

Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report and enclosures
1 - 30 November 1968

Series: AWM95 - Australian Army
commanders' diaries

Item: 1/2/59

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COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

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HEADQUARTERS
AUSTRALIAN FORCE
VIETNAM

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AATTV MONTHLY REPORT - NOV 68

Attached for information is a copy of the AATTV Monthly Report for Nov 68.

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with Hist. Sec.*

(Signature)
(A.L. MacDONALD)
Major General
Commander Australian Force
VIETNAM

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Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam

13 Dec 68

HQ AFV (2)

AATTV REPORT : NOVEMBER 1968General

1. Operations involving members of AATTV continued at a high level of intensity and most were aimed at the destruction of the VC infrastructure. The number and scope of combined operations continued to increase.
2. No casualty was sustained during the month.
3. Deployment. The deployment of the Team as at 26 Nov is at Annex A. Changes in deployment during the month are explained later in this Report.

I Corps

4. Enemy The NVA build-up continues north of the DMZ and NVA units are still active south of Danang and west of Quang-Ngai. HQ I Corps reports that enemy truck convoys have increased 435% since the bombing halt compared with the same period last year.
5. The VC infrastructure has suffered from the combined cordon and search operations, especially in Thua Thien and Quang-Tri Provinces. However, the VC continue to recruit, mainly from the youth and women in the population, and continues to foster the growth in political activity.
6. Operation Continued emphasis is being placed on cordon and search operations by combined forces, with encouraging success. At Annex B is a paper produced by HQ I Corps which has been issued to advisory teams and to ARVN units. It is based on the Australian Pamphlet No 11 "Counter Revolutionary Warfare" adapted for Vietnam conditions. The paper has aroused considerable interest among both Americans and Vietnamese and III MAF have also asked for copies.

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7. On 17 Nov, 3rd Bn, 36th NVA Regt attacked 2/51 ARVN Bn at Dien-Bar. A report on this battle and the success of the ARVN Bn is at Annex C. See also the Report by WO2 CF KEIOSKIE at Annex F. This battle was closely followed by a large cordon and search operation in this area (Op MEADE RIVER) which is still underway. The cordon of six USMC and one Korean Marine battalions covered about 24,000 metres and three ARVN battalions were employed in the search together with RF, MPFF, PRU, National Police and other organizations. This operation followed the standard procedure now adopted by I Corps and III MAF where US units provide the cordon and GVN military and para military force conduct the search.

8. A report by Maj D. Millie on operations in Quang-Tri Province is at Annex D. Again, further advances are being made in developing closer ties between GVN and US forces.

9. A report by WO2 BW Snelling on operations by 3/1 ARVN from 18 Oct to 12 Nov is at Annex E. During this period the battalion accounted for 53 VC killed and captured, collected 38 weapons for the loss of 4 WIA. This is typical of other battalions in 1 ARVN Div and clearly shows the standard of results which are being achieved now. A report by WO1 RJ O'Brien of 2/5 ARVN Bn (2 Div) is at Annex G.

10. An extract from a report by the Senior Province Advisor, Thua-Thien Province, on the overall status of the pacification effort is at Annex H. The results being achieved in this Province are startling.

II Corps

11. As a result of the considerably reduced NVA strength in II CTZ, contacts by the Mobile Strike Force companies were infrequent and were of a small scale. VC initiated incidents continued and some province capitals and SF 'A' Camp were subjected to rocket, mortar and occasionally ground attacks. Members of AATTV were employed on operations with the Mobile Strike Force as follows:

a. Recon Coy : WO2's URQUHART, EDWARDS and JEWELL, completed a short operation at BAN ME THUOT which proved to be successful.

b. 1st Bn 212 Coy Capt BOURKE, WO2s TOLLEY and JACKSON
211 Coy WO2s SMITH and HYLAND.
completed an operation at BAO LOC and DALAT. Whilst in command of the battalion for two weeks Capt BOURKE was responsible for the capture of:

2 82 mortars (complete)
100 rounds of 82mm mortar bombs
18 Russian rifles with sniper scopes
100 rounds of 60mm mortar bombs

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- c. 223 Coy: Capt ROTHWELL, WO2 KAPP and WO2 GRAFTON. Completed an independant operation at BONG SON (near Qui-Nhon) under OPCON to 173 Abn Bde. The results were:
- (1) two NVA bunker complexes located
 - (2) one NVA KIA (one AK 47 recovered)
 - (3) eight VC estimated KIA.
- d. 231 Coy : WO2 FRANCIS
Completed an operation at AN KHE during which his USSF Coy comd was KIA. WO2 FRANCIS took command of the company which at the completion of the operation had accounted for three NVA (KIA) three weapons recovered.
- e. Trg Coy : WO2 STEWART completed a recruiting tour at DALAT and has almost completed a second training cycle with the training company.
- f. Capt SAVAGE is still working as S2 and has reorganised the S3 office and has it working efficiently.

12. Capt JED White is now employed as Assist S3 on HQ 53FG at Nha-Trang. He is responsible for assessing, reporting on and advising on all SF training activities in Vietnam, and as a result travels widely throughout the country.

13. ^{WO2 J S Allan} PRU. ~~Capt F. King~~ is replacing Capt B Palmer with the Mobile Training Team. The activities of the Team have been increased by the introduction of new specialist courses for intelligence, snipers and demolitions.

14. WO1 Ostara, the senior PRU advisor in Binh-Dinh Province, is achieving excellent results and has been highly commended by the Programme Director. During Oct for example, this PRU of 75 Vietnamese all of whom are Hoi-Chanhs, mounted 77 operations resulting in the capture of 27 VCI the killing of two and the dissemination of 52 intelligence reports. The operations log at Annex I is of interest in that it shows the inroads being made into the VCI and the type of VC being captured, many of whom are women or elderly men.

III Corps

15. IRP Training. The third course, for students of 5ARVN Div, began its final operational phase on 25 Nov and is due to graduate on 16 Dec. On 25 Nov one patrol, under WO2 J Pettit, contacted three VC shortly after insertion into the AO killing two and possibly a third.

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16. In addition to the 24 students from 5 Div, 7 Vietnamese instructors are being trained on the present course and on graduation will join the LRP Wing as instructors. This course marks the completion of the training of divisional LRVs for III ARVN Corps. The training of LRPs for IV Corps in an expanded course for 80 personnel will begin on 23 Dec. No increase will be made to the Australian instructional staff but an additional one officer and 7 NCOs will be added to the Vietnamese staff.

17. AATTV Trg Cadre, Phuoc-Tuy. A cadre of one captain and three WOs has been deployed to Phuoc Tuy to assist 1ATF in the training of RF troops in patrol techniques and the training of Australian Mobile Advisory Teams (MATs). The Cadre is accommodated by the 18 ARVN Div Training School near Nui Dat.

18. The training of three MATs and the Australian troops who will be attached to four RF patrols is scheduled for 2-6 Dec. The first course for four RF patrols, each of 10 men will begin on 9 Dec and will consist of five weeks infantry training and three weeks operational training with 1ATF.

IV Corps

19. November has been mainly devoted to the implementation of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC). Initial indications are favorable although it must be recognized that the later phases of the campaign will move into some more remote areas and with the expansion of territory under GVN control, there will have to be a stretching of Territorial Forces.

20. The VC in general have been busy regrouping and resupplying. Major attacks have been minimal but there has been a step up of harassment and terrorist activities. Mortar attacks on towns also appear to be increasing.

21. Deployment At the request of the Senior US Advisor for Territorial Security one of the Australian MATs has been moved from Vinh-Binh Province to Kien-Hoa Province and absorbed into two US Teams. US advisors are anxious to have Australian WOs working with US MATs as their professionalism, experience and motivation help to provide a backbone for the inexperienced members of MATs.

22. RD Mobile Training Team. The team, of two WOs, has been employed on conducting courses for RD Provincial Training Teams, at Can Tho. These teams have now returned to their own provinces to instruct in the mobile security concept. The Australian team is at present monitoring Phong-Dinh Province.


23. An evaluation of the work of the team and of the mobile security concept is at Annex J. It will be seen that the concept has aroused country-wide interest and a request has been made for a second RD MTT to be provided by AATTV for IV Corps.

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Administration

24. The average strength of the Team was 15 officers and 76 warrant officers.

25. It is hoped that the Australian Advisors Club at Danang, donated by AFDF, will be officially opened late December.



(R.L. BURNARD)
Lt Col
Comd.

AATTV DEPLOYMENT
AS AT 26 NOVEMBER 1968

Annex 'A' to
AATTV Monthly Report
for November 1968

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
<u>HQ AATTV (Saigon)</u>								
1	It Col	K.L.	Burnard	RA Inf	HQ AATTV	Commanding Officer	11 Feb 69	SAIGON
2	Capt	F.G.	Bent	RA Inf	"	Adjutant	1 Oct 69	"
3	WO1	F.I.	Branson	RA Inf	"	Chief Clerk	17 Dec 68	"
4	WO2	T.P.	Van Bakel	RAASC	"	" " (Designate)	1 Apr 69	"
5	WO2	S.I.	Wells	RAASC	"	Admin WO (Pay)	4 Mar 69	"
6	WO2	A.H.	Hunter	RAAC	Armoured School	Instructor	11 Mar 69	Thu-Duc (Near Saigon)

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Serial	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
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I CFZ

AATTV QUANG TRI (Quang-Tri Province)

7	Maj	D.R.	Millie	Aust Army Avn Corps	Quang-Tri Sector	S3	14 May 69	Quang-Tri
8	WO2	J.	Carrigan	RAA	Trieu-Phong Sub-Sector	Assistant Advisor RF/PF	18 Nov 69	Trieu Phong
9	WO2	K.G.	Chester	RAASC	Cam-Lo Sub-Sector	Assistant Advisor	4 Mar 69	Cam-Lo Town
10	WO2	W.L.	Deanshaw	RAAMC	ARVN CCS	Medical Advisor	23 Jul 69	Quang-Tri
11	WO2	R.A.	Purton	RA Inf	1/1 ARVN Bn	Assistant Advisor	19 Feb 69	Quang-Tri Area
12	WO2	K.	Gabriel	RA Inf	2/1 ARVN Bn	" "	2 Apr 69	" "
13	WO2	E.W.	Snelling	RA Inf	3/1 ARVN Bn	" "	23 Jul 69	" "
14	WO2	R.M.	King	RA Inf	4/1 ARVN Bn	" "	19 Feb 69	" "
15	WO2	J.F.	Barker	RA Inf	1/2 ARVN Bn	" "	21 Aug 69	Gio-Linh Area
16	WO2	V.	Stack	RA Inf	3/2 ARVN Bn	" "	24 Sep 69	" "
17	WO2	R.L.	Robinson	RA Inf	4/2 ARVN Bn	" "	21 Aug 69	" "
18	WO2	F.D.	Wilkes	RA Inf	5/2 ARVN Bn	" "	4 Jun 69	" "
19	WO2	D.G.	Hill	RAA	11 Arty Bn	" "	30 Apr 69	Quang-Tri Area

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
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I CTZ

AATTV HUE (Thua-Thien Province)

20	Maj	M.	Norris	Aust Int Corps	Thua-Thien Sector	Coordinator, Phoenix Programme	9 Apr 69	Hue
21	WO2	A.J.	Baxter	RAA	Nam-Hoa Sub-Sector	Assistant Advisor RF/PF	22 Apr 69	Nam-Hoa
22	WO2	C.	Ison	RA Inf	1 ARVN Div Recce Unit	Assistant Advisor	24 Sep 69	Hue
23	WO2	M.R.	Bolitho	RA Inf	Black Panther Coy	" "	18 Nov 69	"
24	WO1	E.W.	Jason	RAAC	1/7 ARVN Cav Regt	" "	21 May 69	PK 17
25	WO2	K.J.	Powe	RAAC	2/7 ARVN Cav Regt	" "	1 Oct 69	PK 17
26	WO2	H.J.	Stuttart	RAAC	7 ARVN Cav Regt	" "	18 Nov 69	PK 17
27	WO2	M.	Kelly	RA Inf	2/3 ARVN Bn	" "	18 Jan 69	PK 17
28	WO2	J.R.	McRae	RA Inf	1/3 ARVN Bn	" "	21 Aug 69	PK 17
29	WO2	M.J.	Foster	RAASC	3/3 ARVN Bn	" "	11 Feb 69	Hue
30	WO2	S.C.	Colley	RA Inf	54 Regt	" "	11 Mar 69	Hue
31	WO2	J.E.	Elkins	RA Inf	54 Regt	" "	16 Mar 69	Hue
32	WO2	W.	Brown	RAAMC	ARVN CCS	" "	30 Sep 69	Hue

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Serial	Rank	Initials	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
<u>AATTV IANAIG (Quang-Nam Province)</u>								
33	Maj	I.G.	Porteous	RA Inf	HQ I ARVN Corps Tactical Zone	G-3 (Trg) Advisor	4 Mar 69	Danang
34	Capt	C.J.	Spencer	RAE	" " "	G-3 (Ops)	8 May 69	"
35	WO1	S.L.	Irblaster	RAASC	AATTV Danang	Admin WO	21 May 69	Aust House Danang
36	WO2	D.F.	Phillips	RAASC	AATTV Danang	Admin WO	9 Apr 69	" " "
37	WO2	K.T.	Vincent	RAE	Hoa-Vang Sub-Sector HQ	Assistant Advisor RF/PF	8 Apr 69	Hoa-Vang
38	WO2	D.	Taylor	RAAOC	59 RF Bn	Assistant Advisor	23 Jul 69	Hoi-An
39	WO2	M.T.	Jensen	RA Inf	21st Ranger Bn	" "	18 Nov 69	"
40	WO2	A.L.	Egan	RA Inf	21st Ranger Bn	" "	3 Dec 68	"
41	WO1	J.N.	Harrower	RAAC	2/4 ARVN Cav Regt	Staff Advisor	9 Apr 69	Danang
42	WO2	T.F.	Malone	RAAC	" " " "	Assistant Advisor	23 Jul 69	Hoi-An
43	WO2	J.F.	Keioskie	RAASC	2/51 ARVN Bn	" "	23 Jul 69	Danang
44	WO2	L.H.	Martin	RA Inf	1/51 ARVN Bn	" "	18 Nov 68	Quang-Nam
45	WO2	W.	Kenneally	RA Inf	1/51 ARVN Bn	" "	3 Dec 68	" "
46	WO2	R.A.	Parker	RAA	30 Arty Bn	" "	18 Nov 69	" "

