

AWM52

Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters,  
formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

# 1/4/1 CORPS

1 Australian Corps  
General Branch (1 Aust  
Corps 'G' Branch)

March-May 1941



1/4/1-006%

WAR DIARY HQ 1 AUST CORPS

CAMPAIGN IN GREECE 1941

Mar 6 Adv parties of 1 Aust Corps consisting of the Senior LO and DAQMG (M), and of 6 Aust Div consisting of BM RA 6 Aust Div and the I offr 16 Aust Inf Bde, embarked on HMS "BONAVENTURE" at ALEXANDRIA together with skeleton HQ NZ Div, and portion of 1 Armd Bde, on HMS "GLOUCESTER" and HMS "YORK".

7 Arrived at ATHENS and reported BGS BTG. HQ BTG opened at HOTEL ACROPOLE the same day.

8) Established contacts, but unable to obtain definite  
9) information re employment of 1 AUST CORPS.

Adv Party Recce

11 To LARISSA.

12 KOZANI - VERIA Pass.

13 VERIA - EDESSA with EDESSA - VEVE Pass.  
AMYNTAION - KOZANI return to VERIA.

14 VERIA to SALONIKA - SALONIKA to MAURO DENDI - VERIA

15 VERIA to KATERINE; KATERINE Pass to LARISSA.

16 Return to ATHENS.

17 Seeking information as to arrival of units, locations on arrival, and employment of 1 Aust Corps.

18) Corps Comd and BGS left ALEXANDRIA for GREECE in HMS  
19) "GLOUCESTER", and arrived ATHENS.

20) Obtaining general information of situation and appreciat-  
21) ing future possibilities.

22 Corps Comd and BGS visited northern GREECE and examined  
to positions BTG were to hold.

24 Particular attention was given to the position to be held by NZ Div. On return to ATHENS, Corps Comd conferred with General Wilson as to the line to be held by the NZ Div; it was agreed that the forward position north of KATERINE should only be held lightly.

(Minutes of this conference are att as Appx A)

Corps Comd cable to Prime Minister re military situation (att as Appx B).

27 Corps HQ left ALEXANDRIA in HMT "ULSTER PRINCE" were delayed in crossing owing to naval engagement of Cape MATAPAN and arrived at ATHENS at dark on the evening of 29 Mar.

Apr 1 Corps HQ left ATHENS and moved to GERANIA arriving Apr 3.

5 HQ 1 Aust Corps opened at GERANIA at 1200 hrs and became responsible for the Mount OLYMPUS line, from the coast to a line approx SW of NAOUSSA, which included the KATERINE Pass area held by NZ Div, and the VERIA Pass area held by XII GREEK Div.

(Message O 150 att as Appx C)

16 Aust Inf Bde was moving forward in preparation for the relief of that portion of XII GREEK Div which was holding VERIA Pass. CORA detailed, by 1 Aust Corps Op Instr No 2 (att as Appx D), to recce the approach to KOZANI from the MONASTIR GAP with a view to ascertaining the minimum force required to hold the approach.

- Apr 6 Germany invaded YUGO-SLAVIA and GREECE.
- 7 Arising from the decisions taken at a conference at KOZANE on 5 Apr, 1 Aust Corps Op Instn No 3 (att as Appx E), issued on 7 Apr 41, provided for -
- (a) 16 Aust Inf Bde relieving two fwd Gk Bns and a coy of another bn in reserve, in the VERIA Pass as soon as possible,
  - (b) The relief of Greek Arty in this area by 2/2 Fd Regt,
  - (c) Recce by 19 Aust Inf Bde and 2/3 Fd Regt with a view to the relief of a further portion of XIII GREEK Div.
- 8 GOC-in-C arrived at Corps HQ at 1000 hrs with the information that the YUGO SLAV resistance in the south had broken, and that, as far as was known, there were no allied tps between MONASTIR and FLORENA. The decision was taken to constitute a force, to cover the approach to KOZANI from the MONASTIR GAP, under the comd of Gen Mackay who would comd in addition, such 6 Aust Div tps (less 16 Aust Inf Bde Gp) as were available and the units already forming the AMYNIAION Det under the comd of Brig Lee. The composition and role of the force are given in 1 Aust Corps Op Instn No 4 (att as Appx F). This force was outside the limits of 1 Aust Corps and came directly under the orders of HQ BTE.
- 9 NZ Div ordered to move one bde gp (4 NZ Bde) to hold SERVIA Pass, and to act as a pivot for the subsequent withdrawal of XXI GREEK Div and 16 Aust Inf Bde. 1 Aust Corps Op Instn No 5 (att as Appx G)
- 10 Op Instn No 6 (att as Appx H) issued giving the organization of the defensive position; the outline procedure for the withdrawal to the OLYMPUS - ALIAKMON line if this were decided on; and ordering the preliminary moves of vehicles out of the area in order to clear the rds.
- 11 Message O 252 (att as Appx J) issued giving following -
- (a) Orders for the withdrawal of 1/87 Bn of 12 Gk Div and for 12 Gk Div to commence thinning out that day.
  - (b) 16 Aust Inf Bde to withdraw portion of the Bde to the south bank of the R ALIAKMON at the same time. 12 Gk Div asked permission to withdraw remaining elements of flank bns owing to the distance to be traversed to the new line and the time orders took to get to their flank units. Approval could not be obtained.
- 12 Based on W Force Op Instn No 11 giving orders for the withdrawal to the OLYMPUS - ALIAKMON line, message O 259 (att as Appx K) gave orders for the completion of the withdrawal of 12 Gk Div and 16 Aust Inf Bde, from their positions astride the VERIA PASS, on the evening and night of 12 Apr. Adv HQ 1 Aust Corps moved to ELASSON during the afternoon (message O 257 att as Appx L). The title 1 Aust Corps changed to ANZAC CORPS on this day, messages of mutual goodwill passing between HQ ANZAC CORPS, the NZ and 6 Aust Divs. Messages O 260 and O 262 and NZ Div C 216 (att collectively as Appx M).

- 13 NZ Div Cav Regt held the R ALIAKMON north of KATERINE until German infantry covered by arty and mortar fire secured crossings. The NZ Div Cav Regt, after inflicting heavy casualties, withdrew with the loss of one M/C; the enemy did not regain contact. Before withdrawing, under orders BTG, from their position covering the KOZANI- FLORINA approach on the night 13/14 Apr, the force, built up from the LEE det at AMYNTAION by elements of 6 Div and Comd by 6 Div, was heavily attacked and forced out of the position held by the infantry. The lorries ordered for the withdrawal were available, and, under cover of night, and 1 Armd Bde next day, the force extricated itself. HQ 6 Aust Div moved to SERVIA Pass to take comd in that area; 19 Aust Inf Bde Gp to KERASIA area, where the bde formed on a line north of the ALIAKMON to link the position held at SERVIA with 12 Gk Div, which was the nearest Gk Div on the left of ANZAC CORPS. 6 Aust Div came under comd of ANZAC CORPS on completion of the withdrawal. 1 Armd Bde withdrew via KOZANI to GREVENA on the rd KOZANI - KALABAKA.

Relevant Force HQ Instructions (att as Appx N)

- 14 (a) ANZAC CORPS Op Instn No 8 (att as Appx O giving policy for demolitions.
- (b) SAVIGE Force was organized from 17 Aust Inf Bde and att tps as a reserve, to hold the KALABAKA area, and comd the rds from the north and west, or to be available to support 1 Armd Bde on the line of the R VENETIKOS. (ANZAC CORPS Op Instn No 9 att as Appx P).
- (c) NZ Div Cav Regt was ordered to move to an area to cover ELASSON from the west. One sqn to be west of ELASSON by 0800 hrs 15 Apr. Message O 288 (att as Appx Q).
- 15 The decision to shorten the line by withdrawing to the THERMOPYLAE position was made and the control of the battle for this phase was passed by HQ BTG to ANZAC CORPS. The preliminary moves ordered in ANZAC CORPS OO NO 1 (att as Appx R) for the 15 Apr and night 15/16 Apr were -
- (a) 19 Aust Inf Bde Gp to withdraw from its position north of the R ALIAKMON, and the bde, less att tps, to move by MT to DOMOKOS to form part of LEE Force, which was constituted to hold the DOMOKOS Pass as a rear guard position for the main withdrawal. 2/6 and 2/7 bns had not arrived in time to form part of SAVIGE Force and were accordingly included in LEE Force.
- (b) 16 Aust Inf Bde Gp were to withdraw and take up a position at ZARKOS, on the rd LARISSA - KALABAKA, to cover the withdrawal of 1 Armd Bde and the SAVIDGE Force.
- (c) 6 NZ Bde Gp moved to a covering position between ELASSON and TYRNAVOS, to cover the withdrawal of 5 NZ Bde Gp from KATERINE Pass, and 4 NZ Bde Gp from SERVIA Pass.
- 14 A series of messages from 21 NZ Bn (ILER Force) on 15 and 16 Apr (att as Appx S) showed that the position of this force was serious. CCRA 1 Aust Corps was despatched at 0100 hrs 16 Apr to ascertain the position. At the same time 16 Aust Inf Bde (less 2/1 Bn) was ordered to move to the PENEIOS GORGE to hold the gorge and cover the right flank of the withdrawal of ANZAC CORPS.

Apr 16 A NZ Fd Regt (less one bty) and a tp of the NZ A Tk Regt from 6 NZ Bde Gp was also ordered to join this force.

(b) Orders to cover the further withdrawal were issued as ANZAC CORPS Op Instn No 1 on this day (att as Appx T) Outlined plan was -

- (i) 16 Aust Inf Bde was relieved of the task west of LARISSA and its comd was placed in charge of the forces, including 21 NZ Bn in the R PENEIOS area.
  - (ii) The Comd NZ Div was made responsible for the withdrawal of NZ Div including 16 Aust Inf Bde
  - (iii) The Comd 6 Aust Div was made responsible for protecting the flanks of NZ Div, the withdrawal of SAVIGE Force and the final withdrawal of the rear guard (LEE Force)
  - (iv) 1 Armd Bde was to cover withdrawal of 6 Aust Div. However it failed to receive Op Instn No 1 and withdrew through SAVIGE Force at KALABAKA on 17 Apr, moving direct to ATALANTI area.
- 17 (a) HQ ANZAC CORPS closed at ELASSON at 0800 hrs and opened at SOUMPASI south of LARISSA at the same hour.
- (b) The main bodies of SAVIGE force withdrew to the ZARKOS posn during the night 17/18 Apr and other fwd bdes withdrew in the following order -
- 4 NZ Bde Gp from SERVIA Pass
- 5 " " " " KATERINE Pass
- 18 (a) In view of heavy enemy air attacks on road LARISSA - LAMIA two messages O 327 and O 331 (att as Appx U) were sent to Force HQ asking for protection
- (b) HQ ANZAC CORPS closed SOUMPASI 1900 hrs and opened at LEVADIA at the same hour.
- On the night 18/19 Apr 6 NZ Bde Gp and force under Comd 16 Aust Inf Bde withdrew via VOLOS to THERMOPYLAE line. SAVIGE Force withdrew from ZARKOS via DOMOKOS
- (c) Letter from Comd NZ Div to Comd ANZAC CORPS (att as Appx V) received 2230 hrs 17 Apr. This agreed to.
- (d) Air requirements for 18 Apr in message O (att as Appx W)
- 19 (a) Except for odd vehicles the flow of traffic through the LEE Force at DOMOKOS ceased before midday and therefore, the heavy German strafing of the road from the DOMOKOS Pass to the top of the pass north of LAMIA from 1500 hrs to 1730 hrs was mistimed.
- (b) Orders were issued by message O 360 (att as Appx X) for the occupation of the THERMOPYLAE line, NZ Div to hold the coastal approach and 6 Aust Div the BRAILOS Pass.
- (c) During the night 19/20 Apr LEE Force withdrew from the DOMOKOS Posn, covered by a small rear party put out by Brig LEE to hold the northern end of the pass north of LAMIA. The force was withdrawn successfully and passed through the new defence posn by 2000 hrs 20 Apr.

Apr 20 Message O 124 (att as Appx Y) from 6 Aust Div was repeated to HQ BTG requesting naval assistance to pick up parties of 16 Aust Inf Bde which might have reached the coast between KAVO DERMATAS and KAVOS KOUTSOMPOS and VOLOS.

Message O 364 (att as Appx Z) requesting naval motor boat patrol to cover right flank from KHALKIS to NE of MOLOS.

21 Orders carried by LO to NZ Div for the move of

(a) NZ Div Cav Regt to EUBOEIA ISLAND to give warning of, and delay, any German approach around this flank

(b) One bn to take up an anti-parachutist role in the area east of THEEES and to form a reserve for the RANGERS holding KHALKIS Crossing in the event of an attack coming from this direction.

Owing to the decision to evacuate being taken, the movement of the above units was cancelled by message O 382 (att as Appx AA)

22 ANZAC CORPS OO No 2 for the evacuation of GREECE was issued (att as Appx BB)

A covering force, consisting of 4 NZ Bde with att tps from 6 Aust Div moved to occupy a posn about KRIEKOUKI.

Withdrawal from the THERMOPYLAE line was to be by night, a bde gp from each of the NZ and 6 Aust Div withdrawing on the following successive nights -

22/23	Apr	covering force
23/24	Apr	
24/25	Apr	

23 Arising from air report (att as Appx CC) message O 406 (att as Appx DD) was sent to 6 Div to take action to cover DELPHI approach to safeguard the withdrawal of the remainder of 6 Aust Div.

HQ ANZAC CORPS closed at LEVADIA at 2000 hrs and opened at MANDRA at the same hour.

24 HQ BTG took comd - HQ ANZAC CORPS closed.

(Sgd) Brig.  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Note

On 28th November 1951 this document was sent to Army Headquarters for the use of the Chief of the General Staff, (Lt. Gen Rowell). The document was sent through Capt J. Smith O/C Military History Section.

On 2 January 1952 the diary was returned to the War Memorial with Capt Smith's letter MH 3208 of 27th December.

The words "Return to Capt Smith" written in pencil in the upper right hand corner, and other marginal marks on the same page and page 2, were apparently made while the document was at Army Headquarters.

R. H. H. H. H.

Arthur C. C. C.

2nd January, 1952.

JUN 10 1941

WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices
			<p><u>HQ 1 AUST CORPS</u></p> <p>Period 25 April - 30 <sup>MAY</sup> April, 41</p> <p>HQ 1 Aust Corps left GREECE during the days immediately following night 24/25 April, and after spending a varying number of days in CRETE moved to DEIR SUNEID, PALESTINE, under orders to rest and refit.</p> <p>Most of the personnel required to replace uniforms, clothing and personal gear, and this was effected in a relatively short space of time. Replacement of office equipment and MT took a longer period, but the placing of HQ 1 Aust Corps on the priority list for "Exporter Force" speeded up the issue of essential equipment and vehicles; the latter having to be withdrawn from the slim resources of units and organisations in PALESTINE.</p> <p>Reinforcement of staffs was necessary owing to six officers and sixtyfour other-ranks being posted missing, and considerable difficulty was experienced in obtaining suitable personnel to replace a number of the well trained officers and senior NCOs who had held the more important positions in the various branches of Corps HQ.</p> <p>The war establishment of Corps HQ was revised and a provisional war establishment, modified in accordance with the lessons learnt in Greece, was submitted to HQ AIF (ME) for approval.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Checked for</i> Brig GS 1 Aust Corps.</p>	



PRO-FORMA FOR UNIT WAR DIARY

UNIT: HQ 1 Aust Corps

COMMANDING OFFICER: Major Murphy R.A.A. Camp  
Commandant

For Period: 26 April to 28 April 1941

Period Covering: Evacuation of GREECE

Diary Record of events by VX295 Capt R.J. DAVIS

TOLON - 26 April 1941 - 2100 hrs.		HQ 1 Aust Corps and details under Major MURPHY moved from concealment area C to T Beach for embarkation. About 2,600 men on beach, but 300 - 400 left behind, including the following Corps HQ Officers - Capt B.A. MOYLAN, Capt R.J. DAVIS, Lieut N.F. ROWELL, Capt D.S. HOGARTH, Capt R.U. CURRER, Lieut A. BAILEY, and about 40 OR's.
27 April 1941	0400 hrs	Major McLEAN, A.A.S.C. who was i/c embarkation stated that destroyers would pick the rest of us up on the night 27/28 April, and the best thing to do would be for the men to conceal themselves during the day and to be ready for embarkation on the following night. This was about 0400 hrs 27 April. I did not see Major McLEAN again.
	1100 hrs	The men were then moved back to concealment areas, and at 1100 hrs a conference of Officers was held, and arrangements for organisation of embarkation that night were made.
	2100 hrs	The men who now numbered about 800 British, Australian and New Zealanders were formed up in parties of 30, ready for embarkation in small boats, and we waited for the Ships. Owing to the disappearance of the Naval Beach Officer, we had no code or apparatus for signalling. Using torches we signalled out to sea with no result.
28 April	0300 hrs	No ships having arrived by 0300 hrs 28 April, the men were again taken back to concealment areas and a conference of officers held. We were informed that German Parachutists had landed at CORINTH on the afternoon of 26 April, and were moving SOUTH, and that they might contact us at any time. Lt-Col COURAGE (British Army) was the senior officer, and Lt-Col HUTCHINSON (Recce Regt, 6 Aust Div) his 2 i/c.
	0400 hrs	Lt-Col HUTCHINSON stated that he had arranged for patrols and sentries, and a further conference was called for 1000 hrs to consider the possibility of moving SOUTH to KALAMATA.
	0800 hrs	Shots heard in direction of the village of ASINI on the NAUFILION ROAD - reported that Cypriots responsible. A short time later, several bursts of L.A. fire in same direction and Lt-Col HUTCHINSON came down the road in his Scout Car shouting "The Germans are in the village". A defensive line was hurriedly formed on the WEST slope of the ridge covering the road fork with our backs to the sea. <del>Reflexion</del> The Force at this time consisted of about 1,000 men of whom about 150 were armed, and ammunition and food were scarce. A Vickers M.M.G., a Bren, and a Boyes rifle were salvaged and put into working order. The Germans took up positions in the neighbourhood of ASINI and made little attempt to get in close to us, but engaged us with rifle and M.G. fire and even used a captured Bofors on us. Our casualties were remarkably light in the circumstances,

Continuation of Diary Record of Events by Capt R.J. DAVIS

Unofficial figures were - our casualties, 12 killed and wounded - German casualties, 70 - 80 killed and wounded, but early in the afternoon W.O.II BRIDGEMAN of Corps was severely wounded and died shortly after.

1730 hrs

1800 hrs

A party came up the road from the German lines bearing a white flag, and after a parlez they returned. Shortly afterwards when endeavouring to get instructions for the night, I met Lt-Col HUTCHINSON who ordered me to bring my party down from their positions on the right flank and to surrender them to the Germans on the road fork. He then went on towards the sea in his Scout Car, and I did not see him again. The men were collected, and the party surrendered - the senior officer present being Major W. GUY (1 Aust Corps Bn). We were then taken to a temporary P.O.W. cage in NAUFLION, and some days later to CORINTH. Lieut ROWELL has a list of all Corps HQ personnel who were in the P.O.W. cage at CORINTH. A few transport personnel from Corps HQ who had been on duty at DAPHNE up to 26 April and had subsequently made their way to KALAMATA were captured there on 29 April and joined us in the CORINTH camp.

*R.J. Davis*

Capt

"G" BRANCH HQ 1 AUST CORPS

CRETE - PALESTINE

1/4/11

MOVEMENT

CRETE  
PALESTINE

HQ from GREECE to CRETE and finally DSIR  
SUNSID.  
(date of movement 25 Apr onwards) May 41

"G" BRANCH HQ  
1 AUST CORPS  
25APR-30 MAY

UNIT ORGANIZATION

RESTING &  
REFITTING

of unit. Replacement of Officers etc. May 41.

"G" BRANCH HQ  
1 AUST CORPS  
25APR-30 MAY

REVISION  
OF W.E.

Provisional Modified establishment  
submitted to HQ AIF

ORIGINAL  
1/4/11

9 June - 15 July 1948  
HQ 1 ARCT CORPS

SYRIA

55  
2 JUN - 15 JUL  
41

OPERATIONS

ADVANCE HQ moved from BEIR SO HED to AL HUSAYD L a few miles  
sth of HAZARETH. 9 Jun.

MOVE TO HAZARETH by 1st Div H, which was ordered to assume control  
of all operations against Syria (except HARBURG)  
from 1100 hrs 12 Jun.

COMMAND taken over by Lieut-Gen J.D. Laverack 12 Jun.

MAIN EFFORT AGAINST BEIRUT An order was given by General Wilson who also  
directed that the operations in progress against  
DAMASCUS were to be regarded as secondary and that  
the main effort was to be directed against BEIRUT.  
12 Jun.

16 INF BDE made available for drive on DAM SCUS, but COC-in-C  
urges need for these operations to be completed  
before the time arrived to push for BEIRUT. 20 Jun.

HISTORY REPEATED On night 20/21 Jul 2/3 1st Inf Bn cut the DAMASCUS-  
BEIRUT rd at the FAR DA CORCE thus repeating a  
similar success by 1st Lighthorsemen of the Palestine  
Campaign of 1918.

DAM SCUS SURRENDERS 21 Jun & Gen le Gentilhomme of FF Army makes personal  
entry into city.

HQ 1 UST CORPS closes at HAZARETH and opened at SAFAD.

DAMOUR village completely occupied. 9 Jul.

"CEASE FIRE" order received 11 Jul and hostilities ceased at  
0001 hrs 12 Jul.

CEREMONIAL ENTRY into BEYROUT 16 Jul.

*list of maps etc enclosed*

GENERAL NOTE -

Throughout these appendices, Hq British Troops in GREECE may be referred to as Hq BTC, Force, or as Hq V Gp.

APPENDIX "A"

NOTES ON INTERVIEW AT BRITISH EMBASSY

TOP SECRET

ATHENS - 24 MAR 41

Present: General Wilson, General Blaney, Brigadier Gallaway

1. Role: The defence of the passes on the British front is of paramount importance. Work on these defences should be given priority. General Freyberg will be so informed by Brig Gallaway. Hq Div Cav Regt will be available very shortly to take over forward role and these are sufficient to relieve remainder of Div in advanced positions to allow the Div to prepare defences of KATERINI Pass and pass between sea and MT OLYMPUS.
2. COID: Adv Australian Corps Headquarters should be established in the GERANIA area as soon as possible. Cond of the front to be taken over as soon as can be arranged. Corps Headquarters to be located just South of the pass leading to SERVIA as soon as it can be constructed.
3. Front: To be taken over includes VERIA Pass and New Zealand Divisional front to the sea.
4. Tps: (i) New Zealand Div; formation and units of the Australian Corps as they arrive. Greek tps might be required to remain between Australian and New Zealand sections for some time.  
(ii) 2/3 Bn had been despatched to LERISSA for local protection. This was to be considered as staging forward and subsequent reliefs would be made as other troops staged forward. Brig Lee's cond would be divided, one regt of medium artillery to be allotted to Australian Corps.
5. GOC Force has no troops available for reserve and desires Anti-Tank battery from Australian Corps.
6. Cross roads between KATERINI Pass rd and SERVIA Pass rd will need to be developed.
7. The roads into the passes to be closed to civilians from the date of the German advance into Greek territory. Inhabitants are to be warned by Greek authorities to remain.

APPENDIX 'B'

To: ARMY MELBOURNE

From: AUSTCORPS

15

31/3

IMMEDIATE

Reference Acting Prime Ministers cable 57 of 27 Mar (.) MOST SEC ET and PERSONAL for Minister for Army from General BLANEY (.) Appreciation herewith (.)

Part 1 (.) General situation (.) Reason for despatch of LUSTRE FORCE will be known to you (.) Defensive line selected runs from AEGEAN SEA at foot of MT OLYMPUS northwestwards to YUGOSLAV frontier about KAJMAKATAN (.) Position further Eastwards NOT repeat NOT selected as time and space factor operates greatly in favour of Germans (.) In addition German move through YUGOSLAVIA would at once turn left flank on such position (.)

Part 2 (.) Land forces available (.) Greek (.) After providing minimum requirements ALBANIAN front Greeks have six divisions (.) Four are available fight delaying action on Western portion GREEK-BULGARIAN frontier (.) Remaining two for OLYMPUS line (.) All now disposed battle positions (.) British (.) One armoured brigade (.) New Zealand Div (.) 6 and 7 Aust Divs with all available Corps Troops (.) Armoured Brigade New Zealand Division and 16 Aust Inf Bde now here (.) 6 Aust Div will be complete here by April 15 and 7 Aust Div and Corps Troops by approximately 7 May (.) German (.) Western Bulgaria seven divs (.) Central Bulgaria four to six Divs (.) Eastern Bulgaria four divs (.) North Bulgaria eight divs (.) Germans can now concentrate eleven to thirteen divs against four Greek Divs on frontier and can then turn with six to seven divs against OLYMPUS line held by one armd bde one New Zealand and two Gree Divs (.)

Part 3 (.) Air forces available (.) Allied (.) Plan for LUSTRE envisaged twenty three Sqns RAF (.) At present only eight sqns here and no indication immediate increase (.) Greek Air Force small and composed of many different types making maintenance difficult (.) German (.) Minimum of 125 dive bombers and 500 other aircraft now in BULGARIA (.) This can be increased when capacity Bulgarian aerodromes improved (.)

Part 4 (.) Topography (.) Defensive position has great natural strength and can only be penetrated in for e through the three passes (.) From South to North these are KATERINI VERRIA and EDESSA (.) Two former are most formidable (.) Complete destruction of lengths of road possible requiring months to repair (.) Gradients in EDESSA passes more gentle and same delay NOT possible (.) Forward of defensive line country to river VARDA flat with many water channels (.) Widespread system of demolition prepared covering this area (.) Weakness of position is in North where either a German move through YUGOSLAVIA or EDESSA Pass being forced would mean loss of FLORINA and give GERMANS access to area South from FLORINA to SERVIA (.) This area is suitable for armoured units (.) River ALIAKMON provides second powerful defensive line even if EDESSA pass and FLORINA are lost (.)

Part 5 (.) Lines of communication (.) Only L of C available is rail ATHENS to LARISSA and thence forward by road (.) In both cases these are defiles which can be subjected to intense air attack in vital points (.) Air and ground AA defence hopelessly inadequate and serious dislocation of L of C likely (.) Can only be met by building up reserves in forward area (.)

Part 6 (.) Dispositions (.) KATERINI Pass NZ Div (.) VERRIA Pass one Greek Div (.) EDESSA Pass one Greek Div (.) In SALONIKA Plain

APPENDIX "C"

To: CCRA CSO Sigs 1 Aust Corps GOC I A CE  
 Camp AASC Medical Ord Pro Postal

From: 1 Aust Corps 0 150 4

Warning order (.) ref maps 1 to 250000 sheets S 1872 S 3072  
 S 3060 S 1860 (.) HQ 1 Aust Corps opens 1200 hrs 5 Apr  
 area GERANIA (.) this HQ then assumes comd imperial tps  
 (excl 1 to 64 med regt which remains in support 12 Greek Div)  
 in following area (.) R ALLAKION from mouth to VARVARIES incl  
 VERIA incl rd VERIAAKOZANI excl KOZANI incl rd KOZANI ELASSON  
 excl ELASSON R PENIOS to sea (.) detailed boundaries will be  
 issued later

3018

IMMEDIATE  
 by SDR

APPENDIX "D"

1. AUSTRALIAN CORPS OF INDIAN NO 2

Brig C.M. Clowes DSO, MC,  
CCM 1 Aust Corps

Ref Map: The BALKANS 1:250,000, Sheet S 1872

1. In order to cover a possible enemy breakthrough from the direction of BITOLJ into the comparatively open valley running from the JUGO SLAV frontier down to SARAJEVO, it is proposed to construct defensive posns as follows:

(a) covering the pass on rd BITOLJ - DOBRINJE in squares 66 and 76

(b) covering the area between L VESOMITIS and L RUDNIK

2. You will arrange to make the necessary recce of these posns forthwith accompanied by an RAE offr to be detailed by CE 1 Aust Corps.

3. The maximum use of natural & M obstacles is essential. If these do not exist or are inadequate, a recommendation is required as to the best line of artificial & M obstacles to be constructed, together with an estimate of the amount of civilian labour and technical assistance required for its construction.

4. Your report, which should be furnished not later than 1200 hrs 7 Apr, should include the following -

(a) A recommendation as to the minimum force required to hold each of the above posns.

(b) Proposals for the dispositions of 1 M Regt RAA (less one bty) which, it is expected, will be available in this area.

(sgd)

ACK

S.F. ROWELL  
Brig.  
G3 1 Aust Corps.

Signed at 1220 hrs

Issued through sigs.

Copy 1 Brig C.M. Clowes  
2 6 Aust Div  
3 CCM  
4 CSO  
5 GOC  
6 G  
7 I  
8 AG  
9 CE  
10 - 11 File  
12 - 13 War Diary



APPENDIX "E"

1087 SECRET

Copy No 13

7 Apr 41

1. MUST CORPS OP INSTN NO 3

6 Aust Div

The attached extract from notes of a conference on 5 Apr 41 between General WILSON and General KOTULAS are forwarded for information.

2. Arising from these notes the following action will be taken -

- (a) 16 Aust Inf Bde to relieve I/82 and II/87 Greek Bns in forward positions and the coy of I/87 Bn now in reserve as soon as possible.
- (b) Arty of 12 Greek Div supporting front now being taken over by 16 Aust Inf Bde to be relieved as soon as possible by 2/2 Fd Regt.
- (c) Recce to be made of front now occupied by I/86, II/86 and I/87 Greek Bns and supporting arty with a view to their relief by 19 Aust Inf Bde and 2/3 Fd Regt when 19 Aust Inf Bde is concentrated.

3. In the meanwhile HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde, 2/8 Bn, 2/3 Fd Regt and one Bty 1 A Tk Regt are to be retained in reserve in the area North of R ALIATION and South of KOLINI.

4. 1 A Tk Regt (less one bty) will be directed to ALIATION where it will come under command of "ALIATION DET."

5. For the present II/82 Greek Regt will remain in the forward area East of R ALIATION. The question of it being brought under Command 6 Aust Div when your HQ is opened will be determined later.

ACK

(sgd)

B.F. ROWELL

Brig.

GS 1 Aust Corps.

Signed at 1515 hrs

Issued through Sigs

DISTRIBUTION -

6 Aust Div	1	12 Gr Div	7
1 NZ Div	2	Comd	8
16 Aust Inf Bde	3	G	9
CCRA	4	A	10
CCE C Tps	5	C	11
CSO	6	CEL	12
		War Diary	13 - 14
		File	15 - 16

Attachment to APPENDIX "E"

TOP SECRET

A.H./61/G(o)

MEETING BETWEEN GENERAL WILSON AND GENERAL KOTULAS

at 1130 hrs 5 April 1941

PRESENT: Lieutenant-General Sir H.H. WILSON, GBE, KCB, DSO  
General KOTULAS  
Principle Staff Officer HQ GREEK CMA  
Major MILES REID  
Major BELCHEL

1. General KOTULAS described, with the aid of a Tracing which was retained by General WILSON, the present dispositions of the GREEK CENTRAL MACEDONIAN ARMY.

2. The question of the relief of 12 Greek Div by 6 Aust Div was discussed. General KOTULAS was very anxious for 6 Aust Div to commence taking over positions of the 12 Greek Div at once. He explained that the Greeks are very thin on the ground, and have only minor local reserves. As 6 Aust Div took over from 12 Greek Div it would be possible to thicken up the 20 Greek Div position. He was further anxious to adjust the Greek line forward in the area EDESSA.

The adjustment of the Greek line would give greater depth on the left flank and would cover some excellent battery areas.

General WILSON explained that he was not anxious for Australian Troops to go into the VERIA Gap position before the arrival of the Comd 6 Aust Div who was expected shortly. He expected that 6 Aust Div would take over the greater part of 12 Greek Div front within the next 3 days. He said that he would consult with General BLAKEY regarding the possibility of 16 Aust Bde moving into the area VERIA sooner.

3. In connection with relief of 12 Greek Div by 6 Aust Div the question of lateral communications in the 12 Greek Div sector was discussed.

General KOTULAS agreed to order the construction of a bridge over the R ALIADON in the approximate area (ref map 1/250,000) 0 1919. He said there was already a bridge across the river in the forward area.

General KOTULAS said that his sappers had planned to build a track passable to MT running NORTH from VERIA - KOZANI road behind the defensive positions, and running for a distance of approximately 5 miles to the village XROLEIVADON, with a fort to the WEST. He stated that this road might subsequently be continued WESTARDS into the KOZANI plain. General KOTULAS agreed to issue orders at once for work on this road to commence and estimated that it would be completed in 15 - 20 days.

General WILSON agreed that Australian Sapper Officers should at once make contact with the Greek Engineers building this road, with a view to taking over the construction in due course.

4. General WILSON then laid down that 6 Australian Div would take over the 12 Greek Divisional front from the left boundary of NZ Div to line (ref map: 1/100,000 KOSTOMORI 1937 excl GELADOSTAVLOS 1538 excl ASURVASI 0836 - pt 1587 0533. This implied that the two Greek Battalions on the left flank of 12 Div sector would not be relieved by Imperial Troops.

General WILSON explained that this was inevitable as the area NOUSSA was devoid of communications, so that it would be

4. Possible for Imperial Troops to be maintained there until they received pack transport.

5. General KOTULAS pointed out the gap now existing between NZ Div and 12 Greek Div.

General WILSON said that the Imperial Troops would take over this gap adding that 6 Australian Div and NZ Div must consult as to the provision of troops.

6. The 20 Greek Div Sector was then discussed. General KOTULAS had already mentioned his plan to advance forward the line of 20 Greek Div.

General KOTULAS stated that the road skirting the EASTERN shore of LAKE VEGORRITIS was now completed and was even passable to Led Arty.

7. The construction and composition and composition of the ALYNTAION Det was then explained to General KOTULAS. A copy of the Detachment Operational Instructions was handed to Major LILES REID who will explain it in detail to General KOTULAS.

It was explained to General KOTULAS that the plan was for 64 Med Regt to transfer all but one troop from NORTHERN shores of the Lake to the SOUTH-EASTERN shores; to this General KOTULAS agreed. It was further explained that when the 6 Aust Div took over the VERIA Gap, the troop of 64 Med Regt RA now at VERIA would rejoin the ALYNTAION Det.

In connection with the construction of defence positions by the ALYNTAION Det, General WILSON asked whether the Greeks could loan an excavating machine. It was agreed that this should be referred to the competent Greek Ministry. General KOTULAS agreed to assist with the provision of civilian labour for the ALYNTAION Det.

8. Liaison between HQs was then discussed. General KOTULAS stated that he felt it desirable to have a Liaison Officer (Greek) stationed at his HQ, and liaising with BTG HQ. To this General WILSON agreed and General KOTULAS said he would approach Colonel FOTILAS with a view to the provision of such an officer.

9. General KOTULAS raised the question of RAF machines flying over his area. He stated that on occasions British aircraft flew over the Greek areas, without previous warning, and that cases had arisen when his AA Btys had opened fire because they were unable to identify the aircraft. He was anxious to avoid such occurrences and suggested that he might be given notice of such flights. General WILSON explained the difficulty of giving notice of such flights and the subject was dismissed.

10. General KOTULAS gave General WILSON the dispositions of 19 Greek Div as follows:-

1 Regiment	KILKIS
1 Regiment	area DOIRAN
1 Regiment	CALOKASTRON

11. It was finally agreed that General WILSON should assume Comd of the Allied Forces in the VERION posn as from 1400 hrs 5 Apr 41

DISTRIBUTION - General KOTULAS  
General BLAKEY  
JGS  
Major LILES REID  
File  
War Diary (2)

Brig Salisbury Jones  
for General PAPAGOS

APPENDIX "F"

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS OP INSTM NO 4

Copy No

Ref maps (BALKANS 1/250,000  
(EUROPE 1/1,000,000 SOFIA

8 Apr 41.

Infm Separately

Int

3. In order to stop a blitzkrieg down FLORINA gap a gp will be formed under Comd 6 Div to defend the pass on the road BITOLJ PTOLEMAIS WEST of KLEIDI (N 7964)

Method

4. Command

Hq 6 Aust Div will come direct under Comd HQ BTG, and should be located in close proximity to Gen KOTULAS in vicinity of PERDIK. He should ascertain location and make contact with Gen KOTULAS as soon as possible.

5. Following Tps under Comd

Hq 6 Aust Div  
HQ RAA 6 Aust Div  
HQ RAE 6 Aust Div  
HQ ASC 6 Aust Div  
Sigs 6 Aust Div  
2/3 Fd Regt  
64 Med Regt (less one tp remaining with 20 Gk Div, the tp now in VERROIA PASS will re vert at once to HQ 6 Aust Div).

1 Lk Regt RAA  
NZ 1G Bn less two coys  
RTR

HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde  
2/4 Bn less one coy (moving forward 8 Apr 41)  
2/8 Bn  
2/1 Fd Coy less one sec  
580 Fd Coy RE (moving forward)  
One Coy ALPC (at present under Brig Lee)

6. Brig Lee will remain at disposal of Comd 6 Aust Div.

7. Any Greek units placed under Comd 6 Aust Div will be notified later.

Adm

8. Comd 6 Aust Div will decide on LMC requirements.

Interconn

9. Comd 6 Aust Div will advise HQ BTG when he has taken up his HQ, repeating a copy to HQ 1 Aust Corps. At this hour Comd 6 Aust Div comes under comd HQ BTG.

Time of Signature 1300 hrs

(sgd) C... CLOES Brig  
for Brig.

Method of Issue - to sigs

GS 1 Aust Corps.

- 1 6 Aust Div
- 2 1 NZ Div
- 3 ALYNTAION Det
- 4 Comd
- 5 G
- 6 G

APPENDIX "G"

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS OP INSTN NO 5

Copy No

Ref Maps: MOUNT OLYMPUS, KOSTANI 1:100,000

9 Apr 41;

1. 4 NZ Bde with under cord; 6 Fd Regt, 6 Fd Coy, 31 A Tk Bty, 5 Fd Amb will move FORTHWITH to occupy posn to carry out following tasks:

- (a) Tps vicinity KASTANIA (0697) to prevent enemy penetration EAST of SERVIA.
- (b) Tps STENA PORTAS area (0196) will prevent enemy penetration that area.
- (c) Dispose arty to be capable of bringing fire on line R ALIAKLON.

2. One bn will be retained in reserve.

3. 4 NZ Bde will be the pivot on which subsequent withdrawal of 12 Gk Div and 16 Aust Inf Bde may be made.

4. You may anticipate one med regt and an A Tk Bty being available within the next 48 hrs for additional support.

5. The posn you are to occupy in accordance with this instn is NOT to be considered as the final defensive area of your bde. Your preliminary purpose at this stage is to prevent sudden penetration in this area by enemy tps.

ACK

(sgd)

Time of Signature 1105 hrs

S.F. ROWELL Brig.  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Method of distribution - SDR

Distribution - 4 NZ Bde Gp	1
1 NZ Div	2
12 Gk Div	3
6 Aust Div	4
16 Aust Inf Bde	5
GOC	6
CCRA	7
Q	8
CE	9
Force	10
File	11 - 12
War Diary	13 - 14

APPENDIX "III"

SECRET

1 AUSTRALIAN CORPS OP INSTM NO 6

Copy No

Ref Maps OLYMPUS - KOZANI 1:100,000

10 Apr 41.

INFORMATION

1. The advance of the enemy on the VARDA River has exposed our Northern flank. His advance on DEVDELIJA and beyond the KIOS River menaces the Eastern passes.

2. Our posn has been organized in three sectors -

(i) Right Sector - Comd - Lt-Gen Sir Thomas BLAKEY

Tps - NZ Div  
16 Aust Inf Bde  
2/2 Fd Regt RMA  
One Bty 1st Tk Regt RMA  
12 Gk Div (less two bns and less certain arty)  
Units notified to 12 Gk Div.  
500 A Tps Coy RE

Right Flank - Sea Coast

Left Flank - Original flank of 12 Gk Div

(ii) Centre Sector - Comd - Lt-Gen KOTULAS

Tps - 20 Gk Div  
and other units notified to Commanders concerned

(iii) Left Sector

A force known as ALYNTAION Det has been organized to oppose the advance from the North consisting of -

Comd - Maj-Gen Sir Iven MCKAY

Tps - HQ 6 Aust Div  
1 Armd Bde and att tps  
19 Aust Inf Bde Gp  
Certain arty and other units

INTENTION

3. The posns in the Right Sector will be maintained on the following line -

North of KATERINE from coast to R ALIANTION about 2 Km North of KIKRE SANTA (O 2022) - NAROUSA (O 1039)

REAR DEFENSIVE POSITION

4. In the event of enemy pressure against the Northern flank forcing a withdrawal, it is the intention to readjust the defensive position on the following line known as the OLYMPUS - R ALIANTION posn -

LT OLYMPUS - MERELI 3093 - AG DEMETRIOS 2494 - TITARION 1296 - (excl) SERVIA - Escarpment South of GOULES 9796 - South bank of R ALIANTION

COVERING TROOPS

5. (a) To secure the position and cover movement to it, 4 NZ Inf Bde Gp will occupy a posn covering KASTANIA and the

rd SERVIA - ELASSON in 0096 under direct orders of H, 1 Aust Corps.

(b) Pending the arrival of other tps 4 NZ Inf Bde will also reconnoitre with a view to possible occupation the escarpment South of GOULES - 9796.

#### METHOD OF OCCUPATION

6. If and when withdrawal from VERRIA PASS posn is finally ordered, it is proposed -

(a) that 16 Aust Inf Bde will move via VELVENDOS 1106 - LOSKHOKHORI 1099 to extend right flank of 4 NZ Inf Bde Eastward along the R TITARION 1197

(b) that 12 Gk Div will move South crossing the R ALIAKION North of RYMNION 9394 into the area (excl) Pt 808 (9592) incl LIBADERON (9882) - LAZARADES (9181) - Pt 875 (8982) - PALILONA (8387)

7. (a) NZ Div (less 4 NZ Inf Bde Gp) will continue to maintain the defence of the passes East and West of LT OLYMPUS

(b) One Inf Bde Gp will be maintained in reserve

(c) Recce should be made to cover the area westwards of the present left flank of NZ Div. It is not possible at this juncture to indicate how far to the East the right flank of 16 Aust Inf Bde will finally extend.

