

Series: AWM95
Australian Army commanders' diaries
[Vietnam]

Royal Australian Infantry

Item number: 7/5/23 PART 3

**Item: 5 Battalion Royal Australian
Regiment**

Annexes

1- 30 April 1969

ENCLOSURE H/3

5 RAR
AP AN PHU

26 Apr 69

List B (less Serial 37, 38, 43)

5 RAR SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS

General

1. Military security is the application of measures designed to deny the enemy all opportunity of acquiring information of intelligence value.
2. All ranks must be aware that military knowledge is NOT personal but is held in trust for the nation. Accordingly, all ranks must accept the responsibility for its safe keeping.
3. The following orders are to be read in conjunction with this section:-
 - a. Military Security Instructions.
 - b. ARO 29/64.

Promulgation

4. These orders are to be read to all ranks at least once every six months.

Unit Security Officer

5. The Unit Security Officer is the 2IC. He is responsible to the Commanding Officer for security within the Battalion. His duties are outlined in paragraph 19 of Military Security Instructions. The IO is the assistant security officer. Each sub-unit is to appoint a security officer.

Security within the Battalion

6. The efficiency of security measures is the foundation of security. Alertness with elementary matters such as identity checks, deliberate care in conversation and in the handling of documents by Officers and NCOs sets the guide for all soldiers to follow.
7. It is the responsibility of company commanders to supervise the safe-guarding of offices, barracks and equipment.
8. All ranks are to apprehend any person attempting to enter the camp area at other than the authorized entrance. Any such person discovered is to be escorted to the Adjutant or Duty Officer. A person found trespassing on Commonwealth property may be arrested without warrant by any soldier of the unit.

Security of Information

9. Government legislation holds all individuals, particularly service members, responsible for the preservation of official secrets. NO soldier is to:-
 - a. Pass any information of a military nature to any person NOT authorized to receive it unless directed by the Commanding Officer.
 - b. Unless authorized by the Commanding Officer to do so, pass military information to the Press, radio, TV agency or any other non-military organization.
 - c. Indulge in careless talk either inside or outside the unit. It is the duty of all ranks to discount and stop the spread of rumours.

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Security of Personnel.

10. All soldiers upon joining the battalion, are to sign, in duplicate, an undertaking to preserve official secrets. This document is to be held with the soldier's regimental documents, and a copy lodged with CARO. Company Commanders are responsible for this action.

11. In addition to paragraph 10, all soldiers who have regular access to classified documents are to be cleared to the necessary category by military intelligence.

12. The unit intelligence section will be responsible for the initiation of security clearance and the recordings in the security register of such gradings.

13. An ID is to be prepared for each member of 5 RAR. This will be carried whenever a member leaves 1 ATF for other than operational purposes.

Security of Classified Documents

14. The handling and custody of classified documents is to be as follows:-

a. TOP SECRET and SECRET documents

- (1) To be opened, registered and filed by the intelligence officer (in a separate register) and subsequently registered out to the officers concerned.
- (2) To be secured in a locked safe when NOT in use. TOP SECRET documents are to be retained in the Intelligence Officer's safe, only. A Class B container at least must be used.
- (3) Officers handling these documents are to ensure that they are secured in a safe prior to leaving their offices.
- (4) TOP SECRET documents are NOT to be taken outside the unit.
- (5) SECRET or above matter is to be typed only by the Chief Clerk.
- (6) IO 5 RAR is to keep a register of all SECRET and TOP SECRET documents.

b. CONFIDENTIAL documents

- (1) To be opened, registered and filed by the battalion orderly room sergeant.
- (2) Thereafter, kept in a safe or locked filing cabinet of at least Class C container category at Bn HQ.

15. The destruction of office waste matter is to be by fire as arranged by the IO. Companies are to make their own arrangements.

Containers - Class B & C

16. A copy of all combination lock settings within 5 RAR is to be given to IO for safe keeping. Combinations are to be changed:-

- a. Every six months.
- b. When relevant officers change appointments.
- c. When the combination is compromised.

17. The following rules are to be observed in connection with the security of officers:-

- a. All offices and orderly rooms are to be locked when unattended.
- b. Access to rooms or tents in which classified maps, etc, are displayed is to be limited to specifically authorised personnel.
- c. NO stranger, whether in uniform or civilian clothes is to be allowed to loiter in or in the vicinity of offices. NO visitor is to be left in an unattended office where classified documents are accessible.
- d. Secret documents are to be kept under lock and key when NOT in use. Suitable cabinets with locks will be used for all files, maps and stationary, including used carbon and rubber stamps.
- e. Keys are to be kept in proper custody with the holding officer and NOT left in locks or lying about.
- f. Before leaving their offices on the completion of each days work, each occupant is to ensure that all classified correspondence is removed from his desk and secured.

Security of Official Maps

18. a. The security of official maps is the responsibility of the USO.
- b. Official maps are to be divided into two categories:-
 - (1) Classified maps.
 - (2) Unclassified maps.

Security of Equipment

19. An individual to whom a weapon, ammunition or controlled store is issued is personally responsible for its safe custody.
20. Individuals are not to deposit any arms or personal issue at any cloakroom, luggage office, etc, nor are they to be left unattended in any hotel restaurant or similar place.
21. Whilst in Vietnam, weapons on issue are the responsibility of the individual. They may be left in tents and weapons racks while the owner is nearby. Members will carry their weapons when moving away from their company /barracks area.
22. Sub-unit security officers are to ensure that adequate weapon and ammunition security arrangements exist in their sub-unit.
23. When a member is absent without his weapon, the sub-unit is responsible for its security.

Security of keys

24. All keys are accountable, they are to be recorded in key registers as per Annex 'A', by sub-unit security officers. Keys are to be issued on signature to the member responsible for the security of the store, office, compound or equipment. Keys are to remain with the responsible member and not left in unsecured places, eg. office drawers.
25. All Bn HQ duplicate keys are to be secured in the Adjutant's safe. All duplicate office and stores keys are to be numbered and kept by companies in locked key cupboards.
26. All duplicate keys for equipment stores are to be held by the Quartermaster. They will be secured in his safe.

27. Individuals will NOT have extra keys cut unless authorized by a responsible officer. Such keys are to be taken on charge and are accountable.

Visitors

28. Visitors are NOT to be permitted to enter the 5 RAR area unless their identity and purpose of visit has been established. Unauthorized visitors will be referred to Duty Officer who will advise Det 1 Div Int Unit.

29. Visitors will only enter the Command Post with the permission of the Operations Officer or the Unit Security Officer.

Identity Checks

30. Sentries are to challenge all persons, civilian and service, seeking entry after duty hours and check the credentials of all personnel, irrespective of rank.

Trespass

31. It is an offence for any person who, without lawful excuse, trespasses in the unit area. Any person so found is to be apprehended by any soldier. In such cases, the offender is to be escorted to the Adjutant or Orderly Officer, and then handed over to the civilian police.

Photography

32. Unless the security classification of an activity or equipment prohibits the use of cameras, soldiers may take photographs. Only unclassified subjects may be photographed by the press. Photographs may not be processed by any Vietnamese agency or dealer. Photographs of enemy PW and dead are forbidden except for authorized intelligence purposes.

Communication to the Press

33. Any dealings with the press will be arranged by 2IC 5 RAR. No member of 5 RAR may give information to the press unless authorised by CO or 2IC 5 RAR.

34. All applications by representatives of the press, radio or TV are to be referred to the Public Relations Officer, HQ 1 ATF.

35. If permission is granted for visits by the press (etc), the Unit Security Officer or another officer appointed by the Commanding Officer is to accompany them throughout their visit.

Breaches of Security

36. It is the duty of all ranks to report at once any activity or action, by any person, civilian or military, which is in any way subversive or which is calculated to bring discredit to the Queen or Commonwealth.

37. It must be remembered that in both peace and war, enemy or potential enemy agents are forever attempting to gain military information by various means, such as hospitality, bribes, blackmail, etc. Therefore, when on leave or otherwise absent from the unit, soldiers may be questioned on military matters by civilians or even other members of the Forces. These questions may only be the result of a personal interest, but the possibility of ulterior motives should NOT be discounted. When the motive of an acquaintance is suspected you are to, where possible, establish with discretion the identity and address of the suspect.

38. The use of pen friends correspondence by foreign powers is a well tried and successful technique of obtaining information. Although correspondence is not forbidden, soldiers should immediately report to the Unit Security Officer any requests by their pen friends for military information or the like. In addition, soldiers should make no mention of any classified military matter.

Loss of Keys

39. Any loss of a key to classified, matter, stores or equipment will be immediately reported to the Unit Security Officer. All classified matter will be moved and the lock replaced. An investigation will be made and the person responsible for the loss is to be debited the cost of replacement.

Loss of Classified Matter

40. Upon discovery of the loss of a classified document a thorough search is to be conducted by the responsible officer and the loss immediately reported to the Unit Security Officer. If the loss is simply not due to carelessness or is not readily explicable, and there may be some improper motive behind it, Military Intelligence will be informed. A report will be forwarded to the Unit Security Officer detailing what action has been taken to recover the document and what steps have been taken to prevent further losses. Details of any inquiry and disciplinary action are to be included.

41. The Unit Security Officer is to take action in accordance with ARO 29/64, paragraph 260-262.

Loss of Arms and Ammunition

42. The loss of, or a deficiency in arms or ammunition which could be attributed to theft is to be reported immediately to the Unit Security Officer, initially by phone and confirmed by signal, the following information will be included:-

- a. Quantity and types of arms and ammunition.
- b. Whether weapons were complete with bolts, etc.
- c. Date and time of loss (if known).
- d. Whether the loss was the whole or part only of the total of held.
- e. To what extent the military installations where the loss occurred was physically guarded.
- f. Whether the loss was due to break and entry, and if so, details of the material construction of the building, method used to gain entry, whether security lights installed.
- g. Whether military police have been advised.
- h. Whether an investigating officer is to be appointed.
- i. Any other details of loss which are immediately available, in particular, the probability of theft, and misappropriation or carelessness.

7981-1M,
210 SRAR

ENCLOSURE C/II

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Copy no 35 of 100 copies

5 RAR
FSPB BRUISER

29 Apr 69

R569-1-22

Ops 7

Op 0 9/69 (Op TWICKENHAM)

Reference: A. Map VIETNAM, BINH BA, 6430-III, Series L7014, 1:50,000.
B. Map VIETNAM, VUNG TAU, 6429-IV, Series L7014, 1:50,000.

Time zone used throughout the order: HOTEL

1. Situation

a. En Forces Annex A.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) 4 RAR returns to NUI DAT from AO BAROSSA 1 May 69.

(2) 9 RAR conts Phase II ops in NUI DAT.

(3) RF/PF POSTS

(a) 614 RF coy YS 237772

(b) 771 RF coy YS 253746

(c) OP YS 253712

(d) 772 RF coy YS 259679

(e) PF pl YS 356615

(f) 2 PF pls YS 335613

(g) PF pl YS 303610

(h) PF pl YS 294617

(i) PF pl YS 268688 (2 X 155 mm guns in loc)

(4) Civs - Curfew from 1900 hrs - 0600 hrs. Civs not permitted in AO.

c. Atts and Dets

(1) Under op con from 020630H May

one tp B Sqn 1 Armd
Regt
two mor APC's A Sqn
3 Cav Regt
one TD 15 dozer
one D4 dozer
one back hoe
one 100 gal tar truck

(2) Remaining under op con

one sect A Sqn 3 Cav
Regt
HQ 2 Tp 1 Fd Sqn
one combat engr team

(3) Under op con for convoy mov 2 May

one sect A Sqn 3 Cav
Regt

()

/(4) Under op con

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- (4) Under op con from 030630H May until
rel approx 031100H May one tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
- (5) Under op con from 020630H May until
rel PM 2 May one sect A Sqn 3 Cav
Regt
- (6) Remaining in DS 105 Fd Bty, 1 Fd Regt
ONE H13, 161 (INDEP REGT)
- (7) Under op con during daylight hrs from
040630H ~~one H13, 161 (Indep)~~
~~Recess Flb~~, one RF coy

2. Mission 5 RAR is to conduct RIF ops in AO ILLAWARRA from 2 May 69 with a view to loc and destroying VC and VC instls in AO.

3. Execution

a. Three phase op:

- (1) Phase 1 - Extraction of bn from AO COOGEE to NUI DAT
1/2 May.
- (2) Phase 2 - Redeployment into AO ILLAWARRA 2/3 May 69
- (3) Phase 3 - RIF ops in AO ILLAWARRA

b. A Coy

(1) Grouping

(a) All phases

Remaining att

FO party
MFC
four SB
interpreter

(b) Phases 2 and 3

Under comd from 030630H

Two
~~one~~ RF coy guide
one dog team
one sect aslt pnr pl

(2) Tasks

(a) Phase 1

- 1. RV with TCV's at YS 540614 at 021400 H May 69
Return to NUI DAT in convoy with C coy.

(b) Phase 2

- i. RV with TCV's at A coy base at 030630H May 69.
Move by TCV to debussing pt YS 253714 in accordance
with Rd Mov Table - Annex B
- ii. Debus and move to area A1

(c) Phase 3

- i. On ni 3/4 May ambush across NORTH entrance to
valley in area A1. Be prep to remain in ambush
posns until notified.
- ii. On orders CO 5 RAR commence ops in A1 to loc and
destroy en instls reported at YS 303712

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/iii. Do prep

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- iii. Be prep to move into area A2 on orders CO 5 RAR.
- iv. Be prep to be extracted from area A2 with a view to conducting RIF ops in area Z

c. B Coy

(1) Grouping

(a) All Phases

Remaining att

FO party
MFC
four SB
interpreter

(b) Phases 2 and 3

Under comd from 020630H May

Two

one RF coy guide
one combat engr team

(c) Phase 1

Rel from under comd B coy on arrival NUI DAT PM 1 May

Tracker pl

(d) Phase 2

Under op con from 020630H May

one tp B sqn 1 Arnd
Regt
one sect A sqn 3 Cav
Regt
one sect mor pl
two mor APC's
one TD 15 dozer
one D4 dozer
one back hoe
one 100 gal tar truck

Det to under comd Sp coy until arrival FSPB SUSAN AM 3 May
Under comd from 020630H until rel. 021700H May

4 pl B coy

one ech pl

(2) Tasks

(a) Phase 1

- i. RV with TCV at 011500H May YS 647658 and return to NUI DAT
- ii. Tracker pl to revert to under comd Sp coy on arrival NUI DAT

(b) Phase 2

- i. RV with TCV's at 020630H and move in accordance with rd mov table (Annex B) to FSPB SUSAN, YS 284644
- ii. Secure area FSPB SUSAN by 020830H May
- iii. Comd FSPB SUSAN until arrival Bn HQ gp AM 3 May 69
- iv. 4 pl to revert to under comd B coy on arrival FSPB SUSAN

/(c) Phase 3

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(c) Phase 3

- i. Move on ft at 301100H to area C4 and B1
- ii. Conduct ambush in area C4 and B1 ~~across~~ approaches of SUOI NGOT valley on ni 3/4 May. Be prep to remain in ambush
- iii. Be prep to ~~commence~~ RIF ops in area B1 on order CO 5 RAR
- iv. Be prep to move to and conduct RIF ops in area B2 on order CO 5 RAR
- v. Be prep to conduct RIF ops in area X when ordered

d. C Coy

(1) Grouping

(a) All Phases

Remaining att

FO party
MFC
four SB
interpreter

(b) Phases 2 and 3

Under op con from 030630H May

Tuo
~~one~~ RF coy guide
one sect aslt pnr pl

(2) Tasks

(a) Phase 1

- i. RV with TCV's at YS 540614 at 021400H May 69.
Return to NUI DAT in convoy with A Coy

(b) Phase 2

- i. RV with TCV's at C Coy base at 030630H May.
Move by TCV to debussing pt YS 253714 in accordance with rd mov table - Annex B
- ii. Debus and move on ft to area C1

(c) Phase 3

- i. On ni 3/4 May ambush NORTH WEST approaches to foothills in area C1. Be prep to remain in ambush posns until notified
- ii. On orders CO 5 RAR loc and destroy en instls reported in sq YS 2871
- iii. Be prep to move to area C2 on orders CO 5 RAR
- iv. Be prep to move to area C3 and then C4 on orders CO 5 RAR
- v. Be prep to conduct RIF ops in area W on orders CO 5 RAR

e. D Coy

(1) Grouping

/(a) All phases

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(a) All Phases

Remaining att

FO party
MFC
four SB
interpreters

(b) Phases 2 and 3

i. Under comd from
030630H May

Two
one RF coy guide
one sect aslt pnr pl
one dog team
TRACKER PL

ii. Det to under comd
Bn HQ from 030630H
May

~~tracker pl~~
Pl D coy

(2) Tasks

(a) Phase 1

i. Fly out from PZ YS 678644 to LZ KANGA at
021500H May

(b) Phase 2

i. RV with APC tp at 030630H May and move
to drop off pt area YS 3869

ii. Debus and move on ft to area D1

(c) Phase 3

i. On ni 3/4 May ambush EAST approaches to
foothills to EAST of suspected camp sites
in areas D1 and D2. Be prep to remain in
ambush

ii. Be prep to move to area D2 on orders of
CO 5 RAR

iii. Be prep to conduct RIF ops in area Y on
orders CO 5 RAR

f. Sp Coy

(1) OC Sp coy to move with recce parties by hel at
030900H from FSPB BRUISER to FSPB SUSAN.

(2) OC Sp Coy to be base def comd FSPB SUSAN.

g. Mor Pl

(1) Phase 1

(a) Mor pl less one sect to move from FSPB BRUISER
at 021500H for NUI DAT

Phase 2

(a) One sect to RV with mor APC's at NUI DAT
020630H and move under op con B coy to FSPB
SUSAN.

(b) Mor pl less two sects moves with Bn HQ coy
from NUI DAT at 030800H May for FSPB SUSAN.

(c) CONFIDENTIAL

/(c) Mor pl

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- (c) Mor pl less one sect estb baseplate posn in FSPB SUSAN as dir by base def comd

h. Aslt Pnr Pl

- (1) Phase 1 Mov as part of Bn HQ from FSPB BRUISER at 021500H May to NUI DAT
- (2) Phase 2
- (a) One sect allotted each to under comd A, C, D coys from 030630H
- (b) Aslt pnr pl less three sects moves as part of Bn HQ coy at 030800H to FSPB SUSAN

i. Tracker pl

- (1) Phase 1
- (a) Remains under comd B coy until return to NUI DAT
- (2) Phase 2 and 3
- (a) Under comd D coy from 030630H May

j. Ech pl

- (1) Phase 2 60 ech pers under comd B coy from 020630H. 35 pers to return to NUI DAT by 021800H
- (2) Phase 3 Ech pl (25 pers) to remain at FSPB SUSAN

k. RF coy

- (1) RF coy under op con 5 RAR from 040630H during daylight hrs.
- (2) Provide two guides per rifle coy as arranged with IO 5 RAR.
- (3) Phase 3 Conduct RIF ops to loc and destroy en in area of foothills on the EAST slopes of WARBURTONS in the area bounded by the 65 and 68 NORTHINGS OR in the SOUTH foothills between 32 and 35 EASTINGS. Final locs and tasks to be decided by co-ord conf 1 May 69.
- (4) One member 5 RAR MAT team is to accompany RF coy on all ops

l. Tp B Sqn 1 Armd Regt

- (1) Phase 2
- (a) Tp under op con B coy from 030630H May
- Phase 3
- (a) At 030730H secure debussing pt YS 253714 for A and C coys
- (b) Clear area to EAST of debussing pt to edge of jungle to permit clear passage for coys
- (c) On completion of task return to FSPB SUSAN

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/m. A Sqn 3 Cav Regt

m. A Sqn 3 Cav Regt(1) Phase 1

(a) One sect remains under op con at FSPB BRUISER

(1) At 021130H May sect to RV at VAN KIEP Gate
YS 384606 and escort convoy to B coy RV
YS 650664

(2) Escort B coy convoy to NUI DAT

(3) On completion of task return to A sqn lines

(b) One sect under op con OC TFMA for convoy escort
duties. At 021330H RV with 1 ALSG convoy at VAN
KIEP gate YS 650664 and escort convoy to YS 540614.
Collect A and C coys and escort convoy to NUI DAT.
Further duties as dir by OC TFMA. On completion
of tasks return to A sqn.(2) Phase 2

(a) One sect under op con B coy from 020630H.

(b) RV with B coy as dir on Rd Mov Table - Annex B
and move to FSPB SUSAN.(c) At 030700H clear Route 15 from FSPB to br at BARIA
and escort convoys moving on route

(d) One tp under op con D coy

(e) RV with D coy at coy base at 030630H May and move
to drop off pt YS 6869 and then return to NUI DAT(3) Phase 3

(a) One sect remains under op con in FSPB SUSAN.

(b) Be prep for tasks as dir by CO 5 RAR.

n. 105 Fd Bty

(1) Bty remains in DS 5 RAR

(2) Phase 1 Move with Bn HQ coy at 021500H to NUI DAT(3) Phase 2 Move at 030800H as part of Bn HQ convoy.
See Rd Mov Table - Annex B(4) Phase 3 Estb gun posn in FSPB SUSANo. Engrs

(1) HQ 2 tp to move as part of Bn HQ to FSPB SUSAN

(2) One combat engr team allotted under op con B coy
from 020630H Mayp. Air

(1) One H13 161 (Indep) Recce Flt remains in DS

(2) H13 to report to FSPB BRUISER on 1/2 May at 0700 hrs
for tasks as dir by CO 5 RAR

/(3) H13 to report

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(3) H13 to report to TIGER 5 pad at 030630H.

q. Coord Instrs

- (1) Rd Mov Table - Annex B.
- (2) Air Mov Table - Annex C - Issued separately.
- (3) AO ILLAWARRA - Trace P - Centre of mass YS 3167 - Issued.
- (4) Guides - IO to arrange for guides to join coys as required.
- (5) Liaison
 - (a) 5 RAR MAT team to maint liaison at PHUOC HOA on Bn Comd Net.
 - (b) MAT team to provide an LO with RF coy.
 - (c) Further liaison is provided by 1 ATF LO BARIA on 1 ATF Comd Net and Rebroadcast team at PHU MY.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Gen. Maint from NUI DAT. No fwd ech.

b. Rats.

- (1) Carry 3 days on man out of NUI DAT, excl BHQ Coy who carry 2 days on man.
- (2) Recce parties deploying dir from FSPB BRUISER to FSPB SUSAN to carry 3 days on redeployment.
- (3) Estb kitchen at FSPB SUSAN capable of providing:
 - (a) Fresh meals in FSPB after midday meal 4 May for all meals in FSPB.
 - (b) Rat box meals delivered from FSPB to coys on req after 4 May.
- (4) OC Admin Coy to arrange manning of FSPB kitchen.

c. Water

- (1) Four bottles per man.
- (2) Water bladder 1000 gal to FSPB SUSAN on 2 May.
- (3) OC Admin Coy to estb res of 200 jerry cans at FSPB SUSAN ASP after deployment.
- (4) Water trailer 500 gal to FSPB SUSAN daily.
- (5) Five 100 gal bladders to FSPB SUSAN on 2 May for use by kitchen.

d. Ammo

- (1) First line carried on man.
- (2) One supplemented first ~~line~~ FSPB SUSAN. Supplements are:
 - (a) M72 Grenades - 2 boxes.
 - (b) Grenades Smoke - 100.

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- (3) Fol explosives to be held at FSPB SUSAN
 - (a) C4 - 500 lbs
 - (b) Detonator Cord - 4000 ft
 - (c) Detonator non-electric - 300
 - (d) Safety fuze - 500 ft
- (4) Mor scaling at FSPB SUSAN on 2 May
 - (a) HE - 548
 - (b) Illuminating - 100
 - (c) WP - 50
- (5) Combat engr team and ~~prns~~ to carry max explosive on man

e. Def Stores

- (1) Standard day 1 and day 2 packs to FSPB SUSAN on 2 May with fol supplement
 - (a) 500 small pickets
- (2) 50 picks and 50 shovels to FSPB SUSAN on 2 May.
- (3) Fol to FSPB SUSAN for base def on 2 May
 - 80 trip flares
 - 40 claymores
 - 20 pairs wiring gloves
 - 20 dollies (US pattern)

f. Special Stores

- (1) Mine Detectors
 - (a) A Coy - 2 carried by pnr sect
 - (b) B Coy - 2 carried by combat engr team
 - (c) C Coy - 2 carried by pnr sect
 - (d) D Coy - 2 carried by pnr sect
- (2) Flame Throwers All held FSPB
- (3) Chain saws All held FSPB
- (4) 90mm RCL All held Ech prep for pri mov fwd to coys. Each with:
 - (a) 6 cannister rounds
 - (b) 4 HEAT rounds
- (5) 106mm RCL All held Ech
- (6) Marker Balloons

CONFIDENTIAL

/(a) Coys carry

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(a) Coys carry one set each

(b) Five as res at AQ Cell

(7) Flak Jackets and Helmets Bn HQ Coy carry to FSPB

g. Med

(1) RMO loc FSPB SUSAN; Med asst (Sgt) loc NUI DAT.

(2) Coys carry 10 days paludrine and dapsone

(3) Mosquito nets after 1915 hrs

(4) Insect repellent carried and used by all

(5) Anti miting 2 May and twice weekly thereafter

h. Radio Btys

Three btys per radio to be carried. RSO to hold 150 res btys at FSPB SUSAN

i. Fire Precautions

OC Admin Coy to send fwd on 2 May;

(1) 20 fire beaters

(2) 10 ~~knapsack~~ sprays

(3) 6 extinguishers

j. Refuelling

(1) Possum Estb refuelling pt at FSPB SUSAN manned by 52 Sup Pl

(2) Refrigeration 5 RAR to man refuelling pt

k. Estb FSPB SUSAN

(1) Comd - OC Sp coy

(2) Pri of work -

<u>TD 15</u>	<u>D4</u>	<u>Back Hoe</u>
Gun bunds	CP	Int cell
Arty CP	CO's scrape	Toilet holes
Ammo scrapes	Base def	Pl holes (10 per: pl)
Kitchen scrape	Mor base plate	D Coy pl
APC bunds	Mor CP	Ech pl
RAP	Int CP	Bn HQ pl
Tk bunds	Stores scrape	Individual pits
AP scrape		
Rubbish pit		
Plant scrape		

5. Command and Signals

a. HQ 5 RAR

(1) Phase 1 - Moves at 021500H from FSPB BRUISER for NUI DAT.

/(2) Phase 2

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(2) Phase 2

(a) Bn HQ recce party departs FSPB BRUISER by air for FSPB SUSAN 020900H May - Annex C

(b) Bn HQ coy departs NUI DAT by veh 030800H May for FSPB SUSAN.