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Serial:	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
<u>AATTV QUANG NGAI (Chang-Tin and Quang-Ngai Provinces)</u>								
47	Capt	G.	Dennis	RA Inf	1/5 ARVN Bn	Senior Advisor	5 Nov 69	Tam-Ky
48	WO2	G.C.	Neitz	RA Inf	1/6 ARVN Bn	Assistant Advisor	21 Aug 69	Quang-Ngai
49	WO2	H.A.	Patch	RA Inf	2/6 ARVN Bn	" "	23 Jul 69	Tam-Ky
50	WO2	E.J.	Fahy	RA Inf	2/6 ARVN Bn	" "	4 Dec 68	"
51	WO2	W.S.	Dickey	RA Inf	4/5 ARVN Bn	" "	23 Jul 69	"
52	WO2	J.D.	Frost	RA Inf	1/5 ARVN Bn	" "	21 Aug 69	"
53	WO1	R.J.	O'brien	RAE	2/5 ARVN Bn	" "	5 Feb 69	Quang-Ngai
54	WO2	G.Y.	Jamieson	RA Inf	3/5 ARVN Bn	" "	4 Jun 69	Tam-Ky
55	WO2	M.J.	Poole	RA Inf	1/4 ARVN Bn	" "	18 Nov 69	"
56	WO2	D.	Truelove	RA Inf	4/4 ARVN Bn	" "	24 Sep 69	Quang-Ngai

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Serial:	Rank :	Initis :	Name :	Corps :	Unit :	Employment :	Date RTA :	Location :
<u>II CTZ</u> <u>AATTV PLEIKU</u>								
57	: Capt	: D.	: Rothwell	: RA Inf	: 2nd Mobile Strike Force Command Det B-20, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)	: Company Commander	: 27 May 69	: Pleiku (Base Camp)
58	: Capt	: D.C.	: Savage	: RA Inf	: " "	: S2	: 15 Aug 69	: " "
59	: Capt	: J.	: Bourke	: RA Inf	: " "	: Company Commander	: 18 Jun 69	: " "
60	: WO2	: A.G.	: Urquhart	: RA Inf	: " "	: " "	: 5 Aug 69	: " "
61	: WO2	: L.A.	: Kapp	: RA Inf	: " "	: Pl Comd	: 16 Mar 69	: " "
62	: WO2	: D.G.	: Cameron	: RA Inf	: " "	: Trg Officer	: 19 Feb 69	: " "
63	: WO2	: J.S.	: Hyland	: RA Inf	: " "	: Pl Comd	: 28 May 69	: " "
64	: WO2	: I.L.	: Edwards	: RA Inf	: " "	: " "	: 4 Dec 68	: " "
65	: WO2	: J.M.	: Grafton	: RA Inf	: " "	: " "	: 30 Apr 69	: " "
66	: WO2	: G.E.	: Francis	: RA Inf	: " "	: " "	: 21 May 69	: " "
67	: WO2	: I.J.	: Jewell	: RA Inf	: " "	: " "	: 23 Jun 69	: " "
68	: WO2	: L.	: Jackson	: RA Inf	: " "	: " "	: 23 Jun 69	: " "
69	: WO2	: J.R.	: Stewart	: RA Inf	: " "	: " "	: 21 Aug 69	: " "
70	: WO2	: D.	: Tolley	: RA Inf	: " "	: " "	: 23 Jun 69	: " "
71	: WO2	: G.T.	: Smith	: RA Inf	: " "	: " "	: 23 Jun 69	: " "
72	: WO2	: R.S.	: Simpson	: RA Inf	: " "	: " "	: 20 Jul 69	: " "
73	: Capt	: P.	: Falmer	: RA Inf	: CSD, Province Reconnaiss- ance unit	: Mobile Training Team	: 17 Dec 68	: II Corps Area
74	: WO1	: E.B.	: Ostara	: RA Inf	: " "	: Advisor Binh-Dinh Prov.	: 29 Jan 69	: Qui-Nhon
75	: WO2	: J.S.	: Allan	: RA Inf	: " "	: Mobile Training Team	: 11 Mar 69	: II CTZ

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
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AATTV NHA TRANG

76	Capt	JED	White	RA Inf	HQ 5SFG	Assistant S3	19 Feb 69	Nha-Trang
77	WO2	F.G.	Lucas	RA Inf	Recondo School 5 SFG (A)	Instructor	19 Feb 69	"
78	WO2	A.	Robinson	RA Inf	Ranger Training Centre	Weapons Advisor	17 Dec 68	Duc-My
79	WO2	B.C.	Emerson	RAA	Artillery School	Instructor	5 Feb 69	"

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
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III CTZ

AATTV BARIA (Phuoc Tuy Province)

80	WO2	A.C.	Phillips	RAAOC	RF/PF Phuoc-Tuy	Assistant Advisor	5 Feb 69	Hoa-Long
81	WO2	A.	Shepherd	RAASC	A and L Coy	" "	3 Mar 69	Baria
82	WO2	L.M.	Smith	RAE	RF/PF	" "	23 Dec 68	"
83	Capt	RCM	Hinze	RA Inf	LRRP Wing Van-Kiep National Training Centre	CI LRRP Wing	4 Jun 69	"
84	WO2	K.J.	Litchell	RA Inf	" "	Instructor LRRP Wing	30 Apr 69	"
85	WO2	J.G.	Pettit	RA Inf	" "	" " "	21 May 69	"
86	WO2	R.L.	Wier	RA Inf	" "	" " "	1 Apr 69	"
87	WO2	I.C.	Lever	RA Svy	" "	Admin WO	15 Mar 69	"
88	Capt	F.	Kudnig	RA Inf	PRU Training Centre	Attached	25 Jun 69	Near Vung-Tau
89	Capt	R.L.	Guest	RA Inf	AATTV Cadre att 1ATF	Chief Instructor	6 Aug 69	18 Div Trg School near Nui-Dat
90	WO2	R.G.	Carter	RA Inf	" "	Instructor	21 Aug 69	" " "

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Serial:	Rank :	Initia :	Name :	Corps :	Unit :	Employment :	Date RTA :	Location :
<u>AARTV, IV CORPS AREA</u>								
91	: Maj	: G.	: Templeton (attached from HQ AFV)	: RAAC	: CORDS, IV Corps	: Assistant to Chief of Territorial Security	: 7 May 69	: Can-Tho
92	: WO2	: C.S.	: Horne	: RA Inf	: RF	: Advisor	: 18 Nov 69	: Vinh-Binh Province
93	: WO2	: M.B.	: Cranston	: RA Sigs	: RF	: "	: 5 Feb 69	: " "
94	: WO1	: J.W.	: Mann	: RA Inf	: RF	: "	: 18 Nov 69	: " "
95	: WO2	: G.K.	: Witchard	: RAE	: RF	: "	: 23 Dec 68	: " "
96	: WO2	: C.A.	: Chambers	: RA Inf	: RD Cadre Trg	: Instructor	: 19 Feb 69	: Can-Tho
97	: WO2	: M.G.	: Bolger	: RAEME	: RF	: Advisor	: 10 Dec 68	: Vinh-Binh Province
98	: WO2	: K.	: Forden	: RA Inf	: RF	: "	: 30 Sep 69	: " "
99	: WO2	: W.J.	: Grogan	: RAEME	: RF	: "	: 23 Aug 69	: Can-Tho
100	: WO2	: C.E.	: Munro	: RA Sigs	: RD Cadre Trg	: Instructor	: 23 Jul 69	: "
101	: WO2	: B.R.	: Mule	: RA Inf	: CSD Province Reconnaissance Unit	: Advisor	: 30 Apr 69	: Kien-Tuong Province

MILITARY ASPECTS CORDON AND SEARCH

1. GENERAL: Cordon and Search is normally a combined civil and military operation, based on good intelligence, and should be preplanned in detail and rehearsed. Everything possible must be done to maintain secrecy and achieve surprise. The plan should be simple and capable of rapid execution. Methods and techniques should be constantly varied. Everyone taking part in the search must be quite clear about its aim, which will determine the methods used. The search may be for persons, arms, ammunition and explosives or documents.

2. COMMAND AND CONTROL: The size of the area, the relative strengths of police and troops and an estimate of whether violent resistance may be encountered, will determine whether control of a preplanned Cordon and Search should be exercised by the police or the armed forces. Although a small search in a controlled area may best be controlled by the police, it will be common for all operations outside controlled areas to be commanded and controlled by the military forces with the available police acting in support. In many situations police may not be available in the numbers desired. In these circumstances tasks which should ideally be allotted to the police field force will be carried out by indigenous armed forces who must be trained and prepared for them.

3. TASKS: In a Cordon and Search the following division of responsibilities represents the ideal:

a. Military:

- (1) Planning, commanding and controlling the operation.
- (2) Cordoning the area.
- (3) Escorting police search parties.
- (4) Guarding and escorting detained suspects.
- (5) Providing helicopters to spot movement.

b. Police. The police, if available in sufficient numbers, should be responsible for:

- (1) Carrying out plain clothes reconnaissance, if permitted.
- (2) Providing guides for the cordon troops if required.
- (3) Giving any instructions to the inhabitants after the cordon is in position.
- (4) Carrying out the actual search.
- (5) Screening suspects.

Inclosure 1

Military Aspects Cordon and Search

4. DIFFICULTIES: The difficulties experienced in a large scale Cordon and Search are:

- a. It is difficult to preserve security.
- b. The search may irritate the population and win further support for the enemy.
- c. It may be difficult to withdraw force.
- d. They are costly in terms of manpower.

5. ORGANIZATION: When sufficient forces are available, the following groups should be organized:

a. Cordon Troops. These surround the area to be searched to prevent anyone inside from getting out. The cordon must not be a continuous line of troops but organized with depth; e.g., a platoon would normally have two sections forward and one in depth.

b. Outer Cordon Troops. These are deployed some distance from the main cordon at selected points, to prevent an attack or interference from outside the isolated area.

c. Search Parties. These consist of the police and/or troops who search houses and inhabitants in the isolated area.

d. Cage Troops. These erect and guard cages for holding persons awaiting interrogation.

e. Screening Teams. These consist of police or intelligence personnel, who identify suspects and wanted persons.

f. Escort Troops. These escort wanted persons to a place of detention after interrogation.

g. Road Blocks. These may consist of troops and police who stop traffic trying to enter the isolated area.

h. A Reserve. Troops required at all levels to deal with the unexpected. They should have no other task. Preferably they should be held outside the area at a convenient spot with helicopters available on stand by to lift them in.

6. APPROACH:

a. The aim is to surround an area before the inhabitants realize what is happening. Movement by motor transport prejudices surprise by limiting approaches, routes, concealment, and by creating, particularly at night, light and noise. It also provides an attractive target for ambush. This may

Inclosure 1

Military Aspects Cordon and Search

dictate the need to move the whole distance on foot or by helicopter, or if transport must be used, to dismount at a distance from the area to be cordoned and approach stealthily on foot. When vehicle movement is considered to be the best means in the circumstances, it may be advisable to drive right into the area - as the quickest method often has the most chance of success. An approach by helicopter or by stealth on foot will generally be preferred.

b. These should approach by as many different routes, and as silently, as possible. A cordon established in darkness must be unbroken, but it can be thinned out after daylight and maintained by a chain of observation posts with gaps covered by patrols. Normally, it will not be possible to maintain a continuous cordon for any length of time owing to the large numbers of troops required. Numbers can be reduced in some circumstances by employing cavalry sub-units to cordon along roads, in swamps or flooded padi. Ideally, cordon troops should dig in, taking advantage of natural cover and using wire to help maintain their line. However, the need for silence will often preclude digging. The amount of light and thickness of vegetation will dictate the cordon density and depth.

7. ROAD MOVEMENT: If the risk of ambush is slight and road movement is decided upon, the following points should be considered:

a. Forward Rendezvous (RV). A forward RV is necessary to enable the commander of the force to retain control for as long as possible and to reduce the chance of part of the convoy being delayed by traffic during the final move forward. It should be close to, but out of sound and sight of, the cordon area. It is not a dismounting area.

b. Traffic Control. Traffic control will be required at the forward RV so that the convoy achieves a clear run to the cordon area. If a number of side roads lead into the route selected, between the forward RV and the cordon area, they must be picketed to prevent civilian vehicles infiltrating into the convoy or blocking the route.

c. Routes. It is normally best to move to the forward RV by one route, as this is the easiest way in which to co-ordinate the simultaneous arrival of the whole convoy. From the forward RV to the objective, all available routes should be used so that the cordon may be established all around the objective as quickly as possible and with the maximum surprise. The sub-unit with the furthest distance to travel should move first. This can be done on a time basis, or the necessary gaps can be left in the convoy at the forward RV. Vehicles should not, however, remain in the forward RV for more than two or three minutes, otherwise the advantage of surprise may be lost.

d. Security. Surprise will be lost if traffic police, detectives or police searchers arrive in the cordon area before the cordon is in position. They should move at the rear of the military convoy: this must be made clear during planning and at orders groups.

