

AWM52
2nd Australian Imperial Force and
Commonwealth Military Forces unit war
diaries, 1939-45 War

Item number: 8/3/3

2/3 Infantry Battalion

March - June 1945

MONTH OF MARCH 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.21
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BNDate and Time.—From 1 Mar 45 To 6 Mar 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
DANMAP RIVER MIMA CREEK area	1 Mar 45	0830	Capt MacDonald, in charge of a recce party of one officer from each coy, and accompanied by I O, leave to recce new area on coast. 12 Pl provided protection.	
		1000	Lt MacDougal called down 180 rounds of arty on targets in MIMACREEK MIKEM CREEK. First rounds fell among own troops, - killing Pte Jobson and wounding Ptes Waller, Beck and Englert. Patrol set out for base, one further dead Jap found. Total enemy casualties from this patrol were five killed.	
		1500	Mail arrived.	
ANUMB RIVER	2 Mar 45	0800	Advanced Bn HQ established on coast 800 yards WEST of ANUMB RIVER.	
		1200	Remainder of Bn, less mortar Pl, arrived on coast. All coys established on the beach, with the exception of B Coy, which is 600 yards inland on the old German road. Heavy surf with undercurrent. An abundance of fresh water.	
	4 Mar 45		Bn settling in new area. Two small local patrols found 21 dead Japs in old MDS. Anumb River rose four feet, due to heavy rain.	
		1600	Mortar Pl, less two detachments, arrived in new area.	
	5 Mar 45	0800	River still flooded, local patrols only.	
		1100	Mail, including Xmas parcels and greetings, arrived.	
		2100	RMO, Capt Park, returned from assisting in evacuation of 2/3 MG Bn casualties.	
	6 Mar 45		Patrols engaged in checking topographical information.	
		1400	Bde Comd visits Bn. Further move unlikely for a few days owing to difficulty in maintaining L of C.	
		1500	Jap body washed up on beach was thrown back into the sea and taken by a shark five yards from the beach.	

MONTH OF MARCH 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN

Date and Time.—From 7 Mar 45

To 14 Mar 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
ANUMBA RIVER ANUMB RIVER	7 Mar 45	1100	Tk A Pl reverts to Comd of Bn.	
		1200	Heavy rain - river again flooded.	
	8 Mar 45	0800	Lt Binney and Tk A Pl patrolled along ANUMB RIVER.	
		1230	Bde Comd left for 2/3 MG Bn with an escort of one section from C Coy.	
		1800	Bde Comd returned and stayed with Bn for the night.	
	9 Mar 45		B Coy locate signs of crocodiles in stream used for bathing. Bn re-inoculated against cholera.	
	10 Mar 45	0900	Lt Copeman, on patrol across River, located seven dead Japs. ExSax C O holds conference with Coy Comds to discuss Q matters.	
		1200	Maj MacKenzie relieved Maj Gibson as Bn 2 I C. Maj Gibson assumed comd D Coy.	
	11 Mar 45	0900	C O and O Group visit Bde to study sand table of area of possible future operations. I Section similarly instructed Bn, by paa toons, on unit sand table. Sector of responsibility extended to NINAHAU RIVER. ANUMB again in flood.	
	12 Mar 45	0800	Maj Gibson, with IO, FOO and party, set out with two platoons of D Coy on patrol to NINAHAU RIVER.	
		1800	YMCA Officer, Mr A G Dube, conducted evening church service.	
	13 Mar 45	1400	Capt Gibbons in comd 7 and 8 Pls and accompanied by FOO, and Major FOOTE of Tk A Regt (observing) left on patrol to NINAHAU RIVER area.	
		2300	Very heavy squall collapsed numerous shelters.	
	14 Mar 45	1000	Maj Gibson's patrol xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx returned, report having wounded one Jap.	
		1300	C Coy moved to SIMBE CREEK.	

MONTH OF MARCH 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2r18
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BNDate and Time.—From 14 Mar 45 To 18 Mar 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
XXXXX ANUMB RIVER	14 Mar 45	1600	Heavy gale lasted one hour. Trees were blown down and shelters blown away.	
	15 Mar 45	0800	Lt Varley and four sections of B Coy left to patrol across NINAHAU RIVER to LOANIM village.	
		0900	CO holds 0 group conference and details future operations in BUT area.	
		1400	Capt Gibbons' patrol returns, reports no movement seen.	
	XXXXXX		Bde comd conferred with C O.	
	16 Mar 45	0900	Movement to KAUK commences. Order of march B Coy, Bn HQ, D Coy. Crossing ANUMBE RIVER delayed as only one boat available. Most troops waded the four foot deep stream.	
KAUK		1200	Bn HQ, B and D Coys now located KAUK plantation.	
		1500	Lt Varley's patrol returned after clearing LOANIM village - 2 enemy killed, one wounded.	
	17 Mar 45	1100	While acting as carrying party for 2/2 Aust Inf Bn, C Coy came under enemy arty fire and suffered Pte Hawkins and Pte Hinton wounded.	
		1200	A Coy moved into new position at KAUK. Jeep traffic now operating to our area.	
		1400	Capt Gibbons and Adjt recce BAI villa ge area for prospective site for C Coy.	
		2130	C Coy killed one unarmed, unclothed Jap in their area.	
	18 Mar 45	0800	Maj Gibson, with two platoons of D Coy and FOO party, left on patrol to MARABUS area.	
		0800	Capt MacDonald, with two platoons of B Coy, left on patrol to MARABUS village.	
		1000	Metropolitan newspapers dropped by ANA mail plane.	

MONTH OF MARCH 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN Date and Time.—From 18 Mar 45 To 21 Mar 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
KAUK VILLAGES	18 Mar 45	1200	C Coy move from BAI to SEMBI CREEK, in order to collect their gear, and bivouac the night.	
	19 Mar 45	1000	C Coy, with MMG Pl moved to BAI. Two 25 pounders moved to BAI and Tk A Pl provided local protection.	
		1200	Tk A Pl captured three enemy in emaciated condition.	
		1500	Capt MacDonald's patrol returned from MARABUS. Enemy casualties five killed, two wounded, six found dead.	
		1600	Pl patrol led by Lt McLeod contacted six enemy on NINAHAU RIVER. No casualties, enemy packs captured.	
		1800	Gramophone selections broadcast from YMCA.	
	20 Mar 45	0800	A Coy moved as advance patrol to clear MARABUS area. B Coy, moved in their wake to occupy village when cleared.	
		1100	Tk A Pl captured two PW at BAI. PW inform Lt Binney of the Japanese presence of four more Japs, which were located, and two killers killed.	
		1430	Free issue of comfort funds cigarettes. Maj Gibson's patrol returned - enemy casualties three killed, one wounded, own casualties Pte Holding wounded.	
		1500	A Coy report MARABUS clear.	
1730		MMG Pl killed one Jap. Following Bde Comd's conference, C O detailed unit move to BUT RIVER on 21 March.		
BUT RIVER	21 Mar 45	0800	CO, Asst/Adj, I0 recce BUT area.	
		1230	Bn, less A and B Coys, arrive new area.	
		1300	Two Indians, previously Jap PW, walked in.	
		1500	One Indian accidentally shot by arty line party in forward	

MONTH OF MARCH 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BNDate and Time.—From 22 Mar 45 To 24 Mar 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BUT RIVER	21 Mar 45	08	of C Coy 's position. Indian was taken to our RAP where he was treated by Capt Park, but died soon after from serious abdominal wounds and internal haemorrhage.	
		1600	Another Indian walked into C Coy perimeter and left an hour later for Bn HQ with appetite appeased and loaded with cigarettes, tobacco and chocolates.	
	22 Mar 45	0830	Capt Gall in comd C Coy, with IO and native guides, left on patrol to SIBEREFUTTO village.	
		0900	Major Mackenzie resumed comd D Coy and Major Gibson attached to Bn HQ.	
		1700	A Coy returned from MARABUS patrol. Enemy casualties 1 Officer 3 ORs killed.	
		2200	Impromptu patrols during the day located large Jap dumps, including medical gear, in the Bn area. Capt Gall's patrol returned after killing seven enemy, capturing one LMG. Our only casualty was L/Cpl Shadlow killed.	
	23 Mar 45	0900	A Coy moved into Bn area.	
		1000	Mortar Pl brought in Jap Sjt-Major captured by Bde HQ personnel.	
		1115	B Coy contacted enemy in MARABUS area. Casualties enemy 2 killed, own Pte Melvane DCM wounded.	
		1300	CO and IO attended Bde Comd's conference. Local patrolling by Tk A Pl resulted in one enemy killed and one Indian PW recovered.	
24 Mar 45	0830	Lt Cory took Bn HQ patrol to HALIKAMOK river.		
	1100	Bde Comd, CO and IO visit 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.		
	1700	Lt King and 16 Pl establish ambush position on HALIKAMOK RIVER - two enemy killed.		
	1730	B Coy join Bn from MARA BUS, en route killing one Jap and taking one PW.		

MONTH OF MARCH 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.1118
(adapted)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN Date and Time.—From 25 Mar 45 To 29 Mar 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.	
BUT RIVER	25 Mar 45	0830	CO and O group recce staging area vicinity DAGUA.		
		1430	CO and IO visit Bde.		
		1730	Bde IO visits Bn with topographical information and enemy strengths and dispositions in Bn's new area of responsibility.		
	26 Mar 45	1330	CO 2/1 Fd Amb visited Bn to investigate cases of dermatitis. Thirty-five evacuations resulted.		
DAGUA	27 Mar 45	0830	Bn moves to staging area on main road DAGUA - WONGINARA mission. Cpl Kelly and Pte Harrington of D Coy accidentally wounded by OSMG.		
		1200	One Jap, in poor physical condition, discovered sitting under a tree in C Coy's area.		
		1300	CO IO and Asst/Adjt visit 2/2 Aust Inf Bn and make recce on NORTHERN slopes to JIKKOKU P ASS.		
		1600	Bde Comd visited Bn and ordered move down MABAM RIVER via 1400 feature.		
		1830	CO holds O group conference and issues orders for move down MABAM RIVER.		
		28 Mar 45	0645	Cpl King of C Coy accidentally wounded by OSMG, Pte Patterson, grazed in back by same bullet, remained on duty.	
		0730	Bn's move commenced, D Coy in patrol order were forward screen.		
		0900	Pte Hedger accidentally wounded.		
		1200	In two contacts D Coy killed seven enemy without suffering casualties.		
		1700	D and A Coys reach objective and bivouac the night. Bn set down for night on MABAM RIVER.		
MABAM RIVER	29 Mar 45	1715	MMG Pl, posted on flank guard in rear of Bn killed one Jap. Pte Farkens and Cpl Pateman accidentally wounded.		
		0730	D Coy advanced NORTH along WONGINARA MISSION Road to contact enemy in rear.		

MONTH OF MARCH 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2'18
(adapted.)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN

Date and Time.—From 29 Mar 45

To 30 Mar 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MABAM RIVER WONGINARA MISSION	29 Mar 45	0730 0830 0845 0930 1010 1400 1500	<p>A Coy established astride road and river junction.</p> <p>C Coy captured one Jap wounded by MMG Pl during the night.</p> <p>D Coy contact and kill one enemy.</p> <p>B Coy local patrol killed one Jap.</p> <p>D Coy engaged by snipers. Cpl Monk and Pte Crotty wounded. Pte Smith, of C Coy, accidentally wounded by OSMG.</p> <p>On return from contacting A Coy on MABAM RIVER, 15 Pl, patrol, commanded by Sjt Reece, was fired on by enemy in ambush position. After recovering Pte Grimston, who was wounded in leg, under enemy LMG fire, Sjt Reece led his platoon in a spirited attack, up a steep bank, against the enemy position. Pte Smith was killed and Pte Courtney and Pte Baldock wounded. The Japs fled leaving five packs containing many valuable documents.</p> <p>Stretcher party from A Coy to D Coy engaged by snipers. Pte Denton was killed.</p> <p>D Coy contact enemy armed with rapid firing aero machine gun. Gun captured in an ensuing attack, in which five enemy were killed. Our casualties were Ptes Wilkins and Davis killed, L/Cpl Landis and Pte Osborne L/Cpl Landis and Pte Osborne wounded.</p> <p>1530 Contact again made and D Coy called down arty on enemy position. Forward section killed one Jap.</p>	
	30 Mar 45	0500 0830 1100 1200	<p>Bn HQ killed two enemy attempting to pass through their position.</p> <p>Bn HQ and C Coy moved to new area at junc WONGINARA ROAD and MABAM RIVER area.</p> <p>1100 Contact patrol from D Coy encountered enemy and Pte Baliss was wounded. An A Coy patrol encountered the same enemy position and killed two Japs. Pte Adams and Hammond were killed and Pte Fluke wounded.</p> <p>1200 7 Pl killed one Jap.</p>	

MONTH OF MARCH 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2188
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN Date and Time.—From 30 Mar 45 To 31 Mar 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MABAM RIVER	30 Mar 45	1415	Continuing their advance D Coy encounter heavy fire from enemy JUKI Machine Gun. Casualties enemy 1 Killed, own Sjt Golding, L/Cpl Reading and Pte Ellis wounded.	
		1445	A Coy cleared track to D Coy and killed one Jap.	
		1600	B Coy patrol killed one Jap.	
		1800	Bde Comd advises by phone that operations are to be suspended till special courier arrives with information.	
		1830	Fresh bread and mea t constituted evening meal.	
		2030	Information from Bde that entire Jap Division in our immediate vicinity. This was learned from documents, dated 29 May, captured by Sjt Reece's patrol at 1400 hrs on 29 May.	
	31 Mar 45	0900	D Coy relieved by 8 Pl. On return journey to river killed two Japs.	
		1130	8 Pl killed one Jap sniper, who had been observed climbing a tree.	
		1200	B Coy moved into new position WEST of Bn HQ.	
			Official War Historian, Gavin Long, visits Bn.	
			WOII Godwin of ANGAU, with line of 40 Police Boys and native guides, joined Bn for future operations.	
		1400	Reece Reece patrols with native guides recce high ground surrounding WONGINARA mission. Report no movement seen.	
		1745	Another Jap killed forward of 8 Pl position.	
		2200	Approx 100 refugee kanakas, including Marys and Piccaninnies, move into Bn perimeter from KUBEURIN village area, where ANGAU arranges for their disposal after interrogation.	
			<p><i>Ian Hutchison</i> Lt col (Ian Hutchison) Comd 2/3 Aust Inf Bn</p>	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2118
(adapted)

Unit 2/3 Aust Inf Bn Date and Time.—From 1 Apr 45 To 5 Apr 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MABAM RIVER-WONGINARA MISSION AREA	1 Apr 45	0800	Native patrols dispatched by Angua to recce General area NORTH of WONGINARA MISSION 1 Police Coy killed 1 Kanaka wounded. Easter Services held BnHQ and D Coys by Padre Harley.	
		1700	Angua patrol return having killed 3 Japs. Kanakas report Maj-Gen Makais HQs location.	
	2 Apr 45	0800	B and C Coy with FOO party and line of native guides with Ly Coy as interepter move out to destroy Jap 20 Div H Q.	
		1445	Ly Vamey with 18 Pl established astride Jap L of C Esat along MABAM MacDonald force attack and destroy Jap 20 Div H Q. Cas enemy 29 killed incl 2 Cpts 4 Lts. Large quantities of docs including Maj-Gen badge of rank and good stores captured. Own cas Lt Varley and Pte Adler killed. Ptes Murphy, Robinson, and Haddock wounded.	
		0760 0830	TK/ATK moves to hold B Coys area on MABAM RIVER. Remainder of D Coy joined 18 Pl. Capt MacCracken with 2 Pls B Coy patrol along MABAM RIVER NORTH to Junction to WONGINARA CREEK then to WONGINARA MISSION killed 3 Japs. Capt Gall with 2 Pls C Coy patrol to AMOYA killed 2 Japs	
		1115 1230 1245	Native ration quarters attacked on MABAM RIVER cas enemy 1 killed. D Coy killed 1 Jap Recce patrol from BnHQ locate old vacated Div HQ. 8 Pl kill 1 Jap. 16 Pl attack Jap position and gains spur. cas enemy 4 killed own Cpl Turner killed Pte Kennedy wounded.	
	4 Apr 45	1730	Docs captured by MacDonald force sent to Bde.	
		0630	A Coy killed 1 Jap on perimeter.	
		1030	D Coy continue attack kill 1 Jap.	
		1300	Bde Comd visits Bn, and stays over night.	
		1515	MacDonald force returned to base. Cas enemy 3 killed 3 wounded.	
	5 Apr 45	1745	D Coy gain ledge of crest of high ground. Cas enemy 1 killed own Cpl Walters killed.	
		0800	Capt Gibbons with 2 Pls A Coy and TK/ATK Pl come under comd Maj Mackenzie and moved to support D Coy.	
		0930	Bde Comd and C O visit C Coy.	

MONTH OF APRIL 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN

Date and Time.—From 1 Apr 45

To 3 Apr 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MABAM RIVER	1 Apr 45	0800	Native patrols dispatched by ANGA U to recce general area NORTH of WONGINARA MISSION. One Police Boy XXXXXXXXXXXX killed and one Kanaka killed.	
		1700	Easter Services held Bn HQ, A and D Coys by Padre Harley. ANGAU patrols returned after killing 3 Japs. Kanakas report HQ of Maj-Gen NAKAI, comd 20 Jap Div, at KUREEBOO KUBEURIN.	
MABAM RIVER	2 Apr 45	0800	Capt MacDonald, in comd B and C Coys, with FOO party and native guides, moved out to raid 20 Jap Div HQ.	
		1445	Lt Varney, with 18 Pl, established astride Jap L of C EAST along MABAM River.	
		1600	MacDonald Force moved silently to Jap HQ and attacked the enemy with complete surprise. After a short skirmish, in which Capt McCracken directed the three platoons of B Coy against their respective objectives, the enemy was routed, leaving 29 killed (including 2 Captains and 4 lieutenants) and an unprecedented quantity of maps and documents. Our casualties were Lt Varley, comd 10 Pl, and Pte Adler killed, and Ptes Murphy, Robinson and Haddock wounded.	
MABAM RIVER	3 Apr 45		Extensive patrolling throughout the day by MacDonald Force resulted in the killing of 6 Japs in WONGINARA MISSION area, and the clearing of AMOIA.	
		0700	Tk A Pl occupied B Coy's vacated position on MABAM RIVER.	
		0830	Remainder D Coy moved out to join 18 Pl, killing one Jap en route.	
		1115	Ration train fired on by Japs covering our L of C along MABAM RIVER. One enemy killed.	
		1230	8 Pl killed one Jap.	
		1245	16 Pl attacked Jap position gained spur. Cas enemy four killed, own Cpl Turner killed, Pte Kennedy wounded.	
		1730	Documents captured by MacDonald dispatched by special courier to Bde HQ.	

MONTH OF APRIL 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2'18
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN

Date and Time.—From 4 Apr 45

To 6 Apr 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MABAM RIVER	4 Apr 45	0630 ‡	<p>A Coy killed one Jap on their perimeter. MacDonald force split up to patrol as much of Bn's area of responsibility on their return journey. Capt MacDonald with B Coy moved in an area SOUTH of WONGINARA MISSION, without making contact, and C Coy, commanded by Capt Gall, covered WONGINARA MISSION and the KIDNEY FEATURE, making contact xxx on three occasions and killing three, and wounding three enemy.</p>	
		1300	<p>Contact by D Coy throughout the day resulted in their clearing and occupation of commanding features, vital to the Japanese in their occupation of JIKKOKU PASS. During these actions 2 Japs were killed, and we lost Cpl Walters killed. Bde Commander visited Bn and stayed overnight.</p>	
	5 Apr 45	0800	<p>Capt Gibbons, with two platoons of A Coy and Tk A Pl, moved out to support D Coy and come under command Major MacKenzie. After Arty preparation A Coy attacked and captured high ground overlooking WONGINARA MISSION Road, destroying all remaining enemy resistance in JIKKOKU PASS area. Three enemy killed without loss to our force. A patrol from MacKenzie force contacted 2/2 Aust Inf Bn across the PASS.</p>	
		0830	<p>Member of Int Section with one section of 15 Pl and native guides moved out in an endeavour to identify the body of Maj-Gen NAKAI, but owing to the decomposed condition of the Jap bodies, were unable to do so.</p>	
		0930 1800	<p>Bde Comd and CO visited B Coy. Two hundred refugee natives are brought in by native guides from KUBEURIN and HAMSUK areas.</p>	
	6 Apr 45	0800	<p>Lt MacDougal, with 14 and 15 Pls, patrolled EAST along MABAM River and established an ambush position over-night on Jap L of C.</p>	

MONTH OF APRIL 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN

Date and Time.—From 6 Apr 45

To 10 Apr 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MABAM RIVER	6 Apr 45	1000	D Coy patrols clear WONGINARA ROAD from JIKKOKU PASS to Bn HQ.	
		1130	B Coy relieved A and D Coys on JIKKOKU PASS.	
		1600	B Echelon, guided by natives, locate 4 dead Japs near their area.	
		1630	One Jap killed in WONGINARA CREEK by Arty line party.	
	7 Apr 45	0800	One Jap killed by B Coy - a straggler.	
		1600	Lt MacDougal's patrol returned to base, after killing 4 Japs. Patrolling throughout the day by the Royal Papuan Constabulary resulted in the killing of three enemy. Mr Buchanan, official camera man, photographed members of the Bn.	
8 Apr 45	0800	A Coy moved out to establish ambush astride Jap L of C on MABAM RIVER.		
	0830	IG and recon party left to recon new Bn area on DAGUA STRIP.		
	1200	Mortar, MMG and Tk A Pls join B Coy to hold JIKKOKU PASS area.		
9 Apr 45	0800	Bn HQ, B and C Coys move to the coast and are established in their new positions at DAGUA by 1200 hrs.		
		D Coy took over WONGINARA Bn HQ position at track and MABAM RIVER junction. Major MacKenzie assumed command of that portion of the Bn remaining in the JIKKOKU PASS - MABAM RIVER area.		
DAGUA	10 Apr 45	1000	CO attends Bde Comd's conference.	
		12 00	MMG and Tk A Pls join the Bn on the coast.	
		1600	D Coy patrol, commanded by Capt Nordsvan, was guided by kanakas to a garden area at the headwaters of the MABAM RIVER where eight out of nine Japanese were killed. During the day ACF Xmas hampers were issued.	

