

**AWM52**


**2nd AIF (Australian Imperial Force) and CMF  
(Commonwealth Military Forces) unit war diaries,  
1939-45 War**

Miscellaneous - POW  
Independent Companies

**Item number:** 25/3/2/5

**Title:** 2/2 Independent Company

[August to November] 1942



AWM52-25/3/2/5

25/3/2

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL  
ACCESS STATUS

OPEN

CAO ACCESS STATUS

~~OPEN WITH~~  
~~EXCEPTIONS~~

1942

ORIGINAL

~~PHOTOCOPYING~~  
~~NOT PERMITTED~~

2/2 INDEPENDENT COY.

REPORTS  
STATEMENTS &  
MAPS

Urgent, and absolutely Confidential = Advise your Commanders  
one big column of Yaps go out from Dily two days ago with  
the intention of beginning the operations against you, Hatoia is the termi-  
nus of the operations they say. If they could, I say ---) The first walk, Dily-  
Fatue-Mita, 2<sup>nd</sup>, perhaps Comon Motabane (Railaco) or Soloi via dileu and  
after, Comua. With infantry and one quantity of small artillery. Information  
from Dily say they expect one bombardement from 15 to 30 followed by  
one landing of Australian or American troops. All ammunition are now in the  
houses of the natives, a small quantity of Yaps are now in Dily. Your  
sick men was taken by the Yaps from the hospital of the government  
I think in confidence. Yesterday 2 or 3 war steamers arrive in Dily bringing  
more 400 men. Your Commander Major --- are now in Bolonais advise him  
to have big care with your talks with the Port. authorities there, they are  
pro-British but never forget they are Fascists. All your move-  
ments or intentions known are transmitted to Dily by numbers to the  
Gover. The Yaps know all = The proper Yaps declare this in Dily =  
Your Commanders quickly agree send orders to your troops in Hatoia  
to go out from the tranqueira and to not interfere with the natives  
(mantraia Bapa Titi liquica) but you position the number of your men

in each Porto is reported to the Yaps all days. all the Portuguese  
90%, are anxious by your intervention. all ask how long our  
stay. One day when you make your march against Oily  
you find me in the way. I expect to have the sufficient  
time to say you, that only a few people in Oily are with  
the Governor. I say you this names I know very well all this  
people, big case. If the Yaps return to Oily (is not the first time)

I expect see you - you may know me - one day  
we drink coffee and milk in my house.

God save the bushmen

Coffee and milk

after the salute or shake hand

this two words, and you know me

Don't, and  
never forget

The Yaps go with  
armoured cars (small cars)  
some people say with 40 cars and other

## Statement

I the undersigned, Padraic Pearce McLeabe do solemnly swear that this a true statement to my knowledge and belief

At or about mid-day near the saddle on the track between Atsabe & Bobonaro on the second or third of March this year of god 1942. ex Sergeant Freeman thrown to the boys as curly was in the party with myself. Said. I quote. It is suicide to fight the Japs here on this Bloody Island I am going to Suai to get a boat and go to Australia.

I pointed out this would be desertion.

He replied the Aussies could not get me for desertion as I am a yankee.

I said do not be a fool.

He replied America is a big place if I can make it.

I then replied if desertion is planned

I am going back even if on my own. If you attempted it I would shoot

you in the guts. He said

I said you would not do it curly.

He said try me and see.

nothing more was said on that occasion.

The next occasion was at Maucantur about middle of march when I was attached to Brigadier Beale Freeman with Pte's Keenahan Coles and Lilyer together with a Dutch sergeant by the name of Eric Von Lichten arrived at Maucatai in accordance with an Order issued by one of the Captains of Brigadier Beale's Party. Said this — then we are not reporting to the Major we are going to the island of Kussar. Eric says (meaning the Dutchman) says that there are Boats there. What about coming Mac, I said not on your life I am very pleased to be away from you. He then said. you will be sorry never on any other occasion did I hear him mention desertion excepting to say you'll stick to me Oxford meaning Lilyer. I never once heard Lilyer mention desertion, but always seemed to be in agreement with Freeman whom I think he admired, he always seemed to be under

Freeman's influence.

Webb and Harney I did not ever  
come in contact with since the  
arrival of the Japanese in Sumor.

Sgt. this second day of  
August nineteen forty two

Signed

Patrick Pearce McCabe

Witness V.A. Walsh

NX 73234. MCCABE. P.P. ACTING. SGT.

NX 73296 WALSH V.A. SIG.

Capt R. R. BALDWIN states on oath:

"Since early in February, I have known FREEMAN, a reinforcement who was then acting in an honorary capacity as sergeant, by sight. I never knew the man intimately, but could recognise him with certainty. On or about 16 MAR, in the afternoon, he reported to me at BOBONARO. I then gave him a verbal order to report, with his party, which I then understood to consist of two men, to Major SPENCE, or whatever other officer might be in charge, at CAILACO. I did NOT see him again after giving this order."

R. R. Baldwin, Capt

Witnesses:

A. Spence T/lt Col.

Major



# Australian Military Forces—7th Military District.

Please quote this Number when replying.

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Head-Quarters,  
Darwin.

## INTELLIGENT REPORTS.

Addition to intelligent report instructions. Received from RUMA  
(L.I. 3) 13 Jun.42.

Reliability of intelligent reports will be indicated at the  
end of each section as follows:-

- A1, Very reliable.
  - A , Good.
  - B , Fairly reliable.
  - C1, Own troops reliable report.
- 

MAQUEREC  
MAQUEREC

## I N T E L L I G E N C E      R E P O R T S .

It is required that intelligence reports be submitted to higher authority; and in order that the information be submitted in the correct form the following method of compiling reports will be adhered to - as far as is practicable.

Reports will be compiled under the following headings. Indicator letters and roman numerals may be used as references, when desirable. Only relevant headings need be used and NIL reports for headings not used are Not required.

### A. OWN TROOPS.

- I Change of location of sub units.
- II Patrols. (a) Base from which operatingx and code name.  
(b) Area of operation.  
(c) Last report states.

### B. ENEMY.

- I Variation in strength of locations
- II (a) Movement to and from.  
(b) Activity during movement (i.e. patrolling, foraging, road work etc.)  
(c) Strength.  
(d) Time and date.  
(e) Armament.  
(f) Source of information (i.e. own patrols or O.P's, Portuguese, Chinese or native reports.)  
(g) Reliability. (k) Action taken and your deduction.  
(l) ~~Probability.~~
- III Enemy morale.

### C. SHIPPING OR AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT.

- I Own forces.
- II Enemy.  
Each with subdivisions;-
  - (a) Number and type.
  - (b) Reported from.
  - (c) Time and date.
  - (d) Reliability
  - (e) Probability

### D. LOCAL POPULATION.

- I European.
- II Native.  
Each with subdivisions;-
  - (a) Feeling towards own troops.
  - (b) Feeling towards enemy.
  - (c) Assistance given.
  - (d) Suspicious actions.

### E. GENERAL INFORMATION.

- NOTES.
1. It is important that all reports show clearly the time and date, its source and considered reliability.
  2. The above does NOT exclude the submission of special reports, or the immediate reporting of important information.
  3. The above form will be of most value when reports are being forwarded by runner, but if it is kept in mind when preparing reports for transmission in cipher the work of collating reports at each H.Q. will be simplified.

投降狀

(This is to surrender to the Japanese Army)  
( Soerat Minta Ampoen )

Lantas datang kemari katempat

Tentara Djapan dengan ini Soerat  
Minta Ampoen dan kasi twendjoek  
bendera poetih boeat tanda wata  
kamoe minta ampoen.

Kaloe tidak datang dengan segera,  
Soerat ini tiada bergoena.

---

Come to the Japanese Army with  
this paper holding the white flag  
up.

TO THE AUSTRALIAN MILITARY

The object of our present moving in PORTUGUESE TIMOR is resolute we sweeping you out who still continue negative gerilla fighting against Japanese in spite of your barrack friend surrendering already and who dream groundlessly the last victory.

But today we found among you some have a will surrendering then now once more we offer you the opportunity for it.

The conditions of the world today is just as you know.

However unless you don't awake from the dream groundless so long and if you last the moving as before; even in the neutral country we will spare the time and do our will to the last. You all know what accompanies with it Awake up.

Stop your unfreely life and surrender to the Japanese military.

We wait for you to come down with the guiding of the natives having this letter.

Yours sincerely,

JAPANESE MILITARY.

## SOERAT MINTA AMPOEN.

Djangan sampai mati pertjoema.

Anak, dan binimoe atau familiemoe sama sekali mesti harap betoel. Kamoe tida ada alangan soepaja lekas kembali roemah.

Djangan brani perang lagi, itoe tida ada goena dari sebab tentoe tida bisa menang sama Tentera Nippon Besar jang paling koeat antero doenia.

Soepaja lekas datang minta ampoen dengan bawa soer-  
rat ini dan kasih toendjoek kain poetih boeat tanda mata  
kamoe minta ampoen.

Kita Tentera Nippon mesti tanggoeng djiwa kamoe.

Tentera Nippon.

## Advice

### To the Dutch and Australian Soldiers

The Japanese army had already conquered the netherlandish Indies falling Java into our hands.

All Dutch and Australian troops except here had already surrendered to us and are living now peacefully under our protection of their lines.

The Highest commander of the Dutch Army, General Terpoorten, had met with the Japanese Commander in chief and accepted every proposal demanded by the latter.

At noon on 9th March, General Terpoorten broadcasted his command through the Bandaeng Radio Station that every troops in whole Dutch Indies must surrender to the Japanese Army on no condition.

However, you alone are wandering in the mountains and going on useless fighting still now.

Your comrades surrendered to us are now going on their happy lives.

Don't you think how valuable human lives are?

Don't you think of your homes in your countries?

Stop your aimless fighting just now. We sincerely advise you to surrender to us at once holding white flags up and deliver your ammunition to us.

We promise to protect your lives. But if you want, you may go on fighting despite our kind advice.

We Japanese Army, do not wish you to surrender for our own sake. We advise it for your happiness.

Trully, we had completed all necessary preparation to kill your last soldier in Portugal Timor.

Kaloe beegitoe Tentara Djapan tanggung nyawamu.

Kaloe tidak ikwet sama kami dan kaloe mahoe melawan lagi kamoe bisa melawan, Tentara Djapan tidak hendak serahkanmu. Tetapi kami hendak kesenangan kamoe sekalian.

Tentara Djapan sudah sedia banyak soldadoe nanti membom dan menjerang dengan meriam, semua. r. sok itoe nanti pagarkan dan membinasakan sampai sa-orang pun tiada hidup.

Sekarang inilah waktue serahkan, djangan dapat keresegian yang tiada berguna.

Kamoe sahadja yang melawan dan kaloe melawan lagi pun tidak dapat apa-apa hanya beegi nyawamu. Dengan segera bawah Isyarat Minta Ampoen dan serahkan diri.

Inilah nasihat kepada kamoe

Hari 11 Maart  
Di-pelahoer Timor Portugal  
Panglima Tentara Djapan.

A 137

HQ SPARROW FORCE

PORT TIMOR

13 DEC 42

HQ NOR FORCE

Herewith nominal rolls and old sig registers <sup>& correspondence</sup> valuable for the records of this Force. Owing to the danger of their destruction if we continue to carry them with us here, could you hold them for us.

R. R. Baldwin Capt.

ADJUTANT

SPARROW FORCE

DRESSEE

STATE

A.A.M.C. N.T.

MED. ARRANGEMENTS SPARROW FC

D.O.S

RECEIPT FOR 28 WATCHES

INDY P/MASTER

RE REQUEST FOR MONTHLY

L.M.D.

CAPTURE RETURN

NOR FORCE

RE NO2 CRAIGIE

Parts of Pay book + an envelope from crashed Hudson

RE EVAC OF SANTOS FAMILY

RE TX4745 SIG. LOVELESS

REPORT BY CAPT LANGLAW ON ACTION R.F.M. 111

STORES

10-18 AUG

MEDICAL CASE SHEETS - SPARROW FORCE

SITUATION REPORT 6-31 AUG 42

WAR DIARY - NO2 A.I.C. & FORCE H.Q.

SIG STORES REQUISITION - 1ND COY

EMBARKATION ROLL - 14 7 CAS. RETURN

RE LOSS OF 3" MORTARS

RETURN OF AF G 482 D, A.A.F F21 (3mm)

CASUALTY RETURNS, FORMS (Returned)

NEXT OF KIN - L/SGT J O'BRIEN

REF PERSONAL RECORDS JAGAN - GOODALL - 2 IND COY

REF G 53 3506 - MESSAGE FROM C.M.C

JAP MORTAR & GRENADES

RECONNAISSANCE EASTERN TIMOR (COPIES OF REPORT)

JAP CURRENCY

NO 2 IND COY - NEW METHOD OF OPERATION

Return of 2 IND Coy personnel to AUSTRALIA

WAR DIARY 9 AUG - 5 SEP

MONTHLY REQUISITION - DUTCH FORCE

SITUATION REPORT - SPARROW FORCE - 1-11 SEP 42

JAP TOWEL AND SCRIPT

MEDICAL CASE SHEETS - MES HODG + WALLER

RETURN MAIL - DECEASED PERSONNEL

SANTOS FAMILY

NOMINAL ROLL SPARROW FORCE - LESS DUTCH FORCE

RETURN OF STORES ETC

SPARROW FORCE WAR DIARY 2-12 SEP

TRANSFER OF EQUIPMENT - 2 FORCE

WAR DIARY - 2 IND COY - 17 JUL TO 8 AUG

CASUALTY RETURNS - 2 IND COY

Recommendations for awards

WAR DIARY - SPARROW FORCE 13/14 SEP 42

GLASSES - RE WERSEBOE

RECCO REPORTS - EASTERN TIMOR

RECOMMENDATIONS & PROMOTIONS ETC

Absorption of company personnel in 2ND IND COY

Report on Lieut LAFFY

PROMOTION - SGT COUPLAND, A.A.

REQUEST FOR TEXT BOOKS, ETC

WAR DIARY - NO 2 IND COY - 31 AUG - 19 SEP 42

SITUATION REPORT 12/14 SEP 42

A 11 do do  
 A 12 do do  
 A 13 do do  
 A 14 do do  
 A 15 do do  
 A 16 1 Sep do  
 A 17 2 Sep do  
 A 18 do do  
 A 19 7 Sep do  
 A 20 11 Sep DRD. DARWIN  
 A 21 - HB. MERSEBOE  
 A 22 - "  
 A 23 - "  
 A 24 12 Sep - "  
 A 25 - "  
 A 26 - "  
 A 27 - NEI. ARMY.  
 A 28 - NORFORCE  
 A 29 - "  
 A 30 - "  
 A 31 - "  
 A 32 - "  
 A 33 - "  
 A 34 - "  
 A 35 - "  
 A 36 - "  
 A 37 - "  
 A 38 - "  
 A 39 - "  
 A 40 - MAJ GENERAL STEVENS  
 A 41 - NORFORCE  
 A 42 - "  
 A 43 - "  
 A 44 - "  
 A 45 - "  
 A 46 - "  
 A 47 - "  
 A 48 - "  
 A 49 - "  
 A 50 - "  
 A 51 - "

added



No.	Date	Addresser	Subject
A52	23 SEP.	NORFORCE	FROM LIEUT HEYWARD.
A53	~	NORFORCE	Proposed Relief - 1st & 2nd Coy
A54	~	~	SPARRAW FORCE WAR DIARY 15-22 SEP (Inclusive)
A55	~	~	4th Intn. HQ.
A56	~	~	Safe hand receipt.
A57	25 Sep	~	FROM LIEUT HEYWARD.
A58	~	~	SPARRAW FORCE INTERNAL TRAFFIC
A59	26 Sep	~	AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS
A60	9 Oct.	~	Receiv. Mpts. EASTERN TIMOR
A61	~	~	Delivery of mail - additional nominal roll
A62	12 Oct	~	nominal roll - Dutch force
A63	~	~	Demerition Amos. Voyager, Peris etc
A64	~	~	Finance.
A65	14 Oct.	~	Reports on Jap activities
A66	~	~	Jap atrocities AILEU-ANIBRO
A67	19 Oct	~	Aerodrome sites & strips
A68	~	~	WAR DIARY NO 2 AVCT 2ND COY
A69	~	~	PAYBOOK - SAILOR
A70	22 Oct	~	SM Report 22 SEP/19 OCT
A71	~	~	Awards Decorations
A72	~	~	Recommendations for awards for Heizer by Janssen
A73	~	~	Partials - Sig Murray.
A74	~	~	War Diary 23 Sep - 18 Oct 42 (Inclusive)
A75	~	~	navy Personnel ex H.M.A.S. VOYAGER.
A76	30 Oct.	DUTCH HQ.	TELEPH. PORTUGUESE DICTIONARY
A77	~	NORFORCE	ARMY FORMS RETURNED
A78	~	~	PORTUGUESE LETTERS AND TELEGRAM
A79	~	~	LETTER - DUTCH SOLDIER
A80	~	~	REPORT ON INTERVIEW WITH FORMER SGT
A81	~	~	OFFICERS SPARRAW FORCE
A82	~	~	WAR DIARY - SPARRAW FORCE 19 OCT. - 29 OCT
A83	~	~	W/T FREQUENCIES - SPARRAW FORCE
A84	~	~	PROMOTIONS
A85	~	~	Rec. for awards. Sig Mallin etc.
A86	~	~	monthly medical arrangements
A87	~	~	Returned property. Sgt Walker.
A88	~	~	NO 2 AVCT 2ND COY WAR DIARY 15-31 Oct 1942
A89	~	~	REQUIREMENTS - 2/4 2ND COY
A90	~	~	Rpts - 2/4 2ND COY.
A91	~	~	SM REPORT - 2/4 2ND COY - NOV.
A92	~	~	NOMINAL ROLL - DUTCH FORCE
A93	~	~	W/T SETS LANSTING 44

A94	4 NOV	NORFOLK	Recommendations for awards "Distinguished"
A95	-	G-50	Recommendation for Promotion, Sgt. [unclear]
A96	5 NOV	NORFOLK	Report by oc. B. P. - condition of men
A97	-	-	Service [unclear]
A98	16 NOV	A D [unclear] POC. Boujier D. M. O. V. I. C. Barred	POC., Boujier 21 Dec 42.
A99	-	NORFOLK	was being 4/16 November 1942
A100	-	-	POC. 21 Dec 1942
A101	-	-	Issue orders (returned)
A102	-	-	Personnel belongings NX 77951 Pt William, OR.
A103	-	-	Evacuation of [unclear]
A104	-	-	medical case [unclear], Lt. LARRY
A105	-	-	Special host requirements, by GOULD, AG.
A106	-	NORFOLK	Recommendation for final appointment, [unclear]
A107	-	-	Power from Japanese bank (Pass)
A108	-	-	WAR DIARY 2 AUS INDI COY 1 NOV - 16 NOV 42
A109	-	-	Special Force [unclear] 4-16 NOV 42
A110	29 NOV	NORFOLK	SIT REPORT 18-28 NOV
A111	-	-	SPECTACLES - PTE CHITT

SPARROW FORCE

Force H.Q.

Nominal Roll

QX 6455	Lt.-Col. A. Spence	2 A.I.C.
VX50054	Capt. R.R. Baldwin	"
TX 2326	S/Sgt. Walton, A.C.	2/40 Aust Inf Bn
TX 2605	" Anning, V.D.	"
TX 4174	Sgt. Dennis, B.F.	AAPC
TX 2676	Cpl. Taylor, R.S.	2/40 Aust Inf Bn
WX14451	Bdr. Hettick, J.N.	2/1 H. Bty
NX67763	Pte. Fredericks, H.A.	2/12 Aust Fd Amb
WX12124	<del>Lt.</del> Smyth, E.W.	2 A.I.C.
WX 212	L/Cpl. Kirkwood, R.S.	"
VX 50081	Lt Col COLLINSON, B.J.	"

FORCE SIGS

QX18071	Cpl. Sargent, J.H.	2/1 Frt Sigs
VX54809	" Roberts, I.S.	2/40 Aust Inf Bn
VX26937	Sigmn. Liversidge, E.J.	8 Div Sigs
NX 1707	" Bailey, D.C.	2/1 Frt Sigs
TX 2790	Pte. Lee, D.W.	2/40 Aust Inf Bn
VX53831	" Stevens, F.W.	"
NX38634	L/Cpl. Donovan, J.A.	2/1 Frt Sigs
VX50708	Sigmn. Richards, K.J.	2 A.I.C.
WX13594	" Geere, R.L.	"
NX48453	Pte. Cloutt, J.	Sparrow Force HQ
VX25105	" Smith, G.J.	"
VX31771	" Young, J.W.	"
QX19763	Sgt. Le-Strange, J.A.	2/1 Hvy Bty
QX19746	L/Bdr. Long, A.J.	"
NX50064	L/Sgt. Pepper, R.	"
NX38656	S/Sgt. Conley, R.G.	2/1 Frt Coy
QX 9599	Spr. Bowman, A.C.	2/11 Fd Coy
QX12038	Cpl. Campbell, S.W.G.	"
QX10395	Pte. Collins, L.G.	"
QX13497	Spr. Corby, A.B.	"
QX10532	" Cochrane, N.G.	"
QX13261	" Crisp, A.E.	"
QX 1951	" Clarke, D.S.	"
QX 9246	" Dennis, M.	"
QX 9690	" Francis, A.L.	"
QX 7430	Pte. Grebert, H.C.	"
NX38846	" Gollings, R.	"
QX13115	Spr. Lee, J.	"
QX15340	" Maule, L.	"
QX18433	" McCubbin, R.S.	"
QX16589	" McKeown, F.	"
QX11051	" Reid, A.L.	"
QX16071	" Sagar, D.A.	"
WX21226	Pte. Schmidt, V.C.	"
QX12167	Spr. Tyler, J.	"
QX18433	" Thick, T.J.R.	"
NX39138	Cpl. Elliott, W.E.	2/1 Frt Sigs
TX 3903	Pte. Archer, J.H.	2/40 Aust Inf Bn
TX 5956	" Aylett, V.R.	2/40 " " "
TX 4160	" Bennett, M.	"
TX 3463	" Blight, N.	"
TX 2595	" Bomford, L.J.	"
TX 3920	" Bramich, R.A.	"
TX 4772	" Butters, A.E.	"
TX 1582	" Burn, H.F.	"
TX 5426	" Beeton, R.	"
TX 1486	" Cannon, E.M.	"
TX 3483	L/Cpl. Conroy, M.F.	"
TX 4739	Pte. Curran, H.A.	"
VX36786	Cpl. Davies, R.M.	"

Printed and bound by the Australian War Memorial

Dated  
Head-Quarters

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES—7th MILITARY DISTRICT

# Australian Military Forces—7th Military District.

Please quote this number when replying.

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Head-Quarters,  
Darwin.

AX 2001	Sgt	Dunlop, E. J.	
AX 2002	Sgt	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2003	Sgt	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2004	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2005	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2006	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2007	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2008	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2009	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2010	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2011	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2012	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2013	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2014	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2015	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2016	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2017	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2018	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2019	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2020	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2021	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2022	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2023	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2024	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2025	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2026	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2027	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2028	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2029	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2030	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2031	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2032	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2033	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2034	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2035	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2036	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2037	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2038	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2039	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2040	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2041	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2042	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2043	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2044	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2045	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2046	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2047	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2048	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2049	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2050	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2051	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2052	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2053	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2054	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2055	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2056	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2057	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2058	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2059	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2060	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2061	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2062	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2063	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2064	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2065	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2066	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2067	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2068	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2069	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2070	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2071	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2072	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2073	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2074	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2075	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2076	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2077	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2078	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2079	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2080	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2081	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2082	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2083	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2084	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2085	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2086	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2087	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2088	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2089	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2090	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2091	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2092	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2093	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2094	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2095	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2096	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2097	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2098	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2099	"	Conlon, H. V.	"
AX 2100	"	Conlon, H. V.	"

100/100 H.V.

100/100 H.V.

100/100 H.V.

VX32491	Pte. Dennis, F.R.	2/40 Aust Inf Bn
TX 4824	" Douglas, T.T.	"
TX 3790	L/Cpl. Elmore, W.J.	"
TX 3334	Pte. Gillam, L.	"
VX48366	" Griffin, J.	"
TX 1550	" Greenland, P.	"
TX 3539	" Hawkins, R.W.	"
TX 5879	" Haywood, B.A.	"
TX 4722	" Jarvis, W.C.	"
TX 5059	L/Cpl. Kean, C.E.	"
TX 3529	Pte. Lehner, C.R.	"
TX 4611	" Marsh, S.R.	"
TX 8140	" Meers, W.	"
TX 3328	S/Sgt. Miller, M.L.	"
TX 4141	Pte. Milson, G.B.	"
NX48825	Pte. McNally, E.C.	"
TX 5280	" Nicklason, L.C.	"
TX 3545	" Pinner, K.I.	"
TX 3662	" Porter, L.J.	"
TX 2781	" Price, H.N.	"
TX 5110	" Purton, W.C.	"
TX 3672	" Richards, A.B.	"
TX 3899	" Rice, J.	"
TX 4049	" Simmons, S.P.	"
TX 4684	L/Cpl. Stubbs, W.V.	"
TX 8448	Pte. Savage, H.T.	"
TX 2784	" Webster, A.J.	"
TX 8383	" Whittington, J.	"
TX 1644	Sgt. Wood, C.G.	"
TX 3744	Pte. Young, J.R.	"
NX10883	" Barnier, R.J.	AASC
NX 7116	" Barnier, A.R.	"
NX 6568	L/Cpl. Brownscombe, E.H.	"
NX10607	Cpl. Cooper, P.O.	"
NX 7290	Pte. Caine, C.D.	"
NX10211	Dvr. Dubber, S.T.	"
NX 2900	Pte. Elliott, R.C.	"
	" Field, E.A.	"
VX65009	" Furze, E.	"
NX41795	Cpl. Griffiths, R.C.	"
NX40177	Pte. Hocking, J.T.	"
NX 4567	" Kow, C.	"
TX 3213	" Lee, E.N.	"
NX41445	" Milton, T.R.	"
NX73149	" Stewart, F.A.	"
NX 2092	" Sipple, W.J.	"
NX42498	" Tell, J.A.	"
NX60209	" Morrissey, H.J.	2/12 Fd Amb
NX37771	" Rutherford, J.	"
VX39662	Cpl. Macrury, A.	22 Dental Unit
VX35633	Pte. Cusack, R.A.	75 LAD
NX52731	" Herd, E.J.	"
VX38849	Pte. Leviston, H.K.	"
VX38858	" McKenzie, C.	"
VX34061	L/Cpl. Osborne, L.V.	"
VX39128	Pte. Robertson, C.	"
NX42322	" Trengrove	"
NX 875	" Dean, J.M.	AAOC
NX 8230	" Mears, R.P.	"
TX 3993	Cpl. Jones, S.J.H.	8 Div Postal Unit
VX66104	Sgt. Scholes, A.	

*TX 2597 L/CPL HICKMAN, AW.*

VX50081	Capt. B.J. Callinan	2 Ind Coy
WX 8358	Lieut. J.C. Burnidge	"
WX 6490	Capt. G. Boyland	"
NX76534	Lieut. A. Cardy	"

*Darwin  
Head-Quarters*

Australian Military Forces—7th Military District

WX11076	Lieut. R. Cola	2 Ind Coy
WX 6466	" A. Campbell	"
VX38890	" D.StA. Dexter	"
WX11054	" C.D. Doig	"
WX11064	Capt. C.R. Dunkley	"
NX70537	" G.G. Laidlaw	"
<del>NX77257</del>	<del>Lieut. J.P. Laffy</del>	<del>"</del>
WX 9169	" Mackintosh, K.G.	"
WX 5369	" McKenzie, C.F.G.	"
WX11073	" Nisbet, T.G.	"
VX64494	" C.J. Rodd	"
NX65630	" J.A. Rose	"
WX 8440	" D.R. Turton	"
WX 7291	" C.W. Turner	"
VX42059	Sigmn. Addison, A.R.	"
VX60789	Spr. Adams, L.R.	"
VX60797	Pte. Adams, A.V.	"
WX10542	Cpl. Aitken, R.A.	"
WX12530	Pte. Anderson, L.	"
NX40670	" Anderson, W.S.	"
WX13745	" Barnes, G.C.	"
VX63211	" Baxter, N.E.	"
WX10919	Sigmn. Bayliss, G.E.	"
NX48163	Pte. Beresford, S.A.	"
NX65903	" Bennett, F.W.	"
WX12677	" Blundy, A.W.	"
WX13636	" Bowers, A.G.	"
WX10834	" Brand, J.G.	"
VX29713	Cpl. Bryant, W.F.	"
WX13748	Pte. Brooker, H.T.	"
WX12703	" Brady, N.K.	"
NX49761	" Brown, K.T.	"
WX13194	" Brown, H.J.	"
WX 8627	Spr. Browne, F.E.	"
VX55118	Sigmn. Botterill, H.	"
NX49207	Pte. Buckman, N.	"
WX10837	L/Cpl. Burges, H.A.	"
WX12435	Pte. Burton, R.H.	"
WX10091	" Brady, A.P.	"
TX 4950	Sigmn. Brown, I.J.	"
<del>WX 9129</del>	<del>L/Cpl. Carrier, G.W.</del>	<del>"</del>
WX12135	Cpl. Cash, M.C.	"
WX11299	Pte. Campbell, P.W.	"
WX12844	Pte. Chopping, C.	"
NX52570	" Colless, K.	"
NX73296	" Coles, M.R.	"
NX12137	Sgt. Coupland, A.A.	"
VX59618	Pte. Coats, A.E.	"
WX12431	" Cooper, W.G.	"
WX13760	" Congdon, W.R.	"
NX51317	" Cole, H.J.	"
VX59614	" Coyle, J.T.	"
WX12841	" Criddle, C.R.	"
WX10832	" Cunningham, F.P.	"
VX47342	Cpl. Curran, K.S.	"
WX12793	Pte. Crossing, W.A.	"
WX12885	" Crouch, T.S.	"
WX12423	" Carey, J.W.	"
WX13273	" Calcutt, H.H.	"
NX44493	" Curtis, M.J.	"
NX49540	" Darge, J.	"
WX12343	" Davidson, A.	"
WX 6124	Sigmn. Davies, D.A.	"
NX39548	Pte. Demmery, J.F.	"
WX10538	Cpl. Delbridge, A.	"
WX12123	L/Sgt. Denman, J.R.	"

Dalton  
Head-Quarters

Printed and sold by the Government Printer, Melbourne.

Australian Military Forces—1st Military District

WX10206	Pte. Doyle, P.J.	2 Ind Coy
WX13042	" Doyle, C.E.	"
WX10211	" Dorham, R.	"
WX10834	L/Cpl. Drage, W.A.	"
WX13237	Pte. Dhu, R.C.	"
WX12574	L/Cpl. Dinwoodie, E.	"
VX60070	Pte. Elder, A.E.	"
WX12125	Cpl. Epps, W.T.	"
VX64092	Pte. Eley, W.	"
WX12003	Pte. Fitzgerald, T.	"
WX11366	" Fowler, J.F.	"
WX13202	L/Cpl. Foster, T.A.	"
WX13235	Pte. Freestone, F.	"
WX 8507	L/Cpl. Fullarton, D.R.	"
WX12145	Sgt. Green, G.I.	"
VX60755	Spr. Grachan, A.B.	"
WX13310	Pte. Griffiths, F.A.	"
WX13530	" Grown, F.W.	"
VX55437	Sigmn. Greenhalgh, F.	"
NX47265	Cpl. Garland, H.J.	"
WX13252	Pte. Harrington, R.D.	"
<del>WX12813</del>	<del>" Halse, L.P.</del>	<del>"</del>
NX55272	" Harrison, P.J.	"
WX10744	Cpl. Haire, J.T.	"
WX12804	Pte. Hanson, J.T.	"
WX13535	" Hasson, J.	"
NX78025	" Hartley, J.	"
WX 203	Sigmn. Hancock, P.	"
WX10323	Pte. Herbert, M.S.	"
WX 9916	Cpl. Hillman, A.T.	"
WX12319	Pte. Hislop, G.W.	"
VX57942	Spr. Hodgson, E.	"
WX12126	" Howell, W.N.T.	"
WX12024	Pte. Holly, W.I.	"
NX49113	" Holden, A.	"
WX11349	" Hooper, N.W.S.	"
<del>WX13396</del>	<del>" Holmes, G.B.</del>	<del>"</del>
WX12409	" Holly, C.J.	"
WX 9163	" Humfreys, F.D.	"
WX13305	" Hudson, W.D.	"
NX50837	" Hogg, D.	"
WX12127	L/Sgt. James, H.E.	"
WX 6212	Sgt. Jensen, E.R.N.	"
WX 9937	Pte. Jordan, A.M.	"
WX13497	" Johnson, R.	"
NX49745	" Jones, K.D.	"
NX46653	Cpl. Jones, A.F.	"
NX50134	Pte. Johnson, H.	"
NX77689	Pte. Kenneally, J.P.	"
NX49475	" Keenahan, J.R.	"
VX55541	Sigmn. Kennedy, G.B.	"
VX 5541	Pte. King, C.H.	"
VX56821	Sigmn. King, H.E.	"
WX10528	Pte. King, S.E.	"
VX55888	Sigmn. Krause, F.	"
WX10459	Pte. Lacey, D.	"
WX11917	" Lawrence, J.B.	"
WX12984	L/Cpl. Langridge, B.C.	"
WX11882	Pte. Lewis, G.	"

These boxes are intended for use by the recipient

Dated: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Head-Quarters: \_\_\_\_\_

Australian Military Forces—1st Military District

			No. 2 Ind Coy
NX42173	Pte	LOVI, W.A.	"
WX9489	Cpl	LOUD, E.	"
<del>WX12566</del>	<del>Pte</del>	<del>LONGBOTTOM, H.A.</del>	<del>"</del>
NX55531	Cpl	LUBY, A.	"
WX9938	Pte	LUDLOW, S.	"
WX12529	"	LAWSON-DOOK, R.	"
WX12144	Spr	MARCH, W.E.	"
WX12138	"	MARTIN, A.J.	"
WX13168	Pte	MARTIN, T.	"
VX60067	"	MARTIN, C.R.	"
WX11537	"	MARCHANT, L.D.	"
WX13399	"	MARSHALL, A.	"
WX11488	"	MALEY, J.L.	"
WX13733	"	MATTHEWS, A.E.	"
NX44626	"	MAHER, C.A.	"
WX11604	"	MERRITT, G.	"
VX64675	"	MILLER, G.	"
VX59581	"	MILDREN, T.	"
WX9954	L/Sgt	MORGAN, H.J.	"
VX63724	Pte	MONK, R.J.	"
WX13208	Sig	MURRAY, D.F.	"
WX9291	Pte	MULQUEENEY, G.	"
WX10525	"	MEYER, H.S.	"
WX10469	"	MONK, W.E.C.	"
QX19912	"	MACLACHLAN, A.	"
WX9811	Cpl	McKENZIE, R.	"
WX9910	Sig	McMAHON, B.J.	"
WX10781	"	McPHEE, P.	"
<del>NX73234</del>	<del>Pte</del>	<del>McCABE, P.P.</del>	<del>"</del>
VX58072	"	McCALLUM, D.	"
WX12590	"	NAPIER, F.W.E.	"
WX11582	"	NEWTON, H.	"
WX11271	"	NEUZERLING, R.J.	"
NX58995	L/Sgt	O'BRIEN, J.S.	"
NX73696	Pte	OLDE, L.G.	"
NX50133	"	O'NEIL, F.V.	"
WX12171	"	OTWAY, F.A.	"
WX13602	"	O'SULLIVAN, M.R.	"
WX11473	"	O'TOOLE, G.J.	"
WX9529	"	PALMER, J.C.	"
WX12415	"	PARRY, R.N.	"
WX10278	"	PAYNE, S.E.	"
WX10893	Cpl	PALMER, R.K.	"
TX5455	L/Cpl	PACEY, C.V.	"
WX12340	Pte	PAULL, T.	"
NX47861	Sgt	PAFF, C.V.	"
WX11920	Spr	PENDERGRAST, G.E.	"
WX13213	Pte	PENGLASE, J.C.	"
WX9442	L/Cpl	PICKERING, C.N.	"
WX12552	Pte	POYNTON, J.W.	"
NX67365	Sgt	PRESS, F.A.	"
NX44588	Pte	PURROTT, A.	"
WX12585	"	PULLEINE, T.J.	"
WX13051	"	PARKER, N.H.	"
TX4709	L/Cpl	RICHARDS, R.C.	"
WX8465	Cpl	RITCHIE, D.T.	"
<del>WX12004</del>	<del>Pte</del>	<del>ROFFEY, J.G.</del>	<del>"</del>
WX12935	"	ROWAN-ROBINSON, W.H.	"
WX9540	"	ROWLEY, G.P.	"
WX11493	L/Cpl	ROGERS, S.G.	"
VX53846	Pte	ROBINSON, G.S.	"
WX11374	"	SADLER, C.A.	"
WX11372	"	SADLER, S.	"
VX55488	"	SARGENT, H.A.	"
WX10894	"	SCOTT, N.D.	"
WX12583	"	SHEEHAN, W.J.	"
NX49210	"	SMITH, J.R.	"
WX12818	Sig	SMITH, M.A.M.	"
	Pte	SMITH, G.H.	"
VX60643	"	SMITH, B.T.C.	"



			No 2 Ind Coy
WX 12381	Pte	SMAILES JR	"
WX 5537	Pte	SMEATON A <i>missing</i>	"
WX 10770	Sig	SPRIGG R	"
WX 10184	Pte	SPENCER J	"
WX 9249	Cpl	SPARKMAN F C	"
WX 11590	Pte	SPROXTON H Y	"
VX 55735	L/Cpl	STANLEY G H	"
WX 12136	Spr	STRICKLAND G	"
WX 10110	Sig	STUDDY R E	"
WX 9531	L/Cpl	STEWART A	"
WX 9386	Sgt	SMITH A E	"
WX 12428	Pte	SWANN G V	"
VX 54546	Cpl	SERVANTE J	"
WX 10512	Cpl	TAPPER D L	"
WX 10053	Sig	TATAM R E E	"
WX 8257	Cpl	TAYLOR W	"
NX 49771	Pte	THOMPSON J	"
WX 12320	L/Cpl	THOMPSON L W P	"
WX 13481	Pte	THORNANDER E W	"
WX 11994	Pte	THORNTON N D	"
WX 9508	"	THOMSON A <i>missing</i>	"
WX 12592	"	THOMAS G E	"
WX 12281	"	TOWERS T F D	"
VX 28767	L/Sgt	TOMASETTI W E	"
WX 11477	Pte	TIMMS G D	"
NX 57557	Pte	TEAGUE R	"
NX 38729	"	VANDELEUR R G	"
SX 12656	Spr	VEALL J J	"
VX 64221	Pte	VEITCH G J	"
WX 13731	Pte	WALLACE N E	"
WX 13510	"	WALLER F J	"
WX 13118	"	WATSON R W	"
WX 11385	Sig	WADDINGTON R	"
WX 9580	Pte	WALLIS W S	"
WX 8464	Cpl	WALSH A J	"
<del>NX 75530</del>	<del>Pte</del>	<del>WEBSTER L E</del>	<del>"</del>
NX 13382	Pte	WELLER E	"
VX 59518	"	WELLINGS W J	"
WX 13365	"	WHEATLEY M L	"
VX 60836	Spt	WILBY P V	"
SX 12657	"	WILLIAMSON R McK	"
WX 13212	"	WILKES F R	"
WX 13058	"	WILSON G E	"
WX 13371	"	WILLIAMS J B	"
WX 11485	Cpl	WRAY W H K	"
WX 10995	"	WARES A	"
WX 12634	Pte	WARD S J	"
WX 12642	"	WILKERSON R	"
WX 13770	L/Cpl	WILSON R S	"
<del>WX 11951</del>	<del>Pte</del>	<del>WICKS J</del>	<del>"</del>
WX 12279	Sig	WILLIS W E	"
NX 73291	Pte	WALSH V A	"
NX 38769	"	WILCOX E C	"
WX 13749	"	YOUNG D C	"
NX 41843	"	FREEMAN J	"
48987	"	LILYA, D.L.	"
38586	"	LARNEY, RS.	"
VX 58984	"	WEBB, AS.	"
		POMONIS	"

STATEMENT OF QX I7840 WARRANT OFFICER (Class II) FRANK ALFRED CRAIGIE  
C.S.M. No 2 IND COY A.I.F.

