
AWM52
Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters, formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/12/26
EAST & MIDDLE EAST UNITS

AIF Cadre Battalion Military Mission China

July - November 1942



1/12/26-0021

A.I.F. Cadre Bn. ORIGINAL

WAR DIARY (5) for Month of JULY

Move from Li-Cha-Ping to Tungku

M.4038.

1st.July 1942 Shang Fung to Pei Pu. (7miles) Coolies did not arrive until 0800hrs.as the weather was the worst that had been experienced up to that time.After leaving Shang Fung we climbed 2 high ramges in the pouring rain and reached Pei Pu just as NO.1 Coy. Malaya Bn. was moving out. it had been marooned for 3 days on an elbow of the river.So as not to cause congestion we decided not to push on to Tungku as had been our intention.Billets were found and as 4 men had fever the men were glad of the rest and the shelter from the rain.No.3 Coy. did not arrive.

2nd.July 1942 Pei Pu to Tungku (10 Miles) Left Pei Pu at 0530 hrs. and arrived at Tungku at 1000 hrs. Nos.1 and 2 Coys. in by 1330 hrs.Weather fined up and the men were able to get some of their clothes dry.Dumped all stores in a dump opposite the town on the East side of the River(Siao Ho) The billets are quite good and are fairly dry.

3rd.July 1942 Tungku No.3 Coy arrived at 1030 hrs.Having been marooned at Shang Fung by by the river rising and washing away a bridge.Orders were issued that the Bn. would move to Chiu Chia Kai via Ta TUan Tsao Chiao,Chou Hsien Tung on the 5th. stores by raft to Ta Tuan men by foot. Malaya Bn. should move today but owing to the rain the river rose and the rafts did not arrive. Bn.

4th.July1942) Tungku.) rested ,most of the men have Diarrhoea and are feeling very weak

5th.July 1942) Tungku) This period was spent in resting and trying to get done the number of sick.Malaya Bn. left on the 6th. and the Bn. is

6th.July 1942) Tungku) preparing to leave on the 8th. If we do leave on that day it will mean that at least 12 sick will have to be left behind.

7th.July 1942) Tungku) The weather is still very wet. Final arrangements for the departure made,weather clearing.

8th.July 1942) Tungku) We are to leave 1/3rd of stores as wasdone at Kuantu. River too high for rafts departure postponed.

9th.July 1942) Tungku) Orders received from Col.Johnson that Japanese are threatening Shang Fu about 29 miles from Tsao Chiao and we are to proceed there with 20 coolie loads of explosives,which is one Coys. supply for 1 month.So Coys.Stores were realloted and all was ready foe departure on the following day.Coolies were promised if the river was too high.

10th.July1942) Tungku) River too high for rafts.Lt.Col.Ting came across from his H.Q. to advise us that Gen.Chou was moving the 3 Surprise Bns. to ShangKao which is about 50 miles from this town.So Col. Johnson was wired for further instructions.A message sent to Malaya Bn. was delivered to Lt.Col.Millar which stated that we were to wait here,in Tungku,until further instructions reach us.

Information saying that 10000 Japanese soldiers had crossed the Kan River 50 miles East South East of Shangkao . That Col. Johnson and the Surprising Bns. were moving there. Received orders to move to Shangkao from Gen. Chiu with light operational scale as soon as possible. Coolies organised , everything got ready for the Bn. to move. Got information from the local "I" Service that 200 Japanese cavalry had crossed the Kan River, and had burnt some villages , but were now withdrawing towards Nangchang Namngchang. Weather raining. Received message saying That Gen. Chiu was returning to Chin Chia Kai as there was no threatened attack in the Kan River area. We were told to remain here pending further instructions. Weather fine.

11th. July 1942 T'ungku. Orders received to proceed to Chin Chia Kai as soon as possible leaving all explosive stores. Told that Gen.Hsieh Yuen 9th. War Zone Comdr. was sending three Carrier Coys. forward to move our explosives up. Incidentally he can have no idea what we have: three (3) Carrier Coys. equals 384 coolies; actually we need 750 coolies to carry it. Gen Chiu has been given permission to raise a Carrier Bn. in the area , and we cannot raise even 120 coolies for our needs, Although now that the Chinese here know that we ar going they say that they can get coolies for us. Weather fine.

12th. July 1942. T'ungku. Arrangements made for departure, Chinese say they cannot produce coolies but will give us rafts which will be here to night. Medical situation bad. W.O. Moore, Sgt. Martin and Pte. Sinclair in hospital, Sgts. Macmillan and Mackenzie, Cpl- Ackland, Ptes. Browne and Butt and Major Moffat, having treatment for diarrhoea as well as Col. MacDougal, but the first five have to remain here for an indefinite period. Sgt. Martin is bad with Typhus. Pte. Donaghue No.3 Cadre Bn. died 3 p.m. Typhus Fever. No rafts arr...

WAR DIARY. for Month of July.

Move from Li- Cha- Ping to T'ungku.

14th. July 1942 T'ungku. No rafts. Impossible to move. Lt. Col. Millar went forward to Fd. H.Q. under pressure of Lt. Col. Gill Davis and Lt. Col. MacDougal to explain the hopelessness of the situation to ~~Lt.~~ Col. Johnson. The Chinese obviously do not want us ~~but~~ want us out of the way but War Office cannot understand ~~this~~. Men are becoming less fit and ~~though~~ thoroughly fed up with the whole business. The Billets are disgraceful, compared with our normal standards, there being no attempts at sanitation or other hygien and would be condemned by any regular Bn. immediately.
The funeral of Pte. Donaghue took place. The local Authorities were evoked to have the ferry handy for us to take the coffin over at 0800 hours- At 0900 hours the ferry arrived and at 1045 hours the funeral party was across. The river is about thirty (30) yards wide and was not in flood or swollen in any respect. So much for the co-operation whereever our men die. During the crossing Major Moffat got into the water to stop the boat going down stream. There was a Chinese in the boat, a Captain, who did not make any attempt to assist. Col. Gill Davis on the other bank, said that if a British Major could get into the water and help so could a Chinese Captain. The Magistrate put the coffin coolies under arrest for gambling which was one of the reasons why they were late. Weather fine.

15th. July 1942- T'ungku. Sgt. Martin ex 2/20th. Bn. A.I.F. died 1845 hours from Typhus ~~Fever~~ Cardiac failure. Rafts did not arrive during the day, and Col Ting said that they would be here tomorrow.

16th. July 1942. T'ungku. Sgt's Martin's funeral took place and arrangements were improved in so far as the Magistrate's Administration was concerned. Rafts arrived a few hundred yards down the stream. We were told that they would be up by 0600 hours on 17th. inst.. Sick list today shows two Officers , Major Braund and Col. MacDougal both probable Malaria, and fourteen (14) Other Ranks , One third of Bn. strength. All anti Malarial precautions , such as long trousers after sundown and mosquito nets have been enforced ~~Weather fine.~~ It has been almost impossible to enforce full precautions on the march as men were arriving long after sundown each night.
Orders were received that the two Bns.were to stand fast but unfortunately the later part of the telegram was mutilated and it was impossible to ascertain for what reason.News came that the Carrier Pl. had been arrested but on investigation it was found that only 9 had been.The trouble was that the Carrier Pl. Comdr.had been given authority to enlist locally to make up the Pl. as it was 10 men short,apparently the local Comdr.had registered a complaint but nothing had come of it,so when he heard that the Bns. were moving off he decided to arrest his m men.This motion would have made it impossible to move if the orders had not been changed.Action for the release of these men was finally obtained when Lt.Col.Gill Davies threatened to communicate direct with Chungking.

17th.July 1942 Tungku The Bn. moved to billets across the river to allow the Docters more room,and to establish a hospital.The total numbers now in hospital the three Units is 18 all Ranks.Orders were received to load rafts and that the two Bns. under the command of Lt.Col.Gill Davies,were moving at 0400hrs to Ta Tuan on the 18th.July.The Bn.was redevided into 2 sections under Maj.Godfrey and the whole was placed under the Command of Lt.Col.Gill Davies Lt.Col.D.C.MacDougal and Maj.F.N.B.Braund and 17 ors.were to remain at Tungku for further Medical Treatment.

D MacDougal Lt. Col

WAR DIARY For month of JULY.

Move from Tungku to Chiu Chia Kai Chieh.

18Jul 42. Tungku. Rafts loaded. Orders received to move to Chiu Chia Kai as quickly as possible, Rafts to leave for Ta-Tuan at 0600 h rs 19Jul 42, under Capt. Wolfe, personnel to leave at 1800 hrs. 19Jul 42. A.I.F. Medical Officer to remain behind with sick of A.I.F. and Burma Bns.. Lt.Col. MacDougal to be left because of appendicitis, Major Braund with fever (?Malaria). Major Godfrey to be in command of Bn.

19Jul42. Shan-Tu. Rafts left Tungku at 0800hrs. Telegram received from Col. Johnson saying " Wait return of Miller" received at 0740 hrs. As rafts had already left with rations, were forced to ignore telegram and proceed. Bn. left Tungku at 1230 hrs. 50fficers and 20 O.R's in strength. Arrived at Shan-Tu at 1800 hrs.(15li). Rafts arrived at Shan-Tu at 0330 hrs. One of Burma Bn. rafts had overturned in a rapid and 160 tins of beef,a security box and Bren gun were lost. Extensive diving failed to recover these things. 1 case of biscuits was also soaked but these may still be useable. Quarters at Shan-Tu fair. Destination to-morrow Ta-Tuan.

20Jul42. Ta-Tuan. Arrived at Ta-Tuan at0615 hrs, coolies arrived 1030 hrs, rafts at1230 hrs. Quarters good. Lt.Col. Miller arrived from Chiu Chia Kai 1600 hrs and gives very bad reports of the food situation further on than Ta-Tuan.It being impossible to buy food locally. This means that we shall have to go onto full scale rations shortly, and 15 days will see the end of the rations at this rate. 150 coolies have arrived for Burma & A.I.F. Bns. The local authorities have had a difficult time collecting these coolies.10days ago they were got together but owing to delays (due to inefficiency on the part of the Chinese authorities) were forced to release the coolies time and time again. Held up for 24 hrs. because the coolies are not ready.

21Jul42. Ta-Tuan. Rested all day and organised cooli loads. Bought 7 cooli loads of local foodstuffs to offset in part shortage en route. Destination to-morrow Tsao-Ch'iao.

22Jul42. Tsao-Ch'iao. Left 2/Lt. Long and Pte. McDonald behind at Ta-Tuan for medical treatment; Malaria and Diarrhoea respectively. Arrived Tsao-Ch'iao 1000hrs. coolies arrived 1130-1200 hrs. Distance covered 41 li. Cpl. Hunter has contracted dysentery and Pte. Gilmour has a temperature of over 100. We left Kiyang nearly 3 months ago with 5 Officers,1 Medical Officer & 40 O.R's and our present strength is 3 Officers and 18 O.R's, yet we are still to carry on and show the Chinese how tough and adaptable the British soldier is. As we have been on a very light journey so far (by Chinese standards) what is going to happen if we ever have to operate?. Trouble with coolies again; to-morrow, Bn. stores (except for 11 coolie loads of rations) have to be left behind owing to lack of coolies. Burma Bn. will give us rations if necessary. Two Stretchers ordered for Cpl.Hunter and Pte. Gilmour.

