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[Vietnam]

Headquarters units

Item number: 1/4/8

**Item: Headquarters, 1 Australian
Task Force**

Combat Operations

Operation Enoggera

[1-31 Aug 1966]

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DIARY



1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE
VIETNAM



COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT

OPERATION ENOGGERA

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AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM

NUI DAT

R723-1-5

7 August 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report.

TO: Commanding General
11 Field Force Vietnam (5)
ATTN: ACofS, G3
APO 96266

COPY TO: HQ AFV (4)
HQ NZ Force Vietnam (2)

1. Reference is made to:
 - a. 1st Australian Task Force OPLAN 1-66.
 - b. Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000 Sheet 6442IV Serials L701.
1: 5,000 Enlargement XA LONG PHUOC.
2. Name and Type of Operation: Operation ENOGGERA. The operation incorporated a village search and clearance and tunnel busting.
3. Dates of Operation: The operation was conducted during the period 210700H June to 051415H July 1966.
4. Location: XA LONG PHUOC YS4464. Annex P (Area of Operation).
5. Command Headquarters: 6 RAR.
6. Reporting Officer: Brigadier O.D. JACKSON, O.B.E.
7. Task Organisation: Annex A.
8. Supporting Forces:
 - a. Armour:
 - (1) Planned support: Under command 3 Tp 1 APC Sqn.
 - (2) Extent of Employment: The troop was used for:
 - (a) Assisting in the movement of stores, equipment and ammunition to the operational area.
 - (b) The rapid re-deployment of search groups.
 - (c) The re-deployment of companies.
 - (d) Resupply from the operational base at NUI DAT YS4467 to sub unit locations.
 - (e) The deployment of mortars and movement of 106mm RCLs.
 - (f) The evacuation of minor casualties.
 - (g) Backloading of stores and equipment.
 - (3) Effectiveness: The troop was most effective in all tasks.

/2. b. Artillery:

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b. Artillery:

(1) Planned support:

(a) In direct support - 161 Fd Bty RNZA

(b) In support but at priority call to 5 RAR for DF - 105 Fd Bty RAA

(c) In support but at priority call to Comd 1 ATF - 103 Fd Bty RAA

(2) Extent of Employment:

(a) 161 Fd Bty RNZA was used to engage opportunity targets throughout the operation. These were mainly small groups of VC who had broken contact with our troops.

(b) 103 Fd Bty RAA was employed on firing Harassing and Interdiction tasks for the first half of the operation.

(c) 105 Fd Bty RAA was not called upon to provide fire support.

(3) Effectiveness: Artillery fire was effective for the limited tasks allotted. It was not practicable to obtain an overall assessment of its effectiveness.

c. Engineers:

(1) Planned support: Under command - 1 Fd Sqn RAE.

(2) Extent of Employment:

(a) Integral sapper support to companies to assist with neutralization of booby traps, search of bunkers and tunnels to length of 20 feet, destruction of buildings, tunnels and other installations.

(b) Search and destruction by reserve teams of any tunnels longer than 20 feet.

(c) Development of tunnel warfare techniques and testing capabilities of acetylene generators, gas turbine, MAPP gas, conventional TNT, Bangalore torpedoes, ANFO viper (local pattern).

(3) Effectiveness: The Engineer support was effective for the operations involved.

d. Aviation:

(1) Planned support: One H13 161 (Indep) Recce Flt.
HU1Bs 9 Sqn RAAF.

(2) Extent of Employment:

(a) The H13 RW aircraft was used for:

- i. Command and Control.
- ii. Liaison.
- iii. Radio Relay.
- iv. Artillery OP.
- v. Battlefield surveillance.
- vi. Reconnaissance.

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(b) The HU1B RW aircraft were employed in the latter stages of the operation only on resupply to all localities from the 6 RAR echelon in the operational base area, and the back loading of captured rice.

(3) Effectiveness:

(a) The H13 RW aircraft was used constantly and proved invaluable for this type of operation.

(b) HU1B RW aircraft. Resupply was most effective after initial minor matters of procedure had been resolved and companies and aircraft pilots had established a mutual relationship. The backloading of rice was effective, although the dust from the bags of rice affected the crewmen and the instruments. The RAAF has overcome this problem by the use of plastic sheeting spread over the load.

(c) USAF/VNAF Air: This was available for air strikes but was not used due to the lack of suitable targets which were forthcoming.

9. Intelligence:

a. Enemy strength, location, disposition and situation anticipated in the objective area prior to the operation: See Annex B.

(1) Composition of Enemy Forces: Enemy forces considered most likely to be encountered were stay behind parties of D 445 Bn and local guerillas who may be living in tunnels in XA LONG PHUOC. During the 173 Airborne Brigade operation in XA LONG PHUOC elements of D 445 Bn and local guerillas fought tenaciously in the NE Section of XA LONG PHUOC.

(2) Manpower: The maximum number of local force VC and guerillas in the area was approximately 200. However the largest body thought likely to be encountered would be a platoon group (40 - 50 personnel)

(3) Equipment: Equipment available to the VC in the area could consist of:

4 MGs 12 AR 50 SMG 200 Rifles 24 Pistols
2 x 82mm Mortars 4 x 60mm Mortars 6 x AA MG.

(4) Enemy Movement Reports: There are numerous reports of persons being in LONG PHUOC. These may be civilians returning to their homes, looters or VC reoccupying their positions.

(5) This information was derived from all sources of intelligence available to 1 ATF, the majority of which was included in 1 ATF OPLAN 1-66.

b. Enemy strength and situation actually found as operation was conducted: VC strength in the objective area did not appear to exceed approximately ten local or mobile force soldiers. VC contacts were individual snipers or small groups of up to four individuals. Only one group of six was sighted, but this group was observed to split into two smaller groups. VC activity seemed to be directed mainly towards observing the operation with occasional harassing shots.

c. Terrain and Vegetation: The village of LONG PHUOC was large in area and well constructed, and was situated amongst numerous

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patches of cultivation, bananas, pineapples, grain and root crops, ornamental and shade trees, with numerous hedgerows and fences interlacing the area. Between 25 May and 21 June many artillery bombardments and airstrikes had been aimed at the village, causing some damage to buildings and extensive cratering of open ground. SOUTH of the village a stand of mature but generally clean rubber existed, whilst padi surrounded most of the remaining area. See Annex P. This layout afforded excellent cover and concealment, particularly to snipers and sentries. Fields of observation generally were limited, varying between 30 metres and 200 metres, but more often being the former. Avenues of approach and withdrawal, for both individuals and small parties, were excellent. Obstacles to movement were insignificant.

- d. Weather: The weather generally was fine and warm to hot with occasional heavy thunderstorms by day. Nights were generally clear and mild to warm.

10. Mission: The 6 RAR mission was to clear Zone KHAKI. See Annex P (Area of Operation).

11. Concept of Operation:

- a. TF 6 RAR was to search XA LONG PHUOC and to destroy all VC installations above and below ground, and deny the village to the VC for later use. This was to be accomplished by a three company search, generally from NORTH to SOUTH, each company being allocated map sections and progress being controlled by 6 RAR Battalion Headquarters. Dwellings and tunnels were to be demolished sector by sector.
- b. The basic working group consisted of a rifle company split into two or three platoon search and destroy groups. Each company group was allocated a sector of the village for operations, and on completion of the search, clear and destroy operation in that sector was to be allocated a further sector of operational responsibility. All houses, surrounds and trenches were to be searched; bunkers, entrances to and exits from tunnels and other fortified positions to be located. Engineer groups were to locate installations and then to clear, search, and destroy them whilst infantry groups covered or ambushed entrances and exits. All buildings, excluding churches and pagodas, were to be destroyed progressively as the clearing operation proceeded.
- c. Continuous aerial surveillance for command and control, liaison, radio relay and battlefield surveillance was effected.
- d. General Outline:
- (1) Phase 1 - 21-22 June.
- (a) Patrol, search and clear Sectors A, B and C.
(b) Establish company group bases NE, NORTH and NW of LONG PHUOC.
(c) Establish Bn HQ and Sp Gp NORTH of LONG PHUOC.
- (2) Phase 2 - 23 - 24 June.
- (a) Sectors B, E and F.
(b) Patrol, search and clear houses, including surrounds and trenches.
(c) Detect, locate, clear, search and deny enemy fortified positions (including tunnels) and bunkers.

