

Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report and enclosures
1 - 31 December 1968

Series: AWM95 - Australian Army
commanders' diaries

Item: 1/2/60

1/2/Dec 68

RLB/DVL

R723-10-3

Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam

10 Jan 69

HQ AFV (3)

AATTV REPORT : DECEMBER 1968General

1. Most operational activity during the month was aimed at assisting the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) by either attacking the VC infrastructure (VCI) or pursuing the enemy main force units deeper into their base areas.
2. One casualty was sustained; WO2 J Garrigan was drowned in Quang-Tri Province (GR 334654) at 0915 hrs 27 Dec when his APC sank after striking a submerged object. He was the fifth fatality in the Team for the year.
3. Deployment. The deployment of the Team as at 20 Dec 68 is at Annex A. The main change from last month is the deployment of a second Mobile Training Team (MTT) to the RD Programme in IV Corps.

I Corps

4. Contact with the enemy was infrequent, except in Quang-Nam Province. Operation Taylor Common/Le-Loi by 1USMC Div and ARVN Ranger Group is continuing in the foothills, 20 miles south west of Danang. Cumulative results for the period 9 to 27 Dec are:

	<u>Op Le-Loi</u>		<u>Op Taylor Common</u>	
	Enemy	ARVN	Enemy	USMC
KIA	466	58	276	24
WIA		227	-	163
Captured			22	-

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5. During 1968, Vietnamese soldiers in I Corps killed 28,582 enemy for a loss of 4,282 of their own - a kill ratio of 6.67 to 1.

6. In Quang-Tri Province, operational activity was quiet. A report by WO2 Snelling on the ability of 3/1 ARVN Bn is at Annex B. At Annex C is a report by WO2 Ison on the activities of 1 Div Reconnaissance Company. The clandestine operations are of particular interest.

7. The value of rewards paid in I Corps for information or for enemy weapons is shown in Annex D.

II Corps

8. Special Forces. The Mobile Strike Force of Co B had no significant contacts during the month.

9. Arrangements have been made for each AATTV member joining 5SFG to attend a Combat Orientation Course. The 12 day courses are conducted at Hon Tre island near Nha-Trang and a copy of the syllabus is at Annex E.

10. Province Reconnaissance Units (PRU). A report by Capt B Palmer on the completion of his six months with the Montagnard Mobile Training Team is at Annex F.

11. WO1 EB Ostara, Senior PRU Advisor in Binh-Dinh Province, continues to achieve excellent results. In one month, his 73 man PRU captured 38 VC and killed one, without loss to themselves.

III Corps

12. IRP Training Wing. The third course, and final course for III Corps, for students of 5ARVN Div, graduated on 13 Dec 68. 24 students from 5 Div and 7 instructors from Van-Kiep NTC successfully completed the course. The overall standard was good.

13. During the operational phase of training, the IRPs had a number of contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (B C), 1 VC WIA and 4 suspects captured. One ARVN soldier was WIA.

14. RF Training. An AATTV Cadre of one captain and three WOs established itself at the 18 Div Trg School, at Heavyweight Camp near Nui-Dat, during November and began training on 1 Dec. A report by Capt R Guest, the Chief Instructor, is at Annex G. The problem of interpreters is still under examination.

15. PRU. Capt F Kudnig has been appointed the Chief of Training and Operations at the Special Activities Training Centre (SATC), which is the national PRU training centre, near Vung-Tau. His report is at Annex H. Capt Kudnig is well suited for this appointment and according to his superiors is achieving excellent results.

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IV Corps

16. Territorial Security. The Accelerated Pacification Campaign continues to be prosecuted vigorously. This has resulted in a general upgrading of territorial security throughout the Delta. VC activity has been mainly directed at attacking outposts with some harassment of provincial and district towns.

17. Advisory effort has continued to be placed on the necessity for conducting small unit operations to find and fix VC elements. This is necessary as it is seldom that VC units are concentrated at the present time. Efforts are being made to motivate friendly forces, particularly RF and PF, to adopt the Mobile Security Concept as demonstrated to the CGS and Commander AFV on 20 Dec 68. Progress in this area is slow. However, MACV has accepted the concept and expects to have it included in POI's for RF and PF Training Centers in the near future.

18. Revolutionary Development Cadre Training. The original team of WOs Munro and Chambers completed visits to all 24 teams in Phong Dinh Province during the month. There has been a general improvement in the implementation of the Mobile Security Concept. This has resulted in an improvement in the aggressiveness of the RD Teams in the hamlets. Actions indicating an improvement in this area are as follows:

- a. Team 20 successfully repulsed a VC platoon on 18 Dec whilst employing the tactic taught.
- b. Team 3 ambushed a VC squad. Results were 6 VC KIA and 1 VCC.
- c. There have been a number of Koi-Chanh reporting in to the teams.

19. One of the major problems areas has been the number of personnel present for duty compared with the authorized strength of the team. In some cases only 20 men out of the authorized 59 are available, the rest being illegally employed on other tasks. This matter has been reported to the Chief RDC Division and action is in progress to correct the anomaly.

20. The RD mobile training team has been augmented and split into two, as follows:

Team No 1 deployed in Chau-Doc

Team No 2 deployed in Kien-Giang.

Considerable interest has been shown in the work of the Australian MTTs with RD. Demonstrations of the mobile security concept have been put on for:

- a. All Province Chiefs and PSA in IV CTZ.
- b. Maj Gen Eckhardt, SA IV Corps
- c. CGS and COMAFV
- d. Maj Gen Wetherill, Asst to COMUSMACV.


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Administration

22. Australian Advisors Club, Danang. The Club, which was paid for and furnished by APOF, was opened by COMAFV on Sun 29 Dec 68. Guests included Lt Gen Lam and senior US and Vietnamese Officers. A government sponsored Australian concert party visited Australian House on the same day.

23. Health and morale continue to be good. WO2 J Elkins was evacuated to Australia for surgery to his knee.



(R.L. BURNARD)
Lt Col
Comd.

AATTV DEPLOYMENT
AS AT 20 DECEMBER 1968

Annex 'A' to
AATTV Monthly Report
for December 1968

Serial	Rank	Initials	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
<u>HQ AATTV (Saigon)</u>								
1	Lt Col	R.L.	Burnard	RA Inf	HQ AATTV	Commanding Officer	11 Feb 69	Saigon
2	Capt	D.G.	Bent	RA Inf	"	Adjutant	1 Oct 69	"
3	WO2	T.P.	Van Bakel	RAASC	"	Chief Clerk	1 Apr 69	"
4	WO2	S.P.	Wells	RAASC	"	Admin WO (Pay)	4 Mar 69	"
5	WO2	A.K.	Hunter	RAAC	Armoured School	Instructor	11 Mar 69	Thu-Duc (Near Saigon)

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Serial	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
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I CTZ

AATTV QUANG TRI (Quang-Tri Province)

6	: Maj	: D.R.	: Millie	: Aust Army Avn Corps	: Quang-Tri Sector	: S3	: 14 May 69	: Quang-Tri
7	: WO2	: J.	: Carrigan	: RAA	: Trieu-Phong Sub-Sector	: Assistant Advisor RF/PF	: 18 Nov 69	: Trieu-Phong
8	: WO2	: K.G.	: Chester	: RAASC	: Cam-Lo Sub-Sector	: Assistant Advisor	: 4 Mar 69	: Cam-Lo Town
9	: WO2	: W.L.	: Doanshaw	: RAAMC	: ARVN CCS	: Medical Advisor	: 23 Jul 69	: Quang-Tri
10	: WO2	: R.A.	: Purton	: RA Inf	: 1/1 ARVN Bn	: Assistant Advisor	: 19 Feb 69	: Quang-Tri Area
11	: WO2	: K.	: Gabriel	: RA Inf	: 2/1 ARVN Bn	: " "	: 2 Apr 69	: " "
12	: WO2	: R.M.	: King	: RA Inf	: 4/1 ARVN Bn	: " "	: 19 Feb 69	: " "
13	: WO2	: J.F.	: Barker	: RA Inf	: 1/2 ARVN Bn	: " "	: 21 Aug 69	: Gio Linh Area
14	: WO2	: V.	: Stack	: RA Inf	: 3/2 ARVN Bn	: " "	: 24 Sep 69	: " "
15	: WO2	: R.L.	: Robinson	: RA Inf	: 4/2 ARVN Bn	: " "	: 21 Aug 69	: " "
16	: WO2	: D.G.	: Hill	: RAA	: 11 Arty Bn	: " "	: 30 Apr 69	: Quang-Tri Area

