

AWM52
2nd Australian Imperial Force and
Commonwealth Military Forces unit war
diaries, 1939-45 War

Item number: 8/3/14

2/14 Infantry Battalion
July 1945, Appendices, part 2 of 4

Appx "P"

2/14 Bn. A.I.F.
WAR DIARY
Vol. LXIII Appx. P.

—Letters of Appreciation—

AIR SUPPORT

2/14 Aust Inf Bn.
17 July 46.
Ref No. 11/1

21 Aust Inf Bde

1. During the recent operations at the MANGGAR AIRSTRIP in which this unit has been engaged, the support given by the air has been outstanding.
2. Many heavy fortifications and weapons were encountered and it is highly probable that without air support our task in liquidating the enemy's opposition would have been much harder.
3. Examination of the enemy's positions reveals that the air support has been particularly accurate and together with other supporting arms it has played a considerable part in the defeat of the enemy.
4. Would you please convey to the 13 USAAF and the 8 ALP the sincere appreciation of all ranks of the 2/14 Aust Inf Bn for the excellence and consistency of their support.


Lt-col.
Comd 2/14 Aust Inf Bn.

NAVAL SUPPORT

2/14 Aust Inf Bn.
17 Jul 45.
Ref No. 11/1

21 Aust Inf Bde

1. During the recent operations at the MANGGAR AIRSTRIP in which this unit has been engaged, the naval support given it has been of a very high order.
2. Many fortifications and heavy weapons including 5 inch coastal defence guns were encountered and the task of liquidating the enemy's positions would have been more costly and slower if it had not been for the accuracy and consistency of the gunnery.
3. This was particularly demonstrated on the afternoon of 4 July when the enemy was first met in this area. The Jap had caused casualties and had knocked out an arty OP with its personnel and equipment. The Navy which at that critical time was the only support available, not only silenced the enemy's guns but rendered them considerable damage. That is only an example of the support which continued over the succeeding days of the operation.
4. Would you please convey to the Navy and to 1 Aust Naval Bombardment Group the sincere appreciation of all ranks of the 2/14 Aust Inf Bn for the accuracy, consistency, and weight of their support.

R. Roden
Lt-col.

Comd 2/14 Aust Inf Bn

Appx "Q"

—Operation Order—

SECRET

Copy No.....

11 Jul 45

21 AUST INF BDE OPERATION ORDER No 2

Ref Maps : BALIKPAPAN }
SEPINGGAN } 1 : 25000
MANGGAR }
BANGSAL }

INFORMATION

1. Enemy

- (a) There are indications, verified from authentic sources, that the enemy forces defending BALIKPAPAN are withdrawing West through MENTIWIR with the ultimate intention of moving overland to the West coast at KUCHING.
- (b) Enemy rearguard elements are still in contact with our foremost troops and are holding isolated covering positions to protect this general withdrawal.

2. Own Troops

7 Aust Div is to hold the area inclusive MANGGAR - BATOCHAMPUR. One battalion is to be located to cover each of the roads MANGGAR - SAMBODJA and BATOCHAMPUR - MENTIWIR, and continuous patrolling of the intervening country is to be carried out.

INTENTION

3. 21 Aust Inf Bde will be responsible for the area as shown on trace attached as Appendix "A".

METHOD

4. Areas of Responsibility

- (a) 2/27 Aust Inf Bn Gp - Area No 1 as per Appendix "A".
- (b) 2/14 Aust Inf Bn Gp - Area No 2 as per Appendix "A".
- (c) 2/16 Aust Inf Bn Gp - Area No 3 as per Appendix "A".
- (d) 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt - Area No 4 as per Appendix "A".
less One Sqn and One Tp

5. Tasks

- (a) 2/27 Aust Inf Bn Gp

2/27 Aust Inf Bn, with under command :-

ALP

Det 21 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec

B Coy 2/1 Aust MG Bn less one Pl

and in sp :-

55 Bty 2/5 Aust Fd Regt

One Sec 4.2" Mortars and 2x6pr guns 7 Tk A Bty

Det 2/6 Aust Fd Coy.

will :-

- (i) Occupy a defensive position in the area sq 7568.
- (ii) Patrol the VASEY HIGHWAY forward to BANGSAL.
- (iii) Patrol generally Area No 1 as shown in Appendix "A".
- (iv) Prepare to send a long range patrol (composition to be decided) to SAMBODJA.

