

Series: AWM95
Australian Army commanders' diaries
[Vietnam]

Headquarters units

Item number: 1/4/25

Item: Headquarters, 1 Australian
Task Force

Commanding Officers After
Action Report

[COAAR]

Operation Canberra

[1-31 Jan 1967]



1st AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM



COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATION CANBERRA

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AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM
NUI DAT

R723-1-5

27 December, 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

TO: See Distribution

1. Reference is made to: Maps: VIETNAM: 1:50,000 Sheet 6442IV
Series L701.
2. Name and Type of Operation: Operation CANBERRA -- a search and destroy operation.
3. Dates of Operation: The operation was conducted during the period 060800H October to 101327H October 1966.
4. Location: NUI THI VAL Hills centre of mass YS 2971 and NUI ONG TRINH Hills centre of mass YS 2868. Annex P (Area of Operation).
5. Control Headquarters: 1st ATF.
6. Reporting Officer: Brigadier O.D. Jackson DSO., OBE.
7. Task Organization:
 - 5 RAR
 - 1 APC Sqn (-)
 - 103 Fd Bty RAA
 - Bty A, 2/35 Arty (-)
 - Four combat engineer teams and one HQ team 1 Fd Sqn RAE
 - Elements 103 Sig Sqn
 - 3 SAS Sqn (-)
 - One Tpt Pl 1 Coy RAASC
 - Elements 1st ATF Pro Sec
 - One H13 161 (Indep) Recce Flt
 - Four UH1Bs 9 Sqn RAAF
8. Supporting Forces:
 - a. US Navy:
 - (1) Planned Support: US naval patrol craft from CAT LO.
 - (2) Extent of Employment and Effectiveness: Patrols were carried out throughout the rivers and swamps of the RUNG SAT to the WEST of AO WHITE during daylight hours from 6 to 10 October without incident.
 - b. US Army Aviation:
 - (1) Planned Support:
 - (a) One light fire team was in support of 5 RAR and at priority call to 3 SAS Sqn from 6 to 10 October.

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- (b) Firefly illumination helicopter support was available for use on the night 6/7 October on creek lines WEST of Highway 15 between PHU MY and BARIA.
- (c) Dustoff facility existed as normal. Dustoff UH1B was based at 1st ATF Dustoff Pad YS 434665 from 0700 hours to 1700 hours daily and was on standby at VUNG TAU during the hours of darkness.

(2) Extent of employment and Effectiveness:

- (a) The light fire team engaged clearly defined targets with excellent results. It also provided additional security for convoy movement.
- (b) Firefly support was not used on the request of the Province Chief. The request was made because fishermen were operating in the area during the hours of curfew in an effort to offset the effects of a lean fishing season.
- (c) The Dustoff UH1B proved invaluable in the evacuation of thirteen casualties, the majority suffering from shrapnel wounds from booby traps. Reaction time was minimal. On one occasion at 031400H October when six C/5 RAR soldiers were wounded by a booby trap, one critically, the Dustoff UH1B was airborne and en route to the pick up zone two minutes after the booby trap was detonated.

c. USAF:

- (1) Planned Support: Aircraft were available for airstrikes from US Seventh Air Force.
- (2) Extent of Employment and Effectiveness: Airstrikes were conducted on a number of occasions. Whilst there was negative BDA due to foliage on those occasions when ground follow up was not possible, the airstrikes conducted against a VC installation at YS 284711 on 8 October was so effective that C/5 RAR on searching the area on 9 October was unable to ascertain details of the exact number of weapon pits and tunnels due to the cratering caused by numerous direct hits.

9. Intelligence:

- a. Enemy strength, location, disposition and situation anticipated in the area of operation was as follows.
 - (1) During August and September there had been many agent reports of VC units up to battalion size moving throughout the area. However, it was not thought that there were any enemy forces larger than company size permanently based there. It was expected that the forces in the area were local force VC from the CHAU DUC District Company, and that their main communication routes were in the foothills to the WEST of NUI THI VAI YS 294712.

