


**AWM52**  
**2nd Australian Imperial Force and**  
**Commonwealth Military Forces unit war**  
**diaries, 1939-45 War**

**Item number: 8/3/5**

**2/5 Infantry Battalion**

**December 1944 - February 1945**



**LEGEND**

- Inf Regt HQ
- Inf Bn HQ
- Inf Co HQ
- Inf Platoon
- Coy (HQ - presumably an error for BnHQ) is a conventional sign for BnHQ
- Units in occupation of front lines
- Inf
- Inf Attack Gun
- Machine Cannon
- Inf (HQ - presumably regt HQ)
- Inf (HQ - presumably regt HQ, error for BnHQ)

--- Main tracks  
--- Sector boundaries  
--- Div boundaries  
--- Conditional area

3 Coy 1 Bn 237 Regt  
20 Bn of 3 Bn 1 Cdn Div

MAIN SECTOR  
1st Coy 237 Regt  
2nd Coy 237 Regt  
3rd Coy 237 Regt

1 Bn (less 3 Coy)  
1 Pl of 2nd Coy  
1 & 4 Bn (less 3 Coy)  
1 Pl of 3 Bn (2 Coy)  
1 Regt Gun Coy  
1 Pl of 1 Coy  
1 Pl Machine Cannon

Agricultural Unit  
5th Coy 2nd Coy (less 2 Pls)  
1 Coy 2nd Coy (less 2 Pls)

**WOMSAK SECTOR**

**PEREMBIL SECTOR**

**SALATA SECTOR**

**SECTOR UNDER DIV CONTROL**

**AMI SECTOR**

**SECTOR RESERVE UNIT**

YAKOWOR TONG 1 Coy  
RINGIN-ALBULUM 7 Pls  
TONG-RINDIN 2 Coy

SECRET

REPORT ON OPERATIONS

2/5 AUST INF BN

CAMPAIGN IN TORRICELLI MOUNTAINS

20 DEC 44 - 25 FEB 45

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COMMENTS :- GENERAL

Part (i) Record of events

(ii) Lessons from Operations

(iii) Equipment and weapons

GENERAL

---

THE OBJECT OF THIS SECTION IS:-

1. To give an indication of the scope of the operation and the tasks given to 2/5 Aust Inf Bn.
2. To present with the aid of attached maps and traces a pictorial of our own and enemy movements and own air activity.
3. To provide a close study of instructions which controlled the operation, by attaching copies of orders, instructions and memoranda both from and to 17 Aust Inf Bde.

NOTE : All orders issued by Bn in implementation of tasks set by Bde were verbal and are not recorded. fully.

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REF MAPS : SUAIN EAST  
SUAIN WEST  
NANU EAST  
NANU WEST

---

1. At the commencement of the operation information regarding the enemy in the TONG area was vague. Small enemy parties consisting of elements of 41 Div were occupying villages EAST and SOUTH of TONG. These parties showed little aggressive spirit and were content to forage for food. Enemy dispositions are shown in Appx A which was issued with 6 Aust Div Int Review No.3.
2. Our own forces consisted of 2/7 Aust Cdo Sqn based on TONG with patrol bases EAST and SE of this area.
3. With the intention of conducting operations based on TONG 17 Aust Inf Bde in mid Dec 44 ordered the formation of a force comprising two rifle coys from 2/5 Aust Inf Bn and a composite HQ. This force was commanded by Maj I.H. McBRIDE, was named PIPER FORCE, consisted of A and C Coys, and came under direct command of HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde.
4. Tasks given to the force were :-
  - (a) Task in Gen  
To relieve 2/7 Aust Cdo Sqn at TONG.
  - (b) tasks in Particular
    - (i) You will be responsible for patrolling WEST of NORTH-SOUTH line through MUSU V410071 and SOUTH of line incl NIALU V320207 excl AUN CREEK to junc with AMOK RIVER V350196 thence along AMOK RIVER to creek junc V391158 thence along creek to 41 grid line.
    - (ii) You will patrol SOUTH to the area MIMBIOK V200070 - YAUOTONG V268061 and destroy any enemy along the track between these places.
    - (iii) You will patrol SOUTH and est a base at MUSIMBE V350053.
    - (iv) When a base at MUSIMBE is established, patrol to the EAST and est a base at MUSU.
    - (v) When a base is established at MUSIMBE the main base may be moved to that area subject to the requirement of keeping TONG as a staging post on the L of C. Before moving the main base fwd, it will be ensured that the TONG area is completely cleared of the enemy.
    - (vi) You will render sitreps daily (made up to 1000 I) at 1100 I and such special sitreps as considered necessary.
    - (vii) Your patrolling programme and intentions will be signalled to this HQ by 1800 I on preceding day.
5. For further particulars see 17 Aust Inf Bde G562 of 12 Dec 44 - APPX C ; G571 of 15 Dec 44 - Appx D ; Op Instr No.7 of 15 Dec 44 - Appx E.
6. PIPER FORCE moved from AITAPE via YAKAMUL and relieved 2/7 Aust Cdo Sqn at TONG on 20 Dec. A base was established at TONG and aggressive patrolling commenced on 21 Dec. The force continued operations until 31 Dec incl when it reverted to command 2/5 Bn.
7. For movement of force during period 21/31 Dec see Map B and trace P ; enemy dispositions and movement are shown in Trace Q. Casualties were - Own Nil, enemy 23 killed.
8. During this period 71 Wing RAAF provided close air support and eleven successful air strikes were made. For details see Trace P.

9. At 31 Dec PIPER FORCE had partly achieved its tasks by having established a base at TONG and progressed to DREKIKER, YAMBES and LAUNG. See Trace P.

10. Upon assuming command at midnight 31 Dec/1 Jan Lt Col A. W. BUTTROSE carried on with tasks given in 17 Bde Op Instr No. 7 and formed general outline plan as follows:-

"A Coy will form base at MUSINAU and protect RIGHT flank by continuing pressure EASTWARD and by deep patrolling to SOUTH.  
C Coy to secure in succession PEREMBIL - ASILING - MISIM - SAMASAI.

B Coy on arrival in area to move and secure OLD SAHIK and adv in gen SE direction and clear in succession SUMUL - WALENDE - MAHARINGA - SELNAU".

For implementation of this order see Traces T and V.

11. In reply to 17 Bde Signal 089 of 301100 I (appx F) 2/5 Bn signal 066 of 2 Jan (appx H), set out outline plan for future operation as follows:-

"When PEREMBIL clear main axis through ASILING MISIM to SAMASAI @ will watch RIGHT flank as suggested"

12. 17 Aust Inf Bde I 4/4 of 3 Jan gave a fairly reliable summary of the dispositions, strengths and COB of enemy 41 Div Gp operating in the TONG PEREMBIL area. See appx I and Trace S.

13. On 3 Jan B Coy and MMC Pl arrived at YAMBES and joined Bn. To further the Bn plan B Coy was ordered to move to NEW SAHIK and thus protect C Coy's LEFT flank and rear.

14. 17 Aust Inf Bde 0680 of 3 Jan (appx J) advised that Op Instr No. 7 was still effective and therefore Bn objective continued to be MUSU. The plan was further implemented when C Coy occupied PEREMBIL on 3 Jan.

15. At this stage Bn's forward movement was retarded by receipt of 17 Aust Inf Bde signal 0 157 of 050845 I (appx K) saying "until supplies improve adopt defensive attitude with aggressive patrols @ verify existence of enemy localities at SUMUL and MALBUAIN @ suggest you strengthen post at SAHIK".

