

AWM52
2nd Australian Imperial Force and
Commonwealth Military Forces unit war
diaries, 1939-45 War

Item number: 8/2/20

20 Infantry Brigade

September 1942

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

24. OCT. 1942

WAR DIARY

or

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required).

orig
165

Army Form C. 2118.

20 Bde.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	Sep 1		<p>The laying of the start line and forming up for BULIMBA took place according to plan except that the sp MMG coy had some casualties when fired on by a spandau. This was quite possibly caused by an enemy patrol which it was discovered later by interrogation of PWs had moved to our wire to investigate the reason for the unusual quiet (note during that night there was no harassing fire).</p> <p>The action BULIMBA, reports, and lessons learned are appended.</p> <p>Lt-Gen RAMSDEN (Comd 30 corps) called about 0715 hrs and stayed a short while. The GOC arrived about 0830 hrs and left about 1230 hrs.</p> <p>During the day the visitors from 4 Div (Ind) left to rejoin their units.</p> <p>On withdrawal the 2/15 bn moved into posn vicinity TELL EL ALAMEIN 885295.</p> <p>During the 31 Aug the enemy had been engaged by our light armour and had advanced northwards. If the enemy advance was not held it would have threatened the east flank of the ALAMEIN defended locality and provision had to be made to meet this possible threat. Col WELLS (GS01 9 Aust Div) called on Brig WINDEYER about 1600 hrs concerning the withdrawal of 10 Bty 2 A Tk Regt to go into Div reserve. This meant a general reshuffle of our A Tk defence and left the @Bde with a reserve of only 4 2 prs belonging to the 2/15 Bn. The 2/15 Bn was ordered during the night to man post 1 (87772983) with 2 2 prs and the remaining 4 were to move to a reserve posn north of pt 26 (87903000).</p> <p>The 2/15 Aust Inf Bn was warned to be prepared to relieve the 2/32 bn and re occupy the Bde reserve position. The night 2/3 Sep was one of the quietest experienced. During the night members of 2/15 Aust Inf Bn returned through 2/17 Aust Inf Bn lines.</p>	<p>Special "BULIMBA" Folder C5 C6</p>
	2.		<p>During the day Brig WINDEYER called on the 2/13 and 2/17 Aust Inf Bns to discuss patrolling and general operations. The GOC again called on Brig WINDEYER at about 1100 hrs.</p>	<p>C4 C5</p>

Wells

WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

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or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required).

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Sep	3	1415	Lt-col ONSLOW (CO 2/2 Aust MG Bn) called on Brig WINDEYER to discuss the replacement of guns of one coy by guns held by the Bns and then allow one coy of MG Bn to be drawn out to Div res. The Bns are now holding 2 vickers guns each which, in addition to the 6 A Tk guns provide the nucleus for a support coy which is proposed. 2/13 Aust Inf Bn is to man the posns on the coast, 2/17 Aust Inf Bn the posn near the PIMPLE, 2/15 Bn to man post 1.	C4 C5 C6
		1700	Hon R.G. CASEY, Minister of State ME, The GOC, Col WELLS (G1) called and had afternoon tea. Brig WINDEYER accompanied the party to the 2/15 aust Inf Bn where Mr CASEY spoke with the CO and coy comds. In the south the enemy involved in a general withdrawal westwards.	
	4		Very quiet day. A conference was held at Bde HQ dealing with mines. Report on conference is appended. News from the south informs us that the NZs attacked southwards to harass the enemy withdrawal and have reached the 264 grid. During the day they repulsed 4 counter attacks. The enemy tk strength is becoming rather depleted.	C4 C5 C6
	5		At 1030 hrs General Hon Sir Harold RG ALEXANDER KCB, CSI, DSO, MC C in C (MEF) and General HARDING (DCGS) accompanied by the GOC and Col WELLS (G1 9 Div) paid a visit to 20 Aust Inf Bde HQ. After morning tea, the party paid a visit to 2/15 Bn (Comd C H GRACE) congratulating them on the splendid performance put up by the bn on night 31 Aug - 1 Sep 42. (BULIMBA) and the important part which this operation played in the main battle. The C in C and retinue then called on the tks (#0 RTR) from whence he moved to the 24 Aust Inf Bde.	A C4 C5
	6		The CO 2/13 and 2/17 Aust Inf Bns were called to Bde at 1215 hrs to a conference with Brig WINDEYER. General all patrolling was discussed (a) as to whether it was possible to make a successful raids in view of the recent enemy precautions and strengthened defences. It was decided in the affirmative. (b) The advisability of raiding a post after arty concentrations, losing surprise somewhat but gaining by fire power. Plans were also discussed for the following nights raids. An effort is to be made to have an A Tk gun personnel fire with the gun they are to man and also to have all the guns zeroed. The GOC called on Brig WINDEYER at about 1730 hrs and discussed <i>future planning</i>	C4 C5 D
	7		The 2/13 Fd Coy is organising a school during the afternoon - about 3 hrs each day for 4 days. to instruct offrs and ORs in minelaying and minelifting. The situation remains quiet. In the south the enemy is digging in and building strong posts. along the old wire of our minefds.	C4 C5 C6 D

W. L. L.

WAR DIARY

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or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required).

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	8		GOC called on Brig WINDEYER at midday. A Lt-col of USA army called to look round the area.	C4 C5
	9		The enemy appears to resent our patrolling. His ^{WORKING} walking patrols appear well protected by covering parties and he is sending strong patrols out with the apparent intention of engaging ours. MAJ MAGNO (2 i/c 2/17 Bn) to be temporary Lt-col comd 2/15 Aust Inf Bn Maj BALFE MC (OC HQ coy 2/17 Bn) to be Temporary Lt-col and to comd 2/32 Aust Inf Bn.	C4 C5
	10	0100	One of our patrols returned to report about a coy of enemy in vicinity of 87513037. This is country frequently covered by our patrols.	C4 C5 C6
	11	1230	Bde area divebombed by 16 JU 87s. One member C sqn 40 RTR wounded. one of 2/7 Fd Regt wounded and one buried. one truck 2/7 Fd Regt burned. There is more evidence of the enemy's desire to keep our patrols from his FDLs and one patrol of 2/15 Aust Inf Bn was forced in overnight. Our patrols are being strengthened and are leaving on last light in an effort to get command of no mans land. The GOC together with CBA Col called on Brig WINDEYER. <i>CRA (Brig RAMSAY) and GSO1 (Col Wells)</i>	C4 C5 C6 D
	12		After the enemy activity of the previous nights. the night 11/12 was exceptionally quiet. Thene did not appear to be his usual working parties and none of his patrols were seen.	A C4 C5 D
		1315 - 1700 hrs	Col WELLS (GSO 1 9 Aust Div) and Maj WILSON (BM 20 Bde) had a look at the country from fwd of our wire at 87073002.	
		1400	Brig WINDEYER was evacuated to 7 AGH with jaundice.	
		1500	Lt-col R.W. TURNER arrived at Bde HQ to take over Admin comd during the absence of Brig WINDEYER. Lieut B.D MAUGHAN also arrived from 2/13 Aust InfBnto replace Lieut P.B. MARTIN as LO. The latter broke his leg when his Jeep overturned whilst returning from 2/13 Aust Inf Bn on morning of 9 Sep.	C4 C5
	13		During morning 6 offrs of 451 A/c Sqn RAAF arrived during the morning to gain knowledge of the situation from the inf point of view. Capt B WILLIAMS LO(1) took the party to pt 26 to see the country. P/O J MORGAN 6 Sqn RAAF arrived to stay with the Bde a short while and improve his knowledge of army methods.	C4 C5

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(Erase heading not required).

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	14		A request was made for a further sec Lt AA to be placed along the coast in Bde HQ area to engage JU 87s, as they return after bombing in the div Area. The JU 87s fly out to sea to escape the AA then return west flying low. During the evening there was very heavy enemy MT traffic on the SKYLINE track- mainly NWZ	c4 c5
	15		There was much activity fwd in the vicinity of the RAHMAN supply route. Some quite large concentrations of MT with tanks were reported about 10000 yds fwd of FDLs. LO1) Capt WILLIAMS went to ALAM EL HALFA 437885 to contact 154 Bde (which has become affiliated with 20 Aust Inf Bde) and to arrange for members of 154 Bde to join the units and Bde HQ for battle experience. Lieut HOLTSBAUM went to 7 AGH to see Brig WINDEYER and to take him some despatches before the latter was evacuated to GAZA(6 AGH) for a month. Lt HOLTSBAUM also visited Lt-col OGLE and reported very favourably on his progress. At about 1730 hrs the comd 30 Corps Lt-Gen Sir Dlover LEES ^e called for a few minutes at Bde HQ.	c2 c4 c5
	16	1000	The GOC 9 Aust Div with comd 30 Corps Lt-Gen Sir Oliver LEES ^e and party called at Bde HQ. Lt-col R.W. XXXXX TURNER (Adm comd 20 Bde) took the party to pt 17 (896302) to see the country. They later went to the CUTTING (875299) Whilst in this area the party was subjected to some shelling. Capt MOORE with two other naval men and a naval LO called to see the country. Lieut D.B. MAUGHAN (LO3) took the party to pt 26 (879300).	c1 c4 c5
		1200	Brig HOLDSWORTH DSO MC comd 154 Highland Bde called to make arrangements for his staff to gain experience in the fwd areas. Brig HOLDSWORTH visited 2/13 and 2/17 Aust Inf Bns. P/O M MORGAN left the Bde after lunch to return to his sqn. MT movt has been considerably reduced. It would appear that the unusual MT and Tk movt was caused by the 15 GERMAN pz Div moving north.	c4 c5
	17		Major WILMOTT (1 Black Watch) called at Bde at 1200 hrs and after seeing Lt-col R.W. TURNER (adm comd) moved on to the 2/13 Aust Inf Bn. There was one ^{STUKA} staker JU 87s divebombed bty posn 2/7 Reft - no damage. Relief of 2/17 Aust Inf Bn by 2/13 Aust Inf Bn commenced after dark, and was completed by 2350 hrs.	c4 c5 c6

? 2/15

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	18		<p>Lt-Gen MONTGOMERY (Comd EIGHTH Army) together with the corps comd (Lt-Gen LEES^E and Lt-Gen LUMSDEN, made recce of country from vicinity of TELL EL EISA.</p> <p>The GOC called at Bde 1425 hrs prior to proceeding to 2/15 Aust Inf Bn and 2/17 Aust Inf Bn. Capt HUGEN-TOBLER (BIO) and Lieut HAMILTON (LO) 154 Bde 51 Highland Div arrived for short stay with the Bde to gain experience.</p>	C4 C5
	20		<p>Hostile shelling on FDLs has become very light and only 9 shells fell on area. This is possibly due to lack of movement on the part of our tps.</p> <p>During the night an enemy patrol of 18 strong attempted to encircle one of our recce patrols who were forced to withdraw.</p>	19 SEP A C4 C5 D C4 C5 C6
	21		<p>During the morning ^{2/13} the Bde was warned of proposed relief by 26 Aust Inf Bde. Adv party to arrive night 22/23 Sep. 2/15 Aust Inf Bn to be relieved by 2/23 bn and 2/17 bn to be relieved by 2/24 bn night 22/23 sep. 2/15 bn to be relieved by 2/48 bn night 23/24 Sep 42.</p> <p>Capt HUGEN-TOBLER and Lieut HAMILTON of 154 Bde returned to unit. Capt HAMER and CO Bns attended a tactical exercise with tps and tks by 2/48 bn during the night.</p>	C1 C4 C5
	22		<p>During night 21/22 Sep a 2/15 bn patrol was again forced in from vicinity last pt 24 by an enemy patrol of 18 men. Relief of 2/17 Aust Inf Bn by 2/24 Aust Inf Bn completed without incident by 2338 hrs.</p> <p>Capt YOUNG and Capt HAMER and Lieut FRAWLEY went to ALEXANDRIA to AIF Kit Store to withdraw unit winter dress.</p>	C1 C4 C5 C6
SHAMMAMA AREA	23	1230	<p>Relief of 2/13 Aust Inf Bn by 2/23 Aust Inf Bn completed by 0355 hrs without incident. Umpires for future tactical exercises with tps and tks met Maj BARHAM (GS0119 Aust Div) for preliminary discussion. Lieut Frawley evacuated to MDS.</p> <p>Relief of Bde HQ and Comd timed to pass at 1800 hrs. Reps from 26 Aust Inf Bde did not arrive until 1700 hrs. Relief of 2/15 Bn by 2/48 Bn was completed without incident at 2330 hrs. The Bde moved back into Div Reserve being responsible for locality A. (See op instn 22).</p>	C4 C5

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	24	1100 1730	Lt-col R.W. TURNER (adm comd 20 Bde) held a COs conference. Units represented were : 2/13, 2/15, 2/17 Aust Inf Bns, 12 ATk Bty and B coy 2/2 Aust MG Bn. The present role and future trg were discussed together with local admin. Maj COSTELLO (10 coy AASC) called to discuss role of his coy. Capt PICKERING and Capt HAMILTON also Lieut SHELDON went to ALEXANDRIA to draw winter dress.	C1 C5
	25		Maj WILSON Lieut GEMMELL-SMITH and HOLTSBAUM went to ALEXANDRIA to withdraw winter dress.	C3 C5
	26		Lt-col R.W. TURNER went to ALEXANDRIA to withdraw winter dress.	A C5
	27	1100 1100	Church parade held Col WELLS (GS01 9 Aust Div) called to discuss <i>future ops.</i>	C5
		1100 1130	Lieut TIMSON (9 Aust Div FSS) spoke to unit security offrs concerning security. Offrs to staff 20 AITB left.	
	28		Hy duststorm during morning, due to khamseen blowing from SW, cleared in afternoon. Capt B. WILLIAMS returned from his stay with Sqn RAAP . <i>12 Sqn SAAF</i>	C5
	29		Night exercise 28/29 Sep by 2/17 Bn. The object being to practice at long approach march by night. The making and lighting of gaps in minefds by sappers, the combination of tks with inf followed by their combined exploitations and finally rapid reorganisation to meet possible counter-attack. AT 1100 hrs there was a conference of umpires and at 1500 hrs a discussion was held. During the afternoon country was recced for a Bde exercise.	C5
		2000	Brig WRIGLEY XXXX MC arrived to take over temporary comd 20 Bde. Capts ELLIOTT and LECKY and Lieut WINSLOW to ALEXANDRIA for winter kit.	

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(Erase heading not required).

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	30		Brig WRIGLEY (Adm comd 20 Bde) to 9 Aust Div to see Col WELLS (GS01) the HQ and DAAG. Capt WILLIAMS to ALEXANDRIA for winter dress.	CS

Wrigley
 Brig
 Comd 20 Bde
 Brig

Wells

September



A

Field Return

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS.

HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde (Unit). 5 Sep 1942 (Date)

(To be furnished by all Units of Cavalry, Royal Armoured Corps, Infantry, Royal Army Veterinary Corps, Royal Army Pay Corps, Army Educational Corps, Corps of Military Police, and all Headquarters units).

Part A. Strength. Surplus or Reinforcements required.

1 Detail.	2 Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached).	3 Surplus to Establishment.	4 Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishments).
W.Os. Class I.	1		
W.Os. Class II.	2		
W.Os. Class III.			
Squadron or Company Quartermaster-Serjeants OR Colour-Serjeants.			
Staff Serjeants.	1		
Serjeants.	4	2	1
Buglers, Trumpeters, etc.			
Corporals.	5		
Troopers, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, etc.	58	2	
Totals.	71	* 4	* 1

* These Totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 2 of Army Form W.3009.

Part B. Other Ranks attached from other Corps.

Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.	Detail	Unit and Corps to which they belong.
Cpl. Havercroft,	G. 1 Aust Corps Int Sec.	Cpl. Gullen, R.F.	2/4 Pt Hygiene Sec.
L/Cpl. John, W.	do	Pte. Kule, L.	do
Sjt. Newton, P.	S. 2/13 Aust Inf Bn	58 Aust L.A.C.	15 ORs.
Pte. McGregor, J.C.	do	J Sec 9 Div Bigs	40 ORs.
Pte. Smith, H.	do	1 Pl 2/1 Aust HQ	31 ORs.
Pte. Kierce, A.J.	2/15 Aust Inf Bn	9 Div Postal Unit	4 ORs.
Pte. Kennedy, J.	2/17 Aust Inf Bn	9 Div PPO Coy.	17 ORs.
Pte. Bohannon, A.	do		
Dr. Rowlandson,	L.P. 10 Coy AASC		

Part C. Description of Other Ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks. (e.g. present whereabouts if known).

Part D. Detail of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W. 3009

DETAIL OF SPECIALISTS, TRADESMEN, Etc.	SURPLUS TO ESTABLISHMENT.									REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.									REMARKS.	
	W.Os. Class I.	W.Os. Class II.	W.Os. Class III.	R.Q.M.S.; C.Q.M.S., or Colour-Sergeants.	Staff-Sergeants.	Sergeants.	Buglers, Trumpeters, &c.	Corporals.	Troopers, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, &c.	TOTAL.	W.Os. Class I.	W.Os. Class II.	W.Os. Class III.	S.Q.M.S.; C.Q.M.S., or Colour-Sergeants.	Sergeants.	Buglers, Trumpeters, &c.	Corporals.	Troopers, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, &c.		TOTAL.
Bricklayers...																				
Butchers ...																				
Carpenters and Joiners																				
Clerks ...						1			1											
Cooks ...																				
Despatch Riders ...																				
Drivers I.C. (Tracked) ...																				
" " (Wheeled) ...																				
Driver-Mechanics ..																				
Driver-Operators...																				
Electricians..																				
Equipment Repairers ...																				
Farriers ...																				
Fitters ...																				
Machine Gunners																				
Masons ...																				
Motor Mechanics...																				
Pioneers, Infantry (other than tradesmen)																				
Plumbers and Pipefitters																				
Range Takers ...																				
Saddlers&HarnessMakers																				
Saddle Tree Makers ...																				
Sanitary & Water Duties.																				
Signallers ...																				
Storemen technical ...																				
Tailors ...																				
Wheelers ...																				
Armourer						1			1					1					1	
General duty personnel..								2	2											
TOTALS (to agree with Columns 3 & 4 of Part A)						2		2	4					1						

HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde. Unit.

Date of Despatch 8 Sep 42.

Lucy Young
Signature of Commander.

20 Aust Inf Bde.
Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which unit is serving.

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

HQ 20 AUST INF BDE (Unit.) For Week Ending 5 Sep 42.

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

War Establishment.	1	2	3	4
	Ranks.	Posted strength counting against authorised establishment (excluding attached).	Surplus to Establishment.	Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on establishment).
	*			
	*			
	*			
	*	1		
	Brigadier			
	Lieut.-Colonels ...			
	Majors... ..	1		
	Captains	6		
	Lieutenants	4		
	2nd Lieutenants			
	Quartermasters			
	District Officers			
	TOTALS	18		

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary (e.g., Major-General, Brigadier, etc.).

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.
Lieut.	I. E. CARALON	A.I.F.	30.8.42	Attached for duty with J Sec 9 Aust Div Sigs.

Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known).

