

**AWM373**

**Korean War Unit Diaries - British Infantry  
Brigades and Commonwealth Division  
Headquarters**

War Office: British Commonwealth Division of  
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**Diary number:** WO281/76

**Title:** Commonwealth Division Headquarters,  
G Branch, November 1952



AWM373-WO281/76



W0281/76

R.J. Kilbuck  
10.1.95

4.9.95

EXTD CLOSURE  
25 YRS



CLOSED  
UNTIL  
2028

INSPECTION  
PERMITTED  
UNDER  
s 5(4)



These papers were extracted from

WO 281/75

By MOD



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1 COMWEL DIV

OPS/INT SUMMARY

No 119

Main 1 COMWEL Div 1001G

19 Nov 52

For Period 181800I to 191800I Nov 52  
Ref Map KOREA 1:50,000

PART I - GEN

1 Composition of Friendly Forces

NO change.

2 Ops Planned

NO change.

3 Ops Ordered

Patrols 19/20 Nov.

4 Rds and Rivers

NO change.

PART II - OPS

1 Summary of Ops

The enemy mounted a series of coy sized attacks on A Coy 1 BW during the night. The enemy attacks were repulsed.

(a) 29 BRIT Inf Bde

(i) 1 BW

Preceded by hy cons of arty and mors an estimated enemy coy attacked A Coy 1 BW at CT 104102 at 2100 hrs. The enemy reinforced his attacking elements until almost first lt by which time counter-attacks restored the posn. A detailed acct is att as Appx A.

(ii) 1 DWR

At 0050 hrs, a standing patrol at CT 128107 engaged in a brief fight with twenty enemy. The patrol was withdrawn.

(b) 28 BRITCOM Inf Bde

(i) 1 RF

Recco patrol found one enemy body at CT 148102.

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(ii) 1 RAR

The standing patrol at CT 164191 engaged six to ten enemy at 1910 hrs. In a sharp clash two enemy were seen to fall but enemy mor and MG fire prevented investigation.

(c) 25 CDN Inf Bde

Continued trg and maint of res posns.

(d) 1 MARINE Div

There was an enemy sec sized probe at CT 083080 and a reinforced enemy pl sized probe at CT 092086 and CT 083080.

(e) 1 ROK Div

There were lt patrol contacts at CT 190220 and CT 217293.

(f) 2 Inf Div

NO contact.

(g) IX Corps

There were two lt enemy probes and a lt patrol contact on the 2 ROK Div front, there were two lt probes and a patrol contact in the 3 Inf Div sector and 25 Inf Div had one lt patrol contact.

(h) II ROK Corps

There was a lt patrol contact on the 6 ROK Div front, two lt patrol contacts on the 8 ROK Div front and 3 lt patrol contacts in the 3 ROK Div sector.

(j) X Corps

There was a lt enemy probe and a lt patrol contact in the 40 US Div sector and two lt patrol contacts in the 45 Inf Div sector.

(k) I ROK Corps

There were two lt patrol contacts in the 5 ROK Div sector.

(l) Armd5 DGB Sqn

During the daylt hrs 69 HE were fired at mor and MG posns and bunkers and OPs fwd of 1 BW.

During the action on front of 1 BW night 18/19 Nov tks of 4 Tp sp 1 BW. A tk succeeded in reaching the HOOK with the remainder of the Tp using SLs to aid mov and detect and fire on enemy mov. This tk was hit by a hollow charge projectile but retired under its own power. All tks were subjected to hy enemy shelling. At first lt a tp from B Sqn LdSH (RC) moved in to pt 121.



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(m) <u>Arty</u>	<u>Shells</u>	<u>Mor bombs</u>
Rounds fired	18417	4201
HF	516	194
Neutralization	13694	3183
CB	2927	548
Propaganda	30	-
Smoke	1115	266
Registration	63	-
Calibration	72	-

(n) Air

Results of CS Missions

Strong winds during the day hampered the pilot's aim. Most of the t~~g~~ts were mor posns, which were active during the HOOK battle. "NO results observed" does NOT necessarily mean NO damage was done. A mor posn is small from 4000 ft and smoke from the NAPALM and bombs hindered obsns.