Inclosure 1

Military Aspects Cordon and Search

8. TIMING: Exact timing is the most important factor affecting the success of a Cordon and Search. It is the most difficult to achieve. The area must be surrounded simultaneously. If this does not happen and troops are late in cordoning a part of the area, an alert enemy will be given an escape exit. A possible sequence of events for an operation is given in Inclosure 3.

9. BATTLE PROCEDURE: Careful briefing is essential to insure that every man knows his task. As in all other counterinsurgency operations, alertness, coupled with a determined attitude in every individual, will go a long way to insuring success.

a. Battalion Battle Procedure. This battle procedure is suggested for a battalion operation:

(1) Warning order is sent out which includes the following:

- (a) Features forming the perimeter of the area.
- (b) Time that the cordon is to be in position.
- (c) RV and time for orders.

(2) The Intelligence Officer should produce an enlargement showing measurements and distances marked on each leg of the perimeter, a blackboard showing the area, which company (and platoon) commanders can study while waiting for their orders and air photographs. No battalion operation should need to proceed without air photo coverage, especially as foot reconnaissance is often impossible. Photos should be available right down to sections.

(3) Orders should contain the following information:

- (a) Features forming the perimeter of the area.
- (b) Location and time of RV for all commanders.
- (c) Time cordon will be in position.
- (d) Assembly area for company main bodies.
- (e) Company areas for responsibility around the perimeter and location of reserves.
- (f) Route(s) to the area (and battalion forward RV if required).
- (g) Battalion order of march.
- (h) Battalion and company cages.

Inclosure 1

Military Aspects Cordon and Search

b. Company and Platoon Commanders. Having received the warning order, each company commander issues his own warning order with any additions which may be necessary. After the commanding officers orders, the company commander should be issued with diagrams of the area for his platoon commanders. He will then prepare his own orders and give them to his platoon commanders, who should have examined the diagram while waiting for their orders. The platoon commanders then give their orders to their complete platoons including any attached drivers. Every soldier must understand the outline plan and his part in the operation before he moves off. There is no time, even for last minute orders, on arrival.

10. ACTION IN CORDON AREA:

a. Deployment. As soon as the troops arrive, speed in identifying the area of the cordon and in deployment is essential. Company commanders must be on the ground early to direct platoons to their sectors of the cordon. If anyone in the cordon sees a suspect approaching he should quietly alert his neighbors and challenge him when close enough to insure a shot does not miss. Subsequent action will depend on the person's reaction to the challenge. Pre arranged signals are necessary to prevent clashes of our own troops. Platoon commanders should quickly indicate positions of sections. Section commanders, without pause, should lead their sections to the area allotted. On arrival at section areas troops adopt fire positions that will give the best possible field of fire over the cordoned area. The platoon commander will then quickly confirm that the troops are deployed correctly, and he or the platoon sergeant will detail areas of observation. If strengths permit, patrols should move behind the cordon in each sector to act as pursuit parties should anyone break through.

b. Communications. The various sectors of the cordon must be in radio contact with the headquarters controlling the whole operation. If time and aircraft availability permit, an airborne radio control station in a light aircraft will help to insure continuity of communications.

c. Action After Deployment.

(1) Once the cordon is in position, the police should warn the inhabitants that a house curfew is in force, and tell them what to do if for urgent reasons they need to enter or leave the area. The military commander must tell the police where he wishes the cordon "gate" to be.

(2) At this stage, company commanders should designate a cage area, preferably in the shade, and allot guards.

(3) If transport has been used it should be sent to a secure area close by as soon as practicable, and guarded there by the drivers or a force nominated for this purpose.

(4) If the cordon is established in darkness, movement amongst the cordon force will be restricted to the minimum until first light.

Inclosure 1

Military Aspects Cordon and Search

(5) Commanders should make an early tour of the area and personally ensure that their perimeter of the cordon is complete. Likely escape routes may be sealed off with wire, but must be under observation by sentries. This may reduce the overall number of sentries required.

(6) An area should be selected where reserves can rest. It should be outside the cordon area, but near enough for the reserve to react quickly, and immediately occupy alarm positions.

(7) As soon as possible, commensurate with the necessity for security and protection, the strength of the cordon should be reduced and sentries sited, on dominating points. Company commanders should plan the resting of complete platoons and within platoons it may be possible to reduce sentries still further. Platoons off duty can form a small reserve. Sentries should be sited in pairs:

(a) Where they have good all around observation and consequently plenty of warning of any attempt at break out through the cordon.

(b) Preferably under shelter.

(c) Where possible, in depth.

d. Search Techniques:

(1) Announcement. As soon as the cordon is established the police will inform the community by loudspeaker, or through its headman, that:

(a) The area is about to be searched.

(b) A house curfew is in force and that everyone must remain indoors or that everyone must proceed at once to a central point for screening.


(2) Search Parties. Ideally, each search party should consist of at least one policeman and a protective military escort. The escort's task is to guard the police searcher and prevent anyone escaping. Each search party should also include a trained woman searcher to search females and detect men disguised as women.

(3) The police may carry out the search and give all orders to individuals. Should there be no police, indigenous troops should be used. All searchers must be trained to look for all types of enemy caches.

(4) Cages. The armed forces are responsible for erecting and guarding any cages required. Cages should be sited under shelter if possible and on ground free from stones. If shade is not available, shelter should be erected for women and young children and, if the search is to be prolonged, arrangements must be made for food and water. Adequate latrines must be provided for males and females. A suggested layout for a cage is given in Figure 1.

Inclosure 1

FIGURE 1 - CAGE LAYOUT



Notes:

1. The cage staff should include a doctor and an interpreter.
2. Children must not be regarded automatically as being innocent, since they may have been trained to be hostile by parents and teachers. If under 12 years of age they should be kept with the women.

INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS

1. DISCUSSION:

a. Generally the best intelligence available for a cordon and search operation will be gathered by the intelligence/police agencies located within the district. District intelligence operations coordination centers (DIOCC) function as a coordination agency between the intelligence agencies operating in the district. At province level there is a PHOENIX/Phung Hoang permanent center that performs the same function as the DIOCC at the sector level. Both of these centers are part of the PHOENIX/Phung Hoang program which is directed toward the identification and elimination of the VC infrastructure.

b. It is the VC infrastructure that is the primary target in cordon and search operations since it is the political structure established by the VC to rule and organize the people. Until it has been neutralized, the VC can be reorganized no matter how soundly he is defeated on the battlefield.

2. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

a. Planning:

(1) During preliminary planning, consideration must be given to exploiting every available source of information on the target. Information, blacklists, census overlays and studies should be requested on several different hamlets or villages in order to select the most promising target and not disclose the primary area of interest. Determination of the most promising target, with the help of the Province Phung Hoang Permanent Center or the DIOCC, should normally be based on an analysis of collated information which indicates that the Viet Cong are in the area, and that they can be identified through the use of blacklist, photographs, VC census overlays, identifiers, guides or a combination of them. Requests for studies should be submitted not only for specific operations, but should be requested, maintained and annotated on a continuing basis to assist in the selection of targets for future operations. The following are agencies with representatives in the DIOCC or in the PHOENIX/Phung Hoang Permanent Center and the information they provide:

(a) The Police Special Branch (PSB) obtain blacklists and collated studies on the VC from the PSB Collation Section and from the Provincial Interrogation Center. Cooperative individuals with knowledge of the target area can be obtained through PSB. PSB also provides personnel for the screening point.

(b) The status census grievance (SCG) personnel can provide census overlays, hamlet books and other information relevant to the several suggested targets.

(c) The sector and subsector S-2's can provide order of battle information and information supporting that received from other agencies.

Inclosure 2

Intelligence Aspects

(d) The RD cadre representative can provide information gathered while operating in the area.

(e) The Provincial Chieu Hoi Center can furnish Hoi Chanhs formerly from the target area to assist in the identification of VC members and subjects. PSB and Census Grievance also have Hoi Chanhs working for them.

(f) National Police Field Forces can be used to secure the cage, work with the search party or act as a reaction force to exploit information obtained by the screening party.

(g) The Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) can be used to assist the search party or act as a reaction force to exploit information obtained by the screening party.

(2) Aerial and ground reconnaissance of the target will be made when possible and must be coordinated to preclude repeated reconnaissance and the possibility of disclosing friendly interest in the area.

b. Execution:

(1) Once the cordon has been set and the cage area designated, a screening point or center will be established. (Tab A) All civilians in the cordon area will pass through the screening center and be classified.

(2) National Police personnel will complete, if census data does not exist in police files, a basic registration card, (Tab B) and photograph all personnel over 15 years of age. Photographs will be printed in two copies; one copy is pasted to the registration card and the other placed in the hamlet-book for possible use in subsequent operations, and for identification by Hoi Chanhs and informants.

(3) PSB personnel at the screening center will prepare blacklist cards (Tab C) on all newly developed persons who should be placed on a blacklist.

(4) The screening element chief will ensure that the screeners question relatives, friends, neighbors and other knowledgeable individuals of VC functionaries who are operating in the area, concerning their whereabouts, activities, movements and expected return.

(5) The screening area of the cage should provide areas where selected individuals may be interviewed privately, but not necessarily together, by PSB personnel and military intelligence personnel. Efforts will be made to convince these persons that they can cooperate without being detected by the other inhabitants. The availability of monetary awards (VIP Fund, etc) for certain types of information and equipment should also be discussed during the interview.

c. Follow-Up:

Inclosure 2

Intelligence Aspects

(1) All information of a tactical Order of Battle nature can be used in future operations by the tactical unit; and it will also be turned over to the sector and subsector S-2's for their utilization.

(2) All information concerning VC infrastructure will be turned over to the Phung Hoang Permanent Center, DIOCC and the PSE collation section for inclusion in their files and distribution.

(3) Information concerning VC meetings, indoctrination sessions, etc, will be turned over to the nearest DIOCC for exploitation if elements participating in the operation have not already done so.

Tab A - Screening Center

Tab B - Basic Registration Card

Tab C - Blacklist Card

Inclosure 2

SCREENING CENTER

1. GENERAL: This section includes some recommendations for the organization of the screening center used during a cordon and search operation. It is a consensus of techniques used in Thua Thien (P) by elements of the 101st Airborne Division, Sector/Subsector Headquarters and organizations represented on the Phung Hoang Committee.

2. MISSION: The mission of the screening center is to screen all detainees; render preliminary interrogations and route all persons captured to the appropriate area for further interrogation; and to provide the ground commander with information of immediate tactical importance.

3. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS: The screening center will be comprised of three main elements: the screening unit, the field interrogation unit and the reaction force.

a. The screening unit will receive all captives, POW, civil detainees and innocent civilians. As these personnel pass through the screening center they will be identified and classified. When a suspect is identified, a record of his capture will be made and only pertinent information will be taken at this time. Personnel in the screening unit may be:

(1) Police Special Branch and NPPF personnel will be the primary operators of the screening center. They are trained in the identification of suspects and they have blacklists which help to identify VC, criminals and other wanted personnel.

(2) Sector/Subsector intelligence personnel are familiar with the area and the people who live in the district. They also can coordinate moving into another district to react to information obtained from detainees.

(3) ARVN/FWMAF Intelligence Personnel who will obtain and disseminate intelligence of immediate tactical importance.

(4) Static Census Grievance (SCG) personnel to be used as a fast document readout facility and to be assigned to whatever unit can best use their services. SCG personnel usually will have an intimate knowledge of the area and possess valuable information on the population.

(5) A member of the province Phung Hoang Committee or the DIOCC who will check existing blacklists to assist in identifying VC.

b. Field Interrogation Unit: As a detainee continues through the screening center he will be sent to a field interrogation unit according to his classification (i.e. POW will go to sector, ARVN or FWF interrogation teams; Civil detainees will go to the PSB interrogation unit, etc.). Here the detainee will be interrogated for immediately exploitable information. This information should then be turned over to the appropriate S-2 for action. Once field interrogation is finished the detainee will be released or, if

Inclosure 2
Tab A

Screening Center

suspected, will be transported to the appropriate detention center for further processing and interrogation. Civil detainees will be turned over to District or Province Police depending on arrangements made for the operation.

c. Reaction Force: The third unit of the screening center will be the Reaction Force. This unit will normally be made up of PRU or NPFF personnel. Its function is to react to that information that would not require use of regular forces (i.e. location of various members of the VCI). This reaction force is not to be confused with the reserve force for the operation. It is used to provide the capability to immediately react to information gathered by the screening center.

4. The DIOCC advisor or the advisor to the Province Phung Hoang Permanent Committee will be able to provide the ARVN advisors with the guidance necessary to establish a screening center for each particular operation. Of primary importance is that advisors use their influence to impress upon their ARVN counterparts that the Phung Hoang program can supply a wealth of information prior to the operation and a great amount of assistance during its execution.

