our positions at 517796 (.)  
attack repulsed with losses to enemy (.) other patrols NO enemy  
seen (.) total enemy casualties to date counted dead 1673  
estimated dead 240 PW 58 all informed  
-----

if liable etc

*J.H. Coates Capt.*

1635 SDS except  
1 Beach Gp  
8 Base sub-area



RETURN TO INT SEC

only copy

2554  
A

PERFORMA MESSAGE FORM

11135 J

FROM: 9 DIV

TO: 20 INF BDE : 24 INF BDE : REAR DETAILS 24 INF BDE : 2/9 CAV  
(CDO) REGT : 2/11 CDO SQN : RAA 9 DIV : 2/3 TK A REGT : RAE 9  
DIV : SIGS 9 DIV : AASC 9 DIV : 2/2 MG BN : 3 OP REPORT TEAM :  
2/9 ARMD REGT : 1 BEACH GP : 8 BASE SUB AREA : 593 E B & S REGT :  
4 VISITORS AND OBSERVERS SEC : CTG 75.15 : CTU 70.1.7 : 1 TAF  
RAAF : ALO 1 TAF RAAF : ALO 83 ARMY COOP WING : ALO 4 TAC R SQN :  
BBCAU : US NAVAL PORT DIRECTORATE : SRD : COMD : G : AQ : ADMS :  
DAPM : ADOS : CELE :

-----  
GOL994 (.) SECRET (.) sitrep 94 to 010900I (.) 20 bde (.) 2/15 inf bn  
patrol with FOO from MIRI to square 4478 searched area returned (.) NO  
enemy seen (.) 2/15 bn patrol from LAWAS moved on foot to MALAPAN 2351  
via SINDUMIN (.) returned NO enemy seen (.) junction made with 2/3  
tk A regt at SINDUMIN (.) 31 jul routine patrol left LIMBANG for UKONG  
(.) 2/17 bn section patrol from 690715 to 694699 then by inland track  
to 699691 NO details (.) air (.) 310545I one unidentified plane passed  
over BRUNEL from NORTH (.) total enemy casualties to date 234 counted  
dead 51 estimated dead 69 PW (.) 24 bde (.) active patrolling continues  
in areas PAPAR PINANIS BANGAWAN BEAUFORT NO enemy seen (.) 2/28 bn  
report patrol clash EAST BEAUFORT 1 enemy killed (.) 2/3 tk A regt  
patrol to MESAPOI 195645 (.) NO contact (.) general patrolling SIPITANG  
area NO enemy seen (.) BALIIPARAN (.) SEPINGGANG MANGAAR sector (.)  
NEI patrol reached 043049 ref map MANAIAN delta sheet C (.) encountered  
two enemy river guard house (.) house destroyed 1 enemy killed (.)  
BATOCHAMPAR sector (.) patrol to 626754 killed one enemy (.) 2/5  
cdo sqn maintain contact with enemy (.) total enemy casualties to  
date (.) counted dead 1668 estimated killed 280 PW 58 (.) all  
informed  
-----

If liable etc  
M. G. Lewis Capt

SDS  
except 1 Beach C  
8 Base Sub Area

2/13  
2/15  
2/17  
arty  
Bmb

021440



# FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

Army Form W.3008  
(Adapted) (Page 1)  
(Revised Jan., 1943)

39 / 45 (Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 4 / 8 / 1945 (Unit)

W.E. 11 / 8 / 4 OFFRS. 39 O.R's. 66 + OFFRS. 0 O.R's. = ATT. BY W.E.

## PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.								
Rein'fts Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Rein'fts Required.				
			1	* BRIGADIER * Lieut.-Colonels Majors Captains Lieutenants Quarter-masters A.A.N.S. and A.A.M.W.S. Offrs. Civilians Counting as Offrs.									
IR IR	1 1	1	1 10 6										
IR	8	1	18										
		DETAIL		A.I.P.	C.M.F.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.N.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	**	TOTAL.
		A.A.	18										18
		E.(1)											
		E.(2)											

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 10 of instructions for compilation of form will complete Part E(1) & E(2).

\* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.  
\*\* Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

## PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

### OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit From.	Date.	CAUSE.

### OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit To.	Date.	CAUSE.
1034800	MAJ	HARRIS G W	EVAC TO B/S UNIT	23-7-45	TOD TO "Y" LINE AT 10 AM OVER NIGHT DAYS.

## PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO (Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. / / 194

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).



**PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON POSTED STRENGTH**

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 4/3/1945 (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	Army Number.	Surname.	Initials.	Posting.	Whether present with Unit (insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	Date of Detachment.
Brig	10300	WINDYER	WV	COB	Y		
Maj	10300	HILL	AJ	BI	"		
Capt	10307	WINDYER	IG	BI L	"		
Capt	11100	TAT WILLS	B	SO	"		
Capt	10304	CLARKE	D	SO L	"		
Capt	103004	MURRAY	J	SO	"		
Capt	10300	GRAY-DUGLASS	JL	SO	"		
Capt	103490	HAIR	BI	SO I	"		
Lt	103400	HAIR	JV	SO II	"		
Lt	10300	GILLES	IG	SO III	"		
Capt	103100	SLAP	BI	SO	"		
Capt	1031000	BAIR	OD	SO	"		
Lt	103400	HILLIS	LS	SO	"		
Lt	103700	LOVELL	BA	SO O	"		
Lt	103000	GILMER	PO	SO	"		
Lt	103000	BARLAD	J	SO	"		
Capt	103000	LAKE	OS	SLAP	NO	DET 2/15 HI	9.6.44
Capt	103000	BLACKWELL	GE	"	"	DET 2/17 HI	10.2.44

**PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.**

Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank, if Held.	Army Number.	Name and Initials.	Unit.	Date of Attachment.	Nature of Attachment.
Capt	1031000	FERGUSON R	41 Sqn AL	see 4.5.45.	CHIEF A/P

Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander







**PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 4 / 8 / 1945 .**

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.
Ammunition Examiners				Surveyors, Engineering				Operating Room Assis.				G.P.O. Assistants			
Armament Artificer Fitter				Surveyors, R.A.A.				Operator, Keyboard				Hammermen			
Armament Artificer Fitter (Electrical)				Surveyors, Topographical				Operator, Line				Leather Stitchers			
Armament Artificer Fitter (M.V.)				Surveyors, Trigonometrical				Operator, Signal				Orderlies, Nursing			
Armament Artificer Fitter (A.F.V.)				Toolmakers				Operator, Switchboard				Orderlies, Nursing Mental			
Armament Artificer Instrument				Turners				Operator, Wireless				Plate Layers			
Armament Artificer Radio				Watchmakers				Opticians				Rangetakers			
Armament Artificer Signals				Welders				Painters				Rivettors			
Armament Artificer Wireless								Panel Beaters				Roughriders			
Artificer, Artillery								Photographer, Dry Plate				Saddlers			
Artificer, Engine								Predictor Numbers				Saddletree makers			
Blacksmiths								Printers				Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
Bricklayers								Radiographers				Stevedores			
Computers								Riggers				Stokers, Staty. Engine			
Cooks, Hospital				GROUP II.				Sawyers				Storemen, Technical			
Coppersmiths				Armourers				Signallers				Tailors			
Dispensers				Axemen				Signwriters				Textile Refitters			
Draughtsmen				Bakers				Telescope Identfn. Numbers				Tinsmiths			
Draughtsmen (Architectural)				Bty. Comd's. Asst.				Well Borers				Vulcanizers			
Draughtsmen (Engineering)				Boilermakers				Wheelers				Wagon Erectors			
Draughtsmen (Mechanical)				Carpenters				Winchman				Whitesmiths			
Draughtsmen (Topographical)	2	2	-	Carpenters and Joiners				Wireman							
Electricians				Cooks	3	4	-	Woodturners							
Electricians (M.V.)				Dental Mechanics											
Electricians (Signals)				Driver-Mech. (Eng. and Med.)											
Fitters				Driver-Operator											
Fitters (Cycle)				Drainers											
Fitters (Electrical)				Electricians											
Fitters (Gun)				Electricians (Engineers)											
Fitters (Instrument)				Fire Control Operators				GROUP III.							
Fitters (M.V.)				Gun Operator				Battery Surveyors							
Fitters, Railway Signal				Hatchman				Batchers							
Fitters, Signals				Height Taker				Clerks	4	4	-				
Grinder, Precision				Helio Operator				Clerks, Supply							
Mechanics, Instrument				Instrument Operator				Clerks, Technical							
Mechanics, Instrument (Signals)				Intelligence Duties	4	4	-	Coach Trimmers							
Mechanics, Instrument (Surgical)				Joiners				Concretors							
Mechanics, Radio				Lineman				Cooks							
Mechanics, Typewriter				Lineman, Signals				Dental Clerk Orderlies							
Mechanics, Wireless				Lithographers				Despatch Riders							
Millwrights				Machinists, Metal				Draughtsmen, Signals							
Operators, Excavator				Machinists, Wood				Drivers, H.T.							
Pattern Maker				Masons				Driver Mechanics							
Pharmacist				Masseurs				Driver Twtm. Plant							
Photographer, Wet Plate				Mechanics, M.T.				Engine Hands, I.C.							
Photewriter				Miners				Equipment Repairers							
Plumber				Moulders				Farriers							
Saw Doctors				Nurses, Trained				Fitters' Mates							
Surveyors				Observation Post Assts.				Gun Layers							
CARRIED FORWARD	2	2	-	CARRIED FORWARD	9	10	-	CARRIED FORWARD	13	14	-	Totals of columns marked * to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 1 and 10 of Part A. respectively.	66	69	NR

NOTES.—(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.  
 (b) Authorised trades or specialists not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.  
 (c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are desired show details on back.  
 (d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of N.E. in col. "Reints. Required."  
 (e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander

Capt



**FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS**

At 0000 Hrs Saturday 1944 (Unit)

W.M. 4 Aug  
 OFFER + OFFER - O.R.'s ATT BY W.E.

Part A. Posted Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements Required.