16. At 061530 I 2/5 Bn 0 83 (appx L) advised "policy already implemented @ concur your suggestion @ str SAHIK now one coy less one Pl @ SUMUL being investigated @ MALBUAIN clear."

17. On 6 Jan 2/5 Bn G 2/44 (appx M) gave CO's appreciation of the situation. The Bn outline plan was to make axis of advance EAST through PEREMBIL - ASILING - MISIM - SAMISAI, covering flanks with one coy RIGHT doing deep patrolling and to have standing patrol at SAHIK.

18. Orders issued by Bn included :-

C Coy continue adv along main axis.  
A Coy remain at MUSINAU DREKIKER.  
B Coy remain SAHIK with immediate tasks to patrol SE SAMUL which, if clear to be occupied by one Pl. patrol NE to AMUK river.  
D Coy who were en route from AITAPE to be used with C Coy along main axis upon arrival in area.

19. 17 Aust Inf Bde G 701 of 8 Jan (appx N) gave permission to use ASILING as an objective in lieu of MUSU and suggested SAMISAI be made forward base for aggressive patrols further to SE. Limiting factor to forward move was still the supply problem.

20. By 11 Jan the Bn objective of ASILING MISIM and SAMISAI on main axis were gained by C Coy, while B Coy had reached SAMBUK. D Coy arrived

in the area and in accordance with Bn plan assumed the role of forward coy on main axis after relieving C Coy at SAMISAI on 12 Jan. See Trace W

Further orders were issued by Bn for :-

- A Coy to move fwd and secure PELNADU.
- B Coy to clear as far as MAHARINGA.

this task was completed by 16 Jan.

21. 17 Aust Inf Bde 0170 of 120715 I (appx 0) extended Bn objective to EAST 50 vertical grid and SOUTH 04 lateral grid. Patrols allowed to move to deep SOUTH.

22. Following this instruction 17 Aust Inf Bde G726 of 13 Jan (appx AA) gave an indication of the trend of future ops and set out proposals necessitating a slight variation in abovementioned signal. The instructions were :-

- (a) You will be relieved of any responsibility for the area NORTH of the AMUK River after passing EAST of the 48 vertical grid line.
- (b) You will est contact with the Cav in the HAMBINA village area.
- (c) The mov of the left of your force will be SOUTH of the AMUK River and will be in the gen direction of SELNAVA V4408, AUANG V4906, BALAGA V5502. During this fwd move you will clear the enemy from the country between the AMUK and the NANU River.
- (d) When the move in subpara (c) above is well under way and is approaching the 49 vertical grid, your right should move fwd of PELNANDU area and clear the enemy in succession from the following gen areas LUWAITE V4503, WAHUN A4799, AMUL A5598.
- (e) Careful timing of the moves in subparagraphs (c) and (d) will be essential to ensure that your flanks do not become too widely separated.

23. In implementation of these instructions Bn issued the following orders :-

A Coy will clear in succession the LUWAITE - WAHUN - AMUL areas. Advance to be controlled by the centre. With the occupation of WARINGHAM - BANA areas a dropping ground will be prepared and a firm base established in this area. D and C Coys forward coys will then clear AUANG - BULMITA and secure a firm base with dropping ground in the WARANGAM area. On the LEFT B Coy having secured SELNI area will clear YANA - BOMBISIMA and come into reserve AUANG, moving then to clear KUAINICIMA group. See appx BB - 2/5 Aust Inf Bn G2/45 of 18 Jan.

For implementation of these orders see Traces R,T,U,V,W.

24. 17 Aust Inf Bde 00 No.2 of 25 Jan (appx CC) set out the intention "17 Aust Inf Bde will clear enemy from area WEST to NORTH - SOUTH line through incl AMI V602038 - BITIKA V5908," and gave 2/5 Bn the following tasks :-

- (a) To clear the enemy from the area along the gen line AUANG V4906, WARANGAM villages V5003, NUMANGO villages V6402 thence EAST to the line of the NINAB River.
- (b) To clear the enemy from the area along the gen line LUWAITE villages AMBUM villages A4797 - ILAHOP A5698.
- (c) Patrol to the deep SOUTH as far as the 90 lateral grid line and clean up enemy pockets within striking distance of the

force moving in para 6 (b).

25. Implementing Bde-OO No. 2 2/5 Bn issued orders for further move EASTWARD as follows:-
- D Coy secure SALATA
  - C Coy secure NUMANGO village area
  - B Coy move SOUTH and secure EAST side of SALATA to assist in destruction of enemy in this area. On completion this task to move EASTWARD and bring pressure to bear on BALIF.
  - A Coy resting on main axis.
26. All coy objectives had been gained by 31 Jan.
27. Further verbal orders were then issued by Bn as follows:-
- D Coy will clear the SALATA M'BRAS village area.
  - B Coy secure BALIF.
  - C Coy clear BALAGA-NUMANGO areas.
  - A Coy res.
28. While this operation was in progress a message was received from 17 Bde by R/T at 071015 I stating - Bde comds instrs are to bog-down and return parachutes Q parachutes posn most acute Q comd desires that ops take second place until they are cleared even to extent of slowing right down.
29. 17 Aust Inf Bde G831 of 8 Feb (appx DD) gave a forecast of future operations and assuming objectives given in 17 Bde OO No. 2 were obtained attention was to be directed to MAPRIK as a preliminary to a move to the SOUTH. 2/5 Bn proposed task was to assist 2/7 Cav Cdo Sqn in securing MAPRIK area then clear SINAHU area leaving strong base at M'BRAS ILAHOP or other suitable area. The task being to kill the enemy whilst cleaning up the country with capture of ground no object.
30. In reply to above CO 2/5 Bn of 11 Feb (Appx EE) set out his appreciation of the situation and submitted an outline plan for future operations as follows:-
- (a) When the enemy is either destroyed or cleared from the NUMANGO-ILAHOP areas one coy to be left at ILAHOP to control NORTH-WEST from this base and to patrol SOUTH-EAST ~~xxxxxx~~ destroying the enemy to ILAHINKA 583950.
  - (b) The central axis of the two coys and HQs to move SOUTH-WEST from the BALIF to the M'BRAS area then SOUTH-EAST to ENDIPI, ILAHETA to SINAHU.
  - (c) One coy to move SOUTH-WEST from M'BRAS and destroy or drive the enemy from the APOS group SOUTH-EAST through ASANAKOR to YUBAN-AKUOR then EAST to SINAHU.
  - (d) The above would require the Cav Regt be given the extra task of destroying the enemy EAST of the AMUK to include WALAHUTA AUPIK 1-2 which are at present occupied by a least 100 enemy.
31. By 12 Feb all coy objectives given in para 27 had been gained and 2/5 Bn issued the following orders to further 17 Bde plan of advance on MAPRIK:-
- B Coy secure BARANGABANGI
  - C Coy secure MALAHUM
  - D Coy continue mopping up M'BRAS village area
  - A Coy res.



32. The implementation of these orders resulted in the capture of both objectives by 17 Feb. Mopping up programmes in M\*BRAS area was continuing. Bn then ordered coys to establish firm bases in these localities and patrol aggressively to the SOUTH and SOUTH-EAST with AMUK river as fwd boundary.

33. These tasks were carried out until 2/5 Bn was relieved by 2/7 Bn. Command passed to 2/7 Bn at 0800K 25 Feb.

34. Air strikes during the complete operation were very successful. Altogether 62 strikes were made in close support of advancing troops. Details are shown in Trace R.