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- (3) Phase 3 - 25 - 26 June.
 - (a) Sectors G, H and J.
 - (b) As for Phase 2 (paragraphs 11d.(2)(b) and (c)).
- (4) Phase 4 - 27 - 28 June.
 - (a) Sectors K, L and M.
 - (b) And (c) as for Phase 2.
- (5) Phase 5 - 29 - 30 June.
 - (a) Sectors N, O and P.
 - (b) And (c) as for Phase 2.
- (6) Phase 6 - 1 - 2 July.
 - (a) Sectors S, T and Q.
 - (b) And (c) as for Phase 2.
- (7) Phase 7 - 3 - 4 July. Sector R.
- (8) This pattern of operations was given as a guide only and was subject to the daily progress made in the clearing and destruction of sectors.

12. EXECUTION:

- a. The operation was envisaged in 1 ATF OPLAN 1-66 dated 15 June 1966 and commenced on the planned date of 21 June 1966.
- b. Contact or Incident After Action Reports for actions that occurred during this operation are attached. All were of short duration at relatively short ranges. Communication capability during contact was adequate. On contact, each section and/or platoon concerned reacted immediately with normal contact drills and subsequent fire and movement procedure. However, the enemy usually slipped away after the initial engagements in the excellent cover available. See paragraph 9c.
- c. Details of VC installations, caches and equipment located are shown at Annex C. A statistical summary is given in paragraph 13b.
- d. A Statement of Events in chronological order is as follows:
 - (1) D-1 (20 June): Verbal Orders given at NUI DAT YS4467 and Frag Order 1-2-66 of 200900H Jun 66 was issued.
 - (2) D Day (21 June):
 - (a) TF 6 RAR (less B Co 6 RAR which remained in the operational base area as battalion reserve) moved to allocated sectors to commence search operation as follows: A Co to Sector A, C Co to Sector B, D Co to Sector C, and Bn HQ plus attachments moved to YS445653.
 - (b) Engineer gas turbine teams, the acetylene team, rescue team and plant remained in base location on thirty minutes notice to move to the area of operation. A Co Group located several house tunnels, most of them short, and two up to 40 feet long. Digging tools and a small quantity of kerosene were recovered. A 1,000 pounds cache of rice was destroyed by burning, and the tunnels were demolished with conventional TNT. The OC 1 Fd Sqn RAE authorised the additional search of longer tunnels by A Co Combat Engr teams. Two CBUs, several

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bunkers and pits were destroyed. A tunnel was located at YS45356526 which proved too extensive for search by A Co Engineer demolition teams and a reserve search team was called forward from 6 RAR Bn HQ. The tunnel entrance was an 18 inch diameter hole covered by loose boards in an open clearing adjacent to a banana field. This tunnel subsequently proved to be over 1,000 metres long but had been explored in part by 173d Abn Bde (Sep) in May 1966.

- (c) C Co Group located and destroyed several minor house tunnels and bunkers. Three 44 gallon drums of rice were located in a short tunnel.
 - (d) D Co Group located a tunnel in its harbour area. See Annex D.
 - (e) Engineer HQ Group moved to the A Co location and searched a tunnel (see Annex E) from point A to point B, thought to be a dead end at each end. There was approximately 5 feet of overburden and the tunnel was 4 feet high and 3 feet wide.
- (3) D+1 (22 June): Search of Sectors A, B and C by TF 6 RAR continued:
- (a) A Co Group located and recovered 500 pounds of rice, destroyed two M79 duds, one M26 grenade, and one CBU. An ammunition cache and a document showing the proposed distribution of the ammunition was discovered in a hollow tree. Medical supplies, a VC flag, equipment, and documents indicating that the main tunnel was in Sectors G or J (see Annex F) were found in a kerosene tin buried in the ground. In addition, thirty feet of tunnel and other pits and tunnels were searched and demolished.
 - (b) C Co Group discovered house tunnels and a large tunnel 5 feet high, 3 feet wide and 17 feet below the surface which was only explored for 50 feet as airstrikes had caused a large cave in. Five blocks C4 were found in a house tunnel.
 - (c) D Co Group demolished five wells and pits, one tunnel sixty feet long, and recovered one six inch artillery shell and defused it. This shell had obviously been prepared by the VC for later use.
 - (d) Engr HQ Gp investigated point B referred to in paragraph 12d.(2)(e) and found that the apparent dead end was a cave in. A search was conducted to point F (see Annex E) and retrieved ten rifles and some documents. The acetylene, gas turbine, and oxygen rescue teams were called forward, followed by an Oliver backhoe and a TD 15 dozer. The tunnel had ten feet of overburden and was 4 feet 6 inches to 5 feet 6 inches high and 2 feet 6 inches to 3 feet wide. One vertical shaft with a trapdoor was located. See Annex E. The gas turbine was used to locate entrances A to B. The demolition of the tunnel from B to A was attempted by the use of acetylene gas and was thirty percent successful. Demolition by diesel mist with TNT initiator from point B to point C was also attempted but no detonation occurred.

(4) D+2 (23 June):

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- (a) A Co Group continued the search of sector A and destroyed two CBUs and some house tunnels.
- (b) C Co Group commenced the search of Sector E and destroyed one 55mm blind, two large bunkers and some house tunnels. Thirty pieces of ammunition of varying calibre and some documents in a kerosene tin were found in a house tunnel.
- (c) D Co Group commenced the search of Sector F and located and searched a tunnel system in the area YS442647, one tunnel being 205 feet long and the other 60 feet long with eleven bunkers. See Annex D. The tunnel system was 2 feet 6 inches to 4 feet high and 2 feet 6 inches wide with 4 to 6 feet of overburden, and was roughly similar to the description of a tunnel system discovered by 173d Abn Bde (Sep).
- (d) HQ Group searched the main tunnel system from F to J. The tunnel had caved in at H due to bomb craters. This was the vicinity of a well developed defensive position with weapon pits, crawl trenches and bunkers, and was thought to be the location of the main battle of 173d Abn Bde (Sep). Ponchos, waterbottles and other equipment was discovered in several rooms. The gas turbine confirmed the location of known tunnel entrances, whilst acetylene was used from point E to point D for demolition. This proved only partially successful due to the concentration of gas in a branch tunnel and room.

(5) D+3 (24 June):

- (a) A Co group commenced the search of Sector D. An enemy sniper fired from YS450649 with no result. Two M79s and two CBUs were demolished, whilst two salt caches and two rice caches were located. A total of eight tons of rice was backloaded to the Civil Affairs warehouse in the 1 ATF Base Area.
- (b) C Co group continued the search of Sector E. Snipers fired on a party protecting the bulldozer with no result. One CBU and some house tunnels were destroyed.
- (c) D Co group continued the search of Sector F. Tunnel systems discovered on D + 2 (23 June) were demolished, including a shell discovered on D + 1 (22 June). A tunnel 80 feet long, 5 feet high 2 feet wide with 6 feet of overburden was located and demolished. The tunnel contained 2,200 bamboo panjis.
- (d) Engineer HQ group:
 - (1) The HQ group was visited by an officer from 173d Abn Bde (Sep) who confirmed that the tunnel searched was the main tunnel which had been reported by 173d Abn Bde (Sep) during Operation HARDHOOD in May. He indicated the start point of their search (Point K Annex E) and the end point of search (Point C), and showed areas where acetylene demolition had been previously attempted. This had been successful only from Point K to Point J. The 173d Abn Bde (Sep) sketch of the tunnel bore only partial resemblance to Annex E, but was mapped under more difficult conditions. The area of tunnel searched to this date had exceeded that searched by 173d Abn Bde (Sep) which ended at point C with the comment "tunnel continues unexplored."

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11. The Engineer HQ group searched from Point K towards Point J for 118 feet, encountered extensive cave ins, and ceased searching. The tunnel from Point J to Point H was not completely demolished, was obstructed by several cave ins, and was too dangerous to search. The last search section of the tunnel was demolished with 300 pounds of TNT and was completely successful. The gas turbine misted the tunnel from Point G to Point H. The atmosphere was checked and found to be unsafe until after twenty minutes extraction of mist. MAPP gas was used with oxygen booster from Point E towards D and cracked the surface from 40 metres to 130 metres from point E and demolished the tunnel from Point E to the 40 metres point. MAPP gas was used from Point F to Point E without oxygen and demolished the entrance, cracked the surface for 65 metres, and was assumed to be a successful demolition.

(6) D+4 (25 June):

- (a) A Co group continued the search of Sector D. Two snipers fired at 1 Plt at YS450647 with no result. Nine concrete bunkers were destroyed, three salt caches were located under the school building, medical supplies were found in a stone jar buried in a hedgerow, and a rice cache of two tons and one M72 (unused) were also found.
- (b) C Co group commenced the search of Sector G. Sniper fire was received from YS447645. One VC was probably wounded and one VC possibly KIA by mortar fire. There were no casualties to own troops. A 40 feet long house tunnel with a false wall was located. Beyond the false wall another 60 feet of tunnel and a large chamber were found. One CBU was destroyed.
- (c) D Co group commenced the search of Sectors H and J. Sniper fire was received from YS446645 with no result. 35 pounds of gelignite were found in a house and were destroyed in situ. Three CBUs were also destroyed. Four 44 gallon drums of rice were found in a small tunnel and a VC gasmask was located under a house.
- (d) Engineer HQ group used a dozer in an effort to locate new tunnel from Point K. Located section at L and searched back to K. A further search revealed no further tunnel. It was concluded that the main tunnel served as an escape route from the defensive position to the NORTH EAST and did not branch off in any other direction. A tunnel 60 feet long located by D Co group was destroyed with TNT. The gas turbine was used to test its value in a clear and search operation, but an attempted ignition using the after burner was not successful.

