

AWM373

**Korean War Unit Diaries - British Infantry
Brigades and Commonwealth Division
Headquarters**

War Office: British Commonwealth Division of
United Nations Force War Diaries, Korean War

Diary number: WO281/59

Title: Commonwealth Division Headquarters,
G Branch, February 1952



AWM373-WO281/59

R.I. Kiland
15.1.95
23 Feb 98
S

W 0281/59

EXTD CLOSURE
25 YRS

W
624

CLOSED
UNTIL
2028

ACCELERATED
OPENING

SAFE
2771
ROOM

These papers were extracted from

W0281/58

By MOD

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1 COMWEL DIV INTREP NO 213

Main 1 COMWEL Div 1017/G(Int)

24 Feb 52

Period Covered: 231800I to 241800I
Ref Maps: KOREA 1:50,000 AMSL Series

1 Enemy Situation

At the beginning of the period an estimated enemy pl sp by approx 100 rounds each of arty and mor fire probed in the 28 BRITCOM Inf Bde sector. NO unusual activity was reported during the day as div lt ac maintained a thorough surveillance of the enemy area. Except for the period of the previously mentioned enemy probe, arty fire was negligible during the remainder of the period.

Veh lts were again observed between 2030 and 2230 hrs. Bearings and estimated distances indicated that the vehs were using the pass in the mtns vicinity CT 0429. Estimates place the no of vehs involved between 50 and 100. Although reports of veh lts have been continuous with the exception of two nights, since 1 Feb, last night's reports indicate the second largest activity.

Action across the remainder of the Army front was restd to patrol clashes and lt enemy probes.

2 Enemy Ops During Period

(a) 25 CDN Inf Bde

NO contact.

(b) 28 BRITCOM Inf Bde

At approx 2005 hrs following a one hr arty and mor preparation, an estimated enemy pl sp by arty, MG and mor fire probed CT 138161. The enemy were dispersed with grenades and SA fire. It is considered that due to the considerable amount of enemy mov reported, additional enemy tps were previously dispersed by arty DFs. During this action the enemy emp direction tracer and coloured Very lts.

(c) 29 BRIT Inf Bde

A RCR patrol (under comd) at 2100 hrs received some Burp gun fire from an unknown no of enemy in the vicinity of CT 121145. Patrol returned without further contact.

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(d) 1 ROK Div

One enemy probe was reported.

(e) 3 Inf Div

A 15 Regt patrol, CT 174214, engaged an enemy pl for 50 mins at 0005 hrs after which UN arty was placed and UN patrol withdrew. Estimated 4 enemy killed and 10 wounded.

(f) 45 Inf Div

At 2230 hrs an enemy squad engaged UN posns for 40 mins. An unknown no of enemy also engaged a UN patrol for 1 hr after which the UN patrol withdrew.

(g) 9 ROK Div

Two unsuccessful enemy probes were reported during the night. One CCF deserter was also reported.

(h) IX Corps

In the 2 Inf Div sector enemy in bunkers engaged a UN patrol for 15 mins. After killing 4 enemy the UN patrol withdrew. On the 40 Inf Div front a UN patrol was engaged after which they withdrew. On the 2 ROK Div front three enemy patrols were engaged after which they withdrew.

(j) X Corps

On the 1 MARINE Div front the enemy made one unsuccessful probe. Between 1245 and 1530 hrs 95 rounds of arty and 440 mor bombs fell in gen area DT 2846. Enemy made four attempts to probe front of 7 ROK Div but withdrew. One patrol contact was reported on 25 Inf Div front.

(k) 1 ROK Corps

NO contact reported.

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3 Other Int Factors(a) Enemy Sightings

Source	Time	MR	Action
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HQ RA	1810	CT 081121	7 enemy - arty engaged.
	1905	CT 151204	Active mors - arty engaged.
	to		
	2110	CT 126175	Active mors - arty engaged.
		CT 128167	Active mors and MMG - arty engaged.
		CT 130155	Active mors and MMG - arty engaged.
		CT 128163	Active mors - arty engaged.
		CT 123156	Active mors - arty engaged.
		CT 130164	Active mors - arty engaged.
		CT 119168	Active mors - arty engaged.
		CT 129160	Active mors - arty engaged.
		CT 119175	Active mors - arty engaged.
		CT 128156	Active mors - arty engaged.
		CT 131172	Active mors - arty engaged.
		CT 123157	Active mors - arty engaged.
		CT 134154	Active mors - arty engaged.
	2130	CT 129164	Active MMG - arty engaged.
	2145	CT 122156	Active MMG - arty engaged.
	0950	CT 081111	9 enemy in open - arty engaged.
	1018	CT 090127	4 enemy in trench - arty engaged.
	1035	CT 078122	4 enemy in trench - arty engaged.
	1110	CT 092189	4 gun posns - arty engaged.
	1130	CT 087119	4 enemy - arty engaged.
	1158	CT 076125	10 enemy in village - arty engaged.
	1400	CT 070178	Gun posn - arty engaged.
	1420	CT 101131	5 enemy digging - arty engaged.
	1545	CT 099120	4 enemy in open - arty engaged.
	1600	CT 102167	6 enemy in open - arty engaged.
	1730	CT 151191	Active LMG - arty engaged.

