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**Item: Headquarters, 1 Australian**  
**Task Force**

**Operation Coburg After Action**  
**Report**

**[1-29 Feb 1968]**



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# 1st AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM



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## COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT OPERATION COBURG

1968

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HQ 1 ATF  
NUI DAT

R569-2-69

20 Jun 68

See Sistribution List:

1 ATF COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OP COBURG

1. The attached maps are to be inserted into the subject report.
2. There are four maps already in the report and four maps attached. The Maps are numbered in the grid square indicated as follows:
  - a. Annex P
    - (1) AFV/F7 - 12/2064B (Grid square 1834)
    - (2) AFV/F7 - 12/2064A (Grid square 1634)
    - (3) AFV/F7 - 12/2064C (Grid square 1607)
    - (4) AFV/F7 - 12/2064D (Grid square 1807)
  - b. Annex Q As for sub para a. above except that the map numbers are:
    - (1) AFV/F7 - 12/2065B (Grid square 1834)
    - (2) AFV/F7 - 12/2065A (Grid square 1634)
    - (3) AFV/F7 - 12/2065C (Grid square 1607)
    - (4) AFV/F7 - 12/2065D (Grid square 1807)

*I. H. Maclean*  
(I.H. MACLEAN)  
Maj  
GS02 (Ops)

Distribution:

CG II Field Force Vietnam  
HQ AFV (7)  
HQ NZ Force Vietnam (2)  
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AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

HEADQUARTERS 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM

22 May 68

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report.

TO: Commanding General  
II Field Force Vietnam  
ATTN: AC of S. G3.

COPIES TO: HQ AFV (7)  
HQ NZ Force Vietnam (2)  
HQ 1 ALSG  
HQ 6 Task Force (3)  
HQ 10 Task Force (3)  
Internal (15)

MAPS: Vietnam 1 : 50,000 Series L7014 sheets 6330 I, 6331 II, 6431 III  
and 6430 IV.

1. Name and Type of Operation: Operation COBURG - a reconnaissance  
in force operation.

2. Dates of Operation: The operation was conducted over the period  
24 Jan 68 to 1 Mar 68.

3. Command Headquarters: HQ 1 ATF.

4. Reporting Officers:

a. 1 ATF Brigadier R.L. HUGHES, DSO.

b. 2 RAR Lt Col N.R. CHARLESWORTH.  
3 RAR Lt Col J.J. SHELTON, MC.  
7 RAR Lt Col E.H. SMITH.  
4 Fd Regt Lt Col R.J. GARDNER.  
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt Maj G.H. MURPHY.  
1 Fd Sqn RAE Maj J.H. KEMP.

5. Location: NORTH EAST BIEN HOA Province centre of mass YT2018.

6. Task Organisation:

2 RAR  
3 RAR  
7 RAR  
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt  
4 Fd Regt  
B Bty 2/35 Arty (US)  
1 Fd Sqn RAE  
161 (Indep) Recce Flt

7. Supporting Forces.

a. Armour.

(1) Deployment.

(a) A Sqn 3 Cav Regt was responsible for the move of  
the road convoy from NUI DAT to FSPB ANDERSEN on 24 Jan 68.  
3 Tp assisted with the move but returned to NUI DAT with  
a convoy of empty vehicles at 1650H 24 Jan 68.

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2.

(b) Sqn HQ and 2 Tp operated from FSPB ANDERSEN until 14 Feb when they returned to NUI DAT. During most of this time command of FSPB ANDERSEN was vested in OC A Sqn.

(c) 1 Tp moved to FSPB HARRISON on 25 Jan 68 and remained in support of the FSPB until it was abandoned on 14 Feb 68. The troop then moved to FSPB ANDERSEN to support 3 RAR.

(2) Employment.

(a) A Sqn HQ and 2 Tp operating from FSPB ANDERSEN, provided convoy escorts to LONG BINH prior to the TET Offensive, base protection and support for patrols in the area of FSPB ANDERSEN. 2 Tp assisted D Coy 2 RAR in the clearance of TRANG BOM YT2011 of enemy during the TET offensive.

(b) 1 Tp assisted with the protection of FSPB HARRISON and later FSPB ANDERSEN and patrolled the FSPB AOs.

b. Artillery.

(1) Grouping.

(a) 106 Fd Bty RAA (105 mm Towed) remained in direct support of 7 RAR from 24 Jan 68 until 11 Feb 68, after which it returned to 1 ATF Base.

(b) 108 Fd Bty RAA (105mm towed) remained in direct support of 2 RAR throughout.

(c) 161 Fd Bty RNZA (105mm towed) was placed in direct support of 7 RAR from 11 Feb 68 until 14 Feb 68 after which it was placed in direct support of 3 RAR until the completion of the operation.

(d) B Bty 2/35 Artillery (US) (155mm SP) was placed in general support reinforcing 4 Fd Regt RAA from 28 Jan 68.

(e) Artillery Tactical Headquarters was deployed with Task Force Headquarters from 24 Jan 68 until 14 Feb 68.

(2) Deployment.

(a) 106 Fd Bty and 108 Fd Bty deployed by road and air to FSPB HARRISON YT166176 on 24 Jan 68.

(b) On 28 Jan 68 3 Bty 2/35 US Artillery deployed by road to FSPB ANDERSEN.

(c) 106 Fd Bty was replaced at FSPB HARRISON by 161 Fd Bty on 11 Feb 68.

(d) On 14 Feb 68 161 Fd Bty deployed from FSPB HARRISON to FSPB ANDERSEN to continue the operation in direct support of 3 RAR.

(3) Employment of Artillery. Operation COBURG provided a wide variety of tactical situations in which artillery was used, these were as follows:

(a) Preparatory bombardment of occupied enemy camps.

(b) Covering fireplans for attacks.

(c) Close defensive fire tasks during enemy attacks.

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3.

- (d) Cut off missions on enemy withdrawal routes.
- (e) Counter bombardment of enemy mortar and rocket locations.
- (f) Destruction missions against enemy in the open, and against enemy installations (medium artillery only).
- (g) Harassing and interdiction tasks against infiltration routes and enemy headquarters areas.
- (h) Mark missions to assist infantry navigation.
- (i) Illumination missions.

(4) Corps Artillery Net. A Corps Artillery net was established under the control of II Field Force Artillery. This was successful and enabled a heavy weight of fire (24 Regiments/Battalions) to be brought to bear quickly. The net was useful also for engaging targets in AO COLUMBUS which were out of range to field and medium artillery.

(5) AWCC. An AWCC was deployed at FSPB ANDERSEN with only limited success due to communications problems, and also due to the fact that FSPB ANDERSEN was located under the air approach corridor to BIEN HOA Air Base. Constant liaison with DONG NGAI AWCC provided a solution by which 161 Recce Flt AWCC broadcast local artillery warnings, while DONG NGAI AWCC provided overall air clearance. Direct communications were established with DONG NGAI AWCC which resulted in an effective artillery warning system.

(6) Artillery support was prompt and effective throughout and played an important part in the success of the operation.

(7) Particular note should be taken of the very prompt and highly accurate counter bombardment fire provided by the mortar platoon of 3 RAR on the night 17/18 Feb 68; this was the direct result of the standard of training of the battalion mortar platoon, the complete understanding by the battalion of the need to report quickly and accurately enemy activity, and the close association between the Battalion CP, its affiliated battery and the mortar locating radar deployed at FSPB ANDERSEN.

c. Engineers.

(1) Deployment. 1 Fd Sqn deployed two combat engineer teams with each of 2 RAR, 3 RAR and 7 RAR and two mini teams with A Sqn 3 Cav Regt. The remainder of the Sqn less one troop which remained in NUI DAT was based either at FSPB HARRISON or FSPB ANDERSEN.

(2) Employment.

(a) The combat engineer teams deployed with the infantry battalions were employed in the construction of LZ and winch points and the destruction of enemy booby traps and captured explosives. Some efforts were made to destroy enemy installations however the number and size of camps and the lack of time prohibited any significant destruction programme being carried out.

(b) 1 Fd Sqn operated water points at both FSPBs and assisted with the construction of base defences. Command posts and various installations such as the signal centre were all dug in with the assistance of bulldozers and a trench digger.

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4.

(c) 50 - 60 houses were destroyed in the fighting in TRANG BOM YT2011 during the TET offensive. When the situation had stabilized 1 Fd Sqn constructed 25 - 30 simple frame and roof houses to assist in the rehabilitation of the village.

d. Aviation. The use of air support has characterized all 1 ATF operations. However the level of air activity, the variety of support and the results achieved are worthy of particular note on Operation COBURG. The effectiveness of air support contributed greatly to the success of the operation and 1 ATF learnt many lessons on the employment and coordination of air resources.

(1) 161 (Indep) Recce Flt deployed to BEARCAT on the morning of 24 Jan 68. Initially the majority of aircraft in the flight deployed however with the TET offensive it became necessary for some aircraft to return to NUI DAT. The resources of the flight were barely adequate to cope with the demand for light aircraft in two widely separated areas. 161 Recce Flt continued to operate from BEARCAT until HQ 1 ATF returned to NUI DAT on 16 Feb 68. Air support from then until conclusion of Operation COBURG was then provided from NUI DAT. A HL3 was deployed daily in DS of each of the battalions and HQ 1 ATF. These aircraft assisted the battalions with close VR, minor resupply and liaison visits. The variety of support available to the rifle companies made it essential to have a coordinating officer not involved in the fighting in the area. The battalion DS helicopter was often used to help in this role. 7 RAR in particular used their DS HL3 to coordinate Light Fire Teams, DUSTOFF aircraft, ground attack aircraft, resupply helicopter, artillery and mortar fire. In this they were most effective. The VR plan for Operation COBURG was based on USAF FAC aircraft concentrating on the main mass of AO COLUMBUS with 161 Recce Flt aircraft searching the periphery. In general 161 Recce Flt provided continuous VR by day and limited observation by night with assistance from starlight scopes. Results from this VR contributed to the general build up of the intelligence picture.