35. Casualties resulting from ground action during the operation were

Cwn	7 killed	18 wounded
Enemy	<del>387</del> 378 killed	42 wounded 12 PW.

36. The Bn advance over period 20 Dec 44 to 25 Feb 45 was 29000 yds while at times frontage extended over 11000 yds.

37. LIST OF APPX AND TRACES ATTACHED

- Appx A Int map showing enemy dispositions
- Appx B Map of TONG-BALIF area
- Appx C 17 Aust Inf Bde G562 of 12 Dec
- Appx D 17 Aust Inf Bde G571 of 15 Dec
- Appx E 17 Aust Inf Bde Op instr No. 7 of 15 Dec
- Appx F 17 Aust Inf Bde signal 089 of 30 Dec
- Appx G 17 Aust Inf Bde signal 096 of 1 Jan
- Appx H 2/5 Aust Inf Bn signal 066 of 2 Jan
- Appx I 17 Aust Inf Bde I 4/4 of 3 Jan
- Appx J 17 Aust Inf Bde G680 of 3 Jan
- Appx K 17 Aust Inf Bde 0157 of 050845 I
- Appx L 2/5 Aust Inf Bn 083 of 061530 I
- Appx M 2/5 Aust Inf Bn G2/44 of 6 Jan
- Appx N 17 Aust Inf Bde G701 of 8 Jan
- Appx O 17 Aust Inf Bde 0170 of 120715 K
- Appx AA 17 Aust Inf Bde G726 of 13 Jan
- Appx BB 2/5 Aust Inf Bn G2/45 of 18 Jan
- Appx CC 17 Aust Inf Bde 00 No.2 of 25 Jan
- Appx DD 17 Aust Inf Bde G831 of 8 Feb
- Appx EE 2/5 Aust Inf Bn memo of 11 Feb

- Trace P PIPER force 21-31 Dec. Coy mov and air activity
- Trace Q Enemy dispositions and mov 21-31 Dec
- Trace R Bn HQ mov and air strikes 1 Jan- 25 Feb
- Trace S Enemy mov strength and def areas
- Trace T A Coy mov and patrols 1 Jan-25 Feb
- Trace U B Coy mov and patrols 1 Jan-25 Feb
- Trace V C Coy mov and patrols 1 Jan-25 Feb
- Trace W D Coy mov and patrols 1 Jan-25 Feb

*A.W. Butrose*

(A.W. BUTTROSE)

Lt Col

Comd 2/5 Aust Inf Bn

21 May 45

# TONG — BALIF — AREA

APPX B

REF MAPS: SUAIN EAST & WEST NANU EAST & WEST

RF 1:63360



1 inch equals 1 mile

Drawn by 45 Aust Inf Bn Int Sec  
3 May 45

*MHC*  
SECRET

Subject : OPERATIONS - TONG AREA.

HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde  
12 Dec 44  
G562

Maj I. H. MCBRIDE  
2/5 Aust Inf Bn.

Ref maps : SUAIN EAST 1 in to 1 ml  
SUAIN WEST           "  
NANU EAST           "  
NANU WEST           "

1. Certain ops are pending in the near future which will be based on TONG.
2. At present 2/7 Aust Cdo Sqn are at TONG with patrol bases EAST and SE of this area.
3. I want you to command a force of not less than two coys plus a small HQ and to relieve 2/7 Aust Cdo Sqn in the TONG area. Mov will commence on Sun 17 Dec 44. You will answer directly to me for the tactical employment of this force.
4. All available infm has been incl in the Div daily situation reviews and latest infm will be given to you by Bde IO.
5. Recently, enemy activity in the TONG area has increased. Since Sat 9 Dec 44 our patrols have gained control of the immediate vicinity of TONG and are moving to the EAST. It is likely that the enemy will endeavour to delay our patrol movement in this area by standing patrols and ambushes. An enemy party, str unknown, is reported at WALUM ref V579190.
6. The latest infm regarding the disposns of our own tps will be given to you by Bde IO, but more up-to-date infm should be available on the return of Capt L A CAMERON.
7. ANGAU are maintaining a permanent det in the TONG area under Capt COLE. Certain police boys are available as well as native carriers.
8. You will be responsible for patrolling activity SOUTH of the TORRECILLI MOUNTAINS in the area WEST of a NORTH-SOUTH line through MUSU V410071. As 2/7 Aust Cdo sqn will be operating in the MAKUIR area ref V420193, a clearer definition of your Northern boundary will be arranged and you will be advised.
9. Your tasks will be -
  - (a) To maintain a patrol base at TONG.
  - (b) To patrol SOUTH to the area MIMBICK ref V200070 - YAWATANG ref V268061 and destroy any enemy along the track between these places.
  - (c) Patrol SE and est a base at MUSIMBE ref V350053.
  - (d) With a base at MUSIMBE established, patrol to the EAST and est a base at MUSU.
10. When a base is established at MUSIMBE, the main base may be moved to that area subject to the requirements of keeping TONG as a staging post on the L of C. Before moving the main base fwd, it will be ensured that the TONG area is completely cleared of enemy.
11. Direct air sp will be available to you on application through this HQ. The system of demanding is :-
  - (a) Calls for strikes will be made through HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde. When a request for the following day is granted, it can NOT be cancelled unless a message to that effect is received by this HQ NOT later than 2100 hrs on the day prior to the strike.
  - (b) Tac R aircraft may be communicated with daily by RT or panel signals.
  - (c) Daily, a number of BEAUFORT aircraft will fly over your base to give close sp if required. The aircraft may be communicated with by RT or ground panels. They will be informed where to bomb or told that no support is required, in which case they will bomb a secondary target pre-arranged with 6 Aust Div.

Further instrs will be issued regarding air.

12. Patrols

It is essential that we pass on to 6 Aust Div infm of the location of friendly natives and projected patrols so that 71 WING RAAF may be informed. It is essential that your sig units and sub unit comds thoroughly understand ground panel system of air comm. In order that we may keep 6 Aust Div informed you will sig your daily patrol intentions to this HQ at 1200 hrs on the preceding day.

13. Adm - Separate adm instrs will be issued to you.

14. Intercomm

(a) 17 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec will provide you with a det and two 22 sets, one for rear link and one for air.

(b) A pigeon loft will move to TONG with the first subunit of your force and will be used for comm fwd to your patrols.

15. We will try and organise the L of C behind you on the lines of the WAU-SKINDEWAI track as early as possible.

16. Please let me have your appreciation of this problem and indicate the composition of the force you require, which should NOT exceed 300 personnel.

17. At a later stage, this force will be added to and the cmd will then be taken over by CO 2/5 Aust Inf Bn.

M. J. Moten Brig  
Comd 17 Aust Inf Bde.

Copy to : 2/5 Aust Inf Bn  
BM

Appx D

COPY NO. 2.  
SECRET

Subject : OPERATIONS - TONG Area.

Hq 17 Aust Inf Bde  
15 Dec 44.  
G571.