(3) Phase 3

(a) Bn HQ remains FSPB SUSAN

b. Radio No change to 5 RAR SOI except fol on bn comd net:

(1) C/S 71 - MAT team PHUOC HOA


(2) C/S 5 - LO with RF coy

c. Nicknames To be used throughout op for resup:

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Nickname</u>	<u>Meaning</u>	<u>Sent by</u>
1	BLOGGS CHOICE	passed YS 397627	convoys
2	DREARY SPEAR	passed br YS 375610	convoys
3	SAD FACE	passed PHU HAI YS 320609	convoys

Ack Instr: By telephone to A adjt EMPEROR

(C.N. KHAN)
Lt Col
CO



(A.B. FERRIMAN)
Maj
Ops Offr

Authentication:

Annexes: A. En Sit AO ILIAWARRA
Trace 1 - Tracks and LZ's
Trace 2 - En Instls
Appx 1 - En Instls and Legend
Trace 3 - Fire Trails
B. Rd Mov
C. Air mov (issued seperately)

Traces: Trace P AO ILIAWARRA

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<u>Copy No</u>	<u>Issued To</u>
1	A Coy
2	B Coy
3	C Coy
4	D Coy
5	Sp Coy
6	Admin Coy
7	Sig Pl
8	Aslt Pnr Pl
9	A tk Pl
10	Mor Pl
11	CO
12	2IC
13, 14	Ops Offr
15	Adjt
16, 17	IO
18	QM
19	RMO
20	Tpt Offr
21	A adjt
22	A QM
23	CP (fwd)
24	CP (rear)
25	RSM
26	WO Caterer
27	Chief Clerk
28	UPR
29	RP Sgt
30	Ops Clerk
31	Rats Clerk
32-37	Comds Diary
38	File
39-50	Spare
51, 52	5 RAR MAT TEAM
53-80	HQ 1 ATF
81-83	HQ 1 ALSG
84, 85	1 Fd Regt RAA
86, 87	B Sqn 1 Armd Regt
88, 89	A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
90	1 Fd Sqn RAE
91	161 (Indep) Recce Flt
92	105 Fd Bty
93	BC 105 Fd Bty
94	G802 OPS
95	1 RAR
96	4 RAR
97	7 RAR
98	8 RAR
99	9 RAR
100	1 ARU

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ANNEX A TO 5 RAR
OP 0 9/69 DATED
27 APR 69

ENEMY SITUATION AO ILLAWARRA

Topography

1. Maps are generally accurate although some small creek junction and recent track activities are NOT shown. Terrain in the AO is dominated by the NUI THI VAI and NUI DINH which in some areas are rocky and steep sided (valley in sq 3071 particularly) and in some areas covered with thick bamboo (sqs 3169 and 3970).
2. Streams in the area are mostly dry at this time but springs provide some water (YS 305710 and YS 309700).

Vegetation

3. Most of the area is covered by a fairly thick canopy varying from 40 to 60 ft. The going particularly on the slopes will be very slow.

Weather

4. May is the start of the rainy season in 111 CTZ. Rainfall at any given loc can be expected on 15 to 22 days throughout the month. The average rainfall for May is 6 - 12 ins. Thunderstorms become a daily occurrence and can be expected on 12 - 17 days during a month. May thunderstorms can be particularly violent. Temperature averages 88 to 93 degrees (F) during the day and 72 to 77 degrees at ni. Humidity is above 90%.

Light and Moon times

5.		1st Lt	Last Lt	Moon rises	Moon Sets
	5 May	0545	1955	2230	0909
	10 May	0543	1956	0208	1415
	15 May	0541	1958	0526	1817
	20 May	0539	1959	0926	2235
	25 May	0538	2001	1332	0125

Moon Phases for May are:

- a. Last half - 7 May
- b. New moon - 16 May
- c. First half - 24 May
- d. Full moon - 31 May

LZ's and Tracks

6. See Trace 1 to this annex. Other traces are shown on the maps although accuracy is doubtful.

Background Situation

7. The area of the NUI THI VAI/NUI DINH mountain mass has been used for many years by local guerilla units from villages on Route 15 and Route 2 as a safe haven from harassment by GVN forces.
8. Admin elms from SR - 4 incl med elms are known to use the area.

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/Shipments

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- 2 -

Shipments of foodstuffs, btys and med sups are reported to be being moved along Route 15 from SAIGON and BARIA to the THI VAIS for use by local forces and 274 Regt reported 12 kilometres to the NORTH. Elms of Rear Services Gps 84 are possibly there to co-ord this mov.

Enemy Forces Likely to be met

9. Agents reports indicate that a coy of D445 LF bn (See Appendix 1 to Annex A to 5 RAR Op O 8/69), crossed Route 2 moving from AO GOOGEE into the NUI THI VAI's.

10. There are reports that a pl of D67 Engr/Recce bn of MR - 7 has been active in this area. This cannot be verified. However docus captured by 3 SAS on 23 Apr 69 cfm Engr/Recce elms are operating in sp of local guerilla forces.

Movement

11. SAS reports show that the majority of en mov to Route 15 takes place at first lt and the en return around last lt. The number of recent rd blocks erected at ni on Route 15 would indicate that camps of approx squad size exist close to Route 15 when they can lay up during the day.

Mines and Minefields

12. See Trace 2 to this annex and Appendix 1 to Trace 2.

13. There are regular reports that VC units responsible for security of NUI THI VAI/NUI DINH area have estb a permanent ambush site in the defile at YS 3167 - 3267. This area is said to be covered with mines and booby traps. This could account for the hy track activity running NORTH EAST - SOUTH WEST at YS 304677.

14. Mine incidents have been numerous throughout the area, particularly on tracks.

Camps, Contacts, Installations

15. See Trace 2 and Appendix 1 to Trace 2.

16. Agent reports confirmed in part by SAS on 23 Apr 69 indicate that a hosp exists in the area of YS 303709. Caves in this area were popular tourists attractions during the FRENCH rule and these may provide large, secure accommodation and storage areas. These are probably in the walls of the re-entrant on the EASTERN side.

17. The existance of one cave system suggests that others exist in the mountain mass. If so this would explain the relative lack of evidence of major camps compared with the amount of recent track activity.

Summary

18. The en in AO ILLAWARRA may be expected to avoid contact where possible and to use mines and booby traps to impede and delay 5 RAR in carrying out its msn. The gen dir of VC evasion is likely to be from NORTH WEST THI VAI to NUI DINH and thence to the HAT DICH and then EAST towards XUYEN MOC.

19. May is the last month in which VC op freely throughout the province without early detection by air and ground surv. It is also a traditional offensive period in which political cadre exploit MAY DAY and HO CHI MINH'S birthday (19 May) to encourage units to try harder. Thus en in the AO may be planning attacks by fire on towns adjacent to the AO.

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TRACE 1 TO ANNEX A
TO 5 PAR OP 0 9/69
DATED 29 APR 69

Ref Maps

Sheets 6430 III
6429 IV

1 : 50,000

TRACKS AND LZ



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APPENDIX 1 TO
TRACE 2 TO ANNEX A TO
5 RAR OP 0 9/69
DATED 29 APR 69

ENEMY INSTALLATIONS AND LEGEND

<u>DATE</u>	<u>GRID REF</u>	<u>INCIDENT</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
JAN 69	287714	En Base Camp	Int
" "	291719	En Base Camp	Int
" "	281715	Suspected hosp	Int
" "	313682	Reported of en laying mines	Sector
" "	316674	Report of en pl digging pits	Sector
" "	332699	Air strike on en base camp 1 bunker destroyed	Jade
" "	320705	3 bunkers	161 Recce
" "	355644	Arty engaged camp 2 huts destroyed	Jade
" "	295635	En diggings, possible mor base plate, also at 315682, 316674 and 295635	Agent
" "	274652	Mines in culvert, also at 282644, 283642	1 ATF
" "	323644	2 huts and camp, hit by air strike	Jade
" "	374747	En base camp, wooden framed pits and possible tunnel	RAAF
Feb 69	375715	En base camp	161 Recce
" "	392662	3 cam huts	161 Recce
" "	392663	VR sighted unusual structures, also 388665	Sector
" "	288717	One cave	161 Recce
" "	319705	Air strike on base camp, hy track activity in area	Jade
" "	320699	En base camp in good condition	161 Recce
" "	320699	Air strike base camp, 3 bunkers destroyed	Jade
" "	324670	Old base camp	Jade
" "	352638	Heavily used track	Jade
" "	377633	Air strike on basecamp	Jade
" "	376625	Suspected mor base plate posn	Jade
Mar 69	319698	Air strike on base camp also at 326676	Jade
" "	319698	Hy track activity leading NORTH to SOUTH	161 Recce
" "	295706	One cave with wooden florr	Int
" "	393718	Suspected base camp	161 Recce
" "	342692	Base camp with sign of recent occupation	5 RAR
" "	385695	Air strike on base camp -- 3 bunkers exposed	Jade
" "	342702	Air strike ob base camp no BDA	Jade
" "	282644	Mine incident	Sector
" "	291645	Three en camps in area	4 RAR
" "	281631	Convoy ambushed	LO BARIA
" "	318671	Suspect a tk mine	Agent
" "	361650	Coy sized base camp, recently used	5 RAR
Apr 69	292625	Rd block of bushes, wire and booby traps	Int
" "	302729	Air strike en base camp, 1 bunker destroyed and 2 exposed	Jade

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/374629

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- 2 -

DATE	GRID	INCIDENT	SOURCE
Apr 69	374629	Contacted est coy who withdrew NORTH	455 RF
" "	283630	Rd block (5 lbs TNT) en fired on civ vehs	Int

LEGEND TO TRACE 2

- Base Camp
- ⊕ Hit by Arty or Air
- ∠ Contact
- M Mine incident
- T Tunnel
- ⊙ Suspected mine field
- ⊙ Sighting
- △ Cache
- // Road Block
- B Booby trap
- Bunker
- ∩ Cave
- ⌘ Huts
- ⌘ LZ


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TRACE 3 TO ANNEX A
5 PAR OF 0 9/69
DATED 29 APR 69

REF MAPS
6430-111
6429-1V
1:50,000

FIRE TRAILS



① CLEARED AREAS

CAUTION: Cleared areas have been plotted from VR and not from aerial photo. Posn and shape are approx only

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ANNEX B TO
5 RLR OP O 9/69
DATED APR 69

RD MOV : OP TWICKENHAM

Serial	Date/Time	Units to be Moved	No of Veh	Veh Report To	Convoy Assy Area	SP	Time Report Pick-up Pt	Time at Assy Area	Time Cross SP	Convoy Comd	ROUTE
1	011500	B Coy	7 x TCV 3 x APC	YS 647658	-	As decided OC B Coy	1500	1500	BY 1515	OC B Coy	As decided OC B Coy Dir route AO COOGEE to NUI DAT
2	020700	B Coy Mor Sect Mor Ammo Tp Tks Sect APC Water Def Stores Plant Kitchen	7 x TCV 1 x TCV 1 x Truck 1 x LR 4 x Tks 3 x APC 1 x 5 ton 5 x 5 Ton 3 Veh 1 x Truck (5 RAR)	B Coy Mor Base Plate Mor Base Plate Assy Area B Coy Assy Area Assy Area Assy Area Assy Area	Hughes Rd	Main Gate 1 ATF	0630	0650	0700	OC B Coy	NUI DAT - ROUTE 2 - ROUTE 15 - FSPB SUSAN
3	021400	A Coy C Coy	7 x TCV 7 x TCV 3 x APC	YS 540614	-	YS 540614	1400	1410	1415	OC A Coy	Dir route from YS 540614 to NUI DAT via Route 23
4	021500	BHQ Coy Pnr Pl 4 Pl 2 x Mor Sect Sect APC 105 Fd Bty WP and Avgas Mor Ammo	4 x TCV 2 x TCV 2 x TCV 1 x TCV 2 x APC 3 x APC 19 x 5 Ton 1 x 5 Ton 2 x 5 Ton	FSPB BRUISER	LZ BRUISER		1430	1455	1500	OC Sp Coy	FSPB BRUISER - Route 23 - Route 2 - NUI DAT

5	030730	D Coy	Tp APC	D Coy	D Coy Area	Main Gate 1 ATF	0700	0710	0730	Comd Tp A Sqn	As decided OC D Coy/ Comd Tp A Sqn
6	030800	A Coy 105 Fd Bty C Coy BHQ Coy Kitchen	7 x TCV 19 x 5 Ton 7 x TCV 9 x TCV 1 x Truck (5 RAR)	A Coy Gun Posn C Coy HQ 5 RAR Admin Coy	Hughes Rd	Main Gate 1 ATF	0730	0750	0800	OC C Coy	NUI DAT - Route 2 - Route 15 - FSPB SUSAN. RV with Sect APC YS 365612. A Coy & C Coy drop off at YS 253714

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TRACE P TO
5 PAR OP O 9/69
DATED 29 APR 69

AO ILLAWARRA

REF MAPS
6430-III
6429-IV
1 : 50,000



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AIR PLANNING TABLE

ANNEX C TO
5 RAR OP 0 9/69
DATED 30 APR 69

DATE 2 MAY 69

Serial	Unit	PZ	Freq	C/S	PZ Time	LZ	Freq	C/S	Complete Time	PAX	Sorties	Ac	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)
1	Bn HQ 5 RAR	BRUISER	58.60	92	0900	SUSAN 286644	58.60	2	0920	28	4	4 ALB	
2	Bn HQ 5 RAR	BRUISER	58.60	92	1445	TIGER 5	58.60	95	..	5	-	C & C	
3	D Coy 5 RAR	686647	43.50	4	1500	KANGA	58.60	95A	1510	40	6	6 ALB	LFT required in area 1445 to end of lift
4	D Coy 5 RAR	686647	43.50	4	1520	KANGA	58.60	95A	1530	56	8	8 ALB	
5	Bn HQ 5 RAR	BRUISER	58.60	92A	1200	SUSAN 286644	58.60	92	1330	-	3	1 CH47	CP Stores

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ENCLOSURE H/4

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SERIAL SVN 7

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

ROUTINE ORDERS PART 1

LIEUTENANT COLONEL C.N. KHAN

COMMANDING OFFICER

5th BATTALION

THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT

30 APR 69

Numbers 56 - 62

-
- 56. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL SERVICE OBLIGATION.
 - 57. DAMAGE TO WATCHES WRIST GP.
 - 58. BOUNDS - BATTALION HEADQUARTERS.
 - 59. COLLECTION OF SUB UNIT MAIL.
 - 60. DUTIES - REGIMENTAL POLICE.
 - 61. GROUP 9 QUALIFICATIONS.
 - 62. EXTRA REGIMENTAL APPOINTMENTS.

NOTICES

- 1. IN SERVICE COMMISSIONING.
- 2. DFRB CONTRIBUTIONS OTHER RANK 1959 CONTRIBUTORS
- 3. BN MORTARS - WARNING BEFORE FIRING.
- 4. ASCO PAY PLANS.
- 5. PAY OF MEMBERS ON RTA.

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THE ORDERS ARE TO BE READ TO ALL RANKS56. Extension of National Service Obligation

Attention is directed to MBI 154-1 which establishes Commanding Officers as approving authorities for certain extensions. The correct application form is Annex B to this MBI.

57. Damage to Watches Wrist GP

1. These watches are designed to be moisture proof only, and immersion allows entry of water into the case. Technical examination of watches damaged internally shows cases where they have been affected by both salt and fresh water.

2. Members are not to wear these watches while swimming or showering. RAEME are to declare watches damaged internally by water as NOT Fair Wear.

58. Bounds - Battalion Headquarters

The following areas are out of bounds to all members of Admin Coy with the exception of the Coy Clerk and Coy Pay Rep:

Bn HQ
Unit Pay Office

59. Collection of Sub Unit Mail

Sub unit postal orderlies are the only members permitted to collect mail from the unit Post Office.

60. Duties - Regimental Police

1. The duties of the Regimental Police include the supervision and checking of certain disciplinary aspects, such as dress, bearing, traffic control and unit orders etc.

2. To pursue these duties, the RPs are required to move within sub unit areas of 5 RAR. Whenever this occurs, the RPs are to advise the CSM before touring the coy area.

61. Group 9 Qualifications

The following members have qualified in First Aid Test for Group 9 Mil Skill:

215156 Cpl C.J. ROSS
38921 L cpl G.R. MUDGE

62. Extra Regimental Appointments

Ser	Appointment	Appointee	Reference
1	PMC Offrs Mess	2IC	ARO 40/63, 43/63, MFRS
2	Secretary Offrs Mess	Capt M.R. BATTLE	
3	Treasurer Offrs Mess	2Lt P.J. CLAGUE	
4	Asst Secretary Offrs Mess	Lt C.E. STAMP	
5	Supervisor Sgts Mess	Maj C. DUCKER MC RSM	ARO 40/63, 43/63, MFRS
6	PMC Sgts Mess		
7	Secretary Sgts Mess		
8	Treasurer Sgts Mess		
9	President Regt Institute	2IC	MFRS, ECS
10	Secretary Regt Institute	2Lt P.J. CLAGUE	As directed by Pres
11	Treasurer Regt Institute	WO2 J. SLADE	As directed by Pres

Ser	Appointment	Appointee	Reference
12	Regt Audit Board:		
13	President	Maj E.A. RICHARDSON	As directed by Pres
14	Member	Lt C.E. STAMP	
15	Member	Lt I.R. HOSIE	
16	Member	Lt R.A. BRETT	
17	Member	Lt G.J. DUNLOP	
18	Member	Lt D.J. MEAD	
19	Unit Security Offr	2IC	Army Security Manual
20	Asst Security Offr	IO	" " "
21	Safety Offr	Ops Offr	Army Safety Manual
22	Unit Sports Offr	Adjnt	Rules for Army Games
23	Unit Fire Offr	OC Admin Coy	5 RAR Fire Orders
24	Asst Fire Offr	DPRI NCO	" " "
25	Stamps, Petty Cash, Public Monies Account- ing Offr	A adjt.	FIs PMF, MFR
26	Accountable Forms Holding Offr	A adjt	FIs PMF, MFR MBI 150-1
27	Unit Resettlement Offr	A adjt	MBI 220-1, 220-2, 252-1
28	Unit Education Offr	A adjt	MBI 90-3, MBI 75-1, MBI 252-9, MBI 75-2, MBI 75-3.
29	Unit Messing Offr	OC Admin Coy	MBI 145-1
30	Unit PR Offr	2IC	AFV RO Pt 1 No 8 AFV SOP
31	Unit Compensation Offr	A adjt	MBI 129-6
32	Unit History Offr	IO	
33	Asst Unit History Offr	WO2 ARMITAGE BEM	
34	Families Liaison Offr	A adjt	ECRO 144/67
35	Unit Removals Offr	A adjt	MBI 150-3, MIF 150-3 MBI 90-1, MBF 90-2
36	Welfare Offr	2IC	MBI 278-1
37	Asst Welfare Offr	A adjt	MBI 278-1

2Lt
A adjt

NOTICES

1. In Service Commissioning

1. AHQ plans to introduce a list of officers within the Officer Corps to be known as the Administrative and Technical List. The new List is to be maintained at a strength of from 16 to 20 percent of the ARA establishment of majors and below. Initially, the approved strength is to be set at 725 officers. The strength is to be reviewed at three yearly intervals. The List is to be composed of majors, captains and lieutenants in the approximate ratio of 1:3:1. The initial composition which is related to current establishment requirements, is to be 149 majors, 436 captains and 160 lieutenants. Although no specific provision exists for officers in the rank of lieutenant colonel to be retained on the List.

where required Administrative and Technical Officers will be promoted to that rank and carried supernumerary to the strength and composition of the List.

2. The new List is to absorb the existing QM and Medical Administrative and Technical List. Some serving officers who were appointed by way of ARA Officer Qualifying Courses are to be invited to transfer from their present Corps List to the New List. Details of this aspect of the introduction of the new system are still being determined and will be notified separately.

3. The List is to be brought up to strength and maintained by the appointment of other ranks who qualify at the ARA Administrative and Technical Officers Qualifying Course, the first of which is planned for July 1969. The new course replaces the present ARA Officer Qualifying Course. In general, the prerequisite qualifications for attendance at this course are similar to those required for OCS except that the minimum age for appointment is 27 years, the minimum rank is corporal and applicants must have had from six to 10 years ARA service dependant upon their age.

4. In order to provide for soldiers at present serving in anticipation of receiving a QM appointment, this avenue of entry will be retained until 1 Jan 75. However, all officers appointed to QM Category Commissions will be transferred to the Administrative and Technical Officers List and serve under the conditions of service applicable to that category of officers.

5. In general, conditions of service for Administrative and Technical Officers is to be similar to those obtaining for QM Category Officers. The main exception is that from 1 Aug 70 promotion examinations are to be introduced.

6. An ARO is to be issued shortly, and will contain the detailed procedures which are to apply to the raising and maintenance of the Administrative and Technical Officers List.

2. DFRB Contributions Other Rank Pre 1959 Contributors

1. Members whose pay has been increased as a result of the revised pay grouping system are required to pay increased DFRB contributions. Details are contained in Part 5 of ARO 135/68.

2. A pre-1959 entrant who has previously elected not to pay additional contributions will not pay any additional contribution, neither will he receive a higher rate of pension.

3. A pre-1959 entrant who has not made such an election and who finds the additional contributions now required too heavy to pay may make arrangements as specified in para 63 of ARO 135/68. Any such election must be made before 23 Apr 69.

4. The DFRB Board may accept an election made after 23 Apr 69 if special circumstances exist. Any election submitted after 23 Apr 69 must have a written explanation of the lateness of the submission attached to the election form.

3. Bn Mortars: Warning Before Firing

Effective from 19 Apr 69, the bn mor pl when in NUI DAT Base is to arrange for two whistle blasts to be blown no more than a minute before any adjusting round or group of rounds of fire for effect.

4. ASCO Pay Plans

Facilities exist at the 1 ATF Gift Shop for the payment ASCO Pay Plans. This facility exists for monthly payments as for a full payment.

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5. Pay of Members on RTA

1. E Comd is experiencing difficulty in providing service for members on RTA who draw large amounts of pay. It is requested that members be reminded of facility to remit undrawn pay to bank accounts, this would minimize amount to be drawn at MASCOT.

2. Remittance should be made not less than six weeks prior to RTA to ensure it is available when the member arrives in AUSTRALIA.

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War Diary

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Copy No 27 of 57 copies

5 RAR
AP AN PHU

Apr 69

See Distribution List

5 RAR COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT 2/69
OPERATION FEDERAL/OVERLANDER

- Reference:
- A. HQ 1 ATF Ops 242 of 061430Z Mar 69.
 - B. HQ 1 ATF Op O 15/69 dated 25 Mar 69.
 - C. Map VIETNAM, XUAN LOC, 6430-IV, 1 : 50,000.
 - D. Map VIETNAM, TAN UYEN, 6331-II, 1 : 50,000.

Name and Type of Operation

- 1. Operation FEDERAL/OVERLANDER.
 - a. Operation FEDERAL - occupation of bn def posn in AO ARUNDA and conduct of RIF ops in AO ARUNDA. Redeployment into AO MANUKA and RIF ops in AO MANUKA.
 - b. Operation OVERLANDER - cont RIF ops in AO MANUKA.

Dates of Operations

- 2. 10 Mar - 8 Apr 69
 - a. Op FEDERAL 10 Mar - 2 Apr 69.
 - b. Op OVERLANDER 2 Apr - 8 Apr 69.

Locations

- 3.
 - a. AO ARUNDA - centre of mass YT 1315.
 - b. AO MANUKA - centre of mass YT 3002.
- 4. Both AOs were loc to the WEST of LONG BINH.

Central HQ

- 5. HQ 5 RAR under comd HQ 1 ATF.

Task Organization

- 6.
 - a. AO ARUNDA

Under comd from 100600H	four splinter teams, 1 Fd Sqn
Remaining in DS	105 Fd Bty, 1 Fd Regt
In DS from assumption	
responsibility AO ARUNDA	one H13, 161 (Indep) Recce Flt
In sp for 10 Mar	one H13, 161 (Indep) Recce Flt
Under op con for mov of coys	
from LZ KERRY to coy areas 10 Mar	one tp A Sqn, 3 Cav Regt
Under op con from assumption	
responsibility AO ARUNDA	one sect, A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.
 - b. AO MANUKA

Under comd from 261600H until	
rel...	HQ 2 Tp 1 Fd Sqn and three Com-
	bat Engr teams

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- 2 -

Under op con from arrival
27 Mar until rel
Remaining in DS
Under op con for mov 27 Mar
from KERRY to FSPB SALLY
Det to under op con HQ 1 ATF
from 271030H until rel
In gen sp from 270830H Mar
and under comd for mov from
270830H until arrival FSPB
SALLY
In loc FSPB SALLY from 271000H
until rel.

G Tp 2/11 ACR
105 Fd Bty
elms A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
D coy 5 RAR
B/2/35 Arty (US)
three TD15 dozers, one tractor
with back hoe.

Intelligence

7. Annex A.

Mission

8. a. AO ARUNDA (10-27 Mar 69)

To rel 9 RAR in place in AO ARUNDA on 10 Mar 69 with view to:

- (1) Occupy three coy def loc in AO ARUNDA.
- (2) Employing one coy in a mobile ptl role.
- (3) Conduct RIF ops in AO ARUNDA to loc and destroy en and caches.

b. AO MANUKA (27-Mar - 8 Apr 69)

To deploy by air and rd into AO MANUKA on 27 Mar 69 with a view to:

- (1) Conduct RIF ops to loc en bunker systems and render them unusable by seeding with CS crystals.
- (2) Loc and destroy en and caches.
- (3) Prevent en infiltration through AO MANUKA.

Concept of Operations

9. a. AO ARUNDA. Rel of 9 RAR in place by 5 RAR to be conducted by CH47 to be completed on 10 Mar. Occupation of FSPB KERRY by Bn HQ coy and 105 Fd Bty and three coy def locs. One rifle coy to maint cont ptl activity from time of arrival. On completion of rel, conduct cont RIF ops in AO ARUNDA.
- b. AO MANUKA. Redeployment of 5 RAR gp into AO MANUKA 27 Mar. One coy by rd into SW part of AO. Bn HQ and one coy by rd to FSPB SALLY and one coy by air into FSPB SALLY. One coy to remain in AO ARUNDA under op con HQ 1 ATF. Subsequent two coy redeployment by foot into AO MANUKA.

Execution

10. Annex B - Sequence of Events.

Results

11. a. AO ARUNDA

nil.

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b. AO MANUKA

- (1) NVA/VC - 15 KIA (BC)
5 KIA (poss)
18 WIA (poss)
1 HOI CHANH.
- (2) AUST - 2 KIA
34 WIA.
- (3) US - 10 WIA.
- (4) VN - 1 WIA.