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Serial	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
<u>I CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV HUE (Thua Thien Province)</u>								
17	Maj	M.	Norris	Aust Int Corps	Thua Thien Sector	Coordinator, Phoenix Programme	9 Apr 69	Hue
18	WO2	A.J.	Paxter	RAA	Nam-Hoa Sub-Sector	Assistant Advisor RF/PF	22 Apr 69	Nam-Hoa
19	WO2	C.	Ison	RA Inf	1 ARVN Div Recce Unit	Assistant Advksor	24 Sep 69	Hue
20	WO2	M.R.	Bolitho	RA Inf	Black Panther Coy	" "	18 Nov 69	"
21	WO1	E.W.	Gason	RAAC	1/7 ARVN Cav Regt	" "	21 May 69	PK 17
22	WO2	K.J.	Rowe	RAAC	2/7 ARVN Cav Regt	" "	1 Oct 69	PK 17
23	WO2	H.J.	Stuttart	RAAC	7 ARVN Cav Regt	" "	18 Nov 69	PK 17
24	WO2	M.	Kelly	RA Inf	2/3 ARVN Bn	" "	18 Jan 69	PK 17
25	WO2	J.R.	McRae	RA Inf	1/3 ARVN Bn	" "	21 Aug 69	PK 17
26	WO2	M.J.	Foster	RAASC	3/3 ARVN Bn	" "	11 Feb 69	Hue
27	WO2	S.C.	Colley	RA Inf	54 Regt	" "	11 Mar 69	Hue
28	WO2	N.	Brown	RAAMC	ARVN CCS	" "	30 Sep 69	Hue

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Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
<u>AATTV DANANG (Quang-Nam Province)</u>								
29	Maj	I.G.	Porteous	RA Inf	HQ I ARVN Corps Tactical Zone	G-3 (Trg) Advisor	4 Mar 69	Danang
30	Capt	C.J.	Spencer	RAE	" " "	G-3 (Ops)	8 May 69	"
31	WO1	S.L.	Arblaster	RAASC	AATTV Danang	Admin WO	21 May 69	Aust House Danang
32	WO2	D.B.	Phillips	RAASC	AATTV Danang	Admin WO	9 Apr 69	" " "
33	WO2	K.T.	Vincent	RAE	Hoa-Vang Sub-Sector HQ	Assistant Advisor RF/PF	8 Apr 69	Hoa-Vang
34	WO2	B.	Taylor	RAAOC	59 RF Bn	Assistant Advisor	23 Jul 69	Hoi-An
35	WO2	M.T.	Jensen	RA Inf	21st Ranger Bn	" "	18 Nov 69	"
36	WO1	J.N.	Harrower	RAAC	2/4 ARVN Cav Regt	Staff Advisor	9 Apr 69	Danang
37	WO2	T.F.	Malone	RAAC	" " " "	Assistant Advisor	23 Jul 69	Hoi-An
38	WO2	C.F.	Keioskie	RAASC	2/51 ARVN Bn	" "	23 Jul 69	Danang
39	WO2	E.H.	Lartin	RA Inf	1/51 ARVN Bn	" "	18 Nov 69	Quang-Nam
40	WO2	R.A.	Parker	RAA	30 Arty Bn	" "	18 Nov 69	"

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Serial	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
<u>AATTV QUANG NGAI (Quang-Tin and Quang-Ngai Provinces)</u>								
41	Capt	G.	Dennis	RA Inf	1/5 ARVN Bn	Senior Advisor	5 Nov 69	Tam-Ky
42	WO2	G.C.	Neitz	RA Inf	1/6 ARVN Bn	Assistant Advisor	21 Aug 69	Quang-Ngai
43	WO1	E.J.	Morrison	RA Inf	2/6 ARVN Bn	" "	17 Dec 69	Tam-Ky
44	WO2	W.S.	Dickey	RA Inf	4/5 ARVN Bn	" "	23 Jul 69	"
45	WO1	R.J.	O'Brien	RAE	2/5 ARVN Bn	" "	5 Feb 69	Quang-Ngai
46	WO2	G.Y.	Jamieson	RA Inf	3/5 ARVN Bn	" "	4 Jun 69	Tam-Ky
47	WO2	M.J.	Poole	RA Inf	1/4 ARVN Bn	" "	18 Nov 69	"
48	WO2	D.	Truelove	RA Inf	4/4 ARVN Bn	" "	24 Sep 69	Quang-Ngai

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Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
<u>II CTZ</u> <u>AATTV PLEIKU</u>								
49	Capt	D.	Rothwell	RA Inf	2nd Mobile Strike Force Command Det B-20, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)	Company Commander	27 May 69	Pleiku (Base Camp)
50	Capt	D.C.	Savage	RA Inf	" " " "	S2	15 Aug 69	" "
51	Capt	J.	Bourke	RA Inf	" " " "	Company Commander	18 Jun 69	" "
52	WO2	A.G.	Urquhart	RA Inf	" " " "	" "	5 Sep 69	" "
53	WO2	L.A.	Kapp	RA Inf	" " " "	Pl Comd	16 Mar 69	" "
54	WO2	R.L.	Wier	RA Inf	" " " "	Trg Officer	1 Apr 69	" "
55	WO2	R.D.	Aylett	RA Inf	" " " "	Pl Comd	17 Dec 69	" "
56	WO2	K.C.	Latham	RA Inf	" " " "	" "	17 Dec 69	" "
57	WO2	P.D.	Wilkes	RA Inf	" " " "	" "	4 Jun 69	" "
58	WO2	G.E.	Francis	RA Inf	" " " "	" "	21 May 69	" "
59	WO2	I.J.	Jewell	RA Inf	" " " "	" "	23 Jun 69	" "
60	WO2	L.	Jackson	RA Inf	" " " "	" "	23 Jun 69	" "
61	WO2	J.R.	Stewart	RA Inf	" " " "	" "	21 Aug 69	" "
62	WO2	D.	Tolley	RA Inf	" " " "	" "	23 Jun 69	" "
63	WO2	G.T.	Smith	RA Inf	" " " "	" "	23 Jun 69	" "
64	WO2	R.S.	Simpson	RA Inf	" " " "	" "	20 Jul 69	

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Serial	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
<u>AATTV PHU TRANG</u>								
65	Capt	JED	White	RA Inf	HQ 5SFG	Assistant S3	19 Feb 69	Nha-Trang
66	WO2	F.G.	Lucas	RA Inf	Recondo School 5 SFG (A)	Instructor	19 Feb 69	"
67	WO2	B.C.	Erberson	RAA	Artillery School	Instructor	5 Feb 69	"
68	WO1	E.B.	Ostara	RA Inf	CSD, Province Recce Unit	Advisor Binh Dinh Province	29 Aug 69	Qui-Nhon
69	WO2	J.S.	Allan	RA Inf	" " " "	Mobile Training Team	11 Mar 69	II CTZ