(2) 9 Sqn RAAF deployed helicopters to FSPB ANDERSEN from VUNG TAU daily. The Sqn provided effective support for resupply, troop movement, DUSTOFF and command liaison trips. The lack of suitable LZs in the operational area often meant tasks had to be carried out under difficult conditions. Winches had to be used frequently often at heights of 100 feet although efforts were made to find suitable winch sites where the canopy was under 60 feet. DUSTOFF assistance provided by 9 Sqn was particularly important. The heavy work load on USA DUSTOFF helicopters during this period often meant RAAF helicopters were called on to assist in the evacuation of Australian casualties. Battalion medical officers were often winched in to casualties to provide immediate resuscitation prior to evacuation and to classify the casualties. Urgent cases were evacuated first by the DUSTOFF aircraft and the remainder were evacuated by 9 Sqn ALBATROSS.

(3) US Army Aviation.

(a) Offensive Support. During most of Operation COBURG a Light Fire Team was held on standby at FSPB ANDERSEN. Assistance particularly in armed reconnaissance along the DONG NGAI river and in AO COLUMBUS EAST was provided by LOH Scout detachments from 3/17 ACS. This support was particularly valuable because of the local knowledge 3/17 ACS pilots had of the operational area. PEOPLE SNIFFER missions were also flown and results added to the overall intelligence picture.

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5.

The Light Fire Teams gave very close support to the rifle companies when called for. They were particularly effective in providing cover and in some cases suppressive fire during the evacuation of casualties by winch by DUSTOFF aircraft.

(b) DUSTOFF Support. Evacuation of casualties was carried out by DUSTOFF helicopters based at LONG BINH. The job done by these aircraft was excellent. However they are slower in winching out casualties than 9 Sqn who use the technique more frequently. Because of the heavy demand for DUSTOFF aircraft during the period there were some times unavoidable delays. In such cases 9 Sqn helicopters carried out the task or assisted when necessary. DUSTOFF aircraft made every effort to evacuate casualties as quickly as possible in some cases under fire.

(c) Transport Support. The details of transport support provided by USA Army Aviation helicopters is listed below.

1 ATF was almost completely on air supply for most of Operation COBURG.

i. 24 - 26 Jan 68 (Deployment).

	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Troops</u>	<u>Cargo</u>
UH1D	80	480	Nil
CH47	76	720	166 tons
CH54	2	Nil	2 tons

ii. 9 - 16 Feb 68 (Redeployment).

UH1D	110	663	Nil
CH47	76	335	132 tons
CH54	2	Nil	2 tons

iii. 24 Feb - 1 Mar (Extraction).

UH1D	20	120	Cargo
CH47	10	280	1 ton

iv. 26 Jan - 29 Feb (Resupply)

CH47	224	850 tons
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e. USAF.

(1) USAF FAC aircraft provided continuous daylight VR over AO COLUMBUS. As already mentioned they were responsible for VR in the main mass of the operational area. All airstrikes other than Combat Sky Spot and B52 missions were controlled by USAF FACs.

(2) Air attacks into the operational area by USAF aircraft ranged from B52 strikes through to close support of troops in contact. A total of 97 preplanned missions, 32 Sky Spot missions and 21 immediate missions were put in, in support of 1 ATF.

(3) The preplanned strikes were used to destroy the large number of VC camps, many of them occupied, in the area. Combat Sky Spot and B52 missions hit VC base camps and known VC troop concentration or staging areas.

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6.

8. Intelligence

a. The recent history of enemy activity in the area of interest associated with AO COLUMBUS could be divided into two periods: pre-Christmas and post-Christmas. In the first period the enemy situation was relatively stable; while the second period was characterised by indications of a significant build up of enemy main force elements towards the area and particularly the enemy rocket threat against the LONG BINH/BIEN HOA complex increased with the movement of elements of the 84A Rocket Regiment into the area.

b. The general area of interest divided itself into three areas:

(1) TAN UYEN and WEST of the DONG NAI.

(2) NORTH of the DONG NAI in SW War Zone D.

(3) AO COLUMBUS and the EAST approach to LONG BINH.

c. Pre-Christmas Period. Enemy units in the general area consisted of:

(1) TAN UYEN Area (West of DONG NAI River). About a battalion strength unit, possibly the PHU LOI I Battalion but not firmly identified.

(2) NORTH of DONG NAI. Elements of D800 (the 1st Bn DONG NAI Regt) and elements of the PHU LOI LF unit.

(3) AO COLUMBUS.

(a) Very little VC activity in the actual AO with the exception of a unit called the U1 "Battalion" which is a LF unit of about 150 men whose task is to provide security for the U1 "Special Zone" HQ and food gathering and production activities.

(b) SOUTH of AO COLUMBUS 3 Bn 274 VC Regt had been held for some time ready for use against opportunity targets along Highway 1.

d. Post-Christmas Buildup.

(1) On 6 Jan 68 the DONG NAI Regt attacked the TAN UYEN town area. From this date there was a significant and constant buildup throughout the general area.

(2) TAN UYEN Area. VC forces in this area were built up with elements of the DONG NAI Regt and PHU LOI I Bn being identified in the area and agent reports indicating some elements of 273 Regt.

(3) NORTH of DONG NAI. Agent reports indicated VC forces had built up in this area to at least two battalion strength made up of the bulk of the DONG NAI Regt and possibly a battalion group of 273 Regt with 273 Arty elements.

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(4) AO COLUMBUS.

(a) The buildup in this area took the form of heightened harassment of posts and hamlets along Highway 1 and small scale ambushes. The infiltration of a battalion of the 84A Rocket Regiment from the NNE into the GANG TOI area (YT1722) and with it elements of 273 Regt from the NORTH to give it security and screen forces was reported on 5, 6 and 7 Jan 68 again on 10 Jan 68 by usually reliable agents.

(b) The local forces provided screen and guide elements for this force.

(c) 274 Regt's 3rd Battalion remained dispersed SOUTH of Highway 1 and elements of 274 possibly crossed Highway 1 heading NORTH. This was based upon a rallier report.

(d) An element of 5 Div HQ had also recently arrived in the COLUMBUS area with the possibility of it assuming control of VC mainforce elements in the area.

c. 199 Bde operations in AO COLUMBUS had not made any substantial contact and no firm identifications of main force elements. The local forces in the area were probably responsible for the heightened activity on Highway 1 and the bulk of the small contacts and harassments that 199 Bde had. It is possible that these activities had been designed to cover the main force movement and deployment into the area.

f. Enemy elements that were considered to be in the area of AO COLUMBUS prior to the deployment of 1 ATF were:

(1) Main Force.

273 Regt 9 VC Div (elements)  
274 Regt 5 VC Div (up to a battalion group)  
84A Rocket Regiment (up to a battalion)  
DONG NAI Regiment (small element only)

(2) Local Force.

U1 "Battalion"  
C238 LF Coy (vic YT1523)  
C270 VINH CUU Platoon (vic YT1218)  
Assorted district and village guerilla bands.

g. The aim of Operation COBURG was to deny the enemy access to suitable sites from which to bring 122mm rocket fire onto LONG BINH or BIEN HOA. With this aim in mind 2 RAR and 7 RAR pushed NORTH fairly quickly in order to stop enemy movement SOUTH from the DONG NAI River.

h. Phase 1. (Period 24-31 Jan 68).

During this phase there were a total of 41 contacts by fire with enemy forces during which there were 45VC KIA(BC). Enemy units identified were:



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i. Trends.

- (1) Constant contact early in operation with C238 LF Coy.
- (2) Heavy loads or caches of assault engineer equipment (i.e. Explosives, Bangalore Torpedos, Detonators, RPG2 and RPG7s).
- (3) Large numbers of new or hardly used weapons, (i.e. RPG2, RPG7 and AK47s).
- (4) Large amounts of ammunition carried on the man, (200-300 rds) including main force, local force and district members killed.
- (5) Numerous well constructed large base camps in AO AYRE, which although old, had been recently used or were currently occupied by enemy forces generally below the strength that the camps could accommodate.
- (6) Positioning in AO SIMPSON of enemy medical stations, transport and rear services elements.
- (7) Location of enemy main base area in centre of AO COLUMBUS which appears to be a main provincial HQ installation. (Centre of mass YT2121).
- (8) Reported movements of elements of HQ 5 VC Div from East to West within AO WILLS.
- (9) No sign in AO COLUMBUS of enemy 122mm, 140mm or 240mm rockets, rocket sites or members of 84A Arty Regt.
- (10) Constant crossings at night over DONG NAI River, particularly in squares YT1826, YT2227, YT2427 and the main crossing at YT2527.
- (11) Enemy movements sighted going both NORTH and SOUTH and reverse. But main tracks branch off EAST-WEST through the centre of AO COLUMBUS NORTH of 22 NORTHING.
- (12) Enemy appeared almost to be picquetting area YT1421, YT1521 and were closely observing 7 RAR.

j. Phase 2. (Period 1-8 Feb 68).

During this period there were 55 contacts by fire which resulted in 90 VC KIA(BC), 5 PW (4W1A). Enemy units identified included:

1 Coy, D24, AA Bn, 5 BC Div Artillery  
C22 Tpt Coy, 275 VC Regt  
C11, C13 and C14 Coys, 3 Bn, 274 VC Regt  
C20 Sigs Coy, 274 VC Regt  
C3 Coy, 1 Bn, 274 VC Regt  
C1 Coy, 1 Bn, 275 VC Regt  
C92 Atk Coy, 5 VC Div  
Military Postal Unit, U1 Province  
C838 Recce Coy, U1 Province  
BIEN HOA Province Communication/Liaison Unit  
(Mainly Main Force, with local recce elements and guides)

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(3) Villages of TRANG BOM (YT2011), TRA CO (YT1610) and BAO HAM (YT2715) were apparently entry/exit supply points for UI Base area.

1. Phase 3. (Period 9-13 Feb 68).

This was a quiet period with only two contacts reported resulting in 3 VC KIA. However, these facts are a little misleading as both 2 RAR and 7 RAR were either deploying or preparing to extract and return to NUI DAT. D/2 RAR had a series of small encounters with enemy elements throughout most of 12 Feb. One identification made - C95 Recce Coy, HQ 5 VC Div.

m. Trends.