Lessons Learned

12. The use of CS crystals in an area interspersed with many bunkers proved to be very effective in denying en use of bases and forcing him into new and at times unfamiliar areas. Use of explosives to destroy bunkers is of a very temporary nature and new bunkers can be re-constructed on the same site once friendly tps have departed.
13. Cleanliness of wpons and ammo cannot be overstressed. In one contact involving 3 VC and a machine gunner, 3 rounds were fired before the wpn jammed.
14. NVA tps show a fanaticism in returning to an area to drag out dead or wounded comrades. They are prep to move in quickly firing automatics to surprise tps soon after a contact.
15. Tps are firing too high in a contact. This tendency must be corrected by max use of ranges when out of ops and constant checking of faults.
16. On three occasions the en threw coloured smoke. On the first occasion smoke was thrown near the area of a contact and caused some confusion to air recce of the area. On the second occasion a coy were receiving an Iroquois resup and purple smoke was thrown 200 metres NORTH of the LZ. He again caused confusion by throwing smoke during preliminary checks of friendly locs prior to an airstrike. This gained the en a 40 min respite.
17. Bunkers encountered were well camouflaged and could not be detected until our tps had reached within 10 metres of them. All bunkers were interlocked by a series of track systems.
18. In all cases of contact in bunkers the en did not fight at all from inside the bunkers. All en fire was delivered from bunker entrance/exits, holes, trenches or in one major contact, from posns in the open on the reverse side of the bunker roof.
19. In such contacts at short range with thick undergrowth, especially bamboo, the M72 and M79 could not be used effectively. Grenades cannot penetrate the thick undergrowth and yet are still most effective if tps are practised in throwing from a lying posn. Most of our cas were caused by RPG tree bursts. It is strongly recommended that a rifle grenade launcher be made aval, e.g. the Energa, to provide an explosive wpn that can punch through undergrowth like the RPG. Tps did not have confidence to fire the M72 having observed too many premature detonations on light foliage in trg . We are however retraining in the use of this wpn. The M60 GPMG proved in all cases to be an outstanding wpn.
20. Where large numbers of bunkers are encountered in an area and seeding with CS crystals is employed in order to save time, a centralized engr system to supply eqpt, tools and detonator cord is required, based preferably at HQ 1 ATF.

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21. There is an urgent necessity to see and understand the meaning of en sign, e.g. Branches dragged across tracks, leaves stripped off trees, wooden arrows, bent branches, carvings in trees. Whilst these signs indicate en presence, in the majority of cases, the meaning is not well known to us. Possibly detailed info could be collated for each area to provide bns with a greater knowledge of en sign. The present MACV publication (VC/NVA Mine Indicators) gives gen info on sign but a more comprehensive guide is required related to each area or the methods used by each regiment. The best solution to this problem is considered to be the att of indigenous pers of the 'Kit Carson Scout' type to each rifle coy.

22. It is recommended that further consideration be given to a more secure means of sending Arty DFs. During this op while coy locstats were sent in code, Arty transmissions for DFs were given in clear. In an area where the en had a fairly sophisticated radio intercept capability, this system compromises locstats.

(C.N. KHAN)
Lt Col
CO

Authentication:

(A.B. PERRIMAN)
Maj
Ops Offr

- Annexes:
- A. Intelligence Summary.
 - B. Sequence of events.

Distribution: HQ 1 ATF (16)

<u>Internal</u>
CO
2IC
Ops Offr
IO
A coy (2)
B coy (2)
C coy (2)
D coy (2)
Sp coy (2)
Admin coy (2)
CP
File (2)
War Diary (5)
Spare (5)

For Information:

- B Sqn 1 Armd Regt
- A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
- 105 Fd Bty, 1 Fd Regt
- 1 Fd Sqn
- 161 (Indep) Recce Flt
- 4 RAR
- 6 RAR
- 7 RAR
- 8 RAR
- 9 RAR
- D Inf (2)

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ANNEX A TO
5 RAR COMBAT AFTER
ACTION REPORT 2/69
DATED 25 APR 69

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

General

1. During the period of the op 5 RAR conducted RIF in two main areas - AO ARUNDA and AO MANUKA. In the first to deny 5 VC Div access to the LONG BINH/BIEN HOA complex and in the latter to destroy en bunker complexes deny him future use of the area and destroy possible HQ elms of T7 loc in the AO.

Phase 1 - AO ARUNDA

2. No contacts or finds of any significance were found in the AO, or the small exts that were periodically made. Numerous tracks were reported and reports of mov were made but ground search revealed no definite sign.

3. It is possible that because of the intensive coverage of the AO, that en main forces, generally loc on the periphery of the AO were denied access to conduct recce of routes and instls and were thus forced into areas to NORTH and NORTH EAST where other allied forces were op.

Phase 2 - AO MANUKA

4. The Threat

- a. There was no positively identified en combat elm in the AO. Elms of 33 rd NVA Regt on recce tasks, infiltration gps, camp caretakers and med pers were expected to be met in the early stages of the op.
- b. As the op progressed the presence of EQ T7 (or MR-7) in the AO became known together with possible elms of 274 Regt and D525 Engr Recce bn as protection forces.

5. Most contacts during this phase were against small gps of en in bunker systems and in two instances of ambushes being initiated against large gps. Gen reaction of the en was to quickly return fire, although in the NORTHERN portion of the AO this lacked the ferocity of that encountered in the main bunker systems in the SOUTH of the AO. In the latter, RPG was quickly, effectively and heavily utilised by the en. All en forces withdrew as quickly as possible after contact initiated.

6. Bunkers

Large bunker complexes were loc throughout the AO, some apparently not used for a long time, others in process of being refurbished. Generally all bunkers found were seeded with CS crystals, with a hope for residual effect of 4 - 6 months.

7. Enemy Identification

- a. HQ T7 (MR 7)
- b. 274 Regt (elms)
- c. D525 Engr Recce bn (Documentary)

Conclusions

1. The op disrupted HQ T7 and forced them to move to a new secure area. Consequently co-ord of any en offensive activity throughout the area will be affected and therefore delayed.

/Seeding of

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Seeding of the bunker systems will deny the en another base area for a limited period, and also will deter their use of the infiltration route into the HAT DICH, BINH SON RUBBER areas.

Attachments

- Appendix 1 - Summary of contacts and Incidents
- Appendix 2 - En cas, wpns, eqpt

- Trace 1 - Areas of op OP FEDERAL
- 2 - A Coy routes of OP FEDERAK
- 3 - B " " " " "
- 4 - C " " " " "
- 5 - D " " " " "
- 6 - 5 RAR areas of op AO MANUKA
- 7 - Coy Routes OVERLANDER/FEDERAL
- 8 - Contacts, incidents, instls OP OVERLANDER/FEDERAL

SUMMARY OF CONTACTS AND INCIDENTS

Serial	D/Time	Location	C/S	Activity
	<u>Mar</u>			
1	102007	YT108177	31	Sighted 7 persons 70 metres from their loc moving SOUTH to NORTH
2	111557	YT127154	2	Loc 3 bodies buried in this loc
3	140801	YT103140	TA1	Found 105 mine under bridge
4	141400	YT128147	13	Loc 16 bunkers 2 - 4 weeks old
5	151730	YT156157	3	Found a grave 2 - 3 weeks old
6	151749	YT115164	62	Found a Chicom grenade with instantaneous fuze
7	171500	YT232087	32	Loc en camp evidence of 50 pers occupied 2-3 days ago
8	190913	YT235119	4	Found 3 Chicom grenades
9	191105	YT155158	12	Found 2 graves
10	191156	YT235096	49A	Loc a booby trap
11	200445	YT148169	TA12	Found a Chicom type explosive
12	201045	YT147171	62	Found trees with arrows and triangles carved into the trunks
13	201257	YT149170	62	Found a modolater sand MO-201B/AMT4B
14	241542	YT215108	61	Loc a mor baseplate posn and 7 win pits
15	250805	YT140157	23	Loc a RL site
16	251145	YT286077	12	Loc an old bunker posn
17	251145	YT287067	4	Loc a pl sized bunker system 4 weeks old
18	251256	YT282077	1	Loc 50 bunkers 12 mths old
19	271009	YT157937	1	2 vehs in convoy hit by mines
20	271112	YT294069	31	Found 7 pits and 1 CP, not recently used
21	271123	YT294069	3	Loc 30 pits
22	271140	YT294069	3	Found a baseplate of 60 mm mor
23	271421	YT291069	31	Loc a hut 10' x 6', well made and used recently
24	271450	YT290068	31	Found another hut, and a two day old blood trail
25	271510	YT289070	31	Found 40 empty US rice bag on the track with blood trail
26	271517	YT289070	3	Found a med kit - dated 16 Feb 68
27	271525	YT289070	3	Bunker system extends 200 x 100 metres, C/S 31 found another blood trail and docus
28	271533	YT319063	22	Contacted unknown no of en in bunkers with possible HMG
29	271625	YT289075	33	Found a qty of med sups ammo and docus
30	271635	YT289075	33	Loc 5 bunkers and 2 water pts and digging implements
31	271740	YT319063	2	Loc more bunkers and docus
32	271812	YT289075	33	Found fresh blood tracks, warm fire and docus
33	271906	YT319058	22	Contacted squad of en received a burst of automatic fire. A search next morning revealed 1 en KIA.
34	280710	YT324059	22	Contacted 2 en - result 2 en WIA
35	281300	YT315017	22	Contacted 1 LF VC - result 1 VC KIA (BC)
36	281430	YT288064	3	Loc 4 bunkers
37	290615	YS308999	2	Sighted unknown no of en moving NORTH to SOUTH
38	290920	YS310993	23	Sighted sentry who went to ground and disappeared
39	290922	YT310005	21	Contacted 5 en dressed in black and green cam suits - blood trails
40	291163	YT298003	11	Sighted one person in greens moving WEST
41	291426	YS299999	22	Sighted one person in greens
42	291800	YT283050	32	Found a booby trap - grenade .a. curiosity type
43	292254	SALLY	G50	Had two trip flares set off and heard mov to NORTH
44	300015	SALLY	G50	Had a trip flare set off, cleared by fire
45	300922	YT284045	33	Contacted 10-12 en in bunker system - 3 VC KIA (poss) 1 WIA
46	301312	YT280047	3	Loc 9 bunkers
47	301312	YT281052	33	Loc 10 bunkers
48	301404	YT279053	32	Contacted 3 en in bunkers with RPGs
49	301625	YT292083	D6	Loc 2 x 60 mm mor rounds (complete)

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Serial	D/Time	Location	C/S	Activity
	Mar			
50	301633	YT277052	31	Contacted 6-8 in bunkers with RPGs, contact finished at 301721 hrs
51	301829	YT277052	31	Loc 6 bunkers and 2 claymores ready for firing
52	301920	SALLY	DUMP	Clearing ptl sighted 7 en to SOUTH - engaged with unknown results
53	302015	SALLY	0A	Received bursts of automatic fire - perimeter engaged.
54	310822	YT278051	3	Results so far in search - 30 bunkers - 2 caches & med sups
55	311029	YT288039	12	Loc extensive bunker system with CP bunkers & wells
56	311102	YT278051	31	Loc 3 more bunkers
57	311134	YT278052	31	Loc 1 more bunker
58	311147	YT286028	1	Found diaries tied in a tree & found some docus
59	311307	YT276052	31	Loc another 9 bunkers & ammo, food & docus, med sups
60	311504	YT275057	D6	Loc 2 bunkers
61	311634	YT288030	13	Loc a bunker system; search revealed 76 bunkers
62	311907	YT306040	23	Loc a bunker system & digging implements
63	312029	YT282048	3	To date have found 26 bunkers with crawl trenches & grave
	Apr			
64	010952	YT293062	61	Found blood stained bandages
65	011035	YT273042	32	Loc 3 bunkers which have been used recently
66	011120	YT273043	32	Has now loc 35 bunkers
67	011215	YT273043	62	Lead elms report cooking smells, noises, and a radio being turned off
68	011326	YT291044	11	Loc large bunker system & wells & ammo
69	011530	YT332068	62	Loc 20 bunkers, prior find they heard voices
70	011615	YT332065	C5	Loc 12 bunkers and a kitchen
71	011632	YT307025	D6	Found a 67 mm shell
72	011716	YT273047	32	Contacted 4 en in bunkers - 1 VC KIA (poss)
73	011723	YT299039	23	Loc 12 bunkers used in last 3 or 4 days
74	011816	YT276045	32	Sighted some huts - engaged with M72s and SA also found a well
75	011911	YT276045	32	Now loc 6 - 8 bunkers
76	021308	YS333974	C5	Loc 3 old bunkers, also a stream crossing, recently used
77	021335	YT333006	C25	Contacted 3 en - no results
78	021539	YT301037	23	Reported possible en running out of bunker system - engaged - no fire returned.
79	021724	YS332988	C5	1 elm has hit a mine - 1 APC damaged
80	021735	YS306985	11	Loc 18 bunkers and cache of ammo
81	030849	YS312984	11	Contacted 1 en in extensive bunker system
81	030912	YS313985	12	Contacted 2 en in same system, it extends from C/S 11 to C/S 12
82	031058	YS328972	C35	Contacted 8 en with MGs and loc 20 slit trenches and 20 graves
83	031124	YS328972	9	It appears that the en has thrown green smoke
84	031342	YT273046	3	Contacted 3 en moving along trail, in fol up loc bunker and wells, found a body and a pair of bloody boots, which do not belong to the body
85	031512	YT275039	33	Fired at suspected en in bushes
86	031637	YS314988	13	Contacted unknown no of en while getting water
87	031700	YS314976	12	Contacted unknown no of en - blood trail
88	031832	YS318995	4	Loc a well const bunker system, and blood trail on track
89	031950		ALL	Summary of bunker loc on 3 Apr 69 - 150 + loc
90	040105	YT327019	23	Contacted unknown no of en, en fired back and withdrew
91	040455	YT318020	21	Contacted 30 en with unknown results
92	040645	YT318020	21	Have found 3 bodies, map case and maps - possibly 1 en was female
93	040705	YS319995	4	Have loc more bunkers during search
94	040707	YT3180202	21	New body count, now 4 en KIA by body count and one set of drag marks and 3 Sony radios
95	040710	YS318995	42	Contacted large gp of en in bunker system, contact into the afternoon - LFT were called in

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Serial	D/Time	Location	C/S	Activity
	Apr			
96	041007	YT314021	23	Contacted 6 en - 3 en WIA
97	041229	YS318981	12	Contacted unknown no of en, poss from C/S 4 contact
98	041463	YS317995	4	Loc 12 bunkers & 4 under const, claymores sighted around system
99	041444	YT366035	33	Loc a bunker system
100	050855	YS324986	23	Loc a bunker system which was recently used
101	050930	YS317995	4	Possibility of 1 VC in bunker system found by C/S 23
102	051036	YS317995	4	C/S 23 bunkers now tally 5 & 1 CP and med sup, docus
103	051139	YT275040	32	Loc bunkers
104	051350	Route 1	Arty	
			35	A Hoi Chanh surrendered
105	051006	YS307969	13	Reports recce bunkers, due to voices being heard
106	051151	YS317995	4	Loc more bunkers and a body
107	051551	YS306990	13	Loc 3 bunkers
108	051606	YS318992	4	Loc 15 bunkers
109	051625	YS306990	13	Loc 12 freshly const bunkers
110	051825	YS324936	4	Loc CP and 34 bunkers
111	061124	YS325991	23	Loc 6 bunkers and a well
112	061355	YT277013	32	Found 6 x 82 mm mor rounds and old camp site
113	061625	YS315978	11	Found possible bunker system which could be hosp
114	061811	YS315978	1	Loc 300 lbs rice, 1 Sony radio, 1 PRC 25 set.
115	061943	SALLY	G50	Reported suspected RPG round landing 150 metres to the NW of SALLY
116	062037	SALLY	62	Received SA fire
117	070815	YT315080	C5	1 elm hit a mine - 6 US WIA
118	070834	YS319999	4	Loc week old grave
119	070928	YT315080	C5	Loc hole and digging implements, transistor radio
120	070942	YS311978	1	Loc hosp bunker system and med sup
121	071007	YT329032	21	Found fresh blood trail leading NORTH
122	071019	YS319997	4	Found 4 more graves
123	071120	YS294074	61	Loc a rice cache, 44 gal drum $\frac{3}{4}$ full
124	071647	YS324979	1	Loc a large bunker system in which new typewriter and SMG
125	071805	YS286977	3	Loc 12 bunkers, 6 pits
126	071835	YS323982	1	Loc a large mine in track
127	071958	SALLY	61	While conducting clearing ptl, had 2 pers fol, when spotted ran off into scrub
128	080644	SALLY	G50	Clearing ptl found claymore with wires cut, another was turned facing the perimeter
129	080815	YS324979	1	Found huge qty of ammo, food, med sups and clothing
130	081202	YS324979	1	Loc 15 bunkers in present loc
131	091120	YS332989	11	Contacted one MF en - 1 en KIA - M16 captured

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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX 1 TO 5 RAR
COMBAT AFTER ACTION
REPORT 2/69 DATED
25 APR 69

ENEMY CASUALTIES, CAPTURED WEPS, AMMUNITION, EQUIPMENT,
MEDICAL EQUIPMENT, FOOD STUFFS AND BUNKERS
OP "FEDERAL/OVERLANDER"

1. Enemy Casualties
 - 15 KIA (BC)
 - 5 KIA (Poss)
 - 18 WIA (Poss)
 - 1 HOI CHANH

2. Captured Weapons
 - 6 AK47
 - 2 M16
 - 1 SKS
 - 1 Chicom Pistol
 - 1 Chicom SMG

3. Captured Ammunition
 - 1786 x 7.62 (NATO)
 - 1450 x 5.56
 - 3580 x 7.62 (Short)
 - 12 x Shotgun Cartridges
 - 24 x Chicom Grenades
 - 5 x M26 Grenades
 - 14 x Claymore Mines (VC)
 - 23 x Detonators
 - 2 x 40mm Grenades
 - 2 x 60mm Mor Rounds
 - 1 x Warhead 155 Shell
 - 90 x Blocks Explosive
 - 200 x M1 Rounds
 - 2 x RPG Rounds
 - 10 x 50 cal Rounds
 - 7 x Booster Cartridge RPG 7

4. Equipment
 - 1 x AN/PRC 25 Set
 - 2 x Ampmeters
 - 3 x Sony Transistor Radios (Altered for Intercept)
 - 3 x Transistor Radios
 - 18 x Maps
 - 2 x Mor Aiming Posts
 - 1 x ID Card
 - 1 x Compass (US)
 - 36 x Traces & Sketches
 - 2 x Thompson Mag
 - 2 x Clinometers (Chinese)
 - 1 x Marker Balloon
 - 3 x Torch
 - 22 x AK47 Mag
 - 10 x M16 Mag
 - 11 x Chicom SMG Mag
 - 2 x RPD Mag
 - 1 x Tape Recorder with CES
 - 1 x Sword
 - 1 x Typewriter

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5. Miscellaneous Equipment

- | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 5 x Web Belts (VC Type) | 9 x Dilly Bags |
| 5 x Pouches | 1 x Hand Bag |
| 5 x Water Bottles | 23 x Sets of Toilet Gear |
| 2 x Picks | 4 x VC Bottle Lamps |
| 2 x Screw Drivers | 112 x Candles |
| 5 x NVA Helmets | 2 x Teaspoons |
| 1 x Tin of Oil | 6 x Cups Canteen |
| 3 x Entrenching Tool | 1 x China Bowl |
| 18 sets Footwear | Length of Black Silk |
| 3 x Saws | 220 ft Plastic Sheet |
| 6 x Cloth Hats | 1 x Ruler |
| 3 x Gas Masks | 2 x Fountain Pens |
| 1 x Dixie | 1 x Pocket Knife |
| 2 x Rolls of Rope | 1 x Metal Bottle of Turps |
| Quantity Wire (Elec) | 3 x Tin Dishes |
| 1 x Map Case | 8 x 1.5 Torch Batteries |
| 5 x Hammocks | 2 x VC Cigarette Lighters |
| 1 x Barber Set | 1 x Wallet |
| 1 x Mosquito Net | Very large Quantity of Civ Clothing |
| 1 x Table Cloth | (Male & Female) |
| 200 Ft Flex | Quantity of Mixed Uniforms |
| 1 x Cut-Throat Razor | Quantity of Tobacco & Cigarette |
| 1 x Steel Helmets | Paper |
| 1 x Parachute | 13 x Plastic VC Tents |
| \$VN7,000 (Piastre) | 5 x Carrying Bag |
| \$C500 (Yen) | 2 x Axe |

6. Medical Equipment

a. Med Tools:

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1 x Bone Saw & Spare Blade | 2 x Pronged Retractors |
| 1 x Bone Rubbing Forcept | 1 x Bone Rasp |
| 1 x Bone Holding Forcept | 1 x Bone Scoop & Rasp |
| 2 x Lemnia Guides | 4 x Straight Box Jointed |
| | Artery Forcepts |
| 2 x Bowel Holding Forcepts | 2 x Curved Box Jointed |
| | Artery Forcepts |
| 9 x Curved Artery Forcepts (5") | 3 x Swab Holding Forcepts |
| 1 x Toothed Dissecting Forcept | |
| (5" x 10") | 2 x Plain Dissecting Forcept |
| 1 x Curved Scissors | 4 x Thyroid Tissue Forcept |
| 1 x Pair Artery Forcepts (Broken) | 4 x Bowel Holding Forcepts |
| 1 x Pair Scissors | 2 x Mayo Forcepts |
| 2 x Large Drip Bottles | 4 x Small Drip Bottles |
| 8 x Drip Tubes | 1 x Intrevious Drip Tube |
| 1 x Chloroform Mask | 4 x Pairs of Surgical Gloves |
| 20 x Surgical Face Marks | 45 x Operating Sheets |
| 400 x Rolls Bandages | 5 x Rolls Stitching String |
| 1 x Roll Gut Stitching String | 6 x Syringes |
| 3 x Bottles of Ether Swabs | 4 x ARVN, US, RUSSIAN Field |
| | Dressings |

b. Drugs etc

- | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 700 x Phials Chloroquine | 1 x Phial Snakebite Syrum |
| 300 x Phials Morphine | 6 x Bottles Saline |
| 130 x Phials Adrenaline | 1 x Bottle Daren |
| 370 x Phials Larachel | 200 x Bottles Bipencylline |
| 110 x Phials Tonicinphere | 10 x Bottles Tetrachel |
| 50 x Phials Anti Tetnus | 20 x Bottles Steretomyen |
| 50 x Phials Caphine | 15 x Bottles Ether |
| 50 x Phials Coramine | 6 x Packets Acetysal |
| 15 x Phials Quinine | 4 x Bags Novocaine |
| 5 x Phials Anti Gas Ganorene | 1600 x Tablets Prinaquine |
| Syrup | 4000 x Tablets Camquine |

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3 x Tubes Penicilline	1 x Tin Bismut
5 x Large Cakes Soap	14 x Bottles Oxyetracycline
30 x Bottles Multi Vitamin	446 x Bottles Strepto
24 x Bottles Quinine	6 x Bottles Cod Liver Oil
1 x Measuring Cylinder	160 x Syrettes Units
20 x Cropytoy	

7. Food Stuffs

1315 lb Rice
187 Tins Fish
15 lb Split Peas
24 tins condensed milk
30 lb Salt
12 tins powdered egg

8. Bunkers

a. <u>Located</u>	600 Approx
b. <u>Seeded</u>	350 - 400 Approx.

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ANNEX B TO 5 RAR COMBAT
AFTER ACTION REPORT 2/69
DATED 5 APR 69

OPERATION FEDERAL/OVERLANDER
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
PART 1 - AO ARUNDA

Day 1

10 Mar 69

AM Mov of 5 RAR from KANGA by CH47 into AO ARUNDA.
1010 hrs B coy arrived in loc YT 128146.
1352 hrs C coy complete in posn at YT 117174.
1542 hrs A & D coys complete in posn: A coy YT 114132; D coy YT 134144.
1559 hrs Rel of 9 RAR by 5 RAR completed. 5 RAR assumed op respons-
ibility for AO ARUNDA. All elms 9 RAR clear of AO ARUNDA.
2053 hrs 10 pl reported mov 50 metres to his south.
Ni locs A coy HQ YT 114132; 2 pl YT 112134; 3 pl YT 113126.
B coy HQ YT 128146; 4 pl YT 127146; 6 pl YT 128147.
C coy HQ YT 117170; 7 pl YT 108177; 8 pl YT 117170;
9 pl YT 116176.
D coy HQ YT 134143; 10 pl YT 134140; 11 pl 134143.
Bn HQ, Mor pl (-), 105 Fd Bty, Tracker pl, Aslt Pnr Pl FSPB
KERRY.
Pl Ptls 1 pl YT 112140; 5 pl YT 114156; 12 pl YT 146144.

Day 2

11 Mar 69

0715 hrs 7 pl reported that 7 men passed near ambush loc during ni -
footprints found. Mov from SOUTH to NORTH.
0839 hrs C coy with tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt departed area YT 117170 for
drop off pt YT 160170.
0942 hrs 6 pl reported finding old tunnel from ck bed running EAST
under rice padi approx 12 mths old from YT 155159. Approx
50 metres long. Caved in at entrance.
0940 hrs C coy commenced search of area of "Fried eggs". Centre of
mass YT 148073 from EAST to WEST.
1557 hrs 4 pl loc 3 bodies buried in area of YT 127154 approx 2 weeks
old.
1710 hrs D coy completed search of sq YT 1414 and part of sq YT 1415.
A coy completed search of sq YT 1313 and visited village in
sq YT 1014.
B coy completed search of sqs YT 1115 and YT 1215.
1904 hrs C coy linked up with APC tp for move to ni ambush area.
Ni locs A coy HQ YT 114132; 1 pl YT 114133; 2 pl YT 113135.
B coy HQ YT 127146; 4 pl YT 127146; 5 pl YT 127146.
C coy HQ YT 117170; 7 pl YT 116172; 8 pl YT 117170; 9 pl
D coy HQ YT 134144; 10 pl YT 134145; 11 pl, 12 pl YT 134144.
Bn HQ, Mor Pl (-), 105 Fd Bty, Tracker pl FSPB KERRY YT 137131.
Ptls 3 pl YT 104136; 6 pl YT 112154; Aslt Pnr pl YT 115176;
3 Tp B Sqn YT 115176.

Numerous reports of SA and Mor fire during ni. Most of fire can be att-
ributed to friendly forces to EAST, SOUTH and WEST.

Day 3

12 Mar 69

0835 hrs D coy departed to search area of sq YT 1515, YT 1414.
C coy cont search from EAST to WEST of "Fried eggs" feature.
A coy commenced search of foothills in sqs YT 1112, YT 1212.
B coy commenced search of sq YT 1214.
1200 hrs 4 pl occupied def posn at YT 160127 vacated by coy 1/2 Inf
Regt (US).
1700 hrs Searches completed. B coy rel C coy as mobile coy.
1704 hrs B coy departed by APC to NW part of AO.

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Day 7

16 Mar 69

0800 hrs

C coy cont search in sqs YT 1416, YT 1516 and YT 1315.
2 pl commenced further search of foothills.
11 pl commenced search from D coy base (YT 134144) to YT 139140 to YT 145135 to YT 142134 to YT 134140.