NX 48987 Pte LILYA D.L. is known to me personally, he was a member of the first reinforcements to No 2 IND COY and reported ~~xxxxxx~~ with the draft to the Unit; DILI 20 Jan 42.

On or about 25 Feb 42 he was a member of a patrol under the command of Lieut LAFFY, sent out on a recce by Maj A. SPENCE.

I did not hear any more of him until I was informed by Maj A. SPENCE that on 10 Mar 52 he (Maj SPENCE) had met Pte LILYA in company with Pte FREEMAN and had ordered him to report to Capt R. BALDWIN who ordered him to report to GAILAGO which he failed to do. Nothing more was heard of him until he was reported to be moving towards the EAST end of the ISLAND (Port; Timor)

*F.A. Craigie*

W.O.II

Aug 42

ATTACHED

VX 1112727 SMO JASPER, W.R. N.T. FORCE SIGS

V 7553 SMO GOULD, A.G.

NX 7435 CPL GREGG, E.H.

TX 1690 LIEUT HEYWARD, E.

AUST CORPS SIGS CIPHER STAFF

NX 52123 SGT SPEIGHT, S.C.

NX 1099132 CPL FLETT, A.M.

VX 67549 CPL ELWOOD, A.J.

MESSAGE FORM

WX 6490 CAPT G. BOYLAND

12137	LT	COUPLAND	C.D.	IN	CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS
X 2326	S/SGT	WALTON	A.C.	OUT	

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

3993	CPL	JONES	S.J.H.	TO
X 11582	PTE	NEWTON	H.	FROM

12935	-	ROWAN-ROBINSON,	W.H.
12423	-	CAREY	J.W.
11477	-	TIMMS	G.D.
X 65903	SPR	BENNETT	F.W.
48453	PK	CLOUTT	J.
X 26937	SIG.	LIVERSIDGE	E.J.

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS:  
 IN PLAIN OR IN CIPHER  
 IF LABELS TO BE INTERPRETED OR PAID  
 IN THE REPLY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER  
 ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
 PTE McALLUM

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.		SENDER		READER		SYSTEM TIME IN		SYSTEM TIME OUT	
T.O.R.		SENDER		READER		SYSTEM TIME IN		SYSTEM TIME OUT	

*Safe Hand.*

HEADQUARTERS,  
NT Force,  
2 Oct 42.

3485/G/SP.

Headquarters,  
SPARROW Force.

INDEP COY NCO for ATTENDANCE at POTENTIAL OFFRS COURSE  
at INF OFFRS TRG SCHOOL -- BONEGILLA.

.....

1. Att are two copies of Joining Instns in reference to the above.
2. LHQ has granted a further 5 vacancies to the 2/2 Indep Coy for the OTS commencing 21 Dec 42. Thereafter, the intake of potential offrs will be 1 per Indep Coy at each OTS.
3. Arrangements will be made by this HQ to take off the 6 NCOs selected (5 from 2/2 Indep Coy and 1 from 2/4 Indep Coy) towards the end of Nov, thus giving the students time to be out-fitted, granted leave, etc.

*J. Phillipsallen Major*  
for Brigadier,  
General Staff.

9277

ALLIED LAND FORCES IN S.W. PACIFIC AREA

L.H.Q.

N.T. Force ✓  
N.G. Force  
1 Aust Army  
2 Aust Army  
3 Aust Corps

Copies for information to :- "A" Branch, D.M.T., Ind. Coy. Reinf.  
Depot Foster, M.O.L.

INDEPENDENT COY. N.C.O's FOR ATTENDANCE AT POTENTIAL  
OFFICERS' COURSES AT INFANTRY OFFICERS TRAINING SCHOOL  
BONEGILLA.

1. It has been decided to provide seven vacancies at the Officers' Training School, Bonegilla, for suitable warrant and N.C.O's from Independent Coys. on all courses from and inclusive of the course commencing on ~~16 Nov. 42~~ <sup>21 Dec 42</sup>. Courses will commence at regular 5 weekly intervals thereafter as shown on the attached Sheet. This scale provides one vacancy for each company on each course.
2. After successful completion of the course, personnel will be commissioned and drafted to the Independent Coy. Reinforcement Depot at Foster to await subsequent drafting to any Independent Coy. as Reinforcement Officers.
3. This policy is designed to ensure two things :-
  - (a) It will provide a proportion of reinforcement officers with active service experience.
  - (b) It will widen the scope for promotion of warrant and N.C.O's of companies.
4. It would be appreciated if the attached joining instructions could be distributed to the companies, as indicated, under the various commands, and movement of nominated personnel facilitated. While, on occasions, operational reasons will interfere with any regular flow of candidates, the co-operation of formations is expected in ensuring that selected personnel are despatched whenever possible.

Attached: Joining Instructions,  
Table of Dates.

*Arthur Hoare*  
for. Lieutenant-General,  
Chief of the General Staff.

28 Oct. 42.

9277

ALLIED LAND FORCES IN S.W. PACIFIC AREA.

L.H.Q.

2/2	Aust.	Independent	Coy.
2/3	"	"	"
2/4	"	"	"
2/5	"	"	"
2/6	"	"	"
2/7	"	"	"
2/8	"	"	"

Copies for information to:-

(A Branch  
(D.M.T.  
(M.O.I.  
(C.O. Ind. Coy. Reinf. Depot Foster.

Subject:- INDEPENDENT COY. N.C.O's FOR ATTENDANCE AT POTENTIAL OFFICERS' COURSES AT INFANTRY OFFICERS TRAINING SCHOOL - BONEGILLA.

1. Independent Coy. Commanders are advised that provision has been made for the inclusion of Indep. Coy. personnel at Officers' Training Courses of 12 weeks duration at the Infantry Officers' Training School Bonegilla, Victoria from and inclusive of ~~16 Nov 1942~~ with 21 DEC 42 regular 5 weekly intakes thereafter (see attached Table of Dates).
2. D.M.T. has allotted to Independent Coys seven (7) vacancies per intake which have been spread over the seven (7) Independent Coys., now formed, on a scale of one (1) per Coy.
3. Coy. Commanders will regularly dispatch their quota direct to Bonegilla to arrive on the scheduled dates.
4. Coy. Commanders will note that on the successful conclusion of the course, their representative will be commissioned and drafted to the Indep. Coy. Reinforcement Depot at Foster, pending subsequent posting as a reinforcement officer to any Independent Coy. as and when required and in view of this, all gear should accompany personnel on their movement.
5. Nominal roll of personnel selected for each course will be forwarded to reach D.D.M.O, Victoria Barracks, Melbourne and Adjutant-Infantry Officers' Training School Bonegilla Victoria, ten days before commencement of each course.
6. In accordance with para 4 above, the representative forwarded will be placed on the respective Coy's "X" List.
7. Also in accordance with para 4 above, - Coy. Commanders will promote an N.C.O. to fill the vacancy caused by the above action.
8. This H.Q. will draft forward to each Coy. personnel to make up the deficiency in W.E. so caused, at the appropriate time.
9. Candidates may be Warrant and N.C.Os not below the rank of Corporal.
10. As it may not be possible for joining instructions for each course to reach companies before dispatch of selected personnel the following relevant data vide L.H.Q. Instruction 93890, 20 Aug 42; Subject "Infantry Officers" Training School- Bonegilla, No.27 Course for Potential Officers", will be noted:

/(a)

- (a) Travelling: Rail and Steamer warrants and/or tickets will be issued by formations and endorsed "Charge Inf. O.T.S. No....Course \* for Potential Officers".

\* Insert Course Number as per Tables of Dates.

- (b) Arrival: Students from Queensland and N.S.W. will arrive, if possible, at Albury Station at 0715 hrs. on day prior to commencement of Course. School transport will meet these trains.
- (c) Reporting: All students will report to the Adjutant immediately on arrival at the school.
- (d) Accommodation etc.: Accommodation and messing will be provided at the school.
- (e) Pay etc: Pay books will be carried by all Students, and must be made up to date on the last page regarding schools and courses etc. Travelling, etc., allowance for the forward journey will be paid at the school.
- (f) Records - All basic documents will also be carried by Students.
- (g) Clothing, Equipment, Books, etc: The following will be taken to the school by Students:-

Clothing - Uniform (Serge and Drill)

Personal necessities.

Working dress, two suits.

Two good pairs of boots.

- (h) Leave of Absence: during the course will only be granted in special cases, to be approved by the Chief Instructor. Leave at the termination of the course may be granted to Students who have accumulated leave due to them. Such leave will only be granted provided the sanction of the Student's Commanding Officer (this H.Q.) is obtained in writing 14 days before the termination of the course.

- (i) Equipment: Rifle  
Full Marching Order

(It is essential that all Students take a rifle to the course. At previous courses this instruction has not always been complied with.

- (j) Before proceeding to the school each Student should be fully acquainted with the foregoing instructions and handed a copy para 10 above, sub-paras (a-j)

... Attached.. Table of Dates.

*Amstrong R Col*

for. Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Deputy Director of Military Operations & Plans.

6 Oct. 1942.



TABLE OF DATES FOR 5 WEEKLY INTAKE OF NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS NOMINATED TO ATTEND OFFICERS' TRAINING COURSES AT BONEGILLA, VIC., COMMENCING 12 OCT. 42.

---

<del>1st Intake</del>	<del>Monday</del>	<del>12 Oct. 42</del>	<del>Course 27</del>
<del>2nd "</del>	<del>"</del>	<del>16 Nov. 42</del>	<del>" 28</del>
3rd	"	21 Dec. 42	" 29
4th	"	25 Jan. 43	" 30
5th	"	1 Mar. 43	" 31
6th	"	5 Apr. 43	" 32
7th	"	10 May 43	" 33
8th	"	14 Jun. 43	" 34
9th	"	19 Jul. 43	" 35
10th	"	23 Aug. 43	" 36
11th	"	27 Sep. 43	" 37
12th	"	1 Nov. 43	" 38

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9277

ALLIED LAND FORCES IN S.W. PACIFIC AREA.

L.H.Q.

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2/3	"	"	"
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2/5	"	"	"
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2/7	"	"	"
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Two good pairs of boots.

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- (i) Equipment: Rifle  
Full Marching Order

(It is essential that all Students take a rifle to the course. At previous courses this instruction has not always been complied with.

- (j) Before proceeding to the school each Student should be fully acquainted with the foregoing instructions and handed a copy para 10 above, sub-paras (a-j)

... Attached.. Table of Dates.

6 Oct. 1942.

*Am. Doane R. Col*  
for. Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Deputy Director of Military Operations & Plans.

TABLE OF DATES FOR 5 WEEKLY INTAKE OF NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS NOMINATED TO ATTEND OFFICERS' TRAINING COURSES AT BONEGILLA, VIC., COMMENCING 12 OCT. 42.

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8th	"	14 Jun. 43	" 34
9th	"	19 Jul. 43	" 35
10th	"	23 Aug. 43	" 36
11th	"	27 Sep. 43	" 37
12th	"	1 Nov. 43	" 38

---

Le porteur vous dira qui je suis, qu'elle place j'occupe  
et à quel endroit je me trouve.

Ici il y a toutes facilités, soit pour débarquement  
des troupes, soit des munitions et la baie est magnifique  
pour amarrage des grands navires. Dans l'autre port  
tout pareil de mur et aussi à ma connaissance c'est un endroit  
magnifique pour recevoir des élèves, ayant déjà fait ce  
que le porteur vous dira. De ces deux ports il y a de grandes  
routes vers la capitale, passant par Manatuto. Je n'ai pas  
pu parler beaucoup avec G. K. puisque je n'ai pas pu  
lui expliquer pour lui faire comprendre sur les élèves  
d'aller le cas d'un débarquement japonais, ce que je n'atten-  
dais pas, nous avons ici des positions magnifiques pour nous  
battre surtout ayant la facilité de mener les navires ou se  
occ. Avec moi j'ai 3 européens prêts à se battre pour  
notre liberté et disposés à se faire tuer pour nettoyer la  
tâche que cette ignoble neutralité nous a mis dessus.  
Avec moi, j'ai un grand ami qui a déjà rendu des bon-  
services à notre cause et qui a collaboré à cela avec  
Mrs. Ross et Withicar et que par maladie ne se trouve  
pas depuis longtemps parmi vous.

Nous sommes impossibles de nous battre, puisque les flottes  
du gouvernement sont des vieux elox du siècle passé et les  
munitions ratent toujours le feu. Ainsi, et pour une  
plus étroite collaboration, je viens vous demander de bien  
nous vouloir fournir de l'armement pour nous quatre, annu-  
ment que nous paierons tout de suite ou auquel je paierai une  
quittance. Je profite aussi pour vous dire que Van Rigten,  
votre officier hollandais est parti en mission et est revenu dans  
deux mois, je crois bien pas tout seul. Un porte de S.A.F. est à Missoar

spécifiquement à venir pour ici, mais je crois que le caractère  
difficultés bureaucratiques. Le C.F.N. et de vous en  
quitté et en droit pour attendre des instructions du commandement  
dans une localité, à la montagne tout près d'ici.

Vous pouvez croire, au commandant, que vous sommes entières-  
ment à votre disposition pour tout et que j'attends vos instructions  
pour tout ce qu'il faut faire ici. Dans l'autre partie de l'île, comme  
vous le deviez le porter c'est toujours à nous mijer et il y a de  
un champ d'aviation, à Con, que je ne connais pas, mais, d'après ce  
qu'on m'a dit n'est pas du tout mauvais.

En attendant de vos instructions croyez dans ma  
plus étroite collaboration et veuillez agréer, au commandant,  
l'assurance de ma considération la plus distinguée.

TO THE AUSTRALIAN FORCES HEADQUARTERS

TIMOR-DILLY

SIRS,

The world always admired the great love that all Australian people are showing to their children.

It is this kindness towards the innocents that inspired our request, giving us almost the certitude it will be granted.

As a matter of fact in Soibada, a mountainous village of Portuguese Timor, there is the largest educational center of this colony surrounding a catholic church and convent.

Strange enough, but true all the population of Soibada is exclusively of small boys and little girls and of their teachers; these being catholic Fathers and Sisters.

Besides the above people, in Soibada there is not a single foreign inhabitant, not even one Portuguese in charge of the Administration, the nearest one residing at almost thirty kilometres from this and the natives being spread in small villages in the mountains nearby.

So this catholic center has no military, nor political, nor strategic importance whatsoever.

When lately the boys and the little girls were aware of possibility of being involved in the warfare, they were so scared that first we thought it better to close the schools and send them home, but we found it impossible because the largest part of them were orphans.

What to do? We remembered of the brilliant precedent established in SHANGHAI where four years ago the famous general Matsui

ced to the suggestion of Father Jacquinet and set up a neutral zone in Nantao sparing the lives of 300.000 chinese non belligerents, to which all the world responded with a wave of emotion and admittance.

Why not to repeat this experience in a far small scale here in faraway Timor? It is a small group, but a group of innocent children deserving the sympathy of all and we feel sure that the Australian Forces will please their own people in Australia <sup>by</sup> this noble gesture.


Similar request is addressed to the Japanese and Hollan- dish belligerents, asking them to consider the Catholic Convent of Soibada as neutral, and so not approach by all means to this neutral zone.

Will you be kind enough to give us your assurance that the Australian Forces will take the initiative and consider Soibada a neutral zone? Your reply shall be greatly appreciated by us.

Thanking you in anticipation for the consideration you will reserve to our request,

we have the honour to be with the greatest respect

yours faithfully

A large, stylized handwritten signature in dark ink, consisting of several overlapping loops and a long horizontal stroke at the bottom.



SUSU V ATAB

AX 2

IO

A. ARGO from MAROBO to AIN 8/9 Jul

B. (i) TOMO reports Porto information Porto ship OECUSSI reported to bring

SUSU V ATAB

AX 2

IO

A. ARGO from MAROBO to AIN 8/9 Jul

B. (i) Unknown

(ii) TOMO reports Porto information Porto ship OECUSSI reported to bring troops from ALOR to LIQUISA at night (D,3)

TOMO reports Porto information Jap Colonel gone to ALOR (D3)

(b) Unknown

(c) "

(d) Reported this HQ 0805 IO Jul

(e) TOMO reports Porto information three heavy A/A Guns and Search-Light on Drome also three heavy A/A Guns at Lahane (C3)

(f) Porto via own forward OP (TOMO)

C, (i) TOMO reports seven planes bombed and machine gunned Dil (B2)

TOMO reports six planes bombed LAHANE and TBS (AI)

BAYO reports six planes bombed and machine gunned Dil (AI)

(a) six, type not yet reported

(b) Own OPs (TOMO & BAYO)

(c) I720-I745 hrs 9 Jul

D. (i) No reports

(ii) " "

E. TOMO reports appeared three sticks bombs dropped on LAHANE and two sticks on TBS. Fires were started and burned for twenty mins. Planes turned from NORTH and machine gunned RED HOUSE on Knoll at TBS. BAYO reports bombing started large fires.

- A. (i) ARCO arrived AIN 9 Jul  
(ii) (a) CAL - ALBO  
(b) FBI and RAI
- B. (i) Unknown  
(ii) "
- C. (i) ~~NIL~~ } Two Planes reported by KENO flew in a NNE direction over his  
(ii) a. } area .  
(a) two . two engined  
(b) observation of own troops  
(c) 1540 hrs 10 Jul  
(d) A.I.
- (ii) BOLO reports large bomber landed DIL Drome 1100hrs 11 Jul appeared to refuel and took off at 1215 hrs 11 Jul. Came in from Nth-EAST and ~~departed~~ departed travelling WEST (A.I)
- D. No further information
- E. Phone conversation with KENO reveals possibility of planes (ref C i/ii above) being allied

II40

332

A (1) Set out below is the location of the sub-units of the Company at present. Both C and D Platoons are in the process of settling into new areas and their organisations are not as stable as the other Pls. The locations given for D Platoon may be amended when a report now on its way is received. It will be noticed that B C and D have advanced and rear H.Q.s. While A is at present establishing a new H.Q.

SUB-UNIT	NAME OF VILLAGE etc	MAP REF	REMARKS
A PL H.Q.	RITA BAU	08592518	
I Sec	CAILACO	08542517	
2 "	MALIANA	09002514	
3 "	MAROBO	08582521	
B PL H.Q.	SAME	09002541	
	LILETEI	0839 2541	
4 Sec	REMEXIO	08352539	
5 "	LILETEI	08392541	
6 "	REMEXIO	08352539	
C PL H.Q.	SOLOI	08432532	
	BUILIBO	08492535	
7 Sec	-	-	At present at HBI in transit.
8 "	LES MARIE	08382524	
9 "	BOHAK	08382524	) Fwd <del>zk</del> OP at 08342532
	FATU MERUK	08392529	
D PL H.Q.	LETE FOHO	08502525	
	ATSABE	08552524	
IO Sec	ACOMATATA	08462524	) Being checked
II "	RASLIRRI	08452526	
I2 "	MANTASSIE	08472523	
I3 "	HATO BUILICO	08542531	
	NUNAMOGUE	08522530	

B. NIL

C. The two ~~fixes~~ planes observed at approx 1600 hrs 11 Jul have been definitely reported to be single engined enemy fighters by a patrol from SECO which was at FATU BESI at the time. The planes circled low over them and then flew towards DIL.

1. The following replies have been received from BOLO to queries in LI 44/II

(a) The main fire was located at the foot of prominent spur between TIBESSE and LAHANE and reported to be PORTUGUESE ammunition.

Several small fires were started but died out very quickly.

(b) Barracks and W/T station and RED ROOFED HOUSE TIBESSE were NOT hit, BOLO advises that if the R A A F do manage to hit them he will tell the world.

(c) NO buildings at LAHANE were hit.

(d) Twenty minute fires of BAYO were the same as TOMOS fires of short duration

C. BOLO reports from REM two enemy fighters landed DIL drome 1615 hrs planes gave stunning exhibition over DIL 0900 - 0930 hrs 12 Jul and were still on drome 1215 hrs 12 Jul. BOLOs report 13 Jul makes no reference to plane movements so planes still there

1230

A. NIL

B. NIL

C. Two ~~and~~ unidentified planes reported by SECO at GAL and MAROBO flying EAST to WEST over ERM LIQ and FB at 0915 hrs 14 Jul. (A I)

FORO reports one enemy fighter lightly machine gunned ERM at 0905 hrs 14 Jul  
NO casualties, slight damage to Government building (A I)

BAYO forward CP reports at approx 1100 hrs 11 Jul our twin engined troop carrier landed DIL drome, that 12 personnel were taken by two staff cars to DIB and that luggage followed later. At approx 1200 hrs the plane left in westward direction. The fighters referred to in I REPORT 12 and 13 Jul reported by BOLO to be still on drome at 1345 hrs 13 Jul

D. NIL

E. BAYO reports excavations and apparent refilling of holes on the drome on 10 JUL. This is thought to be possible placing or examination of charges on drome, Further details have been asked for

1040

A. BAYO reports 0545 I6Jul No 8 See now mt in area 08392535 with daily patrol contacting BOLO (this map ref is being checked)

C. ADMIN BOE reports planes along coast WEST of DILI far as MOUBARA 2100 hrs 15 Ju  
His reports from BALIBO and probably BAZAR TETE (D 4)  
BAYO and BOLO do not report any air activity.

I055

COPY ONLY

Dear Capt.

Best regards to all. If you need any information from here we are ready to let you know.

Be careful with the situation of your radio station because the Japs trying to localize it.

The Portuguese schooner "Okussi" now in Jap hands and they make already two voyage in the night bringing troops from Allor or any other port near here.

Supose that many troops in Allor give them a visit and have a look.

Best regards to Mr Ross.

Why dont you ask the flyers to destroy the govt. radiostation which occuppyed by Japs and ~~a~~many of them are in that area.

Cheerio.

K7

AS9 working OK?

SUSU V ATAB

V 1

15

C. 1 SECO reports from MALIANA at 1720 hrs 14 Jul 3 planes with silhouette similar to Flying Fortresses flying S.S.E.. These planes were also reported by Port.

(D 3) as having made a recce of FRONTEIRA from MEMO to BECO.

2. BOLO reports at 0910 14 Jul enemy fighters on recce over REMEXIO area.

E. 3. BOLO reports 14 Jul enemy camouflaging houses in TIBESSE; and that information now available that red roofed house on knoll at TIBESSE has many holes in roof but is still being used by enemy.

4. SECO reports from BALIBO several explosions ATAMBOEA area 1000 - 1200 hrs 14 Jul.

SUSU V ATAB

V 2

17

A. FORO has been with the assistance of natives rendering the road GLANO - ERMERA impassable and it is impassable for M.T.

BAYO & FORO are now concentrating on the formation of blocks along the road TIBAR - TOCOLULLI.

B. Nil.

C. BOLO reports 3rd enemy fighter landed DILI drome 0900 hrs 16 Jul. 3 enemy fighters have 20 minute test flights over DILI usually between 0900 and 1000 hrs each day A1.

SECO reports from GAILAGO unknown number of large unidentified planes moving EAST along coast past ATABI 0850 hrs 17 Jul. Heard 12 large explosions from direction of BALIBO and later loud explosions from direction of DILI B3.

D. Nil.

E. BAYO reports from SOLOI loud explosions from direction of DILI 1615 hrs 16 Jul B4.

SECO reports from GAILAGO 1625 hrs 16 Jul loud explosions from direction MAUBARA B4. This is probably same as in BAYO's report.

BAYO reports from forward O.P. :- 1630 hrs 15 Jul, Japs stood to on drome, pilots entered planes and crews manned A.A. defences near large wooden building EAST of drome on NORTH side of road DILI - TIBAR A1.


BOLO reports that enemy movements in DILI indicate that they are keeping all defences particularly those along the sea front strongly manned during full 24 hours. BOLO also reports much enemy activity around TIBESSE A1.

BOLO also forwards without comment the attached note.

ADDENDUM TO C.

PORT. source states 0915 hrs 1 plane flew from DUTCH territory towards DILI. Also states many bombs dropped in ATAMBOEA D4.





- △ TIMOR HUTS OCCUPIED BY JAPS.
- ☼ LIGHT HOUSE
- ⊙ GUN (?)
- ⊞ 4 A.A. GUNS
- ⊙ TREES

A 1. ARCO No 7 Sec now based at 08422526 and commencing on road demolitions work A 1. Details of blocks carried out by FORO on road GLANO VALLEY-ERMERA are :-  
2 small bridges demolished, 1 rock road block, 2 craters, 2 tree road blocks A 1.

The bridge near 3 Spurs camp Map reference 08382529 has been demolished and the wooden remains burnt. A deep stone revetted culvert also demolished between 3 Spurs and NASUTA A 1.

Possible other demolition spots in this area are now being examined A 1.

B. BOLO reports from REM 1230 hrs 17 Jul large party of Japs moved into high country EAST of DILL at daylight 17 Jul. He considers this was to search for his OP in that area and purely local. Am having position watched carefully A 1.

C. II. BOLO reports 1230 hrs 17 Jul 1 fighter left DIL flying westward 1230 hrs 16 Jul 1 fighter landed DIL 0900 hrs 17 Jul. 3 planes now on drome A 1.

E. BOLO reports 0735 hrs 17 Jul that Governor has asked C de P REM to repair road DIL-HER to permit Portuguese vehicles to be moved to BAUCAU.

Explosions heard by SECO BAYO & BOLO 1615 hrs 16 Jul reported by BAYO to be AA guns near drome; this is supported by Porto report to BOLO. BAYO reports guns are located on EAST side of drome NORTH side of road DILL-TIBAR and are retracted below ground when not in use A 1.

Attached to this report is a sketch showing location of AA guns near DIL drome. This information came through FORO from a Portuguese source D 3.

1015

SUSU V AFAB

AX 78

19

A. SECO reports 0614 hrs 19 Jul KBNO's patrol returned to MALIANA 18 Jul.

B. BOLO reports from REMEKI 1515 hrs 18 Jul that enemy moved into foothills EAST of DILI early morning 17 Jul, during the afternoon of 17 Jul these enemy patrols ~~ran~~ returned to DILI. BOLO's OP is still operating A 1 ~~unit~~.

C. ADMIN, BOBONARO advises that during hours 1230-1430 18 Jul 2 silver planes proceeded to SUAI to BECO to SUAI to BEACO and to DUTCH TIMOR D 4. Probably enemy recce.

BAYO reports 0730 hrs 18 Jul 2 small motor boats arrived DILI from EAST A 1. Possibly Portuguese.

E. Map refs :- AUSTRALIAN AERONAUTICAL MAP SHEET C 5,

PRELIMINARY EDITION ONLY AUG 41.

& (b) PRELIMINARY EDITION ONLY AUG 41 REVISED AND REPRINTED MAR 42.

In future these maps will be referred to as :-

AA MAP C 5 AUG 41

& AA MAP C 5 MAR 42 respectively.

~~N13.~~

F. ADMIN BOBONARO informs me that BBC announced that "a small island off the north coast of TIMOR" was bombed approx 15 Jul; name of the island was given and he thought it was KISAR. Can you inform me if one or the other of the islands

KISOE

Map ref 24250811

KISAR

" " 27110804

was bombed by Allied Ai Forces.

The bombing of KISAR island at this stage would play some small part in the plans of this Unit.

Attached hereto are some scraps of paper collected by BAYO in RAILAGO and TOCULULLI on 4 Jul.

1000

SUSU V ATAB

A. Ref map :- PORT TIMOR <sup>AK 95</sup> Scale 1 : 250000. BAYO reports No 8 <sup>20</sup> Sec has forward <sup>u</sup> at 08362533.

B. Nil.

C. BAYO reports 1217 hours 19 Jul 1 small cargo ship in DILI harbour; and reports further 0600 hrs 20 Jul that this ship left DILI heading WESTward 1215 hrs on 19 Jul. Ship was low in water and carrying approx 40 Japanese A 1.

BAYO reports 1217 hrs 19 Jul that the 2 small motor launches (Ref Intel Rpt 19 Jul) were wireless equipped; these left DILI 1200 hrs 18 Jul heading EASTward and keeping close inshore. He reports 0600 hrs 20 Jul that these launches returned to DILI harbour and have not yet been definitely identified A 1.

D. Nil.

E. Ref map AA Map C 5 Mar 42 :- BOLO reports that 2 PORTO sources state that ship OEGUSSI was bombed and sunk near KISAR Island (Map ref 27110804) approx 15 Jul D 4. 1000. By runner.

SUSU V ATAB

AX 106

21

A. Nil.

B. Nil.

C. One low winged white monoplane probably enemy fighter seen from RITABAU MOROBO & AFSABE flying high SSW 1500 hrs 20 Jul - A 1.

ADMIN BOBONARO informs me that five small ships size 150 tons seen from BALIBO heading EASTward at 1530 hrs 20 Jul - D 4.

SECO reports 1600 hrs 20 Jul from GAILAGO one ship seen WEST of ATABAI travelling EASTward - A 1.

Probably this ship was one of the five seen by the PORTUGUESE at BALIBO and the fighter plane reported was the escort.

BAYO reports 0620 hrs 21 Jul that launches referred to in Intel Reports 19 & 20 Jul have been identified as enemy - A 2.

D. Nil.

E. Nil.

1030

SUSU V ATAB

AX 118

22

A. Nil.

B. Nil.

C. BAYO BOLO report small ship enters DILI harbour and tied up to wharf at 0700 hrs 21 Jul. - A 1.

BOLO reports 1300 hrs 21 Jul large transport left DILI harbour heading NE between ATAURO IS and mainland. There is no report of this ship entering the harbour probably entered during the night 20-21 Jul and owing to time required for message from OP to reach W/T Station its presence was not reported to CHQ before it was seen moving out by personnel in the hills further inland - A 1.

D. Nil.

E. BOLO reports large number of dull explosions from direction of DILI heard 1030-1200 hrs 21 Jul - A 1.

0957

A. B. Nil.

C. 1. BOLO reports 1310 hrs 22 Jul :-

a) Small ship in DILI harbour 21 Jul definitely identified as the PORT ship OEKUSSI it departed during the night 21/22 Jul direction unknown. While in harbour it tied up to wharf and unloaded three truck loads of small cases. - A 1.

b) Large transport leaving DILI 1300 hrs 21 Jul also tied up to wharf and unloaded thirteen truck loads of small cases - A 1.

Both the above ships unloaded direct on to trucks. No personnel or bulky stores were discharged - A 1.

It is considered the stores unloaded were rations. These are possibly being transhipped from a base in comparatively close proximity to DILI.

D. Nil.

2.

E. Ref Intel Rpt of 22 Jul. The explosions referred to by BOLO now thought by BOLO to have come from direction of TIBAR. Possibly FORO working on road demolitions - B 2.

3. BOLO reports sound of engines from direction of aerodrome approx 2400 hrs 21 Jul. A 1. Thought to be fighters warming up but no planes took off. Ref Intel Rpt 17 Jul. BAYO's report of stand-to on drome. The above incidents are either :-

(a) Practice "stand-tos"

(b) Stand-to's as a result of unreliable information.

In regard to (b) BOLO reports that before Allied planes arrived in DILI on 9 Jul he knew twenty minutes before that they were approaching from the EAST and he received a running commentary on their departure in that direction. This news was supplied by telephone from the EASTern end of the island.

4. See Appendix "A".

APPENDIX "A"

Following is a list of badges of rank used by ~~Japanese~~ Japanese. The informant is Father MADEIRA, a Port Priest at NATOLIA who had considerable dealing with them, and are probably correct.

COLONEL	- 4 - 5	pointed Gold stars on collar.
MAJOR	- 4 - 5	" " " " Epaulettes.
CAPTAIN	- 3 - 5	" " " "
LIEUTENANT	- 1 & 2 5	" " " "
SERJEANT 1st CLASS.	4	White embroidered stars on collar.
" 2nd CLASS.	3	" " " " "
" 3rd CLASS.		Chinese letters on front of tunic.
CORPORAL (NO CLASS)	2 stripes on arm	Of Chinese letters on front of tunic.
PRIVATE SOLDIER 1st, 2nd or 3rd CLASS.		Indicated by Chinese letters on the front of their tunics.



Reports

There are 2 signals in Baguia  
and Keli Kai which are respectively  
E.R.B.

E.R.K.

It will be used for our planes dropping  
ammunitions. The chefes de posto of those  
two places have prepared the things  
to receive the goods under the in-  
structions of Captain Haoy. I have talked  
with him and he is waiting for a  
message which will give him the  
necessary instructions for the com-  
plement.

The report of Lago is being  
used for communications between  
Kisser and Timor. The chefes de posto  
of Lago is now supplying food  
for the troops in Kisser that are  
short of it.\*

We are expecting troops from  
Kisser and the landing is supposed  
to be realized in Lago. Everything  
is ready to receive them, and the  
facilities shall be given to  
them.\*

\* Herewith am sending to  
you a code of mine in case of  
a landing. This code is in por-  
tuguese and will be always  
addressed to João da Silva. If you  
have any correction to introduce  
please do it as soon as possible  
so to enable me to work.

\* In S. Domingos area precautions have been taken against Chinese who seem to be in permanent service of the Red ball. No Chinese can come to Bauean or leave from this to other places. The administrator of S. Domingos is 100% British.\*

\* In a place of Lautim called Kom, seems to be fit for a good aerodrome. In case you see the necessity of it all the best shall be done to put it ready to receive planes.\*

\* From HERA to all points of the East nice motor car roads connect all the postos of Bauean, Manatuli, and Lautim.\* So you must have the necessary precautions to stop all the coming by land of the enemies, so that in case of a landing at Soga no obstacles or those traps can be on this side.

As you certainly know SUBAO is the best place for you to have a play on those traps but please, you must left back the attention that you have on the portugueses. The administrator of Manatuli is 100% Red ball and he is capable to do everything to help the enemies and to disturb all of our plans. Please, it is a big favour.

for us all, to put a full stop  
in the consideration that you  
have on Portugal neutrality  
for the Red base have none as  
you can read at the end of  
these reports.

Take care with the cars  
that are travelling to Hera  
and back to Madalato cut  
the telephone wire from Hera  
to Manaculo for the admiral's  
trator of Manaculo is inform-  
ing everything to Dili.

Please do your best to  
catch a man called DOMINGOS  
SERQUEIRA (he used to dress as  
an European) for he is a  
spy. I am waiting for him  
for I know that he will come  
to the East to get information.  
Funnis are trying to come to  
this side. You shall know it  
immediately after their arrival.

The administrator of Ma-  
naculo gave order to repair the  
road that connects to Dily and  
is all quite ready with the  
exception of FATUAI'S mountains  
which was left down for it  
belongs to Dily. With this road  
as you already know all

trucks can easily arrive to  
see points of the coast.

"Captain Navy is trying to  
get a radio transmitter from  
Kisser but it seems to me  
that some bureaucratic difficulties  
were arisen and when those  
being overcome it will come  
through Raga. This radio has  
a big engine, and it carries  
some difficulties to transport  
it to this island. Captain Navy  
is at present in Baguia.

People of this side that  
helps the Red base is under  
my eyes and a black list  
is organised for the Justice  
day.

News get from Dili.

"Enemies are waiting for  
a reinforcement of 6 to 7 thousand  
men. \* Against the bombardment  
at Dilly realised by our  
planes, Japs used to stay out-  
of the capital on the surround-  
ings of it (Sabane, Taibense,  
and other places nearby Dili)  
they went to mixense with  
the portuguese in Sabane for  
they know that A.A.F. will

not bomb the positions where  
the portuguese are living. If  
A.A.F. continue to consider  
this kind of neutrality you  
will continue to get trouble.  
The portuguese that continue  
in Dilly must be considered  
also as your enemies for they  
are disturbing all your operations.  
Who wants to live in war zone must suffer  
the same as those who are  
fighting.

The command in chief  
of the Red Ball forces at Dilly  
is now established in Labane  
in a house just below the  
Governor's.

Labane is now really  
occupied by them on  
account of the bombardment.  
Japs have taken the  
control of the portuguese radio  
at Dili, in Taitessi, and they  
are making use of it.

Dilly is now surrounded  
by japs machine guns,  
to stop your attacks but  
unfortunately they poor

soldiers.

I am informed that they are doing all their best to look for me but when my service is not required in this area I shall go to look for them. I know that Chinese of Ruicui's have informed them all I have done to you and this is the reason why they want to Talk with me.

In case you want to communicate with me please send messages to BAUCAU with my proper name addressed on it in an envelope closed.

I will be thankful to you in case you can supply me with any kind of weapon for my defense. I will also be glad if you can give me a passport so to enable me to meet with any of your boys in this area, without

afraid, and for they can  
have trust in me.