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Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
<u>III CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV BARIA (Phuoc Tuy Province)</u>								
70	: WO2	: A.C.	: Phillips	: RAAOC	: RF/PF Phuoc-Tuy	: Assistant Advisor	: 5 Feb 69	: Hoa-Long
71	: WO2	: A.	: Shepherd	: RAASC	: A and L Coy	: " "	: 3 Mar 69	: Baria
72	: WO2	: T.J.	: Colbert	: RAE	: RF/PF	: " "	: 14 Dec 69	: "
73	: Capt	: RCM	: Hinde	: RA Inf	: LRRP Wing Van-Kiep National Training Centre	: CI LRRP Wing	: 4 Jun 69	: "
74	: WO2	: K.J.	: Mitchell	: RA Inf	: " "	: Instructor LRRP Wing	: 30 Apr 69	: "
75	: WO2	: J.G.	: Lettitt	: RA Inf	: " "	: " " "	: 21 May 69	: "
76	: WO2	: J.M.	: Grafton	: RA Inf	: " "	: " " "	: 30 Apr 69	: "
77	: WO2	: I.C.	: Lever	: RA Svy	: " "	: Admin WO	: 15 Mar 69	: "
78	: Capt	: F.	: Kudnig	: RA Inf	: PRU Training Centre	: Attached	: 25 Jun 69	: Near Vung-Tau
79	: Capt	: R.L.	: Guest	: RA Inf	: AATTV Cadre att 1ATF	: Chief Instructor	: 6 Aug 69	: 18 Div Trg School near Nui-Dat
80	: WO2	: R.G.	: Carter	: RA Inf	: " " " "	: Instructor	: 21 Aug 69	: " " "
81	: WO2	: E.W.	: Snelling	: RA Inf	: " " " "	: "	: 23 Jul 69	: " " "
82	: WO2	: J.D.	: Frost	: RA Inf	: " " " "	: "	: 21 Aug 69	: " " "

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Serial	Rank	Units	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Date RTA	Location
<u>A.I.F.V. IV CORPS AREA</u>								
83	Maj	G.	Templeton (attached from HQ AFV)	RAAC	CORDS, IV Corps	Assistant to Chief of Territorial Security	7 May 69	Can-Tho
84	WO2	C.S.	Horne	RA Inf	RF	Advisor	18 Nov 69	Kien-Hoa Province
85	WO2	M.B.	Cranston	RA Sigs	RF	"	5 Feb 69	Vinh-Binh Province
86	WO1	J.W.	Mann	RA Inf	RF	"	18 Nov 69	Kien-Hoa "
87	WO2	G.h.	Witchard	RAE	RF	"	23 Dec 68	Vinh-Binh "
88	WO2	C.A.	Chambers	RA Inf	RD Cadre Trg	Instructor	19 Feb 69	Can-Tho "
89	WO2	K.	Forden	RA Inf	RF	"	30 Sep 69	Vinh-Binh "
90	WO2	W.J.	Grogan	RAEME	RF	"	23 Aug 69	" "
91	WO2	C.E.	Munro	RA Sigs	RD Cadre Trg	Instructor	23 Jul 69	Can-Tho "
92	WO2	B.R.	Rule	RA Inf	CSD Province Reconnaissance Unit	Advisor	30 Apr 69	Sadec Province
93	WO2	E.P.	Grube	RAAMC	ARVN CCS	Advisor	17 Dec 69	Can-Tho "
94	WO2	A.A.	Welsh	RAE	RD Cadre Trg	Instructor	17 Dec 69	Can-Tho "
95	WO2	H.A.	Patch	RA Inf	RD Cadre Trg	Instructor	23 July 69	Can-Tho "
96	WO2	J.L.	Hyland	RA Inf	RF	Advisor	28 May 69	Vinh-Binh

AFTER ACTION REPORT
3/1 ARVN BN - 102 E.M. SKILLING

NAME -

DATES Nov 16 to continuing (1 Departed 27/11/68)

OTHER UNITS 1/5 Mech Div (1/61 Mech Bn)

SP ARVN Arty APCs (US)

AREA East of Quang-Tri City.

MSM To secure area for road building in conjunction with Sector RD Programme.

EXEC Patrolling by day, & day & night ambushes & raids.

CONTACTS

17 0930	1 VC KIA, 3 PW, 2 weapons captured
18 0400	2 VC KIA
18 2200	4 VC KIA, 1 PW, 4 weapons captured.
22 0600	1 VC KIA
23 0100	2 VC PW
24 2000	2 VC KIA, 3 weapons captured, 10 grenades, 30m Det Cord, 2000 rds AK Ammo.

Note. All contacts were very small clashes. A four day cordon & search, with 1 Coy 3/1 Bn & 1 Coy APC 1/61 Mech was made with negative results. The area of this was approx 10,000m North of our TAO at COA VIM.

Friendly Casualties

3 WIA by mine 24 0700

VC Weapon & Equipment captured

1 x AK 47, 2 x M16, 2 x K43, 1 x M1 Carbine,
2 x GRC, 1 French Mat 49 Sng.
10 Gren (Chicom), 30m Det Cord, 2000 AK ammo.

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COMMENTS

Co-Ord. Was much improved when considered with previous operation of this type, mainly because of frequent visits by 1/61 Mech Bn S3 & his making available a liason NCO who stayed with us. One occasion still arose where a company of US marines were in our TACR. The TACR of ours belonged to 1/61 Mech Bn (half) & 3rd Mar Div (half).

3/1 ARVN Bn. Since I am leaving this unit I will make the following comments on it.

1. Command at Bn & Coy Level

Good throughout.

2. Operational Capabilities

Having had much experience in Airmobile, mounted & foot operations this Bn has always been efficient & aggressive.

3. Generally

Although some of the techniques used were not as we would have them, the end result was quite professional with little fuss & bother.

The main thing that impressed me was the thoughtfulness of officers toward their men, although discipline, when required, was swift & some fines harsh.

The individual soldiers impressed me as being good within their own system & on no occasion did I see anything to detract from this impression.

DN SMELLING
WO2
AATTV.

27722 W02 C. ISON
Recon. Coy 1 ARVN Div
HUE.

OPERATION 20 kilometres West of HUE
Joint Op. with 3/3 Recon. Coy Indep.

RESULTS 3 VC KIA, 1 Chieu-Hoi
Captured: 2 75mm R/Rifles
2 12.7 A/A Barrels
66 CKC Rifles
1 AK 47
4 75mm Rockets
5000 Rds of 12.7
10,000 rds of CKC.

30 huts destroyed & 36 bunkers located 2 VC Bns K9, K10.

FRIENDLY 1 WIA.

OPERATION NAM-HOA 30 kilometres Sth of HUE
Joint Op. with 1 Bn 101st. 1 Bn 3Regt. Recon Coy

RESULTS NIL

Received 60mm mortar rounds 2 days running. No casualties extracted for job in DMZ.

OPERATION In DMZ to capture prisoners.

RESULTS 5 VC KIA
1 VC captured

Weapons captured: 1 LMG
2 AK 47

FRIENDLY 2 WIA

Indep. Op. 1 Coy from 2/2 in support on edge of DMZ.

Dressed two ten men teams in complete VC uniforms and weapons are crossed into the DMZ at 2400 hrs. Remained for two days, out at 0500 hrs on second day. Debriefed and another two teams took over, still no result.

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The first two teams re-entered and at 0900 hrs attacked a squad who was waiting in ambush killing 5 and capturing one and retreated back to our border with a Coy of VC following. Artillery called, ARVN reported 25 VC killed but unconfirmed by us. This op. was to prove that the VC were crossing into the Southern half of the DMZ and find out what was happening on the other side. We found out the locations of a Regt and another Bn. The VC Coy was sent into the DMZ to investigate our teams in there.

OPERATION PHU THU 15,000 mms East of Hue.
Indep Op.

RESULTS 4 VC KIA
2 Pistols captured
60 bags of rice destroyed.

Three teams dressed in VC clothing (15 men) and VC weapons sent into separate areas to contact VC. They were armed with the knowledge of names of local VC cadre men and documents captured in this area. They were supposed to infiltrate into the local VC structure and join them finding out arms caches, infiltration routes and names of other local VC and when ready attack we supported them with our own coy, HQ and 1 pl held back 1000 metres outside the areas plus we had one coy from the 54th Regt as a reaction coy 4000 metres away.