MONTH OF APRIL 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN Date and Time.—From 11 Apr 45 To 24 Apr 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
DAGUA	11 Apr 45	0900 0915 1800	ANA Mail plane dropped Homeland papers. CO visited D Coy on MABAN RIVER. Comd 6 Aust Div visited Bn.	
	12 Apr 45	0900	A and D Coys, together with Mortar Pl, were relieved by 2/3 MG Bn and joined the Bn on the coast.	
	13 - 18 Apr 45		Bn resting on coastal strip at DAGUA. Entertainment was provided by "W. aratah" Concert Party and 6 Aust Div Mobile Cinema Unit. YMCA provided musical programmes. S/Sjt O'Reilly, of 16 Bde FSS, lectured Coys on military documents captured during the campaign. Location was non-tactical and a complete rest with surfing, sunbaking and fishing was enjoyed.	
	19 Apr 45	0800	CO and Adjt. with Pioneer Pl. reced new area KARAWOP Plantation. Pioneer Pl remained to prepare camp site and clear area of any enemy land mines.	
	20 Apr 45	1000 1400	The first Wirraway landed on reconstructed DAGUA STRIP. CO held conference and issued orders for move to KARAWOP. All officers and NCOs of the Bn were instructed by Lt Maloney in the use of Flame-Throwers, man pack.	
	21 Apr 45		Bn operational report covering current operations submitted to Bde.	
	22 Apr 45	0900	Combined Church service conducted by Padre Harley.	
	23 Apr 45	0730	Entire Bn, including B Echelon and Dental Unit, moved by MT to new area KARAWOP Plantation.	
<i>KARAWOP.</i>	24 Apr 45	0730	Capt Johnstone, with 16 Pl, left on patrol along foot hills	

MONTH OF
APRIL 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.21:3
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN

Date and Time.—From 24 APR 45 To 26 APR 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
KARAWOP	24 Apr 45		SOUTH of road to BOIKEN, located enemy ammunition dump with many machine guns, rifles and swords, and established patrol base 700 yards WEST of BOIKEN plantation.	
		1420	Lt Rumble established patrol base 1000 yards WEST of BOIKEN, where he located Jap sentries.	
		1430	CO attended Bde Comd's conference. CO issued orders for capture of BOIKEN.	
	25 Apr 45	0730	Bn advanced towards BOIKEN with A Coy left forward on the Coastal road, and D Coy right forward on high ground to the SOUTH.	
		1330	A Coy contacted enemy dug in astride road. One troop of tanks was called up. Enemy withdrew after flanking attack led by Lt Rumble, leaving 3 dead. Our casualties were Ptes Wolf and Hill wounded. A Coy continued to advance supported by one troops of tanks. Twelve enemy were contacted in vicinity BOIKEN CREEK, but withdrew when attacked from the flank. KENGEN village was occupied, one enemy captured and one Indian PW recovered.	
BOIKEN		1400	D Coy, pushing forward along foot hills, killed two enemy, took one prisoner and captured one JUKI machine gun. Bde Comd visited the Bn, and proceeded with CO and Adjut to forward companies.	
		1900	Lt col Cameron, of 2/2 Aust Inf Bn, visited the Bn. C and D Coys ineffectively mortared by the enemy.	
	26 Apr 45	0730 0730	Bn HQ and remainder of Bn moved to BOIKEN. A Coy continued advance along coast and reached KALIMBOA village where enemy was contacted. An attack was launched with tank support and the area was cleared. Three enemy were killed in this action, and a 37 mm gun destroyed. Two other 37 mm guns and a JUKI MG were found in the BOIKEN area. D Coy continued to sweep foothills WEST of BOIKEN plantation,	

MONTH OF APRIL 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2113
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN

Date and Time.—From 26 Apr 45 To 29 Apr 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BOIKEN	26 Apr 45	0730	were held up by heavy fire from enemy HMGs. Sgt Gooley and Pte Smith were wounded. Nineteen Indian PW, including one medical officer, were recovered near BOIKEN CREEK. B Coy cleared main plantation area and occupied high ground to the SOUTH.	
		1000	Bde Comd visited the Bn.	
	27 Apr 45	1200	B Coy contact enemy with JURI MG. Arty concentration was called down and posn captured. Cpl Saunders seriously wounded by AP mine.	
		1500	Comd 19 Bde visited Bn.	
		1600	D Coy reached objective on BOIKEN CREEK.	
		1830	Lt Copeman, with 12 Pl, contacted enemy dug in at SOUTH EASTERN extremity of Bn area.	
		22 30	Enemy mortared 13 Pl area without causing casualties.	
	28 Apr 45	0700	Capt MacCracken, with two platoons of B Coy, moved out to attack enemy located by Lt Copeman. After arty concentration position was captured. Pte Wise killed, Pte Colbert wounded were our casualties. A Coy rescued Indian PW.	
		1200	Commanders 1 Aust Army, 6 Aust Div, 18 and 19 Aust Inf Bdes visit Bn. Rear Bn HQ and B Echelon join the Bn in BOIKEN Plantation. Cpl Saunders died at MDS. Lt Hoddinott rejoined Bn from Bde.	
		29 Apr 45	0700	Lt Hoddinott, with one section of D Coy and native guides, left on patrol to KOANUMBO.
0800	CO and Adjt visited B and D Coys. Pte Lay, a member of the escort party, was wounded.			
1000	First barges to land at BOIKEN unload two two 155 mm guns.			

MONTH OF APRIL 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN

Date and Time.—From 29 Apr 45 To 30 Apr 45.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BOIKEN	29 Apr 45	1500	Section Patrol was led by Capt Johnstone killed one Jap in BOIKEN CREEK.	
		1630	Lt Hoddinott advised by native runner the location of an enemy position NORTH of KOANUMBO. Capt Boyer with C Coy less 13 Pl, moved out with arty FOO party to join Lt Hoddinott and destroy enemy position. Advanced elements of 19 Bde arrived in the area.	
	30 Apr 45	0730	Capt Boyer's patrol occupied posn held by enemy on previous day without opposition. Probing forward, enemy was contacted and Arty concentration called down, but subsequent was held up by heavy fire from JUKI MG and three LMGs commanding the narrow, razor-back ridge. Two enemy were killed. Our casualties were Ptes Bourne, Ramsay and Plummer (AAMC) killed. Sjt Reece, Cpl Ross and Pte Stevenson wounded. Shelling of the enemy position was continued and the patrol was joined by 13 and 16 Platoons.	
		1700	Air strike requested on KOANUMBO village for 1 May. During local patrolling by B Coy Pte Wilson was wounded.	
			<p><i>Ian Hutchison</i> (Ian Hutchison) Lt col Comd 2/3 Aust Inf Bn</p>	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

Unit 2/3 Aust Inf Bn Date and Time.—From 5 Apr 45 To 11 Apr 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
		1200	A Coy arrived D Coy position. Arty concentration called on enemy position. A Coy followed into attack and captures high ground destroying enemy res stance in JIKKOKU PASS area. Cas enemy 3 Killed remained fled,	
		1530	Patrol from Mackenzie force contacts 2/2 Aust Inf Bn across pass. Kanakas returned having failed to identify Maj-Grn Makais body.	
		1800	200 refugee Kanakas are brought in by native guides from KUMURIM and HAMSUK Areas.	
	6 Apr 45	0800	Lt MacDougal with 14 and 15 Pls left on patrol down MABAM RIVER.	
		1000	13 Pl killed 1 Jap.	
		1030	Capt Johnstone took over 18 Pl D Coy IAKK Lt Cory A/Adj. t.	
		1130	D Coy contact Bn through JIKKOKU PASS. B Coy relieves A Coy and D Coy.	
		1600	BHq guided by natives locate 4 dead Japs vicinity their area.	
		1630	Sig Line party kill 1 Jap.	
	7 Apr 45	1745	Lt MacDougal patrol reach first days objective having killed 3 Japs.	
		0800	B Coy killed 1 Jap.	
		1600	Lt Mac Dougal returns to base kills 1 Jap. Angua patrols returned killed 3 Japs	
		1800	More HAMSUK refugees Kanakas join Bn. Lt Buchanan official phototrapher in area.	
	8 Apr 45	0800	A Coy move out to establish ambush. 4000 yds down MABAM RIVER astride Jap L of C.	
		0830	IO and Recce Party leave to recce new Bn area, vicinity DAGUA AERODROME.	
		1200	Mortar and MMG Pls plus TK. ATK Pl join B Coy to hold Mountain Pass area DNEHXXXXXX	
DAUGA AREA	9 Apr 45	0800	BHQ, B and C Coys, move to coast on DAGUA AERODROME and are established by 1200 hrs. D Coy took over HQ Position holding road and river junction.	
	10 Apr 45		C O to Bde Conference.	
		1200	MMG and TK/ATK Pls join Bn on coast. Comforts Club Xmas hampers issued.	
		1600	D Coy with native guides kill 8 Japs head of WONGINARAH CREEK.	
	11 Apr 45	0900	Mail Plane dropped Home Land papers.	
		0915	C Coy moves to forward position. CO visits D Coy on MABAM RIVER.	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 Aust Inf Bn

Date and Time.—From 11 Apr 45

To 25 Apr 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	12 Apr 45	1500 0900	Comd 6 Aust Div visits Bn D Coy and A Coy together with Mortar Pl join Bn on coast, having been relieved by 2/3 MG Bn.	
	13-18 Apr 45		Bn resting on coastal strip at Dagus. Three concerts provided by Waratah Concert Party. 6 Aust Div Mobile Cinema showed programme. Lt Riley of Bde FSS gave talk on summary information from captured documents. YMCA provided nightly gramophone musical programme. Location was non tactical and a complete rest with surfing sun baking and fishing was enjoyed by the Bn. RAAF sprayed the Bn area with DDT.	
	19 Apr 45	0800	CO and Adjt with Pioneer Pl recon new area KARAWOP Plantation. Pioneer Pl remained to prepare positions in and clear area of enemy mines. Further issue of Xmas hampers.	
	20 Apr 45	1000	First Wirraway lands on reconstructed strip. Orders issued for move to KARAWOP. CO holds coordinating conference. All offrs and N COs instructed by Lt Maloney in the use of Flame Throwers Man Pack.	
	21 Apr 45	1200	Bn Operational report covering current operations submitted to Bde.	
	22 Apr 45	0900	Combined Church service conducted by Padre Harley at YMCA Hut.	
	23 Apr 45	0730	Entire Bn including Beach and Rear and Dental Unit attached move by MT to new area at KARAWOP Plantation.	
	24 Apr 45	0730	Capt Johnstone and 16 Pl left on patrol along foot hills SOUTH of road leading to BOIKEN	
		1300	Capt Johnstones patrol located enemy ammo dump of 14 JUKI HMGs and many LMGs and rifles and swords.	
		1420	Lt Rumble patrol established base 1600 yds WEST of BOIKEN Plantation and contacted Jap sentries.	
		1430	CO attends Bde Comd O Group conference.	
		1600	Capt Johnstone established patrol base on foot hills 700 yds WEST of BOIKEN Plantation.	
	25 Apr 45	0730	CO holds conference and issues orders for capture of BOIKEN Plantation. Remainder of Bn less Bn and B Ech. move forward to BOIKEN area and biv for the night 1000 yds left of BOIKEN CREEK. with A Coy probing forward along road and D Coy similarly probing along foothills.	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

Unit 2/3 Aust Inf Bn Date and Time.—From 25 Apr 45 To 28 Apr 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
		1330	A Coy contact enemy dug-in astride road. 1 Troop of tanks called up. Lt Rumble with 1 Pl move round Jap flank and on grinding enemy position the enemy withdrew. A Coy continued advance advanced and contacted 12 enemy vic BOIKEN CREEK. This enemy also withdrew when attacked from the flank and A Coy with 1 Troop of tanks in support occupy KENGEN VILLAGE. D Coy pushing forward along foot hills capture JUKI HMG killing 2 and taking 1 Prisoner. A Coys cas for day 2 wounded, enemy 3 killed in addition to 2 by D Coy. Bde Comd visits Bn Hqs and proceeds with the C O and Adj to forward Coys. Col Cameron of 2/3 Aust Inf Bn visited Bn Hqs.	
	26 Apr 45	0730	BHQ and remainder of Bn move to BOIKEN Area. A Coy reaches KALIMBOA Villages the EASTERN limit of Bn Area. Contact enemy and attack with tanks clearing the area and exploiting to WELURI. Arty concentrations despatch enemy at WELURI. D Coy continue sweeping foothills WEST of BOIKEN PLANTATION and are held up by JUKI HMG causing deployment. B Coy clear main plantation area and occupy high ground to SOUTH.	
	27 Apr 45	0700	Bde Comd visits Bn. Cas enemy 3 killed own Sgt Goolley and Pte William-Smith Wounded. 3 -37 MM Guns 1 JUKI HMG were captured. 19 Indian PWS were rescued. 2/3 Aust Inf Bn move through and establish Bridge head over HAWIAN RIVER	
		1330	B Coy contact enemy with JUKI HMG. Arty concentrations was called down and position captured. Cpl Saunders seriously wounded by AP Mine.	
		1500	Comd 19 Bde visits Bn.	
		1600	D Coy reaches objective.	
		1830	Lt Copeman with 12 Pl contacted enemy dug-in on Most SOUTHEASTERLY point of Bn Area.	
	28 Apr 45	0700	Enemy mortared 13 Pl area without cas. Capt MacCracken with two Pls left to attack enemy located by Lt Copeman. After heavy arty concentration position was captured. Cas. Pte Wise killed Pte Colbert wounded. A Coy rescue Indian PW.	
		1200	Comd 1st Aust Army, Comd 6 Aust Div, and 16 and 19 Bdes, visit Bn. Rear and B Esphelon join Bn at BOIKEM PLANTATION. Cpl Saunders died MDS. Lt HODDINOTT	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 Aust Inf Bn

Date and Time.—From 1 Mar 45

To 8 Mar 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
DANMAP RIVER-MIMA CREEK AREA	1 Mar 45	0830	Reece party of one Offr from each Coy and I O Capt J E Macdonald in charge leave to reece new area on coast. 12 Pl provided protection.	
		1000	Lt MacDougal called down 180 rds of Arty vicinity of MIKOM CREEK. First rounds fell amongst own troops, casualties—Pte Johnson (killed), Ptes Waller, Beck, and Englert wounded. Patrol commenced return to base. One farther Jap found killed. Total enemy casualties from this patrol five killed.	
	2 Mar 45	1500	Mail arrived. Remaining patrols sitting off.	
		0800	Adv BHQ established coast 800 yds WEST of ANUMB RIVER. D and C Coy with four dets. Mortar Pl leave for new area arrived 1200 hrs, no patrolling due to move.	
	3 Mar 45	0830	BHQ remainder of HQ less Mortar Pl and A and B Coys move to coast.	
		1200	Above Coys reached new location BHQ and all coys except B Coy, estab. on beach. B Coy estab 600 yds inland on old German road. Heavy surf with under-current but abundance of fresh water for bathing and washing to hand.	
	4 Mar 45	1600	Bn settling into new area. Two small local patrols found twenty one dead Japs in old M D S. ANUMB RIVER rose four feet.	
		0800	Mortar pl less two dets arrived new area.	
	5 Mar 45	1100	River still flooded. Patrol local. All reports cit. nor.	
		1600	Mail including Xmas parcels arrive. Xmas contained in parcels greatly appreciated.	
		2100	Four twenty five pounders guns landed by Bn and set up WEST bank ANUMB RIVER	
		0800	R MO returned from assisting 2/3 MG Bn with wounded.	
	6 Mar 45	1400	Patrol local only. No enemy activity. Topo information checked. Bde Comd visits Bn. Further move unlikely for a few days still river crossings bridged.	
		1500	Jap body washed up on beach was thrown back into the sea and taken by a shark, which are very prevalent on this coast.	
	7 Mar 45	1530	Further secondary mail arrived.	
		1200	TK/ATK reverts to comd of Bn.	
8 Mar 45	1200	Heavy rain. River again flooded.		
	0800	Lt Binney and TK/ATK Pl patrol SOUTH.		
	0900	Capt GIBBONS searched MDS on ANUMB RIVER. Nothing of interest.		
	1230	Bde Comd left for 2/3 MG Bn with escort of one Sec of C Coy.		
		1800	Bde Comd returned and stayed with Bn for the night. Surf calmer permitting bathing.	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

Unit 2/3 Aust Inf Bn

Date and Time.—From 8 Mar 45 To 16 Mar 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	9 Mar 45		B Coy located signs of Crocodiles in creek used for bathing. Bn reinsulated against Cholera. Lt Copeman on patrol across river located 7 dead Japs.	
	10 Mar 45	0900 1200	C O hold conference of Coy Comds to discuss W Q matters Maj MacKenzie relieved Maj Gibson as Bn 2/c and Maj Gibson resumed Comd D Coy. Patrols local Report NMS.	
	11 Mar 45	0900 1200	C O and O Group to Bde to study Sand Table of area of possible future Ops. I Sec instructed Bn by Pls on unit Sand Table representing New Area. C O and O Group returned from Bde. Sector of responsibility extended to NINAHAU RIVER. ANUMB again in flood.	
	12 Mar 45	0800 1600	Maj Gibson with I O and FOO takes 2 Pl Patrol to NINAHAU RIVER. Route expected to take two days. Mail arrived.	
	13 Mar 45	1815 1400	Welfare Officer Dube conducted evening church service. Capt Gibbons with 7 and 8 Pls with FOO party and Maj Foote of TK/ ATK Regt left on patrol in NINAHAU RIVER area.	
	14 Mar 45	2300	Very heavy squall. Some shelters demolished. Maj Gibbons patrol returned. Enemy cas. 1 Jap wounded. Reports route followed very swampy.	
	15 Mar 45	1300 1600	C Coy moved to LIMBE CREEK. Heavy Gale lasted one hour. Trees branches blown down and more shelters blown away.	
	15 Mar 45		Ly Varley with 10 Pl and 1 Sec 12 Pl plus FOO and party left to patrol across NINAHAU to LOANIM VILLAGE.	
	15 Mar 45	0900 1400	C O hold O Groupe conference and details future Opps in BUT AREA. Capt Gibbons and reports NMS.	
	16 Mar 45		Bde Comd Referred with C O .OO Ordered BnHQ with B and D Coys to KAUK VILLAGE.	
	16 Mar 45	0900	Move to KAUK commenced order of march B Coy-BHQ-D Coy. Crossing ANUMB RIVER delayed as only one boat available. Most troops waded the four foot stream.	
	16 Mar 45	1200 1500	BHQ and B and D Coys located KAUK Piggstation which is in ruins. Lt Varley patrol returned having been in LOANIM VILLAGE, Enemy cas 2 killed 1 wounded	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form 2118
(adapted.)

Unit 2/3 Aust Inf Bn Date and Time.—From 17 Mar 45 To 20 Mar 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
		1000	Two 25 Pounder guns moved into Bn area.	
		1000		
		1100	C Coy ordered to act as carrying party xxxxxx 2/3 Aust Inf Bn . encountered enemy arty fire. Pte Hawkins and Hinton wounded	
		1200	A Coy moved into a new area in forward position. Jeep traffic operated to our area. BAI	
		1400	Adjy and Capt Gibbons recce YSI VILLAGE as area for C Coy	
		1600	Surfing hampered by heavy seas.	
	18 Mar 45	2130	C Coy killed 1 Jap unarmed and unclothed in their area.	
		0800	Maj Gibson with 17 and 18 Pls and FOO party left on three day patrol up the NINAHAU RIVER. Capt Macdonald with 10 and 12 Pls and FOO party left on two day patrol to MARABUS VILLAGE	
		1000	Metrop News Paper dropped by Mail Plane providing first recent news since operations commenced.	
		1200	C Coy move from BIA to SIMLEE CREEK to collect their gear and biv the night.	
	19 Mar 45	1600	Heavy rain and surf.	
			C Coy with MMG Pl moved to BAI	
		1000	Two 25 Pounders moved to BAI. TK/ATK moved into gun area as protection	
			3 Jap P Ws captured .returned to Bde very emaciated.	
		1500	Capt Macdonald's patrol returned from MARABUS. Enemy cas 5 Killed 2 Wounded 6 found dead	
		1600	Further 6 Japs located in the NINAHAU area .	
		1800	Gramophone selections broadcast at YMCA Hut .	
	20 Mar 45	0800	A Coy moved as xxxxxxx advance patrol to clear MARABUS VILLAGE Area .	
			B Coy moved in wake of A Coy to occupy village when cleared /,	
		1100	TK/ATK Pl captured 2 P Ws at BAI. P Ws informed Ly Binny of the presence of 4 more Japs which the Pl located and killed 2.	
		1200	Free issue of Comforts Fund cigarettes .	
		1430	Maj Gibbon's patrol returned. Enemy cas 3 Killed 1 Wounded. Own cas Pte Holding wounded.	
		1500	A Coy report MARABUS clear/.	
		1530	MMG Pl killed 1 Jap.	
		1730	Following Bde Comds orders. C O holds C Group conference and detailed unit on 21 Mar 45	move to BUT RIVER

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 Aust Inf Bn Date and Time.—From 20 Mar 45 To 26 Mar 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	21 Mar 45	2030	Comd 6 Aust Div sends congratulatory message on speedy capture of BUT. C O sent Adjutant I O recon BUT Area. Bn moved to new area arriving approx 1230 hrs A and B Coys still in MARABUS Area.	
	22 Mar 45	1300	2 Indians previously Jap P W walked in 1 Indian shot by Arty line party. Surf much wilder than usual.	
		0830	C Coy with I O and Native Guid left on patrol for SEBIREFUTTO VILLAGE	
		0900	Maj MacKenzie resumed comd of D Coy. Maj Gibson attached to Bn HQ.	
		1700	A Coy returned from MARABUS Patrol to hold KAUK Area to collect gear Enemy cas 1 Oftrs 3, 6 killed. Impromptu patrol located large Jap Dumps in Bn area including Medical Gear.	
		2200	C Coy returned from patrol. Enemy cas 7 killed 1 L M G captured. Own cas Pte Shallow killed.	
	23 Mar 45	0900	A Coy moved into Bn area at BUT,	
		1000	Mortar brought in Jap SM captured by Bde H Q personnel.	
		1115	B Coy contacted Jap in MARABUS area. Cas enemy 2 killed. Own cas Pte Melvane DCM wounded.	
		1200	Good general mail.	
		1300	C O and I O to Bde Comds Conference to discuss future opps .	
		1600	TK/ATK Pl on local patrol. Enemy cas 1 killed. 1 Indian PW rescued.	
	24 Mar 45	0830	Lt Cory took Bn HQ patrol to HALEKAMOK RIVER .	
		1100	Bde Comd CO and IO visit 2/3 Aust Inf Bn. Bn future role likely to be the mountain sector.	
		1700	Lt King and 16 Pl establish ambush on HALEKAMOK RIVER. Enemy cas 2 killed.	
		1730x	B Coy join Bn from MARABUS enroute killed 1 Jap took 1 PW bringing Bn total above the certuary. Lt Corys patrol returned NMS.	
	25 Mar 45	0830	CO and O Group recon staging area vicinity DAGUA AREA.	
		1430	CO and IO to Bde Conference to discuss future opps.	
		1500	Lt King ambush patrol returns.	
		1730	Bde IO visited Bn with Topo Information and enemy information in Bns new area of responsibility.	
	26 Mar 45	1330	C O 2/1 Aust Fd Amb visited the Bn to investigate Dermatitis. 35 evacuations resulted .	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

Unit 2/3 Aust Inf Bn Date and Time.—From 27 Mar 45 To 30 March

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
		0830	Bn moves to staging area on main road DAGUA WONGINARA MISSION. CO, IO and Asst Adjt visit 2/3 Aust Inf Bn and make recce on northern slopes to JIKOKU PASS Bde Comd visited the bn and ordered move down MABAM RIVER area via 1410 feature. Cpl Kelley and Pte Harrington accidentally wounded by own S M G	
	28 Mar 45	1830 0645 0730 0900 1030 1300 1700 1715	C O holds C Group conference issues orders for move down MABAM Cpl King accidentally wounded own S M G. Bn moved commenced D Coy forward screen Pte Hedger accidentally wounded own S M G. D Coy contact enemy and kill 4. D Coy again contact and kill 3 enemy. D and A Coy reach objective. Bn biv for night on MABAM RIVER. MMG Pl posted on flank guard up river WEST of Bn killed 1 Jap. Pte Farkens and Cpl Pateman accidentally wounded.	
	29 Mar 45	0730 0830 0845 0930 1010 1015 1400 1500 1530 1745	B Coy advances NORTH along WONGINARA MISSION ROAD to contact enemy in rear. A Coy established stride road and river junction. C Coy captured wounded Jap. D Coy contact and kill 1 enemy. B Coy local patrol kill 1 Jap /, D Coy engaged by snipers. Cpl Monk and Pte Crotty wounded. Pte H Smith accidentally wounded own S M G. Sjt Reese with 15 Pl on patrol up river ambushed on return. Enemy ambush desperced. 5 Jap packs captured. Own gas. Pte Smith killed L/Cpl Grimson and Courtney and Pte Baldcock wounded. Snipers killed Pte Denton. D Coy contact enemy gas, enemy 5 killed down Pte Wilkins and Davis killed. L/Cpl Landers and Pte Osborne wounded. 1 L M G captured. D Coy called down Arty fire on Jap position. Forward sec killed 1 Jap. MMG Pl wounds 1 Jap.	
	30 Mar 45	0500 0830 1100	BHQ killed 2 enemy attempting to pass through position. BHQ HQ and C Coy move to new area junction WONGINARA MISSION ROAD and MABAM RIVER Contact patrol from B Coy incouneted enemy Pte Baliss wounded. Contact patrol from A Coy incouneter some enemy from rear. Gas enemy 2 killed own Pte Hammond and Adams killed Pte Fluke wounded.	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

Unit 2/3 Aust Inf Bn


Date and Time.—From 30 Mar 45 To 31 Mar 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
		1415	7 Pl killed 1 Jap. D Coy continue advance and encounter Duki H M C. Gas enemy Dixi Killed own Sjt Golding L/Cpl Reading and Pto gilis wounded.	
		1445	A Coy opens road to D Coy and killed 1 Jap.	
		1600	B Coy patrol contacts BHQ and was killed 1 Jap enroute.	
		1800	Bde Comd phases operations to be suspended till special courier arrives with information.	
		1830	Mail, fresh meat, and bread.	
	31 Mar 45	2030	Information received from Bde that entire Jap Div in our immediate vicinity D Coy relieved by 8 Pl A Coy returning to river killed 2 Japs.	
		1130	8 Pl killed 1 Jap sitting in tree.	
		1200	B Coy move EAST along river 600 yds to creek junction. Official War Historian GAVIN LONG visits Bde. W O 11 Godwin of Angua with line of 40 Police Boys and native guides join Bn for future Ops.	
		1400	Et Coy and 2 ORs and native guides recce High Ground NORTH of WONGINARA MISSION and EAST. Lt Weir with 2 ORs and native guides recce WONGINARA MISSION Both patrol report NMS.	
		1745	8 Pl killed 1 Jap	
		2200	Approx 100 refugee Kanakas are brought into Angua camp from KULEURIN VILLAGE area.	