(b) 2/14 Aust Inf Bn Gp

2/14 Aust Inf Bn, with under command :-

ALP

Det 21 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec

and in support :-

10 Bty 2/5 Aust Fd Regt

One Sec 4.2" Mortars 7 Aust Tk A Bty

Det 2/6 Aust Fd Coy

will :-

- (i) Occupy a defensive position within Area No 2 and as far as possible, in positions at present held.
- (ii) Patrol generally Area No 2 as shown in Appendix "A"
- (iii) Patrol in particular the features BAND, BANAL, BALE and FROST, FOOT, AGOG, AGATE.
- (iv) Patrol from MANGGAR along East side of MANGGAR BESAR to TIMBER MILL at 703705 and beyond to limits of Area No 2.

(c) 2/16 Aust Inf Bn Gp

2/16 Aust Inf Bn, with under command :-

ALP

Det 21 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec

and in support :-

9 Bty 2/5 Aust Fd Regt less one tp.

will :-

- (i) Occupy a camp site in the area sq 7062 between road and coast and East of BATAKAN BESAR.
- (ii) Maintain one rifle coy in the vicinity SEPINGGAN Airfield and sited in defence of the airfield.
- (iii) Patrol generally Area No 3 as shown in Appendix "A".
- (iv) Patrol in particular the track from MANGGAR KETJIL through FLAG, DOVE to track junction 669701.

(d) 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt less one sqn and one tp, will :-

- (i) Occupy a camp site in present area.
- (ii) Patrol generally Area No 4 as shown on Appendix "A".
- (iii) Maintain one tp on each of JACK and HAIL as patrol bases and as protection against any enemy movement from BATOCHAMPUR area.

6. Artillery

(a) Field

2/5 Aust Fd Regt less one tp will remain in present locations and be prepared to support 2/14, 2/16 and 2/27 Aust Inf Bns as indicated in para 5 above.

(b) Tank Attack

Tk A Tp 7 Bty 2/2 Aust Tk A Regt will be in support 2/27 Aust Inf Bn.

7. 4.2" Mortars

One section in support each 2/14 and 2/27 Aust Inf Bns.

8. Engineers

- (a) 2/6 Aust Fd Coy in support Brigade with general task of repairs to L of C and construction of bridges, etc.
- (b) One detachment (approximately 3 men) in support each 2/14 and 2/27 Aust Inf Bns, to locate and delouse mines and booby traps.

9. MMGs

- (a) B Coy 2/1 Aust MG Bn less one pl under command 2/27 Aust Inf Bn.
- (b) One pl will be under direct command Brigade and located in area approx 738660.

10. Patrolling

When units occupy final camp sites this Brigade's responsibilities in regard to patrolling are likely to be decreased and a re-allocation of patrolling tasks will be made.

11. Time At Which This Order Becomes Effective

Units will assume responsibilities as above as from 121200L.

ADMINISTRATION

- 12. Separate instructions.

INTERCOMMUNICATION

- 13. Bde Hq will be located at 739659.
- 14. Line and wireless will be maintained to each battalion and 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt.
- 15. Pigeons will be available for communication by long range patrols direct to Bde, as arranged through 21 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec.
- 16. ACKNOWLEDGE.

Issued by SDR at 112130L

L. Thabit Maj
BM 21 Aust Inf Bde

DISTRIBUTION

	<u>Copy No</u>	<u>Appx "A"</u>
	<u>00</u>	
2/14 Aust Inf Bn	1	1
2/16 Aust Inf Bn	2	2
2/27 Aust Inf Bn	3	3
21 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec	4	-
2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt	5	4
2/5 Aust Fd Regt	6	5
7 Bty 2/2 Aust Tk A Regt	7	-
2/6 Aust Fd Coy	8	-
B Coy 2/1 Aust MG Bn	9	-
2/8 Aust Tpt Pl	10	-
2/34 Aust Sup Depot Pl	11	-
2/6 Aust Fd Amb	12	-
7 Aust Div	13	6
18 Aust Inf Bde	14	7
25 Aust Inf Bde	15	8
HQ 1st TAF, RAAF	16	9
Comd	17	10
BM	18	11
SC	19	-
IO	20	12
File	21-22	13
War Diary	23-24	14

2/14 Bn. A.I.F.
WAR DIARY
Vol. LXIII Appx. R.

Medical Report

MEDICAL ASPECTS OF OPERATION
OBOE 2

~~Do not write~~ W.D.
The A.I.F.
WAR DIARY
Vol. LXIII Appx. R.
2/III Aust Inf Bn.

This resume of the medical aspects covers the period from the landing day 1 July 1945 to 6 August 1945.

The whole campaign from a medical point of view has been highly satisfactory, the most outstanding features, as contrasted with previous campaigns in NEW GUINEA, being the low incidence of disease, and the rapid evacuation of casualties.

A CASUALTIES

Total battle casualties	-	57
Killed in action	-	16
Died of wounds	-	3

The activities of this unit were confined mainly to the narrow coastal belt, and as the axis of advance was along the main coastal arterial highway, communications between the RAP and the Pd Amb were at all times excellent. Collection and evacuation of casualties was hence facilitated by jeep ambulance most casualties reaching the MDS within an hour of leaving the RAP. The greatest time lag was in evacuation from the forward areas to the RAP.

