

AWM373

**Korean War Unit Diaries - British Infantry
Brigades and Commonwealth Division
Headquarters**

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Diary number: WO281/54

Title: Commonwealth Division Headquarters,
G Branch, November 1951



AWM373-WO281/54

R.J. Kiland
10.1.95
EXTD CLOSURE
75 YRS
31.8.95

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INSPECTION
PERMITTED
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UNTIL
2027



These papers were extracted from

WQ 81/53

By MOD

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1 COMWEL DIV INTREP NO 125

Main 1 COMWEL Div 1017/G(Int)

28 Nov 51

Period Covered: 271800I to 281800I
Ref Maps: KOREA 1:50,000 AMSL Series

1 Enemy Situation

Enemy activity during the period consisted of a lt volume of HF. NO contact was reported across the I Corps front as the enemy, at least temporarily has adopted a "wait and see" attitude.

2. Enemy Ops During Period

(a) 25 CDN Inf Bde

NO contact.

(b) 28 BRITCOM Inf Bde

NO contact.

(c) 29 BRIT Inf Bde

A recce patrol from the R NORFOLK contacted an estimated enemy pl on Hill 169, CT 106120. The enemy fired over the heads of the UN patrol which withdrew without further action.

(d) 1 ROK Div

Immediately prior to the period there were minor patrol contacts reported in BS 9392 and BS 9491 and an attack by two enemy pls in CT 0408. During the period there was NO contact reported.

(e) 3 Inf Div

NO contact.

(f) 9 ROK Div

NO contact

(g) IX Corps

The only contacts during the period occurred in CT 5745 where an unknown no of enemy engaged a UN patrol and in CT 6945 and CT 7651 where enemy pls probed UN posns.

(h) X Corps

A UN patrol was engaged by an enemy pl in DT 1646. There was NO further contact reported.

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(j) 1 ROK Corps

P1 sized gps probed UN posns in DT 4174, DT 4275 and DT 4374 during the night and comprised the only contacts during the period.

3 Other Int Factors

(a) Sightings

Source	Time	MR	Event
RA	1035	CT 135205	Enemy mors - arty engaged.
AOP	1100	CT 104125	Five enemy in crawl trench.
RA	1200	CT 135205	Enemy mors - arty engaged.
AOP	1300	CT 159210	Ten enemy in crawl trench.
		CT 156218	Eight enemy.
AOP	1745	CT 100132 to 108130	Fresh enemy diggings occupied by small gps of enemy.

(b) Enemy Arty and Mor

MR	Type	No of Rounds
CT 1718	155mm	16
CT 1913	76 mm	14
CT 1618	Unknown	20
CT 1416	Hy mor	8
CT 1619	Unknown	13
CT 1814	105mm	15
CT 1718	Unknown	30
Unknown	105mm	10

(c) Enemy Tac

The following excerpts from a captured enemy document relating to CCF tac lessons as presented at the MUKDEN Mil Conference were extracted from GHQ Enemy Documents Bulletin No 51, dated 16 Nov 51.

Critique of the enemy's combat efficiency

Pts of advantage

Coord between air force, tks and arty is good and precise.

Efficiency of air bombardment and arty fire is high. Air bombing and strafing are carried out thoroughly and arty mov and change of direction is rapidly performed.

The mobility of the tps is good.

The inf is equipped with many automatic weapons while arty is provided with strong long-range fire power.

Pts of disadvantage

The combat efficiency of the enemy inf is very low, they are good neither in offensive nor in def action, but rely on sp from air forces, tks and arty.

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3 (c) (Continued)

As the enemy tps are heavily equipped, weather and terrain greatly influence their mov.

The enemy is afraid of both night combat and close combat.

The enemy is NOT skillful in the constr of fd fortifications and is also equipped with very few tools.

Attack

When encircling the enemy, the smaller the circle the better. A part of the main force should be emp to penetrate the enemy posn rapidly and violently in order to break the enemy posn org.

Premature approach to the enemy by the main force should be avoided in order NOT to become exposed to enemy arty fire and become unable to deploy. The adv ech should be emp to threaten the enemy adv posns and to obtain info.

In spite of difficulties in comd and conn, night op favours our tp mov and approach to the enemy, and it is then easier to confuse the enemy disposition. These conditions should, therefore, be exploited.

The formation for attack should be wide in frontage and great in depth.

Def

Posns must be selected in places which afford good concealment from the air, and which provide obstacles to enemy armd forces. Fd works should be constr on a slope and at the foot of hills.

Great depth should be provided, and only a small no of tps is to be placed in the front line.

It is advisable to place some A tk weapons in ambush in the adv posn and on the flanks.

During a furious enemy attack, when continued def is impossible, the def tps may withdraw from their posn and call on the arty to control the posn with their fire.

Emp of arty

Hy arty should be att to the div, div arty should be att to the regt and regt arty should be att to the bn.

The chief mission of the hy mors and the 60mm mors of the bn is to suppress enemy fire and skirmishes on the enemy obj.

The chief mission of the hy mors and guns of the regt is to sp the adv ech attack, to destroy enemy posns and to suppress enemy close sp arty fire.

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3 (c) (Continued)

The chief mission of the div hy arty is to neutralize enemy arty, destroy enemy sup vehs and deliver intensive fire on the enemy def front.

(d) Enemy eqpt

Stalin Guns

The following is extracted from an IPW Report No 2601, 164 MISD, 15 Nov 51).

A PW, deserter, from the 35 Regt, 19 Div, NKPA I Corps, who was the Regt (Rear) Comd gave the following info:

In Jul or Aug 50, the PW and several other dignitaries were allowed to observe the test firing of 3 x STALIN Guns at PYONGYANG. The PW was info by KIM, YON DO an Arty Regt Comd of the 105 Armd Div, that the weapons were the STALIN Gun. Obsns were made at a distance of approx 200 metres. The guns were each drawn by a RUSSIAN 6 x 6 truck, and op by approx 10 RUSSIAN speaking CAUCASIAN. (PW understood that the gun was classified SECRET and op only by RUSSIAN crews - CCF or NKPA tps were NOT allowed near the weapon).

The piece was estimated as larger than 76mm - approx 82mm - having NO muzzle brake, and able to be used for the dual purposes of AA or A tk missions (understood to have originally been designed as an AA piece). The PW claimed the gun was semi-automatic and clip-fed (5 rounds per), and mtd on 4 pneumatic rubber tires. Rounds were fired at approx $\frac{1}{2}$ sec intervals, and approx 30 secs was required to change clips. Max effective range (AA) was judged as 15,000 meters when used as AA, the burst appeared to be effective within 300 meters. (Info obtained from KIM, YON DO). Range for flat trajectory unknown. The individual air bursts appeared grey in colour rather than black, and each burst followed at $\frac{1}{2}$ sec intervals.

The recuperator assembly was obscured by a dark canvas to the spectators for security reasons. He stressed that the utmost security was maint within the area of the firings; all civs were deprived of entrance to the area for a considerable distance around the site.

PW could NOT estimate the no of such guns in NK, but had heard among staff discussions within the 19 Div in late Jun 51, that an unknown no of such pieces utilized as AA were emplaced in the vicinity of MO RAN BONG in PYONGYANG. (The exact loc and other details surrounding this arty was claimed SECRET, and NOT discussed).

The PW understood from KIM, YON DO that these guns were radar controlled, but did NOT recall any such mechs within his view during the above demonstration firings. NO additional info known.

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4 Counter-Int

Negative

5 Enemy Capabilities

NO change from INTREP No 124 dated 27 Nov 51.

Distr

List E

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Robertson
for *Capt*
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GSO 1
1 COMWEL Div