Enemy forces were also apparently re-grouping during this period but very little intelligence was available on current enemy strengths or locations particularly to our WEST and EAST. Despite extensive VR, People Sniffer, Red Haze and SLAR surveillance little trace could be found.

n. Phase 4. (Period 14 Feb - 1 Mar 68).

The main change during this period was the rapid build-up of enemy forces which was effected on 17 Feb, culminating in the enemy attack against FSPB ANDERSEN during the night 17/18 Feb.

This attack was extremely well co-ordinated, utilizing heavy and accurate 82mm mortar fire, supported by RPG2s and LMGs, and finally an infantry assault. 4 VC KIA (BC) and later one was identified as a member of C14 Coy, 274 VC Regt.

9. Mission.

To destroy the VC/NVA elements in AO COLUMBUS.

10. Concept of Operations.

a. General Outline.

(1) 1 ATF (-) deployed to AO COLUMBUS centre of mass YT1920 to destroy VC/NVA elements operating in the AO.

(2) The background to this operation was based on the likely threat of a rocket attack on the BIEN HOA/LONG BINH complexes before or during the TET period and possible enemy action against XUAN LOC.

(3) The lodgement of 1 ATF (-) was carried out by road and air on 24/25 Jan 68.

(4) The lodgement and the commencement of operations was in three phases:

(a) Phase 1.

- |     |  |  |
|-----|--|--|
| i.  | 2 RAR<br>Tac HQ 1 ATF  | Deployed to FSPB ANDERSEN<br>by air                      |
| ii. | A Sqn 3 Cav Regt<br>4 Fd Regt (-)<br>Two Coys and two<br>mor sects 7 RAR<br>TFMA vehicles incl<br>Bn echs etc. | Deployed by road via Routes<br>15 and 1 to FSPB ANDERSEN |

iii. Ac in sp 1 ATF deployed to BEARCAT.

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(b) Phase 2. 7 RAR (-) deployed to FSPB ANDERSEN and then FSPB HARRISON.

(c) Phase 3. 2 RAR and 7 RAR commenced operations in Bn AOs.

b. 2 RAR Tasks

(1) Phase 1.

(a) At 240730H commence move by air to FSPB ANDERSEN.

(b) On arrival FSPB ANDERSEN deployed one Coy and Mortar section for protection of the FSPB.

(c) On arrival FSPB ANDERSEN, Battalion less one Coy is to secure areas as ordered by Comd.

(2) Phase 2. Continue protection of FSPB ANDERSEN.

(3) Phase 3. Commence operations in AO.

c. 7 RAR

(1) Phase 1.

(a) At 240730H move two Coys and two Mortar Sects and Mortar Pl by APC to FSPB ANDERSEN.

(b) At 0900H move Battalion less two Coys and two Mortar Sects by air to FSPB ANDERSEN and complete Bn concentration that location.

(2) Phase 2. At 1400H move to FSPB HARRISON, assault landing if LZ not secured. Deploy one Coy to protect FSPB.

(3) Phase 3. Commence operations in AO AYRE.

d. A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.

(1) Phase 1.

(a) Commencing at 240730H escort road convoy from NUI DAT via Route 15 and Route 1 to FSPB ANDERSEN.

(b) On arrival FSPB ANDERSEN:

i. Release one Tp to escort vehicles returning to NUI DAT.

ii. A Sqn (-) to take up def posn in FSPB perimeter.

iii. Allot one APC for AWCC duties.

(2) Phase 2. Be prepared to conduct clearing operations around FSPB ANDERSEN, NORTH of Route 1.

(3) Phase 3. Move one Tp to FSPB HARRISON.

e. Artillery.

(1) 4 Fd Regt

(a) Remains in DS. Provide one Bty for close def of 1 ATF base.

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11.

(b) Gun areas.

- i. Temp posn at ANDERSEN YT2012.
- ii. Main posn at HARRISON YT1716.

(2) B Bty 2/35 Arty.

(a) Gun area YT2810 from 24 Jan.

(b) In GS and at pri call to 1 ATF.

(3) C Bty 1/27 Arty. Provide DF for FSPB HARRISON on call from 4 Fd Regt.

(4) One sect A Bty 2/40 Arty. Provide DF for FSPB ANDERSEN on call from 4 Fd Regt.

(5) A Bty 1/83 Arty. Remains in GS reinforcing.

(6) 1 ATF Det 131 Loc Bty.

(a) Continue present mission.

(b) Deploy one radar det and one LP to FSPB ANDERSEN thence FSPB HARRISON.

(7) AWCC.

(a) NUI DAT Arty remains open throughout.

(b) Det 161 Recce Flt to move with Tac HQ 4 Fd Regt to FSPB ANDERSEN.

(c) Bdry of BIEN HOA Arty has been extended to EAST bdy of AO COLUMBUS. 4 Fd Regt to arrange for transmission of warnings to BIEN HOA Arty.

f. 1 Fd Sqn.

(1) Deploy Sqn (-).

(2) Provide two combat engr teams to each 2 RAR, 7 RAR and three mini teams to A Sqn 3 Cav Regt (one team will return to base PM 24 Jan 68).

(3) Remainder engr Tps to remain in FSPB ANDERSEN.

(4) Be prepared to estb WP in FSPB ANDERSEN (and possibly FSPB HARRISON).

(5) Provide two size 2 dozers to be moved by road to FSPB ANDERSEN.

(6) Provide engr stores sp as required.

g. 161 (Indep) Recce Flt.

(1) Provide one H13 in DS 2 RAR, 7 RAR and HQ 1 ATF.

(2) Provide 1 FW for VR in Op area.

(3) Ac to be deployed to BEARCAT area.

(4) Provide sigs and sig equipment as necessary for AWCC.

(5) Continue TAOR/PHUOC TUY Province area VR.

(6) Provide one H13 for OC A Sqn for convoy control from 240700H.

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12.

h. HQ Coy 1 ATF.

- (1) Responsible for the layout Tac HQ 1 ATF area including helicopter pads.
- (2) Command and organize the local defence of FSPB ANDERSEN including Tac HQ 1 ATF.
- (3) Def Pl is to be on standby for protection of a retransmission station if deployed.

11. Execution.

a. 24 Jan 68.

- (1) At 0700 advance parties of Tac HQ 1 ATF, 2 RAR, 4 Fd Regt, 104 Sig Sqn, HQ Coy 1 ATF and the TFMA moved by air to the proposed site for FSPB ANDERSEN YT2012. The LZ was secured by elements of 199th Bde. At 0900H the road convoy consisting of A Sqn 3 Cav Regt, 4 Fd Regt (-), A and D Coys 7 RAR and TFMA, Engr, USAF vehicles departed NUI DAT for FSPB ANDERSEN. At 0810H the movement commenced of 2 RAR, Tac HQ 7 RAR, Tac HQ 1 ATF, 1 Fd Sqn, elements of the TFMA and B and C Coys 7 RAR by air to FSPB ANDERSEN. At 0730H aircraft and crews of 161 (Indep) Recce Flt and Tac 1 (USAF) moved to BEARCAT. During the morning LO teams were deployed to 18 ARVN Div XUAN LOC and 199th Bde BEIN HOA.
- (2) By 1201H the lead elements of the Road convoy had arrived at FSPB ANDERSEN. Elements of 4 Fd Regt (-) were then deployed to allow the fly in of B and C Coys of 7 RAR to be diverted to FSPB HARRISON YT1617. The LZ at FSPB HARRISON was secured by elements of 199th Bde and by 1405H B and C Coys 7 RAR had been flown in. The remainder of 7 RAR flew from FSPB ANDERSEN to FSPB HARRISON during the afternoon. C Coy 7 RAR remained at FSPB ANDERSEN as protection Coy and the remainder of 7 RAR began deploying NORTH into AO EYRE.
- (3) On arrival at FSPB ANDERSEN the rifle companys of 2 RAR less D Coy began moving NORTH towards AO SIMPSON. D Coy remained at FSPB ANDERSEN.
- (4) At 1650H one troop of A Sqn left FSPB ANDERSEN with a convoy of empty vehicles and returned to NUI DAT.
- (5) At 1705H at YT153193 A Coy 7 RAR contacted two VC with no known results.

b. 25 Jan 68.

- (1) 2 RAR and 7 RAR continued patrolling and movement into AOs SIMPSON and AYRE respectively. 106 and 108 Btys moved by air to FSPB HARRISON YT1617. 1 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt moved across country to FSPB HARRISON and elements of A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and D Coy 2 RAR began patrolling the area of FSPB ANDERSEN. Intensive air reconnaissance of AO COLUMBUS by aircraft of 161 Recce Flt, USAF FACs and 3/17 ACS started.
- (2) At 1250H at YT228152 9 Pl 2 RAR contacted two VC resulting in 1 VC KIA and the capture of 1 M1 carbine.

c. 26 Jan 68.

- (1) 2 RAR and 7 RAR continued patrolling and movement into AOs SIMPSON and AYRE respectively. Intensive air reconnaissance continued with assistance from A Tp 3/17 ACS.

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13.

(2) AT 0845H at YT231125 V Coy 2 RAR made contact with 6 VC. At the same time they also come under fire from an unknown number of VC from their rear. The results of this contact were 2 VC KIA(BC) and 2 M1 carbines were captured. At 1020H at YT197155 B Coy 2 RAR contacted 15-20 VC resulting in 2 Aust KIA, 1 Aust WIA, 2 VC KIA(BC) and 1 AK47 being captured. At 1145H at YT184205 B Coy 7 RAR contacted 3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA(BC) and 1 M1 carbine and 2 grenades being captured. At 1400H at YT184205 B Coy 7 RAR contacted 3 VC with unknown result. At 1621H at YT248150H C Coy 2 RAR contacted 20-30 VC in an enemy camp. The action continued until 271015H and resulted in 2 Aust KIA, 2 VC KIA(BC) and the capture of 2 SKS rifle, 1 Garrand rifle, 1 Mossin Nagant rifle, 5 bangalore torpedoes, 500 lbs rice and a large quantity of small arms ammunition.

d. 27 Jan 68.

(1) 2 RAR and 7 RAR continued patrolling and movement NORTH into AOs SIMPSON and AYRE respectively. Intensive air reconnaissance continued and during the day three air strikes were put in in support of troops in contact. An occupied enemy camp at YT184217 was bombed. There were 3 VC KBA.

