

Australian Army Training Team  
Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report and enclosures  
1 - 30 June 1968

**Series:** AWM95 - Australian Army  
commanders' diaries

**Item:** 1/2/54

**ARMY HISTORIAN**  
**COORD-A**  
**DOWNGRADING/DECLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS**

**SECTION 1 - REQUEST FOR DOWNGRADING OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS**


To: <b>G-3-69 RUSSELL OFFICES CANBERRA A.C.T. 2600</b>	From: <b>REVIEW TEAM AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL ANNEX MITCHELL, A.C.T. 2617</b>
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(Tick appropriate box)

The document(s) listed below are considered to be overclassified and it is requested that their classification be reviewed.  
If downgrading/declassification is agreed, please state new classification in (g); otherwise insert 'Nil Change'.

These records are 25 years old and should be dealt with in accordance with DI(G)ADMIN 27/2 (see Section 2 below).

Serial	Reference No (eg File No)	Description and Title (eg Letter, Report, File, etc)	Date Range/ Date of Origin	Present Classification	Proposed Classification	Revised Classification
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
		AATTU MONTHLY REPORTS JUN 68 <del>JUL 68</del> VIET NAMES TO B2 REMOVED BEFORE RELEASE	JUN-JUL68	CONF	UNCLAS	UNCLAS


 MAJ J. D. TILEROOK  
 MEMBER  
 ARMY HISTORICAL RECORDS REVIEW TEAM  
 Ref No .....  
 23 NOV 84  
 (Signature) (Printed Name) (Rank/Designation) (Date)

**SECTION 2 - NOTIFICATION OF DECLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFIED ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS**  
(For records older than 25 years)

To: CEOAHS **PRIVACY ISSUES** HO 10.2.99

The records described in Section 1.

a.  have reached the age of 30 years and are hereby declassified in accordance with section 31 of the Archives Act 1983

are not yet 30 years old, but have been examined and declassified

are not yet 30 years old but have been examined and assessed as suitable for declassification, but not until they enter the open period. Once these records enter the open period they may be automatically declassified without further examination

b. comprises x ..... cm (x thickness of document)

c. the original of this form has been affixed to the records concerned

ARMY HISTORICAL RECORDS

**ARMY HISTORIAN**  
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**SECTION 3 - AUTHORITY TO DOWNGRADE/DECLASSIFY CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS**

To: <b>G-3-69 RUSSELL OFFICES CANBERRA A.C.T. 2600</b>	From: <b>REVIEW TEAM AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL ANNEX MITCHELL, A.C.T. 2617</b>
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(Tick appropriate box)


Please note that the document(s) listed above are now graded as shown in column (g) above

Other addressees of the document(s) listed above have been informed of the revised classification

A copy has been sent to the OIC of the registry responsible for controlling the record


A copy of this form has been forwarded to CEOAHS, Department of Defence, Russell Offices, Canberra ACT

The declassification action indicated above has been approved by me, being an officer authorised to declassify archival records in Annex C to DI(G) ADMIN 27/2 Navy ADMIN 8-3, Army ADMIN 4-1, Air ADMIN 11-10 of 3 October 1984.

Declassification/Downgrading Authority  

 LT COL M. CHARLES  
 TEAM LEADER  
 ARMY HISTORICAL RECORDS REVIEW TEAM  
 (Signature) (Printed Name) (Appointment) 23 NOV 84 (Date) (File Ref No)

1/2/Jan 68.

CONFIDENTIAL



**AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES**

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

R723-1-35

HEADQUARTERS  
AUSTRALIAN FORCE  
VIETNAM

LOGGED

12 Jul 68

AHQ(C).

AATPV MONTHLY REPORT - JUNE 1968

1. Enclosed, for your information and retention, is a copy of AATPV Monthly Report for Jun 68. The report is forwarded as it contains information of interest and value to AHQ.

*A.L. MacDONALD*  
(A.L. MacDONALD)  
Major General  
Commander Australian Force  
VIETNAM

Enclosure: 1. AATPV Monthly Report - Jun 68.

24 July

DMOP. 26/7.  
DMO. 26/7  
G1(O). 20/7  
G2(O). 24/7  
G2(SW).

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AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

Quote in Reply  
R723-10-3

## ADDRESS

Headquarters  
Australian Army Training Team  
Saigon, Vietnam

7 Jul 68

HQ AFV (2)

MONTHLY REPORT : AATTV : JUNE 68General

1. Operational activity involving members of AATTV was at relatively low level in June, except in Quang-Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.
2. One casualty was sustained during the month. WO2 PA Wooden was seriously wounded by a booby trap at Cam-Lo, Quang-Tri Province on 12 June 68.

Deployment

3. The deployment of AATTV as at 1 July 68 is at Annex A.
4. The only major redeployment during the month was the transfer of the remaining AATTV members from Co C 5SFG at Danang. The MSF of Co C is not a well-run unit and the attachment of AATTV members therefore has been discontinued temporarily. However, the MSF of Co B at Pleiku is a more efficient unit, as well, being considerably larger (having nine MSF Coys as opposed to five in Co C). Accordingly, it has been agreed that AATTV should build up their contribution to two officers and 10 WOs in Co B.

I Corps

5. A report on I Corps operations for the month is attached at Annex B. In comparison with previous months, operational activity during June was at a reduced tempo.
6. No detailed report on the enemy helicopter activity in mid-June is available yet.

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7. The detailed after action reports on the battle of Phu Ky Island near Hoi An in May 68 are attached at Annex C. The reports are of particular interest in that:

- a. They highlight the ridiculous situations which can arise in the Vietnamese command structure.
- b. The result of the initial battle is a prime example of the penalties paid for the lack of planning and preparation.
- c. The frustrations facing advisors are well exemplified.

8. A report by WO2 Oliver on the activities of 2/1 En in the Ashau Valley during May is at Annex D. The report shows the wealth of equipment captured against light opposition. However, a most beneficial side effect is that the battalions received excellent training in air mobile operations and built up their confidence and morale.

9. On 12 Jun at 1115 hrs WO2 P.A. Wooden, a US Army Sgt and two Vietnamese drove to a water point, near Cam Lo refugee village, to continue work on a new pumping installation which was being established for the refugees. They had been told that the approach road and area had been cleared by a USMC mine detection party - a daily routine task. When Wooden arrived they noticed a cardboard sign with Vietnamese writing attached to a stake on the edge of the track. The American Sgt went to lift the stake out of the ground and an M26 grenade, apparently with an instantaneous fuze, at the bottom of the stake exploded, killing the Sgt and critically wounding WO2 Wooden. The sign read:

TRANSLATION

Our people would not co-operate with Americans and followers.

Keep away from Americans and followers.

Regional and Popular Forces ! You should go back with the people. Do not sacrifice your own life for Americans in this place.

Liberation Force's artillery has already been prepared.

Down American - THIEU - KY and all the team who betray the country.

10. A significant feature of the months operations is the large caches which are still being found throughout the CTZ. For example, during a small operation near Quang-Ngai a large cache containing 1600 rounds of 60mm and 1700 rounds of 82mm mortar bomb and many other items was found. It took one Chinook helicopter one day to move the stores found in the cache.

II Corps

11. The coys of the MSF of CoB are invariably deployed as "light battalions" i.e. three MSF coys, a platoon of LRRPS from 1FFV and six

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helicopters under command - four slicks and two gunships. The "light battalions" are commanded by a USSF major who is the CO or XO of Mike Force.

12. During June, the MSF was deployed on two major operations, one near An-Khe and the other South-West of Dalat. Both operations resulted in small contacts only.

13. PRU. AATTV now provide Province PRU advisors at Phan-Thiet, Qui-Nhon and by 10 July, at Ban Me Thuot. A report by WO2 R. Davies on the operations of the PRU at Phan-Thiet is at Annex E. It is interesting in that it shows clearly the excellent results being obtained in the way of "kills" and intelligence, and the inroads which can be made into the VC infrastructure. The growth in the efficiency of the PRUs in II and IV Corps is noticeable.

14. The WO attached to the MACV Recondo School at Nha Trang has been appointed to the responsible position of Training Officer. The School has the charter of training all the IRRPs for Free World Forces in Vietnam.

### III Corps

15. IRRP Training Wing, NTC Van-Kiep. The first nine week course began on 3 Jun 68 and 40 students from 25 ARVN Div arrived. The students were of a high calibre, but the physical requirements of the course have been too great for some. 15 students have dropped out, 12 on medical grounds.

16. Considerable difficulty has been experienced in obtaining logistic support for the course. Many items of equipment are in short supply in the ARVN, and the Wing is finding it extremely difficult to obtain some stores.

17. The standard of training achieved so far is very good and the instructional staff are pleased with results. The operational portion of the course begins on 15 July.

18. The Team provides one captain and four WOs for the Sector Advisory Team in Phuoc Tuy Province. The Sector has recently had an increase in staff and some AATTV members are not being fully employed. If full employment for these members cannot be found in Phuoc Tuy they will be transferred to more worthwhile appointments elsewhere.

### IV Corps

19. The detachment of AATTV in IV Corps have got off to a good start. Four WOs working as two teams, are attached to two mobile RF Coys in Vinh-Binh Province and are operating 5-6 days per week. An additional WO is being deployed to act as a "relief".

20. The RD Mobile Training Team of two WOs will shortly complete its work in the first province - Chuong Thien. It has conducted two courses for the leaders of the 11 RD teams in the Province and the WOs are spending two weeks visiting the RD teams in their hamlets to give them "on-the-job" advice. On 15 July, the Team will move to Ba Xuyen Province.

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21. Maj Templeton is employed as executive assistant to Col W Dumas, Chief of Territorial Security. This office is responsible for the coordination of the activities of:


- a. RF/PF
- b. Revolutionary Development Cadres
- c. Province Recce Units
- d. National and Field Force Police
- d. Civil Defence.

22. Maj Templeton travels extensively throughout the CTZ advising and reporting on RF/PF activities. A major effort is being made in IV Corps to increase the effectiveness of RF in particular.

Administration

23. A request has been made to AFV for more advanced information on the march in of replacements. To plan changeovers properly, 6-8 weeks notice of incoming drafts would be appreciated.

24. The morale of the Team continues at a high level.

  
(R.L. BURNARD)  
Lt Col  
Comd.