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- (2) Because of its location in relation to Highway 15 and a known VC supply route leading NORTH to the HAT DICH, the NUI THI VAI area was thought to be used as a resupply point, to provide observation posts covering Highway 15, and as a rendezvous for couriers.
 - (3) The areas considered most likely to be used by the VC were re-entrants at YS 2871, YS 2870, and YS 3071.
 - (4) The enemy was known to maintain a limited sabotage capability and could destroy any of the bridges and culverts along Highway 15 from BARIA to PHU MY. A force to carry out these tasks could also approach the selected targets from the canals and swamps to the SOUTH and WEST of Highway 15.
 - (5) Main Force VC were believed to be located as follows:
 - (a) One bn 274 Regt approximately 10 kilometres NE of PHU MY.
 - (b) Two bns 274 Regt EAST of Inter Provincial Route 2.
 - (c) Remainder of 5 VC Div EAST of Inter Provincial Route 2.
 - (6) It was not considered likely that Main Force VC would make any attempt to interfere with friendly operations in the area.
- b. Enemy strength and situation found in the area was as follows:
- (1) The operation confirmed intelligence estimates that, because of its location in relation to Highway 15 and a known VC supply route leading NORTH to the HAT DICH, the area was used as a resupply point, to provide observation posts covering Highway 15, and as a rendezvous for couriers.
 - (2) VC were contacted in generally squad and half platoon size groups. However, one group contacted at 081410H October appeared to be of platoon strength.
 - (3) Two company size installations, smaller camps, houses, and livestock were found and largely destroyed within the time available. The approaches to all these areas were thickly infested with fragmentation booby traps. Quantities of food, documents, material and equipment, a booby trap factory, and a hospital were found. The documents were evacuated to 1st ATF base camp for analysis, captured weapons were also evacuated, whilst the remainder was destroyed in situ due to the inaccessibility of caches.
- c. Terrain and Vegetation: The NUI THI VAI Hills consist of three main features, the northernmost feature rising to a height of 467 metres at YS 294712. The Hills are deeply dissected by watercourses, whilst steep gradients, granite outcrops, caves, and cliff faces are characteristic of the area which is covered in fairly dense jungle. To the SOUTH an isolated hill rises to a height of 221 metres at YS 281687. This is called NUI ONG TRINH.
- d. Weather: The weather was fine and warm by day and cool to mild by night. Occasional thunderstorms were experienced.

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10. Mission: 1st ATF was to conduct search and destroy operations in AO WHITE to assist in securing Highway 15 for Operation ROBIN, Annex P (Area of Operation).

11. Concept of Operation:

a. 6 RAR (-) and 1 APC Sqn (-) were to conduct a Road Runner Operation WEST to PHU MY YS 2574 on D-1.

b. 5 RAR was to move to the southern boundary of AO WHITE on D Day. One company of 5 RAR which had been providing local security for XA BINH BA YS 4474 was to rejoin 5 RAR by 041200H October after being relieved by one RF Company.

c. 103 Fd Bty RAA and Bty A, 2/35 Arty (-) were to displace to a fire support base SE of PHU MY YS 2574 on D Day.

d. 5 RAR was to secure the fire support base and to conduct search and destroy operations in AO WHITE from D Day to D + 4 as follows:

(1) Preliminary operations: D Coy and one mortar section were to secure the fire support base in the vicinity of YS 273665 prior to the arrival of the three guns and the battalion main body on D Day. The fire support base was to be protected by one platoon D Coy, Anti-tank platoon, and one APC section. Two sections of Mortar Platoon were to be initially located at the fire support base. One mortar section was to be heli-lifted forward to JULIE when that area had been secured.

(2) Clearnace of AO WHITE. The AO was to be progressively cleared from SOUTH to NORTH in five phases:

(a) Phase 1. Clearance to JAN and BETTY by A, B, and C Coys. Battalion Headquarters and D Coy (-) were to move behind A Coy.

(b) Phase 2. Clearance to JULIE by A, B, and C Coys. Once JULIE was secured one mortar section was to be helilifted forward from the fire support base.

(c) Phase 3. Security of HONEYCHILE by B Coy. Battalion Headquarters and D Coy (-) were to move to JULIE.

(d) Phase 4. Contour searching to MICHAEL by A and C Coys.