Inclosure 2
Tab A

SCREENING BIO CARD

3x5 WHITE

Name :		Alias	Number
Male <input type="checkbox"/>	Fem <input type="checkbox"/>	Occupation	I.D. Card #
Date of birth		Place of birth	
Father (Alive-Dead)		Mother (Alive-Dead)	
Husband-Wife		Children-Ages	
Present Address			
Circumstances		Date/Place	
Remarks			

MẤU DANH THẺ LẬP CHO NHỮNG NGƯỜI ĐƯỢC THĂM VẤN TẠI
TRUNG TÂM THANH LỘC

Họ và Tên		Bí danh	Số
Nam <input type="checkbox"/>	Nữ <input type="checkbox"/>	Nghề nghiệp	Số căn cước
Ngày sanh		Nơi sanh	
Cha (s - c)		Mẹ (s - c)	
Chồng/Vợ		Con/Tuổi	
Địa chỉ hiện tại			
Truong họp		Ngày và nơi	
Cuoc chu			

Inclosure 2
Tab B

BLACK LIST CARD

3x5 WHITE

V.C. AT LARGE	
Name	Alias(s)
Age	Distinguished features
Position in VC	
Last unknown location, date	
Family information	
Additional remarks, Source of information, Date/Place	

MẪU DANH THẺ LẬP CHO NHỮNG TÊN VIỆT-CỘNG HẸY CÒN TẠI ĐÀO

VIỆT CỘNG TẠI ĐÀO	
Họ và tên	Bí danh và bí số
Tuổi	Nhân dạng đặc biệt
Địa chỉ trong hàng ngũ VC	
Ngày và nơi có mặt lần chót	
Tin tức gia đình	
Cuộc chủ, Nguồn tin, Ngày và nơi	

Inclosure 2
Tab C

SUGGESTED SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS

1. 0415H - Blocking forces assume final positions on the line of encirclement.
2. 0430H - Local GVN civil and/or police elements poised at line of encirclement prepared to advance towards the objective hamlet. Key local GVN official, accompanied by ARVN representatives, departs IZ aboard psy-war helicopter to deliver prepared message to villagers. (Message can be prepared previously recorded on tape for delivery without requiring presence of official).
3. 0455H - Local GVN official, airborne in psy-war helicopter (or on tape), delivers message to villagers in objective hamlet via loudspeaker. Official's message notifies the people of the operation that is commencing, informs them that GVN forces (maybe with free-world force assistance) are already positioned around the periphery of the hamlet, and orders all villagers to remain in their homes until further work and not to attempt to leave the hamlet. The official's message stresses that the purpose of the operation is to assist the people of the hamlet, by removing the threat of Viet Cong terrorism, and providing services and assistance to improve the peoples welfare.
4. 0500H - Curfew terminated. (Villages within area of operation must remain in homes).
5. FIRST LIGHT: Local GVN civil and/or police elements (with GVN military security forces, as necessary), tighten the line of encirclement and commence movement towards objective hamlet. Search teams deploy into previously assigned areas to carefully and thoroughly search for Viet Cong personnel or contraband materials. "Control Cadre" equipped with battery-powered portable loudspeakers direct the villagers to assemble at a previously selected central collection area. (Collection area must be easily identifiable to avoid confusion). Maintain tight cordon about hamlet, allowing no one to enter or leave.
6. WHEN DIRECTED: Commander of GVN forces leads civil and military elements into hamlet and establishes command center at central collection point where villagers are being assembled. Hamlet authorities are contacted, informed of the nature of the operation, and invited to assist. Villagers are requested to assist in establishment of the collection point (erect tents, construct detention enclosure, prepare feeding facilities, as required). In the presence of a friendly or passive population, the application of force is accomplished with caution. All personnel concerned emphasize that the purpose of the operation is to help the people.
7. Commence processing (Interrogation and segregation) of villagers. Processing sequence is:
 - a. Initial screening. Local GVN authorities identify those persons

Inclosure 3

Suggested Sequence of Actions

known to assist the Viet Cong and indicate all strangers to the hamlet.

b. Police administrators carefully examine individual and family identification documents, and re-issue documents as required. Examination to include "census-type" and family background information.

c. Persons with inadequate identification papers or otherwise questionable are required to undergo interrogation by ARVN interrogators.

d. USMC-CI/ITT personnel equipped with polygraph, are available to provide assistance. (Personnel who are apprehended as suspects as the result of the screening can be temporarily detained in inclosures erected in close proximity to interrogation tent).

e. After completion of screening (persons completing screening are marked on forearm with special stamp to facilitate identification) villagers attend psy-war program, to include: newsreels, propaganda movies, news broadcasts, taped messages, daily newspapers, etc. Effort is made to provide this program as "entertainment", which makes the propaganda messages much more palatable.

f. Villagers requiring medical assistance are treated by medcap team.

g. Local governmental officials address the people, with emphasis on the concern that the GVN has for the people, the government's future plans, and the assistance that the people can provide.

8. MEAL HOURS: Prepare and distribute staple food ration to those villagers dislocated by the operation or otherwise unable to prepare or provide food.

9. REST OF DAY: Processing continues until all villagers have been screened, all dwellings and family shelters searched, and all suspected hiding places examined for Viet Cong or weapons. Cordon is maintained until termination of the operation.

Inclosure 3

PSYWAR/CIVIC ACTION ASPECTS

GVN/ARVN Psywar/Civic Action Resources.

a. GVN Provincial Resources.

(1) Vietnamese Information Service (VIS). Upon request this organization can provide musical groups, and cultural teams to provide entertainment and disseminate Pro-GVN propaganda. VIS can also provide movies, loudspeakers and literature for distribution.

(2) Hoi Chanh. If available, Hoi Chanh from the area can act as guides, identify VC, VC families, caches, assembly areas, and lines of communication. In addition each province has armed Propaganda Teams (APT) specially trained in face to face PSYOPS. As ex-VC they explain the Chieu Hoi Program and its benefits from their own point of view and urge people to encourage their VC relatives and friends to rally to the GVN.

b. ARVN Resources (Polwar).

(1) Civic Action Team. This team is used to guide and control the population. They also have a MEDCAP capability and during the operation this team hands out clothes, food packages, etc. to the population.

(2) Psywar Team. This team presents GVN Policy, disseminates Pro-GVN literature, organizes games and additional entertainment. They explain the presence of US/PWMAF troops in Vietnam, particularly in the targeted village.

(3) Cultural Teams. Compliment the efforts of the Provincial Cultural Team (para 2a(1) above).

(4) Medical Teams. ARVN Division medical teams assisted by MEDCAP personnel available, attend to the medical needs of the people. They serve as an example of the government's interest and concern for the people.

(c) Considerable emphasis must be placed on the conduct of GVN and ARVN personnel. Disregard of private property, crop destruction, lack of proper respect for the people, and pillaging by troops will quickly negate all other efforts being made. Every man involved must be made aware of his role as a representative of the GVN and that his actions reflect directly on the success of the operation. The beneficial aspects of the operation should be emphasized in conjunction with special efforts to minimize the temporary inconveniences the population must endure. Minor construction, repair or clean-up projects that can be accomplished within the period of operation are excellent means of winning the populations support. These activities also leave tangible evidence of GVN concern for the people after the troops have left and serves to enhance ARVN's image.

Inclosure 4

MEDCAP ASPECTS

1. GOALS: Cordon and search operations provide an opportunity to achieve two related goals of the medical Civic Action Program:
 - a. Establish a spirit of mutual respect and co-operation between the civilian population, GVN civilian officials and RVN F.
 - b. Support Revolutionary Development by improving the health standards of RVN civilians.
2. DEFINITIONS: The administrative definitions of medcap shows the level of assistance by FWMAF medical personnel:
 - a. Medcap I is the care and treatment of RVN civilians by medical personnel of the RVN F. US advisors will assist the RVN F with planning and providing technical guidance in the conduct of Medcap I activities.
 - b. Medcap II is the care and treatment of RVN civilians by US and FWMAF medical personnel.
3. THE LEVEL OF COMMITMENT: should not include complicated medical treatment in the search area. It is desirable that the medcap commitment can be sustained by the GVN authorities after the termination of the operation to show the continuing concern of the authorities for the welfare of the people.
4. INFORMATION: Leaflets can be distributed to provide information on:
 - a. Sanitation
 - b. Medical treatment of injuries
 - c. Where continued medical treatment will be available.
5. Security for medcap teams should be closely coordinated with other population control measures in the search area.
6. Surplus medical supplies should not be left in the area after the withdrawal of the medcap teams.

Inclosure 5

AATTV, Da Nang
25 November 68

HQ AATTV

THE ATTACK ON DIEN BAN

"A Typical Example of NVA Tactics"

1. TERRAIN: The general area we are concerned with is in Quang Nam province located in I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ). The area of primary concern is a radius of 30 kilometers (km) around the south and southwest of Danang city, a main US and ARVN logistic base. The town of Dien Ban is located 19 km south of Danang on Highway #1, the main north-south line of communications in I Corps. The surrounding area is fairly heavily populated and has numerous waterways. It is primarily a rice growing area.

2. ORDER OF BATTLE:

- a. Friendly: ARVN - one battalion (2/51st) and one CAP Pltn.
- b. Enemy: 3rd Battalion, 36th NVA Regiment.
60 man Sapper unit.

3. BACKGROUND: The friendly forces were deployed in and around the town of Dien Ban with the primary mission of securing the town against attacks by fire and to locate and destroy the VC infrastructure. The enemy Base Area was "traditionally" located on Go Noi island about 12 km southwest of Dien Ban. On 7 November 1968 ARVN and USMC forces conducted a sweep operation on the island forcing the enemy to move to new positions about 30 km Eastnortheast of Dien Ban to complete their training and equipping. Consequently, there was no contact on this operation.

On 12 November the Sapper unit completed its training and moved out to start its mission of infiltrating the city of Da Nang and by acts of terrorism tie down any reaction force which could be dispatched to Dien Ban.

On 14 November 1968 the 3rd Battalion, 36th NVA Regiment had finished training and equipping and was ready to carry out its attack against Dien Ban.

4. MOVEMENT:

a. On 14 November 1968 the Sapper unit broke up into five men teams and proceeded east on foot to Highway #1 about 4 km north of Dien Ban. Here they caught normal civilian bus services and easily passed many check points and entered the city of Da Nang where they dispersed and waited for the attack.

b. The 3rd Battalion, 36th NVA Regiment moved on the nights of 14 and 15 November 1968 from their temporary training area back to their normal area of Go Noi island. To do this they passed between two USMC battalions which were supposed to block off this route as an approach to Da Nang and surrounding areas. There were a few reports received on the movement of this enemy unit and it is not known what size groups the enemy used for his movement.

5. THE ATTACK:

a. Sapper Unit: Between 1930 and 2000 hours on 16 November 1968 the Sapper unit struck in Da Nang city. Of the 60 who were infiltrated only 7 attempted to carry out the mission assigned to them. All 7 of them were captured together with explosives, handgrenades and several weapons. The other 53 did not attempt any attacks and they are thought to be still hiding in the city area.

b. Dien Ban: At 0330 hours on 17 November 1968 the NVA battalion commenced its attack on Dien Ban from the South employing mortars, small arms, rockets and grenades. At 0340 hours a heavy ground attack was initiated against the night defensive position of the 2/51st ARVN Battalion and the CAP platoon. At 0400 hours a C47 "SPOCKY" aircraft arrived on station and at 0525 hours a light fire team of two helicopter gunships arrived on station. Heavy contact continued throughout the night and at 0730 hours a second ARVN battalion (3/51st) was dispatched to assist the 2/51st ARVN Bn as they pushed out from their night defensive position to sweep the area at the battle. At 0830 hours the Province Chief at Hoi An dispatched a reaction force consisting of 2/11th Armoured Cavalry Assault Troop, one RF company and the 14th Coastal Surveillance Group. The contact continued throughout the 17th and 18th of November and terminated on the morning of 19 November 1968.

6. CASUALTIES:

a. Sapper Unit:

1. Friendly: 8 WIA.
2. Enemy: 7 Captured, 2 AK-47s, unspecified type explosives and 2 unspecified grenades captured.


b. Dien Ban:

1. Friendly: 25 KIA; 90 WIA.
2. Enemy: 261 KIA, 88 KBA, 12 Captured, 67 weapons (not further identified) captured.

7. FOLLOW-UP ACTION: On 20 November 1968 a large cordon and search operation was initiated to clear the area of the remainder of the 3rd Battalion, 36th NVA Regiment and to clear the VC infrastructure from the Dien Ban area. Seven USMC battalions and three ARVN battalions are presently committed to this operation.

8. CONCLUSIONS: The enemy attack failed in its primary mission to drive the US and ARVN forces out of the Dien Ban area and to originate a reign of terror in Da Nang for the following reasons:

- a. The initial resistance offered by 2/51st ARVN Bn at Dien Ban.
- b. The early deployment of reinforcements from Hoi An.
- c. The timely and accurate support from "Spooky" and gunships in the initial attacks.
- d. The failure of the Sapper unit in Da Nang to carry out its mission. This has been attributed to low morale in this unit. However this is not conclusive as this unit is probably still at large in Da Nang and is still a threat to the security of the city.



C. F. SPENCER
Captain, RA6

REPORT BY MAJ D. MILLIE
S3 QUANG TRI SECTOR

OPERATIONAL GROUPINGS IN NORTHERN I CORPS

1. With the relocation of forces after the departure of the 1st Air Cav Div it appears that the 3rd Mar Regiment has struck an affiliation with the 2nd ARVN Regt, and the 1st Bde 5 Div (Mech) has married up with the 1st ARVN Regt.

2. At the same time units (ie. battalions) have been encouraged to form affiliation with Districts. As a result LO's are located with the DSA, & RF/PF elements working on combined operations with companies/platoons of the unit with whom the affiliation is struck. For example Trieu-Phong - 1-61 of 1st Bde 5 Div, Hai Long - 1-71 of 1st Bde 5 Div, and Mai-Linh - 1-11 of 1st Bde 5 Div. Operations are generally of a cordon & search type, with other para-military and civilian organizations participating.

1ST ARVN REGT

3. Has generally worked in the populated areas of the province. Efforts have mainly been against the VC. Little contact with NVA. Took part in one cordon & search which involved units from four divisions. This was in the MY CHANH area on the province border that a battalion from each of the 101st ACD, 1st ACD & 1st Bde 5 Div (Mech). The four battalions of the 1st Regt worked inside the cordon for two weeks.

4. For the remainder of the reporting period three of the battalions have worked in the pacification area, whilst the fourth bn is now working with 1-11 in the Balong Valley.