AATTV DEPLOYMENT  
AS AT 1 JULY 1968

Annex A to  
AATTV Monthly Report  
for June 1968

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Inits</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Corps</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Employment</u>	<u>Date RTA</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>HQ AATTV (Saigon)</u>								
1	LtCol	R.L.	Burnard	RA Inf	HQ AATTV	Commanding Officer	6 Feb 69	SAIGON
2	Capt	D.	Rothwell	RA Inf	"	Adjutant	27 May 69	"
3	WO1	R.L.	Branson	RA Inf	"	Chief Clerk	19 Nov 68	"
4	WO2	M.J.	Foster	RAASC	"	Admin WO (Pay)	11 Feb 69	"
5	WO2	F.C.	Lever	RA Svy	"	Admin WO (Q and Tpt)	15 Mar 69	"

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
<u>I CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV QUANG TRI (Quang-Tri Province)</u>								
6	Maj	D.R.	Millie	Aust Army Avn Corps	Mai-Linh Sub-Sector	Senior Advisor	14 May 69	Near Quang-Tri Town
7	WO1	L.	French	RA Inf	Trieu Phong Sub-Sector	Assistant Advisor RF/PF	6 Aug 68	Trieu-Phong
8	WO2	K.G.	Chester	RAASC	Cam-Lo Sub-Sector	Assistant Advisor	4 Mar 69	Cam-Lo town
9	WO2	N.G.	Fitzgibbon	RAAMC	ARVN CCS	Medical Advisor	23 Oct 68	Quang-Tri
10	Capt	J.	Lourke	RA Inf	1/1 ARVN Bn	Senior Advisor	18 Jun 69	Quang-Tri area
11	WO2	A.	Robinson	RAA (Special List)	1/1 ARVN Bn	Assistant Advisor	10 Dec 68	Quang-Tri area
12	WO2	K.	Gabriel	RA Inf	2/1 ARVN Bn	" "	2 Apr 69	" "
13	WO2	R.A.	Purton	RA Inf	3/1 ARVN Bn	" "	19 Feb 69	" "
14	WO2	R.M.	King	RA Inf	4/1 ARVN Bn	" "	19 Feb 69	" "
15	WO1	J.	Geedrick	RA Inf	1/2 ARVN Bn	" "	21 May 69	Gio Linh area
16	WO2	D.B.	Phillips	RAASC	2/2 ARVN Bn	" "	9 Apr 69	" "
17	WO2	D.	Hill	RAA	3/2 ARVN Bn	" "	30 Apr 69	" "
18	WO2	L.A	Kapp	RA Inf	4/2 ARVN Bn	" "	16 Mar 69	" "
19	WO2	P.D.	wilkes	RA Inf	5/2 ARVN Bn	" "	4 Jun 69	" "
20	WO2	B.C.	Fmberson	RAA	11 Arty Bn	" "	5 Feb 69	Quang-Tri area

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
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AATTV HUE (Thua-Thien Province)

21	Maj	M.	Norris	Aust Int Corps	Nam-Hoa Sub-Sector	Senior Advisor	9 Apr 69	Nam-Hoa
22	Capt	M.	McCallum	RA Inf	1 ARVN Div Recce Unit	S-3 Assistant Advisor	11 Sep 68	Hue
23	WO2	A.J.	Baxter	RAA	Nam-Hoa Sub-Sector	Assistant Advisor RF/PF	22 Apr 69	Nam-Hoa
24	WO2	B.R.	Rule	RA Inf	1 ARVN Div Recce Unit	Assistant Advisor	30 Apr 69	Hue
25	WO1	E.W.	Gason	RAAC	3/7 ARVN Cav Regt	" "	21 May 69	PK 17
26	WO2	G.B.	Snook	RAAC	" "	" "	26 Nov 68	PK 17. North of Hue
27	WO2	A.K.	Hunter	RAAC	" "	" "	11 Mar 69	PK 17
28	WO2	M.	Kelly	RA Inf	2/3 ARVN Bn	" "	18 Jan 69	PK 17
29	WO2	A.L.	Egan	RA Inf	1/3 ARVN Bn	" "	25 Sep 68	PK 17
30	WO2	S.R.	Wells	RAASC	3/3 ARVN Bn	" "	4 Mar 69	Hue
31	WO2	D.	Wallner	RA Inf	54 Regt	" "	6 Aug 68	"

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Rank	Initis	name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
<u>AATTV DANANG (All members in Quang-Nam, Quang-Tin and Quang-Ngai Province)</u>							
Maj	I.G.	Porteous	RA Inf	HQ I ARVN Corps Tactical Zone	G-3 (Trg) Advisor	4 Mar 69	Danang
Capt	N.	Mason-Jones	RAA	" " " "	G-3 (Ops)	20 Aug 68	"
WO1	J.	Selnes	RA Inf	AATTV Danang	RSM	6 Aug 68	Australia House Danang
WO2	J.	Collins	RA Inf	AATTV Danang	Admin WO	20 Aug 68	" " "
WO2	K.T.	Vincent	RAE	Hoa-Vang Sub-Sector HQ	Assistant Advisor RF/PF	8 Apr 69	Hoa-Vang
WO2	R.J.	Hayes	RAA	HQ Quang-Da Special Zone	Assistant Advisor	6 Aug 68	Hoi-An
WO2	J.S.	Allan	RA Inf	21st Ranger Bn	" "	11 Mar 69	"
WO1	J.N.	Harrower	RAAC	2/4 ARVN Cav Regt	" "	9 Apr 69	Danang
WO2	D.C.	Taylor	RAAC	2/4 ARVN Cav Regt	" "	6 Aug 68	Hoi-An
WO1	S.A.	Abblaster	RAASC	2 Bn 51 Inf Regt	" "	21 May 69	Danang
WO2	W.	Lenneally	RA Inf	1 Bn 51 Inf Regt	" "	3 Sep 68	Quang-Nam

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
43	WO2	J.	Kendall	RA Inf	National Training Centre Hoa-Cam	Training Officer	3 Sep 68	Near Danang
44	Capt	F.	Kudnic	RA Inf	2/6 ARVN Bn	Senior Advisor	25 Jun 69	Tam-Ky
45	WO1	R.F.	Capel	RA Inf	1/6 " "	Assistant Advisor	3 Sep 68	"
46	WO2	E.J.	Fahy	RA Inf	2/6 ARVN Bn	" "	4 Dec 68	"
47	WO2	K.J.	Mitchell	RA Inf	3/6 ARVN Bn	" "	30 Apr 69	"
48	WO2	T.P.	Van Bakel	RAASC	1/4 ARVN Bn	" "	1 Apr 69	Danang
49	WO2	R.J.	O'Erien	RAE	2/5 ARVN Bn	" "	5 Feb 69	Quang-Ngai
50	WO2	G.Y.	Jamieson	RA Inf	3/5 ARVN Bn	" "	4 Dec 68	" "
51	WO2	S.C.	Colley	RA Inf	4/5 ARVN Bn	" "	11 Mar 69	Tam-Ky
52	WO2	A.C.	Massingham	RA Inf	4/4 ARVN Bn	" "	16 Mar 69	Quang-Ngai

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date	Location
<u>II CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV PLEIKU</u>								
5	Capt	JED	White	RA Inf	Mobile Strike Force, Company B, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)	Coy Comd	19 Feb 69	Pleiku (Base Camp)
4	Capt	RCM	Hinde	RA Inf	" "	" "	4 Jun 69	" "
55	WO2	J.E.	Elkins	RA Inf	" "	" "	16 Mar 69	" "
5	WO2	F.J.	Lucas	RA Inf	" "	Pl. Comd.	19 Feb 69	" "
7	WO2	A.G.	Urquhart	RA Inf	" "	Coy Comd.	5 Feb 69	" "
5	WO2	D.A.	McClymans	RA Inf	" "	Trg Offr	20 Aug 68	" "
5	WO2	B.	Davies	RA Inf	" "	Pl Comd.	6 Aug 68	" "
5	WO2	D.G.	Cameron	RA Inf	" "	" "	19 Sep 69	" "
4	WO2	J.S.	Hyland	RA Inf	" "	" "	28 May 69	" "
6	WO2	J.M.	Crafton	RA Inf	" "	" "	30 Apr 69	" "
5	WO2	I.J.	Jewell	RA Inf	" "	" "	24 Jun 69	" "
4	WO2	P.	Temple	RA Inf	" "	" "	28 May 69	" "
5	WO2	B.	Tolley	RA Inf	" "	" "	24 Jun 69	" "
5	Capt	G.W.	Ghent	RA Inf	CSD, Province Reconnaiss- ance unit	Mobile Training Team	16 Jun 68	II Corps Area
7	Capt	B.	Palmer	RA Inf	CSD, " "	" " "	17 Dec 68	" "
5	WO2	R.	Simpson	RA Inf	CSD, " "	" " "	1 Nov 68	" "
5	WO1	E.B.	Oscara	RA Inf	CSD, " "	Advisor Binh Dinh Prov.	TBA	Qui-Nhon
7	WO2	R.G.	Devies	RA Inf	CSD, " "	Advisor Lam Dong Prov.	RBA	Phan-Thiet

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Serial : Rank : Inits : Name : Corps : Unit : Employment : Date RTA : Location

AATTV NHA TRANG

72	: WO2	: J.	: Canill	: RA Inf	: Recondo School 5 SFG (A)	: Instructor	: 20 Aug 68	: Nha-Trang
73	: WO2	: J..	: Hoffman	: RA Inf	: Mobile Strike Force, Det B-52 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)	: Advisor to 91st Ranger Bn (att as MSF to Det B-52)	: 10 Dec 68	: " "
74	: WO2	: A.P.	: Martin	: RAAMC	: " "	: Medical Advisor	: 6 Aug 68	: " "
75	: WO1	: M.	: Evans	: RA Inf	: " "	: Weapons Advisor	: 31 Aug 68	: " "

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Serial	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
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III CTZ

AATTV BARIA (Phuoc-Tuy Province)

66	Capt	C.F.	Spencer	RA Inf	Sector HQ Baria	RF/PF Advisor	8 May 69	Baria
77	WO2	A.C.	Phillips	RAAOC	RF/PF Phuoc-Tuy	Assistant Advisor	5 Feb 69	Hoa-Long
78	WO2	A.	Shepherd	RAASC	A and L Coy	" "	3 Mar 69	Baria
79	WO2	L.M.	Smith	RAE	RF/PF	" "	7 Jan 69	"
80	WO2	R.W.	Harris	RA Inf	RF/PF	" "	25 Sep 68	"
81	Capt	L.	Opie	RA Inf	CSD	Province Recce Unit Training Centre	30 Oct 68	Near Vung Tau
82	WO1	L.E.	Galloway	RA Inf	CSD	" "	3 Sep 68	" "
83	Capt	S.	Krasnoff	RA Inf	LRRP Wing Van Kiep National Training Centre	CI LRRP Wing	4 Dec 68	Baria
84	WO2	I.L.	Edwards	RA Inf	" " "	Instructor LRRP Wing	4 Dec 68	"
85	WO2	C.C.	Turner	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	10 Dec 68	"
86	WO2	R.L.	Wier	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	1 Apr 69	"
87	WO2	M.B.	Cranston	RA Sigs	" " "	" " "	5 Feb 69	"
88	Capt	P.	May	RA Inf	Det 1 ALSG	For duty as GS03	23 Jul 68	Vung Tau

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
<u>AATTV, IV C&amp;FS AREA</u>								
89	Maj	G.	Templeton (attached from HQ AFV)	RAAC	RF/PF	Assistant Senior Advisor	7 May 69	Can Tho
90	WO2	C.N.	McEvoy	RA Inf	RF/PF	Advisor	24 Nov 68	Vinh Binh Province
91	WO2	T.J.	Egan	RAA	RD Cadre Trg	Instructor	4 Dec 68	Chuong Thien Province
92	WO2	G.R.	Witchard	RAE	RF/PF	Advisor	7 Jan 69	Vinh Binh Province
93	WO2	C.A.	Chambers	RA Inf	RF/PF	Advisor	19 Feb 69	" "
94	WO2	M.G.	Rodger	RAEME	RF/PF	Advisor	10 Dec 68	Can Tho
95	WO2	J.G.	Pettit	RA Inf	RF/PF	Advisor	21 May 69	Vinh Binh Province
96	WO2	G.A.	Francis	RA Inf	RD Cadre Trg	Instructor	21 May 69	Chuong Thien Province