MEMORY of SKETCH

MAJ. GEN. NAKAI H.Q.

DESTROYED BY "B" COY ATTACK 2 APR 45.



War Diary

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

2/3 Aust Inf Bn

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL REPORT
 REF MAPS BUT WEST } 1 inch to 1 mile
 BUT EAST }

16 AUST INFBDE

1. The following report covering the Current Campaign in BRITISH NEW GUINEA is submitted:

RECORD OF EVENTS

2. Period Covered

From 28 Jan to 9 Apr 45.

3. Area of Ops

Vide A ppx A att

4. Nature of Ops

Tasks allotted were:-

- (a) To hold the line ARIUAI SADDLE - MALIN - ILAP and clear enemy EAST of grid 69.
- (b) On 21 Feb 45 the task of holding the above line was taken over by 2/3 Aust M & Bn, 2/9 Aust Cav Cmdo Sqn passed from Comd to 2/3 Aust M & Bn. On the same day this units area of responsibility was extended to include the area vide Appx A att.
- (c) On 24 Feb the limit area of responsibility was again extended to incl the area vide Appx A att
- (d) On 3 Mar the Bn moved down to the Coast vicinity the mouth of ANUMB RIVER while the Bde re-organised. The areas of responsibility successively allotted were as per Appx A att.
- (e) On 27 Mar 45 the following tasks were allotted the unit :-
 - (i) Clear enemy along MABAM RIVER from incl Ck and river junc 214943 to incl river and track junc 204950
 - (ii) Cut off the enemy then opposing the 2/2 Aust Inf Bn in the JIKKOKU PASS, by occupying the ground astride enemy L of C SOUTH of the Pass, and destroy such enemy from his rear.
 - (iii) Clear enemy from area Vide A ppx A att

5. DISPOSITIONS

For unit dispositions at various phases vide APPX A att.

6. Method Adopted

Due to lack of precise infm as to enemy strenghts and dispositions a policy of vigorous patrolling to **cover** the several unit sectors was adopted.

7. Types of Patrols Employed(a) Recon

Strength one sec' where possible under comd an offr. This strength was found suitable giving necessary confidence to the men, while being small enough to move undetected. Scouts were worked well forward of the main body. Maps proved reliable, but difficulty was experienced in the early stages of finding Patrol Leaders capable of correctly relating the Map to the ground. This was due to the heavy canopy precluding the true representation of shape of spurs and re-entrants leading to main features. It was found that careful study of maps and A ir Photographs almost completely eliminated this difficulty, and where patrols after this study carried out a rough traverse of the route and paced distances, infm gained was reliable and could be positioned on map. Int Sec pers due to their more specialised trng were found invaluable for this work and were included where ever possible. However the WE Strength of this Sec does not permit of their use as fully as would liked.

(b) Fighting

Strength dependent on infm to hand reaf enemy and distance to be covered. Evac of Gas from a deep patrol necessitated the allotting of more tps to the task than ever needed for actual fighting. Patrols of from one to two Pls strength with full compliment of Coy SBs augmented by bearers from Fd A and a RAP representative and an F O O Arty and Sig Party proved very effective. Patrols of this strength were sufficient to deal with any enemy likely to be encountered, handle evac of own Gas and still be *capable of* completing its task. Larger patrols of One Coy were found unwieldy due to the lack of manoeuvrability unless a special task against a known enemy position in strength was allotted. In this case the operation became more a planned Coy attack than a Patrol. In order to successfully ~~clear~~ ^{cover} the whole of the Unit Sector, where practicable, Coys were allotted a sub area of responsibility. Vide Appx A att. The enemy's inclination to give ground when attacked led to the necessity of travelling long distances over rough country in order to locate and destroy him. Questions of supply and the necessity to hold the essential ground precluded fwd mov of Coy Localities. Accordingly a plan of successive patrolling was adopted. A patrol proceeded with full rations and gear to a suitable area in the locality to be cleared, est a base and worked from there. This patrol was relieved on expiration of its task, the relieving patrol taking ^{over} unexpended amm and shelters etc., of the first patrol. This proved satisfactory, eliminated much useless marching and prevented enemy reoccupation of ground cleared. The presence of an A rty O P O ensured Comn as well as provided protection with def fire if needed and A rty was always available to deal with an enemy encountered in strength. In all fighting patrols the

value of Arty F O O cannot be too highly stressed. The provision of sufficient Arty Sig pers to handle the Sig Eqpt is necessary in order to save inroads into the fighting strength of the patrol. The need for good deep scouting coupled with aggressive action on all fighting patrols became most apparent. Scouts were found to work most successfully well fwd of the point sec. Up to 50 to 60 yds fwd of the leading tps was found practicable for the scouts in all country encountered other than dense Pit Pit, which in any case is best probed from a flank. Link men were provided from fwd sec and hand signals were easily understood and acted upon. In every encounter of the unit during the period covered by this report (with but one exception) our patrols were able to come to assault distance of the enemy undetected. Patrols which, upon location of the enemy and having achieved surprise struck hard were invariably successful with few cas. Patrols which lacked aggression invariably suffered Cas without achieving results.

8.

Actions

(a) A two PI Patrol on 1 Feb located 5 enemy dug in on the crest of a spur. Being undetected, the leading PI at once deployed, assaulted, killed 3 enemy and took the position without cas. Later the same day approx 40 enemy entrenched on the top of a 2100 ft razor backed ridge were encountered. The enemy sentry was located, surprised and killed. The patrol proceeded avoiding tracks. Enemy defences were located by scouts, recce was made and the whole force deployed on the ridge and attack launched undetected. Force was committed one PI fwd one res. Fire was held till tps moved in assault. The outer perimeter was over run and three LMGs captured before the enemy could effectively employ his weapons. Soon as the leading PIs adv began to slacken, and a fire fight appeared to be developing the second PI was committed. Arty and Coy HQ personnel formed the res. This second PI moving into the attack from the flank, and through, the leading pi maintained mov and the whole posn was cleared. Although the enemy mounted his weapons and produced very heavy fire incl grenades from posns sited in depth the mov of our tps, coupled with the fire power of the PI weapons, rendered him unable to cope with the assault and he left his pits thereby becoming easy prey. Six LMGs were captured, quantities of food consisting of rice, tinned meats, curries, coffee and tea were found in area as well rifles, grenades packs and shelters in quantity. Maps and docs showing the presence of new units in the area, their location and intention to attack our force were captured. Thirty three enemy dead were found. Own cas 1 killed 7 wounded.

(b) A similar attack was made on 9 Feb when enemy (who had one hour previously been engaged by a smaller party) were located by the scouts. The position was approached avoiding tracks. The defences were found, recce made and assault launched with complete surprise. The position was captured, two LMGs

(fired from pits with overhead cover) one Bren Gun, packs and eqpt were taken. Cas enemy 5 known dead, own one died of wounds.

- (c) On 26 Feb a patrol 1 Pl strength following a track up a razor back spur was fired on from high ground commanding the approach. Attempts to draw fire was successful and the strength of the enemy position determined. The OP Offr accompanying the force went fwd and selected a suitable OP. The patrol withdrew to a safe distance. Ranging was carried out, the posn engaged with gun fire, and at the conclusion of the conc, the Pl which had moved fwd to within a 150 yds of the posn, assaulted, capturing the ridge without Cas.
- On this occasion the enemy was seen to fire their weapons blindly from their pits, by reaching the weapon fwd without exposing even their head. This fire was of course ineffective. 7 enemy dead were counted the remainder fled.
- (d) A patrol of 2 Pl strength was proceeding in the A NUMB RIVER area, and en route encountered two parties of enemy each of approx 2 Str. On contact the Pl deployed and the adv was very considerably delayed. During the second day enemy in small parties, moved into the rear of the column giving rise to the opinion that he was in greater str than was the fact. These enemy tactics not being fully investigated or dealt with through ~~the~~ diffidence and lack of enterprise on the part of the patrol, cond caused the patrol to return to base with its task incomplete. The same patrol brought Arty fire down on a village. The sight selected for the OP was not in sight of the target. Ranging was dispensed with, and a map spot used to indicate the target. The first rounds fell among own tps causing cas.
- (e) During the carrying out of the second phase of the Bn task in the NINAHAU RIVER area small patrols were sufficient to clear the area between the ANUMB and NINAHAU RIVERS and on completion patrolling was commenced EAST of the NINAHAU. A patrol located enemy dug in astride a saddle EAST of the RIVER. One cas was inflicted on our tps. the patrol withdrew and took no further action. This patrol on return reported having been in MARABAS VILLAGE, and gave infm as to the location of VILLAGE and as to track which was later found to be inaccurate. This infm was plotted on the patrol map and was used as the basis to brief a coy as a patrol to clear the area incl the village. In the wake of this coy a second coy moved with all gear to establish a base from which to operate and clear the remainder of the Bn sector of that phase.
- Acting on the infm given in the briefing this coy patrol, proceeded on the route laid down without checking the map with the ground, or pacing. The result was that this patrol occupied a village, believed to be MARABAS. On checking this was found not to be the case and both coys spent a whole day patrolling before the correct village was located and the force was able to orient itself.
- This delay besides tiring the tps unnecessarily, prevented the force from clearing the area allotted in the time available.

- (f) For the Adv of the Bn from BUT RIVER and over the coastal range and down the MABAM RIVER on 28 Mar a mob Screen of one coy moved in adv of the coin in patrol order. Small delaying pockets of enemy were encountered all along the route. On contact the fwd elements immediately attacked with a minimum of deployment and in every case the enemy was dispersed of at once; and the advance was not impeded. The whole Bn moved self contained with all gear (other than that of the fwd coy) six thousand yds in the day. The two fwd coys reached the objective, via track and river June 957201. When moving fwd NORTH towards the JIKKOKU PASS on 29 Mar, the leading tps were fired on by enemy snipers from well concealed posns on the dominating ground. Deployment was necessary and the snipers dispersed. Pits were single, well sited and not protected by other tps. The task of containing the enemy from the SOUTH preparatory to clearing him from the JIKKOKU PASS was allotted to one coy. By probing fwd till the main posn was reached, and then holding astride the spurs leading to the enemy's defences this task was successfully accomplished. Though holding, pressure was maintained, and the coy continuously probed fwd and slight advances were made. Enemy HMG and LMGs sighted in depth were encountered. Due to a patrol of the 2/2 Aust Inf Bn being in the area, but owing to the lack of info as to its exact whereabouts and the risk of our tps encountering Arty fire which this patrol might call down, this units activities were curtailed and no mov NORTH of grid 21 was permitted by 16 Aust Inf Bde. On 4 A pr orders were received lifting the ban on mov NORTH of grid 21 and one coy was ordered to carry out an encircling mov to the EAST and NORTH, and secure the high ground N E of the enemy defns, from which an attack could be launched. The coy achieved this object the same day, despite enemy opposition from dug in defences. On 4 A pr another coy was ordered to proceed via the same route and join the fwd coy. The force was placed under comd Maj K M MCKENZIE and ordered to attack and destroy the enemy. The second coy arrived in posn approx 1100 hrs 4 A pr. An Arty conc was called for, the OP offr went fwd to est his OP, and ranged. In order to ensure that the rds fell on the target (which was a narrow razor back ridge) this offr actually called down fire on his own posn. A conc of 350 rds was fired. The Inf moved into the assault as the last rds were in flight, one coy fwd. The enemy was caught scrambling back to their posns up the sides of the ridge and the posn extending for 500 yds was captured, without cas to own tps. Over 30 weapon pits with overhead cover and sighted in depth along the ridge were found. So accurate was the Arty fire that the whole ridge was pock marked by shells and even in cases direct hits had been registered on pits. This attack ended all organised enemy resistance in the area.
- (g) Native refugees inform the unit through ANGAU of the location of the enemy HQs of 20 Div, under Maj Gen NAKAI. A force of two coys under Capt J E MACDONALD was despatched to locate and destroy these HQs on 2 Apr.

The native guides led the force via small KA NAKA pads, and along a well concealed route to the vic of the enemy HQ. The coln halted about 500 yds distant and the natives went fwd. On return they stated the enemy was still in occupation and led the force fwd. When within 100 yds of the enemy posn, a recce was made of the enemy held feature. The guide indicated approaches, posn of enemy sentries and location of the defences. One coy was committed to the attack directed to the right flank of the feature. This coy reached to within 10 yds of the enemy undetected, deployed and then assaulted. Complete surprise was effected, the posn captured and the force consolidated for the night. 28 enemy dead were counted, two IMGs captured, food in very large quantities was left by the enemy and documents of importance taken. This area had telephone conn to the Jap Tps then in JIKKOKU PASS and was undoubtedly Maj Gen NAKAI'S HQ. Whether the Gen was killed was not established.

- (h) On 3 Apr the MACDONALD force was ordered to patrol and clear the Bn Sector SOUTH of grid 17. This was done by organising two patrols each of two pls, and for two days the area was combed. Only isolated enemy was found and the whole area declared clear on 4 Apr.
- (j) As the 2/2 Aust Inf Bn were about to attack the villages EAST OF AUROCI, one coy was ordered down the MABAM RIVER on 7 Apr to river and track junc vic 004174. Ambushes were established at this point and generally along the river, at track crossings and maintained for four days. Only 2 enemy were seen and these were killed.
- (k) On 9 Apr the unit dispositioned certain coys vide appx A att and the remainder of the Bn moved to DAGUA AIRCROOME for rest. Within two days the whole unit was relieved by 2/3 Aust MG Bn.

9. Employment of Natives in Ops

On 30 Mar WO LL GODWIN of ANGAU with 4 native police boys and a line of KANA KA guides became att to the Bn. The knowledge of bush craft, ability to appreciate ground, keen eye sight and tracking ability possessed by these boys is remarkable. Moreover they were at all times found honest in their reports and no attempt at "bolstering" was made. The addition of these natives to the Unit str undoubtedly saved lives, many miles of needless marching, and enabled numerous enemy pockets to be killed which would doubtless otherwise have been missed.

These native boys were employed in 3 main rules :-

- (a) As deep standing patrols behind enemy lines, with the task of enticing unfriendly natives in the employ of the JAPANESE over to our cause. It was found that even in the most hostile areas these patrols were successful. On more than one occasion the whole inhabitants of a village have been brought in, numbering over 200 pers. The acquisition of these "usefuls" was of two fold advantage;
 - (i) The enemy was deprived of his most versatile sentries, best food providers, and his only means of portage apart from his own tps. A typical example was when the entire population of the

village of KUBURIN who had lately acted as porters, food suppliers and sentries for the HQ 20 Div were brought in.

- (ii) These natives gave under interrogation by ANGAU representative accurate infm as to enemy dispositions, weapons, supplies, mov and numbers. They frequently acted as guides for our tps to these enemy posns. This infm enabled the Bn to proceed direct to the posn occupied by the enemy, by the shortest route, and was of material assistance in determining the size of the force to be despatched to deal with the situation.

Police boys were excellent in the art of seduction and "greasing" refugees, and unostentatiously moved among the KANAKAS gleanng infm attempted to be held back under interrogation.

Interrogation of these natives is a matter for an expert and must be done by a person with a thorough knowledge of the native as well as his language. Time must be given to the interrogations. Hurried questioning results in incomplete infm.

- (b) As Deep reconce patrols behind the enemy lines.

These patrols str 1 or more Police boys and a small line of KANAKAS proved invaluable in locating enemy posns. L of C and Str. Enemy mov was also reported enabling possible areas of conc to be located. Later our tps were led to the area direct and much needless patrolling obviated. The best results were obtained by the unit briefing the ANGAU representative, who in turn briefed the natives. Dealings, for these patrols should be left entirely to ANGAU. Some instances of the success of natives in this rôle are set out hereunder to illustrate the value of this intelligence.

- (i) A rough sketch of an enemy posn was made by a native, giving area, disposn of weapons and approx str. This was later found to be accurate.
- (ii) Nine JAPA NESE were located by natives at the head water of WONGONARA CREEK. A patrol led to the scene destroyed 8 enemy without cas.
- (iii) Three enemy snipers were located by natives, he was detected and actually spoke to the JAPANESE, he slipped away, infm the Coy Comd and led a party fwd who killed all three.

- (c) As guides and scouts in close co-operation with own tps.

In this rôle native boys were of great assistance to patrols moving over a route where the posn of the enemy was not known; provided the boys were used correctly. The boys must be allowed to work independently of our tps. They will search the ground in their own way and their own time and do the job thoroughly if not interfered with. The only successful way to ensure this is by only allowing one person (who should have some knowledge of Pidgin) to speak with the No. 1 boy of the line. Comd with the rest of the line should be discouraged, and comd with any of the natives by any person other than the one selected for the task should be forbidden. Interference and untimely questioning results in the task being incompleated by the boys and a chaotic report ensues.

These native boys must not be used as scouts in the ordinary military sense of the word. If asked to keep contact while moving they work too closely and are disrupted by the noise of our tps.

The system is for the natives to halt the column, go fwd and do his recce. He will return and report and the the coln can then move till again halted. Should the boys locate enemy they will guide our tps into posn. Owing to their value in ops and due to the number available, the boys should not be allowed to go in to the attack. Though they will if not restrained.

Again if enemy is located and our tps do not take advantage of the infm given and take steps to deal with the enemy promptly, the native becomes disappointed loses some of his faith in the soldier and will not work conscientiously. Pockets located should be attacked at once when ever possible.

The JAPANESE KANAKA sentry is one of the deadliest enemy encountered. His bushcraft makes him more perilous to our tps than his masters. Friendly natives and police boys are the answer. They will see him first and save at least the loss of our scouts.

ADM

10. Sups

Vide appx B att

11. Med

Vide appx C att

12. AMN

The problem of faulty amn and resultant cas to own tps is dealt with 2/3 Aust Inf Bn report of 6 Mar 45.

13. Native Porters

These were used almost continuously throughout this Campaign. They were entirely satisfactory and 250 boys were found sufficient to keep the Bn supplied and to move 3 coys self contained with full amn incl res in one lift. No difficulty was experienced in obtaining permission for boys to service even fwd coys, but adequate protection was always afforded the line.

14. Air Dropping

The Bn and 2/9 Aust Cav Cmdo Sqn under comd were supplied by air (the DZ being located MALIN) from 28 Jan to 3 Mar.

Recovery was almost 100% . Any deficiency was attributed to parachutes failing to open, which occurred on a few occasions. Over the whole period 97½% recovery was effected. Demands were speedily supplied, Packing by Air Maint was good. For the first time in this units experience med sups were Air Dropped. Parachutes were used and 100% recovery effected and no article was damaged. MMG and Mortar 3 inch were dropped successfully.

15. Comm

(a) Line was at all times used where possible and proved reliable.

- (b) Alternative comm by wireless was unsatisfactory.
- (i) The 108 set MK ii did not on any occasion work successfully.
 - (ii) 536 sets were of use only for comm within the force patrolling. They were of considerable use from coys and point Secs to rear elements. For comm to base they were of no utility.
 - (iii) The No. 11 set is far too heavy to handle and is not reliable.
 - (iv) 22 sets were found satisfactory and an allotment of these sets to Bns is recommended.

PART 11

LESSONS FROM OP

16. (a) Use of Maps and Aerial Photos

In order to correctly navigate and to orient posns, in the type of country encountered, a thorough study of maps in conjunction with Aerial Photos and use of Compass is essential. Maps compiled from Aerial Photos were quite different from maps compiled on the ground. The shape and nature of features (due to canopy) are not accurate in maps made from photos. Height spots are only approx. These factors necessitate a very high standard of trg in both map reading and the interpretation of aerial Photos. Too much stress cannot be made on the value of trg in both these subjects.

(b) Knowledge of JAPA. NESE mil. characteristics

A good knowledge of this subject is of assistance especially in patrolling. JAPANESE actions and mov encountered on patrols can be correctly interpreted and appropriate action taken without loss of time and manpower only when the comds are conversant with the JAPANESE methods.

(c) Est of Patrol Bases

To clear any considerable area of responsibility allotted a force, with the minimum amount of travelling, the est of fwd patrol bases is necessary.

The Advantages are Three fold ;

- (i) Unnecessary wastage of manpower is obviated.
- (ii) Essential grounds gained is held preventing enemy re occupation.
- (iii) The sector of responsibility allotted the Unit is much more quickly cleared.

(d) Necessity of Surprise

The value of surprise, though always recognised, is more than ever emphasised in this parts of country and against this enemy. A knowledge of Jap tactics, coupled with good scouting, will in almost all cases achieve this object. Tracks should be avoided.

Scouts must work widely, up to 60 yds in adv of the point sec is possible. This gives surprise and enables the remainder of the force to be closed up thereby preserving the striking ability of the force and ease of deployment. Experience of the JAPANESE in def leads to the conclusion that the "back door" is invariably open or at least lightly guarded. The hardest approach is in the end the easiest.

(e) Concentration of Striking Force

When located AND SURPRISE EFFECTED, the force must at once strike with every weapon and man available, and at the same time mov must be maintained. The present enemy is incapable under these circumstances of dealing with the combination of fire power of Pl weapons and mov.

(f) Employment of Arty Sp

Against enemy defended localities where surprise cannot be gained or the extent of the locality necessitates support, Arty is ideal. FOOs must be prepared to est themselves close to the enemy posn so as to effectively control the fire. Ranging must be thorough, and the shoot conducted on the "close target" principle. To avail the force of the maximum advantage of this sp, the assault should follow immediately the conc is stopped. This enemy will vacate his def posn under a conc, and a quick moving force will catch him out of posn.

(g) Employment of Natives in Ops

This has proved a most successful answer to the query as to the best method of operating successfully against the enemy in this class of country. Their employment makes the task comparatively easy. Native boys should be used with fwd tps whenever available and it is recommended that an ANGAU representative with Police boys and a line of KANAKAS be at all times attached to a unit during ops.

(h) Morale

The only time the soldier becomes so fagged as to feel incapable for further action is when the offr in cmd succumbs to fatigue. Every offr commanding men in action must be prepared to go on and overcome his fatigue if he is to maintain the fighting spirit of his tps. Failure in an offr to carry this out results in tps becoming pre-maturely exhausted.

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT17. Unit Sp Weapons(a) HK/A guns, MMG, PITA

No task was found for any of these weapons during the current campaign, due to the class of the country operated in.

(b) Mortar 3 inch

No adequate justification can be found for carrying these weapons when Arty Sp is available. Employment of Arty obviates the hard carrying of weapons and amn and performs the task equally as well if not better.

(c) It is considered that the sp weapons should be carried as a readily available res with the unit B Ech.(d) Personnel of the 3 pls carrying these sp weapons are most effectively employed in this type of country as infantry men.18. O S M G

This weapon is reliable and effective. Its one big disadvantage is its liability to discharge when bumped. This characteristic has resulted in a number of cas to own tps and steps should be taken to remedy this fault. Modifications made and tested by 45 Aust I A D has been investigated and is a successful counter to this fault. Adoption of this modification is recommended.

19. Other Unit Weapons

All were found effective, and reliable.

20. Air Sp

No target justifying the use of air sp was encountered.

21. Eqpt(a) webbing

The new issue of webbing received in recent months is inferior in quality and its life is not more than 6 weeks. Even before becoming unserviceable it slips during use, and is ill fitting. Pouches basic new type are not of a size to accommodate BREN or OSMG mags and still be capable of being buttoned. It is recommended that all web eqpt be subject to review in order to manufacture a better material and suitable pouches.

(b) Clothing

(i) Sizes of trousers are far too large. Chafing and skin trouble ensues.

(ii) Sox have been in short supply. The life of a pair of sox is only a few days when tps are continually wet or wading creeks. The loose weave tends to cause serious shrinkage when wet.

(iii) shirts - the life of a shirt under conditions of these ops is 3 weeks.

12.


- (iv) Boots - the present issue is good. When subjected to long periods of wet, boots become hard. Dubbin is the only substance found effective to overcome this. The JELLY substitute issued to this unit washes off too easily and was found NON effective.
- (v) It is recommended that full res of all clothing with full range of sizes and adequate stocks of dubbin be on hand and that units be free to draw on demand.

(d) Sig Dept

- (i) LT: this is the most reliable method of comm.
- (ii) Wireless - Vide para 15 (b) above.

20 Apr 45

Ian Hutchison Lt Col
(Ian Hutchison)
Comd 2/3 Aust Inf Bn



SUBS

1. During this campaign the flow of subs with the exception of web eqpt, clothing, boots, dubbin and "BETTY" has been excellent.