5. This Regt is a truly active one with little time spent at the LA VANG Barracks.

2ND ARVN REGT

6. Significant contact was made early in the month in the North East area of the AO.

7. Combined operations have been conducted with the 3rd Mar Regt in the Northern part of the province. There has been no significant contact.

8. A cordon & search is currently being conducted in the populated area adjacent to the GIO LINH Sub Sector HQ with a battalion of 3rd Mar Regt.


.../2

PACIFICATION

9. Success in the military operations have been satisfactory. Popular Forces have been redeployed into 30 hamlets in an effort to improve the posture of the GVN.

10. The Provincial Administration however does not seem to be capable of exerting any real influence at the hamlet level, especially in the targeted hamlets. This has been observed by me on a number of inspections. The common failure is in the area of education. Inadequate schools, shortage of teachers & classrooms, and a reluctance of the people in the hamlets to do anything about the situation. And when one examines the age bracket of the VC - say 16 to 25 years - then there surely must be some relationship between the breakdown of the GVN education programme and the success of the VC with this age group.

11. The following diagram gives a view of VC/GVN effectiveness:



interest on attached.

OBSERVATIONS

- 12.
- a. A3 Combat Base has been abandoned.
 - b. C3 Combat Base has been abandoned.
 - c. The FOB at MAI LOC is to close down in Dec 68.
 - d. Camp J.J. CARROLL is expected to be abandoned in the near future.
 - e. Elements of 26 Support Group are to move to PHU BAI.
 - f. 18 Surg Hosp is to be moved to Camp Evans.

D. Millie
Maj.

AFTER ACTION REPORT
3/1 BN ARVN - WO2 EW SHELING

NAME

DATES Oct 18 to 1 Nov 68

OTHER UNITS Sector & Sub Sector

SP ARVN Arty

AREA RD Area East of Quang-Tri

MISSION To secure area for road building in conjunction with a Sector RD programme.

EXECUTION By patrolling by day & by day and night raids and ambushes.

CONTACTS Oct 24 0400 1 Coy 1 VC captured, 1 KIA

24 1300 2 VC KIA 1 captured

25 0630 Bn sweep 2 VC KIA 1 Captured

26 1145 Previously captured VC discloses rice cache

29 0500 Bn sweep 7 VC captured

30 0100 Coy raid 3 VC KIA

Nov 01 2100 Pl raid 1 VC KIA 8 VC captured

ENEMY CASUALTY & EQUIPMENT

9 VC KIA
18 VC captured
3 M1 Carbines
2 CKC
1 K43
1 K44
1 M79
1 60mm Mor Baseplate
3500 Kilos rice
Documents
Approx 20 grenades

OWN CASUALTY

2 WIA (1 by Friendly RF/PF TPS)
(1 by mine)

.../2

COMMENTS

1. Co-Ordination. This aspect of the operation was generally of a very mediocre standard. Such faults as TAOR boundaries changing frequently especially at outset of operation & US troops being apparently unaware that we had taken part of their AO.
2. The radio net left a lot to be desired in that all traffic both admin & operational for sector, subsector & our operations was on the one frequency.
3. I am of the opinion that our mission was adequately fulfilled until we were withdrawn on 2nd Nov 68.

E.W. Snelling
WO2
AATTV

REPORT NOVEMBER 1968
2/51ST REGT - 13973 WO2 CF KEIOSKIE

OPERATIONS CONDUCTED

No major operations, but bn conducted seventeen "one day" operations in DIEN BAN area.

Weapons lost - Nil
WIA - 112
KIA - 12
VC KIA (Arty & Air incl) - 206 & 8 captured
VC Weapons captured - see attached

VC initiated incidents :

- a. Thirteen probes on company ambush positions.
- b. Sixteen mortar attacks on battalions CP and company positions.
- c. Four B41 attacks on coy positions.
- d. On 18 Nov one regt, the 36th NVA, attacked the city of DIEN BAN. They succeeded in entering the town, heavy fighting ensued for 18 hours. The bn CP came under heavy small arms and mortar fire. The battalion commander used most members of his command element to repel the NVA and the advisory team were forced to enter the town when the battalion commander led HQ Company into it. 43 casualties were taken in this coy but the attack proved successful and the NVA were destroyed.
- e. On 25 Nov 1/35 NVA Bn attacked west of Dien-Ban. This attack was put down by use of air and artillery.

POINT TO NOTE

The NVA when challenged on several occasions at night immediately came back with "What is the PASSWORD". This seems to be taught in basic training as a means to gain time to get away when discovered infiltrating.

CF Keioskie
WO2

27 Nov.

VC WEAPONS CAPTURED

1 76mm RCL
1 61mm MOR
3 Flame Throwers
25 AK 47
4 Hvy MGS
1 AR 15
5 Carbines M1
8 CKCs
1 B41
1 B40
1 Signal Pistol
3 Radios
2 Telephones
69 rds 61mm MOR
51 rds 82mm MOR
45 rds B41 & B40
2 Bangalore
6 rds 76 RCL Rifle ammunition
172 VC grenades
Destroyed 2½ tons of equipment.

AFTER ACTION REPORT
3/1 BN ARVN - WO2 EW SMELLING

NAME LAM-SON 261/COMANCHE FALLS (3rd Insertion)
DATES Nov 4 68 to Nov 12 68.
OTHER UNITS Nil
SP ARVN Arty, US Airstrikes & Gunships
AREA 10000 - 15000m South of Quang-Tri City.
MISSION Search & Destroy within TAOR
EXECUTION By patrolling
INSERTION By heliborne assault 04 0925.

CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS

Nov 4 2120 VC shoot 3 or 4 B40 rockets in vicinity of CP.
Counter with Arty.

Nov 5 0745 1 VC KIA found (by Air)

1245 Contact estimated VC Pl to North East.
Friendly casualty 2 WIA.

1315 Medivac (By Air)

1340 Gunship team reports bunkers to North East & West

1400 Assault North East.
VC casualty : 5 KIA, 5 weapons captured

1450 Assault of West position complete
VC casualty : 18 KIA, 19 weapons captured

Nov 6 0730 2 VC weapons found 2 VC KIA

Nov 7 1215 1 VC weapon found

1415 2 VC weapons found

Nov 8 & 9 Negative contact.

Nov 10 & 11 Negative contact.

Nov 12 Extracted by foot.

.../2

VC CASUALTY & EQUIPMENT

26 VC KIA (19 credited to air)
9 LMG & MMG captured
21 Individual weapons (incl 12 M16)
1 B41 rocket launcher

* NOTE. The LMG/MMG were

1 US Bar
2 US M60
5 RPD
1 Russian LMG

FRIENDLY CASUALTY

2 WIA.

COMMENTS

1. The insertion was preceded by B52 airstrike, and arty fire.
2. The VC appear to be returning to this area each time the friendly units are extracted.

E.W. Snelling
WO2
AATTV

REPORT ON OPERATIONS 21 OCT 68 -
23 NOV 68 BY WO1 RJ O'BRIEN
2/5 ARVN BN

1. The report on operations for the period shown above is as follows:-
- 21 Oct Local patrolling PHU TRA area. Nil contact.
- 22 Oct As for 21 Oct but light contact. Nil casualties.
- 23&24 Oct As for 21 Oct
- 25 Oct Clearing operation in THON CHIN area and showing of flag. Night ambush between THON CHIN and PHU TRA.
- 7 VC including 1 female KIA
Captured : 1 AK47
 1 MAS 36
- Nil casualties.
- 26 Oct Returned to THON CHIN area during day.
- 6 VC KIA
Captured : 1 M16
 1 K44
 4 CHICOM hand grenades
 Documents.
- Included among enemy dead 2 District Organisers with rewards on their heads as follows:
- | | |
|--------------|-----------|
| NGUYEN -TAN | P. 25,000 |
| NGUYEN-HUONG | P. 15,000 |
- Nil casualties.
- 27 Oct Bn moved to NUI YOM area. Patrolling - Light contact.
- Nil casualties.
- 3 Nov Reported by forward elements that US forces had moved into TAOR. This report never confirmed but when investigating own forces suffered:
- 1 KIA
3 WIA - by M16 mines.

.../2

4 Nov)
5 Nov) No contact
6 Nov When extending area of occupation of NUI YON suffered
9 WIA
No enemy casualties confirmed.

7 Nov Scattered contacts. No casualties

8 Nov Move to QUANG NGAI. Airfield security and 1 Coy on Hill 10.
No contact.

9 Nov)
10 Nov) Airfield security and 1 Coy on Hill 10. No contact.

11 Nov) Daytime duties to provide protection for ARVN engineers building
13 Nov) road to PHU SON (HILL 16Z) Nil contact.

14 Nov On way to day security task 1 x 2½ ton truck hit mine.
16 WIA
Further mines discovered.
Description appeared of local manufacture approximately 7½" Diameter by 3" deep covered in dark brown plastic cloth with pressure plate of steel covering full diameter of mine. All inside plastic cover. These mines were buried in puddles in the road to make it hard for them to be detected.
Bn moved to Citadel security in QUANG NGAI. 1 Coy still at PHU SON. Nil contact at night.

15 Nov Citadel guard. 1 Coy at PHU SON. Nil contact.

16 Nov On the morning of 16 Nov info was received by 2 Chieu Hoi people that VC were massing East of QUANG NGAI for attack that night. Orders received 1200 hrs to move at 1300 hrs to check this out. Contact made at 1715 hrs to estimated Coy posn (200-250ms wide) but not completely manned. After Mortar and artillery treatment 2 gun ships attempted to work over area but were beaten off. Bn withdrawn to QUANG NGAI on Div orders without being allowed to attempt to attack. 1 Coy remained at PHU SON. Mor and light ground attacks on QUANG NGAI at 0225 hrs on morning of 17 Nov.
Casualties 6 WIA.

.../3

17 Nov

At daylight Bn (less 1 Coy at PHU SON) moved to West of airstrip to patrol West to Easting 53 along SONG KHA TRUC River. This area is honey combed with bunkers and tunnels and the task given was too much for a 1 day operation as planned (9,000m plus return to QUANG NGAI). There were numerous enemy snipers and small units in this area. Consequently the area was not properly searched and the Bn CP was caught in the open with MG fire and mors with 1 man KIA. All in all the Bn lost

1 KIA
4 WIA

without covering even half the ground ordered without any known enemy casualties. This caused a change of orders from Div HQ to remain in area overnight.

Nil contact at night.

18 Nov

Same comments as for 17 Nov. Still being pushed too hard for safety. Bn CP ambushed and lost 1 WIA.

After locating squad of VC not allowed to complete attack by Div HQ who wanted to start a new move to the South West.

Casualties 2 WIA

Moved to foothills to West. In this whole series of minor operations 4/4 ARVN Bn were operating on the left. Both Bns felt there was too much interference by Div HQ in the operations. During the whole period of this time the Bn Comds on the ground were continually impeded by conflicting orders from above and never allowed to press the enemy when they (the ARVN) received fire. Consequently 2/5 Bn lost

1 KIA
6 WIA without any known casualties on the enemy.

19 Nov

Remained all day at GR 540715 awaiting orders. Joined by coy from PHU-SON and returned to QUANG NGAI at 1715 hrs. Received mortar and MG fire on way out but nil casualties. Returned to Citadel Guard. After this series of operations both 4/4 Bn advisors and 2/5 advisors took our complaints as regards unnecessary interference by Div HQ to the Regimental Advisor (Lt Col WALLIS) who agreed with us and took it further to the Div Advisor (Col HUTTER). In consequence there was a conference between ARVN commanders and senior advisors which promised a more satisfactory system of command. The results can be seen in the following operations.

.../4

20 Nov

Moved out at 0630 hrs for operations in the NGHIA-HANH area where a large number of NVA were reported. In company with 4 ARVN Regt of which 4/4 Bn was placed under command 5 ARVN Regt. Contact with enemy made at GR 575670 when 2/5 En suffered 6 WIA. Estimated enemy platoon well dug in so called on gunships and then attacked.

Own losses 2 KIA
En losses 16 KIA

Captured : 3 AK47
1 RFG Rocket Launcher
6 B40 Rockets
Numerous hand grenades, SA ammo, clothing,
equipment documents, etc.

This attack was pressed home very quickly after the gunships finished (7 mins) mainly, because the Bn advisor (Capt GRANDALL) and myself went with the attacking coy. These enemy were identified as elements of the 2NVA Regt. No further contact during day or night.

21 Nov

Advanced further against light opposition.

Nil casualties.

22 Nov

Probe by enemy at 0135 hrs

Own losses 2 WIA
En losses 1 KIA armed with grenades

23 Nov

Contact at 0700 hrs when NVA patrol walked into friendly positions.

Own losses Nil
En losses 2 KIA
Captured 2 AK 47

Further contact at 0930.

Own losses Nil
En losses 1 KIA armed with grenades
1,000 kilos of rice destroyed.

2. The late submission of this report is regretted but as the Bn has been continually on the move for the last 4 days there has been no opportunity to complete it and even now I will have to wait for a re-supply helicopter to get this out as operations are further continuing in the mountains West of NGHIA-HANH.