Always for the Allies  
Potatoes

P.S.

a letter of the shape de  
post of page is enclosed

Code

1) — Dutch troops arrived  
Picos — patacas diga se  
quire

2) — Aust. or Amer. troops  
arrived  
Costo — palācas diga se  
quire

3) — Parastuis dropped  
Compuji já — picos neli

4) Enemies lausing  
mande — patacas



surprised to hear an artillery piece open <sup>(2)</sup>  
up very close to me, sufficiently close to  
permit me to hear the orders given. I remained  
there until 1600 hours approx and then  
made my way to ROTEL and thence AUTSABE.

B. J. Allen Capt

SLEEP

With the failure of communications it was decided I go to Dutch Timor and there contact the SPARROW force H.Q.

1 Mar. Left V.M. ~~for~~ for HATO LIA. Left HATO LIA 1500 hrs with 4/sqt Tomasetti ~~and~~, Spr Wilby and two Dutch soldiers and arrived CAILACO approx. 1900 hours.

2 Mar. Left CAILACO approx. 0800 hours arrived MEMO approx. 1700 hours. Was surprised to meet Lt. LAFFY and A/sqt McCabe whom I thought were carrying out a patrol around the LETE FOHO (NOVA OBIDOS) area. He informed me that he had been sent there by the Administrator at BOBNARA as being a safe place. His four men had, he informed me, been sent back to Coy HQ at Villa Maria as runners. I instructed him to return to CAILACO the next day, he informed he had been ready to do so that morning but upon being informed by telephone (Lt BURRIDGE at CAILACO) that I was on my way had delayed. We all slept there that night.

3 Mar. I discovered that Lt LAFFY's four men under A/sqt Freeman had come into the town during the night. They had come from DUTCH territory and were accompanied by some fugitive DUTCH soldiers from DILLI. I ordered Lt LAFFY to take the AUSTRALIANS back to CAILACO. Left MEMO <sup>(We were informed there were approx 2000 enemy troops at ATAMBOEA)</sup> <sup>(minus one DUTCH soldier, who unaccountably became ill)</sup> and approx 0900 hours and passed through ROESAN, ASOEMANDE and arrived at LAHOEROES at approx 1900 hours. There was informed by some english speaking catholic priests;

- (i) The fighting in KOEPANG had ceased
- (ii) The AUSTRALIAN and DUTCH troops in ATAMBOEA had been dispersed
- (iii) There were NO enemy troops in ATAMBOEA

P.T.O.

8  
1 Mar. Lt Col van Stratten RNEIA had passed thro' 7  
Atamboea on his way to ATAMBOEA  
With the failure of communications it was decided I go to  
Dutch forces and there contact the SPANISH force H.Q.  
left via HATO LIA @ left HATO LIA 1800 hrs with

1st Lt Tomassetti and 2nd Lt Willy and two Dutch soldiers and  
arrived CALIACO approx. 1800 hours.  
2 Mar. left CALIACO approx. 0800 hours arrived MEMO approx  
1700 hours @ MEMO was surprised to meet Lt LAFFY and  
1st Lt McCabe whom I thought were carrying out a patrol  
around the LETE FOND (KORVA OBIDOS) area @ He informed me that  
he had been sent there by the Administrator at BOBARRA as being a  
safe place @ his four men had, he informed me, been sent back to  
Cap H.R. of Villa Maria as runners @ I instructed him to return to  
CALIACO the next day, he informed he had been ready to do so  
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had come into the town during the night. They had come  
from DUTCH territory and were accompanied by some  
(we were informed there were approx 2000 enemy troops at ATAMBOEA)  
Fugitive DUTCH soldiers from DILLI @ I ordered Lt LAFFY to  
take the AUSTRALIANS back to CALIACO @ left MEMO  
approx 0800 hours and passed through ROSSAN, ~~Atamboea~~  
ASOEMANOE and arrived at LAHOREES at approx  
1500 hours @ there was informed by some english speaking  
Catholic priests;

(i) The fighting in KOBANG had ceased  
(ii) The AUSTRALIAN and DUTCH troops in ATAMBOEA had been  
dispersed  
(iii) There were no enemy troops in ATAMBOEA  
P.T.O.

Later in the evening at the request of the priests we went to a Chinese shop and stopped some looting by DUTCH native soldiers and natives. (2)

4 MAR Moved down track towards ATAMBOEA to place called ILENOMEA, where we received the information from a native that there was an AUSTRALIAN captain with approx twenty troops at the BAOEKAMA River. I sent a message to this officer asking him to ~~come up and~~ bring his troops to me. Then moved to a native village where two DUTCH ~~mess~~ priests had disarmed four DUTCH native soldiers and had forced them to produce the results of the ~~last~~ ~~big~~ previous night's ~~was~~ looting. Confiscated

- 1 DUTCH L.M.G.
- 2 " rifles
- 1 " compass
- 1 " pistol

and ordered the return of the looted material to the shop.

Later one AUSTRALIAN soldier reported to me as a being sent to investigate my previous message. A further message was despatched and that evening Capt PARKER (8 div Sigs) with 7 men arrived at LAHDEROES. Explained position and they agreed to return with me.

MAR ~~Left LAH~~ ← Capt PARKER confirmed statements made by Dutch priests.

5 MAR Left ~~LAHAT~~ Before leaving LAHDEROES Dutch priest again assured me that enemy had NOT arrived at ATAMBOEA as a native had come from there that morning. Left LAHDEROES at approx 0800 hrs and slept that night at RDESAN. Here received message in Malay that there was a message from ~~at night~~ <sup>Australian General</sup> Lt Col Van Stratten for C.O. at native village some miles away. Sent Dutch soldier to obtain it.

6 MAR. 0700hrs left RDESAN and slept that night below CAILACO. Met some DUTCH native soldiers who were making for ATAMBOEA. Informed them of position. All DUTCH, except Lt HORSTING and the few with him, had the idea that ATAMBOEA was the haven all were to make for, and there problems would be solved. Acquired some magazines for DUTCH L.M.G. from these troops. Dutch soldier who had been sent for message had NOT returned.

7 MAR Moved into CAILACO and there met C.O. who was leaving for LOLOTOI to meet BRIGADIER. There heard of actions of A+B Pls in RAILACO and BAZAR TETE areas. It was decided to reestablish platoons in areas centring around

②

C PI. CAILACO, A PI Osokai B PI AINARO with a line of withdrawal through these towns to VILA FILOMENA DA CAMARA, ALAS, NOVA ANADIA, VIQUEQUE

8 MAR Commenced the movement of Coy H.Q. in this direction with despatch of C.S.M. and party to MAROBO O L.Sgt. TOMASETTI with ~~and~~ SPR WILBY with pack team "acquired" on trip to DUTCH Timor moved to HATO LIA with to commence transfer of ammunition to AUTSABE (NOVA DUREM) Instructed Capt Parker to commence efforts to modify existing wireless set 109 ~~Personnel~~ CAILACO used as staging camp for Coy H.Q. ~~and~~ A PI personnel passing through to new area.

So as to enable efforts to be made in communication with AUSTRALIA

Mark

13 Mar Moved to HATO LIA and ~~was~~ arrived half hour after Mr ROSS B.M. Consul in DILLI, who had been sent out by JAP. to inform us of surrender of N.B.I and to request the surrender of COY O Sent message to C.O. stating position and also message requesting attendance of pl. comdrs.

14 15, 16 Mar Remained at ~~CAILACO~~ HATO LIA O C.O. arrived 16 MAR and position discussed and Mr ROSS ~~informed~~ to inform COY would NOT surrender. O Movement of ammunition and stores continued

20 MAR With ~~LT TURTON~~ Capt LAIDLAW, LT TURTON & Sgt A.E. SMITH went by car to LETE FOHO O Capt LAIDLAW remained at LETE FOHO, LT TURTON and self slept at VILA MARIA Sgt Smith collected load of ammunition etc from VILA MARIA and delivered to HATO LIA.

21 MAR Approx 0730 hrs LT Turton and self left to carry out ~~recon~~ observation on DILLI area O Arrived GLANO Valley approx 1130 hours were informed that enemy were at QAILACO O Investigated this and found to be untrue O ~~Slept in QAILACO that night~~ O During night were informed that enemy were coming into area from south O moved about 1/4 mile out of town and slept in scrub.

22 MAR Moved onto to NASUTA and thence to position west of COMORO. Band over looking DILLI O Slept there for night

23 MAR

Spent day observing and ~~that~~ afternoon moved down to native village on banks of COMORO R. ~~at~~ the natives of which had been supplying us with food. There met ~~and~~ one Chinese and one ~~escaped~~ DUTCH native soldier who had escaped from DILI three days previously. These two were preparing a map of DILI showing the location of enemy soldiers, ~~and~~ sentries etcetra.

24 MAR.

That night we were taken across the COMORO R to hill immediately above the aerodrome. ~~During~~ ~~to the~~ Here an O.P. was established and maintained. Owing to the proximity of enemy troops and the possibility of spies our food was brought twice a day from BIDOUKOU.

25 MAR

Chinese man and DUTCH soldier in O.P. supplied details that made possible a plan to destroy all planes on aerodrome at that time numbering nine. Sent message requesting forwarding of ~~of~~ sappers plus fifteen T.S.M. Gns and NO 5 sec. ~~Saw place where~~

~~MAR~~

~~Observation continued. Movement of enemy trucks at n~~  
Saw place where 6 AUSTRALIANS had been prisoners had been bayoneted and their bodies burnt. Intended examining bodies but were prevented by movement of enemy trucks and troops along old AILEU ROAD. Moved from O.P. thinking it had been discovered. Slept in higher ground to ~~not~~ south.

26 MAR

Returned to OP and remained there all day. At night moved back to BIDOUKOU.

27 MAR

~~Contacted~~ ~~Observed enemy on high ground~~  
~~ret~~ ~~await~~ Observed enemy move to high ground on which O.P. established. Two enemy within thirty yards of it but do NOT think they discovered it. Contacted Lts Campbell and Cpl Dook.

28 MAR

Lts DEXTER and MACINTOSH arrived with ~~Hals~~ L/CPL FOSTER and CPL WAIRE. LT TURTON returned to RAILACO to make preparations for

~~Sappers~~ troops moving in to carry out raid  
Plan outlined and long range observation carried out

- 29 MAR. Party returned to RAILACO and discovered that prequired personnel ~~was~~ were NOT coming forward
- 30 MAR. Moved from RAILACO to LETE FOHO (NOVA OBIDOS)
- 31 MAR. Moved from LETE FOHO to AUTSABE (NOVA DUREM)
- 1 APR. Moved from AUTSABE to BOBNARA.
- 2 APR. Had discussion with c.o,
- 3 APR. Moved from BOBNARA to AUTSABE
- 4 APR. Moved from AUTSABE to HATO LIA
- 5 Stayed at HATO LIA, awaiting return of ~~COE~~  
LT COLE and Sgt SMITH so as to investigate reports of native unrest
- 6 APR. Received report from Sgt Smith on his recce of MAVBARA and LIQUICA area and contacts with natives and PORTUGUESE administrator LIQUICA. Forwarded this to c.o. BOBNARA
- 7 APR. Moved all available C PI personnel with some B PI personnel under cpl TAPPER, <sup>the total being approx 35,</sup> down road ~~to~~ RAILACO road to meet enemy who were reported to be making preparations to move along this road. LT TURTON and self went ahead from VILA MARIA and slept that night at ~~two~~ native hut approx half mile south east of CLANO R. BRIDGE  
Saw enemy M.T. at TOCULLULI
- 8 APR. Observed enemy at TOCULLULI and moved up to ridge above there and observed Dwing

Contacted CARDO who was taking patrol towards NASUTA. Attached eight men of No 9 Section to him

to the gathering of natives about us were observed<sup>6</sup>  
by enemy who sent out patrol in our direction.  
Retired to higher ground which was later mortared.  
Continued observation and later moved down and  
slept in CLANO R. valley. There contacted Sgt Smith  
and Cpl. TAPPER. Sent Cpl. Tapper onto NASUTA  
area to join LT CARDY. Approx 150 enemy then at TOCULLULI.

9 APR.

Moved up to higher ground to observe.  
Prepared ambush but enemy patrol did NOT  
eventuate. ~~Was surprised by enemy during afternoon~~  
Party was then LT. TURTON, Sgt SMITH PTE CROSSING  
and self. Were surprised in afternoon by  
enemy ~~to~~ retired quickly, and was disgusted  
to find ~~it was~~ there were only three enemy on  
horses. Returned to area to get enemy but  
arrived too late.

10 APR

Moved back up road - brought Lts BURRIDGE  
and COLE forward from VILA MARIA where they  
had stopped. Established them in ambush position  
on road.

11 APR.

LT TURTON moved down road with sappers  
to establish suitable O.P. on TOCULLULI with  
intention to carry out raid on enemy at CLANO R.  
BRIDGE that night. He encountered enemy  
patrol and dispersed it. <sup>+ Sp March</sup> O/CPL Thompson who was  
~~comm~~ bringing sappers baggage along road  
also encountered enemy and dispersed them  
with BREN gun fire. Reported that there  
were two truck loads of dead taken away  
from this encounter. Enemy brought up  
extra troops but ~~was~~ observed approx 200  
enemy retire from hills at 1700 hours V.O.  
During this engagement enemy ~~to~~ brought into

Total  
number  
of troops  
available  
for these  
operations  
was  
approx  
thirty



operation. artillery and mortars both ineffective. 7.0  
Left Lts BURRIDGE and COLE in position and  
moved back to VILA MARIA for night. ① LT  
TURTON reported that night and later ~~that~~  
LTS BURRIDGE and COLE also reported that they  
had withdrawn. ① Learnt enemy had moved during  
~~MAR~~ night to position below EREMERA and there had  
been considerable enemy activity in FOCULLULI  
and GLANO R. valley.

12 APR In early morning ~~at~~ before dawn sent LT COLE  
to establish O.P. on EREMERA and cover native  
track from EREMERA to VILA MARIA. ① Sent  
LT BURRIDGE to establish O.P. and base for  
raids on road from GLANO R. to VILA MARIA  
① Moved with LT TURTON and PL HQ personnel to  
O.P. above native village ATOORA south east of  
VILA MARIA. ① Discovered LT BURRIDGE at ATOORA  
sent him on further down road. ① Heard  
enemy machine gunning where H.Q. had been the  
previous day. ① Enemy concentrated artillery  
fire on EREMERA in morning. ↗

~~①~~ ~~Enemy moved into EREMERA in early hours~~  
~~of morning.~~ ① LT TURTON and self moved down  
from O.P. and slept at PORTUGUESE house ASMATATA  
north of VILA MARIA

13 APR Enemy moved into EREMERA early  
hours of morning. ① ~~Observed EREMERA in~~  
~~morning.~~ ① Contacted LT COLE in morning and  
(Enemy mortared ridge during morning)  
carried out observation on EREMERA. ① Moved  
down and eat at mid day at ASMATATA. ①  
Natives reported that enemy <sup>patrol</sup> had moved out of  
EREMERA in direction of VILA MARIA. ① Contacted

LT COLE who had NOT been informed by his O.P. @  
Later discovered O.P. had noted movement but  
had not reported and next knowledge was when  
enemy m.g. opened up on VILA MARIA from  
same ridge as their O.P. was on. @ Withdrew  
LT COLE to establish position above VILA MARIA  
@ Moved to ATOORA and slept there.

14 APR Left LT. TURTON in charge and moved towards  
AUTSABE to meet C.O. @ Met Capt Boyland and  
Capt Dunkley explained situation and moved on.  
Arrived AUTSABE approx 2000 hours.

15 APR Remained in AUTSABE (NOVA DUREM) @ Received  
~~APR~~ ~~Moved towards~~ reports from Capt Boyland  
enemy patrols on ridge between ~~enemy~~ VILA MARIA and  
EREMERA and ambush positions arranged on  
road between VILA MARIA and HATO LIA

16 APR Moved from AUTSABE to LETE FOHO  
(NOVA DBIDOS) there learnt enemy ~~removed~~ <sup>had</sup> into  
HATO LIA @ Moved on towards ATOORA  
and met Capt ~~Boyland~~ DUNKLEY  
returning to LETE FOHO @ Capt Boyland had  
intention of moving around to CAILACO  
with platoon. @ Returned to LETE FOHO  
and <sup>Capt Boyland.</sup> contacted XLTS TURTON and BURRIDGE @  
Slept there that night.

17 APR Capt Boyland and self returned to  
ATOORA @ ~~Capt~~ LT. BURRIDGE followed in  
afternoon @ Instructed LT ROSE to establish  
D.P. on VILA MARIA road and if possible on  
EREMERA @ Slept ATOORA that night

18 APR et seq. Reports sent ~~to~~ from LETE FOHO to  
C.O. cover story from there.

5 Apr.

LETE FOHO @ At approx 0230 hrs. Capt Boyland and self ~~at~~ who were sleeping at the posto were informed that Natives had heard ~~the~~ enemy patrols at the river below LETE FOHO @ The sentry was warned ~~to keep~~ and we continued to observe @ At 0345 all personnel were awakened and preparations made to move @ The main body approx 25 under Capt BOYLAND to move to high ground <sup>east</sup> ~~south~~ of LETE FOHO The remainder approx 10 under myself to move to ROTEI @ These bodies moved out under LT. BURRIDGE and CPL MANTLE respectively @ Capt BOYLAND and myself continued to observe but there had NOT been any lights or sounds at all @ We separated at dawn there was NO sight or sound of enemy @ As it was NOT proposed to defend the town owing to the ~~lack~~ lack of ~~means~~ covered means of ~~retreat~~ retreat ~~to~~ the posto had been vacated and this gave the enemy a covered means of entry @ I continued to observe from alongside a chinese shop on the south side of the town @ The natives in the town were fluctuating in a manner which led me to believe that they could see the enemy but they were NOT close @ I then heard a mortar and moved towards the rear of the shop @ I passed an opening ~~to~~ between the shop and an out building and there was immediately bursts of m.g fire which sounded very close and went through the out building above my head @ I then moved quickly down hill @ I took cover in a small re-entrant @ ~~was about to move~~ I heard JAP patrols move along the road just above me @ This quietened down and I was about to have a look about when there were two shots close by and more voices @ I remained there a short time longer and was later

ATAB V SUSU

AX 137

24

A. Nil.

B. Nil.

C. BAYO reports that one of the two ships reported in DILI on 21 Jul carried out shelling practice off ATAURO Island. FORO reports having seen a ship "behaving in a peculiar manner off ATAURO Is" between 0930-1400 hrs 21 Jul. - A 3.

ADMIN BOBONARO informs me, following on further enquiries made by him at my request:

a) CHINAMAN arriving at ATAPOEPOE approx 10 Jul came from MAKASSAR in the CELEBES. D 4  
b) Two ships came into ATAPOEPOE 1000 hrs 21 Jul unloaded approx 200 sick and wounded who were rapidly transferred to ATAMBOEA. Ships left ATAPOEPOE towards WEST at 1700 hrs 21 Jul. D 4.

D. Nil.

E. BAYO reports 0730 hrs 22 Jul :-

a) that one enemy fighter plane kept ticking over continuously on DILI drome - A 1.  
b) Enemy carry out continuous practices at manning AA guns - A 1.  
c) Enemy appear to be training feverishly as though fearing an attack - A 1.

BOLO reports 0820 hrs 23 Jul :-

a) AA guns practicing 1400 to 1430 hrs 22 Jul. - A 1.  
b) Some AA guns located near TIBESSE but exact location NOT known - A 1.  
c) Explasions from guns not very loud and appear to fire clips of five shells similar to BORORS - A 1.

Attached hereto are reports furnished by patrol sent to ATAPOEPOE and referred to in Appendix "A" of Intel Rept 23 Jul.

0950

SUSU V ATAB

AX 150

25

A. FORO reports 1050 hrs 24 Jul that roads :-

(a) LIQUICA-DILI

(b) TOCOLULLI-AILEU

have been closed to MT. Details not available as yet. Demolitions being continued on these roads - A 1.

B. BAYO reports 1347 hrs 24 Jul MG fire near TIBAR 1700 hrs 23 Jul and five men observed on ridge near sea. - A 1. Patrol investigating. Probably enemy carrying out tactical training.

C. FORO reports 1600 hrs 24 Jul that the ship OMKUSSI was observed from BAZAR TETE (Map ref PORT TIMOR 08392523) moving EASTWARD towards DILI between hours 0500-0800 21 Jul - A 1.

C de P BAZAR TETE states OMKUSSI landed cargo. Other ship in DILI unloaded gear including aerial bombs packed in crates - two per crate - D 4. Indicates possible use of DILI as bomber base.

D. Nil.

E. Nil.

0925 R.

SUSU V ATAB

AX 167

26

A. Nil.

B. BAYO's report 24 Jul of MG fire near TIBAR now known to have been patrol of FORO - A 1.

No definite information of cause of action but thought directed at CHINESE trucks which refused to obey order to stop. Full report being awaited.

C. Nil.

D. Nil.

E. Nil.

0950

ATAB V SUSU

AX 183

27

A. BAYO reports 0800 hrs 26 Jul 100 enemy crossed COMORO river at 1600 hrs 25 Jul moving WESTWARD between damaged bridge on road DILI-TIBAR and the brick kilns - A 1. Brick kilns are located on EAST bank of river approx one half mile SOUTH of bridge. He expected attack on 9 Sec and was moving 7 Sec up to support. No further reports to hand and apparently no action took place.

B. FORO advises following alterations to dispositions :-

Sub-sec	No 11 Sec	0842 2526	Village name	FATA GARO
"	" 11 "	0839 2526	"	EREMETA.

C. BOLO reports 1135 hrs 26 Jul one plane took off 1230 hrs 25 Jul headed WESTWARD and did not return; up to time of report only two planes on drome - A 1.

D. Nil.

E. FORO reports that enemy left behind at EREMERA one "motor generator" apparently in good order and now ~~ownerless~~ ownerless. Details are 110 v 5 amp 3 phase - A 1.

It is NOT certain from details forwarded whether it is a motor generator set, an AC motor or an AC generator. Is this desired by SANTA. 1045.

A 1. Standing patrol from SECO leaving early morning 28 Jul for ATABAI. (Ref map PORT TIMOR 1 : 250000 - reference - 0848 2512) This patrol consists of a sub-sec and will carry out the following duties :-

(a) Observation of shipping moving towards DILI from WEST.

(b) Recce of lower LOIS River valley.

Reports will be by telephone through BALIBO MEMO to BOBONARA.

B. BAYO reports 0725 hrs 27 Jul enemy patrol refe red to in Intelreport 27 Jul moved to telephone building at TIBAR (Ref map PORT TIMOR 1 : 250000 - reference - 0834 2529) fired two mortar bombs then moved on down to TIBAR Flats and spent the night in timor huts there. Returned in direction DILI at dawn 26 Jul - A 1.

OP reported enemy seen and scattered shots heard in the vicinity of PORTUGUESE house NORTH OF ROAD DILI-TIBAR and WEST of COMORO R iver (approx map ref 0833 2531) A 1.

Natives from BIDOUKOU (approx map ref 0835 2531) reported that many JAPANESE slept in the vicinity of the COMORO RIVER BRIDGE and werestill there on the morning of 26 Jul. - E 3. This was not confirmed by BAYO's OP.

Whole manoeuvre possibly due to enemy idea that AUSTRALIANS proposed an attack on their temporary bridge over the COMORO River..

C. BOLO reports 1130 hrs 27 Jul one enemy fighter returned to DILI from the WEST 1330 hrs 26 Jul; at time of report there werex three planes on the drome - A 1.

BAYO reports 0700 hrs 28 Jul three enemy fighters on drome in the same positions as reported 18 Jul - A 1.

D. Nil.

E. FORO reports 1510 hrs 27 Jul that demolition of road DILI-LIQUICA at TIBAR was NOT successful, but has cratered the road further WEST and is hoping that sea action will assist in closing road - A 1.

Ref Intel Report 27 Jul FORO reports that the generator at ERENERA now proved to be useless - A 1. 1015 R.



ISU W ATAB

A. Nil.

B. Nil.

C. BOLO reports 1300 hrs 28 Jul the enemy fighters wing tip to wing tip and facing EAST in a position SOUTH of road DILI-TIBAR and approximately SOUTH of oldhangar which is on WEST side old aerodrome - A 1.

BOLO reports 1500 hrs 28 Jul while mechanics were working on one of the fighters on the drome it caught on fire at 1300 hrs 28 Jul and was destroyed - A 1.

SECO reports 0930 hrs one plane heard from CALLAGO in direction of ATAMBOEA at 0750 hrs 29 Jul - A 2.

ADMIN BOBONARA states that C de P BALIBO saw one plane flying very high in an EASTWARD direction towards DILI approx 0755 hrs 29 Jul. Plane unidentified - D 3.

D. Nil.

E. Nil.

1020 R.

Australian Military Forces - 29  
District - AK 215

Head-Quarters

Please quote this number when replying.

A. Nil.

Ref map PORT TIMOR 1:250000

B. BAYO reports 0850 hrs 29 Jul ~~the~~ the enemy movement on 25/25 Jul that he considers now that the movement was NOT directed at his position but was part of a regular move by the enemy out of DILI at night to miss any bombings that may be coming, and return at dawn. He reports that considerable number of enemy sleep at :- (a) Arab house on SOUTH side of road DILI-TIBAR and approx half way between aerodrome and COMORO River - A 1.

(b) Sheds and houses at brick kiln close to COMORO River (Approx map ref 0834 2532) - A 1.

BOLO reports 1320 hrs 29 Jul that between 0830-0845 hrs 29 Jul enemy shelled his OP at DARALMI (Map ref 0834 2537) with light artillery located at TIBESSE - A 1. No casualties and OP still operating. This activity also reported by BAYO.

C. BAYO at 1545 hrs 29 Jul confirms that at 1300 hrs 28 Jul one fighter plane burst into flames and was completely destroyed - A 1.; he further reports that the other two planes were moved from the danger area but later returned to their original positions - A 1.

BOLO at 1845 hrs 29 Jul has forwarded correction to information passed on in AX 223 of 29 Jul. Corrected information confirmed by BAYO at 1545 hrs 29 Jul is :- Additional fighter plane landed DILI 0840 hrs 29 Jul thus replacing the one destroyed by fire - A 1.

1210 hrs 29 Jul the three fighters took off and headed in the direction of KOEPANG. So that no planes on drome upto time of reports i.e. 1845 hrs 29 Jul - A 1.

SECO reports 1230 hrs 29 Jul that one large unidentified bomber plane was seen from GAILACO at 1145 hrs flying approx from DILI to ATAMBOEA - A 1.

Probably the three enemy fighters took off to deal with the large plane which may have been an Allied recon plane (See sub paras (a) & (b) of next para).

ADMIN BOBONARA advises that on 29 Jul :-

- a) The one plane sighted morning 29 Jul was AUSTRALIAN and dropped 12 bombs in DILI.
- b) The three sighted in the afternoon 29 Jul were also AUSTRALIAN and bombs were dropped on ATAMBOEA.
- c) The number of enemy troops in ATAMBOEA has been increased.
- d) At 0600 hrs 30 Jul he reported to C.H.O. that one steamer similar to OEKUSSI

SUSU V 4148

AX252

31

A. Nil.

B. Nil.

Head-Quarters  
Darwin

Please quote this number when replying

--	--	--

C.I. BOLO reports 1900 hrs 30 Jul the following air activity at DILI (Serials 1 to 7 incl - A 1).

<u>SERIAL NO</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>BOLO'S REPORT</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1.	1100	Three fighters landed and took up usual positions.	
2.	1400	One twin-engined bomber from WEST landed.	
3.	1407	Twin-engined bomber took off heading NORTH WEST. Plane mentioned in Ser 2 and 3 is thought to have been carrying an important personage as the flag at the aerodrome was flying whilst the plane was on the drome.	
4.	1435	Two fighters came along the coast from the EAST passed over DILI and continued towards WEST.	
5.	1445	One fighter from EAST landed on drome.	
6.	1500	Plane in Ser 5 took off.	
7.	1500	Three fighters still on drome.	

A considerable number of other reports of aircraft movements were received but are rather confused, probably owing to :-

- a) Lack of accurate timepieces.
- b) Height at which most of the aircraft were flying.

The information is arranged chronologically below :-

<u>SER NO</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>OBSERVER</u>	<u>OBSERVER'S REMARKS</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
8.	1045	G de P BALIBO	Two large planes - direction not stated.	Probably refers to Ser 1. D 2.
9.	1300	SECO - GAILACO	Two planes flying WEST - EAST.	Probably refers to Ser 2.
10.	1320	G de P BALIBO	One large plane flying WEST - EAST.	Do. D 2.
11.	1400	SECO - GAILACO	One plane flying EAST - WEST.	Probably refers to Ser 3.
12.	1440	G de P BALIBO	Two planes flying EAST - WEST, very high.	Probably refers to Ser 4. D 2.
13.	1450	SECO - MEMO	One large dark coloured plane flying EAST - WEST.	Probably refers to Ser 6. A 2.
14.	1455	SECO - GAILACO	One plane flying EAST - WEST.	A 2. Do.
15.	1500	SECO - MALIANA	One plane flying EAST - WEST.	A 2. Do.

Reports of aircraft movements on 31 Jul commence with :-

<u>SER NO</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>OBSERVER</u>	<u>OBSERVERS REMARKS</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1.	0600	G de P BALIBO	Five planes flying WEST - EAST.	D 2.
2.	0630	SECO - GAILACO	Five planes flying WEST - EAST. Thought to be two fighters and three bombers.	A 2.

D. Nil.

E. Appendix "A" gives information reported by FORO regarding enemy badges of rank.

1050 R.

WAS SIGHTED OFF BATUGADE moving from EAST to WEST. At 1000 hrs 30 Jul he further reports that this ship had entered ATAPOEPOE. Does not know if the cargo was troops or stores.

Reference to (a) and (b) consider the explanation given above is correctx and the PORT have confused the shelling of BOLO's OP with air activity.

Reference to (c) it is possible and may be connected with (d).

(d) Probably correct.

1010 R.

APPENDIX "A"

The following further information re the enemy has been obtained from the C de P at ERMERA.

(i) Personnel did not wear any colour patches indicating units but wore little strips of linen which had on them JAPANESE characters. The significance of these was lost on him.

(ii) Badges of rank :- (a) Serjeant - none noticed but carried swords.  
(b) Lieutenant - Two gold bars on epaulette.  
(c) Captain - Three " " " "  
(d) Three stars on a red badge worn over the right breast pocket were noticed on officers and soldiers alike and probably indicate service badges.

(iii) Arms :- (a) All carried grenades even the Commander.  
(b) Soldiers with a mixture of swords, knives and rifles; some only knives.  
(c) Officers carry pistols in addition to grenades. (Other sources state that in DILI NOT all officers carry pistols but all have swords).  
(d) Artillery personnel do not carry arms.  
(e) Cavalry not seen with arms but known to possess them.

(iv) Grenades - when throwing these enemy seen to manoeuvre with string and a screw driver or some other tool.

(v) Clothing worn was very varied, some having DUTCH trousers and others PORTUGUESE clothing.

(vi) All sources state that JAPANESE marines are of exceptionally high standard when compared with ordinary troops, they appear well trained, well disciplined and with high moral code.

(vii) The maximum number of artillery pieces in ERMERA at any one time is not definitely known, but is thought to be seven.

2. On 11 Jul information was received by Coy HQ that a CHINESE had landed at ATAPOEPOE in a small boat; he was purported to have come from the CELEBES. A patrol sent to ATAPOEPOE failed to contact the Chinaman but elicited the information that he had been questioned upon his landing for some hours by the JAPANESE and eventually allowed to proceed to his family reported to be living between ATAMBOEA and HALILOELIK.

Information has now been given by the PORTUGUESE Infirmary at BALIBO that he has spoken to a rich CHINESE named TOG O SING who landed recently at ATAPOEPOE from SOUREBAYA in a small boat and who was questioned by the JAPANESE and eventually allowed to proceed to ATAMBOEA.

It appears certain that the two gentlemen are one and the same.

The following information is gathered from the informant :-

- (i) The enemy possess only the coast line of JAVA.
- (ii) Organised guerilla warfare is still in progress there.
- (iii) The CHINESE heard from a reliable source that the JAPANESE had sent Engineers to the BALIK PAPAN oil fields to repair oil fields. They had it working for one day, when the R.A.A.F. bombed and destroyed it again. The JAPANESE have now abandoned the field.
- (iv) DUTCH scorched earth policy was very successful.
- (v) Acute shortages of petrol were noticed in SOUREBAYA and in ATAMBOEA and ATAPOEPOE. Restrictions on the use of petrol are in force in these places.

REF. SLAUGHTER.

Mape,  
1 AUG 42.

Dear Bern,

Below are my reminiscences of the great battle of GRADE LAU, which I think is the name given to the locality by the natives. You can modify its sensational tone if desired.

For some days before the night of 3/4 MAR 42 A Pl was dispersed in section positions over approx 1 1/2 miles of the big ridge SOUTH of RAILACO. On the morning of 3 MAR it was reported to Capt BALDWIN that a large party of Japs was at BOIBAO. Cpl PALMER was despatched with a party of 5 men to O.P. this body of the enemy. Soon after the departure of Cpl PALMER it was reported that the Japs had attacked Lieut NISBET'S section on KOOT LAU, near BAZAR TETE. Almost at the same time Japs were reported in RAILACO.

In the early evening of 3 MAR a conference of section ~~leaders~~ leaders was held in which L/Sgt DENMAN took the place of Lieut DEXTER who was absent on recce duty behind DILLI. The following dispositions were then made:- 2 section, under Lieut MCKENZIE, to guard the approach from KOOT LAU at the WEST end of the ridge; 3 section, under Lieut TURNER, to guard the approach from RAILACO at the EAST end of the ridge; 1 section, under ~~L/Sgt DENMAN~~ L/Sgt DENMAN, and Pl H.Q., under Capt BALDWIN, in the centre to be in reserve.

Soon after daylight on 4 MAR many heavy explosions were heard from the general direction of TOCOLULLI. Then followed reports from 1 section that enemy could be seen advancing up ridge from RAILACO, and from 2 section that approx 60 enemy were advancing from the WEST end of the ridge. Orders were sent to 3 section warning them of the approach of the RAILACO party and to 1 section to be ready to move to support 3 section if necessary. After the despatch of these orders Capt BALDWIN moved Pl H.Q. to the support of 2 section.

When he arrived at 3 section's area Japs could be plainly seen advancing along a track about 800 yards away. Our troops were rapidly put into positions on the hilltop above the track along which the Japs were moving, with 2 section flanking and Pl H.Q. enfilading at a range of 150 - 200 yards. Almost as soon as these dispositions were complete, came the first burst of concentrated fire against the Japs. As far as our troops could see half a dozen Japs were killed immediately, and a similar number in the half hour sniping duel which followed. Native reports however put the enemy's casualties as 31. Our own were nil.

No contact being possible between 2 section and H.Q. during the firing, the skirmish was broken off at discretion some half hour after the commencement. 2 section then retreated to the EAST along the ridge, H.Q. to the NORTH, into places of concealment. During the day of 4 MAR there was much movement of Japs on the ridge and our own men lay in successful hiding, save for a few chance meetings between individuals and the enemy. From these encounters our men all escaped.

During the night of 4 MAR the movement of our sections to the SOUTH began, independently, according to prearranged plan. No casualties were incurred.

*R.R. Baldwin. Capt.*

KEEP YOUR MOVEMENTS SECRET

9. The points I desire to emphasise to you, sir, that they may be impressed upon others are the following:-

- (i) This force is NOT capable of successfully defending the area we occupy against a determined enemy attack.
- (ii) This force is NOT capable of successfully holding any one point against a determined enemy attack.
- (iii) This force is NOT capable of successfully supporting, in the event of an enemy attack, an organisation which includes any quantity of non-fighting personnel and/or stores.
- (iv) The enemy has adequate troops, armaments and powers of concentration to carry out a successful attack upon certain parts of our area.

10. The above points are, I know, well known to you but I consider it wise that they be repeated so that in the event of an enemy attack there will be no surprise if the above events occur.

11. My prime interest at present is on the LOIS VALLEY area from which the most pressing enemy threat exists. The town of CAILACO is held by twenty men and it is inevitable that the enemy will attack this point; when he commences his operations to open the DILI - KOEPANG ROAD. The orders issued to all forces in this area include those to go into operation in the event of such an attack and it is anticipated that the harassing of the attacking force will greatly reduce its speed of movement but will NOT prevent it. Should the enemy occupy CAILACO the threat to BOBONARO will be great and imminent and its effect will be felt by the whole force, as BOBONARO is the focal point for the area we occupy.

For this reason I desire all the support possible in this area.

12. Of particular value would be air support in:-
- (a) Reconnaissance
  - (b) Bombing of selected targets

WRITE ON BOTH SIDES

13 Apr 42.

*Patrol activity on both sides in E area.*

GENERAL

*Uneventful.*

*Jap men at EREMERU*

H.Q. "A" "B" Pls. Remain in areas. "C" Pl. Patrolling.

14 Apr 42.

*C.C. moved to ATSADE*

GENERAL

*A* patrol of "C" Pl. fired upon a patrol of Japanese at a range of 1000 yds; no casualties observed.

H.Q. "A" "B" Pls. Remain in areas. "C" Pl. Patrolling.

15 Apr 42.

GENERAL :- A patrol under Lieut Cardy attacked and almost entirely destroyed a party of Japanese engaged on road work near NASUTA/. There were no losses on our side.

H.Q. "A" "B" Pl. Remain in areas. "C" Pl. Patrolling.

16 Apr 42.

GENERAL :- *ex* Uneventful.

H.Q. "A" "B" Pls. Remain in areas. "C" Pl. Patrolling.

17 Apr 42.

GENERAL :- Uneventful. *C.C. moved to L.F.O. Japs occupied NATALIA*

H.Q. "A" "B" Pls. Remain in areas. "C" Pl. Patrolling.

18 Apr 42.

GENERAL :- Four men under Lieut Rose attacked and destroyed 1 Japanese truck and 12 men near VILA MARIE. Nobody hurt on our side.

H.Q. "A" "B" Pls. Remain in areas. "C" Pl. Patrolling.



TO LT-COL SPENCE  
 CO. SPARROW FORCE  
 PORTUGUESE TIMOR.

REPORT BY MAJ GJ LAIDLAW ON THE PRESENT FIGHTING EFFICIENCY  
 AND GENERAL PHYSICAL CONDITION WITHIN NO 2 FLIGHT IN COY.