The system of supply has been varied embracing supply by :-

- (a) Air
- (b) Native Porters
- (c) M T.

All systems worked smoothly. Demands were met promptly where goods were available.

2. Rations

At all stages of this operation rations have been excellent and a good balanced diet has at all times been available. Fresh meat and vegetables have at all times been included even in the delivery to the most fwd tps. The quality of the rations has undoubtedly been reflected in the health of the tps.

3. Res

Supplies were adequate (with the exceptions contained in para 1 above) to build up res up to 7 days in any coy localities where necessary.

MED

1. Med Supplies

Supplies have been received readily on request. In one phase stores were air dropped with 100% recovery and without damage.

2. Mov of RAP

- (a) It was found that 20 NATIVE PORTERS were needed to fully move in one lift the whole RAP stores and installations.
- (b) Where NATIVE PORTERS were unavailable the RAP pers moved carrying sufficient stores to enable the post to function for 3 days. Very careful selection of stores carried is needed, and every contingency cannot be provided for but proper functioning for this period can be expected under normal op conditions.

3. Work Performed

RAP was used in its normal role of dressing and resuscitation stations. An emergency kit was kept packed to enable RMO to go fwd and meet cas enroute to post and render assistance. This proved a great help. Administration of serum was successful and is necessary at these posts.

Pers of the RAP Staff when possible accompanied patrols. Their work in the field was meritorious.

4. Evac of Cas

As the op consisted of long patrols, far from the location of RAP, difficulties of evac were encountered. The WB of the RAP is considered too small to enable the supply of trained pers to proceed with patrols of 3 or more days duration. The need for these pers to accompany such patrols is real and their presence undoubtedly saved lives.

The est of 4 stretcher bearers per coy is totally inadequate. In the class of country operated over a minimum of 6 men per stretcher case is essential. For long carries lasting more than 2 hrs a minimum of 8 is required. The absence of sufficient bearers means that the fighting str of the patrol is depleted.

For a period of 2 weeks 32 bearers were att from Fd Amb. For a previous period of one month 16 bearers were att.

As more than one patrol operates at one time it was considered 16 bearers a minimum number effective for the task. This meant that bearers got no rest as on return with one patrol it was necessary to send them out again the following day due to lack of relief.

In one instance a man seriously wounded at approx 18:00K took 22 hrs to reach R A P. Four hours later he reached the surgical team at Fd Amb. This is indicative of the strain on unit bearers.

An increase in numbers to enable at least 20 bearers to be available to the two fwd coys, with adequate reliefs is considered necessary.

5. Surgical Teams

These teams operated in ADS and were maintained as far fwd as the sup problem permitted. The presence of these teams was of the greatest value not only in treating cas quickly but in keeping morale high.

General Health of Tps

- (i) Generally the health of the tps has been good with the exception of the following complaints :-
- (a) Malaria - this disease has caused the greater number of cas. Since the drop in the daily dose of ATEBRIN from 2 tablets per day to 1 the increase in the incidence has been alarming. Approx 70 proven cases occurred in 3 weeks. It is considered that a return to a dosage of 2 ATEBRIN per day would greatly reduce this wastage.
 - (b) Dermatitis - tinea and pustular dermatitis have at all times been noticeable. In the majority of cases the complaint responds to treatment especially if sun and rest can be obtained.
 - (c) Constitutional Insufficiency - this is a very real problem and complaint. Men who have had 4 - 5 or even 3 previous campaigns are very prone to this disability, especially where the campaigns culminated in the Owen Stanley Mountains and where malaria was previously contracted. Some of these men who were able to carry on in a standing camp despite hard trg, since arrival in this area have succumbed to this disability to an extent where they are completely burnt out, and cannot stand up to work as previously. In most cases nothing can be demonstrated clinically.
 - (d) Dengue - the incidence of this fever has been high. Next to malaria it has caused the mos t cas,
 - (e) Neurosis - (anxiety state) - it is considered not enough thought is given by med authorities to these cases. In a number of cases the patient is at once suspect of a desire to evade his obligations before treatment is commenced. Some cases can be treated at RAP but in close fighting this type of disability is a problem to the Pl, therefore considerable notice should be taken of reports of Pl and Coy Comds on these cases before treating. After all the man's immediate commander sees the soldier all day and under all conditions and he is therefore capable of judging or otherwise of the presence of the Anxiety State.
 - (f) Dysentery - Cases of Dysentery have been almost negligible. This is due to good hygiene and water discipline.

War Diary

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

2/3 Aust Inf Bn

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL REPORT
 REF MAPS BUT WEST }
 BUT EAST } 1 inch to 1 mile

16 AUST INFBDE

1. The following report covering the Current Campaign in BRITISH NEW GUINEA is submitted:

RECORD OF EVENTS

2. Period Covered

From 28 Jan to 9 Apr 45.

3. Area of Ops

Vide A ppx A att

4. Nature of Ops

Tasks allotted were:-

- (a) To hold the line ARIUAI SADDLE - MALIN - ILAP and clear enemy EAST of grid 69.
- (b) On 21 Feb 45 the task of holding the above line was taken over by 2/3 Aust M G Bn, 2/9 Aust Cav Cmdo Sqn passed from Comd to 2/3 Aust M G Bn. On the same day this units area of responsibility was extended to include the area vide Appx A att.
- (c) On 24 Feb the limit area of responsibility was again extended to incl the area vide Appx A att
- (d) On 3 Mar the Bn moved down to the Coast vicinity the mouth of ANUMB RIVER while the Bde re-organised. The areas of responsibility successively allotted were as per Appx A att.
- (e) On 27 Mar 45 the following tasks were allotted the unit :-
 - (i) Clear enemy along MABAM RIVER from incl Ck and river junc 214943 to incl river and track junc 204950
 - (ii) Cut off the enemy then opposing the 2/2 Aust Inf Bn in the JIKKOKU PASS, by occupying the ground astride enemy L of C SOUTH of the Pass, and destroy such enemy from his rear.
 - (iii) Clear enemy from area Vide A ppx A att

5. DISPOSITIONS

For unit dispositions at various phases vide APPX A att.

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
A 14 (Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 24/3/1945 2/3 Aust Inf Bn (Unit)

W.E. 11/12/3 OFFRS 33 O.R's 769 + OFFRS 1 O.R's 33 ATT. BY W.E.

PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.					TOTAL.				
Rein'ts Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Rein'ts Required.					
-	-	-	1	Lieut.-Colonels	NAME (RMO)	1	-	-	-					
-	-	-	3	Majors										
-	2	-	7	Captains										
-	-	4	24	Lieutenants										
-	-	-	-	Quarter-masters										
-	-	-	-	A.A.N.S. and A.A.M.W.S. Offrs.										
-	-	-	-	Civilians Counting as Offrs.										
-	2	4	35			1	-	-	-					
Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 10 of instructions for compilation of form will complete Part E(1) & E(2).				DETAIL	A.I.F.	C.M.F.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.N.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	**	TOTAL.
				A.	36									36
				E.(1)										
				E.(2)										

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.
** Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit From.	Date.	CAUSE.
NX11644	LT	JACKSON WT	NG School of Sigs	22.3.45	Resumed Regt'l Duties
NX12157	LT	KING GBC	HOSPITAL	19.3.45	" " "
SX35215	Chap	HARLEY RR	12 Lt AA Regt	22.3.45	Attached from 16 Bde HQ UNIT PADRE

OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit To.	Date.	CAUSE.
NIL					

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO.....(Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. / / 194.....

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).
NIL			

2/3 Aust Inf Bn Unit

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON POSTED STRENGTH

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 24/3/43 (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	Army Number.	Surname.	Initials.	Posting.	Whether present with Unit (insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	Date of Detachment.
LT Col	NA100	HITCHISON	I	CO	yes		
Maj	NA108	GIBSON	ET	2 IC	yes		
"	NA325	MACKINNON	AS	OC Regt	yes		
T/Maj	NA7046	MACKENZIE	KM	OC Regt	yes		
Capt	NA128778	MCKERREN	JA	24 Regt	yes		
"	NA11140	MARDSVAN	MS	24 Regt	yes		
"	NA34890	MACDONALD	JE	OC Regt	yes		
"	NA12174	GILL	JM	OC Regt	yes		
"	NA12174	GIBBINS	GW	OC Regt	yes		
LT	NA12152	DOUGLAS	SF	SPNUM	yes		
"	NA12154	BOYER	KM	Pland	yes		
LT T/Capt	NA11536	HAVEN	FB	GM	yes		
"	VX10166	JOHNSTONE	BWW	Pland	yes		
LT	NA12157	KING	G B G	Pland	yes		
"	NA13920	KUMBLE	NK	Pland	yes		
"	NA1572	MCK DOUGAL	BH	24 Regt	yes		
"	NA11541	CARRIN	HJA	SPNUM	yes		
"	NA10393	VARNEY	CW	Pland	yes		
"	NA60231	BROADFOOT	M	Pland	yes		
"	NA22735	GROVER	LW	SPNUM	yes		
"	NA118760	GRIFFITHS	ET	Pland	yes		
"	NA128791	SCOTT	GE	Pland	yes		
"	NA111438	JONES	LEV	Pland	yes		
"	NA118640	WEIR	SP	Pland	yes		
"	NA76317	STONE	CG	Pland	yes		
"	NA1626	BELL	EG	1 D	yes		
"	NA101644	JACKSON	WT	Sig O	yes		
"	NA12145	COPPERMAN	J	Pland	yes		
"	NA1114	COCKY	GE	Pland	yes		
"	NA12163	SEALY	JA	Pland	yes		
"	NA14533	BINNEY	TH	Pland	yes		
"	NA14074	MILCOY	TE	Pland	yes		
"	NA102833	CHARLES	DW	SPNUM	yes		
"	NA15033	BERNSIDIE	CH	Pland	yes		
"	NA10685	VARLEY	KA	Pland	yes		
ATTACHED WITHIN WE							
Capt	VX11683	PARK	R L J	RMD	yes	Attached from 29 2-43	

PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	Army Number.	Name and Initials.	Unit.	Date of Attachment.	Nature of Attachment.
Chap	SX35215	HARLEY KR	16 Aust Inf Bn	22.3.43	Parole
LT	B2387	DUBE HG	Aust Army Apprentices	2.3.43	YMC A REP

24 Mar 43
Date of Despatch

Law Hutcherson Lt Col
Signature of Commander
Comd 2/3 Aust Inf Bn

Date 24.3.45

2/3 AUST INF BN

WE - 11/12C/3

TRADE	Rank	WE		Def icit	Sur plus	Rfts requ ired
<u>TRADE GROUP 1</u>						
Blacksmith	Pte	1	1			
<u>TRADE GROUP 11</u>						
Carp enter	Pte	6	5	1		
Int Duties	Sjt	1	1			
" "	Cpl	2	2			
" "	Pte	7	9		2	
Signallers	Cpl	4	4			
"	Pte	22	25		3	
<u>TRADE GROUP 111</u>						
Butcher	Pte	1	1			
Clerk	Sjt	2	2			
"	Cpl	6	4	2		
"	Pte	4	3	1		
Eqpt Repairer	Pte	1	1			
Rangetaker	Pte	4	1	3		
Storeman Tech	Sjt	1	1			
" "	Pte	3	3			
Tailor	Sjt	1	1			
"	Cpl	1	1			
<u>NON-SPECIALISTS</u>						
RSM	WO 1	1	1			
CSM	WO 11	5	5			
RQMS	WO 11	1	1			
CQMS	S/Sjt	5	5			
Pl Sjt	Sjt	25	20	5		
Batmen	Pte	35	35			
Dvrs MT	Cpl	1	1			
Dvrs MT	Pte	11	11			
Gen Duties (Mess)	Pte	3	3			
Hyg Duties	Pte	4	4			
LMG/Riflemen	Cpl	36	28	8		
" "	Pte	361	308	53		
MMG Nos	Cpl	2	2			
"	Pte	20	20			
Mortar Nos	Cpl	5	5			
"	Pte	68	68			
Orderlies	Pte	32	32			
Pioneers	Cpl	4	4			
"	Pte	28	28			
Regtl Police	Sjt	1	1			
" "	Pte	6	6			
Storemen	Pte	6	6			
Stretcher-Bearers	Sjt	1	1			
" "	Cpl	2	2		2	
" "	Pte	18	18			
Tk A Gun Nos	Cpl	4	4			
" "	Pte	15	15			
Water Duties	Pte	2	2			
Total carried forward		769	699	75	5	

Trade	Rank	WIC		DEF	SUP	Reinf
Total of Fwd ATTACHED BY WIC		769	699	70	5	
<u>AAMC</u>						
Chiropodist	cpl	1	1			
Hyg Inspector	Sjt	1	1			
Med Ord	Sjt	1	1			
"	rte	1	1			
<u>AAPC</u>						
Shoemaker	cpl	1	-	1		
<u>WABATS</u>						
Postal duties	Sjt	1	1			
<u>AAPC</u>						
Pay Clerk	Sjt	1	1			
" "	cpl	1	1			
<u>AACC</u>						
Caterer	won	1	1			
Cooks	Sjt	5	4	1		
"	plts	5	4	1		
"	rte	13	13			
		801	728	78	5	

Surplus Tradesmen not allowed by WIC

Trade Gp			
19 8 Tailor			1
" 3 Nurse			1
" 3 Gun Lay			1
" 3 Dr Mee			10
" 3 Connector			1
" 2 Cook			1

24 ^{Mar 45} Date of Despatch

Lambertson Col
Comd 2/3 Aust Inf Bn

1/3 AUS INF BN

Unit

Army Form W.3009
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)

B/12
Serial No.

PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 24/3/1945

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.
Ammunition Examiners				Surveyors, Engineering				Operating Room Assts.				G.P.O. Assistants			
Armament Artificer Fitter				Surveyors, R.A.A.				Operator, Keyboard				Hammermen			
Armament Artificer Fitter (Electrical)				Surveyors, Topographical				Operator, Line				Leather Stitchers			
Armament Artificer Fitter (M.V.)				Surveyors, Trigonometrical				Operator, Signal				Orderlies, Nursing			
Armament Artificer Fitter (A.F.V.)				Toolmakers				Operator, Switchboard				Orderlies, Nursing Mental			
Armament Artificer Instrument				Turners				Operator, Wireless				Plate Layers			
Armament Artificer Radio				Watchmakers				Opticians				Rangefakers			
Armament Artificer Signals				Welders				Painters				Riveters			
Armament Artificer Wireless								Panel Beaters				Roughriders			
Artificer, Artillery								Photographer, Dry Plate				Saddlers			
Artificer, Engine								Predictor Numbers				Saddletree makers			
Blacksmiths								Printers				Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
Blacklayers								Radiographers				Stevadores			
Computors								Riggers				Stokers, Staty. Engine			
Cooks, Hospital				GROUP II.				Sawyers				Storemen, Technical			
Coppersmiths				Armourers				Signallers				Tailors			
Dispensers				Axemen				Signwriters				Textile Refitters			
Draughtsmen				Bakers				Telescope Identfn. Numbers				Tinsmiths			
Draughtsmen (Architectural)				Bty. Comd's Asst.				Well Borers				Valcanizers			
Draughtsmen (Engineering)				Boilermakers				Whealers				Wagon Erectors			
Draughtsmen (Mechanical)				Carpenters				Winchman				Whitesmiths			
Draughtsmen (Topographical)				Carpenters and Joiners				Wireman							
Electricians				Cooks				Woodturners							
Electricians (M.V.)				Dental Mechanics											
Electricians (Signals)				Driver-Mech. (Eng. and Med.)											
Fitters				Driver-Operator											
Fitters (Cycle)				Drainers											
Fitters (Electrical)				Electricians											
Fitters (Gun)				Electricians (Engineers)											
Fitters (Instrument)				Fire Control Operators											
Fitters (M.V.)				Gun Operator				GROUP III.				DETAILS OF NON-TRADESMEN.			
Fitters, Railway Signal				Hatchman				Battery Surveyors							
Fitters, Signals				Height Taker				Butchers							
Grinder, Precision				Hello Operator				Clerks							
Mechanics, Instrument				Instrument Operator				Clerks, Supply							
Mechanics, Instrument (Signals)				Intelligence Duties				Clerks, Technical							
Mechanics, Instrument (Surgical)				Joiners				Coach Trimmers							
Mechanics, Typewriter				Lineman				Concretors							
Mechanics, Wireless				Lineman, Signals				Cooks							
MHRights				Lithographers				Dental Clerk Orderlies				ATTACHED BY W.E.			
Operators, Excavator				Machinists, Metal				Despatch Riders							
Patrn Maker				Machinists, Wood				Draughtsmen, Signals							
Phanacist				Masons				Drivers, H.T.							
Photographer, WetPlate				Masseurs				Driver Mechanics							
Photwriter				Mechanics, M.T.				Driver Tptn. Plant							
Plumber				Miners				Engine Hands, I.C.							
Sawdoctors				Moulders				Equipment Repairers							
Survors				Nurses, Trained				Farriers							
				Observation Post Assts.				Fitters' Mates							
CARRIED FORWARD				CARRIED FORWARD				Gun Layers							
												Totals of columns marked * to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 1 and 10 of Part A. respectively.	*	*	

SEE APPENDIX A

- NOTES.—(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.
 (b) Authorised trades or specialists not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.
 (c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are desired show details on back.
 (d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of N.R. in col. "Reints. Required."
 (e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

24 Mar 45
Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander

6. Method Adopted

Due to lack of precise infm as to enemy strengths and dispositions a policy of vigorous patrolling to cover the several unit sectors was adopted.

7. Types of Patrols Employed

(a) Recon

Strength one sec' where possible under comd an offr. This strength was found suitable giving necessary confidence to the men, while being small enough to move undetected. Scouts were worked well forward of the main body. Maps proved reliable, but difficulty was experienced in the early stages of finding Patrol Leaders capable of correctly relating the Map to the ground. This was due to the heavy canopy precluding the true representation of shape of spurs and recesses leading to main features. It was found that careful study of maps and Air Photographs almost completely eliminated this difficulty, and where patrols after this study carried out a rough traverse of the route and paced distances, infm gained was reliable and could be positioned on map. Int Sec pers due to their more specialised trg were found invaluable for this work and were included where ever possible. However the WE Strength of this Sec does not permit of their use as fully as would liked.

(b) Fighting

Strength dependent on infm to hand reaf enemy and distance to be covered. Evac of Cas from a deep patrol necessitated the allotting of more tps to the task than ever needed for actual fighting. Patrols of from one to two Pls strength with full compliment of Coy SBs augmented by bearers from a Fd Amb and a RAP representative and an F O O Arty and Sig Party proved very effective. Patrols of this strength were sufficient to deal with any enemy likely to be encountered, handle evac of own Cas, and still be capable of completing its task. Larger patrols of One Coy were found unwieldy due to the lack of manoeuvrability unless a special task against a known enemy position in strength was allotted. In this case the operation became more a planned Coy attack than a Patrol. In order to successfully ~~cover~~ ^{cover} the whole of the Unit Sector, where practicable, Coys were allotted a sub area of responsibility. Vide Appx A att. The enemy's inclination to give ground when attacked led to the necessity of travelling long distances over rough country in order to locate and destroy him. Questions of supply and the necessity to hold the essential ground precluded fwd mov of Coy Localities. Accordingly a plan of successive patrolling was adopted. A patrol proceeded with full rations and gear to a suitable area in the locality to be cleared, est a base and worked from there. This patrol was relieved on expiration of its task, the relieving patrol taking ^{over} unexpended amm and shelters etc., of the first patrol. This proved satisfactory, eliminated much useless marching and prevented enemy reoccupation of ground cleared. The presence of an Arty O P O ensured Comn as well as provided protection with def fire if needed and Arty was always available to deal with an enemy encountered in strength. In all fighting patrols the

value of a rty P O cannot be too highly stressed. The provision of sufficient Arty Sig pers to handle the Sig Ept is necessary in order to save inroads into the fighting strength of the patrol. The need for good deep scouting coupled with aggressive action on all fighting patrols became most apparent. Scouts were found to work most successfully well fwd of the point sec. Up to 50 to 60 yds fwd of the leading tps was found practicable for the scouts in all country encountered other than dense Pit Pit, which in any case is best probed from a flank. Link men were provided from fwd sec and hand signals were easily understood and acted upon. In every encounter of the unit during the period covered by this report (with but one exception) our patrols were able to come to assault distance of the enemy undetected. Patrols which, upon location of the enemy and having achieved surprise struck hard were invariably successful with few cas. Patrols which lacked aggression invariably suffered cas without achieving results.

8.

Actions

(a) A two PI Patrol on 1 Feb located 5 enemy dug in on the crest of a spur. Being undetected, the leading PI at once deployed, assaulted killed 3 enemy and took the position without cas. Later the same day approx 40 enemy entrenched on the top of a 2100 ft razor backed ridge were encountered. The enemy sentry was located, surprised and killed. The patrol proceeded avoiding tracks. Enemy defences were located by scouts, recce was made and the whole force deployed on the ridge and attack launched undetected. Force was committed one PI fwd one res. Fire was held till tps moved in assault. The outer perimeter was over run and three LMGs captured before the enemy could effectively employ his weapons. Soon as the leading PIs adv began to slacken, and a fire fight appeared to be developing the second PI was committed. Arty and Coy HQ personnel formed the res. This second PI moving into the attack from the flank, and through, the leading pi maintained mov and the whole posn was cleared. Although the enemy mounted his weapons and produced very heavy fire incl grenades from posns sited in depth the mov of our tps, coupled with the fire power of the PI weapons, rendered him unable to cope with the assault and he left his pits thereby becoming easy prey. Six LMGs were captured, quantities of food consisting of rice, tinned meats, curries, coffee and tea were found in area as well rifles, grenades packs and shelters in quantity. Maps and docs showing the presence of new units in the area, their location and intention to attack our force were captured. Thirty three enemy dead were found. Own cas 1 killed 7 wounded.

(b) A similar attack was made on 9 Feb when enemy (who had one hour previously been engaged by a smaller party) were located by the scouts. The position was approached avoiding tracks, the defences were found, recce made and assault launched with complete surprise. The position was captured, two LMGs

(fired from pits with overhead cover) one Bren Gun, packs and eqpt were taken. Cas enemy 5 known dead, own one died of wounds.

- (c) On 26 Feb a patrol 1 Pl strength following a track up a razor back spur was fired on from high ground commanding the approach. Attempts to draw fire was successful and the strength of the enemy position determined. The OP Offr accompanying the force went fwd and selected a suitable OP. The patrol withdrew to a safe distance. Ranging was carried out, the posn engaged with gun fire, and at the conclusion of the conc, the Pl which had moved fwd to within a 150 yds of the posn, assaulted, capturing the ridge without Cas.
- On this occasion the enemy was seen to fire their weapons blindly from their pits, by reaching the weapon fwd without exposing even their head. This fire was of course ineffective. 7 enemy dead were counted the remainder fled.
- (d) A patrol of 2 Pl strength was proceeding in the A NUMB RIVER area, and en route encountered two parties of enemy each of approx 2 Str. On contact the Pl deployed and the adv was very considerably delayed. During the second day enemy in small parties, moved into the rear of the column giving rise to the opinion that he was in greater str than was the fact. These enemy tactics not being fully investigated or dealt with through ~~the~~ diffidence and lack of enterprise on the part of the patrol comd caused the patrol to return to base with its task incomplete. The same patrol brought Arty fire down on a village. The sight selected for the OP was not in sight of the target. Ranging was dispensed with, and a map spot used to indicate the target. The first rounds fell among own tps causing cas.
- (e) During the carrying out of the second phase of the Bas task in the NINAHAU RIVER area small patrols were sufficient to clear the area between the ANUMB and NINAHAU RIVERS and on completion patrolling was commenced EAST of the NINAHAU. A patrol located enemy dug in astride a saddle EAST of the RIVER. One cas was inflicted on our tps, the patrol withdrew and took no further action. This patrol on return reported having been in MARABAS VILLAGE, and gave infm as to the location of VILLAGE and as to track which was later found to be inaccurate. This infm was plotted on the patrol map and was used as the basis to brief a coy as a patrol to clear the area incl the village. In the wake of this coy a second coy moved with all gear to establish a base from which to operate and clear the remainder of the En sector of that phase.
- Acting on the infm given in the briefing this coy patrol, proceeded on the route laid down without checking the map with the ground, or pacing. The result was that this patrol occupied a village, believed to be MARABAS. On checking this was found not to be the case and both coys spent a whole day patrolling before the correct village was located and the force was able to orient itself.
- This delay besides tiring the tps unnecessarily, prevented the force from clearing the area allotted in the time available.