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I CORPS OPERATIONS : 26 MAY - 25 JUNE 68

ARVN Operations

1. During the past month ARVN Forces conducted 47 battalion or larger sized operations against enemy forces in the I Corps Area.
2. The heaviest fighting continued to be in the Northern two provinces of Quang-Tri and Thua Thien. Friendly operations were directed towards eliminating enemy forces in the Dong Ha - Gio Linh area and Rice Denial Operations in the coastal lowlands.
3. LAM SON 227, a 2nd Regt controlled Recon-In Force Operation NW of Dong Ha was conducted from 25 to 30 May. On 25 May, contact was made with a large enemy force believed to be elements of two battalions. Heavy fighting lasted for four days. Friendly forces utilized artillery and gunships in support. The enemy broke contact after suffering heavy losses. Final results for the operation were 19 friendly KIA and 45 wounded; enemy losses were 384 KIA, 8 VC and 98 weapons captured.
4. On 8 June, the 2nd Regiment conducted LAM SON 228, a Cordon & Search Operation East and South of Gio Linh as a follow-up to LAM SON 227. On the 2nd day of the operation contact was made with a company sized element of the enemy. Contact was maintained with the enemy for two days, when, on 11 June, an estimated enemy battalion was engaged. Heavy fighting raged throughout the day. The enemy fired approximately 200 rounds of artillery from their positions north of the Ben Hai river. Friendly forces called artillery support and used gunships. The enemy broke contact late in the day of the 11th. The operation was terminated on 12 June with friendly 29 KIA, 92 WIA and 1 weapon lost. The enemy losses were 219 KIA, 2 VC captured and 49 weapons captured.
5. Friendly Rice-Denial operations have unquestionably strained the enemy rice-line from the coastal lowlands. In addition friendly operations conducted in the mountains to the west have discovered sizeable caches of food and ammunition and destroyed several base camps.
6. LAM SON 224/Quang-Tri, a 1st Regiment controlled Rice Denial Operation East of Quang-Tri, was conducted from 16 May to 17 June. In addition to providing protection to the rice harvesting and transporting the rice to secure government storage areas, friendly units accounted for 210 enemy killed, while capturing 68 weapons. Friendly losses for this operation were 34 KIA and 121 WIA. In addition several large enemy rice caches were found and secured while searching the operational area.

7. LAM SON 224/Thua Thien, Phase II, a Thua Thien Sector controlled Rice-Denial operation in the coastal lowlands East of Hue, was conducted from 23 May to 17 June. On 3 June three enemy surrendered to the Black Panther Company and reveal that there were elements of two enemy battalions in the area. The PW's stated morale was poor and many wanted to surrender. A massive Psych-Ops campaign was initiated utilizing both aerial and ground loudspeakers urging the enemy to surrender. Results of this contact were 83 enemy surrendered or were captured and 74 weapons captured. In addition to this incident, numerous contacts throughout the operation resulted in enemy losses of 229 KIA and a total of 102 weapons captured. Friendly losses were minor, 15 KIA and 96 WIA. Numerous rice and ammunition caches were found while on operation, further hindering the enemy's resupply efforts.

8. To the West of Hue, LAM SON 225, Phase II, a 1st Division controlled Recon-In-Force Operation in the mountainous areas has continued since 18 May. Although ground contact with the enemy has remained relatively light, friendly forces have found numerous large caches of food, ammunition, supplies and equipment. Several large building and bunker complexes, used as battalion resting and staging areas for attacks against the Hue area, were destroyed. Enemy losses were 100 KIA and 99 weapons captured, while friendly forces suffered 19 KIA and 69 WIA.

9. A highlight of the period was the sudden increase in enemy helicopter and jet aircraft throughout the eastern DMZ area. Radar and visual sightings were reported for six consecutive nights. On the night of 15 - 16 June several enemy helicopters were reported destroyed by artillery and Air Force units. A probable explanation for this previously uncommitted helicopter capability could be the emergency resupply of men and material to units and defensive positions in the area. The introduction of these aircraft may also indicate a desire to show their war potential to enhance North Vietnam's image both at home and internationally.

10. In the Quang-Nam Sector, enemy activity remained at a low level throughout most of the period. The activity continued to be mainly harassing in nature. This is probably due to joint ARVN/US Marine Corps Operations conducted against the forward enemy base on Go Noi Island. HUNG QUANG 1-43 a 51st Regiment controlled Operation on Go Noi Island was conducted from 26 May thru 12 June in conjunction with the US. Marine Operation Allen Brook. ARVN force swept through the Eastern portion while USMC elements cleared the Western portion of the Island. Contact was light, however, once again large caches of ammunition, food and equipment were discovered and destroyed. ARVN engineering units attached to the operation destroyed 372 tunnels and bunkers in the operational area. USMC elements are continuing to operate in the Go Noi Island Area and the enemy will not be able to use this area for some time in the future. One terrorist act was reported in the city of Danang. On June 19th an explosive charge was detonated in the Foreign Claims Building.

11. In the Quang Ngai area friendly forces conducted Rice-Denial and Security Operations in support of Pacification. No major contacts were made with enemy forces, however on operation Lien Ket 45, West of Quang Ngai, friendly units discovered a large ammunition cache.

.../3

Free World Forces

12. Operation Scotland, a USMC controlled Clearing Operation in the Khe Sanh area commenced in April and continues. Enemy forces continue to maintain pressure on friendly forces in this area. The enemy is able to resupply and replace personnel in this area easily and it is most likely pressure will be maintained. Three significant contacts were reported in the operational area during the period. On 28 May, USMC elements South of Khe Sanh were attacked by an estimated enemy battalion. 230 enemy soldiers were killed in the day long contact and an additional 94 enemy were killed on 31 May in the same area. On 15 June, approximately 10 kilometers South of the Khe Sanh combat base, USMC defensive positions were attacked by an estimated battalion sized force. During the morning long contact, 219 NVA were killed. On 18 June, in the same area following preparatory mortar fire, the enemy launched another battalion sized ground attack. This resulted in an additional 131 NVA killed. Total enemy losses since the operation began is 2032 NVA killed in action, Friendly : 322 marines.

13. To the West and South of Hue, Operation NEVADA EAGLE continues in the Area of Operations of the 101st Airborne Division. Ground contact has been relatively light, however friendly forces in the mountains have discovered numerous supplies of weapons and ammunition. On 28 May, 26 kilometers South West of Hue, friendly forces found 48 one and one half ton trucks.

14. West of Hoi An, in the Go Noi Island area, the Marines continue clearing in Operation ALLEN BROOK. Marine forces have accounted for nearly 800 enemy dead, while discovering numerous caches of food, ammunition and supplies. Destruction of enemy bunkers and tunnels in this base area continues.

15. In summation, although the enemy has suffered heavy losses and has been largely deprived of the rice harvest, he continues to maintain the capability of multi-battalion attacks throughout the I Corps area. In addition he has the capability of attack by fire (rockets) on the cities of I Corps. During the month, the enemy for the most part, continued to evade contact with friendly forces with the notable exception of the western Quang-Tri Province, operation Scotland area. The enemy is now concentrating on recruiting to fill its losses and striving to rebuild its infra-structure on areas it now controls.

AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION - HUNG QUANG 1/38

1. The attached official "After Action Reports" are correct up to a point. However, certain relevant occurrences were omitted and they are as follows.

2. a. At approximately 1700 hrs May 22 the 21st Ranger Bn C.P. came under mortar attack and the Bn Cmdr and Senior Advisor were both wounded and 53 killed, they were subsequently evacuated.

At 1800 hrs May 22 a replacement officer arrived by heli-copter to command the Bn.

b. At 0713 May 24 the 21st Ranger Bn began moving from its night location and continued to clear to the West. At approximately 0800 hrs the Bn made contact with an en. force and received slight small arms fire and fairly heavy mortar fire. The Bn continued to move slowly then stopped; at this stage en. small arms fire had ceased, however, the heavy mortar barrage continued. The Bn at this stage was deployed in open rice padi and were suffering heavy casualties. I suggested to the Bn Cmdr that because he was receiving negative en small arms fire he should continue the advance to the objective, he denied that the forward elements were not moving and continued to report by radio to the fact that the Bn was continuing to advance. The Bn remained in the same area until taking up a night defensive position at approximately 1800 hrs. During this period the Bn Cmdr locked himself inside an A.P.C. and would not come out. I finally coaxed him out, he then moved 50 metres into a slit trench and refused to budge. I continued to urge the Bn cmdr to move his elements forward, on the theory that the en. mortar positions would have to withdraw, thus relieving the medevac L.Z. from the heavy mortar fire. This he refused to do, claiming that the en small arms fire was too intense, although we were receiving none, he then refused to hold a conversation with me.

c. Subsequently a medevac helicopter was destroyed (not by B40 rocket or 57mm recoilless rifle which has been claimed but by 82mm mortar rd) thus causing the deaths of 2 US personnel and the wounding of 2 others.

Summary

3. This officer has since been relieved of command of 21st Ranger Bn. It is of my opinion that this officer by his actions on May 24 was responsible for many deaths and casualties sustained during this period.

WO2 J. Allan  
21st Ranger Bn.

27 Jun 68

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OFFICE OF THE SENIOR ADVISOR  
1ST RANGER GROUP (ARVN)  
APO 96337

MACTN-ICOP

1 June 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

Commanding Officer  
I Corps Advisory Group  
Advisory Team #1  
APO 96337

1. Name of Operation: Hung Quang I/38, Clearing Operation.
2. Dates of Operation: 170700 - 251430 May 1968.
3. Location: Quang Nam Sector, included within coordinates BT 000550, 003520, 070533, 063561.
4. Control Headquarters: 51st Infantry Regiment, 170700 - 211300 May; 1st Ranger Group, 211300 - 251430 May 1968.
5. Reporting Officers: Major Charles D Mears Jr, Senior Advisor, 51st Infantry Regiment; Major Jack D. Woodall, Senior Advisor, 1st Ranger Group; Captain Donald S. Rowe, Senior Advisor, 21st Ranger Battalion; Captain Walter A. Gunn, Senior Advisor, 37th Ranger Battalion; Captain James Flynn, Senior Advisor, 2/4 Cavalry Troop; Captain Takao Sugiki, Senior Advisor, 2d Battalion, 51st Infantry; 1LT Michael Smoger, Senior Advisor, 4th Battalion, 51st Infantry.
6. Task Organization: 1st Ranger Group (-)  
21st Ranger Battalion  
37th Ranger Battalion  
2/51 Infantry Battalion (detached 22 May)  
4/51 Infantry Battalion  
2/4 Cavalry
7. Supporting Forces:  
Artillery: ARVN (Dien Ban, Tra Kieu)  
ROK (Dien Ban, Cam Ha, Hoi An)  
Naval Gunfire  
USAF/VNAF Air - Tactical air strikes  
USMC/USA Aviation - Medevac and resupply

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SUBJECT: .Combat Operations After Action Report

Air was requested through FM command channels and through FAC on station. Several VNAF strikes were preplanned; US air strikes were immediate. Reaction time varied from 10 minutes to 45 minutes. All strikes were effectively employed.