#### PREPARATORY ACTION

8. (a) Routes will be reconnoitred and preparations completed to move reserve units and formations. No actual movement is to take place pending further orders.

(b) Vehicle transport NOT required for immediate supply will be moved South of rear defensive position during night 10/11 Apr to the following areas:-

16 Aust Inf Bde - East of Rd SERVIA ELASSON between 1 Km North of Pt 549 1285 and KHAHI LEIVADOTIKI 0 1282.

12 Gk Div - LIKROVALTON 9388 - LAZARADES 9181

#### ROUTES

9. When withdrawal is ordered inf, pack arty and pack transport will move as follows -

(a) 16 Aust Inf Bde  
Greek units South of ALIAKION River

by routes East of a line North and South through SKAPHE 0715.

16 Aust Inf Bde will cross R ALIAKION at foot bridge to be erected 0909 and by flying bridge already in posn there.

(b) Remainder of 12 Gk Div

by routes West of a line North and South through SKAPHE 0715. A foot bridge is being erected over R ALIAKION North of RYMNION 9394.

- 3 -

- (e) The rd KOZANI-SERVIA will NOT be used except by wheeled vehicles

TRAFFIC CONTROL

10. Joint Greek and British control posts will be established -

(a) where routes selected cross Rd KOZANI-SERVIA

(b) at all bridges over the ALIAKLON River

11. Lt-Col H; Wells, Senior LO at HQ 1 Aust Corps will proceed to HQ 12 Gk Div on 10 Apr 41. He will coordinate all arrangements for withdrawal of 12 Gk Div and 16 Aust Inf Bde on behalf of HQ 1 Aust Corps.

ACK

Signed at 1210 hrs

(sgd) S.F. ROWELL  
Brig.  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Method of issue - by Sigs copies

by hand 10 copies 2, 3 & 4

DISTRIBUTION -

	Copy No
1 NZ Div	1
12 Gk Div	2
16 Aust Inf Bde	3
4 NZ Inf Bde	4
CCRA	5
CSO	6
GOC	7
G	8
I	10
A	11
Q	12
Senior LO	13
CE	14
DDST	15
DDMS	16
ADOS	17
File	18
War Diary	19
	20
	21
	22



APPENDIX "J"

To: 12 Greek Div 16 Aust Inf Bde CCRA CE CSO Corg  
From: 1 Aust Corps 0 252 11

Ref map 1:250,000 (.) following moves 12 Gk Div and 16 Aust Inf Bde Gp ordered to commence forthwith (.) first (.) 1/87 Gk regt by march route from present area to right flank of 12 Gk Div posn on OLYMPUS RIVER ALIATION line (.) point of junction with left flank 1 Aust Corps KTEMI S 8599 (.) second (.) 12 Gk Div to commence thinning out forward bns provided secure front is maintained (.) personnel so withdrawn will NOT move West of line TETRALOPHON 00422 EREKIA N 9535 until ordered (.) third (.) 16 Aust Inf Bde to commence withdrawal South of R ALIATION in accordance with prearranged plan but should retain equivalent two bns forward (.) 2/2 Fd Regt RAA less two tps to move to MIKROVALTON S 9388 area via SERVIA where they will come under comd CCRA 1 Aust Corps (.) the two tps are to be retained in present posn (.) additional 15000 rations for 12 Gk Div being dumped 12 Apr rd junc N 7003 (.) ACK

(sgd)

EMERGENCY OPS

700 1710

C.H.L. ELLIOTT Lt-Col

for Brig.

APPENDIX "K"

To: 12 Gk Div, 16 Aust Inf Bde, 4 NZ Inf Bde, rptd NZ Div  
6 Aust Div, Adv BTG, copies Q, CSO, CE, CCRA

From: 1 Aust Corps 0 259 12

ref map 1/250,000 (.) withdrawal order (.) 12 Gk Div (.)  
rear parties forward bns will now withdraw direct to new posn  
clearing rd KOZANE-SERVIA NOT later than 1200 hrs 13 Apr 41 (.)  
main bodies of forward units already withdrawn in accordance  
with 0 252 of 11 Apr 41 will cross line TETRALOPHON - EREANIA  
at 2000 hrs 12 Apr en route to new position (.) crossing places  
over rd FLORINA - SERVIA rd and track juncs 886235 and 8816 (.)  
16 Aust Inf Bde and attached tps (.) two tps 2/2 Fd Regt RMA  
and all remaining vehicles 16 Aust Inf Bde and attached tps will  
now move via SERVIA to rejoin remainder of unit tpt (.) 16  
Aust Inf Bde will commence second stage withdrawal commencing  
2000 hrs 12 Apr (.) final stage to be commenced 1200 hrs 13 Apr (.)  
responsibility destruction flying bridge VELVENDOS delegated to  
Comd 16 Aust Inf Bde or offr deputed by him (.) CCRA will co-  
ordinate aa protection area SERVIA bridge and defile (.) no  
guns to be north of bridge after 0600 hrs 13 Apr (.) instruc-  
tions later regarding demolition SERVIA br (.) ACK

(sgd)

C.M.L. ELLIOTT  
Lt-Col for Brig

EMERGENCY OPS  
SDR in order shown to  
4 NZ Bde, 12 Gk Div,  
16 Aust Inf Bde, 6 Aust  
Div

TOO 1300

SECRET

To: CCR, C30, D Coy Aust H. Gd Bn, GOC, G, I, L, Q, CE,  
Camp, ALSC

From: 1 Aust Corps 0 257 12

WARNING ORDER (.) Adv H. 1 Aust Corps and following att tps  
will move to ELASSON afternoon 12 Apr (.) Corps Int Sec (.)  
A Sec FSS (.) Hq 1 Aust Corps arty (.) D Coy Aust H. Gd Bn  
less two pls (.) all sigs coms will be established for Adv  
Hq at ELASSON by 1230 hrs (.) Adv Hq will open ELASSON and  
close GERANIA 1800 hrs (.) branches where necessary will  
arrange direct with Camp for a rear party consisting minimum  
personnel and office eqipt remain at GERANIA to keep Adv Hq  
open until time stated (.) all personnel and stores less  
rear parties will be loaded in vehs ready to move by 1430 hrs (.)  
ACK

(sgd) C.C.F. SPRY Maj  
for Brig.

IMMEDIATE

TOO 1100

APPENDIX "D"

To: Adv BTG, Rear BTG, 6 Aust Div, 16 Aust Inf Bde,  
4 NZ Bde, 12 NZ Div, 81 Base Sub-Area rptd CCR, CGO, GOC, G,  
I, A, Q, Q(Rear), CE, Camp, LASC, Medical, Ord, Pro, Postal

From: 1 Aust Corps 0 260 12

As from 1300 hrs 12 Apr 1 Aust Corps will be designated

ANZAC CORPS

(sgd) C.C.F. SPRY Maj

IMPORTANT

T00 1320

for Brig.

To: Adv NZ Div

From: 1 Aust Corps 0 262 12

from 1800 hrs 12 Apr 1941 1 Aust Corps will be known as ANZAC  
CORPS (.) in making this announcement the GOC ANZAC CORPS  
desires to say that the reunion of the Australian and New  
Zealand Divisions gives all ranks the greatest uplift (.)  
the task ahead although difficult is not nearly so desperate  
as that which our Fathers faced in April twenty six years ago (.)  
we go to it together with stout hearts and certainty of success

S.F. ROWELL

T00 1440

Brig.

To: ANZAC CORPS

From: NZ Div C 216 13/4

all ranks NZ Div welcome reunion of Australian and New Zealand  
divisions with greatest satisfaction (.) will you please send  
this message to our comrades 6th Division (.) FREYBERG comd  
NZEF

T00 1000

BTG OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO 11

Ref Map 1:250,000

INFORMATION

1. Enemy activity is described in H. BTG summaries of information.
2. One Gk Inf Bde has been placed under comd of the Gk Cav Div on the Left Flank of BTG. This Gk Inf Bde is in contact with our Left Sector, pt of junc area AETOS N 75 Gk Cav Div HQ in area VATONORION N 35.
3. Some TUCO-SLAV Artillery is now in posn area SERVIL T 09.
4. Certain units of 12 and 20 Gk Divs and horsed and bullock tpt of 12 and 20 Gk Divs withdraw from posns in "VERMION LINE" to their sectors of OLYMPUS-R ALLIANCE Line, vide BTG Operational Instrn No 10 dated 9 Apr 41 (as amended by Warning Order O 105 dated 10 Apr 41) on the night 11/12 Apr 41.

INTENTION

5. BTG will complete withdrawal to OLYMPUS-R ALLIANCE Line (as approx defined in Warning Order O 105 dated 10 Apr 41) as soon as possible.

METHOD6. 1 AUSSCORPS

- (a) Withdrawal formations of Right Sector will proceed under orders 1 AUSSCORPS.
- (b) 1 AUSSCORPS formations using rd PETRAIA N 91 - SERVIL T 09 will be clear of PETRAIA by 0200 hrs night 12/13 Apr.

7. 20 Gk Div

- (a) DODEC Regt comes under comd 6 Aust Div from 1300 hrs 11 Apr 41 and reverts Comd Gk CIL on arrival new posns.
- (b) Rear parties of 20 Gk Div (less DODEC Regt) vacate posns at time arranged 6 Aust Div direct with Gk CIL.
- (c) Movement of 20 Gk Div main bodies 12 Apr 41 will be by East-West routes crossing main road ALLIANCE N 85 EOTANI N 81 between incl X rds N 8149 X rds PTOLEMAIS N 83
- (d) Except small rearguard parties, units 20 Gk Div will be West of main rd described above by 1400 hrs 12 Apr 41.

8. 6 Aust Div

- (a) DODEC Regt will be withdrawn under orders 6 Aust Div (vide para 7(a) above). Provision of tpt for lifting this Regt already arranged by Force HQ.
- (b) DODEC Regt will proceed to (in words of Comd Gk CIL) "nearest pts in new Gk 20 Div Sector."
- (c) Withdrawal remainder 6 Aust Div and att tps follows vide orders 6 Aust Div; withdrawal is being covered by 1 Armd Bde and att tps.

(d) Destinations 6 Aust Div and att tns:-

- i. HQ 6 Aust Div )  
Hq Arty 6 Aust Div ) Area South of  
Hq CRE 6 Aust Div )  
Hq ASC 6 Aust Div ) SERVIA Defile  
Sigs 6 Aust Div ) T 08 - T 18
  - ii. 2/3 Fd Regt RA - area SW of Pt 808 S 99
  - iii. 1 A Tk Regt RA - area South of SERVIA  
(less one bty) Defile T 08 - T 18
  - iv. One Bty 1 A Tk Regt - area KERASIA N 80 (under  
RAA Comd 19 Aust Inf Bde - on  
wheels)
  - v. 64 Med Regt RA - area South of SERVIA  
Defile T 08 - T 18
  - vi. 2/1 Aust Fd Coy - destination will be in-  
(less one sec) formed Force Rd Control  
Party conference 12 Apr 41.
  - vii. HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde) less most tpt )  
2/4 Aust Inf Bn ) (units lifted ) area KERASIA  
(less one Coy ) to KERASIA ) N 80  
2/8 Aust Inf Bn )  
Tpt bulk of HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde) Dispersal area approx  
2/4 Aust Inf Bn ) LIKROVALTON S 98  
(less one coy) ) via SERVIA Dr  
2/8 Aust Inf Bn )
  - viii. 1 Armd Bde and att tns -  
HQ 1 Armd Bde, Sigs and L&D )  
4 H )  
3 R Tanks )  
2 RHA ) Fighting units to  
102 A Tk Regt RA (less one bty) ) general area having  
155 Lt AA Bty (less one tp) ) GREVENA S 59 as its  
3 Fd Sqn RE ) centre and West of  
142 Fd Pk Tp RE ) R ALLIATION  
1 Rangers )  
27 NZ (LG) Bn (less two coys) )  
4 Lt Fd Amb )  
168 Lt Fd Amb )  
RASC 1 Armd Bde and 2 Armd )  
Div Support Gp )
- 1 Armd Bde and att tns will be South of OLIVUS -  
R ALLIATION Line by 2000 hrs 13 Apr 41.

9. Road Control

(a) BTG Control Party

- (i) Comd Lieut-Col BOWER, 7 RAJPUT
- (ii) Staff as detailed
- (iii) Role FIRST: Rd PETRANA - SERVIA - SERVIA Defile  
to area about pt T 1286 is placed  
under Force Control from 1400 hrs  
12 Apr 41. 1 Aust Corps Pro con-  
tinue duties under Force direction.

SECOND. Force Control Party will establish post in KOZANI

THIRD. Force Control Party will assist movement in area North of Kozani under arrangements direct with 6 Aust Div.

- (b) BTG Control Party will STOP all North-bound movement North of PETRAMA area from 1430 hrs 12 Apr 41. North-bound movement from SERVIA will be restricted from an hour decided by OC BTG Control Party after consultation with 1 Aust Corps.

10. AA

- (a) Additional AA protection has been provided for SERVIA Br and Defile.
- (b) 1 AUSCORPS will ensure AA measures this area are co-ordinated and supplemented by provision of AA Hqs if necessary.

11. RE

- (a) CE will arrange for maintenance parties under RE supervision (of RE, AMPC and/or local labour) on SERVIA Defile.
- (b) CE will inform 1 Armd Bde direct (rptd 6 Aust Div) when Br at H 6505 is strengthened for cruiser tanks.
- (c) The responsibility for blowing SERVIA Br is delegated to 1 AUSCORPS.

12. Destruction of Stores

All natures of sup, pet, RE stores, etc which cannot be back lifted will be destroyed, but NOT by fire.

13. R.A.F.

- (a) Air Recce will be carried out as weather and availability of aircraft permits.
- (b) (F) protection will be provided from 0600 hrs 13 Apr 41 weather permitting over area KOZANI - SERVIA - SERVIA Defile - Br at H 6505.

ADI

14. Transport

- (a) 1 AUSCORPS will despatch 90 LT to lift 2/4 Aust Inf Bn (less one Coy) 2/8 Aust Inf Bn. Head of coln will RV at PTOLEMAIS by 2000 hrs. Comd coln will report HQ 6 Aust Div in advance.
- (b) 1 AUSCORPS will despatch such 1st line LT as available to lift back to 1 AUSCORPS area proportion 210 tons RE stores and 140 tons POL now in fwd dump. Priority to explosives.

15. Supplies

6000 rations will be placed by 1 AUSCORPS on site of No 3 FSD KOZANI H 9414 for 1 Armd Bde. (This cancels previous arrangements for 40,000).

16. Removal of Obstructions

Breakdowns which impede movement and which cannot be readily repaired will be pushed aside OFF the rd.

17. Rec

(a) An Ord Offr will report BTG Control Party 0330 hrs 12 Apr 41 for tech advice.

(b) Rec sets as available will be at call for clearing SERVIA area under arrangements by OS Force HQ.

18. Medical

Medical cases will be evacuated by first suitable means to Medical units South of SERVIA Defile.

19. Refugees

Will be diverted to tracks leading off main rds under arrangements of Force Control Party.

INTERCOM

20. Continuous W/T Watch will be kept during movement.

21. Four W/T sets will be placed under orders BTG Control Party from 0300 hrs 12 Apr 41.

22. (a) Speech by radio will only be used in cases of dire necessity by an offr.  
(b) Code procedure will be adopted in radio messages. No infringement is permissible.

23. BTG Control Party will use radio code on lines laid down in FSPB and inform all concerned of code made.

24. (a) HQ 6 Aust Div reopens after movement in area South of SERVIA Defile.

(b) 1 AUSCORPS HQ moving in near future to area BLASSON.

25. LO at Gk CIA will be responsible for ensuring all Gk formations hereby affected are duly informed.

ACKNOWLEDGE

(sgd) H. GALLAGHER

Method of issue - Signals

Brig.  
General Staff.

Time of Signature 0345 hrs

<u>Distribution</u>	<u>Copy No</u>		<u>Copy No</u>
1 AUSCORPS	1	Comd	24
NE Div	2	IGS	25
16 Aust Inf Bde	3	G	26
Gk CIA	4	E	27
6 Aust Div	5	X	28
1 Aust Bde	6	A	29
BTG Sigs	7 - 8	U	30-33
Rear HQ	9 - 18	BTG Control Party	34-43
Brig A.G. Salisbury-Jones	19 - 20	BTG Recce Sqn	44
(one copy for Gen PAPAGOS)		E Wing R&F	45
81 Base Sub-area	21	File	46
IS	22	War Diary	47-48
LO at Gk CIA	23	Spare	49-54



To: GREEK CIA, ANZAC CORPS

From: HQ BTG

10 0 25

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

WARNING ORDER from Adv BTG (.) ref map 1/250,000 (.) ref  
BTG operation instruction number 10 dated 9 April para 5(b) (.)  
Allied posns for protracted defence amended to mount (?) OLYMPUS  
- TITARAION - ESCARPLENT - GOULES S 9897 repeat S 9897 to  
RYLNIION S 9494 repeat S 9494 thence South bank river ALIAKLON  
to point about S 8691 repeat S 8691 or BOUKIN N 70 (8909?)  
repeat N 70 (8909?) area YEROLILNE N 71 repeat N 71 area SISAION  
N 6530 repeat N 6530 - area KLEIQOURA N 64 repeat N 64 - area  
NYMPHAION N 65 repeat N 65 - area to lake PRESANXO shore in area  
North of LALON N 37 repeat N 37 (.) approx points (mobilisation?)  
junction HQ BTG formations 1 Aust Corps with 12 Greek Div high  
ground immediately NW of R ALIAKLON in S 89 repeat S 89 (.)  
12 Greek Div with 20 Greek Div in area KLEIQOURA N 7819 repeat  
N 7819 - point 1673 repeat 1673 N 7114 repeat N 7114 (.)  
20 Greek Div 2 Greek Cav left boundary repeat W general area  
NYMPHAION N 65 repeat N 65 (.) Probable initial concentration  
area for 1 Armd Bde region GREVENA S 59 repeat S 59 and on arrival  
revert command group HQ (.) 27 NZ (LG) Bn less two companies  
probably remain under command 1 Armd Bde (.) 6 Aust Div on  
arrival in new position revert command 1 Aust Corps (.) 12  
Greek Div on arrival new position revert Greek CIA (.) With-  
drawal unessential administrative units and transport including  
Greek animal transport to south to R repeat R ALIAKLON will be  
accelerated.

T00 2000

TCR 0315

SECRET

HIGH GRADE CIPHER MESSAGE

To: 1 Armd Bde pass to 6 Aust Div  
1 Aust Corps 81 Base Sub-area

From: Adv BTG

10

42 35

TOO 1310

FOR 1746/9

IMMEDIATE

Ref HQ BTG instruction No 10 Apr 9 para 8 (.) 6 Aust Div will instruct 1 Armd Bde withdraw all ancillary units north of River ALLAMON NOT required for maintenance present position to area TRIKALLA (TRIKALLA) S 73 (.) 6 Aust Div to inform this HQ units affected (.) 1 Aust Corps will earmark sufficient mechanical transport to lift road parties 2/4 Aust Inf Bn (less one company) 2/8 Aust Inf Bn 607 AMPC back from present location (.) This mechanical transport will be at 4 repeat 4 hours notice to cross River ALLAMON at SERVLA from 2359 hrs 10 Apr (.) 6 Aust Div will inform this HQ when 607 AMPC can be withdrawn on withdrawal this company come under command 1 Aust Corps

(sgd) H.S. HEMM S/Sgt

for Lieut.  
Cipher Offr 1 Aust Corps.

SECRET

Att to H. DTG OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTION NO 10

General Areas of Responsibility 9 Apr 41

Ref Map: GS 1:250,000

1. 20 Gk Div

YANNA KOKHORI	O 1353
incl NESOVOUNOS	N 94
incl AG KHRISTOPHORUS	N 83
excl PTOLEMAIS	N 83
excl rd PTOLEMAIS - ALYNTAION	
escarpment	N 8366
Pt 1225	N 8271

2. 6 Aust Div

Pt 1225	N 8271	
excl escarpment	N 8366	
incl rd ALYNTAION - PTOLEMAIS		
incl PTOLEMAIS		
incl ASVESTOPETRA		N 73
incl PELEKANOS	N 62	
excl rd running west of PELEKANOS		
excl ARGOS ORESTIKON	N 43	
incl KLEISOURA	N 64	
area NYLPHAION	N 65	
excl LESONESI	N 67	

3. 1 Aust Corps (& 12 Gk Div)

excl PTOLEMAIS	N 83
YANNA KOKHORI	O 1353
VERGION front	
Coast	
Mouth of R PENIOS	T 66
junc rd and rail	T 4452
incl TYRNAVOS	T 24
incl MOLO GOUSTA	T 15
excl KALABAKA	S 64
incl DESKATI	S 87
incl KOZANI	N 81

APPENDIX "O"

SECRET

ANZAC CORPS OP INSTN NO 8

Copy No

Ref Map 1:250,000

14 Apr 41

1. In view of the present situation, it is essential to coordinate a plan for demolition, utilising all personnel and material to the best advantage on the whole Corps front.

2. With this in view a conference CE ANZAC CORPS and CREs 6 Aust Div and 1 NZ Div will be held at 0900 hrs 15 Apr at rd junc T 1772.

3. The priority in preparation of demolitions will be as follows -

- (a) SERVIA Pass
- (b) Thickening existing belt on KATERINI Pass
- (c) The PENEIOS GORGE running through from KATERINI to LARISSA
- (d) The pass from ELEUTHEROKHORION (T 1771) to ELASSON
- (e) ELASSON - DISKATI Rd
- (f) Bridges over Rivers SARANTOPOROS and PENEIOS

4. CE will submit coordinated plan on which the orders can be issued.

5. Comd 17 Aust Inf Bde will be responsible for demolition programme in his own area.

ACK

(sgd) A.R. GARRETT Lt-Col

Signed at 1830 hrs

for Brig.  
GS ANZAC CORPS.

Method of issue - by SDR copies 1 - 3  
by hand copies 4 - 21

DISTRIBUTION -

Copy No

6 Aust Div	1
NZ Div	2
17 Aust Inf Bde	3
CE	4
GOC	5
G	6
I	7 - 9
A	10
Senior LO	11
CSO	12
CCM	13
DOST	14
DDIS	15
ADOS	16
File	17
War Diary	18 - 19
	20 - 21

ANZAC CORPS OP INSTN NO 9

APPENDIX "pu"

Secret

Copy No

Ref map 1:250,000

14 Apr 41

1. In order to meet possibilities, it is proposed to establish a reserve in the KALABAKA area (S 64).

2. This force will have the following tasks -

First To hold area about Pt 582 (S 5954) where rds from West and NE converge.

Second To be prepared to move North to support 1 Armd Bde probably on line R VENETIKOS (S 58).

3. The force will be comprised initially as follows -

Comd Brig S.G. Savige, LC, Cord 17 Aust Inf Bde

Units Hq 17 Aust Inf Bde, Sig Sec and Ld

One Bty NZRA (unit to be notified)

One bty 1 Aust Lk Regt

Hq 64 Med Regt Rn

One 4.5 gun tp) 64 Med Regt Rn

One 6" How Tp )

2/2 Aust Fd Coy

2/5 Bn

2/6 Bn

2/7 Bn

2/11 Bn

Seven Cruiser Tanks 3 R.T.R.

One Coy 2/1 Aust LG Bn

2/2 Fd Amb

4. The above force, which will be known as the SAVIGE FORCE, will be under orders ANZAC CORPS, but will NOT be employed without reference to Hq BTG.

5. Lieut-Col A.R. Garrett, Hq 1 Aust Corps, is allotted to the force as Operations Staff Officer.

ACK

(sgd) A.R. GARRETT Lt-Col

Signed at 1900 hrs

for Brig.  
G3 ANZAC CORPS.

Method of issue - by BDR copies 1 - 6

by hand copies 7 - 23

Distribution -

	Copy Nos		Copy Nos
17 Aust Inf Bde	1	Senior LO	16
6 Aust Div	2	DDST	17
NZ Div	3	DDLS	18
1 Armd Bde	4	LDOS	19
Hq BTG	5	File	20 - 21
Ol Base Sub area	6	War Diary	22 - 23
CCRM.	7		
CE	8		
CFO	9		
GOC	10		
G	11 - 12		
I	13		
A	14		
C	15		

APPENDIX "Q"

To: NZ Div rptd BTG, 17 Aust Inf Bde, 4, CSO, CCRA, CE  
From: ANZAC CORPS 0 288 14

First (.) in view of changed situation desire you expedite withdrawal NZ Div Cav Regt from forward area for employment covering ELASSON from West (.) essential one sqn should be available move from ELASSON NOT later than 0800 hrs 15 Apr and balance of NZ Div Cav Regt as soon as possible thereafter (.) Instructions by LO who carries this message (.) Second (.) one fd bty to be made available temporarily to come under comd 17 Aust Inf Bde at ELABALL 3 6949 (.) Bty to move at once via ELASSON - DALLSI T 1646 rd South to rd junc T 1635 thence westwards (.) report hour of departure and estimated time of arrival ELABALL.

(sgd) G.F. ROWELL EMERGENCY OPS T00 1600  
Brig.

APPENDIX "Y"

To: ANZAC CORPS rptd NZ Div  
From: 6 Aust Div 20 0 124  
believe possible some personnel 16 Aust Inf Bde in their action with enemy 18/19 Apr forced withdraw direction AGYL square T 64 sheet S 3060 (.) possibly emerge on coast and request navy be asked search coast from KAVO DERIATAS square T 75 to KAVOS KOUTSOLOS T 82 (.) possibility some (finding?) way VOLOS area

1535/20 IMMEDIATE T00 1030  
(message sent to adv BTG 1630 hrs) T00 1500

APPENDIX "R"

SECRET SECRET

INMAC CORPS OC No 1

Copy No

15 Apr 41.

Ref Maps COMIL 1:1,000,000 and G.L.I.N.S 1:250,000 sheets 33072, 3060  
1860, 1872

INFORMATION

1. As given verbally to Div Comds by Corps Comd.

INTENTION

2. INMAC CORPS will withdraw southwards to the THEAOPHILE LINE which follows the general line:-

From the Coast near LOGOS 15 miles E SE of LIA - west along high ground through road and rail pass South of LIA - South-westwards covering GLENO GROS - LIDOR-ION and ELATINE.

METHOD

3. The withdrawal will be carried out in TWO phases commencing 15 Apr 41.

PHASE 1

4. (a) 6 NZ Inf Bde Gp (less one bn) will move during night 15/16 Apr to positions covering the two main rds between ELASOON and TYRNEVOS.

(b) 19 Aust Inf Bde (less 2/11 Bn and one Coy 2/4 Bn) together with one bn 6 NZ Inf Bde, one Bty 1st Lk Regt and one Coy 2/1 Aust LG Bn will withdraw during 15 Apr from positions North of R ABILIKON. After withdrawal over river, units will be moved as follows -

19 Aust Inf Bde - to DOMOS which is on main rd 20 miles NW of LIA (L.I.L.) in LT provided by INMAC CORPS.

One Bty 1st Lk Regt ) to DOMOS T 23 where they come under  
One Coy 2/1 Aust LG Bn) orders 16 Aust Inf Bde

One Bn 6 NZ Inf Bde - to DOMENIKON T 1256 in LT provided by INMAC CORPS, where it reverts to Comd 6 NZ Inf Bde

Units proceeding to DOMOS will on arrival, come under orders Brig Lee, CC 1st Aust Corps. Vide para 12 below.

(c) 16 Aust Inf Bde to commence movement during 15 Apr from present areas and withdraw by march route to road SERVL-ELASOON South of SERVL Pass. From here they will be moved by LT provided by INMAC CORPS to position covering the left flank of the main line of withdrawal on the general line DOMOS (T 13) - Pt 692 (T 12). 6 Aust Div will attach any additional tps available to 16 Aust Inf Bde.

Route from ELASOON via LOGOS T 0951 DALLI T 1746 south across river to rd junc T 1834 - thence westwards.

Even if it is not possible to move all 16 Aust Inf Bde at one time it is imperative that one bn should be on the above line as soon as possible after first light.

(d) One Fd Regt Rm 6 Aust Div will be withdrawn from SERVIL area during night 15/16 Apr and will move by route in para 4(c) above to SYN THOMI (T 23) coming under Comd 16 Aust Inf Bde on arrival.

#### PHASE B

5. (a) 5 NZ Inf Bde Gp will withdraw to position covering pass immediately North of ELABON but will ensure that exit South from KATERINI Pass is maintained until 4 NZ Bde Gp is withdrawn.

(b) 4 NZ Inf Bde Gp will withdraw from the SERVIL Pass through position held by 6 NZ Inf Bde Gp.

(c) The following units will come under order NZ Div at the time NZ Div assumes comd SERVIL front -

7 Lrd Regt Rm  
One Fd Regt Rm 6 Aust Div  
2/1 Aust IG Bn (less two coys)

#### 6. Left Flank Protection

NZ Div Cav Regt already in position on rd ELABON-DECKATI, will prevent any movement of enemy eastwards towards ELABON until rear of NZ Div cleared rd ELABON-TYNAVOS. Unit then reverts Comd NZ Div.

#### 7. Command

As soon as 19 Aust Inf Bde has cleared front of 4 NZ Inf Bde Comd of all tps on KATERINI and SERVIL fronts, incl detached force on KATERINI-ELABON Ry and troops in ELABON-TYNAVOS circle reverts to NZ Div.

#### 8. Subsequent Withdrawal

Subsequent withdrawal further Southwards must be as dictated by circumstances and it is only possible to indicate to Div Comds a general plan and delegate to them the widest degree of responsibility and initiative.

#### Routes

#### 9. NZ Div

LARISSA-VELESTINON (30 miles SE of LARISA) south of ALMIROS - SE to PTELEON - LALA - thence Coastal route via MOLOS to ATALANTE.

#### 6 Aust Div

LARISSA-LALA and southwards.

10. Div Comds will mutually arrange the stage at which 16 Aust Inf Bde Gp will be withdrawn having regard to protection of left flank of NZ Div.

1 Lrd Bde )  
(LIVE FORCE)

11. Orders for these detachments will be issued separately.

#### LIVE FORCE

12. The following force will be concentrated at DECKATI under Brig Lee, CCIA LEE'S COMD -

One Coy 2/7 Bn  
2/6 Bn  
2/7 Bn  
2/1 Fd Regt, less one Bty



- 3 -

2/8 Fd Coy  
2/7 Fd Amb  
2/19 Aust Inf Bde  
2/4 Bn  
2/8 Bn

#### Role

13. Organize and occupy defensive position around DOLOKOS to cover final withdrawal of 16 Aust Inf Bde and SAVIGE Force across the plain of THESSALY.

14. LEE Force reverts to Comd 6 Aust Div at a time fixed by Comd 6 Aust Div.

#### DEMOLITIONS

15. The coordinated scheme of demolitions agreed to at conference today will be accelerated to the utmost. All available efforts should be concentrated on demolitions in defile which will impose the maximum delay in proportion to the shortest time taken in preparation.

#### DEFENCE

16. Will be arranged by H. BDE to afford maximum protection.

#### GK FORCES

17. Within limits of responsibility Div Comds will make every possible effort to ensure that GK Force do not withdraw on routes available to Imperial Forces and that they do not in any way hinder the withdrawal.

#### ADM

18. Adm orders issued separately

#### INTERCOLN

19. HQ ANZAC CORPS remains present location but all unnecessary personnel and stores not immediately essential will be moved forthwith to LEVADIA.

#### ACK

(sgd) C.M.L. ELLIOTT Lt-Col

Issued by LO and GDR

for Brig.  
GS ANZAC CORPS.

Signed at 1800 hrs

#### DISTRIBUTION -

Copies	1 -	5	6 Aust Div (copies for 16 and 19 Aust Inf, NZ Inf Bde and 2/1 NZ Bn)
	6 -	8	HQ Div (copies for 5 and 6 NZ Inf Bdes
		9	Savige Force
		10	Lee Force
		11	Arm Bde
		12	HQ Div Cav Regt
		14	Force H:
		15	RAF
		16	GOC
17 -	19	G	
	20	I	
	21	-	
	22	Q	
23 -	25	LOs	
	26	CE	
		27	DIST
		28	DDLS
		29	DDOS
		30	Pro
		31	Camp
		32	Postal
		33 - 34	File
		35 - 36	War Diary
		37 - 40	Spare

UNRECORDED "5"

TO: Anzac Corps

FROM: NZ Div 0 196 15/4

SITREP 13, Gnd ops. 01 NZ Bn report 2230 hrs 14  
Apr tunnel den only partial, NZ Bng informed matter  
in hand. 0050 hrs 01 NZ Bn report enemy in front  
approx 30 vehicles AFVs troop tgt. 0047 hrs enemy  
registering arty 0717 hrs enemy attacking

(DEG 20 told 1025 hrs/15 Apr -(CHL.D) TOC 0803 LT  
sgd

Time in: 0845 LT

THI 0810

TO: Anzac Corps

FROM: NZ Div 0 301 15

SITREP 13 gnd ops. 1000 hrs 01 NZ Bn report enemy  
searching with approx two btys. Five tanks and  
considerable AF seen. 0030 hrs 5 NZ Inf Bde  
report five tanks engaged by 01 NZ Bn tanks retired.  
tanks thought to be medium. 20 NZ (Chori) Bn report  
1000 hrs four AFV moving NZ engaged by our arty retired.  
01 enemy recce plane again over NZ Div area

TOC 1140

THI 1154

TO: Anzac Corps

FROM: NZ Div

SITREP 15 gnd ops. 5 NZ Inf Bde report 1000 hrs all quiet

TOC 1035

THI 1037

TO: Anzac Corps

FROM: NZ Div 0 304 15/4

SITREP 17. 01 NZ Bn report 1548 hrs being intermittently  
shelled all day. Considerable increase of enemy forces  
on our front including inf

ILLORT 12 TOC 1016 LT

THI 1020

APPENDIX "5" contd

TO: Anzac Corps

FROM: NZ Div 0 317 15

two reports from 21 NZ Bn . 1635 hrs large convoys  
of tps arriving on our front . 1846 hrs further  
25 tanks have assembled in front of position .  
IT still coming forward . 1916 hrs tank concentration  
now numbers at least 150 . still moving in

IMMEDIATE SDR TCC 1946 NZ  
THI 1953

TO: Anzac Corps

FROM: NZ Div 0 324 15/4

following received from 21 NZ Bn. begins . Adv  
NZ Div rptd Anzac Corps from 21 NZ Bn . tanks  
have withdrawn in face of our harassing fire .  
present position quiet except for infiltration left  
flank . casualties slight but finding difficult  
to prevent entry of tanks

URGENT

TO: 21 NZ Bn rptd Anzac Corps

FROM: Adv NZ Div 0 325 15/4 GH 14

you are under Anzac Corps . no change your order .

REEL ( driven back ?)

IMMEDIATE TCC 2230  
TCR 0845/16

MESSAGE FROM 21 NZ Bn

TCC - 0900 hrs - Ammunition posn serious  
0920 " - Left flank seriously threatened .  
Provide escorts for engr parties  
in pass to exercise authority  
0940 " - Hvy inf attack left flank posn very  
serious  
1015 " - Inf attack left flank . situation  
serious . am standing by W/T set  
for your reply  
1015 " - W/T sta 21 NZ Bn closing down .  
getting out

APPENDIX "T"

ARMED CORPS C. NO. 1

SECRET

Copy No

13 Apr 41

Ref Maps : 1/450000 Series

1. With reference to ARMED CORPS C. NO. 1 dated 15 Apr, it has been found necessary owing to the situation on the right flank to ensure that adequate force is available to prevent enemy penetration SE of Mt. OLIMBUS on LINESA before rear-guards are clear.

2. The following variations will accordingly be made to dispositions already ordered:-

- (a) 2/2 Aust Bn ) Have already been ordered to take the eastern exit of the gorge through which the LINESA runs SE of LINESA.
- One NZ Fd Regt (less one bty)
- One Tp NZ Fd Regt
- (b) The troops noted in para (a) above together with those holding the gorge, i.e. 21 NZ Bn and one tp NZM will come under orders of Brig A.S. ALLEN, Comd 16 Aust Inf Bde as from 2400 hrs 16 Apr. Comd 6 Aust Div will detail one additional Bn to complete this Gp.
- (c) 16 Aust Inf Bde, originally intended to occupy a defensive position covering LINESA from the WEST, is reduced to a reserve of one inf bn and one fd regt for employment as determined by Comd 6 Aust Div.

3. The division of responsibility between Comds 6 Aust Div and NZ Div will now be as follows -

- (a) Comd 6 Aust Div is responsible for protecting the right and left flanks of withdrawal of NZ Div as far South as a line drawn East and West through LINESA. He is then responsible for the withdrawal through the GORDON (T 2379) position of 3 NZM FORCE and the reserve noted in para 2 (c) above and for the final withdrawal to the THEROPHILE position of NZ FORCE.
- (b) Comd NZ Div is responsible for the withdrawal of NZ Div and also for the force under Brig ALLEN noted in para 2 (b) above. This force will move by same route as NZ Div.

4. Battle H. of 6 Aust Div and NZ Div should be in close proximity until routes of withdrawal diverge South of LINESA.

5. It is hoped that sufficient delay will be imposed on the enemy to conform to the following timetable of withdrawal:-

- (a) 4 NZ Bde Gp to vacate LINESA at night 17/18 Apr and move direct back behind LINESA.
- (b) 5 NZ Bde Gp to vacate LINESA at night 17/18 Apr and move direct back behind LINESA.
- (c) 6 NZ Bde Gp to vacate ELASEON - TYRNAVOS circle 18/19 Apr and move behind LINESA.

(c) SAVIGE FORCE to withdraw main bodies during night 17/18 Apr to MARKOS (21135) - Pt 692 (T 1526) position leaving rear parties at MARKOS to delay during 18 Apr.

(e) Subsequent withdrawal of LEE and SAVIGE FORCE will be directed by Comd 6 Aust Div in co-operation with Comd NZ Div.

6. The role of 1 Armd Bde is to cover the withdrawal of SAVIGE FORCE back to MARKOS, and thereafter the withdrawal of 6 Aust Div as may be directed by Comd 6 Aust Div. 1 Armd Bde comes under orders 6 Aust Div as from the time of receipt of this order.

7. Demolitions The responsibility for demolitions will be

(a) NZ DIV: for all routes on the line of its withdrawal and for the routes of the line of withdrawal of LEE's FORCE South of the line running East and West through LARISSA.

(b) 6 AUST DIV for all routes of line of withdrawal of LEE's FORCE up to the line running East and West through LARISSA.

(c) Armd Bde and SAVIGE FORCE for road LARISSA - TRIMALA and PERILOS RIVER (S 82) and (T 23) as determined between Comds concerned. The Comd on the spot must ensure that demolitions are blown before they fall into enemy hands.

8. ACK

CHE Elliott Lt-Col  
(Sgd) for Brig  
GS ANZAC CORPS.

Signed at 2355 hrs.  
Issued by Sigs.

Distribution

Copy No.

1	6 Aust Div
2	NZ Div
3	Armd Bde
4	Savage Force
5	Allen's Force
6	Lee Force
7-8	CCMA
9	CSO
10	R.F.
11	GOC
12-14	G
15	I
16	Q
18-20	IO's
21	CE
22	DDCT
23	DDIB
24	DDCC
25	Pro
26-27	File
28-29	War Diary
30-32	Spare

APPENDIX "U"

To: BTG

From: ANZAC CORPS

O 327

18

owing condition VOLOS road we can use only main road (.)  
General Blaney says you MUST repeat MUST provide fighter  
protection for road LARISSA LALIA throughout day (.) road  
badly holed at PHARSALE and long column halted northwards

(sgd) J.D. ROGERS      MOST IMMEDIATE  
Lt-Col.      High Grade Cipher      T00 1115

APPENDIX "U"

To: BTG

From: ANZAC CORPS

O 331

18

further our O 327 18 Apr fifty enemy aircraft bombed and  
machine gunned our columns LARISSA LALIA road at 0930 hrs (.)  
there followed intermittent attacks throughout morning and now  
at 1430 hrs continuous attack is being made (.) this road  
is our life line for next few days and we must have air  
protection if humanly possible

(sgd) S.F. ROWELL      High Grade Cipher      T00 1435  
Brig      MOST IMMEDIATE

APPENDIX "V"

17 Apr 41.

My Dear General,

My Div recce reports that the state of the road LARISSA - VOLOS is impassable with mud, and if used will jeopardise using our LT tomorrow for our tasks.

I have therefore arranged with Major-General Mackay to use his road, and the destination of the 5<sup>th</sup> Bde is now all put out. It was going to an area halfway to its final destination, vehicles returning to pick up the 6<sup>th</sup> Bde.

Will you get your Provost to stop it halfway, somewhere - which will enable the transport to return to us to lift the 6<sup>th</sup> Bde?

As you can understand this is dictated in a hurry, as I am on my way to direct our column, and go back to the fwd Div HQ where the withdrawal is proceeding, and is in a rather bad state.

I am getting General Mackay's GSO I to sign this.

Could I be sent a message as early as possible about the 6<sup>th</sup> Bde?

The 4<sup>th</sup> Bde will go forward in the usual way to ATALANTA.

(sgd)

Col

for Maj-Gen Comd  
HE Div

APPENDIX 'W'

Message not available.

The gist of the message was to the effect .