- (f) For the adv of the Bn from BUT RIVER and over the coastal range and down the MABAM RIVER on 28 Mar a mob Screen of one coy moved in adv of the coln in patrol order. Small delaying pockets of enemy were encountered all along the route. On contact the fwd elements immediately attacked with a minimum of deployment and in every case the enemy was dispatched of at once; and the advance was not impeded. The whole Bn moved self contained with all gear (other than that of the fwd coy) six thousand yds in the day. The two fwd coys reached the objective, via track and river junc 957201. When moving fwd NORTH towards the JIKKOKU PASS on 29 Mar, the leading tps were fired on by enemy snipers from well concealed posns on the dominating ground. Deployment was necessary and the snipers dispersed. Pits were single, well sited and not protected by other tps. The task of containing the enemy from the SOUTH preparatory to clearing him from the JIKKOKU PASS was allotted to one coy. By probing fwd till the main posn was reached, and then holding astride the spurs leading to the enemy's defences this task was successfully accomplished. Though holding, pressure was maintained, and the coy continuously probed fwd and slight advances were made. Enemy HMG and IMGs sighted in depth were encountered. Due to a patrol of the 2/2 Aust Inf Bn being in the area, but owing to the lack of info as to its exact whereabouts and the risk of our tps encountering Arty fire which this patrol might call down, this unit's activities were curtailed and no mov NORTH of grid 21 was permitted by 16 Aust Inf Bde. On 4 A pr orders were received lifting the ban on mov NORTH of grid 21 and one coy was ordered to carry out an encircling mov to the EAST and NORTH, and secure the high ground N E of the enemy def, from which an attack could be launched. The coy achieved this object the same day, despite enemy opposition from dug in defences. On 4 A pr another coy was ordered to proceed via the same route and join the fwd coy. The force was placed under comd Maj K M MACKENZIE and ordered to attack and destroy the enemy. The second coy arrived in posn approx 1100 hrs 4 A pr. An Arty cone was called for, the OP offr went fwd to est his OP, and ranged. In order to ensure that the rds fell on the target (which was a narrow razor back ridge) this offr actually called down fire on his own posn. A cone of 350 rds was fired. The Inf moved into the assault as the last rds were in flight, one coy fwd. The enemy was caught scrambling back to their posns up the sides of the ridge and the posn extending for 500 yds was captured, without cas to own tps. Over 30 weapon pits with overhead cover and sighted in depth along the ridge were found. So accurate was the Arty fire that the whole ridge was pock marked by shells and even in cases direct hits had been registered on pits. This attack ended all organised enemy resistance in the area.

- (g) Native refugees inform the unit through ANGAU of the location of the enemy HQs of 20 Div, under Maj Gen NAKAI. A force of two coys under Capt J E MACDONALD was despatched to locate and destroy these HQs on 2 Apr.

The native guides led the force via small KA NAKA pads, and along a well concealed route to the vic of the enemy HQ. The coln halted about 500 yds distant and the natives went fwd. On return they stated the enemy was still in occupation and led the force fwd. When within 100 yds of the enemy posn, a recon was made of the enemy held feature. The guide indicated approaches, posn of enemy sentries and location of the defences. One coy was committed to the attack directed to the right flank of the feature. This coy reached to within 10 yds of the enemy undetected, deployed and then assaulted. Complete surprise was effected, the posn captured and the force consolidated for the night. 28 enemy dead were counted, two IMGs captured, food in very large quantities was left by the enemy and documents of importance taken. This area had telephone conn to the Jap Tps then in JIKKOKU PASS and was undoubtedly Maj Gen NAKAI'S HQ. Whether the Gen was killed was not established.

- (h) On 3 Apr the MACDONALD force was ordered to patrol and clear the Bn Sector SOUTH of grid 17. This was done by organising two patrols each of two pls, and for two days the area was combed. Only isolated enemy was found and the whole area declared clear on 4 Apr.
- (j) As the 2/2 Aust Inf Bn were about to attack the villages EAST OF AUTOGL, one coy was ordered down the MABAM RIVER on 7 Apr to river and track junc via 004174. Ambushes were established at this point and generally along the river, at track crossings and maintained for four days. Only 2 enemy were seen and these were killed.
- (k) On 9 Apr the unit dispositioned certain coys vide appx A att and the remainder of the Bn moved to DAGUA AIRFIELD for rest. Within two days the whole unit was relieved by 2/3 Aust MG Bn.

9. Employment of Natives in Ops

On 30 Mar WO LL GODWIN of ANGLAU with 4 native police boys and a line of KANA KA guides became att to the Bn. The knowledge of bush craft, ability to appreciate ground, keen eye sight and tracking ability possessed by these boys is remarkable. Moreover they were at all times found honest in their reports and no attempt at "bolstering" was made. The addition of these natives to the Unit str undoubtedly saved lives, many miles of needless marching, and enabled numerous enemy pockets to be killed which would doubtless otherwise have been missed.

These native boys were employed in 3 main rules :-

- (a) As deep standing patrols behind enemy lines, with the task of enticing unfriendly natives in the employ of the JAPANESE over to our cause. It was found that even in the most hostile areas these patrols were successful. On more than one occasion the whole inhabitants of a village have been brought in, numbering over 200 pers. The acquisition of these "Kobanees" was of two fold advantage;
- (i) The enemy was deprived of his most versatile sentries, best food providers, and his only means of portorage apart from his own tps. A typical example was when the entire population of the

village of EUBURIN who had lately acted as porters, food suppliers and sentries for the HQ 20 Div were brought in.

- (ii) These natives gave under interrogation by ANGAU representative accurate info as to enemy dispositions, weapons, supplies, mov and numbers. They frequently acted as guides for our tps to these enemy posns. This info enabled the Bn to proceed direct to the posn occupied by the enemy, by the shortest route, and was of material assistance in determining the size of the force to be despatched to deal with the situation. Police boys were excellent in the art of simulation and "greasing" refugees, and unostentatiously moved among the KANAKAS gleanng info attempted to be held back under interrogation. Interrogation of these natives is a matter for an expert and must be done by a person with a thorough knowledge of the native as well as his language. Time must be given to the interrogators. Hurried questioning results in incomplete info.

(b) As Deep recon patrols behind the enemy lines.

These patrols str 1 or more Police boys and a small line of KANAKAS proved invaluable in locating enemy posns. L of C and Str. Enemy mov was also reported enabling possible areas to be located. Later our tps were led to the area direct and much needless patrolling obviated. The best results were obtained by the unit briefing the ANGAU representative, who in turn briefed the natives. Dealings for these patrols should be left entirely to ANGAU. Some instances of the success of natives in this rôle are set out hereunder to illustrate the value of this intelligence.

- (i) A rough sketch of an enemy posn was made by a native, giving area, disposn of weapons and approx str. This was later found to be accurate.
- (ii) Nine JAPA NESE were located by natives at the head water of WONGONARA CREEK. A patrol led to the scene destroyed 8 enemy without cas.
- (iii) Three enemy snipers were located by natives, he was detected and actually spoke to the JAPANESE, he slipped away, info the Coy Comd and led a party fwd who killed all three.

(c) As guides and scouts in close co-operation with own tps.

In this rôle native boys were of great assistance to patrols moving over a route where the posn of the enemy was not known; provided the boys were used correctly. The boys must be allowed to work independently of our tps. They will search the ground in their own way and their own time and do the job thoroughly if not interfered with. The only successful way to ensure this is by only allowing one person (who should have some knowledge of Pidgin) to speak with the No. 1 boy of the line. Comn with the rest of the line should be disparaged, and comn with any of the natives by any person other than the one selected for the task should be forbidden. Interference and untimely questioning results in the task being incompletd by the boys and a chaotic report ensues.

These native boys must not be used as scouts in the ordinary military sense of the word. If asked to keep contact while moving they work too closely and are disrupted by the noise of our tps.

The system is for the natives to halt the column, go fwd and do his recce. He will return and report and the the coln can then move till again halted. Should the boys locate enemy they will guide our tps into posn. Owing to their value in ops and due to the number available, the boys should not be allowed to go in to the attack. Though they will if not restrained.

Again if enemy is located and our tps do not take advantage of the infm given and take steps to deal with the enemy promptly, the native becomes disappointed loses some of his faith in the soldier and will not work conscientiously. Pockets located should be attacked at once when ever possible.

The JAPANESE KANAKA sentry is one of the deadliest enemy encountered. His bushcraft makes him more perilious to our tps than his masters. Friendly natives and police boys are the answer. They will see him first and save at least the loss of our scouts.

ADM

10. Sups

Vide appx B att

11. Med

Vide appx C att

12. AMN

The problem of faulty amn and resultant cas to own tps is dealt with 2/3 Aust Inf Bn report of 6 Mar 45.

13. Native Porters

These were used almost continuously throughout this Campaign. They were entirely satisfactory and 250 boys were found sufficient to keep the Bn supplied and to move 3 coys self contained with full amn incl res in one lift. No difficulty was experienced in obtaining permission for boys to service even fwd coys, but adequate protection was always afforded the line.

14. Air Dropping

The Bn and 2/9 Aust Cav Cmdo Sqn under comd were supplied by air (the DZ being located MALIN) from 28 Jan to 3 Mar.

Recovery was almost 100%. Any defleiciency was attributed to parachutes failing to open, which ocured on a few occasions. Over the whole period 97½% recovery was effected. Demands were speedily supplied, Packing by Air Maint was good. For the first time in this units experience med sups were Air Dropped. Parachutes were used and 100% recovery effected and no article was damaged. MMG and Mortar 3 inch were dropped successfully.

15. Comm

(a) Line was at all times used where possible and proved reliable.

(b) Alternative comn by wireless was unsatisfactory.

- (i) The 108 set MK ii did not on any occasion work successfully.
- (ii) 536 sets were of use only for comn within the force patrolling. They were of considerable use from coys and point Secs to rear elements. For comn to base they were of no utility.
- (iii) The No. 11 set is far too heavy to handle and is not reliable.
- (iv) 22 sets were found satisfactory and an allotment of these sets to Bns is recommended.

PART 11

LESSONS FROM OP

16.

(a) Use of Maps and Aerial Photos

In order to correctly navigate and to orient posns, in the type of country encountered, a thorough study of maps in conjunction with Aerial Photos and use of Compass is essential. Maps compiled from Aerial Photos were quite different from maps compiled on the ground. The shape and nature of features (due to canopy) are not accurate in maps made from photos. Height spots are only approx. These factors necessitate a very high standard of trg in both map reading and the interpretation of aerial Photos. Too much stress cannot be made on the value of trg in both these subjects.

(b) Knowledge of JAPA NESE mil characteristics

A good knowledge of this subject is of assistance especially in patrolling. JAPANESE actions and mov encountered on patrols can be correctly interpreted and appropriate action taken without loss of time and manpower only when the comds are conversant with the JAPANESE methods.

(c) Est of Patrol Bases

To clear any considerable area of responsibility allotted a force, with the minimum amount of travelling, the est of fwd patrol bases is necessary.

The Advantages are Three fold ;

- (i) Unnecessary wastage of manpower is obviated.
- (ii) Essential grounds gained is held preventing enemy re occupation.
- (iii) The sector of responsibility allotted the Unit is much more quickly cleared.

(d) Necessity of Surprise

The value of surprise, though always recognised, is more than ever emphasised in this parts of country and against this enemy. A knowledge of Jap tactics, coupled with good scouting, will in almost all cases achieve this object. Tracks should be avoided.

Scouts must work widely, up to 60 yds in adv of the point sec is possible. This gives surprise and enables the remainder of the force to be closed up thereby preserving the striking ability of the force and ease of deployment. Experience of the JAPANESE in def leads to the conclusion that the "back door" is invariably open or at least lightly guarded. The hardest approach is in the end the easiest.

(e) Concentration of Striking Force

When located AND SURPRISE EFFECTED, the force must at once strike with every weapon and man available, and at the same time mov must be maintained. The present enemy is incapable under these circumstances of dealing with the combination of fire power of Pl weapons and mov.

(f) Employment of Arty Sp

Against enemy defended localities where surprise cannot be gained or the extent of the locality necessitates support, Arty is ideal. FOOs must be prepared to est themselves close to the enemy posn so as to effectively control the fire. Ranging must be thorough, and the shoot conducted on the "close target" principle. To avail the force of the maximum advantage of this sp, the assault should follow immediately the conc is stopped. This enemy will vacate his def posn under a conc, and a quick moving force will catch him out of posn.

(g) Employment of Natives in Ops

This has proved a most successful answer to the query as to the best method of operating successfully against the enemy in this class of country. Their employment makes the task comparatively easy. Native boys should be used with fwd tps whenever available and it is recommended that an ANGAU representative with Police boys and a line of KANAKAS be at all times attached to a unit during ops.

(h) Morale

The only time the soldier becomes so fagged as to feel incapable for further action is when the offr in cmd succumbs to fatigue. Every offr commanding men in action must be prepared to go on and overcome his fatigue if he is to maintain the fighting spirit of his tps. Failure in an offr to carry this out results in tps becoming pre-maturely exhausted.

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT17. Unit Sp Weapons(a) HE/A guns, MMG, PITA

No task was found for any of these weapons during the current campaign, due to the class of the country operated in.

(b) Mortar 3 inch

No adequate justification can be found for carrying these weapons when Arty Sp is available. Employment of Arty obviates the hard carrying of weapons and men and performs the task equally as well if not better.

(c) It is considered that the sp weapons should be carried as a readily available res with the unit B Ech.(d) Personnel of the 3 pls carrying these sp weapons are most effectively employed in this type of country as infantry men.18. O S M G

This weapon is reliable and effective. Its one big disadvantage is its liability to discharge when bumped. This characteristic has resulted in a number of cas to own tps and steps should be taken to remedy this fault. Modifications made and tested by 45 Aust I A D has been investigated and is a successful counter to this fault. Adoption of this modification is recommended.

19. Other Unit Weapons

All were found effective, and reliable.

20. Air Sp

No target justifying the use of air sp was encountered.

21. Eqpt(a) webbing

The new issue of webbing received in recent months is inferior in quality and its life is not more than 6 weeks. Even before becoming unserviceable it slips during use, and is ill fitting. Pouches basic new type are not of a size to accommodate BREN or OSMG mags and still be capable of being buttoned. It is recommended that all web eqpt be subject to review in order to manufacture a better material and suitable pouches.

(b) Clothing

(i) Sizes of trousers are far too large. Chafing and skin trouble ensues.

(ii) Sox have been in short supply. The life of a pair of sox is only a few days when tps are continually wet or wading creeks. The loose wear tends to cause serious shrinkage when wet.

(iii) shirts - the life of a shirt under conditions of these ops is 3 weeks.

12.

- (iv) Boots - the present issue is good. When subjected to long periods of wet, boots become hard. Dubbin is the only substance found effective to overcome this. The JELLY substitute issued to this unit washes off too easily and was found NON effective.
- (v) It is recommended that full res of all clothing with full range of sizes and adequate stocks of dubbin be on hand and that units be free to draw on demand.

(d) Sig Bqpt

- (i) LT: this is the most reliable method of comm.
- (ii) Wireless - Vide para 15 (b) above.

20 Apr 45

Ian Hutchison Lt Col
(Ian Hutchison)
Comd 2/3 Aust Inf Bn



SUBS

1. During this campaign the flow of sups with the exception of web eqpt, clothing, boots, dubbin and "BETTY" has been excellent.

The system of supply has been varied embracing supply by :-

- (a) Air
- (b) Native Porters
- (c) M T

All systems worked smoothly. Demands were met promptly where goods were available.

2. Rations

At all stages of this operation rations have been excellent and a good balanced diet has at all times been available. Fresh meat and vegetables have at all times been included even in the delivery to the most fwd tps. The quality of the rations has undoubtedly been reflected in the health of the tps.

3. Res

Supplies were adequate (with the exceptions contained in para 1 above) to build up res up to 7 days in any coy localities where necessary.

MED

1. Med Supplies

Supplies have been received readily on request. In one phase stores were air dropped with 100% recovery and without damage.

2. Mov of RAP

- (a) It was found that 20 NATIVE PORTERS were needed to fully move in one lift the whole RAP stores and installations.
- (b) Where NATIVE PORTERS were unavailable the RAP pers moved carry sufficient stores to enable the post to function for 3 days. Very carefull selection of stores carried is needed, and every contingency cannot be provided for but proper functioning for this period can be expected under normal op conditions.

3. Work Performed

RAP was used in its normal role of dressing and resuscitation stations. An emergency kit was kept packed to enable RMO to go fwd and meet cas enroute to post and render assistance. This proved a great help. Administration of serum was successful and is necessary at these posts.

Pers of the RAP Staff when possible accompanied patrols. Their work in the field was meritorious.

4. Evac of Cas

As the op consisted of long patrols, far ffrom the location of R A P, difficulties of evac were encountered. The WE of the RAP is considered too small to enable the supply of trained pers to proceed with patrols of 3 or more days duration. The need for these pers to accompany such patrols is real and their presence undoubtly saved lives.

The est of 4 stretcher bearers per day is totally inadequate. In the class of country operated over a minimum of 6 men per stretcher case is essential. For long carries lasting more than 2 hrs a minimum of 8 is required. The absence of sufficient bearers means that the fighting str of the patrol is depleted.

For a period of 2 weeks 32 bearers were att from Fd Amb. For a previous period of one month 15 bearers were att.

As more than one patrol operates at one time it was considered 16 bearers a minimum number effective for the task. This meant that bearers got no rest as on return with one patrol it was necessary to send them out again the following day due to lack of relief.

In one instance a man seriously wounded at approx 18:00K took 22 hrs to reach R A P. Four hours later he reached the surgical team at Fd Amb. This is indicative of the strain on unit bearers.

An increase in numbers to enable at least 20 bearers to be available to the two fwd coys, with adequate reliefs is considered necessary.

5. Surgical Teams

These teams operated in ADS and were maintained as far fwd as the sup problem permitted. The presence of these teams was of the greatest value not only in treating cas quickly but in keeping morale high.

General Health of Tps

- (i) Generally the health of the tps has been good with the exception of the following complaints :-
- (a) Malaria - this disease has caused the greater number of cas. Since the drop in the daily dose of ATEBRIN from 2 tablets per day to 1 the increase in the incidence has been alarming. Approx 70 proven cases occurred in 3 weeks. It is considered that a return to a dosage of 2 ATEBRIN per day would greatly reduce this wastage.
 - (b) Dermatitis - tinea and pustular dermatitis have at all times been noticeable. In the majority of cases the complaint responds to treatment especially if sun and rest can be obtained.
 - (c) Constitutional Insufficiency - this is a very real problem and complaint. Men who have had 4 - 5 or even 3 previous campaigns are very prone to this disability, especially where the campaigns culminated in the Owen Stanley Mountains and where malaria was previously contracted. Some of these men who were able to carry on in a standing camp despite hard trg, since arrival in this area have succumbed to this disability to an extent where they are completely burnt out, and cannot stand up to work as previously. In most cases nothing can be demonstrated clinically.
 - (d) Dengue -- the incidence of this fever has been high. Next to malaria it has caused the most cas.
 - (e) Neurosis - (anxiety state) - it is considered not enough thought is given by med authorities to these cases. In a number of cases the patient is at once suspect of a desire to evade his obligations before treatment is commenced. Some cases can be treated at RAP but in close fighting this type of disability is a problem to the Pl, therefore considerable notice should be taken of reports of Pl and Coy Comds on these cases before treating. After all the man's immediate commander sees the soldier all day and under all conditions and he is therefore capable of judging or otherwise of the presence of the Anxiety State.
 - (f) Dysentery - Cases of Dysentery have been almost negligible. This is due to good hygiene and water discipline.

MONTH OF MAY 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form 2113
(adapted)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 INF BN

Date and Time.—From 1st MAY 45 To 3rd MAY 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BOIKEN - KOANUMBO AREA	1 May 45	0900	Air strike on KOANUMBO area cancelled owing to unfavourable weather.	
		0930	C Coy attacked enemy posns and exploited along KOANUMBO track finding one abandoned JUKI MG considerable number of mines and one enemy dead.	
		1315	Bn HQ accidentally strafed by short burst of MG fire from Mitchell aircraft in process of attacking MUSCHU Island, no casualties were inflicted.	
	2 May 45	1730	C Coy again contact enemy positions astride KOANUMBO track suffering following casualties, Pte McLaughlin killed, Cpl Wing-Quay and Pte Clarke wounded. C Coy, now in a position overlooking KOANUMBO, call for arty concentration on Japanese positions in village.	
		1730	B Coy report enemy still holding xxxxxx feature S W of their posns, which whom arty concentration had failed to dislodge. During the night 1/2 May enemy harassed C Coy posn at close range with grenades and S A fire.	
	3 May 45	0930	Short patrol from C Coy report enemy dug in astride track running EAST from Coy posn. 13 Pl was ordered to attack. Bren gunner from forward section poured several bursts into enemy posn to cover Pte McFarland with flame-thrower, who had moved to a posn within 30 yards of the enemy's defences. Flame was directed onto the enemy and six Japs were seen to flee down either side of the spur. The attack was successful, one enemy was killed and 81 mm mortar and LMG captured. Our casualties, Sjt Cullen killed, L/Cpl Mahoney, Ptes Heath and Weatherdon wounded.	<p style="font-size: 2em; color: blue; transform: rotate(-90deg);">DRAFT</p>
1700		Extensive patrolling by Lts Hoddinott and Copeman with natives throughout the remainder of the day., found 2400 feature clear of enemy and also four enemy sentries located between B and C Coys.		
1700		Remainder of Bn regrouping for defensive role, with A Coy and Tk A Pl to defend Coast, B Coy holding Southern flank and high features, C Coy to continue clearing KOANUMBO area and D Coy in reserve on BOIKEN Creek.		
3 May 45	0730	Pnr Pl move out to relieve 2/ Inf Bn as standing patrol on 1800 feature.		
	0900	CO, accompanied by the Adj. Capt Gibbins and CO 2/1 Fd Amb visits C Coy.		
	1130	One of our native guides is wounded by hostile kanaka while on patrol with Lt Hoddinott.		

MONTH OF MAY

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 INF BNDate and Time.—From 3rd MAY 45 To 7th MAY 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BOIKEN - KOANUMBO area	3 May 45	1230	B de Comd paid a short visit to Bn.	
		1600	Patrols from B and C Coy failed to make contact with enemy. The shelling of enemy on S E slopes of 2400 feature continues.	
	4 May 45	0700	A Coy ordered to relieve C Coy in KOANUMBO area, C Coy to return to a posn on the coast.	
		1000	C Coy now in posn on coast, to enjoy a well earned rest.	
		1400	Bde Comd visited Bn.	
		1430	Air strike by seven Beauforts on S E slopes of 2400 feature successful, 50% of bombs fell on target.	
	4 May	1700	All patrols returned having made no contact with the enemy.	
	5 May	0700	2/11 Bn passed through Bn posn en route to Cape WOM.	
		0900	Capt Bun arrived to take of duties of Capt Park, RMO, who is returning to the Mainland on compassionate leave.	
		1600	Patrols from A and B Coys contacted enemy between their respective Coy posns, in the ensuing skirmishes our casualties were Pte Paul killed, Pl Glennon and Pte Jarrett wounded. Enemy casualties, 1 killed, 2 found dead.	
		1700	The Adjt (Lt Cory) is evacuated to hospital and IO (Lt Bell) returns to Unit.	
	6 May	1030	A Coy cleared enemy posn S E slopes 2400 feature and occupied KOANUMBO village, killing two enemy and finding two killed by arty fire.	
1600		B Coy patrols report area between A and B coy posns clear of enemy and found one enemy dead due to action previous day.		
1900		//(additional) Musical programme supplied by YMCA.		
7 May	0800	Commanding Officer and partyn leave Bn area to visit A and D Coys.		
	1000	Patrol from A Coy located enemy posn astride track S E of KOANUMBO.		
	1400	Lt Hoddinott with natives patrolled SOUTH of KOANUMBO to 1600 feature and found it to be clear of enemy.		