Maj I H McBRIDE  
CO 2/5 Aust Inf Bn (for infm)

1. In amplification of our conversation of yesterday morning:
  1. The posn of enemy forces in the TONG area is delightfully vague and your first consideration is to straighten this out.
  2. Generally, your attitude is to be aggressive. The present passive attitude in that area will not be followed.
  3. Keep all near enemy posts under constant observation so that he can NOT move without your knowledge.
  4. Prevent him from approaching your posts by aggressive patrolling.
  5. Don't become involved in set piece attacks when you can achieve your object by use of air strikes, harassing raids, ambushes, mortar fire and the like.
  6. Make the fullest use of Capt COLE and his police boys for deep patrolling and the collection of infm. COLE is reported to be very dependable and co-operative.
  7. When you judge it expedient, you may lose ground if by so doing you can entice the enemy on to better killing ground.
  8. Don't sink your roots too deeply into the ground - keep your force mobile.
  9. When you contact the enemy in a posn which looks difficult, pull back at the right moment and hit him from the air.
  10. We can afford to lose ground in the fwd areas temporarily provided such loss does NOT jeopardise either your force or neighboring units or prevent you from achieving your ultimate object.
  11. Your proposals to hold the YAMBES area defensively (but with offensive patrolling fwd of this area) while you first clean up the enemy pockets further WEST is considered sound.
  12. Accurately patrol located enemy pockets and clean them out one at a time. Remember the principle of concentration.
  13. Avoid anything savouring of bullheadedness and which might incur one unnecessary casualty.
  14. Infm and more infm is wanted here urgently of the situation EAST of the TONG area. PW will be invaluable. Expedite their move to AITAPE.

M. J. Moten Brig  
Comd 17 Aust Inf Bde.

17 AUST INF BDE OP INSTR NO. 7

Maj I H McBRIDE  
2/5 Aust Inf Bn

Ref Maps : NANU EAST 1:63360  
NANU WEST 1:63360  
SUAIN WEST 1:63360

INFM

1. Enemy

(a) Known enemy posns in the TONG area to date are as follows:-

- (i) at least 30 occupying YAPOMBIL
- (ii) approx 40 occupying SAHIK (V376111)
- (iii) approx 40 occupying EAST village of YAMBES gp (V354088)

The last named force has endeavored twice to dislodge our tps from their posns in WEST village of YAMBES gp (347089).

- (b) 14 enemy were reported to have moved from SOALAF on 12 Dec 44 and present whereabouts are NOT known.
- (c) ANGAU report dated 1 Dec 44 stated a minimum of 200 enemy were based in PEREMBIL villages area. This force was patrolling from time to time in varying str to SAHIK, YAMBES villages, DUMAM villages and MUSIMBILIM. This infm is considered accurate. Enemy parties mentioned in subpara (a) are considered to be part of this force.

2. Own tps

(a) 2/7 Aust Cdo Sqn are occupying TONG area. Disposns are as follows :-

TONG : Sqn HQ plus A Tp  
YAMBES : (V347089) B Tp with OP established.  
YASILE : C tp less two secs.  
KUMBUM : two secs C Tp with OP established.

An OP has also been established at V347150. TONG and YAMBES are occupied as def localities. YASILE and KUMBUM are occupied only as patrol bases.

- (b) On relief in TONG area 2/7 Aust Cdo Sqn are moving to MAKUIR area (V420192).
- (c) ANGAU are maintaining a permanent det at TONG, Capt COLE comd.

3. GEN Issued separately.

TASK IN GEN

4. (a) You will relieve 2/7 Aust Cdo Sqn at TONG with two rifle coys plus a small HQ increment.

(b) The composition of your force will be :-

HQ increment	Of an Adj, QM, RQMS, and 7 service and maint per sonnel
Bn Int det	1 offr 10 OR
Bn Sig det	1 offr 17 OR
Bn Fnr det	10 OR
Bn Med det	1 offr 8 OR
17 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec and one Pigeon Loft	7 OR
Det 6 Aust Div Postal Unit	1 OR

Two rifle coys  
Mortars (2 dets)

11 OR

(c) You will answer directly to HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde for the tactical employment of this force. Your comd will be designated PIPER FORCE.

5. Mov - AITAPE - TONG

The mov will be carried out in three stages.

Stage 1

(a) AITAPE - YAKAMUL by MT

The necessary vehs to tpt your force will report 2/5 Aust Inf Bn 1612001. The journey to YAKAMUL is 2 hrs.

(b) Native carriers will be available at YAKAMUL at 170600I for portorage of stores to TONG (see para 14).

Stage 2

BASE CAMP - NIALU

Stage 3

NIALU - TONG

TASKS IN PARTICULAR

- 6. (a) You will be responsible for patrolling WEST of NORTH - SOUTH line through MUSU V410071 and SOUTH of line incl NIALU V320207 excl AJN CREEK to junc with AMOK RIVER V350196 thence along AMOK RIVER to creek junc V391158 thence along creek to 41 grid line.
  - (b) You will patrol SOUTH to the area MIMBIOK V200070 - YAUTONG V268061 and destroy any enemy along the track between these places.
  - (c) You will patrol SOUTH and est a base at MUSIMBE V350053.
  - (d) When a base at MUSIMBE is established, patrol to the EAST and est a base at MUSU.
7. When a base is established at MUSIMBE the main base may be moved to that area subject to the requirement of keeping TONG as a staging post on the L of C. Before moving the main base fwd, it will be ensured that the TONG area is completely cleared of the enemy.
- 8. (a) You will render sitreps daily (made up to 1000I) at 1100I and such special sitreps as considered necessary.
  - (b) Your patrolling programme and intentions will be signalled to this HQ by 1800I on preceding day.

AIR

- 9. You will implement aggressive air strikes with preference most Southerly and South Westerly areas to drive the enemy Eastwards.
- 10. Direct air sp will be available to you on application through this HQ. The system of demanding is:-
  - (a) Calls for strikes will be made through HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde. When a request for the following day is granted, it can NOT be cancelled unless a message to that effect is received by this HQ NOT later than 2100I on the day prior to the strike.
  - (b) Tac R aircraft may be communicated with daily by RT or panel signals.
  - (c) Daily a number of BEAUFORT aircraft will fly over your base to give close sp if required. The aircraft may be communicated with by RT or ground panels. They will be informed where to bomb or told that no sp is required, in which case they will bomb a secondary target pre-arranged with 6Aust Div.
  - (d) In view of the presence of friendly natives at TONG and EAST of that area, you will request targets only after consultation with ANGAIU rep.
  - (e) Time limit after which NO strike will be made will be included in the request.

App F

~~MESSAGE FORM~~

DEC

FROM 17 Aust Inf Bde

Date Time of Origin 301100 I

TO Piper Force

Originator's No. 0 89. SECRET For BUTTROSE from MOTEN  
Submit outline for further advances as soon as prepared. Expect  
you will watch right flank approaches as far as MOINYEP ref  
A402968 repeat A402968 with native patrols.



MESSAGE FORM

Apx B

JAN

FROM 17 Aust Inf Bde

Date Time of origin 012145L

TO 2/5 Aust Inf Bn

Originator's No. 0 96. SECRET. For BUTTROSE from MOTEN  
Withdrawal O.P. SONGAIEN noted. Consider desirable to cover  
approaches to NW vicinity new SAHIK. Advise your views and  
decision.

MESSAGE FORM

Offn H

JAN

FROM 2/5 Aust Inf Bn

Date Time of Origin 021900 I

TO 17 Aust Inf Bde

Originator's No, 0 66. SECRET your 0 89 and 0 138 ACK  
when PERUMBIL clear main axis of adv through ASILING MISIM to  
SAMASAI. Will watch right flank as suggested. Your 0 96  
NW approaches covered by standing patrol str one NCO 7 OR  
at new SAHIK as from 3 Jan.

2/5 Aust Inf Bn

The following is a summary of infm now available of dispositions and strs of 41 Jap Div.