(e) Phase 5. Concentration at pick up zones for extraction by BHIBs and APCs for relocation along Highway 15 on Operation ROBIN.

e. 6 RAR was to continue patrolling the TAOR in Operation BATHURST; to provide one company as ready reaction force; and to provide one additional company from D + 4 to assist in securing Highway 15 during Operation ROBIN.

f. 3 SAS Sqn was to withdraw reconnaissance patrols from AO WHITE by not later than 1200 hours D Day, and was to deploy Hunter/Killer patrols NORTH and NE of AO WHITE from D Day to D + 4. These patrols were to be no further SOUTH than the 73 northing.

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12. EXECUTION.

- a. The operation was envisaged in 1st ATF Opord 1-10-66 (Op CANBERRA) dated 041100H Oct 66 and commenced at 060800H Oct 66.
- b. Contact or incident after action reports for actions that occurred during this operation are attached. All were of short duration at generally short ranges. Communications capability during contact was adequate. On contact, each section and/or platoon concerned reacted immediately with normal contact drills and subsequent fire and movement procedure. This was the first time that 5 RAR had encountered such extensively booby trapped areas.
- c. Details of VC installations, caches and equipment located are contained in the attached installation reports. A statistical summary is given in paragraph 13.b.
- d. A statement of events in chronological order is as follows:

(1) D - 1 (5 October). The scheduled Road Runner operation by 6 RAR (+) and 1 APC Sqn (-) from NUI DAT YS 4367 to PHU MY YS 2574 was cancelled as company size patrolling of the TAOR and preparations for Operation CANBERRA continued.

(2) D Day (6 October).

(a) 0800 hours. 1 APC Sqn commenced lift of 5 RAR and supporting elements from 1st ATF base camp to area SOUTH of AO WHITE.

(b) 0900 hours. 103 Fd Bty RAA and Bty A, 2/35 Arty (-) moved from 1st ATF base camp with APC escort to fire support base at YS 270667.

(c) 1030 hours. 5 RAR, 103 Fd Bty RAA and Bty A, 2/35 Arty (-) were in location at the fire support base. Four APCs remained at the fire support base to assist in local defence.

(d) 1100 hours. 3 SAS Sqn had withdrawn reconnaissance patrols from AO WHITE and deployed four Hunter Killer patrols NORTH and NE of the AO. 5 RAR commenced Phase 1 of the operation with A, B, and C Coys sweeping from SOUTH to NORTH through the southern sector of AO WHITE. 103 Sig Sqn had deployed a rebroadcast station on VC hill YS 2645 for the duration of the operation, whilst a light aircraft was available for aerial rebroadcast as required.

(e) 1700 hours. 5 RAR completed Phase 1 of the operation and moved into night locations. Battalion HQ and D Coy (-) were located at YS 278684, A Coy at YS 275687, B Coy at YS 271692, C Coy at YS 278689, fire support base at YS 270667.

(3) D + 1 (7 October):

(a) 0704 hours. 5 RAR commenced Phase 2 of the operation.

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- (b) 1000 hours. A/5 RAR was located at YS 285689, B/5 RAR at YS 270685, C/5 RAR at YS 288693, D (-)/5 RAR at YS 279685, and 5 RAR Bn HQ at YS 278686. All companies were moving except C/5 RAR.
- (c) 1010 hours. 103 Fd Bty RAA and Bty A, 2/35 Arty (-) moved to new fire support base at YS 258682. 5 RAR protective and supporting elements remained at former fire support base. Ten APCs assisted in local defence of new fire support base.
- (d) 1315 hours. D/5 RAR sustained one casualty with a fractured collarbone whilst negotiating a cliff face. An emergency LZ was constructed at the eastern end of JAN and the casualty was evacuated in an H13.
- (e) 1407 hours. C/5 RAR completed construction of a landing zone at JULIE.
- (f) 1530 hours. 5 RAR Bn HQ was located at YS 286692, A/5 RAR at YS 293692, B/5 RAR at YS 279700, C/5 RAR at YS 286694, D(-)/5 RAR was approaching JULIE whilst two sections of the M rtar Platoon were being helilifted to JULIE from the former fire support base.
- (g) 1645 hours. 5 RAR protective elements moved from area of former fire support base at YS 270667 to new fire support base at YS 258682.
- (h) 1930 hours. 5 RAR Bn HQ was located at YS 289694, A/5 RAR at YS 297696, B/5 RAR at YS 277700, C/5 RAR at YS 287698, D(-)/5 RAR at YS 288696, Mortar Platoon 5 RAR at YS 288694, and fire support base at YS 258682. C/5 RAR and D/5 RAR had been resupplied by UHIBs.
- (4) D + 2 (8 October)
- (a) 0700 hours. 5 RAR continued Phase 3 of the operation.
- (b) 0745 hours. Vietnamese civilians informed troops at fire support base that Highway 15 was mined at YS 253704. The information was passed to Phuoc Tuy Sector HQ as no mine clearance facilities were available.
- (c) 0945 hours. One SAS patrol contacted and killed three VC (BC) at YS 275745.
- (d) 1040 hours. C/5 RAR sighted six to eight VC at YS 288707 and was fired on from four locations over a frontage of eighty metres. The VC withdrew NE. Whilst participating in a sweep of the area one soldier from C/5 RAR set off a fragmentation booby trap which wounded six soldiers who were evacuated to 36th Evacuation Hospital at VUNG TAU by Dustoff UHIB.
- (e) 1400 hours. One C/5 RAR soldier set off a similar booby trap which wounded another five soldiers who were also evacuated by Dustoff UHIB.