"Request air cooperation for 18 Apr on front of ANZAC CORPS  
as follows:-

1. Any movement of Germans East of OLYMPUS and towards  
PENEIOS GORGE
2. Any movement GREVENA to KALABAKA
3. Fighter protection over road LARISSA - LAMIA



APPENDIX "Y"

To: 6 Aust Div, NZ Div rptd BTG

From: ANZAC CORPS

0360

19

ANZAC CORPS will occupy defensive posn on general line HOLOS to BRAILOS PASS (.) NZ Div on right 6 Aust Div on left (.) interdivisional boundary incl to NZ Div (.) LAHIA excl track junc Y 3639 excl pt 1399 T 33 incl pt 925 Y 52 ELAKHOS Y 71 (.) rear boundary incl to ANZAC CORPS rd LIVANAKIS - ENVADIA (.) primary tasks NZ Div defence of coastal pass 6 Aust Div defence of BRAILOS PASS (.) demolitions are being prepared by CRE 1 Armd Bde (.) CE ANZAC CORPS has all details and will communicate these to Comds 6 Aust Div and NZ Div on behalf of Comd ANZAC CORPS either direct or by LO (.) Comds 6 Aust Div and NZ Div will be responsible for blowing of all charges within their respective areas (.) EXCEPT to prevent them falling into the enemy hands the charges must NOT be blown until 6 NZ Inf Bde 16 Aust Inf Bde and LEE FORCE have withdrawn behind the sites (.) all tasks now being prepared under direction CRE 1 Armd Bde will be taken over by CRE's 6 Aust Div and NZ Div by 1200 hrs 20 Apr

(sgd) C.H.L. ELLIOTT

by LO

T00 1920

Lt-Col

APPENDIX "Z"

To: Adv BTG

From: ANZAC CORPS

0 364

20

essential to arrange at once naval motor boat patrol off coast to cover from KHALKIS E2999 to point Y5446 NE of HOLOS

(sgd) MARMHAM  
Lt-Col

EMERGENCY OPS

T00 1040

APPENDIX "A"

To: NZ Div Copy to Q

From: ANZAC CORPS

O 382 21

in view of Adv BTG signal O 665 defer any action to move units  
discussed with you by LO today (.) ACK

C.M.L. ELLIOTT Lt-Col  
for GOC

MOST IMMEDIATE  
High Grade Cipher

T00 2215

APPENDIX "B"  
CC

To: ANZAC CORPS, BTG rptd

From:

O/123/4 tac/R Arta Agrinion - Missolonghi road 0920 1100 hrs  
Talatus - Aitolikon low cloud made accurate visibility difficult -  
200 lorries moving S from Agrinion to letter N in Argerrokastron  
on road Agrinion - Makhlos 100 IT well dispersed moving towards  
Agrinion - on road west of Lake Amura via 150 IT moving south -  
head on Katorni tail at letter O in Spartos guns included in  
convoy - further lorries moving South from Arta - number not  
assessed owing low cloud - no flak - no EA Agrinian aerodrome  
apparently not used - ACK

T00 0815/23

105T SECRET

Copy No

25 Apr 41

1. 1 Armd Ede is providing protection and area control in vicinity THREE.

2. ANMAC CORPS will withdraw from GREECE.

3. The withdrawal will be carried out over period 22 - 27 Apr.

4. A covering force will be constituted forthwith -

Cond HZ 4 Inf Bde Comd  
Tps 4 HZ Inf Bde  
2/3 Aust Fd Regt  
One Aust .. Tr Bty  
2/8 Aust Fd Coy  
One coy 2/1 Aust MG Bn  
One Aust Fd Amb

5. Except in the case of the move of the covering force to its covering position GCMR optical and technical instruments, personal arms and equipment that can be carried on the man, automatic weapons and MGs, together with what can be carried on the man, will be moved. Otherwise technical vehicles not being used for troop-carrying and guns, will be destroyed. Under no circumstances will any attempt be made to recover vehs by towing.

During daylight 22 Apr

6. (a) Unessential fighting and adm units will move in small cols as already ordered.  
(b) Recce parties covering Force will RV one mile South of KIRIKOUHI E 07 at 1600 hrs to meet covering Force Comd.  
(c) Recce parties bde gps will start recce of concealment area which their gps will move.

During night 22/23 Apr

7. (a) Covering Force will move by 11T and will take up a position astride rd THREE 3 08 - THREE West from Pt 1018 E 07 and deny this position till early 26 Apr.  
(b) 6 Aust Div units of Covering Force will clear rd junction 6014 by 2350 hrs 22 Apr. NZ Inf Bde will follow.

During daylight 23 Apr

8. Thinning out of units due to move night 23/24 pr.

During night 23/24 Apr

9. (a) One inf bde gp in order from each ME Div and 6 Aust Div will move by LZ to concealment areas. ME Bde Cpt will clear rd junc Y 6014 by 2350 hrs 23 Apr.

Must Bde Gp to vicinity 122400N 104  
HZ Bde Gp " " 122400N, East of 122400N

Route: rd junc Y 6014 - THIVE

During night 24/25 Apr

10. (a) Fwd tps other than Covering Force disengage and move by rd to concealment areas. Just Bde Gp will lead and clear rd junc Y 6014 by 0030 hrs 25 Apr.

Just Bde Gp vicinity REGOS D 41  
HE Bde Gp to East of LILHIS B 29

Route: via rd junc Y 6014 - THIVE. If rd via West coast is passable throughout HE Bde Gp will receive orders to move by that route.

(b) One Bde Gp each Just and HE Divs, as in para 9(a) above embark from beaches to be indicated by HQ Force.

(c) Corps HQ moves to LILHIS B 15; during night 23/24 Apr.

During night 25/26 Apr

11. (a) Unless otherwise ordered Covering Force disengages; moves by rd to beaches vicinity LILHIS B 04, and embarks.

(b) All other tps NOT previously embarked move to beaches indicated by HQ Force and embark as ordered. It may be necessary for these to embark night 26/27 Apr.

12. Parachute protection

- (a) Units and gps are responsible for their own areas.
- (b) 1 Arm Bde has been made responsible for THIVE area.

13. AA fire: Formations and units will make clear to all tps that after leaving defensive posns and moving to concealment areas all fire will NOT be opened unless the aircraft are actually attacking them.

14. Demolitions

- (a) Within its own area each div will be responsible for as complete demolitions as can be made.
- (b) CB AMBIC CORPS will arrange demolitions -

Place	Person responsible for ordering destruction
i. rd LILHIS - LILHIS	CB Corps
ii. rd LILHIS - LILHIS B 08	" "
iii. of LILHIS br or its mechanism	HE Bde Gp Comd

Power to order demolitions may be delegated.

(c) In default of orders to blow the engr offr or GR in charge of each demolition will fire the charge if it is in position of falling into enemy hands in tact.

15. Except for the smallest essential war diary records and those items in para 3 above, all other stores, equip and documents will be destroyed. Prior to night 24/25 Apr NO fires are allowed and explosions may only be small and should take place only when other noises of the battlefield will conceal them.

ADH

16. NO baggage or personal belongings except those carried on the man or in his own hand are allowed to be taken from present areas.

17. (a) To remedy traffic jams: when a halt occurs offrs will get out and go ahead, wake up drivers, keep them well over to right side and help clear jams.

(b) NO stops on rds for meals.

- (c) Angers will be spread by secs throughout cols
- (d) All vehs to carry picks and shovels which MUST be carried to concealment areas to dig trenches.
- (e) Sidelights must be used except during actual attack or while still in view of enemy ground tps.

18. A staff offr each from 6 Aust Div and NZ Div will control traffic at rd junc Y 6014 on nights 23/24, and 24/25 Apr until his divisional coln has passed.

19. Other adm details issued separately.

INTERCOM:

20. HQ AMERAC CORPS close present site and opens LINDLE E 15 (code name RINDI) 2000 hrs 23 Apr.

21. (a) Dig centre will at once be set up at LINDLE with W/T to AMERAC CORPS and Adv BTG if possible, covering Force. Cable to Covering Force if possible.

(b) DPs will be pooled for BDR only.

ACK

(sgd) C.M.L. BELLITT Lt-Col

Signed at 1400 hrs

Sent by Sigs

for Brig.  
GS AMERAC CORPS.

Distribution:-

Copy No

Aust Div	1 - 4
NZ Div	5 - 8
1 Arm'd Bde	9
Force HQ	10
CCM	11
HQ C Sps Angers	12
CSO	13
RM	14
RLF	15
COC	16
G	17
I	18
A	19
Q	20
LO	21
CE	22
DDST	23
DDMS	24
DDOS	25
Pro	26
File	27 - 28
War Diary	29 - 30
Spare	31 - 36

APPENDIX "DD"

To: 5 Aust Div

From: ILLAC CORPS

0 406

23

air recce reports 450 IP moving south on road NEBOLOHCHI  
head near AGGLOHISTON (.) it is imperative that you have  
small force comprising inf arty and MG's to guard demolitions  
now being carried out on rd LEVADEIA DELPHI (.) force must  
be in posn by dawn 21 April (.) denial of this road to the  
enemy is essential to ensure the safe withdrawal of your fwd  
bde on night 24/25 April

(sgd) J.P. RO DELL  
Brig.

ILLAC CORPS

TOC 1500

DCS  
G2(o)  
G2(o)  
G3(o)  
G3(o)(C)  
LO  
LO

DCS  
G2(o)  
G2(o)  
G3(o)  
G3(o)(C)  
LO  
LO

DCS  
G2(o)  
G2(o)  
G3(o)  
G3(o)(C)  
LO  
LO

DCS  
G2(o)  
G2(o)  
G3(o)  
G3(o)(C)  
LO  
LO

DCS  
G2(o)  
G2(o)  
G3(o)  
G3(o)(C)  
LO  
LO

DCS  
G2(o)  
G2(o)  
G3(o)  
G3(o)(C)  
LO  
LO

SECRET

HQ BTG INSTRUCTION NO 10

Copy No

9 Apr 41

Ref Map GS 1:250,000

INFORMATION

1. Little is known of German movements to the East, NE or North of our posns.
2. Elements of YUGOSLAV Army are reported on the line BUKOVO N 5694 - PRETOIN 3394 and there are unconfirmed reports of fighting North of PRILEP.
3. Owing weather conditions air recce nil.
4. Present situation with particular regard to FLORINA-KOZANI Gap is not satisfactory except as an interim arrangement. The provisions of HQ BTG OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTION NO 9 dated 9 Apr 41 are therefore only a prelude to future developments.

INTENTION

5. (a) Interim Intention

HQ BTG will hold present posns (vide HQ BTG OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTION NO 9 dated 9 Apr 41) as long as possible in order to gain time for:

- (i) our ALLIES to adjust their dispositions incl forces in ALBANIA
- (ii) organization of a rearward defensive posn as described in para 5 (b) below.

(b) Subsequent Intention

HQ BTG will occupy a posn for protracted defence on the general line Mt OLYMPUS - TITIRION - escarpment GOULES S 9897 to RYMION S 9494 (thence South bank R ALLIATION to area GLEVENA. This will be known as the "OLYMPUS - R ALLIATION" posn.

METHOD

6. Recce of OLYMPUS - R ALLIATION posn:

Responsibility of 1 AUSCORPS and already in hand.

7. Time Factor

Period of time for which present posns are to be held cannot yet be estimated. Enemy pressure developing on the defences in FLORINA - KOZANI gap and at EDESSA may necessitate withdrawal within a short time.

8. Immediate Measures in preparation for withdrawal from present posns:

- (a) Certain readjustment on 1 AUSCORPS front as already agreed with Comd 1 AUSCORPS.

Object: (i) Ensure defence of passes astride Mt OLYMPUS  
(ii) Concentrate a reserve in area SERVIA

It is ESSENTIAL TO REMEMBER there must be no risk of failure to withstand enemy pressure from East and NE on 1 AUSCORPS front until completion of withdrawal (when undertaken) of 20 Gk Div and 6 Aust Div and att tps.

(b) All tpt not essential for defence of present posns for limited period likely (vide para 7 above) will be withdrawn to rear areas to avoid congestion. This will include all unit tpt that can be spared.

(c) Gk Tpt. 1 AUSCORPS and Gk CIA will arrange for withdrawal of all possible wheeled tpt from 12 Gk Div respectively, as follows:

(i) 12 Gk Div tpt directed to area DUSKATI

(ii) 20 Gk Div tpt directed to area GREVENI

This will largely deprive Gk Divs of all but pack animals and respective formation will arrange to assist these Divs by sup from existing IMPERIAL dumps.

#### 9. RE

(i) Gk CIA has been made responsible for rd construction and improvements in area excl KOFANI - excl DERVA - ELASION - TRITIA - GREVENI

(ii) Gk CIA will construct alternative br DERVA and conns thereto

(iii) 1 AUSCORPS is responsible for preparation of demolition belt on OLYMPUS - R ELIASION line from coast to general area North and N. DUSKATI

(iv) 6 Aust Div is responsible for preparation of demolitions on routes radiating from area ELSTORIA - ARGOS ORSTIKON N 43 (as detailed separately)

#### ADM

10. Rear boundary of 1 AUSCORPS is amended from time of receipt this order to following line:-

Mouth of R PENIOS - incl rail and rd intersection T 4452 - incl TYRMAVOS - incl rd TYRMAVOS to MOLO GOUSTA 1051 - excl ELLEBAKA

11. Comds 1 AUSCORPS and 31 Base Sub-area will arrange direct for siting minor ADM units, installations and dumps in their respective areas, but 31 Base Sub-area will make fullest use of sites in South of the Sub-area to avoid congestion elsewhere.

#### INTERCOLN

12. Any necessary instructions later.

#### ACKNOWLEDGE

(sgd)

Method of Issue

Brigadier.  
General Staff.

Time of Signature

#### DISTRIBUTION

	Copy No
1. 1 Aust Corps	1
6 Aust Div	2
Gk CIA	3
Brig R&F	4
Brig Salisbury-Jones (by DRLS)	5
Rear HQ ( " " )	6
Q)	7
E) Force HQ	8
X)	9
File	10
War Diary	11 - 12
Spare	13 - 20



1/2-  
Was Diary  
#1 Aust Corp. AUG 20 1941 ash  
Syrian Campaign  
2 Jun to 16 Jul 41

SUMMARY OF APPENDICES

Appendices 'A' to 'DD'	Operation Orders and Messages, etc.
Appendix 'EE'	Intelligence Summaries
" 'FF'	Situation Reports
" 'GG'	Liaison Officers Reports
" 'HH'	Location Statements
" 'II'	Order of Battle
" 'JJ'	Extracts from Code Lists

SECRET

WAR DIARY - HQ 1 AUST CORPS  
THE CAMPAIGN IN SYRIA.

- 2 Jun HQ 1 Aust Corps was ordered to mobilize and was placed under orders Force HQ P & TJ. HQ 1 Aust Corps was to assume control of the operations against SYRIA on completion of the first phase, which was the occupation of the line DAMASCUS-RAYAK-BEIRUT.  
(Message SD 69535 att as Appx A)
- 3 - 8 Jun (a) It was decided that HQ 1 Aust Corps should move forward during the early stages of the first phase so that everything would be in readiness when the time came to take over.  
(b) During this period preparations were made for the coming move into Northern PALESTINE preparatory to taking part in active operations.  
(c) A recce party left DEIR SUNEID on 7 Jun with orders to select a suitable site for Adv HQ in the vicinity of NAZARETH.
- 9 Jun Adv HQ 1 Aust Corps moved from DEIR SUNEID to AL MUJEIDAL a few miles south of NAZARETH. An Adv Report Centre of HQ P & TJ was at this time in NAZARETH.
- 10 - 16 Jun During this period liaison visits were made to forward formations and to Adv Report Centre HQ P & TJ, and further preparations made for taking over control of the operations.
- 17 Jun Adv HQ 1 Aust Corps was ordered to open at NAZARETH at 1100 hrs 18 Jun and to assume control of all operations against SYRIA (except those of HABFORCE) from that hour.  
(Message O 2869 att as Appx B)  
Formations under command of HQ 1 Aust Corps at that time included -  
7 Aust Div  
5 Ind Inf Bde  
1 FF Div  
84 L of C Sub Area  
85 L of C Sub Area
- 18 Jun Lieut-Gen J.D. Lavarack, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., took over the comd of 1 Aust Corps.
- (2) The situation when HQ 1 Aust Corps assumed command was as follows:-
- (a) 1 Free French Div and 5 Ind Inf Bde (less 1 RF) - Astride the rd DERA A - DAMASCUS and South of DAMASCUS preparing an attack on that city.
- (b) 2/3 Aust Inf Bn - moving forward by rail from PALESTINE for the purpose of guarding the L of C at DERA A and SHEIKH MESKINE. (This bn was less one coy which had been moved earlier to the coastal area).  
TJFF was already in the above area guarding the L of C.
- (c) 16 Inf Bde was disposed as follows:-  
Bde HQ and one bn - ROSHPINNA  
One bn - QOUNEITRA  
One bn - Under orders 7 Aust Div in coastal sector  
The situation around QOUNEITRA and on the rd QOUNEITRA-DAMASCUS was obscure, as VICHY FRENCH forces which had withdrawn from QOUNEITRA still held possession of this rd NE from QOUNEITRA and same distance south from AARTOUZ.
- (d) Small detachments of arty, MG and A Tk units from 7 Aust Div were between METULLA and ROSHPINNA.

(e) 7 Aust Div - holding its ground in the MERDJAYOUN area after a successful French counter-attack had re-taken the town. At JEZZINE and on the coast 7 Aust Div was making some progress from the line.

Dispositions

At MERDJAYOUN (under CRA) -

Two bns 25 Aust Inf Bde

2/2 Aust Pnr Bn

Supporting Arms

At JEZZINE -

25 Aust Inf Bde Gp (less two bns)

One bn 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp

On the coast -

21 Aust Inf Bde Gp (less one bn) - consolidating the area round SAIDA

(3) At a conference held at HQ 1 Aust Corps at 1100 hrs, the GOC-in-C (Gen Sir H.M. Wilson, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O.) directed that the operations in progress against DAMASCUS were to be regarded as secondary and that the main effort was to be directed against BEIRUT. GOC-in-C ordered that 16 Inf Bde was to be incorporated in 7 Aust Div and preparations made for an advance on BEIRUT.

(4) During the evening 18 Jun, GOC-in-C broadcast a message to General DENTZ calling on him to declare DAMASCUS an open town and to withdraw his tps from it. This request was not complied with.

(A copy of this declaration is att as Appx C)

19 Jun

(1) An attack by 5 Ind Inf Bde and Free French Div on night 18/19 Jun was only partially successful. Free French Div was everywhere driven back to its starting line. 5 Ind Inf Bde (which now consisted of two Ind bns and the remnants of 1 RF) after covering its left rear at AARTOUZ and on the rd QOUNEITRA-DAMASCUS, had succeeded in occupying the high ground immediately west of that rd, while there was confused fighting in MEZZE.

(2) In the MERDJAYOUN sector an attack by our tps was held up on the outskirts of the town.

(3) HQ 6 Div (Maj-Gen Evetts, C.B., C.B.E., M.C.) became available for operations and was given the tasks of L of C defence in the DAMASCUS L of C area and control of operations in the DAMASCUS area in co-operation with Comd Free French Div. All British tps in the area DAMASCUS - DERRA - ROSH PINHA - QOUNEITRA were placed at the disposal of Comd 6 Div for his tasks.

(See 1 Aust Corps Op Instn No 21 and message O 2701 att as Appx D)

(4) Late at night 19 Jun advice was received of the projected arrival of further British reinforcements. In view of the situation at DAMASCUS, where it appeared that some extra troops would turn the scales in our favour, representations were made to the GOC-in-C for approval to vary the decision given on the previous day that 16 Inf Bde was to be employed in the coastal sector for a drive against BEIRUT. GOC-in-C agreed that 16 Inf Bde would be available at once for operations against DAMASCUS, but urged the need for these operations to be completed before the time arrived to push for BEIRUT.

20 Jun

(1) Slight progress was made in the DAMASCUS area. 2/3 Aust Inf Bn was moved from DERRA into the fwd area. Information was received that 21 Aust Inf Bde held JADRA.

(2) 1 Aust Corps Op Instn No 22 was issued indicating to Comd 6 Div that from information received the early capture of DAMASCUS should now be possible, and instructing him to hold ready for moving elsewhere the additional tps placed at his disposal for the latter purpose.  
(Att as Appx E)

(3) Request received from GOC 6 Div that in view of the probable depletion in fighting strength of units of 5 Ind Inf Bde (due to the heavy fighting around MEZZE) 16 Inf Bde Gp should be moved to DAMASCUS area as soon as possible via rd QOUNEITRA-DAMASCUS  
(Att as Appx F)

After receiving an assurance that 7 Aust Div could continue holding in the coastal sector, GOC 1 Aust Corps ordered 16 Inf Bde Gp to move to DAMASCUS.  
(Att as Appx G)

- 21 Jun On night 20/21 2/3 Aust Inf Bn (under comd 5 Ind Inf Bde) cut the DAMASCUS-BEIRUT rd at the BARADA GORGE thus repeating a similar success by Australian Lighthorsemen of the Palestine Campaign of 1918. MEZZE was captured by 5 Ind Inf Bde on 21 Jun, but sporadic resistance continued until the afternoon, when DAMASCUS was finally surrendered. At 1600 hrs a formal entry was made by Gen le Gentilhomme. Free French Forces moved north to cover the city. Arrangements were made for 5 Ind Inf Bde to block the DAMASCUS-BEIRUT rd and for 16 Inf Bde (which had by this time cleared the QOUNEITRA-DAMASCUS rd) to move west from AARTOUZ, capture QATANA, and then move north to turn the right flank of the DIMAS posn, about 10 miles west of DAMASCUS.
- 22 Jun Our forces continued to consolidate in the DAMASCUS area.
- 23 Jun (1) 16 Inf Bde captured QATANA and continued to move in the direction of the DIMAS posn.  
(2) On the coast 21 Bde were holding a line east of NEBI YOUNES, our arty was now within range of the DANOUR defences.
- 24 Jun (1) Pressure in the MERDJAYOUN sector had its effect as the enemy withdrew from MERDJAYOUN and his other fwd posns on night 23/24 Jun to a second posn in rear covering HASBAYA and the two routes leading northwards.  
(2) 1 Aust Corps Op Instn No. 23 (att as Appx H) was issued giving the following as future tasks :-  
(A) 6 Div - Continuation of the advance to ZAHLE with a view to securing RAYAK aerodrome and cutting off the withdrawal of the Vichy French now in MERDJAYOUN area.  
(B) Free French Div - Security of DAMASCUS against attack and preparation for a further advance northward on HOMS when 6 Div had secured RAYAK.  
(C) 84 L of C Sub Area - Defence of L of C from incl DERAA to excl DAMASCUS.
- 25 Jun 16 Inf Bde (with two coys 2/3 Aust Inf Bn under comd) were now astride the DAMASCUS - BEIRUT rd just SE of DIMAS, and were meeting strong opposition.
- 26 Jun It was decided to concentrate our efforts on the capture of BEIRUT, since these operations could be fully supported by the Navy and RAF. Also BEIRUT was the main French base, and seat of Government.

Operations from MERDJAYOUN or DAMASCUS would, if successful, only clear up the situation in the ANTI-LEBANON; the problem of crossing the difficult country of the LEBANON would then have to be faced.

27 Jun During the night 26/27 Jun and the morning of 27 Jun 16 Inf Bde gradually moved forward along both sides of the DAMASCUS-BEIRUT rd. Two coys of 2/3 Aust Inf Bn succeeded in capturing portion of the JEBEL MAZAR feature but were counter attacked and lost the position. 16 Inf Bde was withdrawn to the general line DEIR QANOUN - YAAFOUR.

28 Jun (1) HQ 1 Aust Corps closed at NAZARETH and opened at SAFAD

(2) 1 Aust Corps OO No 24 (att as Appx I) was issued, the gist of which follows :-

- (a) 7 Aust Div to concentrate in the JEZZINE and coastal sectors for future operations.
- (b) 23 Inf Bde Gp (Brig GALLOWAY, C.B.E., M.C.) on arrival to relieve units of 7 Aust Div in the MERDJAYOUN sector; the latter units to be transferred to the coastal sector.
- (c) 17 Aust Inf Bde (Brig S.G. SAVIGE, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.) to come under comd 7 Aust Div. 17 Aust Inf Bde to consist of 2/3 and 2/5 Aust Inf Bns and 2/2 Aust Pnr Bn.
- (d) 6 Div to control DAMASCUS and MERDJAYOUN sectors.
- (e) All possible measures to be taken to ensure that 7 Aust Div preparations for the attack remained unknown. The reinforcement of the DAMASCUS and MERDJAYOUN sectors would be simulated where possible. 6 Div activities in the latter sectors were to be designed to lead the enemy to expect attacks in these sectors.

29 Jun (1) 1 Aust Corps Op Instn No. 25 (att as Appx J) was issued limiting, for the immediate present, action by 6 Div in the DAMASCUS and MERDJAYOUN sectors as follows :-

DAMASCUS Sector - Sufficient depth to the west to protect DAMASCUS and DAMASCUS aerodrome.

MERDJAYOUN Sector - Security of the route from QOUNEITRA to SAIDA from attack from the north.

(2) 1 Aust Corps Op Instn No. 26 (att as Appx K) was issued amending the boundary between 6 Div and 7 Aust Div as given in Op Instn No. 24.

(3) 1 Aust Corps OO No. 3 (att as Appx L) was issued with reference to the moves of units resulting from the relief of the force under comd of HQ RAA 7 Aust Div by 23 Inf Bde.

(4) HQ 23 Inf Bde took over control of operations in the MERDJAYOUN sector at 1800 hrs.

30 Jun) No change in general situation.  
1 Jul)

2 Jul (1) 1 Aust Corps Op Instn No. 27 (att as Appx N) was issued advising Comd Free French Div that for the present GOC 1 Aust Corps did NOT approve of any advance beyond NEBEK and stating that as possibility existed of Vichy French counter offensive against DAMASCUS, it was essential that portion of Free French Div be available to move in support of 6 Div in the area west of DAMASCUS.

(2) A letter (att as Appx N) was sent from GOC 1 Aust Corps to Gen Le GENTILHOMME suggesting that it would be advantageous to both if the senior LO 1 Aust Corps (Lt-col Rogers) were attached

to HQ Free French Div as from 3 Jul.

(3) EGS Force HQ and BGS 1 Aust Corps discussed the future employment of 5 Cav Bde. Notes on the discussion are att as Appx O.

(4) GOC-in-C and GOC 1 Aust Corps discussed the employment of the GREYS, CHESHIRE YEO and 1 Fd Regt. Notes on the conversation are att as Appx P).

3 Jul HQ P & TJ Op Instrn No. 55 (att as Appx Q) was received. This instrn laid down the future tasks of 5 Cav Bde in the L of C area south of DAMASCUS.

4 Jul (1) 1 Aust Corps OO No. 4 (att as Appx R) was issued and ordered:

(a) 7 Aust Div to continue the advance on BEIRUT on 7 Jul and to be responsible for its own right flank protection. An outline of R.N., RAF & RAAF co-operation was given.

(b) 6 Div to carry out aggressive patrolling to prevent the enemy from reinforcing the coastal sector.

(c) Free French Div to continue its present role of covering DAMASCUS.

(2) The air component available for the operation of 7 Aust Div was one bomber Sqn RAF, operating from JLEIN; one fighter Sqn RAAF, and one flight of an AC Sqn RAF operating from ROSH PINNA. These formations were placed at the direct call of Comd 7 Aust Div through the medium of an air liaison offr at Corps HQ.

(3) 7 Aust Div plan for the attack was briefly as follows -

(a) 25 Aust Inf Bde to move from JEZZINE and RHARIFE and capture BEIT ED DINE.

(b) 21 Aust Inf Bde - To force crossing over R. DAMOUR and to secure a line running east and west just south of DAMOUR. This Bde was also to protect the right flank against any possible counter-stroke down the road from BEIT ED DINE to DAMASCUS.

(c) 17 Aust Inf Bde - To pass through 21 Aust Inf Bde and exploit success towards BEIRUT.

(d) Attack to be supported by three fd regts, two 4.5 (H) tps, one medium 6" (H) Bty and naval bombardment from cruisers and destroyers.

(e) D1 day - 6 Jul 41.

5 Jul 1 Aust Corps Op Instrn No. 28 (att as Appx S) was issued defining various boundaries.

6 Jul (1) Attack on DAMOUR launched by 7 Aust Div. In spite of all physical difficulties 2/27 Aust Inf Bn succeeded in gaining a crossing and turning the left flank of the forward defence. The frontal attack by 2/16 Aust Inf Bn astride the main rd to secure a bridgehead progressed more slowly.

Coincident with this action 25 Aust Inf Bde commenced to advance northwards towards BEIT ED DINE although the mountainous country rendered progress both difficult and slow.

7 Jul Fighting around DAMOUR continued. 2/14 Aust Inf Bn and later 17 Aust Inf Bde were able to pass through 2/27 Aust Inf Bn and secure a line north of DAMOUR.

- 8 Jul (1) Several determined counter-attacks down the hills against the right flank of our positions around DAMOUR were held everywhere and by the evening the enemy defences had been surrounded and only mopping up operations remained to be carried out.
- (2) 1 Aust Corps Op Instn No. 29 (att as Appx T) was issued to Comd 7 Aust Div:-
- (a) No further advance until all enemy cleared from DAMOUR area.
- (b) When this was completed the advance on BEIRUT and ALEY to be continued.
- (c) 25 Aust Inf Bde to secure BEIT ED DINE.
- 9 Jul DAMOUR village was completely occupied. During the afternoon the advance beyond DAMOUR was resumed but it was obvious that the results of this action had been decisive as during the afternoon information was received from Force HQ that General DENTZ had asked for an armistice. Formations were warned to expect plenipotentiaries advancing under cover of a flag of truce (see Appx U).
- 10 Jul (1) To free 6 Div of responsibility for the MERDJAYOUN sector during the preparation and the battle for JEBEL NAZAR, 23 Inf Bde was placed under direct comd of 1 Aust Corps from 1500 hrs 10 Jul.
- (2) On night 9/10 Jul 6 Div launched an attack on the JEBEL HABIL and JEBEL NAZAR features. The initial attack was successful, the French outpost line being captured except on the right flank.
- (3) In the MERDJAYOUN sector, the enemy commenced to withdraw from his positions around HASBAYA and 23 Inf Bde pushed forward in pursuit.
- 11 Jul (1) Determined French counter-attacks against 6 Div regained for the French a considerable amount of the ground already lost.
- (2) At 1955 hrs BGS Force HQ telephoned to say that at 0001 hrs 12 Jul all tps would stand fast and stop firing, at the same time taking full military precautions. Troops in rear and administrative movement to carry on. 1 Aust Corps to be prepared to meet a Vichy envoy at our outpost on main rd BEIRUT-HAIFA at 0900 hrs 12 Jul. This instruction was repeated to all formations (see Appx V).
- (3) 14 Inf Bde, which was to come under comd 6 Div, commenced to arrive in the DAMASCUS area. 6 Div advised that 14 Inf Bde Group would be available for employment in a defensive role (see Appx W).
- 12 Jul (1) Hostilities ceased at 0001 hrs 12 Jul although sporadic shelling by the French continued for a short period in some sectors where orders had probably not arrived.
- (2) The complete sequence of events leading up to the cessation of hostilities is given in 1 Aust Corps Int Summary No. 22.
- 13 Jul (1) On night 12/13 Jul 14 Inf Bde took over 16 Inf Bde sector in the JEBEL NAZAR area.
- (2) 1 Aust Corps OO No 5 (conditional upon the armistice terms being wholly accepted) was issued covering the method of occupation of SYRIA north of the general line DAMASCUS-BEIRUT by 1 Aust Corps and att tps and giving the initial arrangements for the concentration of French tps for disarmament.



This order contained instructions regarding the re-allotment of certain units and in particular :-

- (a) 23 Inf Bde to revert from Corps control to 6 Div. as from 2400 hrs 14 Jul.
- (b) 5 Ind Inf Bde to come into Corps reserve in QATANA area at the same hour. (see Appx X).
- (2) HABFORCE was placed under comd 1 Aust Corps as from 2400 hrs 14 Jul. (see Appx Y).
- (3) All formations were warned to be ready to resume hostilities in the event of a breakdown of the armistice negotiations. (see Appx Z).

- 14 Jul (1) Message O 828 sent to 7 Aust Div to warn that Vichy French delegate would cross the fwd line of tps at the same place at 0815 hrs 14 Jul. (see Appx AA).
- (2) Message O 3135 received from Force HQ giving the outline of the main points of the armistice convention. (see Appx BB).
- (3) Message O 830 sent to Gen WILSON from Gen BLAKEY urging that in view of the predominance of Australian tps in operations in SYRIA, pride of place be given 1 Aust Corps in any entry into BEYROUTH. (see Appx CC).
- (4) Message O 835 sent to all formations advising them that the armistice was being signed; that OO No. 5 of 13 Jul would operate; and that fwd movement would commence at 1200 hrs 15 Jul. This was consequent on message O 3146 being received from Force HQ. (see Appx DD).
- (5) A recon party left SAFAD at 1400 hrs to select a new site for Corps HQ at ALEY.

15 Jul At 1200 hrs our tps commenced <sup>a general</sup> move northward to occupy the areas allotted in 1 Aust Corps OO No. 5 of 13 Jul.

- 16 Jul (1) Adv HQ 1 Aust Corps left SAFAD and was established at the Grand Hotel, ALEY.
- (2) A ceremonial entry into BEYROUTH was made at 1100 hrs. The following commanders took part in this entry :

Lieut Gen Sir H. Maitland Wilson, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O.  
(GOC in C Allied Forces in P & TJ)

Lieut Gen J.D. Lavarack, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.  
(GOC 1 Aust Corps)

Maj-Gen A.S. Allen, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., V.D.  
(GOC 7 Aust Div)

Maj-Gen Evetts, C.B., C.B.E., M.C.  
(GOC 6 Div)

Gen Catroux  
(Comd Free French Forces In the Middle East).

At approximately 1200 hrs the troops detailed to form the BEYROUTH garrison (2/16 Aust Inf Bn and 'A' Sqn 6 Aust Div Cav Regt) entered the town.

- (3) During the day further movements of Allied tps into SYRIA took place.

*Wells* *W.C.*  
Brig  
GS 1 Aust Corps.



APPENDIX "A"

MESSAGE IN

TO:- MILPAL rtd AJSCORPS AUSFORCE  
FROM:- MIDEAST SD69535 2

para 1 (.). HQ 1 Aust Corps (less 1 Aust Corps signals) will mobilize and come under your orders forthwith to take over OPERATIONAL command exporter on completion 1st phase (.). balance 13 Corps signals now reforming EGYPT and will be despatched PALESTINE earliest possible to come under command CSO Aust Corps as signals for 1 Aust Corps (.). -----

IMMEDIATE.

TOO 1130/2  
System in - Cypher.  
TOR 1840/2

APPENDIX B

MESSAGE IN

TO:- 1 Aust Corps 7 Aust Div 18 Inf Bde 5 Ind Inf Bde  
Free French Div 5 Cav Bde TJFF Arab Legion  
84 L of C Area 85 L of C Area 6 Cav Bde  
HAIFA Fortress LYDDA Area JERUSALEM Area  
AUGBASE MIDEAST HABFORCE Naval Liaison Officer.  
FROM:- MIEPAL 0 2869 17

1 Aust Corps will open at 1100 hrs 18 Jun at present  
location Adv REPORT CENTRE and from that hour will  
take over control of all operations against SYRIA  
except those of HABFORCE.

IMMEDIATE

T00 1300  
THI 1320

Distribution

GOC	OE
BGS	OSO
G	BB
I	SD (2)
A	
Q	

APPENDIX "C"

The following declaration from Gen. Wilson to Gen. Dentz is going on the air now and will be repled at intervals.

BEGINS -

My troops are now on the outskirts of DAMASCUS . I do not wish to cause any damage to that historic city or to its inhabitants . I therefore appeal to you to declare it an open city and to withdraw your troops from it . Otherwise I shall have no alternative but to take such military measures as are found necessary, and the responsibility for any damage which may unfortunately occur to the civil population and to its private and public property will be yours . I am transmitting this message to you by wireless which is my only possible channel of communication. I shall be expecting your answer tomorrow morning at 5.30 am and request you to convey it under flag of truce which will be respected to the nearest allied military post on the DAMASCUS front .

Signed

H. M. Wilson    Gen.

Message recd by phone from

Col Hume for BGS  
GSI KAJU

Recd 2000 hrs, 18 Jun 41

## APPENDIX D

SECRET  
Copy No  
19 Jun 41.

### 1 AUST CORPS OP INSTN NO 21

1. HQ 6 Div will, from the time of receipt of this instruction be responsible for :-

- (a) Defence in area DERAA - EZRA - SHEIKH MISKINE - QUNEITRA - ROSH PINNA
- (b) Control of operations in DAMASCUS Area in co-operation with Comd FFF.

2. Following troops come under Comd 6 Div forthwith :-

- (a) All units of 5 Ind Inf Bde Gp now engaged in operations in DAMASCUS area.
- (b) 85 Base Sub Area with troops under orders OC85 Base Sub Area.
- (c) 2 Queens in QUNEITRA area. This unit is not to be employed beyond QUNEITRA.
- (d) Other units now, in QUNEITRA - ROSH PINNA area, comprising :-

2/3 Aust MG Bn (less 2 Coys)  
One Bty 2 Aust A Tk Regt  
A Fd Arty Unit, designation unspecified  
(either portion of 1 Fd Regt or 60 Fd Regt)  
Now in support of 2 Queens in Quneitra.

3. It is expected following additional troops will be available for 6 Div on 20 Jan :-

One Sqn 9 Aust Div Cav Regt.  
2/5 Aust Inf Bn,

Signed G.W. ELLIOTT Lt-Col for Brig  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

ACK

Time of Signature 1500 hrs

Issued to Sigs

#### DISTRIBUTION

1 Force HQ	9 CCRA
2 6 Div	10 CSO
3 7 Aust Div	11 GOC
4 16 Inf Bde	12 G
5 5 Ind Inf Bde	13 I
6 85 Base Sub Area	14 A
7 Comd FFF	15 Q
8 5 Cav Bde	16 CE
	17 DDST
	18 EDMS
	19-20 File
	21-22 War Diary

APPENDIX "D"

MESSAGE IN

TO:- 1 Aust Corps HQ 16 Inf Bde 84 L of G Area  
85 L of G Area  
FROM:- FORCE HQ PALESTINE & TJ 0/2701 18

Add to 1 AUST CORPS order of battle HQ 16 Inf Bde  
84 L of G Area 85 L of G Area (.) Adv HQ 8 Div  
comes under cmd 1 AUST CORPS 19 June at a time to  
be mutually arranged (.) all informed.

DISTRIBUTION

CORA	Q
CSO	MASS
GOC	AASO
BGS	OE
G	Medical
I	Ord
A	BB
	WD

TOO 1900  
THI 1955

APPENDIX "E"

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS OP INSTN NO 22

Copy No 3

20 Jun 41.

To Comd 6 Div.

1. The latest information available shows that enemy cols were moving NE and westwards from DAMASCUS before 1200 hrs today.

There are indications that these cols may be used to reinforce the MERDJAYOUN area.

2. With the resources now placed at your disposal the early capture of DAMASCUS should be possible.

3. The concentration of this force for the capture of DAMASCUS has denuded the centre and coastal sectors of practically all reserves of infantry.

4. It must be clearly understood that 16 Bde Gp and 2/3 and 2/5 Aust Inf Bns have been placed under your comd for the capture of DAMASCUS and that this formation and these units will be held ready to move elsewhere as soon as the capture of the city has been achieved.

ACK.

*M. Wells*  
Brig.  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Time of signature 1750 hrs

Issued through Sigs

DISTRIBUTION -

Copy No 1	Comd 6 Div
2	File
3 - 4	WD
5	BB

APPENDIX "F"

To: GOC 1 Aust Corps

From: Gen Evatt

JFE/2 20

Information from 5 Inf Bde indicates very heavy fighting in and around MEZZE between the bulk of the bde and approx 20 enemy tanks (.). We are optimistic of success but I wish to point out that should the action go against us the 5 Inf Bde will be seriously depleted in both personnel and material and reduced to approx one Bn (.). Other portion of 5 Inf Bde are just about to start operations to clear front of FF Forces in neighbourhood of AACHRAFRYE is successful FF will probably be in a position to advance towards DAMASCUS (.). I still consider and am supported by GC & L that it is essential to move up the 16 Inf Bde Gpas soon as possible by the QOUNEITRA-DAMASCUS rd (.). hope you have been able to arrange this as any cessation of pressure on our part will in my opinion prejudice the whole success of the operation

Distribution -

T00 1105

I BB  
A WD (2) ✓  
Q

GC - General Gentilhomme  
L - Brig Lloyd

To - Gen Evatt

From 1 Aust Corps

20

Arrangements have been made for Lomax to join you as requested (.). your G1 is acting on this information

(sgd) H.W.  
Lt-Col

IMMEDIATE

T00 1250

Distribution -

I BB  
A WD (2) ✓  
Q

APPENDIX "G"

RECORD OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS

1. Between GOC 1 Aust Corps and Brig Rowell (at HQ 7 Aust Div) at 1120 hrs 20 Jun.

Rang Rowell at Allen's HQ re Evatt's message on subject of 16 Inf Bde and move to DAMASCUS via QOUNEITRA rd. Told him to find out if Allen able hold present positions with aid of KOHR in Reserve pending decision at DAMASCUS. On this depends decision or not to send 16 Inf Bde to DAMASCUS.

Rowell to ring back in few minutes.

2. Between GOC Force and GOC 1 Aust Corps at 1155 hrs 20 Jun.

Catroux has given gloomy picture of Lloyd's difficulties at DAMASCUS. Told him of present posn -

- (i) Message from Evatts asking for 16 Bde and quite confident
- (ii) That I am waiting for assurance from Allen that he can hold on, (in consultation with Rowell at this HQ), and
- (iii) That when I get these assurances I propose to order Lomax to DAMASCUS. Discussed gun posn and informed GOC only one Bty of 4 Pd Regt in action, other having packings attended to. Will be sent up as soon as ready.