23Jul42. Kan-Fan-Shih. Arrived at Kan-Fan-Shih 0845 hrs.(34 li,. Coolies arrived 0830-1030 hrs. Absolutely no co-operation re stretchers which had to be made of cord. Seemingly no effort made by local Magistrate or Chinese Army officials to procure stretchers, despite promises. Because of having no Medical Officers (A.I.F. left at Tungku and Burma at Ta-Tuan), sick have to be taken on to Chiu-Chia Kai where Malaya Bn. M.O. is in attendance. Destination to-morrow Shang-Fu. Stores left at Tsao-Ch'iao arrived under Capt.Upchurch, Burma Bn.

24Jul42. Shang-Fu. Arrived at Shang-Fu at 0900 hrs. Coolies arrived 1000-1400 hrs. Sick personnel much improved except for Cpl.Hunter (Dysentery). Quarters are extremely bad- a shop in the middle of the town with no latrine or kitchen facilities. Malayan Bn. sent back for foodstuff so 3 coolie loads bought by us. Destination to-morrow Chiu Hsien [illegible]ng. (40 li)

D.D.M.S. [illegible]

25Jul42. Chiu-Hsien T'ang. Arrived Chiu Hsien T'ang 0830 hrs. coolies 1100-1430 hrs. Billeted in Government rest house. Chinese meal prepared for us. Col. Johnson came from Chiu Chia Kai to meet us. Destination to-morrow Chiu Chia Kai (8 li).

26Jul42. Chiu Chia Kai. Arrived Chiu Chia Kai 0830 hrs. quarters fair but very cramped, and if many men rejoin the Bn. fromTungku there will not be sufficient room. Major Godfrey and Capt.Grossett quartered with No.5 Surprise Bn. H.Q. Spent most of the day settling in.

27Jul42. C.C.K.

28Jul42. Chiu Chia Kai

Received instruction No.2 (attached) from Col. Johnson. Informal conference with Col.Chen and he showed us probable objective - rather far fetched as 2 Coys. have to hold back 4000 odd Japanese troops and with a strength of 2 Coys. have to attack a bridge held by about 500 Japanese. No comment was made by us because of the informality of the conference and because of the necessity of gaining the Chinese Officer's confidence before finding fault with their schemes. Gen. Chow visited us informally, to see how we were "after our hardships and gruelling march". He did not know that we had brought no explosives with us because of failure on the part of the Chinese supply column; was very sympathetic regards our sickness en route, and I think very disappointed that we are not "tougher" and must realise the drag we would be on his own troops who can travel with no stores at all worth speaking of. The Bn. arrived here in a bad state of health; fever, diarrhoea and one case of dysentery. Out of our total strength with which we left Tunku of 5 Officers and 20 O.R's, there are at present 2 Officers and 10 O.R's fit, and none of these are really fit if judged by the physical standard of the Bn. in Burma.

29Jul42. C.C.K.

30Jul42. C.C.K.

31Jul42. C.C.K.

Settled into new quarters as well as space will allow. Food problem (local foodstuffs) not very acute at present but we are making use of local peoples reserve stocks and these may run out at any time. Extra rations expected here in a few days.

H. LTH. Improved somewhat except for fever at C. C. K. but still very poor. On the move men seem to contract diarrhoea and fever in spite of all precautions taken; this fact will be liable to render us completely immobile and 2 absolute "passengers" if we ever do operations in this country, and chiefly because of this, it is the opinion of all officers (including M.O's) that our military value in this country is absolutely negligible.

MORALE. Still good, but continual sickness and lack of use is giving the men a hard jolt. The standard of education and experience in life of the troops in the Bn. is very high and the true situation and state of affairs is as well known to them as it is to any other thinking man. In view of this the morale is having a very severe test, but is still remaining high although not up to the level it was in Maymyo (Burma) or at Kiyang (China).

Appendix "A" - Extract from letter from Lt/Col W.Banyard to Lt/Col F. Eggleston

"B" - Review of Division 204 Lt/Maj General.

E. B. W. Godfrey Maj.
Comdg 2 i/c F.Cadre Bn.
31/7/42.

ORIGINAL. orig 9012.

WAR DIARY.

A.I.F. CADRE BATTALION. MONTH OF AUGUST 1942

6666 A. CHIU CHIA KAI CHINA

BRITISH 30 SEP 1942

Place. Date.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and Appendices.
2/8/42. Chiu Chia Kai	Maj. Brown D.A.D.M.S. arrived with Maj.Braund's convoy ex T'ungku . W/T set, medical orderleys and supplies, and four men from T'ungku.	
3/8/42	Hospital established Chiu Chia Kai,3 men admitted.	
4/8/42	4 men admitted to hospital including Maj. Braund.	
5/8/42.	Lt/Col.MacDougal arrived,went direct to hospital.	
6/8/42.	Conference :-.Col. Johnson (H.Q.),Lt/Col.Gill-Davies (Burma),Lt/Col. Campbell-Baldwin (Malaya),and Maj.Godfrey (A.I.F.), on methods of co-operating with Chinese in operations [redacted]. Main issue was the placing of British troops under Chinese command, one Contingent Commander stated he did not feel like placing his men under a lot of coolies. This,in view of the very low standard of education of Chinese,would have repercussions.	
7/8/42	1 admitted to hospital. Fired T.S.M.G. practise and tested use of weapon,results very good,.	
8/8/42	Conference, British and Chinese H.Q. and Bn. Commanders, on operational areas,communications,and rough plan of operations. Date for move to areas ~~was~~ fixed as 15th .Operational area does not provide any targets we are capable of tackling for demolition and so we are of no use, theChinese are quite capable of doing anything themselves in this area that we can do.1 admitted to hospital.	
10/8/42	Maj.Braund discharged from hospital and took over command of A.I.F. Contingent. Conference at H.Q.with contingent commanders,subject was instruction No.3 ([redacted] 3admitted to hospital.	
11/8/42	Medical examination of three contingents, A.I.F. results were as appendix 3,and compared very well with other contingents.Interview granted with Col.Johnson (H.Q.) for discussion of Chinese command. Stated that it was feared Chinese might order us into a hopeless show, not in our intended capacity, in which event Contingent Commanders would have ~~[illegible]~~ recourse to allow his troops to take part. This arose out of [redacted], the provisions of which do not ~~allow~~ cover such a contingency but in fact throw full weight of responsibility for refusal to obey orders on Contingent Commanders. Explained possible situations and stated if the occasion arose that I should not obey any Chinese order which was considered to employ troops in use other than in intended role or under hopeless plan. Two Chinese interpreters were transfered out of the contingent as being unreliable, untrustworthy,and of no further use	
12/8/42	Lt/COL. MacDougal and Pte.Gilmour J.W. evacuated on medical grounds took interpreter Chen, who had been sacked, with them. Advised that orders received from 9th War Zone Commander at Changsha to prepare new base at [redacted] - suggesting operations against Hankow-Shangsha rail communications - by end of August; messages sent attempting to evade this and continue plans in original area. Explosives to be sent ahead from T'ungku. Feeling is that Chinese don't want us near the Japs. to stir them into activity and intend to keep us on the move . Conference with Col. Johnson and discussion took place over a telegram sent by H.Q. to Mission H.Q. wherein it stated "repercussions might be expected particularly from A.I.F." This supposition was stated to be entirely false as moral was as good ~~as~~,if not better, than any of the three contingents. Result-despatch of telegram cancelling such reference. 1 admitted to hospital.	
15/8/42	Did not move to area as planed. 2 admitted to hospital.	
18/8/42	At request of Chinese,instructions on demolitions were to be given to Chinese Officers commencing this day for three days. In adition to officers approximately 50 O.Rs.attended, officers not particularly interested.	
19/8/42	Demolition course continued, first lecture scheduled 0500hrs.at Chinese H.Q. At 0520hrs. O.C.Bn. came out and advised lecturer [redacted] of new locality .At0535hrs. lecture commenced, at 0600hrs. personnel were still arriving.Lack of interest and steadily failing regard by Chinese for British. Chinese intelligence reports state much sickness among Japs. due to use of poisons by us!! [redacted]	

(OVER)

CHIU CHIA PAI

20/8/42 Demolition demonstration by Malaya Contingent.

21/8/42 Interview with Col. Johnson Adv. H.Q. Showed me copy of "Principles for bases of operation of British demolition troops with Chinese Bns." which had been translated and sent to Chinese H.Q. to provide an opening for discussion on this subject. Extremely late when so near Japs. and ready to operate, should have been done at Kiyang, lamentable state of affairs.

22/8/42 Interpreter Wong came and pleaded for interpreter Ho who has been sacked. Ho no getting insolent manner. Rifle practise good.

24/8/42 W.O.1 Moore, Ptes. Brown & Weber arrived from T'ungku. Competition rifle shoot against 5th Bn. 4 out of 18 Chinese hit the target still A.I.F. shoot well. 5th Bn. received orders to proceed forward to operational area East & N.E. of here immediately. Maj.F.M.S.Braund Capt.G.C.K.Crossett, W.O.1 Campbell I.T.C. ,Cpl.Rossiter A.E. (R.A.M.C) and Pte. Groton R.J. went with the 5th Bn. taking 10 days rations and4 coolies/ loads of explosives .Apparently the Japs. are withdrawing troops from this area with,it is thought, a view to attacking Changsha. The 5th Bn. are to show that there are troops in the area, cover as large an area as possible, and sorry to force the Japs. to maintain troops in this area. No particulars re duration, type of work, or destination is known so explosives taken are only on spec. Just before leaving Maj. Braund asked Ho no if he knew when Col. Chen would be giving orders Wong replied that he was giving orders to "only his trusted men" ,so Maj.Braund kicked his heels outside because he was not one of the C.O's. trusted men!Lt/Col.Miller was sent a message and came and got the explanation that "trusted men" refered to the C.O's.personal body guard. This is a good example of the harm that incorrect interpreting can do,fortunately the error was discovered before any damage was done. 5th Bn. expected back within a week. 1admitted to hospital.

25/8/42 Capt.J.G.Webb (M.O.)arrived from T'ungku 3 more men .Health position at T'ungku was very bad 5 men been evacuated from there:- S/sgt.MacMillan C.C. ,Sgt.MacKenzie R.J., Sgt.Leak J.D.F., and Ptes. Archer G.S.,& Butt A.S.Evacuation as far as Changsha but these men will almost certainly go to Kiyang. 1 admitted to hospital.

26/8/42 Capt.N.C.F.Wolfe 5th Royal Gurkha Rifles, Ptes.Peeler R., NOONAN W.J MacDonald K.A.T., Strand D.G.,& A/Cpl.Hunter R.A. evacuated today on medical grounds to Kiyang.Base. Capt.Wolfe boarded out to India 1 admitted to hospital.

27/8/42 Maj. Moffat R.J.K. evacuated today on medical grounds to Changsha - also for special duty.

29/8/42 Advised that stores from T'ungku [redacted] on the way to Chiu Kung Shan to start new base there. No news yet of expected move to new base but put on 56 hours notice,and advised that 50 carriers only will be available for move, this means we will have to leave nearly all what little demolition stores we have behind . It does not appear as if we are really required anywhere but are just an embarrassing body to be kept out of the way. Local Captain G.C.K. Crossett, 6th Gurkha Rifles, ~~recommended~~ recommended for promotion to Acting Captain, Local Major in view of evacuations.

31/8/42 5 R.A.M.C. personnel and 4 Royal Corps of Sigs. personal attached to the Bn. as from the ~~26th inst.~~ 2 R.C. of Sigs.still with Adv. H.Q. Lack of W/T sets and present numbers hardley justify this.

Health :- During the month has been extremely bad but has compared favourably with other contingents and has improved towards end of month after 14 were evacuated, [redacted]

Moral :- Has been very good,especialy in view of lack of occupation and bad health and food.

[redacted]

D.B.H. Goodfellow Maj.
for O.C. A.I.F. Contingent

9.9.9. Cadre Bn.

WAR DIARY SUPPLEMENT.