SUMMARY

I consider it essential to bring to your notice the conditions at present existing within this unit. The boy has been in the tropics for over 12 months, and for nearly 9 months of that time they have been waging a guerrilla fight with a Japanese force at least ten times greater in numbers.

It must be obvious that this type of warfare is most exacting and strenuous to the smaller force, entailing as it does, continuous patrolling over very mountainous country, a permanent and full time state of watchfulness and alertness to prevent being wiped out by larger enemy forces, combined with the frequent inability of troops to secure ample supplies of food.

It will be seen from this, that for the successful prosecution of guerrilla war, under conditions existing on this Island, all troops must be in first class physical condition, must be steady and have plenty of nerve, and must be able to travel and fight on a minimum amount of food.

The unit has done all this. For nearly nine months troops have been more or less on the move continuously with their periods of rest broken by irregular sentry duty and stand to at dawn, and the food supply often miserable and rather scanty.

These conditions however have taken their toll, and the present physical condition is generally much lower than the average observer would realise.

In recent months there has been a noticeable increase in minor sickness such as stem complaints, tropical sores, recurrent malaria etc, which has considerably lowered the fighting efficiency of the unit. Our strength at present is approx 250 all ranks plus 80 attached personnel from Roefany units, but I greatly doubt if the present fighting strength would exceed 200 including attached.

all platoons are at present commanded by Lieuts instead of Capt's and at least 6 sets are commanded by NCO'S instead of Lieuts which is not altogether satisfactory and does not assist towards getting the maximum efficiency within the unit.

Fighting equipment is in good order but boots and clothing are in poor condition, despite the arrival of fairly regular supplies from AUSTRALIA which, due to difficulties of transport and distribution, always leaves some troops short of this equipment.

Therefore I wish to stress the fact that the present physical condition of the men and thereby the fighting efficiency of this unit, is considerably below standard. I consider it most necessary that it be recommended this unit be given an opportunity to rest the men thoroughly, reorganise and re-equip at the earliest possible date. Should this opportunity be given it is certain that large numbers of the personnel would have to be taken off strength as physically unfit, but there would still remain sufficient officers and men to enable the boys to build up again to a seasoned and efficient fighting unit.

I know there are some who will say this report is a "squeal" and that we can't take it, but on the other hand unless higher commands are given the true facts, they will retain the impression that all is well with this unit.

Therefore I have endeavoured to give a true accurate account of the actual conditions of the troops in general and of the unit in particular. I hope that you will see fit to pass the information on to those who should see put completely in the picture.

DETAILS

1. Physical condition. As previously stated the physical condition of the men is very low. Many men are now making as fighting soldiers and even those men still fit for duty have not the stamina to maintain activity of a strenuous nature. One platoon who recently organised a platoon action could only put 40 fit men on the job. This platoon has a nominal strength of 67. On a recent visit to a subsection operating in a forward area it was found that 44 out of 91 men were unfit for duty owing to an attack of malaria.

These cases are cited to indicate the conditions existing throughout the unit. The present state of physical fitness can be attributed to the following main causes:-

(A) FOOD. The staple diet during the last 9 months has consisted of rice, sweet potatoes & pumpkin. During the last couple of months fruit, egg & milk have been practically unobtainable in all areas. Supplies of sugar, cheese, etc from Australia have helped considerably, but transport difficulties prevent this supply from ever becoming of more than a supplementary nature.

(B) REST. No facilities exist on this Island, where troops can be rested & whenever troops may be it is impossible for them to fully relax, for at all times they must be fully alert and maintain a constant watch against enemy moves in their direction. This continued strain on their men has had effects, as many good soldiers are now showing signs of "nerves".

(C) MALARIA. Approx 95% of this boy contracted malaria during the first few weeks on the Island. During the dry season, malaria has been kept remarkably well under control, although there are many men who suffer from recurrent attacks of this fever. During the recent rains which are a prelude to the wet season there has been a noticeable increase in the number of men suffering from recurrent malaria and it is considered that when the wet season starts in earnest, the wet conditions will increase the number and frequency of these attacks to a considerable degree.

CONCLUSION

It is quite clear that the morale of this unit remains at a very high level. The men know they have a job to do and are doing it to the best of their ability, but they lack the pep and drive so essential to this type of warfare.

Therefore in justice to the men, I hope that every consideration will be given to the suggestions outlined in this report.

ALFRED PORT TIMOR 2 NOV 1942

(Aga) Geraldau, Maj.  
OC. No 2 AUST INDEP COY.

A96

HQ. SPARROW FORCE,  
PORTUGUESE TIMOR.

5 NOV 1942

HQ.

NORFORCE,  
DARWIN.

REPORT BY OC. C PL. NO 2 AVST IND COY.

Herewith report by Lieut MCKENZIE, recently appointed  
to command C PL, NO 2 AVST IND COY, submitted to MAJ G.G. LAIDLAW  
OC. NO AVST IND COY.

IN submitting this report MAJ LAIDLAW states  
inter alia

" This report will give you some idea of difficulties  
LIEUT MCKENZIE is experiencing

" As a result I have ordered him to rest all the men,  
as far as possible, and just maintain protective patrols  
between MIN and MBS with the few fit men available

" These conditions exist in the other PIs, but  
on a smaller scale. O.C. B. PL - NO 2 COY - is having great  
difficulty in feeding his Pl in forward areas where Japs  
recently operated.

" Consider it essential that the situation be  
clarified as soon as possible. If there is no chance of the  
men being rested in AUSTRALIA they should be moved from their  
present areas and rested in the EAST end of  
PORTUGUESE TIMOR where the food would be better, although  
there may not be any more rest there for them. But it  
should be an improvement on their present location."

(Sgd.) G.S. Laidlaw, Maj  
OC. NO 2 AVST IND COY

C.PL. NO 2 AUST INDI COY.

LIEUT CAMPBELL collapsed at about 1700 hrs 10 OCT and was unconscious for a couple of hours. His shoulder seems to be giving great trouble and he has been walking with much pain for a few days. Really Sir, the health of these men has got me beaten. Apart from their morale being worse than other Platoons, so is their health. All except four NO 9 Section men are absolutely settled, since their return. CPL RITCHIE who was with NO 9 Section has come to me and says he does not feel able to keep up let alone lead his men and desires to revert to the ranks. CPLs WALSH and CONNOR and CPLs WILSON and DUNWOODIE are also on the sick list. All men are suffering from diarrhoea and about 10 men have had bilious attacks lasting some days. I have had other complaints about dizziness and have noticed myself being dizzy in the early morning.

The R.A.P. cpl is sending a report to the M.O. by Lieut CAMPBELL today. I am wondering whether a few nig bodies have polluted the water here, but to date have only discovered one skeleton.

If NO 5 Section can keep an ~~eye~~ eye on MOABISSE - TURISCAI the following is my plan. Turn TUTULORO into a place for rest and spell as many men as I can, making sure all do a quinine - atebain course. Combine all fit men to make a section for Lieut ROSE - or rather have two big sub-sections under CPL LAWSON - DOOK and CPL TAYLOR with Lieut ROSE over the two. Get my Ha. into a reasonably safe place, somewhere where it is dry, and try by good feeding and a minimum of patrol work to get these fellows on the road to something like a work while show, which is more than can be said of it at present.

Hope I have explained briefly enough.

(Sgt) C.F.G. McKenzie, Lieut.

3 NOV 42

# Australian Military Forces—7th Military District.

Please quote this number when replying.

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St 5836

Head-Quarters,  
Darwin.


2 IND COY  
TIMOR

15 Jul 42

To/  
C.O.  
SPARROW FORCE

The attached statement of information gleaned from Portuguese in the HATOLIA - RUMERA area upon the re-occupation of that area is forwarded to you to enable its prompt despatch to higher authority.

It is hoped to obtain additional information of more military value by further and more careful questioning.

  
Capt  
ADM COMMAND 2 IND COY

Report on Recent Visit to ERM and HAT

Between the 10th and 12th July a visit was paid by myself to C de P. at HAT and ERM. On the 10th I arrived at HAT and had a very good reception compared with what previously tended to the 2 AIC in our first visit some three months ago. I believe this change is caused to a great extent by the associations with the C de P. at ASB. He talked freely re Japanese visit but through lack of an interpreter much information was lost. Those stories which were understood are enumerated below.-

1. Two patrols went to ABI

- a. 22 Cavalry
- b. 45 Infantry

Time and dates indefinite.

2. That 22 Japs laid in wait for Australians visiting Bazarr approx. three weeks ago for many hours they were armed with 3 pistol machine guns. Came from ERM via FBI.
3. Japanese remarked that they found traveling and fighting difficult once away from roads.
4. C de P. remarked upon poor type physically and mentally of the soldiers this was supported to great extent by the medical attendant at TAL.
5. That only two visits were made to TAL once by 10 men from HAT and once by approx. 30 men in motor trucks.
6. That on ly five days rations are given to patrols moving out on a stunt similar to the movement to HAT.
7. All medical gear including surgical instrument were taken by Japs.

He gave me his personal opinion that he believed in Aug when the river permits a movement of troops will take place from MBR to ATB leaving Portuguese territory deserted. He is of the opinion that ABI is a key point in the area and would be ideal to garrison and use as an O/P.

I arrived at HI PU on the night of the 11th and contacted Antonio Cavaleiro the Porte there. He renewed the invitation that his house was open to any troops at any time. This gent you may remember fed BOLO's PL whilst moving through. Most of his stories were confirmed on the 12th by the C de P. at ERM. He did offer to point out the four Chinese spies remaining in ERM, and I personally think that his accusations have good foundations as he remained at his post visiting ERM many times. His standing with the Chinese and Timore in the area is very good.

I found the C de P. extremely relieved with the departure of the Japs. His captivity lasted three months and of this time seven days were spent in prison and the remainder under careful observation in a Timor hut above the Church. I believe he is most sincere in his desire to help us in every way possible, as he stated ERM is not a food producing centre but anything that he could possibly get would be made available to us. Some of the following stories may be of interest but many of them are only confirmation of previous reports. It must be appreciated that with his desire to spill everything he knew in such a dam hurry the interpreter could not keep up and not wishing to make it appear that I was applying third degree such information was lost. Following is the list.-

1. A Major was shot dead at ERM at 1900 hrs on the 17th April whilst on sentry rounds. At this time only a skeleton crew remained at ERM owing to the movement to HAT on the 16th April.
2. That the MAJ was boiled in a 44gal. drum until well stewed his bones were removed burnt and the remains casked in cement borrowed from the C de P.
3. That after an action wounded and dead are taken back without observation by fellow troops and those suffering from broken bones are machined gunned and buried sometimes whilst still kicking. This report was confirmed by INOCUSHI in a conversation with the C de P. who has not actually seen this but has had the information passed to him by the Chinese. The Porte from HI PU confirms this.
4. C de P. and secretary state ERM was used extensively as a convalescent centre for malaria cases from DIL.
5. There were two young Japanese interpreters who learnt the Portuguese language in BRAZIL. These two did not bear arms and were quite likeable boys utterly sick of war and very homesick. Many conversations were passed when officers absent and they freely admitted the soldiers' intense dislike for mountain fighting. Likened the Australians to monkeys with human faces who sprung from the ground fought and jumped back again.

6. The C de P particularly noticed that the Jap troops discipline was gained by terrorism and many times he saw soldiers when questioned by superiors shaking all over.
7. The Japs know that certain stores were buried in VM - ASMATATI area and made C De P summon chief native of the area to ERM. They offered ~~him~~ 40 Patacas to any Timor who returned any of the stores this brought no results so they increased it to 400 and lent them picks shovels etc. The chief native saw the Cde P said he knew where it was but did not wish to bring it in the Cde P advised to leave it there so the native kept the picks etc and hit the trail. The Japs were rather annoyed about this so went out and shot two women and one old man.
8. When Timors were used for road work picks and shovels disappeared in a similar manner.
9. INOCUSHI was extremely annoyed with the results of our mine laying and cursed to great length when the truck was destroyed and later when one major and some men were blown up. This major's death seems authentic as the troops were made to file through a room and sight a heavily flowered table believed to surround the remains. INOCUSHI does not like hill fighting and by his manner, says the C de P, shows he is rather frightened. He also hates AUST. hand grenades after the ATO incident when Lieut. Johnie (Presume LIEUT Rose) pitched one in an OOMA. He told C de P that 400 soldiers perished since they left DIL and went to the hills after the AUSTRALIANS whom he admitted were good soldiers.
10. IN the VM truck incident when "Lieut Johnie" staged an ambush 2 officers and many men were killed.
11. The Japs questioned him re an aerodrome at MAPE which was used for conveying stores to AUSTRALIANS.
12. He enjoyed a hearty laugh when even after his advice the Japs heavily mortared for half an hour a native totem pole above ERM.
13. A small wireless was discovered by a Timor between TOC and ERM and sold to the Japs for 5 Patacas also with it was a small battery. I can pick the native up any time he lives at LFO.
14. 5 Timors and 1 Chinese were shot before Japs departed. Personal belief the China knew too much as he was recognised as pro-Jap before.
15. Stated that dead were buried in the trenches. Did not investigate as trenches were partly filled by rotting refuse.
16. Stated that two officers and ten men perished during RAAF bombing.
17. Posto and outbuildings left like a pig sty with straw in places 1 metre thick.
18. The commander was a Colonel. No name given.
19. Two Vickers were mounted for A/A.
20. On night of arrival things were terribly disorganised. Very few guards and much equipment lying about. He stated an attack by a few would have caused a panic.

On looking over ERM I found that the school-house was surrounded in well placed trenches which covered most approaches to the town. Near Posto were 5 bayonet standards only one appeared to have been used. Above the town were a line of trenches (did not inspect them.) Machine gun positions and knife rests were placed on main entrances. China shops, Posto, School house, and kitchen positions in a filthy state. Reported that the machinery in one Associate ~~building~~ building was badly smashed.

From FBI and H&F it is stated that approx. 700 pecos of rubber ready for use is available and considerably more could be ready in a short time. If it is thought that Australia may be interested will make fuller inquiries

From FORO T  
Time 1400 hrs  
15 Jul 42



REPORT RE DEMOLITIONS.

Est. time of Repair

IR/10	Road	08342525	2	Large craters	Washed by sea.	4 Hours.
TBR/AS	"	08382528	5	" "	Landslide country 40yds. completely demolished.	4 days.
"	"	"	1	" "	Water course tapped washing away road foundations	--
"	"	08382529	1	Bridge	THREE SPUR bridge on buttress blown, decking burnt.	2 days
"	"	"	1	culvert	Near THREE SPURS	1/2 hrs.
within 2 days from 30th expects to have 4 culverts blown						
"	6	"	"	"	"	6 " & 6 crater shots
blown if explosives are available.						
NAS/TOC			4	culverts blown	three of them Only with the bearers broken.	2/3 days
			7	Large trees	Approx. 3 feet diam.	1 day
TOC/GLANO			2	" "	" "	1/2 ✓
GLANO/ERM	08452525		2	Bridges	Good job on landslide country.	6 days
			2	craters		
			3	Large trees		
			1	stone road block		
			1	crater with creek flowing through it		
TOC/AIL			2	Large craters	Good job in loose ground	1 day

INTELLIGENCE Australian Military Forces—7th Military District  
PORT TIMOR

This remains more or less unaltered RIKA having done all that is possible with the road ~~BARUG-DE-BALIBO~~ with the small amount of explosives available at the moment.

SASO has almost exhausted the demolition possibilities in his area.

CARO has had a couple of actions which seem to indicate the enemy have an espionage system working in his area.

TABA remains looking at familiar sights with occasional shells flying about. He has also been indulging in a little demolition work.

RATO's men are having an advanced training course to fit them for immediate and efficient action immediately where wanted.

RIKA has also established good contact and liaison with the blokes on his left.

DUTCH TIMOR

This also remains quiet; but is causing some concern. There are rumours of concentrations of natives in ATAMBOEA and on 7 Aug 16 small ships entered ATAPOEPOE from the EAST. These are reported to have unloaded 200-300 DUTCH natives from other islands. It is not known if these have been exported because they are anti-Jap or whether they have been imported because they are pro-Jap.

The position is being watched, but is not, in my opinion, good.

JAPANESE POLICE

As mentioned in previous report the Japs have organised the natives and CHINESE in DUTCH TIMOR into bands who have a stiffening of approx 10 % Jap troops. These are known as Japanese police and are mainly used for keeping terrified any natives who may have DUTCH sympathies.

DUTCH experience with them is they have little guts but are a decided danger in that they obtain good information about DUTCH movements but are able to terrify other natives so that they do NOT tell the DUTCH of the police movements.

One of the main items of equipment of the police is a white linen armband about 4" wide with Japanese character on. Definite evidence has been seen by me that the Japs are attempting to start a similar police in PORT TIMOR and attempting to give it a semi official tone by imprinting on the armband an official PORTUGUESE stamp.

Should the enemy be successful in this a serious threat to our existence will have been created. The best method of dealing with it is by use of natives friendly to us to deal with or point out such Jap police.

CODE NAMES & INDICATOR LETTERS

If the O/C is absent from his command and a message has to be originated the person doing so will use the sub-units code name but his - the originators - own initials. The originator's letter alone applies to the O/C solely.

REPORTS

Every effort is being made to write a war diary that is both official and interesting and also to ensure that it is promptly sent where it will be recorded permanently.

For this reason full reports sent by runner of actions are much appreciated.

GENERAL

The recent increase in air activity on the island indicated that it is playing a NOT inconsiderable part in enemy strategy and its importance may increase greatly in the future.

I find it difficult to imagine the enemy will leave this Unit untroubled. The probable threat now appears to be an attempt to use the natives - possibly the DUTCH.

1. INTELLIGENCE

Dutch Timor

The following is a summary of ~~xxxxxxxx~~ intelligence re activities in Dutch Timor.

Sec "C", while patrolling the SOUTHERN area, was attacked, nine kms EAST of BOAS by a party of 30 Japs and 40 natives. Dutch lost 2 men wounded and 1 missing and the Japs 5 killed. This on the 21 Jul.

On 21 Jul Sec "K" laid A/T mines on the road ATAMBOEA-HALILOELIK 1 km NORTH of HALILOELIK. Natives report on the 22 Jul 1 MT destroyed with 1 Aust and 1 Jap wounded.

DACOLA (Dutch post) reported loud explosions direction of HALILOELIK at 0630 hrs 22 Jul. Immediately after three unidentified planes were sighted flying from NORTH to SOUTH.

From AUST. Allied aircraft bombed HALILOELIK and TOBAKI in DUTCH TIMOR on 22 Jul. Also unsuccessfully attacked a 500 ton enemy vessel in the straits of MALOEA.

The problem ~~there~~<sup>here</sup> is much different from that existing in PORT TIMOR, and MY OPINION is that the following state of affairs exists -  
20% of natives - either actively bearing arms for the Japanese or prepared to do so.

30% " " - Japanese sympathisers.

50% " " - Not definitely either way but dominated by other natives Japs or Dutch depending upon who is closest.

The Japs have patrols organised around ATAMBOEA and towards the SOUTH coast consisting of natives and Chinese and about 10% Japanese soldiers. The Japs have also imported well known anti-Dutch Radjas from other former Dutch possessions who spread pro-Japanese propaganda and organise opposition to the Dutch.

Portuguese Timor

FORO has been busy demolishing roads and SECO will be going into action as soon as recce work is completed and stores become available. In this work nothing is too small to carry out, a few trees across a road or a small culvert destroyed, all cause delays to the enemy, and as such are of value.

SECO will be establishing an OP at \_\_\_\_\_ which I hope will be able to supply advance information reshipping.

BOLO & BOLO are continuing their present work whilst "watching and waiting".

PETC is being kept handy for use where required and has a very well organised lot of good men.

2. INTELLIGENCE GRADING

The following system of grading reports is now in use between this HQ and F.H.Q. and is forwarded for your information.

It is not necessary for you to grade all your reports as that can be done here when reports are being collated; but if you think the APPARENT reliability of a report may be misleading then the addition of its correct grading will be appreciated.

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| A. Highest grade observer working under good conditions.                              | 1. Observation accepted as correct. Confirmed by other reports. |
| B. Highest grade observer working under poor conditions (details probably incorrect). | 2. Quite possible.  |
| C. Good observer in good conditions.  | 3. Possible.  |
| D. Possible reliable source.  | 4. Possible and not improbable.                                 |
| E. Unreliable source.   | 5. Improbable.  |

BOLO V SAKA

SI 1

1

A. Nil.

B. Nil.

C. Aircraft movements 31 Jul :-

<u>SER NO</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>OBSERVER</u>	<u>OBSERVERS REMARKS</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1.	0600	C de P BALIBO	Five planes flying WEST-EAST.	D 2 - Repeated from AX 252
2.	0630	RIKA - CAILACO	Five planes flying WEST-EAST. Thought to be two fighters & three bombers.	A 2 - Do.
3.	0630	CARO - SOLOI	Five planes flew towards DILI.	A 1.
4.	0715	TABA - REMEXIO Report 1115 hrs 31 Jul.	Three planes took off from DILI drome circled out to sea and landed again 0725 hrs.	A 1.
5.	0725	TABA - REMEXIO	Five planes approached from the WEST and continued along coast to EAST.	A 1 - This appears to be an incorrect timing as these planes most likely those referred to in Sers. 1, 2, & 3.
6.	0730	TABA - REMEXIO	Two fighters from WEST landed on drome.	A 1.
7.	0900	TABA - REMEXIO	Three fighters landed on drome.	A 1. At this stage there were ten single engined fighters on the DILI drome
8.	1130	TABA - REMEXIO Report 1450 hrs 31 Jul.	Three planes took off and headed EAST.	A 1.
9.	1230	TABA - REMEXIO	Three planes landed from EAST. Appear to be same as those in Ser 8.	A 1. Still ten fighters on DILI drome.

D. Nil.

E. Nil.

1025 R.

APPENDIX "A" to Intel Report of 1 Aug (SI 1).

B. TABA reports by runner 0840 hrs 30 Jul that he has located the positions of the artillery which operated against his OP on 29 Jul. The description given is :- near FIBESSE and SOUTH of LAHANE river and approx 300 yds EAST of bridge where ESTRADA LAHANE crosses the LAHANE river.

If you have not a corrected map of DILI refer to Insert DILI & ITS ENVIRONS - map PORTUGUESE TIMOR 1 : 250000 to follow this ESTRADA de LAHANE in its EAST of SOUTH course and where it turns slightly WEST to meet ESTRADA MARGINAL de RIBA de LAHANE continues on in the EAST of SOUTH course and where this line meets the RIB. de LAHANE is the bridge referred to above.

C. CARO reports at 1730 hrs 31 Jul there were thirteen fighters on the drome - A 1.

BOLO V SAKA

SI 3

2

A. TABA reports 1130 hrs 1 Aug he is preparing to block road DILI-HERA - A 1.  
 RADA reports 0945 hrs 2 Aug that explosion and possible shot heard 0845 hrs 2 Aug between MALIANA & BOBONARA; later two natives reported with wounds - A 1.  
 Information gleaned from natives indicated that they had walked on a land mine but this is doubted as there were nowounds about the legs of the natives.

During night 1-2 Aug many lights were seen in the hills above MALIANA but RADA was assured by natives that they were other natives returning from a feast - A 2.

ADMIN BOBONARA doubts this as he has issued orders that NO feasts are to be held at present.

RIKA has been instructed to cover area.

ADMIN BOBONARA has arranged for whole area to be investigated.

Probably wounds due to a grenade either thrown or discharged at natives by other native or natives operating with Japanese.

B. Nil.

C. ADMIN BOBONARA has been reassured by the C de P BALIBO who has rechecked information with C de P MAUBARA that DILI was bombed on night approx 28 Jul and the number of Jap casualties was greater than any previous raid - D 3.

ADMIN told C de P it was not possible but received reassurance after further enquiries.

Following is aircraft activity report :-

<u>SER NO</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>OBSERVER</u>	<u>OBSERVERS REMARKS</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1.	31 Jul 1620	TABA - reports 1130 - 1 Aug.	Visibility bad - three fighters landed from EAST.	A 1. - At this stage 13 fighters on drome.
2.	1 Aug 0820	TABA - 1500	One fighter landed from WEST.	A 1.
3.	0840	TABA - 1130	Three fighters took off and headed EAST.	A 1.
4.	0850	TABA - 1500	One fighter referred to in Ser 2 took off and returned to WEST.	A 1.
5.	0930	TABA - 1500	Three fighters referred to in Ser 3 returned from EAST.	A 1.
6.	1200	TABA - 1500	One twin engined bomber landed from WEST.	A 1 - At this stage on drome were 13 fighters and 1 bomber.
7.	2 Aug 0845	RIKA - MALIANA	Three fighters going SW.	A 1.
8.	0900	RIKA - MALIANA	One very large plane going SW.	A 1 - also reported by PORT ADMIN from various posts in LOIS area.

TABA reports 1 Aug :- (a, b, and c - A 1).

a) Plane formation on ground is :-

(i) Three planes wing tip to wing tip in usual position facing EAST as in Intel Report 18 Jul.

(ii) Ten planes take up "V" shaped formation in close proximity to the other three.

b) Planes on patrol always take up the same formation with one plane leading the other two which are side by side and approx 1000 yds behind the leading one.

c) Planes seen to make regular patrols along the coast to the EAST end of the island.

d) Explosions heard 1100 hrs 1 Aug from the direction of the drome and was followed by a large fire near the beach on the "old" drome. The fire was accompanied by thick black smoke and several more explosions - A 1. Possible petrol dump going up - cause unknown.

D. Nil.

E. Nil.

1043 R

*Important  
Keep the Report*

A.1. The following covers all the information available at present about the activities in the MALIANA-BOBONARA area 2 Aug.

- a) The two natives were almost certainly wounded by a grenade - which was probably an AUST one.
- b) It is improbable that the grenade was obtained lately from troops in that area.
- c) It is probable the grenade was thrown by another native, who is now being sent to BOBONARA for examination by the ADMIN.
- d) The prisoner is reported to have been lately in prison at MAPE and it is thought possible that he obtained the grenade there.
- e) It is improbable that the matter has any great significance in the war now being waged in PORT TIMOR by the Allied Nations against the Japanese Empire.
- f) Much benefit has been derived from the event.

The following covers the road demolitions carried out to date by SASO (ref map PORT TIMOR 1 : 250,000) - all items A 1.

ROAD	APPROX MAP REF	DESCRIP OF DEMOLITIONS	REMARKS	ESTIMATED TIME REQUIRED FOR REPAIRS
TIBAR LIQUICA	08342525	Two large craters.	Washed by sea.	4 hours.
TIBAR NASUTA	08382528	Five large craters.	Landslide country. 40 yds completely demolished.	4 days.
DO	DO	One large crater.	Water course tapped and washing away road foundations.	
DO	08382525	One bridge.	"3 spurs" bridge. One buttress blown, decking burnt.	
DO	DO	One culvert.	Near 3 spurs.	1/2 day.
NASUTA TOCOLULLI	-	Four culverts	Three with only bearers broken.	2 days.
DO		Seven large trees.	Approx 3' diam.	1 day.
TOCOLULLI GLANO	-	Two large trees.	Approx 3' in diam.	3 hours.
GLANO EREMERERA	08452525	Two bridges Two craters Three large trees. One rock block. One crater with stream running through it.	Good work in landslide country.	6 days.
TOCOLULLI ALIEU	-	Two large craters.	In loose ground.	1 day.

A.2. CARO reports 1002 hrs 2 Aug that on night 31 Jul/1 Aug two large enemy patrols moved out from DILI; one to TIBAR and the other to BULUKA (map ref NOT available). The patrols burnt two native villages and returned to DILI morning 2 Aug. The patrol to TIBAR was lead by an ARAB spy - A 1.

This probably indicates a growing enemy restlessness under the closing circle of our OPs.

C. TABA reports 1330 hrs 2 Aug that 10 fighters and 1 bomber leftrome 0815 hrs 2 Aug and headed WEST. There were, at the time of reporting, three fighter planes on the drome - A 1.

D. Nil.

E. Nil.

ADDENDUM TO A 1.

Notes (a) The estimated time for repairs are those submitted by SASO. With adequate engineer equipment these times could be greatly reduced; but it is considered with the equipment probably available to the enemy in PORT TIMOR and the assistance given to the demolitions by the terrain, the times stated are approximately correct. (b) Projected demolitions are being delayed by lack of explosives.

AUSTRALIAN Military Force - 7th Military District  
 SOLO VAKA

A. Nil.

B. Nil.

C. Nil

Head-Quarters  
 Darwin.

Please quote this number when replying.

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0886 JB

<u>SER NO</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>OBSERVER</u>	<u>OBSERVERS REMARKS</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1.	2 Aug 1350	TABA - reports 1130 hrs 3 Aug.	Two planes took off and headed WEST.	A 1.
2.	3 Aug 0935	DO	One large bomber landed from WEST - now five planes on drome.	A 1. Cannot account for five planes as records x show there should be only two; being checked at present.
3.	1040	TABA - reports 1430 hrs 3 Aug.	Bomber took off and headed WEST.	A 1.

TABA reports 1130 hrs 3 Aug, one plane on SOUTH edge of EAST-WEST runway and it appeared to be bogged or broken down - A 2.

ADMIN BOBONARA reports 0630 hrs 4 Aug small ship off ATAPOEPOE leading towards ALOR Island. Further reports 0800 hrs ship still off ATAPOEPOE with sail hoisted Ship stated to be small-size NOT definitely known - D 4.

D. Nil.

E. ADMIN BOBONARA stated, at 1630 hrs 3 Aug, that at approx 31 Jul Japs were requiring 100 strong horses in ATAMBOEA. - D 4.

SASO reports 0930 hrs 4 Aug that the majority of the enemy fighters sighted during the preceeding 10 days did NOT appear to have retractable undercarriage; these planes were sighted as far out from DILI as ERENERA & BAZAR TETE - A 3.  
 This information is being checked further.

1015 R

BOLO V SAKA

SI 17

5

A. ADMIN BOBONARA reports at 0800 hrs 5 Aug (D 4) that :-

- a) Enemy at ATAMBOEA has been reinforced from KOEPANG.
- b) Enemy at ATAMBOEA now 400 to 600.
- c) Enemy at ATAMBOEA desirous of acquiring more horses.
- d) Enemy at ATAMBOEA state intention of moving into PORT TIMOR.

B. GARO reports 0550 hrs 4 Aug having one man with flesh wounds in legs obtained in action. No details of action available at present. A 1.

C. Ref Intel Report 4 Aug SI 16 (Remarks Ser No 2 of Para 6).

TABA reports 0850 hrs 4 Aug; 1250 hrs 2 Aug three planes landed and one appeared to bog or crash whilst landing - A 1. The plane appears larger than the other planes but cannot definitely be identified as bomber or fighter as it is a single engined plane.

1350 hrs 2 Aug; two planes took off leaving three fighters and the damaged plane on the drome. These four planes remained on the drome 3 Aug - A 1.

TABA reports 1345 hrs 4 Aug - 1000 hrs 4 Aug, two fighters landed from WEST; thus making a total of six planes on the drome including the damaged one - A 1..

D. Nil.

E. Nil.

1000 R.



XX Ref map PORTUGUESE TIMOR 1 : 250,000

CARO reports 5 Aug the following details of action :-

A raid was organised on DAREI (approx map ref 08352534) on night 3/4 Aug to obtain prisoners.

All information available was that there was a small outpost of six at this place.

The raiding party approached the spot which the enemy were reported to occupy and were within a few yards of their objective when they were fired upon by a strong body of enemy who were entrenched in a coffee plantation.

BADO (Lieut CAMPBELL) and his men behaved well in a difficult situation, but in the withdrawal two soldiers lost contact with the main body. One of these reported to SOLOI on the morning 4 Aug with flesh wounds in the legs, the other reported in during the afternoon 5 Aug.

BADO withdrew his sec to SOLOI to reorganise.

During 4 & 5 Aug the enemy scoured the area in which BADO had been operating and according to reports they used troops dressed in sarongs. The ADMIN BOBONARA informed me that there were 400-500 enemy in that area - his information coming from the C de P BAZAT TETE and this is probably correct. - D 2.

At 0900 hrs 5 Aug TABA (Capt LAIDLAW) reported that natives reported that large numbers of enemy were moving in his direction but has had no confirmation.

At 1220 hrs 5 Aug TABA reports that approx 100 enemy moved to high ground on EAST of DILI at 0700 hrs 5 Aug - A 1.; and this move was in all probability connected directly with the action of CARO.

At 1500 hrs 5 Aug CARO reported that the enemy had moved back to BIDOUKOU (Approx map ref 0835 2532) and that their activities seem to have been directed solely at forcing BADO out of that area.

During the action MOLO & RENO remained in position but at 1500 hrs 5 Aug CARO had NOT received reports from MOLO.

TABA reported 0840 hrs 6 Aug that all enemy returned to DILI and that they did NOT venture far out.

The list below shows positions at which sections and sub-sections have become stabilised :-

No 7 Section	08432532	SOLOI
No 9 Section	<del>0838</del> 08382529	
No 10 Section	S-S 08452522	S-S 08382523
No 12 Section	S-S 08482521	S-S 08472524
No 13 Section	One sub-section at AINARO.	And one each remain at HATA BUILICO & NUNAMOQUE.

B. Nil.

C. TABA reported 0900 hrs 5 Aug that two planes landed 1000 hrs 4 Aug and left again at 1200 hrs 4 Aug heading WESTWARD - A 1.

TABA reported 1220 hrs 5 Aug that there were still four planes on the drome including the damaged one - A 1.

TABA reported 0840 hrs 6 Aug one large bomber landed on drome 1445 hrs 5 Aug - A 1.

D. Nil.

E. Ref Intel report 4 Aug para C..

At 1500 hrs 5 Aug ADMIN BOBONARA reported that the small ship referred to contained two CHINESE ~~and~~ merchandise from MAKASSAR; and that they were being held at BATEUGADE. He proposed sending them to KATAPOEPOE; but after discussion it was decided to countermand his previous order to the C de P BALIBO and to hold them for questioning by us.

Forwarded attached to SI 20 are DUTCH intelligence information reported to have been thrown away by DUTCH soldiers near TIBESSE during the withdrawal from DILI in Feb 42; this was handed to CARO by natives.

BOLO V SAKA

SI 31

7

A. TABA reports 1210 hrs 6 Aug :-

- a) That he proposed blowing the road DILI-HERA night 6/7 Aug. No reports available of demolitions carried out.
- b) That he had a "party" (sis) in DILI after prisoner it was unsuccessful, but will try again.

B. ADMIN BOBONARA reported 0630 hrs 7 Aug that there were approx 1000 natives and 200 Japanese in ATAMBOEA who are stated to be preparing for movement into PORTIMOR. This information comes from the C de P BALIBO whom the ADMIN considers can obtain reasonably reliable information from his native woman who is related to natives in ATAMBOEA. ADMIN connects the following three factors :-

- i) Enemy in ATAMBOEA desirous of acquiring horses - possible.
- ii) Enemy and natives concentrating in ATAMBOEA - possible.
- iii) Arrival of sixteen small ships in ATAPOEPOE - fact.

GARO reported 1100 hrs 6 Aug that enemy had retired to DAREI; he stated many enemy there.

GARO reported 1320 hrs 6 Aug that :-

- a) He considers BADO was definitely ambushed.
- b) Spies appear active in all forward areas and these make work difficult.
- c) DAREI area now unhealthy for our operations, but he expects it to quieten down quickly.

C. GARO reported 1100 hrs 6 Aug one small ship in DILI apparently entered during night 5/6 Aug. No report of its outward movement. - A 1.

TABA reported 1210 hrs 6 Aug that bomber referred to in Intel Report 6 Aug (SI 26) left 0730 hrs 6 Aug heading NORTH - A 1.

ADMIN BOBONARA reported 0630 hrs 7 Aug that sixteen small ships were sighted off BATUGADE and these later entered ATAPOEPOE roadstead - B 2.

0945 R

A. TABA reported 1345 hrs 7 Aug road DILI-HERA blocked at 2300 hrs 6 Aug. Enemy artillery shelled the area while demolitions were in progress but work completed without casualty - A 1.

No details yet of work carried out.

CARO reported 1515 hrs 7 Aug a sub-section of MOLO ambushed near TIBAR morning of 7 Aug - A 1.

No details available yet.

B. Nil.

C. TABA reports one fighter landed on drome 0940 hrs 7 Aug, there then being four fighters plus the damaged plane on the drome - A 1.

This fighter is probably the one sighted over SUAI CAMNASSA MAPE & ATSABE at approx 0930 hrs 7 Aug.

RIKA reported from ATABAI one plane flying EASTWARD 1245 hrs 7 Aug. - A 1.

TABA reported 1345 hrs 7 Aug that one ship approx 1000 tons arrived in DILI from WEST at 1600 hrs 6 Aug and sailed 1800 hrs 7 Aug - A 1.

This is apparently NOT the ship reported by CARO; reports from whose OPs are NOT being regularly received now.

ADMIN BOBONARA reported 7 Aug :-

a) The Captain of the small junk referred to in Intel Report 4 Aug (SI 16) was addressed from one of the enemy ships reported in Intel Report 7 Aug (SI 31). He was questioned as to where he came from and why and was instructed that he could NOT remain in BATUGADE and was to leave immediately - D 4.

b) The sixteen ships that entered ATAPOEPOE brought approx 200-300 DUTCH natives from other islands. These were taken by M.T. to ATAMBOEA.

It is not known if these have been :-

(i) Exported here because of anti-Jap ideas;

(ii) Imported into TIMOR because of pro-Jap ideas.

c) The sixteen ships, plus one other, possibly the one from BATUGADE - plus three "corcor-as" - were in ATAPOEPOE on the evening of 7 Aug - D 3.

RIKA reported from ATABAI that four small ships were seen moving NORTH towards ALOR Islands at 1880 hrs 7 Aug - A 2.

D. Nil.

E. ADMIN BOBONARA reports 7 Aug that :-

a) Radja of ATJEH has now recovered from his wounds - D 4.

b) The stated enemy intention is to move from ATAMBOEA to the hills in the vicinity of LAHOEROES - D 4.

c) The general information he has given about ATAMBOEA was confirmed to C de P MEMO by a DUTCH patrol which came into MEMO.

RIKA reported 0600 hrs 8 Aug GAILACO heard explosions in the direction of EREMERIA at 2230 hrs 6 Aug, and at 0545 and 0550 hrs 7 Aug - A 2.