2. Infm has been obtained from documents and maps captured within the last few days and confirms previous indications as to the activity of 41 Div.
3. Infm is forwarded in amplification of maps already dropped to you and is believed to indicate fairly reliably the dispositions of 41 Div.
4. 41 Div HQ

(a) Organisation

Div HQ is constituted as a gp HQ as follows:-

HQ 41 Div (55)  
41 Div Engr Regt (95)  
41 Div Sigs Unit (30)  
8 Indep Engr Regt (less coys det)  
40 Rd Constr Unit (190)  
Ord Service Unit  
Branch Fd Ord Depot  
51 Constr Unit (50)  
MP dets  
Expeditionary Unit (elements)

Estimated strs are shown in parenthesis.

Total str of HQ is stated to be possibly 5/600.

(b) Location

Gp HQ is located in BALIF villages area and has direct control of BALIF sector.

5. 237 Regt

Although NOT immediately concerning your area, infm of this Regt may be of value.

(a) Responsibility of Regt is apparently divided into three sectors.

(i) Left Sector, manned by portion of 3 bn, is line from ABAU to mouth of NIMBUN creek, then generally SW along high ground to MALIN.

(ii) Right Sector, manned by 1 bn, is line from ROCKY FORESHORE, feature V6928, in general SE direction to unnamed village at V745246.

(iii) Reserve Sector, manned by remainder 3 bn plus att tps, is line from pt midway between ROCKY FORESHORE and village V745246 running in SW direction.

(b) DANMAP RIVER AREA

2 bn was opposed to our tps along line of DANMAP river and infm gained during Nov-Dec indicated str of this unit to be approx 300.

However as 211 enemy have been killed by Aust tps in this area to date it is possible that this bn has now been rendered useless as a fighting force.

(c) Strength

Total str of 237 Regt and att tps is now estimated to be 100-1200 which figure includes approx 650 sick, who are however, compelled to fight and work.

6. 238 Regt

(a) Organisation

Regt has attached the following tps:-

One coy 8 Indep Engr Regt  
54 L of C unit  
90 L of C Hosp  
9 Embarkation unit (dets only)  
1 Fd Hosp  
Ord duty unit

(b) Dispositions

Regt is responsible for what is known as PEREMBIL sector with def posns believed est at SUMUL, PEREMBIL and MALBUAIN.

Regt HQ is situated at SELNI

Unit responsibilities are unknown but following identification of tps have been recently found.

(i) Offr of 3 bn and NCO 1 Fd Hosp at SELNI

(ii) Offr of 3 bn killed at YAMBES on 15 Dec.

(c) Strength

Little infm is available on which to base str of Regt and att tps but pending further infm it is tentatively estimated at 800.

7. 239 Regt

(a) Organisation

Regt has att the following tps:-

One coy 8 Indep Engr Regt  
2 Fd Hosp

(b) Dispositions

Regt, less one bn which is believed to have been withdrawn for duty elsewhere, is responsible for def of WOMSAK and SALATA areas.

Regt HQ is located at WOMSAK

One bn is located at SALATA and is responsible for def of SALATA sector with est defences at MUSENDAI APOS and ASANAKOR.

(c) Strength

Little infm as to str of Regt and att tps is available and pending further infm it is tentatively estimated at 5/700.

8. General

(a) Strengths

Strs quoted have been increased since previous estimates as it is believed a policy of reinforcement of Inf Regts by the att of non-divisional tps is being carried out.

(b) L of C

Mov of 41 Div Gp to areas SOUTH of the TORRICELLI'S was by route MALIN-WALUM-WOMISIS-AMAM-WOMSAK, and should the enemy attempt to adopt offensive tactics against out tps to the NORTH it is considered that this route would again be used.

(c) Inter - Divisional Responsibilities

Responsibilities of 41 Div and 20 Div together with subdivision of 41 Div area into sectors are shown on map already dropped to you.

Maj  
(K.G. CLARKE)  
BM 17 Aust Inf Bde

Subject : OPS - TONG AREA

HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde  
3 Jan 45  
G680

Lt-col A W BUTTROSE  
2/5 AUST INF BN

Infm recently obtained now gives a fairly clear picture of enemy dispositions in the WEWAK area. A summary of infm as effecting your front is att.

2. The actual str of the enemy is an uncertain quantity and the figures given should be treated with res. They may be regarded as a maximum figure.
3. Now that the posn in front of you is reasonably clarified, it should help you to make a sound appreciation.
4. The op instr number 7 still stands.
5. The following points are stressed:-
  - (a) forward bases at YAMBES and DREKIKER (and if you decide to put a base fwd in the new SAMIK area) must be secure and capable of solid def and that before relinquishing a base to move fwd you must in turn secure your fwd base.
  - (b) There is no hurry to wipe out places like PEREMBIL. The maximum use of air strikes and your present harassing tactics by offensive patrols should achieve the required results. I expect you will use your mortars here as well. Look into the possibility of putting an ambush along his L of C EAST of PEREMBIL.
  - (c) No attempt at this stage should be made to move against MALBUAIN 3804 but this flank must be kept under observation and consideration given to the possible enemy approaches leading into MUSIMBILUM from the SOUTH and SE.
  - (d) While dispersion of your bn is unavoidable it should be arranged that you have at least local superiority opposite the forces in your immediate front e.g. the enemy str at PEREMBIL has been stated by your reports to be around 87. This is more than countered by your tps at YAMBES and LUAING and plus your ability to move the whole or portion of your tps from DREKIKER against any enemy conc in the PEREMBIL area. The strengthening of your posn opposite SUMUL 393110 will have to be considered.
  - (e) Any move you make must be carefully co-ordinated with the fwd mov of supe
  - (f) As you move further EAST and drive the JAP from his prepared defs you must expect to be counter-attacked and should prepare accordingly.
6. The sup situation is still not good. Only one aircraft is available but a second has been asked for so that we can build you up to 7 days sup, and with the uncertain flying weather to be expected this is considered a minimum.
7. If D Coy can be gainfully employed it will be moved fwd on your request but the difficulties of sup must be given due consideration.
8. The posn of the comd of att tps in your area has been clarified by 6 Aust Div who have placed them under 17 Aust Inf Bde which authority is delegated to you.
9. The med appreciation of Major PARSONS has been carefully examined and is approved. However the provision of 70 beds at YAMBES seems to be lavish in view of the nature of your ops and the methods employed which should keep casualties to the minimum. Major PARSONS will be told that any future coms of this nature will be submitted to you and a copy sent to ADMS for infm only. Please keep me in touch with the med situation continuously.
10. If you have any difficulties let me know I may be able to help you.
11. Please ack this by sig.

Copy to: BM  
War Diary 2  
File (4)

M J Moten Brig  
Comd 17 Aust Inf Bde.

News of the capture of Perembil has just come in.  
Good work. The principle in para 5 (b) applies generally to all defended enemy localities.

MJM

Appx J

Alfa K

MESSAGE FORM

FROM 17 Aust Inf Bde Date Time of Origin 050845 I

TO 2/5 Aust Inf Bn

Originator's No. 0 157 SECRET until supplies improve adopt  
defensive attitude with aggressive patrols. verify existence  
of enemy localities at SUMUL and MALBUAIN . suggest you  
strengthen post at SAHIK

MESSAGE FORM

Alpha 1

FROM 2/5 Aust Inf Bn

Date Time of origin 061530 I

TO 17 Aust Inf Bde

Originator's No. 0 83. SECRET your 0157 and 0207 ack.  
policy already implemented, concur your suggestion. str SAHIK  
now one coy less one pl. SUMUL being investigated,  
MALBUAIN clear.