By

Major F.N.Braund attached to No.5 Bn.

Month of Aug.42

Field.

1942 Aug. 24

This is written in the first person for easier recording of impressions.

At 1240 hrs. message received to report to H.Q. immediately. At 1300 hrs. Col. Johnson ordered self to proceed with no.5 Chinese Bn. on operations, suggesting taking Capt. Grossett and two O.R's plus one medical orderly. Only information given was that one Coy. would be going North, the other two Coys. in direction of Ching An - Mortars remaining behind at C.C.K. - object being to stir up Japs by activity od Bn, thereby preventing withdrawal for concentraion at (say Hankow) for push on Changsha. Duration of operations unknown - only information given. Returned to billets and told W.O.1 Campbell andPte. Croton to prepare. L/Cpl. Rossiter reported from hospital as medical orderly. Went to Col. Chen for information - none was obtained except that six coolies allotted us as follows: 2 Explosives, 2 Rations, 2 Kits - coolie loads not to exceed 40 catties, this weight being less than usual army coolie load. Said this was insufficient. Explosives and manner of use or quantity could not be ascertained, despiteinquiries of Col. Chen. When told that we could lift scarcely any explosives with 2 coolies we obtained 5 more, resulting in this allotment, 4 explosives, 3 rations and 5 kit - chairs for sick could not be taken as path too narrow - this we later found to be incorrect. 5 kit coolies appears to be a lot but a valise was considered to be a 2 coolie despite weight certainly not more than 30 catties. Chinese officers never carry any equipment and told us to give ours to coolies, which we die not do. They travel in comfort with a good bed-roll and small ketimie of orderleys. Rations taken were 10 days full scale hard. There were no written orders about the move nor were we asked to attend when orders (if any) for the move were issued. On asking, Col. Chen said "move at 1830 hrs." Start time was put back to 1900 hrs. Coolies for gear arrived very late but party ready to move before 1900 hrs. Actual start time was 2000 hrs. when 2 civilians led the Bn., turning right by the hospital through the hills beyond C.C.K.. Prior to starting there was a grave misunderstanding when interpreter Wong stated that the Col.was giving his orders to his trusted men, leading me to assume wrongfully that I was not one of them. 4 Bn.sentry got a fright when we moved on him - unaware of our move. Moving through the hills wearing boots was extremely noisy as well as being treacherously slippery on stones track. That night we travelled 20-25 li to Sheng Wa. Despite an advance party allottment of billets did not proceed smoothly- we reached ours at 0130 Hrs. The Bn. moved very slowly at some rate in the vicinity of 5 li per hour (not li in the hour). Halts were irregular and infrequent; once beyond C.C.K. where civilians were dismissed, again some time later when we rested for half an hour. On arrival at Billets Sigs ran out lines to Coys. from Bn. H.Q.. Prior to departure Col. wanted Capt. Grossett and another to proceed with 3 Coy. and to split our rations - this I said was impossible. These last minute requests are annoying. My impression is that the Col. does everything personally and that there is no delegation of authority.

Aug. 25

We were all asked to eat with Col. Chen at 0930 hrs.. The Coy 2 i/cs reported back from their respective reconnaissances dressed as civilians of coolie type with Mauser pistol carried at rear under shirt tail, hung from the neck by cord. We were advised that the Bn. would move at 1430 hrs. Fed at 1500 hrs. and got started at 1600 hrs. Truly again time is no object. Reached Hsi To 25 li at 2000 hrs. having travelled across mountainous country. We have discarded our boots for black cloth Chinese slippers which are the suitable footwear we find. Hsi To is Gen. Kang Sze Ling's advance H.Q.: he commands the 2 P3T3 guerillas. With the Col. we paid our call. On the road again at 2115 hrs., believing,as we were told, to billet here for the night. It is my opinion that the Col. missed the billets so decided to push on to his base. Travelling was flat and easy but still the pace is very slow. Approximately 8 li out from Hsi To a soldier who had been sent back by the Bn.2i/c to act as eguide, lost hisway thereby delaying us for ½ hour. Passed through Kao Hu despite the fact of a statement that the inhabitants were untrustworhty and same should be skirted. Kao Hu is 15-20 li from Hsi To. Here another guide picked us up leading

us cut to the base at Shang T'ang Yuan in the hills about 10 li from Kao Hu. Arrived 0230 hrs. The 2 i/c was here but evidently had done little or nothing about billetting arrangements as the Col. took a long time to get the Coys. off to their billets - we reached ours at 0315 hrs.. Our kits did not arrive until 1½ hours later, the coolies resting in Kao Hu. I hate Chinese duplicity. We were told that the slow pace was in consideration for us, whereas we had frequently told the Col. to go much faster if he wished. The fact that the coolies had rested was sufficient proof for me. This day we travelled some 50 li in 10½ hours. The slowrate of progress is very tiring, halts being most irregular and at intervals varying between 1½-2½ hours. Administration as known to me is almost nil. During conversation with Gen. Kong he stated that there was little or no food to be bought around Hsi To and none further on.
I learned to-day that the Bn. and Coy.2 i/cs do all the dirty work such as carrying out recces. or any other work likely to prove dangerous. Crossing the bridge, base side of Kao Hu, we were treated to a show by the Col.when a mule would not take the bridge. In approved Chinese Army manner he stood on the bank shouting orders until the entire township of Kao Hu must have been aware of the direction of our travel to our base. Our feet were tender as a result of using the cloth slippers, but travelling was found much easier.

Aug. 25 Everyone slept late until 0930 hrs.- first meal was at 1030 hrs.. We still eat with the Col.- Chinese food twice a day. Food consists of rice and three or four plates of vegetables. One needs to acquire speed to be in the event since they shovel and noisily suck in the rice at an astonishing pace. The Col. gave his outline plan as an accepted fact without even saying "there it is - what do you think of it ?": this out of courtesy as I am allegedly his adviser, I thought he might do. Briefly plan involved sending 1 Pl. of 1 Coy. to vicinity of Wung Hsin as recce party and flank protection - 3 Coy. proceeds to West of Miao Chiang Kai (object could not be ascertained) - 2 Coy. and 1 Coy. less 1 Pl.to area near Chang Kung To and 20 plainclothes men to vicinity of Wung Hsin to stir up trouble there hoping to lure the Japs out of Chang Kung To, when 2 Coy and 1 Coy. less 1 Pl. would come into operation against them. The road running South from Chang Kung To to Ani was to be mined in the hope of blowing up a tank and when this explosion was heard, a soldier dressed in white (civilians dressed thus rush in to warn japs of Chinese approach was to go on to the pontoon bridge across Hsiu river at Chang Kung To and destroy same so as to cut off Japs in addition to preventing reinforcements crossing Hsiu river. This plan assumed numerous actions or rather anticipated Jap. reactionsso that these fitted the plan. We did not point out many obvious weaknesses in tactical side but did so from demolition angle saying, bridge could not be destroyed by dropping hand grenades into pontoons and even if civilian clothed soldier managed to open charges into two pontoons, he would almost certainly be killed before he got any further, in which case two pontoons would not destroy bridge and could quickly be replaced. Mining thereof for a tank, we explained that anyone walking on the mined strip would set it off; this overcome by Col. saying all civilians would be warned off area. Did not like my suggestion that this idea would be a boomerang in that it would certainly be told to the Japs. who would avoid mine. Said this would only blow tracks off tank and finally Col. considered advisability of having party nearby to finish off tank, but would not commit himself by agreeing Interpretation, using my best interpreter Wong, involved a very long discussion before even a rough knowledge of the plan was grasped. Many questions had to be asked and accountof extraordinarily vague statements. Col. then appeared upset by so many questions, but explains difficulties of interpretation. I put forward a suggestion that before the Col. attempts to explain any plan to me, he tells interpreter beforehand and be in a better position to interpret. Further suggestion was made that if his plan and orders were written they could be translated. These suggestions were accepted when time would permit. If quick decisions had to be made, language difficulty would be insuperable. Our calf muscles to-day are very stiff as a result of wearing slippers yesterday.

[illegible] for 6 Mr. Chiang

A request made for 6 V.L.flares. We were not told how, when or where these were to be used nor were we asked for advice on these. I insisted on being told the use to which they would be put, then instructed the soldier on their use, should he have an opportunity of burning a petrol or ammunition dump. Finally ascertained that the flares were required for dropping into gill-boxes in the hope that the Japs. would be scared out and so captured. There is a reward for Jap. soldiers. The soldier who was instructed was one from 1 Coy. 1 Pl. which we were told was going to the vicinity of Chiao Yuan. It is already becoming evident that we are merely travelling companions to the Col. carrying with us stores which will be handed out on request without any information being given on advice asked. It is in any case almost an impossibility to get past dogs and wire to use flares in this manner.

Aug. 27 Breakfast 1000hrs.. H.Q. moved a distance of 1 li into a larger house. Second meal about 1700 hrs. We find it necessary to supplement meals sometimes at mid-day with our rations, but on endeavouring to get all accustomed to the change in living. In the evening there was a conference of officers about which I have never been informed. The Pl. from 1 Coy. previously mentioned left this night 27/28 under the Coy. 2 i/c.

Aug. 28 By asking questions I am able to obtain information. Heard the Japs. believed that there were 30,000 troops at C.C.K. resulting in "strict precautions" being taken on the Chang Kung To - Ani road - what the quote means many questions failed to produce any better information. Again by dint of questioning I ascertained that the outline plan seems to be altered with the dispatch to-day of 1 Pl. to Jen Hsin Kai. Later in the day I found out that this Pl. was mythical and that O.C. 1 Coy, also plainclothes men had left this day for the same place to recce. Also learned by questioning that 3 Coy. had left the Bn. at Shang Wu for Wang Chu Shan- their orders I could not ascertain. Am more fed up with our treatment, more particularly with my own position, alledged to be Bn. advisor, which I now find to be a mere paper proposition. I am not even given any information without having to ask questions to put myself in a position to give advise should such ever by any stretch of the bounds of possibility be asked. Drafted a letter to the Col. for translation by interpreter. Otherwise we are treated generously as prowdd possessions of the Col., omponents or simply travelling companions.

Aug. 29 Had my letter to Col Chen translated into Chinese by interpreter which after three translations back into English seemed to convey my meaning. I personally handed the Col. my letter. Lt.Col Gill-Davies and party arrived this morning. Conference arranged for 1400 hrs. between G-D and Col. At this conference I did not attend believing G- D. wanted information for his own purpose but a request came from the Col. to attend. He explained his plan of defence here should the Japs. move out against him, which plan gave him not the slightest control over the Bn.- also gave the enemy dispositions. He then went on to give his two plans of action,-either (a) involving Chung Kung To bridge, mining road which has already been explained herein, (b) sending a few troops dressed a Militia to feign attack on Ming Hsin whilst one Coy. stationed North on Chang Kung To - Ani road, other two Coys. South on same road to ambush reinforcements coming from these two places to assistance of Ming Hsin. Gill. Davies asked for his own particular information. During the course of this,information was given concerning Pei Cha Shan, Ma Shan, Hua Yuan and Lao To Shan. I then endeavoured to persuade the Col. to send some troops to this area to make a demonstration,then move up to Jen Hsin Kai area,do the same and so on in different areas in thehope of causing the the Japs. to move troops from one area to another. The Col. would not entertain the idea and evinced not the slightest interest. Never before has the Col. been so expansively informative. Twice more this day he called (1) to come into his office to listen to a report by a plainclothes man just returned from a recce.(2) to say Japs. had concentrated within Nanchang following capture of Lin Tang South by Chinese. Once more the plans handeddto me this day were done withoutany discussion with me nor was any comment on them asked. Pleased G.-D. is here to obtain first hand knowledge of my position.