RJ O'BRIEN
WO1
AATTV

OVERALL STATUS OF THE PACIFICATION EFFORT

1. In October Thua Thien Province accelerated the increase of security and the return of a peace time normalcy to both the city of Hue and the rural areas of the Province. Continuous operations by combined integrated FW/ARVN forces using a cordon - search and hold concept with complete exploitation of Phuong Hoang coordinated intelligence agencies has resulted in virtual elimination of VC and VCI in selected areas. These spheres of influence are expanding and the people are beginning to believe that true pacification is returning to the low lands of Thua Thien. Citing just four major operations, the enemy lost 328 KIA, 664 POW's including 249 VCI while 98 enemy returned under the Chieu Hoi program. Total enemy losses were 1090 compared to friendly losses of 6 KIA and 39 WIA. In each of these sanitized areas, the native population is being resettled.
2. The curfew in Hue is now 2400 hours while a key indicator of security, the local price for sand bags, has declined by 25%. It is difficult to describe but an aura of peace and optimism permeates the air as well as the determination to preserve this status. Self-defense forces are actively protecting their areas. GVN officials have a new air of efficiency and confidence as if finally hope for stability and peace is not merely a dream. This month over 16,000 formerly displaced persons were returned to their ancestral homes and by the end of the year this figure should reach at least 25,000.
3. The RF/PF are ranging wider and more energetically in search of an increasingly scarce enemy. Main force and local force units have been forced to retreat deeper into the mountains and any attempt to return to the lowlands will be abortive. Old indicators of effectiveness no longer apply; for example, Thua Thien RF/PF units have lost only three weapons in past five months while capturing over 730.
4. If continued at the present rate, roofing supplies appear adequate to support our plans. The shortage of weapons for Self Defense Forces and barrier materials are minor but continuing problems. In summary, if things get any better sampan cruising on the River Perfume may again become a major tourist attraction.

22 November 1968

EVALUATION OF MOBILE SELF-DEFENSE TRAINING

IN IV CORPS TACTICAL ZONE (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE: The purpose of this report is to identify the dynamics of mobile self-defense as taught by members of the Royal Australian Army to Revolutionary Development cadre in the IV Corps Tactical Zone. The report is further intended to explore the feasibility of introducing this particular mobile self-defense concept into other areas of Vietnam.
2. (U) BACKGROUND: This study has been conducted by Mr. John S. Figueira, Field Evaluator, Office of the ACOFS, CORDS, and is based upon information gathered from field trips throughout IV CTZ, the Vung Tau National Training Center, and to the IV CTZ Training Course in Can Tho, where members of the Royal Australian Army were training Revolutionary Development Cadre in the mobile self-defense concept.
3. (U) DISCUSSION:
 - a. Introduction: The need for taking a new approach to the problem of self-defense by Revolutionary Development teams in the Delta became increasingly obvious during the period of redeployment of RD teams after the 1968 Tet offensive. It was quite evident to the RD advisors that the teams were spending entirely too much time with problems of self-defense. In many instances the majority of the team members would be up all night on watch in static, defence positions (usually sand and log "forts") and would have to sleep during the day, thus detracting from their ability to carry out their mission. Accordingly, the Mobile Security Concept (MSC) was developed as a possible answer to the problem.

b. The Mobile Self-Defense Concept: The Mobile Self-Defense Concept as presented by Mr. James R. Ward, Chief, RD Division, CORDS, IV CTZ, in a paper to all IV Corps province RD advisors is as follows:

... a system of three-man positions in the hamlet perimeter, outside the hamlet proper. The positions occupied are not prepared, but take advantage of available cover and concealment. Three of these three-man positions are on a likely avenue of enemy approach to the hamlet in the form of a triangle to provide all around security for the positions and to make them mutually supporting. The triangle also makes it possible for any of the three-man positions to fall back through the other two when under pressure. To be completely effective, these nine-man, triangular positions must be occupied after dark and then shifted to an alternate location covering the same approach at least once during the night. It is recognized that the Militia interteam of the RDC team can man a maximum of three of these triangles and consequently will not be able to cover all approaches to the hamlet each night. However, the shifting of positions during the night and selecting different positions on different routes of approach each night will create a zone of insecurity for the VC all around the hamlet over a period of time.

A very important side effect of the Mobile Security Concept is that it provides security for the hamlet in general through the establishment of the zone of insecurity. Scattered through the hamlet in small groups and occupying the triangles outside the hamlet gives more breadth to the teams' coverage and provides more all around security for everyone concerned.

c. Introduction of Concept: Once a possible solution to this particular problem in IV CTZ was fairly well developed in the American IV CTZ RDC Division, it was quite evident that the program would have to be sold to the GVN. Using pragmatic techniques, directed primarily at the Vietnamese RDC Control Group, the concept was seen as being of definite value; and the group went through their channels, eliciting

the interest of province and corps officials. After the usual hesitancy, there has been rather enthusiastic reception of the concept by higher officials in the Delta.

d. Selection of Instructors and the Training Program: Concurrent with the search for a solution to the RD defense problem, the RDC Division, IV CTZ, worked with Major Graham Templeton of The Royal Australian Armoured Corps, DEPCORDS for Territorial Security, IV CTZ. Through Major Templeton the services of two Australian warrant officers were acquired. The original plan was for the Australians to move from province to province, training individual RD Teams and teaching the Mobile Self-Defense Concept. This proved, however, not to be the most efficacious way to get the concept across. For practical reasons, it was decided to bring key RDC team members into the province capital for a short concentrated course and then have them return to their teams to teach the new concept to their individual team members. Accordingly, at the training course which is underway at Can Tho (4 Nov to 10 Nov, and 11 Nov to 16 Nov), the Australians, who started out by directly instructing the classes through interpreters, then becoming instructor supervisors, are now reducing their active participation with the goal in mind of becoming course and field monitors. The Australians have been quite successful at incorporating complimentary subjects into the program which increase the tactical confidence of the cadre. The primary emphasis in the course is on marksmanship in night firing. This has proven to be the single most effective confidence builder. Essentially, the course is taken right out of the basic infantryman's course as taught in both the

Australian and American armies. (See Inclosure 1 for Schedule of Course Content.)

e. Practical Application: Introduction of the three-man cell concept and understanding of the concept by itself are relatively simple propositions. However, successful application involves assumptions which are not so simple. It must be kept in mind that the three-man cell concept is basically set up to provide early warning in the case of large-scale enemy intrusion attempts or to provide immediate reaction to small unit intrusion. In either case the three-man cell is in position with the assumption that there is a reliable reaction force standing by. Further, the men in the cells must have confidence in themselves and in their partners. The training course which the Australians have set up is designed to take care of the self-confidence aspects. Confidence in the reaction force will have to be developed in the RD cadre team's individual TAOR. Total cooperation and coordination among the forces in or immediately adjacent to the TAOR is imperative. It is absolutely essential that lines of authority be clearly established, and that all concerned be fully cognizant of their responsibilities. There must be no false assumptions in reference to lines of authority or responsibility.

f. Possible Duplication of Training:

(1) Thus far, implementation of the MSC has been restricted to IV CTZ; however, there has been considerable interest generated in other areas, and steps are being taken in these areas to implement the essential

training and to introduce the concept.

(2) LTC He, the commandant of the National Training Center at Vung Tau, observed the training which was conducted in Ba Xuyen Province by the Australians in August and was so impressed that he sent a four-man study group from his faculty to gather information to incorporate the Mobile Security Concept into the basic course at the center. The first group to receive the training was to have started 4 November. It must be remembered that the persons who are presently receiving the training at Vung Tau are new cadre; the persons who are receiving the training in IV CTZ are cadre who have been in the field for varying periods of time. These cadre did receive paramilitary training while they were at Vung Tau, but it was of a relatively cursory nature when consideration is given to present course content and to the goals of the training as set up by the Australians.

(3) The paramilitary director and the training coordinator at Vung Tau National Training Center have reported that they were visited by LTC Blyth, RDC advisor, I CTZ, about a week prior to the beginning of their first course. LTC Blyth was impressed with the outline of the course as presented to him (at that time the total course plan was not completed), and he has now taken steps to get a similar program started by a USMC (on staff) and two Marine NCO's.

(4) IV CTZ RDC personnel have indicated that II CTZ and III CTZ personnel have approached them about the MSD concept; but to date there has been no practical follow-up.

(5) The problem of needless duplication in future training was discussed with officials at Vung Tau. They feel that they can greatly alleviate this by utilizing their facilities for the training of cadre who have already graduated from Vung Tau and who are now in the field. They point out that the student population at Vung Tau is about 42% below normal and that the influx of returning cadre would place no strain on the center's ability to house and feed the cadre.

(6) If the Vung Tau center is to be used for training cadre from the field who are in the MSC, there will probably be some question as to the feasibility of training cadre from areas of different terrain features. This should not be a problem in that once it has been determined that the concept can be used in an area, the individual should be able to adapt himself to the local tactical situation. Inherent in the type of training presented is the development of self-confidence and a fair degree of individual flexibility in tactical situations.

g. Monitoring the Application of the Concept: It was recognized quite early by the IV CTZ Australians that the cadre teams which received the MSC training would have to be monitored after they returned to their assigned hamlets. Accordingly, a monitoring apparatus was set up. This consists of 7 Vietnamese from provincial PDC's who randomly visit the hamlets at night to see if the trained groups are, in fact, utilizing the concept which they received in the classroom. The Australians were involved in monitoring prior to having to

devote all their attention to the IV CTZ training course. As soon as it is feasible, the Australians will return to the role of field MSC monitors.

h. Success of the Concept:

(1) The Australians point out that assessing the application of the MSC during the short period of time that it has been in effect is a very difficult task. It was found that some teams were attacked when they had not used the concept received in the MSC training. The teams suffered too many casualties for the size of force reported engaged. In Chuong Thien Province, teams which have reportedly been loyal to the employment of the concept have had considerable success in terms of damage to the enemy.

(2) It has been pointed out that the VC are fairly meticulous planners. They will find and fix the defenders in an area before they will make their move. In the case of a team which is using the concept effectively, the VC could well be forced to refrain from direct action because of the uncertainty of the defender's position. It is not too unreasonable to say that a team which utilizes the concept effectively could have continuing negative contact with the enemy due to the enemy's inability to follow through on his plans.

i. Utilization of MSC and Possible Splitting of RD into 30-Man Teams:

Under the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, some RD teams will be split into 30-man teams and will work in concert with PF platoons (1 platoon per team). It is understood that the teams will be split after due consideration of the variables involved in their particular situation.

It is further understood that the main mission of the PF platoon will be that of taking over from the RD cadre their role as militia. Wherever this may be the case, it should not present too difficult a problem. There is no reason why the PF cannot receive MSC training from the MAT's. The Australians point out that an experienced infantryman needs only a brief refresher period in order to run the MSC course effectively and that there should be no problem in having MAT's train PF in the concept. In the event that a 50-man team is trained in the MSC and then placed in a location which is determined to be amenable to a 30-man team, it should not be felt that the MSC training was wasted. Should such a team be working with a PF platoon receiving training in the concept, it would definitely be an asset to the total defensive posture of the hamlet. Where the PF are used as the militia force, the RD cadre would play an integral role as part of the reaction force for the cells. Any understanding that they have of the concept would be beneficial. Further, in their role as the trainers of PSDG, the RD would have more expertise to offer.

4. (U) CONCLUSIONS:

a. This program could be successfully initiated in all areas of Vietnam where it is feasible to use RD teams and where extreme terrain features do not limit its tactical concept of operation. Problems would arise, i.e., selling the program to the GVN and retaining interest throughout all phases of its development and then seeing that there would be adequate monitoring and follow-up. There would be logistical problems in reference to the ammunition which would have to be used for

marksmanship training. This problem has been encountered in the IV
CTZ program.

b. There does not appear to be any need to set up any new offices
to administer this program, as the necessary apparatus already exist
in RD cadre channels.

c. The basic simplicity of the MSC and the training which precedes
its actual introduction make it a valuable tool whether it is given to
RD cadre or to PF soldier.

d. Decisions on the desirability of implementing training in the
MSC should be made at the province level.

2 Incl

1. Schedule of course content
2. Recommendations

John S. Figueira
JOHN S. FIGUEIRA
IV CTZ Field Evaluator

PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION FOR RD CADRE MOBILE SECURITY CONCEPT

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>MOI</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>
INTRODUCTION	1	1-L	To introduce the course and summarize the next five days of instruction
Contact Drills	4	1-L,D 3-PE	To teach the cadre immediate action drills to overcome surprise and shock of initial contact with the enemy.
Fire & Movement	4	$\frac{1}{2}$ -L,D 1-PE 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -PE(live)	To teach the cadre the techniques of Fire & Movement in the offense and defense at the small unit level.
Mines, Flares, & Booby Traps	2	$\frac{1}{2}$ -L,D 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ -PE	To teach the cadre methods of setting mines, flares and booby traps to compliment intergated security.
Squad Formations	3	$\frac{1}{2}$ -L,D 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -PE	To teach the cadre small unit tactical discipline.
Hand & Arm Signals	2	1-L,D 1-PE	To teach the cadre the use of hand and arm signals to control small units in both open and closed areas.
Preparatory Marksmanship Instruction	3	1-L,D 2-PE	To improve the basic marksmanship of the cadre.
Practice Firing	4	4-PE	To improve the basic marksmanship of the cadre.
Night Sounds & Night Movement	4	1-L,D 3-PE	To teach the cadre the techniques of silent night movement.
Use of a Reaction Force	3	1-L,D 2-PE	To teach the cadre methods of organizing and employing a reaction force.
Security in Depth	2	1-L,D 1-PE	To teach the cadre tactical dispersion which subjects the enemy attacking force to an ever increasing volume of fire.

Incl 1

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>MOI</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>
Automatic Weapons	1	1-PE	To teach the cadre correct methods and techniques of firing and employing automatic weapons.
Night Communication Techniques	2	1-L, D 1-PE(N)	To teach the cadre correct methods of communicating silently at night; use of field expedient commo.
Night Firing	3	1-L(N) 2-PE(N)	To improve the confidence of the cadre to hit targets under conditions of limited visibility and with the assistance of illuminations.
Supporting Fires	1	1-L	To familiarize the cadre with the type of supporting fires which are generally available in IV Corps and instruct them in the information necessary to quickly adjust these fires.
Mobile Security Concept	10	1-L 9-PE(2N)	To teach the cadre the concept of mobile security employment which creates a zone of insecurity for the VC around the hamlet.