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- (f) 1410 hours. B/5 RAR observed thirty VC in separate groups one of twelve VC, one of seven VC, and one of eleven VC, in the general area of YS 285701. The VC were dressed in grey uniforms with grey hats. C/5 RAR had discovered that their area was thickly booby trapped and contained houses and livestock. All booby traps were attached to vines designed to channel movement along a track.
- (g) 1430 hours. B/5 RAR sighted fifteen VC in a camp at YS 284711. All approaches to the camp were heavily booby trapped which made further progress difficult and hazardous. Both camps were engaged by artillery fire and one light fire team in an effort to destroy the camps and clear the booby traps prior to a detailed search being carried out.
- (h) 1730 hours. 5 RAR withdrew and called down airstrikes on both camps in an effort to clear the areas. However, due to the difficulty of the terrain the companies were unable to move back to the target areas by last light. The VC camps were also engaged by artillery during the afternoon and night.
- (i) 1845 hours. An airstrike was conducted on a suspected VC withdrawal route at YS 285714. There was negative BDA due to foliage.
- (j) 1850 hours. An airstrike was conducted against twenty VC at YS 344756 who had been sighted by a SAS patrol whilst being extracted by UH1B. There was negative BDA due to foliage.
- (k) 1915 hours. Three high explosive mortar bombs landed 300 metres from the fire support base. Suspected base plate position was in vicinity of YS 283667.
- (l) 1936 hours. Three SAS patrols had been extracted leaving one SAS patrol operating NORTH and NE of AO WHITE. A/5 RAR was located at YS 297703, B/5 RAR at YS 280711, C/5 RAR at YS 281704, whilst 5 RAR Bn HQ group was at JULIE.
- (m) 2145 hours. A combat proof airstrike was carried out on a suspected VC position at YS 29157243.

(5) D + 3 (9 October):

- (a) 0703 hours. 5 RAR continued the clearance of AO WHITE. B/5 RAR received resupply by UH1B. C/5 RAR searched and destroyed installation discovered on 8 October at YS 284714. Details of the exact number of weapon pits and tunnels could not be accurately ascertained as an airstrike on the camp had achieved many direct hits. The installation had been a company size camp. A booby trap factory containing cut down shells and quantities of explosives was found in the camp. Documents which included a weapons register, a company organization by names, and an observation post report on road movement were also found and subsequently evacuated for analysis. In addition one ton of rice was destroyed.