Two more M.L.flares were requested by a soldier sent back by 1 Pl.& Coy.. When told that this Pl. had already been handed 6 we were told that some had been given to 3 Coy.. How or when this could have happened, since this Coy. left Bn. at Shang Wu, I can't imagine. Once more we were given no information of how or where these 2 flares would be used but on enquiring were told that 2 time pencils were also required; another question elicited the time of delay wanted. Chinese duplicity, vagueness and inaccuracy are maddening. Anyway the 2 flares were given out with full instructions for use for burning dumps, such being intended use. Later 2 No. 36 grenades were asked for- intended use as weapons for personal protection. These were not handed out as we explained that, if relied upon, the person using same without cover would certainly be killed. This was despite my feeling that the sooner all our stores are used the better for all concerned. Was asked for poison to poison wells and said that we did not carry any nor could same be used under International Law. Laughter.

Aug. 30 Gill - Davies and party, dressed in Chinese Army clothes sett off with Bn. 2 i/c to recce. - a more laughable sight I have yet to see in this country. This evening a wireless message was received which proved to be indecipherable . Message from Gen. Chou to Col. Chen that if any reliefs being carried out Jen Hsiu, Ani or Sung Wu or withdrewals therefrom, this Bn. should attack thise areas when a suitable opportunity occurred. Pl. from 1 Coy. and 2 Coy.less 1 Pl. under O.C.2 Coy. sent out to Wan Chia near Ch'ing An to recce.and attack if opportunity favourable. O.C.1 Coy. andhis party already at Kan Chou. Always in orders occurs this damned phrase "if opportunity favourable", thereby giving all concerned the opportinity of doing nothing under this loophole.

Aug. 31 Spoke G.-D. at Ch'ing An on phone advising him fighting had broken out in Jen Hsiu area - this he contradicted, saying that he had been observing the place yesterday. G.-D. reported movement of enemy transport along Jen Hsiu - Ani road. Advised Col. Chen of this and he agreed to send out recce party to investigate G.-D.'s report that this transport appeared an easy proposition. Agreed to allow me to accompany this recce. group but would not say when it would be sent. Col. further stated these three Bns. were important troops and this Bn's plans were now dependent on the Nanchang situation. A message received last night from Gen. Chou was translated fro us this morning - text was to recce. Chang Kung To and Yung Hsiu areas then attack if a favourable opportunity occured. I then asked if he intended moving these parts of the Bn. up to Yung Chu Shan in order to be near the locality in the event of this favourable opportunity presenting itself. He Said "NO", but ~~XXXXX~~ he had ordered 3 Coy. to recce. those positions. Then came the patter about these troops being important and our task being dependent on the Nanchang situation. Rossiter, our medical orderly down with fever. By this it can be seen that plans still come out without discussion beforehand.

[signature] Capt. Adjt. A.I.F.

WAR DIARY. M. 403/1 ORIGINAL.

A.I.F. - CADRE BN. Rec'd 18/10/42 GII MONTH OF SEPTEMBER 1942

CHIEF OF STAFF CHINA.

Hour & Date.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and Appendices
1. At operation base Sheng T'ao Kuan.	We ourselves have nothing to do. Still endeavouring to stir Col. Chen into activity.	
2. "	Nothing to note.	
3. "	A few men returned from ~~the front~~ Ih Kang Shan, West of Chang Kung To. They reported an encounter with a small party of Japanese, five of whom were killed and two wounded. Two old rifles, one can and cloth bandoliers captured. One Chinese wounded in left arm just above elbow by grenade splinter. It appears Chinese, dressed as civilians, about a Pl. in strength were out protecting civilians while they were harvesting rice. A small party of Japs. came out and the Chinese lay in wait for them. The Chinese doctor endeavoured to extract the grenade splinter with rusty forceps and knitting needle. Medical supplies rarely reach the troops being either sold by higher commanders and the money kept by them or else a grant of money in lieu of supplies is obtained for the purchase of such supplies and this is misappropriated to their own uses.	
3. C.C.K.	Informed that Lt. Col. MacDougal arrived Chungking and expects to fly to India on 6th. Lt. Col. Gill-Davies back from front and gives very disheartening (but expected) report of work being done by 5th. Bn.	
4. Front.	Endeavoured to get a more detailed description of yesterday's encounter but found it impossible to overcome Chinese vagueness. The Chinese doctor requested us to give him certain drugs, but unable to do so as we only had sufficient for our party of five.	
5. "	A civilian was brought in from Chang Kung To area accused of dealing with the Japs. Unable to find out what these dealings were but presume they must be serious as Chinese openly deal with Japs. Enquired if found guilty would be shot but told he would be handed over to civilian authorities. Punishment of treacherous Chinese is not sufficient deterrent to their dealings with Japs. Lt. Col. Miller telephoned that C.R's could be sent back if of no use. Gen. Chou had spoken to Col. Chen on the telephone just prior to the conversation with Miller. Following this Chen said he wanted a talk. Operations were discussed during the course of which Col. Chen seemed very perturbed. He referred to his original orders to come into this area and be active. Said that short of artillery his forces could not attack the enemy strong points and that they should be true guerillas and not in name only by harrassing the enemy with a series of small scattered demonstrations against various strong points causing them to waste ammunition, loss of sleep by having to stand to and generally to get them on edge. By day to detail men to snipe at anyone entering or leaving the strong points. This would make the enemys life miserable until forced to send out parties to clear the nuisance. When this happened the enemy could be ambushed and fought on ground of our own choosing. This would more than carry out orders and should prove effective. The discussion was long and favourable, Col. Chen listening well; hopeful of getting some activity by the Bn..	
6. "	Col. Chen handed me a written order for operations by 1 & 3 Coys. These translated, then a discussion was held thereon. Copy translated as finally agreed upon - [redacted]. Certain additions were made to the orders. Col. Chen was pleased with the result and so were we. It was pointed out that these tactics would result in larger actions when Japs. decided to clear surrounding country. The Col. fails to realise completely that his Bn. is supposed to be a guerilla force, despite its training as regular troops at Kiyang. Unfortunately that training was most inappropriate. To-day's discussion was the most favourable that has ever taken place. Six plain clothes men returned and gave their recce. report standing around the Col. in a circle, all talking their hardest and loudest at once. For anything ~~to~~ be got out of these reports	

6. Front. (cont) How anything can come out of these reports is difficult to imagine. 1 Coy. left to carry out orders. 3 Coy. advised by phone of orders.

6. C.C.K. [redacted]. No information of expected move, been here since 26 Jul., will we ever receive these anticipated orders ?.

7 " Rifle shoot against Burma. A.I.F. won by narrow margin. 2 men in hospital (no diarrhoea, only occasional mild fever.

7 Front. Spoke to Col.Chen re assembly areas should either Coy. be scattered by Jap. action. Said we worried a lot over plans but he was very pleased. Feel that we are gaining more of his confidence.

8. " Nothing to note.

9. C.C.K. Maj.MacIver arrived with medical supplies from Chungking, to take over hospital from Maj. Brown.

10. Front. Left Base 1030 hrs. travelled to Shang Wu (55Li) arriving 1800 hrs. Maj. Braund, W.O.1 Campbell and escort from Special Squad. Interpreter Kuo accompanied the party; he is practically useless. Orderly prepared Chinese food. Billetted in village house. Squad mounted guard. Ambush reported - for details see Appendix 3.

11 Maj. Braund. Left Shang Wu 0530 hrs. arrived C.C.K. (25 Li) 0815 hrs. Had long interview with Col. Johnson to give personal report also on present condition of Mission. At operation base, great difficulty being experienced in carrying rice, no carriers being available and 2 Coy. being used for carrying for 1 & 3 Coys. on operations. Col. Chen was anxious to give Capt. Grossett and Maj. Braund credit for operational plans, but he was informed all credit was due to him and more particularly to O.C. and 2 i/c 1 Coy. Reported 300 Yen captured and distributed among 1 Coy. Message received from Gen. Chou that there was not sufficient rice at T'an Pu or Kau Eu operational dumps; that all rice would have to be sent from C.C.K. and not to move Bn. Base until arrangements for supply and carrying of rice could be made. Officers of 2 Coy. requested their Coy. be allowed to go out and operate, as 1 & 3 Coys. doing all work and getting all credit.

12. C.C.K. Rifle shooting against Burma, won by Burma. Maj. Braund had further discussion with Col. Johnson wherein it was decided he should return to Bn. on operations and await reply from War Office re withdrawal of Mission. Later called on Gen. Chou informing him of operations when he suggested operations which appeared impossible ones. Telegram from Chungking received re appointment of J.M.Sandell to rank of Lieut. on 26 Feb.42. G.C.M.Grossett to A/Capt. Local Major and F.N.B.Braund to A/Major, Local Lt. Col. At operation Base 2 Coy. officers left to recce. Jen Hsien area and Jen Hsien - Ani road. Further ambush reported [redacted]

13. " Medical supplies obtained from our hospital to take back to 5th.Bn.

14 " Lt. Col. Braund and W.O.1 Campbell prepared to leave C.C.K. for base but found out their coolies had been ordered to return.

15 C.C.K. Coolies borrowed from 4 Bn. left Lt. Col. Braund and W.O.1 Campbell left C.C.K. 1500 hrs. for front arrived Shang Wu 1800 hrs. At operation base reported that all civilians were being fired on by Jap. posts in form of reprisals.

16 " Party of evacuees (sick) to leave C.C.K. on 18th. and another party on 21st. 4 men from A.I.F. Bn.; Pte Weber M.F.M. Pte Smart D.G. Sgmn. Thomson D.W. (R.C.S) and Pte Scott J.G. (R.A.M.C.) both attached to A.I.F. Cadre Bn.

16 Front. Left Shang Wu 0800 hrs. arrived base 1500 hrs. Medical supplies and some 69 grenades handed to Col. Chen. Requested that Medical supplies be used for troops and not sold as appeared to be the custom. Col. Chen said he would make sure of this.

17 " 2 i/c 1 Coy. returned sick. Reported on difficulty of getting at Chang Kung To road owing to barbed wire and heavy undergrowth, that Japs. now have to live on two meals a day off the country instead of receiving tinned rations every four days as well as their own rice, and no longer have any cigarette ration. Uniforms were dilapidated and Puppet troops very poorly clad and armed. Report that Pl. Commanders and small plainclothes party burned grainery at T'su Cha, a small village South West of Ani by using 3 M.I.flares with hay. 2 Coy. left as their Officers reported damage could be done in that area.

18. Kroht. Telegram from Advance H.Q. that British Govt. had decided to withdraw Contingents to India.

19. " Demonstrated and explained use of 36 and 69 grenades, also Thompson Sub-Machine Gun to Special Squad of 5 Bn. Wireless received 1300 hrs. for party to return to C.C.K.. Col.Chen informed of message, arrangements made to leave 20th. and reply wirelessed. Col. Chen later received wireless message to return to C.C.K.

20 " Lt. Col. Brumnd, Major Grossett, W.O.1 Campbell, Cpl. Rossiter (R.A.M.C.) and Pte Croton left base 0900 hrs. with all stores taken up. Coolies could not keep up despite slow pace. Party arrived Shang Wu?55 li, 1800 hrs., coolies arrived 2000hrs. Very cold night.

21. Started 0545 hrs. reached C.C.K.0815 hrs. Escorting Squad straggled very badly. Feet badly bruised by cobble paths. Despite this Chinese slippers are much preferred to issue boots, the latter being too heavy for the mountains and too slippery on the stones. Even wearing boots, feet get bruised. Pte. Weber, A.I.F. and Sgmn. Thomson, R.C.S.attached to A.I.F. evacuated from C.C.K. with sick personnel to Kiyang.