(7) D+5 (26 June):

- (a) 6 RAR Bn HQ was visited by the Minister for Army (Aust) and party.
- (b) A Co group commenced the search of Sector S. Medical supplies and records were found. House tunnels and bunkers were located, and a tunnel 150 feet long was found at YS452649. This tunnel was 3 feet 6 inches high and 3 feet 6 inches wide with 6 to 8 feet of overburden. The entrance was concealed by two concrete slabs over the trapdoor. A reserve search team was called forward.

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- (c) C Co group continued the search of Sector G and destroyed a tunnel found on D+4 (24 June). Two 81mm mortar duds, five CBUs, and some houses were also destroyed, whilst 2,000 panjis were found under some straw.
- (d) D Co group continued the search of sector H and received sniper fire from YS441639 with no result. Two CBUs and one 81mm mortar round were destroyed.
- (e) Engr HQ group increased Co demolition teams to 1 NCO and four teams each of two soldiers. Reserve search teams were returned to 1 ATF Base Area as indications were that future activities would reveal an increased number of small targets rather than any main tunnel system.

(8) D+6 (27 June):

- (a) A Co group continued the search of Sector S. A sniper fired one round at YS459649 and one Aust NCO was WIA. House tunnels and bunkers were searched.
- (b) C Co group commenced the search of Sector T. A tunnel approximately 225 feet long was discovered at YS449645 and approximately 8,000 pounds of rice. One CBU, one 155mm shell and some house tunnels were destroyed. One house tunnel destroyed was 15 feet long and 3 feet 6 inches wide, and the floor was covered with between 18 inches and 2 feet of rice.
- (c) D Co group commenced the search of Sector L. 4,000 pounds of rice were discovered in a short tunnel at YS433641. Eleven bunkers located on D+2 (23 June), peanut oil, milk and candles were found in a cache. Three CBUs were destroyed. The engineer demolition team received sniper fire with no result. Dental equipment was found in a jar buried in the ground, and an air vent six feet deep was located and left for further search.
- (d) Engineer HQ Group searched a tunnel 90 feet long found by A Co group on D+5 (26 June). A gas turbine was used to destroy the tunnel. The acetylene team destroyed the main tunnel from H to G, cracking the ground on the surface and demolishing the rooms underneath.
- (e) 6 RAR Bn HQ and attachments moved to YS442644.

(9) D+7 (28 June):

- (a) A Co group continued to search Sector S and destroyed two CBUs and one tunnel 40 feet long.
- (b) C Co group continued the search of Sector T and located one tunnel 78 feet long, three 6 inch shells (one without fuze), two 105mm shells, and approximately three tons of rice at YS448645 and YS450645.
- (c) D Co group continued the search of Sector L. Contacted one VC at YS448636 with no result. Contacted six VC at YS445635 with no result. Contacted two VC at YS446636 - one VC WIA, one 7.62mm carbine captured. Contacted one VC at YS444636 with no result. Filled 200 sandbags with rice found on D+6 (27 June) and searched tunnel below air vent also found on D+6. Found 50 pounds of rice and demolished the tunnel.
- (d) Engineer HQ group used turbine to search tunnel found by

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D Co group on D+6. System consisted of six entrances but only two were interconnected, and others with short branches up to fifty feet. The system was thought to be in the process of construction. Located 40 gallons of kerosene, soap, 300 candles, 40 cans of condensed milk, 7 blocks of soap, 6 gallons of peanut oil, 14 packets of herbs, eight 60 foot lengths of rubber one inch wide, twelve bottles of 90% alcohol, 27kg monosodium glutamate. Destroyed in situ. One dozer on building destruction with C Co group. Unsuccessful attempt with MAPP gas in 50 feet tunnel - no other entrance - poor gas distribution. Attempted MAPP gas resulted in 80% successful demolition. Attempted MAPP gas blast on 120 feet long tunnel two feet square with 3 feet of overburden failed to detonate probably because gas distribution was affected by the tunnel only having one entrance.

- (e) 3 Tp 1 APC Sqn: One M113 struck a mine at YS441640. No personnel casualties occurred but the M113 was badly damaged and was recovered.

(10) D+8 (29 June):

- (a) A Co group commenced the search of Sector R, encountered minor tunnels and houses, and detained five VCS.
- (b) C Co group continued the search of Sector T. Destroyed house tunnels and one 78 feet long tunnel found on D+8 (28 June). Destroyed four CBUs, three 6 inch shells (one defused), two 105mm shells, and located several rice caches in the area YS4561 totalling 3 tons.
- (c) B Co relieved D Co which returned to the 1 ATF Base Area in battalion reserve. Engineer team B Co group transferred from D Co B Co. Continued the search of Sector L and minor destruction was carried out. Three tons of rice were located in caches at YS447638 and YS446640. Some UXBs, 105mm and 6 inch shells, and 81mm rounds were located but not destroyed.
- (d) Engineer HQ group placed one dozer with C Co on destruction tasks.

(11) D+9 (30 June):

- (a) A Co group continued the search of Sector R and located medical supplies and a tunnel and called Engineer HQ for assistance in tunnel destruction.
- (b) B Co group continued the search of Sector L and located 6 coils barbed wire, 13 bags cement and 4,000 pounds rice.
- (c) C Co commenced the search of Sector K and located 6 tons rice in caches at YS448643 and YS446642. Two CBUs and minor tunnels were destroyed.
- (d) Engineer HQ group used bangalore torpedoes in demolishing three 30 feet long tunnels and in one tunnel 50 feet in length with 100 percent success.

(12) D+10 (1 July):

- (a) A Co group commenced the search of Sector Q and located four 4 gallon drums of rice, one 1,000 pounds rice cache and panjis in concrete blocks.
- (b) B Co group commenced the search of Sector O and located three tons of rice cached in houses. One 40 feet long

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/11. house tunnel

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house tunnel, one CBU, one bomb fuze, and one well were destroyed.

- (c) C Co group commenced the search of Sector M and destroyed six house tunnels and four CBUs.
- (d) Engineer HQ group used local pattern ammonium nitrate/fuel oil viper in one 50 feet long tunnel without success. A gas turbine was used on a 70 feet long tunnel. The afterburner ignited the mist but there was no damage. TNT was used to destroy one tunnel 143 feet long with 100 percent success.

(13) D+11 (2 July):

- (a) A Co group commenced the search of Sector N and located 4,000 pounds of rice at YS447638 in three caches, two of them being located in houses.
- (b) B Co group continued the search of Sector O. A landing zone was constructed using explosives to fell trees. Two clips of ammunition were found in small tunnels and 2,000 pounds of rice was located in a house.
- (c) C Co group commenced the search of Sector P, located 8,000 pounds of rice at YS436631, and demolished some house tunnels.
- (d) Engineer HQ group despatched the dozer to C Co group and successfully destroyed one tunnel 45 feet long with TNT and one tunnel 35 feet long.

(14) D+12 (3 July):

- (a) A Co group continued the search of Sector N and destroyed some house tunnels.
- (b) B Co group continued the search of Sector O, found 13 coils of barbed wire, one M79 and one M36, and destroyed one well.
- (c) C Co group continued the search of Sector P and destroyed some house tunnels.
- (d) Engineer HQ group returned dozer to 1 ATF Base Area.

(15) D+13 (4 July):

- (a) A Co group returned to 1 ATF Base Area.
- (b) B Co group returned to 1 ATF Base Area after destroying house tunnel, tile factory and two CBUs.
- (c) C Co group carried out a sweep of heavily timbered area YS4462. Located enemy camps recently vacated at YS441626 and YS440627. Contact made in area YS433615. One VC WIA but escaped. Found two packs containing M26 and M79 grenades and documents, including a scale drawing of VUNG TAU military establishments. Remained in area.
- (d) Engineer HQ group rechecked main tunnel and demolished damaged sections before returning to 1 ATF Base Area.
- (e) 6 RAR Bn HQ and attachments returned to 1 ATF Base Area.

(16) D+14 (5 July): C Co group carried out a second sweep of

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timbered area YS4462 with no results and returned to 1 ATF Base Area. The operation concluded at 1415 hours.