ARVN artillery. Initially, two 105mm Howitzers were employed from Dien Ban and two from Tra Kieu. On 23 May, two additional 105mm Howitzers were moved from Hoi An to Dien Ban.

ROK Artillery. An artillery battery with six 105mm Howitzers was utilized from Dien Ban, a 105mm Howitzer battalion utilizing 18 105mm Howitzers, and a 155mm Howitzer battery firing from Hoi An.

The ARVN Artillery was effective, accurate and timely when cleared for firing. Because of the few number of tubes available, it was not possible to place large quantities of ordnance on a target. ROK Artillery was responsive and able to expend large quantities of ordnance when required. The greatest problem noted was obtaining clearance to fire. On several occasions the ARVN stated it was clear to fire, the ground commander granted clearance to fire, yet the ROK unit was not granted clearance and the reason could not be determined. A detailed look into the system is necessary to insure clearances are granted in a timely manner or the clearing agency can inform the unit as to the reason why it is not clear.

8. Intelligence: Enemy strength prior to the operation was estimated to be one enemy battalion. It was suspected to be located and operating somewhere on the island with no specific location within the island. Based upon prisoners captured, it appears that two battalions were located on the island with a possibility of a third either on the island or being brought in to reinforce. The terrain greatly favors the defender, affords many ambush sites and allows small units to employ positions to delay much larger units while the enemy inflicts heavy casualties. The terrain consists of flat, rice paddy ares, interspersed with villages. Each village is surrounded by a defensive wall of bamboo, trench lines and bunkers. The area around each village is open for an average of 300 meters in all directions, allowing good fields of fire and observation on advancing units. Natural obstacles on the island are minimal to foot troops; however, an unfordable river must be crossed to gain access to the island. Each village can be considered a critical feature because it favors the defender. The weather was hot and humid; however, water was available from the village wells and the river surrounding the island. Information gained from the District Chief indicates that all of the villagers on the island are considered enemy and no civic action is being performed.

9. Mission: To find the enemy, fix him, and clear him from the area of operation.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

10. Concept of Operation: The operation was a combined heliborne/amphibious assault by two Vietnamese Ranger Battalions, two Vietnamese Infantry Battalions, and a Vietnamese APC Troop. The infantry and APCs were to begin their river crossing on the East side of the island at 0700 hours and secure a landing zone for the Ranger units that were to begin touching down at 0730 hours. The infantry and APC troop were to sweep West, utilizing one infantry battalion as a reserve. The Ranger battalions were to move Southwest initially and then west to parallel the movement of the infantry. Supporting artillery remained in its normal locations.

11. Execution: 21 May, 1300 hours, command changed from 51st Infantry Regiment Headquarters to 1st Ranger Group. The battalions continued searching for caches in vicinity BT 027542, 048539, and 019548. During the day and night the units received several mortar rounds. The units sustained approximately six KIA and 41 WIA during the day.

A 22 May - Daytime activity was relatively quiet. 2d Battalion, 51st Infantry was detached from 1st Ranger Group and extracted from the operational area by making a river crossing at BT 063562. 4th Battalion, 51st Infantry was to join the remainder of the elements in vicinity BT 025552. The battalion made contact at 0843 hours at BT 035544 and the APC troop and 21st Ranger Battalion were sent to reinforce the 4/51 Infantry. Units consolidated night positions in vicinity of BT 0454. At 1715 hours, the units began receiving heavy continuous mortar fire throughout the night. Units sustained approximately four KIA and 36 WIA during the day.

A 23 May - During early morning hours, units received heavy small arms fire and continuous mortars. Mortar fire ceased at 0626 hours and allowed time for resupply to be conducted to the units. At 1723 hours, the 37th Ranger Battalion reported they were under ground and mortar attack. Attack was repulsed. Ground fire and mortars continued throughout the night. Units sustained approximately three KIA and nine WIA during the day. One US Captain Advisor was wounded.

B 24 May - At 0713 hours, the 21st Ranger Battalion began moving from its position vicinity BT 051545 to the West. It was to pass through the 37th Ranger Battalion and 4/51 Infantry Battalion, attach the APC troop and continue to the vicinity BT 018530 to make a thorough search of the area. The 37th Ranger Battalion and 4/51 Infantry Battalion were to follow and search the area vicinity BT 030534. At 0800 hours, the 21st Ranger Battalion and APC troop received small arms fire and mortars from BT 047544. The battalion continued moving slowly, but was finally stopped at BT 036554. The battalion commander reported he was receiving heavy small arms and mortar fire and could not continue. The rear battalion took heavy mortar fire and was ordered to move West to get from under the fire. This required the wounded to be carried. At 1655 hours it was finally possible for the 4/51 Infantry to bring in a medevac chopper. As the second medevac helicopter (H-34) was on

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the ground, it was hit by a B-40 rocket or 57mm recoilless rifle round at 1750 hours and burned. One US 1LT advisor was killed and two US SFC advisors wounded. One US crewman from helicopter was killed; three remaining personnel from helicopter were evacuated safely. After receiving heavy mortar and small arms fire all day and having medevac helicopter destroyed, the units consolidated and prepared night defensive positions vicinity BT 0454. A Naval gunfire ship reported on station and began firing support at 2210 hours. Fires were controlled by a Navy aerial observer. Units sustained approximately eight MIA and 61 WIA during the day.

25 May - The 21st Ranger Battalion received a few mortar rounds and ground fire at 0305 hours. About 0815 hours the units received an order to withdraw from the island. As they withdrew, all units received mortar fire. In addition, the APC troop and 4th Battalion, 51st Infantry received ground fire. At 1246 hours, the 37th Ranger Battalion began its river crossing. All units had completed crossing by 1345 hours. The operation terminated at 1430 hours.

During several days mortars were continuous throughout the night and day. Counter-mortar was fired on suspected locations, but appeared to have no effect. During the operation it is estimated at least 1,000 rounds of 60mm and 82mm enemy mortar rounds were fired. Ground contact was heavy on 18 and 19 May and continued for about eight hours on both days. Thereafter, ground contact generally did not last more than 30 minutes at any one time.

Radio communications was normally good; however, there were periods when Vietnamese radio stations caused over-ride on the advisory net. It caused no insurmountable problem. Ground contact normally began at a range of 200 to 300 meters. The only unusual tactics used were the large number of enemy mortar rounds fired during a few days period.

## 12. Results:

### a. Friendly personnel losses:

KIA: 53 ARVN, 1 US Advisor.  
WIA: 194 ARVN, 3 US Advisors.

### b. Enemy personnel losses: 298 KIA, 4 VCC.

### c. Friendly equipment lost: None reported.

d. Enemy equipment captured: 1 60mm mortar tube, 4 AK-47, 2 B-40 rocket launchers, 8 MG's, 1 AK-50, 1 M-16, 9 CKC, 1 PRC-10 radio, 1 75mm sight, 8 mines, 100 60mm mortar rounds, 18 B-40 rockets, 12 82mm mortar rounds, 15 packs, 6,000 lb rice.

Enemy weapons were captured; the mortar rounds, rockets, packs and some rice was destroyed. In nearly all areas where air strikes were conducted, ground troops later searched.



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## 13. Administrative Matters:

a. All items required for support of the units were carried into the operational area by the troops. Troops appeared to carry their required combat load as no immediate request for resupply was submitted.

b. Proper maintenance of weapons and radios was performed.

c. Casualties were generally medevaced promptly. On 24 May, however, wounded personnel were carried for four hours before being medevaced. This was not because of the system, but because of the intense mortar fire in each battalion area making it impossible to land a helicopter.

d. Advisor communications was generally satisfactory and there was no indication that ARVN communications was not satisfactory.

14. Advisor Analysis: This operation was the second one conducted on the island by ARVN troops since April. On the previous operation, the 51st Infantry engaged a large enemy force and finally departed the area with no significant destruction caused to the defensive positions. The battalions were ordered off the island during Hung Quang I/38 because of the heavy mortar fire they were receiving and loss of key personnel. Again, no real destruction was caused to the enemy's defensive positions because of the extensive amount and the lack of appropriate destruction material and personnel. In my opinion, approximately six weeks of intensive engineer work would be required to destroy the area effectively to deny its use to the enemy. An operation similar to that conducted in the Pineapple Forest should be considered as it appears that the island is a supply and staging area for operations against Danang, Hoi An, Dien Ban and other local areas. Support furnished the operation was adequate, responsive and well employed. Helicopters which lifted the Rangers met their time schedule and provided the number of helicopters planned for. Air support was sufficient throughout the majority of the operation and could have been improved by availability of additional helicopter gunships on a couple of occasions. Spooky, flareships, naval gunfire, and tactical air, both USAF and VNAF, were responsive to the unit's request. Some refugees were removed from the area against their will. The District Chief considers all personnel on the island to be enemy and desired that they be removed. The battalions and the APC troop responded well to orders but became worn down near the end of the operation because of the constant mortar fire they sustained and because of the large number of key personnel who had been wounded or killed. Since the mortar positions could not be located nor eliminated, I believe they were permanently emplaced in well-protected positions, possibly underground. Based upon local intelligence and the material found on the island, it appears that it is a storage and staging area and should be explored well in order to locate caches.

## 15. Recommendations:

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a. A plan for complete destruction of everything on the island should be employed. Since the island has been a haven for enemy forces for a long time, a task of leveling everything, similar to the Pineapple Forest, should be tried.

b. Employ a sufficient number of battalions around the island to secure an engineer force clearing and destroying all bamboo, trench lines, bunkers and caves.

c. Remove all personnel from the island, as they simply aid the enemy forces.

*for* *Jack D. Woodall*

JACK D. WOODALL  
Major, Infantry  
Senior Advisor

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OFFICE OF THE SENIOR ADVISOR  
51ST INFANTRY REGIMENT (ARVN)  
APO 96337

2 June 1968

MACTM-ICOP

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Operation Hung Quang I/38,  
Phases I and II, 17-21 May 1968

Commanding Officer  
I Corps Advisory Group  
Advisory Team 1  
APO 96337

1. (U) GENERAL. Operation HUNG QUANG I/38 was an offensive operation of multi-battalion size against enemy main forces expected to be in the area of Phu Ky Island, Dien Ban District, Quang Nam Province, ICTZ. It was intended to apply pressure against the enemy on the East side of the island to assist the U.S. Marine Corps operation ALLENBROOK in progress further to the West and to effect maximum destruction to enemy personnel, materiel and fortifications.