Such conditions and the excellent work of the surgical teams is reflected in the casualty list - of 41 casualties evacuated through the RAP only 3 subsequently died of wounds.

Credit for this must partly be given to stretcher bearers and Company medical orderlies for their excellent work, at times under very exacting conditions. On more than one occasion their work contributed to the saving of lives of men who otherwise, might have died.

NEUROSES

The conditions of the campaign in the first few weeks were such that frank psychoses and psycho-neuroses were not to be expected. But over the period July 4 - July 12 when our troops were subject to adverse conditions and intense mental strain, the incidence of battle fatigues, though low, was higher than anticipated. It is to be noted that the majority of these cases occurred among men who have already served through two or more campaigns in the infantry.

B SICKNESS

A hygiene appreciation of the operation OBOE 2 was issued on 5 July 45. It stressed the fact that the diseases to be encountered would vary according to the conditions - from operations in previously densely populated well built up town areas where the civil administration would have failed, to sparsely populated coastal flats and dense tropical rain forest in the hills. Three considerations were involved in an appreciation of the diseases to be encountered :

- (a) Diseases endemic to all tropical countries. e.g. malaria, dengue, skin diseases.
- (b) Diseases suspected to be endemic in that particular area of the operation. e.g. Schistosomiasis, VD, scrub typhus.
- (c) Diseases resulting from a breakdown of civil administration resulting from both Japanese occupation, and the actual invasion of our force. e.g. Dysentery, cholera, plague etc.

It must be borne in mind that the majority of our troops have had actual experience of diseases common to the tropics and are well versed in the methods of personal protection and the reasons for such.

Also throughout training, the troops have been made familiar with the diseases of categories (a) and (b), and it is felt that this contributed largely to the low incidence of disease.

RESUME OF THE DISEASES ACTUALLY ENCOUNTERED

CATEGORY A

- (i) Malaria : The efficiency of suppressive Atebrin has been firmly substantiated. The degree of infection in the mosquito population is NOT yet known but so far there have been NO cases diagnosed.
- (ii) Dengue : The coastal area throughout which this unit operated was regarded as being heavily infested with the dengue vectors. This proved true, but a strict dress discipline together with DDT air spraying has paid dividends, for there have been NO cases of dengue notified from this unit. It is however thought that a percentage of our troops are immune, many having contracted the disease in the RAMU VALLEY NEW GUINEA 1943.
- (iii) Skin Diseases : Highest incidence of all diseases. The majority of cases included furunculosis, tinea of all types, bullous impetigo and numerous superficial skin infections. There were also numerous cases of recurrent skin lesions, contracted in Queensland or previously in New Guinea. These in general were very resistant to treatment and necessitated evacuation to a medical unit.

CATEGORY B

- (i) Scrub Typhus : All troops prior to landing had impregnated two complete sets of clothing with Mito Repellent. Only 2 proven cases of Scrub Typhus have been notified - both from B Echelon. The area from which the infection was contracted was established beyond all doubt, but no larval mites were found. Both cases were mild infections.
- (ii) Schistosomiasis : To date no evidence of infestation has been found in the local animals. No snails of the Oncomelania type have been found and it is presumed therefore that the disease is NOT endemic in this area. This however has NOT warranted relaxing of the water discipline.
- (iii) Venereal Disease : With the gradual influx of natives through our lines, the danger of venereal disease is increasing. NO cases of frank V.D. have occurred among our troops so far, although two cases of non-specific urethritis have reported.

CATEGORY C

- (i) Dysentery : A few mild cases only. The actual number for the period covered has been much less than for any corresponding period over the past 6 months.
- (ii) Cholera, typhoid etc : NO cases have been reported in the BALIKPAPAN area.
- (iii) Plague : Has been most unlikely as the operations of this Brigade have been in sparsely settled coastal areas well away from the town area of BALIKPAPAN where however, rats are reported to be numerous.
- (iv) Rabies : All dogs seen so far have been shot by our troops so there has been no chance of any investigation.

In conclusion, attention is drawn to the following statistics :

July 1st to July 22nd	-	Battle casualties	57
		Sickness (necessitating evacuation)	58
		Ratio	1 : 1

July 1st to Aug 6th	-	Battle casualties	57
		Sickness	89
		Ratio	1 : 1.5

When it is considered that the ratio of battle casualties to sickness in previous campaigns in tropical areas has been 1 : 10 or higher the above figures would indicate that control of sickness among troops in operations in tropical area has been reasonably successful.

However the brevity of this campaign must be also considered and as yet no definite conclusion may be drawn.