PM

Ni locs

B coy rel C Coy as mobile coy.
A coy HQ YT 114132; 2 pl YT 113135.
B coy HQ and 4 pl YT 127174; 5 pl YT 104174; 6 pl YT 132186.
C coy YT 128147.
D coy HQ YT 134144; 10 pl YT 135144.
Bn HQ, Mor pl (-), Tracker pl, Aslt Pnr pl, 105 Fd Bty FSPB KERRY YT 139131.
Ptls 1 pl YT 117162; 3 pl YT 111145; 11 pl YT 147143; 12 pl YT 133150.

Reports again received during ni of SA fire, explosions, flashes and flares.

Day 8

17 Mar 69

0815 hrs

B coy departed ni loc by APC to drop off pt sq YT 1614. Task: Conduct creek line search from YT 170166 to no further SOUTH than YT 174147.

0830 hrs

D coy assumed responsibility for protection of Land Clearing Base in area YT 1515.

0821 hrs

Three Blue trucks sighted in area of sq YT 1418. Apprehended by APCs and escorted to Sector HQ DUC TU for investigation.

0835 hrs

C coy moved out to conduct RIF ops in AO JEZEBEL (See Trace) with under op con one tp B Sqn 1 Armd Regt and one tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.

Ni locs

A coy HQ YT 114132; 2 pl YT 113135.
B coy HQ and 4 pl YT 177147; 5 pl YT 176146; 6 pl YT 176147.
C coy YT 128147.
D coy HQ 156154; 10 pl YT 157155; 11 pl YT 134145; 12 pl 133150.
Bn HQ, Aslt Pnr pl, Mor pl (-), 105 Fd Bty FSPB KERRY YT 139131.
Ptls 1 pl YT 115148; 3 pl YT 112161.
Tracker pl YT 155153.

Day 9

18 Mar 69

0800 hrs

B coy demolished old en camp in area YT 174177.

1554 hrs

B coy arrived at YT 128146 and took over def posn from C coy.

1606 hrs

C coy moved to A coy loc YT 114132 to take over def posn.

1745 hrs

A coy moved by APC to area YT 156154 and took over protection Land Clearing base from D coy.

Reports during ni of radar sightings of parties of people moving through AO.. No sightings were verified.

Ni locs

A coy HQ & 1 pl YT 156154; 3 pl YT 156153.
B coy YT 128147;
C coy HQ YT 114132; 7 pl YT 114136.
D coy HQ YT 134145; 10 pl YT 135144; 12 pl YT 134144.
Bn HQ, Tracker pl, Aslt Pnr pl, Mor pl (-), 105 Fd Bty FSPB KERRY YT 139131.
Ptls 2 pl YT 111149; 8 pl YT 135185; 9 pl YT 108176; 11 pl YT 135151.

Day 10

19 Mar 69

0730 hrs

D coy tp B Sqn 1 Armd Regt and tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt under op con departed KERRY for RIF ops in AO AUDOBON (See Trace). Tracker pl under comd D coy. LOs inserted by 5 RAR into TRANG BOM, and 52 Regt ARVN (BAU CA).

Further Radar reports of persons moving in AO during ni. No confirmation.

Ni locs

A coy HQ YT 156154; 1 pl YT 157154; 2 pl YT 157153; 3 pl YT 156153.
B coy HQ, 5 pl & 6 pl YT 128146;
C coy HQ YT 114132; 8 pl YT 114134.
D coy HQ YT 133144; 11 pl YT 134145; 12 pl YT 134144.
Bn HQ, Tracker pl, Aslt Pnr pl, Mor pl (-), 105 Fd Bty FSPB KERRY YT 129131.
Ptls 4 pl YT 124175; 7 pl YT 124175; 9 pl YT 105173; 10 pl YT 133150. CONFIDENTIAL

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Day 11

20 Mar 69

0700 hrs Op JUNGLE BASH commenced - two coy sweep from SOUTH to NORTH of AO PRELUDE (Fried eggs feature - centre of mass YT 148172). A coy on left of axis, D coy on right of axis. Tac HQ to move on Centre Line. B coy to provide one pl for protection of Land Clearing Base. One pl under comd A coy for op. C coy to provide one pl to protect D coy base. One pl under comd D coy for op. Aslt Pnr pl move on axis and protect Tac HQ. Tracker team to move with Tac HQ. One tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt with under op con B Sqn 1 Armd Regt to estb cordon in NORTH.

0753 hrs A coy reported downed ac on bearing 5000Z at 1000 metres. It was Land Clearing Iroquois. No serious cas. Hel recovered by CH47.

1845 hrs Op HUNGLE BASH completed. No en loc in AO PRELUDE. D coy remained in ni ambush posns in AO PRELUDE.

Ni locs A coy HQ YT 156154; 1 pl YT 157154; 2 pl YT 157152; 3 pl YT 156153.
B coy HQ YT 128146; 5 pl YT 128146.
C coy HQ YT 114132; 7 pl YT 114134.
D coy HQ YT 149179; 10 pl YT 149180; 11 pl YT 151184; 12 pl YT 145188.

Bn HQ
Ptls 4 pl YT 109169; 6 pl YT 133151; 8 pl YT 134144; 9 pl YT 114147.

Day 12

21 Mar 69

All sub-units remained in base def locs. C coy changed locs with A coy and assumed responsibility for protection of Land Clearing Base. D coy returned to base loc (YT 134144)

Ni locs A coy HQ YT 114132; 2 pl YT 113135; 3 pl YT 114136.
B coy HQ, 4 pl, 6 pl YT 128146.
C coy HQ YT 156154; 7 pl YT 156153; 8 pl YT 157154.
D coy HQ YT 133144; 10 pl YT 135144; 11 pl YT 134145.
Bn HQ, Mor pl (-), Tracker pl, Aslt Pnr pl, 105 Fd Bty FSPB
KERRY YT 139131.
Ptls 1 pl YT 111148; 5 pl YT 134150; 9 pl YT 159139; 12 pl YT 149145.

Day 13

22 Mar 69

0845 hrs 6 pl commenced search of area in sq YT 1115. A coy commenced search of foothills.

1630 hrs Searches completed and sub-units in ni locs. Pl ptls moving to final locs.

Flashes, flares SA fire, Mor fire reported during ni. 12 pl redeployed at 1200 hrs to new def loc at YT 159139.

Ni locs A coy HQ YT 114132; 1 pl YT 114133; 2 pl YT 113133; 3 pl YT 114136.
B coy HQ, 5 pl, 6 pl YT 128146.
C coy YT 156154; 7 pl YT 156153; 8 pl YT 157154; 9 pl YT 157153.
D coy HQ YT 133144; 10 pl YT 135144; 11 pl YT 134145.
Bn HQ, Mor pl (-), Tracker pl, Aslt Pnr pl, 105 Fd Bty FSPB
KERRY YT 139131.
Ptls 4 pl YT 133150; 12 pl 159139.

Flashes, Flares, SA fire, Mor fire reported during ni. 12 pl redeployed at 1200 hrs to new def loc at YT 159139.

Day 14

23 Mar 69

0827 hrs 1 pl departed in APCs to conduct search of village perimeter: wire on both sides of Route 1.

1149 hrs 6 pl with APCs commenced search of areas to NW and WEST of AO. Flashes, bursts of tracer, lts and Radar reports of mov in AO reported during ni. Engaged with arty.

Ni locs A coy HQ YT 114132; 1 pl YT 114133; 3 pl YT 114136.
B coy HQ, 4 pl, 5 pl YT 128146.

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C coy HQ YT 156154; 7 pl YT 156153; 8 pl YT 157154;
9 pl YT 157153.
D coy HQ YT 133144; 10 pl YT 135144; 11 pl YT 134145;
12 pl YT 159139.
Bn HQ, Mor pl (-), Tracker pl, Aslt Pnr pl, 105 Fd Bty FSPB
KERRY YT 139131.
Ptls 2 pl YT 111149; 6 pl YT 138149.

Day 15

24 Mar 69

AM Continuous radar reports during ni of mov of 15 - 20 pers in area 161156 moving to SOUTH. Engaged with arty. No known results.

0637 hrs 7 pl in APCs moved to area of YT 161156 to investigate radar report.

0825 hrs B and C coys commenced redeployment into AO BANDIT (See Trace) to conduct RIF ops during daylight hrs. Aslt Pnr pl under cond B coy. Tac HQ with under cond Tracker pl to con op. Mor sect in APCs to accompany Tac HQ. One sect 105 Fd Bty to redeploy to airstrip YT 1911 to sp ops in AO BANDIT. One Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt under op con.

1542 hrs Tracker pl found what appears to be mor baseplate posn at YT 215108.

1600 hrs Tracker pl loc 7 wpn pits and 1 hole with 700 x 7.62mm rounds in belts. Dug last ni in area YT 215108.

1905 hrs 12 pl reported hearing voices outside his perimeter.

2155 hrs Firefly ~~man~~ into area to determine validity of radar reports (Man aborted at 2249 hrs - NOT oriented).

Ni locs A coy HQ YT 114132; 2 pl YT 113135; 3 pl YT 114136.
B coy HQ, 4 pl, 5 pl YT 128146.
C coy HQ YT 156154; 7 pl YT 156153; 8 pl YT 157154; 9 pl
156153.
D coy HQ YT 133144; 10 pl YT 135144; 11 pl YT 134145;
12 pl YT 159139.
Bn HQ, Mor pl (-), Tracker pl, Aslt Pnr pl, 105 Fd Bty FSPB
KERRY YT 139131.
Ptls 1 pl YT 113149; 6 pl YT 138149.

Day 16

25 Mar 69

0120 hrs Firefly returned. Checked area of radar reports. Found nothing.

0315-0450 hrs Numerous radar reports of 10 - 15 pers with 2 vehs moving SOUTH through AO. Nothing cfu.

0805 hrs 6 pl when checking on radar reports found rkt launcher site at YT 140157 with 107 mm rkt which looked like it was being set up when en were driven off by arty fire.

0850 hrs A-D coy redeployed into AO BANDIT for daylight RIF op. Search from EAST to WEST in eastern part of AO. Coy 2/52 Regt ARVN under cond 5 RAR for search in western part of AO. Op con by Tac HQ. LOs deployed to TRANG BOM post, coy 2/52 Regt (ARVN), 52 Regt ARVN (BAU CA), D coy 151 LRRP Bn.

1130 hrs D coy reported bunker system at YT 287067 about 1 wk old. Pl size facing EAST to WEST.

1140 hrs 1 pl loc bunker system at YT 286077.

1256 hrs A coy loc coy size bunker system at YT 282077. 50 bunkers extending 200 metres EAST to WEST, approx 12 months old. Not used recently.

Ni locs A coy HQ YT 114132; 2 pl YT 113135; 3 pl YT 114136.
B coy HQ, 4 pl, 6 pl YT 128146.
C coy HQ, YT 156154; 7 pl YT 156153; 8 pl YT 157154; 9 pl
YT 157153.
D coy HQ YT 133144; 10 pl YT 135144; 11 pl YT 134145;
12 pl YT 159139.
Bn HQ, Mor pl (-), Tracker pl, Aslt Pnr pl, 105 Fd Bty FSPB
KERRY YT 139131.
Ptls 1 pl YT 111146; 5 pl YT 133151.

2154 hrs Wng O issued for redeployment into AO MANUKA 27 Mar 69.

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Day 17

26 Mar 69

AM

Radar reports varying from 5 - 15 pers and from 2 - 5 vehs moving mainly SOUTH in AO.

0825 hrs

D coy moved in APCs to search central portion of AO BANDIT until 1400 hrs. C coy to move into western part of AO BANDIT at 1400 hrs and recce ni ambush posns for ni 26/27 Mar.

Ni locs

A coy HQ YT 114132; 1 pl YT 114133; 2 pl YT 113135; 3 pl YT 114136.

B coy HQ, 5 pl, 6 pl YT 128146; 4 pl YT 137151.

C coy HQ and 8 pl YT 214095; 7 pl YT 214096; 9 pl YT 213092.

D coy HQ YT 133144; 10 pl YT 135144; 11 pl YT 134145; 12 pl YT 159139.

Bn HQ, Mor pl (-), Tracker pl, Aslt Pnr pl, 105 Fd Bty FSPB KERRY YT 139131.

Day 18

27 Mar 69

AM

5 RAR redeployed into AO MANUKA.

Execution

A coy move by veh and APC into SW area via Route 15 and LTL 25.

B coy fly in to LZ SALLY (YT 2906) once LZ secured.

C coy move by APC to secure LZ SALLY.

D coy remained in AO ARUNDA under op con HQ 1 ATF. Coy HQ and 2 pls YT 128146; one pl YT 134144.

Bn HQ moved by rd to FSPB SALLY with B/2/35 Arty (US), Tracker pl, Mor pl (-), Aslt Pnr pl and 105 Fd Bty.

PART 2 - AO MANUKA

Day 18

27 Mar 69

1025 hrs

HQ 1 ATF reported 22 cas (10 Aust, 2 US, 1 VN WIA - DUSTOFF) when two vehs hit mines at YS 159937. 9 WIA remained on duty. Mines understood to be pressure, possibly 155 mm shell. 9 wpns destroyed.

1112 hrs

7 pl loc seven small pits and 1 CP. Not used recently at YT 294069.

1123 hrs

Approx 30 more pits found to WEST of last report.

1140 hrs

C coy reported baseplate found at YT 294069 possibly 60 mm. (Proved to be tail of 500 lb high drag aerial bomb).

1209 hrs

Report received from 111 Corps of large guarded wpns dump in area YT 2900.

1421 hrs

7 pl found hut 10 ft x 6 ft. Also 6 mths old well recently used by en at YT 291069.

1450 hrs

7 pl found structure at YT 290068.

1452 hrs

C coy loc complete med kit dated 16 Feb 68 in bunker at YT 289070.

1453 hrs

7 pl loc blood trail leading SOUTH about 2 days old leading from structure at YT 290068.

1510 hrs

7 pl found 40 US rice bags lying on ground while fol blood trail.

1525 hrs

At YT 289070 - extent of bunker system was 200 metres x 100 metres. Also found were personal letters and a few propaganda notes. 9 pl loc axe, shorts and scythe in tree stump at YT 289070. Camp est 1 mth old.

1535 hrs

5 pl reported contact - Approx 4 to 5 en were spotted by the fwd scout moving towards him at YT 319063 and fwd scout fired on party. En withdrew to SOUTH and WEST. En appeared to be local force, dressed in green or black.

1634 hrs

9 pl loc five well const bunkers and two water pts at YT 289075. Found in bunker systems at YT 289075 and YT 289071: 40 x 7.62 rounds, 2 pith helmets, med sups, plastic bag containing docus, 2 x M16 magazines, 1 poncho, Chicom grenades and assortment bamboo splints, bottles and scented bracelets, double handled saw, unident gun, 30 x M16 in plastic bag, dynamite. Further search on 28 Mar loc: 100 x M1 rounds, 1 compass (US), Qty black pyjamas, 500 yen Bank of China, Pers ID Card, Miscellaneous pers articles, 1 pistol holster, Qty ex books.

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4 diaries, 1 ruler, Qty docs, 4 btys in tin box lined with Sydney newspaper dated 9 Feb 69, 1 National Tape Recorder Type RQ 2035 Serial 020783, 3 tapes, 1 Microphone and lead, 1 AC adaptor with lead, 700 x AK47 rounds, more docs and 1 sword.

1740 hrs B coy found two letters of complaint to Chief VC in BIEN HOA Province. Also additional bunkers loc at YT 319063.

1906 hrs 5 pl contact YT 319058 against min of two VC, possibly up to sect str. En withdrew WNW. Search next morning revealed 1 en KIA (BC) and 1 x AR15 captured.

Ni locs
A coy HQ & 1 pl YT 272013; 2 pl YT 267012; 3 pl YT 267012.
B coy HQ & 6 pl YT 318063; 4 pl YT 324059; 5 pl YT 316059.
C coy HQ & 8 pl YT 289069; 7 pl YT 290068; 9 pl YT 289071.
D coy det to under op con HQ 1 ATF.
Bn HQ, Mor pl (-), Tracker pl, 105 Fd Bty, B/2/35 Arty (US), G Tp, 2/11 ACR FSPB SALLY sq YT 2906.

Day 19

28 Mar 69

0710 hrs 5 pl contacted at least 2 en dressed in black at YT 324059. En withdrew WEST. Blood trails indicated that 2 en were WIA.

1300 hrs 5 pl contacted and killed one en local force dressed in grey shirts, black trousers and black plastic sandals at YT 315017. En was carrying pack, 1 x AK47 and grenades and was moving from NORTH to SOUTH.

PM G Tp 2/11 ACR deployed in a NORTH block posn on rd on LTL 25 in sqs YT 2801 and YT 2902. A coy searched from WEST into gen area of sq YT 2900. B coy searched from NORTH to SOUTH towards sq YT 3101. Elms G Tp also blocked to EAST in area of sq YS 3099. C coy cont search in NW of AO.

1950 hrs B coy reported that a previous friendly camp had been loc at YS 309999 with 600 x 5.56 rounds; 600 x 7.62 link belt and 10 x M79 rounds.

Ni locs
A coy HQ & 3 pl YT 290010; 1 pl YT 293009; 2 pl YT 293005.
B coy YS 309999.
C coy HQ & 9 pl YT 284063; 7 pl YT 286063; 8 pl YT 282062.
D coy Remain under op con HQ 1 ATF.
Bn HQ, Aslt Pnr pl, Tracker pl, Mor pl (-), B/2/35 Arty (US), 105 Fd Bty, G Tp, 2/11 ACR FSPB SALLY YT 2906.

Day 20

29 Mar 69

0615 hrs 5 pl fired at noises heard on perimeter at YT 310990. Daylt revealed no sign of en. Probably animals.

0920 hrs 6 pl sighted on sentry at YT 310993. En went to ground. En dressed in blue shirt and appeared to be local force and withdrew WEST after contact.

0922 hrs 4 pl contacted at least 5 en possibly main force dressed in cam suits at YT 310005. En came from NW and withdrew to NW. Blood trail indicated at least one en WIA.

1103 hrs 1 pl reported pers dressed in greens moving WEST. Investigation revealed nothing.

PM B coy cont search to 1400 hrs. Then moved to secure PZ at YS 303999 for move at 1700 hrs to LZ at YT 324059. On arrival at LZ B coy to move to area of YT 325065. G Tp 2/11 ACR to secure LZ leaving 1 pl overni to ambush LZ area. Remainder of G Tp to return to SALLY on completion of task.

1426 hrs 5 pl at YS 299999 sighted 1 pers dressed in greens. Distance too great to engage.

1830 hrs B coy reported skull and crossbones on oxcart track at YT 282050.

2254 hrs B/2/35 Arty (US) had 2 trip flares set off. Saw mov to NORTH.

Ni locs
A coy HQ, 1 pl, 2 pl YT 288015; 3 pl YT 282022.
B coy YT 326063.
C coy HQ, 7 pl, 9 pl YT 280050; 8 pl YT 283050.
D coy
Bn HQ, Sp coy, B/2/35 Arty (US), 105 Fd Bty, G Tp less one pl FSPB SALLY.

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Day 21

30 Mar 69

0015 hrs Trip flare ignited on SW of FSPB perimeter. Engaged by SA fire from B/2/35 Arty (US) and Mor close DF.

0840 hrs Check on skull and crossbones sign reported at 291830H. On side of track was grenade set in a pile of rocks. Trip wire was connected to base of sign and also to friction type Chicom grenade. Trip wire had broken away from the grenade. Skull and crossbones painted crudely on salad oil tin.

0922 hrs 9 pl at YT 284045 contacted 10-12 Main Force en dressed in greens and black pyjamas and obtained 3 en KIA (poss) 1 en WIA (poss). Captured 2 x RPG2s and 1 AK50 (with folding bayonet). En withdrew to EAST and NE. 9 pl also found and destroyed several bags of rice and qty AK47 rounds.

1312 hrs C coy loc nine bunkers at YT 280047. 9 pl has found ten others but finding more all the time.

1404 hrs 8 pl contacted 3 en Main Force at YT 279053 with one en WIA (poss). En fired from pits. 5 - 6 RPG2 rounds fired. Only 1 round was effective, en withdrew NE.

1633 hrs 1 en WIA (poss). En fired RPG and AK47 from bunkers and were dresses in lt blue/grey uniforms. En withdrew WEST and NW. One Aust WIA with GSW to back. Dustoff completed 1748 hrs. Lt fire team accompanying dustoff swept area to WEST and NW. No known results.

2155 hrs FSPB SALLY received SA burst from NORTH engaged by mors.

2304 hrs C coy observed lts outside their posn and engaged with SA fire.

Ni locs
A coy HQ, 1 pl, 3 pl, YT 286027; 2 pl YT 288035.
B coy HQ, 4 pl YT 323053; 5 pl YT 320055; 6 pl YT 323052.
C coy HQ, 7 pl, 9 pl YT 278051; 8 pl YT 278053.
D coy Remains under op con HQ 1 ATF
Bn HQ, Sp coy, B/2/35 Arty (US), 105 Fd Bty, G tp 2/11 ACR (-)
 FSPB SALLY YT 2906.
Ambush Ptls G Tp YT 282082; YT 290080; YT 322048.

Day 22

31 Mar 69

0809 hrs Combat Engr team req from HQ 1 ATF to permit clearance of rd daily from SALLY to Route 1. Approved.

AM Tracker pl with pl Tp moved towards C coy loc.

1029 hrs 2 pl reported finding extensive bunker system, CPs and wells at YT 288039 (7 CPs, 29 bunkers).

1147 hrs A coy loc 20 docus and diaries tied up in trees at YT 286028.

1307 hrs 7 pl loc 5 bunkers at least 12 mths old at YT 276052. Further 9 bunkers loc at 1359 hrs well used in past 24 hrs. Incl 1 Chicom grenade, 2 containers of rice 10 & 15 lbs respectively and med sups.

1504 hrs 2 bunkers 3' x 5' loc by G tp at YT 275057.

1634 hrs 3 pl loc bunker system at YT 308030 (46 bunkers).

1907 hrs 4 pl reported 7 bunkers, and digging implements not recently used at YT 304048.

2029 hrs At area of YT 282048, 9 pl reported finding 26 bunkers with crawl trenches, 560 AK47 rounds, 1 old grave, 2 Chicom Atk grenades, 66 slabs of explosives and docus.

Ni locs
A coy HQ and 2 pl YT 289035; 1 pl YT 289037; 3 pl YT 288030.
B coy HQ YT 303048; 4 pl, 6 pl YT 304048; 5 pl YT 303050.
C coy HQ and 9 pl YT 278051; 7 pl YT 277053; 8 pl YT 278041.
D coy D coy remains under op con HQ 1 ATF.
Bn HQ, Sp coy, B/2/35 Arty (US), 105 Med Bty, G Tp 2/11 ACR (-)
 FSPB SALLY YT 2806.
Ambush Ptls Elms G Tp at YT 314079, YT 301067, YT 327044.

Day 23

1 Apr 69

1035 hrs 8 pl found 35 fairly old bunkers at YT 273043 some of which have been refurbished in past 3 or 4 mths.

1326 hrs 1 pl loc large old bunker system at YT 291044 with A tk grenades, AK rounds, RPG warheads and some wells.

1425 hrs 8 pl loc a pack containing docus and 7 RPG booster charges. Backloaded to HQ.

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1530 hrs Aslt Pnr pl found approx 12 bunkers used in past 30 mins.
 Heard noises just prior to discovery at YT 321033.
 1716 hrs 8 pl contacted four main force en at YT 293047. Two of en
 were wearing black clothing. En withdrew NNW. One en KIA
 (Poss). 3 en returned to extract fourth body.
 1723 hrs 5 pl loc at YT 299039, 12 bunkers approx 12 mths old, used
 in past 3-4 days.
Ni locs A coy HQ, 1 pl, 2 pl YT 292042; 3 pl YT 290039.
 B coy HQ, 6 pl YT 299039; 4 pl YT 298039; 5 pl YT 308032.
 C coy HQ, 7 pl YT 275046; 8 pl, 9 pl YT 270048.
 D coy Remains under op con HQ 1 ATF.
Bn HQ, Tracker pl, G tp (-), Mor pl, B/2/35 Arty (US), 105 Fd
Bty FSPB SALLY.
Aslt Pnr pl YT 322031.
Elms G Tp YT 293081.

Day 24

2 Apr 69

0709 hrs 8 pl found 10 new bunkers with large amount of docus, letters
 and clothing. Could be post office.
 1308 hrs G Tp elms loc 3 old bunkers at YS 333974.
 1335 hrs Elms G tp in contact with 3 local VC at YT 333006. En were
 wearing civ clothing. En withdrew WEST. No cas.
 1539 hrs 6 pl reported 1 poss en heard running out of bunker system at
 YT 301037. No fire returned by en.
 PM A coy moved from PZ SALLY to LZ sq YS 2998.
 1724 hrs APC from G Tp hit a mine at YS 332988. Cas 1 US with broken
 leg; 1 US with ear injury.
 1735 hrs 1 pl loc 20-30 bunkers in area YS 306985 with freshly cut wood.
 Loc 1500 x AK47 rounds and Chicom grenades.
Ni locs A coy HQ, 2 pl YS 302986; 1 pl YS 306985; 3 pl 300986.
 B coy HQ, 5 pl, 6 pl YT 294022; 4 pl YT 296021.
 C coy HQ, 7 pl, 9 pl YT 272047; 8 pl YT 270048.
 D coy Remains under op con HQ 1 ATF.
Bn HQ, Mor pl (-), Tracker pl, Aslt Pnr pl, 105 Fd Bty, B/2/35
Arty (US), Elms G Tp FSPB SALLY
G Tp (-) YS 332977, YS 332979, YS 333995, YS 331914, YT 334005.

Day 25

3 Apr 69

0849 hrs 1 pl contacted one en Main Force at YS 312984. Blood trail
 indicated 1 en WIA (poss). En withdrew NORTH.
 0912 hrs 1 pl swept area of contact and contacted two further main
 force en at YS 313985. Results 2 en WIA (poss). En with-
 drew EAST.
 0941 hrs Large bunker system loc in area YS 313985 with large no docus
 and eqpt in area.
 0955 hrs 2 pl contacted 2 en wearing grey shirts at YS 317985 with no
 result. En withdrew EAST.
 1058 hrs Dismounted ptl G tp contacted 8 local VC at YS 328972. 1 en
 WIA (poss). En withdrew EAST. Sweep revealed pack contain-
 ing docus at YS 325974.
 AM D coy moved by air from PZ YT 128147 at LZ YT 3300.
 1124 hrs VC threw green smoke near G Tp.
 1332 hrs C coy HQ contacted 2 en at YT 273045. 1 en KIA (BC). En
 was carrying 7000 piastres. One en withdrew SOUTH.
 1637 hrs 3 pl contacted 3 main force en at YS 314988 with no result.
 En withdrew NORTH.
 1700 hrs 2 pl contacted 2 en local force at YS 314976. 1 en WIA (poss).
 Found kit bag while fol blood trail. En withdrew SOUTH.
 1822 hrs A coy reported that en threw a purple smoke grenade near their
 loc as resup hel was approaching.
 1832 hrs D coy loc well const bunker system in area YS 318995. Bunkers
 about 1 mth old and used 2 weeks ago.
 1949 hrs D coy reported a total of 49 bunkers loc during day.
Ni locs A coy HQ, 1 pl, 3 pl YS 314985; 2 pl YS 314976.
 B coy HQ, 6 pl YT 319024; 4 pl YT 321017; 5 pl YT 326023.
 C coy HQ, YT 273046; 7 pl, 8 pl YT 273046; 9 pl YT 274042.
 D coy HQ, 11 pl YS 318993; 10 pl YT 321001; 12 pl YS 315995.
Bn HQ, Sp coy, 105 Fd Bty, B/2/35 (US), Elms G Tp FSPB SALLY.