2. (C) ENEMY. During the reported period, ARVN forces made contact with two enemy battalions, the R-20 and the 3d Sapper Battalion. Both of them are subordinate elements organic to the Quang Da Special Regiment. The 3d Sapper Battalion is the most recently organized force battalion in the Regiment. Enemy tactics were basically to delay advancing ARVN forces with covering forces and to cause maximum casualties by heavy, well-placed mortar fire. Most of the heavy contacts were made at close range. The enemy enjoyed superior cover and concealment and used to his advantage an intricate system of communications trenches to deploy his defensive forces at points of contact. By the third day of the operation, the enemy had resorted to extensive booby-trapping and mining of routes of advance as he withdrew from contact with our forces. The enemy was well trained, highly disciplined, well equipped and superbly supplied. He had a large quantity of ammunition available to him, especially 82mm mortar HE ammunition with super-quick fuze. The enemy maneuvered small harrassing forces with mortars and seemed capable of attacking by fire from any direction.

3. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION.

- a. Headquarters, 51st Infantry Regiment (Operation Headquarters).
- b. Headquarters, 1st Ranger Group (-).
- c. 2d Battalion, 51st Regiment.

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- d. 4th Battalion, 51st Regiment.
- e. 21st Ranger Battalion.
- f. 37th Ranger Battalion.
- g. 2d Troop, 4th Armored Cavalry (APC).
- h. 1 squad, 102d Engineer Battalion.
- i. RF/PF forces from Dien Ban and Duy Xuyen Districts (blocking forces).
- j. Supporting arms.
  - (1) Two platoons ARVN Artillery (105mm Howitzers).
  - (2) One battery, ROKMC 105mm Howitzer and one battery, ROKMC 155mm Howitzer, 2d ROKMC Brigade.
  - (3) 2d Battalion, 13th Marines (Artillery).
  - (4) USAF, USMC Tactical Air, VNAF, Americal Division helicopter gunships.

4. (C) EXECUTION.

a. Planning and Preparation:

(1) 13 May - 1st Marine Division requested ARVN participation against enemy in Phu Ky Island. I Corps approved the commitment of two battalions of the 51st Regiment plus the 2/4 APC and the 1st Ranger Group (minus 1 Bn) for 7 days commencing 17 May.

(2) 14 May - The Commanding Officer, 51st Regiment, concerned about the command arrangements since the Rangers were commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel, suggested that the Sector Commander, Quang Nam Sector, LTC Tin, assume command of the operation. LTC Tin declined to do so and appointed LTC Thuc, 51st Regt CO, his Sector Deputy. He did so verbally, however, which did not satisfy LTC Thuc. Never-the-less, LTC Thuc made an operational concept and had it approved by LTC Tin.

(3) 15 May - LTC Thuc went to I Corps to see LTG Lam, CG I Corps. GEN Lam was unavailable. LTC Thuc asked the Chief of Staff to attach the Ranger Group (-) to the 51st Regt or to attach the two battalions to the 51st Regiment. Chief of Staff agreed to attach them. He did not, however, notify the Rangers or issue appropriate direction to the Ranger Commander.

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The Ranger Group was scheduled to return to Danang from the Hue vicinity that day. The Senior Advisors of the two units concerned met each other and the Ranger Advisor received his first notice of an impending operation. The concept of operation was discussed between advisors and modifications were proposed. Neither ARVN commander made any effort to see the other. The Senior Advisor, 51st Regiment, requested helicopter airlift for the two Ranger battalions.

(4) 16 May - A final planning conference for all supporting aircraft commanders was scheduled for 1430 hours in the I Corps Advisors' conference room. The planned feint by an APC/Infantry Task Force on this date was not conducted since no orders had, in fact, been given. The CO, 51st Regt, commented to his Senior Advisor that he still believed Sector Headquarters should command the operation because the Corps commander had not yet given orders to attach the Rangers to the 51st Regt. Until the orders were given, LTC Thu would not command the operation. At approximately 1400 hours, GEN Lam agreed to attach the Rangers to the 51st Regt and to subordinate LTC Hiep to LTC Thu. LTC Thu and the two Senior U.S. Advisors discussed the final plan just prior to the scheduled conference. Since LTC Hiep had not met with LTC Thu at any time, it had to be assumed that the recommendation of the Senior Advisor, 1st Ranger Group was consistent with the desires of his counterpart. Never-the-less, on the recommendation of LTC Hiep's Senior Advisor, the CO, 51st Regt confirmed his plan. The briefing was conducted. Quang Nam Sector Headquarters was given a fire support plan through the Advisor S-3.

b. The Operation Plan (see sketch 1):

(1) Phase I (not executed): 16 May 1968.

This was to have been a feint attack by the 2/51 Battalion and the 2/4 APC from Hoi An, executing a river crossing and securing the LZ areas for the Phase II air assault.

(2) Phase II: 17-20 May 1968.

The Ranger Group was to execute an air-mobile assault landing and to be prepared to attack to seize Objective A on order. The 4/51 Bn was to be moved from their base area South of Danang in the morning and become Regimental Reserve with the possibility of being committed to cross the river into the operational area in the event of heavy enemy contact. The 2/51 Bn and 2/4 APC were to hold the Objective 21 area until the Rangers were organized on the ground. Then the 2/51 and the APC's were to advance Westward, seize Objective 22 and Objective 23. One battalion of the Ranger Group and the 2/51 Bn with the APC's were to attack abreast to seize Objective A. One Ranger battalion would remain in position as an immediate reserve force and 4/51 Bn would be Operational Reserve. After

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moving through Objective A, the 2/51 Bn was to remain in the Objective area with a company of Engineers and demolish the enemy's bunkers and shelters. The Rangers and the APC's would continue to advance to the West to take Objectives B, C, and D and secure the Engineer effort. (NOTE: Reference para 3b. Only 9 Engineers were actually committed to the operation.)

(3) Phase III: 21-23 May 1968.

Elements of the 51st Regiment were to return to their normal RD Security Mission in the Hung Quang I Campaign area and in Hoi An. The Rangers, the 2/4 APC and the Engineers were to remain and continue to selectively destroy enemy fortifications.

c. Sequence of Events - Phase I: (Not executed).

d. Sequence of Events - Phase II (17 May 1968) (Sketch 2).

(1) The Ranger Group (-) conducted a smooth, efficient helicopter assault preceded by an ARVN and ROMMC artillery preparation. The preparation began at 0700 hours and was concluded at 0725 hours. The landings began at 0700 hours and were completed at 1030 hours. No contact was made with the enemy and the airhead was quickly secured.

(2) 2/51 Bn and 2/4 APC crossed the river at approximately 1000 hours (2 hours late). Transportation failed to report to 2/51 Bn in sufficient time to get them to the LD at the designated time. Two APC's broke down and caused further delay. Upon reaching the river, they discovered that no boats were available for the crossing. One hour was consumed while the Infantry commandeered sampans from local civilians to make their assault crossing. The crossing met with only light enemy resistance. An air strike was used to soften Objective 21.

(3) At 0800 hours, the 4/51 Bn arrived by truck on the East bank of the river. They were placed in reserve according to plan.

(4) At approximately 1000 hours, COL Vinh, Special Assistant to GEN Lam for operation, arrived by helicopter at the CP. It was soon apparent to everyone that he had been sent to take command of the operation and that he had a direct line of communications to GEN Lam at I Corps. Whatever he requested was granted.

(5) 2/51 Bn and 2/4 APC made light scattered contact as they moved through and secured Objective 21.

(6) At approximately 1300 hours, 2/51 Bn and 2/4 APC advanced toward Objective 22. The enemy engaged them with mortar fire while they were

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exposed in an open rice paddy. The 2/51 Bn fell back and regrouped. After approximately a half hour, the advance was resumed. This time the advance succeeded in getting into the Eastern portion of the hamlet (Objective 22) despite heavy contact. As the combined attack force reached the vicinity of the stream that runs North to South through the long axis of the hamlet, it was stopped by extremely heavy fire from an enemy dug-in on the opposite bank (BT 058544). The Infantry was pinned down by grazing fire and the APC's had difficulty moving forward through the thick vegetation along the stream. APC's, using their .50 caliber and .30 caliber machineguns at close range, cut down a large number of enemy who attempted to move from position to position. Air strikes were directed on the target (by TOC and by aerial observers, as well as by COL Vinh and ground commanders) but were employed too far to the West to be effective in supporting the attack. Helicopter gunships were employed with some degree of success but the density of the foliage prevented adequate direction of the aircraft by advisors on the ground. Consequently, the enemy was not effectively neutralized. It was initially estimated that one enemy battalion occupied Objective 22. Later evaluation changed that estimate to a probable company. A prisoner captured by the Rangers near their LZ reported elements of the 3rd Sapper Battalion were in that objective.

(7) 4/51 Bn was ordered across the river and went into Objective 21.

(8) The Ranger Group was directed to attack Objective 22 from the North to assist 2/51 Bn and the APC's. They advanced after two air strikes had been put into the hamlet and were hit by accurate and intense small arms and automatic weapons fire as they entered the hamlet. Fighting was at close range and the advance was slow. The 37th Rangers took moderately heavy casualties. The enemy again mortared the attackers from within the objective area. 2/51 Bn and 2/4 APC's remained in position since they were reluctant to move forward and cross the direction of advance of the Ranger Battalion. 2/4 APC supported by mortar fire.

(9) By approximately 1730 hours, the Rangers had succeeded in clearing Objective 22, the enemy apparently having withdrawn to the West to either Objective 23 or Objective A. Friendly units continued to receive heavy mortar fire throughout the late afternoon, mostly from the West and Northwest of their positions. Objective A was subjected to a continual pounding by USAF jets, VNAF fighter bombers and U.S. Army helicopter rocket gunships. At one time in the late afternoon, approximately 1830 hours, four VNAF fighter-bombers and six U.S. Army helicopter rocket gunships were over the operational area simultaneously. All competed for the same air space, the same target and for the time to make their runs at the objective before their fuel was used. Advisors did not know that the air support had been requested and usually unable to direct the planes that were flying support for them. The target most desirable to eliminate was an enemy mortar or mortars in the Eastern end of Objective A. All supporting air between

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1830 hours and darkness attempted to neutralize the mortar position. No artillery was used from 0725 hours in the morning until after nightfall due to the crowded air space and the difficulty and confusion keeping count of aircraft and communicating with their pilots. Several air sorties were wasted because too many aircraft were over the operational area simultaneously and some had to drop their bombs on targets of little significance due to low fuel. Some aircraft dropped their ordnance in open rice paddies. One USAF fighter bomber dropped his second set of bombs on 2/51 Bn by mistake (there were no friendly casualties). Two helicopter rocket gunships, unable to get into the flight pattern to attack the desired target because USAF planes were strafing the same area, had to divert to the Western end of Objective A (approximately 2000 meters from the enemy contact) so as not to return to their home field without having expended their rockets.

(10) During the night, friendly units periodically received enemy mortar attacks from the vicinity of Objective A.

(11) All units occupied night positions in the vicinity of their last daytime positions. Units, except for 4/51 Bn in Objective 21, received scattered small arms fire during the night.