22 C.C.K. Report received from Col. Chen, O.C. 5 Surprise Bn. that 20 Japs. killed by ambush by 5 Coy.

23 " 5 Surprise Bn. returned to C.C.K..Capt. Callum R.A.M.C. took back Ptes. Sinclair and Potts with sick personnel to Kiyang. Col. Johnson advised wireless message had been sent to India to concentrate any A.I.F. evacuees at one station.

24 " Gen. Chou gave feast alleged to honour a Chinese Moon Festival but really was in farewell. Contingent and Chinese Bn. Commanders present.

26 " Orders issued for move to Kiyang. For copy see Appendix 5.

28 " Malay Contingent moved off for Kiyang.

29 " One O.R. sent back by Malaya Contingent with dysentery. Range practice held. Increase in shooting efficiency with rifle has been 33% within 3 weeks. Thompson Sub-machine gun records have not been kept, but shooting has been good.

30 " Col. Chen and Officers of 5 Bn. gave us a feast in the morning. We gave them a return farewell feast in the afternoon. Burma Contingent moved off for Kiyang.
The original strength of A.I.F. Contingent was 48 all ranks, present strength in this forward area is 24 all ranks.

R. Brumnd.
.....Lt. Col.
O.C. A.I.F. Contingent.

Appendix "F"

Report by Major F.N.B.Braund, A.I.F. (attached to 5th Surprise Bn.)

Field, 2 Sep.42

Being one of five who has lived with a Chinese Bn. in the field on what is alleged to be operations, it is with the utmost confidence that I write this report and with the belief that much credence must be given to what I write.

I intend to confine my remarks to matters vital to the continuance of the Mission, that is to say, concerning our usefulness in China; such matters as noticeable absence of administration or efficiency of the Bn. Sigs. in connecting up with Bn. H.Q. with Companies in billets have no place in this report. Such matters are mentioned in my diary which accompanies this report and is intended to be read in conjunction with this.

On 24 Aug., 5th Surprise Bn. was ordered out on operations to the area roughly bounded by Chang Kung To to the North and Ani to the South. To ensure mobility, the Mortar Coy. was left behind. The Bn. was given no ordres as to duration of operations or places to attack; it received instructions to operate in the indicated area so as to prevent withdrawal of enemy troops for use presumably in a drive on Changsha or in the North against Russia. Without limitations or restrictions on its activities, conditions could not have been more favourable to action by this Bn. - freedom of action was unlimited. On the night of 25/26 Aug. we reached our operational base, less 2 Coy which had proceeded to area Kung Ch'u Shan. The Bn. settled itself in comfortably for what later indicated a lengthy stay.

At this time recce parties under Bn.2 i/c and Coy 2 i/cs had been out in the area for at least five weeks; yet despite this more recce parties have been sent out from this base. Recce reports interpreted to me have all been extremely vague and on many occasions inaccurate, for example, I was asked to hear a report by a soldier dressed as a civilian who had just come in from a recce - he stated certain pill-boxes were wired electrically, but on my questioning the source of electricity he said they must have only plain barbed wire - no details of construction of wire obstacles could be ascertained from him. Recces are still being carried out.

Now the important factor is, why am I here. Ostensibly, I am Bn. Adviser, practically, I am an "objet d'art" or merely a travelling companion. Four plans have now been made and presented to me as the final and finished article. Not once have I been invited to discuss the formulation of any plan nor has my advice or criticism ever been sought afterwards. I attempted to give advice on an aspect concerning demolitions and was as good as told by the Col. that his method of using our explosives would be effective - in fact it would not have achieved the desired result. With me is one Chinese-speaking Officer Capt. Grossett who does the Intelligence work and assists in interpreting, one medical orderly now down with fever, one S.C.L. and one Private. With the exception of Capt. Grossett, the O.Rs. have nothing whatever to do and stretching my imagination to the utmost I cannot foresee their usefulness as there are no demolition targets in this area.

For three days at this operation base I was given no information without having to worm it out by asking numerous questions; then I wrote a letter to the Col. stating my position and requesting information. Since that letter the Col. has given me all available information yet my position as Bn. Adviser remains as untenable as ever because plans continue to be given me ready-made without opportunity for previous discussion or subsequent advice or criticism sought. All this despite many

previous assurances by the Col. that he considered me his equal and would always discuss plans before settling same.

The next feature is the language difficulty. Throughout my dealings with the Bn. I have used my best interpreter, the other one being useless. Constantly I find myself unable to understand his command of English thereby gaining a wrong impression of whatever was intended to be conveyed and vice versa. Not infrequently have errors and more particularly omissions been discovered in his interpretations. Interpreting involves very lengthy discussions which would be impossible without unlimited time.

Finally comes the probability of action by 5 Bn. or the other two Bns. if judged by this Bn. As previously stated orders do not restrict but encourage activity by the Bn. in the indicated area. I have frequently been told that the three Surprise Bns. are highly valued troops. This statement would seem irrelevant but now I realise the significance of such remarks based on my knowledge of plans being made and abandoned, seemingly unnecessarily prolonged periods of recces - now over six weeks - and resolute deafness to my suggestions for demonstrations in various sectors of the area. We were ordered here to be active but all my efforts to produce this result are met with the reply "when opportunity is favourable". As example, on 31 Aug. a message came from Gen. CHOU with instructions to attack Chang Kung To and Yung Hsiu. Full of hope for definite action I immediately asked Col. Chen if he would now move the two Coys from here to join 3 Coy. so as to be on the spot to await "a favourable opportunity" to comply with Gen. CHOU's message. However the trap did not fall as he replied "our action is dependent on Kanchang and the general situation" - meaning that we remain here indefinitely. I am assured that Col. Chen is an old soldier and to use a colloquialism knows his way about - my thoughts are that he is too old a soldier and more Chinese than the Chinese to seek action ob to be in command of troops supposed to be active guerilla forces.

Should anyone say I have not awaited for sufficient time to elapse before passing judgment let me reply that nearby are opportunities for attacking movements of enemy transport, and I cannot get the Col. to take any action. My conclusion is that action is not being sought, future action is highly improbable and that if it does take place we shall have no part in it other than that of interested spectators in the distance.

My dreams, in common with others, in Kaymyo following the reading of T.E.Lawrence's "Seven Pillars of Wisdom" will I am quite satisfied never materialise in China.

Mobility should be mentioned as this is a most essential element of guerilla forces. I can now definitely state that with rations and without any explosives a British Cadre Bn. at say half strength would be a hopeless drag on any Chinese guerilla force.

In justification of my convictions and to ease my conscience that I might be failing to help (or?) bring an end to this Mission I must urge that the three salient points of this report , namely (i) our utterly useless presence
(ii) language difficulty
and (iii) Improbability of offensive action,
be represented to General BRUCE with the utmost expedition and with the request, if necessary, that this go on to the War Office or other proper authority responsible for our stay in China.

This Mission is not keeping China in the war, is not having any effect on morale of war troops, but is providing "jobs" for the three Bns. as well as Gen. Li Mo An.

Reports by Major F.N.B.Braund

Can there be any possible justification, excepting Political, which is without foundation, for our continued attempt to help where help is not asked.

I request my representations be forwarded immediately so that all may be withdrawn before the Changsha threat becomes reality, and put to use elsewhere where we shall not be impeded from fighting and shall be of some real use.

If my present position and those with me remains unchanged I must in protest and to save some shred of British prestige as well as self-respect ask for our withdrawal from the Bn.

Signed F.N.Braund
Major
A. I. F.

Distribution:
War Diary 2
Col.Johnson 1
File 1

Note by Major Braund on Chinese Recce Reports.

Based on my observation of standard of reports which have come into 5 Chinese Bn. I have no hesitation in making the following statement for the benefit of all Contingents:

Such reports are inaccurate, in many cases misleading and are based not upon observation of a post, for example, by the person making the report but more upon that he has ascertained by questioning civilians in the neighbourhood, and his own assumptions. Not in one instance can I trace continual observation of any particular place so that details of the habits of the occupants of a post can be gathered - such vital matters as patrols are never mentioned and when questioned no useful information can be obtained.

Conclusion is that it would be extremely foolish to commit British troops to any minor action based on Chinese Intelligence.

F.N.Braund.
Major

8 Sep. 42-

APPENDIX 1.

Report of the Ambush carried out by 1 Coy. 5th.Bn. in Chi Chu Ti ([illegible]) area yesterday.

About 0200 hrs. on 10th. one squad dressed as civilians under Coy.2i/c attacked the enemy at CHI CHU TI ([illegible]) and WU KWEI LING ([illegible]), ~~[illegible]~~ not shown on map but East of CHUAN PEI CHIU ([illegible]) from the East.
At dawn about 50 Japanese (the figure has shrunk since I sent my telegram) issued forth from Chi Chu Ti and started to move West, obviously with the idea of cutting off the Chinese who had been firing at them during the night. However the Japanese were ambushed by 1 Pl. of 1 Coy. under Coy. Commander who had been waiting for them in the area between NAN SHU LIU ([illegible]) and T'ANG HSIA ([illegible]). Japanese casualties amounted to more than 20, while the Chinese suffered none. Two rifles, some ammunition and equipment were captured and these are being sent back to Gen. Chou's H.Q..
On hearing the firing when the ambush took place, the Japanese promptly sent out columns, each between 70 and 100 strong, form CHUAN PEI CHIU (previously informed LAO YUAN) and CHAO LING. Only one gun was opened from these with the idea of encircling the Chinese, but they were unsuccessful and the Chinese withdrew Northwards along the road to SHENG CHI SHU ([illegible]). The remaining Pl. of 1 Coy. during the action had been stationed just North of HSIA TUNG HSIA ([illegible]) to ensure that the Japanese got across to the SHENG CHI SHU road form CH'AO LING or SHANG KUNG LAO ([illegible]). This Pl. saw no action as the Japs. column from CH'AO LING moved South of HSIA TUNG HSIA. Plain clothes section under Coy. 2 i/c. got away going North-East around SHANG KUNG LAO and then West.

G.C.Grossott.
Capt.

Shang Tao Yuan.
11 Sep.42
1100 hrs.

SECRET.

Administrative Instruction No.1

Move of Cadre Bns. to KIYANG.

1. Itinerary and Timings;

The following daily stages will be strictly adhered to by Cadre Bns. S.H.Q. may alter the itinerary as far as the hospital is concerned, after leaving CHIU HSIEN TANG.

	Aprox. distance in li	3 C.B.	4 C.B.	5 C.B. Hosp. & W/T.	H.Q.
Leave C.C.K. (p.m.)		Sep.28	Sep.30	Oct.2	Oct.3
Arr. CHIU HSIEN TANG	10	" 28	" 30	" 2 Hosp.to SHAHOFU	" 3
Arr. KANG FANG	50	" 29	Oct. 1	Oct.3	" 4
Arr. TSAO CHIAO	50	" 30	" 2	" 4	" 5
Arr. TA TUAN	50	Oct. 1	" 3	" 5	" 6
Arr. TUNG KU	50	" 2	" 4	" 6	" 7
Stay TUNG KU	-	" 3	"5	" 7	" 8
Arr. PAI PU	35	" 4	"6	" 8	" 9
Arr.CHANG FANG	45	" 5	" 7	" 9	" 10
Arr.KUAN TU	45	" 6	" 8	" 10	" 10
Stay KUAN TU.	-	" 7	"9	" 11	"11
Arr. SHIH CHIA WAN	50	" 8	"10	" 12	" 12 LIUYANG
Arr. HAN CHIA KANG	50	" 9	" 11	" 13	" 13 YUNGAN
Arr. PU CHI	45	" 10	" 12	" 14	" 14 CHANGSHA
Arr. PAI CHUNG	45	" 11	"13	" 15	" 15 at Changsha
Arr. SHIH TSIU TOU (10 li from CHU CHOW railhead)	45	" 12	" 14	" 16	" 16 at Changsha

Noted; Hospital will proceed via SHAHOFU and will join 5 C.Bn at KAN FANG on Oct. 3rd.