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- 10 -

Tracker Team YT 273046; Sect Mor pl YS 332979; G Tp (-)
YS 332905; YS 332977; YS 332979; YS 333995; YS 333991;
YS 331974.

Day 26

4 Apr 69

0106 hrs 5 pl contacted 2 en at YT 328019 with unknown results. En came from SE and withdrew to SOUTH. 1 en WIA (poss).

0505 hrs 4 pl contacted approx 30 en moving from SOUTH to NORTH at YT 318020. Results 4 en KIA (BC), 2 en WIA (poss). Captured: 1 AK47, 1 Pistol ammo, 3 Sony radios, aerial radio, 4 bags of rice, 4 btys, qty pots & pens, qty black silk and docus with mapcase.

0710 hrs 11 pl contacted a major occupied bunker system at YS 318995. 12 pl moved EAST to assist. Min of 30 en in bunkers. LFT and air strike employed against bunker system. En cas 5 KIA (BC). AUST cas 2 KIA, 11 WIA. Contact broken at 1106 hrs.

0804 hrs D coy HQ contacted 5 en dressed in greens at YS 318995 with nil results. En withdrew NW.

1007 hrs 6 pl contacted 6 en at YT 314021. En sustained 3 WIA (poss). Remainder of en withdrew NE.

1229 hrs 2 pl contacted 4 main force en at YS 318981. Results 2 en KIA (BC), 2 AK47 and ammo and webbing captured. En withdrew NORTH. 2 AUST WIA.

1403 hrs A coy reported 16 bunkers at YS 317995, four of which are under const. Not used for 7 days. Track from this loc lead to another 2 bunkers at YS 314992 occupied within last 48 hrs. These bunkers had track leading off apparently to large system at YS 318995. Several claymores were loc sited to NORTH.

Ni locs
A coy HQ, 2pl, 3 pl, YS 314985; 1 pl YS 308994.
B coy HQ YS 333995; 4 pl YT 333000; 5 pl YS 333989; 6 pl 329004.
C coy HQ YT 268036; 7 pl YT 266036; 8 pl YT 273040; 9 pl YT 268036.
D coy HQ, 11 pl YS 318998; 10 pl YS 318996; 12 pl YS 317994.
Bn HQ, Sp coy (-), 105 Fd Bty, B/2/35 Arty (US), Elms G Tp
FSPB SALLY; 4 Tp B Sqn 1 Armd Regt YT 329004; Tracker Team
YT 268036; G Tp (-) YS 332983; YS 332981; YT 290069;
YS 332979; YS 332976; YS 331975; YS 331973.

Day 27

5 Apr 69

0855 hrs 6 pl & 4 Tp B Sqn loc bunker system in area YS 324986. Recently occupied.

AM 4 Tp B Sqn and 6 pl linked up with D coy in area of YS 324988 and then moved SOUTH then WEST to attack bunker system at YS 318995 from EAST supported by med and fd arty.

1350 hrs One HOI CHANH surrendered to rep B/2/35 Arty (US) on Route 1.

1625 hrs 3 pl found 12 bunkers made of freshly cut timber.

1825 hrs D coy reported finding 1 CP and 5 bunkers with docus and med sups at YS 324936. Further 28 bunkers, 1 CP and 1 hosp bunker found by 12 pl with docus, med sups, food and ammo. 23 bunkers had false bottoms containing ammo, explosives and med sups. All bunkers showed signs of recent and prolonged occupation.

2145 hrs One VC approached elms G Tp at YS 331971. En was fired at. Believed WIA.

Ni locs
A coy HQ, 1 pl, 3 pl YS 314985; 2 pl YS 315976.
B coy HQ, 4 pl, 6 pl YS 332983; 5 pl YT 329027.
C coy HQ, 8 pl YT 266017; 7 pl YT 269012; 9 pl YT 268009.
D coy HQ, YT 314002; 10 pl YS 314992; 11 pl YS 317980; 12 pl YS 315992.
Bn HQ, Sp coy (-), Elms G Tp, 105 Fd Bty, B/2/35 Arty (US) FSPB
SALLY
G Tp (-) YS 332919; YS 332976; YS 332983; YS 332981; YS 331973; YS 331974.
Mor Sect YS 332919; 4 Tp B Sqn 1 Armd Regt YS 314992.

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- 11 -

Day 28

6 Apr 69

1145 hrs
1731 hrs
1811 hrs

6 pl loc 4 bunkers and 10 ft deep well at YS 325991.
1 pl loc bunker system which could be hosp at YS 315978.

A coy reported fol finds:

- a. 300 lbs rice & 1 SONY transistor found by 3 pl.
- b. PRC 25 Radio found by 2 pl.

ni

Reports of rkt and lts fired near SALLY.

Ni locs

A coy HQ, 2 pl, 3 pl YS 314985; 1 pl YS 311977.

B coy HQ, 6 pl YT 321026; 4 pl YT 323026; 5 pl YT 318028.

C coy HQ, 7 pl YT 270001; 8 pl YS 270999; 9 pl YT 270005.

D coy HQ, 11 pl YS 318994; 10 pl YS 318991; 12 pl YS 317995.

Bn HQ, Sp coy (-), Elms G Tp, B/2/35 Arty (US), 105 Fd Bty
FSPB SALLY.

Sect Mors YS 332996; G Tp (-) YS 332996; YS 332983; YS
332981; YS 332979; YS 332990; YS 332978.

4 Tp B Sqn YS 318994.

Day 29

7 Apr 69

AM

All coys cont search and moved towards final ni locs preparatory to mov out by hel AM 8 Apr. Tk Tp to move WEST, join G Tp and assist in search of SE part of A0.

0736 hrs

4 pl loc 9 bunkers in good condition at YT 324028. Some appear to have been used last ni. Also 6 lbs explosive.

0820 hrs

Veh from G Tp hit mine at YT 315080. 6 US cas.

0942 hrs

At YS 311978 A coy loc fol: 20 new civ shirts, 10 new civ trousers, 4 new civ blouses, 100 candles, 12 tins powdered eggs, $\frac{1}{2}$ gal kerosene, 200 ft plastic sheet, 24 tins condensed milk, 30 lbs salt, 2 lbs tobacco, 8 tins fish, 50 lbs rice, 100 rounds 7.62 ammo, 446 powdered strepts at 1.25 grams per bottle, 24 bottles quinine hydrochloride, 14 bottles oxytetracycline, 30 bottles multi vitamin, 6 bottles cod liver oil, 1500 cc measuring cylinder, 60 x 1 cc styrettes Unit B1, 100 x 2 cc styrettes.

1120 hrs

Tracker pl loc 44 gal drum, three parts full of rice at YT 294074.

1144 hrs

Found further 3-4 cwt rice at YT 294074.

1647 hrs

A coy found 9 bunkers at YS 324979. Small amount docus, typewriter and med sups. Appears en left hurriedly. SMG found possibly SOVIET and CHICOM claymores.

Ni locs

A coy YS 323982.

B coy HQ, 4 pl YT 317062; 5 pl YT 317056; 6 pl YT 319062.

C coy YS 286977.

D coy YS 296987.

Bn HQ, Sp coy, G Tp (-), B/2/35 Arty (US), 105 Fd Bty FSPB
SALLY.

Ambush Ptls G Tp YT 305083; YT 300066; YT 305740; YT 333984.

Day 30

8 Apr 69

AM

Closing down of FSPB SALLY. B/2/35 Arty (US) departed SALLY 0900 hrs and reverted to under op con HQ 1 ATF.

A coy remained in area of YS 3297 and reverted to under op con 9 RAR.

PM

Bn less A coy in NUI DAT by 1500 hrs.

Day 31

9 Apr 69

1120 hrs

1 pl contacted 1 main force en at YS 332989. En was carrying M16 and was moving from WEST to NORTH. Results: 1 en KIA (BC); 1 x M16 captured.

CONFIDENTIAL

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 1733741 2Lt R.A. Hutchison.
2. Report on Rocket Launching Site at GR 140157 at 0805 hrs on 25 Mar 69.
3. Instl covered an area of 150 square metres.
4. a to e not applicable.
 - f. 10 or more persons.
 - g. Launching site faced due south.
 - h. (1) Not applicable.
 - (2) Not applicable.
 - (3) Not applicable.
 - (4) There were 3 sets of crossed launching sticks and electric circuit wires facing south.
 - i. (1) Not applicable.
 - (2) Not applicable.
 - (3) Instl was approx 2 - 3 weeks old.
 - j. The instl was loc in a cleared area in bamboo, astride an old ox cart track. The vegetation was low on the southern side.
 - k. There were no booby traps.
 - l. Not applicable.
 - m. A live 107 mm rocket round was disarmed and recovered. Electric wires, detonator tins etc., were removed for destruction.


(R.A. Hutchison)
2Lt
Pl Comd

- Annexes:
- A. Items Found At GR 140157.
 - B. Sketch of Area of Instl.
 - C. Markings on 107mm Round.
 - D. Discription of Rocket Site.


ITEMS FOUND AT GR 140157

1.	<u>Item</u>	<u>Qty</u>
	107mm Round - live.	1
	Batteries, 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ volt, "CALOR" brand, hooked into 2 prong elect plugs	4
	Wires, electric circuit	50 metres
	2 prong electric plugs	2
	Chicom detonator tins.	8
	Rkt base plugs (expended)	2
	Shipping plugs, bakelite (not from 107mm rkt)	4
	Rkt canister caps, bakelite	4
	Knife, 6" blade (<u>civ</u> type)	1
	Shirt, brown <u>civ</u> , torn	1
	Tooth brush, oily	1
	Nylon <u>civ</u> sock, blue	1
	Cloth sleeve, 1 metre long x 120 metres diameter, tied at one end	1
	Bandage, cloth, unused	$\frac{1}{2}$ metre
	Launching sticks, 1 metre long	3 sets
	Launching sticks, $\frac{1}{2}$ metre long	3 sets.

AREA OF INSTL



MARKINGS ON 107MM ROUND.



Rocket olive drab
markings in white
approx $\frac{1}{2}$ " squares

DESCRIPTION OF ROCKET SITE


1. The launching site was set to fire 3 rkts at once.
2. There were 8 empty fuse tins found, so it is possible that 8 rkts were on the site at some time.
3. 2 base plugs were found from expended rkts.
4. An ox cart probably brought the rkts to the site from the north. Old ox tracks were found to the north but there were none to the south of the site.
5. 4 canister caps were found, indicating that the rkts were unloaded on the site from the containers.
6. No canisters were found on the site.
7. Before the last rkt was able to be fired (3 rounds) fell within 10 metres of the site, cutting wires and damaging batteries.
8. From the proximity of mor rounds it could be assumed that several cas were caused.
9. Remaining en probably left with vehicle and rkts.
10. En were probably not local VC, indicated by the fact that they otherwise could have recovered valuable rocket and wiring system.

V.C. INSTALLATION REPORT

1. 2784009 2Lt R.A. LAMBERT.
2. Bunkers at Grid 289070 at 1400 hours on 27 Mar 69.
3. Part A, 10,000 square metres
Part B, 20,000 square metres
4.
 - a. Bunkers
 - b. Varied from 2ft to 4ft in depth.
 - c. In Part B only linked by crawl trench.
 - d. Bunkers average size 3 ft by 4 ft with 2 ft over head cover.
 - e. 28 Bunkers.
 - f. Coy street min.
 - g. Sited in mutual sp. covering all possible approaches.
 - h. Mainly two man with two capable of being used as CP accommodating four or five.
 - i. Eight to twelve months.
 - j. Part A sited on top of spur with stream dividing Part B on lower N.W. slope. Well worn foot pad led into Part A off ex cart track at base of spur.
 - k. None sighted.
 - m. Seeded with CS Crystals by engineers after thorough search.

..... *R.A. Lambert* 2Lt
9 Pl Comd


INSTALLATION FOUND BY C/333 27 MAR 69.



V.C. INSTALLATION REPORT

1. 1201164 2 Lt D.J.MEAD
2. Wpn pits and two caches. At 1430 hrs on 27 Mar 69.
3. 150 square metres.
4.
 - a. Wpn pits only.
 - b. N/A
 - c. N/A
 - d. Simple pits one with overhead cover.
 - e. 12 pits.
 - f. P'
 - g. All round.
 - h. Individual. and one Command Post.
 - i. Pits 6 months old to 12 months old. Cache about 4 months old.
 - j. No
 - k. No
 - m. Cache's destroyed.

Cache's 4' off ground tin roof and floor.
One Cache - 40 bags US Rice (empty)
One Cache - 20 bags US Rice (empty)



D J Mead 27.

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. OPERATION "FEDERAL".
2. Report by 1733741 2Lt R.A. Hutchison.
3. 6 Pl B Coy 5 RAR.
4. Strength of Pl: 24.
5. Action occurred on 27 Mar 69 at 1533 hrs. Duration of contact was 15 mins.
6. Loc: GR YT319062.
7. Pl task was right flank Pl on Coy mov during Recce-in-Force(RIF) op.
8. The Pl was the right flank rear Pl in Coy mov. The lead sect walked into a small cleared area containing a bunker and cooking area. Fwd members of the sect noticed a blur of mov approx 6 VC left the area hurriedly. The fwd sect opened fire and then went to ground and formed an immediate fire base. The bunker was blown with a grenade.
9. Terrain was extremely thick, consisting of primary jungle. It was raining steadily and visibility was only 4-5 metres.
10. En were first sighted at a distance of 5 metres.
11. En were first sighted by fwd scout and Sect Comd.
12. Fwd scout and Sect Comd were forcing a path through thick primary growth.
13. En were noticed by mov, as they picked up packs and ran down hill.
14. There were 6 en, local force. Dress was varied; grey-green trousers and black shirts with green and grey bush hats. Footwear varied from canvas boots to sandals and thongs.
15. Fwd scout and Sect Comd fired first.
16. Wpns fired were the M16s of the scout and Sect Comd.
17. En immediately picked up packs and ran downhill.
18. The sect's immediate reaction was to deploy, grenade the bunker and direct fire on the en withdrawal area.
19. En cas not known.
20. Not applicable.
21. There were no friendly cas.
22. Not applicable.
23. Ammo expenditure was:

M26:	2
7.62 link:	400
M16:	100
24. Docus captured were 2 letters(personal). There were no wpns.
25. Lessons Learnt.

Small en camps loc in thick primary jungle sometimes rely on cam for security and do not use a sentry system. They stop for evening meal early (approx 1530 hrs); possibly to be ready for late afternoon mov for ni ops.

26. Because of small bushes and vines, M72 and M79 could not be used as there was a danger of premature detonation of rounds. The only wpsns that could be used were small arms and hand grenades. There is a requirement for a rifle-fired grenade that will punch through light foliage without detonating in a posn which will endanger the firer.

27. Omitted.

28. Refer para 8.

29. Total est ammo expend during contact:

Grenades:	2
7.62 link:	400
M16:	100
105mm:	30

30. Coy Comd's Comments.

The contact occurred as the Coy was moving into har and the last Pl was moving into posn. This emphasises the requirement for clearing ptls, as in this case the en posn was only about 15-20 metres from one of the static Pls, and yet the en either had not heard us or were prep to stay until our intentions were clear. Special note para 26, especially where falling ground limits Sa fire.

.....
(R.A. Hutchison)
2Lt
Pl Comd

Harring
.....
(R.E. Harring)
Maj
Coy Comd

VC INSTALLATION REPORT


1 Apr 69

1. Report by No.....Rank..Capt.....Name.HADLEY..2.Fd.Tp.RAE..
2. Report on installation....Transit Camp.....at.YT..319063.....
at..1630..hrs on.27.Mar.69.....
3. Area covered by installation.,.200 Metres X 100 Metres.....
4. Defensive layout:
 - a. (1) Yes
 - (2) No
 - (3) No
 - b. ~~Not~~ applicable
 - c. ~~Not~~ applicable
 - d. (1) Not applicable
 - (2) Size suitable for sleeping. Overhead cover 2ft.
 - e. 5 Bunkers. 3 completed and 2 under const.
 - f. 5 bunkers suitable for sleeping 5 men each bunker
 - g. See sketch.
 - h. 5 man.
 - i. (1) Completed approx 12 months old new bunkers approx 1 month.
 - j. LZ constructed nearby bunkers. Suitable for albatross.
 - k. Nil booby traps. Nil mines.
 - m. Seeded with CS gas, residual type

Signed:

Capt

OC 2 Fd Tp RAE



CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op "FEDERAL"
2. Report by 54761 2Lt B.J. Ryan.
3. 5 Pl B Coy 5 RAR
4. Str of Pl: 27.
5. Date/Time: 1900 hrs on 27 Mar 69. Duration: 80 mins approx.
6. Loc: GR 319057.
7. Pl task was Recce in Force (RIF).
8. While mov to ni ambush loc, fwd scout encountered lead elms of unknown size en gp coming up out of a creek on a small foot track. General dir of en mov was east to west. Fwd scout initiated contact and fired, hitting leading VC. Remaining en returned fire.
9. Terrain: Medium and thickening down to creek line. Visibility initially 40 metres - this reduced rapidly as light faded.
10. En first sighted at 15 metres.
11. First sighted by fwd scout.
12. Moving fwd of lead sect.
13. En were noticed by mov and noise.
14. En str: 2 sighted, probably local.
15. Fwd scout fired first, range of approx 15 metres.
16. Sect wpns fired were M16, SLR and M60.
17. En returned fire and withdrew into thick scrub along creek.
18. Sect deployed and returned en fire.
19. En cas: 1 KIA(BC) and possibly others WIA as several blood trails were later found in the area.
20. En cas were caused by M16, possible WIA by SLR and M60.
21. There were no friendly cas.
22. Not applicable.
23. Ammo expenditure: 40 M16, 30 SLR, 100 M60.
24. Docus and wpns captured: 1 M16 rifle, registered number E112163 and 1 torch with small diagram in its base.
25. Lessons Learnt
 - a. M60 fired high.
 - b. There is a requirement for a rifle projected grenade which, is capable of punching through scrub.
26. Other Pts

En were still moving freely in area, despite earlier contact with C/S 23 in that proximity.

Part 2 Pl Comd's Comments

27. Not applicable.

28. On contact the lead sect deployed and returned fire. The second sect were moved up on the left flank while the rear sect collected packs which had been dropped on contact and remained static at the rear. Pl then swept through the area using fire and mov by gps within the sects. Wounded en remained in posn in thick cover on the creek bank and employed automatic fire and blast-type grenades as the sweep moved through. Fire was conc on their posn until en were silenced.


By this time - approx 2015 hrs - visibility was reduced to practically nil.

Pl then withdrew to the loc of rear sect and area was then engaged with arty.

On regrouping, Pl then retired a further 200 metres and continued arty engagement.

At first Lt Pl returned to loc of contact and conducted a sweep of the area.

29. Refer para 23.



Part 3 Coy Comd's Comments,

30. The contact appears to have been with the gp earlier contacted by 6 Pl. Once again the area and darkness prevented the use of the M79 or M72 and rifle discharged grenades would have been extremely useful. It illustrated that en will not always withdraw a great distance or remain static in safe area after contact.


.....Pl Comd

.....Coy Comd

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

Part 1.

1. Op "FEDERAL"
2. Report by 1200424 Lt G.J. Dunlop.
3. 4 Pl B Coy 5 RAR.
4. Str of Pl - 26.
5. Action occurred at 0710 hrs 28 Mar 69.
6. Loc: GR 325061
7. Pl task was Recce in Force.
8. After a ni ambush the Pl redeployed for normal morning maint. A sentry was posnd on a track about 30 metres to the west. Noises were heard approaching from the south-west. He waited and when he saw the first and second enemy he fired at them and came back into the posn through the MG, which then fired towards the en posn. A sweep was made of the area.
9. Terrain: Thick secondary growth.
10. En was first sighted at approx 10 metres.
11. En was sighted by sentry.
12. Sentry was observing track.
13. En were noticed by noise.
14. There were 2 en seen.
15. Sentry fired first, then MG.
16. Sect wpns fired were M16, MG and SLR.
17. En withdrew.
18. Sect opened up with fire as soon as sentry had returned to posn.
19. En cas are unknown.
20. Not applicable.
21. There were no friendly cas.
22. Not applicable.
23. Approx Ammo Expend:
SLR - 4 rounds.
M60 - 30 "
M16 - 20 "
24. No docus or wpns were captured.
25. Lessons Learnt.
 - a. The sentry could not withdraw as en were coming through the undergrowth - refer to diagram.
26. Nil.



PART 2. Pl Comd's Comments.

27. The sentry is quite sure he hit the en with at least one shot in the chest. The en fell but was not to be found during the sweep. The en recover their dead and wounded very quickly. No arty was fired due to th: proximity of call sign 23, who were 20 mins to the west.

28. Refer para 8.

29. Ammo Expenditure: Refer para 23. No arty was fired.

PART 3 Coy Comd's Comments.

30. Where possible the ambush should be left in posn until about 0900 hrs, as the en start their mov fairly early and we can miss opportunities by pulling out early. In this case, had the Pl still been in posn a better result could have been expected but due to other tasks they were required to move out early.

.....Pl Comd

.....Coy Comd

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

Part 1.

1. Op "FEDERAL"
2. Report by 1733741 2Lt R.A. Hutchison.
3. 6 Pl B Coy 5 RAR
4. Str of Pl was 25.
5. Date: 0920 hrs 29 Mar 69 69.
6. Loc: GR YS310993
7. Task: Check creek line for tracks from GR YS305996 to GR YS310993.
8. Pl had reached limit of search and found a very well used track approaching from the west, crossing the creek at a small recently const water point. The Pl deployed around the water point, track crossing, and was investigating the fresh tracks crossing the creek heading east on a bearing of 2000m. A soldier from the sect covering the track approaching from the west saw an en rise up from behind an ant hill then disappear, about 50 metres away. It appeared the en could have been in a sentry hole dug in to the top of the ant hill. Three rounds of M79 were fired, blowing the top off the ant hill, but the en had walked down the track and was behind the ant hill when he was first seen. He had withdrawn before the M79 was fired.
9. Terrain: Bamboo and ant hills, visibility approx 50 metres.
10. En was approx 50 metres from posn when first sighted.
11. The 2IC of 8 sect first sighted en.
12. He was looking at fresh tracks on the ground.
13. En was noticed because of colour of hair(black) and clothes (faded blue shirt).
14. one en only was sighted, wearing faded blue shirt, open at front, no hat and no wpn seen.
15. M79 fired first, range of 50 metres.
16. Only sect wpn fired was M79.
17. En left area fast.
18. Opened fire with M79.
19. There were no en cas.
20. Not applicable.
21. There were no friendly cas.
22. Not applicable.
23. Ammo expenditure: 3 rounds M79.
24. No docus or wpns were captured.
- 25.

25. Pl was searching for arms cache in area and had found no recently used tracks up till time of contact. Approx 15 pers had used the track we were on the ni before and one pers had used it that morning. Tracks indicated en were mov from east to west, toward the primary jungle. This was the only positive info on en mov and was not fold up. Had time been allocated to ambushing en routes and fol up well used tracks better results may be expected. The large passage of pers on the track, and a well used const water point indicated possibility of en in area.

26. Nil

Part 2

27. Not applicable.

28. Pl went to ground, only one member having seen en.

29. Only ammo expended was 3 M79 rounds.

Part 3 Coy Comd's Comments.

Considerable time is reuquired once contact or sighting is made as mov in this terrain with security is extremely slow, especially when signs indicate a fairly large force has passed by.

.....Pl Comd

.....Coy Comd

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

PART 1.

1. Operation "FEDERAL".
2. Report by 1200424 Lt G.J. Dunlop.
3. 4Pl B Coy 5 RAR.
4. Str of the Pl was 25.
5. The action occurred at 0922 hrs on 29 Mar 69. Duration of action was approx 20 mins.
6. Loc of action was GR 310005.
7. Pl task was Recce in Force (RIF).
8. The Pl was about to conduct a creekline search South-East of GR 310005 when a well used track was found. It was approx 100 to 150 metres off the creek and was on the southern side. The Pl fol the track to the north-west, where it crossed the creek. Fresh footprints were found in the mud, and it was decided to pull back and go to ground and see what developed. The Pl had only been in posn approx 10 mins when 5 VC approached from the north-west. They were dressed in cam suits with cam sweat cloths tied around their heads. The leading man had his AK 47 slung. They did not have large packs. The en acted as if they owned the place. The Pl was alerted. The en crossed the creek, closing up to about 2-3 paces between men. The left flank gun became over anxious and commenced firing at a range of approx 30 metres. They claim that they were seen by the en, but when I looked from the en posn I feel sure they were not seen. The first of the en group was hit and fell, the remainder disappearing into thick scrub about 15 metres eit'er side of the creek. The en, at least one, moved round on the left flank and returned fire with automatic wpns, AK 47s. They were engaged by the rear MG and fled. Arty was fired on the en withdrawal routes by the MFC. A sweep was carried out but no bodies were found. There were blood trails.
9. Terrain: Burnt out bamboo, visibility 40 - 50 metres.
10. The en were 40 metres away when first sighted.
11. En were first sighted by MG Nos 1 and 2.
12. MG group were in ambush posn, watching track.
13. En were first noticed because of their mov through patches of sunlight.
14. Str of en group was 5, suspected to be main force. They were dressed in cam suits.
15. The first shots were fired by the MG group at a range of 30 metres.
16. All sect wpns were fired except M72 and M79.
17. En withdrew and then fired on our posn from a flank to cover removal of their wounded.
18. Sect opened up with all wpns.
19. En cas not known. Blood trails were found.
20. Blood trails were caused by en being hit by MG group and SLRs.

21. There were no friendly cas.
22. Not applicable.
23. Ammo expenditure was:
M60 - 400 rounds.
M16 - 200 "
SLR - 40 "
24. No docus or wpns were captured.
25. Lessons Learnt.
- a. Sentries, or any member, can virtually wait until the en is almost on him before firing. This makes things safer immediately after the contact and during the sweep.
 - b. The number 2 on the MG must be prepared not to fire, his task is the preparing of ammo and directing fire.
 - c. Tracer was not visible.

26. Nil.

PART 2 Pl Comd's Comments.

27. Not applicable.

28. Pl Actions.

Refer para 8.

29. Ammo Fired During Contact.

M60 - 400 rounds.
M16 - 200 "
SLR - 40 "
105MM 30 "

PART 3. Coy Comd's Comments.