(2) At 1035H at YT182204 B Coy 7 RAR contacted 3-4 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC). At 1045H at YT169213 D Coy 7 RAR contacted a coy plus of VC in an enemy camp. D Coy captured the enemy camp which was heavily booby trapped. Two rifles, Claymores, grenades, small arms ammunition and 81mm mortar bombs were found in a cache in the camp. There were 8 Aust WIA in the action. At 1050H at YT201161 B Coy 2 RAR contacted a squad of VC resulting in 6 Aust WIA, 1 VC KIA (BC) and the capture of 1 AK47 and 1 RPG7.

e. 28 Jan 68.

(1) 2 RAR and 7 RAR continued patrolling and movement NORTH in AOs SIMPSON and AYRE.

(2) At 1210H at YT250158 V Coy contacted two VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and the capture of 1 M1 carbine. At 1300H at YT190201 B Coy 7 RAR contacted 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA and the capture of 1 AK47. At 1525H at YT250153 V Coy contacted 3 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and the capture of 1 x AK47, 1 x RPG2, 3 RPG2 rounds and various demolition items. At 1620H at YT162214 A Coy 7 RAR contacted 3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and the capture of 1 SKS rifle.

(3) At 1300H B Bty 2/35 Arty (US) moved into FSPB ANDERSEN in support of 1 ATF.

f. 29 Jan 68.

(1) 2 RAR and 7 RAR continued patrolling AOs SIMPSON and AYRE respectively. During the day seven airstrikes were put into AO COLUMBUS, five of which were into occupied enemy camps. 7 VC KBA resulted from these strikes. The VC employed automatic small arms in an anti-aircraft role, during some of these strikes. Attempts were made to insert three SAS patrols by air on the WESTERN side of AO AYRE. All patrols made contact in insertion and were extracted. Total results were 1 Aust WIA (NOT evacuated) and 2 VC KIA.

(2) At 1515H at YT180216 D Coy 7 RAR contacted 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and the capture of 1 AK47. At 1605H at YT162214 A Coy 7 RAR contacted 18-25 VC resulting 1 Aust KIA, 8 Aust WIA, (3 evacuated) 7 VC KIA (BC) and the capture of 4 x AK47s, 72lbs of explosive, 4 RPG7 rounds, 7 RPG2 rounds, grenades and small arms ammunition. At 1235H at YT190223 while carrying out an aerial reconnaissance the 2IC 7 RAR saw and killed 1 VC.

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14.

(3) From 291800H to 300945H 1 ATF observed the TET truce. During the TET truce there were a number of enemy initiated incidents against 1 ATF units. At 1940H at YT178214 an unknown number of VC fired small arms and MGs into D Coy 7 RAR position. Fire was returned with unknown results. There were no Aust casualties. At 1900H a DUSTOFF helicopter evacuating casualties from A Coy 7 RAR was hit by 12 small arms rounds.

g. 30 Jan 68.

(1) 1 ATF recommenced offensive action at 300945H on orders from II FFV after observing the TET truce.

(2) 2 RAR and 7 RAR continued patrolling in their allotted AOs. Elements of A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and C Coy 7 RAR and D Coy 2 RAR patrolled in the area of the FSPBs.

(3) At 0810H at YT162212 1 VC fired on A Coy 7 RAR. The VC escaped, however 1 rifle and 1 claymore were captured by A Coy. At 1615H at YT200188 A Coy 2 RAR killed 1 VC and captured 1 AK47.

(4) At 1710H at YT236183 C Coy 2 RAR attacked a VC base camp occupied by 18-20 VC. The VC withdrew. There was 1 VC WIA and 1 rifle was captured.

(5) The SAS patrols who made contact in insertion on 29 Jan moved to HQ 7 RAR and began operations with 7 RAR.

h. 31 Jan 68.

(1) In the early hours of 31 Jan the VC launched heavy ground rocket and mortar attacks against the LONG BINH/BEIN HOA complex. These attacks changed the concept of Operation COBURG. Until this time 1 ATF's mission had been to destroy NVA/VC elements in AO COLUMBUS.

(2) The enemy attacks against the LONG BINH/BEIN HOA complex were largely unsuccessful. One of the most likely routes of withdrawal for the VC units involved in these attacks was through AO COLUMBUS and then across the DONG NAI river.

(3) 1 ATF concept of operation changed from a reconnaissance in force operation NORTH into AO COLUMBUS into a blocking operation designed to intercept the enemy moving back from his attacks.

(4) 2 RAR and 7 RAR were ordered to establish company blocking position in a rough EAST - WEST line in AOs AYRE and SIMPSON. These positions were sited on tracks with platoon sized ambushes on minor tracks.

(5) At 0315H TRANG BOM YT2011 which is near FSPB ANDERSEN was attacked by an unknown sized VC force. Artillery support for the RF post at TRANG BOM was provided from FSPB HARRISON. The village was over run by the enemy. The RF post although out of ammunition held the VC until first light and at 0800H D Coy 2 RAR and 2 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt began clearing towards TRANG BOM. The road between FSPB ANDERSEN and TRANG BOM which had been mined by VC during the night was cleared. D Coy and 2 Tp were involved in house to house fighting with VC elements in TRANG BOM during the day. Light fire teams provided fire support. TRANG BOM was cleared of VC. There were 4 VC KIA(BC) and 3 VC WIA and 1 AK47, 3 anti tank mines, 5 grenades and 1 Claymore captured.

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15.

(6) During the day 2 RAR and 7 RAR moved towards their blocking positions. At 1147H at YT218188 12-14 VC engaged B Coy 2 RAR. There was 1 Aust WIA and 1 VC KIA. B Coy captured 1 AK47 and 1 grenade. At 1437H B Coy 2 RAR found an occupied VC camp near the area of the earlier contact. B Coy attacked the camp which was heavily defended and became involved in a heavy fire fight.

(7) V Coy 2 RAR were ordered to move to assist and by 1830H had formed a base for B Coy to withdraw to for the evacuation of casualties. There were 4 Aust WIA, 4 VC KIA(BC) and 4 VC WIA.

(8) A Coy 2 RAR clashed twice with the enemy during the day in the area of YT210198. There was one VC killed in each contact and two AK50s were captured.

i. 1 Feb 68.

(1) 2 RAR and 7 RAR continued moving into position to block enemy escape routes. During the night 31 Jan/1 Feb the enemy attacked TRANG BOM. FSPB HARRISON provided artillery support. 2 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and D Coy 2 RAR moved to assist the RF post on the morning of 1 Feb.

(2) B and V Coys 2 RAR continued to make minor contacts with the enemy in the area of the action of the previous day in the vicinity YT218188. B Coy clashed with 5 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA(BC) and the capture of 1 AK50. One Australian was wounded in the two contacts with the enemy, V Coy killed 3 VC wounded 1. They captured 1 AK47, 1 Mosin Nagent rifle, 6 claymores, 3 RPG7 rockets, 2 grenades and some medical supplies. There was 1 NZ KIA.

(3) At 1417H at YT225150 C Coy 2 RAR contacted 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA and the capture of 1 RPG 7, 1 AK 50, 1.38 inch pistol and 3 RPG 7 rockets. At 1740H at YT140208 C Coy 7 RAR contacted 4 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA(BC) and the capture of 1 Garand rifle. 2 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and D Coy 2 RAR cleared TRANG BOM of VC by 1700H. Results were 2 VC KIA and 1 AK 47 captured. Bodies of 6 VC who had been killed by arty during the night 31 Jan/1 Feb were found.

(4) Two airstrikes were put in during the day. One of these was into an occupied camp. There were 3 VC KBA.

j. 2 Feb 68.

(1) 2 RAR and 7 RAR continued to hold a series of blocking positions across AO COLUMBUS. Company positions had been established on tracks which were likely to be used by the VC withdrawing from the LONG BINH/BIEN HOA area. Pl sized ambushes were also established. 2 Tp A Sqn and a Pl of D Coy 2 RAR cleared TRANG BOM village, 11 VC KIA from 1 Feb were found.

(2) At 1223H at YT226152 3 VC were fired on by C Coy 2 RAR resulting in 1 VC KIA(BC) 1 VC WIA and the capture of 2 AK47s and 2 RPGs rounds. At 1215H at YT210198 A Coy 2 RAR engaged three VC causing 1 VC KIA(BC). A Coy captured some medical supplies. At 1513H at YT155154 9 Pl 3 RAR contacted 5 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA(BC) and 1 VC WIA. Three AK47s and 4 grenades were captured. At 1724H at YT183214 B Coy 7 RAR captured 1 VC. The VC had been wounded by B Coy 7 RAR during the night 1/2 Feb 68.

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16.

(3) Four significant airstrikes were put in against enemy installations.

k. 3 Feb 68.

(1) 2 RAR and 7 RAR maintained their blocking positions across AO COLUMBUS. 2 Tp A Sqn with the Def Pl patrolled to the South of the FSPB ANDERSEN in the area of TRANG BOM. C Coy 7 RAR continued to patrol to the NORTH WEST of FSPB HARRISON.

(2) At 1015H at YT141196 C Coy 7 RAR killed 1 VC who was carrying 4 RPG2 rockets. At 1145H at YT183214 B Coy 7 RAR engaged 2 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA and the capture of 1 RPG2. At 1340H at YT211199 3 VC approached A Coy 2 RAR positions. They were engaged by A Coy resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC). Two AK47s, one AK50, 3 grenades and 3 packs were captured. At 1720H at YT211199 12 VC approached A Coy 2 RAR position. A Coy engaged them with small arms and artillery. The results of the action were 3 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC WIA (PW). One 7.62mm machine gun, 1 M16, 2 AK50, 1 AK 47 and 2 pistols were captured.

(3) During the day three VC camps were struck by air. One camp was occupied. Two VC were killed.

l. 4 Feb 68.

(1) 2 RAR and 7 RAR continued to hold their blocking positions. C Coy 7 RAR moved by APC from the area to the NORTH WEST of FSPB HARRISON and began patrolling to the EAST of FSPB HARRISON. 2 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and elements of D Coy 2 RAR patrolled TRANG BOM and the area to the SOUTH of FSPB ANDERSEN.