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	M. or S. Army No.	Substantive Rank.	Higher acting or temporary rank, if held.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No).	Date Joined Unit.	If not present with Unit, state how employed.
1	NX 396	Brig.		W. J. V. WINDEYER	AIF	Yes		Comd
2								
3	NX 328	T/Maj.		B. V. WILSON	"	"		B.M.
4								
5	NX 375	Capt.		T. W. YOUNG	"	"		S.C.
6								
7	QX 6200	Capt.		B. WILLIAMS	"	"		L.O.
8								
9	NX 35094	Capt.		J. H. ELLIOTT	"	"		BASCO
10								
11	VX 15146	Capt.		H. M. HAMILTON	"	"		S.C. Learner
12								
13	VX 13528	T/Capt.		R. J. HAMER	"	"		B.M. Learner
14								
15	NX 15590	T/Capt.		M. V. PICKERING	"	"		T.O.
16								
17	QX 8571	Lieut.		G. A. GIMMEL-SMITH	"	"		I.O.
18								
19	NX 28145	Lieut.		T. C. SHELDON	"	"		L.O.
20								
21	NX 29407	Lieut.		G. F. J. HOLTSBAUM	"	"		Amenities Offr.
22								
23	NX 13863	Lieut.		P. B. MARTIN	"	"		L.O.
24								
25				OFFICERS ATTACHED FOR DUTY.				
26							date of attachment.	
27								
28	NX 57320	Capt.		B. C. LECKY	AIF	6.9.41		OO J Sec Sigs
29	VX 39645	Lieut.		I. F. CARALON	"	30.8.42		Att J Sec Sigs.
30								
31	NX 18932	Capt.		A. I. MORRISBY	"	11.1.42		OO 58 LAD.
32	NX 13029	Lieut.		H. J. WINSLOW	"	21.1.42		OO 1 Pl 2/1 Aust HQ Gd Bn.
33								
34								

(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER CORPS.

Substantive Rank.	Higher acting or temporary rank, if held.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Date of attachment.	Nature of attachment.
SX 12188	Chap.	A. J. ROBJOHN	AACHD	19.11.41	to 2/13 Bn for
QX 6391	Chap.	G. R. GIBSON	"	21.11.41	to 2/15 "duty.
VX 47864	Chap.	W. L. BYRNE	"	21.4.42	to 2/17 " "

HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde.

(Unit.)

5 Sep 42.

(Date of Despatch.)

T. W. Young Capt.

SG 20 Aust Inf (Signature of Commander.)

9 Aust Div.

(Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving.)

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS.

HO 20 Aust Inf Bde (Unit). 13 Sep 1943 (Date)

(To be furnished by all Units of Cavalry, Royal Armoured Corps, Infantry, Royal Army Veterinary Corps, Royal Army Pay Corps, Army Educational Corps, Corps of Military Police, and all Headquarters units).

Part A. Strength. Surplus or Reinforcements required.

1 Detail.	2 Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached).	3 Surplus to Establishment.	4 Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishments).
W.Os. Class I.	1		
W.Os. Class II.	2		
W.Os. Class III.			
Squadron or Company Quartermaster-Serjeants OR Colour-Serjeants.			
Staff Serjeants.	1		
Serjeants.	5	2	
Buglers, Trumpeters, etc.			
Corporals.	5		
Troopers, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, etc.	54	1	3
Totals.	68	* 3	* 3

* These Totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 2 of Army Form W.3009.

Part B. Other Ranks attached from other Corps.

Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.	Detail	Unit and Corps to which they belong.
Cpl Havercroft, G.	1 Aust Corps Int Sec.	Dr. Rowlandson, L.P.	10 Coy Aust.
L/Cpl John, K.	do	Cpl. Cullen, R.P.	2/4 Fd Hygiene Sec.
Sjt. Newton, P.	E.S. 2/13 Aust Inf Bn.	Pte. Kule, L.	do
Pte. McGregor, J.	do	53 Aust L.A.B.	15 ORs.
Pte. Smith, H.	do	J Sec 9 Div Sigs	41 ORs.
Pte. Kierce, A.	B. 2/15 Aust Inf Bn.	1 Pl 2/1 Aust Hd Cd Bn.	32 ORs.
Pte. Kenney, J.	2/17 Aust Inf Bn.	9 Div Postal Unit	4 ORs.
Pte. Bohannon, A.	do	9 Div Pro Coy	16 ORs.

Part C. Description of Other Ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks. (e.g. present whereabouts if known).
NX 14609	Cpl.	Bown, R. C.	AIF	7 A.G.H.
NX 45837	L/Cpl.	Kelman, J. R.	AIF	7 A.G.H.
				4 Aust Con Depot

Part D. Detail of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W. 3009

DETAIL OF SPECIALISTS, TRADESMEN, Etc.	SURPLUS TO ESTABLISHMENT.									REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.									REMARKS.	
	W.Os. Class I.	W.Os. Class II.	W.Os. Class III.	R.Q.M.S.; C.Q.M.S., or Colour-Serjeants.	Staff-Serjeants.	Serjeants.	Buglers, Trumpeters, &c.	Corporals.	Troopers, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, &c.	TOTAL.	W.Os. Class I.	W.Os. Class II.	W.Os. Class III.	S.Q.M.S.; C.Q.M.S., or Colour-Serjeants.	Serjeants.	Buglers, Trumpeters, &c.	Corporals.	Troopers, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, &c.		TOTAL.
Bricklayers...																				
Butchers ...																				
Carpenters and Joiners																				
Clerks ...						1			1											
Cooks ...																				
Despatch Riders ...																				
Drivers I.C. (Tracked) ...																				
" " (Wheeled) ...																				
Driver-Mechanics... MT ...																		3	3	
Driver-Operators...																				
Electricians..																				
Equipment Repairers ...																				
Farriers ...																				
Fitters ...																				
Machine Gunners																				
Masons ...																				
Motor Mechanics...																				
Pioneers, Infantry (other than tradesmen)																				
Plumbers and Pipefitters																				
Range Takers ...																				
Saddlers&HarnessMakers																				
Saddle Tree Makers ...																				
Sanitary & Water Duties.																				
Signallers ...																				
Storemen technical ...																				
Tailors ...																				
Wheelers ...																				
MT						1			1											
General duty personnel..									1	1										
TOTALS (to agree with Columns 3 & 4 of Part A)						2		1	3									3	3	

80 20 Aust Inf Bde.

Unit.

Date of Despatch 18 Sep 48

80 20 Aust Inf Bde.

Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which unit is serving.

Signature of Commander.

J. Young Capt.

80 20 Aust Inf Bde.

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

HQ 20 AUST INF BDE (Unit.) For Week Ending 12 Sep 42.

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

War Establishment:	1	2	3	4
	Ranks.	Posted strength counting against authorised establishment (excluding attached).	Surplus to Establishment.	Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on establishment).
	*			
	*			
	*			
	Brigadier *			1
	Lieut.-Colonels ...			
	Majors... ..	1		
	Captains	6		
	Lieutenants	3		1
	2nd Lieutenants			
	Quartermasters			
	District Officers			
	TOTALS	10		2

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary (e.g., Major-General, Brigadier, etc.).

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.

Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.
Brig.	W. J. V. WINDEYER	AIF	12.9.42	Evacuated to 2/8 Aust Pd Amb - Jaundice.
Lieut.	F. B. MARTIN	AIF	9.9.42	Evacuated to 2/8 Aust Pd Amb - Fractured Tibia & Fibula Left leg.

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known).

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	M. or S.	Substantive Rank.	Higher acting or temporary rank, if held.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No).	Date Joined Unit.	If not present with Unit, state how employed.
		Army No.	Rank.					
1								
2								
3		NY 328	T/Maj.	B. V. WILSON	AIF	Yes		BN
4								
5		NY 375	Capt.	T. H. YOUNG	"	"		SC
6								
7		NY 6200	Capt.	B. WILLIAMS	"	"		LO
8								
9		NY 35094	Capt.	J. H. ELLIOTT	"	"		BR3CU
10								
11		VX 15146	Capt.	H. E. HAMILTON	"	"		SC Learner
12								
13		VX 13593	T/Capt.	A. J. DUNN	"	"		BN Learner
14								
15		NY 15590	T/Capt.	M. V. RICKERING	"	"		TO
16								
17		OX 8571	Lieut.	G. A. GEMMELL-SMITH	"	"		IO
18								
19		NY 28145	Lieut.	T. G. SHELTON	"	"		LO
20								
21		NY 29407	Lieut.	G. F. J. HOLTSHAM	"	"		Amenities Offr.
22								
23								
24								
25				OFFICERS ATTACHED FOR DUTY.				
26		NY 57390	Capt.	R. G. LOCKY	AIF		Date of attachment.	
27		VX 39645	Lieut.	I. P. CARANON	"	6.9.41		OC J Sec Sigs
28		NY 18932	Capt.	A. I. MORRISBY	"	30.8.42		Att J Sec "
29		NY 13029	Lieut.	H. J. WINSLOW	"	11.1.43		OC 58 LAD.
30						21.1.43		OC I PI 2/1
31								Aust HQ Gd Bn
32								
33								
34								

(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER CORPS.

Substantive Rank.	Higher acting or temporary rank, if held.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Date of attachment.	Nature of attachment.
OX 18293	Chap.	A. J. ROBJOHNS	AACHD	19.11.41	to 2/13 Bn for duty.
OX 6891	Chap.	G. R. GIBSON	"	21.11.41	to 2/15 Bn "
VX 47664	Chap.	W. L. BIRNE	"	21.4.42	to 3/17 Bn "

HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde. (Unit.)

12 Sep 42 (Date of Despatch.)

J. Young
(Signature of Commandant)

SC 20 Aust Inf Bde.
(Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving.)

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS.

Bd 20 Aust Inf Bde (Unit) 19 Sep 1942 (Date)

(To be furnished by all Units of Cavalry, Royal Armoured Corps, Infantry, Royal Army Veterinary Corps, Royal Army Pay Corps, Army Educational Corps, Corps of Military Police, and all Headquarters units).

Part A. Strength. Surplus or Reinforcements required.

1 Detail.	2 Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached).	3 Surplus to Establishment.	4 Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishments).
W.Os. Class I.	1		
W.Os. Class II.	2		
W.Os. Class III.			
Squadron or Company Quartermaster-Serjeants OR Colour Serjeants.			
Staff Serjeants.	1		
Serjeants.	5	2	
Buglers, Trumpeters, etc.			
Corporals.	5		
Troopers, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, etc.	54	1	3
Totals.	68	*	*

* These Totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 2 of Army Form W.3009.

Part B. Other Ranks attached from other Corps.

Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.	Detail	Unit and Corps to which they belong.
Cpl Havercroft,	B 1 Aust Corps Int	Dr. Rowlandson,	B. 10 Coy AAA.
L/Cpl John, E. J.	do	Cpl. Cullen E. W.	2/4 Fd Hygiene Bde.
Sjt Newton, P. S.	B 2/13 Aust Inf Bn	Pte. Rule, L.	do
Pte. McGregor, J.	do	58 Aust Inf Bn	15 ORs.
Pte. Smith, H.	do	J Sec 9 Div Sigs	41 ORs.
Pte. Hilder, A.	do	1 Pl 2/1 Aust HQ	do
Pte. Bayley, F.	do	84 Bn	35 ORs.
Pte. Kierce, A. D.	2/15 Aust Inf Bn.	9 Div Postal Unit	4 ORs.
Pte. Kennedy, J.	2/17 Aust Inf Bn.	9 Div Pro Coy.	15 ORs.
Pte. Bohannon, J.	do		

Part C. Description of Other Ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks. (e.g. present whereabouts if known).
NY 14600	Cpl.	DOWN, H. J.	AIF	4 Aust Con Depot.

Part D. Detail of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W. 3009

DETAIL OF SPECIALISTS, TRADESMEN, Etc.	SURPLUS TO ESTABLISHMENT.									REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.									REMARKS.	
	W.Os. Class I.	W.Os. Class II.	W.Os. Class III.	R.Q.M.S.; C.Q.M.S., or Colour-Serjeants.	Staff-Serjeants.	Serjeants.	Buglers, Trumpeters, &c.	Corporals.	Troopers, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, &c.	TOTAL.	W.Os. Class I.	W.Os. Class II.	W.Os. Class III.	S.Q.M.S.; C.Q.M.S., or Colour-Serjeants.	Serjeants.	Buglers, Trumpeters, &c.	Corporals.	Troopers, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, &c.		TOTAL.
Bricklayers...																				
Butchers ...																				
Carpenters and Joiners																				
Clerks ...						1			1											
Cooks ...																				
Despatch Riders ...																				
Drivers I.C. (Tracked) ...																				
" " (Wheeled)...																				
Driver-Mechanics ...																				
Driver-Operators...																				
Electricians..																				
Equipment Repairers ...																				
Farriers ...																				
Fitters ...																				
Machine Gunners																				
Masons ...																				
Motor Mechanics...																				
Pioneers, Infantry (other than tradesmen)																				
Plumbers and Pipefitters																				
Range Takers ...																				
Saddlers&HarnessMakers																				
Saddle Tree Makers ...																				
Sanitary & Water Duties.																				
Signallers ...																				
Storemen technical																				
Tailors ...																				
Wheelers ...																				
" " (Wheeled)...																				
General duty personnel..									1	1										
TOTALS (to agree with Columns 3 & 4 of Part A)									1	1										

J. J. ...
Signature of Commander.

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

HQ 20 AUST INF BDE. (Unit.) For Week Ending 19 Sep 42.

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

War Establishment.	1	2	3	4
	Ranks.	Posted strength counting against authorised establishment (excluding attached).	Surplus to Establishment.	Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on establishment).
	*			
	*			
	*			
	*			
	Brigadier			1
	Lieut.-Colonels			
	Majors...	1		
	Captains	6		
	Lieutenants	3		1
	2nd Lieutenants			
	Quartermasters			
	District Officers			
	TOTALS ...	10		2

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary (e.g., Major-General, Brigadier, etc.).

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.
Lt-Col.	R. H. N. TURNER	AIF	12.9.42	Adn Comd 20 Aust Inf Bde. Attached for duty from 2/13 Aust Inf Bn.
Lieut.	D. W. B. MAUGHAN	"	12.9.42	Attached for duty from 2/13 Aust Inf Bn.
Lieut.	W. F. FRAWLEY	"	15.9.42	Attached for duty as 2 i/c J Sec Sigs.

Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.
Lieut.	I. F. CARALON	AIF	15.9.42	Ceased to be attached to J Sec 9 Div Sigs.

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known).

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
	M. or Army No.	Substantive Rank.	Higher acting or temporary rank, if held.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No).	Date Joined Unit.	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	
1									
2	NX 328	T/Maj.		B. V. WILSON	AIF	Yes		B.M.	
3									
4	NX 375	Capt.		T. W. YOUNG	"	"		S.C.	
5									
6	QX 6200	Capt.		B. WILLIAMS	"	"		L.O.	
7									
8	NX 35094	Capt.		J. H. ELLIOTT	"	"		BASCO.	
9									
10	VX 15146	Capt.		H. M. HAMILTON	"	"		SC Learner.	
11									
12	VX 13528	T/Capt.		R. J. HAMER	"	"		BM Learner.	
13									
14	NX 15590	T/Capt.		M. V. PICKERING	"	"		TO.	
15									
16	QX 8571	Lieut.		G. A. GEMMELL-SMITH	"	"		IO.	
17									
18	NX 28145	Lieut.		T. C. SHELDON	"	"		LO.	
19									
20	NX 29407	Lieut.		G. F. J. HOLTSBAUM	"	"		Amenities Offr.	
21									
22									
23				OFFICERS ATTACHED FOR DUTY.					
24									
25	NX 12213	Lt-Col.		R. W. N. TURNER	AIF	12.9.42		Adm Comd.	
26	NX 31195	Lieut.		D. W. B. MAUGHAN	"	12.9.42		LO.	
27	NX 57320	Capt.		E. C. LECKY	"	6.9.41		OC J Sec Sigs	
28	VX 39645	Lieut.		I. F. CARALOW	"	30.8.42		Att. to	
29	NX 18932	Capt.		A. I. MORRISBY	"	11.1.42		OC 58 LAD.	
30	NX 13029	Lieut.		H. J. WINSLOW	"	21.1.42		OC 1 Pl 2/1 Aust HQ Gd Bn	
31									
32	VX 38133	Lieut.		W. F. FRAWLEY	"	15.9.42		2 i/c J Sec g Div Sigs.	
33									
34									

(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER CORPS.

Substantive Rank.	Higher acting or temporary rank, if held.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Date of attachment.	Nature of attachment.
SX 12188	Chap.	A. J. ROBJOHN	AACHD	19.11.42	to 2/13 Bn for duty.
QX 6391	Chap.	G. R. GIBSON	"	21.11.41	to 2/15 Bn "
VX 47864	Chap.	W. L. BYRNE	"	21. 4.42	to 2/17 Bn "

HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde.

19 Sep 42.

(Date of Despatch.)

(Unit.)

SC 20 Aust Inf Bde

(Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving.)

J. Young Capt.
Signature of Commander.
9 Aust Div.

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS.

HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde (Unit). *20 Sep* 194*2* (Date)

(To be furnished by all Units of Cavalry, Royal Armoured Corps, Infantry, Royal Army Veterinary Corps, Royal Army Pay Corps, Army Educational Corps, Corps of Military Police, and all Headquarters units).

Part A. Strength. Surplus or Reinforcements required.

1 Detail.	2 Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached).	3 Surplus to Establishment.	4 Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishments).
W.Os. Class I.	1		
W.Os. Class II.	2		
W.Os. Class III.			
Squadron or Company Quartermaster-Serjeants OR Colour-Serjeants.			
Staff Serjeants.	1		
Serjeants.	5	2	
Buglers, Trumpeters, etc.			
Corporals.	5	1	1
Troopers, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, etc.	55	1	2
Totals.	69	* 4	* 3

* These Totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 2 of Army Form W.3009.

Part B. Other Ranks attached from other Corps.

Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.	Detail	Unit and Corps to which they belong.
<i>Cpl. Brown, R. E. S. G.</i>	<i>20 Aust Inf Bde</i>	<i>Cpl. Guller, J.</i>	<i>2/4 74 Hygiene Sec.</i>
<i>Cpl. John, R.</i>	<i>do</i>	<i>55 Aust L. Coy.</i>	<i>15 Ohs.</i>
<i>Pte. Hewton, F.</i>	<i>2/3 Aust Inf Bde</i>	<i>1 Pte. 2/1 Aust Bde</i>	<i>41 Ohs.</i>
<i>Pte. Gregory, J.</i>	<i>do</i>	<i>3d Bn.</i>	<i>55 Ohs.</i>
<i>Pte. Smith, W.</i>	<i>do</i>	<i>2 Pte. Postal Coy.</i>	<i>4 Ohs.</i>
<i>Pte. Hilder, A.</i>	<i>do</i>	<i>9 Pte. Pro Coy.</i>	<i>15 Ohs.</i>
<i>Pte. Boyle, J.</i>	<i>2/17 Aust Inf Bde</i>		
<i>Pte. Kennedy, J.</i>	<i>do</i>		
<i>Pte. Shannon, C.</i>	<i>do</i>	<i>PTE CRONIN, C.J.</i>	<i>2/8 Aust FD Amb</i>

Part C. Description of Other Ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks. (e.g. present whereabouts if known).

Part D. Detail of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W. 3009

DETAIL OF SPECIALISTS, TRADESMEN, Etc.	SURPLUS TO ESTABLISHMENT.								REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.						REMARKS.					
	W.Os. Class I.	W.Os. Class II.	W.Os. Class III.	R.Q.M.S.; C.Q.M.S., or Colour-Serjeants.	Staff-Serjeants.	Serjeants.	Buglers, Trumpeters, &c.	Corporals.	Troopers, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, &c.	TOTAL.	W.Os. Class I.	W.Os. Class II.	W.Os. Class III.	S.Q.M.S.; C.Q.M.S., or Colour-Serjeants.		Serjeants.	Buglers, Trumpeters, &c.	Corporals.	Troopers, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, &c.	TOTAL.
Bricklayers...																				
Butchers ...																				
Carpenters and Joiners																				
Clerks ...						1	1		2											
Cooks ...																				
Despatch Riders ...																				
Drivers I.C. (Tracked) ...																				
" " (Wheeled)...																				
Driver-Mechanics...																		1	1	
Driver-Operators...																				
Electricians..																				
Equipment Repairers ...																				
Farriers ...																				
Fitters ...																				
Machine Gunners																				
Masons ...																				
Motor Mechanics...																				
Pioneers, Infantry (other than tradesmen)																				
Plumbers and Pipefitters																				
Range Takers ...																				
Saddlers&HarnessMakers																				
Saddle Tree Makers ...																				
Sanitary & Water Duties.																				
Signallers ...																				
Storemen technical																				
Tailors ...																				
Wheelers ...																				
" " (Wheeled)...																				
" " (Wheeled)...																				
" " (Wheeled)...																				
" " (Wheeled)...																				
" " (Wheeled)...																				
" " (Wheeled)...																				
General duty personnel..																				
TOTALS (to agree with Columns 3 & 4 of Part A)																				

Unit.