3. Between GOC 1 Aust Corps and Brig Rowell (at HQ 7 Aust Div) at 1200 hrs 20 Jun.

Allen's answer satisfactory. Gave orders for move 16 Inf Bde Gp to go on.

4. Between GOC 1 Aust Corps and Col Jennings at 1430 hrs 20 Jun.

Rang Jennings and told him to inform Gen Evatts that present arrangements are designed to carry the opns as far only as the capture of DAMASCUS. Afterwards 16 Bde Gp and 2/3 and 2/5 Aust Bns will be withdrawn to Coastal area.

5. Between GOC 1 Aust Corps and Air Commodore KAJU, 1520 hrs 20 Jun.

Rang Air Commodore's office KAJU to inquire re possibility of ground straffing DAMASCUS BEIRUT Rd where must transport reported. Informed 8 Tomahawks now on the job.

Distribution -

GOC

BC8

BB

WD (2)



## APPENDIX "H"

S E C R E T

1 AUST CORPS OP INSTN No. 23

Copy No. 19

24 Jun, 41.

Ref 1/200,000 DAMAS, SOUEIDA, FIQ HAIFA, BEYROUTH

### 1. FUTURE TASKS

When the tasks laid down for 16 Inf Bde in 6 Div Op Instn No. 3 are completed, the following roles are allotted:

#### (a) 6 Div

Continuation of the advance to ZAFLE with a view to securing RAYAK aerodrome and cutting off the withdrawal of the VICHY FRENCH now in the MERDJAYOUN area.

#### (b) Free French Forces

Security of DAMASCUS against attack from north, NE, east and SE.

Preparation for a further advance northward on HOMS when 6 Div has secured RAYAK.

### 2. L of C

DAMASCUS is opening as an all purpose RH vice DERA A on 25 Jun.

HQ 85 L of C Sub Area will open at DAMASCUS on the same day coming under direct comd 1 Aust Corps on arrival.

3. (a) 85 L of C Sub Area will be responsible from 25 Jun for the defence of DERA A and L of C from incl DERA A to excl DAMASCUS.

(b) Tps now under comd 85 L of C Sub Area will remain available for the tasks given in Paras 3 (a) and 5 (c).

(c) Comd FFF will place at the disposal of 85 L of C Sub Area sufficient tps to guard the L of C from incl RHABARHEB 265287 to excl DAMASCUS.

### 4. RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNAL SECURITY FROM 25 JUN

(a) One Sqn YORKS Dragoon QOUNEITRA reverts to comd 5 Cav Bde from 25 Jun.

(b) Comd FFF as military comd DAMASCUS area is responsible for internal security in DAMASCUS.

(c) Comds of 6 Div, 5 Cav Bde and 85 L of C Sub Area will be responsible for internal security within their areas.

### 5. BOUNDARIES AND AREAS

(a) Rear boundary 6 Div from 25 Jun - incl NAHR EL AOUAJ from excl KISSOU 197156 to incl BEIT JINE 163154.

(b) 5 Cav Bde area is extended to incl MASSAADE 221295 excl BEIT JINE 163154 all incl KHAZARIYE 245299 - RATID 235264 - KHISFINE 227253 - FIQ 216243.

5. BOUNDARIES AND AREAS contd

(c) 85 L of C Sub Area. Area south of 6 Div rear boundary and east of 5 Cav Bde area and to incl the L of C area given in para 3.

6. ADM

Comd 85 L of C Sub Area will be responsible for the local adm of British and Imperial tps in the DAMASCUS Area. Comd 6 Div will co-ordinate with Comd 85 L of C Sub Area all adm arrangements for 6 Div tps in the area.

ACK

Time of signature 16.4.44 hrs.

*H. J. M. J. M. J.*  
Brig  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Issued through Sigs.

Distribution

Force HQ	Copy No. 1
6 Div	2
7 Aust Div	3
Comd FFF	4
5 Cav Bde	5
85 L of C Sub Area	6
CCRA	7
CSO	8
GOC	9
G	10
I	11
A	12
Q	13
CE	14
DDST	15
DDMS	16
File	17 -18
War Diary	19 -20

# APPENDIX "I"

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS OP INSTN NO. 24.

Copy No. 20

Ref: 1/20,000 DAMASCUS, SOUEIDA, FIQ-HAIFA, 28 Jun, 41.  
BEYROUTH.

1. The following formations are placed under comd -
  - (a) 23 Inf Bde under comd 6 Div from 2400 hrs night 30 Jun/1 Jul.
  - (b) 17 Aust Inf Bde under comd 7 Aust Div on arrival in fwd area.
2. 7 Aust Div will concentrate in the JEZZINE and coastal sectors for future operations.
3. Preliminary moves for the concentration of 7 Aust Div will be -
  - (a) Relief of force under comd HQ RAA 7 Aust Div by 23 Inf Bde Gp.
  - (b) Concentration of 17 Aust Inf Bde Gp consisting of
    - HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec and LAD
    - 2/3 and 2/5 Aust Bns
    - 2/2 Aust Pnr. Bn
    - Other tps placed under comd by 7 Aust Div
4. On relief by 23 Inf Bde Gp units will be under comd of 6 Div and 7 Aust Div as shown in appx "A" att.
5. The timetable for the relief by 23 Inf Bde Gp will be in accordance with appx "B" att.
6. SECURITY AND SURPRISE
  - (a) Every possible means will be taken to ensure that 7 Aust Div preparations for the attack remain unknown to the enemy.
  - (b) The reinforcement of DAMASCUS and MERDJAYOUN sectors will be simulated where possible.
  - (c) 6 Div activities on these fronts will be designed to lead the enemy to expect attacks on these sectors.
7. 6 Div responsibility is extended to include the MERDJAYOUN sector from 2400 hrs night 30 Jun/1 Jul.
8. Inter-Div boundary - all incl 6 Div Trig points 1950 1520 18C9 1418 DIRDIYI 1316 and QLEAA 1315 - JAHULA 2028.

ACK

Time of signature 1940 hrs.  
Issued through sigs.

Brig  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Distribution

Force HQ	Copy No. 1	G	Copy No. 11
6 Div	2	I	12
7 Aust Div	3	A	13
Comd FFF	4	Q	14
5 Cav Bde	5	CE	15
23 Inf Bde	6	DDST	16
85 L of C Sub Area	7	DDMS	17
CCRA	8	File	18 - 19
CSO	9	War Diary	20 - 21
GNC	10		

APPENDIX A

Allotment of Units under Comd HQ RAA 7 Aust Div  
on relief by 23 Inf Bde

Unit	Under Comd	Remarks
HQ RAA 7 Aust Div	7 Aust Div	
6 Aust Div Cav Regt	7 Aust Div	
Less A Sqn		
2/5 Aust Fd Regt	7 Aust Div	
One Tp 2/6 Aust Fd Regt	7 Aust Div	
One Tp 5 Aust A Tk Bty	6 Div	
8 Aust A Tk Bty (less 4 guns)	6 Div	
2/9 Aust Fd Coy	7 Aust Div	
Greys Composite Coy	6 Div	
2 KORR	6 Div	To complete 16 Inf Bde
One coy 2/5 Aust Bn	7 Aust Div	To rejoin 2/5 Aust Bn
2/33 Aust Bn	7 Aust Div	To rejoin 25 Aust Bde
A Coy 2/3 Aust MG Bn (less one pl)	6 Div	
One pl B Coy 2/3 Aust MG Bn	7 Aust Div	
2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	7 Aust Div	For 17 Inf Bde Gp
Det Staffs Yeo	6 Div	
Det 25 Bde Comp Coy AASC	7 Aust Div	
B Coy 2/4 Fd Amb	7 " "	

TIME TABLE OF RELIEF BY 23 INF BDE

APPENDIX B

Serial	Date	Unit	From	To	Unit Relieved	Remarks
1	29 Jun	HQ 23 Inf Bde Sig Sec & LAD	Biv Area	Line	HQ RAA 7 Aust Div HQ RAA Sig Sec	
2	29 Jun	4 BORDER Regt	Biv Area	Line	2 KORR	
3	30 Jun	2 KORR	MERDJAYOUN	DAMASCUS	2/3 Aust Bn	
4	30 Jun	1 DLI	Biv Area	Line	2/33 Aust En	Move by daylight in MT
5	Night	2/3 Aust En	DAMASCUS Area	NABATIYE		
	30 Jun/1 Jul			ET TAHTA Area		Move during hrs of darkness
6	1 Jul	11 E. Czechoslovak En	Biv Area	Line	2/2 Aust Pnr En	ET of Serial 3
7	Night	2/5 Aust Bn (less one coy)	DERAA & EZRAA	NABATIYE		
	1 Jul/2 Jul			ET TAHTA Area		Move during hrs of darkness
8		23 Ind Ede Gp Coy RASC	Biv Area	Line	Det 25 Ede Comp Coy RASC	
9		2/9 Aust Fd Regt	Biv Area	Line	2/5 and Tp 2/6 Aust Fd Regts	
10		189 Fd Amb	Biv Area	Line	B Coy 2/4 Fd Amb	
11		2 Fd Coy	Biv Area	Line	2/9 Aust Fd Coy	
12		6 Independent Bde Wkshop	Biv Area	Line		

Notes - (a) Dates for the relief by units in serials 8 - 12 will be as arranged by Comd 23 Inf Bde, but the relief will be completed not later than the night 2/3 Jul.

(b) 7 Aust Div will be responsible for notifying the units remaining under comd 7 Aust Div of the areas they are to lie up in

(c) The reliefs will be so arranged that units remaining under comd 7 Aust Div can move to their lying up areas during the hours of darkness

APPENDIX "J"

1. AUST CORPS OP INSTN No. 25

SECRET

Copy No 4

29 Jun 41.

To Comd 6 Div

1. Confirming conference on 28 Jun 41 between Comds 1 Aust Corps and 6 Div; no variation will be made in the grouping of units between 6 Div and 7 Aust Div as given in 1 Aust Corps Op Instn No. 24.

2. It is emphasized that the immediate relief by 23 Inf Bde Gp of formations and units of 7 Aust Div in the MERDJAYOUN area is designed to facilitate operations by 7 Aust Div for the capture of BEYROUTH.

On completion of the relief, Comd 6 Div is free to vary the dispositions of his tps, as he thinks fit, between DAMASCUS and MERDJAYOUN areas, provided sufficient defensive strength is maintained in the area from which tps are moved.

3. For the immediate present, operations by 6 Div will be limited to those necessary to gain the following objectives :

(a) DAMASCUS area

Sufficient depth to the west to protect DAMASCUS and the DAMASCUS aerodrome.

(b) MERDJAYOUN area

The security of the route from QOUNEITRA to SAIDA against attack from the north.

4. No tps additional to those noted in 1 Aust Corps Op Instn No. 24 will be available to Comd 6 Div for any operation he considers necessary to attain the objectives given in para 3 above.

ACK

*G. Howell* Brig  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Signed at 1300 hrs

Issued by <sup>hand</sup> Sigs <sup>cmr</sup> DR

Distribution

Copy 1	Comd 6 Div
2-3	File
4-5	War Diary

WD  
13  
APPENDIX K

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS OP INSTN NO 26

Copy No 21

29 Jun 41

Ref 1/20,000 BEYROUTH

1. The inter-div boundary given in Para 8 of 1 Aust Corps Op Instn No 24 is cancelled.

The inter-div boundary will be -

All incl 7 Aust Div - EL MALIKIYA 198279 - rd and track  
Junc 130159 - EL AICHIYE 133163 - DARAYA MAZRAAT 137169 -  
JEBEL NIHA 142181 - JEBEL BAROUK 147194 - DAHR EL BAIDAR  
153208 - JEBEL KUISSE 155211

2. ACK

Time of signature 1835 hrs

Issued through Sigs

*H. W. L. L.*  
Brig.  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION -

As per Op Instn No 24

# APPENDIX "L"

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS OPERATION ORDER NO. 3 Copy No. 18

Ref: 1/20,000 DAMAS, SOUEIDA, FIQ HAIFA,  
BEYROUTH.

29 Jun, 41.

1. Moves of units resulting from the relief of the force under cmd of HQ RAA 7 Aust Div by 23 Inf Bde vide 1 Aust Corps Op Instn No. 24, will be in accordance with appx "A" att.

2. Speed will be at the discretion of the OC Convoy for the night movements.

3. All tpt will be supplied by DDST 1 Aust Corps except as follows -

Serial 2 - Will be moved in the vehicles of 5 Res Lt Coy, now under cmd 6 Div.

4. When tps are debussed tpt will return immediately to unit lines and revert to the cmd 1 Aust Corps, except as follows -

(a) Serial 1 - Will be used for Serial 4. 6 Div will hand this tpt over to 85 L of C Sub Area.

(b) Serial 3 - Will be used for Serial 6.

5. 7 Aust Div are establishing Provost control at -

Rd junc TEL HAI 204293  
South and north of METULLA village 2029  
Each end of DEIR MIAESS track  
Bridge at 133157  
NABATIYE ET TAHTA 1216

ACK

Time of signature 1625hrs.

11 iJello 4111  
7.1 Brig  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Issued through sigs.

Distribution

6 Div	Copy No. 1
7 Aust Div	2
23 Inf Bde	3
85 L of C Sub Area	4
CCRA	5
CSC	6
GOC	7
G	8
I	9
A	10
Q	11
CE	12
DDST	13
DIAS	14
File	15- 16
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# APPENDIX A

Issued in conjunction with 1 Aust Corps Operation Order No 3 dated 29 Jun 41

Serial No	Unit	Personnel to be carried	Embussing Point	Route to	Guides to embussing point	Hour and date of embussing	Route	Guides during movement and debussing points	Lights	Remarks
1	KORR	20 480	Rd and track junc 136153 (track not shown on map	Rd junc Kilb 229 south of TEL HAI (204293) rd junc 214295	Guide KORR meets tpt at TEL HAI rd junc 204293	0600 hrs 30 Jun	Track to METULLA - Br JISR BENETT YACOB- QOUNEITRA	6 Div to arrange		Suitable dispersal area for tpt is east of rd at 140152
2	2/3 Aust Bn		6 Div to arrange			night 30 Jun 1 Jul	QOUNEITRA-BANIAS 2129 TEL HAI - track north and south of DEIR MIMESS-DEIR ES ZAHIRANI 1216	(a) 7 Div Pro from BANIAS to br at 133157 (b) 17 Bde to debussing point	Sidelights to METULLA and on track North and South of DEIR MIMESS No lights on main rd after passing METULLA	Move to be completed by 0430 hrs 1 Jul
3	2/33 Aust Bn	23 450	140152	As for Serial 1	Guide from 2/33 meets tpt at TEL HAI rd junc 204293	2100 hrs 30 Jun	Track to METULLA DEIR MIMESS JERME - KAFR HOUN 137173	25 Inf Bde providing	No lights except sidelights on DEIR MIMESS track (b) Moves to JERME during darkness (c) moves again 0430 hrs 1 Jul	
4	2/5 Aust Bn (less one coy)		85 Sub Area to arrange			night 1/2 Jul	SHEIKH MES-KINE thence as for serial 2 to HABBOUCH 1216	as for Serial 2	As for Serial 2	Move to be completed by 0430 hrs 2 Jul

Serial No	Unit	Personnel to be carried	Embussing Point	Route to	Guides to embussing point	Hour and date	Route	Guides during movement and debussing points	Lights	Remarks
5	2/2 Pnr Bn one coy 2/5 Aust Bn	20 590 3 87	Will march to DEIR MIMESS night 1/2 Jul Lie up during 2 Jul Complete march night 2/3 Jul					2/2 Pnr Bn to KAF TIBNIT Coy 2/5 Bn to HABDOUCH	1215 1216	
6	2/14 Aust Bn		Arranged by 25 Inf Bde			0200 hrs 2 Jul	JEEZINE area to SAIDA area	Guides from 21 Bde at EL AULIYA 118182		On completion of Serial 6 tpt returning will move in small gps at 15 mins interval

APPENDIX "M"

SECRET

1. AUST CORPS OP INSTN NO 27

Copy No. 5..

2 Jul 41.

To Comd Free French Forces

1. 1 Aust Corps Op Instn No 23 dated 24 Jun 41 defined the task of the Free French Forces as the security of DAMASCUS against attack from the north, NE, east and SE.
2. While the Corps Comd does not desire unnecessarily to restrict your liberty of action in your interpretation of the above task, he wishes to make it clear that, for the present, he does not approve of any advance in force beyond HEBEK.
3. Reports, as yet unconfirmed, have been received that the enemy may attempt a counter offensive against DAMASCUS. Until this possibility is disposed of, it is essential that portion of your force be available to move in support of 6 Div in the area west of DAMASCUS.

ACK

Signed at            hrs

Brig.  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Issued through Sigs

Distribution -

Copy No 1    Comd FFF  
          2    Comd 6 Div  
          3-4    File  
          5-6    War Diary -

APPENDIX "N"

*War Diary*

1 Aust Corps,  
2 Jul 41.

General Le Gentilhomme  
Comd Free French Forces

Dear General/

Now that the Free French Forces have come under comd of 1 Aust Corps, I feel that it would be advantageous both to yourself and myself if a senior Liaison Officer from my staff were permanently attached to your headquarters.

My BCS discussed this matter today with your Chief of Staff and suggested that Lt-col J.D. Rogers should fill this appointment and that the other British Liaison Officers with you should work under his instructions.

Lt-col Rogers and the other Liaison Officers will keep you posted with all developments on other sectors of the Corps front and will keep me informed concerning the situation in the sector under your comd. They will work in closest co-operation with your own staff.

I trust that this arrangement will be satisfactory to you in which case I suggest that Lt-col Rogers should come to your headquarters on Thursday 3 July.

Yours very truly,

J.D. AAVARACK

APPENDIX O

NOTES ON CONFERENCE

SECRET.

BGS 1 Aust Corps - BGS Force HQ 2 Jul 41

1. BGS Force advised following proposals in regard to employment 5 Cav Bde :-

- (a) Force HQ to arrange for one rifle coy from 6 Aust Div to be moved to TYRE to relieve Sqn N SOMERSET Yeo on L of C duties.
- (b) N SOMERSET Yeo to become available to Comd 6 Div for operations in MERDJAYOUN and DAMASCUS sectors and covering QOUNEITRA.
- (c) Yorkshire Dragoons to move to DERA A area
- (d) Comd 5 Cav Bde to take over L of C defence South of 29 Grid line and east of QOUNEITRA Rd. He would have under him -

TJFF

Scots Greys/Staffs Yeo  
Yorkshire Dragoons

- (e) One Tp 2/1 Aust A Tk Regt to be sent to DERA A direct from GAZA as soon as MT available.
- (f) Cheshire Yeo to be released for return 5 Cav Bde on completion projected operation of 7 Aust Div.
- (g) Boundaries to be adjusted to carry Corps rear boundary up to 29 Grid line. Corps then to cease to be responsible for L of C defence except from ~~Grid~~ 29 Grid line to DAMASCUS.
- (h) 6 Cav Bde to take over internal security duties in Northern Palestine now performed by 5 Cav Bde.

2. No change visualized with HABFORCE. To continue the operations on PALMYRA.

3. No date for arrival 14 Inf Bde Gp.

Distribution-

GOC

G

AQ

BB

WD - 2

APPENDIX "P"

REPORT ON TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

Force Comd rang GOC 1 Aust Corps 0905 hrs 2 Jul 41.


Bn to relieve Greys at DERAA etc will probably 2/2 Aust Bn.  
No transport yet and appear to be short of Brens. Probably  
week before available.

Question of withdrawal of Cheshires -

Recommended to Force Comd this should not be done at present.  
Essential they be left during approach to French posn, at any  
rate, to assist by working up between infantry advances along  
the roads. Force Comd agreed and said proposal was long range  
one, looking forward about three weeks. General idea would  
be for horsed Cav Regts to work as Regts and not divided up  
into smaller packets.

Raised question of possible withdrawal of 1 Fd Regt now with  
6 Div. Recommended no withdrawal during course of present  
operations. Force Comd agreed no withdrawal of troops until  
after operations completed

Distributed by G to -  
GOC BGS G AQ BB WD(2)



Copy No 6 sent to GOC.

## APPENDIX 'Q'

SECRET.

Copy No. 1

5 Jul 41.

OPERATION EXPORTER.

### H.Q. Palestine and Trans-Jordan Operation Instruction No. 55.

#### Information.

1. It has been decided that 5 Cav Bde shall be mobilised. Vehicles and equipment are now arriving.
2. 5 Cav Bde are located as in Appendix "A".

#### Intention.

3. H.Q. 5 Cav Bde (less two Regt) with troops under command as shown in Appendix "B" will operate in the area of the JEBEL DRUZE with a view to liquidating Vichy French Force in that area and protecting the L of C.

#### Method.

#### 4. 5 Cav Bde.

- (a) Will assume operational command in the neighbourhood of DERA'A, and will come direct under orders of H.Q. B.F. in P & T.J.

#### (b) Tasks :-

- (i) To operate so as to contain and eventually liquidate Vichy French resistance in the JEBEL DRUZE area.
- (ii) To protect the L of C, DERA'A - DAMASCUS, northwards within the operational boundary allotted.
- (iii) By operational activity in the JEBEL DRUZE area to prevent the enemy interfering with the HAIFA - BAGHDAD L of C between (incl) MAFRAQ and frontier of TRANS-JORDAN with IRAQ.

#### 5. Boundaries.

The operational boundary between 1 Aust Corps and 5 Cav Bde will be :-

(Ref: map SYRIA 1/200,000).

(All incl. 5 Cav Bde) East and West grid line 29, thence (all excl. 5 Cav Bde) road DAMASCUS - QUNEITRA - JISR BANAT YACQUB.

#### 6. 85 L of C Sub-Area.

- (a) Will cease to have operational responsibility within 5 Cav Bde area (para 5 above).
- (b) Will continue to have administrative responsibility for the working of the L of C as already laid down.

*G. Lefy.*  
*NGS. Sub.*  
*Geo. - JLD*  
*Geo. H*  
*Geo. JLD*  
*BP*

*Dist.*

1.	G	
2.	AG.	
3.	1	
4.	600	
5.	7 Aust Div.	2...../
6.	G.O.C. - BB	
7.	7FF.	

7. North Somerset Yeomanry.

- (a) South North Somerset Yeomanry will be withdrawn forthwith from TYRE under mutual arrangements between 1 Aust Corps and 5 Cav Bde.
- (b) North Somerset Yeomanry will come under command 1 Aust Corps (for 6 Div) on completion of mobilization.
- (c) It is pointed out that N. Som Yeo have no 2nd Line Pot and in consequence their radius of action will be limited. It is intended that N. Som Yeo should operate in the general area QUONEITRA, MERDJAOUTH and Mount EREBOK.

8. Yorkshire Dragoons.

Will move to neighbourhood of DERRA under orders of 5 Cav Bde as soon as commitments of det Yorkshire Dragoons now in neighbourhood of QUONEITRA can be taken over by 6 Div, presumably by N. Som Yeo.

9. Cheshire Yeomanry.

Cheshire Yeo will remain under 1 Aust Corps for the present, but will revert to Comd 5 Cav Bde as soon as opportunity occurs.

10. 6 Cav Bde.

- (a) Will take over from 5 Cav Bde and become responsible for internal security and military control in GALLIES and SAMARIA and that part of HAIFA Civil district which is not under Haifa Fortress Area, and for local administration in these areas.
- (b) Comd 6 Cav Bde will be appointed Military Commander of GALLIES Civil district as well as SAMARIA and that part of HAIFA Civil district not contained in HAIFA FORTRESS area.
- (c) 6 Cav Bde will take over guard duties at MOSH-PINNA now being provided by 5 Cav Bde.
- (d) Staffordshire Yeo, less det with composite mech regt (Greys - Staffordshire Yeo), reverts to command 6 Cav Bde.
- (e) 6 Cav Bde will locate units under command at discretion.

11. Date of above Re-organization.

- (a) The above moves and re-distribution are dependent on rate of mobilization of 5 Cav Bde. 5 Cav Bde will therefore keep all concerned informed of progress in this respect.
- (b) H.Q. 5 Cav Bde will take over Command in DERRA area (as in paras 4 and 5 above) as early as possible, and will give this H.Q. and 1 Aust Corps 24 hours notice of when it will be in a position to do so.
- (c) Arrangements for moves given in paras 7, 8 and 10 will be made mutually between 5 Cav Bde, 1 Aust Corps and 6 Cav Bde, this H.Q. being kept informed.



12. R.A.F.

5 Cav Bde. will submit all requests for air co-operation direct to H.Q. B.F. in P. & T.J.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

Signed 1805 hrs. 2.5.42

Brigadier,  
General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION.

1 Aust Corps.  
Free French Div (through 1. Aust Corps).  
5 Cav Bde.  
6 Cav Bde.  
35 L of C Sub-Area.  
T.J.P.F.  
Adv HABFORCE.  
Desert L of C.  
Haifa Fortress Area.  
Jerusalem Area.  
Lydda Area.  
10 Ind Div.  
G.O.C. in C.  
E.C.S.  
D.A. & Q.M.G.  
A.  
Q.  
G.(I).  
G.(R).  
C.S.O.  
R.E.  
F.A.  
R.A.F.  
G.H.Q., M.E.  
War Diary  
File

Copy No.

1 - 5  
7 - 8  
9 - 11  
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16 - 17  
18 - 22  
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40 - 42  
43 - 44  
45

APPENDIX "A"

Present Locations 5 Cav Bde.

H.Q. 5 Cav Bde.

HAZARETH.

North Somerset Yeomanry

One Sqn.

TYRE.

One Sqn.

HERZLIYON area under 23 Ind Bde.

Remainder.

Northern PALESTINE.

Yorkshire Dragoons.

Area COUNEITRA - ROSE YITTA.

Cheshire Yeomanry.

In SYRIA under Command 7 Arab Div.

continued

APPENDIX "B"  
 UNCLASSIFIED

Force to come under operational Command H.Q. 5 Cav Bde.

Composite Regt Greys & Staffs Yeo.

Now in DERAA Area.

Yorkshire Dragoons.

Now QOUNEITRA Area.

Cheshire Yeo.

At a later date when released  
 by 1 Aust Corps.

T.J.F.F.

Now in DERAA Area.

DRUZE Legion.

Now in BAFRAQ Area.

Tp 2/1 A/T Regt.

Being moved to DERAA Area  
 under orders this H.Q.

One Tp Cheshire Fd Sqn.

Separate orders being issued.

Sec 2 Lt Fd Amb.

Separate orders being issued.

Det Postal Unit.

Separate orders being issued.

4 C.M.V.S.

Separate orders being issued.

## APPENDIX "R"

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS 00 No. 4

Copy No 25

4 Jul 41.

Ref: 1:200,000 DAMAS, BEYROUTH

### INFORMATION

1. PALMYRE surrendered and DEIR EZ-ZOR was captured 3 Jul 41.
2. (a) Tps under comd 6 Div and 7 Aust Div remain under comd  
(b) Additional tps under comd 7 Aust Div from 4 Jul -  
212 Med Bty RA

### INTENTION

3. The capture of BEYROUTH.

### METHOD

4. (a) 7 Aust Div will continue the advance on D1 Day - 6 Jul 41.  
(b) 7 Aust Div will be responsible for the protection of its right flank.

5. - 6 Div will prevent enemy reinforcing the coastal sector by active patrolling and will take advantage of any enemy withdrawal to make ground.

6. Free French Forces will continue their present role of covering DAMASCUS from the north, NE, east and SE and preparing for a further advance.

#### 7. RN

The Royal Navy is supporting 7 Aust Div during the operation as follows -

Prior to D1 Day - Bombardment of enemy posns in the fwd area.

D1 Day - In conjunction with RAA 7 Aust Div by firing a timed programme to the north of 199 Grid line.

#### 8. RAF & RAAF

The RAF and RAAF are supporting 7 Aust Div during the operation as follows :

Prior to D1 Day - Bombing targets selected by 7 Aust Div

D1 Day - (a) Fighter protection over 7 Aust Div gun area

(b) Attacks on comms - particularly those radiating from BEIT ED DINE and BEYROUTH

#### 9. TAC/R and Arty/R

Priority will be given to 7 Aust Div from D - 1 Day.

#### ADM

10. 1 Aust Corps Adm Instrn No 2 dated 3 Jul 41 has been issued separately.

INTERCOMN

11. The location of Battle HQ 1 Aust Corps will be notified later.

12. RAF Tenders

One control and two listening are allotted to 7 Aust Div. Tender from 6 Div will report 7 Aust Div by 1600 hrs 5 Jul.

ACK-

*H. Wells, D. G. C.*  
Brig  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Time of signature 1855 hrs.

Issued through Sigs.

DISTRIBUTION

Force HQ	Copy No 1	CCRA	Copy No. 13
6 Div (copy No 3	2 - 3	CSO	14
passed to 23		GOC	15
Inf Bde.)		G	16
7 Aust Div	4 - 5	I	17
Comd FFF	6	A	18
5 Cav Bde	7	Q	19
84. L of C Sub Area	8	CE	20
85 L of C Sub Area	9	DDST	21
RN	10	DDMS	22
RAF	11-12	File	23-24
		War Diary	25-26

# APPENDIX "S"

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS OP INSTN No 28

Copy No 21

Ref: 1:200,000 DAMAS, BEYROUTH

5 Jul 41.

1. Ref HQ Palestine and Trans Jordan Op Instn No 55 dated 3 Jul 41 issued to 6 Div, 7 Aust Div, FFF. 5 Cav Bde, 85 L of C Sub Area, G, AQ and I.

2. Boundaries will be as follows -

(a) FFF - no alteration

(b) 85 L of C Sub Area - Operational area only  
L of C area from excl DAMASCUS to excl grid line 29.

Comd FFF will place at the disposal of 85 L of C Sub Area sufficient tps to guard this L of C sector.

The date of change to this boundary will be notified when advised by 5 Cav Bde.

(c) 6 Div - Rear boundary - from 6 Jul 41.  
Excl DAMASCUS - excl rd DAMASCUS - RHABARHEB 2628 -  
excl grid line 29 - incl rd JAZSSAA 1715 - QOUNEITRA -  
incl QOUNEITRA - incl BANIAS 2129 excl frontier to  
METULLAH at 135150 - incl TAIBE 198299.

(d) 7 Aust Div - Rear boundary -  
excl R LITANI from inter-div boundary to the coast.

(e) Inter-div boundary - (NOT changed)  
All incl 7 Aust Div - EL MALIKIYA 198279 - rd and track  
junc 130159 - EL AICHIYE 133163 - DARAYA MAZRAAT 137169 -  
JEBEL NIHA 142181 - JEBEL BAROUK 147194 - DAHR EL BAIDAR  
153208 - JEBEL KUISSE 155211

ACK

Brig  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Time of signature 222 hrs

Issued through Sigs

## DISTRIBUTION -

Force HQ	Copy No 1	G	Copy No 11
6 Div	2	I	12
7 Aust Div	3	A	13
Comd FFF	4	Q	14
5 Cav Bde	5	CE	15
		DDST	16
85 L of C Sub Area	7	DDMS	17
CCRA	8	ADOS	18
CSO	9	File	19- 20
GOC	10	War Diary	21- 22

APPENDIX "T"

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS OP INSTN No 29

Copy No 25

8 Jul 41.

Ref - 1:200,000 BEYROUTH

To Comd 7 Aust Div

The following notes are issued in confirmation of the conference between Comd 1 Aust Corps and Comd 7 Aust Div at HQ 7 Aust Div on 8 Jul 41.

1. No further advance is to be attempted until 7 Aust Div has cleared enemy dets from the area now surrounded by 17 and 21 Aust Inf Bdes.

This is to be effected if possible within 24 hrs and in any case within 48 hrs. In this period active patrolling is to be continued to the north and east.

2. As soon as the above task has been completed the advance is to be continued with 17 Aust Inf Bde directed on BEYROUTH and 21 Aust Inf Bde on ALEY 138208 via routes east from DAMOUR and/or EL AATIQA 124197.

3. 25 Aust Inf Bde is to secure BEIT ED DINE 135196

4. Comd 7 Aust Div is to advise as soon as possible the date of the resumption of the advance.

ACK

Time of signature 1320 hrs

Issued through sigs

DISTRIBUTION

As for 1 Aust Corps OO No. 4 dated 4 Jul with ADOS added.

*H. Wells*  
Brig  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

WD

Army Form C3123

# MESSAGE FORM APPENDIX "U"

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS	IN	No. of Groups GR.	OFFICE DATE STAMP 1)
	OUT		

TO EMPY IBGN (Copies to - I BB Duty SO)

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

FROM <u>BECA</u>	Originator's Number <u>0 769</u>	Date <u>9</u>	In Reply to Number
------------------	-------------------------------------	------------------	--------------------

General	DENTAL	has	requested	armistice	to
discuss	cessation	of	hostilities (.)	although	
no	details	yet	available	plenipotentiaries	
under	cover	flag	of	truce	may
approach	forward	posts	from	dawn	to
Jul	(.)	after	verifying	credentials	party
should	be	conducted	under	escort	to

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

Forms C3123/13. Wt. 36189/1798. 1,000x. page 12 /33. B. & S. Ltd. 51-3337.



ARMY FORM C2128

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL  
AND  
INSTRUC-  
TIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups  
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

vicinity	Div	HQ	and	this	HQ
informed	of	arrival	by	clear	the
line	telephone	call			

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

Brig

IMMEDIATE

0930

T.H.I.

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

Forms C2128/13, Wt. 36189/1798, 1,000M. pads. 15 /33, B.S. S. Ltd. 51-5537.

## APPENDIX V

### REPORT ON TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

Conversation - BGS Force - BGS 7 Aust Corps 1955 hrs 11 Jul 41.

1. (a) Message just despatched to you as follows -  
"At 0001 hrs 12 Jul all forward tps will stand fast and stop firing (.) full military precautions will be taken (.) Tps in rear and adm movement will carry on."  
(b) Be prepared meet VICHY envoy 0900 hrs 12 Jul at our outpost on main rd BEYROUTH-HAIFA (.) Envoy should come in under flag of truce (.) Then to be taken to SYDNEY SMITH BARRACKS ACRE to arrive not before 1115 hrs (.)  
(c) BGS stated that he did not know what attitude Foreign Office would take to Gen Dentz's statement that he would only treat with British High Command, but the order in para 1 was intended as a precautionary measure
2. Telephoned message in 1(a) at 2000 hrs to 6 Div (BGS to G1) and asked them to pass to FFF and 85 L of C Sub Area.
3. Telephoned message as in 1(a) and 1(b) above to 7 Aust Div at 2015 hrs.
4. G2(c) to confirm all messages

#### Distribution -

CCRA	G	CE	ADOS
CSO	I	Camp	File
GOC	A	DDST	4D (2)
BGS	Q	DDMS	BB

Army Form C2128

# MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL  
AND  
INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups  
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

V

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

HEMA

FROM

HEMA

Originator's Number

0 791

Date

11

In Reply to Number

at	CCOI	hrs	12	jul	forward
tps	will	stand	fast	and	stop
firing	(.)	full	military	precautions	will
be	taken	(.)	tps	in	rear
and	adm	movements	will	carry	on
(.)	no	fraternization	©	ACK	

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

COT Lt. Col

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR

EMERGENCY OPS  
SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM

IN

READER

SENDER

SYSTEM

OUT

TIME

OUT

READER

SENDER

SYSTEM

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TIME

OUT

READER

SENDER

T.O.R.

ARMY FORM C2128

# MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL  
AND  
INSTRUC-  
TIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups  
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

✓

TO

EMPTY

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

FROM

BECA

Originator's Number

0 792

Date

11

In Reply to Number

at

0001

hrs

12

Jul

forward

tps

will

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fast

and

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(.)

full

military

precautions

will

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taken

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tps

in

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and

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VICTY

envoy

0900

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM

TIME

READER

SENDER

SYSTEM

TIME

READER

SENDER

SYSTEM

TIME

READER

SENDER

T.O.R.

FORM C2128/11, Wt. 26169/1798, 1/000, 1/000, 12/39, B. & S. Ltd. 51-5337.

ARMY FORM C.7123.

## MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL  
AND  
INSTRUC-  
TIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups  
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

V

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

FROM			Originator's Number	Date	In Reply to Number
hrs	12	Jul	at	Australian	outpost
on	rd	KEYROUTH	HAIFA	(.)	envoy
should	cons	in	under	flag	of
truce	(.)	after	verification	of	credentials
envoy	will	be	escorted	under	arrangements
EMPTY	to	SYDNEY	SMITH	DARRACKS	ACRE
to	arrive	NOT	repeat	NOT	before

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY  
ANY MEANS.IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL  
INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE  
SENT IN CIPHER.ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

Signed

Signed

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

Forms C.7123/13, W.L. 34169/1799, 1,000M. pads. 12 / 39. R.A. S. Ltd. 51-5357.

ARMY FORM C-2123.

# MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL  
AND  
INSTRUC-  
TIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.  
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

Y 3

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

1115

hrs

(.)

ACK

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

Lt-Col

HIGHEST IMMEDIATE

2110

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

Form C-2123/13. Wt. 26163/1728. 1,000x. pads. 12 / 29. B.A. S. L/d. 51-5337.

ARMY FORM C.2123

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL  
AND  
INSTRUC-  
TIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups  
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

Y 21

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

IBEW APAD OLUM OSDA

FROM

DECA

Originator's Number

0 793

Date

11

In Reply to Number

at	0001	hrs	12	jul	all
and	tps	will	stand	fast	and
stop	firing	(.)	full	military	precautions
will	be	taken	(.)	tps	in
rear	and	ada	movement	will	carry
on	(.)	to	fraternization	(.)	ACK

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

1st Col

HQST IMMEDIATE

2115

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

Army Form C-2123

MESSAGE FORM APPENDIX W

Serial No.

CALL  
AND  
INSTRUC-  
TIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups  
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

IBEN

FROM

BECA

Originator's Number

0 784

Date

11

In Reply to Number

ref

our

0 747

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(.)

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outside

BECA

area

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY  
ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL  
INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE  
SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1235

SIGNED

SIGNED

Brig

IMMEDIATE

T.H.I.

SYSTEM

IN

TIME

IN

READER

SENDER

SYSTEM

OUT

TIME

OUT

READER

SENDER

SYSTEM

OUT

TIME

OUT

READER

SENDER

T.O.R.



## APPENDIX "X"

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS OO No. 5

Copy No 36

Ref maps - 1:200,000 BEYROUTH and DAMAS  
Diagram att as Appx C.

13 Jul 41.

Note - This order is conditional upon the armistice terms being wholly accepted. Failing such acceptance this order does NOT become operative.

### INFORMATION.

1. An armistice has been arranged with the VICHY FRENCH in SYRIA. The military arrangements for initial concentrations of FRENCH ARMY and AIR FORCE have been issued as Appx A and B.
2. HABFORCE, leaving the det at PALMYRE, is to come under comd 1 Aust Corps and moves to ALEPPO.
3. N Som Yeo and Cheshire Yeo revert to comd 5 Cav Bde at 1200 hrs 15 Jul.
4. (a) BEYROUTH is to form part of 84 L of C Sub Area under adm comd HQ P & TJ.  
(b) DAMASCUS is to remain part of 85 L of C Sub Area under adm comd HQ P & TJ.

### INTENTION

5. 1 Aust Corps and att tps will occupy SYRIA north of general line DAMASCUS - BEYROUTH.

### METHOD

6. Following tps will come under comd 6 Div at 2400 hrs 14 Jul -
  - (a) from HABFORCE - the PALMYRE det.
  - (b) from 7 Aust Div - 23 Inf Bde and att tps; two 4.5 H tps 2/9 Fd Regt
  - (c) from FFF - A sqn 9 Div Cav Regt; one tp 169 Lt Aa Bty; one independent A Tk Tp RA; 239 Fd Bty: this bty is to move to KISWE within 24 hrs of receipt of this order.
7. Following C Tps will come under comd 7 Aust Div at 2400 hrs 14 Jul -
  - (a) 211 Med Bty at ER RAMA
  - (b) HQ & HQ Coy 2/3 MG Bn
8. 5 Ind Inf Bde less Br Bn comes into Corps reserve in present location at 2400 hrs 14 Jul.
9. Two pls E Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn will remain guarding POW at TYRE till further orders. One pl E Coy from LITANI RIVER will rejoin its Coy HQ at ABEY on 16 Jul.
10. Following tps will be placed under comd -
  - (a) Under 84 L of C Sub Area from 1200 hrs 15 Jul -

one bn  
one sqn 6 Div Cav Regt

(b) Under 85 L of C Sub Area -

Br Bn 5 Ind Inf Bde; if this bn is moved away it will be replaced by one bn from 6 Div.

11. Divs will be responsible for the defence and internal security of areas shown on att diagram. They will also be responsible for the custody of VICHY FRENCH tps in the areas.

12. Corps western and southern boundary: all incl JELL ED DIB 136219 - BEIT MERI 138214 - AIN ANOUB 132206 - SOUK EL GHARB 135206 - CHENAYE 144206 - KABB ELIAS 159206 - DARAIYA 197169 - HIJJANE 225156..

13. Interdiv boundaries (in amplification of Appx C.)

(a) Free French. The watershed of ANTI LEBANON south to Corps southern boundary - eastward to HIJJANE - thence NE to north end JEBEL ECH CHARQI - thence westwards, incl QARIATEINE, to the ANTI-LEBANON watershed.

(b) Between 7 Aust Div and HABFORCE and 6 Div. From southern point of TURKISH border southwards along the watersheds both of the main mountain chain west of R ORONTES and of the LEBANON to excl AIN DARA 149205.

(c) Between HABFORCE and 6 Div. An east-west line 10 miles north of HAMA.

14. No moves fwd by fwd tps before 1200 hrs 15 Jul. All other preparations may go on.

15. A Tk minefields and demolition charges will be withdrawn at once. Corps HQ must be told by 2400 hrs 14 Jul of any danger areas NOT cleared by 2100 hrs 14 Jul.

16. The boundaries within which the VICHY FRENCH forces may move and the arrangements for the handing over of arms etc will be issued separately.