(2) Heavy air activity continued. Four significant air strikes were put in during the day. Two of these were into enemy occupied base camps. Three VC were killed. During the day a 161 (Indep) Recce Flt helicopter was slightly damaged by small arms fire.

(3) At 0809H one VC approached D Coy 7 RAR position at YT160218. He was engaged with small arms fire and killed. One AK47 and a compass were captured. At 1110H at YT210198 two VC approached A Coy 2 RAR's position. In the fire fight the two VC were killed and two AK50s were captured. There were two Australians wounded. At 1150H at YT223192 V Coy 2 RAR contacted two VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and the capture of 1 RPG2, 6 RPG2 rounds and 1 grenade. At 1210H at YT180219 5 Pl 7 RAR contacted 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and the capture of one RPG2 round. At 1245H at YT162217 11 Pl 7 RAR contacted 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and the capture of one AK50.

(4) At 1505H one VC approached 5 Pl 7 RAR position and was killed. One grenade was captured.

(5) At 2347H the Task Force Artillery engaged an enemy mortar position. 18 VC bodies were seen in the area by VR aircraft in the morning of 5 Feb 68.

m. 5 Feb 68.

(1) 2 RAR and 7 RAR continued to hold their blocking positions. C Coy 7 RAR continued to patrol to the EAST of FSPB HARRISON. 1 Fd Sqn began reconstruction of the houses which had been destroyed in the TRANG BOM during the TET Offensive while 2 Tp 3 Cav Regt and elements of D Coy 2 RAR provided protection.

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17.

(2) Intense VR continued and five airstrikes were put in during the day. Two of these strikes were in support of C Coy 7 RAR. There were 5 VC KBA.

(3) At 0830H five VC approached D Coy 7 RAR position at YT162217. Three VC were killed and one wounded, and three AK47s were captured.

(4) At 1015H at YT191167 C Coy 7 RAR found an enemy camp occupied by approximately 40-50 VC. As C Coy moved forward to investigate they were engaged by 2 MGs and later came under fire from five MGs. C Coy withdrew after killing two VC and having 1 Aust WIA. Airstrikes, artillery and Light Fire Teams engaged the VC camp. At 1500H C Coy entered the enemy camp again, but came under heavy fire. One Australian was killed and two Australians were wounded. A further three VC were killed. At 1700H the Coy moved clear of the enemy camp. During the night 5/6 Feb heavy artillery harassing fire was fired on the enemy camp.

(5) At 1130H three VC approached V Coy 2 RAR's position at YT223192. Claymores and small arms were used to kill two VC. The third VC escaped. Two AK47s were captured.

(6) At 1300H at YT232182 Anti Tank Pl 2 RAR contacted 7 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA and the capture of 1 RPG2 rocket and 1 grenade.

n. 6 Feb 68.

(1) 2 RAR and 7 RAR continued to maintain their blocking positions. 2 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and D Coy 2 RAR patrolled the area of FSPB ANDERSEN and 1 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and C Coy 7 RAR patrolled the area of FSPB HARRISON.

(2) Seven airstrikes were put in during the day. Three of these strikes were in support of C Coy 7 RAR and a further two were against enemy occupied areas. Eighteen VC were killed.

(3) C Company 7 RAR moved into the enemy camp at YT191167. The camp was one of a series which extended NORTH from the area of contact on 5 Feb. During the day the complex was again hit with airstrikes. C Coy made no contact with the enemy.

(4) At 0710H 2 VC approached V Coy's position. They were killed with small arms fire. One AK47 was captured. At 0850H at YT158206 D Coy 7 RAR contacted 3 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and the capture of 1 AK47, 1 RPG7 and 1 RPG7 rocket. At 0853H at YT222154 C Coy 2 RAR contacted 3 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC) and the capture of 2 SKS rifles, 1 Garrand rifle and 3 Chicom grenades. At 1000H at YT230181 Anti Tank Pl 2 RAR contacted 7 VC resulting in 6 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC WIA and the capture of 1 x 60mm mortar, 3 AK47s and four grenades. At 1340H at YT238183 V Coy 2 RAR contacted 3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and the capture of a 9mm Chicom SMG. There was 1 NZ KIA. At 1537H at YT184212 B Coy 7 RAR wounded and captured 1 VC after a fire fight with 1-2 VC. At 2031H 3-5 VC approached FSPB ANDERSEN. They were engaged with small arms and claymores resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and the capture of 1 x 9mm pistol and 1 AK47.

o. 7 Feb 68.

(1) 2 RAR and 7 RAR continued to maintain their blocking positions. C Coy 7 RAR who had been opcon Comd FSPB HARRISON reverted to command 7 RAR, and continued their search of the camp complex

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18.

found on 5 Feb. 2 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and D Coy 2 RAR patrolled the area of FSPB ANDERSEN. C Coy 3 RAR patrolled to the NORTH of FSPB HARRISON. During the afternoon Bn HQ 2 RAR moved by helicopter to YT222148.

(2) Three airstrikes were put in during the day. One was into an occupied VC camp at YT182227. The VC used automatic small arms against the strike aircraft. The results of the strike were 10 VC KBA.

(3) At 0640H a company plus of VC attacked V Coy at YT238184. The attack was well conducted and approximately 20-30 rockets were fired into V Coy's perimeter. Artillery mortars and Light Fire teams provided support for V Coy during the action. The results of the action were 13 VC KIA (BC) and 8 NZ WIA (6 evacuated). V Coy captured 6 AK47s, 2 LMGs, 3 RPGs, 12 anti tank grenades, 13 RPG2 rockets, 1 grenade and two sand bags of small ammunition.

(4) At 1025H at YT156214 12 Pl 7 RAR wounded and captured 1 VC. At 1035H at YT155206 D Coy 7 RAR contacted 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and the capture of 1 grenade.

(5) C Coy 7 RAR continued to search the camp complex found on 5 Feb. At 1200H at YT192165 they contacted 7 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC). At 1500H at YT194168 the coy contacted a company sized force of VC. There were 12 Australians WIA in this action. At 1440H at YT212186 A Coy 2 RAR contacted 2 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). One grenade and 3 AK47 magazines were captured. At 1851H at YT212186 A Coy 2 RAR contacted an unknown number of VC resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC) and the capture of 4 AK47s and 1 LMG. At 1917H at YT212186 A Coy 2 RAR contacted 10-12 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and the capture of 1 AK47. There was 1 Australian WIA in the action.

(6) In a VC camp at YT183218 B Coy 7 RAR found 1 AN/PRC 9A radio, 3 walkie talkie radios, 4 AK47s, 1 rifle, 100 lb explosives, 2 claymores, 3 anti tank grenades, 9 RCL rounds, 64 detonators and 13 grenades.

p. 8 Feb 68.

(1) 2 RAR and 7 RAR (-) began moving SOUTH in preparation for redeployment. A Coy 7 RAR maintained their blocking position EAST of the DONG NAI river. C Coy 3 RAR continued patrolling around FSPB HARRISON and 2 Tp A Sqn and elements of D Coy 2 RAR patrolled in the vicinity of FSPB ANDERSEN. There were three airstrikes into VC camps during the day.

(2) At 0650H at YT212186 A Coy 2 RAR killed 1 VC and captured 1 AN/PRC 10 radio set. At 1115H at YT166221 Anti Tank Pl 7 RAR contacted 2-4 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and the capture of 1 x 9mm Chicom pistol. At 1230H at YT234181 V Coy contacted 3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and the capture of 1 AK47 and a grenade. At 1530H 1 VC approached A Coy 2 RAR at YT212186. The VC was killed and 1 RPG7, 2 RPG7 rockets and 3 grenades were captured.

(3) C Coy 7 RAR continued their search of the camp complex in the vicinity of YT194167. During the day the Coy found 1 75mm RCL, 1 RPG2, 6 RPG2 rounds, 1 7.62mm rifle, 1 Chicom LMG, 16 grenades, 3000lbs of rice, 60 sets of clothing, medical equipment and small arms ammunition.

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19.

q. 9 Feb 68.

(1) 1 ATF began a redeployment phase for the continuation of Operation COBURG. The order for the redeployment was as follows:

(a) 2 RAR.

- i. Continue operations in AO STIMPSON.
- ii. On 11 Feb complete changeover of HORSESHOE HILL company - C Coy relieves W Coy.
- iii. Commencing 091430H Feb relieve D Coy at FSPB ANDERSEN, place V Coy under comd of A Sqn 3 Cav Regt (-) for local defence FSPB ANDERSEN.

(b) 3 RAR.

- i. On 10 Feb move by air to vicinity FSPB HARRISON.
- ii. Commence operations in AO AYRE on arrival.
- iii. Place one mor. sect under comd 4 Fd Regt (-) at FSPB HARRISON for local defence.

(c) 7 RAR.

- i. Bn less A Coy to be relieved by 3 RAR.
- ii. On 10 Feb place A Coy under comd 4 Fd Regt (-) for local defence FSPB HARRISON.
- iii. Bn less A Coy to return to NUI DAT by air 10 Feb.

(d) Artillery.

- i. Commencing 110730H Feb 161 Fd Bty is to move by air to relieve 106 Fd Bty at FSPB HARRISON.
- ii. 106 Fd Bty is to move by air to NUI DAT.

(e) 1 Fd Sqn.

- i. 2 Tp to be relieved by 3 Tp on 9 Feb.
- ii. Deploy two combat engr teams to op 3 RAR.
- iii. Combat engr teams deployed with 7 RAR to move with 7 RAR to NUI DAT.

(2) 7 RAR less A Coy continued moving towards FSPB HARRISON and at 1337H Bn HQ 7 RAR moved by air to YS167185. The Mortar Pl 7 RAR was redeployed to FSPB HARRISON by RAAF helicopter during the morning. At 1430H D Coy 2 RAR moved by RAAF helicopter to relieve V Coy at YT234176. V Coy moved to FSPB ANDERSEN. The remainder of 2 RAR maintained their positions and continued patrolling. 2 Tp 1 Fd Sqn moved by helicopter to NUI DAT and was relieved by 3 Tp.

(3) 1 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and elements of C Coy 3 RAR and 2 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and the Def Pl patrolled the area of FSPB HARRISON and ANDERSEN respectively.