(12) A flareship was requested and obtained at approximately 2000 hours. Commanders in the field did not all agree with the advisability of illumination but the aircraft was used to support 2/51 Bn and 4/51 Bn before it was called away at approximately 2200 hours to support a unit in contact elsewhere. Request for ROKMC artillery illumination was denied because they believed the flareship would return. At 0300 hours ROK's began to fire illumination. H&I fires were employed throughout the night. GEN Lam directed COL Vinh to fire 6000 rounds of artillery in Objective A. The Koreans and USMC fired approximately 700 rounds.

e. Sequence of Events - Phase II (18 May 1968) (Sketch 3).

(1) The Rangers and 2/51 Bn were resupplied and casualties were evacuated by helicopter in the early morning.

(2) By 0900 hours, the Ranger Group (-) advanced westward into Objective A and 2/51 Bn moved into Objective 22's Western edge. The Rangers had only occasional sniper contact as they entered the objective and by 0930 hours had advanced two-thirds of the way through the objective. At approximately BT 037540, the Rangers were stopped by intense enemy fire delivered from covered and concealed locations at extremely close range. The enemy force was estimated to be approximately a reinforced company occupying trenches and bunkers as well as fighting holes. Enemy mortars kept up heavy fire on the Ranger elements and the 51st elements further to the rear throughout the day. Casualties were heavy. The lead Ranger battalion, the 37th, was relieved by the 21st Ranger Battalion in mid-afternoon. The battle for

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Objective A lasted until nearly nightfall. Advances were slight and difficult. Again, as had happened on the previous day, fire support was provided exclusively by tactical air and helicopter gunships with similar results and similar confusion.

(3) The CO, 51st Regt, planned to position a force South of Objective A to prevent enemy withdrawal from the hamlet. At approximately 1600 hours, the 4/51 Bn and the 2/4 APC (attached) prepared to move to the hamlets located at BT 050533 and BT 045530. Prior to moving, two air strikes were requested on those locations. By 1700 hours, the two units moved South and turned West. They arrived at BT 050533 by 1830 hours. When they arrived there, they received enemy mortar fire.

(4) During the night, the Ranger battalions occupied the center of Objective A, 2/51 Bn occupied the Western edge of Objective 22, and 4/51 Bn and the APC's occupied the position described in the preceding paragraph.

(5) Two contacts were reported during the night, in addition to frequent enemy mortar attacks. 4/51 Bn reported being probed by an enemy squad. They killed one. 2/51 Bn reported that an enemy battalion had marched across the front of their position moving to the Southeast. (Approximately BT 056535.) No illumination was available for the same reason as discussed for the illumination problem of the previous night. Nevertheless, the troops reported they had seen a battalion force at about 300 meters distance crossing the open area. The report was sent back by runner and reached the battalion commander and his advisor too late for effective reaction with artillery. By the time the report was received, the enemy column had disappeared. The troops did not fire at the enemy column. It is presumed that the enemy force withdrew South across the river, breaking contact with forces in the operational area.

(6) Flareship illumination returned to support from approximately 2400 hours until 0500 hours in the morning.

## f. Sequence of Events - Phase II (19 May 1968) (sketch 4).

(1) At 0500 hours the Ranger Group, having suffered heavy casualties, was placed in Regimental Reserve. 2/51 Bn moved up into Objective A and 4/51 Bn moved to the West on the Southern edge of Objective A. Both battalions came abreast each other by 0630 hours at the Western end of the hamlet and prepared to attack forward to seize Objectives B and C.

(2) An extensive artillery preparation of Objective B had been planned during the night. USMC artillery had been requested and targets had been scheduled through coordination of Quang Nam Sector Advisory Group and 1st Marine Division FSCC. An aerial observer was over the area at 0600 hours. As the battalion prepared to move forward, a series of events

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occurred that caused the attacking battalion to lose the heavy fire support they had requested.

(a) At 0700 hours, a VNAF air strike, requested by CO, 51st Regiment, attacked the target.

(b) By 0720 hours, the VNAF air strike was completed and the air observer called for the artillery preparation. It was learned that the firing batteries did not have the target grids, the targets had not been cleared, despite the fact that the requesting unit had clearance authority in the area.

(c) Shortly after that delay, the aerial observer had to leave the operational area for mechanical reasons. The ground advisor could communicate only by relay with one firing battery. Advisors called for the battery to fire the supporting concentration. A check fire had been placed in effect while ROKMC supply helicopters flew resupply missions across the gun-target line. Just prior to lifting the check-fire, another VNAF air strike was diverted from a convoy cover mission and flew another mission on Objective B.

(d) Check-fire was lifted at approximately 0930 hours and the 4/51 Bn began to advance with the support of one 105mm battery.

(3) At 0930 hours, 4/51 Bn advanced into Objective B behind a light but accurate artillery preparation. 4/51 Bn cleared Objective B without enemy contact, and 2/51 Bn moved up on their right flank. 2/51 Bn reported that the enemy had heavily mined and booby-trapped the trail and adjacent trench line that connects Objects A and B. Progress was slow.

(4) 4/51 Bn entered Objective C by 1130 hours and advanced without enemy resistance. By 1230 hours, 4/51 Bn had swept to approximately BT 005529 and began to return to the East.

(5) 2/4 APC moved to the North of Objective A, linked up with the Rangers and together they advanced into Objective D (BT 035554).

(6) Prior to nightfall, 4/51 Bn had returned to the Eastern end of Objective B, 2/51 Bn had taken position to the South of Objective A (BT 035524) and the Rangers had occupied the hamlet at BT 035555 with one Bn and the APC's.

(7) The enemy continued to mortar friendly forces throughout the afternoon and night. The Rangers and 4/51 Bn took the heaviest casualties. Enemy mortars this time were East of friendly forces.

g. Sequence of Events - Phase II (20 May 1968) (sketch 5).

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(1) Little friendly movement was attempted during the morning, as units evacuated wounded and received resupplies. 4/51 Bn was supplied with 700 pounds of explosives with which to destroy enemy emplacements in Objective A. 64 civilians were evacuated by 4/51 Bn.

(2) 4/51 Bn and 2/51 Bn moved back into Objective A as the Ranger Group (-) moved Northward and continued to sweep Objective D.

(3) During the afternoon, LTC Thuc, CO, 51st Regiment, became painfully ill with a recurrence of a peptic ulcer. By 1700 hours, he was unable to stand up and was ineffective. He was evacuated by helicopter to NSA Hospital at 1730 hours. LTC Tin, Sector Commander, Quang Nam, arrived to assume temporary command of the operation.

h. Sequence of Events - Phase II (21 May 1968).

(1) The Ranger battalion resumed their advance Westward through Objective D in the morning and were resisted by small enemy forces and mortar fire. The advance was deliberate.

(2) At approximately 1000 hours, the Ranger Group command group was extracted from the field and brought to Dien Ban District Headquarters, where they assumed command and control of the operation. The Regimental S-3 and S-4 remained to assist the Ranger commander, but the remainder of 51st Regiment headquarters left. The Senior Advisor, 1st Ranger Group, assumed advisory responsibility for the operation as of approximately 1300 hours.

5. RESULTS. (Note: Results are inclusive for entire operation.)

a. Enemy losses:

(1) KIA: 298.

(2) VC captured: 4.

(3) VC suspects: 0.

(4) Weapons and material captured or destroyed:

(a) Crew served weapons: 11.

(b) Individual weapons: 15.

(c) Two tons ammunition destroyed.

(d) Thirteen tons rice destroyed.

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b. Friendly losses:

- (1) KIA: 53 ARVN, 1 U.S.
- (2) MIA: 194 ARVN, 3 U.S.
- (3) Weapons lost, damaged or destroyed: 0.

c. Civilians evacuated: 152.

6. ANALYSIS OF OPERATION.

a. General. Whereas Hung Quang I/20, conducted 18-20 April in this same area, was worthy of praise in many respects, Hung Quang I/38 deserves little praise and considerable criticism. Planning was haphazard, support requested was not provided and normal support expected of higher headquarters and staff was not given. Orders were given too late and in insufficient detail to permit proper execution by commanders. Fire planning was incomplete. Employment of air support was excessive. The scheme of maneuver was unimaginative, too much concern was placed on integrity of Ranger and 51st Regiment battalions. Having cleared Objective A, the battalions had too little Engineer support and insufficient explosives to destroy any major portion of the hamlet. The operation began with little or no support or assistance from I Corps headquarters and, during the first two and a half days, at least, was over-controlled by that headquarters. It was not at all typical of a 51st Regiment operation.

b. Planning and Preparation Phase.

(1) The selection of a commander and the organization of the forces necessary to conduct the operation was unnecessarily delayed. No coordination was ever effected between the two principle commanders. Apparently there was a great reluctance on the part of LTC Thuc to command an officer of equal grade without specific instructions from I Corps.

(2) Due to excessive delays and indecisiveness by the commander and his superiors, Phase I was never conducted. If it had been, 2/51 Bn and 2/4 APC may have had heavy contact early in the operation. They may, however, have served a very useful purpose as a reconnaissance in force.

(3) The attachment of only nine Engineers to the operation when a company had been requested was insufficient for the task. One of the primary objectives of the operation was to destroy a maximum number of enemy bunkers and fighting emplacements. With nine engineers and less than 1,000 pounds of explosives, it was impossible for the ARVN Infantry to accomplish that mission.

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c. Execution.

(1) The artillery preparation of the LZ and the subsequent air assault of the island by the 1st Ranger Group (-) was well conducted. Due to the lateness of 2/51 Bn and 2/4 AF-C crossing the river and failing to secure Objective 21 early in the morning, an excellent opportunity was missed to quickly hit the enemy force from converging directions. Surprise gained by the air assault was not exploited.

(2) Improper preparation was indicated by the time delay caused when 2/51 Bn had to search the river bank for sufficient sampans to make the river crossing. (This comment was also made on the after action report of Operation Hung Quang I/20.)

(3) From the moment COL Vinh arrived at the CP on 17 May until he finally left and stayed away on the afternoon of 19 May, LTC Thuc was relegated to the role of staff officer. COL Vinh assumed "de facto" command of the operation. LTC Thuc, consequently, "lost face" with his staff and lost effective control of the situation in the field. Although certainly well-intentioned, COL Vinh, in fact, interfered with the proper command and control of the operation. Placing telephone calls directly to I Corps TOC and occasionally to GEN Lam, he obtained continual air support for the ground commanders. Air support was not, however, the most effective means of fire support for the units that were in contact. During daylight hours on the 17th and 18th (except for the preparation of the LZ) the ground units were completely without artillery fire support because tactical air and helicopter gunships were constantly flying over the operational area and forcing check-fires. COL Vinh duplicated requests for air support which resulted in the over-saturation of the air space on the afternoon of the 17th (previously described). Two U.S. and one VNAF air observers were employed simultaneously. COL Vinh or the ground commanders or their advisors requested air support from the Senior Advisor. The Senior Advisor would place the request either through Quang Nam TOC or directly to a U.S. air observer. While that request was being processed, COL Vinh frequently placed his own request directly to I Corps TOC or to the VNAF air observer. The result was two, or sometimes three, air strikes arriving simultaneously to attack the same target. This required the ground units to wait for excessive periods before they could advance since they could not move without close support and they feared that the aircraft would drop its ordnance too close to them. After two helicopter gunships had failed to unload their ordnance due to saturation of the target, the Senior Advisor was notified by Quang Nam TOC that further requests for helicopter fire support would have to be completely justified and could not be duplicated by ARVN request. COL Vinh called for all the gunships and air strikes he could get. That resulted in the situation at 1830 hours on the 17th where all aircraft competed with each other for the same target before daylight ran out. These mistakes were repeated on the 18th and caused a further loss of effective close fire support.