**PARTICULARS OF NCOS**

UNIT	RANK	WE	PS	SURP			DEF
				Posted Strength	Number to W.E.	Detached W.E.	
INT DUTIES	S Sjt	1	1				
	CPL	2	2				
CLERKS	WO II	1	1				
	CPL	1	1				
TRANSPORT	Sjt	1	1				
	CPL	1	1				
GENERAL DUTIES	CPL	2	2				
CQMS	S Sjt	1	2	1			
CSM	WO II	1	1				
<p>Analysis of Part A to be shown here by All Units. Only units notified in part 7 of in-Details for completion of this return will complete analysis of Part B(1) and B(2). * Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in the C.M. Particulars will be shown on D.M. Form 10 N.E. Form.</p>							
<p>Part B. Other Ranks Attached from Other Units</p>							
AAAS	Sjt	1	1				
<p>Part C. Other Ranks included in Part A Detached to Other Units</p>							
AAAS	Sjt	1	-				1
AAAS	CPL	-	1				1
AAAC	CPL	1	1				
AAAL	CPL	1	1				
AAAM	CPL	1	1				
AAAN	CPL	1	1				
AAAO	Sjt	1	-				1
AAAO	S Sjt	-	1	1			
Totals		18	19	3			2

**DETAILS OF SURPLUS NCOS**

ARMY NO	RANK	NAME	TRADE	MED CLASSIFICATION
NX118629	S Sjt	PACKETT GW	CQMS	A1
NX150236	S Sjt	GARTRELL J	AMN EXMN	A1 (posted for duty as Amn Exmn)
NX91053	CPL	ROWLAND JL	AMENITIES	A1 (posted for duty as Amenities Sjt)



# FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

Army Form W.3008  
(Adapted) (Page 1)  
(Revised Jan., 1943)  
30 / 45 (Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 11/8/1945 Hq 20 Aust Inf Bde (Unit)

W.E. 112 / 4 OFFRS. 19 O.R.'s 66 + OFFRS. - O.R.'s - ATT. BY W.E.

## PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.									
1	2	3	4		5	6	7	8	9	10				
Rein'ts Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Rein'ts Required.					
NR	1	1	1		* BRIGADIER* Lieut.-Colonels Majors Captains Lieutenants Quarter-masters A.A.N.S. and A.A.M.W.S. Offrs. Civilians Counting as Offrs.									
NR	1	1	10 6											
NR	2	2	19											
				DETAIL	A.I.F.	C.M.F.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.N.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	**	TOTAL.
Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 10 of instructions for compilation of form will complete Part E(1) & E(2).				A <sup>1</sup> A. Class	19									19
				E.(1)										
				E.(2)										

\* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.  
\*\* Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

## PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

### OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit From.	Date.	CAUSE.
NX34810	MAJ	HAMMOND CV	From 2/12 Fd Amb	6.8.45.	EX Hospital

### OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit To.	Date.	CAUSE.

## PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO.....(Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. .... / ..... / 194.....

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).



PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON POSTED STRENGTH

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 11/8/1945 (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	Army Number.	Surname.	Initials.	Posting.	Whether present with Unit (insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	Date of Detachment.
Brig	NX396	WINDEYER	WJV	Comd	Yes		
Maj	NX380	HILL	AJ	BM	"		
Capt	SX6157	WORTHLEY	MG	IM L	"		
Capt	VX11806	TAIT WILLS	E	SC	"		
Capt	QX364	GLASGOW	D	SC L	"		
Capt	NX20884	MURRAY	J	IO	"		
Capt	QX8622	GRAY-BUCHANAN	J I	TO	"		
Capt	NX14840	HAIN	HH	LO I	"		
Lt	NX14881	RYAN	JW	LO II	"		
Lt	QX2990	CHILDS	HG	LO III	"		
Capt	NX110824	BARR	GD	LSC	"		
Capt	VX21165	SHARP	KH	BASCO	"		
Lt	VX74111	MILLIS	LS	BOO	"		
Lt	SX5722	LOVELL	RA	HYG O	"		
Lt	NX19900	GILMOUR	PG	AO	"		
Lt	NX28056	HARLAND	J	BO	"		
Maj	NX34800	HAMMOND	CW	CHAP	No	Det 2/13 Bn	6.8.45.
Capt	QX22994	LAKE	GS	"	"	Det 2/15 Bn	9.6.44.
Capt	QX53993	BLACKWELL	GK	"	"	Det 2/17 Bn	10.1.45.

PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	Army Number.	Name and Initials.	Unit.	Date of Attachment.	Nature of Attachment.
Capt	NX34802	FERGUSON R	41 Sqn	AL Sec 4.5.45.	GTH Air

12 Aug 45

Date of Despatch

*Clayton Clouston* Capt  
Signature of Commander  
SC 20 Aust Inf Bde







**PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 11 / 8 / 1945.**

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.
Ammunition Examiners				Surveyors, Engineering				Operating Room Assts.				G.P.O. Assistants			
Armament Artificer Fitter				Surveyors, R.A.A.				Operator, Keyboard				Hammermen			
Armament Artificer Fitter (Electrical)				Surveyors, Topographical				Operator, Line				Leather Stitchers			
Armament Artificer Fitter (M.V.)				Surveyors, Trigonometrical				Operator, Signal				Orderlies, Nursing			
Armament Artificer Fitter (A.F.V.)				Toolmakers				Operator, Switchboard				Orderlies, Nursing Mental			
Armament Artificer Instrument				Turners				Operator, Wireless				Plate Layers			
Armament Artificer Radio				Watchmakers				Opticians				Bangetakers			
Armament Artificer Signals				Welders				Painters				Rivetters			
Armament Artificer Wireless								Panel Beaters				Roughriders			
Artificer, Artillery								Photographer, Dry Plate				Saddlers			
Artificer, Engine								Predictor Numbers				Saddletree makers			
Blacksmiths								Printers				Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
Bricklayers								Radiographers				Stevedores			
Computers								Riggers				Stokers, Staty. Engine			
Cooks, Hospital				GROUP II.				Sawyers				Storemen, Technical			
Coppersmiths				Armourers				Signallers				Tailors			
Dispensers				Axemen				Signwriters				Textile Reftters			
Draughtsmen				Bakers				Telescope Identfn. Numbers				Tinsmiths			
Draughtsmen (Architectural)				Bty. Comd's Asst.				Well Borers				Vulcanizers			
Draughtsmen (Engineering)				Bollermakers				Wheelers				Wagon Erectors			
Draughtsmen (Mechanical)				Carpenters				Winchman				Whitesmiths			
Draughtsmen (Topographical)	2	2	-	Carpenters and Joiners				Wireman							
Electricians				Cooks	3	4	-	Woodturners							
Electricians (M.V.)				Dental Mechanics											
Electricians (Signals)				Driver-Mech. (Eng. and Med.)											
Fitters				Driver-Operator											
Fitters (Cycle)				Drainers											
Fitters (Electrical)				Electricians											
Fitters (Gun)				Electricians (Engineers)											
Fitters (Instrument)				Fire Control Operators				GROUP III.							
Fitters (M.V.)				Gun Operator				Battery Surveyors							
Fitters, Railway Signal				Hatchman				Butchers							
Fitters, Signals				Height Taker				Clerks	4	4	-				
Grinder, Precision				Helio Operator				Clerks, Supply							
Mechanics, Instrument				Instrument Operator				Clerks, Technical							
Mechanics, Instrument (Signals)				Intelligence Duties	4	4	-	Coach Trimmers							
Mechanics, Instrument (Surgical)				Joiners				Concretors							
Mechanics, Radio				Lineman				Cooks							
Mechanics, Typewriter				Lineman, Signals				Dental Clerk Orderlies							
Mechanics, Wireless				Lithographers				Despatch Riders							
Millwrights				Machinists, Metal				Draughtsmen, Signals							
Operators, Excavator				Machinists, Wood				Drivers, H.T.							
Pattern Maker				Masons				Driver Mechanics							
Pharmacist				Masseurs				Driver Typn. Plant							
Photographer, Wet Plate				Mechanics, M.T.				Engine Hand's, I.C.							
Photewriter				Miners				Equipment Repairers							
Plumber				Moulders				Farriers							
Saw Doctors				Nurses, Trained				Fitters' Mates							
Surveyors				Observation Post Assts.				Gun Layers							
CARRIED FORWARD	2	2	-	CARRIED FORWARD	9	10	-	CARRIED FORWARD	13	14	-	Totals of columns marked * to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 1 and 10 of Part A. respectively.	66	66	*NR

NOTES.—(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.  
 (b) Authorised trades or specialists not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.  
 (c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are desired show details on back.  
 (d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of N.E. in col. "Reints. Required."  
 (e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

12 Aug 45  
Date of Despatch

*[Signature]* Capt.  
Signature of Commander  
SC 20 Aust Inf Bde



**PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in**  
**Part A of Army Form W.3000**  
**PARTICULARS OF NCOS**

UNIT	DEF	SURP	PS	WE	RANK
<b>Int Duties</b>			1	1	S SGT
			2	2	CPL
<b>CLERKS</b>			1	1	WO II
			1	1	CPL
<b>TRANSPORT</b>			1	1	SJT
			1	1	CPL
<b>GENERAL DUTIES</b>			2	2	CPL
<b>COMS</b>		1	2	1	S SGT
<b>CSM</b>			1	1	WO II
<b>SERVICES</b>					
<b>AAES</b>			-	1	SJT
<b>AAAS</b>		1	1	1	SJT CPL
<b>AASC</b>			1	1	CPL
<b>AALC</b>			-	1	CPL
<b>AAMC</b>			1	1	CPL
<b>AACC</b>			1	1	CPL
<b>AAOC</b>		1	1	1	SJT S SGT
<b>TOTALS</b>		<b>3</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>18</b>	

**DETAILS OF SURPLUS NCOS**

ARMY NO	RANK	NAME	TRADE	MED CLASSIFICATION
NX118629	S SGT	PACKETT GW	COMS	A1
NX150236	S SGT	GARTRELL J	AMN EXMN	A1 (posted for duty as Amn Exmn)
NX91053	CPL	ROWLAND JL	AMENITIES	A1 (posted as Amenities Sjt)