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- (b) 1200 hours. B/5 RAR discovered a company size camp at YS 290718. The camp was 300 metres in width and 400 metres in length and contained a tunnel system. The installation contained fifteen huts, a cavern with four beds, one cement house, and four duffel bags of documents concerning tax, training, company records and a weapons register. In addition, a water supply system, training aids, an administrative centre, medical stores which included 400 phials of drugs and surgical packs, a hospital and quantities of ammunition were also found. The ammunition included eight 60 millimetre mortar bombs, four M1A1 anti-tank mines, nineteen anti-tank rockets, eighteen grenades, one 82mm white phosphorous mortar bomb, 400 pounds of small arms ammunition, and ten .62 millimetre Chicom rounds. All documents were evacuated but the remainder was destroyed in situ due to the inaccessibility of the caches.
- (c) 1312 hours. A/5 RAR was located at YS 295707, B/5 RAR at YS 288708, and C/5 RAR at YS 283712.
- (d) 1630 hours. An immediate airstrike was conducted on YS 321709 after one SAS patrol reported an occupied camp and huts in the area. There was negative BDA due to foliage.
- (e) 1750 hours. A/5 RAR captured one VC at YS 293715 who was held overnight prior to evacuation on 10 October. Also, an immediate airstrike was conducted on YS 345752, a known VC camp, with negative BDA due to foliage.
- (f) 1812 hours. A/5 RAR was located at YS 292715, B/5 RAR at YS 290718, C/5 RAR at YS 284712, whilst the locations of 5 RAR Bn HQ and the fire support base remained unchanged.
- (6) D + 4 (10 October):
- (a) 0725 hours. 5 RAR completed Phase 4 of the operation with A, B, and C Coys continuing destruction searches in the vicinity of their overnight harbours.
- (b) 0813 hours. D(-)/5 RAR, locstat YS 289697, was moving to investigate report by an H13 that houses were located at YS 293701.
- (c) 0955 hours. C/5 RAR located and deloused booby traps at YS 287706. Tunnels were also located in the area but were only partially destroyed as the company had to proceed to the pick up zone at MICHAEL. A/5 RAR and B/5 RAR were proceeding to MICHAEL.
- (d) 1115 hours. One APC struck an anti-tank mine at YS 273728 whilst moving to MICHAEL. There were no personnel casualties but the vehicle had to be towed.
- (e) 1205 hours. D(-)/5 RAR returned to JULIE after a negative search. B/5 RAR married up with 2 Tp 1 APC Sqn and commenced redeployment to Highway 15 for Operation ROBIN.
- (f) 1240 hours. Another APC struck a mine in the vicinity of YS 277723. There were no personnel casualties but the vehicle had to be towed.

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(g) 1327 hours. One SAS patrol continued to operate in the area NORTH and NE of AO WHITE. A/5 RAR had secured MICHAEL, 2 Tp 1 APC Sqn was carrying B/5 RAR from MICHAEL to YS 251726, C/5 RAR was moving towards MICHAEL, whilst D(-)/5 RAR and 5 RAR Bn HQ and Mor Pl were located at JULIE. 5 RAR, less B/5 RAR which was already deploying in APCs for Operation ROBIN, having concentrated at the pick up zones was then extracted by UHIB to company base locations along Highway 15 on operation ROBIN.

13. RESULTS:

a. Casualties:

Friendly

KIA: None
WIA: 13
MIA: None

VC

KIA (BC): 3
KIA (possible): 3
WIA: 1 (blood trail)
WIA.(possible): 2
PW: 1

b. Equipment and Material Losses:

Friendly

2 APCs damaged

VC

1 x Mosin Negant rifle
1 x KAR 98 rifle
8 x 60mm mortar bombs
9 x tons rice
4 x M1A1 anti-tank mines
19 x anti-tank rockets
18 x grenades
1 x 82mm WP bomb
410 x SAA
400 x phials of drugs and surgical packs
15 x huts
1 x cement house
1 x hospital

14. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

- a. 5 RAR carried one 24 hour ration pack and one days C rations per man. Resupply was subsequently made by UHIB into LZs constructed by the companies.
- b. Casualties were satisfactorily evacuated by helicopter.
- c. No major health problems occurred as the operation was of short duration.

15. Commander's Analysis: Although the balance of casualties did not appear satisfactory, the operation was a success in that a large VC base area was located and largely destroyed with consequent disruption to the VC. The requirement to redeploy for Operation ROBIN in order to provide route security of Highway 15 prevented complete destruction of VC installations at the time. Consequently, on the completion

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of Operation ROBIN 1st ATF returned to the area on Operation QUEANBEYAN.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

10 10 1968

S.J. MAIZEY
Major, RA Inf
S3

Annex: P. Area of Operation


Enclosures: 1. Contact or Incident After Action Reports
2. Installation Reports.