- e. Details of VC installations, caches and equipment located during the search of XA LONG PHUOC are contained in Annex C and Appendix 1 thereto.

13. Results:

a. Casualties:

Friendly

VC

KIA: None	KIA: 1 (possible)
WIA: 1	WIA: 3 (possible)
MIA: None	CAPTD: None
WPNS: None	VCS: 32
	WPNS: 10 (all rifles)

b. Equipment and Material Losses:

Friendly

VC

None	(1) Houses	537
	(2) Escape tunnels and air raid shelters under houses.	approx 500
	(3) Tunnel 800 yards long.	1
	(4) Other tunnels of varying lengths up to 205 feet; total length approx 2,000 feet.	20
	(5) Rice.	42.5 tons
	(6) Salt	3.5 tons
	(7) Medical supplies.	
	(8) Dental supplies.	

14. Administrative Matters:

- (a) The administrative plan for the operation was sound and worked well. Only minor variations in its execution were needed. Initially all resupply tasks were undertaken by 3 Tp 1 APC Sqn, but later in the operation this was largely taken over by 9 Sqn RAAF.
- (b) Experience was gained in organizing and controlling air supply. A special section (AQ Section) working under the TOC, and provided with its own communication facilities, has now been adopted by 6 RAR to handle all maintdems / opdems and to organise and control the battalion resupply programme.
- (c) On this operation, intelligence indicated that tunneling would be more extensive than was in fact encountered. For this reason a large engineer force was deployed. In addition extra personnel were required for experimentation with new equipment. Because of the large number of engineers and quantity of equipment and explosives, a section of APCs was detached permanently to the engineer element. In addition, explosives constituted part of the daily resupply

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15. Special Equipment and Techniques:

- a. 1 Fd Sqn RAE tested and assessed several new equipments:
- (1) US Acetylene generating equipment for destruction of tunnels.
 - (2) MAPP gas, a commercial substitute for acetylene, for tunnel destruction.
 - (3) Australian designed gas turbine for locating tunnel entrances, clearing of tunnels, and destruction of the tunnels.
 - (4) Conventional explosives, for tunnel demolition.
 - (5) Australian designed communications system for use by tunnel searchers.
 - (6) Gas sensing device.
- b. The effectiveness of these equipments is discussed in a separate report on new techniques in tunnel warfare with particular reference to Operation ENOGGERA.

16. Commander's Analysis:

- a. Where boundaries between operating sub-units cannot be defined clearly on the ground, a buffer space should be left between sectors of activity or search, to give all sub-units a free hand in following up enemy activity without having to worry unduly about the safety of neighbouring troops. This also allows the pursuit of enemy beyond a company's area of responsibility without the delay imposed by the requirement for coordination where areas adjoin.
- b. In the terrain offered, navigation techniques are paramount for keeping position and to prevent wandering beyond (often artificial) boundaries. The map should be used to confirm position finding determined by navigation, but not to accurately maintain position, especially in built-up areas. Whilst the map was accurate in points of topographical detail it was most unreliable in the village proper.
- c. Contact drills, although well executed in this operation, are of little value unless there is immediate follow up action by the section/platoon commander. There is a need for commanders at this level to be well practised in the actions necessary to complete the engagement after the initial contact drills are completed.
- d. An adequate number of air photographs is almost an essential for this type of operation if it is to be conducted completely and efficiently. They should be issued down to platoon commanders. Where natural features do not exist for defining boundaries, artificial ones on air photographs can be used as each object can usually be identified clearly. Where this cannot be done the only other resource is to tapes.
- e. Generally food caches were found inside dwellings buried nine to eighteen inches below the floor and often indicated by a subsidence of the floor. Metal prodders are essential and every inch of floor space must be examined. It is essential the complete cache be removed and the ground underneath examined for tunnels or hides.

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- f. All soft ground, subsidences or mounds of earth must be investigated as they may reveal air holes, dirt, evacuation holes or old entrances into tunnels.
 - g. Where the physical destruction of houses is a requirement, plant in the form of dozers should be available; desirably one for each company. Otherwise a large quantity of explosive is needed for each house. This can become a logistic problem. Also additional time is required.
 - h. There is need for further and continuous shooting practice at service targets at battle ranges. Suitable sub-unit ranges are being constructed to improve accuracy of shooting.
 - i. In some instances infantry attempted their own tunnel search with some success. This should not be encouraged since sappers have specialised knowledge, equipment, and understanding of the consequences of their actions (e.g. one infantryman used an illuminating flare to light the interior of a tunnel - this could have caused a later casualty owing to foul air).
 - j. Engineer demolition teams must be regarded as advisers to infantry commanders at all levels.
 - k. Some systems were not reported in sufficient detail. Demolition teams, assisted by infantry, should report all details of tunnels (except short house tunnels) to the HQ Group, for assessment as to the general pattern of tunnels.
 - l. Engineer HQ group should hold stocks of explosives to immediately resupply co demolition teams, and restock reserves daily.
 - m. Many blinds and CBUs were encountered as a result of earlier bombardments and airstrikes. CBUs should not be used where friendly troops are to move into the area later.
 - n. Infantry protective parties must remain, and act in concert with, engineer demolition teams whilst engineer search, clearance and subsequent demolition of installations is being carried out.
17. Conclusion:
- a. Operation ENOGERA was 6 RAR's first operation and the first operation undertaken solely by 1 ATF in VIETNAM. It was also a type of operation in which the battalion had not had the opportunity of exercising previously. The search and clearing of a village the size and complexity of XA LONG PHUOC had not even been studied, much less practised as a TEWT or an exercise with troops, before, although some of the techniques of house to house search and street clearing are taught at the Australian Jungle Training Centre at CANUNGRA in QUEENSLAND.
 - b. All planning, command and control was executed at battalion level and the command structure worked satisfactorily. The detailed search and clearing was handled at company level within a sector arrangement controlled by Bn HQ in the interests mainly of troop safety.
 - c. At the lower levels command and control was good, especially fire control. If anything, fire control was too rigid, but this was improved to ensure troops safety in an area of limited visibility, and the emphasis that had been given to all troops to ensure positive identification of the enemy to prevent accidental shooting of own troops. This was more than justified as patrols did tend to err in navigation and at times passed in front of, or were located dangerously close to, the activities of troops from other companies.

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- d. TF 6 RAR performed well and was successful in the accomplishment of its mission - to clear Zone KHAKI. Operation ENOGERA has been valuable experience and provided excellent training for future operations.

Annexes: A. Task Organisation.
B. Intelligence.
C. VC Installations, Caches and Equipment.
D. Minor Tunnel Systems.
E. XA LONG PHUOC Tunnel Complex Location Plan.
P. Area of Operation.

Enclosure: 1. Contact or Incident After Action Reports.


JACKSON
Brig

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Hannigan
ba/HANNIGAN
S3

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
Annex A (Task Organization) to Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation ENOGGERA)



ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT (OPERATION ENOGERA)


SCALE 1:5000

Xã Long Phước



Compilation: from uncontrolled photo mosaic.
Photography: large scale USAF Jun 66.
Annotation: stereoscopic inspection and limited air reconnaissance.
Reference Map: 6442-IV L701 series
Reliability: fair.

SCALE 1:5000



- LEGEND**
- Highway/Roads
 - Tracks minor
 - Paddy Fields
 - Stream perennial
 - " non perennial
 - Contours, orchards &/or plantations
 - Timber & boundaries
 - Standing buildings

ANNEX C (VC INSTALLATIONS CACHES AND EQUIPMENT) TO COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT (OPERATION ENOGGERA)


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Xã Long Phước



Compilation: from uncontrolled photo mosaic.
Photography: large scale USAF Jun 66.
Annotation: stereoscopic inspection and limited air reconnaissance.
Reference Map: 6442-IV L701 series
Reliability: fair.

