

Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report and enclosures
1 - 28 February 1969

Series: AWM95 - Australian Army
commanders' diaries

Item: 1/2/62

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AUSTRALIAN FORCE VIETNAM



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HEADQUARTERS

Army Component

26 Mar 69

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AHQ(C)

AATTV MONTHLY REPORT - FEB 69

1. Attached, for information, is a copy of the AATTV Monthly Report for Feb 69.
2. Several matters raised in the report are being examined with a view to determining whether some redeployment of the Team is desirable. The result of this examination and any subsequent redeployment will be advised in due course.

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(R.A. HAY)
Major General
Commander Australian Force
VIETNAM

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
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HEADQUARTERS
AUSTRALIAN FORCE
VIETNAM

Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam

15 Mar 69

HQ AFV (3)

AATTV REPORT : FEBRUARY 1969

General

1. Operational activity in which members of AATTV were involved increased considerably in intensity during the month.
2. WO2 RL Weir was wounded in action on 16 Feb while on operations with the Mobile Strike Force in Kontum Province.

Change In Command

3. On 10 Feb 69, Lt Col RDF LLOYD MC assumed command of AATTV vice Lt Col RL Burnard.

Deployment

4. The deployment of AATTV as at 1 Mar 69 is at Annex A.

I Corps

5. A significant increase in activity occurred in the Corps area compared with the previous month, particularly in the last week of Feb. Increased contact with enemy during operations occurred primarily in the three Southern Provinces of I Corps.
6. In 11 DTA the main operation in progress during the month has been Dewey Canyon in the southern Ashau Valley involving 9 Marine Regt and elements of 2 ARVN Regt. Casualty figures reported by I Corps for the

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period 27 Jan to 28 Feb 69 in this operation are as follows:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>Enemy KIA</u>
Marine	107	677	1098
ARVN	6	14	16

Included among weapons captured in the Ashau were 5 ton prime movers and 122mm howitzers.

7. A report by Maj Millie on operations in Quang-Tri Province is attached at Annex B and a report on Thua-Thien Province by Maj Norris is attached at Annex C.

8. In Quang-Nam Province, during the last week of Feb, there were 83 enemy initiated incidents reported as well as significant rocket and mortar attacks. The main activity has been on the outskirts of Danang and in the populated areas of the Province. ARVN units with whom AATTV members are deployed have been heavily involved in operations in the Province. A report by Capt CF Spencer, Senior Advisor 1/51 ARVN Bn is attached at Annex D.

9. A report by WO2 K Vincent, RF/PF advisor with Hoa-Vang Sub-Sector is attached at Annex E.

10. In 12 DTA operational activity has remained at a high level of intensity. Operations involving 6th ARVN Regt and elements of 5th ARVN Regt in which members of AATTV are deployed, in the Tam-Ky area in the latter part of the month resulted in inflicting 168 enemy KIA at the expense of 6 KIA and 8 WIA ARVN personnel. In the Quang-Ngai area the enemy is believed to have the equivalent of three regiments. ARVN operations in the area, beyond rocket range of Quang-Ngai, have been limited by the need to protect population centres. However, these operations, in which members of AATTV were involved, during the last week of Feb accounted for 123 enemy KIA (incl 25 KBA) at the expense of 44 KIA and 123 WIA ARVN personnel.

II Corps

11. Operations conducted by the Mobile Strike Force (MSF) of Co B, 5 SFG remained at a high level of intensity during the month. The normal pattern of 30 to 45 day operations with breaks of 5 to 10 days between operations continued. Specific operations by Battalions of 2 MSF during the month were as follows:

a. Ist Bn - 30 day sweep operation 20 kms North of Kontum, essentially for security of "A" Camps in the area. Enemy casualties inflicted - 4 KIA, 2 suspects captured.

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- b. 2nd Bn - 30 day sweep operation in the vicinity of An-Khe. A succession of AO's on the highway to Qui-Nhon. The Bn was placed under the operative control of an operational US unit, whose task was road security. Enemy casualties inflicted - 8 KIA, 3 suspects captured.
- c. 3rd Bn - Search and destroy operations approximately 25 kms South East of Ban-Me-Thuct. Enemy casualties inflicted - 28 KIA, 12 captured, 26 suspects captured.