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(4) Having personal knowledge of the capabilities of the Commanding Officer, 51st Regiment and of his battalion commanders, it is my firm belief that LTC Thuc was completely capable of commanding the Ranger Group (-) without outside assistance. He had proved during Operation Hung Quang I/20 that he could effectively manipulate supporting artillery and air without the assistance of others outside his own staff. There was no indication that LTC Hiep, Commanding Officer, 1st Ranger Group, would not accept orders from LTC Thuc. Intervention by an I Corps staff officer was not indicated and should not have been directed.

(5) The directive from GEN Lam that ARVN and ROKMC fire 3,000 rounds of artillery into Objective A on the night of 17-18 May and that USMC artillery fire another 3,000 rounds at that same objective was unrealistic and impossible to comply with. To expect the U.S. Advisor to convince the U.S. Marines to fire 3,000 rounds in support of an ARVN operation when their own forces were in heavy enemy contact was unrealistic. If the Commanding General, I Corps, wanted his forces to have 6,000 rounds of artillery for support, he and his headquarters had the obligation to make that support available.

(6) Why the planned artillery support for 4/51 Bn and 2/52 Bn on the morning of 19 May failed to materialize, this reporting officer does not know. However, too many unnecessary delays could have seriously impaired the effectiveness of the attack had the enemy resisted.

(7) In the favor of the participating units, it must be stated that the Regimental and Battalion S-4's performed creditably during the reported period. Supplies were pre-stocked, adequate cargo nets were available and accurate cubic and weight measurements were provided the supporting helicopter units. This was a significant improvement over previous operations. One criticism is justified, however. Two cargo nets used to deliver supplies on the first day were discarded by the ARVN troops rather than carry them until the next helicopter arrived. Further, all units resupplied their rations with bagged rice and bottles of nuoc mam and soy sauce. These are bulky and difficult to use. They cause delays in the operation for distribution of the rice. ARVN commanders should pre-plan to resupply packaged field rations for their troops.

(9) Once heavy enemy contact was lost on the 20th, the commanders had no plans for further maneuver. This caused excessive periods of immobility and further resulted in heavy casualties when the enemy succeeded in mortaring the static positions.

#### 7. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Operations of such a scope as Hung Quang I/38 should not be conducted without detailed planning and preparation. Aerial reconnaissance,

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aerial photography should be programmed well in advance. Major commanders should have maximum time to plan and coordinate with all supporting arms, especially artillery, air and engineer elements. Realistic estimate of ammunition, explosives, fuel, rations and other consumables must be made and adequate plans for initial issue and resupply of these items must be made. "High use factor" items should be pre-allocated and immediately available when needed.

b. To reduce the possibility of compromise of the plan and subsequent loss of surprise of the enemy a "cover plan" should be developed and issued simultaneously to the development of the actual plan.

c. When forces from one command are attached to another command, the unit being attached must be ordered to report to the gaining unit as of a designated time. The gaining commander must not have the responsibility of notifying a unit that is to be attached to him. That is the job of the commander who exercises control over both units involved, in the case of Hung Quang I/38 it was GEN Lam or his headquarters.

d. A commander must be selected prior to the planning phase of an operation and should be supported to the best of the ability of the higher headquarters but should not be interfered with in the execution of his mission.

e. When ARVN, ROKMC and US artillery and/or air support are to be used in support of an operation, a fire support coordinator should be designated. He should allocate all missions and responsibilities for support.

f. Any river crossings that are contemplated should be planned sufficiently in advance to permit an expeditious crossing. In this case, PF forces from Dien Ban or RF forces from Cau Lau Bridge could have commandeered civilian sampans and had them positioned for the use of the 1/51 Bn.

g. When an ARVN unit is still in heavy contact with enemy at nightfall and has been on the offensive during the day, it should not break contact and withdraw. It should maintain close contact to reduce the enemy's success with mortars. If the troops are still capable, the commanders should order the attack continued through the night. Aerial flareships can be kept on station at 7500 feet and provide continuous illumination while artillery fire can be employed in direct support under the aircraft. The shock effect it would have on the enemy would be of considerable advantage to ARVN troops. The enemy usually breaks contact at night time and exfiltrates out of danger or to new positions. He must not be allowed to control the night. If the enemy succeeds in breaking contact, the ARVN should not attempt, of course, to pursue.

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8. CONCLUSIONS. Hung Quang I/38 succeeded in only one respect, it killed many enemy. The increased tactical efficiency experienced in Hung Quang I/20, however, receded. Morale has dropped due to excessively high casualties and too few enemy destroyed. The 51st Regiment learned many lessons on this operation. It is hoped that they and their higher headquarters learn from the mistakes made during Hung Quang I/38.

*For Charles D. Mears Jr.*

CHARLES D. MEARS JR.  
Major, Infantry  
Senior Advisor

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
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HUNG QUANG I/38

M.A.P: 1/50,000

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SKETCH 1  
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51 +  
98




HUNG QUANG I, 38

18 MAY 1968

MAP: 1/50,000  
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6640 I, 6640 IV

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+57

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SKETCH 3

51  
+  
48


HUNG QUANG I/38

19 MAY 1968

MAP 1/50,000  
HOI AN & DAI LOC  
6640 E, 6640 E

07  
+  
57

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CONFIDENTIAL

51  
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
HUNG QUANG I/38

20 MAY 1968

MAP: 1/50,000  
HOI AN & DAI LCC  
6640 I, 6640 IV

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28916  
WO2 R.I. OLIVER  
2nd Bn 1st Regt 1st ARVN Div.  
QUANG-TRI

MONTHLY REPORT  
FROM 30 APRIL TO 4 JUNE

BATTALIONS TASKS

1. From 30 April - 10 May

LAM SON 216

Type: Search and Destroy

Area: ASHAU Valley

Results:

Enemy : 1 KIA

Weapons : 1 AK47

Friendly: 4 KIA (by US Air Craft  
8 WIA (by US Air Craft

A. Report of Operation:

- 1) Battalion air lifted into Tabat air field in the centre of the Ashau Valley, with the task of moving South to the end of the valley near the Laos border..
- 2) To search and destroy any enemy troops or stores found in the area.
- 3) For the first 6 days we would move down the East side of the Ashau river and the 2nd Bn/3rd Regt would move down the West side. On the 7th day 2nd Bn 1st Regt would cross to the west side of the river and the 1st Bn 3rd Regt would move to the East side and the 2nd Bn 3rd Regt would remain with the fire base half way between Tabat and Ashau Special Forces camp at Ashau Airfield.
- 4) On the night of 3 May 2nd Bn/3 Regt reported seeing lights moving along the road to the North and called for Helicopter Gun Ships which arrived at 2100 hrs.

Although my battalion was on higher ground than the other Battalion, at no time did we see or hear any vehicles.

After the gun ships arrived and were working with the 2nd Bn 3rd Regt on the West side of the river, one helicopter sighted what he thought to be a vehicle moving and fired on it. The object he thought to be a vehicle was 3rd Coy 2nd Bn 1st Regt in night location East of the river. Results were 4 KIA and 8 WIA which we could not MEDVAC until first light, and was completed by 0745 hrs next morning.

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- 5) Nothing was found in the search of the area until the 7 May when we found 5 miles of telephone line running from North to South which we destroyed. Also we found 5 large grass houses, a peanut and corn farm of 500 acres which we also destroyed.
- 6) On 8 May we found two A.A positions but no weapons.
- 7) On 10 May the battalion was air lifted back to Lavang air strip Quang-Tri.

B. Remarks on Operation

- 1) Not enough co-operation between battalions
- 2) Poor air support (US)
- 3) Good ARVN Artillery, but poor US Artillery support
- 4) All battalions worked hard, but found very little for their troubles.
- 5) A good operation for training Vietnamese in the use of air mobility.

2. From 11 May to 16 May

Battalion was resting and being re-issued new equipment. Also the battalion was put in defence of the city of Quang-Tri. Nil action.

3. From 17 May to 4 June

LAM SON 225

Type : Search and Destroy and Protect the Base Area (Fire Base)

Area : Ap LAI BANG

Results:

Enemy : 22 KIA

Weapons: 2 x 60mm Mortars  
400 x 1 LB Blocks Explosive  
1 x 12.7mm A.A Gun  
1 x M16  
1 x Chicom 7.62mm Machine Gun  
2 x AK 47  
49 x CKC  
1 x (US) Carbine MK1  
2 x BAR  
2 x M1 (US 30 Cal)  
4 x K50  
1 x Flare Pistol  
454 x B40 & B41 Rockets (plus 13 case of charges)

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30 x 122mm Rockets  
210 x 60mm Rounds  
30 x 82mm Rounds  
15 x 75mm Artillery Rounds  
19 x Mines  
112 x Cases of Ammo. (AK47 & K50 330 rounds  
per case)  
14 x Telephones  
1 x Telephone Swich Board  
7 x Radios  
400 x VC/NVA Uniforms  
2 x Typerwriter  
106 x VC grass Huts destroyed  
10 x Rolls of telephone wire (200 meters for  
roll)

Friendly : 1 KIA 13 WIA  
1 Helicopter destroyed.

A. Report of Operation

17 May.- The 2nd Battalion moved to PK 17 to operate with the 3rd Regt on LAM SON 225.

18 May.- At 0700 hrs 2nd Battalion was air lifted into Ap LAI BANG 5 miles west of camp Evans, by helicopter. On landing in the area which was later to become the fire base one helicopter failed to follow landing instructions and crashed landed, one ARVN soldier broke his leg and the helicopter was destroyed.

The Battalion had to enlarge the area and this was completed by 1500 hrs. Then 6 x 105mm Guns were lifted in with ammo, and a fire base was set up, and all helicopter lifts were completed by 1830.

19 May.- 3rd Company 2nd Bn whose job it was to guard the fire base made contact with VC 2,000 metres from fire base. Results 5 VC KIA 2 Type-writer, 1 x 12.7mm AA gun and 50 VC uniforms. Friendly 1 WIA.

20 May.- 3rd Company again made contact found 5 VC huts, a rice cache, 1 M16, 2 AK47 plus in the huts they found a complete lay out of the city of Hue, and detailed instruction of operations to be carried out against the city.

Under every hut were tunnels which ran from one hut to another.

21 May.- Lt Dutcher and myself accompanied the Battalion XO and 2 Companies on a search and destroy operation in the area around the fire base area. We moved out at 0600 hrs (first light) and moved

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2,000 metres (S/E). At 0930 hrs, we found 8 VC grass houses and 20 bunkers which we destroyed, and arriving at the VC camp which we found the day before we found hiding in the grass 2 VC bodies killed during the gun fight the day before.