Signature of Commander.

Date of Despatch 26 Aug 1917

Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which unit is serving.

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

HQ 20 AUST INF BDE (Unit.) For Week Ending 26 Sep 42.

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

War Establishment:	1 Ranks.	2 Posted strength counting against authorised establishment (excluding attached).	3 Surplus to Establishment.	4 Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on establishment).
	*			
	*			
	*			
	*			1
	Brigadier			
	Lieut.-Colonels			
	Majors...	1		
	Captains	6		
	Lieutenants	3		1
	2nd Lieutenants			
	Quartermasters			
	District Officers			
	TOTALS ...	10		2

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary (e.g., Major-General, Brigadier, etc.).

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.

Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.
Lieut.	W. P. FRAZLEY	AIF. (3 300 8 Div Sigs).	23.9.42	Evacuated to S/11 M. P. S.

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known).
Brig.	W. J. V. WINDEYER	AIF	6 A.G.H.

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	M. or S.	Substantive Rank.	Higher acting or temporary rank, if held.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No).	Date Joined Unit.	If not present with Unit, state how employed.
1								
2	X	329	T/Maj.	R. V. WILSON	AIF	Yes		
3								
4	X	375	Capt.	T. W. YOUNG	"	"		
5								
6	X	6200	Capt.	B. WILLIAMS	"	No.		Detached for duty to RAF.
7								
8	X	35094	Capt.	J. H. ELLIOTT	"	Yes		
9								
10	X	15146	Capt.	H. W. HAMILTON	"	"		in Learner.
11								
12	X	13523	T/Capt.	R. J. HARRIS	"	"		in Learner.
13								
14	X	15590	T/Capt.	H. V. FLEMING	"	"		
15								
16	X	8571	Lieut.	G. A. GIBBELL-SMITH	"	"		
17								
18	X	28145	Lieut.	E. G. GIBBELL	"	"		
19								
20	X	29407	Lieut.	G. F. J. HOLTERBAUM	"	"		in medical office
21								
22				OFFICERS ATTACHED FOR DUTY.				
23								
24								
25	X	12213	Lt-Col.	L. W. H. THURTELL	AIF		12.8.42	in command
26	X	21195	Lieut.	R. W. H. MAURICE	"		12.8.42	
27	X	57320	Capt.	R. G. LUCKY	"		6.9.41	in 1st Sig Bde
28	X	19932	Capt.	H. I. MERRILEY	"		11.1.42	in 5th Div.
29	X	13022	Lieut.	H. J. WINDHAM	"		11.1.42	in 1st Div 8/1
30								in 1st Div 8/1
31								
32								
33								
34								

(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER CORPS.

Substantive Rank.	Higher acting or temporary rank, if held.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Date of attachment.	Nature of attachment.
X 12138	Capt.	A. J. BROWN	AIF	10.11.41	to 2/15 Div for
X 6391	Capt.	G. B. SIMON	"	11.11.41	to 2/15 Div.
VI 47364	Capt.	H. L. BROWN	"	21.12.41	to 2/17 Div

83 20 Aust Inf Bde.
(Unit.)
26 Sep 42.
(Date of Despatch.)

J. Young
(Signature of Commander.)
83 20 Aust Inf Bde.
(Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving.)

SECRET

Copy No. 9

25 Aug 42

4 AUSTRALIAN LIGHT ARTILLERY REGIMENT OPERATION ORDER No. 6

Ref Map : TE ALAMEIN 1/50,000

INFORMATION

1. The enemy is expected to attack on RIGHT ARMY front during period between 25 and 30 Aug.
2. 2/15 Bn with tps u/c is to raid vicinity west point 23 at 37252969 and enemy localities and comms further west under certain conditions.
RAA 9 AUSTRALIAN DIV is supporting the raid and is changing locations of Btys to effect this end.

INTENTION

3. 4 AUSTRALIAN LIGHT ARTILLERY REGIMENT will support the raid.

METHOD

4. Tps allotted under command.

3 Tps 10 AUSTRALIAN LIGHT ARTILLERY BATTERY is placed under command 2/15 AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BATTAL for the duration of the raid.

5. Allotment of Tasks

10 AUSTRALIAN LIGHT ARTILLERY BATTERY (less 3 Tps) in support of 2/7 FIELD REGIMENT as under,

One sec in support one Fd Bty Square 380300
One sec in support one Fd Bty less one Tp Square 278301

11 AUSTRALIAN LIGHT ARTILLERY BATTERY (less one sec) in support 2/12 AUSTRALIAN FIELD REGIMENT in area squares 378293, 379298, 379297.

One Sec 11 AUSTRALIAN LIGHT ARTILLERY BATTERY remaining in support Main HQ 9 AUSTRALIAN DIV.

12 AUSTRALIAN LIGHT ARTILLERY BATTERY (less one Sec) in support of 2/8 AUSTRALIAN FIELD REGIMENT in area squares 378295, 379296, 379294.

12 AUSTRALIAN LIGHT ARTILLERY BATTERY
One Sec/in support one Fd Bty (2/7 AUSTRALIAN FIELD REGIMENT) square 378298.

6. Zero

All preparations will be completed before last light 25 Aug.

7. Notice. Notice of operation may be expected NOT later than 2030 hrs on night preceding attack.

8. Planning

(a) Comd B Tps 10 Bty will be available to C.O. 2/15 Bn forthwith for planning. Tps will not be moved from present tasks for training without reference to 4 AUSTRALIAN LIGHT ARTILLERY REGIMENT.

(b) Bty Comds will plan in conjunction with Comds Fd Regts for occupation of fwd positions by night.

9. Duration

The expected maximum duration of the operation is twenty-four hours.

ADMIN

10. Tpt and Equipment

Three Pantams will be made available to 3 Tp 10 ALST LT AA BTY as under,

- One from 10 AUST LT AA BTY
- One by 11 AUST LT AA BTY
- One by this Hq.

Time and place of handing over will be notified later. Predictors will not be taken forward.

11. Rec. To W/Shops Sec at present location.

12. Sup s. Rations and water for 24 hrs to be taken to fwd positions.

INTERCOM

13. Hq 4 AUST LT AA REGT remains in present location.

14. Btys will notify locations Tac Hq and comms required to RHQ and Sig Sec by 1700 hrs 25 Aug.

15. Sig Sec will arrange necessary line comms for Btys immediately after movement. Line Com will NOT be extended below Bty Hqs.

16. Synchronisation. With associated Fd Regt Hq.


17. Code Words. Code word to institute operation will be "BULLHORN". Btys will receive this code word from Regt or from Fd Regts they at present sup port. In latter case Bty will report receipt to Regt by code word "BULL".

18. Security. These orders are to be disclosed to subordinates prior to the operation only to sufficient extent to permit performance of their role in the operation.

ACKNOWLEDGE

Method of Issue D.R.

Time of signature 1530 hrs


 _____ Capt
 (D.A.V. Nott)
 Adjnt, 4 Aust Lt AA Regt.

Distribution

- Copy No. 1 10 Aust Lt AA Bty
- 2 11 " " " "
- 3 12 " " " "
- 4 4 Aust Lt AA Regt Sig Sec
- 5 4 Aust Lt AA Regt W/Shops Sec
- 6 Comd
- 7 C.H.
- 8 RAA, 9 Aust Div
- 9-10 20 Aust Inf Bde
(One for 2/15 Aust Inf Bn)
- 11 24 Aust Inf Bde
- 12 2/7 Aust Fd Regt
- 13 2/8 Aust Fd Regt
- 14 2/12 Aust Fd Regt
- 15-16 War Diary
- 17 File

25 Aug 42

24 Aust Inf Bde O.O. No. 11.

Ref map: EL ALAMEIN 1/50,000
EL DABA - EL ALAMEIN

No change from verbal orders

INFM

1. The enemy is expected to attack on EIGHTH ARMY front during moonlight period between 25 Aug and 1 Sep.
2. Raids are being prepared by NZ Div and 9 Aust Div as immediate counter strokes to the enemy attack or for use prior to the enemy attack.
3. 9 Aust Div raid, controlled by 20 Aust Inf Bde, is to be made as follows :-

(a) Raiding force 2/15 Bn, with under comd -

- one sqn (less four tps) 9 Aust Div Cav Regt
- one sqn 20 RTR (Valentines)
- one sqn RTR (Crusaders)
- one tp 2/7 Fd Regt
- one tp 4 Aust Lt AA Regt
- 9 Aust A Tk Bty
- one sec 2/13 Fd Coy
- B Coy (less one pl) 2/2 MG Bn

and in ap
RAA 9 Aust Div

seize and hold a sector of the enemy defences in vicinity pt 23 (87252969), through which an exploiting force will operate.

(b) Exploiting det of raiding force is to pass through 2/15 Bn and cause maximum damage and interference to the enemy on the tracks leading south from SIDI ASD EL RAHMAN, returning to own lines 1500 hrs same day.

This force is organised -

Comd - Maj A.E. McIntyre - 9 Aust Div Cav Regt

- Tps - one sqn (less four tps) 9 Aust Div Cav Regt
- one sqn RTR
- one tp 2/7 Fd Regt
- two A Tk tps
- one inf pl
- det 2/13 Fd Coy

(c) Entire force will be withdrawn into present FDLs at last light on day of raid.

(d) Preparations are to be completed before night 25/26 Aug, after which raid may be ordered.

4. From 24 Aug, 9 Aust Div Cav will discontinue recce along QATTARA Rd, but will continue normal recce south of TEL EL EISA.

5. 24 Aust Inf Bde, when advised, is to relieve 2/15 Bn in its present defended locality, placing one bn temp under comd 20 Aust Inf Bde for the purpose.

INTENTION

6. 24 Aust Inf Bde will be prepared to relieve 2/15 Bn by night in its present locality.

METHOD

7. 2/32 Bn will relieve 2/15 Bn by night when ordered. Similarly 2/28 Bn will be prepared to relieve 2/32 Bn in its present locality. Reccees will be commenced forthwith.

8. Fire sp of 24 Aust Inf Bde for 2/15 Bn op will be advised later if required.

9. On relief 2/15 Bn, 2/32 Bn will come under comd 20 Aust Inf Bde.

10. Present tactical roles 2/32 Bn will be assumed by 2/28 Bn on relief.

11. Reliefs will not affect sp arms, who will maintain present roles.

ADM

12. Tpt Tp carrying tpt will be provided for movement 2/28 Bn and 2/32 Bn.

13. Res Sup Res stocks will be handed over and signed for.

INTERCOMM

Codeword

14. Codeword for the op will be BULIMBA.

ACK

Confirmation issued through Sigs
Time of signature 0625 hrs. B.M. 24 Aust Inf Bde.

<u>Distribution</u>	<u>Copy No.</u>
2/28 Bn	1
2/32 Bn	2
2/43 Bn	3
2/3 Pnr Bn	4
K Sec Sigs	5
76 LAD	6
2/8 Fd Regt	7
11 Bty 3 A Tk Regt	8
2/3 Fd Coy	9
C Coy 2/2 MG Bn	10
D Coy 2/2 MG Bn	11
9 Aust Div	12
20 Aust Inf Bde	13
Comd	14
S.C.	15
I.O.	16
File	17
War Diary	18



AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

S E C R E T

G 647/60/2

HEADQUARTERS

Main 9 Aust Div

24 Aug 42.

20 AUST INF BDE

Ref 9 Aust Div 00 No 17.

1. Instns will be issued by this HQ daily commencing 25 Aug by 2100 hrs stating whether BULIMBA is on or off.
2. A Naval bombardment of DABA is to take place during the same night as BULIMBA.

*Passed by L.O.
to 2/15 Bde.*

A. W. H. H. J. Col
GS 9 Aust Div

OO No. 8

Copy No. 7

25 Aug 42

Ref Maps 1/50,000 EL ALAMEIN
GHAZALINFORMATION

1. On receipt of codeword "BULIMBA", 2/15 Aust Inf Bn is to raid vicinity of WEST Pt 23 8725 2969 and to exploit by raiding enemy localities and comms further WEST.

Additional Tps under comd 2/15 Bn

One sqn (less four tps) 9 Aust Div Cav Regt
 One sqn 40 RTR
 One sqn RTR (CRUSADERS)
 D Tp 14 Bty 2/7 Aust Fd Regt
 B Tp 10 Bty 4 Aust Lt AA Regt
 9 Aust A Tk Bty
 One sec 2/13 Aust Fd Coy
 B Coy (less one pl) 2/8 MG Bn.

2. 2/15 Bn outline plan

Phase I : 2/15 Bn is to seize and hold at first light enemy defences vicinity WEST Pt 23 as a firm base and bridgehead for further ops.

Phase II : Exploiting force is to debouch from firm base, raid localities and comms further WEST and return through the firm base at 1500 hrs same day.

Phase III: Entire force is to withdraw to present FDLs at last light on day of raid.

Notice of Raid - is to be given to CO 2/15 Bn NOT later than 2030 hrs on eve of attack.

3. Additional Arty - 7 Med Regt RA is placed in sp for the op.

INTENTION.

4. RAA 9 Aust Div, with 7 Med Regt RA, will sp the op by timed concentrations and obs fire.

METHOD.

5. Zones of fire - ALL Regts whole zone.

For sp by obs fire general division is
 2/7 Aust Fd Regt - Bridgehead & WEST
 2/12 " " " " " & NORTH
 2/8 " " " " " & SOUTH

Obs - will conform with zones of fire.

6. Occupation - On receipt of codeword "BULIMBA" regts will occupy fwd posns.

Routes - 2/8 WESTWARD along ry line route or telegraph route.

2/12 NORTH via ALAMEIN Sta route and WESTWARD via main tarmac road.

7. Tasks - Tables and traces Appx "A" - to follow

Fwd OPs - Each Fd Regt will establish three fwd OPs, Med Regt, one; OPOs establishing OPs fwd of enemy minefields will move through minefield gaps as soon as possible after the inf. Med Regt fwd OPO will have call on one Tp after 2 + 75.

METHOD (Contd)

7. CB - Allotment. 7 Med Regt (after Z+75 less one Tp).
Policy neutralisation.
Tasks will be issued direct to Regt by CBO 30 Corps.
8. FOOs - One per Pd Regt - will report to CO 15 Aust Inf Bn at 1400 hrs 25 Aug and arrange time of reporting for ops. Each FOO will have call on one Bty.
9. Time to be ready - Zero will be notified when "BULIMBA" is ordered - NOT before 0500 hrs.
10. Withdrawal from fwd posns - will be ordered by CRA on completion of the op. Routes as for occupation. 2/7 Aust Pd Regt will be prepared to cover withdrawal of 2/15 Aust Inf Bn from bridgehead to within the FDLs.
11. A Tk - CO 3 Aust A Tk Regt will re-allot A Tk resources in present FDLs on move out of 2/15 Bn and again on its withdrawal
12. AA - CO 4 Aust Lt AA Regt will arrange protection of gun areas during the op.

ADM.


13. Issued separately.

INTERCOMN

14. Locations - 20 Aust Inf Bde 8805 3006
 2/15 Bn HQ is to move on axis of attack with A Coy and to be established on WEST side of enemy wire marked by "80" sign on unpainted tin.
15. Liaison - Maj R.L. JOHNSTON, 2/7 Aust Pd Regt, will report to CO 2/15 Aust Inf Bn as Arty Liaison Offr for the op - detailed instns from CRA.
 Comm L/T to 2/7 Aust Pd Regt - W/T on CRA's gp - call sign will be allotted later.
16. Place name codewords used by 20 Aust Inf Bde -

<u>Place</u>	<u>Codeword</u>
TELL EL EISA Sta (87612991)	CHEESE
BARREL HILL (87542972)	BARREL
PIMPLE (87592982)	PIMPLE
SANDY KNOLL (87462976)	SANDY
WEST PT 23 (87252969)	BEEP
TRIG 29 (86823008)	MUSTARD
SKYLINE TRACK (running approx SE along dark 25 metre contour line about 868 grid line)	SKYLINE
Main SW Track from SIDI ABD EL RAHMAN	ONIONS
SIDI ABD EL RAHMAN (86553085)	RAZOR

17. Synchronisation - at 0400 hrs with HQ RAA.



ACK.

METHOD (Contd)

Method of issue - To 2/7, 2/8, 2/12 Rd Regts
 7 Med Regt, 3 A Tk Regt
 4 Lt AA Regt, 20 Inf Bde
 & 2/15 Bn by SDR, remainder
 through Sigs.

Time of signature 1330 hrs.

[Signature]
 Maj
 9 Aust Div

Distribution	Order copy No.	Appx "A" Copy No.
2/7 Aust Md Regt	1	10
2/8 " " "	2	20
2/12 " " "	3	30
7 Med Regt	4	35
3 Aust A Tk Regt	5	-
4 Aust Lt AA Regt	6	-
20 Aust Inf Bde	7	34
2/15 Aust Inf Bn	8	35
HQ 9 Aust Div	9 - 11	36 - 38
CCRA 30 Corps	12	-
CBO 30 Corps	13	39
CRA 1 SA Div	14	-
OC No. 1 Coy 9 Div Sigs	15	-
OC No. 2 Coy 9 Div Sigs	16	-
CRA	17	40
War diary	18 - 20	41 - 43
File	20	43

15. Liaison - Maj R.L. JOHNSON, 2/7 Aust Md Regt, will report to
 CO 2/15 Aust Inf Bn as Arty Liaison Officer for the op -
 detailed tasks from CRA.
 Comm Lt to 2/7 Aust Md Regt - W/T on CRA's op -
 call sign will be allocated later.

16. Place name codewords used by 20 Aust Inf Bde -

Codeword	Place
CHEESE	TELL EL KISA (EYELISS)
BARRAL	BARRAL HILL (EYELISS)
PIMPA	PIMPA (EYELISS)
BARDY	BARDY KNOLL (EYELISS)
BIRD	WEST PT (EYELISS)
MUSTARD	TRIG 20 (EYELISS)
CRYLINE	CRYLINE TRACK (EYELISS)
	(main SW track from side and NI HANAN side and NI HANAN (EYELISS))

17. Synchronization - at 0600 hrs with HQ RAA.

SECRET

COPY NO 34

APPX A TO HQ. BMRA 9 AUST DIV.

OO No B 25 AUG 42

Ret. Map - Et Munein
1:50,000

*Line to be
blacked
H*



871

300

871

294



871

294


A. S. Williams
Maj.
BMRA 9 AUST DIV

TO AUST INF BDE OP "BULIMBA" BOMBLINES

SUPERIMPOSE ON EL ALAMEIN, GHAZAL & EL HIQEIF 1:50,000.



OWN TPS
"FIRM BASE"



- PRESENT BOMBLINE
- NEW BOMBLINE AFTER ASSAULT
- PROBABLE ROUTE OF EXPLOITING FORCE

NB. NOTIFICATION TO AASC OF CHANGE TO NEW BOMBLINE WILL BE A SIGNAL "BOMBLINE BULIMBA"

Date.....	No.....	Survey Co., R.A.	Ref. No.....		
Battery.....					
Target.....					
Battery.....	Post.....	Computed Bearing.....	Chart Bearing.....	Range.....	A. of S.....

TARGET TRACE.