III Corps

12. RF Training Cadre.-- The second RF Course conducted by the AATTV Cadre (attached to 1 ATF) in conjunction with 1 ATF, commenced on 10 Feb. A report by Capt Guest (AATTV), the Chief Instructor, is attached at Annex F. The comments and recommendations contained in paragraphs 4-7 of his report are supported provided the 1 ATF/Province intention is to continue with this RF Training project. The original plan, arrived at by discussion 1 ATF/AATTV and agreed by HQ AFV, has proved to be, at least in part, unworkable. It is considered that the plan now needs review. The future involvement of 1 ATF or 1 ATF/AATTV in the training and operational activities of Territorial Forces in Phuoc-Tuy Province requires clarification so that the need for an AATTV commitment in this field can be properly assessed.
13. It is AATTVs view, based on observations of other areas of Vietnam, that better impact would be achieved if the Aust effort in the Territorial Forces field were to be more in Combined Action Platoons (CAPs), which would operate with the PF. AATTV could assist in the training at least of the initial CAP sections/squads provided by 1 ATF, if this suggestion were adopted.
14. The matters contained in Capt Guest's report and the possibility of CAPs has been briefly discussed with 1 ATF. AATTV is now awaiting advice from 1 ATF so that further discussions can be held. It is important that the future of the current RF training project be decided as soon as possible to enable planning for the next RF Course to proceed (if there is to be one) and to enable the future AATTV commitment in this part of the country to be considered and settled.
15. Special Activities Training Centre (PRU) : Vung-Tau.-- A report by Capt Kudnig, Chief of Training and Operations of the Centre, is attached at Annex G. His report indicates some of the problems which are becoming apparent in the present and proposed PRU organisation. It has not been possible up to the time of writing this report, to discuss the events described by Capt Kudnig with him in private. However this will be done and the matter also discussed with the PRU Directorate as soon as possible. Good results are being achieved against the VE Infrastructure by PRU's in which members of AATTV are deployed and there is no requirement to take any immediate action regarding members of AATTV deployed with the PRU organisation. However, the situation will be carefully watched, particularly at SATC.

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16. LRP Training.- A report by Capt Hinde, Chief Instructor of the LRP Wing, NTC Van-Kiep, is attached at Annex H.

a. The question of incorrect employment of LRPs trained at Van-Kiep once they return to their parent formations has arisen before and action was taken through appropriate channels. This problem will be discussed again with Central Training Command and it will be recommended that one of their representatives and Capt Hinde visit III and IV Corps as soon as possible to check on the employment of trained LRPs by divisional commander's. Unless these personnel are employed properly our effort is really wasted at Van-Kiep.

b. The problems described by Capt Hinde in his report regarding Regimental Courses are unfortunate. However, it is quite evident from his report and subsequent discussions that have been held, that these Regimental Courses should be deleted and that we should concentrate with maximum ARVN assistance, on the training of personnel from Divisional Recce Companies.

IV Corps

17. General.- The expected Tet offensive in IV Corps failed to materialise. VC propaganda was active, warning the people of their intentions and restricting population movement. However, these actions had no great effect on the population.

18. Territorial Security

a. Although the number of enemy-initiated incidents increased just prior to the Lunar New Year holiday, nothing of significance was triggered during the holiday itself. There has been an increase of incidents since 22 Feb, the end of the VC self-imposed truce. Dong-Tam, 9 (US) Inf Div base and My-Tho have been mortared. Chau-Doc has been shelled and mortared several times. Attacks on district towns, outposts have increased and on 25 Feb, a bridge on Route 4 in Dinh-Tuong Province was blown. However, there does not appear to have been any significant change in the Territorial Security status of the Delta. The enemy retains his capability to concentrate against province and district towns but does appear ~~to~~ not to have the capacity to achieve significant gains. There has been no marked regression of the newly-acquired APC hamlets, despite the fact that the VC have had ample time in which to react.

b. The Mobile Defence Concept as applied to the defense of hamlets has been accepted by the JGS and promulgated to all sector commanders. Maj Templeton attended a conference at HQ, MACV on 26-27 Feb and briefed the conference on the concept. The implementation of this idea, which is only the employment of basic minor tactics, should enhance the security of small units. It is

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unlikely that there will be a rapid change from present techniques employed by the RF and PF and improvement will probably be slow. A copy of the MACV/JGS promulgation on the Mobile Defence Concept is attached at Annex I.

19.