W/T set and personnel under Sgt. Chamberlain will join 5 C.Bn. at CHIU HSIEN TANG on Oct. 2nd.

2. Carriers.

Carriers are alloted as follows :-

	3 C.B.	4. C.B.	5 C.B.	W/T	Hosp.	H.Q.
Changsha Bn. Carriers	60	55	35	16	25	20
Kiyang Carriers	All	All	All	-	-	-
Chair Carriers	9 with 3 chairs	9 with 3 chairs	9 with 3 chairs	-	12 with 4 chairs	6 with 2 chairs

Changsha Bn. Carriers: These carriers will proceed to CHUCHOW only and will return immediately to TUNGKU.

Kiyang Carriers : Kiyang Carriers will accompany C.Bns. to Kiyang.

Chairs and Chair Coolies : Chairs (other than those for the hospital) and chair coolies for the first stage will be provided at CHIU HSIEN TANG under arrangements to be made by H.Q. Chairs will be taken right through to Kiyang.

Changsha Bn. Carriers will report at H.Q at 1300 hrs. on the 28th, 30th, Sep. and 2Nd. Oct. Os.C. Cadre Bns. will send an adjutant to H.Q to conduct these carriers to billets where loads will be handed over. The carriers will then proceed to CHIU HSIEN TANG under the orders of Os. C Cadre Bns. Carriers for W/T and Hospital will be sent to the hospital by H.Q. at 1300 hrs. on Oct.2nd.

No British personnel should accompany the carriers on the line of march. The Carrier Bn. Commander has agreed to the stages given in para. 1 above.

Note. Special arrangements may have to be made for the safe-guarding of cash.

Kiyang Carriers will be placed under the orders of the Officer i/c. Changsha Carrier parties. We have no responsibility as regards pay or rationing of the Changsha carriers. Separate instructions will be issued to contingents regarding the pay and rationing of the Kiyang carriers.

3. Chinese Personnel :

Interpreters with the exception of LIN CHOU SEN ( )No.5 C.B CHIN SEN CHIEH ( ) No.5 C.B., and FENG YUNG CHEN ( )No.4 C.B. and adjutants will accompany Cadre Bns. to Kiyang.

Chinese orderlies and cooks may also proceed with Cadre Bns.

4. Signallers and Medical Orderlies.

The following will proceed on Oct.2nd. with the hospital and 5 C.Bn.:- Sgt. Chamberlain Pte. North. Sgmn. Pope
Sgmn. Parry W/T. Wang N.O.Liu.

The remainder will move with their contingents. Those who have not yet joined their contingents will do so on the day before the date of departure.

5. Train Arrangements

L.O. CHANGSHA has been ordered to reserve the necessary train accomodation at CHUCHOW and send instructions to Capt. House, R.T.O. KIYANG. Capt. Upchurch will be sent to CHUCHOW as R.T.O.

Cadre Bns. will be billetted in SHIH TSUI TOU and not in CHUCHOW as a precaution against air-raids. They will, if possible proceed independently from CHUCHOW to Kiyang at 2 day intervals.

Rations.

10 days' preserved rations will be carried for the journey. Consumed rations will be replaced at TUNGKU. Carriers will have to stop at Kiyang to draw rice, but they will join contingents at HAN CHIA KANG.

7. Kits : TUNGKU and KUANTU
Any kits left at those places which individuals require to be moved from China must be taken with Cdrs Bns.

8. Medical : MOOs. will give such medical attention to carriers en route as is considered practicable.
Arrangements are being made to give medical treatment to the Changsha carriers at CHIU HSIEN TANG during the next few days.
Dr. London will proceed with 4 C2Bn.

9. Intercommunication :
Communication with Adv. H.Q. will be made as necessary and when feasible as follows :-
Up to 1400 hrs. Oct. 3rd. at C.C.K.
To 0600 hrs. Oct. 4th. at CHIU HSIEN TANG (R.O.)
Messages form thenceforwards will be received at TUNGKU until 0600 hrs. Oct.9th.
Thence at KUANTU until 0600 hrs. 12 Oct.
Thence at LIUYANG until 0600 hrs. (c/o Magistrate) 13 Oct.
Thence at CHANGSHA (BIOLA) until entrainment completed.
A staff Officer from Mission H.Q. CHUNGKING will be at KIYANG before Contingents arrive and will remain there until evacuation from KIYANG is completed.
O.C. No.3 C.Bn. will obtain 3 stencil ciphers from H.Q. and will hand over one each to O.C. KUANTU DEPOT? Capt. Upchurch (R.T.O. CHUCHOW, and Capt. House (R.T.O.HENYANG). He will inform Capt. Upchurch that he is responsible for keeping L.O. CHANGSHA, R.T.O. HENYANG and O.C. Supply Base KIYANG informed of all movements. He will also inform Capt. House that he is responsible for keeping O.C. Supply Base KIYANG informed of the progress of the move.
Telegraphic Addresses.
Adv. H.Q. Oct 4th-8th. Supply Station TUNGKU in Chinese.
" " " 9th- 11th. " " KUANTU in Chinese.
" " " 12th-16th. BIOLA CHANGSHA
The W/T. will be prepared for communication with KIYANG on the following dates :-
At TUNGKU 6 Oct. 2000 Hrs. to 7 Oct. 2000 hrs.
At KUANTU 10 Oct. 2000 hrs. to 11 Oct. 2000 hrs.

Sgd. H.H.Johnson
Colonel.
26 Sep. 42. Commanding Adv. H.Q.

Appendix 5

COPY.

SECRET.

British Cadre Bns.

Operation Order No.1
Copy No.....

26 Sep.42

1. Information: The British Govt. has decided to withdraw Cadre Bns. to INDIA.

2. Intention: Cadre B ns. will move independently to Kiyang and there receive further orders regarding movement to KUNMING.

3. Method: March route to CHUCHOW thence rail to LICHIAPING.

4. Administrative Arrangements
5. Intercommunication
) See Administrative instructions Attached.

6. Acknowledge.

Issued by hand.
Time

Sgd. H.H.Johnsmn. Colonel.
Commanding Adv. H.Q.

Copy No. 1
Copy No. 2
Copy No. 3
Copy No. 4
Copy No. 5
Copy No. 6.

Operation Orders Issued by Col.Chen (O.C.5th Chinese Bn.)
At Bn.H.Q. Shang T'ao Yuan 6/9/42.

1.The enemy,owing to reports they have received regarding our presence in this area,are strengthening their defence works.
2.With a view to enticing the enemy into a favourable position to be ambushed the Bn.will make the following ~~maximum~~ dispositions
3.On 7th inst No.1 Coy.will move to occupy Chang Heng (長坑) and Chiao Yuan (校源) as operation bases.Each night 1 Pl.split into 3 squads,will attack the enemy in 3 different places in the area Shang Kung Lo (上公路),Ch'iao Ling (橋嶺),Chi Chu Ti (吉竹地),Liao Yuan Shan(寮源山) while the remaining 2 Pls. will lie up in the area bounded by Shang Chi Chu (上吉竹), Shia T'ung Shia(下同下),Chu Lo Chuan(朱洛村) as a ready reserve to ambush the enemy if he comes out.
4.No.3 Coy. using Ching Tso Fu(井左附)& Yao Yuan(水源) as bases will likewise send out each night 3 squads from one Pl.to attack in 3 different enemy strong points in Chang Kung Tb (上公路) area.The remaining 2 Pls.will lie up in the area Chi Chien ( ),Wu Chuan (吳村),Pai Hsia Ti (白沙地), again for the purpose of ambushing the enemy if he comes out.
5.No.2 Coy.will remain here till sufficient rice supplies have been laid down forward and then will move to Yu Yuan(沿源)and Chou Fang( ).
6.Bn.H.Q. will remain at Shang T'ao Yuan(上桃源).
7.During the day 2 men will be sent to snipe at each ofthose enemy posts in Nos.1 & 3 Coy.areas which have been attacked during the previous night.These men will be dressed as civilans and will be protected against surprise by the enemy by other plain-cloths troops. These snipers will be supplied by Pl.other than that carrying out night operations.
* Paragraph No.7 was added at Maj.Braund's suggestion

These orders are more in the nature of instructions and leave Coy.Comdrs.considerable latitude.

The above translation was forwarded to Adv.H.Q. by Capt.C.C.M. Grossett.

Appendix 2

A.I.F. CADRE BN.
BRITISH MILITARY MISSION.
ROUTINE ORDERS PART 11
by
Major F.N.B.Braund

Chih Chia Kai | Wednesday 16 Sep.42 No.134 | Ref. last issue No.13 24.Aug.42

REVERSIONS.

VX6873	A/Cpl. Hunter R.A. 8th. Div. Sigs. A.I.F.	To be Private with Trade Group 1. Signm. w.e.f. 9 Sep. 42
VX27069	Pte. Noonan W.J. 2/9 Fd. Amb. A.I.F.	To be Priavte without Trade Group. w.e.f. 9 Sep. 42.

STRENGTH INCREASE

VX43909	Pte. Potts A.J. 2/9 Fd. Amb. A.I.F.	Discharged from hospital C.C.K. 30 Aug.42
7370120	Pte. Scott J.G. R.A.M.C.	Rejoined unit 1 Sep.42
VX47434	Pte Robinson B.A. 2/9 Fd. Amb. A.I.F.	Discharged from C.C.K hospital 6 Sep.42

STRENGTH DECREASE

VX43909	Pte Potts A.J. 2/9 Fd. Amb. A.I.F.	Admitted hospital C.C.K. 2 Sep.42 V.D.

Evacuation.

VX47434	Pte. Robinson B.A. 2/9 Fd. Amb. A.I.F.	To Base Depot Kiy[illegible] or beyond. 12 Sep.[illegible]

INCREASE OF PAY.

7267188	Pte Drummond. J.A. R.A.M.C.	Granted 3rd. y[illegible] increement of 9d [illegible] diem wee.f. 2 [illegible]

STOPPAGE OF PAY

VX43909	Pte. Potts A.J. 2/9 Fd. Amb. A.I.F.	Forfeits pay of 5/5 per diem fro[illegible] 17 Aug.42 to 30 [illegible] 42. Whilst in hospital with V.D.

Distribution.
War Diary 1 & 2 ✓
File 3

A.D.H. Goston ... Maj.
for O.C. A.I.F. Cadre Bn.

A.I.F. CADRE BATTALION
B.M.M. 204
ROUTINE ORDERS PART 11.
by
Lt. Col. F.N.Braund.

Chuu Chia Kai	Saturday 26 Sep.42 No. 15	Ref. last issue No.14 of 16 Sep.42

STRENGTH INCREASE.

7379938	Pte. Molloy J.W. R.A.M.C.	Rejoined unit 25.9.4 from duty at hospita

STRENGTH DECREASE.