Distribution:

5 - 5 RAR
5 - CG II FFORCEV, Attn: AC of S, G3.
5 - HQ AFV
2 - HQ NZ Force VIETNAM
2 - Comd's Diary
1 - File

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ANNEX P (AREA OF OPERATION) TO COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT (OP CANBERRA)

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INSTALLATION REPORT
No 1

Originator - C COY 5 RAR
Date - 9 Oct 66
Location - GR28457115
Sketch - Attached

Description - General.

From W to E
Accn and HQ area. 2 Huts
Adm & Feeding area. 5 Huts
Workshop & accn area. 3 Huts

Tracks - Tracks approached this camp from the ridge to the W and from the re-entrant to the SOUTH a further track proceeded to Area No 2 at GR 28657115. The tracks were pedestrian and well used recently, ie. within 24 hrs.

Defences - Pits. 1 only in centre of village. No weapon pits on approaches to village, however rock formation would have provided ample cover and firing positions.

Bunkers - Invariably each hut had a bunker down approx 8' with approx 3' of overhead cover. The bunkers were approx 8' square in each case.

- No other defence works were located.

- The area was not visible from a distance when approaching from any direction. Fwd scouts came across it when only 10 yds from its perimeter.

Buildings by Types:

Accn - 6 Huts
Cooking - 2 Huts
Workshop - 1 Hut
Wood Hut
Fowl Hut

- All huts were of bush timber frames, thatched grass roof, split bamboo walls and raised floors approx 2' off the ground. They had been built at least 18 months and longer. In some cases huts had been rebuilt. The age of this camp site could be any number of years in excess of one.

Recent Use - B Coy 5 RAR had observed this area as occupied on 8 Oct. This was confirmed. There was no evidence of a disorderly evacuation as no stores, equipment etc were visible nor where any weapons found. However, no booby traps were encountered in this area as was done elsewhere.

ITEMS RECOVERED
INVENTORY

<u>Item</u>	<u>Qty</u>	<u>Disposal</u>
Crosscut Saws	2	Destroyed
Survival Knives USA	3	"
Entrenching Tool USA	1	"
Parang, Blade	2	"
File large	1	"
Files Small	7	"
Chisel Wood	1	"
Chisel Cold	1	"
Jemmy	1	"
Punches	2	"
Ball Hammer	1	"
Screw Driver Small	1	"

Item	Qty	Disposal
Pliers	1	Destroyed
Scissors	2	"
Strips of Brass & Steel	qty	"
Helmet Steel USA	3	"
Helmet Inner USA	1	"
Boots, Canvas, ARVN	2	"
Boot, Lea USA	1	"
Water Bottle USA	1	"
Water Bottle NVN	2	"
Sewing Kit	1	"
Rifle Cleaning Kit	1	"
Survival Kit-Packs USA	4	Returned
Clothing, pieces	70	Destroyed
Cloth, pieces	60	"
Sandbags <u>AUST</u>	50	"
Documents	qty	Returned
Ammo SAA asstd	100	Destroyed
Plastic Sheets	qty	"
Cooking Utensils	qty	"
Crockery	qty	"
Rice lb	300	Destroyed by use of c/s
Kerosene gal	4	grenade and exposure
Oil Cooking gal	1	to weather.
Opium lb	1	Destroyed
Money (NVN)	qty	"
Coins (Indo-Chinese)	small qty	"
Trip Flare USA	1	"
Tomahawk	2	"
Home made Haversacks	qty	"
Water-proof Wallets	qty	"

Remarks

- The area had been hit by Artillery, Bombing etc in the W part only. Two huts only had been destroyed. No other damage was visible. The area inside and around was littered with empty USN Emergency Drinking Water Cans 12 oz. The fowl house was extremely well constructed from fly screen wire and bamboo, indicating the permanency of the installation. Considerable numbers of birds remained in the area, plus one cat. Dogs were heard.

Conclusions

- The area would have accommodated 30 permanent occupants served from two kitchens. **Their** security was negligible, demonstrated by B Coy on Oct 8. **Their** decision to evacuate was made suddenly, but sufficient time was taken to remove items of equipment, SAA and weapons. I consider ~~the~~ area was a Coy or large HQ area for a permanent formation, operating in the general area of the mountains, QL 15 etc.