Revolutionary Development Cadre Training.

a. Kien-Giang Province. Training has progressed quite satisfactorily, however, the redeployment of RDC teams has not proceeded smoothly. 59 man teams were re-constituted into 30 man teams on 1 Feb. This upheaval followed by the Tet Festival has slowed down the redeployment of teams into the hamlets again. Teams are, on the whole, still concentrated in district towns. The whole process has been further confused by the fact that US advisors and VN officials cannot agree on a redeployment plan in support of the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan. WO2 Welsh and WO2 Hyland are to move out of Kien-Giang on 1 Mar. They will go to the Revolutionary Development MTC, Vung-Tau for a week and then move to a new province - which province has not yet been decided upon.

b. Vinh-Binh Province. The programme is proceeding satisfactorily. No major problems have been encountered. A copy of the advisor's report is at Annex J. It is expected that they will be redeployed to a new province in mid-Mar.

20. RF/PF Training Progress in this field, whilst slow, is satisfactory. WO1 Mann and WO2 Horne are to travel all of Kien-Hoa Province in Mar and instruct on the Mobile Security Concept. They will go from MAT to MAT and cover the field as it affects RDC Teams, PSDF and RF/PF. This is considered to be a very worthwhile project.

Programme of Visits by CO AATTV

21. During the month of Feb, all Corps areas have been visited by CO AATTV twice and some cases three times. The primary aim during these visits was to see all available members of the Team and to meet Senior US Advisors and Vietnamese Commanders with whom members of AATTV are involved.

22. It is now the intention of CO AATTV to spend 7 days (approx) in each province/tactical area with members of the Team, looking more closely at, and participating in, the various activities in which they are involved. This will result in a coverage of the entire Team less often, but is considered essential if the necessary command and man-management of the Team is to be achieved. The first visit under this revised programme has already taken place in Quang-Tri Province.


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Administration

23. A small number of AATTV members were hospitalised/confined to quarters in I Corps area early in Feb with a virus infection, however, these members of the Team are now fit and back with their units.

24. The following members of AATTV were medically evacuated to Australia during the month:

- a. WO2 J.G. Pettit - Instructor LRP Wing, as result of injuries received during operational training.
- b. WO2 R.L. Weir - Mobile Strike Force, WIA (para 2 refers).



(RDF LLOYD)
Lt Col
Comd

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Annex B to AATTV
Report - Feb 69

AATTV
QUANG-TRI
27 Feb 69

MONTHLY REPORT
QUANG TRI PROVINCE - FEB 1969

1. Operations

- a. 2nd ARVN Regt continues to operate with 9 Mar Regt in Op DEWEY CANYON. NVA KIA in this operation now exceeds 1,000. The USMC elements are operating into the NVA Base Area in Laos. A 122mm Arty Gun was captured and heli lifted to 3 Mar Div Rear.
- b. 1st ARVN Regt continues with LAM SON 261 from LZ NANCY.
- c. 3 Mar Div is committing more troops to the Western portion of the Province. 1st Bde 5th Mech have taken over that portion of 3 Mar Div AO which includes CON THIEN (A4), C2, C2A and C4.
- d. There has been little enemy activity in the populated portion of the Province. Territorial Forces are now preparing security plans to cover the hamlet & village elections to be held on 2, 9, 16 and 23 March 69.
- e. Operation KANGAROO is to commence about the 20th March 69. (Cam Vu Resettlement Plan attached).

2. Aust Water Supply System (Irrigation)

- a. A list of spare parts for the water pumps has been compiled. It is thought that they can be purchased in Australia.
- b. It was a disappointment that the proposed visit of a member of the AID Staff, Australian Embassy on 15 Feb 69 did not take place as proposed.

3. After Action Reports

- a. Attached are After Action Reports from WO Snelling & WO2 Barker and a PF Pl After Action Report.

D. Millie
Major
AATTV

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AATT EMPLOYMENT

AS AT 1 MARCH 1969

Annex 'A' to
AATTV Monthly Report
for February 1969

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Inits</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Corps</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Employment</u>	<u>Due RTA</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>AATTV SAIGON</u>								
1	Lt Col	RDF	Lloyd	RA Inf	HQ AATTV	Commanding Officer	Jan 70	Saigon
2	Capt	D.G.	Cent	RA Inf	"	Adjutant	Oct 69	"
3	WO2	T.P.	Van-Bakel	RAASC	"	Admin WO (Chief Clerk)	Nov 69	"
4	WO2	C.F.	Keioskie	RAASC	"	Admin WO (Pay)	Jul 69	"
5	WO2	A.K.	Hunter	RAAC	Armoured School	Instructor	Mar 69	Thu-Duc (near Saigon)
6	WO1	E.W.	Gasen	RAAC	" "	" (Designate)	May 69	" "