These were probably the enemy shelling the area of TABA's demolitions.

BOLO V SAKA

SI 39

C. TABA reports following air activity :-

<u>SER NO</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>OBSERVERS REMARKS</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1.	7 Aug 1100	Large bomber landed from WEST.	A 1. Appeared to refuel.
2.	1150	Bomber in Ser 1 took off headed NORTH	A 1.
3.	1310	Large bomber landed from WEST.	A 1. Appeared to refuel.
4.	1400	Bomber Ser 3 took off headed WEST.	A 1.
5.	8 Aug 1015	Large bomber from WEST landed.	A 1. Appeared to refuel.
6.	1120	Two fighters landed from WEST, making total of six fighters on drome.	A 1.
7.	1140	Bomber Ser 5 took off headed WEST.	A 1.

NOTES - DILI drome apparently used as refuelling depot for large bombers.

b) TABA ~~xxxxxxx~~ considers previously reported damaged plane may be used as a dummy as NO apparent effort to repair or camouflage it.

c) TABA also reports seeing many fighters well away from drome with landing wheels down.

D. Nil.

E. RIKA reports following ~~xxxx~~ demolitions on road BALIBO-BATUGADE :-

<u>MAP REF</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	<u>EST TIME FOR REPAIR</u>
25010859	4 bridges between 12 & 14 kms from BATUGADE.	Timbers removed and burnt. Gap 12' in length approx 10' deep.	} Conservative estimate of time required - two days.
Do	Approx 15 heave trees 18" to 48" in diam.	Rough country with embankment on one side and cutting on other.	
Do	Culvert.		
25020858	Fall of rock onto road.		

APPENDIX TO C.

<u>SER NO</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>OBSERVERS REMARKS</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
8.	8 Aug 1350	One fighter from WEST landed.	A 1. Now seven fighters on drome.
9.	1600	Three fighters took off headed SOUTH.	A 1.
10.	1600	One twin engined bomber from NORTH EAST landed.	A 1. Total now on drome - 4 fighters 1 bomber.

BECO & MAPE bombed between the hours of 0915-1000 9 Aug - A 1.

1045

*Return to Maj Arnold.*

REPORT ON ENGINEERS RECCE OF ROAD BATUGADE - BALIBO - MALIANA 30 -31 Jul 42

Patrol of seven men left MAL 0600 Hrs 30 Jul reaching BAL 1500 Hrs after camping three hours on the track to avoid too early arrival giving time for information being sent to enemy. At 1900 Hrs moved under cover of darkness to culvert at 11 KM. 700 yd mark burnt by KENCO patrol some days before. At 0520 Hrs 31 Jul after sleeping in the bush moved back to BAL doing recce on the way. Figures of distance are in yards from KM. post which commences at the border. 1KM. being 1100 Yds.

AT 11 KM. 1000 yds small wooden culvert 6ft. deep.

" 12 KM. 600 yds water course 10ft. wide 6ft. deep

" 12 KM. 800 yds " " 10ft. " 8ft. "

" 13 KM. 700 yds " " 3ft. " 9ft. "

These culverts are all of wooden logs 8 to 12 ins. diam. with 6 to 12 ins. of soil over them. In my opinion the best way to demolish these is with a crowbar to dig out the logs and burn them. Four men should be able to do each of them easily in one hour. This would leave the concrete lined drain which would cause considerable delay.

AT 14 KM. 100yds is a large tree 2ft in diam. leaning over the road. This would bring down 2 smaller trees with it on falling.

At 14 Km. 300yds two large trees at wide shaft bend of the road would fall in a tangle together one 2ft diam the other 2ft. 6ins. diameter.

At 14 KM/ 400yds culvert 2ft 6ins wide 3ft. deep and 3ft. below road surface.

At 14 KM. 800 yds culvert 2ft. 6ins. wide 3ft. deep 2ft to 4ft below road surface.

AT 16 KM. 100 yds. culvert 3ft wide 4ft deep 2ft 6 ins below road surface.

At 16 Km. 300 yds culvert 2ft wide 4 ft deep and 3ft below road surface.

At 18 KM. 300 yds Mal side of BAL culvert 2 ft wide 3ft deep 3ft below road surface.

At 18 KM. 800 yds. culvert 2ft. wide 3ft. deep and 6ft. below road surface.

In my opinion these culverts are not worth blowing up as it would be too difficult to tamp them in the culvert as they are all dry water courses and there is not sufficient road bed to blow from above. Stone and concrete sides.

(1) At 19 KM. 400yds culvert on bend 2ft. 6ins wide 6ft. deep 7ft below road surface Good position where repairs would take some time.

At 19 KM. 1000yds culvert 2ft. 6ins wide 4ft deep and 6ft. below surface. In my opinion not worth attempting.

(2) At 20 KM. 300 yds. culvert 2ft wide 7ft. deep and 9ft. below surface. Good position on sharp "S" bend of road. 2ft. wide 7ft. deep and 9ft. below surface Can be covered from hill top at approx 200yds range.

(3) At 20 Km 800yds culvert 2ft wide 7ft. deep and 8ft. below surface. Good position in deep re-entrant.

(4) At 21 KM. 100yds culvert 2ft. wide 3ft. 6ins and 10ft below surface. Good position over deep water course where track NUN. BAL. joins road.

In my opinion these four culverts are well worth blowing. They are all situated over deep water courses in positions which it would be impossible to detour. Owing to the difficulty in efficiently tamping such large holes in a dry water course I believe that the only way to do a job properly is with two craters on each, put sufficiently far below the surface to allow the explosion to blow out the stone and concrete sides of the culvert.

Trees of sufficient size to be worth expending explosive on only three were seen but if obtaining a party of men with good axes could find a large number of smaller tree Diam. 8 to 12 ins which would make a tangle of the road and cause considerable delay. There is a continuous avenue of straggly ornamental trees on both sides of the road which would make the removal of timber on the road more difficult.

Culverts other than wooden ones are stone and concrete walls on each side of and 18ft. road surface. Walls 12 to 14 inches thick. The water course through it is similiary lined with large flat stones over the top and the whole filling so far as could be ascertained was earth and rubble which should be easily penetrated with a camouflet set if such is obtainable. Failing that should be possible with a crowbar to remove a stone from the wall to allow an earth auger or simular tool to dig in from the side. The aim in my idea should be mainly to blow out the side walls.

STORES	Detonators	30	Cordtex	70ft.	Safety fuse	30ft.
	Auger Wood	1	Camouflet set or Earth Auger	1	Crowbars	4
	Shovels	2	Axes	2		
	Explosives for trees	6lbs				
	" for culverts	300lbs	This is to allow sufficient for 15ft Crd			
Number of men required	Demolishing timber culverts	4	Cutting small trees	4	Blowing larger trees	2
	Blowing culverts	4				
						14

This number could do the job I believe in one day, for the smaller jobs through

the culverts may take a little longer . Boong labour could be used to some extent  
The patrol reported back to MAL at 1645 Hrs 31 Jul.

Signed A.T.Hillman Cpl.  
1500 Hrs 1 Aug.

P.S. After return to MAL KENO'S patrol reported that approx 300 yds from BAT  
was a wooden culvert similar to those earlier mentioned but otherwise nothing between  
there and the 12KM. peg . The five miles to be travelled and extra risk of  
surprise on the open plain with no cover for retreat does not seem to warrant the trip  
to do this one . A.F.H.

REPORT ON COOPERATIVE PATROL

BY :- LIEUT MCKENZIE

1. INFORMATION

Received information from SECO that a CHINESE had arrived from MAKASAR in the CELEBES.

2. INTENTION

To contact CHINESE and find out all available information re situation in CELEBES.

Lieut SCHREUDER attached to MABO arrived at MALIANA on 13 Jul to be temporarily attached to KENO. As Lieut SCHREUDER had a thorough knowledge of the CELEBES (having been stationed there for some years) and furthermore could speak Malay, it was decided to send him i.c of a patrol co-operating with AUST troops.

KENO's patrol at BALIBO on 13 Jul was told to wait there until Lieut SCHREUDER ARRIVED. Lieut SCHREUDER travelled to BALIBO via TAHOM & RAIBOEBOE and joined his own men (patrol of nine) who had been sent to make contact with KENO's patrol at BALIBO.

KENO forwarded written orders to L/Cpl FOWLER i.c of AUST patrol at BALIBO and the party moved off from BALIBO Night 14/15 Jul.

3. ROUTE

It was decided to travel via direction of DOEBANASE and move by night.

4. TIME

The time limit for the job was five days.

5. REPORT AS DICTATED TO KENO BY LIEUT SCHREUDER

Using troops dressed as natives as scouts the party travelled during the hours of darkness to arrive at BRENIS (NE and near to DOEBANASE) before dawn. The party rested all day and had a good OP on ATAMBOEA and surrounding country. During the day native scouts were sent well forward towards ATAPOEPOE and brought back information that very few native villages in the area remained inhabited and the natives that did remain were not totally unfriendly. Night 15/16 Jul the party moved off across country until they reached the WEHOOR to ATAPOEPOE track and proceeded during the hours of darkness to a high feature SOUTH of ATAPOEPOE where it was arranged to meet native scouts. ATAPOEPOE was OPed all day and native scouts sent in to seek information re CHINESE. A school teacher from ATAPOEPOE came out to see Lieut SCHREUDER with information that:-

A CHINESE had landed from CELEBES in a native prow was held some hours by the JAPS ALLY ALLOWED TO PROCEED TO HIS FAMILY who lived previously in ATAMBOEA but between ATAMBOEA & HALILOELIK.

- 2) Normally there were between 20-25 JAPS at ATAPOEPOE but constantly re-inforcements come and go by truck from ATAMBOEA and occasionally by boat.
- 3) There is one truck stationed at ATAPOEPOE.
- 4) The parties of re-inforcements usually take part in a fishing expedition and secure great numbers of fish by using explosives and mortars. If the re-ins. stay overnight they occupy the customs house.
- 5) The small party stationed at ATAPOEPOE engage in fishing daily in parties of 3 or 4 at BERLOELI & ABAT and seldom carry arms.
- 6) All villages near the coast e.g BERLOELI ABAT PATULUNKA are now vacant except for a very few unfriendly natives - the bulk of the natives have gone into the hills and into the MARAN area.
- 7) The CHINESE camp is also vacated.
- 8) The JAPS no longer use AUST drivers in their trucks between ATAMBOEA & ATAPOEPOE.
- 9) JAPS stationed at ATAPOEPOE are short of food and have to shoot pigs etc for themselves because natives wont bring them in.
- 10) JAPS have more or less ceased to use propaganda in the area, but seem now to favour the threat idea. Lieut SCHREUDER read a Pamphlet in MALAY ordering all natives in the area to report for duty on the ATAMBOEA drome and threatening them with death burnt villages etc if they failed. There are a large number of natives working at cutting grass etc on the ATAMBOEA drome. The JAPS are telling the natives they want the drome for fighter planes to combat the AUST bombers. Some natives however say that the JAPS are frightened of AUSTRALIANS coming and want the area clear for observation.
- 11) JAP HQ in DUTCH TIMOR is now definitely at SOE. They have a large supply of rice stored in both RC and Prot churches.

The patrol returned via WEHOOR SADI COVE to BALIBO. OPed work on progress on ATAMBOEA drome and destroyed by fire a bridge between BATUGADE and BALIBO.

The route then followed was via RAIBOEBOE ROESAN TAHOM MEMO to MALIANA. As the CHINESE could not be contacted in the area visited Lieut SCHREUDER sent native scouts to bring him to ROESAN or HASMETAN.

KENO's patrol states food and water through the area is difficult (one water hole only at BRENIS). Full report by L/Cpl FOWLER to follow.

REPORT OF REGGIE PATROL OF BALIBO & ATAPOEPOE FROM MALIANA BY L/CPA FOWLER.

TASKS

- No 1 - Trip and places visited. No 2 - Cooperation with DUTCH.  
No 3 - Endurance of troops on trip. No 4 - Feeling of natives toward troops.  
No 5 - Water and food problem. No 6 - Conclusions.

1. Leaving MALIANA with a party of five early in the morning, we travelled across the NUMURA Plains which we found to become hot as the day went on. The road is a good MT one in dry weather. After crossing the plains we turned LEFT leaving the road MALIANA-BALIBO following a native track to the BEBAI River, a short distance below the border rivers.

We contacted DUTCH troops at NUMURA then after a much needed rest, we travelled on to BALIBO by native track, striking the MALIANA-BALIBO road about two miles from BALIBO. Here the road appeared to be an all weather MT road. Enquiring from natives we found out that the river was the only hold up for MT travelling, and it would require a few days labour before fit for such use. Sleeping the night a short distance from BALIBO we received orders from our Lieut to send two Tommy gunners back to MALIANA, and await further orders from our Lieut, which came back with a Bren gunner and No 2. After our midday meal we left for a native hut called BRENIS in PORT TIMOR. Night fell before reaching BRENIS so we had a meal and slept the night under a tree.

We left for BRENIS next morning reaching there about midday, we decided to rest until nightfall, as we did not know how we stood with the natives in DUTCH TIMOR which was only a short distance further on.

Until we reached the border the travelling was good, but owing to night travelling from there we found it rather difficult, as the track was much rougher. The DUTCH procured a native guide, and we proceeded on our journey until reaching a native village where the DUTCH Lieut had speech with the Native Radja, within four miles of ATAPOEPOE.

The DUTCH patrol carried on to ATAPOEPOE leaving our patrol at the village as it was thought to be of no advantage for us to make the trip with them to ATAPOEPOE without having OPed the area, as no fighting was proposed.

We found that the time given us was far too short to do the job it would take eight or nine days. We then made through to BATUGADE sleeping the night there. The following day we proceeded to BALIBO ringing through to MALIANA reporting everything OK. We then went to RAIBOEBOE sleeping the night and the next returning to MALIANA.

trip from start to finish, we found the DUTCH cooperation excellent. They are good travellers and stayers, also they appear capable troops, as they never hesitated in taking the forward position.

3. Our own troops travelled very well, considering conditions, as time was short and we had to travel long distances daily. Having no time to wash our socks, some of the boys returned a little footsore, we were all very tired when we returned to MALIANA.

4. It appeared to us that troops hadn't travelled the ATAPOEPOE area. The natives seemed to be scared, but the DUTCH didn't have any trouble to get a native guide. We noticed one native very scared, he dropped some water which he was carrying and disappeared to an ooma, but I think they would swing our way.

5. Water problem is serious, it is a long way between running streams or waterholes. The food is also scarce, rations would have to be carried as oomas are scarce, and a long way apart.

6. The travelling was good all the way, but very open country for travelling troops, as long range fire would be used to great advantage for the enemy. The road EAST of BALIBO is perfect for ambush positions.

The road ATAPOEPOE & BATUGADE is low and runs parallel with the beach.

The road BATUGADE & BALIBO would be good for long range fire or ambush positions; on this road we destroyed a bridge which makes MT impossible until the bridge is replaced as it is impassible otherwise by MT.

There is one bridge between ATAPOEPOE and BATUGADE which could be destroyed, causing much delay.

A patrol leaving MALIANA to OP ATAPOEPOE would require at least eight or nine days to complete the job.

Our patrol was out for six days from time of leaving MALIANA until returning MALIANA.



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REPORT ON RECONNAISSANCE OF TRACK FROM ABI, to BAL-BAT ALONG COSTAL TRACKS TO MOUTH OF LOIS RIVE R

GENERAL 1st DAY

Left ABI, 1445 Hrs 30 Jul, arrived FATU-LARAN 1645 . Time 2 hours.

2nd DAY Left FATU-LARAN 0700 hrs 31 Jul arrived BAL, 1200 hrs Time 5 hrs.

Left Bal, 1445 Hrs arrived BAT, 1645 Hrs Time taken 2 Hrs.

3rd DAY Left BAL, 1445 Hrs arrived BEBAU (BEGAU) 1500 hrs, Time taken 8Hrs.

4th DAY Left BEBAU 0700 Hrs 2 Aug arrived MOUTH LOIS 1200 Hrs time taken 5Hrs

Left MSH, LOIS 1315 Hrs, arrived 1800 Hrs Time taken 4 1/2 Hrs.

TIME TAKEN 3 DAYS

TIME TRAVELLED 27 HOURS/

PATROL C CONSISTED OF L/CPL. C. VERNEDE, PTE. R. DHU.

WEATHER FINE

THE TIMES ARE FOR FAST WALKING.

DETAILS Left ABI, at 1445 Hrs, 30 Jul, and passed village of RAIROBO ( CHEFE COIS ) 1hour later .ARRIVED FATULARAN ( CHEFE MAUCAU ) at 1645 Hrs and stayed for the night . Natives here were definitely frendly and supplied us with food but were unable to supply any information regarding the movement of troops . Was told here that tracks led from this village to CAL & BAT but didnot investigate . Left FATULARAN 0700 Hrs 31 Jul, and arrived at BAL, 1200Hrs passing on the way RAIUBUN ( CHEFE ATILELO ) one hour from BAL, . Stopped at the hut here but natives still unable to proffer information , though very frendly. On arrival at BAL, was given dinner by CHINESE who could not do enough for us . Here we were told of how we were getting Boots , Tobacco, etc. in fact seem to know more than we do ourselves . They also informed us that 7 soldiers had left for MAL, 0700 Hrs that morning 30 Jul, . The track between ABI- BAL is good , open to fast travelling and for most of the journey reasonable flat . Water is scarce and except for a few soakagesholes along the track none is available. Left BAL, at 1445 Hrs and took short cut to BAT. This track cuts off about two and a half miles exceptfor cutting across the main road at various places there is no road travelling for the first 2 & 1/2 miles . The last 3 1/2 miles is done on the road . The journey is all down hill and good cover is on both sides of the road. Arrived at 1645 Hrs after 2 hrs travelling .Was given dinner at the POSTO but the native in charge was a little bit frightened . He said that the JAPS hadn't been there for 2 months , That they were short of GASOLINE for the trucks and that when they did go there they wore no boots . He also informed me that owing to MALARIA between 12and 15 JAPS was all that was stationed at ATP-BAT . is 3 Kilos from FRONTIER and consists of Posto about the same as CAL and about 20 huts .

Left BAT at 0650 Hrs and followed track along very hard flat country about 1/4 mile from coast . Here could be seen definite evádence of trucks having used this track and was told by natives that it had been put in use by the JAPS on their scrounging expeditions to PAU-LACA.

PAU-LACA is a native fishing village of about 20 square huts under the care of a supposed retired native cavalry Tenente by the name of VICENTE PAULO FERREIRA . He toldus that the JAPS went there several times two months age and shot pigs each time offering in return 1 Petaka . The truck was driven by an AUSTRALIAN . He also informed me that 1 Month ago 12 AUSTRALIANS in charge of a CAPTAIN visited there. Also at PAULACA was an ARAB from DUTCH TIMOR . He produced a certificate showing he had been in the Military service at ATB. He didnt seem to be able to cause much trouble in this out of the way place , in fact seemed frightened in case we informed the DUTCH of his whereabouts . His name of this fugitive was SALEH KANARA . At this village the natives were definately frendly and gave us food . PAULACA is 5 miles or about 1 3/4 hrs walk from BAT and 1/4 mile of the coast. 1 1/2 Hrs from PAULACA ( is a large village ) TUTABABA ( CHEFE B E RE-LACA ) at the foot of MT. SARMORNU. This village is formed of 10 big huts & numerous out houses . No information could be gathered from here but the 12 AUSTRALIANS who had been at PAULACA had slept here. The country is flat and here is the only running stream between BAT and the LOIS . Plenty of food was offered to us and all natives very frendly.

Left TUTU BABA and began to leave the flat country and travelled around the south side of a hill MT. MANDOOKI and onto the flat again .Here the track passes through the village of BECAU shown on the map as BEBAU . Questioned the natives as to the change of names all are definite that the two names are one and the same place. BECAU is right on the coast formed of 30 huts and is mainly a fishing village . Pigs and goats are plentiful . On arrival the natives were scared , but later came good. We were told that we were the first AUST. to go there , so can see the reason of their

fright. The CHEFE here is BAU-CURU who seems to act under the supervision of a CHEFE LOIS. Couldn't gather any information here but was told that DUTCH soldiers passed there on their way to ATB, when the JAPS landed in DIL. Also that there are 12 enemy planes on the drome in DIL. Was also informed that if any AUSTRALIAN troops passed through they would be given food.

Between BECAU and the river LOIS are numerous villages HENIK LARAN 1/2 Hr. from BECAU, SOOLILARAN 1/2 Hr from the east named & CORMORNI which is 1 & 1/2 Hrs from SOOLI LARAN. 1Hr. from CORMORNI is HAUBOOTI & this is the last village before TAILACO at the mouth of the LOIS and in the position of the place shown on the map as ATALAI. These two places are identical and I have no hesitation in saying that TAILOCOIS the place. I have had a good look around but could see no other village to be confused with this place. The CHEFE here is LOIS and is in charge of all the places mentioned back to BECAU. All these villages are within 1/4 mile of the ocean and the track is on flat country at times skirting the seashore. The coast as seen at low tide is very rocky for about 300 yds. out and would be hard to land boats here. The natives are all friendly, gave us food also fowls and eggs to bring back with us. From TAILACO the track crosses the LOIS to MBR.

The whole track from TAILACO to BAT is well worn and over the whole distance good cover is available. Unlike other areas the usual procedure of having to follow made tracks can be diverted from for the country here is fairly open and cross country travelling could be done should the necessity arise. Food over the whole area is plentiful and sufficient water could be procured for drinking. Good view of the coast can be had from hills along the beach.

The times for section to travel could be as follows.

ABI - BAL	12 Hrs.
BAL - BAT	3 Hrs
BAT - PAULACA	2 1/2 Hrs
PAULACA - BECAU	6 Hrs.
BECAU - TAILACA	8 Hrs.
TAILACA - ABI	7 Hrs.

Never along this track did the natives refer to us as AUSTRALIANS /  
Always ENGLISH soldiers or ENGLISH AIRCRAFT.

Lt. D. D. D.

P. Timor

REPORT ON PROPOSED POSSIBLE MALIANA,  
E. L. G.

TO SAKA FROM RIKA 4 AUG 42

REASON FOR REPORT.

On 3 AUG 42 with LT M'KENZIE & CPL PALMER I inspected the possible landing ground near MALIANA and was so impressed with its possibilities that I thought it well to add my amateur opinion to the expert opinion already expressed by LT BEGERMAN.

SELECTION.

- (i) With a not abnormal amount of labour the E. L. G. could carry both fighters and bombers. The runway (bearing  $162^{\circ}$ ) could be made longer than 1500 yds.
- (ii) Area recommended for E. L. G. is in my opinion the largest area of open level country on the NUMURA PLAINS. If the E. L. G. were used, another section would be necessary and could be established in huts on the banks of the BULOBO RIVER, with outposts and listening posts on the three small hills to the N.W. and WEST of the E. L. G. E. L. G. is about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  - 2 miles from MALIANA, & guarding the E. L. G. would be outside the the present job of the MALIANA section, which is fully occupied patrolling the plains and watching the frontier. With plenty of native labour E. L. G. could be prepared in a fortnight.
- (iii) Two runway strips running  $\approx 162^{\circ}$  &  $280^{\circ}$ . Direction of prevailing wind seems to vary between S.E. & S.S.E.
- (iv) Surface of E. L. G. is generally very level with a prevailing slope of about 1 in 70. This is not measured and is entirely my own opinion.
- (v) Site requires many stumps to be easily removed as well as ~~had~~ a clump of about 12 trees at about the 900 yd mark towards the NORTH end of the  $162^{\circ}$  runway. (over)

There exist about 3 holes which could be easily filled in with rubble and pebbles from the BULOBO RIVER. In my opinion the NUMURA PLAINS in the dry season ~~are~~ have one of the hardest and driest of surfaces while in the wet season they have one of the softest and most slushy surfaces. <sup>However the C.C. being situated on a very slight tableland could probably be adequately drained.</sup>

(vi) Aircraft could easily approach silently through our own territory over the ~~the~~ LONE TREE SADDLE between MT CAILACO and the OILEU RANGES or it could drop suddenly from over the OILEU RANGES on to MALIANA. Visibility over the plains is bad when looking from the DUTCH TIMOR border or from the BALIBO PLATEAU. The JAPS would need very keen eyesight to see a plane flying low near MALIANA from their present positions.

#### PREPARATION

- (i) Find it impossible to drive a car at 30 mph over surface of strip but consider that if we had one it would do the task easily and with comfort to the passengers (and how!). Of course the above mentioned stumps and trees would need to be removed and the few holes would need to be filled.
- (ii) There would be no need to fell any trees other than those mentioned as they are already "la ita". All obstructions which exceed 1 in 20 (ie: MT CAILACO + OILEU RANGE) are more than 1 mile away.
- (iii) Compass directions of 2 runways  $162^{\circ}$  +  $280^{\circ}$ .
- (iv) Could prepare landing strips or a minimum width of 100 ft + with native labour could widen to a distance varying between 200 and 250 ft.
- (v) Corners of strip could be suitably indicated. Smoke fires could also be used as it is futile to try and disguise anything from the natives. Besides fires abound

on the NUMVRA PLAINS during the dry season. Sides of runways could also be indicated if necessary.


(vi) Night landings would be difficult but indications could be given by means of fires.

## REPORTS


- (i) Position impossible to miss. ELC is WEST of SOUTH ~~tip~~ point of huge mass of MT CAILACO (LOILACA LAU to natives). It is situated on the ~~the~~ WEST bank of the BULOBO RIVER which pursues ~~its~~ its unmistakable course towards the BEBAI RIVER and which flows <sup>roughly</sup> to the NORTH along the WEST slopes of MT CAILACO. The ELC is also on the EAST ~~side~~ <sup>edge</sup> of the plain about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles ~~of~~ the NORTH of the few prominent white buildings of the POSTO of MALIANA.
- (ii) This information already given accurately by LT. BEGERMAN
- (iii) Already given.
- (iv) " " "
- (v) Fogs clinging to the PLAINS abound in the wet season but in the dry season they are only occasionally hanging low. ELC could probably be picked up during moonlight.

## SUMMARY


With 100 natives working under MURADORS who would be overseen by RIKA's picked soldiers the ELC should be suitable for landing fighters within a week. Within another week working hard the ELC would probably be suitable for landing bombers. This would depend of course upon whether axes, saws, shovels, picks, crowbars were available. To my amateur eye the position as pointed out to me by LT M'KENZIE seems an excellent one for immediate conversion into an ELC and eventually for conversion into an aerodrome. 55 center. 4 AUG 42



SECTION A-A



SECTION B-B



SCALE  
 DISTANCE 1:10 000  
 HIGH 1: 100

TO CAPT CALLINAN

6 Apr 42

.%.

FROM SGT SMITH

Report on activities from 1 APR. to 6 Apr. 42.

I left Hato Lia at approximately 0830 hrs on the 1st April to proceed to Mobara, and investigate reports, which had reached us, on the food situation there. This report stated that food was being collected from around this area, stored at Mobara, and then forwarded to Dilli for Japanese troops.

I proceeded towards Mobara via the river route, and at every native settlement, or hut, a few natives, complete with Bows and arrows, or spears, tacked themselves on to my party. By the time I had got 4 or 5 miles from Hato Lia, I had approximately 50 natives with me. I tried to make them go back to their homes, but owing to language difficulties I couldn't make understand.

When these natives knew that I was going to Mobara, they assured me that the Portuguese in Charge would either shoot me or else cut my throat, and that they, the natives, were coming along with me for my protection. On the night of April 1st I slept at a native village, the name I don't know, and next morning, Apr. 2. when I started on my way again at approx 0700 hrs all the natives who were with me the day before, and about another 30 from this village travelled along with me. By this time the number of natives who were with me, were decidedly emboldening, and no matter what I tried to tell them, they all said that if I went into Mobara on my own I would be shot by the Portuguese. About 1 hour's march from the native village where I had spent the night, the natives brought to me 4 natives who they said were very friendly with the Japs. These men the natives begged of me to shoot, but of course this was impossible, so the natives then made these four men kiss my foot and then the back of my hand, and so let these 4 natives go.

Every native village at which I arrived I was greeted by the chief, and given eggs and chickens as present. At all these villages more men joined in my retinue. At approximately 1400 hrs on April 2 I arrived at Mobara, and proceeded straight to the Officer in Charge there. All the natives were with me then. Approx 200 of them. I asked the Officer in Charge there to tell the natives to go back to their homes and work, but He said that he didn't care to speak to so many of them at once, so I got three (3) of the Chiefs in to talk to Him. The Officer in Charge then spoke about a dozen or so words to them and then told me that that was all He had to say.

After conversing with him for just over an hour, I decided to journey on Liquiça. Before leaving Mobara I went into a Chinese shop and



obtained some tobacco. My retinue and myself then went into an empty native hut and had something to eat. The natives I had previously noted were all carrying a few comcobs with them. At this time 4 Portuguse men drove up in a utility truck and I had a short conversation with them. At the conclusion of this conversation, one of these men gave me a bottle of Bolo Gin, for which. I was truly thankful.

At 1600 hrs I left Mobarra via the hills track for Liquiça. On the night of April 2 nd I camped in another native village about 6 miles from Mobarra on the Liquiça track. At 0630 hrs on the 3st April I left this village on my way to Liquiça. My native escort was increasing all the time and I was very worried about them, as it seemed to be the beginning of a native uprising which was not desired by anybody.

By this time I had lost count of the number of fowls and eggs that had been given to me, but estimated 20 fowls and 200 eggs. I also had one(1) pig. I then decided to go to the Officer In Charge at Liquiça and tell him all my troubles, and see if he could help me any.

At 1400 hrs I arrived in Liquiça complete with natives and gifts. I went into a shop there and got some tobacco and a léiper for my Boy. I then went up to the Officer In Charge and told him my position. As He had had previous word from Mobarra that I was coming, He was more or less ready for me.

The Officer In Charge then told me that amongst the natives who were with me, were two(2) men, whom He badly wanted to arrest, and asked my permission to do so. I then told him that I had no wish to interfere with the Portuguse Administration, and as these were all Portuguse natives He was at liberty to do what he wanted to with them. The natives by now were getting very restless, and so I then put forward the suggestion that the Officer in Charge let me take all the natives with me up to Boi Bau, where I intended staging that night and that he make what arrest he wanted there. The Officer in Charge consented to this and further offered to give me a guard of 4 or 5 of his native Police for my own personal protection. I thanked him for his kindness but refused his offer of an escort.

My reasons for wanting to take the natives to Boi Bau, was that in Liquiça they were obtaining wine, and I thought that any interference by police these wald start trouble which perhaps I would not be able to control. The Officer In Charge gave me a cup of coffee, and a glass of Port Wine to follow. He also gave me a battle of wine to drink when I reached Boi Bau.

I then took leave of the Officer In Charge and as I was on my way back to the natives, which were about 200 jds from the Residence, another Portuguse gentleman, whom I had seen at the Residence, came along

with me to where the natives were assembled. When he saw the natives with the fowls and eggs he naturally assumed that they were stolen. I then explained to him that they had been given to me, and he apologized. The natives had with them then, 2 goats and another pig, which I told this man were not mine. He then put forward the suggestion, that I move forward as my horse, taking with me the stuff which was mine, and leaving the rest of the natives and stuff with him, and he would take care of every thing. To this I agreed, and did as he asked. My Boy drew my attention to the fact that something was wrong after we had gone a few hundred yards, but I didn't turn back or interfere, as I had promised to let this Portuguese gentleman have his own way.

I then kept on my way to Boi Bau arriving there at 1930 hrs on the 3rd Apr.

On the morning of Apr. 4th I found that none of the gifts I had received were still with me, and enquiring from the natives. I was told that they were all taken by the Portuguese in Liquiça. I then got into contact with the Officer in Charge at Liquiça by telephone, and he promised to return every thing or else pay for it, adding that the natives must have run off with my eggs and fowl and pig, between Liquiça and Boi Bau.

I remained in Boi Bau on April 4, and April 5. At approximately 1500 hrs on April 5 some natives arrived with a pig and 4 Patacas which they said, had been sent to me by the Officer in Charge at Liquiça.

I left Boi Bau at 0730 hrs on April 6 and arrived at Hato Lia at 1615 hrs the same day.

A E Smith (Sgt.)

2045 hrs.

GENERAL At approx. 2130 hrs on 19 Feb 42 the Japanese landed in Portuguese Timor. This landing was in conjunction with one in Dutch Timor. The troops were landed in the vicinity of TIBAR and CACTUS FLAT. The first troops to land moved to the SOUTH of DILI to intercept <sup>also</sup> troops, retiring from DILI. More troops then moved EAST along the Dili road. At 2230 hrs they were fired upon by our Section (No. 2 Sec) <sup>who appeared to be taking cover</sup> stationed at the Airdrome. At 2230 hrs an unidentified destroyer entered DILI harbour and fired on the Dutch H/Q/. Dutch continued to resist the Japanese <sup>H.Q. withdrawn at approx. 0530 hrs but the war spread Dutch units</sup> until 1600 hrs 20 Feb 42. It is estimated that 1000 Marines together with 4000 soldiers were landed for the action.

H.Q. Stationed at RAILACO. Unaware of landing until message received <sup>Supportia by 1st Coy, 1st Bn, 1st Div</sup> ~~received~~ from "B" Pl. at 1100 hrs. Capt Callinan was in DILI having gone in there the previous evening to confer with Col Van Straaten, no news of him was available. S.Sjt Walker and Dvr Chalmers were presumed captured as they <sup>had</sup> proceeded to DILI in the early morning in the Company's one truck for rations. Thus the Unit was left without M.T. Pte Alexander also left, with a message for Capt Callinan on the only Motor cycle, and was killed near the Airdrome. All records, files etc in Coy. H.Q. were destroyed immediately. <sup>as it became obvious that the Japs would land at all times and keep a state of high mobility</sup> ~~on receipt of the news of the landing.~~

"A" Pl. In GENESIS Camp near RAILACO. Immediately sent out patrols; otherwise remained on the alert.

"B" Pl. Camped in the <sup>Garra</sup> MAE HO area. Had a good view of the landing after dawn. As the Portuguese <sup>Comoro area</sup> troops were expected on the 20 Feb 42 they presumed they were the troops landing; they were later identified as Japanese. Kept HQ in the picture in regard to the landing, <sup>by messages.</sup>

"C" Pl. Camped in the <sup>Comoro area</sup> COMO area. Reported 14 men of No. 7 Sec. were in the ration, truck and must be presumed captured. Later reported that L.Sjt Chiswell and Ptes Hayes Alford and Marriott were disarmed, bound and shot. Pte Hayes did not die and subsequently returned to the Unit. <sup>was not removed by natives carried for, and eventually re-evacuated back to the Coy. This was the consequence of active hostility of the Timor natives</sup> ~~Remainer made prisoner.~~

21 Feb 42.

GENERAL. Coy. stores from RAILACO and COMO moved from a Staging Camp 11 miles from RAILACO. A British Indian volunteered his old truck, which, with two of the Coy to nurse it, did much valuable work. Pressed natives, commandeered pony trains and ox carts were some of the means of transport used. As the stores arrived at the Staging Camp they were reshipped to VILA MARIA to which an advance party had moved.

H.Q. Assisting in the transport of the stores from RAILACO.  
"A" "B" Pls. Remain in areas; fighting patrols working.

On the same time the 5th of Dili

The ground troops of the 1st Coy, 1st Bn, 1st Div

"C" Pl. Shifting stores from COMO to RAILACO and sending out patrols.

22 Feb 42.

*Left DILI with outst. by last upon*

GENERAL. Capt Callinan returned to the Unit having accompanied Col Van Straeten as far as AILFO. He left the Colonel there as the Colonel was heading with all haste for Dutch Timor. Two small bridges near COMO were destroyed by the Sappers who also prepared and threw two road blocks near NASUTA. All stores not shifted at 2359 hrs were destroyed.

H.Q. Moved to VILA MARIÉ.

"A" "B" Pls. Remain in areas; patrols active.

"C" Pl. Destroy all remaining stores and move back to VILA MARIÉ. A broken down truck loaded with explosives standing on the road near NASUTA was destroyed by them in the belief that it was derelict.

23 Feb 42.

GENERAL. All our troops are now WEST of the GLANO River. The Sappers demolish the bridge over this River at approx 0900 hrs.

H.Q. Many Dutch survivors from DILI pass through and are fed and clothed as well as is possible.

"A" "B" Pls. Remain in areas sending out patrols.

"C" Pl. Rest at VILA MARIÉ.

24 Feb 42.

GENERAL Uneventful.

H.Q. "A" "B" "C" Pls. Remain in areas; some patrols sent out.

25 Feb 42.

GENERAL. Uneventful.

H.Q. "A" "B" Pls. On watch in areas.

"C" Pl. Move to HATO LIA/ 8 Sec move to CAILACO and 9 Sec to FATU BESI.

26 Feb 42.

GENERAL. Heavy stores were hidden and buried at VILA MARIÉ.

H.Q. "A" "B" "C" Pls. Remain in areas.

27 Feb 42.

GENERAL. Some stores were shifted to HATOLIA by pony train. Japs are known to be visiting TIBAR, AIPLO, LIQUICA & MAUBARA to collect women for the entertainment of troops and men for forced labour.

H.Q. "A" "B" "C" Pls. Alert in areas.

28 Feb 42.

GENERAL. "B" Pl. ambush Japs on LIQUICA Road.

H.Q. "A" Pl. Remain in areas. Some patrol activity.

"B" Pl. Prepared an ambush on the LIQUICA road for Jap M.P. in LIQUICA.

Owing to the failure of a pressure switch only one truck was destroyed.

This truck was an Aust. 3 ton army truck. Our Unit suffered no losses in the ambush.

1 Mar 42.

GENERAL. Owing to the number of very contradictory rumours regarding the fate of the SPARROW FORCE that <sup>has</sup> been reaching the Unit it was decided to send a senior officer into DUTCH TIMOR to contact H.Q. Sparrow Force and exchange information in reference to the position at each end of the island.

Capt Callinan was selected and with his party (L.Sjt Tomzatti and Spr <sup>and 2 Dutch soldiers</sup> Wilby) left HATOLIA and arrived at CAILACO at 2000 hrs. The end of the first leg.