ADM

17. Issued separately.

INTERCOMN

18. Adv HQ opens GRAND HOTEL, ALEY, 1200 hrs 16 Jul and closes SAFAD same time.

ACK

*CHM/6/11/10/11/12/13/14/15/16/17/18/19/20/21/22/23/24/25/26/27/28/29/30/31/32/33/34/35/36/37/38/39/40/41/42/43/44/45/46/47/48/49/50/51/52/53/54/55/56/57/58/59/60/61/62/63/64/65/66/67/68/69/70/71/72/73/74/75/76/77/78/79/80/81/82/83/84/85/86/87/88/89/90/91/92/93/94/95/96/97/98/99/100*  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Time of Signature 1800 hrs.

Issued through Sigs

Distribution:

6 Div (Copy No.)	1	Habforce	13	DDMS	26
7 Aust Div	2	5 Cav Bde	14	ADOS	27
23 Inf Bde	3	6 Cav Bde	15	DADOS	28
FFF	4	AL Sec 1 Aust	16	Fay	29
CCR	5	GOC /Corps	17	Fostal	30
CRE Right Sector	6	BGS	18	APL	31
CRE Left Sector	7	G	19-20	Corps Reception Camp	32
CSG	8	I	21	Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps	33
2/3 Aust IG Bn	9	A	22	File	34-35
11 Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn	10	Q	23	War Diary	36-37
84 L of C Sub Area	11	CE	24	Force HQ P & TJ (for infm)	38
85 L of C Sub Area	12	DDST	25	Spare	39-45

APPENDIX A

MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR INITIAL CONCENTRATION OF FRENCH  
ARMY AND AIR FORCE


1. All forward French Troops to be withdrawn from battle positions and concentrated in the main areas detailed in Appendix 'A', by 1200 hrs Tuesday 15 July, 1941, except for the JEBEL DRUZE area and the North Eastern Frontier outposts.
2. All Small Arms, Machine Guns, Mobile Artillery, Armoured Fighting Vehicles and movable warlike stores to be taken to the concentration areas by 1200 hrs Tuesday, 15 July, 1941.
3. Any Ammunition Dumps that cannot be moved from forward areas e.g. Battery positions, to be left under guard until such time as they can be taken over by British Troops. Location of all such dumps to be notified.
4. It is agreed that the supply and maintenance of all French Troops in the concentration area and such guards as they may leave for the safe custody of the dumps referred to in para 3 above, and the guns referred to in para 5 below, will be the responsibility of the French Headquarters. For this specific purpose French Supply Echelons will be permitted to circulate between Supply and Petrol Depots, and the troops they are serving.
5. French Headquarters to furnish a list of all fixed coast and anti-aircraft defences and to be responsible for the safe custody of such defences until delivered over to the British Troops in good order.
6. The transit camp North of BEIRUT to be put in charge of care and maintenance party found by French Headquarters. The number of such care and maintenance party not to exceed 50.
7. The charges to be removed from all roads and bridges prepared for demolition and all booby traps etc. to be dismantled before 1200 hrs 15 July, 1941. Any not removed to be notified.
8. French Headquarters to be permitted reasonable signal facilities for the administration of their troops in the concentration areas.
9. All vehicles required for the maintenance of French Troops in the concentration areas to be provided with special distinguishing marks.
10. French G.H.Q. will be located at TRIPOLI. Representatives of all Branches of the Staff and Services will form a liaison mission to be attached to H.Q., 1 Aust. Corps, ALEY, from 0900 hrs 16 July, 1941.
11. French Headquarters will be responsible, with the troops shown in Appendix 'a' for the maintenance of order in the town of BEIRUT, TRIPOLI, HOMS and ALEPPO until the arrival of British Troops.

APPENDIX B

AREA.	NUMBERS	ACTUAL SITE OF CAMPS
DJOUNIEH	5000.	DJOUNIEH village 1422 - MAAMELTEINE village 1423 - TABARJA 1423.
ALEY 1320    SOFAR 1420	3000.	SOUK-EL-GHARB 1320 - BHAMDOUN village 1420 - BTETER 1320.
KABB ELIAS    1520	2500.	Woods S.E. of village.
ZAHLE    1621.	4000.	Barracks at ABLAH 1721 - To right of main road S.E. of ZAHLE.
HOMS.	3000.	Polish Camp.
ALEPPO.	3000.	Barracks.
TRIPOLI.	2000.	ZGHORTA    1627.
LATAKIA	1200.	Bivouac outside town.
JEBEL DRUZE	1700-1800.	SUWEIDA.
EUPHRATES.	400-500.	To withdraw on ALEPPO.
BEIRUT.	1000.	(To consist of Hospital Supply Units and Transit Camp).
FRENCH H.Q.		G.H.Q. TRIPOLI. Liaison Mission at 1 Aust Corps H.Q., ALEY.

DIAGRAM SHOWING DIV BOUNDRIES IN SYRIA.

(ISSUED WITH 1 Aust Corps OONo 5 dated 13 JUL 41)



Checked for Big GS 1 Aust Corps.

APPENDIX "Y"

MESSAGE IN

TO:- 1 Aust Corps, Habforce 10 Ind Div. rptd Gen IRAQ  
5 Cav Bde, 85 L of C area 84 L of C area.  
FROM:- HQ Pal & TJ NO 03122 13.

at 2400 hrs 14 july Habforce comes under command 1 Aust Corps (.)  
garrison PALMYRA less one cav regt must remain (.) intention is  
that 4 Cav Bde group plus Royals should move ALEPPO area in  
accordance with armistice terms (.) for special reason HQ Habforce  
will remain present location (.) 10 Ind Div will secure by  
occupation of main centre under armistice terms are a exclusive  
KAMECHLI exclusive MEYADIN inclusive river EUPHRATES to TURKISH  
frontier at JERABLUS (.) no move forward before 1200 hrs 15 July  
unless hostilities resumed (.) in every area occupied British  
martial law will be proclaimed (.) ack

Distributed by G on 14 July to:-  
GOC BGS G I A Q CE DDST  
DDMS ADOS WD(2) BB

T00 2025 THI 2050  
System in - 2310 - L  
Reached Ops 2345

ARMY FORM C-212

# MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL  
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IN

APPENDIX Z

No. of Groups  
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

OUT

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

IBEN LMFY AFAD HEMA ONDA GLUM

FROM

ENCA

Originator's Number

0 826

Date

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In Reply to Number

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THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

Signed

Signed

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

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T.O.R.

Form C-212/12, Wt. 26165/1798, 1,000 L. 12/33, B. & S. Ltd. 51-3337.

ARMY FORM C.122.

## MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

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AND  
INSTRUCTIONS

IN

No. of Groups

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

OUT

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

RAF	resources	on	PALESTINE	front	come
direct	under	ACC	(.)	present	indications
are	that	negotiations	are	proceeding	satisfactorily
(.)	ACK				

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

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DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

2225

SIGNED

SIGNED

Lt-Col

IMMEDIATE

T.H.I.

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T.O.R.

Forms C.122/12. W.L. 34169/1798. 1,000M. para. 12. /33. R. &amp; S. Ltd. 51-5537.



ARMY FORM C.2123.

MESSAGE FORM

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IN

APPENDIX "AA"

No. of Groups  
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

OUT

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

KMPY rptd OBDA SHAH

FROM

BECA

Originator's Number

0 828

Date

14

In Reply to Number

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ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
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0640

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IMMEDIATE

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SENDER

T.O.R.

Forms C.2123/13, Wt. 30169/1798, 1/0001, 1-0001, 12/29, B.S. & L.D. 31-3337.

# APPENDIX "BB"

To - 1 Aust Corps

From - MILPAL

0 3135

14

following is precis main points armistice convention (.) full terms follow after signature (.) FIRST (.) the British tps will occupy SYRO LEBANESE territory (.) French forces will be concentrated in selected areas as follows by 1200 hrs 15 July except those in JEJEL DRUZE and North Eastern frontier outposts who will remain for security reasons in garrison until relieved by British tps (.) read (A) Area (B) numbers (C) site for camp (.) (A) DJUNIEH 140227 (B) 5000 (C) DJUNIEH village - MAMELSTEIN village 142230 - TABARJA 140232 (.) (A) ALEY 136207 - SOFAR 147207 (B) 3000 (C) SOUK - EL - JHARB 134206 - BHAM DOUM 143207 - BTETER 136203 (.) (A) KABELIAS 158206 (B) 2500 (C) BARRACKS ABLAH 172214 (.) (A) ZAHLE 1621 (B) 4000 (C) Woods SE of Village to right of main road SE of ZAHLE (.) (A) HOMS (B) 3000 (C) POLISH Camp (.) (A) TRIPOLI (B) 2000 (C) BARRACKS (.) (A) LATTAGUE (B) 1200 (C) Bivouacs outside town (.) (A) JEJEL DRUZE (B) 1800 (C) SOUEIDA (.) (A) EUPHRATES (B) 400 to 500 (C) Withdraw on ALEPPO (.) (A) BEIRUT (B) 1000 (C) To consist of Hospital supply units and Transit Camp (.) FRENCH HQ TRIPOLI Liaison Mission with BECA (.) SECOND (.) At 1200 hrs 15 July Allied Tps will move to occupy certain strategic points (.) THIRD (.) Aircraft Air installations and equipment French or Axis will be handed over intact (.) British Aircraft may land on any landing ground LEBANON and SYRIA (.) FOURTH (.) Full honours war to be accorded (.) French Forces to retire to selected areas taking all arms guns tanks machine guns ammunition moveable stores (.) Gendarmerie to retain arms (.) Officers and OR's permitted retain side arms and rifles but no repeat no ammunition except limited quantity with units and gendarmerie for security reasons (.) All other war material incl transport to be stocked under British control with right take over anything useful (.) FIFTH (.) French military authorities to notify location ammunition dumps and arrange guards until British take over (.) To withdraw charges demolitions booby traps and notify any remaining also minefields sea and land (.) To assist in recovery of arms in hands of civil population (.) SIXTH (.) Executive officials and officials technical services will remain at posts as long as necessary (.) SEVENTH (.) All means of communication fuel stocks public utility services to be handed over intact (.) Sufficient fuel for civil and military transport to be placed at disposal French Command (.) EIGHTH (.) All allied prisoners to be set free forthwith (.) NINTH (.) To ensure public security the occupation of principle localities Syria and Lebanon will be undertaken in accordance with programme which will allow immediate replacement of French by occupying forces (.) TENTH (.) French troops and subjects electing repatriation will be repatriated under British Control (.) ELEVENTH (.) British will not persecute in any way native Syrians and Lebanese in consequence recent hostilities (.) TWELFTH (.) Currency and other means payment in circulation with banks and public authorities to be safeguarded (.) THIRTEENTH (.) Up to time of repatriation French tps remain under French Command (.) FOURTEENTH (.) port installations naval establishments all ships incl British to be handed over intact (.) FIFTEENTH (.) control of implementation by armistice commission sitting at BEIRUT

Distn.

CCRA CSO GOC DGS G I(2) A Q  
CE AASC Medical ORD PRO BB WD(2)

TOO 1415 GMT THI 1445 GMT  
TOR 1900  
System In

Army Form C-2123

# MESSAGE FORM

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IN

APPENDIX CC

OUT

No. of Groups  
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

LAMP

FROM

BECA

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

0 830

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for

General

WILSON

from

General

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reference

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to

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this

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Free

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operations

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ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

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T.H.I.

SYSTEM

TIME

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ARMY FORM C.2123.

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No. of Groups.  
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

I	desire	to	urge	that	pride
of	place	numbers	given	1st	Australian
corps	in	any	entry	into	BEYROUTH
)	am	certain	that	Commonwealth	Government
'l	take	grave	exception	any	procedure
t	does	NOT	ensure	this	

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ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

Teleprinter

Lt-col

IMMEDIATE

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T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

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APPENDIX "D"

To : 1. Aust Corps Adv Hq Habforce Hq 5 Cav Bde Hq 10 Ind Div  
Ft 85 L of C Area

From : Hq Pal & TJ

O 3146

14/7

armistice being signed (.) forward movement in accordance with  
armistice terms to occupy strategic points will commence at 1200  
hrs (1200 hrs) 15 Jul (15 Jul) (.) precise of terms sent to you  
under my immediate signal O/3135 of 14 Jul(2)

ACK

Distn by G on 14 Jul to:-

CCRA CSC GOC BGS G I A

CS AASC Medical G3(Air)

pro 32 (TD)

TCG 1735 GMT THI 2045  
System In  
FOR 2100

APPENDIX "DD"

To : IBEN EMPY HEMA APAD LULO CAMO (E Coy) OSDA GLUM KIMO  
SHAM BONE WEPT rptd LAMP GOC BGS G I A Q CE DDST  
DDMS ADOS DADOS PAY POSTAL APM CCRA CRE Right Sector  
CRE Left Sector CSO 1 Aust Corps Reception Camp FILE WD BB

From : BECA

0 835

14

armistice being signed (.) BECA 00 No 5 of 13 jul operates (.)  
fwd movement will commence at 1200 hrs 15 jul

*H. Wells* Lt-col

IMMEDIATE

T00 2220

HQ 1 AUST CORPS

LIST OF MAPS APP W.D. JUN - JUL 41

Merchofch  
Tell Kalalsh  
Damas Nord  
Tripoli 14 Jun 1/50,000  
Jebail  
Hamidieh  
Tahle  
Beyrouth 5 Jun 41  
Hama Dist  
Kartada  
Rayak  
Nebek Dist  
Qatana  
Halba  
Saïda  
Sir ed Danie  
Batroun  
Rastane  
Jezzene  
Homs - Levant 1/50,000  
(sheet NI-37)  
Zeb dain  
Baalvec  
Damas Sud  
Rachaya-Nord  
Sjera Ablus  
Ressafe  
Seleniye  
Palmyra  
Qariataine  
Gjebel temp  
Hassatche  
Antioche  
Tripoli 31 May, 1/200,000  
Souïda  
Saba-Biar  
Qamichliye-sinjar  
Damas  
Racca  
Bir-sejri  
Beyrouth 1 Jan 41  
Alepp  
Iraq (Syria) 137L Anah  
Qadi L Mier  
Homs May. 41. 1/200,000  
Abou-Kemal  
Fil-Haifa  
Zelaf  
Iraq Syria - 137F Suneisala  
Taulalaaba  
Lattequie - Hama  
Deir-az-Zor  
Qadi L Mier 1/200,000 14 Jun.

*(2nd ed, in actual time)*

SECRET.

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 1

Compiled from information received from  
1200 hrs 20 Jun to 1200 hrs 21 Jun 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

1. GROUND.

Our Operations.

(a) The two main areas of operations have been DAMASCUS and LERDJAYOUN. At DAMASCUS 13 FF Bde with 5 Ind Inf Bde have been attacking. The FF attack on JEBEL-EL-LEB was held up until late on 20 Jun when the Foreign Legion made a successful flank attack on Pt 743 and on SAHIAKA (195165), which enabled 13 FF Bde to advance to QADEI Station. On the left however, 5 Ind Inf Bde moved fwd against opposition to the outskirts of BEZZE where despite vigorous resistance they maintained their position.

(b) In the LERDJAYOUN sector 25 Bde have made several attempts to recapture the town. The attack of 2/25 Bn from the North on 19 Jun was unsuccessful and they were later compelled to withdraw to river line. On the South side our tps occupied a line about two kilos short of KHIAI fort, which was held by enemy. In late afternoon 20 Jun it was found KHIAI was no longer held by enemy and 2/2 Pnr Bn, supported by a IG coy attacked and were able to advance about three kilos.

(c) Elsewhere there has been little change. The enemy forces in SOUEIDA are reported to be surrounded by hostile DRUZE tribesmen. From QOUNEITRA a force has been sent up to help in the attack on DAMASCUS. On the coastal sector our tps have taken very little offensive action pending the fall of DAMASCUS. Our car patrols are on a line near RAS ELBI KOUNES and our inf are consolidating at JABRA.

2. AIR

Our Operations.

At 1300 hrs Tac/R reported 70-80 IT stationary facing H. I. on the DAMASCUS-BEYROUTH rd at 178165. This column was successfully attacked by fighters and by bombers later in the day.

Enemy Operations.

Three enemy fighters attacked one of our Tac/R machines over DAMASCUS. Our machine returned undamaged.

Four enemy bombers attacked tp concentration and rds South of DAMASCUS during the afternoon. Little damage was caused.

3. SUMMARY OF AIR RECORDS.

Tac/R over DAMASCUS between 1500 hrs-1800 hrs report a number of large explosions resembling demolitions, among barrack buildings and supply depots.



At 0730 reports state that 30 IT were observed moving North West on DAMASCUS-BEYROUTH rd at 173107. A further 40 IT was observed parted off the road at 171195. These IT were later attacked by our fighters, but results are not yet to hand.

No movement was observed on the MERDJAYOUN-BAKRA-  
ZAHLE or the MERDJAYOUN-MASDAYA-MASMAA rds. The rds BEYROUTH-  
GADRA and BEYROUTH-MASMAA were likewise free of IT.

On the aerodrome at RAYAK five enemy aircraft were observed. The pilot was unable to state their degree of service-ability.

#### 4. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

Attached Appendix "A" shows enemy Order of Battle.

#### 5. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS.

Attached Appendix "B" shows grouping by sectors and changes.

#### 6. ENEMY ORGANISATION AND EQUIPMENT.

i. It is reported that the enemy have been using incendiary bullets in their low flying MG attacks

ii. From interrogations of PIs it is learnt that the Vichy French are trying to mobilize the civilian population and are commandeering farm tractors to supplement their IT.

iii. Organisation 6 R.L.E. (6th Foreign Legion)

Prior to Dec 40 the 6 R.L.E. consisted of 4 bns each 4 coys each coy 4 pls, the 4th coy in each bn was an MG coy, i.e. (4, 8, 12, 16).

After French campaign 1940 the organization was changed. Nos 4, 8, 12, 16 coys ceased to exist. The 4th Pl in each rifle coy was dissolved and added to the other pls to bring them to strength. A new 4th (MG) Pl per coy took its place, these pls being taken from the old MG coys. Each MG pl has OC Lieut, 20 ORs (plus "Muletiers"- ammunition carriers), four 8 mm HOTCHKISS (1914/15) MGs. Each gun has a crew of five.

*K. A. W. W.*

#### DISTRIBUTION :

Lt-Col  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Force HQ P & TJ	1	CSO	1	HQ 6 Aust Div	1
6 Div	20	G	1	Aust LO, GHQ, ME	1
7 Aust Div	24	I	1	SHQ Melbourne	2
Free French	1	A	1	File	1
84 L of C Area	1	Q	1	War Diary	1
"C" Flt/208 Sqn	1	DDST	1	Spare	1
GOC	1	ADOS	1		
BGS	1	DDIE	1		
CCRA	1	HQ AIF ME	1		
CE	1	HQ AIF BASE AREA	1		
CHE C Tps	1	Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps	1		

1 AUSTRALIAN CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 1

APPENDIX 'A'

VICHY FRENCH ORDER OF BATTLE

From information received up to 1200 hrs 21 Jun 41

1. BEIRUT - DALOUR Area

1/24 R.I.C. Presume moved north from SAIDA  
2/24 R.I.C. " " " " "  
3/24 R.I.C. " " " " "  
2 Bn 6 R.L.E. Moved from BAALBECK 17/6.  
4 Bn 6 R.L.E. " " " " "  
HQ 9 R.T.A.  
1 and 2 Coys 1 Bn 9 R.T.A.  
17 R.F.S. - 2 coys  
2 and 3 btys LE Arty Moved from SAIDA 16/6.  
6 Sqn 4 Spahis " " BEIT EL DINE  
1 Bn Senegalese  
2/6 R.C.A. (incl 15 tanks)  
3qn 8 Spahis - Balance of  
Det 33 Engr Bn  
Det 43 Communication Bn  
4 AA Btys

2. JESSINE Area

2 Coy 1 Bn 6 R.L.E. Left HOMS 14/6.  
3 Coy 1 Bn 6 R.L.E. " " "  
2 Bn 17 R.F.S. (Less 8 Coy casualties) " DAMASCUS 13/6.  
R.L.E. Arty Gp - One Bty  
6 R.C.A. - Some elements

3. LEKDJAYOUR Area

3 Bn 6 R.L.E. From DAMASCUS 17/6.  
1 Bn 16 R.T.F.  
1 and 2 Bns 22 R.T.A. Moved from BEIRUT 18/6.  
Note: 2 Bn KHIAM  
1 B.C.L.  
Det 631 Pioneer Bn.  
Three btys arty

QOUNEIRA Area (Formerly in) Present location unknown.

1 Bn 6 R.L.E. Moved from HOMS 14/6  
1 and 3 Bns 17 R.T.S.  
3 B.D.L.  
60 MEF  
Small group armed cars  
9 tanks (Probably some captured and some knocked out)

5. DAMASCUS Area

HQ 6 R.L.E. Moved from HOMS 14/6  
11 Coy 4 Bn 6 R.L.E.  
HQ 10 North African Half Bde  
5/1 R.T.M.  
6 R.C.A. - possibly one sqn incl 6 A/Tk guns  
Four btys - two 105 mm, two 75 mm  
1 Gp Partizans  
3 Lt Desert Coy  
Three unidentified btys (One probably mountain arty 65 mm)  
Circassian Lt Cav - 16, 18 Sqn, one unidentified sqn  
Portion 7 R.C.A.  
29 R.T.A., 3 Bn, 9, 10 & 11 Coys - 15.6.41

(2)

6.

SOUEIDA - ZARQA AREA

2 Bn 16 R.T.T.  
11 Coy 4 Bn 16 R.T.T.  
5 Coy 1 Bn R.T.T.  
4 Coy 16 R.T.T.  
Gp L.E. Dr (Druse Cav)

Moving east to SOUEIDA 16/6

Six tanks  
Fifteen armd cars

7.

BAALBEK - TRIFOLI AREA

One Bn Colonial I f  
One Bn Syrian Inf  
Two Bns Levant Inf  
Two Btys 1 R.A.L.L.

8.

LATTAKIA - HOLES AREA

1 Coy 1 Bn 6 R.L.E.  
6 " 2 Bn  
Three bns Levant Inf  
1 Armd Car Pl  
One coastal defence bty

Reported left for ?

9.

RAYAK AREA

15 Coy 2 Bn 6 R.L.E. Moved 14/6 from BAALBEK.

10.

JEBEL DRUZE AREA

HQ 3 Bn 9 R.T.A.  
5/1 R.T.I.  
4 Bn 16 R.T.T.  
One Bn 17 R.T.T.  
Druse Cav.

From BEIRUT 13/6

Sqns moving to SOUEIDA.

11.

ALEPPO AREA

HQ 16 R.T.T.  
4 Bn Levant Inf  
4 Sqn Syrian Cav  
One Bty 75 mm.

12.

HALEPPE AREA

15 Coy 4 Bn 6 R.L.E.  
1 Lt Desert Coy.

13.

BEIR-ES-ZOR - ADO METEL AREA

6 B.D.L.  
2 Lt Desert Coy  
2 Lt Mech Unit  
2 Gp Levant Metropolitan arty.

14.

TEL-LOTCHEN AREA

6 B.D.L.  
21, 23, 24, 25, 28 Lt Sqns  
5 Sqn Djezireh Cav.

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 1.

APPENDIX "B"

VICHY FRENCH ORDER OF BATTLE

From information received up to 1200 hrs on 21 Jun 41.

Sector	Inf Bns	Cav horsed	Cav Mech	Arty	+	-	Remarks
BEIRUT-DAI'OUR	7	2	1	2 (fd) 4 (AA)	2 bns	2 sqns (H) 1 sqn (H)	
JEZZINE	2 <sup>1</sup>	Unknown	Probab ly 1 sqn	1 (Fd)			
TERDJAYOUN	5	Unknown	Unknown	3 (Fd)	2 bns		
QOUNEITRA	4	Unknown	Probab ly 1 sqn	Un- known	1 bns		Present lo- cations unknown
DAMASCUS	3	5	Probab- ly 2 sqns	7	1 sqn (H)	1 bty (Fd) 2 Lbs	
SOU'EIDA-EZRAA	2	1	1 <sup>1</sup>	Un- known	2 bns 1 sqn (H)		
BAALBEK-TRIPOLI	4	Unknown	Unknown	2			
LATTAKIA-HOIS	3 <sup>1</sup>	Unknown	1	1 (cstl def)			
RAYAK	1 coy						
JEBEL DRUZE	3	At least one	Unknown	Un- known	2 bns	5 lt sqns	
ALEPPO	1 <sup>1</sup>	1	1	Un- known			
PALESTINE	1 coy	1	Unknown	Un- known			
DEIR-ES-ZOR ABU KEBEL	1	1	1	At least two			
TEL KOTCHEK	1	5 lt sqns 1 ORD					

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 2

Compiled from information received from  
1200 hrs 21 Jun 41 to 1200 hrs 22 Jun 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

NOTE. It is learnt from the BBC 1400 hrs News Service today that hostilities have begun between GERMANY and RUSSIA on a 2000 kilometre front - from FINLAND to the Black Sea.

ITALY declared war on RUSSIA at 1530 hrs this afternoon. Further details not yet available.

1. GROUND.

Our Operations.

(a) DAMASCUS Sector: After severe fighting HEEZE was captured by 5 Ind Bde yesterday and 2/3 Aust Inf Bn was established astride the DAMASCUS road about 198176. The FF forces later entered DAMASCUS itself yesterday and, although there was hand to hand fighting in the barracks area for some time, the whole city and the Citadel was occupied and all resistance ceased by 1800 hrs 21 Jun. The Free French pushed on and now hold BARZE 204180 with patrols further north. The formal entry of Gen GENTIL-HOLME was probably made last night. 16 Inf Bde is now in the AARTOUZ area and a column from QOUNEITRA has moved up along the QOUNEITRA - DAMASCUS road to junction with them.

(b) In the HERDJAYOUN sector there has been little change in the situation. The enemy is constructing field works with wire obstacles east of the town and our arty has shelled the barracks.

(c) Elsewhere the position is static with normal patrol activity only. On the coast our inf are holding a line east of RAS NEBI YOUNES and also astride the road SEBLINA 123188 - EL QUARDANIYE 123187 - JAILIYE 122186.

2. AIR

Our Operations.

IT concentrations NW of DAMASCUS and IT convoys retiring from DAMASCUS were attacked by our fighters and bombers. Tac/R reports at 1800 hrs show that damage was done to the enemy IT.

Enemy Operations.

No enemy activity reported.

*Handwritten:*  
It was made at 1600 hrs 22 Jun 1941  
[Signature]  
23 June 41

(2)

3. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES.

At 1200 hrs 60 IT were reported moving NE through QTAIFE.

Three Tac/Rs reported considerable numbers of IT moving NW along DAMASCUS - BEYROUTH rd especially between DIMAS and HASNAA. Only small numbers of IT were reported moving south along the HASNAA - HASBAYA rd and the ZAHLE - MERDJAYOUN rd. These were believed to be supply IT only.

Total EA destroyed to date by AA fire 7 on 6 Div front and 4 on 7 Aust Div front. These are confirmed crashed aircraft.

4. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS.

A further bn 16 RTT has been identified in the SOUEIDA - EZRAA area. In the LATTAKIA - HOMS area 2 troops of Fd Arty have been located.

Attached Appendix "A" shows enemy Order of Battle. It differs from that sent out with Int Sum No 1 in that identified units have been set out in the following order:- Inf, Cav (Horsed), Cav (Mech), Arty (Fd), Arty (AA), Engrs, Misc.

It is learnt that CHTUARA (161209) is a type of transit camp and that units moving from DAMASCUS and ALEPPO to MERDJAYOUN area have staged the night there.

Casualties to the Foreign Legion in action against our troops have been heavy, one coy having 100 casualties and two other coys have only 20 men left in each.

The morale of those on the coast is low, particularly owing to our heavy Naval bombardment.

In addition PW reports the following defences at KHALDE, south of BEIRUT as at Jan 41. Four cement casemates covering approaches to BEIRUT from the shore as well as trenches on other side of BEIRUT, as precautions against attempted landings. A bty of four 75 mm guns. Guns in front of the electric plant and one 25 mm A/Tk gun between the village and BEIRUT.

5. ENEMY ORGANISATION AND EQUIPMENT.

A summary of the principal features of VICHY tanks encountered by our troops is attached as Appendix "B".

*Kabrus*

DISTRIBUTION :

Force HQ P & TJ	1
6 Div	20
7 Aust Div	24
Free French	1
84 L of C Area	1
"C" Flt 208 Sqn	1
GOC	1
BGS	1
CCRA	1
CE	1
CRE C Tps	1

CSO	1
G	1
I	1
A	1
Q	1
DDST	1
ADOS	1
DDMS	1
HQ AIF IE	1
HQ AIF BASE AREA	1
Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps	1

Lt-Col  
GS 1 Aust Corps

HQ 6 Aust Div	1
Aust LO, GHQ, IE	1
AHQ Melbourne	2
File	1
War Diary	1
Spare	1

# 1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 2

## APPENDIX "A"

### VICH. FRENCH ORDER OF BATTLE

From information received up to 1200 hrs 22 Jun 41

1.

#### BEIRUT - DAMOUR SECTOR

INF	1/24 R.I.C.	Presumed moved north from SAIDA
	2/24 R.I.C.	Presumed moved north of SAIDA
	3/24 R.I.C.	Presumed moved north from SAIDA
	6 L.E. 2 Bn	Moved from BAALLEEK 17/6
	6 L.E. 4 Bn	Less 13 and most of 14 Coys (captured)
	9 R.T.A. HQ	
	9 R.T.A. 1 Bn 1 & 2 Coys	
	17 R.T.S. Two coys	
CAV (Horsed)	4 Spahi 6 Sqn	Moved from BEIT ED DINE
	1 Bn Senegalese	
	8 Spahi - one sqn	Less elements captured
CAV (Mech)	2/6 R.C.A.	
ARTY (Fd)	6 L.E. 2 Bty	Moved from SAIDA 16/6
	6 L.E. 3 Bty	" " "
ARTY (AA)	Four AA Btys	
ENG	33 Eng Bn	Detachment
MISCL	43 Communication Bn	Detachment only

2.

#### JESSINE SECTOR

INF	6 L.E. 1 Bn 2 Coy	Left HOLIS 14/6
	6 L.E. 1 Bn 3 Coy	" " "
	17 R.T.S. 2 Bn	Less casualties sustained by 8 Coy
CAV (Mech)	6 R.C.A. 2 Gp 3 Sqn	
ARTY	6 L.E. - one bty	

3.

#### HERDJAYOUN SECTOR

INF	6 L.E. 3 Bn	Moved from DAMASCUS 17.6
	16 R.T.T. 1 Bn	
	22 R.T.A. 1 Bn	Moved from BEIRUT 18/6
	22 R.T.A. 2 Bn	
	1 B.C.L.	PW reports large percentage has deserted: Unconfirmed
ARTY	Three btys	
MISCL	631 Pioneer Bn	Detachment

8. LATTAKIA - HOLIS SECTOR  
 INF 6 L.E. 1 Bn 1 Coy  
 6 L.E. 2 Bn 6 Coy  
 Three bns Levant Inf?  
 CAV (Mech) One armd car pl  
 ARTY Two AA btys  
 One coastal defence bty
9. RAYAK SECTOR  
 INF 6 L.E. 2 Bn 5 Coy Moved from BAALBEK 14/6
10. JEBEL BRUZE SECTOR  
 INF 9 R.T.A. 3 Bn From BEIRUT 18/6  
 5/1 R.T.M.  
 16 R.T.T. 4 Bn  
 17 R.T.T. - one bn  
 CAV (Horsed) Druse Cav Sqns moving to SOUEIDA
11. ALEPPO SECTOR  
 INF 16 R.T.T. HQ  
 4 B.D.L.  
 CAV (Horsed) 4 Sqn Syrian Cav  
 ARTY One bty 75 mm
12. PALMYRE SECTOR  
 INF 6 L.E. 4 Bn 15 Coy  
 CAV (Horsed) 1 Lt Desert Coy
13. DEIR-ES-ZOR - ABU KEMEL SECTOR  
 INF B.D.L.  
 CAV (Horsed) 2 Lt Desert Coy  
 CAV (Mech) 2 Lt Mech Unit  
 ARTY Bn Levant Metro Arty
14. TEL-KOTCHEK SECTOR  
 INF 8 B.D.L.  
 CAV (Horsed) 21, 23, 24, 25, 28 Lt Sqns  
 Five sqns Djezireh Cav



1 AUSTRALIAN CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 2

APPENDIX "B"

INFORMATION ON FRENCH RENAULT TANKS

M 35 AMR Lt TANK

Weight - 5 tons  
Height - 6'6"  
Length - 12'6"  
Width - 5'3"  
Crew - 2  
Armour basis - .5 inch approx  
One .5" (approx) Heavy LG  
Two light LGs  
Carries 220 rds for heavy and 2250 rds  
light LG  
Speed - 31 mph  
Suspension - 4 bogie wheels  
1 bogie  
2 ind. bogie wheels fore and aft  
Radius - 125 miles  
Ground clearance 1'2"  
Crosses 4 foot 3 inch trench  
Fords 1'8"  
Step 1'8"  
Intercomm: Wireless, Flag, Lamp

R 35 (Light Medium) A squat heavy type tank with powerful  
RENAULT engine

Weight - 12 tons (approx)  
Height - 8'1"  
Length - 13'2"  
Crew - 2  
Armour - On turret 2½" armour plate, on bulge  
immediately below turret 1½" armour  
plate. Remaining armour 2" BUT NOT  
ARMOUR PLATE  
One 1.5" (approx) gun  
One Lt LG (coaxially mounted)  
Carries 100 rds for gun and 2400 rds for Lt LG  
Speed - 12 mph  
Suspension - 5 bogie wheels. Two pairs of  
bogies with scissors articulation.  
One independent bogie wheel.  
Radius - about 90 miles  
Ground clearance - 1'2"  
Crosses 5 feet 3 inch trench  
Fords 2'7"  
Step 2'11"  
Intercomm: Wireless and flag

Notes on R 35

1. Our 25 pdr A.F. will pierce this tank.
2. At long range our 2 pdr A.F. will pierce this tank anywhere below turret and below bulge immediately below turret.
3. If the instruction to fire low is carried out our 2 pdr will stop this tank.
4. At short range (in view of tests against GERMAN 40 mm armour plate) our 2 pdr will penetrate anywhere unless angle of blow is too glancing.
5. Space inside tank very limited - no seat for driver, crew cannot, with any efficiency, be men of over 5'2" in stature.

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 3

Compiled from information received from  
1200 hrs 22 Jun to 1200 hrs 23 Jun 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

1. GROUND

Our Operations

(a) DAMASCUS Sector: FF forces are now well beyond the city. On NE rd they established a post 8 miles out. To the north they successfully attacked an enemy position and now hold the CHARQI Ridge with 5 Inf Bde astride DAMASCUS - BEIRUT rd on their left. 16 Inf Bde are attacking through QATANA northwards. DAMASCUS itself is quiet and the civil administration is being reestablished.

(b) In MERDJAYOUN and JEZZINE sectors our tps are attacking but details are not yet available.

(c) On the coast our inf patrols have been active. The villages of BARJA, BAASSIR, JIYE are reported clear and at CHEHIM a small enemy force was compelled to withdraw. Our arty is now engaging targets in the DAMOUR - BEIT ED DINE line.

2. AIR

Our Operations

On 22 Jun 41 our bombers attacked BEYROUTH harbour with HE bombs. Direct hits were scored on a Vichy destroyer and a merchant vessel alongside the northern mole. The destroyer is believed sunk and the merchant ship was set on fire. Bombs were also dropped on the wharf, but the extent of the resulting damage is unknown. Later another destroyer was attacked with unknown result.

RAF and RAAF fighters carried out a number of offensive sweeps along enemy lines of communication, ground strafing troops and MT particularly along the DAMASCUS - BEYROUTH rd.

Enemy Operations

Enemy aircraft carried out a number of attacks against forces in the PALMYRA area. A number of casualties was caused and some vehicles damaged

3. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES

Tae/Rs timed at 1700 - 1800 hrs 22 Jun and 0830 - 0900 hrs 23 Jun confirm the presence of approximately 100 MT in the DIMAS - JDEIDE (172191) area.

LO 8132  
LO 8131  
LO 8130

A close examination of 150 MT repeatedly reported near JDEIDE (172191) suggests that this is a salvage area and that vehicles parked there are mostly the results of the action of our fighters and bombers during the past week.

Following a report that a large staging camp was sited near CHTUARA (161208) the area was closely examined, but no indication of the reported camp was observed.

Close examinations of the ZAHLE - MERDJAYOUN and MASNAA - HASBAYA routes and the lateral roads connecting them revealed only odd vehicles proceeding North and South.

Low lying cloud prevented a detailed recon in the coastal area where only one small convoy of 10 MT moving south from BEYROUTH was observed.

#### 4. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

From a captured document it would appear that the following units were in the DAMASCUS Sector:

6 L.E. HQ Moved from HOMS 14/6  
6 L.E. 4 Bn 11 Coy  
1 R.T.M. 5 Bn  
29 R.T.A. 3 Bn  
17 R.T.S. 1 Bn  
17 R.T.S. 3 Bn

CAV (Horsed) 1 R.S.M.  
1 Gp Partizans  
3 Lt Desert Coy  
Circassian Lt Cav  
12 Sqn  
13 "  
14 "  
16 "  
18 "  
33 "  
41 "  
42 "

CAV (Mech) 6 R.C.A. Possibly one sqn ?  
inc 6 A/Tk guns  
7 R.C.A. One gp tanks  
1 R.A. M.E.  
13 Bty 65 mm (mountain)  
Probably four unidentified btys

#### 4 (a) ENEMY PLANS

From a reliable source information was received that the Vichy garrison of DAMASCUS had orders to withdraw to BAALBEK.

#### 5. ENEMY DEFENCES

The following information re defences of DAMOUR has been obtained from interrogation of PWs:-

(A) The number of 75 mm arty guns in the DAMOUR area is doubtful. It seems certain however that there are at least four 75 mm guns in DAMOUR area. The 3 GDL (Groupe du Levant) was at SAIDA and it is reported that nine of its twelve guns were damaged at SAIDA. However the gun repair workshops are at BEYROUTH and this bty may have received new guns.

A Tk Guns - 25 mm:-

All roads leading to DAMOUR from the SOUTH and SE are covered by A Tk guns. As all AFV movement is confined to the rds owing to the thickly planted groves on the WEST and steep hills on the right of the COAST RD, attack by AFVs would meet hvy opposition.

TKs and ARMD Cs:-

Approx 7 lt tanks (8 - 10 tons) and 4 armd Cs reported in the DAMOUR area. At present these AFVs are patrolling the rds leading from DAMOUR but could be used against tps in the orange groves as they were used at SAIDA.

Minefields:-

The following pts on the rd DAMOUR - SAIDA are believed to be mined:-

Br over River DAMOUR at 12371969	}	Bridge is made of stone or concrete and including approaches is 120 <sup>x</sup> long. It is 15' above the water level and has two arches. The centre arch contains the demolition charge. The br itself is NOT mined but mines have been laid 100 <sup>x</sup> along rd SOUTH from br & 100 <sup>x</sup> NORTH of br. It is not known whether mines have been laid along the river banks.
Br at 12081915		Mined on br and for 20 <sup>x</sup> North and South. PWs state br not prepared for demolition.
Rd junc 12111920		Mined at rd junc and also for 150 yds along rd BARJA - NEBI YOUNES.
Rd junc 11901882		Rd block covered by fire from JADRA at 11981888 7 Coy of Bn Foreign Legion were ordered to lay mines at this rd junc but it is thought mines have NOT yet been laid.

(B) River DAMOUR:-

This river is about 35 yds wide near the br but wider further EAST.

The water is approx one or two feet deep near the br and becomes even shallower between the br and the coast.

The bed of the river is rocky.

The northern bank of the river is planted with banana trees and the banks on the western side of the br are very low and passable to AFVs. EAST of br the banks become steeper and would not be passable to AFVs.

(C) Naval targets:-

All enemy positions mentioned above are visible from the sea. PW states that the tps are very frightened of NAVAL fire and their morale is very low.

6. GENERAL NOTES

Reports received from both our flanks confirm the fact that EA concentrate their attacks against our arty.

It is reliably reported that General DE VERDILLAC and staff left RAKKA for DEIR EZ ZOR 1800 hrs 21 June. Such a movement seems very difficult to understand considering the position of his forces at this moment.

*M. A. H. is*

Lt-Col  
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION :

Force HQ P & TJ	1	G	1
6 Div	20	SLO	1
7 Aust Div	24	I	1
Free French	1	A	1
84 L of C Area	1	Q	1
"C" Flt 208 Sqn	1	DDST	1
3 Sqn RAAF	1	ADOS	1
57 Lt AA Regt RA	1	DDHS	1
GOC	1	HQ AIF ME	1
BGS	1	HQ AIF BASE AREA	1
CCRA	1	Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps	1
CE	1	HQ 6 Aust Div	1
CRE C Tps	1	Aust LO GHQ ME	1
CSO	1	AHQ Melbourne	2
		File	1
		War Diary	1
		Spare	1

62(0) *He*  
62(0) *He*  
63(0) *He*  
SL 0902  
LO 1 *He*  
LO 1 *He*

SECRET

615  
402/2/6

1. ARAB CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 4

Compiled from information received from  
1200 hrs on 23 Jun to 1200 hrs 24 Jun 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only

1. GROUND

Our Operations

(a) SOUEIDA Area: On the morning of 22 Jun UMI EL OUALAD was successfully attacked by 2 squadrons of TJFF supported by artillery. The garrison consisting of about 100 Druze Cav under a French officer fled to SOUEIDA.

(b) DAMASCUS Sector: The attack by 16 Inf Bde was successful and QATANA was evacuated by the Enemy. The road from QOUNEITRA to DAMASCUS is now open.