We dressed our group and moved them at night under canopied trucks to the area then sent our three teams in. However on entering one team was fired on by the VC but they did not return the fire. At approx 0900 hrs the next morning they contacted 20 VC who sent 2 men forward to our team and wanted to know who they were. After producing documents and giving them some information that we got from a Chieu Hoi from that area they shook hands with our group. The other 18 VC held back, then the 2 VC with our team asked them to lay down their weapons, the team leader decided since the other group didn't come forward not to take the risk so shot and killed the 2 VC with them, who were both armed with a pistols, and attacked the other group of VC who fled. This now compromised the whole operation so we decided to go in in force killing two more VC. It nearly came off and we were all highly disappointed but from now on all VC will be very suspicious of each other if that means anything. More planning was needed.

We are now being used as a recon coy should be as before we were only being used as an Inf. Coy. After approaching Div HQ on several occasions we have got them thinking our way and with our limited success should be used more often in this role. We are at present on another interesting operation but as it is not yet completed.

C. LSON
WO2
AATTV

Here is the handout:

FRONT

<u>AMMO</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>
Small arms ammo-per/rd up to 50 rd	5\$VN	10\$VN
Small arms ammo-per/lot (more than 50 rd)	50\$VN	500\$VN
Mortar ammo, 60mm/81/82mm	300\$VN	1000\$VN
Artillery ammo	500\$VN	3000\$VN
Recoilless rifle, ammo	500\$VN	3000\$VN

WEAPONS

Hand grenade or rifle grenade	500\$VN	750\$VN
Pistol	500\$VN	1000\$VN
Rifle, semi, auto or bolt action	1000\$VN	1000\$VN
Rifle, auto	1500\$VN	2000\$VN
Submachinegun	2000\$VN	2000\$VN
M-79 grenade launcher	2000\$VN	4500\$VN
Machinegun 30 cal or 50 cal	5000\$VN	8000\$VN
Mortar 60mm/81mm/82mm	5000\$VN	10000\$VN
Recoilless rifle, 57mm/75mm/82mm	5000\$VN	10000\$VN
Artillery piece, less than 100mm	15000\$VN	25000\$VN
Artillery piece, or mortar over 100mm	20000\$VN	50000\$VN
Rockets, 122mm and 140mm or larger	20000\$VN	65000\$VN

MINES OR BOOBY TRAPS

Mines or booby traps	500\$VN	2000\$VN
If a mine or booby trap is reported which has been set for explosion by the enemy	2500\$VN	10000\$VN

In addition to rewards above, up to 100,000\$VN will be paid for information that results in the capture or destruction of artillery or 120mm/140mm rockets in position for firing. As much as 100,000\$VN will also be paid for reporting information which results in capture or destruction of enemy troop base areas, communication sites and logistic storage areas.

BACK

COMMUNICATIONS OR ELECTRONICS
EQUIPMENT

Equipment in working or repairable condition	500\$VN	2000\$VN
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INFORMATION

Information which results in the killing or capturing of VC/NVA troops:

Less than a squad	1000\$VN	2000\$VN
Squad size unit	2000\$VN	4000\$VN

Platoon size unit	4000\$VN	6000\$VN
Company size unit	6000\$VN	8000\$VN
Battalion size unit	8000\$VN	10000\$VN

Information which leads to the capture alive of VC infrastructure:

Individual members	1000\$VN	2000\$VN
Hamlet leaders	2000\$VN	5000\$VN
Village leaders	5000\$VN	8000\$VN
District leaders	8000\$VN	10000\$VN
Information on enemy infiltration activities	2000\$VN	4000\$VN
Information on sapper activities	3000\$VN	5000\$VN
Information on enemy troop movement activities	2000\$VN	4000\$VN
Information on imminent attacks on U.S., RVNAF or other FVMAF bases	8000\$VN	10000\$VN
Information on location of PWs and PW camps	9000\$VN	10000\$VN

For information which leads to the successful recovery of PWs, special amounts in excess of 10,000\$VN will be paid. Amount will be determined by the Commanding General.

Vietnamese will not be required to sign receipts in return for funds. Only civilians will be rewarded. The minimum amount authorized should be paid for each item unless there is a specific reason to pay more. Under no circumstances may more than 10,000\$VN be paid to any one person in any one transaction without the prior approval of the payment by the VIP Custodian, 3d Marine Division (G-2).

Annex E to AATTU
Report Dec 68

PENDIX I (POI) to 5th SFGA Reg 612-2

PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION

MISSION: To train selected United States Army Special Forces personnel the special combat skills required for duty in the Republic of Vietnam and to prepare these individuals to deal effectively as counterparts to the Vietnamese Special Forces in their conduct of counter guerrilla warfare and pacification programs.

PURPOSE: To prescribe the curriculum to be presented.

DETAIL: ANNEXES A thru N (Scope of Instruction). The following general categories of instruction are to be presented:

<u>BLOCK</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
100	Administration	13.5
200	Physical Training	8.5
300	General Map Reading	13.5
400	Medical Techniques	3.0
500	Communication	3.0
600	Combat Intelligence	3.0
700	Patrol Training	7.25
800	Weapons Training	11.0
900	FAC Procedures	3.0
1000	Combat Operation	40.0
1100	Examination and Critique	4.0
1400	USASF Detachment "A"	2.0
1500	Counterpart Relationship	2.0
1600	Advisor to Irregular Forces	2.0
Recapitulation:		
	Academic	62.25
	Combat	40.0
	Admin	<u>13.5</u>
	TOTAL	115.75

ADMINISTRATIVE: Upon arrival students will be billeted at the Replacement Detachment MACV Recondo School compound. Prior to starting the Combat Orientation Course students will be inprocessed, receive assignments and be able to depart Replacement Detachment upon completion of course. Students who are able to inprocess by 1000 hours on Monday of academic classes conducted on Hon Tre Island will be allowed to continue instruction.

4 Annexes
as

ANNEX A (Administration) to Tng Dir 1

BLOCK	SUBJECT	HOURS	TYPE	SCOPE OF INSTRUCTION	REFERENCE
101	Class Opening	1.0	L, C	Address by representative of school commandant. Briefing of goals, policies, and facilities.	TD1
102	Equipment Issue and Turn-In	4.0	L	Issue all Equipment, maintenance, and turn-in.	SOP
103	Troop Movement	3.0		Movement of students to and from training areas outside school compound.	SOP
104	Staff Briefings	5.5	L	Briefings by all staff sections - S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, Chaplain, Engineer, and Funds Officer.	Instructors Notes
		<u>13.5</u>			

ANNEX B (Physical Training) to Tng Dir 1

BLOCK	SUBJECT	HOURS	TYPE	SCOPE OF INSTRUCTION	REFERENCE
201	Physical Training	8.5	D,PE	Army Drill #1. Begin with eight repetitions, increase one each day. Two mile run each day for five days or supplemented by road march carrying 30 pound rucksack.	TM 21-200
		<u>8.5</u>			

ANNEX C (Map Reading) to Tng Dir 1

BLOCK	SUBJECT	HOURS	TYPE	SCOPE OF INSTRUCTION	REFERENCE
301	Introduction to Map Reading	0.5	L, C	Marginal information, map colors, topographic symbols, and types of maps.	FM 21-26
303	UTM and Military Grid Reference System.	1.5	L, C	Definition and description of UTM system; use of UTM grid zone designation; 100,000 meter square description and identification; reading of coordinates to nearest 10 meters.	FM 21-26
304	Scale and Distance Use of Protractor.	1.0	L, C	Graphic scales, representative fraction, how to measure distance on a map, use of a protractor.	FM 21-26
305	Elevation, Relief, and Profile	2.0	L, C	Contour lines, types of slopes, terrain features, and construction of profiles.	FM 21-26
306	Direction	0.5	L, C	Base line, azimuth, and back azimuth, declination diagram.	FM 21-26
307	Map Orientation	0.5	L, C	Familiarization with lensatic compass; orientation of map, with and without use of a compass.	FM 21-26
308	Intersection and Resection	1.0	L, C	Determination of azimuths and back azimuths; location of points of intersection and resection.	FM 21-26