MONTH OF MAY 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 INF BN

Date and Time.—From 7th MAY 45 To 11th MAY 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BOIKEN - KOANUMBO Area	7 May 45	1500	A Coy patrol returns after having proceeded WEST along track to KOANUMBO, reports having located an old enemy HQ, two new enemy graves and one JUKI MG intact. - on return journey contacted enemy, killing two, and found two more dead, result of previous action.	
		1900	Mobile cinema provided programme in BOIKEN plantation, which is attended by large audience despite the heavy rain.	
	8 May 45	1500	Patrols from A Coy SW and SE from KOANUMBO reached limits of unit area of responsibility, killing two enemy and finding another new grave, also signs that enemy had evacuated area. Lt Johnstone marched out to join 2/48 Bn by way of reposting, XXXXXXXXXXXX	
	9 May	0900	Lt Weir also marched out, to Bde HQ as Brigade Major Learner. 13 and 14 Pls rejoined C Coy posn on BOIKEN point to allow B Coy less 11 Pl to move to KURAPIA, and take over responsibility this portion of coast, while 11 Pl remained in posn at 126195 to guard Southern flank in hills.	
		0930	Due to the increasing evidence of scrub typhus it is necessary to rigid typhus precautions. <i>Again stress the importance of this</i>	
		1200	With the exception of an A Coy patrol which located four more enemy dead in KOANUMBO area no other signs of enemy activity were reported.	
		1745	Special Thanksgiving services were held to commemorate V E day by Padre Harley.	
	10 May	1000	Bde Comd visited Bn.	
		1100	Lt Bell moved out to accompany 2/6 Cav Dco Sgt in an amphibious operation on Red Beach in Dove Bay, as observer.	
		1400	XXXXXX C Coy plus Pioneer Pl relieved 2/2 Inf Bn forces holding WELUBI, HAWAIN and PAROM.	
		1700	Again patrols report no signs of enemy within Bn area of responsibility.	
	11 May	1900	Recorded music by YMCA.	
		0900	Two detachments of Mortar Pl occupied posns vacated by C Coy on BOIKEN Point.	
		1400 1900	17 Pl assumed responsibility KOANUMBO area and A Coy returned to posn on Coast. Lt Bell returns to Bn after witnessing the amphibious operations by 2/6 Cav.	

MONTH OF MAY 1945.

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 Inf BnDate and Time.—From 12th MAY 45 To 18th MAY 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BOIKEN - KOANUMBO Area.	12 May 45	1000 hrs	<i>having been selected for British Army in India</i> Capt Boyer marched out to enlist in Indian Army.	
		1400 hrs	Maj R W F McDonald rejoined the unit on termination of his duties as CO 18 AFB., and commenced duties as Bn 2 I/C.	
		1900 hrs	Mobile Cinema provided programme in Bn area, featuring "When our hearts were young and gay".	
	13 May 45	1000	CO and 2 I, C leave to visit A and C Coys.	
		1500	10 Pl relieved 11 Pl	
		1800	Church service held by Padre Harley.	
	14 May 45	0700	Party of Knakas from Muschu Island land at C Coy posn on the beach.	
		0900	CO and 2 I C move out to visit D Coy	
		1000	Bde Comd visits Bn.	
		1500	YMCA issues comfort funds parcels.	
	15 May 45	1000	Lt Hoddinott assumes Comd C Coy.	
	16 May 45		Patrol from B Coy moving along reentrant South of their posn captured one Jap PW, physical condition very poor, found almost necessary to carry him back to Coy posn.	
		1000	13 Pl relieved 14 Pl at PAROM. 14 Pl returned to Coy posn.	
1700		Extensive patrolling throughout the day without further contact being made with enemy.		
17 May 45		Lt Scally and Pl patrol to RANIMBOA area returned after having contacted enemy and killing one of them.		
	1200	Maj MacKenzie and small party made an unsuccessful attempt to reach GUAP Island in a lakatoi, due to strong currents and wind.		
	1700	Result of days patrolling, no further signs of enemy reported.		
18 May 45	0900	17 Pl is relieved by 16 Pl and Coy HQs of D Coy in KOANUMBO area		
	1600	Local patrols from A and B Coy found 4 more recently dead enemy.		

MONTH OF MAY 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 INF BNDate and Time.—From 18th May 45 To 23rd May 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
KOANUMBO BOIKEN Area	18 May 45	1900 hrs	Entertainment provided by mobile Cinema in B Coy area.	
	19 May 45	0900 hrs	10 Pl relieved by 12 Pl in South flank patrol base.	
		1000 1600	CO visits CAPE WOM area with Bde Comd. D Coy patrols located two further recently dead enemy.	
	20 May 45	0900	13 Pl relieved by Pnr Pl. at PAROM Patrol base.	
		1600	Patrols again report no further signs of enemy activity within area of responsibility.	
	21 May 45	21		
		0900	Adjt and I O visit CAPE WOM.	
		1000 1600	Bn is placed on 72 hours notice for movement to WEWAK area to relieve 2/8 Bn. Patrol from 13 Pl returned to HAWAIN base after killing 3 enemy in RANIMBOA area. Lt WOII Adem, commanding the Pl, stated that enemy in this area were very active.	
	22 May	0800	Capt Gibbins with A Coy, left on patrol to clear RANIMBOA area. In proximity of RANIMBOA contacted enemy, killing three of them, own casualties one native wounded.	
		1600	Lt Stone with 10 members of Pioneer Pl and natives on patrol in NUMIKIM area contacted enemy, who fired on patrol, mortally wounding Pte Sweeney. Leaving one man with Pte Sweeney, Lt Stone moved the remainder of the force to the East flank of the enemy position, where he successfully attacked the position, killing seven of the enemy and suffering one casualty, Pte Field wounded. One man was despatched to bring a stretcher party, four more men were detailed off to begin carrying Pte Sweeney out, and with the remaining three fit men Lt Stone completed the task of the patrol.	
23 May	1030	Troops receive rather issue of two bottles of beer per man, one free for VE day celebrations.		
	1200	Heavy downpour of rain breaks unusually long dry spell.		
	1400	Bde I O visits Bn.		

MONTH OF MAY 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.21.8
(adapted)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 INF BNDate and Time.—From 28th May 45 To 28th May 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
<u>BOIKEN - HAWAIN area.</u>	23 May 45	1500	A Coy patrol moving from NHMEKE RANIMBOA along track to NUMIKIM contacted enemy posn and deploying immediately, attacked position, causing the enemy to flee in a Westerly direction.	
	24 May 45	0900	Maj McDonald, with a party from Bn HQ, were conveyed by barge to GUAP island and returned with considerable quantities of paw paws and native trinkets.	
		0930	17 Pl relieved D Coy HQ and 16 Pl at KO'ANUMBO Patrol base.	
		1600	A Coy patrol contacted a further enemy position in NUMIKIM village. Attack successful, 4 enemy killed, our casualties Pte Baker killed, WOII Smith, Cpl Dawson, Ptes Gill and Abernethy wounded.	
	25 May 45	0900	CO and Adjt visited C Coy.	
		1400	Bn 2 I C and Adjt visited DAGUA aerodrome accompanied by unit photographer. Snap-shots taken of wrecked planes and other objects for illustration purposes in Bn magazine.	
		1600m	Lt Broadfoot and 15 Pl patrolling in MUMIKIM area contacted Japanese, killing two.	
	26 May 45	1400	WOII Adam promoted to commissioned rank in the field.	
			The RSM, WOI Edmondston, marched out of unit B Class, to return to the Mainland. Patrolling confined to local defense only.	
	27 May	1900	Mobile cinema showed in B Coy area.	
		0900	Pioneer Pl relieved by 15 Pl from base and en route 15 Pl captured one enemy.	
	28 May	1600	A police boy patrol in Parom area recovered 9 kank kanakas who had been previously working for the Japanese.	
Capt Palmer released from duties with 2nd Army, returned and assumed cmd C Coy.				
0730			CO, Adjt, IO and Coy Comds moved to BORAM aerodrome to make a recce of new Bn area.	
1200			All patrol bases taken over by A Coy 2/1 Bn, and out-posted Pls rejoined their respective companies.	
	1400	Police boy patrol in MUMIKIM area killed one Japanese and returned with approx 100 kanakas incl 2 Jap police boys.		

MONTH OF MAY 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 INF BN

Date and Time.—From 29th May 45 To 31st May 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.	
BOIKEN - KOANUMBO area	29 May 45	0730	Coys engaged in packing preparatory to moving to BORAM area. Bn HQ commenced movement by MT to new site. A, B, and C Coys are to follow later by barge.		
		1000 hrs	Bn HQ now located on WESTERN end of spur overlooking BORAM drome.		
		1400 hrs	Barges containing A, B and C Coy personnel arrive at Beachhead on Cape BORAM and are transported relieve 2/8 Bn Coy bases.		
	30 May 45			Flanking troops are now 2/4 Inf Bn on Western side and 2/6 Cav Cdo Regt on the East. The Bn's new role is purely defensive.	
		0800 hrs	B and C Coys begin patrolling to clear Bn area.		
		1000 hrs	Remainder of Bn, D Coy B Echelon and Tk A Pl, arrive at BORAM.		
		1100 hrs	A B Coy patrol, under comd Lieut Stone, contacted a strong enemy posn on 910 feature, resulting in own casualties, Ptes McIntyre and Brown killed, Ptes Colbert and Roberts wounded. Lt Stone called for Arty support and this was cancelled because of other troops in near proximity of enemy position, rendering it necessary for the patrol to return to its base.		
		1700 hrs	Remaining patrols reported no signs of enemy.		
		2000 hrs	Enemy threw grenades into A Coy position, without causing casualties.		
	31 May	1000 hrs	Bde Comd visits Bn.		
1400 hrs		Capt Hughes joins Bn and is posted 2 I C D Coy.			
1800 hrs		A Carrying party from A Coy moving back to Coy posn was fired on by three enemy, who had cut company's communications then escaped, killing Pte Rahill. Patrols again report no contact with enemy.			
			<i>Ian Hutchison</i> Lt col (Ian Hutchison) Comd 2/3 Aust Inf Bn		

2.

(g) 2/3 Aust Inf Bn ^{15 TO} ~~15 TO~~

(i) Prevent any enemy penetration NORTH and WEST through feature 300 W1418 - PAROM W163180 - EAST to HAWAIN RIVER - NORTH along HAWAIN RIVER

(ii) carry out coastal def of sector allotted

(iii) relieve 2/8 Aust Inf Bn at RANIMBOA W1612 when captured but will NOT operate SOUTH of PAROM towards RANIMBOA until this occurs.

(iv) Patrol forward to line of Bde responsibility

(h) Arty

One tp 2/2 Aust Fd Regt sited in area KARAWOP will cover Bde area of responsibility and will be in sp of each unit until relieved by one Bty less one tp 2/3 Aust Fd Regt which will continue the same tasks.

(j) TK A

Two tps 2/1 Aust TK A Regt will be disposed to carry out coastal def in sp of each Bn from incl HAWAIN to incl CAPE KARAWOP

(k) 2 4.2 in Mortars disposed by arty for tasks as considered necessary

INTENTION

3. 2/3 Aust Inf Bn will defend the coastal area from excl creek at 146205 to excl creek at 102231.

METHOD

4. Area of Responsibility

All excl creek at 146205 SOUTH along creek thence to SADDLE 142190 thence along creek from 142187 to 130174 thence SOUTH along 13 grid to 130150 thence WEST along 15 grid to creek at 086150 thence NORTH along creek to 090194 thence NE through SADDLE 094195 to 099197 thence NORTH along WEST slopes of feature 1800 to creek at 099219 thence NORTH along creek to coast.

5. Tps and Tasks

(a) B Coy will

(i) Hold the line feature 147183 feature 125195

(ii) Prevent enemy penetration from SOUTH

(b) 5 Pl will

(i) Est base on SOUTHERN slopes feature 1800 at 103208

(ii) Patrol the area sq 1020 and 1120

(iii) Prevent enemy reoccupation feature 1800.

SECRET

Copy No. 16

May 45

2/3 AUST INF BN CO5

Ref maps: BUT EAST 1 in to 1 mile
KAIRUO WEST 1 in to 1 mile
MAPRIK EAST 1 in to 1 mile
WEWAK WEST 1 in to 1 mile

INFM

1. Enemy

As per 16 Aust Inf Bde and 2/3 Aust Inf Bn sitreps.

2. Own Tps

(a) 16 Aust Inf Bde is to come in the area BOLKEN PTN with the following tasks :

(i) Destroy enemy at CAPE WOM - YARABOS W2410 crossing by head by this Bde over HAWAIN RIVER.

(ii) Clear RANIMBOA W1612.

(iii) Cut the tracks SOUTH of WERUI MISSION W3204

(iv) Destroy enemy in area WEWAK PT -- CAPE MOEM.

(b) 2/6 Aust Cav Cdo Regt less 2/7 Cdo Sqdn is to land with att tps in DOVE BAY at a date to be notified.

(c) 2/3 Aust MG Bn with under cmd ^{one} tp 2/3 Aust Fd Regt is to continue protection of BUT DAGUA Area.

(a) 16 Aust Inf Bde ¹⁵⁷⁰ ~~1570~~ def the coastal area from incl mouth of HAWAIN RIVER WEST to 00 grid

(e) Area of Responsibility

All incl mouth of river HAWAIN - WEST bank HAWAIN RIVER -- track map ref W173160 to river crossing-PARINGA RIVER -- RANIMBOA W1612 -- NUMIKIM W1314 -- thence NORTH to 15 northing grid -- WEST to 00 grid -- NORTH to coast.

(f) 2/1 Aust Inf Bn ¹⁵⁷⁰ ~~1570~~

(i) Prevent any enemy penetration NORTH through the line of high ground from 000225 - KWANGEN - KUMBUU - feature 082213 EAST to inter on bdy

(ii) carry out coastal def KARAWOP Area :

(iii) Patrol fwd to line of Bde responsibility.

3.

(c) A Coy with in sp 4 Pl will defend coast from excl creek at 146205 to incl mouth BOLKEN CREEK.

6. Striking Force

C Coy with under comd two Police Boys and four KANAKA guides will

Est patrol base at cross tracks 109187 and locate and destroy enemy pockets of resistance in Bn area of responsibility

7. Res

D Coy located area 116212 will remain in readiness and be prepared to move at one hrs notice.

8. Sp Arms

(a) Fd Arty

(i) 1 Bty less one tp 2/3 Aust rd Regt on call

(ii) FOO's to be allotted as required

(b) Mortars

(i) 3 Pl less two dets area 119216 and be prepared to fire on demand.

(ii) MFC's to be allotted as required

(c) TK A Pl

(i) Def of coastal area

(ii) Senior Offr 2/1 TK A Regt will co ordinate siting of guns and fire tasks within Bn area

9. Bomb and Mine Disposal

(a) All unexploded bombs and mines located in Bn area will be fenced off - clearly marked and reported this HQ

(b) Only engr personnel will demolish

ADM

10. Normal

INTERCOMM

11. (a) Bn HQ remain 123223

(b) Line to all coys

12. Synchronisation

Daily at 0700K - Sig Offr responsible

ACK

Issued by D R L S and ^{uaner}

Signed at 02 1530K

276-123
275-122
250-133

4.

~~A Coy~~ Lt
(G E CORY)
A/Adjt 2/3 Aust Inf Bn

DISTRIBUTION LIST

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WAR DIARY	15-16

MONTH OF JUNE 1945

WAR DIARY or ~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY~~Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN

Date and Time.—From 1 Jun 45 To 4 Jun 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BORAM	1 Jun 45	0800	B Coy, under comd Capt McCracken, moved out to clear 910 feature.	
		1500	The company contacted strong enemy bunker posns on the feature, and after arty concentrations, probing patrols found enemy still in occupation. Capt McCracken formed company perimeter for the night.	
		1000	A local patrol from A Coy sighted one enemy, who escaped. C Coy moved to high ground occupied by 14 Platoon.	
	2 Jun 45	0830	15 Pl sighted six enemy in vicinity of their position. 13 Pt, under comd Lt Adam, moved out to attack. Five of the six enemy were killed, one LMG and four rifles captured. Lt Adam, Ptes Combo and Healy were wounded, and Pte Nicholls was killed in an attempt to outflank the enemy.	
		0930	15xR B Coy attacked and captured first enemy positions on 910 feature after arty concentration.	
		1330	Following devastating arty concentration, an the remaining enemy posns were overrun, and the occupation of the feature completed. Enemy casualties were 30 killed (including 18 by arty fire). Capt MacCracken, wounded in the leg, was our only casualty.	
	3 Jun 45	0800	CO and Adjt visited B Coy area.	
		08300	Maj McDonald, Bn 2 I C, left to recce a new area for B Coy on BORAM beach.	
		1200	B Coy was relieved on 910 feature by D Coy and moved out to their new area. Tk A and mortar Pls, under comd Sjt Laughlin, moved into B Coy's old posn on BORAM drome.	
	4 Jun 45	1800	Padre Harley held parade service.	
		0900	Maj MacKenzie, with arty FOO party, on recce for DF tasks, were fired on by enemy SOUTH of 910 feature, but suffered no casualties.	
		1000	CO visited Cape WGM.	
	1600	D Coy patrol, commanded by Lt Scott, located six enemy on 370 feature, who fled before being engaged.		

MONTH OF JUNE 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN

Date and Time.—From 5 Jun 45 To 12 Jun 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BORAM	5 Jun 45	0600	Enemy Sjt Major surrendered to C Coy.	
		0900	Bn 2 I C left to recce Bn rest area at Cape PUS.	
		0930	CO visited B Coy on beach.	
		1430	D Coy recce patrol located enemy still holding feature SOUTH of their position in strength.	
	6 Jun 45	1600	Two bottles of beer per man were issued where situation allowed.	
		0930	CO and Coy Comds of 2/11 Aust Inf Bn arrived to discuss relief of the unit.	
		1400	CO, with Brigade Major and Bde I O, visited D and C Coy.	
	7 Jun 45	1600	Patrols made no contact with enemy.	
		0800	Bn 2 I C left to accompany 2 I C to new rest area.	
	8 Jun 45	1300	Coy Comds conference at Bn HQ.	
0900		CO and IO visit cape PUS area.		
1100		Adjt and IO 2/11 Bn arrived to discuss hand over.		
9 Jun 45	1300	CO 2/11 Bn visited D Coy position.		
	1000	2/11 Bn advance party moved in to various company areas.		
CAPE PUS	10 Jun 45	0900	First elements of Bn moved out by MT to Cape PUS.	
		1300	Bn concentrated in Cape PUS area.	
		1430	GOC visited Bn area.	
11 Jun 45	1000	Bde comd visited Bn.		
	1800	Bn engaged in clearing area of thick undergrowth. Two bottles of beer per man issued.		
12 Jun 45	0900	Maj MacKenzie detached to temporary command of 2/6 Cav Cdo Regt.		
	1800	General cleaning up and pitching of tents. Mobile cinema showed in Bn area.		

MONTH OF JUNE 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN

Date and Time.—From 13 Jun 45

To 23 Jun 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
CAPE PUS	13 Jun 45		Tk A Fl relieved 2/2 Bn at OP Cape PUS, for observation of MUSCHU ISLAND.	
		1400	Construction of camp site continues.	
		1900	Capt Silk, Bde IO, visited Bn.	
			Mobile cinema again showed in Bn area.	
	14 Jun 45)		Camp construction continued.	
	15 Jun 45)	1400	Main body of rear details arrived from AITAPE, with LOB gear.	
	16 Jun 45		Bn Band reformed.	
		1400	CO attended Bde Comd's conference. Bn allotted an area of responsibility and preparation was made for patrolling to commence.	
	17 Jun 45	0730	Bde Comd cancelled patrol programme.	
		0930	CO visited Bde.	
		1000	Bn HQ was accidentally strafed by CRTIC Liberator operating against MUSCHU ISLAND. Signal and Pay Offices were hit, but no casualties resulted.	
		1800	Church Parade in YMCA Marquee.	
	18 Jun 45		Bn area of responsibility passed to 2/1 Aust Inf Bn, who commenced patrolling.	
		1400	Remainder of LOB personnel rejoin unit, with all remaining gear.	
19 Jun 45		Area is now satisfactorily cleared.		
20 Jun 45	1800	Earth tremor experienced.		
21 Jun 45	1500	Fifty personnel rejoin unit from 2/11 AGH at AITAPE.		
	1900	Mobile Cinema in area.		
22 Jun 45		Quantities of recreational equipment were distributed.		
23 Jun 45		Training for of Bn Guard of Honour for Governor General commences.		

JUNE
MONTH OF ~~JANUARY~~ 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN

Date and Time.—From 24 Jun 45 To 30 Jun 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
CAPE PUS	24 Jun 45	1100	CO holds Coy Comd's conference.	
		1300	Capt D E Williams rejoined Bn, after absence with British Army in India.	
		1900	Mobile cinema.	
	25 Jun 45	1100	Maj MacKenzie rejoined Bn from 2/6 Cav Cdo Regt.	
	26 Jun 45		Normal routine.	
	27 Jun 45		All weapons subjected to an LAD inspection. Electric light plant installed and in operation.	
	28 Jun 45	1900	Mobile Cinema showed in neighbouring 2/1 Aust Inf Bn Area. Personnel ferried to area by Bn transport.	
	29 Jun 45		Construction of new YMCA (Moratai Hut) completed, and new cinema area cleared with the assistance of a Bulldozer.	
	30 Jun 45		Coy eliminations for Bn bridge tournament commenced... Keen interest was shown.	
			<i>Ian Hutchison</i> Lt col (Ian Hutchison) Comd 2/3 Aust Inf Bn	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 INF BNDate and Time.—From 1st MAY 45 To 3rd MAY 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BOIKEN - KOANUMBO AREA	1 May 45	0900	Air strike on KOANUMBO area cancelled owing to unfavourable weather.	
		0930	C Coy attacked enemy posns and exploited along KOANUMBO track finding one abandoned JUKI MG considerable number of mines and one enemy dead.	
		1315	Bn HQ accidentally straffed by short burst of MG fire from Mitchell aircraft in process of attacking MUSCHU Island, no casualties were inflicted. C Coy again contact enemy positions astride KOANUMBO track suffering following casualties, Pte McLaughlin killed, Cpl Wing-Quay and Pte Clarke wounded. C Coy, now in a position overlooking KOANUMBO, call for arty concentration on Japanese positions in village.	
		1730	B Coy report enemy still holding xxxxx S W feature S W of their posns, which whom arty concentration had failed to dislodge.	
			During the night 1/2 May enemy harassed C Coy posn at close range with grenades and S A fire.	
	2 May 45	0930	Short patrol from C Coy report enemy dug in astride track running EAST from Coy posn. 13 Pl was ordered to attack. Bren gunner from forward section poured several bursts into enemy posn to cover Pte McFarland with flame-thrower, who had moved to a posn within 30 yards of the enemy's defences. Flame was directed onto the enemy and six Japs were seen to flee down either side of the spur. The attack was successful, one enemy was killed and 81 mm mortar and LMG captured. Our casualties, Sjt Cullen killed, L/Cpl Mahoney, Ptes Heath and Weatherdon wounded.	
1700		Extensive patrolling by Lts Hoddinott and Copeman with natives throughout the remainder of the day., found 2400 feature clear of enemy and also four enemy sentries located between B and C Coys.		
			Remainder of Bn regrouping for defensive role, with x A Coy and Tk A Pl to defend Coast, B Coy holding Southern flank and high features, C Coy to continue clearing KOANUMBO area and D Coy in reserve on BOIKEN Creek.	
	3 May 45	0730	Pnr Pl move out to relieve 2 nd Inf Bn as standing patrol on 1800 feature.	
0900		CO, accompanied by the Adj. Capt Gibbins and CO 2/1 Fd Amb visits C Coy.		
1130		One of our native guides is wounded by hostile kanaka while on patrol with Lt Hoddinott.		

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 INF BNDate and Time.—From 3rd May 45 To 7th May 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BOIKEN - KOANUMBO area	3 May 45	1230	B de Comd paid a short visit to Bn.	
		1600	Patrols from B and C Coy failed to make contact with enemy. The shelling of enemy on S E slopes of 2400 feature continues.	
	4 May 45	0700	A Coy ordered to relieve C Coy in KOANUMBO area, C Coy to return to a posn on the coast.	
		1000	C Coy now in posn on coast, to enjoy a well earned rest.	
		1400	Bde Comd visited Bn.	
		1430	Air strike by seven Beauforts on S E slopes of 2400 feature successful, 50% of bombs fell on target.	
	4 May	1700	All patrols returned having made no contact with the enemy.	
	5 May	0700	2/11 Bn passed through Bn posn en route to Cape WOM.	
		0900	Capt Bun arrived to take of duties of Capt Park, RMO, who is returning to the Mainland on compassionate leave.	
		1600	Patrols from A and B Coys contacted enemy between their respective Coy posns, in the ensuing skirmishes our casualties were Pte Paul killed, Op1 Glennon and Pte Jarrett wounded. Enemy casualties, 1 killed, 2 found dead.	
		1700	The adjt (Lt Cory) is evacuated to hospital and IO (Lt Bell) returns to Unit.	
	6 May	1030	A Coy cleared enemy posn S E slopes 2400 feature and occupied KOANUMBO village, killing two enemy and finding two killed by arty fire.	
		1600	B Coy patrols report area between A and B coy posns clear of enemy and found one enemy dead due to action previous day.	
1900		//(additional) Musical programme supplied by YMCA.		
7 May	0800	Commanding Officer and partyn leave Bn area to visit A and D Coys.		
	1000	Patrol from A Coy located enemy posn astride track S E of KOANUMBO.		
	1400	Lt Hoddinott with natives patrolled SOUTH of KOANUMBO to 1600 feature and found it to be clear of enemy.		