(4) There were three airstrikes against VC camps during the day.

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20.

r. 10 Feb 68.

(1) The redeployment of 1 ATF continued. At 0730H C Coy 2 RAR was extracted from YT223149 by helicopter and returned to NUI DAT. At 0820H the changeover of 3 RAR/7 RAR less A Coy through FSPB HARRISON began. A Coy 3 RAR moved directly to relieve A Coy 7 RAR at YT133227. A Coy 7 RAR moved to FSPB HARRISON by helicopter. On arrival at FSPB HARRISON 3 RAR began moving NORTH into AO AYRE. V Coy 2 RAR and 2 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt patrolled the area of FSPB ANDERSEN. 2 RAR maintained their company positions and patrolled.

(2) During the day D Coy 2 RAR had five contacts with small groups of 2-5 VC in the area of YT237188. The results of these contacts were 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 AK47 and 1 grenade captured. There were 2 Australians KIA.

(3) Three airstrikes were put into VC base camps in AO COLUMBUS during the day.

s. 11 Feb 68.

(1) The redeployment of 1 ATF continued. There were no contacts with the enemy.

(2) After W Coy had been relieved by C Coy 2 RAR at HORSESHOE HILL YS4962 the relief of 106 Fd Bty by 161 Fd Bty began. By 1143H 161 Fd Bty was complete at FSPB HARRISON.

(3) 2 RAR continued to patrol from coy positions in AO SIMPSON. D Coy 2 RAR moved SOUTH EAST from the area of their contacts of 10 Feb.

(4) 3 RAR less A Coy continued to move NORTH into AO AYRE while A Coy maintained its blocking positions EAST of the DONG NAI river in the vicinity of YT133227.

(5) A Coy 7 RAR and V Coy 2 RAR patrolled the area of FSPB HARRISON and FSPB ANDERSEN respectively.

(6) There were five airstrikes put in against VC base camps. There was 1 VC KBA.

t. 12 Feb 68.

(1) The redeployment of 1 ATF continued and orders were issued for further redeployment which involved the move back to NUI DAT of 2 RAR less W Coy. 2 RAR continued patrolling and moved to LZs in preparation for extraction to NUI DAT on 13 Feb. W Coy 2 RAR moved by helicopter from NUI DAT to FSPB ANDERSEN. On arrival they became opcon 3 RAR and began moving WEST from FSPB ANDERSEN towards AO NULLABOR. 3 RAR began patrolling back towards FSPB HARRISON in preparation for the next phase of operations.

(2) At 1125H at YT244176 D Coy 2 RAR contacted 3 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and the capture of 2 AK47s and 2 grenades. Three VC base camps were hit by airstrikes.

u. 13 Feb 68.

(1) Orders were issued for the continuation of Operation COBURG. The orders were as follows:

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21.

(a) 2 RAR.

i. Bn less D, V, and W Coys extracts by air to NUI DAT on 14 Feb 68.

ii. D and W Coys to operate opcon 3 RAR.

1 D Coy wef arrival FSPB ANDERSEN.

2 W Coy wef 121200H.

(b) V Coy and one sect mor pl 2 RAR are to move by APC to NUI LAT under opcon A Sqn 3 Cav Regt on 14 Feb.

(c) 3 RAR.

i. Grouping. 3 RAR Gp:

under comd from 141200H

161 Fd Bty  
3 Tp 1 Fd Sqn

Opcon

D and W Coys 2 RAR  
One Tp and two mor APCs  
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt (plus  
one engr mini team)

In DS remaining

One H13 161 (Indep)  
Recce Flt

On call for general sp  
reinforcing

B Bty 2/35 Arty (US)

ii. Tasks.

1 Commence ops in AO NULLABOR on 13 Feb. (see Annex 'Q').

2 At 130800H relieve A Coy 7 RAR at FSPB HARRISON with one rifle coy and maintain this coy at the FSPB until all elements 4 Fd Regt have been extracted.

3 At 140730H commence relief of V Coy 2 RAR at FSPB ANDERSEN.

4 Maintain one coy and one mor sect at FSPB ANDERSEN from 140930H for local def FSPB.

iii. A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.

1 Escort convoy to NUI DAT.

2 Place one tp and two mor APCs opcon 3 RAR on 14 Feb.

3 Provide one APC as AWCC.

iv. Artillery.

1 At 130830H extract 161 Fd Bty and one radar Det 131 Div Loc Bty to FSPB ANDERSEN.

2 Commencing 140800H extract all remaining elements 4 Fd Regt from FSPB HARRISON to NUI DAT.

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22.

3 AWCC. Det 161 (Indep) Recce Flt continues ops from FSPB ANDERSEN as BIEN HOA Forward.

v. 1 Fd Sqn.

1 Extract all elements to NUI DAT on 14 Feb excl:

3 Tp 1 Fd Sqn  
One D4 Dozer  
Water Point

2 Be prepared to assist road convoy on 14 Feb by rapid repair of culverts and bridges, by the provision of bypasses and the checking of suspect mined areas.

vi. 161 (Indep) Recce Flt.

1 Continue to provide one FW for VR in ops area.

2 AWCC continues ops.

3 Provide one H13 for OC A Sqn for convoy control from 141200H.

vii. HQ Coy 1 ATF. Extracts to NUI DAT.

(2) The role of 1 ATF in the area of AO COLUMBUS changed considerably. The TAOR was increased by the addition of AO NULLABOR however the number of troops deployed was decreased.

(3) As 2 RAR and 3 RAR moved out of AOs SIMPSON and AYRE and FSPB HARRISON was abandoned, AO COLUMBUS and AO COLUMBUS EAST less AO NULLABOR and AO FSPB ANDERSEN came directly under the control of Tac HQ 1 ATF which remained in FSPB ANDERSEN. Ground activity by 1 ATF elements in these areas ceased and was replaced by heavy air activity and artillery fire against VC installations. Certain parts of AO COLUMBUS EAST were also allocated to 18 ARVN Div for reconnaissance in force operations.

(4) At 0745H D Coy 2 RAR moved by RAAF helicopter from an LZ at YT245175 to FSPB ANDERSEN. On arrival D Coy became opcon 3 RAR. At 0735H the move of 161 Fd Bty from FSPB HARRISON to FSPB ANDERSEN by CH47s helicopter began. 161 Fd Bty was complete at FSPB ANDERSEN by 0920H. C Coy 3 RAR and 1 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt moved from FSPB HARRISON via Route 24 and Route 1 and began operations to the SOUTH WEST of AO NULLABOR. D Coy 3 RAR relieved A Coy 7 RAR of its protection task at FSPB HARRISON. A Coy 7 RAR moved by CH47 helicopter to NUI DAT at 1110H. At 1300H the extraction of HQ 2 RAR, A and B Coys initially to FSPB ANDERSEN by AHC and then to NUI DAT by CH47 helicopter began. By 1000H the move was complete.

(5) D Coy 2 RAR began moving into the NORTH WEST of AO NULLABOR.

(6) There were no contacts with the enemy during the day however four airstrikes were put into VC base camps.

v. 14 Feb 68.

(1) The redeployment of 1 ATF continued. At 0730H HQ 3 RAR, A Coy and the mor pl were moved by air from FSPB HARRISON to FSPB ANDERSEN. On arrival, A Coy relieved V Coy 2 RAR of its task of defending FSPB ANDERSEN. At 0800H the extraction of 4 Fd Regt less 161 Fd Bty by CH47 to NUI DAT commenced. When this move was complete D Coy 3 RAR abandoned FSPB HARRISON and began moving SOUTH to AO NULLABOR.

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/23.



23.

(2) At 1124H a convoy consisting of A Sqn 3 Cav Regt less two troops, V Coy 2 RAR, elements of 1 Fd Sqn, HQ Coy 1 ATF and vehicles of the TFMA, 104 Sig Sqn and 1 ALSG left FSPB ANDERSEN for NUI DAT. The convoy moved via Route 1 to LONG BINH and then via Route 15 to NUI DAT.

(3) The Commander 1 ATF and a small staff remained at FSPB ANDERSEN.

(4) There was one contact with the enemy. At 0924H at YT190128 W Coy 2 RAR contacted 2 VC with no results.

w. 15-17 Feb 68.

(1) 3 RAR carried out reconnaissance in force operation in AO NULLABOR. Tac HQ 1 ATF continued to control AOs COLUMBUS and COLUMBUS EAST less AO NULLABOR and AO FSPB ANDERSEN. A pattern of airstrikes and artillery fire was directed at known VC camps and VC routes in the area. Eight significant airstrikes were put in against VC base camps and installations.

(2) On 16 Feb D Coy 2 RAR was released from opcon 3 RAR and returned to NUI DAT by air.

(3) Contact with the enemy by 3 RAR was light. At 151340H at YT173134 W Coy 2 RAR contacted 12-15 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA(BC) and the capture of two weapons.

(4) At 171000H control of the complete area of AOs COLUMBUS and COLUMBUS EAST were given to 3 RAR. Tac HQ 1 ATF returned to NUI DAT during the day.

x. 18 Feb - 1 Mar 68.

(1) During this period 3 RAR continued reconnaissance in force operation in AO NULLABOR and AO FSPB ANDERSEN and continued the destruction of VC camps in AO COLUMBUS and AO COLUMBUS EAST. On 24 Feb D Coy 7 RAR moved to FSPB ANDERSEN and became opcon 3 RAR. W Coy 2 RAR returned to NUI DAT.

(2) Twenty nine significant airstrikes were put in against VC camps during this period.

(3) At 180107H an estimated VC company launched a ground attack against FSPB ANDERSEN. The attack was supported by mortar, RPG and IMG fire. CB fire from 3 RAR Mors silenced the enemy mors. Casualties from the attack were 7 Aust KIA, 1 US KIA, 22 Aust WIA (13 evacuated) and 3 US WIA. VC casualties are unknown.

(4) At 192320H an unknown sized VC force attacked FSPB ANDERSEN. Results of the attack were 4 VC KIA (BC).

(5) At YT161154 on 24 Feb B Coy 3 RAR found a cache containing 21 60mm mortar bombs, a grenade and miscellaneous items of clothing, medical supplies and documents.