SCALE 1:5,000



LEGEND	
Highway/Roads	
Tracks minor	
Paddy Fields	
Stream perennial	
" non perennial	
Contours, orchards &/or plantations	
Timber & boundaries	
Standing buildings	

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Appendix 1 to Annex C (VC Installations, Caches and Equipment) to Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation ENOGGERA)

Serial	Date	Location	Find	Remarks
1	21 Jun 66	448657	1 Tunnel containing tools	
2		43786509	1 Tunnel	
3		44466512	1 Tunnel and well containing rice	
4		451665	1,000 lb of rice	
5		45136552	1 tunnel containing 10 rifles and 100 lb of rice	
6	22 Jun 66	438467	1 tunnel destroyed	
7		45126527	Ammo documents and clothing	
8		449650	Tunnel	
9	23 Jun 66	44966529	Tunnel	
10		45086519	155mm shell and 2 CBUs	
11		452652	1,000 lb of rice	
12		44166470	3 magazines (M16) full of ammo	
13		44366437	Tunnel located containing 50 rounds of SAA and documents	
14	24 Jun 66	44366462	Medical equipment, 1 bag of salt and documents	100 lb salt
15		44306450	2,200 panji stakes bundles	
16		45006484	5,000 lb salt	
17	25 Jun 66	44866493	3,000 lb rice	
18	25 Jun 66	443643	Basket containing torch, spirit lamp, clothing, books, 1 box gelignite, 1,000 lb rice, 1 VC gas mask	

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Serial	Date	Location	Find	Remarks
19	25 Jun 66	45266505	2 kerosene tins of documents	
20		44876400	21 large bags of rice plus 1/2 ton of rice	3,120 lb rice
21	26 Jun 66	452649	1 tunnel located	
22		45216473	18 ampules of quinine, 100 ampules of vitamin C, 18 ampules of energil, 2,000 sulphur tablets, 100 ampules of adrenalin, 100cc anti-tox vaccine, 1,000 aspirin tablets, 2 bags of sulphur powder, 100 ampules of glucose, 1 bag streptomycene.	
23		45156487	Tunnel located	
24	27 Jun 66	449645	Located tunnel and 4 tons rice, 1 cu yd of dried fish, 1 cu yd of salt	4 tons rice 1 ton salt
25		433641	Located two tons rice	
26		44556375	Tunnel located	
27		44136375	Large quantity dental equipment	
28		45466504	200 lb salt	
29	28 Jun 66	450645 448645	3 tons rice	
30		46676	Contact 2 VC result 1 VC WIA, 1 x 7.62 Chicom rifle captured	
31		44556375	50 tins milk, 8 lengths of rubber 1" x 60', 9 x 4 gal drums of Shell kerosene, 12 x 26oz bottles of alcohol, 20kg of mono sodium glutamate, 12 cakes of soap, 300 candles, 8 pkts of herbs, 6 tins of peanut oil	
32		Main Road	2 x 44 gal drums of rice	240 lb rice
33		43314610	100 bags of rice	10,000 lb rice
34	29 Jun 66	447639 446640	2 tons of rice, 15 bags of cement	

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Serial	Date	Location	Find	Remarks
35	29 Jun 66	450461	2 tons of rice	
36		44976445	2,000 lb of rice	
37		45376437	250 lb of rice, cooking fat, dried fish, kerosene, panji stakes and panji blocks	
38		44906438	1 water bottle and medical supplies	
39	30 Jun 66	448643	6 tons of rice	
40		45416452	400 lb of rice	
41	1 Jul 66	4439429	2 tons of rice	
42		45116393	2,800 lb of rice, medical supplies and documents	
43		44936380	1,000 lb of rice, medical stores, documents, ARVN cloths	
44	2 July 66	447638	2 tons of rice	
45		436661	2 tons of rice	
46		45426316	Letters	
		45006402	Tunnel	
		44706380	Tunnel	
		45236345	Tunnel	
47	3 Jul 66	44656385	1,200 lb of rice	
		44906390	Tunnel	
48	4 Jul 66	433615	Grenades and equipment, and documents	
49		441637		
		444637		
		438632	4½ tons of rice and documents	
		429632		
		437628		

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


FIG 1 D. DAY D. COY




FIG 2 D+2 D. COY

ANNEX D (MINOR TUNNEL SYSTEM)
TO COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT
(OPERATION ENNOGGERA)





FIG 3 D+7 HQ GROUP

ANNEX P (AREA OF OPERATION) TO COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT (OPERATION ENOGERA)

SCALE 1:5000

Xã Long Phước



Compilation: from uncontrolled photo mosaic.
 Photography: large scale USAF Jun 66.
 Annotation: stereoscopic inspection and limited air reconnaissance.
 Reference Map: 6442-IV L701 series
 Reliability: fair.



LEGEND

Highway/Roads	
Tracks minor	
Paddy Fields	
Stream perennial	
" non perennial	
Contours, orchards &/or plantations	
Timber & boundaries	
Standing buildings	

RESTRICTED

AFTER ACTION REPORT

PART 1 TO BE COMPLETED BY PATROL COMD

OPERATION: ENOGGERA

REPORT BY: 216174 2Lt SB PENNY 9 Pl C Coy 6 RAR

DATE OF ACTION: 25 Jun 66 TIME: 1300 hrs DURATION: 5 mins

LOCATION: 44456445 In an orchard next to house.

PATROL TASK: Protection of area while another platoon searched houses.

DESCRIBE IN OWN WORDS WHAT HAPPENED, INCL DIAGRAM: We were in all round defence when an fired above our heads with automatic fire. Fire was returned by 2 MG, 2 M16, 1 M79 and other platoon weapons. It is believed en were in tree and one was wounded.

DESCRIPTION OF TERRAIN (TO INCLUDE RANGE OF VISIBILITY): Overgrown orchard range of visibility 150 metres.

DISTANCE TO EN WHEN FIRST SIGHTED: 150 metres.

WHICH MEMBER FIRST SIGHTED EN: Gunner.

WHAT WAS MEMBER DOING: In a fire position.

WHAT CAUSED EN TO BE NOTICED: The blast and movement of en.

VC STRENGTH: 3 RANGE: 100 metres. DRESS: Black shorts brown-red Tshirt.

WHO FIRED FIRST: En WHAT SEC WEAPONS FIRED: All.

WHAT WAS EN IMMEDIATE REACTION: The en ran out of view in dead ground to safety.

WHAT WAW THE SECTION IMMEDIATE REACTION: Sp assault by 8 pl.

EN CASUALTIES: Believed to be one wounded.

CAUSED BY (WEAPON): Small arms.

APPROX AMMO EXPENDITURE: 15% mostly MG and M16.

DOCUS/WPNS CAPTURED: Nil

PART 2 (PL COMD'S COMMENTS) Report made by Pl Comd.

PART 3 (COY COMD'S COMMENTS) This pl was used on the initial move across the road to the SE and had been providing a firm base for the other two pls to move through. The Pl was fired on after the other two pls had moved through. The en shot out of the tree was later tracked together with another man by 8 Pl. One man was limping badly and dragging one foot. It is believed he sustained these injuries either by being hit in the tree or by 8 Pl during the pursuit.

SB PENNY 2Lt	Ptl Comd
8 Jul 66	Date/Time
SB PENNY	Pl Comd
B McFARLANE	Coy Comd

RESTRICTED

AFTER ACTION REPORT

PART 1 (TO BE COMPLETED BY PATROL COMD)

OPERATION: ENOGGERA

REPORT BY: 15390 2 Lt EJ ANDREWS 8 Pl C Coy 6 RAR.

DATE OF ACTION: 25 Jun 66 1300 hrs DURATION: 2½ hours.

LOCATION: 44676442

PATROL TASK: Protection platoon.

DESCRIBE IN OWN WORDS WHAT HAPPENED, INCL DIAGRAM: Whilst waiting in ambush as protection for remainder of Coy we heard several shots fired towards D Coy who were working next to us to the SW. One of the gun teams spotted movement and immediately returned fire. After both 9 and 7 pls had swept across the rd 8 Pl was called over and continued the search. Tracks were found for 2 men, of whom 1 appeared to be limping. These tracks were followed with 11 men to GR 45116392 where they were fired upon. After more searching in that area it was discovered that 2 or more VC were added to the group which was being followed. Reinforcements were called. However due to time and distance from remainder of company the chase was abandoned.

DESCRIPTION OF TERRAIN (TO INCLUDE RANGE OF VISIBILITY ETC): Banana and other fruit plantations. Visibility 30 to 100 metres.

DISTANCE TO EN WHEN FIRST SIGHTED: On chase 75 metres.

WHICH MEMBER FIRST SIGHTED EN: By gun team during chase by fwd scout.

WHAT WAS MEMBER DOING: - WHAT CAUSED EN TO BE NOTICED: His firing.

VC STRENGTH: 4 possibly 5 DRESS: Shorts & thongs black clothing sandshoes.

WHO FIRED FIRST: VC RANGE: 150 metres.

WHAT SECTION WEAPONS FIRED: 2 MG on initial contact, 2 OMC and 2 rifles on chase.

WHAT WAS EN IMMEDIATE REACTION: Fire and run.

WHAT WAS THE SECTION IMMEDIATE REACTION: Took cover and returned fire on chase sec, group used fire and movement to close with the en who got away by using a tunnel.

EN CASUALTIES: 1 WIA CAUSED BY: (WEAPON) M 79.

APPROX AMMO EXPENDITURE: 100 rounds link belt 30 rounds OMC.

DOCUS/WPNS CAPTURED: Nil

LESSONS LEARNT: Immediate follow up action is necessary to catch fleeing en.