Methods of Instruction:

L - Lecture
D - Demonstration
PE - Practical Exercise
(N) Night Training

Recap:

Course	49 hours
Day training	40 hours
Night training	9 hours
Lecture & Demo	13 hours
Practical Exercise	36 hours

Instructional Material to be issued during the course:

Lesson outline for each block of instruction.
Format for requesting Air/Artillery Support
Ordnance danger zones
Arm & Hand Signals Handbook
Training Schedule
Administrative and support requirements for the course.

RECOMMENDATIONS

EVALUATION OF HOSTILE SELF-DEFENSE TRAINING

IN IV CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

These recommendations are those of the field evaluator and are forwarded to the command/agency concerned for information:

- a. That the MSC be implemented nationally.
- b. That new RD cadre be trained in the MSC at Vung Tau and that selected cadre from the field be trained in the MSC also be trained at Vung Tau.
- c. That PF be trained in the field by MATs and that copies of this study be sent to each of the PF training centers.

Incl 2

OCT

I. THANH	010800 BR 935365	Intel. collection against VCI	FRU intel report.	One FRU intel member went to AN HOA Hamlet to conduct surveillance on TRAN PHU, aged 52. A VCI suspect. Mission ended at 030700 hrs.	Information confirmed. Report submitted. Suspect lives at BR941363.	None.
2. COC.	010800 BR 964276	" "	" "	One FRU intel member went to DAI HOI Hamlet to conduct surveillance on NGUYEN HUONG a VCI suspect. Mission ended at 030700 hrs.	Nothing confirmed. Surveillance to continue.	None.
3. LOI.	010800 CR 078253	" "	" "	Two FRU intel members went to HUNG THANH to conduct surveillance on NGUYEN LUC, aged 52 a VCI suspect. Mission concluded at 030700 hrs	Nothing confirmed. Surveillance to continue.	None.
4. LAN.	010830 BR 963357	Capture of VCI. Raid.	AN NHON DIOCG Report.	(45) Fifteen FRU members went to AN NHON to capture HA THI NAM, aged 40, a Motivation Section, Chief. Selling Resistance Bonds. Mission ended at 01 1130 hrs.	Capture effected and prisoner delivered to AN NHON DIOCG at 1100 hrs.	ANPRC 25 HEI's
5. LE KE.	030800 BR 889582	Intel. collection against VCI	FRU intel report.	Two FRU intel members went to TAN XUAN to conduct surveillance on PHAM THI CHUNG and VUONG CONG THANH two VCI suspects. Mission ended at 031130 hrs.	Information confirmed. Plan submitted for their capture.	None.
6. LAN.	031030 BR 982293	Capture of VCI. Raid.	" "	Sixteen FRU members went to THANH HUY to capture PHAM THI CHAN, aged 45, a woman's cell leader. Mission concluded at 031100 hrs.	Capture effected and prisoner delivered to TUY PHUOC DIOCG at 1330 hrs.	ANPRC 25 HEI's.
7. MANG NGOC HUNG.	031200 BR 889582	Capture of VCI. Raid.	" "	Fifteen FRU members went to TAN XUAN Hamlet to capture PHAM THI CHUNG and VUONG CONG THANH, prisoners delivered to PHU CAT DIOCG, PSB.	Capture effected and prisoners delivered to PHU CAT DIOCG, PSB.	ANPRC 25 HEI's.
8. PHI.	040800 CR 009221	Intel collection against VCI	" "	Two FRU intel members went to PHUOC THANH hamlet to conduct surveillance on TRAN XUA and LE VAN LOC. Two VCI suspects. Mission concluded at 060730 hrs.	Information confirmed. Report submitted. Suspects living at CR016258.	None.
NGUYEN NGOC TRU	040800 BR 887557	Recon of Hamlet.	" "	Three FRU intel members went to CHANH AN Hamlet to conduct a ground recon for future operations against VCI in that area. Mission concluded at 04 1000 hrs.	Information confirmed. Operation plan submitted.	None.

PART 7. UNPLANNED/UNEXPECTED OPERATIONS CONDUCTED DURING 1969

SERIAL AND TEAM NUMBER	DATE TIME	REF CODE	TYPE OF OPERATION	BASIC REASON FOR OPERATION	NARRATIVE OF OPERATION	RESULTS	COMMO USED
10. HANG HOC HUNG	041200	BR 887557	Capture of VCI. Raid.	PHU CAT DIQCC report.	Eighteen PHU members went to CHANH AN Hamlet to capture VCI in that area. Mission ended at 041600 hrs.	Capture effected. TRAN THI O, CAO THI HOA, VO THI PHUEN, PHAM THI HO and PHAM THI HOA, delivered to PSB at PHU CAT at 041530 hrs.	ANPRC 25 RTI's.
11. LAN.	050830	BR 938355	Capture of VCI. Raid.	PHU Intel. report.	Fourteen PHU members went to AN HOA Hamlet to capture TRAN PHU, aged 53, Liaison and supply cadre, for KHEN KHEN Village. Mission ended 1330 hrs.	Capture effected and prisoner was delivered to AN BINH DIQCC at 1300 hrs.	ANPRC 25 RTI's
12. PHU.	060800	CR 018257	Intel collection against VCI	PHU intel. report.	The PHU intel members went to PHUOC LONG Hamlet to conduct surveillance on TRAN XUA, aged 50. Mission concluded at 090730.	Information confirmed. Suspect is living at LONG VAN Hamlet, CR018256 Report submitted.	None.
13. LAN.	080830	CR 062301	Capture of VCI. Raid.	" "	Twelve PHU members went to PHUOC HONAI to capture NGUYEN THI BAY. Mission ended at 081200 hrs.	Negative result. A search of HUYNH MAI Hamlet failed to reveal the suspect. We wuffed it.	ANPRC 25 RTI's
14. BINH.	080830	CR 073245	Intel collection against VCI	PHU Report.	One PHU intel member went to area ID in QUI BINH to conduct surveillance on NGUYEN VAN THUNG, aged 35. A VCI suspect. Mission ended at 100700.	Information confirmed. Suspect lives at CR07225. Report submitted.	None.
15. LAN.	090730	CR 018257	Capture of VCI. Raid.	PHU Intel report.	Six PHU members went to PHUOC LONG to capture TRAN XUA, aged 48. They then went to PHUOC HONAI where the mission concluded at 091130 hrs.	After failing in the capture at the first place PHU pursued the suspect until the capture was effected. The prisoner was delivered to TUY PHUOC DIQCC.	ANPRC 25 RTI's.
16. LAN.	110830	BR 936407	Capture of VCI. Raid.	PHUONG HOANG information report #153. BINH BINH.	Six PHU members went to capture NGUYEN VAN THUNG, HUYNH VAN MAN and VAN LAI. Mission ended at 1100 hrs.	Negative results. These men were PSB informers and were released. Closer coordination necessary on our intelligence sources.	ANPRC 25 RTI's
17. THANH.	110900	BR 936407	Intel collection against VCI	Intel report from ID RD Team.	One PHU intel member went to BINH HAN Hamlet to conduct surveillance on LE TRINH, aged 63. A VCI suspect. Mission concluded at 13 0700 hrs.	Information confirmed. Suspect is living at BR 936407. Report submitted.	None.

SERIAL AND TEAM LEADER	DATE TIME	MAP COORD	TYPE OF OPERATION	BASIS/REASON FOR OPERATION	NARRATIVE OF MISSION	RESULTS	COMMO USED
18. KIM	110820	BR 073215	Intel collection against VUI.	PHU intel report.	One PHU intel member went to BACH LANG Hamlet to conduct surveillance on NGUYEN THE UT, aged 24, a VUI suspect. Mission ended at 13 0700 hrs.	Information confirmed. Report submitted.	None.
19. HANG NGOC HUNG	111830	BR 587557	Capture of VUI. Raid.	" "	Twenty three PHU members went to CHIANG AN Hamlet to conduct a cordon and search in order to capture VUI NLF Provincial Youth Executive Committee members. Mission ended 120830.	Capture effected. Contact made with VC security platoon at 2100 hrs. VC broke contact at 2115 hrs but attacked again at 0530 hrs. Blood trails indicate KIA/WIA. No PHU casualties. Prisoners delivered to PHU CAT PEB at 1000 hrs 12 oct. 68	AMPRO 25 HTI's.
20. THANG	120810	BR 035285	Intel collection against VUI	" "	One PHU member went to PHUOC THUAN Hamlet to conduct surveillance on DOAN THI NAM, aged 27 and DOAN THANH BINH, aged 18 suspected VUI. Mission ended at 141730 hrs.	Information confirmed but exact location of suspects not yet known. Surveillance to continue. Probably THUAN NGHI Hamlet. CRO43282	None.
21. CHAN.	120810	BR 065280	" "	" "	One PHU intel member went to PHUOC AN Hamlet to conduct surveillance on DANG KANH, aged 40 a native of QUI HOI Hamlet. Mission ended at 141730	Exact location not confirmed. Surveillance to continue.	None.
22. BAO.	120810	BR 059209	" "	" "	One PHU intel member went to PHUOC THAM Hamlet to conduct surveillance on NGUYEN LUC, aged 52 a VUI suspect Mission ended at 140800 hrs.	Information confirmed. Operation planned.	None.
23. NGUYEN NGOC TRU	121300	BR 093544	" "	" "	Three PHU intel members went to BINH LONG Hamlet to investigate the activities of PHAM TAN a VUI suspect. Mission concluded at 121800 hrs.	Information confirmed. PHAM TAN operates in this area but is protected by a VC platoon. Report submitted.	None.

SERIAL AND TEAM LEADER	DATE TIME	MAP COORD	TYPE OF OPERATION	BASIS/REASON FOR OPERATION	NARRATIVE OF MISSION	RESULTS	COMMO USED
24. HUYNH LAI	130000	BR 930658	Intel collection against VCI	FRU HY HIOCC report.	Four FRU intel members went to HY HUI Hamlet to conduct surveillance and investigate reported VCI activity. Mission ended at 131400 hrs.	Negative contact. Nothing confirmed. Surveillance to continue.	None.
25. NANG HOOC HUNG	131100	BR 893544	Reconn. of Hamlet.	FRU intel. report.	Two FRU reconn. members went to BINH LONG Hamlet to conduct a ground reconnaissance for a night operation. Mission ended at 131600 hrs.	Information confirmed. Operation planned.	None.
26. NANG HOOC HUNG	131800	BR 893544	Ambush and capture of VCI.	" "	Sixteen FRU members went to BINH LONG Hamlet and deployed at the ambush position. Mission ended 140000 hrs.	Negative contact. Ambush not sprung.	ANPRC 25. RTI's.
27. HUYNH HOOC THU	140800	BR 893544	Intel collection against VCI	" "	One FRU intel member went to BINH LONG to conduct investigations on VCI activities and to try to discover why the ambush was not sprung. Mission concluded at 141600 hrs.	No contact with VCI but one VC CO. With 1 M79, 4 M40 RL, 3 M79s and personal weapons operating around the hamlet. A direct link here somewhere. Report submitted.	None.
28. THI THANH	140815	BR 987293	" "	" "	One FRU intel member went to PHUOC AN Hamlet to conduct surveillance on TRAN THI THANH, aged 40, a VCI suspect. Mission ended at 160030 hrs.	Information confirmed. Operation planned to capture VCI.	None.
29. YICH.	141030	GR 8823	Capture of VCI. Raid.	" "	Five FRU members went to QUI NHON City to capture HUENT THI UT, aged 24, Village liaison cell leader and concurrently motivation troop mass section chief. Mission ended 1200 hrs.	Capture was effected and prisoner delivered to BINH DINH NATIONAL POLICE. at 1415 hrs.	RTI's.
30. HUYNH LAI	140950	BR 984643	Intel. collection against VCI	FRU HY HIOCC report.	Four FRU members went HIEP AN Hamlet to investigate VCI activities in that area. Mission ended at 141800 hrs.	No contact with VCI. One 30 man VC platoon operates in this area. Report submitted.	None.