(6) At 251045H at YT175122 C Coy 3 RAR contacted 4 VC without results. In the follow up action there were 2 Aust WIA.

(7) At 261600H at YT172129 D Coy 3 RAR contacted 3 VC. There was 1 VC KIA (BC).

(8) At 280100H 15-20 mortar rounds were fired into FSPB ANDERSEN causing 3 US WIA.

(9) On 29 Mar D Coy 3 RAR returned to NUI DAT by helicopter and on 1 Mar 3 RAR and supporting elements abandoned FSPB ANDERSEN and moved to NUI DAT by road and air.

/24.



12. Results.a. Friendly Losses.

- (1) Personnel: 4 Aust KIA (in addition 3 DOW)  
 2 NZ KIA  
 1 US KIA  
 61 Aust WIA (evacuated)  
 8 NZ WIA (evacuated)  
 6 US WIA (evacuated)

(2) Material: Nil.

b. Enemy Losses.

- (1) Personnel: 145 VC KIA (BC)  
 7 VC KIA (poss)  
 52 VC killed by air  
 24 VC killed by arty  
 27 VC WIA  
 5 VC PW

(2) Material:

- (a) Captured: 9 crew served weapons  
 94 small arms  
 10 RPG2 launchers  
 3 RPG7 launchers  
 5 Transmitter/receiver radios  
 2 compasses

- (b) Destroyed: 49 RPG2 rockets  
 8 RPG7 rockets  
 9 RCL rounds  
 13 claymores  
 99 grenades  
 29 mortar bombs  
 5 bangalore torpedoes  
 172lbs explosive  
 5 mines  
 3500lbs rice

13. Administration.a. General.

(1) Operation COBURG was the first time that a TFMA was established outside a base area to support units engaged in operations. Prior to this operation, units drew their daily maintenance requirements direct from their echelons located at NUI DAT.

(2) COBURG was also the first deployment of 1 ATF outside the Province. It was not economically possible to maintain the force in the "old style", that is from the 1 ATF base area. The "new look" logistic system deployed a TFMA within economical range of the supplying depots and the user units.

(3) Throughout the operation, it is emphasized that the normal system of daily maintenance was employed. There was no departures from established principles, nor were any departures contemplated. The only difference, was the re-location of part of the logistic agencies.

b. The Outline System.

(1) The warning order to deploy was issued approximately 48 hours prior to the deployment occurring. It must be appreciated that, in



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this instance, there was insufficient time to prepare a detailed maintenance plan and a system of "the best educated guess" was employed.

(2) It was quickly agreed that, because of the distance between 1 ALSG and HQ area of operations:

(a) It was uneconomical to maintain the Task Force from VUNG TAU.

(b) The most economical method of resupply would be to draw from an existing depot close to the area.

(c) The normal resupply system must continue to operate.

(d) The Task Force must be maintained in two locations, namely at NUI DAT and in the COBURG area.

(3) Therefore, the following decisions were taken:

(a) The US depot complex at LONG BINH should be used to supply the forward elements of the Task Force.

(b) The Task Force elements at NUI DAT would continue to be supplied from VUNG TAU.

(c) It would be necessary to split the logistic elements of both 1 ALSG and 1 ATF.

(4) Accordingly the following occurred:

(a) 1 ALSG deployed a "drawing and delivery" detachment to LONG BINH. The function of this team was to draw requirements from US sources and deliver them to the Task Force.

(b) The TFMA split into two groups:

i. Fwd TFMA to receive in bulk and issue to unit echelons deployed in the COBURG area.

ii. Rear TFMA to receive and issue to elements of the Task Force remaining at NUI DAT.

(5) The logistic system was thus established and those units required to operate the system were deployed. No changes in methods or system of resupply were envisaged or employed.

(6) The establishment of the 1 ALSG cell at LONG BINH is outside the scope of this report.

c. (1) The Fwd TFMA deployed forward to FSPB ANDERSEN on 24 Jan 68 by road and air.

(2) Because of the short notice on which the Fwd TFMA was deployed, it was impossible for the TFMA to provide a representative on the 1 ATF Advance Party and also continue with concurrent preparations of personnel and equipment for the move of the Fwd TFMA. It was therefore decided that OC 26 Coy RAASC would move by air on 24 Jan 68, the balance of the Fwd TFMA moving by road.

(3) OC 26 Coy RAASC arrived at FSPB ANDERSEN approximately three hours before the arrival of the main body. This allowed a plan for the TFMA layout to be made before the arrival of stores. However as a matter of procedure it is felt that a Fwd TFMA recon element must move into an area where it is proposed to deploy a Fwd TFMA as early as possible.

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(4) As with the Task Force Headquarters, it was quickly apparent that the existing TFMA can only barely and adequately function when split. The operation pointed out several weaknesses in the existing TFMA establishment and the appropriate RVEs have been submitted.

d. Comments on the System that Operated.

(1) Planning provided for daily resupply to the Fwd TFMA from Fwd ALSG using road transport. This worked well until the VC denied us the use of the road. The rapid switch to aerial resupply underlines the flexibility of the existing logistic system.

(2) It was, indeed, unfortunate that more timely warning of the operation could not be given. This lack of warning meant that Fwd ALSG did not deploy until the same day as the Task Force. Therefore contacts with the Americans were sketchy and tenuous and it was with great difficulty, but with commendable effort, that the first resupply was effected on day two.

(3) The switch from a road L of C to an air L of C was rapidly and smoothly achieved.

(4) Material and Services.

(a) Task Force SOP were followed.

(b) Fresh rations were not programmed. This was an error when the length of the operation was considered. However, extensions to the operation were introduced three or four days at a time. Towards the concluding stages a limited amount of fresh rations (one meal a day) was introduced.

(c) No provision was made to stock the Fwd TFMA with a range of ordnance stores. This decision was taken because:

i. The initial planned deployment time was 11 days.

ii. No scaling of desired items was readily available from 1 OFP on the warning given.

Since this operation a scaling, held in bin packs, has been provisioned and a detachment is available for deployment.

(d) Canteen supplies were not provided because:

i. The American Sundry Pack contains adequate stocks of cigarettes, confectionary, writing materials, etc.

ii. An air L of C did not allow sufficient space to be used for non-combat essential requirements.

(e) Summary.

i. Current logistic procedures are sound.

ii. The logistic system is flexible and can rapidly switch to alternative means of resupply.

iii. Established procedures enabled the operation to be smoothly launched and maintained with a minimum of time for planning.

iv. Some errors in initial stocking figures occurred because insufficient time was available to adequately plan the maintenance of the operation.



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14. Commander's Analysis.

a. Operation COBURG was a very successful operation in that the 1 ATF mission, to prevent the movement of enemy forces to their attack positions and subsequently to interdict their withdrawal, was achieved during the period 1 ATF was deployed in AO COLUMBUS.


b. Although the enemy's attacks against his major targets were not prevented, it is certain that they were hindered to a considerable extent by 1 ATF's activities in AO COLUMBUS. 1 ATF had no contact with enemy main force regiments prior to the TET offensive. However, numerous contacts with local force elements who were to act as guides and with enemy engineer elements in AO COLUMBUS undoubtedly contributed to the failure of the enemy's attacks against major installations in the III Corps area.

*R.L. Hughes*  
for  
(R.L. HUGHES)  
Brig  
Comd

Annex: Q. AOs Op COBURG.

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**LEGEND - CHỮ TỰ**  
MAP INFORMATION AS OF 1965  
BẢN ĐỒ TỈNH TUYÊN 1965

On this map a LANE is considered as being a minimum of 2.4 m in width. Tracks less than 2.4 m wide are shown as dashed lines. Tracks 2.4 m or more wide are shown as solid lines. Tracks 2.4 m or more wide are shown as solid lines. Tracks 2.4 m or more wide are shown as solid lines.

When referring to populated place names, include UTM grid coordinates. The number in parentheses following a populated place name indicates more than one place is so named within the map sheet area.

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**Scale**  
Tỷ lệ 1:50,000

1 1/2 0 1 2 3 Statute Miles  
1000 500 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Meters  
1 1/2 0 1 2 3 Nautical Miles

**CONTOUR INTERVAL - 20 METERS**  
SUPPLEMENTARY CONTOURS - 10 METERS

**SPHEROID** ..... EVEREST  
**GRID** ..... 1,000 METER UTM: ZONE 48 (BLACK NUMBERED LINES)  
**PROJECTION** ..... TRANSVERSE MERCATOR  
**VERTICAL DATUM** ..... MEAN SEA LEVEL AT HÀ TIÊN  
**HORIZONTAL DATUM** ..... INDIAN DATUM 1960

**CREDITS**  
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PRINTED BY ..... AMS (WO), U.S. ARMY

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XIN GỬI NHỮNG SỬA ĐỔI TRONG BẢN ĐỒ NÀY VỀ NHÀ BẠC-HÀ QUỐC GIA, DALAT, VIỆT NAM

**KHOẢNG CÁCH ĐỀU VÒNG CAO ĐỘ: 20 MÉT**  
CÁC VÒNG CAO ĐỘ PHỤ TÙNG 10 MÉT

**KHỐI BẮC ĐƯỢC**  
O VUÔNG ..... UTM TÍNH 1,000 MÉT: KHU HÌNH THOẠI  
(NHỮNG ĐƯỜNG CÓ CHỈ SỐ ĐỎ)

**HỆ THỐNG CHẾ**  
BÌNH DIỆN CHUẨN ..... MẶT BẰNG TRUNG BÌNH TẠI HÀ TIÊN  
HỆ THỐNG TRẮC CẦU CHUẨN ..... HỆ THỐNG TRẮC CẦU AN ĐỘ 1960

**GRID CONVERGENCE**  
FOR CENTER OF SHEET  
VỊ TRÍ VUÔNG CỘT VÀ VUÔNG  
TÍNH Ở TRUNG TÂM BẢN ĐỒ  
0°24' (7 MILS/MIL)

**ELEVATION GUIDE**  
CHỈ DẪN CAO ĐỘ

**BOUNDARIES**  
NHỮNG ĐỊA GIỚI

**ADJOINING SHEETS**  
BẢNG RÁP ĐỊA ĐỒ


**VIETNAMESE** ..... **ENGLISH** ..... **COMPARABLE** .....  
Tỉnh, Khu or Tỉnh ..... U.S. STATE  
Xã, Huyện, Quận ..... District  
Thị trấn, Phường ..... Township  
Thị trấn, Phường ..... Hamlet

**VIETNAMESE** ..... **ENGLISH** ..... **COMPARABLE** .....  
A. Tỉnh Bình Hòa ..... U.S. STATE  
1. Quận Bình Hòa ..... District  
2. Quận Bình Hòa ..... Township  
3. Quận Bình Hòa ..... Hamlet  
B. Tỉnh Bình Hòa ..... U.S. STATE  
1. Quận Bình Hòa ..... District  
2. Quận Bình Hòa ..... Township  
3. Quận Bình Hòa ..... Hamlet  
C. Tỉnh Bình Hòa ..... U.S. STATE  
1. Quận Bình Hòa ..... District  
2. Quận Bình Hòa ..... Township  
3. Quận Bình Hòa ..... Hamlet


**GLOSSARY - CỜ TỰ**

Ấp ..... village  
Bãi ..... lake, pond, swamp  
Cầu ..... bridge  
Đồn ..... plantation  
Núi ..... hill, mountain  
Sông, Suối ..... stream  
Xã ..... village






# AO COLUMBUS EAST




XÃ GIA KIÊM, VIETNAM STOCK NO. L701464313









**NOTE**

From 161200H Feb 68, 3 RAR controlled this complete area of Operation COBURG.