**OTHER RANKS ON LEAVE - (COMPASSIONATE)**

NX78482	PTE	SCOTT GA	BATMEN	A1
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**NIL RETURN**

NOTE: (1) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.  
(2) Authorized leader or sergeant not included in list will be added in list as shown provided.  
(3) Where A.W.B. and/or A.A.M.W.B. personnel are detailed show (A.W.B. or A.A.M.W.B.) in rank column.  
(4) Where replacement not made, note accordingly on reverse of report in rank column.  
(5) Where any request for reduction is made on back of form, the words "Reduction Requested" should be written in one of the blank spaces on the back.

Signature of Commandant \_\_\_\_\_ Date of Report \_\_\_\_\_



# FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

Army Form W.3008  
(Adapted) (Page 1)  
(Revised Jan., 1943)

HQ20 Aust Inf Bde 31 / 45 (Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 18 / 8 / 1945 (Unit)

W.E. II / 2 / 4 OFFRS. 19 O.R's. 66 + OFFRS. - O.R's. - ATT. BY W.E.

## PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.											
1	2	3	4		5	6	7	8	9	10						
Rein'fts Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Rein'fts Required.							
NR NR	1 1	1 1	1 2 10 6		* * BRIGADIER Lieut.-Colonels Majors Captains Lieutenants Quarter-masters A.A.N.S. and A.A.M.W.S. Offrs. Civilians Counting as Offrs.											
NR	2	2	19													
				DETAIL	A.I.F.	C.M.F.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.N.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	**	TOTAL.		
Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 10 of instructions for compilation of form will complete Part E(1) & E(2).				A.												
				E.(1)	19											19
				E.(2)												

\* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.  
\*\* Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

## PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

### OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit From.	Date.	CAUSE.

### OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit To.	Date.	CAUSE.

## PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO (Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. / / 194

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).



PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON POSTED STRENGTH

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 18 / 8 / 1945 (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	Army Number.	Surname.	Initials.	Posting.	Whether present with Unit (insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	Date of Detachment.
Brig	NX396	WINDEYER	WJV	Comd	Yes		
Maj	NX380	HILL	AJ	BM	"		
Capt	SX6157	NORTHEY	NG	BM L	"		
Capt	VX11806	TAIT WILLS	E	SC	"		
Capt	OX364	GLASGOW	D	SC L	"		
Capt	NX20884	MURRAY	J	IO	"		
Capt	OX8622	GRAY-BUCHANAN	JY	TO	"		
Capt	NX14840	MAIN	HH	LO I	"		
Lt	NX14881	RYAN	JW	LO II	"		
Lt	OX2990	CHILDS	HG	LO III	"		
Capt	NX110824	BARR	GD	LSO	"		
Capt	VX21165	SHARP	KH	BASCO	"		
Lt	VX74111	MILLIS	LS	BCO	"		
Lt	SX5722	LOVELL	RA	HYG O	"		
Lt	NX19900	GILMOUR	PG	AO	"		
Lt	NX28056	HARLAND	J	NO	"		
Maj	NX34800	HAMMOND	CW	CHAP	No	Det 2/13 Bn	6-8-45
Capt	OX22994	LAKE	GS	"	"	Det 2/15 Bn	9-6-44
Capt	OX53993	BLACKBELL	CK	"	"	Det 2/17 Bn	10-1-45

PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank, if Held.	Army Number.	Name and Initials.	Unit.	Date of Attachment.	Nature of Attachment.
Capt	NX34802	FERGUSON R	41 Sqn AL Sec	4-5-45	G III Air

18 Aug 45  
Date of Despatch

*[Signature]*  
Signature of Commander  
Capt  
SC 20 Aust Inf Bde







**FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS**

**SOON OF SPECIALISTS**

At 0000 Hrs Saturday 10/0/1943 (Unit) 101 Bde

UNIT ATT BY W.E. TINU

Part A. Posted Strength, Surplus or Engagements Required.

W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED				ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Relevant Required	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength	Arm or Corps	Posted Strength	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.
				WO II CPL			CLERKS
				CPL			
				W.O. Class I CPL			
				W.O. Class II CPL			
	1	1		Squadron or Company Quartermaster Sgts			GENERAL DUTIES
	1	1		Staff Sergeants			COMMS
NR	3	1		Sergeants			
NR	2	1		Corporals			CSM
NR	2	2		Troopers, Privates, etc.			
				Civilians counting as O.R.			
NR	7	8	67	Totals of cols marked * should agree with details shown in Part B on Page 2			SERVICES
				Sgt			SEAS
				CPL			TOTAL
				Sgt			SEAS
				CPL			
				CPL			AASC