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
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AATTV : QUANG TRI Province

7	Maj	D.R.	Millie	Aust Army Avn Corps	Quang-Tri Sector	S3	May 69	Quang-Tri
8	Maj	H.	bell	RA Inf	" " "	S3 (Designate)	Nov 69	(Att 1 ATF until late Mar 69)
9	WO2	B.L.	saxoy	RAE	Trieu-Phong Sub-Sector	Assistant Advisor RF/PF	Jan 70	Trieu-Phong
10	WO2	J.M.	O'Donnell	RAAOC	Cam-Lo Sub-Sector	Assistant Advisor RF/PF	Jan 70	Cam-Lo Town
11	WO2	W.L.	Leanshaw	HAAMC	ARVN CCS	Medical Advisor	Jul 69	Quang-Tri
12	WO2	A.H.	Beezley	RA Inf	1/1 ARVN Bn	Assistant Advisor	Jan 70	Quang-Tri Area
13	WO2	K.	Gabriel	RA Inf	2/1 ARVN Bn	" "	Nov 69	" "
14	WO2	E.W.	Snelling	RA Inf	3/1 ARVN Bn	" "	Jul 69	" "
15	WO2	W.	Tillet	RA Inf	4/1 ARVN Bn	" "	Feb 70	" "
16	WO2	J.F.	Darker	RA Inf	1/2 ARVN Bn	" "	Aug 69	Gio-Linh Area
17	WO1	J.	Geedrick	RA Inf	2/2 ARVN Bn	" "	Sep 69	" "
18	WO2	V.	Stack	RA Inf	3/2 ARVN Bn	" "	Sep 69	" "
19	WO2	R.K.	Gurney	RA Inf	3/2 ARVN Bn	" (Designate)	Feb 70	" "
20	WO2	R.I.	Robinson	RA Inf	4/2 ARVN Bn	" "	Aug 69	" "
21	WO2	H.S.	Stuttart	RAAC	11 ARVN Cav Regt	" "	Nov 69	Quang-Tri Area

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
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AATTV : THUA-THIEN Province

22	Maj	M.	Norris	Aust Int Corps	Thua-Thien Sector	Coordinator, Phoenix Programme.	Apr 69	Hue
23	Capt	D.	Sevage	RA Inf	1 ARVN Div Recce Unit	Senior Advisor	Aug 69	Hue
24	WO1	W.	Brown	RAAMC	ARVN CCS	Assistant Advisor	Sep 69	"
25	WO2	A.J.	Baxter	RAA	Nam-Hoa Sub-Sector	" " RF/PF	Apr 69	Nam-Hoa
26	WO2	J.A.	Bond	RAAC	7 ARVN Cav Regt	" "	Jan 70	Hue
27	WO2	M.R.	Bolitho	RA Inf	Black Panther Coy	" "	Nov 69	"
28	WO2	G.C.	Leitz	RA Inf	54 Regt	Bn " "	Aug 69	Hue Area
29	WO2	L.	Jackson	RA Inf	54 Regt	Bn " "	Jun 69	" "
30	WO2	J.R.	McRae	RA Inf	1/3 ARVN Bn	" "	Aug 69	" "
31	WO2	M.	Kelly	RA Inf	2/3 ARVN Bn	" "	Aug 69	" "
32	WO2	A.J.	Joyce	RA Inf	3/3 ARVN Bn	" "	Jan 70	" "