30. Possible use of M79 into area may have discouraged removal of en wounded or bodies. Also grenades from rifles would have been handy, as once again ranges for thrown grenades was a bit long and bamboo inhibited use of the M79; sloping ground . restricted effectiveness of SA fire. Fast withdrawal of en necessitates pre-planned cut off fire with Pl wpns if necessary.

.....Pl.Comd

.....Coy Comd

RESTRICTED

CONTACT/INCIDENT *AFTER ACTION REPORT

Part 1

1. Operation FEDERAL
2. 2788009 2 Lt R.A.LAMBERT
3. 9 PL C Coy 5 RAR
4. 28 men
5. 0930 hrs 30 Mar 69 Duration 60 mins
6. Grid 278051
7. Fwd elm of Coy moving to loc LZ.
8. Lead Sect, 8 Sect was moving to high ground on bearing of 3800 μ when the scout sighted five en grouped around a hammock and bunker. Sect deployed with other two sects to flanks and engaged.

EN
8 Sect
7 Sect
9. Heavy primary jungle. Visibility limited to 15 - 20 metres.
10. 15 to 20 metres
11. Fwd scout 8 Sect 218012 Pte R.W.SMITH.
12. Moving fwd of Sect as scout.
13. Scout saw clothing which looked like washing hanging in area.
14. 12 en sighted, Main force. Dressed in greens, some in black.
15. Sect engaged first at 10 to 15 metres.
16. SLR, M 16 first the M 60 and M 79 fired after initial contact.
17. Returned fire, commenced fire and mov from bunker to bunker.
18. Sect commenced fire and mov up to posn with other two elm of Pl for flank protection. Pl then began systematic fire and mov into main part of complex.
19. Two KIA in initial fire fight and one WIA(Possible). As en withdrew into bunkers two dead were seen to be dragged with them. In the main part of bunker fire fight cont with the Pl Sgt killing one en and Sect possibly wounding another.
20. M 16, SLR, M 60.
21. Nil
22. Not Applicable.
23.

800	M 60	Link	7.62 mm
500	M 16	Ball	5.56 mm
300	SLR	Ball	7.62 mm
12	M 79	Grenades	
6	M 26	Grenades	
24. Large quantity Docus all assorted.
 - 1 x SKS 7.62 rifle.
 - 2 x Chicom claymores.
 - 11 x RPG 2 Rkts
 - 2 x At Rifle M 1 Grenades
 - 1 x Chicom A tk Grenades
 - 5 x Chicom hand-frag grenades
 - 500x AK 47 rounds
 - 2 x Quadrant sights for mor.

/.....mor

<u>FOOD CACHE:</u>	120	Cans	Small Fish -	16	Cans	Large Fish
	40	lbs	Sugar	260	lbs	Rice
	40	lbs	Noodle powder	6	lbs	Dried Fish
	1	lbs	Tobacco	9	pkts	Molasses
	1	pkt	Dried beans	3	pkts	Monosodium glutamate
	1	pkt	Pepper	1	pkt	Salt
	6		Candles	2	tins	Oil
			Med eqpt.			Med sups

25. Quick reaction into the system resulted in success as en was hurried and harassed and was unable to successfully hold his ground. M 79 can be used in mor role with idea to confuse en and cut off likely escape routes.

26. Con is difficult in fire fight, particularly with arty sp. Info must be passed by all pers to aid comd in deployment of his elms.

Part 2 Pl Comd's Comments:

- 27. Not Applicable
- 28. Not Applicable
- 29. Not Applicable

Part 3 Coy Comd's Comments:

30. Pl moved very well by fire and mov into and through the posn. En did stand and fight for a short time. A well con Pl action.

..... Ptl Comd
 Pl Comd
 Coy Comd

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. 2784009 2 Lt R.A.LAMBERT.
2. Bunkers at Grid 284045 at 0930 hrs on 30 Mar 69.
3. 7,500 square metres.
4.
 - a. Bunkers
 - b. 3' to 3' 6" in depth.
 - c. No
 - d. Bunkers approx 6' x 5' with logs and soil 2' 6" overhead protection
 - e. 16
 - f. Squad.
 - g. Sited on likely approaches in mutual support astride well worn pads.
 - h. 2 Man.
 - i. 6 to 8 months.
 - j. Sited adjacent to two well worn foot pads and astride one pad leading dir to posn. A non-perennial stream was approx 200 metres from posn.
 - k. One Wpn pit was fwd of system perimeter.
 - m. Bunkers seeded with C.S. Crystals.

..... *R.A. Lambert* 2 Lt
9 Pl Comd

VC INSTALLATION REPORT
BY C/S 23



o Bunker
- Foot Pad

RESTRICTED

CONTACT/INCIDENT *AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. OPERATION FEDERAL
2. 38797 Cpl E.EVANS
3. 4 Sect 8 Pl C Coy 5 RAR
4. 4 men.
5. 1420 hrs 30 Mar 69 Duration 10 mins.
6. Grid 279053
7. Guide 7 Pl into Coy position.
8. We were travelling N in single file along a track when my scout spotted en and opened fire. We went to ground and the en returned fire from a bunker. Then fire opened from another en pit 20 yds N. 5 or 6 rifle grenades were fired at us and the en withdrew using fire and mov NE. No cas either side. Only one grenade exploded.
9. Thick scrub. Many vines. Max visibility 10 metres.
10. 10 metres.
11. Fwd scout.
12. En aiming at fwd scout.
13. En mov.
14. 3 Main force.
15. Fwd scout at 10 metres.
16. M 16, SLR, Grenades.
17. Occupied bunkers.
18. Deploy.
19. Nil (Possible 1 WIA)
20. M 15
21. Nil
22. Not Applicable.
23. 3 x M 26, 280 5.56 mm M 16
24. Not Applicable
25. Ptl should be larger for 100 yds distance.
26. Ground once cleared should be held.

Part 2 Pl Comd's Comments:

27. Not Applicable
28. Not Applicable
29. Not Applicable

Part 3 Coy Comd's Comments:

30. Ref para 25 - Pl Comd was directed to send Sect Str Ptl. Although remainder of Pl was sent fwd very quickly it is felt the thick undergrowth allowed the en the opportunity to withdraw.


..... Ptl Comd
..... Pl Comd
..... Coy Comd

RESTRICTED

CONTACT/INCIDENT *AFTER ACTION REPORT

Part 1

1. Operation FEDERAL
2. 1201164 2 Lt D.J.MEAD
3. 7 Pl C Coy 5 RAR
4. 15 Men
5. 1630 hrs 30 Mar 69 Duration 50 mins
6. Grid 277052
7. The pl minus one sect was to clear around the feature C Coy was occupying.
8. The fwd scout of 1 Sect had just moved across the ox cart track on a small pad, when he saw one en in a bunker to his front. The scout opened fire with one mag of M 16 then withdrew. The en then returned fire. The Sect Comd, Cpl J.LOADER was caught in the open and wounded in the back as he went to ground. 1 Sect gun moved fwd to the right flank and engaged the en, other members moved to the left and fwd. The Sect Comd was then dragged back as the en firing ceased. The rear sect fired at 2 to 3 en trying to move around the left flank and they withdrew fwd. The en then withdrew to the second bunker which we did not know existed at the time. En fire ceased and Cpl Loader was taken out. We remained deployed fwd until the third sect was brought fwd.



9. Very thick undergrowth, the only clear path was the pad. We could not see the bunkers until 10 metres from them.
10. 15 metres.
11. Lcpl M.G.BOLTON.
12. Scouting for 1 Sect.
13. Flash off en's wpn in the bunker.
14. 6 to 8 en in all, Main force, Light grey blue uniforms.
15. Our scout at 15 metres.
16. M 79, M 60, SLR, M 16, M 26 grenades.
17. Returned fire rapidly.
18. Sect pushed the gun and other fwd.
19. 1 possible WIA.
20. M 16.
21. 1 WIA.
22. AK 47.
23. Of Pl:

300	7.62 mm	Link	M 60
200	5.56 mm	Ball	M 16
200	7.62 mm	Ball	SLR
4	Grenades		M 79
3	Grenades		M 26
24. 1 diary and 1 RPD mag.

RESTRICTED

25. En stands and fights if he can. Even though he is in small numbers he seems to try to send an elm around to one of our flanks. Last lesson learnt, dont walk on pads.

26. Most effective wpn's used were the M 60 and M 26 ~~grenades~~. M 79 usually burst in the undergrowth before reaching objective. M 72 was not fired, too thick.

Part 2 Pl Comd's Comments:

27. After initial contact, ~~action~~ became a pl minus contact as covered.

28. Pl actions as described in para 8.

29.	Ammo:	105 mm		45
		81 mm		26
		42 inch		26
	M 60	7.62 mm	Link	400
	M 16	5.56 mm	Ball	300
	SLR	7.62 mm	Ball	300
	M 26	Grenades		6
	M 79	Grenades		4

Part 3 Coy Comd's Comments:

30. No further comment.

..... Ptl Comd

..... Pl Comd

..... Coy Comd

RESTRICTED

CONTACT/INCIDENT *AFTER ACTION REPORT


Part 1

1. Operation FEDERAL
2. 1201164 2 Lt D.J.MEAD
3. 7 Pl C Coy 5 RAR
4. 23 Men
5. 1703 hrs 30 Mar 69 Duration 60 mins
6. Grid 277052

7.

8. After previous contact the en withdrew to a bunker in the rear of the first one, which we weren't aware of. Lcpl Maltby of 3 Sect, the Sect fwd on the left moved fwd to grenade the first bunker and cut the claymore lead to a claymore 15 metres to the front of the bunkers. After completing this task he was fired on by an RPD light MG, and he withdrew quickly, under covering fire of our own M 60's.

After receiving permission, we got sp from the light fire team supporting the Dustoff for our WIA. We defined our flanks with smoke and then used the gunships to a very reliable effect. He brought fire as close as 70 to 110 metres to the front of the smoke. After the sp we tried to move to the left flank of the system and hit more bunkers, again there was a claymore to the front of the bunker. We grenaded a bunker and again cut the claymore lead. The pl then withdrew to the Coy as we were running out of light.



9. Thick undergrowth. Visibility 20 metres.
10. 20 metres.
11. En not seen.
12. Had completed cutting claymore lead.
13. En fired.
14. 6 Main force. Light grey blue uniforms
15. En.
16. M 60, M 16, SLR.
17. Withdrew when fired on, we think.
18. Both sect fwd were in posn to bring fire on the en.
19. Nil
20. Not Applicable
21. Nil
22. Not Applicable
23. 150 7.62 mm Link M 60
100 5.56 mm Ball M 16
100 7.62 mm Ball SLR
1 Grenade M 26
24. Nil
25. Bunkers always sited to sp each other.
26. Nil

Part 2 Pl Comd's Comments:

- 27. As discribed previously.
- 28. As discribed previously.
- 29. Ammo as para 23 plus:

Rkts and MG fire from gun ships

Part 3 Coy Comd's Comments:

- 30. No further comments.

..... Ptl Comd

..... Pl Comd

..... Coy Comd

5 RAR
AP AN PHU

30 Mar 69

REPORT FROM 11 ARC CLEARING PATROL

1. A pit which could have been used as a firing pit and with fresh dirt scratches was sighted 300 metres West of 105 Fd Bty.
2. 6 reports of green tracers being used have been reported coming in from West and North. 11 ACK do NOT use green tracers.

ASSESSMENT

VC, possibly locals could have fired into FSPB from posns at 294069 (during clearing ptl) and 295076 (at 2200 hrs).

OBSERVATION/ENGAGEMENT OF CLEARING PATROL

1. Clearing Patrol.
2. No 10, SSG-E-6 ADELAIDE FUENTER
3. Section
4. 4 APC's
5. 30 March Time 1915
6. 304068
7. Same as one (1)
8. On or about 1900 hrs while working on the South side of the NDP, one of my TC in TRACK no 12 info me that his L/G saw 3 pers walking North of the South side. We tried to halt them and they took off running East into the bananas trees at which time we opened fire. We searched the area, nothing found.
9. Flat with banana trees and big rock Viz 200 - 250 metres
10. 400 to 500 South of NDP
12. Clearing ptl 1
13. L/G on track (12) observation to rear
14. 3 pers - local dress
15. G12 - 600 metres
16. All four tracks, 50 cal, M60

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Night ambush ptl | 2. No 27 PSG-E-7 Dalton M Gordon |
| 3. Sect | 4. Three A Cavs (13 men) |
| 5. 30 Mar 69 2200 hrs | 6. 290080 |
| 7. Night ambush ptl | 8. Trip flare went off and the ptl opened up in the area of the flare which was Soth East |
| 9. Flat ground with weeds and small bush, clear field of sight 150 metres. | 10. Not applicable |
| 11. Not applicvble | 12. observing |
| 13. Not applicable | 14. Not applicable |
| 15. G27 APC 75 metres | 16. One APC fired-50 cal M60 M16 M79 |

1. On perimeter security
2. 22, E-5 Sgt James C. DODD
3. Individual APC
4. Same as above, 5 men
5. 29 Mar 68 2200 hrs
6. AZ of 355° :
7. Same as No 1
8. My veh. was on perimeter security and at 2200 hrs we received en fire, we waited a few seconds to see if we received any more and try to get their definite loc so we could return effective fire and did so.
9. Terrain atop a slight hill, with rolling terrain in front, range of visibility approx 150 metres.
10. Negative sightings (except for muzzle flash)
11. APC G22 crew
12. Observing to front (North)
13. They Fired on us from NNW to NW
14. Unknown
15. The enemy unknown
16. One APC

The incident was the receiving of incoming on SA fire

V.C. INSTALLATION REPORT

1. 1201164 2 Lt D.J.MEAD.
2. Bunker System at Grid 277052 at 1100 hrs 31 Mar 69.
3. 16900 square metres.
4.
 - a. Bunkers only
 - b. Not Applicable
 - c. Not Applicable
 - d. Bunkers only
 - e. 14 Bunkers.
 - f. $\frac{1}{2}$ Coy to Coy.
 - g. Bunkers supporting each other - all round defence - 2 Bunkers separate from rest about 200 metres (possibly as early warning)
 - h. Bunkers could take four or more men with each approx 6' x 8' with 3' overhead protection.
 - i. Bunkers 2 to 6 months old - part renewed - cam etc only 24 to 48 hrs before find. System occupied up to 12 hrs before find. Rice and cooking gear left.
 - j. Layout near non perennial stream.
 - k. 2 Bunkers in early warning position as mentioned.
2 Claymores (home made type) at up fwd 15 metres of two of the bunkers.
 - m. CS Gas used, Claymores destroyed.

Gear found - 25 lbs rice
Cooking pot and plate.
4 fragment type grenades.
small medical supply
10 AK 47 rounds.

..... *D.J. Mead* 2 Lt
7 Pl Comd

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. 217210 2Lt R.A. BRETT.
2. Bunker system at YS 288035 at 1000 hours on 31 Mar 69.
3. Area 50,000 sq yds (250x200).
4. Defensive layout.
 - a. The system comprised.
 - (1) 7 CP type bunkers.
 - (2) 29 bunkers (including pits with overhead protection).
 - (3) 10 open weapon pits.
 - b. There was no tunnel system in the camp.
 - c. Unit to occupy system : approx company strength.
 - d. Main coverage by system : along main tracks to S and E.
 - e. The pits were single man; all bunkers capable of 2-3-persons.
 - f. The system was at least 1 year old however reconstruction on many of the bunkers had been done within at least three weeks of discovery.
 - g. System had been used up to 1 day prior discovery but only by a group of up to 10 for a short period.
 - h. The system overlooked a stream and water point and straddled a large track system.
 - i. Early warning posts were found on all major tracks leading to the system, none manned.
 - j. All documents and equipment found have been reported in detail prior to this report.
 - m. Site and all bunkers were seeded with No1 riot control CS gas.

13 Mar 69

(R.A. BRETT)
2Lt
OC 2PL A Coy 5 RAR

TRACE 'P' TO
 RE INVESTIGATION POINT
 YS 286035. 31 MAR 61



LEGEND

- ② CP
- I BUNKER
- OPEN PIT
- KITCHEN
- RUBBISH (STAKE HOLE)
- MAIN TRACK
- * WELLS IN CREEK


VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. 235328 Lt E.J. LEE.
2. Enemy bunker system at YS 287035. at approx 1200 hours
31 Mar 69.
3. 90 yards x 290 yards.
4. a. (1) Yes
(2) Bunkers.
(3) Nil
b. Not applicable.
c. Bunkers were sighted in groups of approx four within the system.
d. (1) Nil
(2) Bunkers: Were dug to a depth of approx 3'6". There was enough room inside to sleep about three men. Logs were laid across the top of the opening and also to a height of about 18" - 2' at the front of the opening. Earth was piled on top of the layer of logs to the height of the logs at the front ie. 18" - 2'. The earth was covered in leaves and ferns.
e. 21 bunkers, 7 weapon pits.
f. Company.
g. See diagram.
h. (1) Fighting pits were 2 man.
(2) Bunkers could hold three men sleeping. 2 men to fight from (one from each entrance).
i. (1) 12 months old at least.
(2) Bunkers 6-8-months old.
j. The layout was near a creek. A water point had been set up in the creek bed.
k. There was a sentry pit just inside their animal trap system. These are composed of brush which has been cut down and laid down around the perimeter of the system approx 50 metres out. There is a break in the row every now and again where they have a snare set up to catch animals. These traps are a good warning that you are close to the system. If the system is occupied there is a piece of bamboo cut at both ends across the track by day and a vine across it by night.
l. Nil
m. CS gas was used.

12 Apr 69

.....
(E.J. LEE)
Lt
OC 1Pl A Coy 5 RAR

Legend
 □ Gun pits
 — Fall lines
 ? Mine pits
 — Trench
 (M) Machine gun positions




YS287035
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VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. 2784009 2 Lt R.A.LAMBERT.
2. Bunkers at Grid 282048 at 1500 hrs on 31 Mar 69.
3. 19,500 square metres.
4.
 - a. Bunkers
 - b. Depth 2' 6" to 3' 6"
 - c. Outer perimeter linked with crawl trench.
 - d. Bunker average 4' x 5' with 2' 6" overhead cover.
 - e. 28 Bunkers
 - f. Squad could be adequately held by ten men.
 - g. Sited in mutual sp covering all possible approaches.
 - h. 2 Man
 - i. 6 to 12 months
 - j. System built astride well used foot pad within 200 metres of non-perennial stream.
 - k. No
 - m. Not Applicable.

..... *R.A. Lambert* 2 Lt
9 Pl Comd


VC INSTALLATION LOCATED BY CP 33
31 MAR. 69 GRID



VC INSTALLATION REPORT


1. 215832 Lt B. THRIFF
2. Bunker System at Grid 278057 at 1525 hrs 31 Apr 69
3. 2500 square metres.
4. a. Yes
 - (1) 7 Bunkers.
 - (2) Nil
 - (3) Nil
- b. Not Applicable
- c. Not Applicable
- d. (1) Not Applicable
 - (2) Bunkers 4' 6" deep 4" dia log supports 3' overhead spoil (Not camouflaged) No revetting, two entrances.
- e. 7 Bunkers.
- f. Probably Pl early warning post for bigger complex found to NW.
- g. Sited for all round def, mutually as p. is. not sited to any original approach.
- h. 3 Man.
- i. (1) 3 months old.
- j. Near ox cart track, No obvious water supply.
- k. No
- m. C.S. crystals.

B. Thripp..... LT
8 Pl Comd



VC INSTALLATION REPORT.


1. Report by 1200424 Lt G.J. DUNLOP.
2. Report on bunkers at GR 305047 at 1730 hrs on 31 Mar 69.
3. Area covered by the instl was 240 metres.
4. DEF LAYOUT
 - a. There were wpn pits only, no tunnels.
 - b. Not applicable.
 - c. Not applicable.
 - d. Pits were const of logs and bush.
 - e. Number of pits: 10.
 - f. Est Pl posn.
 - g. Wpn pits were facing in all round def.
 - h. All pits were two man. There were no crew served wpn pits.
 - i. Wpn pits were 6 - 9 months old.
 - j. The def layout was 400 metres from a river.
 - k. There were no booby traps in the area.
 - l. Nil.
 - m. Destruction action: seeded with CS crystals.


(G.J. Dunlop)
Lt
Pl Comd

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Capt HADLEY (for CRIME 5)
2. Small bunker at 332065 at 1630 hrs on 1 Apr 69.
3. 20 X 60 metres
4.
 - a. (1) Bunkers & 1 kitchen
 - b. Not applicable
 - c. Not applicable
 - d. (2) Wpn pits 3'X2'X2' 18" OHP
 - e. 12 bunkers
 - f. Pl size
 - g. All round def
 - h. (1)*
 - i. Bunker occupied in the last 30 mins
 - j. 300 metres from route 25 & 50 metres from river
 - k. Nil - however four RPG 7 booster cases, 1 X chicom grenade, small no med sups, food & clothing.
 - m. Seeded with CS crystals

Capt
C 1 Fd Sqn RAE




RESTRICTED

CONTACT/INCIDENT *AFTER ACTION REPORT

Part 1

1. Operation FEDERAL
2. 215832 Lt B. THRIPP
3. 8 Pl C Coy 5 RAR
4. 28 Men (Pl intact)
5. 1715 hrs 1 Apr 69 Duration 75 mins
6. Grid 273047
7. Patrol task to recce bunkers.
8.
 - a. Circumstances: 8 Pl was proceeding in a SW dir fol down a well used track through a bunker system which had been cleared previously (GR bunker system 275043). Our msn was to recce this system and map bunkers.
 - b. After clearing the system we struck an ox cart track running in an NW to SE dir. The rear sects were placed in all round def and the fwd sect was instr to proceed down the track in an SE dir.
 - c. Contact: The contact occured just as the MG on the right rear sect was going into bunkers. The MG gp to the right rear sect spotted 4 en moving in a NW dir about 15 metres in from the track through very thick foliage. The MG opened fire and 1 en was seen to fall. The other 3 disappeared. Covering fire was placed in the area of the body and a sect aslt was put in from the SW. The aslt took some time to close posn due to the thick terrain. Heavy covering fire was maintained during this time because there was mov observed in the contact area. When the aslt finally closed the posn the en had withdrawn removing the body. On the contact posn a pair of sandals, a pair of shorts and a water bag wre found on a track running NW. The Pl was regrouped and the track fol. By this time a tracker team had joined the Pl. He fol up and revealed a bunker system of 5 bunkers. Upon approach the en opened fire from the bunkers and fire and mov was employed to close the posn. The en withdrew in a NW dir. They were not fol due to failing light. The contact took place at 274043 the bunkers were reached at 1845 hrs at GR 270048.



- 9. Very thick, Visibility 10 metres.
- 10. 10 metres
- 11. MG No 2.
- 12. Taking fire posn
- 13. Mov.
- 14. 4 NVA
- 15. 5 Sect MG
- 16. M 60, M 16, SLR.
- 17. One fell others ran.
- 18. Deploy fire.
- 19. 1 KIA (Possible) 1 WIA (Possible)
- 20. M 60
- 21. Nil
- 22. Not Applicable
- 23. 1400 7.62 mm Link M 60
 240 7.62 mm Ball SLR
 640 5.56 mm Ball M 16
 5 Grenades M 26
 15 Grenades M 79
- 24. Large qty of propaganda leaflets and books also a large qty of personal letters.
- 25. Quick fol up needed.
- 26. En returned fire with M1 carbine. (Possibly 3)

Part 2 Pl Comd's Comments:

- 27. Not Applicable.
- 28. Deployed in all round defence. Moved up fire and mov in fol up action.
- 29. As per para 23.

Part 3 Coy Comd's Comments:

30. The expenditure of ammo for 4 en appears rather high considering the results and the fact that the en did not fire very much in return and were able to withdraw. It is considered (and has been passed on) that short bursts of MG and auto fire are just as beneficial as and more conservative than long bursts.

Had time and light permitted a longer fol up it is felt that confirmation of KIA/WIA claims by 3/2 would have been obtained.

Once more the thick undergrowth permitted the en to withdraw under cover and slow down any fol up.

Further use of tracker team on 2 Apr 69 failed to reveal anything.

..... Ptl Comd

..... Pl Comd

..... Coy Comd

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 1733741 2Lt R.A. Hutchison.
2. Report on bunkers at GR YT299039 at 1722 hrs on 1 Apr 69.
3. Area covered by instl was 2000 square metres.
4. The bunkers were roughly sited in straight line in 3 basic groups. The long axis of the complex ran from east to west.
 - a. There were wpn pits only - no tunnels.
 - b. Not applicable.
 - c. Not applicable.
 - d. Types of constr.
 - (1) Not applicable.
 - (2) Wpn pits were 3 metres x 2 metres x 1½ metres with 6" logs and 1½ metres of earth overhead cover.
 - e. There were 12 bunkers.
 - f. The posn was for approx Pl str or more.
 - g. Bunkers were in all round def.
 - h. The pits were two and three man. There were no one man or crew served wpn pits.
 - i. The instl was approx 2 months old and appeared to have been occupied fully about 1 - 2 weeks previously. Up to 3 persons had used the bunker 2 - 3 days ago.
 - j. A well used foot track ran north-south through the system, joining an extremely well used track running east-west, 200 metres south of the complex. There was a sentry post either side of the complex, 30 metres out and covering the north-south track.
 - k. There were no booby traps in the area.
 - l. Not applicable.
 - m. The complex was seeded with CS crystals.
5. Sketches are att.

(R.A. Hutchison)
2Lt
3Pl Comd




BUNKER SYSTEM

450 metres

Main Track

25 Small Cattle
holes (empty)





Old OR CART
Track

-  Bunkers
-  Leaf fireplace hovels
-  Toilets

CONST OF BUNKERS

Elevation of Bunkers

Leafy bundles



V.C. INSTALLATION REPORT

1. 215832 Lt B. THRIPP
2. Bunker System at Grid 270048 at 1745 hrs 1 Apr 69
3. 75 square metres.
4. a. (1) Bunkers
(2) Nil
(3) Nil
b. Not Applicable
c. Not Applicable
d. Hand smooth interior, obviously tamped to stop seepage 8'x8'x 4" deep 3' overhead cover with 3" beams supporting. Steps inside.
e. 5 Bunkers.
f. Squad (probably political cadre.)
g. No particular dir. Pad leads in NW. SE. Pits were mutually asply fire bays did not cover any set dir. but offered full round protection.
h. Estimate 3 man bunkers.
i. Bunkers had been built within the last month.
j. Within 100 yds of a well.
k. Nil
m. C/S Crystals used on bunkers.

B. Thripp
..... Lt
8 Pl Comd




V.C. INSTALLATION REPORT

1. 215832 Lt B. THRIPP
2. Bunker System at Grid 276044 at 1015 hrs 2 Apr 69.
3. 1000 square metres.
4. a. (1) Bunkers
(2) Nil
(3) Nil
b. Not Applicable
c. Not Applicable
d. (1) Not Applicable.
(2) Shell scrapes with overhead protection.
e. 35 Bunkers.
f. Coy overnight stop only
g. Sited for all-round def.
h. (1) Big enough for 2 men.
i. Estimate over 12 months
j. 20 yds off Ox cart track, 30 yds from a well
k. Nil
M. CS Crystals used.