PART 2 (PL COMD'S COMMENTS) Report made by Pl Comd.

PART 3 (COY COMD'S COMMENTS) After 7 & 9 pls had swept through the area where the en was sighted, 8 Pl was conducting a further sweep when the en were sighted and pursued. The pursuit was fast and furious and ultimately the pursuers were being drawn too far from the remainder of the Co and were ordered to withdraw.

EJ ANDREWS Jul 66 Pl1 Comd

EJ ANDREWS Pl Comd

McFARLANE Maj Coy Comd

RESTRICTED

AFTER ACTION REPORT

PART 1 (TO BE COMPLETED BY PATROL COMD)

OPERATION: ENOGGERA

REPORT BY 43433 2 Lt G M KENDALL 10 Pl D Coy 6 RAR

DATE OF ACTION: 25 Jun 66 TIME: 1340 hours DURATION: 4-5 mins.

LOCATION: GR446646

PATROL TASK: Search and destroy.

DESCRIBE IN OWN WORDS WHAT HAPPENED, INCL DIAGRAM: Section was engaged in houses while second section provided security. En sniper approx 2-3 shots from rifle about 20ft over heads of people engaged in demolition. Range estimated 200 metres.

DESCRIPTION OF TERRAIN (TO INCLUDE RANGE OF VISIBILITY ETC.): High scrub and domestic plants around house. Southern boundary (ROAD) running across front between sub-unit and en. On the other side of the road, low scrub with bamboo clumps.

DISTANCE TO EN WHEN FIRST SIGHTED: Not sighted.

VC STRENGTH: 1 DRESS: Unknown.

WHO FIRED FIRST: En RANGE: Approx 200 metres.

WHAT SECTION WPNS FIRED: M60 M79.

WHAT WAS EN IMMEDIATE REACTION: Withdrew quickly to the south.

WHAT WAS THE SECTION IMMEDIATE REACTION: Returned fire, not permitted to follow up.

EN CASUALTIES: Not known. APPROX AMMO EXPENDITURE: 51 rds 7.62 link
5 x 79 40 mm grenades.

DOCUS/WPNS CAPTURED: Nil

LESSONS LEARNT: Pl1 should not be restricted by boundaries as regards follow up and cut off for at least 400 metres.

PART 2 (PL COMDS COMMENTS): This report was made by Pl Comd.

PART 3 (COY COMD'S COMMENTS):

Lone VC, probably sent to observe the harass. Concur with para 24. In this case permission was not granted due to close proximity of C Coy.

GM KENDALL 1200 Jun 66 Pl1 Comd

GM KENDALL Pl Comd

Maj SMITH Coy Comd

RESTRICTED

AFTER ACTION REPORT

PART 1 (TO BE COMPLETED BY PATROL COMD)

OPERATION: ENGGERA

REPORT BY NO 2781294 2Lt D R SABBEN 12 Pl D Coy 6 RAR.

DATE OF ACTION: 28 Jun 66 TIME: 1415hrs DURATION: 5 mins.

LOCATION: YS44286316

PATROL TASK: Search and Destroy.

DESCRIBE IN OWN WORDS WHAT HAPPENED: Patrol fired upon as it was inspecting the ID card of an adult civilian. Fire was from one light machine carbine initially and was joined by two or three rifles almost immediately. Fire was returned by point section scout and gun group into the general area to allow those behind to gain suitable fire positions. The enemy withdrew after 4 to 5 minutes firing.

DESCRIPTION OF TERRAIN (TO INCLUDE RANGE OF VISIBILITY): Patrol was in small clearing near an old house. Leading elements of point section starting into thin young rubber. En fired from a patch of old rubber to our left front. Visibility in en direction - 50 metres.

WHICH MEMBER FIRST SIGHTED EN: Fwd scout. VC STRENGTH: 4

DRESS: Black pyjamas carrying khaki 37 patt packs. At least 3 of the 4 wore hockey-soled boots. At least 1 of the 4 did not have a hat.

WHO FIRED FIRST: Enemy. RANGE: 40 metres.

WHAT SECTION WEAPONS FIRED: Armalite, SLR M60

WHAT WAS EN IMMEDIATE REACTION: Stay and fight it out. Later they heard the orders or saw the reserve section swing out to flank them, and withdrew.

WHAT WAS THE SECTION IMMEDIATE REACTION: Fwd sec closed on sec comd. Gun went to left and fired. Scouts and comd into firm posn and fired. Reserve sec closed up on ptl comd.

EN CASUALTIES: Not known, probable nil.

LESSONS LEARNT: When en withdrew, follow as fast as possible, particularly when en numbers are small, press the initiative.

PART 2 (PL COMD'S COMMENTS) Report made out by Pl Comd.

PART 3 (COY COMD'S COMMENTS):

Probable the same 4 VC left of the group contacted by 10 Pl at GR445635 at 1215 hours. Sentries should have been posted out to prevent VC from approaching undetected.

D R SABBEN 2 Lt
0840 4 Jul 66

Ptl Comd
Date time

Maj SMITH

Coy Comd

RESTRICTED

AFTER ACTION REPORT

PART 1 (TO BE COMPLETED BY PATROL COMD)

OPERATION: "ENOGGERA" Search and Destroy LONG PHUOC Village.

REPORT BY NO: 271465 2Lt G C SHARP 11 Pl D Coy 6 RAR.

DATE OF ACTION: 28 Jun 66 TIME: 1430hrs DURATION: one minute

LOCATION: LONG PHUOC GR YS44586368

PATROL TASK: Search and destroy.

DESCRIBE IN OWN WORKS WHAT HAPPENED, INCL DIAGRAM: The enemy had been seen by 12 Pl and we (11 Pl) joined with them to do a sweep in extended line. Upon approaching the house at GR 44586368, a member of the pl sighted an en and fired one shot from his SLR as there were 6 VC reported in the area. I then ordered a grenade from the M79 to be fired at the house he was seen leaving from. The house was searched but there were no VC present.

DESCRIPTION OF TERRAIN (TO INCLUDE RANGE OF VISIBILITY ETC): Vegetation, elephant grass, mingled with bamboo, quite clear around the house but dense 10 yds from house. Terrain flat. Visibility 30 yds in grass.

DISTANCE TO EN WHEN FIRST SIGHTED: 20 yds.

WHICH MEMBER FIRST SIGHTED EN: Pte HOUSTON

WHAT WAS EN DOING: En was vacating house we intended to search.

WHAT CAUSED EN TO BE NOTICED: Movement.

VC STRENGTH: 1 DRESS: Black

WHO FIRED FIRST: Own tps RANGE: 20 yds

WHAT SEC WPNS FIRED: SLR and M79.

WHAT WAS EN IMMEDIATE REACTION: Withdrawal.

WHAT WAS THE SECTION IMMEDIATE REACTION: Search the house and continue the sweep.

EN CASUALTIES: Nil

APPROX AMMO EXPENDITURE: SLR 1 round. M79 1 grenade.

DOCUS/WPNS CAPTURED: Nil

LESSONS LEARNT: Marksmanship and a chance to improve it e.g. test firing ra.

PART 2 (PL COMDS COMMENTS)

Not applicable.

PART 3 (COY COMD'S COMMENTS)

Reference para 24. There is an urgent requirement for the establishment of a battle range. Other than zeroing, members of the company have not fired battle practice since Feb 66.

G C SHARP 2 Lt Pl1 Comd
050800hrs
G C SHARP Pl Comd
Maj Smith COY Comd

RESTRICTED

AFTER ACTION REPORT

Part 1 to be completed by: Patrol Comd

Operation: ENOGERA

Report by No 55106 Rank Sgt Name R.S. BUICK

Sec P1 10 Co D Bn 6 RAR

Date of action: 28 Jun. 66 Time: 1215 Duration:

Location: En sighted at YS445635

Patrol task: Search and destroy

Describe in own words what happened, incl diagram: Ptl was engaged in investigating suspected tunnel entrances when en was sighted 200 metres away travelling WEST then NORTH. Half the ptl was sent to cut off and ambush en but en withdrew to south. On investigation it was found that en had entered house at YS44626348. The ptl concentrated in this area and a search of all bldgs was conducted. In a straw thatch lean to, at YS44626477 a cache of approximately 6 x 7.62mm, 16 rds M1 .30 inch rds, clothing and literature was found in a 44 gal drum. On searching other bldgs (2) VC moved NORTH up track from the rubber and were fired on by OMC of Pte D B MONTGOMERY from about 15 metres, time 1250.

Description of Terrain (to include visibility etc): Flat open with scattered banana plantations and padi. Track lead NORTH-SOUTH from rubber YS44506335. Track bounded by barbed wire and heavy hedge.