ANNEX C (Map Reading) to Tng Dir 1

BLOCK	SUBJECT	HOURS	TYPE	SCOPE OF INSTRUCTION	REFERENCE
309	Overlay Techniques	0.5	L, C	Military symbols, methods of over- lays, and organization and prepara- tion.	FM 21-26, FM 101-5
311	Determining Directions Using Field Expedients	0.5	L, C	Shadow tip method of determining directions and times; direction at night; and direction using a watch.	FM 21-26
313	Compass Course	4.5	PE	Familiarize the individual with prac- tical use of compass and movement using the compass.	FM 21-26
314	Principles of Day and Night Navigation	1.0	L, C	Practical exercise requiring appli- cation of previously learned land navigation principles during daylight.	FM 21-26
		<u>13.5</u>			

ANNEX D (Medical Techniques) to Tng Dir 1

BLOCK	SUBJECT	HOURS	TYPE	SCOPE OF INSTRUCTION	REFERENCE
401	Special Medical Drugs	0.5	L, C	Teach the Student how to recognize and properly administer the special drugs which may be used by reconnaissance teams.	CURRENT MEDICAL DRUGS - Civ Pub
402	Life Saving Steps and Albumin Blood Unit	1.5	L, C, D	A detailed explanation of steps to be used to treat combat casualties in all situations and to teach the use of the albumin expander unit.	FM 21-11, FM 8-30, TM 27-11
404	Common Emergencies	0.5	L, C	Teach the student how to avoid and to treat common emergencies and to treat emergencies encountered in the field; e.g., snake bites, heat exhaustion, blisters, foreign objects in the eyes, ears or nose, etc., and burns.	FM 21-11, TM 27-11
405	War Wounds	0.5	L, C	Teach the student how to treat special type war wounds; e.g., chest wounds, head wounds and stomach wounds.	FM 21-11
		<u>3.0</u>			

ANNEX E (Communications) to Tng Dir 1

BLOCK	SUBJECT	HOURS	TYPE	SCOPE OF INSTRUCTION	REFERENCE
501	Radio Set AN/PRC-25 HT-1, and URC-10	2.0	L, C	Teach the characteristics, capabilities, operation, maintenance, advantages, and disadvantages of these three radios.	TM 11-5820-393-12, Inst Manual for Transceiver HT-1
503	Emergency Signal Devices and Constructions of Field Expedient Antennas	0.5	L, C D	Teach the student the techniques and use of the following signaling devices; Mirror, panel, strobe light, pen gun flare, and smoke. Require each student team to construct a field expedient antenna.	FM 23-30, FM 31-20, FM 31-21
505	Communications Procedures	0.5	L, C	Explain proper RTO procedures and the reasons for standard operating procedures.	FM 24-1, FM 24-18
		<u>3.0</u>			

ANNEX F (Combat Intelligence) to Tng Dir 1

BLOCK	SUBJECT	HOURS	TYPE	SCOPE OF INSTRUCTION	REFERENCE
601	Combat Intelligence	1.0	L, C	An introduction to the basic principles of intelligence - what to look for, sources of information, and methods of reporting.	FM 30-5, FM 30-7
602	VC Tactics	1.0	L, C	The students are taught basic VC tactics, methods of conducting ambushes, early warning systems, and methods used in marking mines and booby traps.	Handbook for US Forces in Vietnam
605	Handling of POW, Captured Documents and Equipment	1.0	L, C PE	Instruction in handling of POW, captured documents, and equipment. Also includes demonstration on searching a POW.	FM 19-40, FM 21-75 FM 30-7
		<u>3.0</u>			

ANNEX G (Patrolling) to Tng Dir 1

BLOCK	SUBJECT	HOURS	TYPE	SCOPE OF INSTRUCTION	REFERENCE
702	Patrol Equipment	0.5	C, D, PE	Explain and demonstrate the standard MACV Recondo patrol equipment recommended for recon School SOP work. Demonstrate the modifications and standard procedures for effective noise discipline, comfort, and accessibility.	
704	Patrol Techniques and Patrol Tips	2.0	L, C	Teaches the students special selected FM 21-50, patrol tips, techniques, and lessons learned for conduct of long range and local recon.	FM 21-75 FM 31-18
706	Evasion and Escape	0.5	L, C	Teaches the students the principles of escape and evasion, and how to plan for recon operations.	FM 21-75, FM 21-77 FM 30-7 FM 31-20
707	Patrol Preparation	1.0	L, C	Instruction in all phases of planning and preparation, utilizing troop leading procedures for a recon patrol from the time the warning order is issued until infiltration. Each patrol member's duties are explained and the patrol briefback is taught.	MATA Handbook, FM 7-20, FM 21-75
712	Ambushes	1.0	L, C	Teaches the student when and how to employ different types of ambushes.	FM 21-75
713	Immediate Action Drills	1.0	L, C	Trains the student in the actions to be taken when contact is made with the enemy.	FM 21-75
714	McGuire Rig	1.0	L, C, D	Familiarizes the student with techniques, principle usage and application of McGuire Rig.	

ANNEX C (Part II) to Tng Dir 1 (Cont'd)

BLOCK	SUBJECT	HOURS	TYPE	SCOPE OF INSTRUCTION	REFERENCE
715	C&C Brief	.25	L, C	Familiarize selected personnel in the concepts of C&C.	Instructor's Notes
		<u>7.25</u>			

NNEX H (Weapons Training) to Tng Dir 1

LOCK	SUBJECT	HOURS	TYPE	SCOPE OF INSTRUCTION	REFERENCE
01	Weapons Firing	6.0	L, C, PE	Each student zeros his individual weapon and fires the M-79, M1 rifle, carbine, BAR, SMG, and 81 mm mortar. (MZ HYBL & MG)	FM 23-12, FM 23-71
02	Mines and Booby Traps and VC Expedient Booby Traps	3.0	L, C, PE	Explains the installation and removal of booby traps and mines. A practical exercise of installing booby traps is conducted. Explanation of more common field expedient booby traps used by the VC.	FM 5-25, FM 5-31, FM 30-32, FM 21-50, FM 31-20, FM 31-20A(S)
03	FO Procedures and Artillery Adjustment	2.0	L, C, PE	Teaches the students the basic principles of artillery fire adjustment and FO procedures. Includes one hour of practical application.	FM 6-135, FM 6-140, Artillery & Missile School, Ft Sill, Ok

11.0

ANNEX I (FAC Procedures) to Tng Dir 1

BLOCK	SUBJECT	HOURS	TYPE	SCOPE OF INSTRUCTION	REFERENCE
906	Forward Air Control Procedures	3.0	L, C, PE	Teaches students the sources, availability, and coordination agencies for close air support; types of ordnance available for immediate air strikes. Also, what information is required and how to communicate with the FAC. A practical exercise is conducted with FAC being directed by each student team.	Taught by Air Force Officer
		<u>3.0</u>			

ANNEX J (Combat Operation) to Tng Dir 1

BLOCK	SUBJECT	HOURS	TYPE	SCOPE OF INSTRUCTION	REFERENCE
1000	Combat Operation	40.0	L, C, PE	This block initiates with an actual warning order and requires the student to go through the entire process in the conduct of a successful operation. The students remain in the field approximately two full days on an actual operation. Every team has a faculty advisor who evaluates the students on all phases of their performance.	MACV Recondo School SOP
		<u>40.0</u>			

ANNEX K (Examination and Critique) to Tng Dir 1

BLOCK	SUBJECT	HOURS	TYPE	SCOPE OF INSTRUCTION	REFERENCE
1101	Final Map Exam	1.0	PE	This exam is given after 9 hours of basic map reading instruction to evaluate the class and determine their level of learning.	FM 21-26
1102	Final General Subjects Exam	1.0	PE	General subjects other than map reading.	All previous instruction
1103	Review of Final Exam and Critique of Course	2.0	C	To answer questions and insure material is known before departure. Allow for Critique of methods and technique of training.	All previous instruction
		<u>4.0</u>			

ANNEX L (USAF Detachment "A") to Tng Dir 1

BLOCK	SUBJECT	HOURS	TYPE	SCOPE OF INSTRUCTION	REFERENCE
1401	USASF Detachment "A"	2.0	L, C	Organization of Detachment "A" and duties performed; cross training; mission in Vietnam; organization of camp, problems with maintenance and defense.	
		2.0			