H.Q. "A" "B" "C" Pls. Remain in areas

2 Mar 42.

GENERAL. A numerically superior force of Japanese troops attacked "B" Pl. area. No. 4 Sec received the main attack and having inflicted proportionately heavy casualties withdrew with the remainder of the Pl. Ptes Mitchell and Knight were killed, Lieut Nisbet was shot in the thigh, L.Sjt Morgan in the ankle, Pte Craghill in the ear shoulder and arm and Pte Hollow in the lower jaw. These casualties were all caused by the one M.Ger who was, immediately after, shot dead by Pte King. The Pl. commenced to withdraw to HATOLIA. Makeshift stretchers were thrown together for the wounded; these were carried by natives without whose help the evacuation of these men would have been a very difficult task.

Capt Callinan and party left CAILACO <sup>0600 hrs</sup> by horse and arrived at MEMO the same evening. at 1700 hrs - met Lieut Luffy + Sgt McLake who were ill - Both instructed to return CAILACO. C.C. informed 2000 hrs of ATAMBORA

H.Q. "A" Pl. Remain in areas; patrol activity.

"B" Pl. Attacked by Japs. Withdrawing towards HATOLIA.

"C" Pl. Patrolling in area.

3 Mar 42.

GENERAL:- Japanese attack "A" Pl. area. The attacking force was ambushed by No. 2 Sec. and Pl. H.Q. A large number of Japanese were killed and wounded without loss to the Unit. The Pl. then withdrew by Secs. to HATOLIA.

Capt Callinan <sup>left MEMO at 0700 hrs</sup> and party arrived at LAHAROUS <sup>LAHAROUS</sup> in Dutch Timor where there is a large mission. <sup>(with special B.M.G.) in reserve</sup> The priests there passed the information in regard to the fate of the <sup>3</sup> Sparrow

3 Mar 42 (Contd.)

Sparrow Force. Briefly, all but approximately 200 had been killed or captured. <sup>Dutch Garrison at ATAMBORA dispersed</sup> Through the natives it was learnt that there were a party of Australians near a river approx. 3 miles away. These men were contacted and proved to be Capt Parker and 9 men of the Sparrow Force. These men returned with Capt Callinan's party to Portuguese Timor.

H.Q. Moving through the hills to a new site.

"A" "B" Pls. Retiring to HATOLIA.

"C" Pl. Patrol activity around HATOLIA. Approx. 80 N.F.I. troops, the remnants of the DILI garrison, have been organised into 3 patrols by Maj Spence and placed under the Command of an NFI officer, Lieut Horstink. Whilst patrolling a few days later approx. 70 of these men deserted and fled to ATAMBORA.

4 Mar 42

GENERAL. All Japanese (except the dead) who were engaged in the actions with "A" & "B" Pls. have returned to DILI.

Capt Callinan and party spend the day resting in LAHAROUS?

H.Q. Moving to new area.

"A" "B" Pls. Moving to HATOLIA.

"C" Pl. Patrolling in area.

5 Mar 42.

GENERAL. Uneventful. ~~Capt Callinan and party rest in LAHAROUS?~~

H.Q. Moving to new area.

"A" "B" Pls. Moving to HATOLIA.

"C" Pl. Patrolling in area.

6 Mar 42.

Capt Callinan and party leave LAHAROUS? and arrive ~~in~~ ROUSAN (Dutch Timor) the same evening. Maj Spence receives a message that there is a Brigadier in Port. Timor.

H.Q. Arrive and make camp in CAILACO.

"A" Pl. Arrive HATOLIA/

"B" Pl. Moving to HATOLIA/

"C" Pl. Patrolling in area.

7 Mar 42.

GENERAL :- Capt Callinan and party arrive at ~~CAILACO~~. <sup>a point 3 miles from CAILACO and camped the night</sup> Capt Callinan <sup>now in CAILACO at 1000 ft and Capt Callinan</sup> conferred with Maj Spence and passes all the information he has to him.

Maj Spence and Sjt Press depart CAILACO to contact the Brigadier. Reach MOROBO the same evening.

*now all units divided as: A PL OSOKA, B PL ANARO CP. CAILACO + line of withdrawal through the forest of SORAI GLAI NAWANADA + VIQUEVA*

H. Remain in area.

"A" Pl. No. 1 Sec pass through CAILACO/

"B" Pl. Moving to HATOLIA.

"C" Pl. Patrolling in area.

~~7 Mar~~ 8 Mar 42.

GENERAL :- Maj Spence reaches LOLOTOI and meets Brigadier Veal who arrived in Timor to assume command of the Sparrow Force about 12 Feb 42. A conference follows.

*Red from camp. D.T. must HATOLIA  
to ship news from there to ATSA.*

H.Q. Depart CAILACO and arrive at ATSA the same evening.

"A" Pl. Moving to new area.

"B" Pl. Arrive HATOLIA and rest for a day.

"C" Pl. Patrolling area.

9 Mar 42.

GENERAL :- One of the items of information discovered at LAHAROUS was the fate of the Unit's Christmas mail. Despite repeated requests for this mail to be forwarded to the Unit it was left at ATAMBOFA. When it was rumoured that the Japanese were approaching this town it was handed over to the troops there and what was left was burnt.

"A" "B" Pls. Moving to new areas.

H.Q. Settling at ATSA.

"C" Pl. Patrolling in area.

10 Mar 42.

GENERAL :- Uneventful. The events of the past fortnight have shown very clearly that the Unit owes a great deal to the Portuguese and natives. They have been of great assistance to us whenever we wanted ~~some~~ help. More power to their respective elbows.

H.Q. Remain in area.

"A" Pl. Arrive in BOBONARO. Sections move out to previously selected areas.

"B" Pl. Leave the wounded men at HATOLIA with the MO and set off for area selected by Coy. HQ.

"C" Pl. Information of anti-Australian activities at FATU BESI led to a raid there by No. 9 Sec. Jaime, the owner, was arrested and a powerful radio receiver confiscated.

11 Mar 42.

GENERAL :- Uneventful. Jaime was escorted to CAILACO.

H.Q. Routine in area. Some patrols sent out.

"A" Pl. Settling in in area.

"B" Pl. Moving to area.

"C" Pl. Patrolling from HATOLIA.

12 Mar 42.

GENERAL :- Uneventful. Jaime escorted to BOBONARO and handed over to the Admin here  
15 subsequently released as no proof of his activities  
could be had.

H.Q. "A" Pl. In areas.

"B" Pl. Moving to area.

"C" Pl. In areas.

13 Mar 42.

GENERAL :- Just previous to the attack by the Japanese \$10000 was handed  
to Maj Spence having brought from KOPANG by a member of the Unit who  
had been there on duty. *This money was paid out immediately* Thus all the personnel had a fair supply of  
money with which to buy food when they were moving around in the hills.

All Army rations had been used *consumed* as we had only received 60 days rations  
for our period of service in DILI. *so all ranks depended on their own wits* However, ~~tax~~ arrangements to  
supply the Company with foodstuffs required by them were completed between  
Maj Spence and the Administrator of the Circunscrição of FRONTEIRA today.  
Also the balance of the cash from the pay was held by Maj Spence as a  
Company fund to provide, as far as possible, things which were necessary  
to the efficient functioning of the Unit and which would normally come  
from Army sources.

See 19 Mar.

14 Mar 42.

GENERAL :- Uneventful.

H.Q. "A" Pl. In areas.

"B" Pl. Moving to area.

"C" Pl. Patrolling around HATOLIA.

15 Mar 42.

GENERAL :- Uneventful.

H.Q. "A" Pl. In areas.

"B" Pl. Moving to area.

"C" Pl. Patrolling area.

16 Mar 42.

GENERAL :- Uneventful. Japanese are not moving about the country as yet.

H.Q. "A" P  
1.

See 21

*Admin for Post.*



16 Mar 42 (Contd)

H.Q. "A" Pl. Remain in areas.

"B" Pl. Moving to area.

"C" Pl. Patrols.

See 21

17 Mar 42.

GENERAL :- All quiet. The lack of tinned food in the Company makes it very hard to move large bodies of troops around the country.

H.Q. "A" Pl. Remain in areas.

"B" Pl. Moving to area.

"C" Pl. Patrolling around area.

18 Mar 42.

GENERAL:- All quiet.

H.Q. "A" "B" "C" Pls. Remain in areas. Patrols sent out.

19 Mar 42.

13 { GENERAL :- His Majesty's Britannic Consul in Dili - Mr D/Ross arrived by horse in HATOLIA having been escorted as far as LIQUICA by 100 Jap Infantry and 1 Bren Gun Carrier. He had been sent by the Jap. Consul in DILI to demand the surrender of all the AIF troops in Port. Timor. All the senior officers of the Unit were called in to HATOLIA.

H.Q. "A" "B" "C" Pls. Remain in areas. Some patrols sent out.

20 Mar 42.

GENERAL :- Uneventful. All senior officers moving to HATOLIA.

H.Q. "A" "B" "C" Pls. Remain in areas.

21 Mar 42.

16 { GENERAL :- The following officers ----- conferred and decided to refuse the Japanese offer to surrender. Maj Spence asked Mr Ross to inform the Japanese Consul that all AIF troops in Port. Timor were under the control of 7 MD, Australia. As it had been reported that the NEI Govt had capitulated it did not necessarily mean that we as Australian soldiers should capitulate. Australia was still fighting and so we would continue to fight until Australia capitulated which we agreed would be never. Protest was lodged with the action of the Japanese in shooting members of the Company in cold blood. In reply to the Japanese threat to declare us outlaws if we refused to surrender Maj Spence claimed that <sup>we fought</sup> ~~as it was~~ the way we had been taught to fight, <sup>and so</sup> personnel of the Company were entitled to all consideration as POW if captured by the Japanese. The Japanese answer to this was

21 Mar 42 (Contd.)

distribute pamphlets per native calling upon the troops themselves to surrender. The general opinion was that they were good souvenirs. At the conference Capt Parker was authorised to exploit all possible means of communication with Australia. In this matter the Unit would offer as much assistance as was required.

H. Q. "A" "B" "C" Pls. Remain in areas.

22 Mar 42.

GENERAL :- Armour's and Demolition stores moved to LOLOTOI and LEBOS. A pack train of ammunition arrived from ATAMBOGA, and from BOBONARO was distributed and hidden around the countryside. At the time of the Japanese landing a consignment of QM stores was on its way to the Unit and had reached ATAMBOGA. The remnants of these stores, they having been rifled by troops passing through, reached us on this train also. They consisted of about 9 pair of boots and a few shirts. We are not in a very happy position in regard to boots and clothing. The non-arrival of stores coupled with the hard wear and tear that service in this country imposes on these items make the Unit look a very ragged lot. Most men have a native sarong and shirt to wear as a change of clothing. C.C. & LT. command O.P. DUM

H.Q. Capt. Parker and his party move to MOROBO. A large radio transmitter was destroyed at ATAMBOGA when the Australians were there. Three men left this morning for ATAMBOGA with instructions from Capt Parker to return with all the parts from this transmitter that were worth carting.

"A" "B" "C" Pls. Remain in areas.

23 Mar 42.

GENERAL :- Two large twin engined Japanese bombers bombed HATOLIA and ~~XXXXXX~~ TEMERA at approx 1100 hrs. No. Australians were hurt but several Portuguses and Chinese were hurt in TEMERA.

H.Q. "A" "B" "C" Pls. Remain in areas.

24 Mar 42.

GENERAL :- Uneventful.

H.Q. "A" "B" "C" Pls. Remain in areas. Some patrolling.

25 Mar 42.

GENERAL :- Maj Spence conferred with the Brigadier at LOLOTOI. The Brig. had previously conferred with Col Van Straaten who had decided to re-organise the NFI Forces in Dutch Timor. Plan for raid on Drome completed. S. 15 TEMER & No. 5 Sec

"A" "B" "C" Pls. Remain in areas.

26 Mar 42.

GENERAL :- Uneventful.

H.Q. "A" "B" "C" Pls. Remain in areas.

27 Mar 42.

GENERAL :- All quiet. *L. Campbell + Cpl. L+Deak arrive at 0.P.*

H.Q. "A" "B" "C" Pls. Remain in areas.

28 Mar 42. *L. Dexter + M. Kintner + Cpl. HARRIS + FOLTER*

GENERAL :- *L. Thinter returned to RANLACO to organise troops* Capt Parker's men returned from ATAMBOBA. The natives had had a lot of fun with the transmitter there and had almost completely destroyed it; thus they had very few parts that were of any use.

H.Q. "A" "B" "C" Pls. Remain in areas.

29 Mar 42.

GENERAL :- *Raid called off - as troops manned did not come forward.* A converted Lucas lamp and improvised ground strips have been prepared <sup>at CANLACO</sup> to signal to any planes proved to be friendly.

H.Q. "A" "B" "C" Pls. Remain in areas.

30 Mar 42.

GENERAL :- Over the past week the survivors of the Sparrow Force have been moving into Port. Timor in the SOUTH EAST area. Most of these men are without arms or equipment of any kind. Their story is that they were told to throw them away. The majority of these men are from Base HQ at TJAMPLONG and a few are hospital patients. They have been organised into a Company and are spread over the SE area.

H.Q. "A" "B" "C" Pls. Quiet in areas.

31 Mar 42.

GENERAL :- A representative of the Brig. conferred with Maj Spence and the Administrator at BOBONARO and decided that the rationing arrangements that applied to <sup>our</sup> ~~out~~ Company would also apply to the troops from Dutch Timor. The Administrator is <sup>most</sup> ~~always~~ very helpful and co-operates with us to an absolute maximum.

H.Q. "A" "B" "C" Pls. Remain in areas.

1 Apr 42

GENERAL :- The first Japanese, estimated at 100, to arrive in ATAMBOBA drove in in trucks escorted by a light tank. They arrived at the time the Dutch forces were reorganising. The Dutch immediately fled to the hills again.

H.Q. "A" "B" "C" Pls. Remain in areas.



No. 2 AUST. IND. COY.  
H.Q. MAPE  
PORTUGUESE TIMOR  
13 MAY. 1942.

C.O.  
SPARROW FORCE  
MAPE  
PORTUGUESE TIMOR.

I. REPORTS: EXPERIENCES: RECOMMENDATIONS, ETC.

1. The training of IND. COMPANIES--the newest type of warfare introduced to the A.I.F.--commenced at NO. 7 INF. TNG. CENTRE, FOSTER, VIC., on 17 MAR., 1941. I consider, Sir, that in the compilation of this report, it would be unwise not to record certain experiences and recommendations. This I have taken the liberty to do, irrespective of a statement required to cover the COY'S activity following the landing of the JAPANESE in DILLI, believing that these remarks will be useful in the establishment, training and equipping of further IND. COYS. in AUSTRALIA.
2. ESTABLISHMENT:  
The establishment under which this COY. was organised is satisfactory. M.T. requires consideration and revision. One Staff Car, three 30-cwt trucks, 4 motor cycles is now allowed on the establishment. Due to the nature of the roads insofar as PORT. TIMOR is concerned little use can be found for a staff car in present circumstances; 30-cwt. trucks must be replaced by 1-ton trucks because of the construction of the roads in this part of TIMOR. Motor cycles are invaluable and eight (8) would not be too many for the COY. to carry on strength.
3. TRAINING:  
Only a well trained well disciplined Unit can hope to continue to exist on Islands inhabited by Neutrals or even Allies where thousands of natives exist. I cannot overstress the urgency for maintaining the highest moral code with native women. If this is not maintained then a further menace is added to small wandering bands of soldiers in the hills away from their PL. H.Q. Another factor is the question of ownership of animals etc. In PORT. TIMOR very few animals are without ownership of some form or other and to disregard this fact in wanton shooting for food results in the Natives mustering their stock and disappearing into places known only to themselves. If particular attention is paid by all to the treatment of Natives and Neutrals generally--and this can only be achieved by the highest form of discipline--then the Unit preserving these ideals may expect a measure of success in this type of Island fighting.
  - (b) It is imperative that all ranks know and realise the value of CYPHER and MESSAGES generally for this class of warfare. Too much stress cannot be laid on all branches of FIELD CRAFT and 100 per cent. efficiency in compiling OBSERVERS' REPORTS, establishing OBSERVATION POSTS, knowing how to use such posts and getting back reports to PL. or COY. H.Q. Every enemy move must be noted and reported upon. Knowing where the enemy is, what he is doing, discounting all rumours until checked by your OWN troops WILL make for the success or failure of a Unit operating against the JAPANESE.
  - (c) If these COYS are to continue to be successful, strict supervision must be maintained in the selection of personnel. Each soldier should be medically examined by the Unit medical officer when the COY. is formed. Those classed as fit should then be subjected to a fortnight's severe training and then re-examined. If this is done only fit men will be selected for IND. COYS., thus overcoming much wastage within an IND. COY which WILL otherwise occur no matter how careful the selection. Wastage within an IND. COY. is its greatest enemy because the fighting efficiency of the Unit cannot be maintained, of course, unless the lines of communication is open for the reception of WELL-TRAINED reinforcements.
4. EQUIPMENT:
  - (a) ARMS: Dependent upon the function of IND. COYS. the only suggested alteration in Arms is the addition of 2in. and 3in. Mortars. When this Unit left AUS. 2in. Mortars were on the establishment but no bombs were available and the Mortars were left at FOSTER.
  - (b) SIGNALS:

Wireless forms the basis for the quick checking of all rumour and enemy movement. Unless Units are equipped with light and portable sets for O. POSTS and work in forward areas movement in rugged and hilly country is restricted to a minimum. From experience gained in PORT. TIMOR it is considered that the IO8 Set is not of any use to IND. COYS. because: (1) Its range is far too short. Mountains and the auriferous nature of PORT. TIMOR have made its use here impracticable; (2) It is purely an R/T Set and the necessity for silence in forward areas must be obvious; (3) Its weight (25lbs.) and bulk makes it almost impossible to make a quick getaway if that is necessary. A 208 Set is suggested in its place because: (1) It is much lighter; (2) It is purely a W/T Set which cuts out the necessity for speech; (3) It has a much greater range.

A base SET capable of maintaining communication with AUS. is necessary. A Set of the G.P. PACK (IO82-IO83) TYPE is suggested.

It has been found that the IOI SET is a much better type of SET than the IO9 SET. It is suggested that IOI SETS replace IO9 SETS wherever possible. Reasons: (1) The little extra range of the IO9 SET does not make up for the extra drainage on batteries; (2) The IOI SET by being much lighter, becomes much easier for transportation by PLS. on the move.

Long range Lucas Lamps should replace short range Lucas Lamps. Although its weight is practically the same it has almost double the range and has the advantage of telescopic sights.

At present heliograph is not provided for on the establishment for Signals--this item should be added because: (1) The nature of island here is ideal--this most likely applies to all other islands in the N.E.I. territory; (2) power is derived from natural resources; (3) it is light and portable; (4) capable of long distance communication; (5) provides an alternative method of communication and could be used as a L. of C. between Coy. H.Q. and Pl. H.Q. (NOTE: At present this Unit is using a well-dispersed telephone system for inter-communication--a fact which has been forced upon it because of lack of equipment to repair damaged wireless sets and the calling into action of the only two remaining IO9 and IOI SETS to make ~~xxxxxxx~~ wireless communication possible with AUSTRALIA.

(5) LANGUAGE:

The Language problem presents many difficulties. It is understood there are now soldiers of the N.E.I. Army in AUS.--if six (6) capable linguists were attached to each COY. for work in these Islands many of the language difficulties that are confronting us would be overcome. Languages, i.e.--Malay, Tatem, Portuguese, Dutch.

(6) FINANCE:

Each C.O. of an IND. COY. leaving AUS. should be entrusted with an Imprest Account available in the particular Island currency, the minimum amount be \$1000.

(7) REINFORCEMENTS:

It is useless sending untrained reinforcements. IND. COYS. require specially highly trained men. This training cannot be given on active service, in present circumstances, hence their lack of training and discipline defeats the object. If this Island became a base for IND. COYS. then, I consider, it is possible to carry out certain training here to prepare certain untrained personnel for guerilla fighting.

(8) ISLAND BASE:

PORT. TIMOR presents an excellent base from which to operate with guerilla tactics against other JAP. occupied Islands. The network of roads, while not all trafficable at present, could soon be repaired by native labour. This would open up a vast territory in the mountainous regions above the malaria belt where troops and stores could be held at bases at the various Chefe de Postes. A great deal more could be stated regarding the use of this Island as a Base for IND. COYS. but as you are widely conversant with these facts, further remarks are unnecessary.

(9) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AWARDS:

WX5369 Lieut. C. F. McKenzie: Lieut. McKenzie was in charge of a SEC. of 18 men and attached personnel (Sigs. and Sappers) at the DILLI aerodrome on the night 19-20 FEB. 42, when the JAPANESE landed and later occupied DILLI. His capable leadership was responsible for holding up a much superior JAP. force driving through to DILLI from the WEST thus enabling certain DUTCH forces to reach their positions. and making it

possible for his own men to inflict heavy casualties upon the enemy. When faced with the problem of no communication from DUTCH H.Q. he displayed good judgment in summing up the situation, deciding to combine his withdrawal with the destruction of the aerodrome, which enabled many of his men to move over open country through a heavy dust screen to safety. In a subsequent ~~ambush~~ JAP. ambush in the hills behind DILLI, Lieut. Mc-

Kenzie again displayed coolness and sound judgment, which probably saved the lives of all the troops under his control and that of two DUTCH medical officers, Capts. Bloomsmar and Tay. As a result of all these actions Lt. McKenzie lost two men from his section and one attached, wounded or killed.

WXI2552 Pte. POYNTON, J.W.: Pte. Poynton is attached to Lieut. McKenzie's SEC. as one of several Tommy Gunners. By his coolness and daring and complete disregard of danger he ~~XXXX~~ played an important role with four other soldiers in preventing two drives by the JAPS. to attack the aerodrome hangar from the rear across a small bridge which formed the only crossing over a wide and deep canal or drain. He displayed great courage by continuing to fight the enemy at close quarters while Pte. Hudson removed ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Poynton's water bottle to hand to Sig. Cannon, who had been wounded. In a subsequent ambush when his officer (Lt. McKenzie) was faced with a party of JAPS. armed with two L.M.G.'s ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Pte. Poynton obtained possession of hand grenades from a DUTCH soldier, rushed forward and with the third grenade destroyed one of the M.G. posts and killed the ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ gun crew of four JAPS. Just prior to this incident Pte. Poynton had gone into action with his Tommy Gun and silenced the other L.M.G. As a result of Poynton's quick thinking and daring his officer (Lt. McKenzie) was enabled to take the initiative and move to safety when other JAP. troops commenced to sweep the valley with all types of fire.

... *Aspence* .....MAJ.  
C.O. No. 2 AUST. IND. COY.

Company's Activities

19 - 20 Feb. 1942.

GENERAL:

- (1) The report deals with the activities of No.2 Aust. Ind. Coy following the landing of JAPANESE forces at DILLI on night of 19-Feb 1942.
- (2) The attached map is taken from RF PORTUGUESE TIMOR 1-250,000.

METHOD OF TREATMENT:

- (3) RED indicates the positions of A,B,C Plns and Coy H.Q. at the time of the JAP landing- One SEC A Pln being detached and stationed at the aerodrome DILLI.
- (4) (BLUE) indicates the progressive moves of the Coy following the JAPANESE drive into the interior which commenced with the action against A and B Plns on 3 - 4 March 1942 followed by the action against C Pln at HATOLIA and LETE FOHO between 7 APR and 26 APR 1942.
- (5) Areas occupied by the various platoons were known to Coy H.Q. as follows
  - (a) (RED) A Pln :- GENESIS CAMP.
  - B Pln :- FATU MASIN.
  - C Pln :- THREE SPURS.
  - Coy HQ :- RAILACO.
  - (b) (BLUE) As indicated by place names on the map with the addition of VILLA MARIA (in ink), which represented base H.Q. for approx one week, and NASUTA, a Sig station.
- (6) While all the platoons were in communication with H.Q. by W/T and R/T the whole system of communication was being revised. The detached section at the aerodrome was in communication by Lucas Lamp i.e. AERODROME- BOHAC - NASUTA - RAILACO. Additional W/T was provided by 109 set from DUTCH H.Q. to Coy H.Q. at RAILACO.

EVENTS PRECEEDING 19 FEB:

- (7) About 20 Jan 1942 RAILACO became the H.Q. of the Coy. This could only be done as a gradual process. The Company carried about 20 tons of stores and equipment with only 2 1-ton trucks to meet all requirements including the transport of rations from DILLI to THREE SPURS camp for breaking down to the respective platoons. One truck was caught in the flood waters of the COMORO RIVER. It was out of commission for EIGHT days. At this stage the main springs broke in the other truck. A change over of springs was made to keep one truck in commission and the broken down truck was held at RAILACO pending the making of new springs in DILLI. We were confronted with this difficulty on 19 Feb 42. Two very second hand trucks were requisitioned on the road. One, which was loaded with explosives broke down near NASUTA and was blown up. The other transported several loads of stores etc from RAILACO to VILLA MARIA and then broke down. All important Company stores such as medical, arms, ammunition, some explosives and accessories, rations and Sig equipment were taken from RAILACO to VILLA MARIA by native porters, horse trains and waggons drawn by water buffalo.

PLATOON AND COY. H.Q. DISPOSITIONS:

- (8) "A" Platoon occupied a tented camp over a series of well dispersed heavily wooded spurs with alternative hide-out positions located in rugged hills a short distance from the tented camp.
- (9) "B" Platoon was dispersed in section areas in the rugged hills and spurs of FATU MASIN.
- (10) "C" Platoon occupied native huts along THREE SPURS camp, four miles inland from TIBAR.
- (11) Coy H.Q. was located at RAILACO, Personnel living in tents and native huts. Coy H.Q. personnel comprised the normal establishment plus 55 re-inforcements (4 Officers and 51 O/rs) which were engaged in training in IND COY tactics, most of the re-inforcements had had very little previous training.



19 - 20 Feb. 1942

GENERAL:

- (1) The report deals with the activities of No 2 Aust. Ind. Coy following the landing of JAPANESE forces at DILLI on night of 19 Feb 1942.
- (2) The attached map is taken from RP PORTUGUESE TIMOR I-250,000.

METHOD OF TREATMENT:

- (3) RED indicates the positions of A, B, G Pins and Coy H.Q. at the time of the JAP landing - One SAC A Pin being detached and stationed at the aerodrome DILLI.
- (4) (BLUE) indicates the progressive moves of the Coy following the JAPANESE drive into the interior which commenced with the action against A and B Pins on 3 - 4 March 1942 followed by the action against G Pin at NATOLA and WEST YONO between 7 APR and 26 APR 1942.
- (5) Areas occupied by the various platoons were known to Coy H.Q. as follows:
  - (a) (RED) A Pin: -- GAMBIS CAMP.
  - B Pin: -- PATU MARIN.
  - C Pin: -- THREE SPURS.
  - Coy H.Q.: -- RAILAGO.
- (6) (BLUE) As indicated by place names on the map with the addition of VILLA MARIA (in ink), which represented base H.Q. for approx one week and NATOLA, a Sig station.
- (7) While all the platoons were in communication with H.Q. by W/T and R/T the whole system of communication was being revised. The detached section at the aerodrome was in communication by Lucas Lamp i.e. AERODROME - BOHAC - NATOLA - RAILAGO. Additional W/T was provided by 100 set from DUTCH H.Q. to Coy H.Q. at RAILAGO.

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- (10) "C" Platoon occupied native huts along THREE SPURS camp, four miles inland from DILLI.
- (11) Coy H.Q. was located at RAILAGO, Personnel living in tents and native huts. Coy H.Q. personnel comprised the normal establishment plus 25 reinforcements (4 Officers and 21 ORs) which were engaged in training in IND COY tactics, most of the reinforcements had had very little previous training.

- (12) NO information was received at Coy H.Q on the night of 19 Feb 1942. It was later found that mists obscured the Signal posts in the mountain ranges. The first intimation H.Q had of some action in DILLI area was a series of detonations which could be heard in the distance. These were heard in the Orderly Room at about 0750 on Feb 20. With the continued absence of information from DILLI some doubt existed as to the extent of the action. "B" Platoon, working on W/T schedule, at 0820, reported two transports and a light cruiser off AIPELO, moving slowly in the direction of ~~XXXXX~~ TIBAR. A later message reported small craft leaving the transports and proceeding in the direction of the COMORO RIVER where they were lost to view.
- "B" & "C" Platoons were ordered to move out to observe, contact and carry out harrassing tactics. Owing to distance the ~~the~~ enemy was not contacted but they were observed moving in the direction of DILLI. Patrols and O.Ps were maintained over the COMORO RIVER-TIBAR areas but there was no enemy movement in that direction along the main DILLI-KOEPANG Rd. "A" Platoon maintained patrols along the main AILEU-TOCULLULI Rd -indicated on the ~~map~~ attached map but not shown on the PORTUGUESE TIMOR map and kept ~~the~~ the junction of the roads at TOCULLULI guarded by one Section, to cover any movement from the rear by JAP patrols. At Approx 0800 hrs on 21 Feb 42 a Dutch engineering party (2 Sgts and 20 O/rs) reported into RAILACO from a bridging job across the RAILACO RIVER. This party stayed at RAILACO that night and proceeded to HATOLIA on 22 Feb 42. The Sergeant stated they hoped to secure rations and horses at HATOLIA and then proceed to ATAMBOEA.
- (13) Early on 21 Feb 42 patrols reported that the JAPS had occupied DILLI and that the DUTCH had withdrawn. Capt CALLINAN returned to Coy H.Q at approx 1300 hrs on 21 Feb 42 and confirmed this report. With the complete withdrawal of the DUTCH the position "C" Platoon and Coy H.Q became untenable. "A" & "B" Platoons held positions in the hills from which they could operate any delaying action required. To prevent the JAPS from using the road for some time two bridges and the road was blown by engineers. Further demolition work was carried out later by the engineers on the road as far out as EREMERA turn-off. The concrete bridge over the GLANO RIVER was destroyed.
- (14) Coy H.Q commenced moving from RAILACO to VILLA MARIA, a previously reconnoitered base H.Q, on Sat 21 Feb 42 and "C" Platoon commenced its move to HATOLIA on Sun 22 Feb 42. In the event of a sudden drive by Japs splitting up the Company, RAILACO was fixed as a Company rallying point.
- (15) These moves formed the basis for a plan to harrass the JAPS in any contemplated move towards ATAMBOEA DUTCH TIMOR; thence to KOEPANG in the rear of the 2/40 Bn. During this period and for some days afterwards the IND. COY  $\frac{1}{2}$  was in ignorance of the fate of the 2/40 Bn.
- (16) Base H.Q was temporarily established at VILLA MARIA approx Wed. 25 Feb 42. "C" Platoon established itself at HATOLIA approx Fri. 27 Feb 42. Following a report from Capt Boyland ("C" Platoon) I proceeded to HATOLIA on Sat. 28 Feb. 42 and organised approx 80 DUTCH soldiers into a platoon under a DUTCH officer (Lt HORSTINK) and a further thirty sick and wounded were ordered to move to ATAMBOEA. HORSTINK'S patrols were to co-operate with "C" Platoon and patrol areas from MAUBARA to BOBONARA to prevent any infiltration of JAP troops into DUTCH TIMOR. The new platoon was not a success - Lt HORSTINK - after the first patrol finishing with only 20 O/rs. this officer and his men continued under my command until the end of Mar. 42, when he was recalled by his C.O for the re-organisation of the DUTCH forces. I instructed Lt HORSTINK to bury about 50-000 rounds of ammunition and rations in a secluded spot near HATOLIA to prevent it falling into JAP hands. Most of the rations were used later to feed "A", "B", and "C" Platoons. About 20,000 rounds were dug up and conveyed by pack train to NOVA DUREM otherwise known as ATASABE and finally sent through to the re-organised DUTCH forces at TILOMAR.
- (17) Approx one week after the occupation of DILLI the JAPS moved in M.T. to LIQUICA & MAUBARA, WEST of DILLI, and ~~maximize~~ their object was to collect native labour for work in DILLI and native women for brothels. They shot all the pigs and water buffalo found in those areas for food. While on one of these foraging trips a convoy of five M.T was ambushed

five M.T was ambushed by a section of "B" Platoon, the trucks shot up and one completely destroyed by fire. After this surprise attack JAPS then moved in parties of one hundred strong.

(18) On Sun. Mar 1, 1942 the JAPS moved from DILLI in force—Afterwards estimated 500 strong— and engaged "A" and "B" platoons in their respective areas. "B" Platoon was first engaged on 3 Mar. 42. Due to the dispersal of the sections, difficult terrain and lack of exact information on our exact positions both platoons were able to withdraw after inflicting severe casualties. We lost two killed and four wounded. It was afterwards learned that the two killed men had been severely wounded and then bayoneted by the JAPS. Efforts were made by a PORTUGUESE friend of "B" platoon to help these two wounded men. He made three attempts to help and each time the JAPS refused, slapped him and prodded him away at the point of the bayonet. When he saw them again they had been bayoneted. Confirmed reports later disclosed that the JAPS were recalled to DILLI during the action on Mar. 3, 1942 and later some troops left for an unknown destination.

(19) Following the earlier plan to rally at CAILACO in the event of a definite drive by JAPANESE base H.Q at VILLA MARIA was vacated on TUES 3 Mar 42. (Note: Full use was made of the DILLI-KOEPANG road to its limit HATOLIA; from there it is impossible for M.T. or Bren carriers to use the roads running out from HATOLIA. The road from the GLANO RIVER VALLEY to the EREMER junction follows a torturous grade up the HATOBOL MOUNTAIN and here the Sappers blew the road in several places).

(20) Coy. H.Q. was established at CAILACO on Fri. 6 Mar. 42. Capt CALLINAN reported in to H.Q. about 1000 hrs Sat. 7 Mar. 42 with information which confirmed a previous rumour that the SPARROW FORCE at KOEPANG had been captured. This knowledge and the known fact that the DUTCH force from DILLI was disorganised resulted in a change of plans. Coy. H.Q. was moved from CAILACO to NOVA DUREM (or ATSABE) "A" & "B" Platoons were diverted to BOBONARO & VILA FILOMENA da CAMARA (or SAME) areas respectively to establish bases from which to operate forward toward DILLI. "C" Platoon was ordered to remain at HATOLIA. These new moves were well under way by Sat 14 Mar. 42.

(21) On 7 Mar 42 the JAPS began a determined drive along the main DILLI - KOEPANG Rd. Troops estimated at 150 R.Vd at TOCULLULI and it was reported, large numbers at RAILACO. This action—which lasted from 7 to 26 April 42—proved to be a series of ambushes, sniping and night raids in which our troops figured. Approx 400 JAPS were engaged in the area EREMER-HATOLIA-TALO-NOVA OBIDOS against Sections of "C" Pln "B" Pln Sigs and Engineers operating as guerilla troops. During this game of hide and seek the JAPS carried out a night attack and two large scale dawn attacks on VILLA MARIA & NOVA OBIDOS. Altogether our troops bagged three M.T. totally destroyed and about 100 men. Our casualties totalled one SIG. wounded.

(22) The only advantage gained by the JAPS was to drive "C" Platoon out of HATOLIA - which we always expected. "C" Platoon has now been ordered to MAOBISSE to establish its own Platoon H.Q. and Bases.

(23) Capt CALLINAN left H.Q. at VILLA MARIA on Mar 42 to try and get through to SPARROW FORCE H.Q. in DUTCH TIMOR. He reaches LAHAROS and there learned of the cessation of fighting at KOEPANG and the dispersing of the troops at ATAMBOEA. He returned with Capt Parker of BRIGADE H.Q. to CAILACO reaching there on 7 Mar. 42. Capt PARKER and his personnel of Sigs were then attached to this COMPANY. He was instructed to try and communicate with AUSTRALIA using all the wireless apparatus the COMPANY possessed. Additional apparatus was required and this was obtained by a patrol to the wireless station at ATTAMBOEA which had been put out of action some time previously. Great work was done by this band of sigs to which were attached Sigs LOVELESS M.L. and RICHARDS K.R., Instrument mechanics of the IND. COY., To quote Capt PARKER:—"Had it not been for Sig LOVELESS the set would never have been built".

(24)A Approx three weeks ago Lt GARNETT in charge of sub-section approached and O.Pd DILLI from the EAST in the REMEXIO

area. Working in conjunction with friendly PORTUGUESE a complete wireless transmitting set was obtained from the wireless station at DILLI and transported by native porters to NOVA LUSA (south coast) and taken over by Capt PARKER.

(25) About 7 Mar. 42 I had the pleasure of meeting ANTONIO DE SOUSA SANTOS, Administrator of the Frontier Province (BOBONARA), who might well be described as one of nature's gentlemen. Definitely pro-British in his ideas, despite the constant threat of JAPANESE entry into his Province, he opened the hospitality of his home, the vast resources of his province and the help of his many subjects to assist the AUSTRALIAN and DUTCH soldiers using his territory as bases from which to operate against the JAPANESE in PORTUGUESE TIMOR. I trust, Sir, that his name will be ranked high among the list of neutrals whose assistance to the Allied Forces can never be repaid, by word or deed.

(26) On 15 Mar. 42 I met and conferred with Mr D Ross, H.B.M Consul, DILLI. He had been sent out to HATOLIA by the JAPANESE CONSUL, DILLI to call on the AUSTRALIAN soldiers, who were believed to be disorganised bands roaming in the hills, to surrender. At the conclusion of the conference Mr. Ross was advised to inform the JAP. Consul that: "The IND. COY. was attached to the SPARROW FORCE under the control of 7 M.D., DARWIN. Though advised that the ~~MYK~~ N.E.I. Govt. had capitulated this action did not concern us. The Aust. Govt. had not capitulated therefore we would continue to fight."

(27) On Fri. 6 MAR. 1942, I was contacted by runner at CAILACO. As a result of the message handed to me I left CAILACO next day en route to LOLOTOI, where I ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ reported to Brig. ~~VEALE~~,  
..... *Aspence* ..... MAJ.

C.O. No. 2 Aust. Ind. Coy.

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ted this action did not concern us. The Aust. Govt. had not capit-  
ulated therefore we would continue to fight."

(27) On Fri. 6 MAR. 1942, I was contacted by runner at GALIAGO. As  
a result of the message handed to me I left GALIAGO next day en route  
to LOLOTOI, where I ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ reported to Brig. ~~xxxxxx~~  
WRALE.  
.....  
C.O. No. 2 Aust. Ind. Coy.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

ON

THE COASTAL TOPOGRAPHY OF DIILI AREA.

TO:-

MAJ. A. SPENCE

O.C.No.2 AUST. IND. COY.

PORT. TIMOR.