Dist to En when first sighted: 200M

Which member first sighted en: 55106 Sgt R S BUICK

What was member doing: Advancing E then N along track ref para 8.

What caused en to be noticed: En walking single file.

VC Strength: 6 Dress: 3 black pyjamas, 3 in greens. Ho headdress. Carry wpn on shoulder. No automatics seen.

Who fired first: Pte MONTGOMERY Rangs: 15mm ref para 7.

What Section Weapons fired: OMC and GPMG

What was immediate reaction: Withdrew after being hit by OMC SOUTH along track into rubber.

What was the section immediate action: Remain in position and call Pl Comd 43433 2Lt G M KENDALL.

En casualties: Blood trail indicate 1 en wounded severely.

Caused by (Weapon) : OMC

Approx Ammo Expenditure: 30 rds 9mm 20 rds 7.62 linked.

Docus/Wpns captured: Com BLOC 7.62mm rimmed bolt action rifle with permanent fixed bayonet. 10 rds 7.62mm rimmed. 16 rds .30 inch. Assorted clothing and literature.

Lessons learnt: Sec was not employed in proper use. M60 badly sited. If not restricted by boundaries follow up could have been successful.

/Part 2

RESTRICTED

PART 2 (Pl Comds Comments)

RELATED SECTION REPORT: Accurate and recommendations fully agreed with Sec Comd's siting of M60 does not do him any credit as a move of only about 10m would have assured 2 kills instead of mere wounding. Consider OMCs should be replaced with M16 as a hit by any other wpm at this range would certainly have stopped en escaping

DESCRIBE PL ACTIONS: P1 concentrated after contact and followed up to Southern boundary. However wounded en was apparently assisted by second VC and blood trail lost after approx 130m.

ESTIMATE OF ALL AMMO FIRED (INCL ARTY, MORS, ETC): Small arms (ref para 22)

PART 3 (COY COMD'S COMMENTS)

More local security required to give early wng when searching.

RS BUICK	Ptl Comd
5 Jul 66	Date/Time
RM KENDALL	P1 Comd
H SMITH	Coy Comd

RESTRICTED

AFTER ACTION REPORT

PART 1 (TO BE COMPLETED BY PARROL :COMD)

OPERATION: ENOGGERA

REPORT BY: 1730944 2Lt M J GILLESPIE 7 Pl C Coy 6 RAR.

DATE OF ACTION: 4 Jul 66. TIME: 1530hrs; DURATION 1 hour 30 min.

LOCATION: 428612

PATROL TASK: Detaining of 1 Suspect VC.

DESCRIBE IN OWN WORDS WHAT HAPPENED, INCL DIAGRAM: 1 Section and pl hq had followed suspect for 1000 metres across padi. He was called upon to stop and a burst of OMC was fired over his head. He started to run and was shot down with two bursts of M16. He was only wounded however and escaped by mixing with about 40 civilians who watched encounter.

DESCRIPTION OF TERRAIN (TO INCLUDE RANGE OF VISIBILITY ETC): OPEN PADI

DISTANCE TO EN WHEN FIRST SIGHTED: 400 metres.

WHICH MEMBER FIRST SIGHTED EN: Pl Sgt.

WHAT WAS MEMBER DOING: Walking quickly across padi and looking over his shoulder.

WHAT CAUSED EN TO BE NOTICED: Swift movement.

VC STRENGTH: 1 DRESS: Black shirt and trousers, white hat.

WHO FIRED FIRST: Own tps. RANGE: 400 metres.

WHAT SECTION WEAPONS FIRED: 1 OMC 1 M16.

WHAT WAS EN IMMEDIATE REACTION: TO try to run to some cover 50 metres away then to join civilians.

WHAT WAS THE SECTION IMMEDIATE REACTION: To give chase.

EN CASUALTIES: 1 wounded. CAUSED BY (WEAPON) M16.

APPROX AMMO EXPENDITURE: 10 rds M16 15 rds OMC.

DOCUS/WEAPONS CAPTURED: 1 M26 grenade, 8 rounds carbine ammo, several maps and notes, clothing and first aid kit and drugs.

LESSONS LEARNT: Quick follow up necessary.

PART 2 (PL COMD'S COMMENTS) Report made by Pl Comd.

PART 3 (COY COMD'S COMMENTS) Both the pl Sgt of 9 Pl and I had noticed this person walking in a SW direction to our SOUTH. When he came into view of 7 Pl they also became suspicious of his urgent gait and requested permission to pursue him. This final opinion caused me to give permission for the chase.

MJ GILLESPIE	Pt1 Comd
081040 Jul 66	
MJ GILLESPIE	Pl Comd
B McFARLANE	Coy Comd

RESTRICTED

AFTER ACTION REPORT

PART 1 (TO BE COMPLETED BY PATROL COMD)

OPERATION: ENOGGERA

REPORT BY: 1730944 2 Lt MJ GILLESPIE 7 Pl C Coy 6 RAR

DATE OF ACTION: 25 Jun 66 TIME: 1430hrs DURATION: 15 mins.

LOCATION: 44686440

PATROL TASK: Clearing area from which sniper had fired at 8 Pl.

DESCRIBE IN OWN WORDS WHAT HAPPENED, INCL DIAGRAM: We had cleared to limit of our area when during re-org 1 sniper fired upon my HQ gp. Fire was immediately returned by 9 Pl protecting my flank. 1 min later en was sighted withdrawing from area and was fired upon by 1 MG

DESCRIPTION OF TERRAIN (TO INCLUDE RANGE OF VISIBILITY ETC) Houses covered area restricting visibility to 25 - 30 metres.

DISTANCE TO EN WHEN FIRST SIGHTED: Through a lane in houses 60 metres.

WHICH MEMBER FIRST SIGHTED EN: Gun team.

WHAT WAS MEMBER DOING: Running into long grass between 2 houses.

WHAT CAUSED EN TO BE NOTICED: Movement.

VC STRENGTH: 1 DRESS: Black shorts red or brown shirt.

WHO FIRED FIRST: VC RANGE: 70 to 80 metres.

WHAT SECTION WEAPONS FIRED: 1 MG

WHAT WAS EN IMMEDIATE REACTION: Go to ground and observe. On sighting VC gun immediately opened fire.

WHAT WAS THE SECTION IMMEDIATE REACTION: To try to find where en was situated.

EN CASUALTIES: Unknown.

APPROX AMMO EXPENDITURE: 50 rds 7.62 linked belt.

DOCUS/WPNS CAPTURED: NIL

LESSONS LEARNT: Exposed condition of Pl during re-org.

PART 2 (PL COMD'S COMMENTS) Report filled by Pl Comd.

PART 3 (COY COMD'S COMMENTS) Apparently 7 Pl was fired upon by the en pers assisting the wdr of the sniper who had been shot out of a tree by 9 Pl.

MJ GILLESPIE Pt1 Comd
1040 hrs 8 Jul 66
MJ GILLESPIE Pl Comd
B McFARLANE Coy Comd

RESTRICTED

AFTER ACTION REPORT

PART 1 (TO BE COMPLETED BY PATROL COMD)

OPERATION: ENOGGERA

REPORT BY: 43433 2Lt GM KENDALL 10 P1 D Coy 6 RAR

DATE OF ACTION: 26 Jun 66. TIME: 1135 hrs DURATION: -

LOCATION: YS440640

PATROL TASK: Search and destroy.

DESCRIBE IN OWN WORDS WHAT HAPPENED, (INCL DIAGRAM) Ptl engaged in burning house, sniper fired one or two rounds and withdrew.

DESCRIPTION OF TERRAIN (TO INCLUDE RANGE OF VISIBILITY ETC) Centre of village, two rows of houses down each side of road.

DISTANCE TO EN WHEN FIRST SIGHTED: Not sighted.

WHO FIRED FIRST: En RANGE: 150 metres.

WHAT SEC WPNS FIRED: Nil

WHAT WAS EN IMMEDIATE REACTION: Withdrew

WHAT WAS THE SECTION IMMEDIATE REACTION: Follow up after gaining permission to cross boundary, but this took 4 mins to obtain.

EN CASUALTIES: Nil

LESSONS LEARNT: Enemy had repeated his action of the day before at almost the same time. Decided to use more people in protection role further out from work party in order to try and detect en mov before he fired.

PART 2 (PL COMDS COMMENTS) P1 Comd made out report.

PART 3 (COY COMD'S COMMENTS) Probably same VC who fired at the pl on 25 Jun 66. Delegation of authority needed to prevent delay in follow up.

GM KENDALL	PTL COMD
051200H Jul 66	
GM KENDALL	P1 COMD
H SMITH	COY COMD

RESTRICTED

AFTER ACTION REPORT

PART 1 (TO BE COMPLETED BY PATROL :CMD)


OPERATION: ENOGGERA

REPORT BY: 47045 Lt P DINHAM 2 Pl A Coy 6 RAR.