(c) MERDJAYOUN Sector: Our troops attacked at 0530 hrs on 23 Jun and the high ground NW of KHAM was captured. Fierce fighting occurred throughout the day for IBELES SAKI. During the night a general enemy evacuation took place. At 0850 hrs 24 June our patrols found IBELES SAKI abandoned and later entered MERDJAYOUN where they encountered only sporadic fire from the Northern outskirts.

(d) JEZZINE Sector: Our troops attacked North of the village but were unable to gain ground. There was active mortar fire and shelling by the enemy throughout the day.

(e) COASTAL Sector: Our patrols were active, but there was no material change in the situation.

2. AIR

Our Operations

RAF fighters attacked buildings and enemy aircraft on the aerodrome at RYAK. 10 aircraft were destroyed with a further 5 unconfirmed. Three RAF machines were lost.

The fort at SOUEIDA was attacked by RAF bombers. Bombs fell in the target area but the extent of the damage caused is unknown.

Fighters of an RAAF squadron destroyed two enemy aircraft on the ground and set fire to a large hangar at EL QUSIER. On the return trip the RAAF machines were attacked by a number of Vichy Dewoitine fighters. Two of the Vichy fighters were shot down and one was damaged, without loss to the RAAF.

ENEMY OPERATIONS

Enemy aircraft continued their attacks against Allied forces near PALMYRA. One of the attacking aircraft was shot down from the ground.

### 3. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES

Strat/R afternoon 23 Jun 41 reported the following:- BEYROUTH Harbour 2 submarines 4 warships and 3 cargo ships. A train of 30 trucks facing south at HOMS. A body of 300 infantry marching south toward RAS BAALBEK and congestion of goods traffic in RAYAK railway yards. Large dumps were observed to the south west of TALIA and 50 new tin huts at EL QUASIR.

Nothing of importance to report from evening Tac/R over coastal area.

Tac/R between 0730 - 0815 hrs 24 Jun 41 reported 80 MT at SABBOURAI 186175 and 30 MT in area of YAAFOUR 181177. These were believed to be Allied MT. Shells were seen bursting on the track at 186179 and 15 large lorries were moving out of this area in a westerly direction. 5 MT facing north were observed on track 181186. No movement was seen between 181186 and BAALBEK. Pilot reported this as very good road, but from ZEBEDANI - BAALBEK there are no areas beside the road suitable for parking MT.

The following roads were reported clear of MT:- BAALBEK to JDITA, JDITA to MERDJAYOUN, MASNAH to HASBAYA.

At RAYAK 4 enemy aircraft were on the landing ground. Visibility was very good and Tac/R was carried out from 2,000 - 2,500 ft.

### 4. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

A new Order of Battle as set out in Appendix "A" is attached hereto. In addition a list of the more common abbreviations of the names of units is attached as Appendix "B".

1/16 R.T.T. formerly in the MERDJAYOUN area has now been identified in the DAMOUR area.

1/9 R.T.A. formerly in the BEIRUT - DAMOUR sector has been identified in the DAMASCUS area.

It is learnt from PWs that there is a large proportion of GERMANS in the Foreign Legion who watch other members to prevent any attempt of desertion or surrender.

NOTE: 1. 9 R.T.A. and 29 R.T.A. are one and the same regiment.  
11. 3/22 R.T.A. = 3 Bn 22 R.T.A.  
3/II R.A.M.L. = 3 Bty II Gp R.A.M.L.  
2/6 R.C.A. = 2 Sqn 6 R.C.A.

### 5. ENEMY DEFENCES

The following additional information re DAMOUR has been received:- HQ said to be situated in house opposite church in DAMOUR. An ammunition dump is located in the grove 124197.

### 6. ENEMY ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

Tests carried out by one of our A/TR Regiments against captured enemy tanks (R 35) show that up to 500 yds penetration by 2 pdrs is 40%, up to 800 yds 10%.

*Robert*  
Lt-Col  
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No 3

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 4

APPENDIX "A"

VICHY FRENCH ORDER OF BATTLE

From information received up to 1200 hrs 24 Jun 41

Areas are in alphabetical order

1. ALEPPO

INF 16 R.T.T. HQ  
4 BDL  
CAV (Horsed) 4 Sqn Syrian Cav  
CAV (Mech) R.C.A. - one sqn  
ARTY 2 R.A.M.L. HQ and HQ Bty  
1/2 R.A.M.L. - One bty 75mm (Horsed?)  
1 Bty 75mm Lorryborne 2/2 R.A.M.L.  
ENG 3/33 Eng Bn  
MISCL 1/43 Communication Bn

2. BAALBEK

INF 2/6 LE 5 Coy  
ARTY 1/1 RAHL One bty 105mm, one bty 65mm

3. BEIRUT - DAMOUR SECTOR

INF 1/24 R.I.C.  
2/24 "  
3/24 "  
2/6 - LE.  
1/16 R.T.T.  
17 R.T.S. - two coys  
3rd Levant 2 Bde HQ  
2 B.C.L.  
3 B.C.L.  
CAV(Horsed) 6/4 Spahi  
8 " onesqn.  
CAV(MECH) 2/6 R.C.A.  
ARTY 6 LE Arty-Regt & 3 Btys.(75mm)  
R.A.C.L. 3 Gp (Coastal Defence) (7 Bty 145mm  
(8 " 164mm  
4 " (A.A.) (10 Bty 75mm  
(11 " 75mm  
14/1 R.A.M.L. 10 Bty (A.A) 25mm  
Lebanese Coastal Defence Bty.(75mm)  
ENG 1/33 Eng Bn  
Special Eng Coy  
" telephone Coy  
MISCL 43 Communication Coy, 3&4 Coys  
631 Pioneer Bn (A detachment only)

DAMASCUS SECTOR

INF 6-LE H.Q.  
4/6 LE 11 Coy  
1 R.T.H.  
1/9 R.T.A.  
3/9 R.T.A.  
1/17 R.T.S.  
3/17 R.T.S.



4. CAV (Horsed) 1 R.S.M.  
1 Gp Partizan 13 Sqn  
3 Lt Desert Coy?  
Circassian Lt Cav  
12 Sqn  
13 "  
14 "  
16 "  
18 "  
33 "  
41 "  
42 "
- CAV (MECH) 6 R.C.A. Probably one sqn including 6 a tk guns  
7 R.C.A. One group of tanks, probably two sqns
- ARTY Gp 1 R.A.M.L. (2 Gp Motorized of three btys 105 mm  
one bty 47 mm A/tk  
13 Bty 65 mm (Mountain)  
16 Bty (A tk) 1 R.A.M.L. (75 mm)  
8 Bty (A.A.) 111/1 R.A.M.L. (75mm Motorized)
- ENG 2/33 Eng Bn  
2/43 Communication Bn  
B.P.I.C. 4 & 6 Coys.
5. DEIR-ES-ZOR-ABU KEMEL
- INF. 6 B.D.L.
- CAV(Horsed) 2 L.A. Desert Coy
- CAV(Mech) 2 L.A. Mech Unit
- ARTY 2/2 R.A.M.L. One bty mixed 65mm & 75 mm Lorryborne
6. HAMA
- INF 7 B.D.L.
7. HOMS
- INF 1/6 LE One Coy  
CAV (Horsed) 2 Sqn Levant Line Cav.  
CAV(Mech) 2 pl spec Armd Cars
8. JESSINE SECTOR.
- INF 1/6 2 & 3 Coys ?  
2/17 R.T.S.
- CAV(MECH) 2/6 R.C.A. 3 sqn
- ARTY 6 LE 1 Bty  
Some unidentified heavy arty
9. LATTAQUIE.
- INF 1st Levant 1/2 Bde H.Q.  
2 B.D.L.  
5 B.D.L.
- CAV (Mech) Spec. pl Armd Cars  
(2/2 R.A.M.L. One Bty 65 mm (Lorryborne)  
ARTY (One Coastal Defence Bty. (2 R.A.M.L. ?)

10

MERDJAYOUN SECTOR

INF.

3/6 LE  
1/22 RTA  
1 BCL

CAV(Mech)

One Sqn. (10/11)

ARTY

Three Btys

MISCCL

631 Pioneer Bn ( A detachment only)

11.

NEBEK

INF.

3 B.D.L.

12.

PALTYRE

INF

4/6 LE 15 Coy

CAV(Horsed)

3 L.A. Desert Coy.

13.

RAYAK-ADLAH

INF

2/6 LE 5 Coy

ARTY

7 Bty 111/1 R.A.H.L. 75mm Motorised AA  
1V/1 R.A.H.L. (25 mm)(11Bty?)  
AA Motorized  
3/1 R.A.H.L. (75 A.A.) Motorized

14.

SOUEIDA

INF

2/16 R.T.T.  
3/16 "  
4/16 " 11 Coy ?  
1/1 R.T.H. 5 Coy ?

CAV (Horsed)

One Sqn

15.

TEL KOTCHEK

INF

8 B.D.L.

CAV (Horsed)

DJEZIREH CAV 21, 23, 24, 25 & 28 Sqns. (L1)

16.

TRIPOLI.

INF

1 B.D.L.

ARTY.

1.2 R.A.H.L. ? One bty 75mm (Horsed)  
Thought to have moved South.  
12 Bty 1V/ R.A.C.L. 75mm AA  
9 Bty 111 R.A.C.L. (Coastal Defence half 90mm  
half 75 mm

1. AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 4

APPENDIX "B"

NOTES AND ABBREVIATIONS

A.C. Anti-tank  
A.M. Automitrailleuses (Armoured cars)  
B.C.C. Bataillon Chars de Combat (Tanks)  
B.C.L. " Chassuers Libanais  
B.D.L. " du Levant  
B.M.T.S. " de marche Tirailleurs Senegalais  
Colonial troops. Troops of the regular French army who spend half their service at stations in France and half in the Colonies.  
C.L.D. Compagnie legere du desert  
C.S.T.L. Commandement superieur des troupes du Levant (Gen Staff)  
D.C.A. Defense contre avion  
E.L.Dj Escadron leger Djezireh (Djezireh Light Cavalry)  
E.L.Dr " " Druse (Druse Light Cavalry)  
E.L.N.S. " " Nord Syrie (North Syrian Light Cavalry)  
E.L.Tch " " Tcherkess (Circassian Light Cavalry)  
Etr Legion Etrangere (Foreign Legion)  
Genie Engineers  
Gp Groupe or Groupement (Sub-division of a regt)  
H.C.F. Haut Commissariat Francais  
Intendence Supply service  
Metropolitan Troops Troops (French and native) belonging to the French Army in France and North Africa.  
Mtn Pack transport  
P.A.R.E.M. Sub Regional workshops  
Partizan Irregular Light cavalry  
Porte Lorry borne (Artillery)  
F.R.R.E.M. Regional workshops  
R.A.C.L. Regiment d'artillerie du Levant  
R.A.L.L. " " metropolitaine du Levant  
R.C.A. " Chassuers d'Afrique. (~~Chassuers d'Afrique~~)  
R.I.C. " d'infanterie coloniale  
R.T.A. " Tirailleurs Algeriens  
R.T.L. " " Marocains  
R.T.S. " " Senegalais  
R.T.T. " " Tunisiens  
S.A. Spahis Algeriens  
S.M. " Marocains  
Sp Troupes speciales. Troops recruited and maintained by local governments, but trained and partly officered by French.  
S.T. Spahis Tunisiens  
T.L. Territoires des Liban  
T.N.S. " Nord Syrie  
Train Transport Corps  
Transmissions. Signals.  
T.S.S. Territoires Sud-Syrie

SECRET

186

1. G.

62(0)  
62(0) NW  
63(0)

1. AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 5

Compiled from information received from  
1200 hrs 24 Jun 41 to 1200 hrs 25 Jun 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

SPECIAL NOTE: Will anybody who has good photographs of operations in CRETE especially those showing parachutists or gliders, either in the air or on the ground, please lend copies to G.S.I.? These will be returned safely within short time. Photographs should be addressed to G.S.I.(a) G.H.Q., Middle East and have a note of the owner's name and address.

1. GROUND

Our Operations

(a) DAMASCUS Area: 16 Inf Bde have moved up through QATANA gap in the face of some opposition and are now astride rd DAMASCUS - BEIRUT 1 kilo SE of DIMAS. They are now meeting MG and arty fire. FF have occupied MAARABA (203182) and QASTAL (240220). RH is being moved to DAMASCUS.

(b) MERDJAYOUN Area: Our attack has been continued. KHEIBE and BMERIQ are in our hands. We hold high ground 1/2 kilo NE of MERDJAYOUN itself. In front of HASBAYA the enemy are reported to be holding line from near BALATE to RACHAYA EL FOKHAR.

(c) At JEZZINE the position is obscure but some fwd tps have been forced to withdraw a short distance by enemy counter-attacks. Enemy are strong in arty and mortars.

(d) In the coast sector there has been considerable offensive patrol activity and our arty with RN have been shelling enemy posns in front of DAMOUR.

2. AIR

Our Operations

Two dive bombing attacks were carried out by RAF bombers against BEIRUT harbour. Direct hits were registered on the jetty on each occasion.

RAYAK aerodrome was again attacked and hits scored on buildings and dumps.

In a raid on the fort at SOUEIDA three direct hits were observed but the extent of damage caused is unknown.

During the day fighters of RAF and RAAF provided protection over units of the fleet and carried out a number of offensive sweeps over the forward areas and enemy aerodromes. No enemy aircraft was encountered.

### ENEMY OPERATIONS

Enemy bombers attacked DAMASCUS 0345 hrs. Extent of the damage caused not yet reported.

No enemy fighter action has been reported during past 24 hrs.

### 3. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES

Strat/R morning 24 Jun 41 reported following. At ALEPPO 5 AC on the aerodrome. 12 trucks in railway yard, but no railway movement. A large number of new wooden huts was observed along the road between ALEPPO and HOMS.

Tac/R between 1500 and 1600 hrs 24 Jun 41 reported the road blown at 14261626 and a road block at 142163. 15 MT well spaced were observed moving North between RACHAYA and MASNAA. The roads MERDJAYOUN to JDITAI and MACHRHARA to RACHAYA were reported clear of any movement.

Considerable numbers of MT were reported dispersed off the DAMASCUS - BEYROUTH road between BARELIAS and SABBOURA. As our own troops were believed to be operating in the DIMAS area at the time it is difficult to say how much of this MT belonged to the enemy and how much to the allied forces.

This morning's Tac/R carried out between 0645 and 0730 hrs over the same area reported NMS HASBAYA area and 10 MT facing North between RACHAYA and MASNAA and 50 MT between MASNAA and DIMAS. For the balance of the area NMS was reported.

A Tac/R at 1715 - 1815 hrs 24 Jun over the route DAMASCUS - EL QARYATEIN (290253) EN NEBK (243231) - DAMASCUS revealed a total of only 8 single MT moving in various directions.

Round DAIROUD and extending SW for 6 miles the pilot saw a line of large circular holes about 20 yds apart; and commencing at 223188 and running due east for approx 6 miles another line of holes was observed. The pilot was unable to suggest for what purpose these holes had been constructed.

### 4. ENEMY INTENTIONS

There are indications that the general immediate plan of the enemy is to fight strong delaying actions on the ANTI- LEBANON and between MERDJAYOUN and RACHAYA EL OUADI while holding his posns from DAMOUR to BEIT ED DINE and in front of JEZZINE.

There is reason to believe that his ultimate intention is to withdraw to the quadrilateral DAMOUR - BEIT ED DINE - CHTUARA - RAS BAALBECK - TRIPOLI and to put all he has into the defence of this line.

### 5. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

9 tanks and 3 armd cars have been captured NW of DAMASCUS. This reduces the number of identified enemy mechanised sqns in the area to 2.

Personalities: It is reported that General BERGERET, the Vichy Air Minister is proceeding to SYRIA to take over command of the Air Forces.

From captured documents and statements of PWs, the following unconfirmed information is promulgated.

4 B.D.L. has moved from ALEPPO to the JEZZINE area.

It seems probable that at least the equivalent of one bn R.I.C. was recently moved from the BEIRUT - DAMOUR sector to the DAMASCUS area.

2/22 and 3/22 R.T.A. now in BEIRUT - DAMOUR sector.

15, 16 and 18 Sqns Tch in DAMOUR sector.

2/9 R.T.A. in MERDJAYOUN sector.

Elements 1 R.S.H. area SOUEIDA.

030249

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 5

Compiled from information received from  
1200 hrs 24 Jun 41 to 1200 hrs 25 Jun 41

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Our Operations

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(c) At JEZZINE the position is obscure but some fwd tps have been forced to withdraw a short distance by enemy counter-attacks. Enemy are strong in arty and mortars.

(d) In the coast sector there has been considerable offensive patrol activity and our arty with RN have been shelling enemy posns in front of DAMOUR.

2. AIR

Our Operations

Two dive bombing attacks were carried out by RAF bombers against BEIRUT harbour. Direct hits were registered on the jetty on each occasion.

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Enemy bombers attacked DAMASCUS 0345 hrs. Extent of the damage caused not yet reported.  
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Considerable numbers of MT were reported dispersed off the DAMASCUS - BEYROUTH road between BARELIAS and SABBOURA. As our own troops were believed to be operating in the DIMAS area at the time it is difficult to say how much of this MT belonged to the enemy and how much to the allied forces.

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A Tac/R at 1715 - 1815 hrs 24 Jun over the route DAMASCUS - EL QARYATEIN (290253) EN NEBK (243231) - DAMASCUS revealed a total of only 8 single MT moving in various directions.

Round DAIROUD and extending SW for 6 miles the pilot saw a line of large circular holes about 20 yds apart; and commencing at 223188 and running due east for approx 6 miles another line of holes was observed. The pilot was unable to suggest for what purpose these holes had been constructed.

### 4. ENEMY INTENTIONS

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There is reason to believe that his ultimate intention is to withdraw to the quadrilateral DAMOUR - BEIT ED DINE - CHTUARA - RAS BAALBECK - TRIPOLI and to put all he has into the defence of this line.

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From captured documents and statements of P.I.s, the following unconfirmed information is promulgated.

4 B.D.L. has moved from ALEPPO to the JEZZINE area.

It seems probable that at least the equivalent of one bn R.I.C. was recently moved from the BEIRUT - DAMOUR sector to the DAMASCUS area.

2/22 and 3/22 R.T.A. now in BEIRUT - DAMOUR sector.

15, 16 and 18 Sqns Tch in DAMOUR sector.

2/9 R.T.A. in MERDJAYOUN sector.

Elements 1 R.S.H. area SOUEIDA.

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 6

Compiled from information received from  
1200 hrs 25 Jun to 1200 hrs 26 Jun 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

1. GROUND

Our Operations

(a) There has been little change in the posn astride rd DAMASCUS - BEIRUT where 16 Inf Bde are meeting strong opposition especially from arty fire. Available evidence indicates that the enemy is prepared to fight a delaying action at least on this line. North of DAMASCUS FFF have occupied SAID NAYA and are moving up rd running HNE. Fwd elements are approaching HEBEK.

(b) Between MERDJAYOUN and HASBAYA our tps have consolidated their gains. The enemy are reported to have moved back from the BALATE - RACHAYA EL FOKHAR posn and are now digging in on a line astride the rd from 140163 SE along fwd slopes to FERDISSE (144160).

(c) At JEZZINE no change has been reported.

(d) On the Coast 21 Aust Inf Bde have pushed fwd and now hold a line just north of KASSOUBA (122194) and offensive patrol activity continues.

2. AIR

Our Operations

Bombers of RAF attacked hostile batteries NW of DIMAS. Bombs landed in the target area but no direct hits were observed.

When on a protective patrol over allied troops at PALMYRA a squadron of RAAF fighters encountered 4 POTEZ 63 bombers. In the ensuing combat 3 of the enemy bombers were shot down in flames and the fourth was last seen with one engine on fire and was steadily losing height.

The same squadron this morning carried out ground strafing attacks on enemy aerodromes. At HOMS 4 aircraft on the ground, a petrol dump, an ammunition dump and a railway truck were destroyed by fire. Other aircraft on the ground were damaged.

KUSSIAR aerodrome was next attacked. Hangars and tents were machine gunned. No aircraft were visible.

At RAYAK 12 aircraft were observed on the ground. It is believed that some of these were dummies, but 3 genuine machines were located and machine gunned.

Near a road junction south of MASNAA 164190 a staff car was attacked and each of the five occupants were hit while running away.

At 160174 5 or 6 MT and 2 armoured cars were attacked. All these vehicles were damaged but none was burnt.

Enemy Operations

Four enemy POTEZ 63 bombers attacked allied troops in the PALMYRA area (see above). No report of damage caused is yet to hand.



### 3. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES

Tac/R carried out between 1845 and 1915 hrs 25 Jun 41 reported 12 HT well spaced between HASBAYA and MASNA. Between 172190 and 182184 -140 HT were observed dispersed off the road. It is believed that between 50 and 70 of these HT are in a salvage area.

### 4. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

A new Order of Battle as set out in Appendix "A" is attached. An agent reports the garrison of SOUEIDA to be 150 Algerians, 10 - 11 Armd Cars, two or three sqns of Druze Cav. This corresponds very nearly with previous information from PWs. Several reports of enemy troops surrendering have been received. At DEIR in the DAMASCUS Sector 100 men of the Vichy Camel Corps crossed over to our side.

In the MERDJAYOUN area 200 Circassians have surrendered. Personalities: General DELHOMME was replaced by General DE VERDILLAC as GOC DAMASCUS a short while ago. General DE VERDILLAC left by plane for ALEPPO on 19 Jun with General ROTTIER who was to be GOC SOUTHERN SYRIA. General ROTTIER's sympathies are virulently anti-British.

### 5. ENEMY ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

Tanks: Ref para 6 of Summary No.4. These remarks should be read in conjunction with the notes at the foot of Appendix "B" to Summary No.2 dealing with R 35 tanks.

Ref para 6 Summary No.5, cancel this para.

Prior to the commencement of hostilities the Vichy French were thought to possess 90 tanks (Model 35 R) equally distributed between 6 RCA and 7 RCA. This was corroborated on two occasions by PWs. However, from information of a more reliable source it would appear that the original total of tanks (model 35 R) in SYRIA was approximately 50. These were distributed as follows :-

6 R.C.A. consisting of two Groups each of two sqns each of two tps with 5 Tks per tp = 40

7 R.C.A. of one sqn only of  
two tps each of 5 Tks = 10  
50

This information agrees with identifications already made and is therefore being accepted.

Of the original total of 50 Tks, 18 are known to have been put out of action or captured by our forces.

This, however, does not include any which may have been incapacitated but still in the hands of the French.

Armd Cars: Each of the abovementioned five sqns is thought to have two recce tps of Armd cars. These recce tps are alleged to be composed of Dodge Armd cars each with a 37 mm gun and a 7.5 mm MG.

In addition there is a group of four independent sqns and two special Pls of Armd cars whose strengths are unknown.

The total number of Armd cars so far disposed of by our forces is 12.

### 6. GENERAL.

During the recent operations in GREECE a moon rise table was found most useful. A table for JULY is attached as Appx "B".

VICHY units are sometimes confused and the task of identification hindered by different names and numbers being given to the same regiment. The most common are -

(a) Levant or Lebanese Spahis. The official name is Chasseurs Libanais (abbreviation C.L.). They are horsed and are not to be confused with the Battalion Chasseurs Libanais, which is an inf unit.

(b) Levant Legion. A name sometimes used by personnel of the Bataillon du Levant (B.D.L.).

*W. A. Smith*  
Lt-Col  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION :

Force HQ P & TJ	1	SLO	1
6 Div	20	I	1
7 Aust Div	24	A	1
Free French	1	Q	1
84 L of C Area	1	DDST	1
"C" Flt 208 Sqn	1	ADOS	1
AILO 11 Sqn RAAF	1	DDIS	1
AILO 3 Sqn RAAF	1	HQ AIF ME	1
57 Lt A. Regt RA.	1	HQ AIF BASE AREA	1
GOC	1	Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps	1
EGS	1	HQ 6 Aust Div	1
CCRA	1	Aust LO GHQ ME	1
CE	1	AHQ Melbourne	2
CRE C Tps	1	File	1
CSO	1	War Diary	1
G	1	Spare	1

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY #06.

APPENDIX A.

# VICHY FRENCH ORDER OF BATTLE

From information received up to 1500 hrs. 26 Jun 41.

Areas are in alphabetical order.

1.    ALEPPO

INF 16 R.T.T. H.Q.

CAV(Horsed) E.L.E.S (Syrian Cav) Four sons

CAV (Hecl) R C.A - one sqn (Thought to have moved to Damascus sector)

ARTY  
2 R.A.H.L. H.Q. and H. Ety  
1/2 R.A.H.L. - one bty 75 mm (Horsed?)  
2/3 R.A.H.L.  
1 Bty 75 mm. Lorryborne  
Unidentified portion thought to have moved  
south, probably to Damascus area.

ENG 3/33 Eng En

DISCL. 1/43 Communicati. En

2. SALE

1/1 R.A.M. One bty 105mm, one bty 65mm

3. BEINUT - DAIQUA SE TOR

INF  
1/24 R.I.C.  
2/24 "  
3/24  
2/6 LB. Less 5 Co at Rayak.  
1/16 R.T.T  
17 R.T.S - two coys - possibly Damascus?  
3rd Levant  $\frac{1}{2}$  Bde HQ  
2 E.C.L.  
3 E.C.L.  
2/22 R.T.A. P. (Unconfirmed)  
3/22 R.T.A. P. "

CAV(Horsed) 5/4 Spahi  
C " o e sgn.

CAV(Hsch) 2/6 H.C.A.

ARTY

6 Lb Arty Regt & 3 Btys (75mm)  
A.A.C L: 3 Gp (Coastal Defence) (7 Bty 145mm)  
(8 " 164mm)  
4 " (A.A.) (10 Bty 75mm)  
(11 " 75mm)  
4/1 R.A.M.L. 10 Bty (A.A.) 25mm.  
Lebanese Coastal Defence Bty (75mm)

ENG 1/33 Eng Bn  
Special Eng Coy  
" Telephone Coy

43 Communication Bn, 3 & 4 Coys  
631 Pioneer Bn (a detachment only)

4. DAMASCUS SECTOR

The exact location of these troops are at present uncertain.

The forces which were defending Damascus have withdrawn west in the general direction road Damascus - Rayak. North in the general direction road Damascus - Homs.

INF. 4/6 LE 11 Coy?  
5/1 R.T.A.  
1/9 R.T.A.  
3/9 R.T.A.  
1/17 R.T.S.  
3/17 R.T.S.  
3/24 R.L.C From Beirut.

CAV( horsed)  
1 R.S.H. (Port-on)  
1 Gp Partizan 13 Sqn.  
Circassian Lt Cav.  
12 sqn  
13 "  
14 "  
18 "  
33 "  
41 "  
42 "

CAV(Mech) 6 R.C.A. Probably one sqn including 6 a/tk guns  
1/7 R.C.A. ~~2 sqn - also possibly 4 Sqn~~

ARTY Gp 1 R.A.H.L. (2 Gp Motorized of three btys 105 mm  
one bty 47 mm A/Tk)  
13 Bty 65 mm (Mountain)  
1 R.A.H.L. 16 Bty (A/Tk) 847mm  
3/1 R.A.H.L. 8 Bty (AA) 75 mm Motorized  
~~Some 400 mm guns~~

ENG 2/33 Eng Bn  
2/43 Communication Bn  
B.P.I.C. 4 & 6 Coys (Indo-Chinese Labour Bn)

MISCL 1/29 Horsed Transport Coy

5. DEIR-EZ-ZOR - ABU KENEL

INF 6 B.D.L.

CAV (Horsed) 2 Lt Desert Coy

CAV (Mech) 2 Lt Mech Unit ?

ARTY 2/2 R.A.H.L. - one bty mixed 65 mm and 75 mm  
Lorryborne

6. HAILA

INF 7 B.D.L.

7. HOMS

INF 1/6 L.E. - one coy

CAV (Horsed) 2 Sqn Levant Line Cav

CAV (Mech) One pl Spec Armd Cars

8. JEZZINE Sector

INF 1/6 LE 2 and 3 Coys (1 Coy at HOMS)  
2/17 R.T.S.  
4 B.D.L. (From ALEPPO - P.M.)

CAV (Mech) 2/6 R.C.A. 3 Sqn  
 ARTY 6 LE 1 Bty  
 Some unidentified med Arty  
 One bty 75 mm (P.W. unconfirmed)  
 Lebanese Htn Bty 65 mm (P.W.)

9. LATTAQUIE

INF 1st Levant 1/2 Bde HQ  
 2 B.D.L.  
 5 B.D.L.

CAV (Mech) Spec pl Armd Cars

ARTY 2/2 R.A.H.L. - one bty 65 mm (Lorryborne)  
 One Coastal Defence bty (2 R.A.H.L. ?)

10. BEINDJAYOUN Sector

INF 2/9 R.T.A. ?  
 3/6 LE  
 1/22 R.T.A.  
 1 B.C.L.  
 2/16 R.T.T. P.W. (Unconfirmed)

CAV (Horsed) 15 Sqn Tchekess (Mostly wounded P.W.)  
 16 " "  
 38 " "

CAV (Mech) One sqn

ARTY Three btys

MSCL 631 Pioneer Bn (A detachment only)

11. NEBEK

INF 3 B.D.L. (Probably moved south)

12. PALMYRE

INF 4/6 LE 15 Coy

13. RAYAK - ABLAH

INF 2/6 LE 5 Coy

ARTY 111/1 R.A.H.L. 7 Bty 75 mm Motorized<sup>AA</sup> and one other  
 similar bty  
 1v/1 R.A.H.L. 25 mm 11 Bty? AA Motorized

14. SOUEIDA

INF 4/16 R.T.T. 11 Coy? (Formerly at EZRAA)  
 5/1 R.T.H. - one coy?  
 1 R.S.H. - one gp

CAV (Horsed) One sqn?

15.

TEL KOTCHEK

INF

3 B.D.L.

CAV(Horsed)

DJEZIREH CAV 21, 24, 25 & 26 Lt sons.

16.

TRIPOLI

INF

1 B.D.L.

ARTY

1/2 R.A.M.L. ? One bty 75mm (Horsed)  
Thought to have moved south  
12 bty 4 R.A.C.L. 75mm A.A. 1 sec  
9 bty 3 R.A.C.L. (Coastal Defence half  
90 half 75mm)

UNPLACED

3/16 R.T.T. has at EZRAA (Prob. Damascus)

RAKKA

23 E.L. bty reported moving from HASLETCHIE  
to RAKKA.

1 AUSTRALIAN CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 6. APPENDIX B.

TIMES OF SUNRISE, SUNSET, MOONRISE AND MOONSET  
IN G.M.T. FOR LATITUDE 32° 30' N, LONGITUDE 35° E

JUNE - JULY 1941

Date Sunrise. Sunset. Moonrise. Moonset. Moon's Phase.

JUNE.

27.	0234	1651	0458	1843
28.	0234	1651	0556	1924
29.	0234	1651	0655	2004
30.	0235	1651	0757	2042

JULY.

1.	0236	1652	0858	2120	First Quarter
2.	0236	1652	1001	2200	
3.	0236	1652	1106	2242	
4.	0236	1652	1211	2328	
5.	0237	1652	1317	----	
6.	0237	1651	1422	0017	Full Moon
7.	0237	1651	1524	0112	
8.	0238	1650	1621	0210	
9.	0239	1650	1714	0312	
10.	0240	1650	1801	0414	
11.	0240	1650	1842	0515	
12.	0241	1650	1920	0615	
13.	0241	1649	1957	0712	Last Quarter.
14.	0243	1649	2030	0809	
15.	0243	1649	2103	0903	
16.	0243	1648	2137	0956	
17.	0244	1648	2212	1049	
18.	0244	1648	2249	1141	
19.	0245	1647	2330	1234	
20.	0246	1646	----	1326	
21.	0246	1646	0014	1417	New Moon.
22.	0247	1645	0102	1507	
23.	0248	1645	0155	1555	
24.	0248	1644	0251	1641	
25.	0249	1644	0348	1723	
26.	0250	1643	0448	1804	
27.	0250	1642	0550	1843	
28.	0251	1642	0652	1922	
29.	0251	1641	0754	2001	
30.	0252	1640	0850	2042	
31.	0253	1639	1002	2126	

Note:- For Palestine Summer Time, add three hours to G.M.T.

SECRET

B.S.  
1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 7

CL  
Compiled from information received from  
1200 hrs 26 Jun to 1200 hrs 27 Jun 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

1. GROUND

Our Operations

(a) Continuous pressure has been maintained on the enemy line astride rd DAMASCUS - BEIRUT and part of JEBEL HAZAR has been seized by 2/2 Aust Inf Bn. It is reported the enemy are preparing to evacuate the whole posn and 16 Inf Bde are therefore pressing their attack. To the North FFF have occupied NEBEK 40 miles NNE of DAMASCUS.

(b) In MERDJAYOUN area attacks by our tps have been driven back to line from which they started and the enemy appears to be holding his present posns in force.

(c) No material change in the JEZZINE sector.

(d) In the Coastal area offensive activity has been continued and 2/16 and 2/27 Bns now hold ES SAADIYATE (122195) and ES SAYAR (123195). Further to the right 2/25 Bn has occupied CHEHIN (127188) and MAZBOUD (127187) after some opposition from tanks and armd cars.

2. AIR

Our Operations

During the night 25/26 bombers of RAF attacked destroyers and the mole in BEYROUTH Harbour. Bombs fell in the target area but results are so far unknown.

On the evening of 26 Jun bombers attacked a petrol dump at TELKALAH. High explosive and incendiary bombs were seen to fall on the dump and railway siding causing a number of large fires.

RAAF fighters again attacked the aerodromes at HOIS, QUSEIR and RYAK. At HOIS 4 fighters, a petrol dump, an ammunition dump and a railway truck were destroyed by fire. A number of LT, a hangar and some huts, were machine gunned at QUSEIR. No aircraft were visible. At RYAK 3 aircraft were machine gunned but no results were observed. LT on the DAMASCUS - BEYROUTH Rd and on the MASNAA - HASBAYA Rd were machine gunned and a number were seen to be damaged considerably. Later the same squadron carried out a fighter patrol over the forward troops, but failed to intercept any enemy aircraft.

RAAF fighters carried out a further attack against RYAK aerodrome and destroyed a further 3 fighters and 1 bomber on the aerodrome. 6 other fighters, 10 bombers, the watch tower and hangars were heavily machine gunned.

As the result of the above operations one RAAF machine was damaged and force landed in our lines. The pilot was unhurt. All other aircraft returned to their base.



## Enemy Operations

Three enemy aircraft machine gunned the DAMASCUS aerodrome at 0545 hrs today. No damage or casualties resulted.

### 3. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES

Tac/R between 1030 and 1130 hrs 27 Jun reported 200-250 MT in area 180185 and 173187.

NMS HASEAYA and BEIT ED DINE areas. - Between LAJOUR and YAROUTI - 3 only HT were observed.

The above indicates no change in the situation since the Tac/R carried out between 1200-1345 hrs on 26 Jun when the report was identical

A Strat/R carried out during the afternoon of 26 Jun located one oil tanker in TRIPOLI harbour and two tankers in BEYROUTH Harbour. These vessels had been previously reported moving South in TURKISH waters.

#### 4. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

No 5 Coy 2/6 LE previously shown in RAYAK is now in the BEIRUT - DAMIOUR Sector. One coy of the 1/6 LE formerly at HOMS has been identified in the JEZZINE Sector (Unconfirmed).

In the IHERDJAYOUN Sector a further 40 CIRCASSIANS have surrendered.

Personalities: It is learnt that General DENTZ was at BEIT ED DINE on the 21 Jun.

## 5. ENEMY ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

In addition to the figures given in yesterday's Summary a further 8 enemy tanks and 7 armd cars have been destroyed.

The totals are now: 26 Tanks and 19 Armd Cars destroyed  
and captured

2 ~~1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840~~

DISTRIBUTION:

Force HQ P & TJ	1	SLO	1
6 Div	20	I	1
7 Aust Div	24	A	1
Free French	1	Q	1
84 L of C Area	1	DDST	1
"C" Flt 208 Sqn	1	ADOS	1
AILO 11 Sqn RAF	1	DDMS	1
AILO 3 Sqn RAAF	1	HQ AIF ME	1
57 Lt AA Regt RA	1	HQ AIF Base Area	1
GOC	1	Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps	1
BGS	1	HQ 6 Aust Div	1
CCRA	1	Aust LO GHQ ME	1
CE	1	AHQ MELBOURNE	2
CRE C Tps	1	File	1
CSO	1	War Diary	1
G	1	Spare	1

B. 5. 9

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 8

Compiled from information received from  
1200 hrs 27 Jun to 1200 hrs 28 Jun 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

WARNING: IRAK PETROLEUM COY'S PLANE

I.P.C. will be using a civil aeroplane along the whole length of pipe line from HAIFA to KIRKUK as from 28 Jun. A description of the plane is as follows: Twin-engined biplane painted silver with red, white and blue stripes on wing tips and on the rudder. It carries civil markings. All troops should be warned to avoid firing on this plane.

Ref: LEVANT: 1/200,000 and 1/50,000 Series.

1. GROUND

Our Operations

(a) DAMASCUS sector. MAZAR front: The report that the enemy was preparing to evacuate his posns astride DAMASCUS - BEIRUT rd on the MAZAR feature proved unfounded. 16 Inf Bde with 2/3 Aust Inf Bn on their left attacked morning 27 Jun and met with initial success, 2/3 Aust Inf Bn capturing the summit 179181. Later the enemy counter-attacked strongly and forced 16 Inf Bde to withdraw to their original defensive line 188184 - 186181 - 182177. It is reported that one coy of 2/3 Aust Inf Bn failed to extricate itself.

(b) To the north FFF still occupy QTAIFE and NEBEK and report NEBEK area clear of enemy.

(c) Elsewhere there has been no change in the situation. Our tps have consolidated on posns previously occupied and there has been intermittent shelling and patrol activity.

2. AIR

Our Operations

RAF bombers twice attacked enemy batteries and MT concentrations West of DAMASCUS. Some hits were observed among the MT but the results of the attacks against the batteries are as yet unknown.

RAF fighters were engaged in protective patrols over the fleet off the Syrian coast.

RAF fighters carried out protective patrols over our bombers West of DAMASCUS on 27 Jun 41.

The same squadron encountered 6 GLEN MARTIN bombers over PALMYRA this morning. All 6 enemy aircraft were shot down in flames without loss to the RAF.

### Enemy Operations

During afternoon 27 Jun 41 an enemy aircraft groundstroffed MT and troops on the coast rd. No casualties have been reported.

### 3. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCE

A Strat/R between 0830-0930 hrs 27 Jun reported 20 enemy aircraft on R.Y.K landing ground (it is possible that most of these are damaged), 12 destroyers and 1 cargo ship in BEYROUTH harbour and 5 made up trains between HOMS and R.Y.K.

One large ship and 5 sea planes in TRIPOLI harbour. N.M.S. at sea as far as CYPRUS.

Tac/R between 0800 and 0845 hrs 28 Jun 41 reported 10 MT dispersed round H.S.B.A.Y.A., a total of 24 MT on H.S.B.A.Y.A. - MESNAD rd proceeding in both directions as single vehicles. 70 MT in area round rd junction 179184 and 60 MT dispersed between 172191 and 174196.

Tac/R between 1100 hrs and 1200 hrs 28 Jun reported the bridge at 12381969 over the DAMOUR river as being badly blown. Road blocks have been placed on north side of river. The balance of the western area was covered by low lying cloud and observation was difficult.

### 4. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

The Bn of 24 R.I.C. which had been reported as having moved from BEIRUT to the DIMASCUS area has been identified in the DIM.S area. It is not however the 3 Bn but the 1 Bn.

Prisoners from this unit state that some time ago 3 Bn was dissolved and incorporated in 1 and 2 Bns. The bulk of 1 Bn being European French personnel and 2 Bn mostly natives. Further they state the Rgt now bears the title Regiment Mixte Colonial (R.M.C.) in lieu of R.I.C. (Regiment Infanterie Colonial). This information has not been confirmed.

It appears that 1 Bn which at the outbreak of hostilities was at TRIPOLI, travelled via BEIRUT to SLIDA where it was engaged in operations for about one week. It was then withdrawn to BEIRUT for a week's rest, after which it proceeded to the DIM.S area in lorries.

Of the three btys 105 mm 2/1 R.A.M.L. reported in DIM.S area only two have definitely been identified. In view of a report from the JEZZINE sector that large calibre shells were being used, it is reasonable to suppose that the third 105 mm bty is in that area.

General: At HOMS the enemy has his main tank depot and repair shops.

Personalities: Col. AMMANDRICH, the enemy tank commander, is regarded by the French as an expert in Mechanical Warfare. It is now reported that General BERGERET (The Vichy Air Minister) has returned to FRANCE.

ERRATUM: Ref Summary No.7, para 1, line 3. "2/2 Aust Inf Bn" should read "2/3 Aust Inf Bn".

*Katrin*  
Lt-Col  
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION: As per Summary No.7

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.9

Compiled from information received from  
1200 hrs 28 Jun to 1200 hrs 29 Jun 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

Ref: Maps - BEIRUT: 1/200,000  
" 1/50,000  
JEZZINE: 1/50,000

SAIDA: 1/50,000  
DAMOUR: 1/25,000

NOTES:

Will all recipients of this Summary who NEED any of the publications listed below, kindly notify GSI HQ 1 Aust Corps as early as possible, stating the number of copies of each ALREADY IN POSSESSION and the number required.

GERMANY

Pocket Notes on Identifications of German Units  
Notes on Enemy Army Identifications, Germany  
Brief Notes on the Organization, Equipment and Tactics of the German Army.  
Periodical Notes on the German Army, Nos 32, 33 and 34 (down to Bns and equivalent)

OTHERS

Notes on the French Army (Down to Brigades and equivalent)  
Manual of Military Intelligence in the Field, Pamphlets Nos 1, 2, 3 and 4 (Down to Bns and equivalent)

1. GROUND

Our Operations

(a) DAMASCUS Sector: On the MAZAR front there has been no marked change in the situation. Our tps still occupy the defensive line indicated yesterday. Enemy arty has shelled the rd junc at 194179 and EA have bombed QATANA and AARTOUZ without much result. Most of the coy of 2/3 Aust Inf Bn who were reported as cut off on the summit of JEBEL MAZAR on 27 Jun have since made their way through to our lines.