J F Miller
Maj
 (J F MILLER)
 OC C COY

INSTALLATION REPORT

No 2

Originator - C COY 5 RAR
Date - 9 Oct 66
Location - GR 28657115
Sketch - Attached

Description - This installation was located in amongst a large number of big rocks which formed natural caves and gave protection from air and ground view, until the observer had entered the camp. 12 Huts were located and were built wherever the rock formation allowed. In addition, rock caves provided at least another 3 or 4 installations. The area was very clean, huts were well constructed. Layout was haphazard as rocks were the deciding factor.

Defences - Defences were negligible except that caves etc gave excellent cover from air and the village could only be seen when almost inside. An OP with good vision to N. W. and SW for many miles was located at the W edge of the village.

Buildings by Types -

Accn - 8 Huts
Kitchen - 1 Hut
Mess Hall - 1 Hut
Fowl Hut
Hospital - 1 Hut (6 beds)
Treatment Room
Ammo Cache - 1 underground
Rice Cache - 1 Hut

Tracks - A track came from area No 1 at GR 28457115. One to the NW down a re-entrant, and another on the S side of the ridge heading E. All tracks were pedestrian and well used and defined.

Recent Use (a) Calenders were showing 6 Oct.
(b) A wood fire was still smouldering in a kitchen.
(c) There was no evidence of disorderly evacuation.
(d) Clothing was still on lines.
(e) Fresh cooked food remained on tables.

Medical Installations - A variety of medical stores were located and either destroyed or returned to 5 RAR. There were negligible medical instruments except for scissors - blades - thermometer - bandages - one head lamp (local patt) - however, a large quantity of medical supplies of various types was found. Some was returned to 5 RAR, the remainder was destroyed.

Most stores were of FRENCH origin others were USA med stores and a small percentage local herbalist type stores.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Qty</u>	<u>Disposal</u>
Documents	qty	Returned
Med Stores	qty	Returned
Patent Medicines	}	Destroyed
Sunburn Cream		
Lumbago Cream		
Aspirin		
Savlon Cream		
Powders, various	}	Destroyed
Scissors		
Clippers		
Forceps		
Razor Blade		

Qty Item	Qty	Disposal
Razors Safety	3	Destroyed
Syringes 7cc USA	30	"
Grenades CHICOM	18	"
Rounds 20mm HE	2	"
SAA .223, 7.35, .30, .45, 9mm.	qty total 400	"
SAA 7.62 (USSR)	200	"
TNT ½ lb Blocks	11	"
SAA 7.62 (GR)	50	"
Rockets A Tk L23 TNT	15	"
Mines A Tk M1A1	4	"
Bombs 60mm HE	8	"
Flames Trip USA	1	"
Cord Det coils	3	"
Case Cart 37mm	1	"
Gunpowder oz	12	"
Bomb 81mm WP	1	"
Magazine .45 Pistol	1	"
Mag 30 rds 7.62mm CHICOM	1	"
Mag THOMPSON	1	"
Barrel .45 Pistol	1	Returned
Binoculars French pro	1	Destroyed (US)
Pouches Ammo USA	2	"
Shell Dressing	1	"
AXE Short Handle	1	"
First Aid Haversack	1	"
Axe	1	"
Survival Knives USA	6	"
Crosscut Saws	6	"
Tools all Types	50	"
Survival Kit Haversacks	5	Returned
Clothing pieces	100+	Destroyed
Cloth pieces	100+	"
Plastic Sheeting	qty	"
Money (NVN)	qty	"
Flag (USSR)	1	"
Forks Dining USA	20	"
Parachute pieces	qty	"
Hammocks	qty	"
Drums 44 gal	4	"
DEISO Oil gal	3	"
RICE - by volume 27"x54"x72" estimated wt	3600lb	Destroyed by oil c/s gas & exposure to weather & scattering.
Opium lb	2½	Destroyed

Conclusion - This area relied on outposts and the natural rock formation for protection and defences. Accn existed for up to 50 persons. This, plus the type of installation found, indicated that this was an adm area for a Bn or greater formation.

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