ANNEX M (Counterpart Relationship) to Tng Dir 1

BLOCK	SUBJECT	HOURS	TYPE	SCOPE OF INSTRUCTION	REFERENCE
1501	Counterpart Relationship	1.0	L, C	Talk by Vietnamese Camp Commander	Instructors Notes
1502	Counterpart Relationship	1.0	L, C PE	Orientation by USASF Detachment Commander, Practical application of planning and execution of daily activities.	Detachment Commander's Handbook
		<u>2.0</u>			

ANNEX N (Advisor to Irregular Forces) (Cont'd)

BLOCK	SUBJECT	HOURS	TYPE	SCOPE OF INSTRUCTION	REFERENCE
1601	Advisor to Irregular Forces	2.0	L, C	Types of trade, lessons learned and techniques in advising Irregular Forces.	Lesson Learned Handbook Vietnam
		<u>2.0</u>			

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Annex F. to AATTV
Report: Dec 68

12 December 1968

MEMO TO : C/ECO/J

INFO : C/SAIC
ROIC, Region II
C/MPH/MTT
CO/AATTV

SUBJECT : Montagnard PRUs

AIM

1. The aim of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of the Montagnard PRUs and to make recommendations for changes which, in the writer's opinion, would improve the efficiency of these units. It is not a comparative study. An attempt should be made to use this paper as a basis for comparison with PRUs of other ethnic groups. However some of the comments and recommendations will apply equally well to all PRUs.

SCOPE

2. The reader should keep in mind that the data base for the statements is limited to the experience of the writer as C/MPH/MTT. This covers the six months period from July to December 68 and training and operational experience in the following provinces: Kontum, Pleiku, Phu Yen, Darlac, Tuyen Duc, Quang Duc, and Lam Dong. There is a further limitation in that the tribal groups which have been met include only, Radeh, Jarai, Kaho, Benhar, Stieng, Slieng and a few Chieu.

3. The scope of the paper will cover command, control, organization, administration, equipment, training, coordination with other agencies, and factors limiting the development of full effectiveness. Although each of these will be treated separately, there is of course a considerable degree of overlapping and interaction.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

4. There can be no doubt whatever that the greatest single factor influencing any PRU is the degree of competence, integrity, experience, intelligence, patience and zeal of the advisor. The greatest care must be taken in the selection, recruitment and training of these men. Since

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they are operating in a relatively independent role, their integrity must be beyond question. This integrity should extend to critical self appraisal and honest reporting. There is always a tendency to gloss over the bad points and high light the good points of one's own operations. This of course misleads the next echelon of command and is an insidious eroder of combat efficiency, as one eventually comes to believe one's own self deception. The adviser must be ruthlessly honest in his post action analyses. Many an operation succeeds more by good luck than by good management. The temptation is to ignore the mistakes and mismanagement and be satisfied with the success. It takes a special type of integrity and self discipline to overcome this temptation. The best way of improving a unit's efficiency is the after action critique. The adviser should hold a critique after every action. He and his team leaders should point out to all the men their mistakes and omissions. The men should be encouraged to ask questions and explain their actions. This sort of frank discussion will benefit all. We are said to learn by our mistakes, but to learn from them one must recognize them.

5. The good adviser exercises patience in dealing with his men and the local authorities. He uses his experience and personal competence to improve his unit. He must be energetic and enthusiastic. It goes without saying that he must accompany his men on operations as often as possible.

6. It is recommended that the term "adviser" be dropped. The title should be "Commander". At the same time no effort should be spared to train and develop promising indigenous leaders. It is a fallacy though, to call one the chief when he is in no way fitted for the task, and assume only the smallest portion of a commander duties. It is a rare Montagnard who is capable of really commanding his men. The positions of chief or deputy chief should only be filled by an outstanding individual.

7. There are still Province Chiefs who believe that they "command" the PRU. They must be made to understand that their function is one of coordination and support not command. While it is perfectly reasonable for the Province Chief to desire full information on the activities of the PRU in order to coordinate them with other activities, it is not reasonable for them to veto or obstruct or forbid PRU operations for no better reason than that he does not want to disturb the VCI.

8. Control of the PRU adviser should be exercised through the SCR in each province. If there is no SCR then

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the RDC/P officer should be in control. The "O" officer's duties and training in no way fit him for control of the PRU. And PRU operations have no connection whatsoever with the RD program. The only field in which the RDC/O is fitted to be of assistance to the PRU is through his possession of the equipment and personnel for handling stores and supplies.

ADMINISTRATION

9. It is recommended that the PRU pay scale be reviewed and increased. The Montagnard is not subject to drafting. He is not therefore influenced in this way to join the PRU. He can earn better money by serving in CIDG.

10. Selection of personnel for employment in PRU should be based on the following criteria in order of preference.

- a. Previous military experience;
- b. Maturity;
- c. Education;
- d. His value through friends and relatives as a potential intel source.

11. Each PRU should be permitted to employ an interpreter and a clerk or clerks depending on the size of the unit.

12. The RDC/O has the facilities to receive and handle and store equipment, clothing, weapons and ammunitions for the PRU in the same way he does for the other agencies. This should be his only connection with the PRU.

ORGANIZATION

13. The organization should be modified to provide for a separate unit leader for each 18 man unit. We do not expect an American platoon leader to command his platoon and a squad at the same time and it is wrong to expect it of indigenous personnel. This would not greatly increase the number of personnel if at the same time the positions of chief and deputy chief were eliminated as recommended in para 6.

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MAXIMUMS

14. The following changes to the equipment table are proposed. Reasons for the changes are given in Annex A.

- a. Uniforms. Heavy duty "Tiger" camouflage fatigues should be issued instead of the present flimsy "Leopard" type. Combat socks should be issued in the highlands.
- b. Boots. Standard US jungle boots should be issued in lieu of the canvas "Bata" boots.
- c. Weapons. The M1D sniper rifle should be replaced by the M24 with the telescope as the sniper weapon, and Starlight scopes should be held at Region to be available on call at short notice.
- d. Communications. CTC 15 sets should be authorized on a basis of 1 per 18 man unit plus one for backup or relay. At 1 radios or an equivalent set should be issued on the basis of 3 per 18 man unit with a max of 6 for PRU up to 4 x 18 man units, and 9 for PRU with more than 4 x 18 man units.

COOPERATION WITH OTHER PROGRAMS

15. For PRU advisor should try to achieve the closest possible link with all concerned agencies, in particular the Phoenix Program. In addition to the obvious link with the Phoenix Program, close cooperation with SOG, SOG/P, 730, 731 and the Military SSG retains handsome dividends. The man who tries to "go it alone" or relies on only one of these agencies is like a man walking around with his ears closed and his nose plugged. He sees things but his vision lacks depth perception and perspective. He has a sense of hearing but he is not using it. The advisor must exploit to the full every possible source. The more contacts on these agencies the better will be their results each time.

ADVISOR QUALITY AND ETHICAL STANDARDS

16. Where it exists, incompetence, inexperience or lack of enthusiasm in the advisor is the most limiting factor. However, the quality of the new group of advisors reflects the care which is now being put into selecting these men. There has been a distinct improvement in the

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quality of the advisors. I consider that the continued and intensified exercise of the greatest possible care in the selection and training of the advisors is the most potent influence that the Saigon Egs Staff can exert. It is far more important than the efforts of the Training Staff. Some suggestions on advisors are set out in Annex B.

17. Given good advisors the most common limitation is in the poor quality or lack of a system of display of the intel gathered by the various agencies. The Phoenix/Long Young Committees must be more action oriented. Since their prime task is "Planning of the Infrastructure" they must develop a system solely directed to the production, accumulation and "DISPLAY" of data useful to the action arms. If they fail to do this then they have no reason to exist. The mere amassing of reports in neatly kept filing systems and card indexes, the compiling of statistics is of no use whatever. The material must be compiled in a form that provides the action arm with the information they need to act on, and that it must be given to the appropriate action arm. In general the Phoenix Programs seem to be good at collecting the intel but bad at displaying the intel in a useful way and even worse when it comes to disseminating the prepared material to the action arms. Some detailed criticisms and suggestions are in Annex C.