(b) To the north FFP still occupy NEBEK and have met enemy forces at DEIR AATIYE (246239).

(c) In the HERDJAYOUN and JEZZINE sectors there has been little change. Our cav patrols have been active and have located the enemy in RACHAYA EL FOKHAR 143158.

(d) In the Coastal sector patrols from 2/16 and 2/27 Bns have gained points of observation on the DAMOUR defences and ~~as a~~ FDL line has been extended through ES SADIYATT and ES SIYAR to EL FESTEQUANIYE and ER REZANIYE. 2/25 Bn have pushed forward and

occupy DARAYA 129189. There has been a marked increase in enemy shell fire in the last 24 hrs. A surprising incident was the move of an enemy horsed cav patrol through MEJDALOUNA 12371848 to JALLIEH 12141854 about 1800 hrs last night. Counter measures were at once taken by 21 Aust Inf Bde but no further reports have yet been received.

## 2. AIR

### Our Operations

On 28 Jun RAF bombers attacked the barracks and stores at PALMYRA. Direct hits were scored on the stores and large fires started. On the return trip direct hits were observed on the railway siding at RAYAK.

An enemy camp in the PALMYRA area was attacked early this morning. Bombs were seen to fall on the target but results are unknown.

Fighters of RAF and RAAF carried out protective patrols over our bombers and units of the fleet without intercepting any enemy aircraft.

### Enemy Operations

In the coastal sector enemy air activity has increased during the past five days. A number of machine gun attacks by low flying aircraft is reported.

At 1230 hrs 28 Jun 5 enemy aircraft attacked QATANA area with incendiary and HE bombs. No casualties resulted.

Sixty bombs were dropped by 5 enemy aircraft which attacked the AARTOUZ (188165) area at 1915 hrs. One officer was killed and one OR wounded. Two of the aircraft believed hit by AA.

At 0530 hrs this morning one DEWOITINE fighter was shot down by AA fire in the DAMASCUS area. The pilot was killed.

## 3. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES

Strat/R during the morning 28 Jun reported 13 fighters 2 light aircraft and one four engined machine on the landing ground at RAS BAALBEK and one small ship in TRIPOLI harbour.

Tac/R 0800 to 0930 hrs this morning reported NMS on the HASBAYA - MASNAA rd and 60 - 70 MT well dispersed round rd junc 179184. There is no fresh digging in the area 179184. No AA was observed.

Tac/R 1100 - 1215 hrs over the coastal area covered following route:-

JEZZINE - BEIT ED DINE - YAROUTI - DAMOUR - BEIT ED DINE - RHARIFE - JADRA - YAROUTI.

15 to 20 trucks were observed moving east at 122188 and 10 MT dispersed 125187. Balance of task NMS.

Visibility during all recces reported very good.

## 4. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

A new C of B is attached as Appendix "A".

Personalities: The commander of the HASBAYA area is Col. ALBOURG who has received instructions to keep on fighting at all costs. It is reported that ALBOURG is keen to remain in the good graces of General DENTZ.

General ARALEOSSE has been inspecting the defences of DAMOUR several times during the last ten days.

- 3 -

5. ENEMY ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

A French officer who recently joined the Free French Forces, was previously with 6 R.C.A. in SYRIA.

He is adamant that at the commencement of operations by us there were 90 model 35R tanks in possession of the Vichy French, 45 with 6 R.C.A. and 45 with 7 R.C.A.

Numerous conflicting reports are continually being received about the original number of tanks of this model, but there seems little reason to doubt the truth of the above statement.

Advice has been received that of the 26 tanks quoted in Summary No. 7 as having been captured or permanently lost to the enemy, 9 which were taken at QATANAH were practically obsolete and only used for training purposes. They were not R 35s.

It is now computed that 26 out of the original 90 35R tanks are in our hands.

There are reasons to believe that of the balance of 55, a number have been damaged and are out of commission.

From the statements of a number of FWs the range of the 81 mm Mortar seems to be approx 2500 yds.

A subsidiary repair workshop for tanks is at ST. ELIE, close to the sea in the BEYROUTH area.

About 150 armoured cars have been built locally. Their armour plate consists of two layers of plate with a layer of wood in between and is said to be effective. About 50 of these cars are armed with a 37 mm gun, the remainder with MGs.

6. ENEMY DEFENCES

Info from FW considered fairly reliable. The following lines of defence in the Coastal Sector have been reported but as yet are unconfirmed:

First Line: DAMOUR  
Second Line: KHALDE  
Third Line: CHOUEIFAT, ALEY, BHAMDOUN

In addition to bridges and roads previously reported mined the following mines have been laid:-

Br at BAAL EL NAAME 12442003. The river under the br is dry at present and mines have been laid in the river bed and also on the br itself. Mines have also been laid in other dry creek beds near the Coast rd where vehicles would be forced to detour by demolition of brs.

The following rds have been mined:-

CHEHIM to MAZBOUD  
AANOUT - CHARIFE - BEIT ED DINE

The mines have been placed across the rd some 10 metres before the barricades from the side of the British front.

There is a bty of 75 mm guns near the NAHR EL KELB, north of BEYROUTH.

There were (12 Jun) three medium guns near the X rds in HASHIYE. These guns were removed on 14 Jun.

Coastal Guns: 2 guns at 2006 on hills east of (BAOUAOCHE) These guns were at ABEY (13102000) on 24 Jun and fired on Royal Navy during their bombardment of DAMOUR. The range was too great and the guns have now been moved to their present posn. These coast defence guns are either 120 mm or 155 mm guns and have an approx range of 12000 yds. This means that they can now fire on any ship 6000 yds from the shore.

At KHALDE there is a big gun which is believed to be 9 metres long and has a range of 20 Kilos. Between KHALDE and DAMOUR there are many MG nests covering the area between the foot of the hills and the coast on both sides of the rd.

There is another big gun north of KHALDE at a place called BIR HASSAN. This gun is as big and has the same range as the KHALDE gun. Between the two big guns there are MG nests all along area on both sides of the road.

did not see pill boxes on the coast but barbed wire was observed all along the coast from BEYROUTH to DAMOUR.

## 7. GENERAL

Several PWs interrogated have been very impressed with the accuracy of our arty fire. One stated that during our attack on MERDJAYOUN on 19 Jun, in the first 20 minutes his coy suffered the following casualties:- one capt., one lieut., two NCOs and 15 ORs killed, 40 odd wounded.

The following information comes from PW or local inhabitants and can be considered reasonably reliable.

There is a petrol store (180 tons) at BAABDA (133212). The store is partly underground and is situated between the sta and the rd BAABDA - HADETH.

Tps are concealed in the gardens of DAMOUR, CHOUEIFAT and KAFA CHIMA. They hope to repeat the tactics followed at SAIDA.

On 16 Jun the Mufti of the LEBANON while trying to persuade Gen DENTZ to declare BEYROUTH an open town pointed out that the French seemed more ready to make a battlefield of BEYROUTH than of PARIS.

British and Australian prisoners are being kept in the quarantine sta near the river at BEYROUTH as a staging post on their way north.

A lot of propaganda about the bad treatment they will receive if they become prisoners is being spread amongst the enemy.

The civilian population of DAMOUR has been evacuated and tps are billeted in the town. Tks, Arm'd Cs and trucks are also in the town and are hidden in side streets.

The following interesting information concerning the Vichy Air Force in SYRIA has been received from an informer:-

Aircraft, mostly of the "Dewoitine" fighter type, are maintained at BAALBECK, larger aircraft being kept at RAYAK. At BAALBECK the number of aircraft very seldom exceeds 20 machines. Fuel for the planes is kept in aluminium painted barrels of 50 gallons each, and hidden in trenches covered with earth on the southern end of the 'drome. The approximate number of barrels is placed at about 175, divided amongst 6 or 7 trenches. The landing ground is divided into two distinct areas by a road or track running across the ground from east to west. The northern end of the ground is used exclusively for dispersed aircraft, and around the benzine at the southern end are MG emplacements. To the southern extremity some 3 kilos from the landing ground, there is a small hill surmounted by about 3 heavy AA guns and about 4 light guns. Due east of these defences at a lower level is a camp occupied by the ground staff personnel. This camp lies north of a small village of some 50 or 60 houses. At a point some 15 kilos north of the landing ground are situated further AA defences, consisting of a similar disposition of guns as that at the southern end. Apart from being sunken emplacements, it appears that NO attempt is made to camouflage their presence. There is another benzine point to the east of the landing ground, lying south of the rd connecting this landing ground with the main BAALBEK rd. Apart from Air Force personnel there does not appear to be any military units in the vicinity. The road to the landing ground leaves the main BAALBEK - HOMS rd at a point about 5 kilos due north of BAALBEK, and then 7 kilos due west.

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.7  
with the addition of 85 Base Sub Area

*Flattis*  
Lt-Col  
GS 1 Aust Corps

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.9

APPENDIX "A"

VICHY-FRENCH ORDER OF BATTLE

From information received up to 1200 hrs 29 Jun 41

Areas are in alphabetical order.

1. ALEPPO

CAV (Horsed) E.L.N.S. (Syrian Cav) - four sqns  
CAV (Mech) R.C.A. - one sqn (Thought to have moved to  
DAMASCUS sector)  
ARTY 2 R.A.M.L. HQ and HQ Bty  
1/2 R.A.H.L. - one bty 75 mm (Horsed?)  
2/2 R.A.H.L.  
1 Bty 75 mm Lorryborne  
Unidentified portion thought to have moved south,  
probably to DAMASCUS area.  
ENG 3/33 Eng Bn  
MISCL 1/43 Communication Bn

2. BAALEBEK

ARTY 1/1 R.A.H.L. - one bty 105 mm, one bty 65 mm

3. BEIRUT - DAMOUR SECTOR

From information received up to 1200 hrs 29 Jun 41

INF 2/24 R.H.C.  
2/6 LE  
1/16 R.T.T.  
17 R.T.S. - two coys - possibly DAMASCUS ?  
3rd Levant 1/2 Bde HQ  
CAV (Horsed) 2 B.C.L. (Syrian Cav) - four sqns  
3 B.C.L.  
CAV (Mech) 2/22 R.T.A. (P.W. - unconfirmed)  
3/22 R.T.A. (P.W. - unconfirmed)  
CAV (Horsed) 6/4 Spahi  
8 Spahi - one sqn  
CAV (Mech) 2/6 R.C.A.  
ARTY 6 LE Arty Regt and three btys 75 mm  
R.A.C.L. 3 Gp (Coastal Defence) - 7 Bty 145 mm  
8 " 164 mm  
ENG 2/13 4 Gp (A.A.) - 10 Bty 75 mm  
11 " 75 mm  
MISCL 4/1 R.A.H.L. 10 Bty (A.A.) 25 mm  
Lebanese Coastal Defence Bty 75 mm  
ENG 1/33 Eng Bn  
ALEX Special Eng Coy  
" Telephone Coy  
MISCL 43 Communication Bn 3 and 4 Coys  
631 Pioneer Bn (A detachment only)



4. DAMASCUS SECTOR

The exact location of these troops is at present uncertain. The forces which were defending DAMASCUS have withdrawn west in the general direction road DAMASCUS - RAYAK. North in the general direction road DAMASCUS - HOMS.

INF (vino 1/56 1st Coy) 1/56 1st Coy

5/4 R.T.A.

1/9 R.T.A.

3/9 R.T.A.

1/17 R.T.S.

3/17 R.T.S.

1/24 R.H.C. from BEIRUT

CAV (Horsed) 1 Gp Partizan 13 Sqn

Circassian Lt Cav

12 Sqn

13 "

14 "

18 "

33 "

41 "

42 "

3/1 R.S.M. - from RAYAK

4 Spahi Regt?

CAV (Mech) 6 R.C.A. - probably one sqn including 6 A/Tk guns  
1/7 R.C.A.

ARTY Gp 1 R.A.H.L. (2 Gp Motorised of two btys 105 mm  
one bty 47 mm A/Tk)  
13 Bty 65 mm (Mountain)  
1 R.A.H.L. 16 Bty (A/Tk) 47 mm  
3/1 R.A.H.L. 8 Bty (AA) 75 mm Motorised

ENG (vino 1/56 1st Coy) 1/56 1st Coy  
2/33 Eng Bn  
2/43 Communication Bn  
B.P.I.C. 4 and 6 Coys (Indo-Chinese Labour Bn)

MISCL 1/29 Horsed Transport Coy

5. DEIR-EZ-ZOR - ABU KEMEL

INF 6 B.D.L.

CAV (Horsed) 2 Lt Desert Coy

CAV (Mech) 2 Lt Mech Unit?

ARTY 2/2 R.A.M.L. - one bty mixed 65 mm and 75 mm  
Lorryborne

6. HAMA

INF 7 B.D.L.

7. HOMS

CAV (Horsed) 2 Sqn Levant Line Cav?

CAV (Mech) One pl Spec Armd Cars

8.

JEZZINE SECTOR

INF 1/6 LE  
2/17 R.T.S.  
4 B.D.L. (From ALEPPO - P.W.)

CAV (Mech) 2/6 R.C.A. 3 Sqn

ARTY 6 LE 1 Bty (75 mm)  
One bty 105 mm  
One bty 75 mm (PW - unconfirmed)  
Lebanese Mtn Bty 65 mm (PW)

9.

LATTAQUIE

INF 2 B.D.L.  
5 B.D.L.

CAV (Mech) Spec pl Armd Cars

ARTY 2/2 R.A.M.L. - one bty 65 mm Lorryborne  
One Coastal Defence bty (2 R.A.M.L. ?)

10.

HERDJAYOUN SECTOR

INF 2/9 R.T.A. ?  
3/6 LE  
1/22 R.T.A.  
1 B.C.L.  
2/16 R.T.T. (PW - unconfirmed)

CAV (Horsed) 15 Sqn Tcherkess (Mostly wounded PW)  
16 " "  
38 " "

CAV (Mech) One sqn ?

ARTY Three btys

MISCL 631 Pioneer Bn (A detachment only)

11.

PALMYRE

INF 4/6 LE 5 Coy

12.

RAKKA

23 E.L.Djz reported moving from HASSETCHE to RAKKA

13.

RAYAK - ABLAH

ARTY iii/1 R.A.M.L. 7 Bty 75 mm Motorised AA and one  
other similar bty  
iv/1 R.A.M.L. 25 mm 11 Bty ? Motorised AA

14.

SOUEIDA

INF 4/16 R.T.T. 11 Coy ? (Formerly at EZRAA)  
1 R.S.M. - one gp

CAV (Horsed) One sqn ?

15.

TEL KOTCHEK

INF

8 B.D.L.

CAV (Horsed) Djezireh Cav 21, 24, 25, 28 Lt Sqns

16.

TRIPOLI

INF

1 B.D.L.

ARTY

1/2 R.A.M.L. ? One bty 75 mm (Horsed)

Thought to have moved south

12 Bty 4 R.A.C.L. 75 mm AA

9 Bty 3 R.A.C.L. (Coastal Defence) half 90 mm  
half 75 mm

UNPLACED

3/16 R.T.T. Was at EZRAA (Probably DAMASCUS)

3 B.D.L.

Copy No. 1 (incl. 14-9)

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.10

Compiled from information received from  
1200 hrs 29 Jun to 1200 hrs 30 Jun 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

Ref: LEVANT: 1/200,000 and 1/50,000 Series

1. GROUND

Our Operations

(a) There has been no appreciable change in the situation on the HAZAR front in the last 24 hrs.

(b) In the Northern Area, where FFF have<sup>d</sup> moved forward about 60 miles with little opposition, the enemy is now fighting back. He has attacked our tps in NEBEK and QTALFE, where he was driven back and there have been minor skirmishes near JAIROUD 244207 and MOUADDAMIYE 255200.

(c) There has been no change in the MERDJAYOUN sector.

(d) North of JEZZINE the enemy withdrew his tps from pts 1284 (13741802) and 1332 (13781806) which have been occupied by our tps despite heavy mortar fire. KHARATT was also captured this morning. The enemy is still holding the high ground north of the WADI NAGRAT about 139181. It is reported the Foreign Legion tps in this sector have been withdrawn to NIHA 13981844.

(e) In the coastal sector our tps have consolidated in yesterday's line and have pushed patrols beyond towards the DAMOUR defences. On the right flank 2/25 Aust Inf Bn have occupied AANOUT 129188. In this area enemy activity has been confined largely to cav and Armd Car patrols and the general tendency is for him to give way before the offensive action of our tps.

2. AIR

Our Operations

Bombers of RAF squadrons attacked barracks and stores at PALMYRA on 29 Jun. Incendiary and high explosive bombs were seen to hit the stores. 10,000 pamphlets were also dropped.

Bombers also attacked the residency at BEIRUT. Bombs were seen to land in the target area. Photographic confirmation of damage is not yet to hand.

Three Dewoitines and two Potez machines attacked an unescorted bomber on a Strat/R over LATTAKIA. The recce was abandoned and our aircraft returned to its base.

During the night 29/30 Jun RAF bombers attacked BEIRUT. Result so far not known.

The HQ of General DENTZ, GOC Vichy French, was attacked by RAF bombers. A considerable number of direct hits was scored.

Fighters of an RAAF squadron escorted the bombers on their raid on PALMYRA and later in the day carried out a ground-strafting attack against enemy aircraft on the aerodrome at QUSEIR. Four Glen Martin bombers were set on fire and destroyed; and one large multi engined monoplane was severely damaged. On the return trip another Glen Martin was intercepted west of QUSEIR. On sighting our fighters the enemy bomber turned west and was eventually shot down into the sea some miles off BEIRUT.

#### Enemy Operations

No enemy air activity has been reported during the past 24 hrs.

### 3. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES

Tac/Rs carried out between 0815 and 0900 hrs; and 1000 to 1100 hrs indicate no changes in location since yesterday.

The pilot who carried out No.1 Sortie over the DAMASCUS front reported that gun positions in the area of 176183 appear to have been heavily shelled since yesterday, but was unable to state amount of actual damage caused.

No.2 Sortie carried out over the area YAROUTI - KHALDE - BARELIAS - JEZZINE revealed a total of 12 single MT only. The pilot reported "very quiet indeed" in the coastal sector, but added that the country from DAMOUR area to BEYROUTH was such that it provided for maximum concealment for MT and men.

4. An account of ENEMY air activity at TOBRUK Fortress is attached as Appendix "A". This is a reprint of an appendix to a GHQ Summary.

### 5. ENEMY ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

One report has been received that the Germans are replacing the turrets of about 400 captured French R-35 tanks with a roofless armoured box shield built in rectangular sections. The thickness of the armour is 25 mm in front, 20 mm at the sides and 15 mm in the rear. The tanks formerly had an armour basis of 40 mm cast steel. The armament consists of one MG and one SKODA 47 mm A/Tk gun with a travers. of 50°. This gun may possibly be the same as that mounted on the German Armoured Chassis MK 1b.

Numbers of each type of German tank have been knocked out in LIBIA and in GREECE by a variety of methods, and penetration performances of BRITISH weapons against these tanks are very good indeed. As usual the myth of German invincibility of material, when submitted to the cold light of engineering fact, makes a sorry exhibition.

When a diary of a German tank officer was captured in the Western Desert many interesting sidelights on German psychology were observed. This officer expressed great annoyance at the Imperial Troops opposing him; he much preferred tank engagements where the enemy retreat in full flight giving the German Armoured formations a good opportunity to operate their favourite outflanking tactics.

### 6. GENERAL

It is reported that the DRUZE Sheikhs are endeavouring to co-operate with the BRITISH forces, this follows many instances of DRUZE soldiers deserting to our side. The Vichy French are trying to counter this by sending armed terrorists round the villages as well as patrols led by French officers. Col BOUVIER

(who is Area Commandant of the JEDEL DRUSE) called a meeting of all DRUZE Sheikhs on 27 Jun in an endeavour to stop this disintegration of his levies.

On account of frequent losses caused by BRITISH fighters, the Germans have ordered that trips by single vehicles across country will only be undertaken when absolutely necessary. The second driver or other man will always be in position as lookout. As soon as an enemy aircraft is recognized the vehicle will stop and the personnel will disperse.

*Handwritten:*  
p./Lt-Col  
GS 1 Aust Corps

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1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.10

APPENDIX "A"

Appendix "A" to G.S.I., G.H.Q., M.E.  
Daily Intelligence Summary No.401  
dated 25.6.41.

ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY AT TOBRUK FORTRESS

(Based on accounts from observers recently returned)

1. TACTICS OF DIVE BOMBERS

The usual number of dive bombers employed on raids has been thirty to forty, with an escort of about ten Messerschmitt 109. The enemy has used either JU.88 or JU.87. The JU.88 generally dive bomb at an angle of 50 to 60 degrees; the JU.87 have always dived at 70 to 80 degrees. Formations have always approached at a height of about 17000 to 14000 feet from the sun and then dived out of the sun, releasing their bombs at about 6000 feet. When A.A. fire is heavy they do not stay on each other's tails in the dive but maintain a good interval; also, they very rarely dive through heavy AA gun barrage but release their bombs about 500 feet above. When the anti-aircraft is not so heavy they sometimes attack four at a time in a single line. They generally release one large and four small bombs on the one attack, or one large and two small. They never make more than one run. The bombs form no pattern and the large bomb usually over-shoots the small ones. The bombs usually fall within 50 to 150 yards of the target.

After pulling out, the dive bombers disperse seawards at low altitude, about 100 feet, occasionally machine-gunning indiscriminately.

Raids are generally concentrated on one single target. 40 JU.87, in five or six flights, attacked one four-gun A.A. post. The attack which sank the "Ladybird" was also made by 40 JU.87. When the Hurricanes were in action, enemy losses were often 50%. The heavy AA Harbour barrage has forced 70% of the dive bombers to release their bombs at over 4000 feet with consequent loss of accuracy. Many divers have been seen to swing sideways near the end of their dive to try and avoid the barrage; in these cases the bombs drop over 400 yards wide.

Recently, dive bombing attacks have sometimes been preceded by a high level raid carried out by two or three JU.88. These latter come in from the opposite direction with the obvious purpose of distracting attention from the dive bombers and causing the anti-aircraft guns to point the wrong way for dealing with the latter.

Recent dive bombing raids have also been accompanied by one or two HE 126 which stay up at 15000 feet or higher and watch the performance. It has been suggested that these aircraft are there to see that the Stukas do their work properly.

2. GERMAN BOMBS

About 20% at least of the bombs dropped on TOBRUK failed to explode. In a recent raid, 14 out of 40 bombs were dud. High level aircraft occasionally use bombs with a delay action of a few minutes.

3. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE

Most of the JU.87 shot down are destroyed by Bofors

and other light anti-aircraft guns and are hit as they pull out from the dive. This moment, which exposes the whole belly of the aircraft, provides the best target and is when the aircraft is most vulnerable. Very few dive bombers have been brought down by heavy A.A. Dive bombers are not often hit during the dive. A tremendous amount of small arms fire is directed against all aircraft at any range. This probably worries the aircraft crews and certainly relieves the feelings of those being attacked.

Only about 50% of the aircraft shot down fall inside the defences, which renders the exact estimation of casualties difficult.

#### 4. CASUALTIES

Casualties to guns and personnel in anti-aircraft posts being attacked are very slight in proportion to the weight of the attack. Slit trenches and gun defences provide good cover and large bombs bursting 50 yards away do no damage, blast and fragments passing overhead. 90% of the effect is nuisance value. In a recent raid 30 dive bombers attacked one four-gun anti-aircraft post inflicting neither damage nor casualties. The heaviest casualties so far recorded have been nine of one gun crew killed in a raid of similar weight.

#### 5. GENERAL

The majority of the troops become fairly well used to dive bombing as they know that they are reasonably safe when they themselves are not the actual target. Inaccurate high level bombing, on the other hand, may catch anyone. At the same time, the frequency of these dive bombing attacks is of course disturbing.

Despite these constant air attacks, bathing parties are enjoyed daily at TOBRUK though cricket is NOT played in the Fortress, as published in the Press.



SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.11

Compiled from information received from  
1200 hrs 30 Jun to 1200 hrs 1 Jul 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

Ref: LEVANT: 1/200,000 and 1/50,000 Series

1. GROUND

Our Operations

In the DAMASCUS area on the afternoon of 30 Jun an enemy force composed of two companies of infantry and one troop of horsed cavalry supported by 14 tanks attacked the Free French positions at NEBEK.

A vigorous counter attack proved highly successful and the enemy withdrew leaving 30 dead and 15 prisoners in our hands, together with four 35-R tanks one of which was undamaged and is in running order.

FF casualties were very slight.

In the MERDJAYOUN and JEZZINE sectors the day was marked by enemy shelling and by active patrol activity on our part. One of our patrols in broken country at 140178 due west of JEZZINE had a successful encounter with a small party of the enemy and took 14 prisoners, identified as belonging to 1/6 Foreign Legion.

A successful action in the COASTAL SECTOR on the night 29/30 Jun carried out by 2/27 Aust Inf Bn gave us the high ground at Pt 394, which possesses good observation. Cav patrols on the right flank have now occupied MAZRAAT ED DAHR (129184) and EL JLEILIYE (130185), where a sharp engagement took place.

2/25 Aust Inf Bn are pushing eastward against enemy opposition and have established positions in the vicinity of HASROUT (13151885).

2. SECURITY

The translation of a German document captured in the Western Desert operations reveals the following story.

A German soldier had a notebook giving details of German dispositions. Against all orders, he took this into action and was captured. His notebook, with this valuable information, was taken from him by a British soldier. Against all orders and commonsense, this British soldier failed to hand the notebook in to his Intelligence Officer but kept it as a souvenir. A fortnight later the British soldier was in turn captured by the Germans who thus got back their precious notebook. The value of the information which we lost through this stupidity is clearly shown by the tone of the German document referring to its recovery.

3. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

The following have been identified in the NEBEK area:-

One tp Spahis  
One coy 16 R.T.T.  
One mixed coy

*14 Tanks. Probably part of a Sq in that area.*

#### Enemy Defences

The following information has been received from a DRUZE who is considered reasonably reliable.

The br between JDEIDE and MOUKHTARA has been prepared for demolition. The rd AIN MATOUR - BAADARAME - HASSER ECH CHOUF is good.

Demolition has been prepared at 12991817 rd embankment, also at culverts 13011809 and 13411794.

#### 4. RUSSIA

Attached as Appendix "A" is an extract from the GHQ Weekly Review of the Military Situation.

#### 5. AIR

##### Our Operations

RAF bombers again attacked stores and barracks at PALMYRA. A number of direct hits was observed on both targets but the extent of the damage caused is not known.

The Citadel and military depot at SOUEIDA were also attacked and direct hits were observed on both targets. Pamphlets were dropped on the town.

RAF fighters attacked aircraft on the ground at BAALBEK on 30 Jun. 5 twin engined aircraft were reported damaged or destroyed. Buildings and personnel were also heavily machine gunned.

This morning RAAF fighters again attacked aircraft on landing grounds at QUSEIR and BAALBEK.

The large monoplane reported attacked at QUSEIR on 29 Jun was again attacked and burnt out.

At BAALBEK 12 - 15 aircraft were attacked on the landing ground. 4 POTEZ 63 were damaged but not burnt. One unidentified aircraft was left in flames.

All our aircraft returned safely.

NOTE: Pilots report that all POTEZ 63 damaged at BAALBEK were painted battle ship grey. No yellow was visible.

##### Enemy Operations

Effective enemy air action in area CHATEAU QUEMERE (386294) is reported. Extent of damage or casualties has not yet been reported.

#### 6. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES

The following Recces were carried out:-

Sortie No.1: 1000 to 1045 hrs over DAMASCUS - BAR ELIAS - HASBAYA area. Pilots report indicated the position in this area as fundamentally unchanged since previous recce.

Sortie No.2: 1000 to 1045 hrs over the coastal area revealed that the br over the DAMOUR river at 125197 has been blown. In the balance of the area NMS.

Strat/R 0800 to 1000 hrs along rds DAMASCUS - QTAIFE - HOMS and tracks leading off these roads failed to locate column of 63 MT reported to have been moving in those areas.

The following is an analysis of both Enemy and Own AIR FORCE losses in SYRIA from the commencement of hostilities to 23 Jun. The figures have been taken from an RAF HQ Summary.

	TYPE	ENEMY		OWN	
		DESTROYED	PROBABLY DESTROYED		
1. By BOMBING	POTEZ '63	2	2 Damaged	1 Blen-	
	GLEN MARTIN	-	1 3 Damaged	heim-	
	MORANE	1	2 Damaged	Crashed	
	CR 42	-		on	
	UNIDENTIFIED	4		landing.	
2. GROUND STRAFFING	MORANE	1			
	CR 42 --	1			
	PORTEZ 63 )				
	GLEN MARTIN )	10	12 -		
	DEWOITINES		6 damaged		
	UNIDENTIFIED		8 damaged		
3. FIGHTER ACTION		15	4	5 damaged	7 Fighters 1 damaged
4. AA ACTION		16		1 damaged	
	<u>TOTALS</u>	50	17 Probables	8- and 1	
			26 damaged	damaged.	

## 7. GENERAL.

(a) Questioned as to the reaction of the inhabitants to the British capture and occupation of DAMASCUS, a local inhabitant expressed the opinion that everyone was delighted. Further questioned as to the reason for this he replied, "Because the British have so much money".

(b) The following interesting information comes from the GHQ Weekly Review of the Military Situation.

The Petrol problem in SYRIA is so difficult that the Vichy French garrisons have been ordered to report daily on their petrol state and there has been an instance of an official being unable to leave an important centre because of complete lack of petrol there.

(c) Germany. Translation of order by 15 German Arm'd Div. The FUHRER has ordered that the issue of tobacco to members of the armed forces is to be based on the principle of the abolition of smoking. It is therefore, strictly ordered that the tobacco ration be issued to smokers only. Non-smokers will receive the substitutes laid down and will draw, as far as stocks allow, an issue of 30 grammes of boiled sweets in place of the tobacco ration.

*File 100*  
Lt-Col  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

## DISTRIBUTION :

As per Int Summary No. 10.

Taken from GHQ Weekly Review of Military Situation.

# RUSSIA

HITLER is still faithful to his doctrine of the concentration of effort. Safeguarding his right flank by an agreement with TURKEY and reducing German activities in Western EUROPE and the Middle East to a minimum, he has cast the full weight of the German war machine against RUSSIA. Hitler's ultimate objectives are clear, the seizure of Russian oil, grain and heavy industries to enable the German war machine to continue. But it is as yet too early to discern the immediate objectives. He has announced that the campaign has opened on the whole vast front from the BALTIC to the BLACK SEA; but whether the strongest pressure will develop against the UKRAINE only or whether an attempt will be made to bring about the complete collapse of all RUSSIA by shattering blows on a wide front is not yet clear. One thing however, is clear. The whole plan is based on the conception of the successful blitzkrieg. The Germans have staked all on finishing the war this year. If RUSSIA can maintain resistance until late autumn, it should spell catastrophe for GERMANY.

It may be worth while to consider shortly to what extent we may indirectly benefit from the conflict. Our real knowledge of the value of the Russian Army is so little that there are widely divergent opinions as to what resistance it can put up. At least, it is hoped that the effort of overcoming the Red Army will cost the Germans losses which cannot very quickly be made good.

In the worst case, we can expect that it will be some weeks if not months before the Germans are free to turn full military pressure in some other direction.

The Red Air Force now has the opportunity to bomb oilfields and industrial installations in ROMANIA and in Eastern Germany which are out of range of our bombers. It should be possible for Russian submarines to make precarious if not impossible the supply of oil from ROMANIA to ITALY via the BLACK SEA, thus thrusting this very heavy traffic back on to the already overloaded land communications through the BALKANS. The Red Navy should also be able to interfere with the German Iron Ore trade from the Northern Polish ports. Even the most pessimistic view gives us two months as the minimum in which GERMANY can reduce RUSSIA and reorganise her forces, especially her air forces, for a major effort on another front.

As regards the Red Army, its reorganisation under Marshal TILOSHENKO has been veiled in haze of mystery. The Finnish campaign showed up grave weaknesses, especially in leadership and administration, which have since been a subject of earnest attention. The system has been dropped of placing in all units a Political Commissar of equal rank and greater influence than the Unit Commander himself. It has been found that the study of KARL MARX is not the best preparation for modern battle. The Commissar is now a subordinate and the Military Commander is in command. The Russian Army is organised on the same lines as most European armies, especially the German, but with perhaps one outstanding difference, namely, that the Russian infantry division contains a tank battalion in its establishment. RUSSIA is numerically strong in A.F.V. In addition to infantry division tank battalions, she is believed to have 65 tank brigades each of about 155 tanks. How she can use and supply these vehicles is yet to be discovered, as is their mechanical and fighting value. Her total army at the present is estimated a minimum of 183 infantry divisions, 45 cavalry divisions, 65 tank brigades and 16 motorised brigades, the majority of which are disposed on her western front. The Russian Air Force is directly under Army control and is also strong numerically. Its technical and operational efficiency have yet to be tested. The main weaknesses we may expect to find will be shortage of trained staff officers, the generally low standard of Commanders and failure in maintenance and other directions where skilled tradesmen are necessary. On the other hand, reports have for some time agreed that the morale and discipline of the Russian soldier is high. Superior Command is believed not to shrink from the prospect of losses and GERMANY may find that she has a difficult opponent. It is not improbable that German armoured formations at the outset will penetrate deeply into Russian territory but the Germans may find that this is like hitting a pillow. The traditional Russian defence has lain in

2.

drawing the enemy on, lengthening his lines of communication and denying him local resources by thorough destruction. Another in face of the vast and experienced German forces Marshal TIMOSHENKO will be able to maintain control and coordination of effort, and succeed in denying to GERMANY the prizes which she seeks, remains to be seen. One of the chief difficulties the Marshal will have to contend with will be the supply of fuel oil to his vast forces. The inadequate communications by which this oil reaches RUSSIA from the oilfields will be a first objective of the German ground and air forces.

#02/2/6 284

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 12

Compiled from information received from  
1200 hrs 1 Jul to 1200 hrs 2 Jul 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

Ref: LEVANT: 1/200,000 and 1/50,000 Series

1. GROUND

Our Operations

- (a) There has been no change during the last 24-hrs in the situation in the DAMASCUS area. Recce patrols by FFT on the extreme right and north have been active. At SABA BIAR 331204 they made contact with the enemy. Elsewhere enemy raiding activity has apparently ceased for the time being.
- (b) On the HAZAR front the situation is static. The Leicesters have moved forward slightly and now hold a posn west of the rd. 16 Inf Bde are now on the approximate line 187184 - track junc (186182) - 185179 - ring contour 184178 - 182178. Patrols report no enemy movement between DIHAS (183183) and DEIR QANOUN (187185).
- (c) In the MERDJAYOUN area 23 Inf Bde is taking over from the BERRYFORCE and the change is now nearly complete. 17 Aust Inf Bde has concentrated at HABATIYE EL TAHTA (126162).
- (d) In the JEZZINE sector 2/31 Aust Inf Bn have been active in patrolling towards WADI MAGRAT (139181) with enemy patrols on north bank. Unconfirmed enemy activity is reported near HACHGHARA (142177) and NW of Pt 1332 about 13781805.
- (e) On the right of the coastal sector the enemy has actively resisted the forward moves of our cav and has reoccupied EL JEELIYE (131185) and HAZRAAT ED DAMIR (129184), but 2/25 Aust Inf Bn still hold DARAYA (128189) and AANOUT (129188) with elements in HASROUT (131188). There is considerable patrol activity along the south bank of the DALOUR river but no significant change in the general dispositions.

2. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

From P/I statements it appears that the coy of 16 RTT recently identified in the NEBEK area is 8 Coy 2/16 RTT. This coy was formed a fortnight ago in ALEPPO and was moved via TRIPOLI to NEBEK.

PW further stated that two dismounted LG Secs of MEHARISTES (Camel Corps) were also in that area and that his coy (8) was forced to advance and attack, the officers threatening to fire on those retreating. The morale of this coy was stated to be very low.

5, 6 and 7 Coys of 2/16 RTT are still thought to be in the MERDJAYOUN area but confirmation is still lacking.

Reports indicate that 1, 2 and 3 Coys 7 BDL formerly at HALIA have been moved to HOLIS.

The sqn of Levant Line Cav at HOLIS appears to be the 3rd and not the 2nd as previously thought. In addition, in that area there is a troop of tanks and at least one bty of 75 mm.

3/16 RTT, last identified in the EZRAA area, is reported as being in the SOUEIDA sector (unconfirmed). In that area there are also thought to be four sqns of Druse Cav who have been considerably depleted in strength owing to desertions. The only arty identified in that sector is some fortress guns of an unknown calibre.

Personalities: From a PW (a Regular of 15 years service) the following infm has been received. The Commandant du groupement de DAMOUR is Lt-Col ROGER, a man in whom the PW has no confidence whatsoever considering him quite unsuitable for his post as he has no idea of strategy or tactics.

### 3. TOPOGRAPHICAL

Appendix "A" attached shows:-

- (1) Distances between principle towns in SYRIA.
- (2) Speedo chart from HAIFA to ALEXANDRETTA along coast rd.

Note:- In a few cases the mileages would be shorter along doubtful short-cuts.

### 4. AIR

#### Our Operations

On 1 Jul bombers of an RAF sqn attacked the barracks at PALMYRA and SOUEIDA. Direct hits were registered on both targets but the full extent of the damage is not yet known.

RAF fighters carried out a number of offensive patrols along the whole front but failed to intercept any enemy aircraft.

Fighters of an RAAF sqn ground strafed and damaged 20 IIT and 2 staff cars on the DAMASCUS - BEIRUT rd. Two lt tanks were also attacked and hit, but the extent of the damage caused is not known. One aircraft returned with a bullet through the fuselage and another with a bullet hole in a wing. All our aircraft returned safely.

#### Enemy Operations

No enemy air action reported.

### 5. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES

Two Tac/Rs were carried out between 0800 and 0945 hrs 2 Jul.

No.1 Sortie was over the eastern sector from a north south line through NEBEK (243231) to a north south line through JDITA (160209). The pilot reported no change in the IIT situation on the main DAMASCUS - BEIRUT rd.

The following is reported to be a good track though through very rough country:-

YARDOUD (235224) - TELLE TAYA (211209) - SERRHAYA (190208)

No.2 Sortie over the western sector reported rd blocks in position immediately North of DAMOUR on the BEIRUT rd.

Along either side of the rd in the same vicinity the pilot saw indications of the laying of mine fields.

No IIT movement was observed in this sector.

6. SECURITY OF DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION

There have recently been cases of leakage of information to the enemy concerning the Order of Battle of our own tps. It is suggested that all documents relating to the Order of Battle should be marked and treated as MOST SECRET, and kept only by officers. The only exception to this rule should be with the Code Name Lists which must of necessity be handled by Signals personnel.

7. GENERAL

The following is an extract dated 21 Jun from a diary of a VICHY FRENCH soldier captured at MERDJAYOUN. "There are still aeroplanes overhead, they are 'Yankes' (American built planes flown by BRITISH pilots). Just now three FRENCH fighters have flown past: since the beginning of hostilities it is the first time that we have seen our aeroplanes, and we ask ourselves - where are they?"

*Richards*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Lt-Col  
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.10



# ROAD MILEAGE CHART

1 Aust Corps Int Summary  
No 12. APPX "A".

	Alexandretta	ALEPPO	Ba'albek	Baniass (N)	Batroun	Beit-ed-Dine	BEYROUTH	Cheikh Meskine	DAMASCUS	Deraa	Esrtie	HAIFA	Hama	HOMS	Jebel Tenf	(K see Q) LATTAKIA	Massiaf	Merdjayoun	Nagoura	Nazareth	Nebek	PALMYRA
ALEPPO	91	0	179	153	245	263	272	282	239	297	77	377	95	124	290	120	121	267	346	327	176	192
BEYROUTH	291	272	53	116	30	19	0	109	68	136	205	101	149	119	228	149	175	53	75	125	119	218
DAMASCUS	359	239	64	184	100	64	68	53	0	68	189	120	132	103	160	217	158	78	118	88	51	152
HAIFA	359	374	160	211	140	95	101	96	120	85	307	0	250	221	280	250	276	80	28	25	171	272
HOMS	182	124	55	90	80	139	119	156	103	171	86	221	29		236	120	55	143	195	191	53	98
LATTAKIA	106	120	202	35	121	168	149	258	217	285	167	250	91	120	377		65	236	224	275	173	218
PALMYRA	280	192	151	185	178	237	218	205	152	220	68	272	127	98	145	218	153	230	293	240	90	0
QOUNEITRA	362	283	111	188	101	61	71	37	43	53	232	76	174	146	203	220	200	35	73	63	96	195
ROSH PINNA	409	298	108	234	108	65	78	65	66	64	243	49	197	168	226	227	223	31	46	35	117	218
TRIPOLI	226	226	109	61	17	75	56	177	124	192	149	157	92	63	284	93	118	109	131	152	116	161
ZAHLE	321	202	25	146	59	30	30	96	43	111	160	140	107	78	203	179	133	52	105	129	94	176

(Over.)

	Qtaife	QOUNEITRA	Qariateine	Saida	Souaida	TRIPOLI	Tyr	ZAHLE
ALEPPO	200	283	174	301	320	226	27	202
BEYROUTH	95	71	150	29	136	56	57	30
DAMASCUS	27	44	82	97	77	124	135	43
HAIFA	147	76	193	73	124	157	46	140
HOMS	77	146	50	149	180	63	177	78
LATTAKIA	197	220	170	178	294	93	206	179
PALMYRE	125	195	69	247	229	161	275	195
QOUNEITRA	60	0	125	77	65	127	77	89
ROSH PINNA	93	28	148	73	93	134	76	83
TRIPOLI	151	127	113	85	201		113	86
ZAHLE	70	89	125	59	120	86	87	

COAST ROAD

	miles
Alexandretta	359
Border	290
Lattakia	254
Djeble (to left)	237
Baniass	221
Tarouss	197
Haridiye	186
Turn off to Homs	164
Tripoli	161
Enfa	154
Chehka	150
Batroun	143
Aamchite	130
Jebail	128
Jonich	113
Beyrouth	105
Damour	94
Saida	76
To Qouneitra	70
Litani (bridge)	50
Souro (to left)	45
Nagoura (border)	27
Acre	15
Haifa	00

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 13.

Compiled from information received from  
1200 hrs 2 Jul to 1200 hrs 3 Jul 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
  - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
- 

Ref : LEVANT: 1/200,000 and 1/50,000 Series.

1. GROUND

Our operations.

There has been no marked change in any sector of the Corps front during the last 24 hrs.

(a) The situation North and N.E. of DAMASCUS is unchanged. FFF in NEDEK have not been further troubled by hostile offensive patrols, although the enemy are known to be in DEIR AATIYE (247239) and have 3 tps of AFVs in the neighbourhood.

(b) There has been no change on the MAZAR front. Activity has been confined to intermittent shell fire and patrolling. Enemy cavalry patrols are reported to the North on the HADAYA region, about 186195.

(c) In the MERDJAYOUN area there has been patrol and shelling activity only: the enemy are in position near the escarpment in 137181, and our patrols have been held at this point. On the right 2/33 Bn has prepared a defensive flank against possible moves from the direction of HACHGHARA (142177) where enemy were reported yesterday.

(e) On the Coastal Sector the situation is unchanged. The DAMOUR River is still being actively patrolled by our troops on the South bank and by the enemy on the North, and there have been some skirmishes. Towards the right a patrol from 2/25 Bn has reentered EL JLEILIYE (131135)

2. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

Attached as Appx "A" is a new Order of Battle of the Vichy French Forces in SYRIA. This supersedes all previous ones which should be destroyed forthwith.

The following information comes from a document captured in the DAMASCUS sector and dated 17.6.41.

- (a) INF 1/9 R.T.A. Three small coys
- 3/9 R.T.A. Two reformed coys
- 4/1 R.T.H. Two coys, demoralised and broken.

This may or may not be a typographical error for 5/1 R.T.M. As far as is known only 5 Bn of this regt is in SYRIA consisting of 17, 18, 19 and 20 Coys.

- 1/17 R.T.S. Four tired coys
- 3/24 R.M.C. Three fresh coys
- 3/24 R.M.C. Bn was alleged by a number of PWs to have

been dissolved, it is possible they referred to 4 Bn of which reports have been received although it has never been definitely identified.

17 R.T.S. 11 Coy KUNEITRA  
 17 R.T.S. 12 Coy Tired, reorganised after  
 being in action.  
 3 B.D.L. 1/2 coy Defence of DAMASCUS

(b) UNITES DE FORMATION

One "Compagnie de March", broken up to be  
 reformed  
 (No information to hand)  
 C.O.A.C.L. (Compagnie courriers d'Artillerie  
 Colonial du Levant)  
 (No information to hand)  
 B.H.R. (Batterie hors rangs) 1 R.A.C.L.  
 Very tired to be withdrawn at first opportunity  
 (No information to hand)  
 "Compagnie FOUGERAUX" - very tired  
 (No information to hand)

(c) METROPOLITAN CAV

1 R.S.M. Three horsed sqns (presumably 1, 2 & 3)  
 4 Sqn lost ?  
 5 " Motorised - detached as  
 "Colonne Lointaine"

(d) NATIVE CAV

Tcherkess Lt Sqns  
 12 Sqn ) KUNEITRA Column  
 14 " )  
 13 " ) disbanded, to be reformed  
 18 " )  
 33 " disbanded and useless

3. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS

The following information is from an unconfirmed report dated 28.6.41.

(a) In the ZEBDANI area there were from 1200 to 2000 tps, who were saying they would attack DAMASCUS in a few days. These tps are pillaging the villages.

(b) In a depression near the rd on the DAMASCUS side of the point where the ZEBDANI rd joins the DAMASCUS - BEIRUT rd, there are four 75 mm guns whilst three or four others are near there on the hills overlooking the rd. In addition there are about 7 MGs and 7 tanks.

4. AIR

Our Operations

On 2 Jul 41 RAF bombers attacked the fort at SOUEIDA. Direct hits were scored with a number of HE bombs.

RAF fighters carried out offensive patrols over our fwd tps and protective patrols over the cooperating naval units. No interception.

RAAF fighters attacked two flying boats at anchor in TRIPOLI harbour. Both of these aircraft were left in a sinking condition. The hangar and slipway were heavily machine-gunned.

All our aircraft returned safely from all the above mentioned operations.

Enemy Operations

No enemy aircraft action reported.

5. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES

Tac/R over the DAMASCUS sector revealed only odd MT on rds and tracks in the QTAIFE - NEBEK - BAALBEK areas, and NMS on rd BAALBEK - ZEBADANI to rd junc 179184. 46 MT well dispersed in the JDEIDE (172190) area showed a decrease of approx 40 MT since the previous report. Otherwise the MT situation in the DIMAS - MASNAA area remained unchanged.

In the RACHAYA area 23 MT and 2 Armd Cs were seen dispersed at 159176.

6. GENERAL

(a) The following information is from an unconfirmed report dated 28.6.41.

The report states that the French in BEIRUT were moving all their papers from BEIRUT towards LATTAKIA and that some French had actually left. The High Commissioner was, however, still in BEIRUT that day.

(b) A reliable source states that there was substantial interruption of the BEIRUT wireless station, due to the transfer from a fixed to a mobile station.

*in and out 3rd*  
*line*  
for Lt-Col  
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.10

1. AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.13

APPENDIX "A"

VICHY FRENCH ORDER OF BATTLE

From information received up to 1200 hrs 3 Jul 41

Areas are in alphabetical order

1. ALEPPO

CAV (Horsed) E.L.N.S. (Syrian Cav) - 19, 20, 26 and 27 Sqns  
CAV (Mech) R.C.A. - one sqn ? (Thought to have moved to  
DAMASCUS sector) ?  
ARTY 2 R.A.M.L. HQ and HQ Bty )  
1/2 R.A.M.L. - one bty 75 mm (Horsed?) )  
2/2 R.A.M.L. - one bty lorryborne )  
1 Bty 75 mm lorryborne )  
An unidentified portion of this Arty is thought  
to have moved south, probably to DAMASCUS area.  
ENG 3/33 Eng Bn  
MISCL 1/43 Communication Bn

2. BAALBEK

ARTY 1/1 R.A.M.L. - one bty 105 mm and one bty 65 mm

3. BEIRUT

INF 2 B.C.L.  
3 B.C.L.  
2/22 R.T.A. (PW - unconfirmed)  
3/22 R.T.A. (PW - " )  
CAV (Horsed) 6/4 Spahis (Tunisian Spahis)  
1/8 Algerian Spahis  
CAV (Mech) Unknown  
ARTY R.A.C.L. 4 Gp (AA) - 10 Bty 75 mm  
11 Bty 75 mm  
4/1 R.A.M.L. 10 Bty (AA) 25 mm  
ENG Special Eng Coy  
" Telephone Coy  
MISCL 43 Communication Bn 3 and 4 Coys  
631 Pioneer Bn (A detachment only)

4. DAMASCUS

INF 4/6 LE 11 Coy ?  
5/1 R.T.A.  
1/9 R.T.A. (Three small coys - capt doc 17.6.41)  
3/9 R.T.A. (Two reformed coys - capt doc 17.6.41)  
1/17 R.T.S. (Four coys - tired - capt doc 17.6.41)  
3/17 R.T.S.  
1/24 R.M.C. from BEIRUT

CAV (Horsed) E.L. Tch (Circassian Lt Cav)  
 12 Sqn )  
 14 " ) Numerous deserters.  
 27 " KURDS )  
 Partizans Tcherkess  
 41 Sqn  
 42 "  
 3/1 R.S.M. (Moroccan Spahis)  
 5/4 Tunisian Spahis

CAV (Mech) 6 R.C.A. - probably one sqn including 6 A/Tk guns  
 1/7 R.C.A. (An unidentified portion)

ARTY 1 R.A.M.L. (2 Gp motorised of two btys 105 mm and  
 one bty 47 mm A/Tk  
 13 Bty 65 mm (Mountain) (R.A.C.L.) ?  
 1 R.A.M.L. 16 Bty (A/Tk 47 mm) - attached to RTS  
 3/1 R.A.M.L. 8 Bty (AA) 75 mm motorised

ENG 2/33 Eng Bn  
 2/43 Communication Bn  
 B.P.I.C. 4 and 6 Coys (Indo-Chinese Labour Bn)

MISCL 1/29 Horsed Transport Coy

5.

DAMOUR

INF 17 R.T.S.  
 2/6 LE - 5 Coy  
 2/24 R.M.C.  
 1/16 R.T.T. ?

CAV (Mech) 7 Lt Tanks )  
 4 Arm'd cars ) 2/6 R.C.A. - at least two tps

ARTY At least one bty 75 mm guns  
 6 LE Arty Regt (Two btys 75 mm)  
 R.A.C.L. 3 Gp (Coastal Defence)  
 7 Bty (145 mm) 2 guns DAMOUR  
 8 " (164 mm) 2 " KHALDE

ENG 1/33 Eng Bn

6.

DEIR-EZ-ZOR - ABU KEMEL

INF 6 B.D.L.

ARTY 2/2 R.A.M.L. - one bty mixed 65 and 75 mm lorryborne

7.

HAMA

INF 7 B.D.L. 4 Coy

8.

HASBAYA

INF 3 B.D.L. ? (less 2 Coy area MAZRAA - TEKYE  
 capt doc)

CAV (Horsed) 15 Sqn Partizans (One tp identified)

ARTY Unidentified

9.

HOMS SECTOR

INF 7 B.D.L. 1, 2 and 3 Coys each with 4 MMGs  
 CAV (Horsed) 3 Sqn Levant Line Cav  
 CAV (Mech) Tp of Tanks (5)  
 ARTY 6 or 7 med guns (probably 155 mm)  
 Bty 75 mm (5 guns)

10.

JEZZINE

INF 1/6 LE  
 2/17 R.T.S.  
 4 B.D.L. (From ALEPPO - PW)  
 CAV (Mech) 2/6 R.C.A. 3 Sqn (Probably one tp)  
 ARTY 6 LE 1 Bty (75 mm)  
 One bty 105 mm  
 One bty 75 mm (PW - unconfirmed)  
 Lebanese Mtn Bty 65 mm (PW)

11.

LATTAQUIE

INF 2 B.D.L.  
 5 B.D.L.  
 CAV (Mech) Special pl Armd Cs  
 ARTY 2/2 R.A.M.L. - one bty 65 mm lorryborne  
 One coastal defence bty (2 R.A.M.L. ?)

12.

HERDJAYOUN

INF 2/9 R.T.A. ?  
 1/22 R.T.A.  
 3/6 LE  
 1 B.C.L.  
 2/16 R.T.T. 5, 6 and 7 Coys (8 Coy NEBEK area)  
 CAV (Horsed) 15 Sqn Tcherkess (Mostly wounded PW)  
 16 " "  
 38 " "  
 CAV (Mech) Probably one tp tanks  
 ARTY Three btys  
 MISCL 631 Pioneer Bn (A detachment only)

13.

NEBEK

INF 2/16 R.T.T. 8 Coy  
 One mixed coy ?  
 CAV Two dismounted MG secs Meharistes (Camel Corps)  
 One tp Spahis ?  
 14 Tanks (Probably portion of a sqn in that area)



14. PALMYRE AREA

INF 4/6 LE 15 Coy  
Gardes Mobiles

CAV 3 C.L.D. (Meharistes) Mech and Camel  
2 " " " " "  
1 " " " " "

CAV (Mech) 2 Lt Mech Unit  
One pl spec Armd Cs

ENG 43 Eng Bn (detachment only)

15. RAKKA SECTOR

23 E.L.Diz reported moving from HASSETCHE to RAKKA

16. RAYAK - ABLAH

ARTY iii/1 R.A.M.L. 7 Bty 75 mm motorised AA and one  
similar bty  
iv/1 R.A.M.L. 25 mm 11 Bty ? motorised AA

17. SOUEIDA

INF 3/16 R.T.T. (was at EZRAA)  
4/16 R.T.T. 11 Coy ? (formerly at EZRAA)

CAV (Horsed) Four sqns Druze Cav  
1 R.S.M. - one gp (Moroccan Spahis)

ARTY Some fortress guns only

18. TEL KOTCHEK

INF 8 B.D.L.

CAV (Horsed) Djezireh Cav 21, 24, 25 and 28 Lt Sqns

19. TRIPOLI

INF 1 B.D.L.

ARTY 1/2 R.A.M.L. ? One bty 75 mm horsed  
thought to have moved south

ARTY 12 Bty 4 R.A.C.L. 75 mm AA  
9 Bty 3 R.A.C.L. (Coastal Defence)  
half 90 mm and half 75 mm

20. UNPLACED

INF 3/24 R.M.C. (DAMASCUS) ?

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.14

Compiled from information received from  
1200 hrs 3 Jul to 1200 hrs 4 Jul 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
  - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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Ref : LEVANT: 1/200,000 and 1/50,000 series.

1. GROUND.

Operations. There have been minor operations only during the last 24 hrs and in general the position on the Corps front is still unchanged.

(a) In the MAZAR sector there was some heavy shelling by the enemy during yesterday afternoon and enemy car patrols were again reported on the MADAYA Ridge about 185194 and 186195. There has been some MT movement near DEIR QANOUN just North of the right flank of our positions. Last night was quiet.

(b) In the MERDJAYOUN sector the artillery of both sides has been active. 23 Inf Bde has carried out recce and fighting patrols on the left flank.

(c) In the JEZZINE area the threat from the direction of HACHGHARA (142177) has not materialised, and our patrols have pushed forward into the WADI NAGRAT at 13821816 and up the left of the escarpment towards BAHAMINE (13731831).

(d) Coastal sector. On the right flank 2/2 Pnr Bn has occupied EL JLEILIYE (13091858) and 2/25 Bn has reached points 832 (13201877) and 814 (13221882). The enemy still hold EL MTOULLE (13191863). There has been harassing and counter-battery fire by our artillery. On the DAMOUR River there has been vigorous patrolling by both sides and some skirmishes with enemy patrols on the South side of the River have occurred. A patrol from 2/27 Bn was forced to withdraw.

2. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS.

A deserter has volunteered the following unconfirmed information :-

(a) 40 Sqn Tcherkess was dissolved on 25 Jun 41 at HOMS, and the men sent home.

(b) Four armd cars patrol the road HOMS-QARIATRINE-NASRIYE.

(c) Of the effective strength of 7 B.D.L (Bataillon du Levant) stationed at HAMA, between two and three hundred have deserted.

Enemy Defences.

It has been reported that the Serrailat BEIT ED DINE is

used as an ammunition store. There is also a petrol store a short distance to the West of the Serail.

3. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS.

The following information has been received from local inhabitants :-

In the HASBAYA sector the Vichy HQ are at MILESS (148165). In the area SOHMOUR YOUNGOUR Square (14187) there are tanks, trucks, mule waggons, and arms and ammunition. There is an ammunition dump at BOUR QUOZ (139165).

4. AIR.

Our operations.

On 3 Jul RAF bombers attacked a VICHY ship in CHEKKA BAY. No direct hits were observed and as far as is known the ship was not damaged.

Fighters of an RAF sqn attacked aircraft on the ground at HAMA aerodrome. Two twin engined machines were set on fire and 8 others damaged. Other RAF fighters carried out protective patrols over units of the Royal Navy. No interceptions.

A recent deserter from the VICHY forces has stated that during a recent raid by RAF bombers on HOMS 80 vehicles, 4 aircraft and 2 supply depots were destroyed.

Enemy operations.

No reports have been received of enemy air operations during the past 24 hours.

On 29 Jun VICHY aircraft bombed DEIR AATI<sup>Y</sup> killing 16 of their own troops. The same aircraft later attacked NEBEK. Two Free French ORs were reported killed.

At 0402 hrs 2 Jul unidentified aircraft dropped 2 bombs on PW camp at LATRUN. 37 German and Italian prisoners were killed or wounded. The perimeter lights were on at the commencement of the raid.

5. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES.

Two Tac/Rs were carried out between 0615 hrs and 0815 hrs this morning. Visibility in both cases was reported as "good".

The pilot of No 1 sortie observed 7 trailer type vehicles moving North at BAALBEK. At least 4 of these were positively identified as guns. On BAALBEK aerodrome 17 aircraft were observed. It is believed that the majority of these machines have been damaged by our fighter patrols.

The enemy positions to the East and South of the rd junc 179184 have been considerably extended and improved. In the same area 114 MT were observed. This is an increase of 40-50 vehicles on any previous report on the same area. There were 51 MT dispersed in the JDEIDE (172190) area. 20 MT and 3 Armd cars were reported at 158175.

The observations of the pilot of No 2 sortie clearly indicate a North Easterly movement from the DEIR AATIYE (246239) and QARATEINE (290254) area South. Between 265230 and 278242 18 Lt tanks were observed moving toward the PALMYRA area, while at 282296 a further 5 Lt tanks were seen proceeding toward the same area.

A total of 16 MT were observed at various points also moving North East and a further 6 MT were seen dispersed outside

LABOUE (205252).

A number of large holes, presumably dumps, were observed in areas 239206 and 23C187.

5a. Att as Appx. "A" is a review of the Russian Air Force reproduced from an Appx to a GHQ Int Summary.

6. GENERAL.

The following information has been extracted from a Force HQ Summary :-

(a) It is reported that General DENTZ has moved his HQ to the French Law School in JESUIT STREET, BEIRUT.

(b) It is reported that the VICHY freighters "St DIDIER" and "CHATEAU-YQUEM" have left SALONIKA at intervals of 24 hrs starting on 30 Jun. It is thought that these ships are making for TRIPOLI. These two ships and some smaller craft that left on approximately the same time could carry about four fully equipped battalions. Another possible indication that these ships may be coming to SYRIA is the fact that the three VICHY destroyers left BEIRUT on 1 Jul presumably to meet and escort these vessels.

. HABFORCE has announced that PALMYRA surrendered at 1540 hrs on 3 Jul.

*W. C. 1711*  
Lt-Col  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary NO 10.

1 Aust Corps Int Summary  
No. 14 APPX "A"

(Taken from GSI. GHQ ME Daily Int Summary No 404 of 28 Jun.)

The first-line strength of the Russian Air Force is estimated at about 6300 aircraft. Of these 4650 are in Western RUSSIA, comprising 1900 bombers, 1750 fighters, 780 recon machines and 220 Fleet recon aircraft. Considerable reserves of old types exist, but reserves of modern types are probably small as re-equipment is still in progress. 300 factories produce about 500 service aircraft a month.

There is a comprehensive system of aircraft parks, repair depots and workshops, but a fundamental weakness is lack of skilled labour. Owing to this, it is probable that in protracted operations on a large scale the maintenance organisation would break down.

There is no shortage of pilots, but relatively few of the Russian pilots are really well trained in handling modern types of aircraft. In fact, the average training of the Russian Air Force pilot is believed to be less than rudimentary.

The stock of bombs is unknown but believed to be considerable. The Finnish war showed that the types then used were frequently inefficient and that a large percentage failed to explode. Ample supplies of aviation petrol and oil are available.

There is a fairly comprehensive system of aerodromes throughout Western RUSSIA. Owing to the distances involved and the limited transport facilities, however, many aerodromes away from towns are merely emergency landing grounds with few or no facilities. In large scale operations the transport problem would probably give rise to supply difficulties.

In general, the Russian Air Force has a large number of aircraft and pilots, but many of the aircraft are of semi-obsolete types and the general standard of training of pilots is low. As a result, the operational efficiency of the Air Force must be expected to be relatively low. Administration is poor, and, so far as is known, there are few capable Air Force leaders. In a war with a major Western power such as GERMANY, which can bring to bear the full weight of a modern air force, it is to be expected that very heavy losses will be sustained by the Russian Air Force and that air superiority will rapidly be achieved by the Germans, though not perhaps before they have suffered considerable losses.

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.15

Compiled from information received from  
1200 hrs 4 Jul to 1200 hrs 5 Jul 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

Ref: LEVANT: 1/200,000 and 1/50,000 Series.

1. GROUND

Our Operations

In the DAMASCUS sector a squadron of 9 Aust Div Cav found QARIATEINE clear of the enemy on the morning of 4 Jul, while Free French forces captured two prisoners and an armoured car at JIREDJIR.

Apart from lively hostile shelling in the MERDJAYOUN sector particularly on FORT KHAM, there was no change in this area.

North of JEZZINE our patrols pushed forward into the WADI NAGRAT and into the hills to the north of it. They captured 14 prisoners and a truck, but were unable to hold all the ground made owing to hostile fire.

In the COASTAL sector there has been very vigorous patrolling south of the DAMOUR river while at one point a recce patrol even crossed it. The Royal Navy carried out a successful bombardment of the enemy's defences north of the river on the afternoon of 4 Jul.

As the result of a successful engagement by 2/2 Aust Pnr Bn and 2/25 Aust Bn we have occupied EL MTOLLE and CHARIFE; 7 prisoners and several MGs being captured. The enemy blew the br at 133190 north of CHARIFE.

2. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

from 6 Div

It is learnt that the MEHARIST prisoners captured at NEBEK were from No.3 Coy. This Coy which had its HQ at DMEIR consists of 3 mobile platoons each of 2 MG and 2 LMG Sections, these platoons are carried in trucks. In addition there is one pl of 8 Armd Cs and one dismounted platoon. PWs state that the 1 Coy MEHARISTS was at PALMYRA and 2 Coy at DEIR EZ ZOR.

3. AIR

Our Operations 4 Jul 41

RAF bombers attacked shipping in TRIPOLI harbour. No direct hits were observed and the extent of damage caused is as yet unknown.

Aerodromes at HAMA were also attacked. Two direct hits were secured on twin engined bombers. Remainder of bombs fell among dispersed aircraft and hangars.

RAF fighters attacked 6 large unidentified twin engined aircraft and one large monoplane on the landing grounds at BAALBEK. All the aircraft were damaged but none destroyed by flames.

Protective patrols were carried out over units of the Royal Navy. No interceptions.

### Enemy Operations

Three enemy fighters attacked some RAF bombers over ALEPPO. Although some of our aircraft were damaged all returned safely.

#### 4. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES

Tac/R between 0615 hrs and 0745 hrs this morning indicated a decrease of 50 - 60 MT in the area rd junc 179184 since yesterday morning.

NMS was reported on rd RAS BAALBEK - BAALBEK - ZAHLE. 20 MT and 2 - 4 armd Cs reported at 159176 during the previous 48 hrs have moved.

Low cloud over the area made observation difficult.

#### 5. GENERAL

The following interesting information dealing with the reaction of the inhabitants of the Southern Lebanon to the BRITISH advance has been received. Christian opinion was almost universally favourable and enthusiastic at the start, but has dwindled a little lately owing to the delay in our progress. The Druze were definitely antagonistic at the beginning, but now they appear to be indifferent towards both forces. This is borne out by the large numbers who have deserted and returned to their farms during the last few weeks.

GERMAN propaganda is still active through the Young Syrian National Party, and leaflets of this organisation are still being distributed.

During recent operations on the Coastal Sector it was noticed that approx 10% of the enemy shells failed to explode. A large percentage of enemy amn is of 1918 manufacture and the fragmentation is very poor.

Lt-Col  
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.10

486  
SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 16

Compiled from information received from  
1200 hrs 5 Jul to 1200 hrs 6 Jul 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
- 

Ref: LEVANT: 1/200,000 and 1/50,000 Series

1. GROUND

Our Operations

(a) 21 Aust Inf Bn launched a full scale attack across the DAHOUR River in the early hours this morning. Supported by most of 7 Aust Div arty increased by 212 Med Bty, and with the co-operation of the RH and the RAF, the attack was made by 2/27 Bn on the right and 2/16 Bn on the left. Considerable opposition has been met, but 2/27 Bn captured EL BOUH (1267 1970) by 0705 hrs and now have three coys forward on the line of the track 1270 1976-1265 1975-1260 1974. On the left 2/16 Bn has crossed the River at two points. The right coy is now between tracks about 1245 1974, and the centre is on the River bend about 1269 1970, with another coy in support just South of the River, about 1244 1970. On the left considerable difficulty is being encountered from the olive groves and the 4th coy is still on the South bank about 1236 1968. Enemy arty fire is hampering the work of the engineers on the crossing about 1237 1968 and has prevented movement along the road about 1228 1965. The action is continuing.

(b) Elsewhere the situation has not materially altered. In the JEZZINE and MERDJAYOUN sectors there has been vigorous patrol activity combined with intermittent shelling and bursts of prolonged Mortar and MG fire. Our troops report HASBAYA itself unoccupied by the enemy, though he is still holding positions all round it and his line appears to be extending towards the South East. In both sectors the enemy is fighting back with determination.

(c) On the MAZAR front the position is static. Enemy cav patrols have been more active to the South than to the North of the 16 Inf Bde. North and North East of DAMASCUS we hold QARIATEINE and SABA BIAR and the enemy is reported to have prepared a defensive line North of DEIR AATIYE from HOMEIRA to BORDJ EL AYOUN.

2. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

The following infm has been received from a PW and is considered reliable.

The Lebanese mtn bty of 65 mm's formerly in the JEZZINE Sector is now in the DEIR AATIYE Sector.

One sqn of the 4 Tunisian Spahis is at DAHOUR, and one sqn in the JEZZINE Sector. The 1/8 Tunisian Spahis are reported at BEIT ED-DINE.

Attached as Appendix "A" is a new VICHY FRENCH ORDER OF BATTLE, another list of the more common abbreviations is attached as Appendix "B".



### 3: ENEMY ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

Numerous statements from PWs confirm previous reports received from other sources that about 150 armd cars have been armoured locally in SYRIA. Their armour consists of two layers of thin plating with a layer of wood in between, and is said to be effective. About 50 of these Cs are armed with a 37 mm gun, and the remainder with machine guns.

It has been reported from a reliable source that the TRIPOLI BEYROUTH rd is mined at the NAHR-AL-KALB (the br 1 km from JOUNIYEH and the CHEKKA tunnel (near TRIPOLI).

One of the heavy guns located at ABEY was knocked out by the ROYAL NAVY in their bombardment of 2 Jul.

### 4. AIR

#### Our Operations 5 Jul 41

RAF bombers attacked the Vichy HQ and defences at BEIT ED DINE with HE and incendiary bombs. Several direct hits were scored on the HQ.

Fighters of RAF sqns carried out ground strafing attacks against the aerodromes and landing grounds at HOMS, QOUCIER and BAALBEK. During the entire patrol only one aircraft was seen. This was obviously unserviceable.

During the day pamphlets were dropped on BEIRUT and SOUEIDA.

#### Enemy Operations

At 1600 hrs 1 enemy bomber escorted by 6 fighters attacked the LITANI river br 105155. No damage caused.

Two Dewoitine fighters attacked one of our Tac/R aircraft at 1030 hrs today over the DAMOUR area. The pilot was unhurt but the aircraft was declared unserviceable on reaching its base.

### 5. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES

Tac/R 1200 - 1245 hrs 5 Jul reported the following:-

- (a) Rd MERDJAYOUN - GDITA:
  - (i) From MERDJAYOUN to CAMP De QARAOUN there are no bridges. Only small culverts and no water.
  - (ii) At AIN TIE the rd does NOT cross the river.
  - (iii) The br at CAMP De QARAOUN is NOT blown. The pilot described the br as a 'big one' and the river he considered to be as wide as the LITANI river at the Coast Rd. The banks are steep.
  - (iv) The rd between Trig 288 at 147179 and the br is particularly tortuous.
  - (v) Between the br and GDITA are a number of small culverts over dry watercourses.
- (b) The following are reported as being good tracks:
  - (i) CAMP De QARAOUN (147181) - JOUBB JENNINE (155188) - KAMED EL LEZ (158188).
  - (ii) From R in JISREL HASBANI (139163) - LIBBAYA (149171) - KAHER MECHKI (153175) - KAMEDELE (158188).
- (c) Rd badly blown at K in KAHLOUNIE (134191).

### 5a. INFORMATION FROM THE AIR

Attached as Appendix "C" is Report No 52 from the Army Interpretation Unit.

6. GENERAL

Material captured at DEIR EZ ZOR included 5 guns, 2 aircraft and many army vehicles. Prisoners taken at PALMYRA included six officers, 48 Air Force personnel and over 100 rank and file.

-----  
Two inhabitants from BEYROUTH gave the following infm which is considered fairly reliable. General DENTZ is very unpopular, many prominent local inhabitants are endeavouring to have BEYROUTH declared an open town but General DENTZ will not listen to this plea. The fact that bread in Allied occupied DAMASCUS is 10 times cheaper than in BEYROUTH is causing great discontent. There has been a considerable exodus of locals, the remaining population are said to be awaiting the arrival of BRITISH troops quite calmly.

-----  
DRUZE deserters are continuing to apply for employment with the BRITISH Forces.

*W. L. L.*

Lt-Col  
GS 1 Aust Corps

NOTE: Ref para 2 line 4 of this Summary, delete "DEIR AATIYE" and substitute "MAZRAA - TEKIEH"

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.10

1 Aust Corps Intelligence Summary No 16.

Appendix "A"

VICHY FRENCH ORDER OF BATTLE.

From information received up to 1200 hrs 8 Jul 41.

Note The number of a unit before the oblique stroke indicates the battalion, the number after indicates the regiment.

1. ALEPPO.

CAV (HORSED) E.L.N.S. (Syrian Cav) - 19, 20, 26 and 27 Sqs.

CAV (MECH) R.C.A. - 4 Sqn (Still at ALEPPO - PW 2.7.41.)

ARTY. 2 R.A.M.L. HQ and HQ Bty. }  
1/2 R.A.M.L. - one bty 75 mm (Horsed ?) }  
2/2 R.A.M.L. - one bty lorryborne. }  
1 Bty 75 mm lorryborne. }  
An unidentified portion of this arty is thought  
to have moved south, probably to DAMASCUS area.

ENG. 3/33 Eng. Bn.

MISCL. 1/43 Communication Bn.

2. BAALBECK.

ARTY. 1/1 R.A.M.L. - one bty 105 mm and one bty 65 mm.

3. BEIRUT

INF 2 B.C.L.  
3 B.C.L.  
2/22 R.T. (PW - unconfirmed)  
3/22 R.T. (PW - " )

CAV (HORSED) 1/8 Algerian Spahis (Bait ed Dine)

CAV (MECH) Unknown

ARTY. R.A.C.L. 4 Gp (AA) - 10 Bty 75 mm  
11 " 75 mm  
4/1 R.A.M.L. 10 Bty (AA) 25 mm.

ENG Special Eng Coy.  
" Telephone Coy.

MISC 43 Communication Bn 3 and 4 coys.  
631 Pioneer Bn (A detachment only)

4. DAMOUR

INF 17 R.T.S.  
2/6 LE  
2/24 R.M.C.  
1/16 R.T.T. ?

CAV (Horsed) 4 Tunisian Spahis - One sqn.

CAV (MECH) 7 Lt Tanks - 2/6 R.C.A. at least two tps and  
probably whole sqn (PW)  
4 Armcd cars - 1/3 R.C.A. (Portion of Armcd Car  
Sqn - PW)

4. DAMOUR (contd).

ARTY At least one bty 75 mm guns  
 6 LE Arty Regt (Two btys 75 mm)  
 R.A.C.L. 3 Co (Coastal Defence)  
 7 Bty (145 mm) 2 guns DAMOUR  
 8 Bty (164 mm) 2 guns KHALDE.

ENG 1/33 Eng Bn.

5. DEIR-EZ-ZOR - ABU KEMEL.

INF 6 B.D.L.

ARTY 2/2 R.A.M.L. - one bty mixed 65 and 75 mm lorryborne.

6. DEIR ALTIYE

INF 2/16 R.T.T. 8 Coy.  
 One mixed coy

CAV One dismounted MG sec MEHARISTES ( Camel corps).  
 One tp Spahis  
 7-10 tanks (Probably portion of a sqn in that area.)

ARTY. One bty or part of a bty 105 mm.  
 One bty 75 mm.

7. HAMA

INF 7 B.D.L. one coy (21.6.41.)  
 130 Local recruits (21.6-41.)

CAV (HORSED) 4 Sqn Levant Line Cav, one troop ( from DERAA)  
 21.6.41.)

ARTY. One gun ( 90 mm) 21.6.41).

8. HESBAYA

INF 3 B.D.L ? (Less 2 Coy area MAZRAA-TEKIYE capt doc)  
 2/9 R.T.A ?  
 1/22 R.T.A.  
 3/6 LE  
 1 B.C.L.  
 2/16 R.T.T. 5, 6, and 7 coys ( 3 coy NEBEK area)

CAV (HORSED) 15 Sqn Partisans ( One tp identified)  
 15 " Tcharkass (Mostly wounded PW)  
 16 " "  
 38 " "

CAV (Mech) Probably one or two tanks

ARTY Unidentified - 5 btys ?

MISGL 631 Pioneer Bn ( A detachment only)

9. HOMS

INF 7 B.D.L. three each with 4 MGs (less 200/300  
 deserters) (23.6.41.)

CAV (HORSED) 3 Sqn Levant Line Cav ( 60 Horsemen)

9. HOMS (Contd)

CAV. (MECH) Tp of tanks (5) (From S.I.D.)  
4 Armd. Cars

ARTY 6 or 7 med guns (Probably 155 mm)  
Bty 75 mm (5) guns

10. JEZZINE.

INF 1/6 LE  
2/17 R.T.S.  
4 B.D.L. (From ALEPPO - PW)

CAV (HORSED) 4 Tunisian Spahis - One Sqn.

CAV (Mech) 2/6 R.C.A. 3 Sqn (Probably one tp)

ARTY 6 LE 1 Bty (75 mm)  
One bty 105 mm  
One bty 75 mm (PW - unconfirmed)

11. LATTAQUIE

INF 2 B.D.L.  
5 B.D.L.

CAV (Mech) Special pl - armd cars

ARTY 2/2 R.A.M.L. - one bty 65 mm lorryborne.  
One coastal defence bty (2 R.A.M.L.?)

12. MAZRAH - TEKIEH

INF 4/6 LE 11 Coy?  
5/1 R.T.S.  
1/9 R.T.S. (Three small coys - capt doc 17.6.41)  
3/9 R.T.S. (Two reformed coys - capt doc 17.6.41)  
1/17 R.T.S. (Four coys - tired - cap doc 17.6.41)  
3/17 R.T.S.  
1/24 R.M.C. from BEIRUT.

CAV (HORSED) E.L. Tch (Circassian Lt CAV)  
12 Sqn  
14 " } Numerous deserters.  
27 " KURDS  
3 Partizans, Charkass  
41 Sqn  
42 Sqn  
3/1 R.S.L. (Moroccan Spahis)

CAV (MECH) 2/7 R.C.A. including 6 A/tk guns.  
1/7 R.C.A. (An unidentified portion)

ARTY 1 R.A.M.L. (2 Gp motorised of two btys 105mm and  
one bty 47 mm A/Tk.  
13 Bty 65 mm (Mountain) R.A.C.L.)?  
1 R.A.M.L. 12 Bty (A/Tk 47mm) - attached to RTS.  
3/1 R.A.M.L. 8 Bty (A.) 75 mm motorised.  
Lebanese Mtn Bty (65 mm) PW.

ENG 2/33 Eng Bn  
2/43 Communication Bn  
B.F.I.C. 4 and 6 Coys (Indo-Chinese Labour Bn)

MISCL 1/29 Horsed Transport Co.

13. PAIMYRE AREA.

INF 4/6 LE 15 Coy  
Gardes Mobiles

CAV 3 C.L.D. (Meharistes) Mech and Camel  
2 " " " " "  
1 " " " " "

CAV (Mech) 2 Lt Mech Unit  
One pl-spec Arm'd Cars

ENG 43 Eng Bn (detachment only)

14. RAKKA SECTOR 23 E.L.Djz reported moving from HASSETCHE to RAKKA.

15. RAYAK - ABLAH

ARTY 111/1 R.A.M.L. 7 Bty 75 mm motorised AA  
and one similar bty.  
1V/1 R.A.M.L. 25 mm 11 Bty ? motorised AA.

16. SQUEIDA

INF 3/16 R.T.T. (was at EZRAA)  
4/16 R.T.T. 11 Coy ? (Formerly at EZRAA)

CAV (Horsed) Four sqns Druse Cav.  
1 R.S.M. - one Gp (Moroccan Spahis)

16. PAIMYRE AREA.

ARTY Some fortress guns only.

INF 4/6 LE 15 Coy  
Gardes Mobiles

17. TEL KOTCHEK.

INF 8 B.D.L. (Meharistes) Mech and Camel  
" " " " "

CAV (Horsed) Djazireh Cav 21, 24, 25 and 28 Lt Sqns.

18. TRIPOLI.

INF 1 B.D.L.  
" " " " "

ARTY 1/2 R.A.M.L. ? One bty 75 mm horsed  
thought to have moved South.  
12 Bty 4 R.A.C.L. 75mm AA  
9 Bty 3 R.A.C.L. (Coastal Defence)  
half 90mm and half 75mm.

19. UNPLACED

3/24 R.M.C. (DAMASCUS) ?

INF 8 B.D.L.

CAV (Horsed) Djazireh Cav 21, 24, 25 and 28 Lt Sqns.

19. TRIPOLI.

INF 1 B.D.L.

1. AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 16.

APPENDIX "B".

NOTES AND ABBREVIATIONS.

- A.C. Anti-tank.  
A.M. Automitrailleuses (Armoured cars)  
B.C.C. Bataillon Chars de Combat (Tanks)  
B.C.L. Bataillon Chasseurs Libanais.  
B.D.L. Bataillon du Levant.  
B.M.T.S. Bataillon de marche Tirailleurs Senegalais.  
Colonial Troops. Troops of the regular French Army who spend half their service at stations in France and half in the Colonies.  
C.L.D. Compagnie legere du desert.  
C.S.T.L. Commandement superieur des troupes du Levant (Gen. Steff)  
D.C.A. Defence contre avion.  
E.L.Dj. Escadron leger Djezirah (Djezirah Light Cavalry)  
E.L.Dr. " " Druse (Druse Light Cavalry)  
E.L.N.S. " " Nord Syrie (N. Syrian Light Cavalry).  
E.L.Tch. " " Tcherkess (Circassian Light Cavalry).  
Etr. Legion Etrangere (Foreign Legion).  
Genie. Engineers.  
Gp. Groupe or Groupement (sub-division of a regt.)  
H.C.F. Haut Commissariat Francais.  
Intendance. Supply service.  
Metropolitan. Troops (French and native) belonging to the French Army in France and North Africa.  
Mun. Pack Transport.  
P.A.R.E.M. Sue Regional workshops.  
Partizan. Irregular light cavalry.  
Porte Lorry borne (Artillery).  
P.R.R.E.M. Regional workshops.  
R.A.C.L. Regiment d'artillerie coloniale du Levant.  
R.A.M.L. Regiment d'artillerie metropolitaine du Levant.  
R.C.A. Regiment Chasseurs d'Afrique.  
R.I.C. Regiment d'infanterie coloniale.  
R.T.A. Regiment Tirailleurs Algeriens.  
R.T.L. Regiment Tirailleurs Marocains.  
R.T.S. Regiment Tirailleurs Senegalais.  
R.T.T. Regiment Tirailleurs Tunisiens.  
S.A. Spahis Algeriens.  
S.M. Spahis Marocains.  
Sp. Troupes speciales. Troops recruited and maintained by local governments, but trained and partly officered by French.  
S.T. Spahis Tunisiens.  
T.L. Territoires des Liban.  
T.N.S. Territoires Nord Syrie.  
Train Transport Corps.  
Transmissions. Signals.  
T.S.S. Territoires Sud-Syrie.

SECRET.

1 AUSTRALIAN CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.16.

APPENDIX "C".

REPORT ON AIR PHOTOGRAPHS.

Report No. 52.

No. 2 Section,  
Army Interpretation  
Unit,  
R.A.F. Station  
Ramatleh.  
4.7.41.

REPORT ON THE FOLLOWING PRINTS:

Taken by Squadron : 45.  
Date taken : 3.7.41.  
Height : 16,500 feet.  
Focal Length : 14".

DUMP 7 MILES N. OF HAMA (Pt. 245365) - 4 Prints. Time 1030 hrs.

Ref. Report No. 44 of 1/7/41 para. 3.

The prints cover the whole of the dump area.

There now appear to be provision for 289 magazines.

These magazines consist of concrete floors, approx. 25-35 feet square, with explosives and ammunition stores stacked openly on them. 23 of these magazines are full, 52 half full, 37 partly stocked and 177 empty. 12 in the centre of the dump near the HAMA-ALEPPO road, have been enclosed by thick earth walls. Of these, 1 is full, 3 are half full, 2 partly so and 6 empty.

The layout of the dump is similar to the one at TALIA with magazines 45-65 yds. apart, sited in rows. It extends from the HAMA-ALEPPO road on the East to the HAMA-ALEPPO railway on the West. A single siding has been constructed on this line at pt. 24463658. A well-used track runs from this through the centre of the dump. There are 12 waggons in the siding.

The area of the 8 main buildings (now suspected to be quarters as there is a football pitch nearby) at the main entrance to the dump, is well defended by fire and communication trenches outside of which is a barbed wire fence. There appear to be 3 M.G. positions. On the west side are 3 suspected A/A guns. This small defended area covers approx 28 acres.

The raised earthwork mentioned in previous report as bounding the dump area on the East, is now observed to enclose the whole of the dump area. 5 blockhouses are visible.

The area immediately to the South of the dump is possibly being used as an emergency landing-ground as 1 large aircraft is visible with 3 A.P. nearby.

Nothing further to report.