[M3701] W2122/1309 2500 pads 3/32 149 G & S 122 Forms/B.2541/5

ARMY FORM B.2541
(In pads of 50)

T A S K T A B L E

S E C R E T

Appx "A" Issued with RAA 9 Aust Div 00 No 8 dated 25 Aug 48

Copy No

34

Ref Maps : 1/50,000 EL ALAMEIN CHAZAL

Serial	Task letter	Units & Tps to engage				Time		Map Ref	Amm	Rate	Remarks
		2/7	2/8	2/12	7 Meds	From	To				
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
1	A		6	6		Zero +15	Zero +20	Area bounded by 87216 29791, 87233 29782 87223 29758 87260 29685 87240 29680 87232 29700 87182 29791	HE	Normal	Each Regt to cover whole of area shown
2	I	2				Zero +15	Zero +34	Line to be blinded 87242 29690 to 87330 29670 to 87377 29629	SMOK	as reqd by met condit- ions	Purpose- to screen left flank. If conditions unfav- ourable for SMOK obsvd fire by GPO with Hs
3	H	1				Zero +15	Zero +34	line to be blinded 87320 30255 to 87380 30229	SMOK	do	Purpose- to screen right flank of attack.
4	G	1				Zero +15	Zero +20	Area bounded by 87114 29884 87153 29849 87137 29828 87095 29870	HE	Normal	
5	F	1				Zero +15	Zero +20	Area bounded by 87083 29956 87110 29923 87093 29915 87093 29869 87078 29859 87087 29920 87074 29950	HE	Normal	
6	B				4	Zero +15	Zero +20	as for Serial 7	HE	Normal	

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
7	B		2	2		Zero +21	Zero +34	Area bounded by 87210 29744 87234 29695 87182 29695 87182 29705 87196 29705 87193 29740	HE	Normal	
8	C			4		Zero +21	Zero +34	Area bounded by 87155 29775 87180 29767 87170 29710 87148 29718	HE	Normal	
9	D	2				Zero +21	Zero +34	Area bounded by 87182 29805 87195 29800 87180 29767 87168 29770	HE	Normal	
10	E		4			Zero +21	Zero +34	Area bounded by 87148 29762 87158 29749 87102 29720 87105 29733	HE	Normal	
11	G	2	6			Zero +35	Zero +75	As for Serial 4	HE	Slow	2 tps 2/7 & 2 tps 2/8 to be super- imposed and avail- able at call of P00
12	F	1		6		Zero +35	Zero +75	As for Serial 5	HE	Slow	2 tps 2/12 to be superimposed and available at call of P00

Zero+75 Zero+78: CB 87092966 and 86832988

By phone from RAA 1123 hrs 27 Aug.

(a) At Z +20 and Z +34, one gun per tp will fire one rd SMOK to indicate lift.

(b) After Zero+75, two tps 2/8 are allotted for CB duties. If not required for CB are available for obs fire

(c) After Z +75, ~~one tp 7 used available for obs fire and these tps remain on CB duty.~~
2 tps 5.5 for obs fire and 2 tps 4.5 for CB tasks.

By phone RAA 1153 hrs 27 Aug.

A. J. Williams

Maj
BM RAA 9 Aust Div

S E C R E T

HQ RAA 9 Aust Div

Ref No .7/5

31 Aug 42

2/7 Aust Fd Regt
2/8 Aust Fd Regt
2/12 Aust Fd Regt

REF BULIMBA

1. 2/15 Aust Inf Bn may require a smoke screen to cover final withdrawal from the bridgehead.
2. Regts will provide this screen by obs fire as follows :-
 - 2/12 Aust Fd Regt NORTHERN flank
 - 2/8 Aust Fd Regt SOUTHERN flank
 - 2/7 Aust Fd Regt WESTERN front of bridgehead
3. SMOKE will be ordered by this HQ by use of code word " TOBACCO "
4. ACK. ✓

U3U3

A. E. Williams Maj

Copy to :-

BM RAA 9 Aust Div

20 Aust Inf Bde
2/15 Aust Inf Bn
Major R.L. JOHNSTON.

25 Aug 42

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE9 AUSTRALIAN DIV CAV REGTOPERATION INSTRUCTION No. 15

Ref Maps

EL ALAMEIN 1:50,000

EL DABA) 1:100,000

EL ALAMEIN)

INFORMATION

1. The enemy is expected to attack during the moonlight period between 25 Aug and 1 Sep.
2. Bn Raids are being prepared by 2 N.Z. Div and 9 Aust Div as immediate counter strokes to the enemy or for use prior to the enemy attack.

INTENTION

3. (a) 9 Aust Div will raid to the West of the area "enemy" 23.872296.
(b) A Force under Command of Major A.E. McINTYRE 9 Aust Div Cav will exploit success of 9 Aust Div raid.

METHOD

4. (a) The raid will be carried out by 2/15 Aust Inf Bn, with ancillary troops detailed by Div.
(b) Exploitation under Major McINTYRE - composition of force given below.
(c) Raiding Bn and Exploitation Force are under Comd of 20 Aust Inf Bde.
5. TASKS
(a) 2/15 Aust Inf Bn will seize and hold Sector of the enemy defences through which the Exploiting Force will debouch and return.
(b) Exploitation Force will interfere with enemy movement and maintenance on the tracks leading South from SIDI ABD EL RAHMAN and cause maximum damage to the enemy.

6. Composition of Exploitation Force

Commander: Major A.E. McINTYRE 9 Aust Div Cav Regt

"A" Sqn (less four troops) 9 Aust Div Cav Regt

One Sqn RTR (Crusaders)

"D" Tp 14 Bty 2/7 Aust Pd Regt

Two Tps A/Tk Guns (One Tp detailed by CRA
(One Tp 2 Pr. Portee from 20
(Aust Inf Bde

One Pl To be detailed by 20 Aust Inf Bde

Det RAE From Sec 2/13 Aust Pd Coy for demolition.

7. Planning, Organisation and Training Major A.E. McINTYRE will contact the Os/C of Sub Units under his command forthwith to carry out the above.

The Regt is at call for any assistance required.

8. (a) From 24 Aug Patrols on Left Sector (EL ALAMEIN) will be discontinued. One Tp however, will remain to assist Arty OPOs. Patrols on the TEL EL EISA Sector will be maintained; normal activity will be continued in this area to prevent arousing suspicion.

(b) Tours of Duty to 28 Aug will be as under:-

24 Aug	Right Sector	B Sqn
	Left Sector	One Tp C Sqn

25) Aug	Right Sector	C Sqn
26)	Left Sector	One Tp B Sqn

27) Aug	Right Sector	B Sqn
28)	Left Sector	One Tp C Sqn

(c) A Sqn will be at disposal of Major A.E. McINTYRE.

(d) Two Troops of the forward Sqn will "Stand by" for any opportune duty connected with the Exploitation Force. These two troops will be netted to Regtl Net.

ADMINISTRATION

9 Reserve Sqn will have two "Stand by" wheeled vehicles ready for PWs. These vehicles will each carry 10 boxes S.A.A. and 20 Smoke Projectors to take forward to Exploitation Force.

Other Admin details for Exploitation Force to be issued separately by Major A.E. McINTYRE.

Medical

Special arrangements between RMO 2/15 Aust Inf Bn and Regt RMO.

INTERCOMMUNICATION

10 Codeword for the Operation will be BULIMBA. On receipt of this Code Word Sub Units will RV in accordance with orders issued by Major A.E. McINTYRE. Wireless communication will be as per Sig Plan attached marked "A". Regt will make one Operator and one No. 11 Set available to 20 Aust Inf Bde.

ZERO

11 Preparations will be completed before the night 25/26 Aug after which the raid may be ordered. The notice to be given will be notified later.

12. Regt Tac HQ for operation will be at "Alternative" Tac HQ at 88152969.


Signed at 1800 hrs

J. D. Ferguson Lieut
Adj 9 Aust Div Cav Regt

DISTRIBUTION

1. File to be initialled by the following:
2 i/c; OC HQ Sqn - A - B - C; Sig Offr;
QM; OC "C" Sec Sigs; OC 22 Aust LAD.
2. Major A.E. McINTYRE
3. HQ 9 Aust Div
4. 20 Aust Inf Bde
- 5-6. War Diary

SIGNAL DIAGRAM "BULIMBA"



Subject : TP CARRYING TPT FOR OP BULIMBA

Main HQ 9 Aust Div
Ref: Q 80/1/69
26 Aug 42.

26 AUST INF BDE
20 AUST INF BDE

Copies for "G"
AASC

- 9 Aust Div OO No. 17 dated 23 Aug refers.
1. 26 x 3 ton lorries will be required by 2/15 Bn during the BULIMBA op. These vehs will be provided by 101 Aust Gen Tpt Coy.
 2. 26 Aust Inf Bde will make the following arrangements:
 - (a) An offr of 101 Aust Gen Tpt Coy to liaise with 2/15 Bn on the afternoon of 26 Aug to coordinate details of guiding and reporting of tpt.
 - (b) Keep a DR from 101 Aust Gen Tpt Coy at HQ 26 Aust Inf Bde. This DR will be sent to 101 Aust Gen Tpt Coy each day, on receipt by HQ 26 Aust Inf Bde of advice as to whether BULIMBA is on or off. This advice will be telephoned to the Staff Capt by "Q" 9 Aust Div daily, not later than 2040 hrs.
 3. The tpt mentioned in para 1 will be held in constant readiness to move at short notice, but drivers may stand down on receipt each night of message that op will not be on that night.

Leslie M. M. M. Col.
A.A. & Q.M.G., 9 Aust. Div.

-2-

HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde
26 Aug 42.
Ref: G.18/8/476

2/15 Aust Inf Bn.

Anderson Maj.
BM 20 Aust Inf Bde.

25 Aug., 42.

9 AUSTRALIAN FIELD REGIMENT. O.O. NO. 19.

Ref. Maps:- GHAZAL
EL ALAMEIN } 1:50,000.

INFORMATION.

1. ENEMY. The enemy is expected to attack on EIGHTH Army front during moonlight period between 25 Aug. and 2 Sept. He may attack at other times.
2. OWN TFS. 9 Aust. Div. has prepared to make a raid on his L. of C. Controlled by 20 Aust. Inf. Bde., 15 Aust. Inf. Bn., with the following under Comd., will carry out the operation.

One Sqn. (less four tps.) 9 Aust. Div. Cav.
One Sqn. 40 R.T.R. (Valentines).
One Sqn. R.T.R. (Crusaders).
D Tpn., 7 Aust. Fd. Regt.
B Tpn., 10 Bty., 4 Aust. Lt. A.A. Regt.
9 Bty., 3 Aust. A/Tk. Regt.
One Sec. 13 Aust. Fd. Coy.
3 Coy. (less one pl.) 2 Aust. M.G. Bn.

In support R.A.A., 9 Aust. Div., plus 7 Med. Regt. R.A.

3. OUTLINE PLAN - 15 AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BN.

Phase I. Force to seize and hold at first light enemy defences vicinity WEST Pt. 23 (872296) as a firm base and a gap.

Phase II. Exploiting force (as under) to move through and raid localities and comms. further WEST, and return through gap at 1500 hrs.

In Comd. Major A.E. McINTYRE, 9 Aust. Div. Cav.

One Sqn. (less four tps.) 9 Aust. Div. Cav.
One Sqn. R.T.R.
D Tpn., 7 Aust. Fd. Regt.
Two tps., 9 Aust. A/Tk. Bty.
Det. 3 Fd. Coy.
One Inf. Pl.

Phase III. Entire force is to withdraw to present F.D.L's. at last light on day of raid.

This op. may be ordered any time from night 25/26 Aug. onwards. Force Comd. will be informed not later than 2030 hrs. on eve of operations.

INTENTION.

4. 8 Aust. Fd. Regt. will support the operation by timed concentrations and observed fire.

METHOD.5. ZONES.

(a) Fire. Zone of fire for all Btys. from Ry. to incl. QATARRA Track.

(b) OBS. 8 Aust. Fd. Regt. from incl. Cap to incl. QATARRA track:-

15 Fd. Bty. - Gap incl. generally RIGHT half of Zone.

16 Fd. Bty. - QATARRA Track incl. generally LEFT half of Zone.

58 Fd. Bty. - As for 15 Bty.

C. GUN AREA.

(a) Area SOUTH of Ry., NORTH of telegraph track and WEST of 880 EASTING Grid.

<u>P. G. No.</u>	NORTH Bty.	(879455	296279	9
	Posn.	(878908	296062	12
	EAST Bty.	(880307	294864	6
	Posn.	(879737	294652	7
	S.W. Bty.	(878644	295311	7
	Posn.	(879004	295081	11
	(Present Fwd.)			
	(Bty. Posn.)			

- (b) 15 Bty. occupying S.W. Posn. -
- 58 Bty. occupy NORTH Posn.
- 16 Bty. occupy EAST Posn.
- 16 Bty. occupying S.W. Posn. -
- 15 Bty. occupy NORTH Posn.
- 58 Bty. occupy EAST Posn.
- 58 Bty. occupying S.W. Posn. -
- 15 Bty. occupy NORTH Posn.
- 16 Bty. occupy EAST Posn.

7. OCCUPATION. On receipt of codeword "BULIMBA" the two Btys. in their main posns. will occupy fwd. posns.:-

ROUTE - Westward along telegraph line and Main Rd. Bty. using main Rd. will have to move immediately so as to clear road before movement of 2/12 Fd. Regt. who will be using same route. If this is not possible, Bty. detailed to use main rd. will follow Bty. using Telegraph route.

- (a) 15 Fd. Bty. in Fwd. Posn.
- 16 Fd. Bty. Telegraph Route.
- 58 Fd. Bty. Main Rd.

- (b) 16 Fd. Bty. in fwd. posn.
- 15 Fd. Bty. - Main Rd.
- 58 Fd. Bty. Telegraph-Route.

- (c) 58 Fd. Bty. in fwd. posn.
- 15 Fd. Bty. - Main Rd.
- 16 Fd. Bty. - Telegraph Route.

8. TASKS. As per task table and tracings issued 25 Aug., 42.

9. FWD. O.P.O.'s. AND F.O.O.'s.

- (a) Each Bty. will establish one fwd. O.P.
- (b) 15 Fd. Bty. will provide one F.O.O. to move with attacking force (15 Bn.) F.O.O. will have call on 15 Fd. Bty.

10. C.B.

Allotment.

58 Fd. Bty. will be at C.B. call after Z plus 75.

10. C.B. (Central).

Policy - Neutralization.

Tasks - To be issued by C.B.O., 30 Corps.

11. TIME TO BE READY. Zero will be notified when BULIMBA is ordered - NOT before 0500 hrs.

12. WITHDRAWAL FROM FWD. POSNS. Will be ordered by C.R.A. through R.H.Q. on completion of the operation. Routes as for occupation. 2/7 Aust. Fd. Regt. has been detailed to cover withdrawal of 2/15 Aust. Inf. Bn. from bridgehead to within the F.D.L's.

13. A.A. O.C., 12 Bty., 4 Aust. Lt. A.A. Regt., is to arrange protection of gun area during the operation.

ADM.

14. AMN.

DUMPING.

(a) For the operation amn. will be dumped at gun posns. as follows:-

	Complete Rounds.		
	H.E. Ch. Normal.	SMOK.	25 Pr. Super.
15 Bty.	1480	240	360
16 Bty.	1480	60	90
58 Bty.	1480	60	90
	-----	-----	-----
	4440	360	540
	-----	-----	-----

(b) Amn. for dumping will be distributed as follows:-

COMPLETE ROUNDS

	H.E. Ch. Normal.	SMOK.	25 pr. Super
<u>15 BTY.</u>			
A.A.S.C.	504	168	252
Unit vehs. from ARP 1st line	576	72	108
	400	-	-
	-----	-----	-----
	1480	240	360
<u>16 BTY.</u>			
A.A.S.C.	504	-	-
Unit vehs. from ARP 1st Line	576	60	90
	400	-	-
	-----	-----	-----
	1480	60	90
<u>58 BTY.</u>			
A.A.S.C.	504	-	-
Unit vehs. from ARP 1st line	576	60	90
	400	-	-
	-----	-----	-----
	1480	60	90
<u>TOTAL</u>	4440	360	540

14. AMM. (cont'd).

(c) On receipt of codeword "BULIMBA" -

- (i) Dumping will commence.
- (ii) Two guides per tp. knowing the location of tp. posns. and the amounts required at each tp. will report to A.P. to guide 2nd line amm. vehs. to gun posns.
- (iii) Regt. vehicles capable of transporting amm. to be collected from ARP (EL ALAMEIN at 8863 2943) will report to ARP. Movement will be co-ordinated by Regt. Q.M.

A working party as below will accompany vehs. to ARP:-

15 Bty.	-	4 Gns.
16 "	-	4 Gns.
58 Bty.	-	1 Bdr. and 4 Gns.

(d) Route. Tarmac Rd. to turn off to gun areas.

(e) Timings. Order of movement of 2/8 Aust. Fd. Regt. and 2/12 Aust. Fd. Regt. vehs., which will be using the same route, will be:-

- (i) 2/12 Aust. Fd. Regt. Gun Gp.
- (ii) 2/8 Aust. Fd. Regt. 2nd line amm. vehs. - NOT to pass rd. junc. at 8873 2943 until tail of 2/12 Fd. Regt. Gun Gp. is clear.
- (iii) 2/12 Aust. Fd. Regt. 2nd line amm. vehs. - NOT to pass rd. junc. at 8873 2943 until 2nd line amm. vehs. 2/8 Fd. Regt. are clear of this point.
- (iv) 2/8 Aust. Fd. Regt. regt. amm. vehs. - NOT to move from ARP on to main rd. until tail of 2/12 Fd. Regt. 2nd line amm. vehs. passes 886 EASTING grid.
- (v) 2/12 Aust. Fd. Regt. amm. vehs. - NOT to move from ARP on to main rd. until regt. amm. vehs. 2/8 Fd. Regt. pass 886 EASTING grid.

2/12 Fd. Regt. will post a rep. at rd. junc. 8873 2943 who is to be informed by 2/12 Fd. Regt. when the last vehicle of its Gun Gp. passes this point. The rep. will remain at this point and will inform the guides with 2/8 Fd. Regt. 2nd line amm. gp. if the 2/12 Regt. Gun Gp. vehs. are clear.

(f) The remainder of 1st line amm. (1st line less 40 r.p.g.) will be on wheels and accessible at short notice.

(g) Withdrawal. ALL amm. remaining with the guns when the order for withdrawal is given will be returned to present gun posns.

15. MEDICAL. R.A.P. vicinity QATARRA track at 8800 2955.

INTERCOMN.

LOCATIONS H.Q.'s.

5

Tac. R.H.Q.

Blockhouse at 8815 2965.

Tac. H.Q., R.A.A., 9 Aust.
Liv.

8882 2945.

20 Aust. Inf. Bde.

8805 3006.

2/15 Aust. Inf. Bn. H.Q.

Is to move fwd. on axis of adv.
with A Coy. and is to be established
on WEST side of enemy wire marked
by "80" sign on unpainted tin.

17. LIAISON. Major R.L. JOHNSTON, 2/7 Aust. Fd. Regt., will be accom-
panying C.O., 2/15 Aust. Inf. Bn. as Arty Liaison Offr.

18. D.R.'s. D.R.'s. from Btys. will report to R.H.Q. in its present posn.
on receipt of codeword, and will accompany Tac. R.H.Q. to its new
posn.

19. Place Name Codewords used by 20 Aust. Inf. Bde.: -

PLACE.

TELL EL EISA Sta. 8761 2991
BARREL HILL 8754 2972
PIMPLE 8759 2982
SANDY KNOLL 8746 2976
WEST Pt. 23 8725 2969
TRIG. 29 8682 3008
SKYLINE TRACK (running approx.
S.E. along dark 25 metre Contour
line about 868 Grid)

CHEESE
BARREL
PIMPLE
SANDY
BEEF
MUSTARD
SKYLINE

19. Place Name Codewords used by 20 Aust. Inf. Bde. (cont'd):-

<u>PLACE.</u>	<u>CODEWORD.</u>
Main S.W. Track from SIDI ABDEL RAHMAN	ONIONS
SIDI ABDEL RAHMAN 8655 3085	RAZOR

20. SYNCHRONISATION. Approx. 0400 hrs. after synchronisation with H.Q., R.A.A.

21. Codeword for operation - "BULIMBA."

22. Zero Hour - to be notified.

Ack.