At 1500 hrs we moved 500 metres N/East and found another village consisting of 30 grass houses and tunnels, and found 1 RN/GRC, 9 radios, 10 telephones, 1 telephone switch board, 1 medical dictionary, 10 rolls of telephone line (200 metres per roll), 100 VC/NVA uniforms. It was getting too dark to search any more, so we stayed the night in the VC camp.

22 May.- At first light we continued the search and found in another hut the following: 2 x 60mm mortars, 1 CKC, 1 carbine, 70 B40-41, 80 x 60mm mortar rounds, 20 x 82mm mortar rounds, 7 mines, 52 cases CKC and AK47 rounds, 7 claymores, 1 telephone, 200 x 1LBS bar explosive, 6 AK47 mags, 3 cases B40 charges, 100 uniforms, 30 x 122mm rockets, and in a cave we found 50 x 60mm mortar rounds. At 1540 hrs we moved 400 metres over the hill to the north and found 25 more grass houses, which we destroyed and stayed the night in this location as it was getting dark.

23 May.- At 0700 hrs we found another cave with the following: 12 cans of salad oil, 2 VC grenades, 1 large box of medical supplies and 3 VC packs.

We moved out of this location at 1000 hrs; 1030 hrs we made contact with 3 VC/NVA and we suffered 1 WIA, VC fled and we found 10 VC grass huts.

Medvac wounded man 1500 hrs and set up night base.

24 May.- Made contact with a platoon size VC/NVA element 200 metres from night location. Results : 11 VC KIA, 9 grass huts destroyed. We found 2 VC grenades, 80 x 60mm mortar rounds, 80 x B40, 47 CKC 2 bar, 2 M1 (US), 4 K50, 1 Chicom machine gun, 60 case AK47, 15 x 75mm arty shells, 10 x 82mm mortar shells. Moved out of village at 1100 hrs I made contact 1230 hrs with 3 man squad VC/NVA KIA 1, weapons 1 AK47, 2 B40. All weapons lifted back to fire base 1700 hrs. When clearing fire lines found small cave with large box of drugs, returned drugs to fire base 1800 hrs. Stayed night at LZ for resupply next day.

25 May.- Searched to the S/East and East but no contact, resupplied 1500 hrs. Moved out to new night location. Quiet day.

26 May.- Moved out to the south of fire base area , after going 1,000 metres made contact (1000 hrs) found 10 VC grass huts. On destroying them we were fired upon from hill 50 metres away by VC/NVA Squad 4 men wounded. Two Coys attacked. VC/NVA fled, results of search were: 301 B40, 200 blocks 1LBS explosives, 2 telephones. Moved out of this village after destroying ammo catch.

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Two Coys moved to the east 200 metres and made contact with VC Squad again. Results: 2 VC KIA, 1 CKC, 1 claymore mine, 4 mines, 100 VC/NVA uniforms, 1 flare pistol, 1 set 60mm mortar sights, 1 set 122mm rocket sights. Friendly losses 4 WIA.

Built LZ and Medvac completed by 1750 hrs, and resupplied with food and ammo. Resupply completed by 1800 hrs.

27 May.- C.P ordered to return to Fire Base by 1800 hrs, lifted back by helicopter.

28-30 May. Operated LZ and resupply to other two battalions still on operation.

31 May.- Operating LZ from 0600 hrs to 1900 hrs - night guard fired at moving target at 2300 hrs . Nil results.

1 June.- 2nd Coy made contact with VC sniper on hill over looking fire base. Results : Friendly 1 KIA. Enemy nil result.

2 June.- 2nd Coy made contact with VC Squad. Enemy: nil. Friendly 2 WIA.

3 June.- Resupplied 1st & 2nd Battalions 3rd Regt by helicopter.

1830 hrs Fire Base mortared, 20 rounds received, nil damage.

Reason for no damage, it was raining very hard, and I don't think they could range in on Fire Base.

4 June.- WO2 Oliver & Lt Hoedl returned to Quang Tri, and replaced by Capt Lawrence and WO2 Gabriel.

B. Remarks on Operation

- 1) Well planed operation.
- 2) All battalions were working well, after Ashau Valley, which I think was the start of more close working with US Forces.
- 3) 2nd Battalion, 1st ARVN Regt worked very hard, and are ready to take over a greater role in the defence of their country.

Ray Oliver  
WO2

PROVINCE BINH THUAN

Date : 23 May 1968

1. Source of Information : PRU
2. Mission : Capture or kill VC squad
3. Friendly Losses : Nil
4. Enemy Losses : KIA 4, WIA 4-6 (?) CIA. 0  
(a) Equipment captured : 2 AK 47  
(Registered Nos: M22, N006861 & 11062108)  
1 Magazine Carrier  
6 Personal Docs.

All retained by PRU. Advisor for Black Operations.

5. Prisoners : Nil
6. Enemy : Size : 18-20 men  
Ambush : 788085  
Weapons : AK 47's, B40, LMG's  
Uniforms: Khaki  
Activity: Unknown
7. Friendly Forces : 34 PRU
8. Team Equipment Losses : Nil
9. Photographs taken : Nil
10. Narrative : Based on information received from outside sources, the PRU plus Advisor moved to Ham-Thuan Sub-Sector, at 1700 hours 22 May 1968. On reaching this area, the PRU Chief, Advisor, District Chief, DIOCC Advisor had a conference on the information on the AAT of Muong Man and decided it was too good and looked like a trap. At this stage I decided to abort the mission and operate on information re VC movement in the area

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of 788085. This information came from a PRU source and stated an unknown number of VC were crossing the Phan Thiet Ham-Thuan Highway at 2030-2100 hours each night. After an extensive briefing the PRU left Ham Thuan and proceeded to the ambush site across country. We broke the PRU up into four groups and sited them as an area ambush. We were in position by 2030 hours. At 2033 hours contact was made with the VC and a fire fight developed. Ham Thuan Sub-Sector fired 81mm mortar illumination on request. This was a great asset and we saw 4 VC bodies by the light of the flares. The fire fight lasted 15 minutes before the VC broke contact, during this time we received a large volume of small arms fire, plus 1 B40 round. At approx 2050 hours a squad of 6 PRU moved in and searched the killing ground and found 1 AK47 plus 2 VC KIA's. At 2100 hours the PRU moved back to Ham Thuan arriving at 2145 hrs. A dawn sweep of the ambush area provided 1 AK47 and two more VC KIA's. Many blood trails were also found, some indicated a large loss of blood, this leads me to conclude that 4-6 VC were WIA.

Comment : The PRU are to be commended on their night movement, noise discipline and fighting ability. The PRU Chief did all that could be expected of him.

RAY G. DAVIES  
WO2

WEEKLY REPORT

BINH THUAN PROVINCE

Monday 3rd June 1968

1430 Hours. P.R.U. moved to the location of (AN 801081) where a grave had been reported to contain the bodies of 3 VC KIA in the P.R.U. ambush of the 22nd May 1968. The grave was found and it did hold three bodies, the grave was filled in again. This confirmed the previous agents report, and now gives a seven body count for the action. In view of the accuracy of this report I feel it is safe to assume that the report of four wounded is also true.

Tuesday 4th June 1968

1000 Hours. P.R.U. Advisor and Intel. Leader departed by helicopter for the Special Forces Camp at Long Son. As this unit is leaving in the near future they gave us the names of their informants in the area to enable us to take over their intel net. Other information on local V.C.I. 's was also obtained. We then flew down to Binh Thuy Province and contacted the R.D.C.O with the view to a possible combined operation against the VC tax point on Highway 1. Intel operation on exact location of the tax point and its operation sent out, negative result at this time.

Wednesday 5th June 1968

Received report on tax point, still active, collection routine changed, vehicles are stopped and driver taken 600 meters into the jungle where he pays the tax collector. P.R.U. agent reported two persons about to join the VC., Nguyen-Van-Duoc and Vo Mo. They were arrested and turned over to the police. Report on VC 430th Platoon location (AN 740124) checked out, negative contact.

Thursday 6th June 1968

P.R.U. Advisor to Nha Trang for pay. P.R.U. Given two missions, tax point reported operating at (AN 743130), and an ambush at (AN 740119) by night. I cleared this with Sector before departing but the District Chief of Ham Thuan refused the P.R.U. to operate in this area when they reached his H.Q. No clear reason was given. The P.R.U. Chief moved his unit down into the area of (AN 732050) checking on reported VC locations, negative contact. At dusk he moved to the area of (AN 750089) and set up an ambush on a likely VC route. 2100 hours 3 figures were seen approaching the ambush site some 200 meters away. At this time dogs started to bark and the party moved quickly into a stream bed and moved away. They were not fired on as the ambush party did not wish to compromise their position, no further sightings were made. A daylight search of the area provided negative results. At 0700 hours the P.R.U. returned to Phan-Thiet.

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Friday 7th June 1968.

P.R.U. Advisor returned from Nha Trang. At 2020 hours a message was received from Sector stating that the P.R.U. were required for an operation, and would be briefed at Sector H.Q. on arrival. We were at Sector by 2035 hours and I was informed by the S3 (VN) that he wanted six points ambushed against a possible VC platoon. I pointed out to him that this would necessitate breaking the P.R.U. down into eight man groups, and I considered it militarily unsound to commit an eight man group against a platoon especially as we had not seen the ground in daylight. He told me that it had been ordered by the Province Chief in writing. I informed him that if that was the case we would carry out the order under protest, and requested to see the written order. This he would not, or could not do. I informed him that in absence of this written order I had no alternative but to return to my base, where I would remain on radio watch in case we were required to assist in the defence of the city. I was visited by the S2 (VN) at 2200 hours who informed me that the Province Chief had issued no such order, it was all the S3's idea and often occurred when he was Duty Officer.

Saturday 8th June 1968

Visited Major Chaa with reference to P.R.U. member Lai THE GIA, (see attached letter). I indicated that he had been misinformed in this matter and that at the time Gia was arrested on the 5th May as a draft dodger he was in fact serving with the P.R.U. as could be seen by his personal documents signed by the Province Chief on the 3rd May. I also informed him that Gia did not escape from arrest but was released when the P.R.U. Chief produced Gia's papers to the police. He then informed me that he had a letter from Saigon which stated that the P.R.U. could not enlist men of draft age and he would provide me with a copy. I said that if this was the case we would be only too happy to assist in any way we could after I had contacted my superiors. We parted on very good terms, however, I have a feeling that this could now die a natural death and we will hear nothing further, I hope! At 1130 hours, acting on P.R.U. information we went to the area of (AN 882134) and cordoned it off. The cordon area was covered by arcs of fire rather than by men. Six three man snatch teams were sent into the area against predetermined targets, result, 6 VCI's who were blindfolded and removed to the P.R.U. safehouse by 1400 hours. At 1700 hours our interrogation gave us the names of two further VCI. As this is a contested area between dusk and dawn, I took 30 P.R.U. back into the same area where two snatch teams picked up the wanted people. We returned to Phan-Thiet at 1845 hours, we received a little small-arms fire in the area (AN 851120) no casualties were sustained.

Sunday 9th June 1968

Interrogation of VCI's continuing.

Ray G. Davies  
P.R.U. Advisor