Part B. Other Ranks Attached from Other Units				Part C. Other Ranks Included in Part A Detached to Other Units			
Number of O.R.	Unit to which they belong	Number of O.R.	Unit to which they belong	Number of O.R.	Unit to which they belong	Number of O.R.	Unit to which they belong
1		1		1		1	
1	YMCA	1	Compassionate Leave	1		1	
1	2/8 Pz Amp	1		1		1	
1	41 Aust Sqn AI Sec	1		1		1	
1	34 Aust Pz Sec (M)	1		1		1	
1	9 Aust Div Bn	1		1		1	
2	Mobile Cinema Unit	1		1		1	
3		16		18		3	
5							

**DETAILS OF SURPLUS NCOS**

ARMY NO	RANK	NAME	TRADE	MED CLASSIFICATION
NX118629	S SGT	PACKETT GW	COMMS	A1

ARMY NO	RANK	NAME	TRADE	MED CLASSIFICATION
NX150236	S SGT	GARTRELL J	AMN EXMN	A1 (posted for duty as Ann Exmn)

ARMY NO	RANK	NAME	TRADE	MED CLASSIFICATION
MX91053	CPL	ROWLAND JL	AMENITIES	A1 (posted as Ann Sjt)

**OTHER RANKS ON LEAVE - COMPASSIONATE**

ARMY NO	RANK	NAME	TRADE	MED CLASSIFICATION
NX78482	PTE	SCOTT GA	BATMAN	A1

AWL

NIL RETURN



**PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 18/8/1945.**

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.
Ammunition Examiners				Surveyors, Engineering				Operating Room Assts.				G.P.O. Assistants			
Armament Artificer Fitter				Surveyors, E.A.A.				Operator, Keyboard				Hammermen			
Armament Artificer Fitter (Electrical)				Surveyors, Topographical				Operator, Line				Leather Stitchers			
Armament Artificer Fitter (M.V.)				Surveyors, Trigonometrical				Operator, Signal				Orderlies, Nursing			
Armament Artificer Fitter (A.F.V.)				Toolmakers				Operator, Switchboard				Orderlies, Nursing Mental			
Armament Artificer Instrument				Turners				Operator, Wireless				Plate Layers			
Armament Artificer Radio				Watchmakers				Opticians				Rangetakers			
Armament Artificer Signals				Welders				Painters				Rivettors			
Armament Artificer Wireless								Panel Beaters				Roughriders			
Artificer, Artillery								Photographer, Dry Plate				Saddlers			
Artificer, Engine								Predictor Numbers				Saddletree makers			
Blacksmiths								Printers				Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
Bricklayers								Radlographers				Stevadores			
Computers								Riggers				Stokers, Staty. Engine			
Cooks, Hospital				GROUP II.				Sawyers				Storemen, Technical			
Coppersmiths				Armourers				Signallers				Tailors			
Dispensers				Axemen				Signwriters				Textile Refitters			
Draughtsmen				Bakers				Telescope Identfn. Numbers				Tinsmiths			
Draughtsmen (Architectural)				Bty. Comd's. Asst.				Well Borers				Vulcanizers			
Draughtsmen (Engineering)				Bollermakers				Wheelers				Wagon Erectors			
Draughtsmen (Mechanical)				Carpenters				Winchman				Whitesmiths			
Draughtsmen (Topographical)	2	2	-	Carpenters and Joiners				Wireman							
Electricians				Cooks	3	4	-	Woodturners				NON SPECIALISTS			
Electricians (M.V.)				Dental Mechanics								DVRS MT	10	12	-
Electricians (Signals)				Driver-Mech. (Eng. and Med.)								GEN DUT'S	5	5	-
Fitters				Driver-Operator								WAT DUT'S	1	1	-
Fitters (Cycle)				Drainers								HYG DUT'S	1	1	-
Fitters (Electrical)				Electricians								SIG ORD'S	9	10	-
Fitters (Gun)				Electricians (Engineers)								BATMEN	13	14	-
Fitters (Instrument)				Fire Control Operators				GROUP III.				CO DETAILS OF NON-TRADESMEN			
Fitters (M.V.)				Gun Operator				Battery Surveyors				CSM	1	1	-
Fitters, Railway Signal				Hatchman				Butchers							
Fitters, Signals				Height Taker				Clerks	4	4	-				
Grinder, Precision				Helio Operator				Clerks, Supply				SERVICES			
Mechanics, Instrument				Instrument Operator				Clerks, Technical				AALC CLERK	1	-	NR
Mechanics, Instrument (Signals)				Intelligence Duties	4	4	-	Coach Trimmers				" B'MAN	1	1	-
Mechanics, Instrument (Surgical)				Joiners				Concretors				AAMC ORD	1	1	-
Mechanics, Radio				Lineman				Cooks				AAOC ANN EX	1	1	-
Mechanics, Typewriter				Lineman, Signals				Dental Clerk Orderlies				" B'MAN	1	1	-
Mechanics, Wireless				Lithographers				Despatch Riders				ATTACHED BY W.E.			
Millwrights				Machinists, Metal				Draughtsmen, Signals				AASC CLERK	1	1	-
Operators, Excavator				Machinists, Wood				Drivers, H.T.				" B'MAN	1	-	NR
Pattern Maker				Masons				Driver Mechanics				AACHD	3	1	NR
Pharmacist				Masseurs				Driver Tptn. Plant				AAES	1	-	NR
Photographer, Wet Plate				Mechanics, M.T.				Engine Hands, I.C.				AAAS	1	1	-
Photowriter				Miners				Equipment Repairers							
Plumber				Moulders				Farriers							
Saw Doctors				Nurses, Trained				Fitters' Mates							
Surveyors				Observation Post Assts.				Gun Layers							
CARRIED FORWARD	2	2	-	CARRIED FORWARD	9	10	-	CARRIED FORWARD	13	14	-	Totals of columns marked * to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 1 and 10 of Part A. respectively.			
													66	67	NR