Issued by - S.D.R. to Btys.
Others - Sigs.

Time of Signature 11:30 h.

Del 0201

[Handwritten Signature]

Capt., R.A.A.,

Adj. S Aust. Md. Regt.

Distributions:-

- 15 Fd. Bty. 1
- 16 Fd. Bty. 2
- 58 Fd. Bty. 3
- F Sec. Sigs. 4
- 64 L.A.D. 5
- C.O. 6
- 2 i/c. 7
- Adj. 8
- Q.M. 9
- 20 Aust. Inf. Bde. 10
- H.Q., R.A.A., 9 Aust. Div. 11 (plus additional copy of adm. para. 14 for
File 12 (Capt. McDERMOTT.)
- War Diary 13-14

31 Aug 42.

"BULIMBA".ZERO: 0535 hrs 1 Sep 42.Coy timings from present areas :-

<u>Coy</u>	<u>Start</u>	<u>Ry Stn</u>	<u>Debus</u>	<u>Assembly</u>
C	0340	0407	0425	0435
D	0415	0423	0440	0450
A	0422	0439	0445	0505
B	0430	0449	0505	0515
En Hq	-	-	-	-

CODEWORDS:

TELL EL EISA STN (87612991)	CHEESE
BARREL HILL (87542972)	BARREL
PIMPLE (87592982)	PIMPLE
SANDY KNOLL (87462976)	SANDY
WEST PT 23 (87252969)	BEEF
SKYLINE TRACK ()	SKYLINE
TRIG 29 (86823008)	MUSTARD
TRACK JUNC (860295)	GIN
SIDI ABD EL RAHMAN (86553085)	RAZOR
MAIN TRACK SW FROM SIDI ABD EL RAHMAN	ONIONS
EXPLOITING DET TO MOVE FWD	JOHNNIE WALKER
EXPLOITING DET RETURNING TO "FIRM BASE"	MELBOURNE BITTER
CARRIERS TO MOVE FWD TO GUIDE EXPLOITING DET IN	MELBOURNE BITTERS
RALLY OF B SQN 40 KTR IN VICINITY SANDY KNOLL	BEACON



- 2/15 - 2
2/17 - 1.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

WDW

G695/60/2

MAIN HEADQUARTERS,
9 AUST DIV
31 Aug 42

20 AUST INF BDE /

AIR SP - BULIMBA

Confirming Appx "A" to 9 Aust Div OO No 17:-

RAF has given orders for:-

1. F sweep of one sqn minimum over minefield area at time to be decided by Comd 20 Aust Inf Bde to synchronize with debouching of coln. Duration of patrol 15/20 mins. Time of protective sweep to be stated on Air Sp Tentacle.
2. Escorted Tac R to cover area west of minefield gap to depth of approx 10 miles to determine location of enemy forces and provide warning of probable enemy counter attack. Time of Tac Rover area - 0830 hrs (L.T.)
3. Escorted Tac R late morning or early afternoon over vicinity of coln on return journey. Request to be made on tentacle.
4. Calls for F and B sp in emergency only to be made through tentacle; Air commitments may not permit such calls being answered.
5. Movements of raiding coln to be reported on tentacle.
6. Roundels on vehs.
7. Red smoke to be burnt by ground tps on approach and identification British aircraft.
8. "In the event of Tac R aircraft wishing to pass urgent infm on the location of strong enemy forces in the vicinity of the coln, a message dropping sta is being established at TELL EL EISA ry sta and messages and/or marked maps are to be dropped at this pt. The dropping sta will be marked with a "V" made of white ground strips."
9. Additionally Tac R infm to be passed through Air Sp link on completion of the sortie.

2/17 take messages + maps
direct to Maj GRACE at
burnt out ~~W~~ GRANT tk
Arranged by phone RJA.

NWells Col
GS 9 Aust Div



AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

WDW

G695/60/2

MAIN HEADQUARTERS,
9 AUST DIV
31 Aug 42

20 AUST INF BDE 4

AIR SP - BULIMBA

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9. Additionally Tac R infm to be passed through Air Sp link on completion of the sortie.

H. Wells
Col
GS 9 Aust Div

PROFORMA MESSAGE FORM

327

TO :- 20 AUST INF BDE : 24 AUST INF BDE : 26 AUST INF BDE :
9 AUST DIV CAV REGT : RAE : RAA : SIGS : 2/2 AUST MG BN :
B SQN 40 RTR : G SQN RGH : G : AQ

FROM :- MAIN 9 AUST DIV 0688 30 -----

SECRET (.)
ref 0687 of 30 aug (.) for BULIMBA only appx A to 9 Aust Div OO
17 of 23 aug still stands and RED smoke will be used

[Signature]
Capt

ELS

TOO 1500

8/13
8/15
8/17

PRO FORMA MESSAGE FORM.

326

TO :- 20 A UST INF BDE 24 AUST INF BDE 26 AUST INF BDE
9 AUST DIV CAV REGT RA A

FROM :- MAIN 9 AUST DIV 0 689 30

ref and to air comm

~~ref appx A air sp BULIMBA para 11 b (.)~~

first (.) ETA for tac R ~~is~~ NOT being given (.)

second (.) to assist message dropping a red smoke
candle will be used to indicate the 'V' sign (.)

third (.) as the plane must dive low for message
dropping all personnel must be warned NOT to fire
on single aircraft flying low or diving in the
area of the 'V' sign

H. B. ...
..... Maj

E.L.S. T00 1515

HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde.
27 Aug 42.

Ref:

9 Aust Div.

GROUND TO AIR SIGNAL : OPERATION "BULIMBA".

Ref G.658/60/5.

For operation "BULIMBA" white ground strips in the form of a "V" with the apex pointing towards the enemy, will be laid out at the following map ref :-

87656 29908.

Smilson Major
Comd 20 Aust Inf Bde. *Ad.*

APPX 'A'

(Issued in conjunction with 9 Aust Div OO No17 dated 23 Aug 42.)

To supersede instns issued in 9 Aust Div
G 658/60/5 of 26 Aug 42.

AIR SP - BULIMBA

A. The following Air Sp is being provided by RAF

1. F Cover

(a) Over the 2/15 Bn objective 871297, 872297, 872296
871296. One sqn sortie to cover the debouching of
the raiding force. At call from 0700 hrs (estimated
delay 45 mins)

(b) With Tac R as in para 2 (b) below.

2. Tac R

(a) At 0830 hrs unless amended or cancelled.

One Tac R sortie with F escort.

(b) When called for during late morning or early afternoon
(estimated delay 1½ hrs).

One Tac R sortie with F escort.

3. Further Air Sp may be provided on request but will be depend-
ent on air requirements for the main battle and may take the form of:-

(a) F sweeps returning from the main battle area - if called
for.

(b) B sp - (estimated delay 1½ hrs) if called for.

4. SOS Tasks

Additional Air Sp may be provided in emergency. This will
not be asked for unless the situation demands this action, prefer-
ably through Div HQ.

5. Identification Raiding Party

(a) Roundels will be on all vehs.

(b) All vehs will carry the blue identification flag.

(c) On the approach of friendly aircraft red smoke candles
will be lit in addition to the firing of red verrey
lights. (A further supply of candles is being obtained).

6. Bomblime

(a) The bomblime will be for 2/15 Bn only.

(b) The raiding force will identify itself as in para 5(c).

(c) Opening bomblime 87523043 - 87343024 - 87002987 -
87002950 - 87292950.

6. Bombline (cont)

(d) Changes in bombline will be made through the Air Sp Tentacle and a local bombline given with each request for Air Sp.

7. Infm to RAF

The following infm will be passed to the RAF through the tentacle:-

- (a) Calls for Air Sp as in paras 1 to 4.
- (b) Reports of any enemy air action in the area.
- (c) Changes in bombline.
- (d) The movements of the raiding coln by means of the following code.

Trig 29 868300 MUSTARD

SIDI ABD EL RAHMAN RAZOR

Track junc at 860295 GIN

2/15 Bn objective BEEF

Example:- "Coln RAZOR next GIN hrs"
Meaning Coln near SIDI ABD EL RAHMAN moving on track junc at 860294 probably arrive hrs.

8. Recce area Tac R.

GHAZAL STA 852310 - SIDI ABD EL RAHMAN 865308 - TELL EL EISA STA 876299 - KILO 9 QATTARA RD 876291 - DEIR EL DHIB 873286 - ALAM EL BILUSIYAT 860286 - DEIR EL MURRA 852293 - GHAZAL STA.

9. General Task:

To give the location and general composition of enemy forces moving towards 2/15 Bn objective and or the raiding force.

Intercomm

10. Tac R Reports

- (a) Urgent infm will be dropped at the V sign 87662991
- (b) Remaining infm - normal procedure.

11. Ground to Air

- (a) V sign located at 87662991 with apex towards the enemy.
- (b) At ETA 6 red smoke candles will be lit at the V sign irrespective of whether aircraft are seen or not.
- (c) A further six will be lit when the aircraft are sighted.

ACKNOWLEDGE

PJB Mike Capt
Col,
GS 9 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION :-

as for OO No 17.



SECRET

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

WDW

G658/60/5

MAIN HEADQUARTERS

20 AUST INF BDE

9 AUST DIV

26 Aug 42

Copies to :- Lt Col R.W.G. OGLE
Maj A. E. McINTYRE
WAR DIARY

METHOD OF COMN FOR AIR SP

OPERATION - BULIMBA

1. The following instns refer to subparas of para 18¹ your OO No 19.

- (a) Requests for air sp will be made through Air Sp Tentacle.
- (b) Change in bomblines will be made through Air Sp Tentacle and local bomblines given for each request for air sp.

(d) Ground to Air Signal

White ground strips in form of V will be laid at a point to be notified in the request for air sp or previously made known.

If sp is granted an ETA will be sent over the tentacle.

At the ETA six red smoke candles will be lit at the V irrespective of whether aircraft are seen or not.

A further six ~~will~~ be lit on aircraft being sighted.

Emergency Recognition Signal, Ground to Air.

If attacked by own aircraft, fire succession of red Verey lights.

2. Red Candles

A minimum of 48 red candles ~~are~~ to be delivered to HQ 9 Aust Div by 2400 hrs 26 Aug and will be sent to you by LO.

Failing receipt of red candles, red verey lights will be used.

Well
Col
GS 9 Aust Div



FAB

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

G 653/65/4

HEADQUARTERS

MAIN HQ 9 AUST DIV
25 Aug 42.

G 1518/182

20 AUST INF BDE (a)
~~Lt Col R.W. OGLE.~~

RECOGNITION SIGNALS

Ref 20 Aust Inf Bde OO No 19, para 18 (d) should be amended
on following lines:-

Aircraft calling for posns on the ground will :-

fire a white cartridge followed by a green two star
cartridge for HQ;

fire a white cartridge for fwd tps.

These sigs will be repeated until answered from the ground.

HQ will answer aircraft by :-

firing a white cartridge, or

burning a smoke generator and putting out a ground
indicator.

Fwd tps will answer aircraft by :-

firing a white cartridge, or burning a smoke generator,
and, displaying a 'T' ground sign with the crosspiece
nearest the enemy and parallel to the front.

HQ and fwd tps will repeat light sigs every minute for three
minutes.

2. Attention is drawn to METP 3 A, Appx "H".

*Copy to 415 Bn for
notifications to all
sub-units under command.
25 Aug 42.*

R. D. Parham Major Col
GS 9 Aust Div



G 15/8/183

SECRET

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

G651/60/2

Main HEADQUARTERS
9 Aust Div
25 Aug 42

30 CORPS

Copy to 20 Aust Inf Bde ✓

AIR SUPPORT - OPERATION "BULIMBA"

Forwarded herewith is Copy No 24 of 20 Aust Inf Bde OO No 19 for operation "BULIMBA" for transmission to RAF with the following requests for air sp please:-

1. Information during the operation of movement of any enemy forces towards -

in order of priority { (a) bn objective
(b) raiding force.

Can arrangements be made for this infm to be passed by both

(a) message dropping to bn and
(b) by normal Tac R broadcast.

2. Ground to air recognition sigs

May advice be given as to whether recognition sigs shown in para 18 (d) of the OO ^{are} be confirmed.

3. Fighter cover from 0800 hrs.


N.W. Col
Lt Gen.
Comd 9 Aust Div.

I 13/13/974

NOTES FROM CONFERENCE ON BULIMBASECRETCLEARANCE OF MINEFIELDS AND MARKING OF GAPS

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

1. The German minefield was in three parts of four rows of mines in each part. Two rows ran parallel and the third row (which caused all the trouble) diverged from its line parallel to the other two and ran at an angle of about 30 degrees fwd, e.g.,



The divergence of this rd from its line was the only cause of trouble due to minefields. The drs of vehs etc who could clearly see the gaps ran onto this rd when making for them.

2. Two gaps were cleared in a very short time and the third owing to casualties to the sprs took slightly longer to clear. The Sgt in charge of this gap directed tks from this to the other gaps. Very soon afterwards the gap was cleared.
3. Three gaps of 30 - 50 yds wide were made and are considered to have been adequate for the operation.
4. All traffic tended to use the one gap following the tracks of previous vehs.
5. Maj GEHRMAN gave as his opinion.
 - (a) Where minefields are located they can be cleared by night.
 - (b) Where minefields are not located daylight is preferred.
 - (c) Where Booby Traps exist the clearance of the gaps cannot be guaranteed.
 - (d) Daylight is required for the clearance of Booby Traps which take too long to clear at night.
 - (e) The existence of unmarked minefields in no mans land could be determined and plotted by the Spr patrols with detectors at night. These could then be lifted on the night preceding an operation; if not from the whole area then along the route to be used by vehs.

The following recommendations were made.

- (a) For future ops the action outlined in Para 5(e) be taken.
- (b) As fire will always be directed on the gaps the continuous widening of the gaps should be arranged. For this purpose the original gaps should be sited to facilitate the widening process by joining up neighbouring gaps.
- (c) It is not sufficient to mark the gap only. The approach to the gap from both the enemy and our own side require to be marked in the same way. Tapes, which get blown about by shell fire, are not entirely satisfactory.

As the gear has to be carried fwd by sprs in the first instance it requires to be comparatively light.

The standard minefield gap sign is considered satisfactory for day and the use of lights is necessary by night.

WDW

6. (Contd)

- (d) To ensure that all gaps are used, control of vehs moving fwd is necessary. Men should be stationed a few hundred yds from the gaps to direct vehs to them and to the particular gap allotted, also to advise if the gap is or is not clear. In larger ops control pts could be established and gap signs numbered or lettered.
- (e) It was considered that the posn allotted the sprs, i.e. following the leading inf, is suitable for their work.
- (f) Where unexpected and other minefields are encountered, for which no gap marking signs are available, the gaps cleared should be marked by piling the mines lifted in small piles on each side of the gap to indicate the limits of the cleared laneway.
- (g) A res of sprs should be retained in all ops which involve minelifting.
- (h) If resources of sprs permit, a spr should be allotted to each gp of vehs to provide technical assistance with uncharted minefields.
- (i) As it has been found that the enemy immediately booby-traps any area visited by our patrols, early decision is required to be taken as to objectives for future ops so that patrolling is arranged to avoid the enemy taking this action.

W. D. ... Col.
GS 9 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION

- 20 Aust Inf Bde
- 24 Aust Inf Bde
- 26 Aust Inf Bde
- Cav
- RAA
- RAE
- Sigs.
- MG
- B Sqn 40 RTR
- 23 Armd Bde
- Comd
- G (2)
- Q (2)
- AASC
- Medical
- Ord
- File (2)
- War Diary (2)
- Spares (6)

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

Z OUTPLIC

No. of Groups

GR.

115

OFFICE DATE STAMP

OUT

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

20th Inf Bde

FROM

24th Inf Bde

Originator's Number

0161

Date

2

In Reply to Number

—

Further	to	our	0159	2/28	Bn will
commence	move	on	foot-	2000	hrs
and	leave	near	party	at	least
one	appx	bn	HQ	and	each
copy	and	one	OK	per	sect
plan	party	rejoin		under	unit
arrangements					in the

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN.

SIGNED

SIGNED

IMMEDIATE

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER
235031T.	Wt. 30	318/919.	450M pads.	10/40.	W & S. LTD.	51-8011.					

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

**CALL
AND
INSTRUC-
TIONS**

IN

OUT

No. of Groups

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

arranged 20	dest	inf.	Bde	not
before 2000	hrs 0	2/32	Bn	on
relief by	2/15	Bn	reverts to	
cmd 24	Bde	and	2/15	Bn
reverts to	cmd	20	Bde	estimated
time 2200	hrs 0	Lpt	will	report
2/32 Bn under arrangement 24 Bde at 2100				

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN** BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT **IN CIPHER**.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN.

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER
235031r.	Wt. 30	318/919.	450M pads.	10/40.	W & S. LTD.	51-8011.					

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

No. of Groups

GR.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

<i>Lrs O</i>	<i>Route 2/32 Rn</i>	<i>By</i>	<i>main</i>	<i>Rd O</i>
<i>ctll</i>	<i>informed</i>			

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN** BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT **IN CIPHER**.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN.

1750

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

1820

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER
<i>L</i>	<i>150</i>	<i>RHB</i>	<i>Bayphaw</i>								
235031r.	Wt. 30	318/919.	450M pads.	10/40.							
				W & S. LTD.	51-8011.						

342

Pro Forma MESSAGE FORM

TO: 2/15 Bn, 2/28 Bn, rptd 20 Aust Inf Bde, 2/43 Bn, 9 Aust Div,
2/8 Fd Regt, 2/3 Fd Coy

FROM: 24 Aust Inf Bde 0 159 2

warning order (.) night 2/3 sep 2/15 bn reverts to comd 20 Aust Inf
Bde and returns former operational area (.) 2/28 Bn will occupy
present locality 2/15 bn (.) 2/32 bn reverts to comd 24 Aust Inf
Bde and will return to former locality 888294 (.) complete recces
(.) detailed orders follow

if liable to be
intercepted or fall
into enemy hands, this
message must be sent in
CIPHER

IMPORTANT

T00 1020

Dr Jackson

615/8/495

SECRET
HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde
8 Sep 42.

9 Aust Div.

REPORT ON OPERATION "BULIMBA"

THE PLAN

1. The op was prepared by 20 Aust Inf Bde in accordance with 9 Aust Div OO No. 17 of 23 Aug 42, which provided for the launching of a Bn raid as an immediate counter-stroke to an enemy attack further south.
2. The Bde intention and plan for the op appear from 20 Aust Inf Bde OO No 19 of 24 Aug 42 a copy of which has been fwded.
3. (a) In outline the plan was to attack with 2/15 Aust Inf Bn supported by one sqn of 40 RTR (VALENTINES) and other arms and make a breach in the enemy line. If this breach could be made it was then hoped to pass through it a mob exploiting force consisting of :-
 - one sqn 9 Aust Div Cav Regt (less three tps)
 - one sqn RTR (CRUSADERS)
 - one tp 13 bty 2/7 Aust Fd Regt
 - two tps A Tk guns
 - one pl inf (lorried)
 - det RAE.
- (b) The task of the exploiting force was to raid enemy comms and veh on the routes leading south from SIDI ABD RAHMAN causing as much damage as possible.
- (c) 2/15 Aust Inf Bn was to consolidate on the ground captured so as to make a "bridgehead" or "base" for the use of the exploiting force and keep the breach open for its return.
- (d) Once the exploiting force had returned through the breach, which it was anticipated would be during the afternoon of D1, the whole force was to be withdrawn as soon as this could be accomplished. This it was anticipated might be after nightfall on D1.
4. (a) In choosing the sector of the enemy line to be secured to make the bridgehead it was thought desirable to carry out the op as far away as possible from the ridges near SIDI ABD RAHMAN, known to be held by the enemy and affording observation over all the surrounding country.
- (b) The objective chosen was the area of a feature commonly known as "WEST POINT 23". This is the highest part of a small ridge. It is not really a commanding feature but it does overlook the surrounding desert for several thousand of yds.
- (c) It was chosen for the following principal reasons :-
 - (i) Although known to be strongly held by the enemy and protected by minefields and wire it was not under observation from the SIDI ABD RAHMAN features.
 - (ii) The "going" between our FDLs and it is suitable for MT.