SECRET

*Hfsc M*

Subject : OPS TONG AREA

HQ 2/5 Aust Inf Bn  
G2/44  
6 Jan 45.

Brig Moten  
Comd 17 Aust Inf Bde,

Ref your G680 of 3 Jan 45. The situation this area at present is appreciated as follows:-

1. Any movement of the 239 Regt from SALETA area in a Westerly or NW direction can be observed by native sentries of the MOINYEP APOS Village area and by those of the DOMAN GP. MALBUAIN is reported clear and will be kept under close observation.
2. My present intention is to leave A Coy at MUSINAU DREKIKER. Tasks patrolling EAST to NIGIRA area. WEST MUSIMBILIM NANAHAN SOUTH DUMAN GP. Setting ambushes on Map L of C ASILING SAMISAI.
3. PEREMBIL is the dominating feature of the ridge running SE to PELNANDU. Enemy occupy ASILING feature. NISIM MUSU - SAMASAI are used for staging, MUSU is apparently a very small village of no importance.
4. The enemy fwd of PEREMBIL main feature were in occupation of a lower PEREMBIL village but this morning evac and have moved to the ASILING feature. The lower village was approx 500 yds SE. I allowed Cameron to occupy this village with one Pl as it dominates ASILING.
5. Your paras 5 (b) (c) are fully appreciated and will be applied. Any further movement along this main axis is controlled by the supply posn. D Coy will be used with C Coy along this axis.
6. The next move of this HQ is to PEREMBIL. A dropping ground is being prepared. Maint within the unit should become easier where base is established. NO move is intended before the ASILING feature is clear.
7. The infm of the Japs NW of SELNI is still very vague. Sentries have reported 30 between WALAHANA SUMUL. Cole of Angau is organising this area at present so infm will improve.
8. B Coy less 11 Pl occupied NEW SAHIK to-day and on arrival D Coy 11 Pl handover, NASALEN and join Coy. Immediate tasks B Coy will be patrols SE SAMUL which if clear will be occupied by one pl. This occupation will deny Japs movement to BELU. Patrols NE to AMUK river.

Subject : OPS TONG AREA

~~SECRET~~

*Appx N*

HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde  
8 Jan 45  
G701

Lt-col A. W. BUTTROSE  
2/5 Aust Inf Bn

Lt WALCH has returned and given me a fairly complete picture of activities in your area.

2. From his report I am very satisfied with the way things are going.
3. WALCH raised a few queries which I will try and clear up

(a) OBJECTIVE

41 grid line as an objective is NOT arbitrary but merely a guide. You are the only person in a posn to determine tactical objectives. If ASILING is a better objective than MUSU then stop at ASILING. Go beyond MUSU if you feel it necessary but DON'T be drawn too far to the SE. Suppose you stop at say SAMISAI and make this a forward base, and patrol aggressively from here further to the SE. Your patrols should soon establish complete control of the country between the NANU River and the MIHAMBON River and progressively as far South as the 99 lateral grid line and maybe even further south.

- (b) TIME just does not enter into the problems. Go quietly and methodically as you are doing and you can't go wrong.
- (c) Take advantage of any opportunity the Jap gives you as you did at PEREMBIL. This was a good show. Please convey my congratulations to Cameron and his men.
- (d) The limiting factor to all your forward moves will be supply. There appears to be no immediate possibility of improvement. No second plane has been made available but the Courier plane is sometimes persuaded to drop an odd load. Whatever happens you won't starve. In an emergency the Beauforts will assist. Hence your movements will of necessity be governed by your ability to maintain any troops you push forward of YAMBES.

7. It is regretted that the present posn here dictates a gen attitude of def by you but within the limits of your sup be as aggressive as you can.
8. Ack by signal

M J Moten Brig  
Comd 17 Aust Inf Bde

Copy :  
Comd  
BM  
SC  
File  
War Diary (3)

Appx 0

MESSAGE FORM

FROM 17 Aust Inf Bde

Date Time of origin 120765 I

TO 2/5 Aust Inf Bn

FOR INFORMATION 6 Aust Div

Originator's No. 0 170. SECRET. from MOTEN to BUTTROSE in view improved supply position objective extended to East to 50 repeat 50 04 repeat 04 lateral grid but patrols may move to the deep south ACK

Subject : OPS - TONG AREA

HQ 17 AUST INF BDE  
13 Jan 45  
G726

Lt-col A W BUTTRICK  
2/5 Aust Inf Bn

1. Further to my sig 0170 of 12 Jan 45 the following indication is given of the trend of future ops in order that you may look ahead in your planning.
2. Two sqns 2/6 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt are working SOUTH towards the junc of HIMALI River and MISA Creek. Timings are unce rtain but they should arrive in this area within seven days.
3. GOC 6 Aust Div has intimated that on arrival in the above area the Cav will be placed under my comd in which case I propose to direct them to the gen line of the KUBAB Creek V5905. Their move will follow the route HAMBINI Villages V4909 - WMSAK Villages V5209 - NILU V5609 - DAHABIGA V5806 thence CHAKANUM V5803, MISANGAI V6003 and MAMOLANUNGA V6005. They will be required to clean up enemy pockets NORTH of the AMUK River.
4. This will necessitate a slight variation in the instrs sent you in the sig above referred.
  - (a) You will be relieved of any r4sponsibility for the area NORTH of the AMUK River after passing EAST of the 48 vertical grid line.
  - (b) You will est contact with the Cav in the HAMBINI Cillage area.
  - (c) The mov of the left of your force will be SOUTH of the AMUK River and will be in the gen direction of SELNAUA V4408, AUANG V4906, BALAGA V5502. During this fwd move you will clear the enemy from the country between the AMUK and the NANU River.
  - (d) When the move in subpara (c) above is well under way and is approaching the 49 vertical grid, your right should move fwd of PELNANDU area and clear the enemy in succession from the following gen areas LUWAITE V4503, WAMUN M4799, AMUL A5598.
  - (e) Careful timing of the moves in subparas (c) and (d) will be essential to ensure that your flanks do not become too widely separated.
5. These are essential preliminary moves before MAPUIK can be tackled. At present they are merely proposals and on receipt of orders from Div placing the Cav under my comd, you can anticipate receiving instrs somewhat on the above lines.
6. We are having an immediate air recce made of the above proposed gen lines of adv to select possible air dropping stas. The results will be advised you and will possibly determine the lines along which you will eventually move.
7. AIR SF  
The posn here has definitely improved and all your requirements should now be met. Make the maximum use of the RAAF in all your planning.
8. Ack by signal.

M. J. Moten Brig  
Comd 17 Aust Inf Bde.

Copies to :  
Comd  
EM  
SC  
File (2)  
War Diary (3)

S Capt leaving here tomorrow. He knows the plot and can discuss fully.

MJM

*Affix BB*

SECRET

*2/5 B*  
18 Jan 45  
G2/45

Brig M.J. Moten  
Comd 17 Aust Inf Bde

In reply to your G726 of 13 JAN. Your intentions and information is quite clear and unless the Jap alters his present tactics will bring about his destruction or clearing of the area as desired.