VX29830	Pte. Smart D.G. 2/9 Fd. Amb. A.I.F.	Evacuated to Kiyang 18 Sep.42 on Medical grounds.
7370120	Pte. Scott J.G. R.A.M.C.	ditto.
NX45386	Pte. Weber M.F.M. 2/20 Bn. A.I.F.	Evacuated to Kiyang 21 Sep.42 on Medical grounds.
2328842	Sgmn. Thomson D.W. Royal Corps Sigs.	ditto.
NX20007	Pte. Sinclair J.F. 2/20 Bn. A.I.F.	Evacuated to Kiyang 23 Sep.42 on Medical grounds.
VX43909	Pte. Potts A.J. 2/9 Fd. Amb. A.I.F.	ditto.

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.

(a) Officers.

NX12551 Capt.,L/Major F.N.B.Braund 2/19 Bn. A.I.F.	to be A/Major, Local Lt.Col. w.e.f. date unknown - authority W903(MSIP) from Chungking.
EC2347 2Lt.,A/Lieut, L/Capt. G.C.M.Grossett 6th. Gurkha Rifles	to be A/Capt,Local Major w.e.f. date unknown - authority W903 (MSIP) from Chungking.
VX27806 W.O.11,A/W.O.1 J.N.Sandell 2/9 Fd. Amb. A.I.F.	Commissioned Lieuten 26 Feb. 42 authority letter 2385452 D/Aug. 28 1942 from Army in India. To be Local Capt. w.e.f. 26 Feb.

(b) O.R's

2361370 A/Cpl. Chamberlain R.R. Royal Corps Sigs.	to be A/Unpaid Sgt. w.e.f.1 Sep.42. to be A/Sgt. with pay w.e.f. 1 Sep.42. (published at the request of Adv. H.Q.)

Distribution.
War Diary 1 and 2
File 3.

F.N.Braund
Lt. Col.
Commanding A.I.F.Cadre Bn.

APPENDIX 4

Report on Operation by 5 Surprise Bn. CHANG KUNG TO area.

1. Early in the morning of Sep.12th. at about 0300 hrs., two Pls. from 1 Coy. attacked the enemy at MA AN SHAN ( ). OnePl. attacked from the South and the other from the East. When the firing was heard the enemy commenced firing from a Pill-box at TUAN SHAN ( ), not shown on the map, but situated just West of the C.H.T.- Ani road, N.W. of MA AN SHAN. At thesame time the enemy sent out a party between 60 and 80 strong from CHIAO CHUNG TZE ( ) who approached passing N.E. of MA AN SHAN. These were fired on by the Pl. attacking from the East. Immediately this occured the enemy sent 3 armoured cars and 1 tank down the road from CH'EN CH'IAO ( ). The armoured cars turned their searchlightson the Chinese and commenced firing but the two Pls. immediately withdrew. The only casualty suffered by the Chinese was a guide who was caught in the searchlight and killed by the fire from the tank. The Japanese casualties (it is reported that these were not Puppet troops) according to civilians who saw them removed by trucks to CHANG HUNG TO from MA AN Shan next day, amounted to 5 killed and 10 wounded. It is reported that it is practically impossible to get at the road to mine it in order to catch tanks, as it is well guarded with earthworks all along the made up section. (This remains to be seen as Chinese reports are seldom accurate. All the rice in this region has been cut.

WAR DIARY. ORIGINAL.

A.I.F. CADRE BN. MONTH OF OCTOBER 1942

1. At Chiu Chai Kai, kits and gear sorted for return to Kiyang.

2. 1430 hrs. Continent left billets - strength 5 Officers and 25 O.R.'s. Col. Chen Commanding 5 Surprise Bn. called with his Officers and accompanied Continent to pass out of the Valley. At the pass 1 Coy. of 5 Bn. formed a guard of honour, complete with bugles and firecrackers. Officers came on further where they stood and watched Continent on its way down to Chiu Hsien Tang, a distance of 8 li. Billetted here at 1530 hrs. Four signallers with wireless equipment reported in later - moved with Continent in accordance with orders. Chinese seemed genuinely sorry about our departure.

3. Left Chiu Hsien Tang at 0800 hrs. and reached Kan Fang 1430 hrs. Distance 45 li over mountainous country. Very hot. Carriers were in a deplorable physical condition; chiefly malaria and bed sores. They lack any medical treatment. Continent M.O. gave them treatment which was greatly appreciated by the men and tolerated by the Officers. Runner sent by Magistrate to Ta Tuan to engage civilian coolies in order to rest the Army carriers in the hope that they might pick up in condition.

4. S.T. from Kan Fang 0745 hrs. reached Tsao Chiao 1145 hrs. - distance 30 li. Billetted in civilians shops. Doors were taken down and used as sleeping boards. Carrier Officers told to send sick for treatment but they did not arrive until much later than arranged. Old boots are causing many blisters and sore feet.

5. S.T. Tsao Chiao 0745 hrs. reached Ta Tuan 1400hrs. after an excessively hot march - distance 45 li. Billetted in farm house.

6. S.T. 0630 hrs. stopped at San Tu 1115 hrs.- distance 40-45 li. Left 1545 hrs. reached Tungtu 1545 hrs.- distance 15-18 li. Total distance 55-60 li. Very hot. Now on undulating country where the valleys do not terminate in steep passes. Civilian coolies used and they travel much faster than Army carriers. Still very hot.

7. Rested at Tungtu. Picked up kits previously dumped here and reached. Rations drawn. Wireless opened.

8. S.T. 0645 hrs. arrived Sheng Fang 1630 hrs. - distance 60 li. Stayed 3 hrs. en route. Carriers came in late - said distance too much. Rain. Billetted in shops.

9. S.T. 0645 hrs. arriving Kuantu 1515 hrs. - distance 65 li. Rain. Civilian coolies ordered were not obtained for us; kits did not arrive until next day. Burma Continent shared bedding in billett at dump.

10. Rested at Kuantu. Carriers given medical treatment but unable to do much as they need better nourishment and long treatment. Rain.

11. S.T. 0815 hrs. arriving Shih Chia Wan 1445 hrs. - distance 45 li. Flat travelling. Rain. Billetted in shops. Twenty civilian coolies engaged had to be changed at Ku Kang 20 li out because they cannot travel in ~~xxx~~ to the next district. Major Grossett with 2 O.R's and Interpreter continued to Luiyang a further 20 li with new civilian coolies to engage more for the next stage.

12. S.T. 0730 hrs. arrived Luiyang 1000 hrs.- distance 20 li. Major Grossett was unable to engage civilian coolies for to-day. Left Luiyang 1230 hrs. and reached Hsu Chia Kang 1445 hrs.- distance 15 li. Billetted in shops. Flat travelling. Rain. According to schedule setting out stages, total distance to be covered this day to our billetts was 50 li, but was in fact only 35 li.

13. S.T. 0730 hrs. arriving P'u'Chi 1515 hrs.- distance 55 li. Rain. Flat but slippery track. Last night paraded Army carrier commandrs and censured them for their unpunctuality and failure to carry out their duties - this was the third occasion they were spoken to and threatened that this conduct would be reported. Civilian coolies if obtainable are better in all ways, more particularly for the heavier loads they carry and longer distances they will cover. Billetted in coolie H.Q.

14. S.T. 0815 hrs. reaching Wan Pi Tien 1230 hrs.- distance 30 li. Rain. Scheduled stage was to Pai Chung stated to be 45 li. In fact our stop was 5 li beyond Pai Chung because there was only

14 (cont.) one small shop - the usual thatched mud hut at that place. Lt. Col. Braund continued to Chuchow with three chairs cases to arrange entraining. Strained arches, inflamed tendons and bad knees have been brought on by these rough cobblestone pathways, so that each day it was necessary to carry at least one man by chair.

15. S.T. 0615 hrs. reaching Chuchow 0915 hrs. - distance 30 li. Rain. Carriers arrived 5 mins. before departure of train. Entraining in freight trucks. Train started 1020 hrs. arriving Henyang East 1750 hrs. A wooden bridge has been constructed across the river and now carriages are moved over this. Detrained and fed in restaurant after crossing river in Sampans. At Henyang arrangements made for accomodation of troops at West station in 3rd. class sleeping car - Officers slept in waiting room. Form Shih Chia Wan to Chuchow the schedule of stages appeared to have been set out by the Chinese without any knowledge of the distance or facilities for billetting.

16. Train left Henyang West station 0900 hrs. reaching Li Chia Ping 1300 hrs. By truck to old quarters at S.W.S.T.C. Hiyang.

17.) These three days were spent at Hiyang, where all U.S. rifles
18.) Tommy guns and ammunition for same were handed in. T.S.M.'s
19.) were retained together with 50 rounds per man for the trip out. A new issue of certain articles of clothing was made. Accounts were closed, each balance handed in. Otherwise normal administration.

20. Left Hiyang by truck at 0900 hrs for railhead Li Chia Ping. Entrained at 1130 hrs. Accomodation was 2 3rd Class Sleepers for O.R.'s and 1 1st class sleeper for Officers. On seven under control of the Chinese, accomodation has been in freight trucks. Party consisted of remainder 5 Officers and 34 O.R.'s. accompanied by Colonel H.F. Johnson and one Medical Orderly. Trains are under strict military control; passports are frequently examined, because it is in a precaution against spies.

21. Liuchow at 0800 hrs changed trains. Arrived railhead Chin Chin Chang 1600 hrs. Meal at Railway Hotel. Two trucks were across the river which we had to cross by ferry because the bridge had been washed away. Arrived Yochi 1800 hrs - distance 30 kilos - and billetted in China Travel Agency.

22. S.T. 0715 hrs. arrived Chu Wan 1645 hrs - distance 246 kilos. Billetted in two Inns, sometimes 8 courts.

23. S.T. 0730 hrs. Arrived Hsiang 1400 hrs - distance 150 kilos - good climate. Spring broken on one truck. Trucks serviced.

24. S.T. 0730 hrs. At 25 kilos spring broke on driving side of same truck & Packed spring and got truck back to Kweiyang. Chinese made springs are of most inferior steel and have proved to be very brittle. Second truck at Anshun - distance - 100 kilos had a broken spring. Stayed the night here in the hotel.

25. S.T. 0500 hrs. Very frost. Arrived Pin Yi - distance - 240 kilos at 1800 hrs. No accomodation kept at China Travel Agency because previous two parties did not stay there as arranged.

26. S.T. 0730 hrs. Arrived Kunming - distance 280 kilos - 1400 hrs. Billetted in former A.V.G. quarters. Total distance travelled by truck was 1114 kilos. Troops are now much improved in health and are picking up rapidly after our experiences.

27. At Kunming awaiting transport by plane to India.

F.E. Braund Lt.Col.
O.C. Allied Contingent

1. At Chiu Chai Kai, kits and gear sorted for return to Kiyung.

2. 1430 hrs. Contingent left billets - strength 5 Officers and 25 O.R.'s. Col. Chen Commanding 5 Surprise Bn. called with his Officers and accompanied Contingent to pass out of the Valley. At the pass 1 Coy. of 5 Bn. formed a guard of honour, complete with bugles and firecrackers. Officers came on further where they stood and watched Contingent on its way down to Chiu Hsien Tang, a distance of 8 li. Billetted here at 1530 hrs. Four signallers with wireless equipment reported in later - moved with Contingent in accordance with orders. Chinese seemed genuinely sorry about our departure.

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12. S.T. 0730 hrs. arrived Luiyang 1000 hrs.- distance 20 li. Major Grossett was unable to engage civilian coolies for to-day. Left Luiyung 1230 hrs. and reached Han Chia Kang 1445 hrs.- distance 15 li. Billetted in shops. Flat travelling. Rain. According to schedule setting out stages, total distance to be covered this day to our billetts was 60 li, but was in fact only 35 li.