**LEGEND - CHỮ TIẾT**  
**MAP INFORMATION AS OF 1965**  
**BẢN ĐỒ TỈNH TẠM NĂM 1965**

On this map a LANE is considered as being a minimum of 2.4 km in width. Thôn bản chỉ rộng một LỐI XE Đạp đi được có một rừng rậm thì nhỏ là 2 km rưỡi

Desert forest or jungle indicates more than 25 percent of ground is covered by canopy with undergrowth generally impassable to man. Clear forest indicates more than 25 percent of ground is considered to canopy with undergrowth generally passable to man. Vegetation classified by other description than forest.

*Rừng rậm hay rừng già chỉ rừng cây hay phải mặt đất rộng trên 25% chỉ thành vòm cây kín chỉ phải đi được rừng không cây bụi được. Rừng thẳm chỉ rừng cây hay phải mặt đất rộng trên 25% chỉ thành vòm cây kín chỉ phải đi được. Thảm thực vật khác rừng thẳm khác rừng.*

**WHEN REFERRING TO POPULATED PLACES NAMES, INCLUDE UTM GRID COORDINATES**  
**THE NUMBER IN PARENTHESES FOLLOWING A POPULATED PLACE NAME INDICATES**  
**MORE THAN ONE PLACE IS SO NAMED WITHIN THE MAP SHEET AREA**

**ROADS - ĐƯỜNG - ĐÀ**

All weather, hard surface, two or more lanes wide  
*Đường nhựa cứng, có hai hay nhiều làn xe đi*

All weather, loose light surface, two or more lanes wide  
*Đường cát hay đường nhựa, có hai hay nhiều làn xe đi*

All weather, hard surface, one lane wide  
*Đường nhựa cứng, có một làn xe đi*

All weather, loose light surface, one lane wide  
*Đường cát hay đường nhựa, có một làn xe đi*

Fair or better weather, loose surface - Đường đất

Cart track - Đường nhỏ không bề mặt

Footpath, trail or weather, loose, đường bộ không bề mặt

**ROUTE MARKERS - DẤU HIỆU ĐƯỜNG - SÀ**

Quail - Chỉ Lườn sông

Provisional - Chưa có

Tỉnh lộ - Đường 10 hay khác

**RAILROADS - ĐƯỜNG XE LỬA**

Normal gauge, single track, 1 meter (3'3") wide, Station  
*Đường sắt thường, một đường, rộng 1 mét G, trạm*

Normal gauge, double track  
*Đường sắt thường, hai đường*

Narrow gauge, single track  
*Đường sắt hẹp, một đường*

**Airfield - BANG CHỖ SẦM SẦM**  
 Sân bay: Đường chạy máy bay; Tầng máy

**Bridges**

Wood - Cầu gỗ

Steel - Cầu thép

Concrete - Cầu bê tông

Footbridge - Cầu nhỏ

Ferry - Phà

Ford - Chỗ lội qua

Boat across - Cầu thuyền

Levee - Wall - Bùn đất, Tường

**Canal or ditch; Less than 18 meters wide; Over 12 meters wide**  
*Kênh hay mương; dưới 18 mét; trên 12 mét*

**HAO LONG**

Provisional office, Delegation office  
*Trạm văn phòng; Văn phòng; Trụ sở hành chính Quận*

Tank, Well, Spring  
*Đất chứa nước; Nước ngầm*


Messy; Dam; Earthen dam  
*Đập đất; Đập đất*


Lake or pond; Permanent; Intermittent  
*Hồ hay ao; Có nước quanh năm; Tầng máy*

**Other symbols:**

- Build-up area - Thôn thị
- Village - Làng
- Church; Christian shrine; School
- Núi thì: Thôn rậm; Trường học
- Temple; Pagoda; Minor pagoda
- Đền; Chùa; Chùa nhỏ
- Post office; Telegraph; Telephone
- Trạm bưu điện; Trạm điện
- Dam - Cánh cửa
- City - Thành phố
- Fort; Barracks - Đồn; Trại
- Horizontal control point
- Điểm kiểm soát ngang
- Spot elevation in meters; Contour; Unchecked
- Cao độ điểm cao; Đường đồng mức; Chưa kiểm tra
- Plantation; Tea
- Đồn; Trại
- Swamp
- Đầm lầy
- Land subject to inundation
- Đất dễ bị ngập
- Rice; Mangrove
- Đất nước; Cây lúa
- Coffee; Rubber
- Cà phê; Cao su
- Palm; Braconid
- Cây dừa; Bọ rầy
- Pine; Bamboo
- Cây thông; Tre

Scale 1:150,000





**CONTOUR INTERVAL - 20 METERS**  
**SUPPLEMENTARY CONTOURS - 10 METERS**

**SPHEROID** ..... EVEREST  
**GRID** ... 1,000 METER UTM: ZONE 48 (BLACK NUMBERED LINES)  
**PROJECTION** ..... TRANSVERSE MERCATOR  
**VERTICAL DATUM** ..... MEAN SEA LEVEL AT HÀ TIÊN  
**HORIZONTAL DATUM** ..... INDIAN DATUM 1960

**CREDITS**

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**NAMES DATA BY** ..... NGS, VIETNAM  
**CONTROL BY** ..... USANSPF, NGS, VIETNAM  
**PRINTED BY** ..... AMS (VO), U.S. ARMY

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*XIN GỢI NHƯỜNG SỰ A DÒI TRONG BẢN ĐỒ NÀY CHỈ PHÁC-HOẠ VỚI TÍNH-CÁCH QUỐC GIA, ĐẤT, VIỆT NAM*

**DELINEATION OF INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES IS APPROXIMATE**  
*RANH GIỚI HÀNH-CHÍNH TRÊN BẢN ĐỒ NÀY CHỈ PHÁC-HOẠ VỚI TÍNH-CÁCH ĐẠI-CƯƠNG*

**GLOSSARY — CỜ TỬ**

Ấp	village
Bàu	lake, pond, swamp
Cầu	bridge
Đồn điền	plantation
Núi	hill, mountain
Sân Bay	airfield
S. Sông, Suối	stream
Xã	village

1:50,000

2 3 Statute Miles

2000 3000 4000 Meters

000 3000 4000 Yards

1 2 3 Nautical Miles

**KHOẢNG CÁCH ĐỀU VÒNG CAO-ĐỘ: 20 MÉT**  
**CÁC VÒNG CAO-ĐỘ PHỤ THÙNG 10 MÉT**

KHOẢNG CÁCH ĐỀU	EVEREST
U. M. 1000	UTM TUNG 1,000 MÉT, KHU VỰC THỜI 48
	(NHỮNG ĐƯỜNG CỎ CHỈ 30 MÉT)
HỆ THỐNG CHIẾU	U. T. M.
BÌNH DIỆN CHIẾU	MẶT BẰNG TRUNG BÌNH TẠI HÀ TIỆT
HỆ THỐNG TRẮC CẦU CHIẾU	HỆ THỐNG TRẮC CẦU KHU 1600

GRID CONVERGENCE  
 FOR CENTER OF SHEET  
 HƯỚNG ĐƯỜNG CỎ Ở VÙNG  
 TÍNH Ở TRUNG-TÂM BẢN-ĐỒ  
 0°24' (7 MILS/MIL)


GRID NORTH  
 BẮC 0 VÒNG

MAGNETIC NORTH  
 BẮC 10°


1965

[illegible]



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












**KHOẢNG CÁCH ĐỀU VÒNG CAO ĐỘ 10 MÉT**  
**CÁC VÒNG CAO ĐỘ PHỤ THÙNG 3 MÉT**

KHỐI BẦU DỤC O VÒNG	ƯỚN TỪNG 1.000 MÉT, KHU HỮN THỜI 48 (NHƯNG ĐƯỢC CỎ CHỈ SỐ BỀN)	EVEREST T. 1.0. T. M.
HỆ THỐNG CHUẨN BÊN BIỂN CHUẨN	MẶT BIỂN TRUNG BÌNH TẠI HẢI TIỀN	
HỆ THỐNG TRẮC CẦU CHUẨN	HỆ THỐNG TRẮC CẦU CAO ĐỘ 1980	
MẶT THỦY ĐẠO CHUẨN	LÀ MẶT BIỂN PHÒNG CHỐNG LÚC THẤP NHẤT	

GRID CONVERGENCE  
FOR CENTER OF SHEET

GRID CONVERGENCE  
FOR CENTER OF SHEET  
HƯỚNG BẰNG KẾ Ở VƯỜN  
TỈNH Ở TRUNG-TÁI BÀN-ĐỒ  
(2°21' @ 8 MILLS/MIN)

★

TRUE NORTH  
MAGNETIC NORTH  
DEC. 7°

1945