18. The most limiting factor is lack of support and sometimes actual obstruction on the part of Vietnamese authorities and PSAs. It is pleasing to note that in this matter things are improving.

19. Part of the standard of training of the PSAs themselves. The most difficult part of the training is to select the individuals to whom the capture of infrastructure individuals. I can only recommend more and more emphasis on intel training for selected individuals and less emphasis on more and more emphasis placed on capture of selected personalities.

TRAINING

20. The new advanced course is being well received by the advisors. They have all said that it is much more valuable than the previous basic course. However there is a limit to the scope of this training program as in three weeks one can only cover a small amount of the total training requirement. Most advisors neglect communications training. They should be pressed to continue

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to build on the base of training given by the MTT. Further regular training in marksmanship and demolitions is easy to organize and should be a regular feature of their work. Refresher intel training can be arranged through the PAIR in province. Further leadership training is more difficult to arrange. However small sand table or map exercises involving planning of operations and issue of a five paragraph field order can be organized. Continuation training is an important part of the advisors duties.

CONCLUSION

21. The Program has improved in the six months that I have been with it, but there is ample room for further improvement. The criticisms in this paper are intended to be constructive and in no way reflect on the abilities of any individual or organization. I am convinced that the adoption of the above recommendations will have a marked effect on the future progress of the Program.

Ch. Palmer

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C/MPRU/MTT

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ANNEX A

EQUIPMENT CHANGES

1. Uniforms. The light weight "Leopard" type camouflage suits are not suitable. They are too frail and are easily torn and wear out quickly. They are not warm enough for use in the highlands. And finally and most importantly they are not effective as camouflage on night operations. They almost "shine" in the dark. As most PRU operations are conducted at night this is very important. The heavy duty material, "Tiger stripe" type of suit is recommended.

2. Boots. The issue of the canvas "Bata" boot is false economy. They may be suitable on the softer wetter ground of the lowlands but the rough and rocky highlands country soon destroys them. Also they are not well shaped and are hard on the feet. The issue of standard US jungle boots is recommended. These will last up to two years or more and are better suited to the hard going in the highlands.

3. Weapons. Sniper training in four provinces has confirmed my earlier observations on the unsuitability of the MID sniper rifle. It is far too heavy and long for the Montagsard. We have found that the men can produce consistently smaller shot groups with the M16, without the scope than they can with the MID with the scope. It is strongly recommended that the issue of the MID be discontinued and that a scope for the M16 be substituted. This would not only be more effective, it would be cheaper.

4. Since night capture operations are a very common activity of the PRU it is strongly recommended that a few "Overlight Scopes" be obtained and held centrally at Region. From Region they can be quickly sent out to a province as required. They would greatly improve the effectiveness of PRU night operations.

5. It is also recommended that one or two silenced weapons be held at Region for special operations.

6. Communications Equipment. PRU operations cannot be successfully carried out without radios. Every PRU has removed or "screwaged" PRC 25s or 10s as they cannot do without them. It is unreasonable to expect a unit to do this and even more unreasonable to expect a unit to operate without radios. PRC 25 are used constantly for communication with Sector and Subsector HQs and other units on night operations. They are also used for calling artillery

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and air strikes. Et 1 radios are also very important for intra unit communications. They are especially useful in the ambush and raid/capture operations.

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ANNEX B

SELECTION AND TRAINING OF ADVISORS

Selection

1. A great improvement has been noted in the exercise of care in the selection of advisors. There are however several points which should be considered mandatory.

- a. The adviser should have had previous combat experience.
- b. He should have some form of intel background.
- c. He must be infantry trained and a specialist in patrolling.
- d. A PRU assignment should not be his first job in Vietnam.
- e. He should have attended SF school or Ranger Training.

Training

2. In addition to the present "briefings" a short training course should be organized. The new PRU advisor should be briefed, sent directly to Region for local briefing, visit his province for about a week and then returned to SATC to attend a course of instruction before actually taking over his province. It is understood that CPT Hiett has already made a detailed recommendation on this matter. It cannot be stressed enough that the quality of the advisor sets the standard of the PRU.

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ANNEX C

TARGETING BY PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG

Dossiers

1. The most common problem encountered in the provinces is in the poor quality or complete lack of a targeting system. There is a tendency to consider the job done if a copy of each report is sent to all interested agencies. There is also a tendency to act on a single report giving current information about the present location of an individual. Many Phoenix coordinators have told me "We don't get much good intel, by the time I get it it's one or two weeks old." They fail to see the value of building up a store of information about an individual over a period of time, thus enabling a pattern of activity to be detected. They also fail to see the value of a dossier, containing copies of every report even mentioning the man, first as an aid in interrogation and second as evidence to help in conviction.

2. Several coordinators had not heard of the "Target Data Sheet". Few of them actually use it. Those that do open dossiers tend to make a summary of known info about the man rather than use copies of actual reports. I have never found a coordinator who, when a dossier had developed fairly well, went back to the sources and requested further detailed information. Finally the reasons for opening dossiers are not clearly established. There should be two main reasons for opening a dossier. First one should monitor the most active people and second the high level people.

3. The steps in a targeting system should be:

a. Receive reports from source agencies.

b. Develop a simple card system designed to highlight the most active VCI. This card need only contain the man's name and the FIR number and date of every FIR which mentions his name. No attempt should be made to summarize the report on the card. The cards which most quickly build up the largest number of report references are the ones to open dossiers on.

c. Open the dossier. A copy of every report listed on the card should be inserted and a target data sheet opened.

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d. File in the dossier every new report which which mentions the name.

e. Go back to the source agencies with specific questions to fill in the gaps in our knowledge of the man, his family, friends and movements.

f. Finally hand the dossier to an action arm with a request to capture the man.

4. This dossier, after the capture, should be handed to the interrogator to assist him in his interrogation. It therefore needs to be in Vietnamese as well as English. After interrogation the dossier will form the basis of the case against the suspect at the court or tribunal.

5. Blacklists and village VCI lists without dossiers are next to useless.

6. Every effort should be made to orient the Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program toward action and away from the compiling of statistics. The measure of the program's efficiency must be the number of VCI killed or captured as a result of this targeting. It should not be the volume of reports or the neatness of the filing system or the correctness and timeliness of their statistical reports.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Capt RL GUEST
18 Div Trg Centre
HEAVYWEIGHT
Nui-Dat

REGIONAL FORCE TRAINING - PHUOC TUY

General

1. The AATTV Cadre attached to 1ATF established itself in the 18 Div Trg Centre located at HEAVYWEIGHT, during the period 13 Nov - 1 Dec 68.
2. Training programs for the RF Patrol course were revised and programs for MATs training and RF Patrol Orientation were produced.
3. Accommodation for the Training Team members had to be constructed as existing accommodation was inadequate. Assistance from 1ATF was given in the form of material and some labour on the ablution block. Accommodation and facilities are now good.

MATs Training

4. From 2-5 Dec 68, inclusive three Australian Mobile Advisory Teams were trained. Each battalion of the Task Force provided a five man advisory team consisting of 1 x officer 1x Sergeant 2x Corporals and 1x Driver 1 Radio operator.
5. All members of the advisory teams were volunteers and showed considerable interest in the course. Also all teams agreed that they gained considerably from the course and were better prepared than previous advisory teams placed in the field by 1ATF.

RF Patrols Orientation Course

6. An orientation course for the Australian NCOs and soldiers who were to attend the RF Patrol Course was held from 2-6 Dec 68.
7. Training on day 1 of the course could not proceed due to one unit failing to provide its quota of students. Also four of the twelve students nominated were found to be unsuitable after they had received the initial briefing, as they had no idea of what they were required for prior to the course. These students were then replaced by volunteers.
8. It is considered that motivation of the Australian soldiers to work with the RF is a prime factor thus necessitating all troops for this, and future courses, to be volunteers.