13. S.T. 0730 hrs. arriving P'u Chi 1515 hrs.- distance 55 li. Rain. Flat but slippery track. Last night paraded Army carrier commandr and censured them for their unpunctuality and failure to carry out their duties - this was the third occasion they were spoken to and threatened that this conduct would be reported. Civilian coolies if obtainable are better in all ways, more particularly for the heavier loads they carry and longer distances they will cover. Billetted in coolie H.Q.

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14 (cont.) one small shop - the usual thatched mud hut at that place. Lt. Col. Braund continued to Chuchow with three chairs cases to arrange entraining. Strained arches, inflamed tendons and bad knees have been brought on by these rough cobblestone pathways, so that each day it was necessary to carry at least one man by chair.

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22. S.T. 0715 hrs. Arrived Tu Yun 1645 hrs - distance 246 kilos. Billetted in two Inns. Mountainous country.

23. S.T. 0730 hrs. Arrived Kweiyang 1400 hrs - distance 168 kilos - road slippery. Spring broken on one truck. Trucks serviced.

24. S.T. 0730 hrs. At 75 kilos spring broke on driving side of same truck & Packed spring and got truck back to Kweiyang. Chinese made springs are of most inferior steel and have proved to be very brittle. Second truck at Anshun - distance - 100 kilos had a broken spring. Stayed the night here in the hotel .

25. S.T. 0500 hrs. Heavy frost. Arrived Ping Yi - distance - 340 kilos at 1900 hrs. No accomodation kept at China Travel Agency because previous two parties did not stay there as arranged.

26. S.T. 0730 hrs. Arrived Kunming - distance 230 kilos - 1400 hrs. Billetted in former A.V.G. quarters. Total Distance travelled by truck was 1114 kilos. Troops are now much improved in health and are picking up rapidly after our experiences.

27. At Kunming awaiting transport by plane to India.

28. 0915 hrs orders received that three planes would leave at approx. 1030 hrs taking all three Contingents. Lt.Col. Braund and Capt Sandell remained to complete administration at the request of General Bruce. Major Godfrey to proceed to Dealali in charge of troops. 1200 hrs all troops loaded into Douglas transport planes (three) ready to take off. Information received that Japanese attacking landing ground at Dinjan, Assam. 1415 hr took off but planes recalled at 1425 hrs. Postponed and troops returned to quarters.

29. Three transport planes took off at 1330 hrs landing at Dinjan Assam landing ground at 1720 hrs. Planes flew at 19,000 feet to clear the mountains. All troops affected by lack of Oxygen experiencing difficulty in breathing. Course taken was a Northerly one to avoid enemy aircraft; this took the planes over part of the Himalayas. By truck to billetts at Tinsukia.

30 (cont) Arrived Tinsukia 2115 hrs. No rations available; fed at British Service Canteen at 2230 hrs.
30 Rations for seven days drawn at Tinsukia. Entrained there at 1200 hrs.
31 Arrived Gauhati 0900 hrs. Taken off train to Rest Camp. Re-entrained 1915 hrs. Arrived Pandu 1945 hrs . Embarked 2100 hrs on river steamer (Brahmaputra River).

MISSION 204 — WAR DIARY — NOVEMBER
A.I.F. CADRE BN. — MONTH OF ~~SEPTEMBER~~ 1942.

1 Arrived Dhubri 1300 hrs. Proceeded to Rest Camp. Entrained 1930 hrs.
2 Arrived Parbatipur 0715 hrs. Changed to broad guage railway and proceeded at 1135 hrs. Arrived Bandel Junction 1915 hrs.
3 Delayed at Bandel Junction until 1045 hrs. Arrived Howrah Station, Calcutta 1200 hrs to be despatched at 1625 hrs to Deolali near Bombay. Delay ensued.
4 Left Howrah Station at 1145 hrs by train.
5 Rations need replenishing but unable to obtain any. Railway is unable to supply meals at the refreshment rooms. The railway service appears to be suffering considerably from local civil conditions.
6 Arrived Nagpur Junction 0845 hrs. Calcutta R.T.O. had not informed Nagpur of our departure or numbers; no accomodation for extra coaches on Bombay train. Telegraphed O.C. Base Reinforcement Camp of our impending arrival. Left Nagpur 1915 hrs.
7 Arrived Deolali 1100 hrs. Telegrams had not been received. Other telegrams sent in India failed to reach their destination. Such service was very bad at this time. Proceeded to Base Reinforcement Camp wher under canvas. Major Braund and Capt Sandell at G.H.Q. New Delhi on administrative matters.
8) At the Camp. T.S.M.G.'s and ammunition handed in.
9)
10)
11 Left deolali 0630 hrs arrived Bombay 1100 hrs and moved to Transit C Camp to be held pending embarkation. Cpl Cordingley admitted to Hospital with fever - later diagnosed as Typhus Fever. One other also admitted with Malaria. Supply of Quinine which was being taken daily as a prophylactic had run out.
12) At the Transit Camp. Two further cases of Malaria, one admitted
to) to Hospital.
16)
17)
18 Embarked at Bombay On "City of Paris" for Colombo.
20 Sailed.
23 Arrived Colombo.
25 Transhipped to "Mauretania". Sailed this day for Australia.

[signature]
Adj
O.C. R.A.F. Cadres

A.I.F. CADRE BN.

BRITISH MILITARY MISSION 204.
ROUTINE ORDERS PART 11
by
Lt. Col. F.N.B.Braund.

Kiyang. 18th. October 1942. No. 16. Ref. last issue No. 15 of 26 Sep. 42.

STRENGTH DECREASE.

VX31493	Spr.Gilmour W. 2/10 Fd. Coy. A.I.F.	Evacuated from Kiyang Base to India 10.9.42 Med.Grounds
NX35151	Pte. Archer G.S. 2/19 Bn. A.I.F.	Ref. Part 11 orders No.13 of 28.8.42 amended to evacuated from Kiyang Base to India 18.9.42 Med.Grounds
NX35435	Pte Butt A.S. 2/19 Bn. A.I.F.	ditto.
NX27018	" Gilmour J.W. 2/20 Bn. A.I.F.	Ref. Part 11 order No 11 of 15.8.42 amended to evacuated from Kiyang Base to India 18.9.42 Med.Grounds
WX6873	Sgmn. Hunter R.A. 8th. Div. Sigs. A.I.F.	Ref. Part 11 order No.13 of 28.8.42 amended to evacuated from Kiyang Base to India 18.9.42 Med.Grounds
VX41995	Pte McDonald K.A.T. 2/9 Fd.Amb.A.I.F.	ditto
VX27069	" Noonan W.J. 2/9 Fd. Amb. A.I.F.	ditto
VX31245	" Peeler R. 2/9 Fd. Amb. A.I.F.	ditto
NX31205	" Strand D.G.H. 2/20 Bn. A.I.F.	ditto
QX1997	Sgt. Mackenzie R.J. 2/10 Fd. Regt. A.I.F.	Ref. part 11 order No13 of 28.8.42 amended to evacuated from Kiyang Base to India 24.9.42 Med.Grounds
NX36029	Sgt. Leake J.D.F. 2/19 Bn. A.I.F.	ditto
VX47434	Pte Robinson B.A. 2/9 Fd. Amb.A.I.F.	Ref. Part 11 order No 14 of 16.9.42 amended to evacuated from Kiyang Base to India 1.10.42 Med.Grounds
VX29830	Pte. Smart D.G. 2/9 Fd. Amb. A.I.F.	Ref.Part 11 order No 15 of 26.9.42 amended to evacuated from Kiyang Base to India 3.10.42 Med.Grounds
NX45386	Pte. Weber M.F.M. 2/20 Bn. A.I.F.	Ref. Part 11 order No 15 of 26.9.42 amended to evacuated from Kiyang Base to India 8.10.42 Med.Grounds

STRENGTH INCREASE.

VX43909	Pte. Potts A.J. 2/9 Fd. Amb. A.I.F.	Discharged from Hospital at Kiyang 6.10.42

STOPPAGE OF PAY.

VX43909	Pte.Potts A.J. 2/9 Fd. Amb. A.I.F.	Forfeiture of pay of 5/5d per diem from 3.9.42 to 5.10.42 whilst in hospital with V.D.

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.

(a) OFFICERS.

NX12551	Capt.,L/Major F.N.Braund 2/19 Bn. A.I.F.	Amendment to Part 11 order No 15 of 26.9.42,to be A/Major,Local Lt. Col. w.e.f. 13.8.42.Authority Part 11order by G.O.C. B.M.M. Item 183 of serial No 19 0f 16.9.42
E.C.2347	2/Lt.,A/Lieut,Local Captain G.C.M.Grossett 6th. Gurkha Rifles	Amendment to Part 11 order No 15 of 26.9.42, to be A/Capt,Local Major w.e.f. 13.8.42. Authority Part 11 order by G.O.C. B.M.M. Item No 183 of serial No 19 of 16 Sep.42.

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS (cont)

(b) O.R's

QX4588	A/W.O.11, A/ W.O.1 Binnie T.D. 2/10 Fd.Regt A.I.F.	Rank of Warrant Officer Class 11 Confirmed. w.e.f. 18.10.42
NX20081	A/W.O.11, A/W.O.1 Moore J.M. 2/20 Bn. A.I.F.	ditto
NX52549	A/W.O.11, A/W.O.1 Sparke K.P. 2/19 Bn. A.I.F.	ditto
NX58159	A/S/Sgt. Carey W.G. 2/19 Bn. A.I.F.	to be S/Sgt. w.e.f. 18.10.42
NX40717	A/Sgt. Ackland D.H. 2/18 Bn. A.I.F.	to be Sgt. w.e.f. 18.10.42
NX60375	A/Cpl. Finn T.R. 2/19 Bn. A.I.F.	to be Copporal w.e.f. 18.10.42
NX33597	L/Cpl. Cordingley W.S. 2/19 Bn. A.I.F.	to be Corporal w.e.f. 18.10.42
NX59243	L/Cpl. Eddy S.K. 2/20 Bn. A.I.F.	to be Corporal w.e.f 18.10.42.
NX56199	L/Cpl. Kimbell M.D. 2/19 Bn. A.I.F.	to be Corporal w.e.f 18.10.42

NX33597 A/Sgt, A/Sgt Campbell C.T.C. 2/19 Bn AIF

Rank of Warrant Officer Class II Confirmed w.e.f. 18/10/42

.....
Lt. Col.
Commanding A.I.F. Cadre Bn.

Distribution.

War Diary 1 & 2
File 3

A.I.F. CADRE BATTALION

BRITISH MILITARY MISSION 204
ROUTINE ORDERS PART II
by
Major F.N.B.Braund

India	9th Nov. 1942 No.17	Ref. to last Issue No.16 of 18 Oct. 42.

REVERSIONS

QX4588	W.O.II	A/W.O.I Binnie, T.D. 2/10 Fld. Regt.	To be W.O.II w.e.f. 1 Nov. 42.
NX52549	W.O.II	A/W.O.I Sparke, K.P. 2/19 Bn.	do.
NX35935	W.O.II	A/W.O.I Campbell, I.T.C. 2/19 Bn.	do.
NX20081	W.O.II	A/W.O.I Moore, J.M. 2/20 Bn.	do.

F.N.B. Braund Major
Commanding A.I.F.Cadre Bn.

Distribution :
War Diary 1,2
File 3

S E C R E T MOST IMMEDIATE

B.G.S.
B. i/c Admin.
C.C.

INWARD CIPHER CABLE NO. 29333/C DATED 22/11

TO: MOVEMENTS COLOMBO
FROM: ARMINDIA

Personal from Commander in Chief for Lt. Col. MACDOUGALL Commanding A.I.F. contingent.

On your leaving my command I should like to express my appreciation of your good and gallant work in CHINA under difficult conditions.

Good luck to you all.

CEYLON
22/11/42.