- (iii) In an attack on the north side of the feature the attackers would, at least during the early stages, be partially defiladed from enemy positions to the South.
- (iv) When taken, the posn would give us command and observation and would not be closely overlooked from the flanks.
5. (a) The detailed plan for the capture of the posn and formation of the bridgehead was very thoroughly and capably prepared by CO 2/15 Aust Inf Bn (Lt-col R.W. OGLE) who was (under the general control of 20 Aust Inf Bde) in comd of the raid.
- (b) The complete details of the plan appear from 2/15 Aust Inf Bn CO No. 10 of 24 Aug 42 and supplement dated 26 Aug 42, copies of each of which have been fwded. All details of the method of attack need not be considered here.
6. (a) The order provided for the attack to be formed up on a frontage of 600 yds with two coys fwd and launched silently under cover of darkness from a taped start line approx 2000 yds from the enemy FDLs which at that point are approximately 3000 yards from ours.
After reaching the enemy posns the two fwd coys were to capture objectives pointed out to them; the left rear coy was to exploit rear south and secure the Trig 23 hill itself; the right rear coy which consisted of only two pls, the third being with the exploiting force, was to gain a posn pointed out on the right rear and there to remain in reserve.
- (b) The initial attack was to be supported by timed concentrations by BAA 9 Aust Div followed by observed fire after the capture of the posn. Flanking fire by MMGs of 2/2 Aust MG Bn was also provided for on a timed programme.
- (c) Zero was fixed at 0535. This time was chosen for the following reasons :-
- (i) It was calculated that by crossing the start line at that time the leading wave of inf would reach the enemy minefd just at first light.
- (ii) Sappers were to accompany the leading inf to make and mark gaps in the minefd. It was thought that the effective and speedy raising of mines and the passage of the supporting tks through the fd could best be accomplished in some degree of daylight. AP mines had been discovered by patrols in other parts of the enemy FDLs and clearing or passing through these in darkness is slow and dangerous.
- (d) The initial arty concentrations were to commence at Z plus 15, it was calculated that after that time the attack would not be able to proceed further in silence without the enemy becoming aware of it.

(3)

- (e) Three gaps were to be opened in the minefd as rapidly as possible and tks and other vehs, which were to come fwd after the inf, were allotted to particular gaps.
- (f) The sqn of VALENTINES was to pass through the gaps as soon as possible to assist the inf to their objectives in order to make a complete break through and to widen the breach.
- (g) To preserve silence during the approach march and forming up, most of the 'A' Ech vehs (incl mortars, consolidation stores, and res amn) were left at our FDLs and others e.g. A Tk guns at an intermediate posn between our FDLs and the start line. They were to follow the tks through it. This arrangement was made so that the soft skinned vehs would not be delayed in a vulnerable position outside the enemy minefd while it was being cleared and lost before the gaps were available as was reported to have happened in other engagements.
- (h) The sqn of VALENTINES had its own start line and start time calculated to bring the tanks to the minefd at the time when it was anticipated the gaps would be open and the inf needing the assistance of the tks.
- (i) Provision was made for MMGS and A Tk guns to come fwd for consolidation immediately the posn was captured.

7. PREPARATIONS

- (a) Recce of the objective from the ground was carried out systematically by CO 2/15 Aust Inf Bn and offrs of the Bn and other arms, both by day and night, from posns well fwd in "no-mans-land". The general line of the enemy's wired localities was thus known.
- (b) Air photos of the enemy line were provided, interpreted by an APIU officer and a map issued showing details of the enemy posts as obtained from air photos, ground observation and patrols. This information proved very accurate.
- (c) Some information providing a useful check on that posn, ^{from} other sources was also obtained from a BRITISH soldier who, having escaped from TORRUK, reached our lines two days before the operation, after having spent upwards of a fortnight hiding in the enemy lines in the very area chosen for our attack.
- (d) Unfortunately during the nights preceding the op the moon was high. This made a detailed close examination of the enemy minefd by sappers impossible without it being detected. The posn of the enemy's main fd was known. Scattered enemy fds in "no-mans-land" were also known and removed at night before the op. But the existence of a "spur" minefd, unfenced and carefully concealed just on our side of the main fd was NOT known. It is possible that it had been laid only a very short time before the op commenced although our recce parties did not see this being done. It was thought possible that the presence of patrols right on the enemy wire on the nights immediately preceding the attack might disclose our intentions, particularly if any member were captured and proved insecure. Patrolling was therefore restricted to recce by junior leaders who were to take part. It seems however essential that if minefds in localities which are being developed by the enemy are to be negotiated, engr recce, if possible, with mine detectors must go on right up to the time of attack so that concealed and newly-planted fds are discovered in time.

8. As the raid was to be launched only after the enemy had begun his thrust further South there was a period of waiting after preparations had been made. The time which elapsed between the issue of preliminary orders and D1 not only enabled many details of the plan to be settled and officers and many NCOs to see the ground closely. It also ensured a full explanation of the plan to all the men taking part and permitted them to see the line of advance and the objective from our lines. Their individual knowledge of what was intended and required is thought to have done much to give the tps confidence and resolution.
9. A waiting period of this character however, has dangers particularly to security. It is reported that the general outlines of the intention were known to tps in ALEXANDRIA. This it is thought occurs largely through gossip in rear echs of fwd units and in sup and medical channels. It might have a serious effect on larger scale ops.
10. (a) Arrangements for deception and to ensure surprise included among others :-
- (i) ostentatious recces and arty registration of enemy localities on the main road remote from the objective.
 - (ii) limitat on of all abnormal daylight movement and recces fwd of our FDL from points near exits from our own minefds.
 - (iii) no obvious arty registration on the objective. This was not necessary as it had been one of the regular harassing fire targets for a considerable time.
 - (iv) continuance of normal Div Cav patrols.
 - (v) restriction of movement to assembly areas etc until after dark on eve of attack.
 - (vi) patrols and covering parties during laying of tape line.
- (b) These precautions seem to have in part defeated their own object. If statements of a PW are correct the enemy found us "unusually silent" during the day of 31 Aug - presumably because there was little arty harassing fire. The enemy sent a patrol at night to investigate this quietness. The patrol got close enough to our FDLs to hear the sounds of preparatiion for attack - and according to PW went back to report it but decided to have a rest before doing so. A party of our machine gunners which went out some hours before zero to dig in their guns for their flanking fire task also encountered an enemy patrol and suffered casualties. Again surprise might easily have been prejudiced. The wide expanse of "no-mans-land" in this part of the front makes it impossible to deny all access to it by small enemy parties; and single scouts can, as our own activities have proved, lie up in "no-mans-land" all day and closely observe the opposing lines. The risks of the enemy's suspicions being aroused by his fwd patrols and scouts hearing the movement of tks and vehs or seeing other preparations for attack must therefore be recognised. A possible solution might be the use of aircraft to distract attention by their noise on the night of the attack and for several nights previously. Precise knowledge of our point of attack can be prevented by patrolling on the night of the attack to keep all enemy away from the locality of the actual start line.

11. THE ATTACK

Accounts of the op written by Maj GRACE 2/15 Aust Inf Bn, and other offrs have already been fwded. It is unnecessary to repeat all details here. The course of the main events appears from the following paras.:

12. The assembly of tps, debussing, move to start line, forming up in normal compact formation for a night attack

- and advance from the start line all went very smoothly and quietly. The Bn had had considerable trg in this phase of night attacks and a few nights previously had rehearsed the op in the actual formations to be adopted.
13. Up to Z plus 15, the time when the arty concentrations began, there was no enemy fire and the enemy apparently knew nothing of the coming attack.
 14. Under cover of the arty concentrations, the leading inf reached the enemy minefd just before our arty lifted. They crossed the minefd into the enemy posn with little difficulty although the right fwd coy came under the enemy ^{DF}. The enemy in the fwd posts were both dazed by our arty and surprised by the inf attack. Many posts when actually assaulted readily surrendered, but others continued to resist.
 15. By 0630 hrs all the attacking inf had got into the enemy posn and Bn HQ had been established by the adjt about 150 yds inside the enemy wire.
 16. Shortly after 0600 hrs CO 2/15 Aust Inf Bn (Lt-col OGLE) was badly wounded when his carrier ran on a mine. He remained conscious and gave orders to OC 9 Bty 3 A Tk Regt (Maj COPELAND), who was travelling behind in a jeep, to get the tks through the minefds as soon as possible and to summon Maj GRACE 2 i/c of the Bn. Maj GRACE was then at 87602976 just inside our FDLs where the Bn had established a rear HQ and veh lines for the first phase of the op. Maj GRACE got the message to go fwd at about 0625. He left at once and arrived at fwd Bn HQ at about 0645. He was shortly afterwards joined there by Maj COPELAND and by the comd MMG Pl and the arty LO Maj JOHNSTONE.
 17. The loss of the CO at that stage of the engagement was especially unfortunate. It not only deprived the Bn of his comd and direction but meant that it was without any real control from the time he was wounded until Maj GRACE arrived and this period was a critical phase of the battle.
 18. When Maj GRACE arrived little infm was available at Bn HQ of the situation in front of the coys or even where they were. There was a heavy cloud of dust and smoke caused by our arty concentrations and visibility was extremely restricted.
 19. (a) At 0715 it was reported to Bde that the left coy was not on its objective, had suffered casualties and was waiting for the tks to assist it fwd.
 (b) At 0725 the situation was reported to Bde to be "uncertain".
 (c) At 0726 PT 23 was reported as occupied by us.
 (d) At 0733 the VALENTINES reported through their LO at Bde that they were then sitting behind their objective. This was scarcely accurate.
 (e) At 0737 one of the fwd coys was reported as pinned down on its objective by MG fire.
 20. In the meantime the engrs who had accompanied the leading coys had made and marked gaps in the minefds. They carried out their task most methodically and steadily notwithstanding constant enemy fire which caused them a number of casualties.
 21. Unfortunately the passage of the tks through the gaps was not very successful. Some of the crews seemed to lack confidence and moved very slowly. ^{The} tks ran on to the fd by turning abruptly while in the gap.

22. The effective employment of the tks was considerably hindered when the sqn leader Capt LUMLEY 40 RTR, was killed shortly after he got his own tk through the fd. He had shown marked bravery in getting in and out of his tk under hy fire to receive instructions and get infm. His second in command, who also showed enterprise and determination, was killed when his tk was knocked out by an A/Tk gun while he was endeavouring to assist one of the left coys on to pt 23.
23. Shortly after 0700 the enemy had recovered from his early surprise and the posn came under increasing arty, mortar and MG fire - the last mainly upon those of our tps who had gained the top of the first ridge and tried to exploit further.
24. At about 0730 the fwd coys began calling for extra amn. The mortar vehs and res amn vehs in trying to get fwd came upon a concealed minefield on our side of the enemy wire. They were unable to get through promptly and the TO thereupon went back and brought other amn vehs fwd and with them some sappers and inf personnel who cleared a new gap. This would have got the vehs through but by the time they were clear it had been decided to withdraw from the posn.
25. At 0740 the enemy appeared to be forming up for a counter attack. He was engaged by our arty.
26. (a) At 0805 (coys being reported to be on their objectives) OC Exploiting Force Maj McINTYRE 9 Aust Div Cav was ordered by the Bde Comd to be ready to move fwd and to take his force through when the breach was established in the enemy line. He was directed to go fwd to get in touch with Maj GRACE and ascertain whether the brea-ch was established.
- (b) At the same time Maj GRACE was informed by the Bde Comd who had communicated with Div that the Exploiting Force must not be committed until the position was stable.
27. Reports continued to come to Bde from various sources incl th arty OP on Trig 33 that enemy reported as lorried inf was moving up for a counter attack. He was engaged by our arty.
28. (a) At 0835 the mortar vehs were still outside the minefd and it was reported to Bn HQ that they had been blown up. This was not correct. Actually only the leading veh had hit a mine.
- (b) Reports received from coys stated they had had casualties. The actual figures given by one coy were quite erroneous as one pl and elements of another which had not been in touch with coy HQ for some time were assumed to have been lost. Actually most of them had gained a posn on the far side of the Pt 23 ridge.
29. The fwd elements of the two fwd coys were in fact on the coy objectives on the ridge - but further progress down the fwd slope and through rear enemy localities could not be made. The penetration into the enemy position made was not really deep enough to be regarded as a breach in his line. And it was not very securely held. Once the initial momentum of the attack had gone and the enemy had recovered from his surprise, regained his observation and brought his guns and mortars to bear, further progress by the attack could only have been made by a new fire plan, proper use of the SP arms, including tks and probably far more reserves than the rather weak coy (2 pls) which remained available.

30. (a) At 0845 Maj GRACE influenced very largely by the reports from one coy of its casualties and by the absence of the mortars which he believed to be lost decided (after consultation with Maj JOHNSTONE, arty LO with him, who concurred) to break off the engagement. By that time the enemy shell and mortar fire showed no signs of abating and casualties were still occurring. Dust and smoke had destroyed visibility and our FOOs were unable to engage any targets by observed fire. He therefore gave orders for the withdrawal of the coys in a specified order commencing at 0900 hrs, the withdrawal to be covered by MG and the five tanks remaining.
31. In his report Maj GRACE states that on the information he had received from his coy comds he : "appreciated that he could not hold the posn against an organised counter attack and that since this was the case the raiding force could not safely be sent through. He therefore decided to withdraw the Bn as the casualties being caused by enemy arty could not be justified unless the posn could be held long enough to permit the raiding force to carry out its task".
32. (a) When it was learnt at Bde HQ that this withdrawal was taking place the Bde Comd felt that the decision was premature, as the threatened counter attack had not commenced and it appeared that it had been or might be broken up by our arty.
- (b) A message was therefore sent to the Bn that no withdrawal was authorised unless the troops were actually forced off the position. This was sent both by wireless and by an offr. It was not however received until the Bn was on its way back.
33. The behaviour of the tps during the withdrawal was very commendable. They came out when ordered in an orderly unhurried manner well under control. While leaving the enemy posn they were under fire but in the actual journey across "no-mans-land" casualties were few and there was little fire.
34. (a) It is not necessary to speculate for how long the posn might have been held if withdrawal had not commenced when it did and if there had been no mistakes and no mischances. The result might perhaps have been different. But even so it would not be right to infer from this that the force which was employed was strong enough for its task and sufficient to break through the enemy line on future occasions.
- Once the enemy had reorganised after his first shock our flanks were too closely exposed to enemy posts and the frontage we held too narrow to permit of the posn being held securely enough and long enough to guarantee the raiding force its exit and way home.
- (b) The casualties incurred, as shown by the data already fwd amounted to 36% of the strength of the Bn committed to the attack
35. (a) The success of the initial attack shows again that we can by surprise and a vigorous assault capture a posn. The principal comment to be made on the execution of the plan seems to be that the initial success which was achieved was due to inf fighting with the assistance \rightleftharpoons of the sp arms employed to their full on a pre-arranged programme. In the later stages inf were fighting either without the sp of the sp arms and weapons or with ^{them} much less effectively employed than was intended.
- (b) To overcome this in future a combination of two courses seems desirable :-

Firstly, to eliminate the mistakes and accidents which prevented the employment of sp weapons to the best advantage on this occasion.

Secondly, to have a sp fire programme which will continue even if only at a slow rate on flank and rear localities after the initial concentrations are over. The change from pre-arranged timed concentrations to observed fire need not for either MGs, arty, or mortars mean a cessation of all fire at a critical stage of the battle because observation is impossible, or because casualties have occurred, or because communications have been broken.

36. SP ARMS AND WEAPONS

(a) Tks

Their action was on the whole disappointing and contributed very little to the op, and except in the case of the six tks which went through the minefd, they seemed reluctant, from the time of passing our own minefd, to carry out their role - that of assisting in widening the breach and carrying the penetration through to the rearmost enemy localities.

(b) Arty

The concentrations provided for in the fire-plan were most accurate and effective. Thereafter for various reasons arty sp was less effective; one of the FOOs was wounded on the way fwd and the other two were hampered by extremely bad visibility and lack of comms. In the result the only fire actually directed by an FOO was through the unsatisfactory medium of a coy LB set operating back to Bn HQ, thence relayed by the Arty LO to HQ 2/7 Aust Fd Regt. An OPO on Trig 33 put down observed fire on the enemy preparing to counter attack, but otherwise the operation showed the urgent necessity for arty sp to be continued by a fixed programme to be varied by FOOs when they can get observation and proper comms.

CB fire did not appear to be effective.

(c) A Tk

The A Tk guns came fwd behind the inf but did not go through the gaps. Owing to the hy fire on the gaps and the uncertainty of the situation, they were held in readiness east of the minefd, and eventually helped to cover the withdrawal.

(d) Engrs

(i) Timing of OP - As stated above, this was greatly influenced by the desire to have daylight in which to clear gaps in the enemy minefds, particularly as booby-traps were expected. The mines were cleared, and it was not considered possible to use mine detectors. It is however for consideration whether, in view of the great advantages to the inf and sp arms of reaching the objective and beginning the reorganisation before dawn, minefds cannot be cleared at night, e.g. in half-moonlight, even if the gaps cannot be completely guaranteed.

In daylight the movement of MMGs and A Tk guns, with their conspicuous towing vehs is often very restricted.

(ii) Width of Front - SA and mortar fire from the flanks was directed on the sprs clearing the gaps, and at one gap all the sprs eventually became casualties. Initial penetration on a considerably wider front would be necessary to eliminate the danger of the minefd-clearing dets being all knocked out.

(iii) Number of Gaps - The number of gaps (3) provided for in this op is considered suitable for a Bn. Two gaps is the minimum, and additional sprs should be fwd with the task of progressively widening all gaps in order eventually to produce one large gap. The initial width of the gaps (30-50) yds) is thought to have been adequate.

(iv) The allotment and organisation of engr in relation to leading inf provided for in the CO was most successful.

(v) Booby-Traps

No booby-traps were found though they have been reported in other parts of the enemy line. Booby-traps att to mines greatly delay the clearing of minefds, and trip-wire AP fds are a great deterrent to inf. Nevertheless in a large scale attack that risk may have to be taken in future and in half-moonlight or more, the short pickets to which the trip-wires are att can probably be seen by the inf and avoided. The demoralising effect booby-traps, ^{haul} however seems to require very close consideration.

(vi) Marking of Gaps - Gaps were marked on either side by standard signs, but it seems that some means of indicating the edge of the gap or the way through the fd is required. Two tks were blown up because they suddenly turned at right angles on their way through the gap and ran on to the mines. Other tks lost their way both in our own and in the enemy minefds and had to be extricated. Tk comds were naturally reluctant to open their turrets to get a better view as the tks were drawing by fire, and one casualty in a VALENTINE crew puts the tk out of action. The tks were consequently very blind.

Two points emerge :-

- (i) mines, when deloused, should be placed in small stacks to mark the edges of the gap;
- (ii) men acting as guides to tks through the gaps should walk at least 20 yds ahead of the tk in order to be seen. At night a system of coloured lights would be ideal and would be easily seen.

(vii) Marking of approaches to gaps - Tapes were used but were much blown about by mortar and shell fire, and obscured by dust. Tks in the limited visibility found difficulty in distinguishing the right from the left tape. In addition as stated above a number of vehs were blown up on a hidden "spur" minefd and on scattered mines, when approaching gap.