FROM:-

*by*

( CAPT. R.R. BALDWIN  
LIEUT D DEXTER )

No. 2 AUST. IND. COY.  
PORT. TIMOR

(HQ Maps 13/5/42

MAPS BY PTE C.W. VERNEDE

No. 2 AUST. IND. COY.

PORT. TIMOR.

GENERAL.

1. The report deals with area extending from TIBAR (Long.  $125^{\circ} 28'$  to HERA (Long.  $125^{\circ} 42'$ ) and from the shore as far back as the summits of the coastal range of hills.

2. The data concerning roads was collected during Jany 42 and may be now out of date.

METHOD OF TREATMENT.

1. The preliminary report "A" deals in general with the whole area and is illustrated by a sketch map AM.

2. Then followed detailed reports B, C and D, each illustrated by a sketch map BM, CM, DM. The areas referred to in these detailed reports are shown on the general sketch map AM.

3. On the sketch map SM is shown the telephone system of the area. on this map also are shown the places illustrated by the photographs which accompany the report.

4. On a map TM are shown DILLI and environs, including the aerodrome.

REPORT "A".COASTLINE .

The shore of TIBAR BAY is flat and swampy with mangroves. the bay is seriously coral bound. EAST of TIBAR BAY a rocky prominty projects and the hills are steep to a rockbound shore. EAST of this promintary a steep shelving sandy beach extends to the mouth of the COMORO RIVER. This continues to a point approx 800 yds WEST of the WESTERN end of AERODROME. from this point to DILLI HARBOUR the beach is coral bound. EAST of DILLI a rocky headland rises to a height of 400 feet. It projects to about two miles to the NORTH. EAST of this point the nature of the coast is not known for certain, but is surmised to be rock and coralbound up to the anchorage at HERA.

TERRAIN AND VEGETATION.

From TIBAR headland to the headland EAST of DILLI, a coastal range rising at its highest point to approx 1500 feet forms a rough semi-circle at its greatest distance some three miles from the shore. Midway between TIBAR headland and the COMORO, a spur of this range reaches out to within three hundred yards of the beach thus forming two plains almost encircled by hills. The more WESTERLY of these plains is taken up with three salt lagoons and almost covered with dense thickets of prickly pear. The larger EASTERN plain, at the EASTERN end of which DILLI lies is otherwise taken up with palm swamps grasslands rise fields and cocoanut plantations. Emerging from a gorge the COMORO RIVER flows NORTH over the westerly portion of this plain. Two and a half miles EAST of DILLI another river flows approx north. East of this river there is a saddle of about two hundred feet which gives on to the WESTERN portion of a plain similar to that on which DILLI lies. Another river flowing approx north enters the sea near HERA.

The TIBAR end of the coast range as far as the COMORO is sparcely timbered with eucalypts. From the COMORA to HERA the range is more thickly covered with sub-tropical vegetation, but there are several clearings. Throughout its length the coast range is very steep and much cut with re-entrants.

WATER.

(a) DRINKING WATER may be obtained from a spring on the coast at TIBAR and from wells in the DILLI area as well as from the town supply

(b) RIVERS; All the rivers mentioned above are normally dry or very shallow flowing. Their beds are stony and the channels are

REPORT "A"

over a width of approx 200 yards. When there is heavy rains in the hills these rivers may rise in the space of an hour or two, to be muddy torrents up to six feet deep and very fast ~~xxxxxx~~ flowing.

ROADS AND TRACKS.

(a) From TIBAR to DILLI there is a main road varying from A1 to B2, subject to interruption by lands slides on TIBAR headland and by a rise in the COMORO RIVER where there is no bridge. Approx one mile and a half WEST of the COMORO RIVER, the road passes through a narrow cutting about twenty feet deep and about eighty yards long. A main road in its good parts B1 to B2 runs from DILLI to HERA but it is subject to interruption by floods in the two rivers mentioned above and is completely broken by landslides between DILLI and HERA, at the saddle.

(b) A road B2 runs SOUTH from DILLI into the hills to LAHANE (two miles) and thence to DARI and LAULAURA (further two miles).

(c) From the saddle between DILLI and HERA, and from a point about one mile WEST of HERA two other roads branch south from the main road. Where they lead to is Unknown.

(d) From DILLI an old B1 and B2 road (the old AILEU Rd) and skirts the foothills in a general S.W. direction to the mouth of the COMORO GORGE. From there on it is practically washed away and the sound parts are much overgrown.

(e) TRACKS. Over the whole area there are numerous tracks which are indicated in the detailed report.

NATIVE VILLAGES.

There is a scattered native village at TIBAR, one of approx fifteen huts by the largest of the three salt ~~xxxxxx~~ lagoons, one of similar size immediatly WEST of the mouth of the COMORO RIVER and many other scattered huts, particularly in the neighborhood of DILLI. There are also native villages on the coastal range at REMEXIO LIOLISSA TALTOO BALIBA and LAU LAURA, as well as scattered huts.

EUROPEAN BUILDINGS.

Apart from DILLI and LAHANE there are:- an isolated telephone station (native attendant) on a hill one mile EAST of TIBAR, a Portuguese dwelling about half a mile WEST of the COMORO and **four hundred yardsefrdm** the shore, a brick kiln about one mile S.S.E. of the COMORO crossing, several stone built white houses on the WEST side of the AERODROME, POSTOS (telephone and administrative) at HERA REMEXIO and LAULAURA, scattered portuguese dwellings in the hills overlooking DILLI.

HILLS AND O.Ps.

High points and spurs of the coastal range offer numerous excellent O.Ps over DILLI and the coastline. The better ones are mentioned in the detailed report.

FOODSTUFFS.

The JAP occupation of DILLI makes it impossible to estimate food resources in this area. In general it has been found that the coastal villages are very poor, and that those in the hills offer supplies of Maize, rice, fruits, poultry, pigs, goats and buffaloes to small parties of six to eight troops, but these supplies are both scanty and sporadic.

NATIVE MORALE.

This is difficult to estimate owing to the JAP occupation. In general the natives used to be friendly to AUSTRALIANS and probably remain so when not terrified by the JAPS.

COMMUNICATIONS.

There are telephone lines DILLI-TIBAR and beyond, DILLI-HERA and beyond; HERA-REMEXIO-AILEU; DILLI-AILEU and beyond.



COASTLINE.

(a) TIBAR BAY. The southern shore of the bay is mud flats with mangrove swamps. The eastern shore, rocks and coral. The mouth of the bay seems to be barred by a complicated system of coral reefs.

(b) From point 1 on the map to point 2 the shoreline is abrupt and rocky, save in the centre where there is a sandy beach approx 500 yds long. It is not known whether this is coralbound or not.

(c) From point 2 to point 3 there is a sandy beach steeply shelving, curving inwards, and free of coral.

(d) From point 3 to the mouth of the COMORO there ~~is~~ is a sandy beach, but whether coralbound or not is unknown.

TERRAIN AND VEGETATION.

(a) EAST of TIBAR the coast range runs right out to form a rocky headland, approx 400 feet at its highest point. Beyond this to the ~~east~~ EAST is a plain which extends as far as another spur of the main range, which ends in a bold peak approx 500 feet in height and approx half a mile from the shore. EAST of this another plain stretches to the COMORO.

(b) The first plain ("a" above) is covered with clumps of prickly pear, interspersed with grassy spaces, and carries some timber. There is little cover from the air. Close under the range lie three salt lagoons.

(c) The second plain ("A" above) is covered near the shore with a very heavy growth of scrub palms, and on the SOUTH of the road is similar, but cleared here and there for rice fields.

(d) The coast range in this area rises at its highest to approx 800 ft and is much cut up by small reentrants. The re-entrants are heavily timbered and scrubbed, the summit and spurs of the range sparsely clothed with eucalypts.

WATER.

There is a good spring of variable flow at TIBAR; The COMORO flows with muddy water. Apart from this the area has no fresh water.

ROADS AND TRACKS.

(a) The main road is clearly shown on the maps AM and BM.

(b) A short cut track passible for horse transport lead from TIBAR to the three lagoons area.

(c) A foot track leads along the top of the coastal range.

(d) In the swampy plain there is a maze of animal and foot tracks.

(e) Marching on these tracks would not average more than 2 M.P.H in the area.

NATIVE VILLAGES.

There are native villages in the places marked, but these are not of importance as the area is miserably poor. It is impossible to know the temper of the natives since the JAPS occupation. Before they were friendly to the AUSTRALIANS.

EUROPEAN BUILDINGS.

(a) There is a white stone built telephone station of about six rooms overlooking TIBAR from the EAST.

(b) There is a four roomed stone house in the position shown near the mouth of the COMORO.

O.Ps.

The trig point marked on the central spur of the area offers excellent observation of DILLI and the whole coastline from the headland EAST of TIBAR to the headland EAST of DILLI

COASTLINE

The mouth of the COMORO RIVER is of delta type and divided into several channels. The nature of the bottom off shore is not known. From the mouth of the COMORO to a point approx six hundred yards WEST of the WEST edge of the aerodrome there does not seem to be any coral, and at seven or eight hundred yards from the WEST edge of the drome there is known to be good boat landings. From about this place coral reefs stretch almost unbroken to the EAST side of DILLI bay. From shore observation it is impossible to give an accurate description of the reefs.

TERRAIN AND VEGETATION.

Throughout this flat area the distance from the coast to the hills ~~there is a~~ varies between one and a half and two and a half miles. Near the mouth of the COMORO the bed is about two hundred and fifty yards wide and divided into several channels between which grow clumps of trees and grass. For a distance of about three hundred yards EAST of the COMORO, between the main road and the coast there is tall grass about six feet high. From here between the coast and the main road the vegetation up to the drome consists mainly of coconut plantations, banana plantations and small native holdings growing mainly maize. Three belts of palms approx one hundred yards apart and stretching NORTH & SOUTH make WEST to EAST progress very difficult except along the Beach or just to the NORTH of the road through the Native holdings. The first belt is about opposite the WEST edge of the coral reef and the other belts are towards the 'Drome. The vegetation on the SOUTH side of the main road consists mainly of rice fields, isolated clumps of trees and the usual trees and maize surrounding a few native huts. A ditch about eight feet wide by five feet deep runs along the WEST edge of the 'Drome and a canal of similar dimensions runs along the EAST edge. An irregular belt of Prickly Pear runs along the edge of the ditch. N.W. of the 'Drome the Dutch cleared about 100 yds. of Coconut palms in order to construct M.G. nests. A full description of the 'Drome will be found below. SOUTH of the 'Drome are rice fields, clumps of trees and native dwellings, stretching to the foothills.

DILLI itself is approx. one mile from the 'Drome.

There are native and Chinese houses along both sides of the main road. This area will also be described below.

The town of DILLI will be described below.

EAST of DILLI up to the first watercourse the country is very flat and thickly clad with trees.

WATER:

There is only a scanty supply of well water between the COMORO and DILLI. The DILLI supply is partly from wells and partly for drinking water from a pipe system drawn from the hills. EAST of DILLI besides the non-perennial waters there is only well water.

ROADS:

- (a) For roads in the town area see Map TM.
- (b) The main DILLI-TIBAR Rd. is subject to interruption by flood at the COMORO Rv. where there is no bridge, and where the water is constantly changing its course and its depth. Otherwise it is an A1 to B2 Rd. See photo No. 4.
- (c) The DILLI-HERA Rd. is class B2 in this area.
- (d) The DILLI-LAHANE-LAULAURA Rd. is class B2 with several wash-aways behind LAHANE. The grade is not accurately known but is steep with many cuttings.
- (e) The old DILLI-AILEU Rd. skirts the foothills in a ~~SE~~ S.W. direction to the bank of the COMORO Rv. Up to the COMORO Rv. though not used, it is class ~~B1~~ B2. Thence onwards it is much washed away by the river.

TRACKS.

(A) The foottracks in the swampy heavily overgrown areas WEST & EAST OF the drome are numerous and too complicated for verbal description.

(b) A rough cart track runs from just EAST of the COMORO crossing SOUTH one mile to the brick kiln.

(c) There is a system of inter-twining native tracks following the summit of the coast range, from the gorge of the COMORO, EAST to LAU LAURA BALIBA, TALTOO, and thence on to REMEXIO. There are feeders to this system

Running up almost all the spurs of the main range, particularly from valley of the COMORO.

#### NATIVE VILLAGES.

There are villages of ten or more houses at BIDOUKU, COMORO, BALIBA, TALTOO and many scattered huts in the ranges and on the DILLI plain.

#### EUROPEAN BUILDINGS.

Beyond the environs of DILLI there are :-

- (a) A brick kiln one mile S.S.E. of the COMORO crossing.
- (b) Several European houses dwelt in by Arabs between the COMORO and the WEST edge of the drome.
- (c) About six houses between the COMORO and LAHANE on the higher slopes and spurs.
- (d) LAHANE: Hospital, Governors palace and several large residences.
- (e) DARI:- Large mission of many rooms. This was used by the JAPS as an O.P. on LAU LAURA during early March 1942.
- (f) LAU LAURA :- POSTO of about six rooms.
- (g) The wireless station about one mile S.S.E. of DILLI.

#### O.Ps.

Any spur and most parts of the coastal range offer good O.Ps on DILLI, but the following are particularly good:- The first trig point EAST of the COMORO, LAU LAURA, BALIBA, TALTOO - all uses by AUSTRALIANS.

#### DILLI AERODROME.

From observations on March 2nd 1942 and during the week ending March 28th 1942 it may be stated that the old drome has considerably changed since the ALLIED occupation. The NORTH-SOUTH runway has been extended over the road, across the rice field towards the foothills. This is presumably a fighter runway. On March 2nd this was almost completed.

SOUTH of the main road for a distance of approx 400 yds the JAPANESE have cleared all huts and vegetation. A big EAST-WEST runway running along the SOUTH of the main road was nearing completion on March 28th. This runway was presumably for bombers. Flooding of the COMORO over the rice fields would cause this runway to be unservicable.

On March 28th ten fighters were lined up wing tip to wing tip on the WESTERN side of the old drome.

On March 28th the two Arab houses immediately WEST of the drome were being used by the JAPS. The two hangar building towards the S.W corner of the old drome and the small explosive hut in the centre of the WEST side of the old drome were also being used. About one hundred yards EAST of the hangars were two large tents with a large JAPANESE flag flying from one. EAST of the new fighter runway near the centre of the old drome were two more large tents. Towards the S.E. corner of the old drome was a petrol dump. In the extreme S.E. corner of the old drome was a large building being used by the JAPS.

The WEST side of the drome was bounded by a ditch across which were two small wooden bridges. Except for the road there was no bridge across the canal on the EAST side of the drome. The main road runs along the south boundary of the drome and the drome road enters from the S.W corner.

In January there was grass three feet high on the drome but most of this as well as the grass, creepers and cactus NORTH of the drome along the coast have been since cleared.

For a sketch map of the new drome see appendix      /      to map T.M..

#### DILLI.

DILLI can best be studied from the map TM.

Between the EAST edge of the drome and DILLI itself is an area covered with palms, crisscrossed by many tracks and dotted with native huts. A small non-perennial watercourse runs to the sea through this area.

DILLI harbour is beaconed by a light house immediately EAST of the drome. A channel leads into the harbour through the coral reef and there is a T shaped concrete pier.

The streets of DILLI are good for wheeled traffic and many of the streets are tree lined.

Report 'C' Area 'B'

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Water is supplied to DILLI from wells and from the LEHANE pipe system.

Most of the buildings in DILLI are of white stone or cement. The ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH is a land mark for many miles.

During the Allied occupation market day was on Sunday when approx 4000 natives crowded into DILLI.

TO

7

REPORT "D". AREA "C".

COASTLINE.

(a) From point 1 on the map to point 2 the beach is shelving but there is a coral strand stretching across the whole of DILLI bay with the exception of the channel.

(b) From point 2 to point 3 there is a rocky headland. Beach in this area is very rugged.

(c) From point 3 to HERA anchorage the coastline is unknown but from the coastal range there appears to be much coral beyond the sand beach.

TERRAIN AND VEGETATION.

The area described in this report stretches from the DILLI plain to the HERA plain. That portion of the DILLI plain described is shown in photograph 1 (see map SM). Two small and one large non-perennial watercourses drain the large re-entrant which stretches to the hills bounding the EAST DILLI plain. From these hills which rise to 1500 feet a spur reaches to the headland EAST of DILLI. This spur divided the DILLI plain from the HERA plain where another watercourse drains the hill. Sub-tropical vegetation covers both plains and the encircling hills. There is also a coconut plantation at HERA.

WATER.

Apart from the four watercourses mentioned above there is no water along the route from DILLI to HERA. There is good water in the hills at SAN FRANCISCO and along the track to LIOLISSA & REMEXIO. There is well water at HERA and at the plantation approx one mile WEST of HERA.

ROADS AND TRACKS.

(a) The main road is clearly shown on the maps AM and DM. The road is very rough varying from B2 to B4. From the second watercourse EAST of DILLI the road is almost non-existent and transport would only be possible by porter and horse. From the DILLI-HERA saddle to HERA the road is B2.

(b) The road marked X on the map DM was blocked by a landslide ~~xxxx~~ 200 yds from the main road. The road marked Z on the map DM was B3 up to the foothills. It is not known where these two roads lead to.

(c) An excellently graded track for pack horses leaves the main road where it crosses the second watercourse EAST of DILLI and climbs to the ARAB settlement of SAN FRANCISCO. It then skirts the large re-entrant SOUTH of the EAST DILLI plain and reaches LIOLISSA & REMEXIO. From the track another leads to LAU LAURA. Travelling times would be :- DILLI to SAN FRANCISCO three hours; SAN FRANCISCO to REMEXIO 6 hours.

NATIVE VILLAGES.

There are many native huts along the watercourses of the EAST DILLI plain and along the track mentioned above. There is a small village of about ten huts N.W. of SAN FRANCISCO. SAN FRANCISCO consists of two stone built houses. LIOLISSA is the seat of CHIEF MATHIAS (Timor) and consists of one large stone house and about ten huts. At REMEXIO there are about eight Chinese shops and houses as well as about ten native huts.

There are huts at HERA but along the road to DILLI there are very few.

In the fertile LIOLISSA-REMEXIO area there are enough fruits, goats, pigs, poultry, buffalo, maize and rice (Jan 1942) to maintain about eight men indefinitely.

EUROPEAN BUILDINGS.

The POSTO at REMEXIO, the telephone exchange (native attendant) at HERA, and the building on the plantation one mile WEST of HERA are the only buildings other than the Chinese and Arabs already mentioned of anything other than native design in this area.

O.Ps.

From SAN FRANCISCO and points along the mountain track there are good O.Ps on DILLI. From the vicinity of REMEXIO there are good O.Ps on HERA. The DUTCH maintained an O.P. on the headland east of DILLI

STOP

To:- C.O.  
No.2 Indep. Coy.  
P.Timor.

From:- Capt B J Callinan  
2 i/c No.2 Indep. Coy.

Map references:- (a) PORTUGUESE TIMOR. Scale- 1 : 250,000  
Drawn from data; ASIA INVESTMENT COY 1937.  
(b)  
(b) SECTION PORTUGUESE TIMOR. Scale:- 1 : 250,000.  
Attached to report of C.O. No 2 Indep Coy.

Attached hereto is an extract from a diary describing my movements from the time of the occupation of DILLI and it describes my knowledge at the time of the action.

From the commencement of the action until the breakdown of communications, due to the enemy cutting of telephone wires and the prevention of the return of Pte Doyle to the aerodrome, I was able to Co-ordinate the action of No 2 Section under Lt. McKenzie, at the aerodrome with any action contemplated by Lt. Col. Van Straten.

At the time I had no knowledge of what other orders or instructions Lt. Col. Van Straten had issued to his force as these were given in Dutch. It was not until he had moved from the town that I was able to discuss the general situation, and I discovered that what I presumed was a movement to an alternative H.Q. was in reality a withdrawal from the town. I then made all efforts to Coy. H.Q.

As directed the following report on communications during the occupation is supplied:-

At approx 0030 hrs 20 Feb I sent a message to Sig Hancock at the Company's signal station attached to Dutch H.Q. This message was intended to inform Coy H.Q. that there was naval gunfire on DILLI. Sig Hancock reported to me that the set was out of commission due to the removal of some parts by Cpl Stanley who had left DILLI. I instructed him to wait by the set in the hopes that Cpl Stanley would return with the parts. Sig Hancock later reported that he had managed to get the set working but was unable to contact Coy. H.Q. because they were NOT on the air. The interference at night rendered the use of wireless impossible and so an alternative method of communication had been established, and this was by Lucas Lamp from the aerodrome. I then gave Sig Hancock another message which included ~~xxxx~~ the information that a JAPANESE attack on DILLI was thought to be occurring.

At approx 0200 hrs a message similar to the later, I sent by telephone to Lt McKenzie to be sent by Lucas Lamp at the next scheduled time which was 0230 hrs. Lt McKenzie wisely delayed to send this message until the return of a patrol he had sent out. At 0300 hrs an attempt was made to send the message but was prevented by a heavy mist which lay over DILLI during that night

No attempt was made to send a runner to Coy. H.Q. because the road to Coy. H.Q. was the road along which the enemy had advanced. At approx 0230 telephone communication between Dutch H.Q. and Lt McKenzie ceased.

19 Feb.

Approx 1400 hrs I left Railaco for Dilli to discuss with Lt. Col. Van Straaten details of proposed move of Australian and Dutch troops to DUTCH TIMOR. Waited at "C" Pln area for Sgt Press who had a message to be transmitted to KOEPANG. Arrived in Dilli, called at the aerodrome but Lt McKENZIE was in Dilli. Proceeded to DUTCH H Q, dined and slept there. At 1110 hrs was awakened, but person did not inform me of reason. Arose and was about to move out of room at 1120 hrs when there was an explosion which shook the building. Went to east end of building where Aust. Sigs were housed, heard moans of wounded, could not contact sigs there. Moved back to main building and there was another explosion, this larger than the previous one. Moved out to trenches in front of the building and contacted Col. Van Straaten.

20 Feb.

There were further shells which Col. and his staff believed to be coming from a submarine which had come in close. They thought they could hear the engines of the submarine. The shells were preceded by a flash from a powerful searchlight. In general the shells were not effective some exploding in large Wahrungan trees above the trenches, stripping the trees but otherwise doing no damage. Contacted Lt McKenzie at aerodrome who reported some shells in his direction, but no other activity at the time. Later he reported lights and activity about the mouth of the Comoro River. As the DUTCH troops whose positions were at the aerodrome were NOT there (they were sleeping near the lighthouse) I instructed Lt McKenzie, at the request of Col. Van Straaten, to move his Bren gun to cover the road from the Comoro into Dilli and to send out a patrol towards the Comoro R; These things he did. I also passed to Lt McKenzie the Col's instructions not to demolish the drome as the Col. considered that it would endanger his own troops who were moving up. I instructed him NOT to destroy the building containing the kit bags etc as it would illuminate his and the Dutch positions. I gave him a message to send by Lucas Lamp to Coy H.Q. I had previously discovered from Sig. Hancock that the set there had been dismantled. He later got it working and remained at the set until 0730 hrs in the attempt to get it through. He was ordered to leave by Lt McKenzie.

The patrol reported back and had encountered nothing. Lt McKenzie still reported lights about the Comoro, this I passed to Col Van Straaten but he and his 2i/c still thought the activity due to a submarine. The reason for such activity being NOT known. He had been unable to move the Dutch troops quickly from the lighthouse area because the telephone communication had broken down.

At 0300 hrs (approx) Pte Doyle reported to me that the enemy had come along the road towards Dilli. The Bren gun had not operated at long range because of doubts as to the identity of the troops. All through the action the similarity of Dutch and enemy uniforms created confusion.

The Bren gun had fired effectively until put out of action by grenades. This news I passed on to the Col.

I sent Pte Doyle back to Lt McKenzie with what information I could give him regarding Dutch movements, but shortly afterwards Pte Doyle returned as he had encountered enemy troops who appeared to have surrounded the Australian positions. Firing could be heard from the direction of the drome. The Dutch artillery up to this time had NOT fired. The Col. could NOT understand this.

At dawn the Dutch H<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> Q<sup>2</sup> troops moved from the trenches to higher ground to the rear of Dilli, close to the wireless station; Pte Doyle and I moving with them.

Col Van Straaten told me that he had instructed his men to withdraw to the hills and carry out guerilla tactics. He was worried lest they should delay their withdrawal and so be trapped. H.Q. moved from this high ground to a track which I understood to lead to Aileu. Here I discussed with the Col. the situation and he told me ~~this~~ he intended

- (a) Moving to Aileu.
- (b) There contacting Major Spence
- (c) Obtaining transport from Aileu to Toculluli.
- (d) Reform his troops at Toculluli as this place was on the line of withdrawal along the road towards Dutch Timor.

I decided that my value to the Colonel was now nil as he had no

contact with either his or our troops so I decided to make due west across country and attempt to reach the road to Railaco above Tibar. So Pte Doyle and I left the Col. and his party.

After some rather rough climbs and descents we came on to the road to Lou Lara and stopped at approx 0900 hrs for food at a Portuguese h use. From here we could see troops moving through cover from the aerodrome towards where Pte Doyle told me was the hide out and alternative hide ~~hide out~~ H.Q. for No 2 Section. We also noticed mortar bombs exploding at the end of each of the spurs flanking the re-entrant leading to this hide out.

We moved on from here along the road but after moving about half a mile we met a Dutch medical N C O running in our direction, who told us that the Japanese were just round the corner. We moved back a short distance and then left the road and climbed a steep re-entrant. We had almost reached cover when we were fired upon by Japanese. We reached our cover and remained there for approx one hour. Our arms were one colt automatic and four grenades - Pte Doyle's rifle had been given to Cpl Delbridge before he left the Drome.

We heard the enemy constructing a machine gun emplacement and later heard a car come along the road from Dilli, this car moved under the enemy position but out of our view, except for brief periods, due to trees.

We did not know who the occupants were; The car was heard to stop and voices were heard. Then an old truck was heard labouring up the road and as this was revealed to us for a short time, we saw in it Dutch and Australian soldiers. This also passed out of sight and stopped. We decided to break from our cover with two alternatives, that (a) we would be unobserved or (b) we would be fired upon and thus reveal the presence of the enemy. We moved and were NOT fired upon. We had moved some little distance before firing and exploding grenades were heard. By the time we reached the top of the ridge all in that area was quiet again. From here we moved through the hills, meeting Dutch soldiers who all told me they were moving to Atamboea. They did NOT know of any reforming at Toculluli.

We slept that night in the hills.

#### 21 Feb.

In the morning we moved to Aileu arriving there at approx 1100hrs. There we had a meal and obtained transport to Railaco. There were no Dutch troops at Toculluli as we passed through there. We reported into Coy H.Q. and slept at Railaco that night.

#### 22 Feb.

Remained at Railaco for morning. In afternoon moved to "A" Pln area. In evening moved with "A" pln patrol to Toculluli and thence with Pte Cornelius to Glano River bridge which had been prepared for demolition by Sappers. Remained at bridge until demolition, at approx 0115 hrs 23 Feb.

#### 23 Feb.

Moved along road and moved to short distance above road to sleep with intention of going back to bridge in the morning. Reports of shots and an unexplained explosion gave the idea that the enemy were in Toculluli area so moved the party, now of five, along road to where staging dump had been established 11 miles from Railaco. Stayed there for day with Lt. Garnett getting stores away to VILLA MARIA, mainly by promising natives money at VILLA MARIA. Lt Garnett did excellent work here.

#### 24 Feb.

With Pte Cornelius moved back along road across Glano River and up towards Toculluli and obtained native who led me to where Lt. Turner. ("A" Pln) had his section. That night contacted Capt Baldwin and slept with Lt. McKenzies section.

#### 25 Feb.

In morning joined in conference Capt Baldwin was having with his officers. Later moved with Capt Baldwin through BAZAR TETE area and contacted Lt. Nisbet ("B" Pln) and Capt Laidlaw.

#### 26 Feb.



PAGE 2

26 Feb.

Saw Jap fleet of twentyfive ships including four aircraft carriers pass Dilli, going westward. Moved back along river valleys to "A" pln area near Toculluli ~~xxxx~~ and slept in Lt Dexter's hideout.

27 FEB.

Moved from there to Ai Phoo and Eremera back to Villa Maria.

28 Feb.

Remained at Villa Maria.

REPORT ON        ENEMY TACTICS:

TO C O

— No 2 Ind Coy  
P Timor.

FROM Capt B J Callinan  
2 <sup>i/c</sup> No 2 Ind Coy  
P Timor.

1. The information that I have collected will be best given as a series of experiences, each separate and from which conclusions can be drawn.
2. COMORO RIVER. While carrying out observations on the aerodrome the following points were discovered.
  - (a) Enemy did not sleep away from Dili; all troops returned to quarters in houses in or near Dili each night.
  - (b) Only small percentage of troops working on aerodrome roads or bridges carried arms although many of the remainder carried sticks about three feet long.
  - (c) Each house containing troops had one or two sentries and in addition a town patrol functioned at night. But as far as could be ascertained all patrol activity ceased at approx 2300 hrs.
  - (d) Enemy preferred to make troop movements at night.
3. TOCULLULI The enemy observed Lt Turton and myself in a position approx one half mile from their positions at Toculluli road Junction and sent out a patrol (afterwards discovered to be about fifty strong).  
~~The following procedure~~  
The following procedure was followed:
  - (a) The patrol moved along the road towards our position—making use of all available cover and the winding nature of the road.
  - (b) The patrol was followed by a mortar team of approx nine.
  - (c) The mortar team selected a prominent village on ridge behind our O.P. and commenced to mortar it. Unfortunately we were close to this village when the mortaring commenced but I DO NOT consider that we had been observed. The mortaring was accurate but ineffective and was, I consider, solely for intimidation.
  - (d) The patrol continued along the road leaving groups of two or three soldiers at each bend in the road and having a patrol of approx fifteen men moving up and down the road.
  - (e) Eleven soldiers then searched a deserted village through which we had moved. We observed these soldiers make a thorough search lasting one half hour and then return towards Toculluli.
  - (f) The patrols remained out for three or four hours AM but returned to Toculluli as soon as evening descended.
  - (g) The next day the road area we had occupied was patrolled.
  - (h) The enemy adopted the expedient of firing a few shots at the natives who congregated on top of every knoll and peak, and who had been observing all enemy movements.
4. RAILACO-HATOLIA ROAD. After Lt Turton and his sappers had contacted the enemy:
  - (a) Artillery commenced shelling four prominent land marks roughly behind the area in which we were imagined to be occupying. The shelling was fairly methodical, being carried out in an anti-clockwise direction with approx six shells on each position. It was accurate but ineffective, the shells having very little splintering effect. Owing to the hilly nature of the country slight alterations in range made large variations in the points of impact. But in all cases observed the mortars and artillery have been accurate.
  - (b) Similarly mortars selected prominent land marks for their attention.
  - (c) Shelling mortaring and M<sub>2</sub> fire continued long after the Australians had left the area of action.

(d) All enemy troops ,approx 200 returned to Toculluli as evening approached.The maximum number of Australians in that area ws thirty.

(e) At approx 1600 hrs artillery was moved to a position covering the valley in which the Eremera road runs.

(f) At approx 1800 hrs truck lights etc were seen moving in the valley. There seemed little effort to conceal lights.

5 EREMERA. Enemy artillery subjected this town and the surrounding area to a bombardment lasting some hours. Australian troops had never occupied this town.

(b) Later in the day the enemy moved from their position below the town, into which they had moved during the night, and occupied the town ~~itself~~ itself.

(c) A mortar was located on a peak on the west and overlooking Lete Foho.

(d) Patrols were sent round through the coffee plantations to the town to cut off any retreat of Australians towards Rotei.

(e) It is presumed that other troops were held to cut off any movement towards north which was in open country and towards the road.

(f) At approx 0530, upon the firing of a signal flare from the high ground to the west of the town, the

(c) The enemy were heard machine gunning positions along the road we had occupied the previous day.

(d) The following morning one of our O.Ps which we had not used for several days, was mortared. We moved up the ridge and were able to see the mortar set up in the street of Eremera. The mortaring was concentrated on the O.P and NO effort was made to search the ridge from which we continued to observe.

(e) Later a patrol of normal enemy size (thirty to fifty) with M.G. moved to the ridge.

6 HATOLIA. The enemy occupation of Hatolia was preceded by some some days of enemy observation from the high ground between Villa Maria and Eremera. These days were also used by the enemy to machine gun and mortar the Villa Maria area.

(b) On one occasion they mortared an O.P. actually being used by Australians. They took no other action and the O.P. was used again the next day.

(c) Patrols were sent out to cover the high ground on the east side of the road. Patrols did not operate at night.

(d) The occupation took place at 0300 hrs.

7 VILLA MARIA AREA. The enemy spent almost two weeks searching this area with patrols of forty or fifty. Each day these patrols mortared and/or machinegunned villages in this area, but not in any case discovering the whereabouts of Capt Boyland and his men.

(b) After ambush of two trucks by Lt Rose the enemy became more active in this area and by moving troops from Hatolia occupied approx ten Villages and while in these villages was apparently was able to discover the village which had been used as a H.Q. for almost two weeks.

(c) The enemy raid on this village was preceded by four mortar bombs (two of which were duds) fired at 2150 hrs, and was by approx 80 troops. There were no Australians there.

(d) At dawn the next day the enemy planted a large flag on the O.P. which covered the whole of that area. They established an O.P. there. No effort was made to conceal the O.P. personnel.

8 LETE FOHO. After three days of observation on Lete Foho the enemy enemy moved to there on a bright moonlight night. Enemy strength was approx 400, together with 35 trucks. The probable enemy movements were:-

(b) Forming up point Atdoora at approx 2000 hrs.

(c) Movement of patrol to river at approx 0001 hrs. This patrol was in all probability responsible for the littering of the track with paper so as to facilitate the movement of the main body. Enemy movements were reported to me at 0215 hrs by natives.

(d) From the river the enemy used three tracks to move towards Lete Foho. All these movements were made without sound or lights as far as we could discover.

(2)

(e) A mortar was located upon a peak on the west and overlooking Lete Foho.

(f) Patrols were sent round through the coffee plantations to the South of the town to cut off any retreat of the Australians towards Rotie.

(g) It is presumed other troops were held to cut off movement towards the north which was in open country and towards the road.

(h) At approx 0530 hrs upon the firing of a signal flare from the high ground to the west of the town the Mortar landed a bomb on the Posto and the machine guns to the south opened up on the rear of the Chinese shops. The town was searched with mortars and machine guns and then entered. The organization appeared to be excellent.

(i) As soon as possible artillery was established and firing through holes knocked in the rear of Chinese shops shelled Rotie. It is considered that the artillery was brought by horse along with the other troops and was to be used if there was any opposition. As there was no opposition the artillery was used once again in the hope of intimidation.

9 From each of the paragraphs above some conclusion can be drawn, but there is NOT yet sufficient experience to make dogmatic statements on all points. The following can, I consider, be reasonably held:-

(1) The enemy frequently make use of mortars, artillery and machine guns for intimidation alone.

(2) Enemy observation from O.Ps is good.

(3) Enemy troops do considerable amount of indiscriminate firing at natives and animals.

(4) Artillery and mortar fire are accurate but ineffective.

(5) Enemy rifle fire is remarkably accurate.

(6) Enemy patrols are normally thirty to fifty strong but there are sufficient patrols in an area to render it frequently inadvisable to contact any one patrol. This applies of course only when our forces are of approx section strength and isolated as was the case in above.

AUTSABI

P. 3 TIMOR

7 May 1942.

..B.J. Callinan...CAPT.

2 i/C  
No 2 Aust Ind Coy.

(5)

ENEMY OCCUPATION OF DILLI.

REPORT ON EVENTS 20-21 FEBY.

BY LT. MCKENZIE.

At 2200 hrs on night 20-21 Feb, Pte Hasson on sentry duty at the aerodrome reported hearing movements at sea. The thump of heavy engines ~~xx~~ winches and small craft was plainly audible.

Cpl Delbridge and two men were sent out to investigate and brought back report that two ships were close in to shore and were apparently landing troops in small motor launches. The talking of landing party proved it to be a foreign force.

Doto was informed immediatly and action stations were manned by No 2 Section with R.A.E. attached.

At about 2359 hrs Dutch artillery opened up with two shells across the bay. The enemy replied immediatly with light naval guns and heavy machine gun fire across the bay towards Dilli.

The naval vessel which was closest in then retired West to about the mouth of the Comoro River and there proceeded to land further troops using motor launches and searchlights.

At 0020 hrs Cpl Curran and four men went on patrol west of the drome down through the thick bush for half a mile and back to drome along the road. This patrol reported no enemy movement close to drome but movement was along the shore to a presumed concentration at the mouth of the Comoro.

At 0040 hrs I was ordered to cover the road west from Dilli with Bren fire. Cpl Delbridge, Pte Ryan ~~xxx~~ No 1 Gunner and Pte Smith F.C. No 2 Gunner were immediatly sent out to do this job. Pte Doyle (runner) went out with this party to bring back a report on the area and gun position.

At 0110 hrs my bren opened fire along the road and was immediatly ~~xxx~~ replied to with grenades and heavy H.E (Moral effect) bombs.

Quietness reigned for about half an hour and then much movement was evident out around gun position. At 0140 hrs crawled back to H.Q. suffering from shock and reported that both Pte Ryan (leg) and Smith F.C. (shoulder) had been wounded and that the Bren had been captured. Pte Doyle (runner) who had been hiding, listening, arrived back almost with Cpl Delbridge and collaborated this report. From then on until 0340 hrs much movement and talking almost all around us signified that we were outnumbered. A large number of Japanese had been engaged on the S.W. corner of the drome, presumably burying their dead and questioning Pte Ryan (in perfect English).

As communication with the Dutch had been cut off for some time I appreciated the position, and decided to no longer act according to previous or earlier orders. My decision after appreciation was to close my own troops closer in to the Hangar buildings so we could develop a sort of a village fight, prepare to destroy all gear and blow the drome before evacuating (my plan of evacuation was also altered in as much as my route would be through the town instead of practically straight south into the hills). Pte Doyle was at this juncture despatched to town to contact Capt Callinan and make known my decision.

Setting up petrol to burn the gear was in progress when a small Jap patrol of about a dozen appeared at a little bridge over drain west of the hangar interrupted our work but it was soon wiped out by ~~xxxx~~ Ryan Ptes Poynton and Thomas (T.S.M.Gs) Hudson (rifle) and Cpl Curran (grenades).