NOTE:

The system was old and in poor repair, however there were signs of renovation. Only 15 bunkers were plotted on map however there were a further 20 to the east.

The bunkers were only shallow, little more than shell scrapes but they had good solid overhead protection in the form of large logs.



VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 1733741 2Lt R.A. Hutchison.
2. Report on bunker system at GR YS301037 at 1530 hrs on 2 Apr 69.
3. Area of instl was 1000 square metres.
4. Bunkers were sited to cover all round, though the basic line of bunkers ran NE - SE.
 - a. There were wpn pits only.
 - b. Not applicable.
 - c. Not applicable.
 - d. Constr.
 - (1) Not applicable.
 - (2) Bunkers had overhead cover of logs and earth, $\frac{1}{2}$ metre thick.
 - e. There were 6 bunkers.
 - f. Str of approx 10 - 15 pers .
 - g. All round defence.
 - h. Pits were two and possibly three man. There were no one man or crew served pits.
 - i. Bunkers were 1 - 2 months old and had been used during last 1 - 2 weeks.
 - j. Def layout was near a well used track running east to west.
 - k. No booby traps in area.
 - l. No.
 - m. No destruction action was taken.

5. Coy Comds Comments

This was one of two systems found in this general area and apparently recently set up and intended for use in the wet season as there was no water or wells within 500 to 1000 metres.

.....Pl Comd

.....Coy Comd

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation. FEDERAL/ OVERLANDER.
2. 235328 Lt E.J. LEE.
3. 1Pl A Coy 5 RAR.
4. 28 men
5. 0847 hours 3 Apr 69 (Approx 1 hour).
6. In area of YS312984/313985.
7. Lead Platoon in move to suspected loc of MR7.
8. The lead section had found an animal trap and a snare which was still set. This indicated that a bunker system was close by. We then found an AK 47 mag in pieces on the track, a latrine was not far from it. We found three bunkers which had obviously been used within the last 24 hours because of the strong asian smell and signs of cooking and movement in the area. I deployed my forward section to cover the track backing out of the system and began to have a look around. Whilst doing this I received an 'enemy' signal from the front. This was closely followed by a shot from one of my men (Pte Reilly), we received a short burst of AK 47 fire in return. I moved two of my M60s forward and sprayed the area. Arty fire was adjusted to our right front to cover likely exit routes along the ridge. I left one section on the ground to give us fire support and took two sections to the left flank to do a sweep. We came across a lot of bunkers and gear that had been left in a hurry. The sweep continued North where we found a blood stain. A track ran from the feature on a bearing of 1000 metres. This was covered. Another section was pushed out to the East to investigate another track. During their sweep they fired on an enemy in a bunker. He returned their fire and bugged out. Again we sprayed the area with MG fire. More bunkers were found. Two blood trails were later found leading from the area. I halted the section as they were getting too far away from the main body and the bunkers kept going. We then began to search the bunkers - a lot of maps and overlays were found.

CONTACT 'A'.

9. Area was reasonably flat on top of the ridge. Visibility was down to a range of about 15 - 20 metres. The undergrowth is fairly leafy but reasonably easy to move through.
10. 15 metres.
11. Pte J.W. REILLY.
12. He was moving down the track to get a better view around the corner of the track. He was in a crouched position when he saw the enemy.
13. Movement of the enemy (probably a sentry) on the track.
14. One mainforce - black flannel trousers and black shirt - no hat - AK 47 weapon, the enemy was not wearing webbing.
15. Pte M.B. Skelly, 15 metres.
16. All weapons.

2/ 17 Fell to track.

17. Fell to the track - fired back and doubled away.
18. Those in position to see returned the fire and the MG was moved to a better position from which to fire.
19. 3 possible WIA.
20. SLR.
21. Nil
22. Not applicable.
23. 150 GPMG, 70 SLR, 70 x 5.56.
24. Maps of LONG BINH area with overlays, diaries, letters. AK47 rounds in a mag, NVA webbing and packs, food in several receptacles, brew tins for a reasonable size group.

CONTACT 'B'.

- 10 15 metres.
11. Lcpl B.A. DUNLOP.
12. Was part of the section sweep.
13. Movement in a bunker, he was eating rice.
14. One mainface, black clothes, NVA type hat, webbing, AK 47wpn.
15. Lcpl Dunlop 15 metres.
16. All
17. Returned fire with AK 47 and bugged out.
18. Dropped to ground, began fire and movement.
19. 2 Possible WIA.
- 21 Nil
22. Not applicable.
23. 150 GPMG, 80 SLR, 70 x 5.56.
24. Diary, Clothing, Food.
25. Lessons learnt.
 - a. All these bunker systems had a barrier to animals running around them. This is in the form of brush cut down and lying on the ground. They have gaps in these in which a snake is set up. The trap is usually about 50 metres from the sentry post of the system.
 - b. If the system is occupied there is usually a piece of bamboo cut at both ends lying across the track by day and a vine tied across the track by night.
 - c. Caches are usually found at the base of big buttress trees in the system.
26. Nil
27. Nil
28. As above.
29. 300 GPMG, 150 SLR, 140 5.56, 2 x M79.

3/ Pl Comd Comments.

Pl Comds Comments.

- a. Field signals for enemy are not required. If enemy is close enough to see he should be shot. The remainder of the platoon soon gets the image.
- b. Our firing is too high on the whole. (Suggest) select point of aim and fire 18" lower). This of course doesnt apply for when the enemy is in view - this only applies for covering fire.

Coy Commanders Comments.

30. It appeared that the enemy just moved into the bunker system prior to the contact - hats and clothing were still wet with sweat stains.

31. The enemy left a great deal of gear and equipment behind. Civilian clothes were neatly ironed and almost brand new.

32. MG fire was definetitly too high and if it had been lower their would have been a more definite result, the position where the enemy were eating was riddled with holes 4 to 5 feet above ground level

13 Apr 69

.....

(E.J. LEE)

Lt

OC 1Pl A Coy 5 RAR

.....
(R.F. SUTTON)

Maj

CO A Coy 5 RAR



VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. 235328 Lt E.J. LEB.
2. Bunker system at YS 314896 (centre) at approx 0910 hours on 3 Apr 69.
- 3.
4.
 - a. (1) Bunkers were the only structures in the area.
 - b. Nil
 - c. The bunkers were sited in groups of approx four.
 - d. Bunkers - approx 3'6" deep with 18" to 2' of OHP. Logs were used as leavers and again as strainers at the front of the bunker; where the entrance was.
 - e. 12.
 - f. Company plus.
 - g. See diagram
 - h. Bunkers would hold approx 3 men to sleep and allow two men to fight from them (one from each entrance).
 - i. 6-8 months old but had been kept in good condition, probably by a caretaker group.
 - j. There were creeks to the North and South of the system. A track led off to the North to the creek.
 - k. Sentry pit forward of the position to the SW.
 - l. Nil
 - m. CS gas.

13 Apr 69

E.J. LEB
.....
(E.J. LEB)
Lt
OC 1Pl A Coy 5 RAR

TRAIL 'P' TO
 INSTALLATION REPORT
 YS 314 896. 3 APR 69.



LEGEND

- DUNGEON
- △ PIT
- ▣ PBM PIT
- TRACK
- ⇒ RIVER (WATER IN IT)

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation FEDERAL/ OVERLANDER.
2. 217210 2Lt R.A. BRETT
3. 2Pl, A Coy, 5 RAR.
4. Strength 21.
5. 3 Apr 69. 0957 - 1000 hours. (not including follow up).
6. YS 317985.
7. Following up blood trail from contact (1Pl).
8. The platoon had been following the blood trail for approx 50 metres down a footpad heading NE. The forward scout reported seeing more bunkers ahead so I directed the forward section commander to break into extended line, go to ground and I was going to recce from his position. The platoon Sgt had moved to the right and as he approached the gunner he sighted enemy movement off to his right approx 70 metres across a shelled out clearing. He fired a burst from his M16 at the figures who were at this stage disappearing into undergrowth on the far side of the clearing. The machine gunner immediatly engaged the area of the enemy at this stage. The platoon being in extended line at this stage swept forward using fire and movement. On reaching the area where the enemy were last seen a detailed search failed to locate any sign of them. The platoon followed a track that I suspected the enemy had withdrawn along for approximately 400 metres. At this stage I stopped the forward movement and the platoon returned to the company position.
9. Medium rain forest with thick low scrub. For about 5 metres. An open shelled area approx 60 metres. The enemy 5 metres on the other side.
10. 70 metres.
11. Platoon Sgt (SGT B.A. ROGERS).
12. Moving forward to speak to the forward gunner.
13. Movement.
14. 2 Regional. One in blue or grey civies, other greens.
15. Pl Sgt 70 metres (Sgt Rogers).
16. Pl Sgt M16 followed by M60 then all section weapons.
17. Ran.
18. Continued to fire.
19. Not known.
20. Not applicable.
21. Nil
22. Not applicable.
23. 450 xM60, (2 M60 in section) 60x7.62, 50x5.56.
24. Nil
25. Enemy in civilian clothes.
26. Nil
27. -

2/.. 28. Pl only

28. Platoon only comprised 2 sections and platoon HQ as result of losses in mine incident. The platoon was in extended line, 1 section up. In this formation the fire forward was good but the troops had difficulty seeing in the low scrub. After the initial contact the platoon moved forward quite rapidly using fire and movement. All details as per para 8.

29. As per Para 23.

Platoon Commander Comments.


30. Comments. The enemy were probably the same element that C/S 11 contacted previously. 2Pl reacted quickly and cleared the area without undue delay. The bunker system in the contact area was an early warning post for the main system in which C/S 11 had initial contact with the enemy.

13 Apr 69

.....
(R.A. BRETT)
2Lt
OC 2Pl A Coy 5 RAR

R. F. Sutton
.....
(R.F. SUTTON)
Maj
CO A Coy 5 RAR

TRACE P¹ TO
BETA ACTION REPORT
YS 31725, 2 APR 69.



CONTACT REPORT

1. Dismounted ptl
2. 02334950 1/Lt LOUIS T. ALMEIDA Jr
3. G tp 3rd Pl 2 Sqn 11th ACR
4. 12 men 6 in contact
5. 3 Apr 69 12.30 05 min
6. 325975
7. Recce of Foot path
8. Ptl was moving on the side of the path when the first elm of the ptl turned to the west started to turn north on a seperate trail. Lead elm ran into 8 NVA which were between the ptl engaged at that time.
9. Thick to hvy growth jungle
10. 15 ft
11. Pt man
12. Scanning the area
13. Open area and noise
14. 8 NVA 1 M60 - AK's
15. Our Pt man
16. First elm of ptl
17. Return fire and tried to ambush trail elm of ptl.
18. Return fire
19. Believed 1 WIA
20. M16
21. None
22. Not applicable
23. 100 M60 70 M16
24. Sack with docus
25. Ptl's to stay intact whenever any contact is made.

RESTRICTED


CONTACT/INCIDENT *AFTER ACTION REPORT

Part 1


1. Operation FEDERAL
2. 213825 WO2 J.W.LAKE
3. CHQ C Coy 5 RAR
4. 14 Men
5. 1320 hrs 3 Apr 69 Duration approx 30 mins including fol up.
6. Grid 273045
7. Security of LZ and area of bunkers which incl CS Crystals was being prep in.

8. The southern sentry sighted 2 men mov towards him along an old ox cart track at approx range of 40 metres. He ident them as VC and hit the first man in the right shoulder with his first shot (SLR). Both men dived to their left into the scrub. The second man triggering off a burst of auto fire in the sentries general dir. Then fol a further exchange of SA fire between the en and the sentry with no further cas on either side.

The tracker team was called fwd from CHQ loc approx 100 metres away with a 4 man elm of C/S 32. The C/S 32 elm, 3 man tracker team and dog, my pronto and myself commenced the fol up which resulted in the finding of one VC body and another sighting of the second man all pointed out by the dog. C/S 33 was called fwd to the loc of the body (GR 275039) to continue the fol up with neg results.



SECOND CONTACT.



- 9. Thick primary and secondary growth.
- 10. 40 metres.
- 11. The sentry.
- 12. On sentry duty.
- 13. The mov.
- 14. Two, possible main force of NVA Grey type greens, US flappy hat and tropical boots and Aust sox.
- 15. Our sentry at approx 40 metres.
- 16. Only one SLR.
- 17. Dived into scrub returned fire which was far to high.
- 18. Returned fire.
- 19. 1 VC KIA (BC)
- 20. Caused by SLR.
- 21. Nil
- 22. Nil
- 23. 20 rounds SLR initially and later 60 M 16 in fol up.
- 24. No wpn's of personal papers.
- 25.
 - a. Alert sentries pay off.
 - b. We had been in the area approx two days, had one contact previous received general choppers and the en were still not aware of our presents. The en intel net is not infalible.
 - c. A well trained dog and a team available shortly after a small contact such as this one will net good results.
 - d. A well trained dog under these circumstances is completely reliable and will point out any en before they can ambush or carry out offensive action against the fol up party.
- 26. Nil

Part 2 Pl Comd's Comments:

- 27. Not Applicable.
- 28. Not Applicable.
- 29.

20	7.62 mm Ball	SLR
300	5.56 mm Ball	M 16
200	7.62 mm Link	M 60
2	Grenades	M 26

Part 3 Coy Comd's Comments:

30. The tracker dog and quick fol up were invaluable. The en move very quickly despite the fact that one was very seriously wounded (later found dead) any delay in fol up may have prevented recovery of the body. It should be noted that the en who escaped apparently removed the dead en's boots in an effort to confuse the dog as they were so badly worn they were not worth retrieving. C/S 33 reacted very quickly to RV and assist in the fol up being diverted from another task.


..... Ptl Comd
 Pl Comd
 ,..... Coy Comd

V.C. INSTALLATION REPORT

1. 2784009 2 Lt R.A.LAMBERT.
2. Bunkers at Grid 275038 at 1400 hrs on 3 Apr 69.
3. 250 square metres.
4.
 - a. Bunkers
 - b. Three foot deep.
 - c. Nil
 - d. Bunkers 3 ft x 2 ft with 1 ft overhead cover.
 - e. Five bunkers
 - f. Section
 - g. Facing track as per diagram.
 - h. Two man
 - i. Twelve months.
 - j. Astride track
 - k. Nil
 - m. Nil

.....*R. Lambert*..... 2 Lt
9 Pl Comd


INSTALLATION FOUND BY CH-33 SAFETY



+

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation FEDERAL/OVERLANDER.
2. 217879 Lcpl I.W. ROE.
3. 9 Section 3Pl A Coy 5 RAR.
4. 5 Men
5. 3 Apr 69, 1637 hours, 30 minutes.
6. YS 314988
7. Ambush track crossing creek.
8. I was told by my platoon commander to ambush the track which crossed the creek, while he was looking at a bunker system. When I was in position I looked at my gun and as I looked back up the track I saw a NVA soldier: about 10m from me, I fired a burst and withdrew by fire and movement to the creek while the rest of my patrol gave me fire support.



9. Flat ground with creek in depression, medium vegetation, North of the creek. A belt of heavy vegetation south of the creek 15 metres thick with medium vegetation beyond that.
10. 10 metres.
11. Patrol commander (Lcpl I.W. ROE).
12. Standing to on track.
13. He was not heard coming but seen 10 metres away.
14. 3 Main force.
15. Patrol commander, 10 metres (Lcpl Roe).
16. M60, M16, SLRs, M79.
17. Go to ground and return fire with AK 47, M79.
18. Return fire and withdraw to southern side of creek.
19. Unknown.
20. M16.
21. Nil
22. Not applicable.
23. M60 200, M16 100, SLRs 100, M79 2.
24. Nil
25. Dont split small force. Ambush from flank if possible.
26. The enemy counter with M79 fire was very quick.

2/.. Part 2.

Part 2.

27. As part of the briefing given to the patrol before departure it was pointed out that no one could move north of the creek that ran East - West. The patrol commander of the ambush patrol I left at GR315987 forgot this and sited his his patrol in two groups on both sides of the creek. Where he had been told to ambush offered a very good site on the southern side of the creek covering both the track and the creek. The patrol commander was sitting on the track in full view of any enemy moving along the track. Passage of information from the patrol back to me, once contact had been established was poor and highly inaccurate making any aggressive reaction difficult.

28. I was 175 metres away from the creek point with the remainder of the platoon (one section of 6 men, sig and medic) investigating a bunker. Upon hearing the contact I moved my force to the right flank of the ambush and gave support fire from the GPMG M60. At this stage I had been told that the ambush patrol was in contact with 10 enemy some with RPGs. Clearance was given to me almost immediately and I swept the northern side of the creek with the section I was with but found nothing. It appears that the enemy were not in as large force as first indicated and that they fired M79s not RPGs.

29. GPMG M60 500, M16 100, SLR 100, M72 8, 105mm 6.

Coy Commander Comments.

30. Comments. I am sure that the enemy encountered in this contact was a water party from the force occupying the bunker system that D Coy contacted the following evening.

31. I am of the opinion that the patrol in contact was not "switched on" and allowed the enemy to gain the initiative. A small party must always take care of its security and expect trouble at any time. Also, a more correct siting of the patrol could have led to better results.

13 Apr 69

I.W. Roe
.....
(I.W. ROE)
Patrol Commander.

J.R. James
.....
(J.R. JAMES)
2Lt
OC 3Pl A Coy 5 RAR

R.F. Sutton
.....
(R.F. SUTTON)
Maj
CO A Coy 5 RAR

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation FEDERAL/OVERLANDER.
2. 217210 2Lt R.A. BRETT.
3. 2Pl A Coy 5 RAR.
4. 21.
5. 3 Apr 69, 1700 - 1705 hours (No follow up).
6. YS 314976.
7. Cover crossing point at creek.
8. Prior to contact the platoon had followed up a very fresh and well used track to a creek crossing at GR 314976. I put the platoon down in all round defense and set an immediate ambush on the crossing. About 30 mins later I decided to start our return to the company base. The lead section had moved off and platoon HQ had just started moving when the enemy sign was passed from the rear. The platoon went to ground and I moved back to check the report. The rear section commander said that just as he started to move he saw four enemy moving down towards the creek on the South side. As about 5 minutes had passed since the sighting I assumed that they had either heard or seen us. I decided that they may move if we did, so I placed the 2 M60s from the rear section covering the two immediate crossings and left the section commander in charge of the group. I then moved the rest of the platoon and moved up the track approx 70 metres, I left the platoon Sgt in charge of the platoon and moved back to site an ambush position for that night. As I moved back I heard the gunner I had left at the creek open fire. I called the platoon forward and ran to the crossing. What had happened was that two of the enemy had moved back to the crossing. The first (a woman) stopped to get water when the gunner covering that area opened fire. The gun jammed after three rounds, however he stated that the three hit her and flung her back up the 3 foot embankment. This was verified when we found a pack with three holes through it and blood and flesh stuck to it. The other gunner had changed direction and continued the fire into the area, then was joined by the first gunner again. The platoon then spread out and I advanced across the creek with fire and movement and continued the sweep. On the far side we found a large blood trail immediately and a large pool of blood behind a tree approx 20 metres from the creek, I followed the trail south for 700 metres along a very well used track. Approx 50 metres along the track we found a pack with cooking, and sleeping equip in it, blood stained with three holes in it.
9. On the Northern side of the creek it was scattered bamboo but to the South was heavy rain forest. Visibility across creek was approx 15 metres.
10. 20 metres.
11. Gunner (Pte R.R. COOPER).
12. Ambushing that area.
13. Movement.
14. 2 Regional Forces.
15. Gunner 15 metres, Pte RR COOPER.

2/..16. M60

16. M60.
17. The one that was hit was blown up the bank, the second one grabbed her and ran.
18. Fired, stoppage, continued to fire.
19. Blood trail.
20. M60.
21. Nil.
22. Not applicable.
23. 400 M60. 20 5.56.
24. Pack and equipment.
25. M60 gunner firing too high.
26. There is no possibility of following up a wounded if there are others to help him as they move fast.
27. -
28. As per serial 8.
29. 400x M60. 20 x 5.56.

Coy Commander Comments.

30. Comments. 2Lt Brett is sure the enemy would have died from the wounds received. Outright success in this contact was prevented by two main factors.

- a. The ambush was not fully established.
- b. The M60 had a stoppage.



31. It is of note that this platoon cleaned all ammunition after the contact and did not have another stoppage. The following day this **paid** dividends in another contact.

13 Apr 69

.....
(R.A. BRETT)
2Lt
OC 2Pl A Coy 5 RAR

R.F. Sutton
.....
(R.F. SUTTON)
Maj
CO A Coy 5 RAR

TRACE 'P' TO
AFTER ACTION REPORT
YS 314970 2 APR 69



CONFIDENTIAL

D Coy
5 RAR
AP AN PHU
SOUTH VIETNAM

//Apr 69


VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by: 57055 Maj M. P. Blake.
2. Report on: Bunker system at 318995 at 1830 hrs 3 Apr 69.
3. Area covered by Instl: 300 sq yds.
4. Defensive Layout: See diagram att.
 - a. Instl comprised 15 completed bunkers, 3 incompletd bunkers.
 - b. Dimensions of bunkers: 10' long, 6' wide, 4' deep.
 - c. Bunkers were interconnecting by f~~h~~ tracks.
 - d. Types of constr used:
 - (1) OHP with 4" - 6" drain logs and 2' earth.
 - e. Number of Wpn Pits and Tunnels; Not applicable.
 - f. Instl. would hold coy str.
 - g. Dir wpn pits were facing: All round def with main emphasis WEST.
 - h. Tunnels served by 3 - 4 men, any type wpn could be used.
 - i. Bunkers were approx 3 mths old with sign of frequent and recent use.
 - j. Def layout was 250 m from river and next to a track system.
 - k. Early w~~ing~~ posts consisted of two wpn pits on each of the seven approaches.
 - l. There were no booby traps in the area.
 - m. Destructive action: Area seeded with CS gas.

M. P. Blake
(M. P. Blake)
Maj
OC



▣ SENTRY POST
□ BUNKER



UNFINISHED

1: 300 yds.

Instl e... 15 completed bunkers 3 inc...

UNFINISHED

UNFINISHED us...:

t to obs.

11 round of with 1 o... 1.

OLD OX CART TRACK

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op "FEDERAL".
2. Report by 54761 2Lt B.J. Ryan.
3. 5 Pl B Coy 5 RAR.
4. Str of Pl: 28.
5. 0100 hrs 4 Apr 69.
6. Loc: GR YT327019.
7. Pl task: Ni ambush.
8. Above posn was occupied to block possible en filtration routes from actions further south. En approached from south and then swung east when they reached route 321. Later fol up showed that they paralleled Route 321 for a short distance and then commenced to cross obliquely to our front. They approached dir fwd of the centre MG which immediately engaged en at close range as the leading en appeared to be walking straight at them. En returned fire with automatic wpns and initially withdrew dir west. Area was engaged by Arty but due to limitations could not be used to correct effect. En then withdrew south and subsequently swung east again, crossed Route 321 further down, and moved on until they came into contact with C/S 21.
9. Terrain: Dense cover opening to land cleared areas bordering Route 321, which has now become partially overgrown with small brush and long grass.
10. Distance to en when first sighted: 20 metres.
11. En was first seen by MG sentry.
12. Sentry was manning the MG.
13. En were noticed by mov silhouette.
14. Str of en unknown - there were 2 en initially sighted, with many more heard behind as they withdrew. Subsequent fol up of bilod trails revealed that this was the same gp that contacted C/S 21 approx 4 hrs later, indicating str to be approx 20 - 30.
15. Our MG sentry fired first, range approx 20 metres.
16. Sect wpns fired: M60, SLR, M16 and M79.
17. En withdrew
18. Sect concentrated fire on gen area.
19. En cas: 1 WIA - extremely likely KIA - subsequent sweep loc large amount of blood, 1 pr blood-sodden trousers and 2 fd dressing packages. The blood trail carried on to the area of C/S 21 even after the obvious use of the 2 fd dressings. En was shot in area of hip and stomach (ascertained from bullet holes in trousers).
20. En cas were caused by M60 and SLR.
21. Friendly cas: Nil.
22. Not applicable.

- 23. Ammo expenditure: 25 M60, 20 SLR, 12 M79.
- 24. No docs or wpns were captured. There was Vietnamese writing on the fd dressing packs.

25. Lessons Learnt.

Premature firing remains a problem, especially when en are in close proximity.

26. Other Pts.

It again became obvious that rifle projected grenades are a must. The M79 was unable to produce the required effect due to predetonation on small twigs etc.


Use of Arty was ineffective due to the limitations imposed.

Part 2 Pl Comd's Comments

- 27. Not applicable.
- 28. Not applicable.
- 29. Refer para 23. Arty not known.



Posn was not occupied until 1900 as original plans were for different areas which proved unsuitable. This posn resulted in difficulties in siting Claymores, MGs etc as time avail for recce was limited.



Part 3 Coy Comd's Comments

30. Main problem was the lack of daylight time left for detailed recce of the area by the Pl. This resulted in lack of detailed knowledge of the ground **which** the en were able to use to their advantage. The requirement for rifle grenades came up again, as arty could not be brought close enough and M79s would not penetrate even the light tall grass in the area.

.....Pl Comd

.....Coy Comd

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

Part 1.

1. Op "FEDERAL".
2. Report by 1200424 Lt G.J. Dunlop.
3. 4 Pl B Coy 5 RAR
4. Str of Pl: 23
5. Action occurred at 0500 hrs on 4 Apr 69. Duration: 5 mins
6. Loc: GR YT319020.
7. Pl task was ni ambush.

8. The Pl moved into the above ambush at 1815 hrs. The killing zone was covered with 4 Claymore mines with others to the flanks and rear.


At approx 0500 hrs I was woken by the sentry gp comd. About 25 metres to my front I could ob the en passing from south to north.

Approx 8 en or more had passed when I detonated 4 Claymores. The GPMGs on either flank then opened up and the right flank Claymore was also detonated onto the en who had passed through.

There were approx 30 en all told. The bulk of them were caught in the fire from the right flank gun. The en deployed and returned fire but could not hold out against the M60. They withdrew to the south, leaving 7 packs and blood trails. Arty was fired to the south.

At first lt a sweep was carried out. A total of 4 bodies (3 male, 1 female) and other assorted gear was ~~loc~~

An elms of C/S 23 joined us at 0730 and helped us bury the bodies.