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RF Patrol Training

9. The pilot course for the RF Patrol Training commenced on Mon 9 Dec and is continuing.
10. The RF administration was inadequate initially due to the RF troops having insufficient money to buy food. A pay advance from the following months pay was arranged through Sector. It is recommended that future RF courses start immediately after pay day or adequate arrangements be made prior to the arrival of the RF troops for them to have sufficient money for food.
11. The standard of RF troops sent appears to be high. The present course consists of four squads each from a different RF Coy. The squads themselves were made up from within the companies so do not constitute a ready made team. It is felt that this is not in keeping with the basic aim of the training and more benefit would come from an organized squad being trained so that it could return to its area and work as a team.
12. The variety of weapons brought by the RF necessitated some minor changes to the training programs, as one squad is equipped with M16, and the remainder with M1 rifles and M2 carbines. Weapon training is concentrating on marksmanship rather than individual handling.
13. Although repeated requests were made both directly and through 1ATF to Sector for interpreters, to this date none have arrived. The interpreter with the 18th Div US Advisory Team has been utilised but this arrangements necessitates all classes being conducted as a whole rather than by individual patrols. Communication between the Australian soldiers and the RF is progressing by various means and it has been found possible to teach minor tactics without interpreters.
14. Without being too optimistic at this stage, it is evident that some improvement in the RF soldiers' standard has already been achieved. Weapon cleanliness, and minor tactics are the two fields where most improvement has been noticed.
15. The attitude of the RF is most eager. They seem to understand the language problem and make an extra effort to absorb the training given them. They are quick to learn by demonstration.

Conclusion

16. The program is progressing satisfactorily. Interpreters would improve the standard of instruction being given and to this end it is requested the possibility of interpreters from sources outside of 1ATF and Phuoc-Tuy Province be investigated.

RL GUEST
Capt AATTV

Attachment : MATs Program.

14 Dec 68

MATS ORIENTATION COURSE - 1 ATF
2 - 5 DEC 68

Serial	Date	Timings	Subject	Area	Instructor	Remarks
1	2 Dec 68	0830 - 0910H	Opening Address. MATS Team Mission			
2		0920 - 1000H	RF/PF Org and Eqpt			
3		1020 - 1100H	Province Organization			
4		1110 - 1150H	RF Comd System and Logistical Administration			
5		1330 - 1410H	} Introduction to RF Weapons incl Live Firing			
6		1420 - 1500H				
7		1510 - 1540H				
8	3 Dec 68	0830 - 0910H	RF Basic Training			
9		0920 - 1000H	Revolutionary Development Program			
10		1020 - 1100H	RF Advanced Inf Training			
11		1110 - 1150H	Civic Affairs			
12		1330 - 1410H	Vietnamese Customs			
13		1420 - 1500H	Advisory Techniques			
14	4 Dec 68	1510 - 1540H				
15		0830 - 0910H	RF In Place Training for Units			
16		0920 - 1000H				
17		1020 - 1100H	Fire Support			
18		1110 - 1150H	Checklist for MATS			
19		1330 - 1410H	} Visit to RF Outpost			
20		1420 - 1500H				
21		1510 - 1540H				

Serial	Date	Timings	Subject	Area	Instructor	Remarks
22	5 Dec 68	0830 - 0910H	Visit to RF Outpost			
23		0920 - 1000H				
24		1020 - 1100H				
25		1110 - 1150H				
26		1330 - 1410H	Political Warfare			
27		1420 - 1500H	RF Outposts			
28		1510 - 1540H	Reserve			

SATC
Vung-Tau
30 Dec 68

MONTHLY REPORT

General

1. This report covers the period from my initial assignment to the HRU programme, 4 Nov 68, to 30 Dec 68.

Orientation and Assignment

2. The following is a rough outline of my activities from 4 Nov to 29 Nov:
 - a. 4-9 Nov - Orientation and lectures in SAIGON.
 - b. 10-16 Nov - Orientation and observation of training at SATC.
 - c. 17-23 Nov - Visit and observation of training with the Montagnard Training Team in TUYEN DUC province.
 - d. 24-28 Nov - Further orientation and "read-in" in SAIGON.
 - e. 29 Nov - Arrived SATC with assignment as Chief of Operations and Training.


Duties

3. Due to a lack of continuity of personnel at SATC and the absence of defined procedures, the organisation of SATC and functions/duties of the advisory staff were somewhat chaotic and not effective on my arrival.
4. Since my arrival I have been involved in the re-organisation of training and advisory functions. In addition, the arrival of a newly appointed Chief/SATC has assisted in this re-vamping of SATC.

Organisation

5. The organisation of the advisory staff is now:

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Current Tasks

6. Attached at Annex "A" is a copy of the Training Branch priority of work. It gives a good indication of the tasks in which I am currently involved - in addition to routine day-to-day training management.

Future Considerations

7. Two major considerations are confronting SATC advisory staff at this time:

- a. The integration of Vietnamese officers and NCOs into the MU programme. The political and programme control implications of this transition are already showing most delicate characteristics.
- b. Re-orientation of the programme in line with a possible "cease-fire" situation. The tactical, techniques and legal arrest aspects of this problem are also extremely delicate.

Liaison With 1 ALSC

8. I have liased with units of 1ALSC in attempt to gain assistance in a number of fields including survey and construction of a classification target/night firing range and the acquisition of air photographs. Co-operation in all aspects has been excellent.

9. Due to poor training areas and the lack of "live" situations for final course exercises, it is my intention to liase with 1ALF with a

.../3

view to using portions of their AO.

Conclusion

10. It is my aim to have re-organized where necessary, and have intimate advisor participation within the Training Branch of SATC by 24 Feb 69. This date marks the intake of the first revised PHU course and carely pre-dates the first Vietnamese Officer Orientation course scheduled to commence on 10 Mar 69.

F.M. KUDNIG
Capt
AATTV.

SPECIAL ACTIVITIES TRAINING CENTER

Training Branch

Priority of Work

10 Dec. 1968

TASK	TO BE COMPLETED BY
1, <u>Training Office re-organisation</u>	
a, Revise and re-organize filing system	as possible
b, Schedule of courses board	complete
c, Course scheduling board	21 Dec.
d, Instructors manning detail board	21 Dec.
2, <u>Subject Material Revision and Up-Dating</u>	
a, Compilation and translation of lesson plans for all current lessons	31 Dec.
b, Examination of lesson plans for nature of content, correctness of information/techniques and methods of presentation. Revision and updating where necessary.	10 Feb.
c, Examination revision/updating of all practical exercises.	10 Feb.
d, Arrangement of course syllabi and lesson plans in separate self contained folders.	10 Feb.
3, <u>Preparation of course Syllabi</u>	
a, Adviser Orientation	14 Dec.
b, ARVN Officer's Orientation	1st draft complete final form
	28 Feb.
c, ARVN NCO's Orientation	15 Mar.
d, Revised PRU	1st draft complete final form
	15 Jan.
4, <u>Orientation and Examination of the Training System</u> to include the committee system, allocation of instructors and the number of instructors required.	Examination - 9 Feb.
	Action - 24 Feb.
5, <u>Assessment of Instructors</u>	9 Feb.

	TASK	TO BE COMPLETED BY
6,	<u>Examination of Training Manuals and Reference Material</u>	
	a, The requirement and procurement	ASAP
	b, Establishment of a training reference library	ASAP
7,	<u>Establishment of an MTT Standard Reporting Format</u>	17 Dec.
8,	<u>Establishment of a Standard Interview Format</u> (incl. practical tests) for prospective instructors	24 Dec.
9,	<u>Detailed Examination of Marksmanship Training and Range Requirements.</u>	31 Dec.
10,	<u>Examination of Training Branch SOPs with revision/</u> updating where necessary	24 Feb.
11,	Research and prepare subject material to be covered in a " <u>Cease Fire Situation</u> " Re-Orientatien <u>Course.</u>	31 Jan.
12,	<u>Inspection of Training Areas</u> - requirement and proposal for additional areas	31 Dec.


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F. M. KUDNIG

Chief of Operations and Training

	TASK	TO BE COMPLETED BY
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
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ASAP 6 a ; 6 b .



F. M. KUDNIG

Chief of Operations and Training