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Source	Time	MR	Action
ALO	0905	CT 110118	15 - 20 enemy and bunker.
		CT 123174	.30 calibre MG.
		CT 110115	15 - 20 enemy.
	1410	CT 073132	15 enemy.
		CT 078132	10 enemy.
		CT 079113	5 enemy.
		CT 107120	10 enemy.
28 Bde	1600	CT 138194	4 enemy - mor engaged (1 WIA)
5 DG	1500	CT 154190	MG - tk engaged and destroyed.
AOP	1815	CT 070179	3 Active guns.
		CT 097186	Suspected gun posn - arty engaged.
	0805	CT 120178	Enemy HQ - arty engaged.
	to	CT 058133	Enemy HQ - arty engaged.
	1015		
	1045	CT 092186	Gun posn - arty engaged. 1 direct hit.
	to		
	1300	CT 081202	Suspected gun posn - arty engaged.
	1340	CT 070179	Gun posn - arty engaged. 1 direct hit.

(b) Enemy Arty and Mors

ARTY

MR	No of Rounds	Type
CT 1315	10	76mm
	22	Fd
CT 1316	11	Lt
CT 1418	14	Fd
CT 1618	6	Unknown
CT 1518	3	Med
CT 1415	8	Unknown
CT 1619	1	Unknown
CT 1517)		
CT 1618)	23	Fd
CT 1518)		

MORS

CT 1316	14	Unknown
CT 1416	11	Unknown
CT 1417	12	Unknown
CT 1517	23	Unknown
CT 1615	12	60mm
CT 1317	13	Unknown
CT 1315	15	Unknown

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(c) CCF Discipline and Indoctrination

At Appx A is an interesting report based on the interrogation of a CHINESE PW, showing the discipline and indoctrination technique of the CCF.

(d) Enemy Cas

Date	No of Cas	Place	Unit Inflicting	Remarks
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24 Feb	1 wounded	CT 138194	KSLI	Mor fire

(e) Weather

- 25 Feb - Broken to overcast low clouds over NORTH and central KOREA, becoming scattered during the afternoon. Restd visibility during morning hrs.
- 26 Feb - Clear and colder. Visibility up to 10 miles.
- 27 Feb - Clear with increasing scattered to broken high clouds.
- 28 Feb - Broken high clouds increasing to overcast. Scattered low clouds along western coast. Restd visibility during morning hrs.

4 Counter-IntEnemy Agents

A suspected enemy agent, LEE, Sung Hai, age 17, was questioned by CIC after Metropolitan Police were notified of his activities by suspicious orphanage teachers where LEE was staying.

He was in his first year of high school when the present conflict began. The schools were closed and a classmate, a devoted COMMUNIST, persuaded LEE to go to an intelligence school op by the NKPA. The school was known as the NORTH KOREA Army Boys School and was loc in NAPORI, Chorwon-gun. The six instrs were NKPA offrs. The trg was given in three phases: (a) political indoctrination, (b) int trg, and (c) mil trg. The entire course lasted approx 40 days.

After completion of the course, the students were told that they would be dispatched to SOUTH KOREA and would enter through refugee channels. These boys were to observe and report locs of units occupying prominent buildings, and if possible, obtain emp in UN organizations as labourers or houseboys. Once emp, they were to pick up any kind of correspondence, orders, or any papers written in English discarded in trash cans or wastebaskets.

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LEE succeeded in entering refugee channels and was placed in the Huksong-dong Orphanage in YONGDONGPO on 16 May 51, where he remained until Aug 51. At this time, LEE left the orphanage and went to SUWON where he observed the loc of K-13 Air Fd and obtained info concerning tps stationed at the Railrd Sta in SUWON. He returned to SEOUL where he met another member of his gp and passed the info he had obtained in SUWON and YONGDONGPO to him.

LEE continued to wander around SEOUL gathering info on tps and installations. Because of the cold weather, he went to a boys' refugee camp in SEOUL which returned him to the Huksong-dong Orphanage.

LEE became despondent at the orphanage and info his school teachers of his activities, after which he again left the orphanage and returned to SEOUL. The teachers at the orphanage notified the Metropolitan Police and LEE was apprehended in the Tongdaemon Market area of SEOUL. (F-3)

EUSAK Comment: LEE, although 17 yrs of age, is malformed and appears to be about eight yrs old. He is approx three ft, 10 ins tall and weighs about 55 lbs. LEE displayed a keen sense of judgment and a brilliant mind. It is evident that he would never be suspected of having the capabilities for performing an int mission because of his physical appearance, his orphan status, and sympathy-arousing background. LEE's diminutive stature, which made him appear to be only half his true age, is proof that UN units should NOT minimize the use of children, or those who appear to be children, as espionage agents by the COMMUNISTS.

GSO 2(Int) Comment: This article also indicates the necessity for proper disposal of classified waste and safe custody of all classified docs.

(Partially extracted from EUSAK PIR No 590 dated 22 Feb 52)

5 Enemy Capabilities

Enemy activity has been fairly constant since 12 Feb consisting mainly of nightly recce patrols and probes of up to pl size, of our fwd posns. Enemy arty fire remains lt and his fd pieces are probably deployed at max range from our FDLs. Digging activity continues but on a greatly reduced scale. Several strag pts have been observed by lt ac while in the process of preparation. These have heavily timbered roofs. It is now thought that at least some of the vehs observed at night, are bringing fwd loads of pit props. However, it is quite evident from the no of veh lts observed, that at least a minor sup build up is in progress.

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568 Regt of 190 Div is now accepted in the line along the high ground from Hill 166, CT 1215 to SOUTH of Hill 149, CT 1419. PW reports show this change over with 570 Regt took place approx 2 Feb. It is considered that this is a normal rotation of fwd elements.

Thus, at present the enemy attitude is def. NO indications of large scale offensive intentions are manifest. Although PW from time to time make mention of the coming 6th Phase Offensive, allowances must be made for the continued flow of propaganda from their Political Offrs to which they are subjected. The enemy is expected to continue his night patrolling in gps of from 3 to 25 in str. In addition, raids to capture UN PW are certain to occur.

Distr

List E

Robert Blair Major
Lt Col
GSO 1
1 COMWEL Div

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Appx A to
INTREP No 213
dated 24 Feb 52

CCF DISCIPLINE AND INDOCTRINATION

A 23 year old CHINESE PW, formerly a pl ldr (equivalent) with the duty of apprentice med offr, has thrown interesting light on the psychological techniques of discipline and indoctrination emp by the CCF. He reported as follows:

The CCF did NOT believe in punishment by confinement, fines, physical violence, or official tongue-lashings for its tps. Rather than use these methods, which were considered savage and insulting to a man's dignity, it attempted to correct all offenders by humiliating them, by making them confess their crimes in public (at "self-confession" meetings), and by "enlightening" them concerning their mistakes.

Typical treatment for an offence would be carried out along the following lines: For example, a soldier might write his mother that he was currently at T'AIAN, that he was lonely and suffering from the cold, and that he was eagerly looking forward to an early discharge. After the letter had been censored, the matter would be brought up the following morning at a coy fmn. The Political Offr would read the letter to the entire coy and ask the assembly to offer criticism.

Ardent COMMUNISTS would start the criticism by giving their views on why the letter was unmanly, uncommunistic, insulting to the CCF and to the writer's fellow tps, and why it reflected the imperfect indoctrination of the writer. Gradually, the whole coy would become fired with excitement, and every man would join in with the accusations.

The prisoner stated that he had gone through this experience once and that the psychological impact was such that he felt as if he wanted to crawl into the nearest hole. He felt that he would much rather have been slapped by the offr or beaten by the men in the coy or even sent to jail. He could NOT keep the tears of humiliation from flowing when he was ordered, in front of the coy, to list his violations of the rules and swear never to make such mistakes again. CCF tps, he said, by far preferred physical punishment to public ridicule, which involved a loss of face that persisted forever.

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After such a "denunciation meeting", the offender was called into the Political Offr's office for a heart-to-heart talk. The Political Offr never shouted, called names, or used threats, but was always "kindly and fatherly". He sometimes spoke to the offender for hrs regarding his duty to the CCF and to the COMMUNIST Government. By the time the offender was dismissed, he had been so humiliated that he developed a strong desire to improve himself, as well as an enthusiasm to go out and serve Communism, even at the cost of his own life.

The prisoner felt that psychological techniques of this type developed in CCF tps a respect and loyalty to their army which made them far better soldiers than the CNA tps, who fought without conviction because they were ordered to do so.

(Extracted from GHQ ISUM No 3444, 13 Feb 52)

G2(I) Comment: This is but another example of the measures undertaken by the enemy to increase the efficiency of his army. Its effect is reflected in the small no of deserters from the CCF.

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