SERIAL AND TEAM LEADER	DATE TIME	MAP COORD	TYPE OF OPERATION	BASE/REASON FOR OPERATION	NARRATIVE OF MISSION	RESULTS	
31. NGUYEN HOC THU	15 0800	BR. 887540	Co-operation against VCI	Hu Cat BLOCC intel report.	Six PHU assets went to Chanh An Hamlet for a cooperation against VCI, mission ended at 1330 hrs.	As a result, 22 VCI CIA among of which 3 following are on PHU record : NGUYEN THI XANG, LE THI CUC and VO DUC TAM.	As PRC-25
32. PHAM KE	17 0800	BR. 900535	Intel Collection against VCI.	Local Report	Two PHU assets went to Hoa Hoi Hamlet to investigate the reports of VCI tax and food collection activities. Mission ended at 1600 hrs.	Report confirmed. Approx. 6 VCI cadres (names unknown) were protected by approx. a VC squad.	None
33. BUI SON	17 0800	BR. 919696	"	PHU intel report.	Two PHU members went to My Tai Village and obtained the info of VC and VCI operations in Mai Lap mountainous area. Mission ended at 19 1300 hrs	2 VC plt. led by Son (alias Xu) operating in My Quang Village area. No VCI activities uncovered.	None
34. THUNG	17 0900	CR. 078253	"	PHU intel net	Two PHU assets went to Phuoc Ham Village and obtained the info of VCI cadres named Phan Dan, aged 40, native of Long Van Hamlet, Phuoc Long Village. Mission ended at 18 0830 hrs	Information was not confirmed yet. Surveillance to continue.	None
35. BINH	17 0900	CR. 073245	"	"	BINH went to Qui Myon and obtained the info on DANG THI THU, aged 21 and DANG THI DINH, aged 17, VCI suspects. Mission ended at 18 0830.	Mission would be continued.	None

REF ID	TIME	REF NO	TYPE OF OPERATION	REPORTING UNIT	DESCRIPTION OF OPERATION	STATUS	REMARKS
36. PHAN KH	180800	BR. 902484	Intel Collec- tion against VCI.	Requested by OSI	2 FRU assets went to An Ham Hamlet to observe the action of PHAN TRONG TO who was suspected to take a VCI intel agent. Mission ended at 191000.	Report was not confirmed yet. Surveillance to continue.	None
37. HANG NGOC HUNG	180800	BR. 902540	Recoun of target area	FRU report	3 FRU assets went to My Hoa Hamlet to recon the area for an ambush operation against 6 VCI tax & food collectors. Mission ended at 1330 hrs.	Information confirmed. Operation planned.	None
38. NGUYEN THIEM	180900	BR. 959209	Operation against VCI.	FRU report	Operation to capture one VCI cadre named NGUYEN SUC, aged 61, who operated at Long My Hamlet. Mission ended at 1200 hrs.	As a result, one VCI CIA and was turned over to TUYPHUOC DIQCC.	FRG-25 HE-1
39. HANG NGOC HUNG	181830	BR. 902540	Ambush against the VCI.	FRU report	20 FRU assets under the command of the deputy chief, launched an ambush operation against VCI financial economic cadres. Mission ended at 190600	Contact was made at 190400 hrs. One FRG-25 & economic financial cadre named HOAI HT-1, DUC was KIA. Important documents were seized.	
40. THANG	190800	GR. 090338	Intel Collec- tion against VCI.	FRU intel net.	Thang went to Phuoc Son and obtained the info of DANG CAO KHAI, aged 50, a VCI suspect. Mission ended at 21 0700 hrs.	Information confirmed. Operation planned.	None
41. TRUNG	190900	GR. 014248	Intel Collec- tion opn.	FRU intel net	TRUNG went to Long Van Hamlet and obtained the info of 4 VC underground guerrillas hiding at Loc. CR. 017278, Lant Le Hamlet, Phuoc Han Village. Mission ended at 210700.	Report was disseminated to the local News DIQCC.	

SERIAL AND TEAM LEADER	DATE TIME	MAP COORD	TYPE OF OPERATION	BASIS/REASON FOR OPERATION	NARRATIVE OF MISSION	RESULTS	COMING US
42. BINH	190900	BR. 916384	Intel Collec- tion against VCI.	Information given by BD National Police Service.	Acting on information, BINH went to Khan Thap and confirmed NGUYEN CHUNG aged 40, native of Ngai Chanh Hamlet & VC liaison agent. Mission ended at 200730 hrs.	Report confirmed.	None
43. DAO	200800	CR. 039287	Intel Collec- tion against VCI.	FRU intel net	DAO conducted a surveillance on DINH THI DINH & DANG THI THU. Mission ended at 210730 hrs.	Negative result.	None
44. BINH	200800	CR. 057365	Intel Collec- tion against VCI.	Information given by BD National Police Service.	BINH confirmed one VCI cadre named DINH THI THANH, aged 40, living at Ky Son Hamlet, Phuoc Son Village. Mission ended at 210730	Information confirmed. Operation planned.	None
45. THANH	200800	BR. 244386	"	FRU intel net	Thanh obtained the info of NGUYEN CHUNG	Negative result.	None
46. PHAM KE	200800	BR. 853463	"	Requested by OSI	Two FRU intel assets went to Thuan Hanh Hamlet to continue investigating PHAN TRONG TO who was suspected of having VCI connections. Mission ended at 201500 hrs.	Report completed and submitted to OSI office.	None
47. NGUYEN LAI	200800	BR. 885575	"	FRU intel report.	Two FRU assets went to Khanh Phuoc Hamlet to investigate a VCI named VO KY suspected of being a VCI economic financial cadre. Ended at 201700 hrs.	Surveillance to continue.	None

OPERATION NAME	DATE TIME	REF CODE	TYPE OF OPERATION	STATUS/REASON FOR OPERATION	OPERATION DESCRIPTION	RESULTS	REMARKS
48. HUAN KE	210800	BR, 953585	Intel Collection against VCI.	FRU intel report.	Two FRU members went to Thai Thuan Hamlet to investigate a number of VCI economic cadres. Mission ended at 22 0700 hrs.	No VCI activity uncovered.	None
49. NGUYEN LAY	210900	BR, 885575	"	"	NGUYEN LAY continued conducting surveillance on VO KY at Khanh Phnoc Hamlet. Mission ended at 21 1700 hrs.	Information confirmed. Operation planned.	None
50. TIENT	210900	BR, 968296	"	FRU intel net	TIENT obtained the info of NGUYEN THI KIM CUC, aged 35, DAO THI LUU, aged 35 and BUI THI MAO, aged 21, native of Qui Hai Hamlet, Phnoc An Village. Mission ended at 240700 hrs.	Surveillance to continue.	None
51. TRUNG	220830	GR, 079219	Intel Collection Operation.	Information given by ND National Police Service.	TRUNG went to area 6, Qui Nhon to investigate the general situation. Mission ended at 23 0700 hrs.	Neg. result	None
52. THANG	22 0830	GR, 057365	Intel Collection against VCI.	FRU intel net	THANG obtained the info of VCI cadre named NGUYEN LE, aged 50, native of Binh Thanh (GR.063258), Phnoc Hsu. Mission ended at 23 0830 hrs.	Report confirmed.	None
53. BINH	22 0830	GR, 058323	"	"	BINH obtained the information of HUYNH NGOC CU, aged 33, native of Vinh Quang Hamlet, Phnoc Son Village Tuy Phnoc District. (GR.045238). Mission ended at 230830 hrs.	Mission would be continued for further information.	None

OPERATION LEADER	DATE TIME	REF. CODE	TYPE OF OPERATION	BASE/REACTOR NO. OF OPERATOR	OBJECTIVE OF MISSION	RESULTS	REMARKS
54. THANG	230830	GR. 035235	Intel Collection against VCI.	FRU intel net	Seeking the residing location of DOAN THI NAM, aged 27 and Doan Thanh Binh, aged 18, VCI suspects. Mission ended at 24 0730 hrs.	Information was not confirmed yet.	None
55. THANG	230830	GR. 057365	"	"	THANG confirmed NGUYEN THI CUC BA, aged 31, native of Tung Giang Hamlet Phuoc Hoa Village (GR.056377), a VC liaison agent. Mission concluded at 25 1800 hrs	Information confirmed. Operation planned.	None
56. CHAU	230830	GR. 058323	"	"	CHAU went to Phuoc Son Village and obtained the info of LE THI NGAI, aged 40 and LE NGHE, aged 60, native of Ky Son Hamlet (GR.660326), VC supply cadres. Mission ended at 25 1800 hrs.	Report was not confirmed yet.	None
57. BINH	230830	GR. 057365	"	"	BINH confirmed the VCI cadre named LE THI DI, 22 years old, operating at the 4th area, Bach Dang Hamlet, Qui Nhon City. Mission ended at 24 0700 hrs.	Information confirmed. Operation to capture was planned.	None
58. YE LAN	230900	GR. 055325	Operation against VCI.	FRU intel report.	One 18-man FRU unit launched an operation to capture VCI cadres at Ky Son Hamlet (GR.055325). Mission ended at 1400 hrs.	Operation effected. Five VCI CIA named DINH THI THANH, DAO HUE, DAO THO, DANG CAO BUI, NGUYEN THI THANH TUYEN and were turned over to Tuy Phuoc DIACC.	An FRG-25 RT-1.

OFFICER AND TEAM LEADER	DATE TIME	MAP COORD	TITLE OF OPERATION	PAST/REASON FOR OPERATION	NARRATIVE OF MISSION	RESULTS	COMMENTS
59. BINH	240800	GR. 005325	Intel Collec- tion against VCI.	FRU intel net	BINH obtained the information of one VCI cadre named TRAN THI NHO, aged 30 residing at Quang My Hamlet, Phuoc Lo Village. (GR.005325). Mission ended at 25 0700 hrs.	Information was not confirmed yet. Surveillance to continue.	None
60. TIET	240800	RR. 968286	Intel Collec- tion against VCI.	FRU intel report	Acting on info, TIET and TRUNG went to Qui Noi Hamlet and confirmed one VCI cadre named HO VAN TU, aged 20, also obtained the info of another VCI named NGUYEN XUAN MAI. Mission ended at 27 0830 hrs.	Information confirmed. Operation planned.	None
61. MANG NGOC HUNG	240900	RR. 924377	Recon of target area.	FRU intel report	Acting on information, four FRU assets went to Nhan Thap Hamlet for reconnaissance of terrain to make an ambush operation against VCI. Mission ended at 1300 hrs.	Report confirmed. Operation planned.	None
62. LE DINH TICH	241700	RR. 924377 923379	Ambush opn.	"	Two 30-man FRU units under the command of the FRU Chief, launched an ambush operation at Nhan Thap Hamlet to annihilate the VCI. Mission ended at 25 0830 hrs.	As a result, FRU killed one VCI named NGUYEN DUM and captured one hand grenade.	PRC-25 HT-1
63. BINH	25 0830	GR, 078253	Intel Collec- tion against VCI.	FRU intel net	BINH confirmed MAI THI NGUYET ANH, aged 39, residing at Phu Hoa Hamlet GR.052252, a VC supply cadre. Mission ended at 26 0700 hrs.	Information confirmed. Operation planned.	None
64. THANG	26 0810	GR. 060326	"	FRU intel report.	THANG confirmed LE THI NGAI, aged 50 native of Ky Son Hamlet, having served for the VC as a VCI cadre. Mission ended at 29 1200 hrs.	Information confirmed. Operation planned.	None

SERIAL AND TEAM LEADER	DATE TIME	MAP COORD	TYPE OF OPERATION	BASIS/REASON FOR OPERATION	NARRATIVE OF MISSION	RESULTS	COMMO USED
65. CHAU	26 0820	CR, 071369	Intel Collec- tion against VCI.	FBU intel net	CHAU went to Tan Giang Hamlet and confirmed NGUYEN THI TRAM, aged 21, a VC liaison agent. Mission concluded at 291200 hrs.	Surveillance to continue.	None
66. BINH	260820	CR, 005325	"	"	BINH confirmed TRAN THI HHO, aged 30, residing at Quang Ky Hamlet, Phuoc Loc Village, a VCI cadre. Mission ended at 270630 hrs.	Information confirmed. Operation planned.	None
67. BINH	270830	CR, 073245	"	"	BINH went to Qui Nhon City and obtained the information of NGUYEN HOOC CHAU, 44 years old, native of Phuoc Nghia Village. Mission ended at 28 0730.	Surveillance to continue.	None
68. BINH	28 0800	BR, 909279	"	"	BINH confirmed the VCI cadre named LE KHAN LANG, aged 19, native of Qui Noi Hamlet, Phuoc An Village. Mission ended at 29 0730 hrs.	Information confirmed. Operation planned.	None
69. TIET	280800	BR, 928182	"	"	TIET went to Nam Tang Hamlet and obtained the information of VCI cadre named DANG THI HHO, 38 years old, native of Luang Hong Hamlet (CR,073244) Mission ended at 29 0700 hrs.	Surveillance operation would be continued.	None
70. TRUNG	280800	CR, 071369	"	"	TRUNG obtained the information of two supply cadres named NGUYEN DUC CHINH and NGUYEN CHI THANH, residing at Tan Giang Hamlet. Mission ended at 29 1500 hrs.	Surveillance to continue.	None
71. LAN	281000	CR, 047265	Operation to capture VCI	FBU intelligence & FBU report.	FBU assets launched an operation to capture TRAN HIEN, aged 42, who was a VC supply and liaison agent. Mission ended at 28 1600 hrs.	TRAN HIEN was CIA and turned over to Tuy Phuoc DIACC.	PRC-25 & RT-1

SERIAL AND TEAM LEADER	DATE TIME	MAP COORD	TYPE OF OPERATION	BASE/REASON FOR OPERATION	NARRATIVE OF MISSION		
72 THI	300730	CR. 067263	Intel Collec- tion against VCI.	PRU intel not	THI went to Luong Hong Hamlet and obtained the info of NGUYEN PHUOC, 43 years old, native of Tay Dinh Hamlet, Phuoc Hoi Village, a VCI cadre. Mission ended 31 0830 hrs.	Surveillance to continue	None
73 VO NGOC CHAU	300730	BR. 244386	Id	Id	CHAU obtained the info of VCI cadre named NGUYEN NGON, aged 56, native of Vinh Dinh Hamlet, Nhon Phong Village, An Nhon District BR.996413. Mission ended 31 0630 hrs.	Information was not confirmed yet. Surveillance to continue.	None
74 BINH	300730	BR. 244386	"	"	BINH obtained the info of TRAN THE, aged 40, residing at Loc BR.958379, a VCI cadre, mission ended at 310530.	Surveillance to continue	None
75 TRUONG CHAU	301000	CR. 042352	"	"	CHAU confirmed the activities of TRAN THE XU, NOT CONNECTING with VCI. Mission ended at 311800 hrs.	Negative result	None
76 THANG	301000	BR. 928382	Intel Collec- tion operation	"	THANG obtained the info of one VC company hiding at CR.025324. Mission ended at 31 1800 hrs.	Negative result	None
77 TICH	310345	BR. 968297	Operation to capture VCI	PRU intel report	42 PRU members, under the command of the PRU Chief, made an operation to capture VCI cadres at Qui Hai Hamlet. The mission ended at 1200 hrs.	As a result, two VCI cadres were captured and turned over to Tay Phuoc DIOCC for interrogation. One hand grenade captured.	CIA PRG-25 & HL-1 radio