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>AR¹V : QJANG-NAM Province</u>								
33	Maj	F.C.	Johnston	RA Inf	HQ I Corps	G-3 (Trg) Advisor	Feb 70	Danang
34	Capt	C.	Spencer	RAE	1/51 ARVN Bn	Senior Advisor	May 69	Mieu-Bong (Regt Base)
35	WO1	S.L.	Arblaster	RAASC	AATTV Danang	Admin WO	May 69	Aust House Danang
36	WO2	D.B.	Phillips	RAASC	" "	" "	Apr 69	" " "
37	WO2	K.J.	Rowe	RAAC	11 ARVN Cav Regt	Assistant Advisor	Oct 69	Hoi-An
38	WO1	J.N.	Narrower	RAAC	4 ARVN Cav Regt	Staff Advisor	Apr 69	Danang
39	WO1	J.B.	Staunton-Latimer	RAAC	4 " " "	Assistant Advisor	Feb 70	"
40	WO2	K.T.	Vincent	RAE	Hoa-Vang Sub-Sector	" " RF/PF	Apr 69	Hoa-Vang
41	WO2	B.	Taylor	RAAOC	Quang-Nam Sector	Advisor RF/PF - Mobile Advisory Team	Jul 69	Moc-Bai
42	WO2	M.T.	Jensen	RA Inf	37th Ranger Bn	Assistant Advisor	Nov 69	Hoi-An
43	WO2	E.H.	Martin	RA Inf	1/51 ARVN Bn	" "	Nov 69	Mieu-Bong (Regt Base)
44	WO2	W.J.	Bruce	RA Inf	2/51 ARVN Bn	" "	Feb 70	" "

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>AATTV : QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Provinces</u>								
45	Capt	G.	Dennis	RA Inf	1/5 ARVN Bn	Senior Advisor	Nov 69	Quang-Ngai
46	WO2	D.	Truelove	RA Inf	1/4 ARVN Bn	Assistant Advisor	Sep 69	" "
47	WO2	M.J.	Poole	RA Inf	2/4 ARVN Bn	" "	Nov 69	" "
48	WO2	V.L.	Harris	RA Inf	3/4 ARVN Bn	" "	Feb 70	" "
49	WO1	E.J.	Morrison	RA Inf	1/5 ARVN Bn	" "	Dec 69	" "
50	WO1	R.J.	O'Brien	RAE	2/5 ARVN Bn	" "	Sep 69	" " (Now on pre-extension leave
51	WO2	W.S.	Dickey	RA Inf	4/5 ARVN Bn	" "	Jul 69	" " in Australia)
52	WO2	T.F.	Dolan	RA Inf	2/6 ARVN Bn	" "	Jan 70	Tam-Ky
53	WO2	L.I.	Morrison	RA Inf	3/6 ARVN Bn	" "	Jan 70	"

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
II CTZ								
AATTV : PLEIKU								
54	Maj	W.	Paydon	RA Inf	2nd Mobile Strike Force Command, Det B-20, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)	Battalion Commander	Feb 70	Pleiku (Base Camp)
55	Capt	D.	Rothwell	RA Inf	" " "	Company Commander	May 69	" "
56	WO2	G.E.	Francis	RA Inf	" " "	Pl Comd	May 69	" "
57	WO2	D.	Tolley	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Jun 69	" "
58	WO2	P.D.	Wilkes	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Jun 69	" "
59	WO2	R.S.	Simpson	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Jul 69	" "
60	WO2	B.L.	Young	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Jul 69	" "
61	WO2	J.R.	Stewart	RA Inf	" " "	HQ Coy	Aug 69	" "
62	WO2	R.D.	Aylett	RA Inf	" " "	Pl Comd	Dec 69	" "
63	WO2	K.C.	Latham	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Dec 69	" "
64	WO2	J.W.	Wigg	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Jan 70	" "
65	WO2	R.D.	Cameron	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Feb 70	" "
66	WO2	A.M.	Kelly	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Feb 70	" "
67	WO2	K.	Payne	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Feb 70)a. As at 1 Mar attending 5 SFG Combat Orientation Course, Nha-Trang.
68	WO2	M.W.	Gill	RA Sigs	" " "	" "	Feb 70	
69	Sgt	A.J.	Shelton	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Feb 70	

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>II CTZ (Cont'd)</u>								
<u>AATTV - II CORPS AREA</u>								
70	WO2	I.J.	Jewell	RA Inf	Recondo School 5 SFG (A)	Instructor	Jul 69	Nha-Trang
71	WO2	D.G.	Hill	RAA	ARVN Artillery School	"	Apr 69	Duc-My
72	WO2	G.T.	Smith	RA Inf	Ranger Training Centre	"	Jun 69	"
73	WO1	E.B.	Ostara	RA Inf	CSD, Province Recce Unit	Advisor Binh-Dinh Prov.	Aug 69	Qui-Nhon (Now on pre-extension leave in Aust)
74	WO2	J.S.	Allan	RA Inf	" " " "	Mobile Training Team	Mar 69	II CTZ
75	WO2	G.Y.	Jamieson	RA Inf	" " " "	" " " " (Designate)	Jun 69	"