MONTH OF MAY 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 INF BN

Date and Time.—From 7th MAY 45 To 11 MAY 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.	
BOIKEN - KOANUMBO Area	7 May 45	1500	A Coy patrol returns after having proceeded WEST along track to KOANUMBO, reports having located an old enemy HQ, two new enemy graves and one JUKI MG intact. - on return journey contacted enemy, killing two, and found two more dead, result of previous action.		
		1900	Mobile cinema provided programme in BOIKEN plantation, which is attended by large audience despite the heavy rain.		
	8 May 45	1500	Patrols from A Coy SW and SE from KOANUMBO reached limits of unit area of responsibility, killing two enemy and finding another new grave, also signs that enemy had evacuated area. Lt Johnstone marched out to join 2/48 Bn by way of reposting.		
		0900	XXXXXXXXXXXX Lt Weir also marched out, to Bde HQ as Brigade Major Learner. 13 and 14 Pls rejoined C Coy posn on BOIKEN point to allow B Coy less 11 Pl to move to KURAPIA, and take over responsibility this portion of coast, while 11 Pl remained in posn at 126195 to guard Southern flank in hills.		
	9 May	0930	Due to the increasing evidence of scrub typhus it is necessary to take <i>again stress the importance of</i> rigid typhus precautions.		
		1200	With the exception of an A Coy patrol which located four more enemy dead in KOANUMBO area no other signs of enemy activity were reported.		
		1745	Special Thanksgiving services were held to commemorate V-E day by Padre Harley.		
		10 May	1000	Bde Comd visited Bn.	
		1100	Lt Bell moved out to accompany 2/6 Cav Dco Regt in an amphibious operation on Red Beach in Dove Bay, as observer.		
	11 May	1400	XXXXXX C Coy plus Pioneer Pl relieved 2/2 Inf Bn forces holding WELUBI, HAWAIN and PAROM.		
		1700	Again patrols report no signs of enemy within Bn area of responsibility.		
		1900	Recorded music by YMCA.		
		0900	Two detachments of Mortar Pl occupied posns vacated by C Coy on BOIKEN Point.		
		1400	17 Pl assumed responsibility KOANUMBO area and A Coy returned to posn on Coast.		
		1900	Lt Bell returns to Bn after witnessing the amphibious operations by 2/6 Cav.		

MONTH OF MAY 1945.

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.21.8
(adapted)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 Inf Bn

Date and Time.—From 12th MAY 45 To 18th MAY 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BOIKEN - KOANUMBO Area.	12 May 45	1000 hrs	<i>having been selected for British Army in India.</i> Capt Boyer marched out to enlist in Indian Army.	X
		1400 hrs	Maj R W F McDonald rejoined the unit on termination of his duties as CO 18 AITB., and commenced duties as Bn 2 I/C.	
		1900 hrs	Mobile Cinema provided programme in Bn area, featuring "When our hearts were young and gay".	
	13 May 45	1000	CO and 2 I, C leave to visit A and C Coys.	
		1500	10 Pl relieved 11 Pl	
		1800	Church service held by Padre Harley.	
	14 May 45	0700	Party of Knakas from Muschu Island land at C Coy posn on the beach.	
		0900	CO and 2 I C move out to visit D Coy	
		1000	Bde Comd visits Bn.	
		1500	YMCA issues comfort funds parcels.	
	15 May 45	1000	Lt Hoddinott assumes Comd C Coy.	
	16 May 45		Patrol from B Coy moving along reentrant South of their posn captured one Jap PW, physical condition very poor, found almost necessary to carry him back to Coy posn.	
1000		13 Pl relieved 14 Pl at PAROM. 14 Pl returned to Coy posn.		
1700		Extensive patrolling throughout the day without further contact being made with enemy.		
17 May 45		Lt Scally and Pl patrol to RANIMBOA area returned after having contacted enemy and killing one of them.		
	1200	Maj MacKenzie and small party made an unsuccessful attempt to reach GUAP Island in a lakatoi, due to strong currents and wind.		
	1700	Result of days patrolling, no further signs of enemy reported.		
18 May 45	0900	17 Pl is relieved by 16 Pl and Coy HQ of D Coy in KOANUMBO area		
	1600	Local patrols from A and B Coy found 4 more recently dead enemy.		

MONTH OF MAY 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2.18
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 INF BNDate and Time.—From 18th May 45 To 23rd May 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
KOANUMBO BOIKEN Area	18 May 45	1900 hrs	Entertainment provided by mobile Cinema in B Coy area.	
	19 May 45	0900 hrs	10 Pl relieved by 12 Pl in South flank patrol base.	
		1000	CO visits CAPE WOM area with Bde Comd.	
		1600	D Coy patrols located two further recently dead enemy.	
	20 May 45	0900	13 Pl relieved by Pnr Pl. at PAROM Patrol base.	
		1600	Patrols again report no further signs of enemy activity within area of responsibility.	
	21 May 45	21		
		0900	Adjt and I O visit CAPE WOM.	
		1000	Bn is placed on 72 hours notice for movement to WEWAK area to relieve 2/8 Bn.	
	22 May	0800	1600	Patrol from 13 Pl returned to HAWAIN base after killing 3 enemy in RANIMBOA area. Lt WOII Adam, commanding the Pl, stated that enemy in this area were very active.
			Capt Gibbins with A Coy, left on patrol to clear RANIMBOA area. In proximity of RANIMBOA contacted enemy, killing three of them, own casualties one native wounded.	
1600		Lt Stone with 10 members of Pioneer Pl and natives on patrol in NUMIKIM area contacted enemy, who fired on patrol, mortally wounding Pte Sweeney. Leaving one man with Pte Sweeney, Lt Stone moved the remainder of the force to the East flank of the enemy position, where he successfully attacked the position, killing seven of the enemy and suffering one casualty, Pte Field wounded. One man was despatched to bring a stretcher party, four more men were detailed off to begin carrying Pte Sweeney out, and with the remaining three fit men Lt Stone completed the task of the patrol.		
23 May	1030	Troops receive xxxxx issue of two bottles of beer per man, one free for VE day celebrations.		
	1200	Heavy downpour of rain breaks unusually long dry spell.		
	1400	Bde I O visits Bn.		

MONTH OF MAY 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 INF BNDate and Time.—From 23rd MAY 45 To 28th MAY 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BOIKEN - HAWAIN area.	23 May 45	1500	A Coy patrol moving from MUMIKI RANIMBOA along track to NUMIKIM contacted enemy position and deploying immediately, attacked position, causing the enemy to flee in a Westerly direction.	
	24 May 45	0900	Maj McDonald, with a party from Bn HQ, were conveyed by barge to GUAP island and returned with considerable quantities of paw paws and native trinkets.	
		0930	17 Pl relieved D Coy HQ and 16 Pl at KOANUMBO Patrol base.	
		1600	A Coy patrol contacted a further enemy position in NUMIKIM village. Attack successful, 4 enemy killed, our casualties Pte Baker killed, WOII Smith, Cpl Dawson, Ptes Gill and Abernethy wounded.	
	25 May 45	0900	CO and Adjt visited C Coy.	
		1400	Bn 2 I C and Adjt visited DAGUA aerodrome accompanied by unit photographer. Snap-shots taken of wrecked planes and other objects for illustration purposes in Bn magazine.	
		1600m	Lt Broadfoot and 15 Pl patrolling in MUMIKIM area contacted Japanese, killing two.	
	26 May 45	1400	WOII Adam promoted to commissioned rank in the field. The RSM, WOI Edmondston, marched out of unit B Class, to return to the Mainland. Patrolling confined to for local defense only.	
		1900	Mobile cinema showed in B Coy area.	
	27 May	0900	Pioneer Pl relieved by 15 Pl from base and en route 15 Pl captured one enemy.	
			A police boy patrol in Farom area recovered 9 knak kanakas who had been previously working for the Japanese.	
		1600	Capt Palmer released from duties with 2nd Army, returned and assumed comd C Coy.	
	28 May	0730	CO, Adjt, IO and Coy Comds moved to BORAM aerodrome to make a recce of new Bn area.	
		1200	All patrol bases taken over by A Coy 2/1 Bn, and out-posted Pls rejoined their respective companies.	
		1400	Police boy patrol in MUMIKIM area killed one Japanese and returned with approx 100 kanakas incl 2 Jap police boys.	

MONTH OF MAY 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 INF BN

Date and Time.—From 29th May 45 To 31st May 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.	
BOIKEN - KOANUMBO area	29 May 45	0730	Coys engaged in packing preparatory to moving to BORAM area. Bn HQ commenced movement by MT to new site. A, B, and C Coys are to follow later by barge.		
		1000 hrs	Bn HQ now located on WESTERN end of spur overlooking BORAM drome.		
		1400 hrs	Barges containing A, B and C Coy personnel arrive at Beachhead on Cape BORAM and are transported relieve 2/8 Bn Coy bases.		
	30 May 45			Flanking troops are now 2/4 Inf Bn on Western side and 2/6 Cav Bde Regt on the East. The Bn's new role is purely defensive.	
			0800 hrs	B and C Coys begin patrolling to clear Bn area.	
			1000 hrs	Remainder of Bn, D Coy B Echelon and Tk A Pl, arrive at BORAM.	
			1100 hrs	A B Coy patrol, under comd Lieut Stone, contacted a strong enemy posn on 910 feature, resulting in own casualties, Ptes McIntyre and Brown killed, Ptes Colbert and Roberts wounded. Lt Stone called for Arty support and this was cancelled because of other troops in near proximity of enemy position, rendering it necessary for the patrol to return to its base.	
			1700 hrs	Remaining patrols reported no signs of enemy.	
			2000 hrs	Enemy threw grenades into A Coy position, without causing casualties.	
	31 May		1000 hrs	Bde Comd visits Bn.	
			1400 hrs	Capt Hughes joins Bn and is posted 2 I C D Coy.	
			1800 hrs	A Carrying party from A Coy moving back to Coy posn xxxx was fired on by three enemy, who had cut company's communications then escaped, killing Pte Rahill. Patrols again report no contact with enemy.	
			<i>Ian Hutchison</i> Lt col (Ian Hutchison) Comd 2/3 Aust Inf Bn		

MONTH OF APRIL 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN

Date and Time.—From 1 Apr 45

To 3 Apr 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MABAM RIVER	1 Apr 45	0800	Native patrols dispatched by ANGA U to recce general area NORTH of WONGINARA MISSION. One Police Boy XXXXXXXXXX killed and one Kanaka killed.	
		1700	Easter Services held Bn HQ, A and D Coys by Padre Harley. ANGAU patrols returned after killing 3 Japs. Kanakas report HQ of Maj-Gen NAKAI, comd 20 Jap Div, at XXXXXXXXXX KUBEURIN.	
	2 Apr 45	0800	Capt MacDonald, in comd B and C Coys, with FOO party and native guides, moved out to raid 20 Jap Div HQ.	
		1445	Lt Varney, with 18 Pl, established astride Jap L of C EAST along MABAM River.	
		1600	MacDonald Force moved silently to Jap HQ and attacked the enemy with complete surprise. After a short skirmish, in which Capt McCracken directed the three platoons of B Coy against their respective objectives, the enemy was routed, leaving 22 killed (including 2 Captains and 4 lieutenants) and an unprecedented quantity of maps and documents. Our casualties were Lt Varley, comd 10 Pl, and Pte Adler killed, and Ptes Murphy, Robinson and Haddock wounded.	
	3 Apr 45		Extensive patrolling throughout the day by MacDonald force resulted in the killing of 6 Japs in WONGINARA MISSION area, and the clearing of AMOIA.	
		0700	Tk A Pl occupied B Coy's vacated position on MABAM RIVER.	
		0830	Remainder D Coy moved out to join 18 Pl, killing one Jap en route.	
		1115	Ration train fired on by Japs covering our L of C along MABAM RIVER. One enemy killed.	
		1230	8 Pl killed one Jap.	
	1245	16 Pl attacked Jap position gained spur. Cas enemy four killed, own Cpl Turner killed, Pte Kennedy wounded.		
	1730	Documents captured by MacDonald dispatched by special courier to Bde HQ.		

MONTH OF APRIL 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN

Date and Time.—From 4 Apr 45

To 6 Apr 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MABAM RIVER	4 Apr 45	0630 x	A Coy killed one Jap on their perimeter. MacDonal force split up to patrol as much of Bn's area of responsibility on their return journey. Capt MacDonal with B Coy moved in an area SOUTH of WONGINARA MISSION, without making contact, and C Coy, commander by Capt Gall, covered WONGINARA MISSION and the KIDNEY FEATURE, making contact for on three occasions and killing three, and wounding three enemy. Contact by D Coy throughout the day resulted in their clearing and occupation of commanding features, vital to the Japanese in their occupation of JIKKOKU PASS. During these actions 2 Japs were killed, and we lost Cpl Walters killed. Bde Commander visited Bn and stayed overnight.	
	5 Apr 45	0800	Capt Gibbons, with two platoons of A Coy and Tk A Pl, moved out to support D Coy and come under command Major Mackenzie. After Arty preparation A Coy attacked and captured high ground overlooking WONGINARA MISSION Road, destroying all remaining enemy resistance in JIKKOKU PASS area. Three enemy killed without loss to our force. A patrol from MacKenzie force contacted 2/2 Aust Inf Bn across the PASS.	
		0830	Member of Int Section with one section of 15 Pl and native guides moved out in an endeavour to identify the body of Maj-Gen NAKAI, but owing to the decomposed condition of the Jap bodies, were unable to do so.	
		0930	Bde Comd and CO visited B Coy.	
		1800	Two hundred refugee natives are brought in by native guides from KUBEURIN and HAMSUK areas.	
	6 Apr 45	0800	Lt MacDougal, with 14 and 15 Pls, patrolled EAST along MABAM River and established an ambush position over-night on Jap L of C.	

MONTH OF APRIL 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN

Date and Time.—From 6 Apr 45

To 10 Apr 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MABAM RIVER	6 Apr 45	1000	D Coy patrols clear WONGINARA ROAD from JIKKOKU PASS to Bn HQ.	
		1130	B Coy relieved A and D Coys on JIKKOKU PASS.	
		1600	B Echelon, guided by natives, locate 4 dead Japs near their area.	
	7 Apr 45	1630	One Jap killed in WONGINARA CREEK by Arty line party.	
		0800	One Jap killed by B Coy - a straggler.	
		1600	Lt MacDougal's patrol returned to base, after killing 4 Japs. Patrolling throughout the day by the Royal Papuan Constabulary resulted in the killing of three enemy. Mr Buchanan, official camera man, photographed members of the Bn.	
8 Apr 45	0800	A Coy moved out to establish ambush astride Jap L of C on MABAM RIVER.		
	0830	IO and recce party left to recce new Bn area on DAGUA STRIP.		
	1200	Mortar, MMG and Tk A Pls join B Coy to hold JIKKOKU PASS area.		
9 Apr 45	0800	Bn HQ, B and C Coys move to the coast and are established in their new positions at DAGUA by 1200 hrs.		
		D Coy took over Major MacKenzie's Bn HQ position at track and MABAM RIVER junction. Major MacKenzie assumed command of that portion of the Bn remaining in the JIKKOKU PASS - MABAM RIVER area.		
DAGUA	10 Apr 45	1000	CO attends Bde Comd's conference.	
		12 00	MMG and Tk A Pls join the Bn on the coast.	
		1600	D Coy patrol, Commanded by Capt Nordavan, was guided by kanakas to a garden area at the headwaters of the MABAM RIVER where eight out of nine Japanese were killed. During the day ACP Xmas nampers were issued.	

MONTH OF APRIL 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BNDate and Time.—From 11 Apr 45 To 24 Apr 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
DAGUA	11 Apr 45	0900 0915 1500	ANA Mail plane dropped Homeland papers. CO visited D Coy on MABAM RIVER. Comd 6 Aust Div visited Bn.	
	12 Apr 45	0900	A and D Coys, together with Mortar Pl, were relieved by 2/3 MG Bn and joined the Bn on the coast.	
	13 - 18 Apr 45		Bn resting on coastal strip at DAGUA. Entertainment was provided by "W aratah" Concert Party and 6 Aust Div Mobile Cinema Unit. YMCA provided musical programmes. S/Sjt O'Reilly, of 16 Bde FSS, lectured Coys on military documents captured during the campaign. Location was non-tactical and a complete rest with surfing, sunbaking and fishing was enjoyed.	
	19 Apr 45	0800	CO and Adj, with Pioneer Pl, reced new area KARAWOP Plantation. Pioneer Pl remained to prepare camp site and clear area of any enemy land mines.	
	20 Apr 45	1000 1400	The first Wirraway landed on reconstructed DAGUA STRIP. CO held conference and issued orders for move to KARAWOP. All officers and NCOs of the Bn were instructed by Lt Maloney in the use of Flame-Throwers, man pack.	
	21 Apr 45		Bn operational report covering current operations submitted to Bde.	
	22 Apr 45	0900	Combined Church service conducted by Padre Harley.	
KARAWOP	23 Apr 45	0730	Entire Bn, including B Echelon and Dental Unit, moved by MT to new area KARAWOP Plantation.	
	24 Apr 45	0730	Capt Johnstone, with 16 Pl, left on patrol along foot hills	

MONTH OF
APRIL 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN

Date and Time.—From 24 Apr 45 To 26 Apr 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
KARAWOP	24 Apr 45	1420	SOUTH of road to BOIKEN, located enemy ammunition dump with many machine guns, rifles and swords, and established patrol base 700 yards WEST of BOIKEN plantation. Lt Rumble established patrol base 1600 yards WEST of BOIKEN, where he located Jap sentries.	
		1430	CO attended Bde Comd's conference. CO issued orders for capture of BOIKEN.	
	25 Apr 45	0730	Bn advanced towards BOIKEN with A Coy left forward on the Coastal road, and D Coy right forward on high ground to the SOUTH.	
		1330	A Coy contacted enemy dug in astride road. One troop of tanks was called up. Enemy withdrew after flanking attack led by Lt Rumble, leaving 3 dead. Our casualties were Ptes Wolf and Hill wounded. A Coy continued to advance supported by one troops of tanks. Twelve enemy were contacted in vicinity BOIKEN CREEK, but withdrew when attacked from the flank. KENGEN village was occupied, one enemy captured and one Indian PW recovered.	
		1400	D Coy, pushing forward along foot hills, killed two enemy, took one prisoner and captured one JUKI machine gun. Bde Comd visited the Bn, and proceeded with CO and Adjut to forward companies.	
		1900	Lt col Cameron, of 2/2 Aust Inf Bn, visited the Bn. C and D Coys ineffectively mortared by the enemy.	
BOIKEN	26 Apr 45	0730	Bn Hq and remainder of Bn moved to BOIKEN.	
		0730	A Coy continued advance along coast and reached KALIMBOA village where enemy was contacted. An attack was launched with tank support and the area was cleared. Three enemy were killed in this action, and a 37 mm gun destroyed. Two other 37 mm guns and a JUKI MG were found in the BOIKEN area. D Coy continued to sweep foothills WEST of BOIKEN plantation,	

MONTH OF APRIL 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN

Date and Time.—From 26 Apr 45

To 29 Apr 45

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BOIKEN	26 Apr 45	0730	were held up by heavy fire from enemy HMGs. Sjt Gooley and Pte Smith were wounded. Nineteen Indian PW, including one medical officer, were recovered near BOIKEN CREEK. B Coy cleared main plantation area and occupied high ground to the SOUTH.	
		1000	Bde Comd visited the Bn.	
	27 Apr 45	1200	B Coy contact enemy with JUKI MG. Arty concentration was called down and posn captured. Cpl Saunders seriously wounded by AP mine.	
		1500	Comd 19 Bde visited Bn.	
		1600	D Coy reached objective on BOIKEN CREEK.	
		1830	Lt Copeman, with 12 Pl, contacted enemy dug in at SOUTH EASTERN extremity of Bn area.	
	28 Apr 45	22 30	Enemy mortared 13 Pl area without causing casualties.	
		0700	Capt MacCracken, with two platoons of B Coy, moved out to attack enemy located by Lt Copeman. After arty concentration position was captured. Pte Wise killed, Pte Colbert wounded were our casualties. A Coy rescued Indian PW.	
		1200	Commanders 1 Aust Army, 6 Aust Div, 16 and 19 Aust Inf Bdes visit Bn. Rear Bn HQ and B Echelon join the Bn in BOIKEN Plantation. Cpl Saunders died at MDS. Lt Hoddinott rejoined Bn from Bde.	
	29 Apr 45	0700	Lt Hoddinott, with one section of D Coy and native guides, left on patrol to KOANUMBO.	
0800		CO and Adjut visited B and D Coys. Pte Lay, a member of the escort party, was wounded.		
1000		First barges to land at BOIKEN unload two two 155 mm guns.		

MONTH OF APRIL 1945

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required)

Unit 2/3 AUST INF BN

Date and Time.—From 29 Apr 45 To 30 Apr 45.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BOIKEN	29 Apr 45	1500	Section Patrol xxxx led by Capt Johnstone killed one Jap in BOIKEN CREEK.	
		1630	Lt Hoddinott advised by native runner the location of an enemy position NORTH of KOANUMBO. Capt Boyer with C Coy less 13 Pl, moved out with arty FOO party to join Lt Hoddinott and destroy enemy position.	
	30 Apr 45	0730	Advanced elements of 19 Bde arrived in the area.	
		1700	Capt Boyer's patrol occupied posn held by enemy on previous day without opposition. Probing forward, enemy was contacted and Arty concentration called down, but subsequent was held up by heavy fire from JUKI MG and three LMGs commanding the narrow, razor-back ridge. Two enemy were killed. Our casualties were Ptes Bourne, Ramsay and Plummer (AAMC) killed. Sjt Reece, Cpl Ross and Pte Stevenson wounded. Shelling of the enemy position was continued and the patrol was joined by 13 and 16 Platoons.	
			Air strike requested on KOANUMBO village for 1 May. During local patrolling by B Coy Pte Wilson was wounded.	

Ian Hutchison
(Ian Hutchison) ^{LT} col
Comd 2/3 Aust Inf Bn

MEDICAL APPENDIX

To 2/3 Aust Inf Bn War Diary for months MAY JUNE 45

In first week of May 45 Capt R L Park returned to Australia on compassionate leave, and was replaced by Capt M Bunn. At this time the Bn had occupied BOIKEN and three companies (A, B and C) were occupying a perimeter in the hills.

Personnel were now beginning to show signs of the strain of fifteen weeks in action. The malaria rate began to rise rapidly; skin lesions of all types were prevalent and tropical fatigue began to effect all ranks. Fortunately, and due solely to the excellent hygiene of the companies, very few cases of diarrhoea occurred, and almost all of these responded to sulphaguanidine.

On 29 May, after 4 weeks at BOIKEN - weeks of continuous patrolling and sporadic clashes with the enemy - the Bn moved on to BORAM plantation, replacing the 2/8 Aust Inf Bn. For the first three days sharp fighting ensued, with several casualties. Exhaustion, nervous strain and malaria now became uncontrollable, and brought the Bn to its knees. All companies were affected, and by the end of the first week in June, in most cases could scarcely muster one full platoon, and of these many were carrying on the fight with temperature over 100°. The CO was informed that the Bn could no longer carry on, and would require at least two (2) months rest before they could be considered an effective fighting force again.

On Jun 10 the Bn moved to a rest area at ~~RMS~~ Cape PUS. Almost immediately the malaria rate began to fall, until by the end of the month, doubtless aided by increased ~~by~~ atebirin ~~xxxx~~ supression dosage, it has almost returned to expected limits.

Now, at the end of June, after only three weeks rest, the Bn is showing signs of recovery apart from the decreased incidence of malaria. Skin lesions are less numerous and are responding more readily to treatment. Adequate sleep, plenty of swimming and sun bathing, recreation and other amenities, e.g. pictures and (occasionally) beer - these factors are slowly putting the Bn back on its feet. It is to be hoped that this rest will ~~be~~ continue for ~~xxxxxxxx~~ such time as will allow all personnel to have recovered sufficient vitality to continue the fight.

MORALE

In spite of the low state of health, the morale of the troops ~~will~~ has always been high.

HYGIENE

Under the able direction of Sjt Irons a high standard has been maintained throughout the Bn.

Mosquito Control.

Filling in of pools and swamps, where possible, or spraying with malarisol, has been carried out.

DDT

The small amount available has been used for fly control around the kitchens. It is found that the available fly spray (apart from freon bombs, which are difficult to procure) is inadequate.

Garbage

Garbage, wet and dry, has been effectively dealt with. Carefully precautions are the rule with latrines.

Water

4 scoop water has been encountered in all areas occupied. The almost complete absence of bowel affections is the direct result of efficient sterilization.

RATIONS

These have been very good throughout. At regular intervals there have been ~~xxxx~~ issues of fresh meat and butter. A well balanced and well cooked diet has been supplied at all times.

MALARIA

As mentioned above, the end of May and beginning of June saw the rate rise to uncontrollable proportions. It is difficult to give an adequate explanation to this. It seems reasonable to suppose that physical and mental exhaustion ~~xxxx~~ may be a factor - but it may well be that one atebrin tablet daily was insufficient. On 19 Jun the Bn was placed on two atebrin daily, at which time the malaria rate was already falling in the rest area. The efficiency of this increased dosage remains to be tested when the Bn goes back into action.

VCASES EVACUATED

	<u>Conf Mal</u>	<u>PUO</u> (with malarial symptoms)
Week ending Friday 11 May	50	20
18	30	14
25	38	9
1 Jun	73	16
8	66	32
15	38	6
22	26	6
29	8	2

For the weeks ending June 8 and 15 PUO figures were high because the men were too sick to hold while blood films were examined. A large percentage of these were confirmed on arrival in hospital.

DERMATITIS

The skin lesions encountered in action were mainly tinea, circinata and pustular dermatitis. Since arrival at the rest area these have abated, but there has been a small increase in the number of boils, abscesses and cellulitis.

REINFORCEMENTS

Thirty-one were received on 27 and 28 June. In the main they were good types, although very young (ages 19 - 25).

BATTLE CASUALTIES for period

- 9 Killed in action.
- 20 Wounded in action (including 2 police boys).

STRETCHER BEARERS AND RAP STAFF

The ~~xxxx~~ thanks of the RMO are due to all coy stretcher bearers. They have at all times conducted themselves gallantly and their treatment of wounded has been excellent.

Sjt Woods has been boarded B class, and leaves the Bn with a splendid ^{record}. He has been replaced as RAP Sjt by Cpl Armstrong, who has already been promoted. At all times the RAP staff has given loyal and efficient service. They are a credit to the AAMC.

Dunn Capt
 RMO 2/3 Aust Inf Bn

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCE

2/3 Aust Inf Bn

Ref 225/45

Subject - ORIGIN OF PLACE NAMES

6 Mil Hist Field team,
HQ 6 Aust Div

Ref Maps BUT WEST 1"
BUT EAST 1"

1. Reference 6 Mil Hist team memo 15/BH of 31 May 45.
2. Following are the stories relating to places named by the unit in the current campaign.
3. (a) CORY SPUR Ref sq/6824.

On 1 Feb 45 two pls, No 13 and 16, under comd NX7864 Lt G E CORY of URALLA NSW were given the task of patrolling this area. On the spur named strong enemy defensive positions were located. Nearing dusk the force was deployed within ten yards of the enemy and a surprise attack was launched capturing the spur and killing thirty three enemy. Many valuable documents and much equipment were also captured.

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- (b) POPES HILL Ref 683248

This was the first important hill on CORY SPUR. During the action described above NX59156 Lt K R POPE of ROSE BAY NSW, in comd of 16 pl was seriously wounded while coolly directing his pl in the face of intense enemy fire and later died of his wounds.

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-
- (c) SCOTTS SADDLE Ref 683246

This was the line of approach to POPES HILL. NX39032 L/Cpl L E SCOTT of LISMORE NSW was in charge of the forward section during the attack over this portion of the ground. He was killed during the attack whilst leading his sec against an enemy machine gun post. Two actions were fought in the saddle before Cpl SCOTT's body was recovered. This action was the first large scale attack launched against the enemy by the unit in the present campaign.

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- (d) GIBBINS KNOLL Ref 683250

This was the second hill on CORY SPUR. On 10 Feb 45 enemy were contacted holding this feature and two pls of "A" Coy under comd of NX12474 Capt G GIBBINS of GUYRA NSW were given the task of clearing out the enemy. In a spirited attack the enemy were routed leaving six dead. A bren LMG and TSMG were captured as well as much equipment.

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- (e) DORANS CREEK Ref 679249

During the attack on GIBBINS KNOLL, NX22373 Pte W DORAN of CROWNS NEST NSW was killed in action. The creek running from the knoll was so named because it was the only line of withdrawal for the force and was the way Pte DORAN's body was carried out.

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-
-
-
-
- (f) THE KIDNEY Ref sq 7025

The feature was so named on account of its distinctive shape. On 24 Feb 45 "A" Coy was moving to take up a position on this

feature which was previously reported to be clear. The forward recce party was fired on from the feature. A pl under NX143640 Lt S P WEIR of RICHMOND NSW cleared the feature killing four enemy.

(g) THE TOOTH Ref 722246

Again named because of its close resemblance to a tooth. On 26 Feb 45 two actions were fought before clearing enemy from the feature. 14 Pl under comd NX50633 Lt A A SCALLY of WOOLSTONECRAFT NSW attacked first killing five enemy including two offrs. Later the same day NX40047 Lt A E McLEOD of MIDDLE BRIGHTON VIC with 11 pl attacked and cleared the feature killing seven enemy. During the two actions NX72737 Cpl J A RYALL of GLEN INNES NSW and NX153902 Pte G FRENCH of SCOTSDALE TAS were killed.

(h) GULLENS CORNER Ref 113183

During the advance of "C" Coy on BOIKEN PLANTATION to KOAN-UMBO on 2 May 45 much heavy fighting had taken place. 13 pl had the task of clearing the enemy from a track junction. During the attack against enemy heavy and light automatic fire NX40656 Sjt F CULLEN of TENTERFIELD NSW, an old identity of the unit was killed whilst leading a charge.

(i) MOUNT HUTCHISON Ref sq 7022

This feature was named when the unit moved into action on 23 Jan 45. It is a 3,500 feature dominating the whole of the Bn area. It was considered that as the mountain dominated the area it would be appropriate to name it after the commanding officer NX100 Lt col I HUTCHISON of MOSMAN NSW.

(j) PREECE SPUR Ref sq T123 - 7223

Is named after NX39901 Cpl A G PREECE of BELMORE NSW a member of the Bn Int sec. He was responsible for checking the maps of a patrol which had to move over this spur. He did a great deal of valuable work in this area checking and verifying topographical data.

27 Jun 45

Ian Hutchison Lt col
(Ian Hutchison)
Comd 2/3 Aust Inf Bn

9 Jun 45

2/3 AUST INF BN 006

Ref maps : WEWAK DROME 1 : 20000
KAIRIAU WEST 1 : 63360

INFM

1. Enemy

- (a) As per sitreps issued 081800K.
- (b) Area CAPE PUS-CAPE WOM reported clear of enemy.

2. Own tps

- (a) As per locstats issued to 081800K.
- (b) B coy move to area 245153

INTENTION

- 3. 2/3 Aust Inf Bn will conc area 245153.

METHOD

4. Summary of op

The op will be carried out in three phases

- Phase I. Relief by 2/11 Aust Inf Bn of defence of BORAM PTN area.
- Phase II. Move to conc area 245153.
- Phase III. Occupation of conc area 245153.

PHASE 1

5. Summary of events

- (a) 9 Jun 45
 - 0845K 2/11 Aust Inf Bn adv parties arrive BORAM PTN
 - 0900K 2/3 Aust Inf Bn coy guides meet 2/11 Aust Inf Bn adv parties at respective coy jeep heads
- (b) 10 Jun 45
 - 0815K 2/11 Aust Inf Bn main body commence arrival BORAM PTN
 - 1200K Relief complete
 - 1230K Comd passes from 2/3 Aust Inf Bn to 2/11 Aust Inf Bn

6. Timings

Relieving tps are to arrive jeep head respective coy Ls of C as under :

- i A coy 100815K
- ii C coy 101015K
- iii D coy 100815K
- iv 3 pl 101015K
- v 4 pl 100815K
- vi HQ coy (less 3 and 4 pls and Bn HQ) 101015K

7. Patrols

(a) Standing patrols will be est as under :

Ser	Coy	Str	Time est	Time in	Task	Location
1	A Coy	1 sec	100830K	When relief completed	To cover relief	376044
2	A Coy	do	100830K	do	do	377040
3	C Coy	do	100830K	do	do	Feature 460 sq 3403
4	C Coy	do	10030K	do	do	Feature 280 sq 3404
5	C Coy	do	100830K	do	do	Track at 353037
6	D Coy	do	100830K	do	do	Track junc 353024
7	D Coy	do	100830K	do	do	On track 80 yds SW feature 910
8	4 pl	do	100830K	do	do	367033

(b) Fighting patrols will be supplied as under :

Ser	Coy	Str	Time out	Time in	Route	Task
1	C Coy	1 sec	100830K	When relief reports coy posn	From Coy posn to Bn HQ via main L of C	To clear L of C and provide protective screen to relieving tps
2	3 pl	1 sec	On arrival tps relieving D Coy	When relief completed	From pl posn via main L of C to D Coy	do

8. Assembly area

On completion relief coys will assemble as under :

- (a) A Coy 373047
- (b) C Coy, HQ Coy (less 3 and 4 pls), Bn HQ 359046
- (c) D Coy, 3 pl, 4 pl 369044

9. Routes

Via respective Ls of C from present coy posns.

PHASE 11

10. The move from respective assembly areas to new area will be by M T
11. Adv party
B Coy already in posn at new area will improve coy localities under direction Bn 2 1/C.
12. Allotment of tpt
- | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| (a) Bn HQ | 2 trucks 2½ ton, 5 jeeps, 5 trailers |
| (b) A Coy | 2 trucks 2½ ton, 1 jeep, 1 trailer |
| (c) C Coy | 1 truck 2½ ton, 1 jeep, 1 trailer |
| (d) D Coy | 2 trucks 2½ ton, 1 jeep, 1 trailer |
| (e) HQ Coy (less 3 and 4 pls) | 2 trucks 2½ ton, 1 jeep (for TO) |
| (f) 3 and 4 pls | 1 truck 2½ ton |
| (g) TO will co-ordinate | |
13. Tpt report
Respective coy assembly areas
14. Embussing areas
Respective coy assembly areas
15. Timings
- | | |
|-------------------------------|---------|
| (a) Report coy assembly areas | 101230K |
| (b) Embuss | 101245K |
| (c) Pass S P | 101300K |
16. Speed and density
- | | |
|-----------|----|
| (a) v t m | 20 |
| (b) m i h | 10 |
17. S P
Rd junct 357054
18. Embussing Offrs
Respective coy 2 1/Cs
19. O C Convoy
Lt D W CHARLES
20. Route
Via main COAST RD to new area

PHASE 111

21. Occupation
On arrival coys will occupy areas as shown on trace att appx "A"
22. Guides
B Coy will provide guides to meet M T on arrival new area and guide coys to respective localities.

23. Security

Coys will be each responsible for security in respective areas.

ADM

24. Amn

- (a) Unit SAA res move with B Ech
- (b) Res held coy posns will be handed over to 2/11 Aust Inf Bn and receipt obtained.

25. Sups

- (a) On the man - unexpended portion of days rations will be carried
- (b) Res in coy localities will be handed over to 2/11 Aust Inf Bn and receipt obtained

26. Water

- (a) Water bottles filled
- (b) 2 gal containers with coy kitchen gear

27. Cooking gear

- (a) QM will be responsible for moving by native porter all coy cooking gear from coy localities to B Ech area by 101030K
- (b) 14 native porters will report each A O D coys 100830K to move coy gear
- (c) QM will move coy gear with B Ech
- (d) QM will co-ordinate native porters.

28. B Ech

- (a) Will move to new area by M T
- (b) 10 trucks 2½ ton will report QM 100700K
- (c) TC will co-ordinate
- (d) QM will arrange loading and unloading parties
- (e) Move will be completed and tpt returned this HQ by 101200K

29. Med

RAP will move in rear of convoy

30. Dental

Will move with B Ech

INTERCOMN

31. H Q

Closes present location 101230K opens 243153 same time.

32. L T

Sig Offr will arrange for 2/11 Aust Inf Bn to take over existing line in bn area and will collect same length of line from 2/11 Aust Inf Bn


33. Synchronisation

Sig Offr responsible to synchronise on 100700K
time sig

ACK

Time of signature 090730K

Method of distribution - Runner and SDS


 Lt
(G E GORY)
Adjnt 2/3 Aust Inf Bn

<u>DISTRIBUTION LIST</u>	<u>COPY NO</u>
A Coy	1
B Coy	2
C Coy	3
D Coy	4
HQ Coy	5-7
CO	8
Bn 2 1/C	9
Adjnt	10
Q M	11
I O	12
Sig O	13
T O	14
RMO	15
RSM	16
2/6 Aust Cav (cdo) Regt	17
2/3 Aust Fd Regt	18
2/4 Aust Inf Bn	19
2/11 Aust Inf Bn	20
16 Aust Inf Bde	21
File	22
War diary	23-24


CONCENTRATION AREA

Ref Map KAIRIRU WEST. 1.63360 Location 243153

APPX "A" 2/3 AUST INF BN O.O. N°6



SCALE - 1 inch to 50 yds.



2/3 AUST INEBN

WE - 11/120/3

TRADE	Rank	WE		Def icit	Sur plus	Rf's requ ired	x
<u>TRADE GROUP I</u>							
Blacksmith	Pte	1	1				
<u>TRADE GROUP II</u>							
Carpenter	Pte	6	6	2			
Int. Duties	Sjt	1	1				
" "	Cpl	2	1	1			
" "	Pte	7	8			1	
Signallers	Cpl	4	2	2			
"	Pte	22	23				
<u>TRADE GROUP III</u>							
Butcher	Pte	1	1				
Clerk	Sjt	2	2				
"	Cpl	6	4	2			
"	Pte	4	4				
Eqpt Repairer	Pte	1	1				
Rangefinder	Pte	4	2	2			
Storeman Tech	Sjt	1	1				
" "	Pte	3	1	2			
Tailor	Sjt	1	1				
"	Cpl	1	1				
"	Pte	8	1	7			
<u>NON SPECIALISES</u>							
RSM	WO 1	1					
CSM	WO II	5					
RQMS	WO II	1					
CCMS	S/Sjt	5					
Pl Sjt	Sjt	25	16	9			
Batman	Pte	35	22	13			
Dvrs MT	Pte	11	11				
Dvrs MT	Cpl	1	1				
Gen Duties (Mess)	Pte	3	3				
Hyg Duties	Pte	4	4				
LMG/Riflemen	Cpl	36	33	3			
LMG/Riflemen	Pte	361	139	222			
MMG Nos	Cpl	2	1	1			
MMG Nos	Pte	20	16	4			
Mortar Nos	Cpl	5	2	3			
Mortar Nos	Pte	63	44	19			
Orderlies	Pte	32	20	12			
Pioneers	Cpl	4	1	3			
Pioneers	Pte	23	25				
Regtl Police	Sjt	1	1				
Regtl Police	Pte	6	5				
Storeman	Pte	6	6				
Stretcher-Bearers	Sjt	1					
" "	Cpl	2					
" "	Pte	18	1	17			
TK A Gun Nos	Cpl	4	12	8			
" "	Pte	15	7	8			
Water Duties	Pte	2	2				
Total carried forward		769	432	338		1	

APPENDIX (Cont'd)

TRADE	Rank	WE		Def icit	Sur plus	Rfts reqd	X
Total brought forward		769					
<u>ATTACHED BY WE</u>			432	333	1		
<u>AAMC</u>							
Chiropodist	Cpl	1	1				
Hyg Sjt	Sjt	1	1				
Med Orderly	Sjt	1	1				
" "	Pte	1	1			1	
<u>AAOG</u>							
Shoemaker	Spl	1	1		1		
<u>AAPS</u>							
Postal duties	Sjt	1	1		1		
<u>AAPC</u>							
Pay Clerk	Sjt	1	1		1		
" "	Cpl	1	1		1		
<u>AACC</u>							
Caterer	WOLL	1	1		1		
Cooks	Sjts	5	5				
"	Cpls	5	5				
"	Pte	13	10			3	
		801	457	345	3		

SURPLUS TRADESMEN NOT ALLOWED
BY T E

TRADE GROUP

TO 3 Tailor	1
TO 3 Drv Mch	7
TO 3 Concretebr	1

X This column NOT to be used.

DATE OF DESLATCH

22 Jun 45

Jan Kutschera Lt Col
Comd 2/3 Aust Inf Bn

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS

PERSONNEL ATTACHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH

GR 197/44

VX. 73843 C/1 ROBERTSON W.G.

MED CLASS - A1

TRADE - SHOEMAKER

QUALIFICATIONS - C/1 SHOEMAKER

1 RECORDS WORKING

1 OTHER DIS. CONTACT

5 2nd 2nd

1 2nd 2nd

1 2nd 2nd

1 2nd 2nd

1 2nd 2nd

1 2nd 2nd

1 2nd 2nd

1 2nd 2nd

2/3 AUST INF BN. Unit

Army Form W.3009
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
8 / 24 Serial No.

PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 23/6/1945.

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	
Ammunition Examiners				Surveyors, Engineering				Operating Room Assts.				G.P.O. Assistants				
Armament Artificer Fitter				Surveyors, R.A.A.				Operator, Keyboard				Hammermen				
Armament Artificer Fitter (Electrical)				Surveyors, Topographical				Operator, Line				Leather Stitchers				
Armament Artificer Fitter (M.V.)				Surveyors, Trigonometrical				Operator, Signal				Orderlies, Nursing				
Armament Artificer Fitter (A.F.V.)				Toolmakers				Operator, Switchboard				Orderlies, Nursing Mental				
Armament Artificer Instrument				Turners				Operator, Wireless				Plate Layers				
Armament Artificer Radio				Watchmakers				Opticians				Rangemakers				
Armament Artificer Signals				Welders				Painters				Riveters				
Armament Artificer Wireless								Panel Beaters				Roughriders				
Artificer, Artillery								Photographer, Dry Plate				Saddlers				
Artificer, Engine								Predictor Numbers				Saddletree makers				
Blacksmiths								Printers				Shoemaker and Boot Repairer				
Bricklayers								Radiographers				Stevedores				
Computers								Biggers				Stokers, Staty. Engine				
Cooks, Hospital				GROUP II				Sawyers				Storemen, Technical				
Coppersmiths				Armourers				Signallers				Tailors				
Dispensers				Axemen				Signwriters				Textile Refitters				
Draughtsmen				Bakers				Telescope Identif. Numbers				Tinsmiths				
Draughtsmen (Architectural)				Bty. Comd's Asst.				Well Borers				Vulcanizers				
Draughtsmen (Engineering)				Bollermakers				Wheeler				Wagon Erectors				
Draughtsmen (Mechanical)				Carpenters				Winchman				Whitesmiths				
Draughtsmen (Topographical)				Carpenters and Joiners				Wireman								
Electricians				Cooks				Woodturners								
Electricians (M.V.)				Dental Mechanics												
Electricians (Signals)				Driver-Mech. (Eng. and Med.)												
Fitters				Driver-Operator												
Fitters (Cycle)				Drainers												
Fitters (Electrical)				Electricians												
Fitters (Gun)				Electricians (Engineers)												
Fitters (Instrument)				Fire Control Operators				GROUP III				DETAILS OF NON-TRADESMEN.				
Fitters (M.V.)				Gun Operator				Battery Surveyors								
Fitters, Railway Signal				Hatchman				Butchers								
Fitters, Signals				Height Taker				Clerks								
Grinder, Precision				Helio Operator				Clerks, Supply								
Mechanics, Instrument				Instrument Operator				Clerks, Technical								
Mechanics, Instrument (Signals)				Intelligence Duties				Coach Trimmers								
Mechanics, Instrument (Surgical)				Joiners				Concretors								
Mechanics, Radio				Lineman				Cooks								
Mechanics, Typewriter				Lineman, Signals				Dental Clerk Orderlies								
Mechanics, Wireless				Lithographers				Despatch Riders				ATTACHED BY W.E.				
Millwrights				Machinists, Metal				Draughtsmen, Signals								
Operators, Excavator				Machinists, Wood				Drivers, H.T.								
Pattern Maker				Masons				Driver Mechanics								
Pharmacist				Masseurs				Driver Tptn. Plant								
Photographer, Wet Plate				Mechanics, M.T.				Engine Hands, I.C.								
Photowriter				Miners				Equipment Repairers								
Plumber				Moulders				Farriers								
Saw Doctors				Nurses, Trained				Fitters' Mates								
Surveyors				Observation Post Assts.				Gun Layers								
CARRIED FORWARD				CARRIED FORWARD				CARRIED FORWARD				Totals of columns marked * to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 1 and 10 of Part A. respectively.			*	*

NOTES.—(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorised trades or specialists not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.
(c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are desired show details on back.
(d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of N.E. in col. "Reints. Required."
(e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

22 Jun 45
Date of Despatch

Paul Dufschwiler
Signature of Commander
Comd 2/3 AUST INF BN

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943)

Serial No. _____

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 23 / 1945 5 2/3 Aust Inf Bn (Unit)

W.E. 11 / 120 OFFRS. 0 OR's. 719 OFFRS. 0 D.R's. ATT. BY W.E.

PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.								
Rein'ts Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Rein'ts Required.				
-	-	-	-	*									
-	-	-	-	*									
-	-	-	-	1	Lieut.-Colonels								
-	-	-	-	2	Majors								
-	-	-	-	5	Captains	AASC (RMO)	1	-	-				
-	-	-	-	14	Lieutenants								
					Quarter-masters								
					A.A.N.S. and A.A.M.W.S. Offrs.								
					Civilians Counting as Offrs.								
-	13	-	20				1	-	-				
		DETAIL		A.I.F.	C.M.F.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.N.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	**	TOTAL.
		A.		21									21
		E.(1)											
		E.(2)											

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 10 of instructions for compilation of form will complete Part E(1) & E(2).

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.

** Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit From.	Date.	CAUSE.
BX 4734	LT	HODDINGT F J	HOSPITAL	21.6.45	Att from 16 Aug 4 Inf Bde

OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit To.	Date.	CAUSE.
BX 4734	LT	HODDINGT F J	Hospital	17.6.45	Admitted
BX 6031		BROADFOOT M		20.6.45	Admitted

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO _____ (Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. _____/_____/194_____.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).
		NIL	

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON POSTED STRENGTH

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 23 / 194. (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	Army Number.	Surname.	Initials.	Posting.	Whether present with Unit (insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	Date of Detachment.
Lt col	IX 100	MUTCHISON	I	CO	Yes		
Maj	IX 91	MCDONALD	R W F	2 I C			
T/Maj	IX 7546	MACKENZIE	K M	CC D COY	No	Det 6 Aust Div Coy (Sig)	1.6.45
Capt	IX 852	HUGHES	R L	2 I C B Coy	Yes		
"	VX109475	SMITH	F S	2 I C A Coy			
"	IX 12474	GIBBINS	G W	CC A Coy			
Lt	IX161541	GARBIN	H J A	QM			
"	IX123791	SCOTT	G E	PL Comd			
"	IX125937	JONES	B E V				
"	IX117257	HOWE	J R				
"	IX 76317	STONE	G O				
"	IX 4626	BELL	F G	A/QM			
"	IX101644	JACKSON	W T	Sig C			
"	IX 4263	KALHS	R W	PL Comd			
" T/Capt	IX 7364	CORY	G E	Adjt			
"	IX 4523	SINNEY	T H	PL Comd			
"	IX105923	CHARLES	D V				
"	IX179932	IRONSIDE	J B				
"	IX 14380	REAY	R J				
"	IX 13153	HAMMOND	J A				
		ATTACHED WITHIN			FROM		
Capt	VX 98010	BURN	M	RSO	Yes	5.5.45	

PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank, if Held.	Army Number.	Name and Initials.	Unit.	Date of Attachment.	Nature of Attachment.
Capt	IX 35215	HARLEY R R	16 Aust Inf Bde	23.3.45	Att for duty
Capt	IX165815	CAMERON D A	2/4 Aust Inf Bde	2.4.45	"
Lt	IX 4794	HODDINGOT F J	16 Aust Inf Bde	29.4.45	" (CC Coy)
Lt	B 2387	DUBB A G	Aust Army Appliances Service	26.5.45	"

22 Jun 45
Date of Despatch

Jan Hutchison Lt Col
(Jan Hutchison)
Signature of Commander
Comd 2/3 Aust Inf Bn