1. As far as I can ascertain any group of villages reported to be occupied has a maximum of about 100 Japs, with only a percentage armed with a few automatics. These concentrations do not appear firm and very according to the ability of gardens in the vicinity to maintain them,
2. The situation at present and my outline plan is as follows.
3. A Coy will clear in succession the LUWAITE - WANUN - AMUL area. Any assistance required by the coy to be made available from the main force. The advance will be controlled by the centre.
4. With occupation of the WARANGAM-BANA areas a dropping ground will be prepared and a firm base and HQs will be established in this area. D and C Coys forward coys. The centre force will then clear AUANG-BULMITA and secure a firm base with dropping ground in the WARANGAM area (5003).
5. On the left B Coy having secured SELNI area will clear YANA, BOMBISIMA and come into reserve AUANG, moving then to clear the KUAINICIMA group.
6. Looking ahead if the Jap intends putting up any sort of resistance we should meet it in the BALIF area or at BALAGA. Here I feel two detachments of 4.2" mortars would be a worthwhile surprise for him. I have given due consideration to the maintenance of two dets but with the labor situation clarified and the topographical aspect in our favour I am sure these weapons will prove their effectiveness. The unit mortar personnel are trained in the use of the 4.2" mortars but if you wish otherwise I would be content. Unless we run into a field piece of the Jap to worry us the dropping of two mortars in the SULAMITA area should fill our requirements.
7. The Jap has shown apparent dislike for areas which we harass at night with mortar fire and in view of the fact that in many of the areas not even foxholes have been dug, it is quite understandable
8. The improvement in the supply is making these operations from the unit viewpoint very satisfactory and the troops are in very high and keen spirits. If ACF could augment the tobacco supply they would be without a complaint. The unit canteen from Regimental Funds is assisting.
9. The health of the troops continues to be satisfactory. Diarrhoea amounting to an average of 30 cases per week with a five day treatment is a full-time duty. Pressure is being maintained in instructions and inspections by the RMO and myself. The clearing of Jap habitation destroys many flies there are many still in evidence. It is evident that the Japs as usual are suffering from dysentery pretty badly and this does not help in our task.
10. Darling unfortunately has injured his leg and Parsons has ordered his return to AITAPE, which I am sorry about and it also must be most disappointing to him. He actually only saw the YAMBES SAHIK areas.
11. I am awaiting the Staff Capt and party and expect their arrival within a day or so.

A. W. Buttrose Lt col

25 Jan 45.

17 AUST INF BDE OO NO 2

Ref maps ; AITAPE - WEWAK 1 in to 1 mile series, and  
4 miles to 1 in series.

INFM1. ENEMY

All available infm has been issued to units.

2. OWN TPS

- (a) JOCK FORCE (Comd - Capt A. J. MARSHALL 2/2 Aust Inf Bn) is patrolling in the YUBANAKUOR A4988 - NANU River area and is due to return to AITAPE early in Feb.
- (b) AIB patrols are op in the SINAHU area (which is bounded on the EAST by rd MARUI - MAPRIK) and the area MOI A5066 and SOUTH to SEPIK river.
- (c) A GAU patrol is op along ATOB River - ARAMAP River - SCREW River V700070.
- (d) 16 Aust Inf Bde Gp is relieving 19 Aust Inf Bde in the coastal sector and is responsible for securing the line ILIAP - MALIN - ABAU, and offensive patrolling fwd to ANUMB River. They are establishing a standing patrol at WALUM V5719.
- (e) 19 Aust Inf Bde is relieving 17 Aust Inf Bde of its responsibility for def in the AITAPE area NOT later than seven days after 19 Aust Inf Bde concs in AITAPE.
- (f) 2/6 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt less one sqn comes under comd 17 Aust Inf Bde from 08001 31 Jan 45.
- (g) Inter-bde bdy  
Excl to 17 Aust Inf Bde junc ANUMB River HILIMAP Creek V770183 - GINI - IMI V685167 - SUAP Creek - ATOB river ALIGAS creek V600184 point V505180 thence WEST along grid 18 to AIUK river V380180 to incl NIALU V320294.

INTENTION

- 3/ 17 Aust Inf Bde will clear enemy from area WEST of NORTH - SOUTH line through incl AMI V602038 - BITIKA V5908.

METHOD4. GEN

The intention will be implemented by aggressive patrolling and harassing tactics against located enemy localities, concs and L of C. The maximum use will be made of air strikes and mortar fire for the sp of offensive patrols. Bases must be made secure and capable of solid def and before relinquishing a base to move fwd comds will in turn secure the fwd base. All bases should be suited for air maint and thus units be indep of a fixed L of C for sups.

5. 2/6 AUST CAV (CDO) REGT less one sqnTASKS

- (a) Patrol EAST along the tracks bounded on the NORTH by the inter-bde bdy, on the EAST by the 70 vertical grid line and on the SOUTH by the 10 lateral grid line, and destroy all enemy in that area.
- (b) Est a suitable fwd base and move NG less than one sqn to clear the enemy from the areas along and adjacent the gen line WOMSAK Villages V5209 - NILU V5609 - DAHABIGA V5806 thence the area MANOLANUNGA V6005 NUMBATA V6306 - MUSANGAI V6003 - CHAKANUM V5803.

6. 2/5 AUST INF BN with under comd:  
Det 17 Aust Inf Bde Sig sec  
Det 4 Aust Pigeon Sec  
2/24 Aust Sup Dep Pl  
Det 2/2 Aust Fd Amb  
Det 2/4 Aust Ml arial Control Unit  
Det ANGAD

TASKS

- (a) To clear the enemy from the area along the gen line AUANG V4906, WARANGAI Villages V5003, NUMANGO Villages V6402 thence EAST to the line of the NINAB River.
- (b) To clear the enemy from the area along the gen line LUWAITE Villages AMBUM Villages A4797 - ILAHOP A5698.
- (c) Patrol to the deep SOUTH as far as the 90 lateral grid line and clean up enemy pockets within striking distance of the force moving in para 6 (b).

7.

INTER-UNIT BDY

Incl to 2/6 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt LAKE IMBIA V7003 - WALAHUTA V5802 - thence WEST along the AMUK River to track and river junc at V480090.

8.

LIAISON

- (a) Capt D.M. McGREA of HQ 6 Aust Div is att to 2/6 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt for liaison with 2/5 Aust Inf Bn.
- (b) Lt W. J. A. WILLS of HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde is att 2/5 Aust Inf Bn for liaison with 2/6 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt.

9.

2/7 AUST INF BN

- (a) Will relieve 2/5 Aust Inf Bn during Feb and will continue with the tasks in para 6.
- (b) Separate instrs will be issued regarding the relief.

10.

AIR

Air sp and tac R will be requested through HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde.

ADM

11. Will be issued separately.

INTERCOMM

12. 17 Aust Inf Bde HQ remains present location.

13.

WIRELESS

- (a) One 22 set will be provided by HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde for 2/6 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt for use as a rear link to this HQ. Unit will be included in the gp HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde (Control) - 2/6 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt - 2/5 Aust Inf Bn.
- (b) Freq and Code Signs  
Will be allotted by 17 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec.

15.

CODE WORDS - GROUND TO AIR

2/6 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt	KUNAI
2/5 Aust Inf Bn	PIPER
2/7 Aust Inf Bn	SAC SAC

ACK

Signed at : 0930I  
Issued by : SIGS

K C Clarke Maj  
BM 17 Aust Inf Bde,

DISTRIBUTION

2/6 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt  
2/5 Aust Inf Bn  
2/6 Aust Inf Bn  
2/7 Aust Inf Bn  
16 Aust Inf Bde  
6 Aust Div  
71 Wing RAAF  
Comd  
BM  
SG  
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War Diary

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Subject : OPS. - MAPRIK AREA

HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde  
8 Feb 45  
G831

Lt col A. W. BUTTROSE DSO  
2/5 AUST INF BN  
Lt col E. C. HENNESSY MC  
2/6 AUST CAV (CDO) REGT

Herewith a forecast of future ops.