The solution of this problem seems to lie in having a cleared "lane" up to the gaps beginning about 1000 yds from the enemy FDLs and marked by stakes and conventional signs, and at night by small coloured lights.

In this op, although 3 gaps were opened, one was not used at all, and a second only slightly, although both tks and MT had been allotted to definite gaps. This was partly due to the smoke and dust, so that vehs reached the minefd without warning, and tended to "follow the leader" and make for the gap seen to be in use, without being aware which gap it was; a second cause was the fact that the most southerly gap (owing to casualties among the sprs) had not been completely opened when the tks arrived, and the tks were accordingly diverted north to the next gap. This compelled them to run broadside on to the enemy posns, making them more vulnerable, and several of them ran on the unmarked external minefd.

It is essential to prevent queuing up and delay at the minefield gaps, and to ensure that all gaps are used as planned.

It is suggested therefore that signs marking the "lanes" up to the gaps should carry numbers of coloured lights clearly denoting which gap it is. In addition there should be a control pt about 1000 yds out from the minefield to give warning whether the gap is open or not and if necessary to divert traffic to other routes.

Other tasks given to the Engrs included, making and marking gaps through our own minefields. The provision of Bangalore Torpedoes for breaking enemy wire. The former was done in a most satisfactory manner, but the latter was not required as the enemy wire which was not considerable, had been crushed and broken by the arty fire.

(e) MMGs - According to plan, one pl provided flanking fire, and the other remained ready to come fwd for the reorganisation; the latter did actually reach a posn near the enemy minefield from which it could give some sp against enemy posns south of the objective, but was not ordered through the minefield, as owing to the hy fire on the gaps and the uncertainty as to the posn of the coys, it was thought inadvisable to send thin-skinned vehs through the defiles.

Three MMGs mounted in inf carriers were allotted the task of neutralising any enemy A Tk guns covering the minefield gaps.

These vehs were blown up on the unmarked spur minefield.

(f) Mortars - Four 31 mm mortars fired their programme with the available amount of amm. They were only used in the initial phase of the attack. The 3" mortars were not called fwd as early as planned and as stated above never got through the minefield. Had they been available, they might, perhaps have been used against enemy MG posns, but could not have dealt with the enemy mortars which were mainly out of range.

The Bn CO provided that one sec should be under comd each of three coys. It seems that the Coys Comd's other problems are sufficient, and unless the mortars can move with coys throughout the initial stages, it will often be better to have the mortars as far fwd as possible but under Bn control.

(g) As a general comment on sp arms, it seems that if soft skinned vehs are required in fwd areas for reorganisation or for any other purpose, they must be got fwd and be off-loaded while the enemy is still disorganised

37. Air Sp

Air sp was arranged for the op and was provided. A fighter sweep was made when asked for, and one Tac R message and a marked map was dropped in the area arranged.

The system of ground to air recognition was changed several times just before the op, and it is hoped that a uniform and standard drill has now been arrived at.

38. Comms

(a) A detailed report by Bde Sigs Offr has already been fwded. A large number of alternative means of comm was provided. Many in fact broke down, but at all times Bde HQ was in touch with Bn HQ by at least *Two* means, though at times several links were involved.

(b) Comms within the Bn were not wholly effective largely owing to casualties among operators and the unreliability of LOS sets (18 sets were quite satisfactory).

(c) Laying and maintenance of lines is expensive in men and material, and in spite of the large number of lines provided, prove entirely useless because of the tks, carriers, mortar and shell fir.

(d) To ensure comms being maintained many more W/T sets are required than the present establishment provides.

(e) Bn HQ was established well fwd and inside the enemy minefd and in the place previously chosen. It was to have been marked by a sign which however was in the COs carrier when it ran on the minefd.

Traffic from the rear often had difficulty in finding HQ. Where the approach march to the objective is long as this was and in desert conditions where the exact posn of HQ cannot easily be described by something recognisable on the ground, it seems desirable to have some direction signs.

The direction marks to the gaps might be extended by a sign at the gap shewing the direction of Bn HQ.

39. Enemy Fighting Qualities and Methods.

(a) The enemy did not stand up to direct assaults on their posts but under the first impetus of the attack surrendered readily.

It was found however, that while those who were actually in front of parties of assaulting inf often did not resist, the resistance of neighbouring posts continued. While collecting prisoners in one place our tps would find themselves under close spandau fire from near by. There were some cases of enemy parties overrun in the initial assault but not rounded up or killed firing at our tps who had gone past. Attention to mopping up is necessary. The difference between fighting ITALIANS and fighting GERMANS is not only that the GERMAN resists more stoutly, but that he does not surrender just because his comrades in adjacent posts do. Penetration in one place does not itself cause a crumbling on the flanks.

(b) In considering therefore the ^{size} ~~width~~ of the breach which for the purpose of any op it is desired to make in the enemy lines it seems essential in desert localities where flanks usually cannot be effectively secured by defilade or otherwise that it should be at least on a two Bn frontage with a third available to deepen the penetration.

(c) The consistent enemy shelling and mortar fire on the gaps as the tks went in seems to have been directed largely by observation from the flanks. The suggestion that the enemy arty fire did not follow our tps through "no-mans-land" as they withdrew.

It is more probable that the enemy fire was directed from a more distant OP and was largely not directed but pre-arranged in accordance with his plan of engaging any part of his FDLs which collapses.

Since the GERMAN registers ^{his} own FDLs and does not hesitate to fire on them when a posn is lost, it is desirable that objectives to be finally occupied should where possible be places other than the enemy's own posts and well in from his FDLs.

GENERAL

(a) Although the op did not achieve all that was hoped ~~it might~~ it was no doubt a solid blow to the local enemy. Considered simply as a raid it resulted in the capture of 104 prisoners and the inflicting of a great number of casualties on the enemy. The number of these casualties is difficult to assess but it is conservatively estimated that upwards of 100 were killed in close inf fighting and others killed and wounded by arty and small arms fire.

(b) Our tps fought with the greatest bravery. No man left the engagement before the order to withdraw and their battle discipline and determination were of a high order.

Our own casualties have already been forwarded.

Brig.
Comd 20 Aust Inf Bde.

The enemy maintained an OP on West R 29 seems improbable as

C. Signals, 9 Aust Div.

W/T SET 101.

1. E2 scale of issue of above set is 7 per Bde Signal Sec.
2. Typical disposition of sets is as follows :-
 - (a) Bde Comd recce.
 - (b) Bn.
 - (c) Bn.
 - (d) Bn.
 - (e) Control
 - (f) Working to Arty Regt Gp.
 - (g) Spare
3. Specifications of range for this set using R/T as set out in Sig Trg Vol III, Pam 3 are :-

- (a) Ground stations 6 - 8 miles.
- (b) Both sets mobile 4 - 6 miles.


From experience W/T can be relied upon for ranges of 8 - 10 miles when both sets are mobile.

4. Wireless is normally the sole means of inter-Bde comn under following conditions :-
 - (a) When a Bde is engaged in mobile ops.
 - (b) When a Bde is moving from one posn to another, e.g. relieving a Bde in the line from a reserve posn.
 - (c) When a Bde or portion of a Bde is advancing in attack
 - (d) When, because of hy shellfire or other reasons, line comms to units of a Bde are interrupted.
5. In the cases of sub-paras (a), (b) and (c) para 4 above, distan involved are frequently greater than those specified for a 101 set for both R/T and W/T. Instances of (a) and (c) are given :-

When 20 Aust Inf Bde was engaged in mobile ops in RUWEISAT RIDGE area Bde Comd's recce set was sometimes at distances of up to 20 miles from Bde HQ and Bn sets. Bn HQ sets were at times distances of 10 miles or more from Bde HQ, thus precluding reliable operation of 101 sets either for W/T or R/T. W/T set No.11 (HP) would have provided reliable comn throughout.

During "BULIMBA" raid by 2/15 Aust Inf Bn a 101 set was mounted in a WILLYS truck 4cwt 4 x 4 ("JEEP") which operated at distances of from 4 to 6 miles to a 101 set at HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde. Comn was maintained throughout by W/T but R/T was found impossible. No.11 sets operating over the same area gave R/T comn throughout.

6. It is therefore considered that the W/T Set No.11 HP is more suitable for Bde Signal for following reasons :-
 - (a) Its range is more than double that of a 101 set, whereas the 101 may be considered sufficiently powerful to provide comn for a Bde in static warfare, it is to be expected that distances involved in movt, and Comd's recce, of a mobile Bde Gp will far exceed those specified for the reliable working of a 101 set.
 - (b) The workmanship and fittings of a No.11 set is better than that of a No.101 set e.g. Master Oscillator of 11 set tunes both receiver and transmitter, better key is provided, a reading lamp is provided and set is of more robust nature.


OC "J" Sec Sigs. Capt.

9/15/8/2007

NOTES on MOVES of ARTY LO and FOOs in BULIMBA OP

The following infm has been obtained by the CRA from the Arty LO:-

Orders from Bn were:-

(1) LO. To move with his carrier with inf carriers on the centre line of attack and meet Bn Comd at his HQ which was to be west of the enemy wire and on or near the centre line.

Carriers were to move at Z plus 15, and JOHNSTON moved fwd from just in rear of SL at Z plus 15.

(2) FOOs to move in rear of inf carriers to meet coy comds on their objectives which were pointed out previously on a fwd recce.

STEWART conformed to this plan; RICHARDSON was wounded going up and the third FOO who was to report to one of res coys was latter switched to replace RICHARDSON.

Both LO and FOOs adhered to the plan made originally.

Copies to: File
20 West Coy Bde

2.
20 West Coy Bde

For your information

7 Sep 42

W.D.
W.D. Major Gen
GS 9 West Coy

Comd,
20 Aust Inf Bde.

"J" Sec 9 Aust Div Sigs
HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde.
3 Sep 42.

"BULIMBA" ; COMMUNICATIONS.

The following comms were attempted by 20 Aust Inf Bde to, and within, 2/15 Aust Inf Bn during "BULIMBA" raid on 1 Sep 42:-

1. LINE:

- (a) A direct line from HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde to Adv HQ 2/15 Aust Inf Bn.
- (b) Line from TELL EL EISA Sta to Adv HQ 2/15 Aust Inf Bn.
- (c) Line from Rear HQ 2/15 Aust Inf Bn to Adv HQ 2/15 Aust Inf Bn.
- (d) Lines to Coys within 2/15 Aust Inf Bn.
- (i) Line (a) was laid to minefd at BARREL HILL 87562972 before ops commenced. At commencement of op the line was laid from a veh behind the advancing bn, a maintenance party having been left in area 87562972. Line party (a) appeared to come under hy shell fire after passing south of SANDY KNOLL feature and the line behind them was cut in several places by shells. They proceeded with the line with the intention of mending it after reaching Bn HQ, and got as far as the GERMAN minefd when the party came under very hy shell and mortar fire. The NCO i/c of the party was wounded and the line was so badly cut about by shellfire and carriers that repairs would, besides taking many hours, reduce the conductivity of the line to an unusable state. The line party therefore picked up wounded of line party (b) (mentioned in para (ii) below) and then went via the RAP to rear Bn HQ to pick up more cable and relay the line.
- (ii) Line (b) was laid to minefd at 87552978 before ops commenced. At commencement of ops they proceeded per veh behind the bn in a line approx $\frac{1}{2}$ mile distant from line (a). This party appeared to come under hy shell and mortar fire when approaching the GERMAN minefd. The veh received a direct hit from a shell which wounded 3 of the crew and slightly wounded the fourth man, who was some distance behind dragging the cable back. The line already laid was cut by shellfire, carriers and tks to an irreparable degree. This party was ^{picked} picked up by line party (a) and returned to RAP. The veh was rendered U/S and had to be abandoned. On arrival at 2/15 Bn HQ area a line crew was organised from the remaining ~~men~~ and more cable sent for so that a fresh line could be attempted. Word came through shortly afterwards that the Bn would withdraw so no further attempt was made to lay a line until a short time later when word was received that the bn was to remain if possible. Line was then laid to a pt $\frac{1}{2}$ mile east of SANDY KNOLL feature but it was then found that the bn was almost completely withdrawn. This latter line would perhaps have had better success, at least as far as the minefids, than the former lines as at that stage shellfire, and carrier and tk traffic along the line of advance had considerably diminished.
- (iii) Line party (c) advanced on foot in rear of the bn and reached adv Bn HQ. The line was used during the approach but when Bn HQ was reached the line was so badly cut about that repair was impossible.
- (iv) Lines (d) within the bn were attempted but were found impossible owing to hy shell and mortar fire.
- (v) Lines were laid by 2/7 Fd Regt from Regt HQ and from Bty HQ but met with similar results. Local lines from F.O.O to wireless set were equally unsuccessful.

....2.

2. W/T:

Sets were disposed as follows :-

- Group I - (a) CO 2/15 Bn - HP 11 Set.
- (b) Comd Arm Force - " "
- (c) Comd VALENTINE Tks " "
- (d) Bde Comd " "
- (e) CO Div Cav " "

(i) Set (a) was mounted in carrier of CO 2/15 Aust Inf Bn. This carrier hit a mine at an early stage and CO, who was in it, was wounded. The set was undamaged and continued to operate from the damaged carrier until it was transferred at about 0900 hrs to another carrier and was rendered U/S by a sniper's bullet while being lifted into the second carrier. After the first carrier was damaged on the minefield the set, although it continued to operate successfully, was not used for passing of messages as it was some distance in rear of Bn HQ.

(ii) Set (b) worked throughout.

(iii) Set (c) was destroyed and the operator killed when the Tk Comd's tk was knocked out.

(iv) Set (d) worked throughout.

(v) Set (e) worked throughout.

- Group II - (a) Bde Comd 101 set.
- (b) 2/15 Adv Bn HQ 101 set.

Set (b) had been ordered to remain at 2/15 Bn rear HQ until the A Ech vehs were called for. This did not occur until approx 0740 hrs. The set then followed the first amn convoy which was unable to locate the gap in the enemy minefields. The set reported that it was unable to locate Bn HQ and this infm was relayed to Adv Bn HQ. The set returned to 2/15 Rear Bn HQ when first vehs withdrew, but as Bn HQ itself had not then withdrawn it was sent back to contact them to be available during the withdrawal and met them between the enemy minefields and our FDLs. Contact between the sets was made only by W/T throughout, R/T being found impossible owing to the limitations of the sets.

- Group III - (a) RHQ 2/7 Fd Regt 109 set.
- (b) Arty LO (Maj JOHNSTON) at Bn HQ 109 set (for use of OPOs).

As local lines^{to} OPOs were not possible this channel was used for passing a certain amount of traffic. The sets operated satisfactorily throughout.

- Group IV - (a) CO 2/15 Bn 18 Set.
- (b) Coy "
- (c) Coy "
- (d) Coy 108 set.
- (e) Coy 108 set.
- (f) Carrier Pl 18 Set.
- (g) MG Pl "
- (h) MG Pl "
- (i) Rear Bn HQ 108 set.

Set (a) was carried in CO's carrier in addition to the 11 set. It was removed and carried further forward when CO was wounded.

Set (b) - both operators were wounded and the set was returned to Bn HQ but was later returned to the Coy.

Set (f) was destroyed when Carrier Comd's carrier was knocked out.

The balance of the Gp worked successfully throughout and were the only means of internal comm within the Bn other than runners. They also provided an important link to Rear HQ 2/15 Bn and to C and D Coys 2/17 Bn where 18 sets were listening and infm passed back to Bde Comd.

CONCLUSIONS.

3. (a) Laying of lines should not be attempted until shell fire and tracked veh traffic has diminished sufficiently to render the line less vulnerable.
- (b) That as many W/T links as possible be available from Bde HQ fwd both for direct contact and for interception of fwd W/T Gps. It is also considered that 101 sets are not powerful enough to use R/T over any distance and should be replaced by No.11 sets.
- (c) That within Bns No.18 sets only be used as these have a longer range, less frequency restriction, and a key for use where R/T cannot get through. The 108 sets Mk I were found satisfactory over a short distance but over longer distance they were not so successful as the No.18 sets. They restricted the frequency band to one which could not be overheard by a larger set thus obviating the need of intercept sets other than No.18 sets with fwd coys of 2/17 Bn. ^{as used by 2/15 Bn} It is also considered that the antennae of a No.108 Mk I is much more noticeable than that of a No.18 set, rendering the operator and set more vulnerable in battle. No.108 Mk II sets were not used, but these, although superior to No.108 Mk I sets, are not as efficient as No.18 sets.

Lucky
OC "J" Sec Sigs. Capt.

WD

PRO FORMA MESSAGE FORM

TO :- 20 AUST INF BDE 24 AUST INF BDE 26 AUST INF BDE
9 AUST DIV CAV REGT RAA RAE SIGS 2/2 AUST MG BN
B SQN 40 RTR AASC MEDICAL ORD Copy to :- Q

YVW

FROM :- TAC 9 AUST DIV 0 159 1

9 aust div cav and B sqn 40 RTR revert to roles and
locations allotted prior to BULIMBA (.) 2/15 bn moves to res
posn in EL ALAMEIN comes under comd 24 bde /adm comd 20
bde (.) under arrangements CRA and CO 2/2 MG bn following
will be withdrawn during night 1/2 sep from 20 and 24 bde
resources

(a) into div res ALAMEIN one a/tk bty one MG coy (.)

(b) to comd^e under comd 26 bde one tp 12 a/tk bty

IMMEDIATE

TO:- 20 & 24 Bdes, Cav) TOO 1535
& B Sqn 40 RTR)By LO

26 Bde, MG, Sigs,)
RAA, RAE, AASC) SDR
Medical, Q)
Ord) E.L.S.

R. D. ...
Maj

MESSAGE FORM

344

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

Z

011P

No. of Groups.

GR.

60

OFFICE DATE STAMP



(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

20 Aust Inf Bde 24 Aust Inf Bde rptd Sig 2/2 Aust
MO BN AAASC

FROM

MAIN 9 AUST DIV

Originator's Number

0 728

Date

2

In Reply to Number

2/15

and

2/32

bns

revert

to

comd

20

and

24

bdes

and

return

to

own

bde

sectors

under

mutual

arrangements bdes

during

night

2/3

sep

OS

bdes

will

report

arrangements

for

move

and

times

comdr

of

bns

passes

4/41. B. & S. Ltd. 51-15. 4/41. B. & S. Ltd. 51-15. 4/41. B. & S. Ltd. 51-15. 4/41. B. & S. Ltd. 51-15.

(5/882) THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS *.....WIRELESS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

IMMEDIATE

TIME OF ORIGIN

1540

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

1555

SYSTEM IN

TIME IN

READER

SENDER

SYSTEM OUT

TIME OUT

READER

SENDER

SYSTEM OUT

TIME OUT

READER

SENDER

H 160

Handwritten signature

T.O.R.

1620

1705

* Originator to insert "including" or "except" according to whether the message may or may NOT be sent by wireless.

MESSAGE FORM.

DATE STAMP

CALL IN
OUT

Serial No.

PREFIX AND INSTRUCTIONS.

No. of Groups.

GR

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

RAA 9 AUST DIV rpld. 20 AUST Inf Bde

FROM

2/15 AUST INF BN

Originator's Number

0-22

Date

31

In Reply to Number

REF

2/15

AUST

INF

BN

O.O

No 10

PARA

20

0

ZERO

0535

hrs

1

SEPT

42

TIME OF ORIGIN

1630

DEGREE OF PRIORITY AND INSTRUCTIONS BY ORIGINATOR

IMPORTANT

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE IN CIPHER.

SIGNATURE *

SIGNATURE *

* ORIGINATOR MUST SIGN IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE.

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN.

TIME IN.

READER.

SYSTEM OUT.

TIME OUT.

SENDER.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

"BULIMBA"

Z T3 LIC

OUT

Z

No. of Groups.

GR.