NOTES.—(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.  
 (b) Authorised trades or specialists not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.  
 (c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are desired show details on back.  
 (d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of N.R. in col. "Reints. Required."  
 (e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander



# FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

Army Form W.3008  
(Adapted) (Page 1)  
(Revised Jan., 1943)  
32 / 45 (Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 25 / 8 / 1945 HQ 20 Aust Inf (Unit)

W.E. II / 2 / 4 OFFRS. 19 O.R's. 66 + OFFRS. - O.R's. - ATT. BY W.E.

## PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.											
Rein'ts Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Rein'ts Required.							
NR	1	1	1	* Brigadier												
			2	Lieut.-Colonels												
NR	2	1	3	Majors												
NR	1		5	Captains												
				Lieutenants												
				Quarter-masters												
				A.A.N.S. and A.A.M.W.S. Offrs.												
				Civilians Counting as Offrs.												
NR	4	2	17													
				DETAIL	A.I.F.	C.M.P.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.N.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	* *	TOTAL.		
Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 10 of instructions for compilation of form will complete Part E(1) & E(2).				A Class	17									17		
				E.(1)												
				E.(2)												

\* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.  
\* \* Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

## PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

### OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit From.	Date.	CAUSE.

### OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit To.	Date.	CAUSE.
NX14840	Capt	MAIN HI	No for discharge	21-8-45	under "LONGSER"
GX2990	Lt	CHILDS HG	M/o for discharge	21-8-45	"LONGSER"

## PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO.....(Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. .... / ..... / 194.....

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).



PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON POSTED STRENGTH

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 25 / 8 / 1945 (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	Army Number.	Surname.	Initials.	Posting.	Whether present with Unit (insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	Date of Detachment.
Brig	NX396	WINDYER	WJV	Comd	Yes		
Maj	NX380	HILL	AJ	BM	"		
Capt	SX6157	WORTHLEY	MG	BE L	"		
Capt	VX11806	TAIT WILLS	E	SC	"		
Capt	QX364	GLASGOW	D	SC L	"		
Capt	NX20884	MURRAY	J	IO	"		
Capt	QX8622	GRAY- BUCHANAN	J I	BO	"		
Lt	NX14881	RYAN	JW	LO II	"		
Capt	NX110824	BARR	GD	LSO	"		
Capt	VX21165	SHARP	ZH	BASCO	"		
Lt	VX74111	MILLIS	IS	BCO	"		
Lt	SX5722	LOVELL	RA	HYG C	"		
Lt	NX19900	GILMOUR	FG	AO	"		
Lt	NX28056	HARLAND	J	Edn C	"		
Maj	NX34800	HAMMOND	CV	CHAP	No	Det to 2/13 Aust Inf Bn	6-8-45
Capt	QX22994	LAKE	GS	"	"	Det to 2/15 Aust Inf Bn	9-6-44
Capt	QX53993	BLACKWELL	GK	"	"	Det to 2/17 Aust Inf Bn	10-1-45

PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	Army Number.	Name and Initials.	Unit.	Date of Attachment.	Nature of Attachment.
Capt	NX34802	FERGUSON R	41 Sqn AL Sec	4-5-45	GIII AIR

25-8-45  
Date of Despatch

*Duncan Campbell*  
Signature of Commander  
SC 20 Aust Inf Bde







**FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS**  
**PARTICULARS OF NCO'S**

At 0800 Hrs Saturday 5 / 1942 (Unit)

UNIT	RANK	WE	PS	SURP	DEF
Int Duties	S SGT CPL	1 2	1 2		
CLERKS	WO II CPL	1 1	1 1		
TRANSPORT	SJT CPL	1 1	1 1		
GENERAL DUTIES	CPL	2	1		1
COMS	S SGT	1	2	1	
CSM	WO II	1	1		
SERVICES					
AAES	SJT	1			1
AAAS	SJT CPL	1 -	1 -	1	
AAAC	CPL	1			1
AALC	CPL	1			1
AAMC	CPL	1	1		
AACC	CPL	1	1		
AACC	S SGT SJT	- 1	1 -	1	1
		18	15	3	6

**DETAILS OF SURPLUS NCOS**

ARMY NO	RANK	NAME	TRADE	MED CLASSIFICATION
NX118629	S SGT	PACKETT GW	COMS	A1
NX150236	S SGT	GARTRELL J	AMN EXMN	A1 (posted for duty as Amn Exmn)