- (i) GA 224, CT 098118, mor posns, 4xF80s, 8x1000 lb bombs, one plane aborted. NO results observed.
- (ii) GA 225, CT 090129, mor posns, 4xF84s, 8x500 lb bombs, NO results observed.
- (iii) GA 226, CT 102121, mor posns, 4xF84s, 8x500 lb bombs. NO results observed.
- (iv) GA 227, CT 108121, mor posns, 4xF51s, 8x500 lb bombs, NO results observed.
- (v) GA 228, CT 092120, mor posns, 4xF4Us, 3x1000 lb bombs, 9xNAPALM. NO results observed. (smoke)
- (vi) GA 229, CT 092106, mor posns, 4xF84s, 8x500 lb bombs, NO results observed.
- (vii) GA 223, CT 126189, mor posns, 4xF84s, 8x500 lb bombs, NO results observed.
- (viii) GA 230, CT 102129, mor posns, 4xF84s, 8x500 lb bombs, NO results observed.
- (ix) GA 221, CT 129205, sup area, 4xF51s, 8x500 lb bombs. Two fires started.

Results of Radar Bombing

- (i) CT 10222348 - CT 10722367, 36x500 lb GP bombs, B-29 ac.
- (ii) CT 15133804 - CT 15283777, 10x500 lb GP bombs, B-26 ac.

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## PART III - INT

1 Gen

An estimated bn sized attack was made against 1 BW posns on the HOOK CT 103104. Pending debriefing of members of A Coy 1 BW, info of int value is NOT available. This attack appears to be a continuation of the many clashes which occurred in this sector when it was occupied by 1 MARINE Div and substantiates the conclusions drawn in para 6 of 1 COMWEL Div OPS/INT summary No 112 PART III.

Apart from a small patrol contact in the 1 RAR sector, there was little enemy activity in the 28 BRITCOM Inf Bde sector during the period.

Enemy sightings during the day were lt, the largest being two separate gps of twenty enemy seen at CT 129107 and CT 145245. Hostile arty and mor fire for the period ending 1700 hrs was extremely hy, the majority of this fire being in sp of the enemy attack on the 1 BW sector.

A total of 122 shells and 5 mor bombs, plus 4000 mixed shells and mor bombs in the 1 BW sector, fell on 29 BRIT Inf Bde and 13 shells and 53 mor bombs were received by 28 BRITCOM Inf Bde. On the remainder of the Army front, enemy activity was lt, in all cases being restd to minor probes and patrol contacts.

2 (a) Enemy Sightings

<u>Source</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>MR</u>	<u>Obsn</u>
HQ RA	2045	CT 154190	active MMGs - arty engaged
		CT 128154	enemy mor - arty engaged
	0120	CT 129107	twenty enemy - arty engaged
	0440	CT 108105	enemy mov - arty engaged
		CT 107103	small nos of enemy - arty engaged
	0515	CT 098104	unknown no of enemy forming up - arty engaged
	0610	CT 104108	unknown no of enemy in smoke screen - arty engaged
	1010	CT 083108	four enemy - arty engaged
	1630	CT 146230	eight enemy - arty engaged
		CT 145245	twenty enemy - arty engaged
	5 DG	1435	CT 173217
1130		CT 130163	MG posn - engaged by tk fire
1150		CT 109122	mor posn - engaged by tk fire
1200		CT 109123	mor posn - engaged by tk fire
		CT 109117	two suspected OPs - engaged by tk fire
1305-		CT 104108	five bunkers - engaged by tk fire
1345			
1355		CT 104108	bunker - engaged by tk fire
AOP	1620-	CT 055118	active gun
	1910	CT 055119	active gun
	(18 Nov)	CT 046148	three active guns
		CT 041159	three active guns
	0630-	CT 090103	active mors
	0800		
	0955-	CT 093167	active gun - arty engaged
	1215		
	1325-	CT 041159	enemy gun posn - arty engaged
	1600	CT 069164	three probable gun pits - arty engaged
	CT 036120-	AA gun - arty engaged	
	CT 092120)		

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How long this system will last is unk, but as long as it does, there should be no trouble in breaking unit codes. In addition, it is believed that this will aid in explaining many of the misc units rptd such as the 44th Army.

(ii) 31 Div 12 CCF Army att 15 CCF Army

As a result of info furnished by seven PW it is now accepted that 31 Div 12 CCF Army is now att to 15 CCF Army and functioning under its op control. 31 CCF Div will be shown in the SNIPER RIDGE (CT 6844) - TRIANGLE HILL (CT 6544) area. 29 CCF Div will continue to be shown as maint the enemy MLR posns.

(b) Interrogation Highlights

The following information was extracted from a EUSAK interrogation report (502 - MISC - I - 3239) of a CCF major from the Political Department, 67th CCF Army, who deserted to elements of the 6th ROK Div on 2/ Oct 1952.

CITATION AND ACTIVITY OF UNITS

As of 15 Oct 1952, the mission of the 67th Army was to replace either the 12th or 68th Army on the front lines. According to the understanding of the officers, the mission, was to be one of defence. The PW had heard in late Sept 1952 from the Chief of the Propaganda Section that the 67th Army would be sent to the Eastern sector because the South Korean strength had been increased in that area by two divisions. The troops were constantly told that they should regard the 38th parallel as the boundary of CHINA and that they must keep the UN forces from entering CHINA. The soldiers were told that a few victories would help win an honorable peace at PANNUMJOM Peace Conference and that the soldiers would be returned home where they could be rehabilitated under the auspices of the Land Reform Program. The officers on the other hand, were warned to prepare for a long stay in KOREA with the modernized American Army as the enemy. The officers had been told that the UN Forces could not be held back on the chinese mainland, but that the terrain of KOREA was favorable to the CCF. The officers were further told that the CCF did not have a single mechanized army at the present time and that the air force was considerably behind the more modern nations. (IN: The officers were told to inform all the soldiers that the CC Air Force was the third ranking power in the world with the USSR in first place and the USAF in second place).

As of 15 Oct 1952, the MAO Tse Tung Military Tactics were in effect. These tactics, according to the PW, fell into two categories; one to be used in CHINA and the other to be used in KOREA. In strategy and battle in CHINA, the rule was to throw majority against minority and would be used regardless of the loss of territory. In KOREA, however, the rule was to emphasize strong defensive positions, accumulate minor victories in order to achieve the final great victory and train and utilize snipers and forward observers.

The PW stated that as a rule each army stayed on the front lines for a period not exceeding twelve months. This all depended on whether there was heavy fighting and whether the army had suffered heavy casualties. It was common knowledge among all CCF officers that the CCF armies would



<u>Source</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>MR</u>	<u>Obsn</u>
AOP (continued)	1425- 1625	CT 078113	suspected gun posn - arty engaged
	1705-	CT 069159	two vehs moving SOUTH
	1815	CT 074188	four men moving SOUTH

(b) Cas

<u>Date</u>	<u>Cas</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
18/19 Nov	2 KIA	vicinity the HOOK CT 103104	1 BW	taken PW but died of wounds
12/13 Nov	1 KIA	CT 148182	1 RF	state of decomposition would indicate enemy killed during patrol contact on night 12/13 Nov 52.

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Visual Air Recce

The Lt Liaison Flt made one sortie of forty five mins duration and the AOP Flt flew four missions totalling eight hrs twenty five mins.

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Other Int Factors(a) Enemy OB(i) New CCF Code System (extract from EUSAK PIR 848, 6 Nov 52)

A previously rptd PW from the Pgnl Section, Political Dept, 67th CCF Army, who deserted vic (CT 8050) on 27 Oct 52, stated upon further interrogation that all CCF armies use the following code systems: To decode army designations, subtract 5 from given code number. To decode div designations, subtract five hundred (500) from the given code number.

The regimental codes are one (1), two (2), and three (3) branch unit starting with the lowest numbered regt in the div.

EUSAK comment:

The CCF use code numbers extensively, although they fail to effectively increase their security. They therefore change them rather frequently, and usually no pattern can be discerned across the whole front. In this case, however, the system works in at least three different armies and probably will turn up in others.

Recently captured PWs from the 15th and 38th Armies have stated that their army codes are the 20th and 43d units respectively. The first PW identified the 87th Regt, 29th Div, and said the code for this unit is the 3d Branch Unit, 529th Unit. The 87th Regt is, of course, the highest numbered regt in the 29th Div, hence the 3d Branch Unit. Likewise, the second PW identified the 334th Regt, 112th Div or 1st Branch Unit, 612th Unit. The system will result in some minor duplications. For example, the 20th unit is not the 20th Army but is the 15th Army instead. The same applies to the 65th Unit which is the 60th Army, the 47th Unit or the 42d Army and the 68th Unit or 63d Army. Care must be taken not to confuse these units.



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comply with the CCF program, of Building Modern and Regular National Guard Armies - a program which was to be fulfilled in 1954. Subsequently, the Armies relieved in KOREA would be relieved by well organized troops and be able to return to CHINA to become modernized. The relieving troops would gain valuable experience in combat against UN Forces. The PW stated that should the Chinese mainland be attacked, the USSR would step into the picture so that the CCF troops would not have to be withdrawn from KOREA as per the agreement known as the SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE PACT.

#### ARMOR, ARTILLERY AND ROCKETS

The officers generally knew that the armies on the front lines were being supported by Independent Artillery, KATYUSHA and ARMORED units (depending upon the strategic importance). The artillery and armored units were attached to divisions while the KATYUSHA units were attached to regiments.

#### MORALE AND BATTLE EFFECTIVENESS

The PW classified the troops of the CCF into four categories.

- (a) Party members - mostly volunteers from among Chinese students.
- (b) Liberated soldiers.
- (c) Reformed farmers.
- (d) Mobilized recruits.

Group "a" had high morale because it consisted of many veterans of the Korean campaign and was controlled closely by the Communists. The PW stated that many men were homesick, although they showed no outward sighs.

Group "b" was composed of the best fighting men because they all had previous combat experience. This group, however, was not trusted by the Communists because it had the highest percentage of deserters. These men also displayed dissatisfaction.

Group "c" followed the Communists blindly, mainly because it had received benefits from the Land Reform Program in CHINA. This group also admired and envied CCF officers and sought promotion and power.

Group "d" was composed mainly of illiterate and inexperienced youngsters and was the poorest group among the CCF fighting men. During the last offensive, these men were the most poorly trained. These men were not trusted by the Communists, who considered them as the "mass".

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MEDICAL

The PW classified diseases in order of their frequency.

Most frequent: Night blindness  
 Very frequent: Diarrhea and dysentery  
 Frequent: Malaria  
 Average: Chilblains  
 Scattered: Tuberculosis  
 Rare: Typhoid and typhus

NKPA AND CCF DISSENSION

The political department of all CCF armies had received orders to promote better relations with the NKPA. The CCF often sent "USO" teams to entertain the NK troops to promote good will. It was discovered that whenever NKPA troops passed through CCF troop areas, the CCF complained of losing equipment such as shoes and blankets. These incidents were kept secret, and the losses were replaced. In general, no open signs of dissension existed between the NKPA and CCF.

Relations between the CCF and NK civilians were good. The CCF reserve units helped the NK farmers in planting and harvesting. NO compensation was ever accepted by the CCF. When NK civilians were asked to render services for CCF troops, they did it willingly and accepted no money. NKPA troops, however, were served by the people only because they realized it was of no use to refuse.

CCF Troops were under strict orders to leave NK women, including prostitutes alone.

UNDERWATER BRIDGES

The PW stated that it was common knowledge that bridges were no longer repaired. Rocks were deposited in the river bed until the level of the rocks was only a few inches below the water level. The underwater bridges could be readily seen by the truck drivers during the day. At night, two poles were set up at each end of the bridge to guide the drivers. These bridges could not be detected by aircraft.

(c) PW

In accordance with the now accepted practise of the CCF facing 1 COMWEL Div the two wounded PW, captured by 1 BW last night at CT 103104, died before they could be interrogated.

5 Counter Int

Negative.

6 Enemy Capabilities

NO change from C'S/INT SUMMARY No 112 dated 12 Nov 52.

*[Signature]*  
 Lt Col  
 GSO 1  
 1 COMWEL Div

Distr:  
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List E

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Appx A to 1 COMWEL Div  
OPS/INT SUMMARY No 119  
dated 19 Nov 52

SUMMARY OF ACTION ON FRONT 1 BW ON  
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NIGHT 18/19 Nov 52  
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Gen

It is estimated that the enemy employed a bn on a coy frontage in the aslt on the HOOK. The enemy maintained the impetuous of the attack by reinforcing on the feature and by reorganizing on the reverse slopes. Counter attacks by own tps restored the posn by first lt. A feature of the action was the large arty and mor efforts of both sides. A tp of tks was successfully employed in the counter attack.

Sequence of Events

2000 - 2030 hrs approx 200 rounds enemy arty in B Coy 1 KINGS - probably a diversion.  
2050 hrs The standing patrol on WARSAW reported mov and withdrew.  
2100 hrs Hy arty and mor fire on HOOK.  
2145 hrs The attack developed on ridge from RONSON. Arty fired MIKE tgts on advancing enemy who closed with A Coy in the trenches.  
2150-2250 hrs 1 pl withdrew to tunnels and called down two UNCLE tgts VT fuze scale three on the posn. Own tps left tunnels and drove enemy from HOOK. The enemy was reported reforming on WARSAW and RONSON and these features were subjected to hy arty and tk fire.  
0037 hrs Enemy mounted a coy sized attack from WARSAW. A tk covered by the remainder of the tp moved fwd to assist A Coy on HOOK. SLs were employed to aid fire direction. Enemy reached trenches.  
0200 hrs A Coy counter attacked and restored the posn after hand to hand fighting.  
0400-  
0450 hrs The enemy again attacked A Coy and tried to encircle the posn. A pl from D Coy broke up the attempt. Again the enemy reached the trenches and hand to hand fighting continued till first lt when C Coy 3 PFCLI counter attacked and restored the posn.

Summary

Counted enemy dead in the vicinity of one hundred at time of writing indicates extremely hy enemy os. The tenacity of the inf of the fwd coys and the magnificent efforts of the arty and tks broke up a most determined enemy aslt.

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