DATE OF ACTION: 27 Jun 66. TIME: 1040hrs. DURATION: 20 mins.

LOCATION: LONG PHUOC Sector S.

DESCRIBE IN OWN WORDS WHAT HAPPENED, INCL DIAGRAM: A sniper fired on the pl as we were moving along. A sect cmd was wounded by the only en shot. The pl returned fire.



DESCRIPTION OF TERRAIN (TO INCLUDE RANGE OF VISIBILITY ETC): Thick scrub in patches, visibility up to 100 yds.

DISTANCE TO EN WHEN FIRST SIGHTED: 75 yds. (only flash was seen.

WHICH MEMBER FIRST SIGHTED EN: Fwd scout - saw flash of wpn.

WHAT CAUSED EN TO BE NOTICED: Flash of wpn.

VC STRENGTH: 1 DRESS: unknown.

WHO FIRED FIRST: VC RANGE: Approx 100 yds

WHAT SEC WPNS FIRED: 2 MG

WHAT WAS EN IMMEDIATE REACTION: To run off.

WHAT WAS THE SECTION IMMEDIATE REACTION: To go to ground, return fire and pass back information.

EN CASUALTIES: Nil

APPROX AMMO EXPENDITURE: 50 rds 7.62 link belt 4 x M79 grenades.

LESSONS LEARNT: More speed is required to close with and kill a sniper.

PART 2 Pl COMDS COMMENTS:

DESCRIBE PL ACTIONS: To deploy initially and then to clear area.

PART 3 (COY CMD'S COMMENTS) Nil

P DINHAM	Pl1 Comd
060850H Jul 66	
P DINHAM	Pl Comd
P SMEATON	Coy Comd

RESTRICTED

AFTER ACTION REPORT

PART 1 (TO BE COMPLETED BY PATROL COMD)

OPERATION: ENOGGERA


REPORT BY: 54820 2Lt TJ GARDINER 1 Pl A Coy 6 RAR.

DATE OF ACTION: 25 Jul 66. TIME: 0850 hrs DURATION: 30 mins.

LOCATION: MAP XA LONG PHUOC (Special) 1:5,000 GR44986467 GR45026475.

PATROL TASK: Platoon search and destroy sweep along southern border of Sector U.

DESCRIBE IN OWN WORDS WHAT HAPPENED, INCL DIAGRAM: The platoon was moving to a start point for the sweep along the border. Simultaneously snipers opened up with quick shots at firstly the point sec Comd on recce of the trace and secondly at rear sec moving through the scrub.



DESCRIPTION OF TERRAIN (TO INCLUDE RANGE OF VISIBILITY ETC): Terrain was flat and covered with low thick scrub right up to the buildings. Visibility generally was up to 30 yds, in some cases up to 40 yds.

DISTANCE TO EN WHEN FIRST SIGHTED: EN not sighted, fired from approx 25 yds.

WHAT WAS MEMBER DOING: Point section on recce. Rear Sec fol pl.

WHAT CAUSED EN TO BE NOTICED: Shots fired by en.

VC STRENGTH: 2 DRESS: -

Contact front fired 7.62 Russian wpn, contact rear a small cal wpn.

WHO FIRED FIRST: En. RANGE: Approx 25 yds in both cases.

WHAT SECTION WPNS FIRED: None

WHAT WAS EN IMMEDIATE REACTION: En fired wild shots and bugged out very quickly.

WHAT WAS THE SECTION IMMEDIATE REACTION: Both secs went to ground in fire position and then swept through area of shots fired.

EN CASUALTIES: Nil

DOCUS/WPNS CAPTURED: NONE. One cartridge case was picked up type 7.62 Russian and with rim.

LESSONS LEARNT: Enemy sniper positions have to be determined quickly and followed up by a small fast tracker team.

PART 2 PL COMD'S COMMENTS)

RELATED SECTION REPORT: Point section went to ground quickly, info was slow to get back as no one actually saw any thing. The action by the rear sec was similar.

DESCRIBE PL ACTIONS: Remainder pl closed up went to ground awaiting further instrs. The double ended action was confusing as either sections did not know of the others contact. Under the circumstances the pl acted well and did as they were taught.

PART 3 (COY COMD'S COMMENTS

Nil comments.

TJ GARDINER PTL COMD
051200H Jul 66
TJ GARDINER Pl Comd
P SMEATON Coy Comd

RESTRICTED

AFTER ACTION REPORT

PART 1 (TO BE COMPLETED BY PATROL COMD)

OPERATION: ENOGGERA

REPORT BY: 1730944 2 Lt M J GILLESPIE 7 Pl C Coy 6 RAR

DATE OF ACTION: 24 Jun 66 TIME: 1645 hrs. DURATION: 1 hour.

LOCATION: 44676442

PATROL TASK: Protection of dozer.

DESCRIBE IN OWN WORDS WHAT HAPPENED, INCL DIAGRAM: Both 7 & 8 pls were lined out on NORTH side of road protecting dozer in 8 Pl location. Several shots were fired at the troops and dozer. Pl immediately deployed on SOUTHERN side of road and returned fire. Mortar and arty fire was then directed onto the area.

DESCRIPTION OF TERRAIN (TO INCLUDE RANGE OF VISIBILITY ETC): Most of the area was covered by banana and heavy trees. Visibility approx 30 metres.

DISTANCE TO EN WHEN FIRST SIGHTED: From about 150 metres.

WHICH MEMBER FIRST SIGHTED EN: En not sighted.

WHAT CAUSED EN TO BE NOTICED: His firing.

VC STRENGTH: Unknown

WHO FIRED FIRST: VC RANGE: 150 metres.

WHAT SECTION WEAPONS FIRED: 1 MG

WHAT WAS EN IMMEDIATE REACTION: Immediately took cover and observed.

WHAT WAS THE SECTION IMMEDIATE REACTION: To try to find where VC was by observation.

APPROX AMMO EXPENDITURE: 30 rounds link belt.

LESSONS LEARNT: This was pl first contact and they had learned to carry out IA drill quickly.

PART 2 (PL COMD'S COMMENTS) Report compiled by Pl Comd.

ESTIMATE OF ALL AMMO FIRED: 7.62 linked belt, - 30, arty - 60 rounds, mortar 50.

PART 3 (COY COMD'S COMMENTS) Due to the lateness of the hour and the fact that Sector T from where the fire was coming was previously unpatrolled the en was engaged by arty and mor fire and when sign of en activity ceased the pls involved were wdn to the Coy base.

MJ GILLESPIE
1040 hrs 8 Jul 66
MJ GILLESPIE
B McFARLANE

PTL COMD
Pl Comd
Coy Comd

RESTRICTED

AFTER ACTION REPORT

PART 1 (TO BE COMPLETED BY PATROL COMD)

OPERATION: ENOGGERA

REPORT BY: 15390 2Lt E J ANDREWS 8 Pl C Coy 6 RAR.

DATE OF ACTION: 24 Jun 66 TIME: 1645hrs DURATION: 1 hr.

LOCATION 44676442

PATROL TASK: Protection of Crab.

DESCRIBE IN OWN WORDS WHAT HAPPENED, INCL DIAGRAM: Both 7 & 8 pls lined out on NORTH side of road. Dozer pulled up on the side of road in 8 Pl loc where its motor idled for about 10 mins probably drawing attention to itself. At the time stated several shots were fired incl automatic fire at the dozer crew. Both pls wdr behind cover and directed Artillery and Mortar fire into the area from where the fire originated.

DESCRIPTION OF TERRAIN (TO INCLUDE RANGE OF VISIBILITY ETC): Mostly banana and fruit tree plantations. Visibility from ground to 4 feet high was 25 metres. Above 4 feet visibility was 100 metres.

DISTANCE TO EN WHEN FIRST SIGHTED: 150 metres.

WHAT WAS MEMBER DOING: EN NOT SIGHTED.

WHAT CAUSED EN TO BE NOTICED: His own firing.

WHO FIRED FIRST: VC RANGE: 150 metres.

WHAT SEC WPNS FIRED: 2 MG

WHAT WAS THE SECTION IMMEDIATE REACTION: Took cover, looked.

EN CASUALTIES: Nil

APPROX AMMO EXPENDITURE: 100 rounds link belt.

LESSONS LEARNT: How to take good cover quickly.

PART 2 PL COMD'S COMMENTS: Report made out by Pl Comd.

PART 3 (COY COMD'S COMMENTS) Nil.

BJ ANDREWS
8 Jul 66
E J ANDREWS
B McFARLANE

Pt1 Comd
Pl Comd
Coy Comd