NX91053	CPL	ROWLAND JL	AMENITIES	A1 (posted as Amn Exmn Sjt)
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**OTHER RANKS ON LEAVE**

NX78482	PTS	SCOTT GA	BATMAN	A1
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AWL

NIL RETURN



**PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 25 / 8 / 1945.**

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.
Ammunition Examiners				Surveyors, Engineering				Operating Room Assts.				G.P.O. Assistants			
Armament Artificer Fitter				Surveyors, R.A.A.				Operator, Keyboard				Hammermen			
Armament Artificer Fitter (Electrical)				Surveyors, Topographical				Operator, Line				Leather Stitchers			
Armament Artificer Fitter (M.V.)				Surveyors, Trigonometrical				Operator, Signal				Orderlies, Nursing			
Armament Artificer Fitter (A.F.V.)				Toolmakers				Operator, Switchboard				Orderlies, Nursing Mental			
Armament Artificer Instrument				Turners				Operator, Wireless				Plate Layers			
Armament Artificer Radio				Watchmakers				Opticians				Bangetakers			
Armament Artificer Signals				Welders				Painters				Riveters			
Armament Artificer Wireless								Panel Beaters				Roughriders			
Artificer, Artillery								Photographer, Dry Plate				Saddlers			
Artificer, Engine								Predictor Numbers				Saddletree makers			
Blacksmiths								Printers				Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
Bricklayers								Radlographers				Stevadores			
Computers								Riggers				Stokers, Staty. Engine			
Cooks, Hospital				GROUP II.				Sawyers				Storemen, Technical			
Coppersmiths				Armourers				Signalers				Tailors			
Dispensers				Axemen				Signwriters				Textile Refters			
Draughtsmen				Bakers				Telescope Identfn. Numbers				Tinsmiths			
Draughtsmen (Architectural)				Bty. Comd's. Asst.				Well Borers				Vulcanizers			
Draughtsmen (Engineering)				Boilermakers				Wheelers				Wagon Erectors			
Draughtsmen (Mechanical)				Carpenters				Winchman				Whitesmiths			
Draughtsmen (Topographical)	2	2	-	Carpenters and Joiners				Wireman							
Electricians				Cooks	3	4	-	Woodturners				<u>NON SPECIALISTS</u>			
Electricians (M.V.)				Dental Mechanics								DVRS MT	10	10	-
Electricians (Signals)				Driver-Mech. (Eng. and Med.)								GEN DUT'S	5	4	NR
Fitters				Driver-Operator								Wat Dutes	1	1	-
Fitters (Cycle)				Drainers								HYG DUT'S	2	1	-
Fitters (Electrical)				Electricians								SIG ORD'S	9	10	-
Fitters (Gun)				Electricians (Engineers)								BATMEN	13	14	-
Fitters (Instrument)				Fire Control Operators				GROUP III.				COMS	1	2	-
Fitters (M.V.)				Gun Operator				Battery Surveyors				<u>DETAILS OF NON-TRADESMEN.</u>			
Fitters, Railway Signal				Hatchman				Butchers				CSM	1	1	-
Fitters, Signals				Height Taker				Clerks	4	4	-				
Grinder, Precision				Helio Operator				Clerks, Supply				<u>SERVICES</u>			
Mechanics, Instrument				Instrument Operator				Clerks, Technical				AALC CLERK	1	-	NR
Mechanics, Instrument (Signals)				Intelligence Duties	4	4	-	Coach Trainers				" RAT'N	1	1	-
Mechanics, Instrument (Surgical)				Joiners				Concretors				AAMC ORD	1	1	-
Mechanics, Radio				Lineman				Cooks				AAGC AMN BX	1	1	-
Mechanics, Typewriter				Lineman, Signals				Dental Clerk Orderlies				" B'MAN	1	1	-
Mechanics, Wireless				Lithographers				Despatch Riders				<u>ATTACHED BY W.E.</u>			
Millwrights				Machinists, Metal				Draughtsmen, Signals				AASC CLERK	1	-	NR
Operators, Excavator				Machinists, Wood				Drivers, H.T.				" B'MAN	1	-	NR
Pattern Maker				Masons				Driver Mechanics				AACHD	3	1	NR
Pharmacist				Masseurs				Driver Typ. Plant				AAES	1	-	NR
Photographer, Wet Plate				Mechanics, M.T.				Engine Hands, I.C.				AAAS	1	1	-
Photowriter				Miners				Equipment Repairers							
Plumber				Moulders				Farriers							
Saw Doctors				Nurses, Trained				Fitters' Mates							
Surveyors				Observation Post Assts.				Gun Layers							
CARRIED FORWARD	2	2	-	CARRIED FORWARD	9	10	-	CARRIED FORWARD	13	14	-	Totals of columns marked * to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 1 and 10 of Part A. respectively.	66	63	* NR

NOTES.—(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.  
 (b) Authorised trades or specialists not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.  
 (c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are desired show details on back.  
 (d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of N.E. in col. "Reints. Required."  
 (e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

25 Aug 45  
Date of Despatch

*Duncan Campbell*  
Signature of Commander Capt  
SC 20 Aust Inf Bde