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Serial:	Rank :	Initis :	Name :	Corps :	Unit :	Employment :	Due RTA :	Location :
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III CTZ

AATTV : III CORPS AREA

76	: Capt	: RCM	: Hinde	: RA Inf	: LRP Wing Van-Kiep National Training Centre.	: CI LRP Wing	: Jun 69	: Baria ✓
77	: Capt	: R.L.	: Guest	: RA Inf	: AATTV Cadre att 1 ATF	: Chief Instructor RF Trg	: Aug 69	: 18 ARVN Div Trg School near Nui-Dat. ✓
78	: Capt	: F.	: Kudniz	: RA Inf	: PRU Training Centre	: Attached	: Jun 69	: Near Vung-Tau ✓
79	: WO2	: R.	: Bury	: RAEME	: LRP Wing Van-Kiep National Training Centre.	: Admin WO (Designate)	: Jan 70	: Baria ✓
80	: WO2	: C.	: Kealy	: RA Inf	: " " "	: Instructor LRP Wing	: Jan 70	: " ✓
81	: WO2	: K.J.	: Mitchell	: RA Inf	: " " "	: " " "	: Apr 69 (To be RTA 4 Mar 69)	: " ✓
82	: WO2	: J.M.	: Grafton	: RA Inf	: " " "	: " " "	: Apr 69	: " ✓
83	: WO2	: R.G.	: Carter	: RA Inf	: <i>AATTV CADRE att 1 ATF</i>	: Instructor RF Trg	: Aug 69	: 18 ARVN Div Trg School near Nui-Dat ✓
84	: WO2	: J.D.	: Frost	: RA Inf	: " " "	: " " "	: Aug 69	: " " " ✓
85	: WO2	: J.	: Macartney	: RAASC	: Phuoc-Tuy Sector	: Assistant Advisor, Att Coy (RF)	: Jan 70	: Baria ✓
86	: WO2	: T.J.	: Golbert	: RAE	: Phuoc-Tuy Sector	: Assistant Advisor RF/PF	: Dec 69	: " ✓

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Attachment 19
Annex C - PATTV
Report Feb 69

OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR
THUA THIEN PROVINCE
ADVISORY TEAM 18
APO 96258

FACCZ-ITT

3 February 1969

SUBJECT: Province Report, (RCS, FACCORDS-01-67)
(Period: 1-31 January 1969)

THRU: Commanding General
ATTN: COMDS Joint Staff
Danang, Vietnam

TO: COMUSMACV
ATTN: COMDS
Saigon, Vietnam

1. Overall Status of the Pacification Effort:

a. January brought an end to the Accelerated Pacification Program in Thua Thien Province with all 33 programmed hamlets secured. Of the 11 "Bonus" hamlets, 5 were upgraded to a "C" rating or above. Emphasis continued on resettling the refugees to their former homes. Many hamlets which were bleak war scarred areas one month ago now gleam in the sunlight from the new aluminum roofing; rotary plows are tilling the soil for the new rice crops while the children are returning to school. Many hectares of land are now being tilled and planted which were standing barren and deserted two months ago.

b. The railroad from Hue to Danang is operating daily with a train in each direction averaging 200 passengers per trip. Merchants are also beginning to move stocks from Danang to Hue via the railroad. Work has started on repairing the railroad bridge across the Perfume river. Farmers in the Phu Bai area are selling \$60,000 worth of vegetables to the US armed forces procurement officer per month and this is expected to increase. Thua Thien may well turn into the vegetable hub of I Corps if this program continues. Traffic from Danang to Hue on Route #1 continues to flow with ever increas-

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ing traffic. (Two months ago a drive from Hue to Danang was considered a trip which only the most adventurous would attempt but now is considered a Sunday afternoon drive with the family to take pictures and observe the scenery). No VC incidents have occurred on this road during the last month.

2. Priority Pacification Programs:

a. Upgrading Territorial Security: Security within the province continues to improve during the month. Units have been deployed into the countryside to secure areas which permit the refugees and displaced families to return to their former homes. However, an increase in small enemy contacts occurred during the month.

The lines of communication (LOC's) have been open throughout the month with no interruption in traffic. A pontoon bridge over the Perfume River in Hue has been implaced while the railroad bridge is being repaired.

The U.S. 101st Airborne Division and ARVN 1st Infantry Division have continued to conduct operations in the mountains which have resulted in the uncovering of many VC cache sites.

(1) