

Series: AWM95
Australian Army commanders' diaries
[Vietnam]

Headquarters units

Item number: 1/4/10

Item: Headquarters, 1 Australian
Task Force

Combat Operations

Operation Sydney II

[1-31 Aug 1966]

CONFIDENTIAL



1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM



COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT

OPERATION SYDNEY II

CONFIDENTIAL

OP SYDNEY II

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM

NUI DAT

R723-1-5

21 August 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report.

TO: Commanding General
11 Field Force Vietnam (5)
ATTN: AC of S, G3
APO 96266

COPY TO: HQ AFV (4)
AH NZ Force Vietnam (2)

1. Reference is made to:

a. Maps: VIETNAM: 1:25,000 Sheets 6430 IIIS, 6430 IIS.
1:5,000 Enlargement BINH BA SOUTH.

2. Name and Type of Operation: Operation SYDNEY II - Search and destroy operation.

3. Dates of Operation: 15 July to 23 July 1966.

4. Location: XA BINH BA YS4473.

5. Command Headquarters: 5 RAR.

6. Reporting Officer: Brigadier O.D. JACKSON, O.B.E.

7. Task Organisation:

a. Task Force 5 RAR:

5 RAR
One rifle co 6 RAR
One tp 1 APC Sqn
One mor sect 1 APC Sqn
105 Fd Bty RAA
3 Fd Tp RAE
One H13 161 (Indep) Recce Flt
Four HUIB 9 Sqn RAAF
Two psy ops voice aircraft
One light fire team
Six additional Vietnamese interpreters
Six Vietnamese policemen

8. Supporting Forces:

a. Armour:

(1) Planned support: Under command One tp 1 APC Sqn
One mor sect 1 APC Sqn.

(2) Extent of Employment:

(a) The movement of two sects mor plt 5 RAR and 400 rounds of mortar ammunition by one mor sect 1 APC Sqn.

(b) The movement of A Co 5 RAR and Atk Plt 5 RAR to cordon positions to the SOUTH of DUC MY village YS447725 by three sects of 1 APC tp.

(c) The strengthening of the cordon around DUC MY village by three sects of 1 APC tp.

/2. (d) The provision

- 1 -
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(d) The provision of one M113 ambulance and one command track at 6 RAR Bn HQ by tp HQ One 1 APC tp.

(e) The movement of VCS by tp HQ One 1 APC tp.

(3) Effectiveness: The M113 support was effective in all tasks, though a delay occurred in closing the cordon to the SOUTH of DUC MY Village because the M113s could not negotiate a creek crossing, despite the fact that the crossing place had been reconnsited by a 1 APC Sqn NCO with an infantry patrol several nights earlier.

b. Artillery:

(1) Planned support: Remaining in direct support and under command for movement - 105 Fd Bty RAA.

(2) Extent of Employment: 105 Fd Bty RAA provided direct support for the operation from 1 ATF Base Area. On 22 July a number of missions in area YS4774 were fired at maximum range.

(3) Effectiveness: Artillery fire was effective for the limited tasks allotted. It was not practicable to obtain an overall assessment of its effectiveness.

c. Engineers:

(1) Planned support: Under command 3 Fd Tp RAE.

(2) Extent of Employment: Three demolition teams (each of 2 OR) were attached to each rifle plt D Co 5 RAR to assist in neutralisation of booby traps and village clearance, and to provide additional engineer assistance as required.

(3) Effectiveness: The engineer support was invaluable.

d. Aviation:

(1) Planned support: One H 13 161 (Indep) Recce Flt
Four HU1B 9 Sqn RAAF.

(2) Extent of Employment:

(a) The H 13 RW aircraft was used for:

- i. Liaison.
- ii. Reconnaissance.
- iii. Command and control. 2IC 5 RAR on the morning of 20 July coordinated the linking of the cordon around DUC MY village, and the employment of the psy ops voice aircraft and the light fire team.

(b) The HU1B RW aircraft were used for:

- i. Resupply.
- ii. The evacuation of minor casualties.

(3) Effectiveness: Aviation support was most effective.

9. Intelligence:

a. Enemy strength, location, disposition, and situation actually anticipated in the objective areas prior to the operation:

(1) DUC MY village YS447725:

CONFIDENTIAL

- (a) About 97 VC members lived in BINH BA village complex; of these about 26 lived in DUC MY, the hamlet to be cordoned and searched.
- (b) Local VC roamed the area at will and 5 VC Div had moved back inside the border between LONG KHAN and PHUOC TUY Provinces.
- (c) The attitude of the local population was if anything pro Viet Cong due to the absence of RVN control for several years.
- (d) There would probably be NO contacts due to many ground reces prior to the operation and intensive air recce. A psy ops voice aircraft was also to warn the people of the presence of the cordon and advise them to stay in their houses.
- (e) Some suspects would be detained for the following reasons:
- i. No ID Card.
 - ii. Weapons in their possession.
 - iii. Unusual amounts of food or stores in their houses.
 - iv. No affiliation with any particular family in the hamlet.
- (f) This information was derived from Counter Intelligence reports.
- (2). AO PURPLE EAST of Inter Provincial Route 2 (LT2):
- (a) The general enemy situation remained as stated in paragraph 9 a (1) (a) (b) and (c).
- (b) Local and Mobile Forces were considered to be the only enemy troops in the area, and contacts were expected with enemy forces no larger than section size. However the 400 VC reported on 15 July, and the subsequent report of VC situated in strength in the hills to the SW of the Province and at PHU MY YS2674 was constantly borne in mind; this plus the fact that the battalion was operating further NORTH than ever before and in thick country, ideal for guerilla warfare, meant that patrols were company sized, and always within gun range and within mortar range as much as possible.
- (c) It was also expected that VC camps and caches would be found.
- (d) This information was derived from the pattern of contacts since 24 May, reports by M GOURCI (Manager of the BINH BA Rubber Estate), and an appreciation of the terrain and vegetation.

b. Enemy strength and situation actually found as the operation was conducted:

(1) DUC MY Village YS447725:

- (a) The number of contacts made with the enemy were surprising. This was attributed to the fact that the operation was postponed for 40 hours, thus creating a time gap between the last reconnaissance and the actual operation.
- (b) All contacts and sightings were with local force VC.
- (c) Suspects were detained as expected with the exception of one rallier who came forward and surrendered.

14. (d)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- (d) Contrary to expectations, the VC were not observed to have entered the hamlet after TF 5 RAR withdrew. Ambush parties laid around the hamlet reported negative movement.

(2) AO PURPLE EAST of Inter Provincial Route 2 (LT2):

- (a) Contacts were as expected, but there were no VC camps or caches found of any significance.
- (b) All the VC contacted were local force.
- (c) All the VC contacted were local force. However on 21 July, a report from US Sector HQ BARIA was intercepted which stated that there were 300 to 500 VC with AA guns located at YS460729 about 500 metres NW of C Coy 5 RAR location. A company patrol failed to find any evidence of their existence. AA guns would indicate Main Force.

c. VC units identified and other significant intelligence gained:

- (1) DUC MY Village YS447725: One of the wounded VC captured revealed that three cells each of 12 VC visit the village in turn.
- (2) AO PURPLE EAST of Inter Provincial Route 2 (LT2): A VCC, who claimed that he was coming in to surrender, stated that he was a member of 50th Plt which had a strength of 27 members and was split up into small groups. Patrols in the vicinity failed to locate any sign of the other members.

- d. Terrain and Vegetation: The area of DUC MY YS447725 is covered with banana plantations and other fruit trees, giving limited visibility. There are approximately eighty occupied houses in the village, which is surrounded by rubber plantations. The vegetation between DUC MY and 1 ATF Base Area consists of rubber plantations and a number of swampy areas and old paddy fields.

- e. Weather: The weather was fine and warm to hot with occasional heavy thunderstorms by day. Nights were generally clear and mild to warm.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

10. Mission: TF 5 RAR was to conduct search and destroy operations in AO PURPLE and Secure Inter Provincial Route 2 (LT2) for movement of civilian traffic for 48 hour period.

11. Concept of Operation: TF 5 RAR was to:

a. Phase 1:

(1) Search and destroy AO PURPLE WEST of Inter Provincial Route 2 (LT2) commencing 14 July 1966. (This requirement was subsequently achieved immediately prior to the termination of Operation SYDNEY I on 14 July 1966 as a lead into Operation SYDNEY II).

(2) Cordon and search of hamlets at DUC MY YS447725 Annex P. This was to be achieved by:

(a) Reconnaissance of cordon areas, approach routes, etc, by ground patrols and air several days prior to operation.

(b) Cordon of hamlets on three sides by three rifle coys after night approach march.

(c) Cordon of fourth side of hamlet by rifle co moved forward on APCs. Relief of one rifle co on cordon by APCs.

(d) Search of hamlet by one rifle co.

b. Phase 2: Open Inter Provincial Route 2 (LT2) from road and track junction YS450732 SOUTH to AN PHU YS436692, and secure by picquetting for use by civilian traffic for 48 hour period. (This requirement was cancelled prior to the operation).

c. Phase 3:

(1) Conduct search and destroy operations in AO PURPLE EAST of Inter Provincial Route 2 (LT2). Three rifle companies were to search allotted areas INDIA, JULIET, KILO, with one rifle company in reserve. Annex Q.

(2) Conduct special reconnaissance for sign of VC trails EAST of River SUDI BA BANG.

d. Phase 4:

(1) Return to 1 ATF Base Area moving from NE to SW.

(2) Conduct widest possible sweep of area during return journey.

12. Execution:

a. The operation was envisaged in HQ 1 ATF Frag Order 1-2-66 of 092330H July 66, and commenced 15 July 1966.

b. Contact or Incident after Action Reports for actions that occurred during this operation are attached. All were of short duration at relatively short ranges. Communication capability during contact was adequate. On contact, each section and/or platoon commander concerned reacted immediately with normal contact drills and subsequent fire and movement procedure.

c. A statistical summary of casualties is given in paragraph 13.

d. A statement

CONFIDENTIAL

d. A statements of events in chronological order is as follows:

- (1) D Day (15 July): TF 5 RAR verbal orders were give at Area TENNIS YS432707 and OPORD 8-66 dated 14 July 1966 was issued. The operation was delayed for 24 hours. This was necessitated by the initiation of Operation BRISBANE at short notice, and highlighted the problem of defending the operational base area and conducting operations with a two battalion task force. B Co and C Co returned to 5 RAR Base Area by M113s; B Co assumed responsibility for the defence of 6 RAR Base Area during Operation BRISBANE, whilst C Co protected the 5 RAR Base Area. 5 RAR Bn HQ, A Co and D Co Group remained at Area TENNIS YS432707.
- (2) D+2 (16 July): A Co and D Co sent out close patrols around Area TENNIS. Company reconnaissance patrols moved out to DUC MY at approximately 1500 hours.
- (3) D+3 (17 July): Company reconnaissance patrols returned to Area TENNIS. A Co and D Co sent out close patrols around AREA TENNIS and another night reconnaissance of DUC MY was conducted.
- (4) D+4 (18 July): Reconnaissance patrol returned to Area TENNIS. A Co and D Co sent out patrols around Area TENNIS.
- (5) D+5 (19 July): B Co and C Co returned to Area TENNIS YS432707 by M113s. TF 5 RAR verbal orders given at Area TENNIS and Frag Order 8-2-66 of 18 July 1966 was issued. At approximately 1700 hours all companies and 5 RAR Bn HQ moved to their assembly areas (Annex P), and the cordon moved into position during the night 19/20 July.
- (6) D+6 (20 July):
 - (a) The psy ops voice aircraft was activated at 0615 hours. 5 RAR Bn HQ and A Co moved into position by M113s as planned, except that A Co had to dismount sooner than expected and complete the cordon on foot.
 - (b) The search and clearance of the village commenced and continued until approximately 1300 hours.
 - (c) Movement to areas of search for the search and clearance of AO PURPLE EAST of Inter Provincial Route 2 (LT2) began at 1500 hours. Annex Q. Atk Plt chased a group of VC first contacted by C Co. Although mounted in M113s the platoon did not inflict any casualties.
 - (d) C Co remained in ambush positions around DUC MY during the night 20/21 July. 5 RAR Bn HQ moved by M113s to area shown at Annex Q. A Co moved on foot towards Area JULIET. B Co preceded 5 RAR Bn HQ of foot to the area shown at Annex Q, and D Co moved towards Area KILO. En route, A Co had a contact at YS465716 which resulted in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC WIA who escaped.
- (7) D+7 (21 July): A Co moved into Area KILO and began searching. D Co began search of Area JULIET. A report of several hundred VC with AA guns resulted in moving C Co up to the NORTH, in an attempt to locate the VC; however they had only one minor contact at YS464728 and reported no sign of enemy in the vicinity. Ambushes from the Aslt Pnr Ptl were reported in position as shown at Annex Q at 1222 hours. Anti Tk Plt could not find suitable ambush sites in the area shown and continued their patrol down to the SOUTH, then WEST and then back to 5 RAR Bn HQ. D Co had several contacts during the day in the area.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(8) D+8 (22 July): Companies continued searching as planned. D Co wounded and captured on VC who claimed he was a member of 50th Platoon. The Aslt Pnt Plt lifted its ambushes and returned to Bn HQ. C Co moved NORTH to hills in square YS4774 following VCC's information. An airstrike was called on Hill 101 but C Co reported negative sign of enemy. C Co moved SOUTH during the afternoon. A B Co patrol to the NORTH of 5 RAR Bn HQ failed to locate any VC. A Co moved SW towards the 5 RAR Base Area and arrived approximately 1830 hours.

(9) D+9 (23 July): TF 5 RAR moved back to 1 ATF Base Area.

13 Results: Casualties:

Friendly

KIA: None
WIA: None
MIA: None
Wpns: None

VC

KIA: 4 (BC)
WIA: 2
WIA and VCC: 4
VCC: 1
Rallier: 1
VCS: 4
Wpns: Four M1 Carbines
One 26 grenade.
One DH8 mine

14 to 17. Omitted.

Annexes: P. Assembly Areas, Routes, Cordon, and Harbour Positions.
Q. Areas of Search, Ambushes Routes.

Enclosure. 1. Contact or Incident After Action Reports.

JACKSON
Brig

OFFICIAL

HANNIGAN

83

CONFIDENTIAL

1:5000

BINH BA SOUTH

Annex P (Assembly Areas Routes Cordon and Harbour Positions) to
Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation SYDNEY II)

Compilation - Enlarged from Xa Binh Ba
1:10,000 photo plot with no additional
information

SCALE 1:5000

100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 METRES

LEGEND

Roads (gravel formed)
Tracks Minor
Streams
Plantations general
Rubber plantations
Timber boundaries
Buildings

AFTER ACTION REPORT

After Action Report

1. Op No: SYDNEY TWO
2. Report by 212600 Cpl E. O'Reilly
3. 1 Sect 1 Pl A Coy 5 RAR
4.
 - a. Time of action. 0725
 - b. Duration. 20 secs
 - c. Date. 19 Jul 66
 - d. Location DUC MY Village
5. Tasks of ~~fmns~~engaged in action. Cordon and search of DUC MY village by 5 RAR.
6. Was it contact or incident: Incident.
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence: At approx 0730 a single VC tried to break the cordon in C Coy's location a number of shots were fired but VC was seen to run past the C Coy cordon by Pte G. D. Moles who fired a burst of 3 rounds with 5.56 at the VC when he was about 20 yds to the rear of the cordon VC was seen to fall and crawl dragging his right leg towards what appeared to be the entrance of a tunnel. Later a wounded VC was taken prisoner from the same tunnel by D Coy.
8. VC.
 - a. Str 1.
 - b. Type. Guerilla.
 - c. VC Cas. KIA 1.
VCC 1.
 - d. Will VC cas be disposed of by -
 - (1) Hel evac - date time
 - (2) Buried - location
 - (3) Other means -
 - e. Kit recovered by D Coy
 - f. Ommitted
 - g. Ommitted
 - h. VC Dress. Black pyjama type trousers and light greyish shirt.
 - i. Ommitted
9. Own Cas. Nil
10. Lessons Learnt: Gaps between men in cordons not greater than 10 metres apart.

Signed E. O'REILLY Cpl

Signed A.P. CASSIDY Maj

AFTER ACTION REPORT

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op No -
2. Report By 1731087 2Lt J.H. Deane-Butcher.
3. 9 Pl C Coy
4.
 - a.
 - b. Duration 200800 - 220730
 - c. Location TAOR LAMB
5. Task of fms engaged in action Search and destroy operation
6. Was it contact or incident -
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence Route taken as per trace.
 - a. First huts located (already searched) ordered to move on.
 - b. Harbour for lunch. Two (2) shots heard investigated NTR. shots did not appear to have been fired at us, but away in the air.
 - c. First overnight harbour. Searched two (2) small huts. Papers handed in.
 - d. Rubber plantation village. Women seen moving. ID cards checked and copied handed OC C Coy, Frenchman from BINH BA reported moving down road, said village was LA SON contrary to marking on map
 - e. Loc of ambush between two groups of huts NTR.
8. VC NTR
9. Own Cas NTR

Signed J. H. Deane-Butcher 2Lt
Signed N.E.W. Granter Maj

AFTER ACTION REPORT

After Action Report

1. Op No SYDNEY TWO.
2. Report by 19973 Cpl L. J. URQUHART.
3. 5 sect 8 Pl C Coy 5 RAR.
4.
 - a. Time of action 0645 hrs.
 - b. Duration 1 min.
 - c. Date. 20 Jul 66
 - d. Location; 446733
5. Tasks of fmns engaged in actions: Cordon of WESTERN side of DUC MY.
6. Was it a contact or incident: Contact.
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence: While putting a cordon on the WESTERN side of DUC MY we were in extended line when we came across a VC carrying clothes and a rifle, which he dropped when we nearly walked into each other. I picked up the weapon and clothing and continued on until we linked up with A Coy. Then as I was placing my sect I noticed 1 VC by a hut which I thought had been searched. I called to him to halt, but he took off, I fired two shots which were tracer, and saw them hit, then my M60 opened up with a short burst and number 2 fired two rounds. We could not follow up as we had to move back to a new cordon.
8. VC.
 - a. Str. 1
 - b. Mobile
 - c. VC Cas KIA 1.
 - d. VC casualty disposed of by A Coy
 - e. Ommitted.
 - f. Type and number of weapons recovered: 1 CHICOM bolt action, 1960
 - g. Ommitted
 - h. VC Dress: Khaki uniform, complex webbing.
 - i. VC action and tactics: VC tried to escape through cordon.
9. Own Cas: Nil
10. Lessons Learnt: Be certain to search all huts thoroughly

Signed L. J. URQUHART Cpl

Signed N. E. W. GRANTER Maj

AFTER ACTION REPORT

After Action Report

1. Op No SYDNEY TWO.
2. Report by 55069 L cpl R Slater.
3. 6 Sect 2 Pl A Coy 5 RAR.
4.
 - a. Time of action 1130 hrs.
 - b. Duration 15 mins
 - c. Date 21 Jul 66
 - d. Location. 444729
5. Tasks of ~~units~~ engaged in action: Right flank sect in pl in cordon and search.
6. Was it contact or incident: Contact
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence. Whilst in cordon and search during rain Pte Murphy informed me he had seen something move to our right flank. About 3 mins later 1 VC emerged from underground into a small clearing in front of our posn. I fired one shot VC disappeared into undergrowth I ordered my MG group who immediately fired at movement to their front. We then did a sweep of the area where 1 VC was found KIA.
8. VC.
 - a. Str. 1
 - b. Type. Guerilla
 - c. VC cas 1 KIA.
 - d. KIA VC was taken to 1 ATF by APC
 - e. Summary of docus and kit recovered: Basic equipment
 - f. Type and number of wpns recovered 1 X M2 Carbine
 - g. Wpns identified in the action: 1 x M2 Carbine
 - h. VC Dress: Black dress webbing, wpn, no hat.
 - i. Summary of VC action and tactics: VC thought cordon had dispersed and using cover of rain tried to escape.
9. Own Cas. Nil.
10. Lessons Learnt. VC likes rain whereas we don't.

Signed R SLATER Lcpl

Signed A P CASSIDY Maj

AFTER ACTION REPORT

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op No SYDNEY TWO
2. Report by No 54624 2Lt D. C. Rainer
3. 10 Pl D Coy 5 RAR
4.
 - a. Time of action, 1310 hrs
 - b. Duration, 15 mins
 - c. Date, 21 Jul 66
 - d. Location, GR 471723
5. Tasks of fms engaged in action, search a sector of area JULIET.
6. Was it a contact or incident, a contact.
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence, MG No 1 in lead sect noticed mov on left flank and fired on 3 VC hitting 2 VC. Sect deployed and gave covering fire while remainder of pl mov to left flank to aslt. Axis of aslt was too thick, so lead sect gave covering fire while remainder of pl mov to right flank and aslt through. The aslt force found 1 body and blood trail on WEST bank of ck. There is a strong possibility that the second VC hit could have fallen in the ck.
8. VC
 - a. Str 3
 - b. Type, guerilla.
 - c. VC Cas:
 - (1) WIA 1
 - (2) KIA 1 body count, 1 possible, may have fallen in ck.
 - (3) VCC nil
 - d. Will VC be disposed of by -
 - (1) Hel evac -
 - (2) Buried, yes Location, GR 471723
 - (3) Other means
 - e. Summary of docus and kit recovered, 1 X letter, 1 X instr leaflet med prescriptions and list of med sup.
 - f. Type and number of wpns recovered, 1 X 26 grenade.
 - g. Wpns identified in the action 1 X SMG, 1 X 30 cal rifle, the third VC had no wpn only 3 grenades.
 - h. VC dress, 1 in blue - grey shirt and fawn trousers, 2 in black and all wearing webbing.
 - j. Summary of VC action and tactics, lead VC was aiming at sect comd when hit by MG burst. Second VC was also hit by MG burst. Second and third VC went to ground in "dead" ground. Whilst 10 Pl was deploying to aslt they removed wpn and webbing from dead VC and fled towards ck.
9. Own Cas: Nil
10. Lessons learnt: If dead ground cannot be covered by SA fire then grenades should be used as an alternate wpn, if dead ground is outside grenade range then M79 can still eff cover area. Sect comds must appreciate the need for rapid thinking and deployment even when under fire. MG gunner was forced to ground to reload after expending 30 rnds. Had he had 100 rds on gun he could have advanced on the en whilst still firing. Gunners must have 100 rnd belts on the gun.

(D. C. Rainer)
2Lt
Pl Comd

P. N. Greenhalgh
(P. N. Greenhalgh)
Maj
OC

AFTER ACTION REPORT

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op No SYDNEY TWO
2. Report by 5713714 2Lt M. J. Roe
3. 12 Pl D Coy 5 RAR
4.
 - a. Time of action 1530
 - b. Duration 12 mins
 - c. Date 21 Jul 66
 - d. Location GR 475725
5. Tasks of fms engaged in action, 12 Pl was pt leading D Coy to new loc, direction SOUTH, fmn two sect up in single file 8 sect on right 7 sect on left.
6. Was in a contact or incident, contact.
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence, 8 sect number 1 scout saw 1 VC (in black) 30m to his right front mov down the pl flank. 7 and 8 sect turned and swept fwd 30m to the WEST 7 sect (on Left) sighted and fired at same VC 70m to their front. 8 sect also brought fire to bear in his direction. VC appeared to be drawing the pl fwd. I sent 7 sect on a left flank and 8 sect closed another 20m. 8 sect again fired on VC (noe 2) one rtn fire from SMG, 8 sect cover and 7 sect complete left hook finding 1 X Chinese claymore and VC withdrawn WEST.
8. VC
 - a. Str 2
 - b. Type, guerilla
 - c. VC cas- Nil
 - d. Will VC cas be disposed of by -
 - (1) Hel evac -
 - (2) Buried - Location -
 - (3) Other means -
 - e. Summary of docus and kit recovered, 1 X chicom claymore DH 9 1 X 60ft electric cable, were given to 1 Fd Sqn.
 - f. Type and number of wpns recovered, Nil
 - g. Wpns identified in the action, 1 X SMG
 - h. VC dress, black.
 - j. Summary of VC action and tactics, VC sentry attracted us into killing ground of claymore. 7 sect left hook caught his flank and he was forced to wdr rapidly leaving claymore.
9. Own cas: Nil
10. Lessons learnt: A flank hook is more liable to upset VC plan especially if he has a claymore. Wpns must be zeroed. Sect comd and fwd scout had well aimed shots but missed.

(M. J. Roe)
2Lt
Pl Comd

P. N. Greenhalgh
(P. N. Greenhalgh)
Maj
OC

AFTER ACTION REPORT

After Action Report

1. Op No SYDNEY TWO.
2. Report by 54596 Cpl P. J. Bunting.
3. 5 Sect 2 Pl A Coy 5 RAR.
4.
 - a. Time of action: 1750 hrs
 - b. Duration: 12 mins
 - c. Date: 21 Jul 66
 - d. Location: 467715
5. Tasks of fms engaged in action: Section sweep.
6. Was it contact or incident? Contact.
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence: The coy harboured near the edge of rubber. Section sentry sighted smoke 100 yds NTH across the road in secondary undergrowth. He reported to me I stood the section to and reported to the Pl Comd. Then took the section EAST keeping inside the rubber for 200 yds, crossed the road and fanned out in extended line, area too thick to sweep through moved into single file. Fwd scout spotted hut in very thick bushes 15 ft in front. Moved fwd to have a look and saw 2 men, basic webbing and 1 rifle. Moved gun group up and started to deploy the rest of the section. I then heard a rifle cocking and ordered the scout and gun to fire. After the initial burst the section swept through in extended line to the edge of the clearing to secure area and search for WIA. Pl comd swept through the clearing and found heavy blood trail leading NE followed up for 20 yds could not complete as dusk approaching. Ordered back to coy loc after burial.
8. VC
 - a. Str: TWO
 - b. Type: GUERILLA
 - c. VC cas: WIA 1 KIA 1 VCC NIL.
 - d. VC was buried at GR 467715.
 - e. Summary of docs and kit recovered: NIL
 - f. Type and No of wpns recovered: NIL
 - g. Wpns identified in the action: M2 CARBINE.
 - h. VC Dress: Black local dress, webbing, wpn, hat.
 - i. Summary of VC action and tactics: Suspect wounded VC heard sect deploying. Grabbed gear and wpn moved to a flank cocking wpn on the move. Probably why he was missed on initial burst of fire.
9. Own Cas: NIL
10. Lessons Learnt: Impossible to sweep through thick secondary undergrowth quietly in extended line and maintain control.

Signed P. J. Bunting Cpl

Signed A. P. Cassidy Maj

AFTER ACTION REPORT

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op No SYDNEY TWO
2. Report by no 28648 WO2 D. McGregor
3. Sp Sect Coy HQ D Coy 5 RAR
4.
 - a. Time of action 0920 hrs
 - b. Duration 1 min
 - c. Date 22 Jul 66
 - d. Location GR 479721
5. Tasks of fms engaged in action, two man sentry post loc approx 50m from Coy HQ covering path to Coy HQ.
6. Was it a contact or incident, contact.
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence. Sentry on EASTERN edge of footpad saw an armed VC approaching along footpad. The VC was dressed in black shirt, dark blue trousers. Sentry engaged VC firing one mag of OMC. Sentry on WESTERN side of track also engaged VC firing one mag of OMC. VC disappeared into thick undergrowth and both sentries swept the immediate vicinity of where VC disappeared. Sentries did not find VC and on completion of search rtn and reported contact to Coy HQ. Later search by a sect discovered the wounded VC.
8. VC
 - a. Str 1
 - b. Type, guerilla
 - c. VC cas -
 - (1) WIA -
 - (2) KIA -
 - (3) VCC 1 (WIA)
 - d. Will VC be disposed of by -
 - (1) Hel evac 221020
 - (2) Buried - Loc -
 - (3) Other means -
 - e. Summary of docus and kit recovered, pistol belt, poncho, mag pouch, filled mag, cleaning kit, VC type fd dressing.
 - f. Type and number of wpns recovered, one M1 carbine with large armed mag.
 - g. Wpns identified in the action, as in para (f)
 - h. VC dress black shirt dark blue trousers
 - j. Summary of VC action and tactics, VC approached cautiously along track with wpnat ready posn. He showed no signs of wanting to surrender as he later stated. After contact he disappeared quickly but was found when a larger clearing force was organized.
9. Own Cas: Nil
10. Lessons learnt: The VC was wounded above knee and in the base of spine. Both sentries were armed with OMC's. Main lesson appears that sentries should be armed with a more powerful wpn eg AR16 or L1A1. This type of contact proves the value of having sentries covering approaches to base camps.

(D. McGregor)

WO2

CSM

(P. N. Greenhalgh)

Maj

OC

INFORMATION GIVEN BY VCC ON THE 22 JUL 66

1. He was 16 yrs old and member of 50th pl. 27 members who were based in a banana plantation with a ck running through it.
2. He had left his pl to surrender to the AUSTRALIANS after hearing voice aircraft over DUC MY village.
3. Lived in BARIA, had been with the VC for 8 months. Told life was good but now disillusioned. Said he was with another VC who also wanted to surrender. Other VC not seen. He left his pl Thursday before and moved 500 metres that morning.
4. Reported there were 9 VC and an instructor in BINH BAH and 8 VC in the 4th hamlet.
5. He said that VC ambushed tracks and they did use the track which sentry was covering.
6. He was hungry.
7. When asked what did the VC think of AUSTRALIANS he stated he did not know. None of his pl had had contact with them. Not all are armed, and they swap them around.

Jul 66



(P. N. Greenhalgh)
Maj
OC

AFTER ACTION REPORT

After Action Report

1. Op No 3.
2. Report by 213872 Cpl S. R. Quinn.
3. 4 Sect 8 Pl C Coy.
4.
 - a. Time of action 1200 Hrs.
 - b. Duration 1 Min.
 - d. Date 22 Jul 66.
 - d. Location GR 464728
5. Tasks of fmns engaged in action: C Coy moving two pls fwd in battle fm through rubber plantation.
6. Was it a contact or incident? CONTACT.
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence: C Coy had halted in battle fm for several minutes, members had taken up fire positions. Fwd scout of the section informed the sect comd of 4 VC approaching right flank of the coy. Sighted also by three other members of the sect. One member of the rifle group opened fire simultaneously with the fwd scout, sect comd. One VC observed struck by Armalite tracer rounds as he ran across to some thickets followed by another VC. 4 Sect swept through an area in the rubber and an area of the thickets. No sign of blood or VC tracks found. The sect was recalled arty was called in, two blood trails were found by D Coy later that afternoon. The trails were heading NORTH in the same direction that the VC had fled.
8. VC
 - a. Str 4.
 - b. Type GUERILLA.
 - c. VC casualties WIA 2 KIA NIL VCC NIL
 - d to f ommitted.
 - g. Wpns identified in the action: 1 Bolt action rifle of unknown make.
 - h. VC dress: One member wore long sleeved black shirt, trousers, black Aust style bush hat. Other members wore black trousers, short sleeved shirt.
 - i. Summary of VC action and tactics: Two VC emerged from thickets, passed approx 20 yds inside rubbers edge to observe then ran back into thickets when fired upon.
9. Own Casualties: NIL
10. Lessons Learnt: Correct information must be passed to sect comd, as soon as possible, without alerting enemy. Correct sight picture must be quickly obtained (as for snap shooting): single shots preferred to automatic. In this case allowing for other troops not having knowledge of nearness of VC, the member of the rifle group who opened fire was correct. His action alerted the sect and directed their attention towards the enemy faster than a word of command could have.

Signed S. R. Quinn Cpl


Signed OC C Coy Maj

AFTER ACTION REPORT

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op No SYDNEY TWO
2. Report by 54624 2Lt D. C. Rainer
3. 10 Pl D Coy 5 RAR
4.
 - a. Time of action 1243 hrs
 - b. Duration 10 mins
 - c. Date 22 Jul 66
 - d. Location GR 479721
5. Tasks of fms engaged in action, protection for Coy HQ in Coy har
6. Was it a contact or incident, an incident.
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence, A sentry outside the har perimeter moved from his posn to a better vantage pt and was fired on by a VC. Sentry went to ground, then rtn to the perimeter. A clearing party moved out and swept the front of the perimeter, but found no trace of the VC.
8. VC
 - a. Str 1
 - b. Type, guerilla.
 - c. VC Cas - Nil
 - d. Will VC cas be disposed of by -
 - (1) Hel evac -
 - (2) Buried - Location
 - (3) Other means -
 - e. Summary of docus and kit recovered. nil
 - f. Type and number of wpns recovered. nil
 - g. Wpns identified in the action, 1 X rifle
 - h. VC dress, not known.
 - j. Summary of VC action and tactics, VC fired one round at sentry then withdrew.
9. Own cas:
KIA -
WIA 1 minor bullet graze on left little finger, Pte Bott.
10. Lessons learnt: Sentries should go to ground, rtn fire and give tgt indications to MG gp. They should not attempt to rtn to the perimeter unless called in under coverin, fire or unless they are obviously outnumbered.

(D. C. Rainer)
2Lt
Pl Comd


(P. N. Greenhalgh)
Maj
OC

AFTER ACTION REPORT

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op No SYDNEY TWO
2. Report by 55071 Lt G. N. Negus
3. sect 11 Pl D Coy
4.
 - a. Time of action 1615
 - b. Duration 3 mins
 - c. Date 22 Jul 66
 - d. Location GR 484726
5. Tasks of fms engaged in action, recce party checking VC camp area.
6. Was it a contact or incident, Contact
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence, when a recce party moved in a VC camp at GR 484726 to check the size and time of occupation 4 VC dressed in black were seen moving NORTH 75 metres from the camp. They were engaged immediately with MG and rifle fire, 1 other VC being sighted only 30 metres from the camp. All VC went to ground and disappeared in the thick scrub. The remainder of the Pl swept through the area of contact but found only tracks moving NORTH WEST. Arty was called in on their likely escape route but there was no further trace.
8. VC
 - a. Str ~~5~~ 4
 - b. Type Guerilla
 - c. VC Cas-
 - (1) WIA Perhaps
 - (2) KIA No
 - (3) VCC No
 - d. Will VC cas be disposed of by-
 - (1) Hel evac - date/time -
 - (2) Buried - Location -
 - (3) Other means
 - e. Summary of docs and kit recovered some letters and gear found in the camp area.
 - f. Type and numbers of wpns recovered -
 - g. Wpns identified in the action, no fire returned but weapon seen on the closet VC.
 - h. VC dress Black
 - i. Summary of VC action and tactics, when we opened fire VC went to ground and withdrew quickly in the thick scrub.
9. Own cas: NIL
10. Lessons learnt: Take bigger recce parties into VC camps.

I don't agree
R.N.

(G. N. Negus)
Lt
Pl Comd

P. N. Greenhalgh
(P. N. Greenhalgh)
Maj
OC

1000000
1000000
(2)
1000000 (3)

AFTER ACTION REPORT

After Action Report

1. Op No SYDNEY TWO.
2. Report by 36911 2Lt J. CARRUTHERS.
3. 4 Pl B Coy 5 RAR.
4. a. Time of action 0555
- b. Duration 7 - 10 mins
- c. Date Jul 66
- d. Location 448733

5. Tasks of fmns engaged in action. Coy Task. EASTERN side of Bn cordon.
Pl Task. Point Pl of coy

6. Was it contact or incident. Contact

7. Summary of action in chronological sequence. At 0555 on Jul 66 I was leading 4 Pl into posn to form the EASTERN side of the Bn cordon around DUC MY, behind 4 Pl was CHQ and the remainder of B Coy. I turned off a track running WEST and started to move on a track leading SOUTH. About 75 metres SOUTH of the track junction I came face to face with 5 persons coming onto the track from my right (WEST). We looked at each other and I covered them with my OMC. The front 2 who were armed dived into the bananas and made good their escape. The remaining three stood fast and put their hands on their heads when told. The older man had a large pack on, the woman had a medical pack and the younger man had a rifle, a belt of ammo and a small pack on. I called for the Pl Sgt to come forward and take the prisoners so that we could continue with the cordon. This was about 3 mins after the first encounter. Then I heard shots at the rear of the pl, 4 or 5 VC had run into the rear of the Pl and in front of CHQ, at the track junction from the WEST. Pte KENNEDY shot and wounded him. Another VC jumped into a slit trench with Pte TURNER who shot him in the head, another VC jumped over the trench and Pte TURNER shot him in the crutch as he went over. The other VC was also wounded and was found lying on the EASTERN side of the track. 6 Pl moved fwd and secured the prisoner whilst 4 Pl pushed forward and completed the EASTERN side of the cordon.

8. VC.

- a. Str.
 - (1) 5
 - (2) 4 or 5
- b. Type.
- c. VC Cas
 - (1) WIA 3 (2 captured)
 - (2) KIA 1
 - (3) VCC 3
- d. VC cas disposed of by heli evac
- e. Summary of docs and kit recovered
- f. Type and number of wpns recovered, 1 X M1 carbine & 2 French rifles (single shot).
- g. Wpns identified in action.

h. VC Dress. Black shirts and trousers

i. Summary of VC action and tactics, VC reaction was one of amazement then they tried evasive action.

9. Own Cas. Nil

10. Lessons Learnt.

a. The reason for not firing at the first group of 2 who had made good their escape was that I did not wish to alert other VC who still did not know of our presence and hence escape before the cordon was in position.

b. I suggest that the following Vietnamese words be known by all ranks:

(1) Halt. Stop

(2) Hands up.

(3) Lie down.

(4) Come here.

c. If a cordon is to be successful and contacts occurring when placing a cordon into posn, a reserve group must be ready to immediately secure VCC and eqpt to allow the cordon to be placed in quickly, after such contacts.

Signed J. CARRUTHERS. 2Lt

Signed M. B. McQUALTER Maj
(OC B COY)