Pressure from enemy prevented me from any further action regarding the destruction of gear. (It was plainly visible by this time that we were being surrounded and I thought that a fire would betray our line of retreat.) I sent orders to prepare for a dawn attack. Ptes Poynton and Thomas (T.S.M.Gs) Hudson and Hasson (rifles and grenades) were to cover our retreat momentarily. All was quiet for a while and then a single shot rang out from the centre of the drome. (One of the R.A.E. had shot a Jap or a ~~fix~~ fifth columnist who was obviously trying to destroy the connections to the charges laid on drome).

Cpl Curran was given command of blowing the drome and the evacuation of all men excepting the four men mentioned and myself. They were to retire to the S.E corner of the drome (after blowing it) and cover us as we came out.

It was now just on dawn and another Jap thrust succeeded in getting about four men across the small bridge. Cpl Curran was cut off over the drain just then and used his bayonet to effect (five Japs) presumably one officer, to get back. He had also noticed a small party of Japs who had crawled over the drain and into a small room near drain. These he grenaded in passing. Two of the party of four had now forced Pte Hasson out of ~~xxxx~~

Position and pursued him back into me where I was able to use the rifle (Pte Doyle) instead of my pistol.

Meanwhile the remaining three who were with Pte Poynton were now attacking fiercely and were causing much havoc amongst streams of Japs who were trying to force their way across the little bridge. I had just got close enough to Poynton to tell him to come when the drome went up and Signaller Gannon was found wounded. Poynton and Thomas continued to fight until Hudson had removed Poynton's water bottle and given it to Gannon. Our party of four was now ready to leave (myself leading) when a light automatic opened up on us. Having no cover I momentarily decided to surround him and use a grenade but just then got nicked by a bullet of his second burst, so quickly replied with three lucky shots from the hip. Our line of was now clear except for mortar fire, presumably Dutch, which made us keep our heads down as it seemed to be directed on no set target. During our race across the drome we were engaged from all around with machine gun fire (a type, from noise etc, which suggested a heavier gun than had been hitherto encountered.)

During the exit I made it my business to quickly inspect the craters and found the one I saw closely to be 12-15 ft deep and 15-20 ft wide.

Continuing now on my own towards town I encountered another machine gun over the big drain, but it was Dutch and they recognised me after a burst or two. I waited at the Dutch artillery camp and gathered a party of twelve, and proceeded into town with Pte Hooper, leaving the remainder of my section (eleven) at the road gun emplacement closest to town.

As I could not find Capt Callinan and the town around Dutch H.Q. was being shelled, I decided to send Hooper back for my party and retire into the hills via Lahane up to Lolora and then along the range back by our original route to Railaco. Signaller Hancock was discovered at H.Q. frantically trying to get a message away but without success. I ordered him to try until 0820 hrs and then come with me. Meanwhile my men were resting and I had checked up on the gear to find it was no use our staying in the hills to try and harass the enemy.

At 0830 hrs my party plus Sig. Hancock and three Dutch troops left for the hills via route previously mentioned. Doctor Bloomsma - Tay and a party in a car followed by a truck, overtook us above Lahane en route to Aileu and after conferring with them decided to join their party to as far as Lolora. I noticed one Jap (in shorts, alone) rush on to the road and act as though to open fire on us. My rifle jammed at this stage, which probably was a good thing, because I feel sure that the Jap was tired and had mucked up a perfectly good ambush. My inability to fire and so not bring fire back enabled me to select a spot where I could direct the stopping of the truck and positioning of troops by visual signals. My scheme here was a success apart from my being cut off from my men. Eight Japs now appeared over the edge of the hill (two with L.M.Gs and six with rifles which looked like small bore automatics).

Pte Poynton and Grown had selected good positions and Grown was quick to bring down one Jap. Poynton went determinedly into action now and quickly silenced the nearest gun, which had not yet gone into action. I then noticed one of the Dutch troops clambering up to Poynton - Poynton took something from him and rushed forward to another tree. He then threw a grenade which missed its mark - tried another which failed, but the third blew up the gun and four men. I thought we had the initiative as on arrival a native told me there were only fourteen Japs and waved my troops to attack up the hill but changed my mind when heavy machine gun fire plus mortars and grenades commenced to sweep the valley. As this continued for some time my position was precarious until I discovered Bloomsma in hiding and together we jumped on the cliff forcing a landslide down to safety. Bloomsma and I laid in hiding for sometime and were later joined by some of my men. L/Cpl Brown, Ptes Bowers, Criddle, Hasson and Hooper who had decided to come back for me. I decided to lay up there as long as we were safe until dark. The valley below us was machine gunned and bombed on quite a few occasions during the day. At about 1530 hrs a Chinese came crawling up to our hideout and brought a volume of fire with him. A Jap appeared just above my rifle muzzle with grenades but he clung to the one he had ready when he was shot.

Dr Bloomsma and Pte Hooper had decided to evacuate before this

down the creek. Now that our hiding place was known I decided to move further down, which we did and here we slept till 2100 hrs.

Moving at night towards Railaco, with native guides, and hiding up the next day, we observed several small Jap parties going up and back. We moved off again at dusk and heard voices just below us, on investigation we found them to be Ptes Gowns and Hooper with two Dutch troops. Arriving at a native hut we decided to investigate it and get a meal. Here we discovered one native Dutch soldier who signified his intention of living there until he obtained native clothes. As we had not encountered any more Japs I ~~decide~~ decided to travel all ady over the Comoro to "C" Pln. Natives informed us ~~at~~ that Australians had moved to Railaco so we changed our course, headed down onto the road, up to Railaco and on to "A" Platoon.

Details of officers and O/Rs taking part in the aerodrome action:  
VX5008I Capt. B. J. Callinan; WX <sup>5369</sup>Lieut. C. F. McKenzie; WXI3535 Pte  
Hasson J; WX I0538 Cpl. Delbridge A.; VX47342 Cpl. Curran K $\frac{1}{2}$  S.;  
WXI3624 Ptes. Ryan M.P.; WXI2840 Smith F.C.; WX I3042 Doyle C.E.;  
WXI2552 Poynton J.W.; WX I2679 Thomas H.E.; WXI3305 Hudson W.O.;  
WXI0548 Sig. Gannon H.I.; WXII349 Pte. Hooper, N $\frac{1}{2}$  W.S.; WX 203  
Sig. Hancock P.; WXI3530 Pte Gowns, F.W.; WX I3194 L/Cpl Brown,  
H.J.; WXI3636 Pte Bowers, A.G.; WXI284I, Pte Criddle, C.R.;  
Sappers TX 4709 L/Cpl Richards R.C. and SXI2657 Williamson R. McK.



REPORT ON RECEPTION OF PATROL AT BATAPOOTI

By CPL R K PALMER

WX 10893

RATIONS.

We left Cout Lou 3rd March. After marching from there to coast at Batapooti, living as we could off the country, we arrived at Battapooti at 1900 hrs on the 8th March. I approached an officer of the 2/40th re rations for tea. He gave us a packet of biscuits per man. Next morning I again approached the same officer for rations for another meal and received a tin of Meat and Vegetables for six men. We knew that all personnel had received rations for up to thirty days each two days before from stores intended for our company (No 2 A.I.C.). We could see through the window of the hut where the officers were that they had a room half full of rations and from reports gathered we found that they had a plentiful supply of rations, including tinned fruit and ~~ratio~~ milk (which we saw through the window).

On the afternoon of the 9th we met Capts Francis and Read who took us out to their hideout and issued us with two cases of Bully beef and some tea and sugar. They did all they could for us, also arranging for us to get some rice from the Dutch.

The two officers in charge at Battapooti were Lt. Scott and Lt. Williams.

RE ARMS.

When we arrived at Batapooti we had all our arms excepting one rifle which I lost in the Be Bai river whilst in difficulties. The officers there asked me to dice most of them so as not to risk firing on the Japs and so get all men classed as guerillas and get them shot on sight. They told me that the Japs were all round us and that I was foolish to leave that area, but as my intentions were to return to this Company as soon as possible, I left it to my men to decide what they carried.

The night we arrived at Batapooti we left our belongings in a shed about 20 yards away whilst we had our biscuits and on returning found that one rifle had been removed. It was the property of WX13497 L/Cpl Johnson. R.

RE MAIL & XMAS PARCELS.

On arrival at Batapooti on the evening of the 8th March, we were told that the Xmas parcels belonging to our Company had been issued out to the members of the 2/40th at Batapooti, whom, we were told, numbered approx 120. We saw numerous wrappers with the names of members of our Company on them. Also in the parcels were numerous watches and cameras, as well as an accordion belonging to Pte McEachern, of No 3 section. These were also issued to the 2/40th men.

The letter and paper mail had been burned two days ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ before our arrival. A Staff Sergeant of the 2/40th told me it took them two days to burn them and the officers confirmed this statement.

REPORT ON        ENEMY TACTICS:

TO C O  
— No 2 Ind Coy  
P Timor.

FROM Capt B J Callinan  
2 1/2 No 2 Ind Coy  
P Timor.

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(3)

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AUTSABI

P.  $\frac{1}{2}$  TIMOR

7 May 1942.

... *B. J. Callinan* CAPT.

2 i/C  
No 2 Aust Ind Coy.

(5)

REPORT ON MISSING PERSONNEL - NO 2 INDEP COY.

TO: C. O.  
SPARROW FORCE.

FROM: CAPT B J CALLINAN  
ADM. COMD.  
NO 2 INDEP COY.

1. Investigations carried out by me during the last four months have convinced me that the following missing personnel of this company have been disposed of in the manners indicated. Some of the information has been collected from eye witnesses questioned near DILI within a month of the enemy landing. While personal certainty is held that the method of disposal is correct it will be noted that the official postings have been made wide where any doubt can be held.

2. On the morning of 20 Feb, sixteen company personnel proceeded to DILI in one of the units M.T. These personnel were unaware of the enemy landing. When within three miles of DILI the truck was stopped and surrounded by JAPANESE. All personnel were forced to dismount and were disarmed. Owing to the overcrowding of the truck, four were forced to march behind the truck towards DILI. When close to the aerodrome a machine gun, presumably DUTCH, opened up and the AUSTRALIANS took cover in a depression at the side of the road; They were ordered to move back along the road. They moved back a short distance and turned off into a drain leading into some disused rice fields, they stopped there thinking they were to be kept there but instead they were shot by their guards at five yards range upon the order of one who is believed to have been an officer. They were then bayoneted in the neck. These four were:-

L/Sgt	G.A.Chiswell	VX 38419
Pte	H.W.Marriott	WX 13354
Pte	F.J.Alford	WX 10460
Pte	K.M.Hayes	WX 12317

The above details were supplied by Pte K.M.Hayes WX 12317 who survived the shooting and bayoneting in the neck, was rescued and cared for by natives and eventually escorted back to the company by them.

3. No definite knowledge is available of what happened to the other occupants of the truck; These were:-

Col	J.F.Simpson	WX 8341
Pte	K.J.Hogg	WX 8339
Pte	C.L. Stanton	WX 10455
Pte	A.J.Lane	WX 12342
Pte	F.J.Crowder	WX 12318
Pte	H.J.Cotsworth	WX 23164
Pte	R.H. Murray	WX 7906
Pte	P. Alexander	WX 12344
Pte	J. Pollard	WX 12341
Pte	D.H.Airey	Wx 12316
S/Sgt	J.W.E.Walker	VX 41872
Pte	R.S.Chalmers	VX 34811

But while carrying out C.P. work near DILI aerodrome towards the end of March 42 I had pointed out to me a spot where the surrounding trees and scrub were obviously burnt and here I was told the bodies of SIX AUSTRALIANS had been burnt after they had been shot and bayoneted by JAPANESE on the morning of 21 Feb. Arrangements were made to inspect the bodies but were frustrated by an unexpected enemy movement to that area. An AUSTRALIAN steel helmet was brought to me from there but unfortunately it had no name or number on it. It is my opinion that this information is reliable.

4. This leaves six of the truck personnel still unaccounted for and in spite of close questioning I have been unable to account definitely for them, but I was given reasonably reliable information that no prisoners were taken from DILI, and this seems probable as DUTCH prisoners were and are still kept in DILI. It is certain that there have NOT at any time been more than two AUSTRALIAN prisoners in DILI and these will be accounted for below so I consider it probable these six also suffered the fate of the other ten of being shot and bayoneted with their hands tied behind their backs.

5. In the action on the aerodrome during the night of 19-20 Feb three personnel were wounded and could not take part in the withdrawal;

Withdrawal;

these were:-

Pte	M.P.Ryan	WX 13624
Pte	F.C.Smith	WX 12840
Sig	B.J.Gannon	WX 10548

Reliable information is available that Pte M.P.Ryan is now a prisoner in DILI having been cared for at the PORTUGUESE GOVT hospital there for approx two ~~xxxxx~~ months and then placed by the JAPANESE with other prisoners of war. Because of his height and other distinctive marks he has been described several times by PORTUGUESE and he has managed to send a message out and write his name and number in a note book belonging to a PORTUGUESE DEPORTADO who was in the hospital with him. All descriptions indicate that the second AUSTRALIAN prisoner in DILI is Sig. B.J.Gannon WX 10548 and although the same certainty can NOT be held as in the case of Ryan, the information is very probably correct. It is considered that Pte F.C.Smith WX 12840 died of wounds received at the aerodrome during the action.

6. Pte R.G.Alexander WX 191, was sent as a despatch rider to DILI on the morning 20 Feb. and it has been reported that he was shot as he unsuspectingly attempted to pass through the attacking enemy; It is considered that this report is correct.

7. Pte P Knight WX 13454, and Pte H.E.Mitchell WX 9344 were wounded by enemy action in the BAZAR TETE area on 3 Mar 42. The bodies were buried by the PORTUGUES Chefe de Poste at BAZAR TETE, Snr CEZAR MOREIRA RATO, who had previously made three efforts to persuade the JAPANESE to hand the wounded men over to him; Each time he was insulted and abused and on the third occasion prodded with a bayonet. The bodies when buried by him shewed bayonet wounds.

8. Pte E.C.Potts WX 12552 and Pte C.H.Dodge WX 10516 were in Koepang when the enemy landed and no further definite knowledge of their movements is available, but it is thought they made an attempt to reach AUSTRALIA by boat. Because of the absence to them of definite knowledge of the company and the many other similar attempts made from DUTCH TIMOR their action must be approved.

9. Pte J Freeman NX 51543, Pte R.S.Larney NX 38586, Pte A.S.Webb VX 58984 and Pte Lilya, D.L NX 48987 deserted the company and reports indicate that after moving to the eastern end of the island they managed to obtain a boat and arrive on the island of KISA and from there they moved further eastward and were possibly transported later to AUSTRALIA. The action of these personnel in deliberately leaving the company at a time when every effort was being made to maintain the company intact and to prepare resistance to enemy movements ~~xx~~ can NOT be described as anything else but desertion.

1 Jul. 42.

0900 Hrs.

Bernard Gallen Capt.  
Adm. Comd.  
No 2 Indep. Coy.

AX I

8

USU V

A. Nil

B. FORO reports Porto from DT says JAPS moving from KOEPANG to HASLILY (near ATB) Have five cm A/A Guns there.

BAROMETER reports C de P TIL says natives say large numbers JAPS moving to ALAS and TOB to fight DUTCH and AUST.

C. Nil

D. Nil

E. FORO reports Porto from DT says AUST POW being taken to TEAONY and that one Officer and some soldiers escaped whilst in transit

1000

TO BE DESTROYED IMMEDIATELY AFTER READING

Received  
Bolo 28

TO.  
FROM. ATAB AX 2 IO

1. The following information is placed before all Platoon Comdrs to enable them to get as clear an idea of the whole situation as is possible and also to indicate lines along which our work can be improved.

2. GENERAL FUTURE OF THE COY  
Definite instructions are now known of the intentions of higher authority with regard to the Company, and while it is impossible at present to divulge this information it is clear that the Company has NOT been forgotten, its work is very highly appreciated and its future is part of a co-ordinated long range plan. All Officers are asked to squash as far as possible all unfounded rumours regarding future activities in this area as being in the long run dangerous to morale. †

3. MAIL  
No mail has been received lately but it has been indicated that it will be delivered by another means shortly; while this is a disappointment it is obvious that persons elsewhere are doing their best for us in all matters.

4. STORES  
Considerable stores have been received for MEDO and it is hoped that these will satisfy a long felt want. I would ask all Officers to inform their men that quantities of stores, reading matter and stationary are neither copious nor varied. All that are received are distributed on a pro-rata basis and there is absolutely NO attempt to keep stores or to build up reserves. In at least one case a rumour of large quantities of boots at Coy HQ ~~arose~~ arose out of some smart "ALEX" ~~marking~~ noticing three pairs of boots (odd) returned the previous day. Also if any stores asked for are NOT received it must be taken that they are NOT available and H.Q. has not sufficient paper to send out ~~announcements~~ notices to this effect.

5. WORK OF THE COMPANY  
It is ~~confirmed~~ confirmed that one of the roles of the Company is Intelligence and the supply of rear communication equipment indicates its importance. The following reminders are given so that they may be impressed on all ranks.

(a) Careful adherence to the forms of report previously circulated, with particular attention to the supply of "time and date" direction of movement and ~~reliability~~ reliability of information and the avoidance of such terms as "yesterday", Officers can assist greatly by checking all reports as they are handed in and pointing out any deficiencies to the person concerned.

(b) Whenever possible give the eight figure references for sub-section positions and notify Coy H.Q. promptly of all changes. Place names from one locality ~~mean~~ mean little to persons in another area. This information is NOT required solely for the paper war, as recent upheavals show.

(c) The need for care in speaking and spreading information still remains and Officers must set a good example in this matter.

6. All care must be taken that the ENEMY is NOT underestimated and there is NO guarantee that the present state of quiet will last for long. With the present dispersion there is a risk of contact being lost in the event of enemy action and the ~~maintenance~~ maintenance of the unit intact will depend on:-

(a) Supplying Coy H.Q. with prompt and accurate information re enemy moves or positions.

(b) Maintaining contact with the enemy.

(c) Maintaining your units intact and under control especially in with-

~~drawal~~  
7. There are available some water-bottle carriers and shoulder straps which can be used to carry drum type T,S.M.G magazines. Inform Coy H.Q. should you desire some. Approx twelve sets of complete I937 ptn equipment will ~~also~~ also be supplied to each platoon in the near future.

† FORCE is now represented in AUSTRALIA by an Officer specially despatched for the purpose.  
~~represented in Australia~~  
~~despatched for the purpose~~



~~MOST SECRET~~

KEEP YOUR MOVEMENTS SECRET

REPORT ON:-

GENERAL SITUATION, AUSTRALIAN FORCE IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR.

NO. 1 DIVISION A.W.

To

Lt Col Spence  
C.O. Sparrow Force.

From

Capt B.J. Callinan

O.C. No 2 Aust. Ind. Coy. and Attachments.

Map Ref:- Port Timor 1:250,000. Asia Investment Coy 1937.

Dutch Timor 1:250,000.

1. This report is submitted that the general position and possibilities of this force be available for your reference. The exact localities and numerical strength of the force are supplied to you by daily intelligence reports.
2. The following premises are held by me:-
  - (a) That ~~the~~ Port Timor and the forces here are the recipients of a considerable amount of interest by A.H.Q.
  - (b) That, Port Timor and the forces here are playing a not unimportant part in the general strategy in this portion of the Pacific war area.
  - (c) That, for (b) above it would be considered important by A.H.Q. that the Status Quo in Port Timor be maintained.
3. If the above premises are correct I consider it ~~important~~ important that the strength and possibilities of the force here be made clear.
4. ENEMY. Strength and dispositions:-

WRITE ON BOTH SIDES. IT'S A WARTIME ECONOMY.

Dispositions/.

KEEP YOUR MOVEMENTS SECRET



PORT TIMOR; 2000 - 2500 along DILI - EREMERIA ROAD  
DUTCH TIMOR; 4000- 5000 along KOEPANG - ATAMBOEA ROAD.

5. OWN FORCES. Strength:- 400 - 450 fighting soldiers.

Dispositions:- Over a line approximately sixty miles in length and running from MEMO through MALIANA, MAOBISSE, CAILACO, HATOLIA, LETE FOHO, HATO BUILICO, MAOBISSE, SARIM RIVER, to TURISCAI, each of which is approximately one days travel from those on either side of it.

In each place our strength is approx twenty

6. The operations of this force during the last three and one half months have forced upon the enemy a mode of warfare eminently suitable for the force and which increases the difficulties of the enemy.

7. Not the least important result of these operations is the great increase in confidence and experience of all ranks in dealing with the Japanese; and, at the same time, all reports and experiences indicate that there has been a correspondingly lowering of the morale of the enemy in dealing with us.

8. The achievements and operations of the force give every reason for confidence in its continued success and my orders to the force are that it will continue to operate in the manner in which it has been trained and which it has found so successful.

These orders do NOT include those for the taking up and maintaining of defensive positions; but are aimed at deterring enemy attacks by small raids along this front and this action to be intensified in the event of the enemy launching an attack on any one portion.

WRITE ON BOTH SIDES ITS A WARTIME ECONOMY

MOST SECRET - IF LIABLE FALL

SECO BOLO BAYO FORO V ATAB

AX 164

Herewith are extracts from a pam "Characteristics of Japanese Operations" in the PHILIPPINES, MALAYA BORNEO & AMBON.

Unfortunately I am not able to supply you all with a copy as desired, but I am sure these extracts will give much food for thought.

The first thing that is noticeable is that many of the movements and arms of the JAPANESE observed by us in PORTUGUESE TIMOR are shown to be standardised and we can expect to see more of - and deal with them.

The Pl tactics demonstrated - and these also apply to companies and Battalions - are almost habitual and considering the mentality of the enemy troops and the fact that the tactics have been eminently successful elsewhere I consider it of absolute prime importance that ALL Coy personnel be practiced in these tactics immediately.

With the cipher system now in use it must be presumed that the enemy know the text of all messages passed over the air and so have a good knowledge of our organisation. This fact coupled with the fact that it has been ~~an~~ almost <sup>invariable</sup> ~~immoveable~~ for the JAPANESE to strike direct at Headquarters - whether Platoon Company or Battalion - should impress on you all the necessity for remaining very alert so that in the event of an enemy move you do not become separate units, we can fight much more effectively as a Company. I have been trying to get more effective cipher systems for use between Coy and Pl HQ.

The whole of the Allied past experiences with and the training of the Japanese Army leads me to believe they WILL NOT remain long on the defensive in PORT TIMOR.

I particularly request that you forward any comments, opinions or experiences which you consider may be of value to others, and I will arrange to circulate them. We have a resourceful and aggressive enemy and our only chance of success is by more intelligence and more aggressiveness - the aggressive spirit must be infused in all.

0945. R.

NOTE

Extracts from pamphlet  
"Characteristics of Jap. Ops"  
have been removed from  
this file for subsequent  
refce in writing remainder  
of Vol III

F. Wignmore  $\frac{23}{51}$

3M.


*[Faint, illegible handwriting, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the paper]*

*[Handwritten signature in red ink, possibly "L. ..."]*

EYE SKETCH OF ATAPORPOE

By Lt. MCKENZIE  
 COPIED FROM ORIGINAL  
 By Lt. SCHROEDER  
 20.7.1942.

copy.



When Japs Remains  
 stay over night  
 they use Customs  
 house as a billet.

CONVENTIONAL SIGNS

□	KRM. AGENTS HOUSE	Now. JAP BILLET.
DD	Two HOUSES the OWNERS of WHICH ARE ALLOWED TO REMAIN BUT ARE DEBARRED the USE of FRONT ROOMS IN EACH CASE.	
X	GUARD DURING DAY	
○	NIGHT.	
⊕	CHURCH	
≡	STONE STAIRCASE	
□	CUSTOMS HOUSE	
	CATTLE YARDS	

# CONTOUR MAP OF NANURA HATOLIA ROAD.


SCALE 1" = 2 MILES

19/6/42.

V.I. = 100 FT.

D. A. Foster

-  BRIDGES
-  RIVERS.
-  ROAD
-  RICE TRACKS
-  CONTOURS
-  TALL GRASS
-  TREES.
-  SAGO PALMS
-  NATIVE HUTS
-  NATIVE OP.



# ALIAN NEWS

## Natives

ceived that killed last Daly River miles south- had inhabi- ne Daly for in, of the Darwin, re- pedal wire- tory police- ate immedi-

Escape prisoners-of- ers, escaped in the Goul- d according of them have w or when their escape, Friday, but broke away one of the recapture of outbreak of being con- .B. and the the north-

d of the es- were posted n Canberra ister Forde y into the

alians general and airs, Dr. H. Britain's on Church- alian bomb- Sir Staff- utmost aid They have helping us ocated the in Europe. omen for Labor, , that em- red women ve commit- e National

women can factories at lays as the reaches of be severely

## Letters Dropped By Japs

The Government revealed yesterday that the letters dropped by the enemy, over Port Moresby on April 28, were strictly censored. They were from Australian prisoners-of-war.

Most of the 395 letters stated that the men were being well-treated, but, the Government pointed out, the men were probably not allowed to say otherwise.

## New R.A.A.F. Unit

A complete self-contained unit of 1000 men is being organised to build and equip landing fields throughout Australia, it was announced from Canberra last night.

It will be called the R.A.A.F. Mobile Work Unit, and as soon as organisation is complete, the men will probably be drafted to front line work immediately.

## Tax Allowances for States

The Federal Treasurer has turned down a suggestion by the Premiers of New South Wales and Queensland regarding the Uniform Tax Scheme. He said that the Commonwealth will only consider one suggestion, and that is for the setting up of one taxing authority in Australia during the war.

Explaining the bill to make grants to the States to compensate them for the loss of taxation, Mr. Chifley said New South Wales would receive £15,350,000; Victoria, £6,517,000; Queensland, £5,821,000; South Australia, £2,361,000; Western Australia, £2,523,000; and Tasmania, £811,000.

The average income tax collections of each State over the last two years had been taken as a basis, and from it there had been deducted the estimated saving to the State in administrative and collection costs as a result of the establishment of a single tax authority.

## Bread Zoning Extends

The zoning of bread and milk deliveries has now been extended to South Australia. The new system commenced yesterday. Bakers have also been limited to producing four different kinds of loaves.

The zoning system is already in operation in New South Wales and Victoria.

## May Produce Rubber Here

Scientists in Australia are studying many ways by which rubber may be produced here.

They say that power alcohol, which is being produced in Australia from wheat, can be turned into a basis for synthetic rubber.

sia, through the Arctic ports during the winter months, and that 20 trucks a day pass through Persia to Russia, with equipment from the U.S. and Great Britain.

## 1,000,000-lb. Apple Tart

The Army has bought a 1,000,000 lb. "apple tart"—in the form of dehydrated apple nuggets—as new food for the soldiers.

Apples are the only fruit, except lemons, that the Army is using in dehydrated form.

Cooking experts have found that "apple nuggets" have a delicious flavor when eaten uncooked, and are equally tasty when boiled or used in apple sauce.

## Six Million Women

At least 6,000,000 women will have to be called up to replace men in industries, a Census Bureau report says.

This number will include millions of young married women, including many with dependent children.

The report says that most of the women will be drawn from cities and industrial regions.

## Costly Daughters

It was virtually impossible to bring up a debutante daughter on less than 500 dollars (£152) a month, socially prominent Mrs. Dorothy Wagstaff declared in a suit against her former husband in New York recently.

Mrs. Wagstaff at present receives 300 dollars (£91) a month to support her 19-year-old daughter.

She complained she was forced to dig deep into her own pocket to pay for the "correct" clothes and culture essential for a society debutante.

## Coal Ration Warning

The Chief of the War Production Board (Mr. Donald Nelson), has warned householders that coal rationing may be necessary unless they immediately lay in full stocks.

Mr. Nelson explained that railroads and other transport facilities still had some surplus carrying capacity.

This would have to be used now to avoid serious transport dislocation by heavy coal orders in autumn and winter.

the Germans threw 120 tanks into the battle to try and stem the Russian advance—59 of them were destroyed.

The enemy also landed paratroops behind the Russian lines and three units of them were sabred by the Red Cavalry.

The Moscow communique said that a Cavalry division crossed a "certain" river and captured a town of "extremely strategic importance."

Near Kharkov it was reported that German planes are being brought down by concentrated rifle fire.

## Crimea Battle

In the Crimea, the Russians have been pushed back to the northern tip of the Kersch peninsular. The Germans claim that they occupy the whole of the peninsular, but Moscow says that fighting still goes on around the town of Kersch.

The Germans also spoke of strong Russian resistance.

The London Times declares that the Russians hold the initiative on all fronts, except at Kersch.

## Transport Sunk

In the Barents Sea, a 6000-ton enemy transport has been sent to the bottom, and 59 planes were destroyed when they tried to bomb the base for Russia's northern fleet. Not one bomber got through to its target.

## E-Boats Attempt To Attack Malta

The coastal defences of Malta were given an opportunity to show they are no less alert than the A/A and Air Force, when searchlights picked out four enemy E-boats creeping into the harbor, for an attack, at dawn on Sunday.

The guns blazed at them before they could speed out of range, a hit was scored on one and an orange-colored flame burst out from another. Later, a night-fighter picked one of them out, as it was crawling out of the harbor, and attacked it.

In the air over Malta on Sunday, one German bomber and four fighters were shot down. Two other fighters and two flying-boats were damaged.

## GENERAL SAYS: "RUSSIANS IN BERLIN BY JULY NEXT"

General Sir Hubert Gough, famous Commander of the British Fifth Army in the last war, predicts that the Russians will be in Berlin by July.

Sir Hubert knows Russia intimately, and was chief of the Allied Mission to the Baltic in 1919. He is now a zone commander of the Home Guard in England.

"It may sound optimistic," said the general, "but I have been optimistic about the position all the way through, and my optimism has been justified by events.

"I am not afraid to be quoted as saying that the Russians will be in Berlin by July. My declaration that Leningrad would not fall to the German armies has come true.


"I regard Stalin as the greatest general in the Allied cause today. I have some knowledge, as the world knows, of fighting a retreating battle, and I can say that Stalin has handled his forces with consummate skill. Whilst he fell back he did the least possible hurt to himself and no talking, but grimly mustered his reserves and supplies, which he has now thrown into the conflict at the crucial moment, with devastating results.

"I do not believe that Hitler will invade Britain. He has not sufficient men available for the task. His armies all over Europe are pinned down, and he will not have a man to spare to invade Britain."

Printed and published by Captain W. H. Sellen, Press Unit, Darwin.

## Kum Goings On

By Alex Gurney in the Melbourne Sun News-Pictorial.





6° 36'

125° 20'

125° 30'

123° 40'

Between TOCCA-LULI + TRIG Point - Numerous Culverts

Between TRIG Point + Aileu - Several Bridges

TRIBUTARIES of

RAILACO RIVER

COMORO RIVER

RAILACO Road

Old Aileu Road

TOCCA-LULI

Solo

SABORIA (AILEU) RIVER

GLANO RIVER

RICE Fields

To Aileu

R.F. 1 - 250 000 (APPROX)

TRIG Point MARKED +


8° 40'

8850'



SCALE 1" TO 2 MILE (APPROX)

Joseph W. Fullerton



5

- Para Marobo -

1 porco de 92 cates.....	\$ 11,04
1 cabrito grande.....	\$ 6,00


Em 4 de Maio de 1942.-

Recebeu O R  
W Jexter

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

RECEBUE ANA LARA 3

# MALIANA-NUNURA AREA



V. 1. 400 ft. aprox.

R.F. 54,000



Scale 1 in = 1500 yds. aprox

MAP OF AREA PATROLLED



J. A. Foster

SCALE - APPROX. 4 MILE TO 1 INCH

16 Feb. 42.

MAP of AREA PATROLLED



ATAR


ATAR

2 MILES

SCALE - APPROX. 1/4 MILE TO 1 INCH

C. V. ...





第 一 號 軍 用 圖 冊 日 本 海 軍 部 編 印  
 日 本 海 軍 部 編 印

東 島 島 嶼 圖 冊 日 本 海 軍 部 編 印

第 一 號 軍 用 圖 冊 日 本 海 軍 部 編 印



TIMOR DIGTA  
 TOSE MARIA MABOUES  
 BUA


TCHON KII

大 南 海 門 報  
 倫 敦 報 費 單




NOT TO SCALE

PLAN OF DILLI. SHOWING ENEMY BILLETS AS ON 1. JULY 1942.

BUILDINGS USED AS BILLETS SHOWN  



CONVENTIONAL SIGNS

ENEMY BILLETS	
STREETS	
RIVERS	


SKETCH BY G.G. LAIDLAW CAPT.  
1 JULY 1942.

INFORMATION FROM DILLI RESIDENT.  
SOURCE CONSIDERED RELIABLE

- DILI DROME -

NOT TO SCALE

PREP BY: B. COLE LIENT  
DATE: 19 JUL 42



- MAG. BOARDS ▲
- SCRUB wavy lines
- PALMS Y
- DRAINS hatched lines
- CAR ROUTES - - - -



Australian Military Forces—7th Military District.

Head-Quarters,  
Darwin.

Please quote this number when replying.

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
21 2888

Plan drawn at BIDOUKOU on COMORO R.  
 and dug over 42 and used to  
 obtain information from a Chinese named  
 NAM ZEE who used to visit  
 DILI and came back with answers  
 to questions re enemy disposition

Dr

W. 120° 15' E. 121° 15' W.

LAOUET



← TIBAR DISTRAAT. DILI →



Djalana Kapal Oudara (Bikin Bekarong)

CK  
No. of Copies  
OFFICE DUTY STAMP

W. 120° 15' E. 121° 15' W.



Most interesting - copy  
in way south


QX

DATE... OCT 4 Sept. 42


Atsura Is  
Maumeta

LEGEND

--- Dutch-Portuguese Border. Road   
- - - Road under Construction. Anchorage 



PORTUGUESE TIMOR.  
SCALE 1:750,000.



B. M. COOPER, SGT.  
ADV. H.Q. M.T. FORCE.




DATE. 4 OCT. 42

These dates are approximate when applicable.


Australian Military Forces—4th Military District.

LEGEND

--- Dutch-Portuguese Border. Road ---  
- - - Road under Construction. Anchorage ⚓




PORTUGUESE TIMOR.  
SCALE 1:750,000.




OCT.  
DATE 5. SEPT. 42

LEGEND

- Datch-Portugese Border.
- Road
- - - Road under Construction.
- ⚓ Anchorage



PORTUGUESE TIMOR.  
SCALE 1:750,000.



B. M. COOPER, SURT.  
ADV. H. & N. T. FORCE.

targets/.

KEEP YOUR MOVEMENTS SECRET



I desire that the following areas be given as much as possible of both (a) and (b) types of activity:-

- (i) EREMLERA-- FATUBESI - GLANO VALLEY - VILA MARIA AREA.
- (ii) ATAMBOEA - ATAPOEPOE - LANOEROES AREA.

Reports available indicate that (ii) above received very ~~xxx~~ satisfactory attention on the evening of 2 JUNE and this must greatly enhance our position.

13. I would also ask you to investigate the possibilities of air support at the actual time of the attack on CAILACO. The ~~xxxxxxx~~ forces there will be prepared for co-operation with aircraft should it be available.

1400 Hrs.

Bernard J Callinan Capt.

3 - JUN - 1942.

Copy 1 Force H.Q.  
Copy 2 Force H.Q.  
Copy 3 File. ✓

WRITE ON BOTH SIDES. IT'S A WARTIME ECONOMY.

10. JONO, DEXO, CAMO Rpt QUNO. BJC 6 13.

CALO has been ordered that the activities of the Coy be restricted to:  
 (1) Maintaining itself intact, report on enemy concentrations and movements.  
 (2) Being at all times able to report on enemy concentrations and movements.

To attain (1) it is necessary that immediate attention be given to:-  
 (a) Siting and preparation of ambush positions on all roads and tracks which might be used by the enemy. Particular attention will be ~~given~~ <sup>stop</sup> given to the siting of Bren guns.  
 (b) Establishing alternative H.Q.'s.  
 (c) Preparation of and exercising troops in a plan which will force the enemy to search every hill valley and village in the area before moving on. There will be NO headlong retreats from any area.  
 (d) Maintaining contact with flank troops so that mutual support may always be given.  
 (e) Establish and maintain an efficient system of communication with Coy H.Q. THIS IS ESSENTIAL SO THAT SUPPORT MAY BE GIVEN WHEN REQUIRED.

To attain (2) it is necessary to:-  
 (a) Establish and maintain O.P.'s in accordance with allotment below.  
 (b) as in (e) above.

O/C	X HQ	X AREAS
DONO	AUTSABE	HATOLIA, TALO, GARRAI, VILA MARIA, UMBOI, LETE FONO.
JONO	MALIANA	NUNURA, MEMO, MALIANA
DEXO	MAROBO	MAROBO VALLEY
BELO CARLO	CALACO	NUNURA - HATO LIA RD MALIANA and HATO LIA TRACKS.

1400/20 Dispatch  
 1420/20 Dono personally.  
 1420/20 DEXO Jono Dono per Calo  
 1420/20 Camo Runer. T.S.P.






DATE. 9 OCT. 42.

LEGEND

--- Dutch-Portuguese Border. Road Road under Construction. Anchorage



PORTUGUESE TIMOR.  
SCALE 1:750,000.




DATE 15 Oct 42

Ateuro Is. Maurotz


LEGEND

--- Dutch-Portuguese Border. Road ---  
- - - Road under construction. Anchorage ⚓



PORTUGUESE TIMOR

SCALE - 1:750,000



R.J. Tuck Cpl.  
Adv. H.Q. N.T. FORCE




DATE 15 Oct. 42

Atauro Is. Maumeta

LEGEND

--- Dutch-Portuguese Border. Road ---  
--- Road under construction. Anchorage ⚓



PORTUGUESE TIMOR

SCALE - 1:750,000




R.J. Tuck, Cpl  
Adv. H.Q. N.T. FORCE

DATE 21 OCT 42

Ateuro Is. Mauneta


LEGEND

--- Dutch-Portuguese Border. Road ---  
- - - Road under construction. Anchorage ⚓



PORTUGUESE TIMOR

SCALE - 1:750,000




R.J. Tuck, Cpl.  
Adv. H.Q. N.T. Force

DATE 21 OCT 42

Atauro Is. Mauneta

LEGEND

--- Dutch-Portuguese Border. Road ---  
- - - Road under construction. Anchorage ⚓



PORTUGUESE TIMOR

SCALE - 1:750,000

0 10 20 30 40 50

Miles

R.J. Tuck, Cpl.  
Adv. H.Q. N.T. Force