9. Terrain: Bamboo with secondary growth.
10. En were first sighted at 20 metres.
11. They were first seen by MG No 1.
12. MG No 1 was on sentry.
13. En were noticed by noise.
14. En str was 30 plus, type not known. They wore grey or green.
15. Contact was initiated by Claymore fire.
16. Sect wpns fired: M60, M16, SLRs and Claymores.
17. On contact, one en cried out "Pugie" and the remainder withdrew, except for 3 to 4 who returned fire from a flank. They also withdrew when the MG opened fire on them.
18. Sects immediate reaction: See para 8.
19. En cas: 4 KIA, 3 WIA (conservative).
20. En cas were caused by Claymores with possible WIA by SA fire.
21. There were no friendly cas.
22. Not applicable.
23. Approx ammo expenditure: 7.62 link 400, M16 240, SLR 30.
24. Docus and wpns captured were: 1 AK47, 1 pistol, 6 packs, assortment of books, maps etc.
25. Lessons Learnt.
 - a. Multiple Claymore detonation is the best method of initiating an ambush. Pls should each have some method of firing a number of Claymores simultaneously.
 - b. The en comd gp was travelling in the same posn as ours does.
 - c. The en gp were travelling fairly slowly, with 1 scout approx 20 metres in front and 8 - 10 metres between men.
26. Other Points.
 - a. The en were carrying more than the normal qty of rice.
 - b. They also carried pots and pans, as if they were shifting camp.
 - c. The offr and 1 other male were definitely Chinese..
 - d. Four (4) Claymores detonated simultaneously in front of friendlies has no ill affects except the loss of ni vision and most other facilities for a few seconds.

Part 2 Pl Comd's Comments

- 27. Nil
- 28. See para 8.
- 29. See para 23.

Part 3 Coy Comd's Comments

30. The en were apparently also carrying a radio of the ANPRC 10 or 25 type, as the sentry could hear the squelch go on and off. It is fairly certain this radio was caught in the ambush but en dragged the operator away. A well carried out ambush.

.....Lt
Pl Comd

.....Maj
Coy Comd

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
D Coy
5 RAR
AP AN PHU
SOUTH VIETNAM

Apr 69

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by: 17103 Capt M. R. Battle.
2. Report on: Bunker system at 317938 at 0715 hrs 4 Apr 69.
3. Area covered by instl: 30,000 sq yards.
4. Def Layout: See att diagram.
 - a. Instl consisted of 30 bunkers with 3 ft OHP.
 - b. Not applicable.
 - c. Bunkers were not interconnecting.
 - d. Types of constr used:
 - (1) Not applicable.
 - (2) Wpn pits: 6' x 8' x 4' holes with 3 ft OHP with two entrances.
 - e. Area consisted of 30 bunkers.
 - f. Approx 100 men to occupy the posn.
 - g. Dir wpn pits were facing: All round def.
 - h. All pits were three man served, RPG served.
 - i. Pits were occupied on discovery.
 - j. Def layout was loc near a creek.
 - k. Early wng devices: Nil. Sentries were seen.
 - l. Extent of booby traps: D10 Claymores (AP) were set but not detonated.
 - m. Destruction Action taken if any: Area seeded with CS gas.

M. R. Battle
(M. R. Battle)
Capt
2IC



CONFIDENTIAL

D Coy
5 RAR
AP AN PHU
SOUTH VIETNAM

17 Apr 69

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op. Op FEDERAL.
2. Report by. 57055 Maj M. F. Blake.
3. D Coy 5 RAR.
4. Str in Contact. 2.
5. Date/Time/Duration of Action. 040705H Apr 69, 3 mins duration.
6. Loc. 318996.
7. Task. Recce of supposed unoccupied bunker system.
8. Description of action. With one rfn I was checking the layout of a bunker system. The entrance of each bunker was too narrow to allow me to wear webbing so I was carrying my pers wpn and a torch only. After finishing the recce task I was moving back to my Hq area counting each bunker. At the time of contact my wpn was on safe carried in my hand and I had a torch in the other hand. I was not alert on approaching the bunker as I was looking down on the palm of my hand. As I reached the bunker I looked up and saw one en observing me. He appeared to be bringing his wpn up to the fire posn to fire at me. I dropped the torch and fired approx ten rds from the hip, however the en had moved behind cover by this stage. I heard mov approx 20 metres to my front so I withdrew expending the remaining 5 rounds. The rfn with me was 20 metres behind and I blocked his line of fire. After several mins I moved towards the bunker making a noise to draw fire (I had no ammo) while the rfn advanced from the other side. The bunker was empty and the en had withdrawn to the rest of his party.
9. Description of Terrain. Thick vegetation.
10. Distance to en when first sighted. 9 ft.
11. Which soldier first saw en. 57055 Maj MP Blake.
12. What was soldier doing. Squatting down - sentry.
13. What caused en to be noticed. Visual sighting.
14. VC Str and type. Main force, one dressed in greens.
15. Who fired first. Maj Blake from 9 ft.
16. What sect wps fired. Not applicable.
17. What was en's immediate reaction. Jumped towards bunker.
18. What was ptl's immediate reaction. Withdrew 10 metres.
- 19.-22. Omitted.
23. Ammo Expenditure. 14 rds M16.
24. Docus/wps captured. Nil
- 25.-29. Omitted.

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Part 3 - Coy Comd's Comments

30. Comments. En str est as 5 and must have come into the system from a small track of the main track system to get between me and the remaining party. After the initial contact the en fired on the other party approaching my posn. Coy comd's make lousy fwd scouts.

M. P. Blake
(M. P. Blake)
Maj
OC

n t

r nls. T. rnl with no v

CONFIDENTIAL


D Goy
5 RAR
AP AN PHU
SOUTH VIETNAM

Apr 69

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by. 17103 Capt M. R. Battle.
2. Report on. Bunker system at 312992 at 0800 hrs 4 Apr 69.
3. Area Covered by Installation. 15,000 sq yds.
4. Defensive Layout. Attached as Appendix 1.
 - a. Bunker system comprised 21 bunkers not interconnecting.
 - b. Not applicable.
 - c. Not applicable.
 - d. Types of construction used.
 - (1) Not applicable
 - (2) Wpn Pits. 6' x 8' x 4' holes, 3' overhead protection with two entrances.
 - e. Number of Wpn pits and Tunnels. 21.
 - f. Est unit or sub unit required to Occupy Installation. Coy plus (60 men)
 - g. Dir wpn pits were facing. All dir.
 - h. Were the Pits.
 - (1) Not applicable
 - (2) Not applicable.
 - (3) Three man.
 - (4) Not applicable.
 - (a) Not applicable
 - i. How Old Were.
 - (1) Wpn pits. Pits were occupied in previous 8 hours.
 - (2) Not applicable.
 - (3) Not applicable.
 - j. Instl loc near a creek. ..
 - k. Early wng devices consisted of two bunkers covering the track.
 - l. Not applicable.
 - m. Destructive action taken. Area seeded with CS crystals.

M. R. Battle
(M. R. Battle)
Capt
2IC



CONFIDENTIAL

D Coy
5 RAR
AP AN PHU
SOUTH VIETNAM

17 Apr 69

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op. Op FEDERAL.
2. Report By. 54326 Sgt A. E. Jackson.
3. 11 Pl, D Coy, 5 RAR.
4. Str of Pl in Contact. 24 men.
5. Date/Time/Duration of action. 040810H Apr 69. Four hr duration.
6. Loc. 316998.
7. Ptl Task. Reconnaissance in Force.
8. Description of Action. The pl had patrolled from the coy base at 308994 to a track running along the side of a creek, believed to be an en route. Once the pl had reached the track it was deployed and 5 sect was to clear fwd to the creek and return on the right flank, 5 sect had moved fwd approx 15 metres when the fwd scout saw a bunker and heard voices. The sect went into a fire base. The scout, sect comd and pl comd moved fwd to within 10 metres of the bunker, the scout then threw a grenade. 5 Sect comd sighted 2 en and fired on them, the en reacted swiftly with MG and auto wps. 6 Sect were then ordered fwd to bring ^{fire} on to the left flank of the system. 4 Sect had already been deployed on the right flank and were able to lay down heavy fire into the bunker system. Pte Pike the fwd scout for 5 sect was shot in the left shoulder in the first five minutes of the contact, at about the same time two heavy RPG were taken on the right flank and the RPG fire was kept up during the entire engagement killing one man (Pte White) and wounding seven others. The thick undergrowth prevented the pl from using M72 rockets.
The pl had been in contact for about two hrs when the en laid down heavy sustained fire on the left flank including heavy machine gun fire which only fired approx 25 rds
After approx three hrs of contact 12 Pl moved into the area and gun ships moved in at the same time, while the gun ships were engaging the en, 11 Pl were able to make stretchers and move out the dead and wounded.
After four hrs of contact the pl broke contact and moved back to the coy base.
9. Description of Terrain. Thick undergrowth on a downward slope.
10. Distance to en when first sighted. 10 metres.
11. Which soldier first saw en. Fwd scout and sect comd.
12. What was soldier doing. Throwing a grenade into a bunker.
13. What Caused en to be noticed. Voices and a bunker.
14. VC Str and Type. Main Force
15. Who fired first. Sect comd 5 sect, at approx 10 metres.
16. What Sect wps fired. All.
17. What was en's immediate reaction. Voilent.
18. What was pl's immediate reaction. Returned fire.

CONFIDENTIAL

19. En Cas.
20. Caused by.
21. Friendly Cas. KIA 2, WIA 7.
22. Cas caused by. 1 x sa, 1 x RPG .
23. Approx ammo expenditure. 1500 link, 250 x 5.56, 100 x 7.62.
24. Docus/wpns captured. Docus found when coy returned to clear area.
25. Lessons learnt.
 - a. Coloured smoke used for dir LFTs drew hy fire.
 - b. The lack of an adequate hy wpn to use in thick vegetation, M72s and grens. M79 not effective because of close range
26. Other points. The M60 was the only effective wpn in preventing the en returning fire.

Part 2 - Pl Comd's Comments.

27. Related sect reports. Not applicable.
28. Describe Pl Actions. As above.
29. Estimate of all ammo fired during contact. Para 23.

Part 3 - Coy Comd's Comments

30. Comments.
 - a. A breakdown in fd sigs occurred in the lead sect as chopping noises were heard but sig did not get back to the pl cord.
 - b. The pl deployment along the obs proved unfortunate as the pl comd found all his pl were under fire and he had no res.
 - c. The use of fire sp leaves a lot to be desired. The major defect appears to be indicating where the tgt is in relation to own tps. The safety factor tends to have initial sp away from obj and I believe that a lot of sp directed from the air is rendered ineffective due to observers directing fire into the initial area of firing and thereby increasing the problem. It is of interest to note that only one arty rd fell into the actual contact area and this was a blind.
 - d. The contact occurred at a time when the coy was dispersed and the OC was absent from the Hq and initial reaction was unco-ordinated which reduced the overall effect of this action

(A. E. Jackson)
Sgt
A/Pl Comd

M. P. Blake
(M. P. Blake)
Maj
OC

CONTACT REPORT

1. Op FEDERAL/OVERLANDER
2. 36538 WO2 J.W. SIZELAND
3. 12 Pl D Coy 5 RAR
4. 15
5. 4 Apr 69 0910hrs 4 Apr 69 to 1110hrs 4 Apr 69
6. Sheet 6430 IV XA XUAN LOC YT 317991
7. To assist 11 Pl D Coy who were pinned down by en RPG, MG and AK rifle fire.
8. The pl was ordered to move to 11 pl D Coy loc and assist them as required. 11 Pl were being engaged by hy en fire and were pinned down. On reaching 11 Pl loc the pl was also engaged by en fire.
9. Thick jungle
10. 15 metres
11. Fwd scout of leading sect
- 12.
13. Hy fire as per item 7
14. Est coy of NVA
15. En 15 metres
16. All
17. Not known except to return hy fire continuously
18. Take cover and return fire
19. Unknown
20. Unknown
21. Three (3) WIA
22. RPG Shrapnel
- 23.
24. Nil
25. When action is imminent it is not advisable to throw smoke on req from ac only under direct circumstances as I am convinced my posn was disclosed to en ground troops by the smoke I threw which to a degree lost the elm of surprise for me as a reaction force.
- 26.
- 27.
28. The pl was pinned down by fire from their right flank could only return spasmodic fire and direct left onto the tgt area. It was unable to deploy due to hy en fire when fire from the left was on tgt the pl covered by fire the withdrawal of 11 Pl D Coy.
- 29.
30. See comments on Sgt JACKSON's report.

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation FEDERAL/OVERLANDER.
2. 217210 2Lt R.A. BRETT.
3. 2Pl A Coy 5 RAR.
4. 21.
5. 1240 - 1253 hours on 4 Apr 69.
6. YS 318981.
7. Ambush track system.
8. The platoon had followed a track North after a contact on it the previous day. At GR 318981 we had a report that D Coy were in a heavy contact approx 500 metres due North. I suspected that the track I was on could have led straight to this location and I placed the platoon in all round defence and ambushed the track junction I was on. I only had two sections but one had 2 M60s and I placed these at the North of my position covering a bend in the track. The rest of the platoon was put down to cover all other routes in the position. At 1240 hours the two forward gunners opened up together along with fire from the northern pits. Fire was immediately returned into us, this was mainly AK 47 and M79 fire. Two of my platoon were returning the M79 fire which I found very effective in even the thick country we were in. In the enemies first return of fire we suffered two wounded from M79 fire. The platoon immediately swept forward employing fire and movement into the enemy. In the move we found two bodies and two large pools of blood past them but no blood trail. We continued the sweep for 200 metres then I moved back to take care of my own wounded.
9. Very thick rain forest, visibility 10-15 metres.
10. 20 along track.
11. Gunners (Pte R.R. COOPER, Pte P.J. DRUMMOND).
12. Ambushing track.
13. Movement.
14. (4 seen) However the amount of fire we received after killing 2 of them tends to indicate at least 2-3 more. (Main force).
15. 2 M60 gunners, 8 metres. (Pte Cooper, Pte Drummond).
16. All except grenades and M72.
17. Fired back.
18. Continued to fire.
19. 2 enemy KIA (BC) suspect at least 2 WIA as gunner saw 2 fall then get pulled away.
20. M60 initially.
21. 2 WIA.
22. M79.
23. 800xM60. 100x7.62. 160x5.56. 20xM79.
24. 2xAK 47, webbing and equipment.
25. Gunners fired to high. Enemy is very fast in reaction.
- 26.

2/..27. When I

27. When I reached the gunners in the contact I found Pte BRIGGS, No2 on one of the guns, laying in the open, linking MG belts together and feeding them into the gun and directing fire. The area around him was at this stage receiving heavy AK and M79 fire, the man next to him having been wounded by it. He remained in the open continued with his job. As I moved around the forward pits redirecting fire onto the enemy I saw Pte HARTSHORN firing his M79 into the enemy when he in turn was hit by M79 shrapnel in the hand. He immediately gathered his weapon again and continued to return fire.

28.

29. 850 M60. 120 7,62. 180 5.56. 20 M79.

Coy Commander Comments.

30. Comments. It is thought that the enemy in this contact were a group withdrawing from the D Coy contact further North.

31. The enemy were well trained and moved with stealth. Their immediate reaction on contact was to return fire whilst standing.

32. Track junctions are obviously the ideal site for ambushing, especially when the track systems connect bunker complexes.


13 Apr 69

.....
(R.A. BRETT)
2Lt
OC 2Pl A Coy 5 RAR

Brett
.....
(R.F. SUTTON)
Maj
CO A Coy 5 RAR

TRACE # 1
DIPER AREA REPORT
YS 310981 14 APR 49

THICK RAIN FOREST



N 3/4 zone in thick rain forest south of town before he
passed.
N 3/4 zone in thick rain forest from the south west forest
up into the contacts.


VC INSTALLATION REPORT.

1. Report by 1733741 2Lt R.A. Hutchison.
2. Report on bunker system at GR 324986 at 0900 hrs on
5 Apr 69.
3. Area of instl: 2000 square metres.
4. Def Layout
 - a. There were wpn pits only, no tunnels.
 - b. Not applicable.
 - c. Not applicable.
 - d. Const
 - (1) Not applicable.
 - (2) Wpn pits had log and earth overhead protection.
 - e. Total wpn pits: 6.
 - f. Instl was for approx 15 - 25 en.
 - g. Pits were facing in all round def.
 - h. Pits were 3 and 4 man. There were no 1 or 2 man pits and no crew served wpn pits.
 - i. Bunkers were 3 - 4 months old, or had been renovated about that time.
 - j. An old ox cart track ran east-west approx 100 metres south of the instl and a track ran west 700 metres to a bunker system at GR 317988, and another ran north 400 metres to a system at GR 326990. Water pt was a well at the camp at GR 326990.
 - k. There were no booby traps.
 - l. Not applicable.
 - m. Instl was seeded with CS crystals.
5. Coy Comd's Comments.

Part of an outpost system to the east of the main posn.
Well built and cam and could only be seen from close up.

.....Pl Comd

.....Coy Comd




VC INSTALLATION REPORT.

1. Report by 1733741 2Lt R.A. Hutchison
2. Report on bunker system at GR 326990 at 1030 hrs on
6 Apr 69
3. Area of instl: 1800 square metres.
4. Def Layout.
 - a. There were 3 bunkers and 2 wells, with no tunnels.
 - b. The wells were 3 metres deep x 1 metre diameter.
 - c. Not applicable.
 - d. Const
 - (1) Not applicable.
 - (2) Log and earth overhead protection.
 - e. There were 3 bunkers and 2 wells.
 - f. They were approx squad str.
 - g. Bunkers were in all round def.
 - h. Pits were two and possibly three man - no individual pits.
 - i. Instl was 2 - 3 months old.
 - j. Near a track which ran south to a system at GR 324986.
 - k. There were no booby traps.
 - l. Not applicable.
 - m. Bunkers were seeded with CS crystals.

5. Coy Comd's Comments

Apparent outposts to the main system to the west. Well built and maintained.




.....Pl Comd

.....Coy Comd

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. 55092 2Lt J.R. JAMES.
2. Bunker system at **YS** 298987 at 1300 hours 6 Apr 69.
3. 5,000 square yards.
4.
 - a. Weapon pits/ bunkers only.
 - b. Not applicable.
 - c. No
 - d. Local timber and earth construction.
 - e. 26 weapon pits/ bunkers.
 - f. Under strength Coy.
 - g. Generally followed ridge line running North-South pits were sited to cover East and West.
 - h. The pits /bunkers were large enough to hold 2-4 men within and had two seperate one man fighting bays.
 - i. 6-9- months.
 - j. System sited along a track within 400 metres of running water.
 - k. There was an early warning post of 6 pits 130 metres along the track to the East.
 - l. None.
 - m. CS gas used on entire system.

13 Apr 69


.....
(J.R. JAMES)
2Lt
OC 3Pl A Coy 5 RAR

TRACE 'P' TO
INSTALLATION REPORT
YS 298987. 6 APR 69





VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. 55092 2Lt J.R. JAMES.
2. Bunker system at YS 308992 at 1430 hours 6 Apr 69.
3. 2,000 Square yards.
4.
 - a. Weapon pits/ bunkers only.
 - b. Not applicable.
 - c. No
 - d. Local timber and earth.
 - e. 18 weapon pits/ bunkers.
 - f. Two platoons.
 - g. Sited to cover all approaches with main emphasis on re-entrant running North East.
 - h. The pits/ bunkers were large enough to hold 2-4 men with two separate one man fighting bays.
 - i. 3-6 months.
 - j. System sited within 250 metres of running water.
 - k. No. Heavy vegetation surrounded the system.
 - l. None.
 - m. CS gas used on entire system.

12 Apr 69

J.R. James
.....
(J.R. JAMES)
2Lt
OC 3Pl A Coy 5 RAR

TRACE 'F' TO
INSTALLATION REPORT
YS 308992 6 APR 67



VC INSTALLATION REPORT



1. 235328 Lt E.J. LEE.
2. VC bunker system at YS311978 at approx 1730 hours on 6 Apr 69.
3. 120 x 100 yds.
4. a. (1) Nil
(2) Bunkers 14.
- b. Bunkers were approx 3'6" - 4' deep with approx 12" OHP. On top each bunker the earth had been stamped down hard and a thatched roof had been built to cover the area. The peak of the roof would have been approx 12' off the ground. Tables and chairs made from bamboo were on the top of the bunkers. Most of the major bunkers were approx 6'-8' across and about 10'-12' long.
- c. No
- d. Bunkers- dimensions described in (b). There were bamboo racks on most of the floors. Provision had been made for hammocks to be hung in one bunker.
- e. 14 bunkers.
- f. This system was obviously used as a hospital. There was an operating table of bamboo set up outside one bunker with a transfusion bottle hanging above it. From the amount of medical supplies that we found around the area in caches there is little doubt of the use to which the system was put.
- g. See diagram.
- h. Some bunkers had been set up as wards and others used as sleeping bunkers. Two of the bunkers in the area were nearly dug (within the last 10 days). One had not been finished. Water bowls still full, were in the bunker where people had been working when forced to leave.
- i. New pits (2) were about 10 days old. Older ones have been in area for some time and have been kept in good shape. The system was a very comfortable set up indicating that no-one had disturbed them for quite sometime. There were 3 wells down the track to the South of the position. One of these was approx 4' across and about 14' deep. Water was in the bottom. The other two wells were approx 4' deep and obviously had not been finished.
- j. Tracks led in and out of the system roughly in a N-S direction. The river (creek) was only 300 metres away.
- k. Approx 50 metres N of the system there was a sentry post in a tree. The tree has been cut out at the back.
- l. Nil
- m. All bunkers were gassed and structures and equipment (including medicine and clothing) were burnt down. N.B. Caches of food and medicine were found approx 50 metres from the bunker system.

13 Apr 69

.....
(E.J. LEE)

OC 1Pl A Coy 5 RAR

TRACE 'P' TO
INSTALLATION REPORT
YS 311978, 6 APR 67




VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. 217210 2Lt R.A. BRETT.
2. Bunker system at YS 323982 at 1500 hours on 7 Apr 69.
3. Area 40,000 sq yds (200x200).
4. Defensive layout.
 - a. The system contained.
 - (1) 13 bunkers.
 - (2) 2 Kitchen areas.
 - b. There were no tunnels in the system.
 - c. Unit required to occupy system. Platoon Plus.
 - d. The main direction covered was West but all other directions were covered on the likley approaches.
 - e. All bunkers were capable of containing 2-3 persons.
 - f. The system was at least 1 year old but extensive reconditioning of the system was still in progress.
 - g. The system straddled a major track system.
 - h. An early warning post was found to the South.
 - i. All documents, equipment were reported as found prior to this report.
 - j. The system was seeded with No1 riot control CS gas.

13 Apr 69


.....
(R.A. BRETT)
2Lt
OC 2P1 A Coy 5 RAR

TRACE 'P' TO
VIC INSTALLATION REPORT
YS 323982 - TAPP 68



VC INSTALLATION REPORT.

1. Report by 1200424 Lt G.J. Dunlop.
2. Report on bunkers at GR 325029 on 7 Apr 69.
3. The instl covered an area of 200 square metres.
4.
 - a. The instl consisted of 9 bunkers only, each bunker containing sleeping spaces for 3 men.
 - b. The bunkers appeared to have been used frequently.
 - c. They were being renovated at the time of discovery.
 - d. They were set in all round def and could effectively cover all approaches. They were not designed as a def posn, but appeared to be designed as an over-night stop.
 - e. A small cache containing the fol was located:
 - (1) 10 lbs of chicom TNT.
 - (2) 5 lbs of chicom PE.
 - (3) Docus.
 - (4) 1 large and 8 small pencils.
5. The instl was left for C/S 62 to destroy.



6. Coy Comd's Comments.

This is apparently a transit camp used on the approach and exit route to the main camp further south.

.....Pl Comd


.....Coy Comd

V.C. INSTALLATION REPORT

10

1. 215832 Lt B. THRIPP
2. Bunker system at Grid 295977 at 1735 hrs on 7 Apr 69.
3. 2500 square metres
4.
 - a. 4 Wpn pits 8 Bunkers.
 - b. 2 tunnels linking 4 bunkers.
 - c. 2 tunnels linking 4 bunkers.
 - d. (1) Not revetted, shallow;
(2) Good log overhead protection.
 - e. 12 Wpn pits and bunkers, 2 tunnels.
 - f. Pl overnight stop only.
 - g. Sited all round defence.
 - h. (1) Individual.
 - i. About 12 months.
 - j. Sited astride an old oxcart track. No obvious water-sup.
 - k. No
 - m. Bunkers grenaded. Little damage done except for partial collapse of over head protection.

B. Thripp..... Lt
8 Pl Comd



CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation. FEDERAL/OVERLANDER.
2. Report by. 235328 Lt E.J. LEE.
3. 1Pl A Coy 5 RAR.
4. Strength. 28.
5. 1120 hours 9 Apr 69, Duration 15 minutes.
6. YS 332989.
7. Task. Platoon was in a Coy harbour for a lunch break.
8. Describe what happened. Pte J. REILLY was on sentry on the left flank of the platoon (West) when he saw two enemy stand up in the bush across the road from him. Because of the age of one of them (he looked to be about 14yrs old) Pte Reilly held hid fire for fear that they could have been village children. They started to cross the road towards him and he then saw that they were carrying wpns. He fired two shots at them before his weapon jammed. Both lept over the bund at the edge of the road. The M60 could not fire because Pte Reilly was between the gunner and the enemy. When he came back we saturated the area with M60 fire. A sweep was conducted and one of the Rfn (Pte Fallins) fired at movement in the bushes near the bund where the enemy had disappeared. On investigation it turned out to be the enemy. His weapon, an M16, was found on the road. The weapon had blood on it indicating that he had been hit on the road. The sweep section was fired at from the bush to our West (possibly by the companion of the dead enemy). Again we saturated the area with M60 fire.
9. Terrain. The Coy was harboured in rubber. The road was about 10' - 15' wide. The bush on the western side of the road was very thick.
10. Distance to enemy when first sighted. 50 - 60 metres.
11. Pte J.W. REILLY.
12. Sentry to the flank of the platoon.
13. Movement on the road.
14. Two enemy. Main/Regional.
First enemy: Blue/Black trousers. Blue shirt.
US belt and pouch (ammo), M26 grenade,
Black rubber (Ho Chi Minh type) sandals.
M16 rifle + 5 mags. Money 30,000 piastres.
Second enemy: AK47 weapon, greens and webbing similar
to first one, Boots.
15. Who fired first. Pte Reilly, 50 metres.
16. Section weapons fired. M60 and SLRs.
17. Enemies reaction. Doubled back into bush.
18. Sections reaction. M60 fired when Pte Reilly was back behind it.
19. Enemy Casualties. 1 KIA.
20. Caused by weapon. SLR.
21. Freindly casualties. Nil

22. Not applicable.
23. Approx ammo spenditure. 100 rounds M60, 2x SLR.
24. Docus/weapons captured. Money 30,000 piastres, note with money addition on it. M16 rifle, 5 mags, 1 x M26 grenade, poncho.
25. Nil.
26. Nil.
27. Above.
28. Above.
29. As for para 23.

Coy Commanders Comments.

30. Comments. This contact proved a very worthwhile point. The Coy was on the way back to Nui Dat and the soldiers were very conscious of this fact - they were semi "switched - off". Security at halts is vital and the sentry in this case did his job in excellent fashion. It is of note that another sentry posted from 2Pl also saw the enemy movement.

13 Apr 60

[Signature]
.....
(E. J. LEE)
Lt CO 1PI

[Signature]
.....
(R. F. SUTTON)
Maj
CO A Coy 5 RAR