2. The present indications are that the Jap line of withdrawal is to the South and that there are few if any Japs in the MAPRIK drome area.
3. The main enemy conc appears to be in the SINAHU area 8 to 10 miles South of ILAHOP A5698, between the NANU and AMUK Rivers.
4. Our job is to kill as many Japs as we can as part of the process of cleaning up the country. The actual capture of ground means nothing to us at this stage.
5. Assuming the objectives given you in 17 Bde CO No.2 are obtained our next attention is on the MAPRIK area as a preliminary to a move to the South.
6. Active patrolling to get str and dispoins of enemy in MAPRIK area will be undertaken by both units and as many enemy as possible destroyed in the process.
7. The actual clearing of the MAPRIK area will mainly concern the Cav with such sp of 2/5 Bn as may be considered necessary at the time. The line of approach to MAPRIK should generally be from the North and also (if possible) from the East. The SCREW River track (between 67 and 69 vertical grid) and the CHIRMAN Creek (line of 67 vertical grid) appear to offer suitable approaches for 2/7 Sqn which should be rejoined by A and B Tps in say 14 days from now. This approach should bring 2/7 Sqn in a favourable posn to move fwd with 2/10 Sqn.
8. On clearing MAPRIK the Cav will be required to gd the left and rear of 2/5 Bn and to mop up the Japs in the country within easy reach to the EAST of MAPRIK.
9. The 2/5 Bn (or 2/7 Bn on relief) will turn SOUTH and clear the SINAHU area leaving a strong base in either the M'BRAS villages, ILAHOP or other suitable area.
10. Subsequent moves of 2/5 Bn will depend on infm of enemy moves but the Bn may be required to continue to the SOUTH and/or to the EAST to WOSERA or they may move back to MAPRIK area and then proceed with the Cav EAST of MAPRIK towards the KABOIBUS GP.
11. Please examine these proposals and let me have your views.
12. At this stage the future policy of div activities has not been defined but a ruling is expected in the next few days.
13. Ack by sig.

M. J. Moten Brig  
Comd. 17 Aust Inf Bde

Copy to:

Lt col F.K. PARBURY MC  
2/7 Aust Inf Bn  
BM  
SC  
File (3)  
War Diary (3)



*Alfa EE*

HQ 2/5 Aust Inf Bn  
11 FEB 45.


Brig M.J. Moten,  
COMD 17 Aust Inf Bde

Ref your G831 OPS MAPRIK area my views are forwarded for consideration.

1. From recent figures and information it would now appear that approximately 3000 Japs are in existence in the country SOUTH-WEST, SOUTH and SOUTHEAST of the present area controlled by this unit to the SEPIK river.
2. Whilst a concentration appears to be in the SINAHU area there is also definite evidence of approximately 500 Japs to the SOUTH-WEST, SOUTH, and SOUTH-EAST of the APOS group SOUTH and SOUTH-EAST of ASANAKOR ENDIPI ILAHETA groups.
3. As the task is to kill the enemy whilst cleaning the country and the capture of ground no object if the tasks as given in OO 2 are to be completed with effect all enemy pockets SOUTH to the 90 grid line must be destroyed.
4. It is suggested in your para 9 that a strong base be left in the M'BRAS or ILAHOP areas with this apparent task. I am of the opinion that no force smaller than a battalion will successfully carry out this task for the following reasons.
5. It is now quite evident that the enemy has no plans or ability for resistance or protection of any particular area and has but one intention to survive by subsistence. He has made no determined effort to resist our movement through this country at any point and as the bulk of this country will supply his wants he is quite content with any area in which we show no interest.
6. A force of one coy assuming this is a strong force would not have the ability to deny the enemy any movement he may make in a NORTH - WEST direction and unless control is maintained in the area already cleared by this unit it is quite obvious that before very long the enemy will return to the gardens in this area from which he was ordered previously to secure his subsistence.
7. I respectfully submit that the task of destroying the enemy and cleaning the area could be carried out in the following manner.
8. When the enemy is either destroyed or cleared from the NOMUNGO-ILAHOP areas one coy be left at ILAHOP to control NORTH-WEST from this base and to patrol SOUTH-EAST destroying the enemy to ILAHINKA 583950.
9. The centrak axis of two coys and HQs to move SOUTH-WEST from the BALIF to the M'BRAS area then SOUTH-EAST to ENDIPI, ILAHETA to SINAHU.
10. One coy to move SOUTH-WEST from M'BRAS and destroy or drive the enemy from the APOS group SOUTH-EAST through ASANAKOR, to YUSANAKUOR then EAST to SINAHU.
11. The above would require the Cav Regt be given the extra task of destroying the enemy EAST of the AMUK to include WALAHUTA AUPIK 1-2 which are at present occupied by at least 100 enemy.
12. The task suggested for 2/5 Aust Inf Bn or relief 2/7 Aust Inf Bn would involve considerable difficulties both for supply and maintenance one very important factor being the natives who are only under partial administrative control. It is also very doubtful whether the present system of supply and responsibility of L of Cs imposed on the unit would allow this task to be completed in anything like a reasonable period.

A. W. Buttrose Lt col  
Comd 2/5 Aust Inf Bn

# B' COY MOVT & PATROLS 1 JAN - 25 FEB.




**LEGEND**

Coy Movt ———→

AREAS PATROLLED - - - - -




# A COY MOV'T & PATROLS 1 JAN - 25 FEB

TRACE 'T'  
to APPX 'B'



**LEGEND**

- COY MOV'T → (dashed line)
- AREAS PATROLLED → (dashed line)






# BN HQ MOV'T & AIR STRIKES 1 JAN-25 FEB

TRACE 'R'  
TO APPX 'B'

JAN: BN HQ



BOMBED JAN:2,3

BOMBED JAN:3,8,9

BOMBED JAN 11

BOMBED: JAN 5,7

BOMBED JAN:20,23

BOMBED JAN:28

BOMBED JAN:27

BOMBED FEB:13

BOMBED FEB:15

20 JAN BN HQ

29 JAN BN HQ

BOMBED JAN:16,19

BOMBED FEB:2

BN HQ 12 FEB. relieved by 217 BN 25 FEB

BOMBED JAN: 25,26,28,29 FEB: 1

BOMBED JAN:30

BOMBED JAN: 29,31 FEB: 7





BOMBED FEB 9.

BOMBED FEB:24




BOMBED FEB: 14

BOMBED JAN:17,19 FEB: 23,24

BOMBED FEB:23




# ENEMY DISPOSNS & MOV 21-31 DEC



# PIPER FORCE 21-31 DEC - COY MOV & AIR ACTIVITY

TRACE P  
TO APPX B

OP MAINTAINED 21-31 DEC  
By 'A' Coy



## LEGEND

- Movt. 'A' Coy → → →
- ' C' Coy → → →
- AREA PATROLLED 'A' Coy - - -
- "      " ' C' Coy - - -

20 20


00 20

4 10 0

20 25

TRACE 'V'  
TO APPX 'B'

# C COY MOVT & PATROLS 1 JAN - 24 FEB.



LEGEND


Coy MOVT	--->---
AREAS PATROLLED	- - - -

90 25

60 90



# D'COY MOVT & PATROLS 10 JAN - 26 FEB



LEGEND

Coy MOVT ———→

AREAS PATROLLED.. - - - - -