45

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

20 AUST INF BDE 2/15 BN 2/43 BN 2/7 FD REGT

FROM

2/19 BN

Originator's Number

183

Date

31

In Reply to Number

Lighting	patrol	0	Strength	12	men
to	of	out	2145	hrs	time
in	first	light	0	Route	out
87532971	on	303	Deg.	for	1300
yds	to	87442977	0	4 ch	

(5/882) THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS *.....WIRELESS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

2130

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER
L2155		CSA		L2207			CSA				

T.H.I. 2140

T.O.R.

* Originator to insert "including" or "except" according to whether the message may or may NOT be sent by wireless.

4/41 B. & S. Ltd. 51-15.

(5/882) Wt 46923/1825. 400M Pads.

2 Pl, B Coy
2/2 Aust MG Bn
2 Sep 42

REPORT ON 2/15 AUST INF BN OPERATION "BULIMBA"

- I. The role of this Pl was to assist in reorganisation after objectives had been taken.
- II. The Pl arrived at its Assembly Area just behind Barrel Hill at 0515 hrs (one section arrived about ten minutes later).
- III. I proceeded to SL on foot where I met Col OGLE and the Adjutant whom I was to accompany.
- IV. The operation started on time. At Z + 15 we moved from SL, the CO in his carrier, the Adjutant and myself in a Jeep. The CO was very worried at this stage that the Arty FOOS were not with him in their own carriers.
- V. After proceeding about 1600 yds the CO's carrier ran on to a mine and the CO was badly injured. At this time the Adjutant was forward on foot about 100 yards and though I tried to get word forward to him by moving infantry I doubt that it reached him.
- VI. Major COPELAND was travelling just behind the CO's carrier and shortly afterwards Major JOHNSTON, Arty LO, arrived in his carrier. He sent a wireless message back to send Major GRACE forward as the CO was injured. The CO was eventually placed on Major COPELAND's Jeep and taken back.
- VII. Major COPELAND and I decided then to go forward on foot through the minefield and obtain what information we could. On the far side I saw Major JOHNSTON in his carrier and he informed me that he would take command and establish a control post at that point pending the arrival of Major GRACE. Proceeding about another 100 yards I found that Major GRACE has already arrived and set up a Comd Post with the Adjutant. Apparently Major GRACE had passed us unobserved whilst we were tending the CO.
- VIII. Information at this stage was very meagre and it was not till a little later that the forward Coys reported being on their objectives.
- IX. Major GRACE then sent for the tanks and told them to assist the Coys on the left by moving forward to .23. I think there were about five tanks through the gap at that stage.
- X. Major JOHNSTON had since come forward and set up his control post and from then on he directed the Arty fire and relayed all messages to and from Bde.
- XI. There was no information for some time till D Coy reported they were expecting to be counter-attacked by infantry who were massing on their left. D Coy asked for more Arty support which was given and I suggested that the MMGs be brought up to assist D Coy. Just then however the tanks drew a great weight of Arty fire on themselves and around the gap (actually this did not let up until some time after the withdrawal was completed) and Major GRACE said he felt it would be unwise to commit the MMGs under such fire and without more definite information from D Coy. I concurred in this view and I am certain that the forward movement of the MMGs in their soft skinned vehicles or on foot at this stage would have been absolutely abortive. Had the MMGs been equipped with carriers I feel they could have been run forward to support with a reasonable chance of getting through.

XII. Major GRACE then ordered the tanks to go to the support of D Coy but they informed him that they had received orders that they were not to go forward except under the direct command of their CO. A message to this effect was sent to Bde asking for their support and a reply was received that the Brigadier ordered the tanks to act on Major GRACE's orders. The tanks were again ordered to help D Coy and they moved forward to a hull down position behind the ridge. I saw one tank set on fire and within a few minutes all the tanks had withdrawn back from the ridge near the Comd Post and the gap.

XIII. About this time Major SUTHERS (B Coy) reported by wireless that he had a Coy strength of 12 men and on receipt of this information the question arose as to whether a determined attack on D Coy could possibly be held. It was considered that the position was very weak and Major GRACE decided that it was necessary to withdraw. Major JOHNSTON was consulted and fully concurred. Brigade and Coy were then advised that the withdrawal would commence at 0900 hrs and arrangements were made with the Arty to cover the withdrawal with smoke.

XIV. The question of covering the withdrawal with the MMGs was being discussed with Major GRACE when Major SUTHERS sent a wireless message to the effect that he had contacted my Pl Sjt (Sjt LAWRIE) and that they had decided to place the guns in position for this role. I therefore left the Comd Post and returned to my Pl where I found the guns were satisfactorily positioned for the task. I arranged with Major SUTHERS to cover him out after D Coy had withdrawn and then to pull out myself under carrier screen.

XV. After the withdrawal had been proceeding for some time carriers of the 2/17 Aust Inf Bn came forward to cover us out so Major SUTHERS decided that his Coy and my Pl could withdraw together, all D Coy being practically right in by this time. I called the vehicles up and the Pl withdrew behind the Pimple.

XVI. With reference to the earlier movement of the MMGs. When the CO was injured he ordered me to get the MMGs up and I sent a wireless message for them. I realised however that the CO had no actual knowledge how the attack was proceeding and further we had not as yet discovered the gap in the minefield. On the arrival of the vehicles I ordered Sjt LAWRIE to take them back about 400 yards, disperse them and wait there for orders. During this manouvre one truck ran on to a mine and was badly damaged and a little later another truck was struck by a shell but was not very badly damaged. There were no casualties to personnel. It was in this vicinity that the guns were mounted to cover the withdrawal.

(sgd) J. F. LAVAN Lieut
OC 2 Pl B Coy

REPORT ON "BULIMBA" OPERATION

No 3 Pl role supporting fire from rt flank vicinity 87402985.

Task to engage A/Tk concentrations 87182982 to 87122987 during
Z + 15 to Z + 75.

Moved out of own FDLs with three vehicles approx 2359 hrs through gap at telegraph line. Met enemy patrol strength 8 - 12 vicinity 87412984 exchanged SA fire and was mortared and subjected to LMG fire for five (5) minutes Pl casualties 1 Killed 2 Wounded enemy casualties at least three (3) believed wounded. Opened with Arty and fired for one hour. Observation limited owing to dust and smoke. At 0800 hrs ordered fwd by message relayed from Rear HQ line and wireless communication having broken down as result of enemy fire. Role to assist in reorganisation. Returned along route of sig wire to pick up sig repairing line and finally contacted him rear Pimple. Reported Rear HQ for additional instns and ordered to await adjustment of fwd minefield gap before moving. During stand-by message intercepted that withdrawal 15 commenced at 0900 hrs. Remained in vicinity Rear HQ in case required to cover withdrawal. At 1115 hrs ordered to rear area by BULIMBA Comdr. Total casualties 1 killed 4 wounded.

(Sgd) G. T. FERGUSON Lieut
OC 3 Pl B Coy.

715/8/186



B Coy.,

2/2 Aust MG. Bn.


3 Sep 42.

To 20 Aust Inf Bde.

BULIMBA.

Herewith are submitted separate reports by the Pl Comdrs of the two
Pls of this Coy engaged in the above operation.

I was in the Rear HQ area throughout the action and cannot usefully
add to these reports.


..... Maj.
O.C., B Coy.

2 Pl, B Coy,
2/2 Aust MG. Bn.,
2 Sep 42.

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- IX. Major Grace then sent for the tanks and told them to assist the Coys on the left by moving forward to .23. I think there were about five tanks through the gap at that stage.
- X. Major Johnston had since come forward and set up his control post and from then on he directed the Arty fire and relayed all messages to and from Bde.
- XI. There was no information for some time till D Coy reported they were expecting to be counter attacked by infantry who were massing on their left. D Coy asked for more Arty support which was given and I suggested that the MMGs be brought up to assist D Coy. Just then however the tanks drew a great weight of Arty fire on themselves and around the gap (actually this did not let up until some time after the withdrawal was completed) and Major Grace said he felt it would be unwise to commit the MMGs under such fire and without more definite information from D Coy. I concurred in this view and I am certain that the forward movement of the MMGs in their soft skinned vehicles or on foot at this stage would have been absolutely abortive. Had the MMGs been equipped with carriers I feel they could have been run forward to support with a reasonable chance of getting through.
- XII. Major Grace then ordered the tanks to go to the support of D Coy but they informed him that they had received orders that they were not to go forward except under the direct command of their C.O. A message to this effect was sent to Bde asking for their support and a reply was received that the Brigadier ordered the tanks to act on Major Grace's orders. The tanks were again ordered to help D Coy and they moved forward to a hull down position behind the ridge. I saw one tank set on fire and within a few minutes all the tanks had withdrawn back from the ridge near to the Comd Post and the gap.

XIII. About this time Major Suthers (B Coy) reported by wireless that he had a Coy strength of 12 men and on receipt of this information the question arose as to whether a determined attack on D Coy could possibly be held. It was considered that the position was very weak and Major Grace decided that it was necessary to withdraw. Major Johnston was consulted and fully concurred. Brigade and Coy were then advised that the withdrawal would commence at 0900 hrs and arrangements were made with the Arty to cover the withdrawal with smoke.

XIV. The question of covering the withdrawal with the MMGs was being discussed with Major Grace when Major Suthers sent a wireless message to the effect that he had contacted my Pl Sjt (Sjt Lawrie) and that they had decided to place the guns in position for this role. I therefore left the Comd Post and returned to my Pl where I found the guns were satisfactorily positioned for the task. I arranged with Major Suthers to cover him out after D Coy had withdrawn and then to pull out myself under carrier screen.

XV. After the withdrawal had been proceeding for some time carriers of the 2/17 Aust Inf Bn came forward to cover us out so Major Suthers decided that his Coy and my Pl could withdraw together, all D Coy being practically right in by this time. I called the vehicles up and the Pl withdrew behind the Pimple.

XVI. With reference to the earlier movement of the MMGs. When the C.O. was injured he ordered me to get the MMGs up and I sent a wireless message for them. I realised however that the C.O. had no actual knowledge how the attack was proceeding and further we had not as yet discovered the gap, in the minefield. On the arrival of the vehicles I ordered Sjt Lawrie to take them back about 400 yards, disperse them and wait there for orders. During this manouvre one truck ran on to a mine and was very badly damaged and a little later another truck was struck by a shell but not very badly damaged. There were no casualties to personnel. It was in this vicinity that the guns were mounted to cover the withdrawal.

Signed. J.F. Lavan Lieut.
O.C., 2 Pl., B Coy.

REPORT ON BULIMBA OPERATION

No 3 Pl role supporting fire from rt flank vicinity 87402985.

Task to engage A/Tk concentrations 87182982 to 87122987 during
Z + 15 to Z + 75.

Moved out of own FDLs with three vehicles approx 2359 hrs through
gap at telegraph line. Met enemy patrol strength 8 - 12 vicinity
87412984 exchanged S.A. fire and was mortared and subjected to LMG
fire for five (5) minutes. Pl casualties 1 killed 2 wounded enemy
casualties at least three (3) believed wounded. Opened with Arty
and fired for one hr. Observation limited owing to dust and smoke.
At 0800 hrs ordered fwd by message relayed from Rear HQ line and
wireless communication having broken down as result of enemy fire.
Role to assist in reorganisation. Returned along route of sig wire
to pick up sig repairing line and finally contacted him rear Pimple.
Reported Rear HQ for additional instns and ordered to await
adjustment of fwd minefield gap before moving. During stand-by
message intercepted that withdrawal 15 commenced at 0900 hrs.
Remained in vicinity Rear HQ in case required to cover withdrawal.
At 1115 hrs ordered to rear area by BULIMBA Comdr. Total casualties
1 killed 4 wounded.

Signed.. G.T. Ferguson, ..Lieut.
O.C., 3 Pl, B Coy.

WD

PRO FORMA MESSAGE FORM

gvrw

TO :- 3 Aust A.Tk Regt, 20 Aust Inf Bde, 24 Aust Inf Bde,
26 Aust Inf Bde

FROM :- H.Q. R.A.A. 9Aust Div 722 1

During night 1/2 Sep 42 (.) first (.) One A.Tk Bty will be
withdrawn from comd 20 bde and passes to 9 Aust Div reserve
EL ALAMEIN Fortress (.) Second (.) one tp 12 Aust A.Tk Bty
moves to area of and comes under comd 26 Aust Inf Bde

except wireless

E.L.S.

T.O.O.1700

A. G. Williams

Maj

BMRA 9 Aust Div

9 AUST DIV OO No 17

Copy No
23 Aug 42.Ref maps: EL ALAMEIN 1/50,000
EL DABA - EL ALAMEIN 1/100,000INFM

1. The enemy is expected to attack during the moonlight period between 25 Aug and 1 Sep.
2. Bn raids are being prepared by 2 NZ Div and 9 Aust Div as immediate counter strokes to the enemy attack or for use prior to the enemy attack.
3. 7 Med Regt RA is placed in sp for the op

INTENTION

4. 9 Aust Div will raid to the west of the area "enemy 23" 872296

METHOD

5. The raid will be by one bn of and controlled by 20 Aust Inf Bde
Task -
The bn will seize and hold a sector of the enemy defences through which the exploiting force will debouch and return
6. Arty -
RAA 9 Aust Div will sp the op
7. A Tk -
One bty less one tp will be detailed by CRA
8. AA -
One tp 4 Aust Lt AA Regt will be placed under comd 20 Aust Inf Bde under arrangements made by CRA
9. MG -
Two pls B Coy 2/2 Aust MG Bn are placed under comd 20 Aust Inf Bde for the op
10. Mortars -
Two 81mm mortars (Italian) ^{without dets} will be provided by 26 Aust Inf Bde
11. RTR -
One sqn 40 RTR will come under comd 20 Aust Inf Bde for the op
12. Cav -
From 24 Aug 9 Aust Div Cav Regt recce along the QATTARA rd will be discontinued. The recce south of TELL EL EISA will be continued; normal activity will be continued in this area to prevent arousing suspicion
13. RAE -
One sec 2/13 Aust Fd Coy is placed under comd 20 Aust Inf Bde for the op
14. Exploitation -
Exploitation will be by the force detailed below to interfere with enemy movement and maintenance on the tracks leading south from SIDI ABD EL RAHMAN and cause maximum damage to the enemy

Page two.

15. The following force is placed under comd 20 Aust Inf Bde :-

Comd - Maj A E McINTYRE 9 Aust Div Cav Regt

Tps - One sqn (less four tps) 9 Aust Div Cav Regt

One sqn RTR (Honeys)

One tp 13 Bty 2/7 Aust Fd Regt

Two tps A Tk guns (One tp detailed by CRA
(One pl 2 pr portec from 20

Aust Inf Bde

One pl (inf)
Det RAE

To be detailed by 20 Aust Inf Bde
From sec 2/13 Aust Fd Coy in para
13 for demolition

16. Air -

Requests for Tac R and air sp at call are being submitted

17. Zero -

Preparations will be completed before the night 25/26 Aug after which the raid may be ordered

18. The notice to be given will be notified later

19. Planning, organization and trg -

Comds of sub units detailed in paras 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 15 will be made available to 20 Aust Inf Bde and Maj McINTYRE respectively for planning forthwith and the sub units as required for trg for the op. (One sqn RTR (Honeys) on arrival)

ADM

20. Amn -

81mm amn Italian and German is available at the AP

INTERCOMN

21. Codeword -

The codeword for the op will be BULIMBA. On receipt of this codeword sub units will RV in accordance with orders issued by comds concerned

22. Tac HQ 9 Aust Div will move to 88792942

✓ ACKNOWLEDGE

Issued through Sigs

Time of signature 2330 hrs

R. B. Law Maj
Col.,
GS 9 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION :-

Copy No.

20 Aust Inf Bde	1		
24 Aust Inf Bde	2		
26 Aust Inf Bde	3	Medical	19
Cav	4	Ord	20
RAA	5	DAPM	21
RAE	6	File	22 - 23
Sigs	7	War Diary	24 - 25
MG	8		
Sqn 40 RTR	9		
30 Corps (3) incl one for RAF	10 - 12		
Comd	13		
G	14 - 15		
AQ	16 - 17		
AASC	18		

Comd Post 1 Sep 42

LOG OF DUTY

Operation BULIMBA

	TO	FROM	TIME	DESCRIPTION	NOTES	DEDUCTION	ACTION
1.			0550	Arty concentrations begin			
2.	C.P.	Segs	0605	Line party is moving fwd behind 2/15 Bn			
3.	Bde	2/17	0620	One 2/17 Bn carrier blown up in minefd near D Coy - no details.	Later message - no casualties.		
4.	Bde	Arty	0621	0555 - SOS enemy lines. 0557 - Conc. enemy lines. 0600 - enemy DF 0606 - enemy DF very lt 0615 - vis. very difficult owing to down bombardment. 0620 - enemy DF strong this area	Messages from Maj JOHNSON - arty LO with 2/15 Bn		
5.	Bde	LO	0625	Lt-col OGLE wounded - Maj GRACE has gone fwd			Div infmd
6.	Bde	LO	0627	Own tps have gone through minefd. TK comd heard saying: "If b.s don't put their hands up shoot them". MG pl summoned fwd for consolidation			Div infmd

SERIAL	TO	FROM	TIME	INFORMATION	NOTES	DEDUCTION	ACTION
7.	Bde	Arty	0636	0635 - passing GERMAN PW going back to our lines.			
8.	Bde	2/32	0637	2/32 Bn in posn at 0545 hrs.			
9.	Bde	Arty	0641	0640 - on edge of minefd waiting for gap to be opened, under heavy fire.	Confirmed by TK HQ. We the line struck interior minefd trying to get through.		
10.	Bde	2/17	0647	PW coming in to C Coy lines			
11.	Bde	W/T set	0653	0645 - Valentines through gap in second minefd 0653 - Valentines NTP.			
12.	Bde	TK HQ	0655	Bn HQ + Arty HQ established inside minefd			
13.	Bde	Arty	0658	Attempt All minefd gaps cleared			
14.			0659	Heavy enemy CB fire Bde HQ area			
15.	Bde	Arty	0703	Arty HQ reports 100 PW passing back with hands up - GERMANS.			
16.	Bde	HQ	0705	Exploiting force is to go out. Maj McIntyre NOT yet left. B Sqn going out			

ACTION DIARY.

3.

SERIAL	TO	FROM	TIME	INFORMATION	NOTES	DEDUCTION	ACTION
17.	Bde	2/17	0710	Mof Coln moving towards Pt 23 - not having much fire on them			@ Div.
18.	Bde	Arty	0715	0705 Maj GRACE arrived. Left fwd Coy NOT on objective - casualties by - waiting for this to assist. 0706. TKs nowhere.			
19.	Bde	2/17	0717	about 40 PW now in Bde Cage.			
20.	Bde	Arty	0718	0710 - 3 of our tks & carriers seen at 871298.			
21	Bde	Arty	0725	Message from GRACE - situation uncertain			
22	Bde	Arty	0726	West Pt 23 - occupied by us.			
23	Bde	TK Co.	0733	4 TK. casualties known - personnel probably OK. Valentines now sitting behind objective			
24	Bde	Arty	0735	Hy. enemy shelling on West Pt 23 - white vapour lights going up from enemy positions further west.			

SERIAL	TO	FROM	TIME	INFORMATION	NOTES	DEDUCTION	ACTION
25.	Bde	Arty	0737	0740 - right fwd coy on objective pinned down by MG fire			
26	Bde	DN Cav	0740	Hy mortar fire area 8730-2973 - appears to be coming from south of west Pt 23.			
27	Bde	Arty	0742	Right fwd coy being counter-attacked.			
28	Bde	Sigs	0746.	Sigs line-laying truck being fired at by ATK guns, and three casualties so far. TKs have cut up line.			
29	Bde		0747	About 50 PW being collected at Pt 23			
30	Bde	Arty	0748.	Intercept from 7th Bn - send amm lorry			
31	Bde	MO.	0752	Counter attack seems to be forming up on D Coy's left. Mortar, MG and SAA are on their way			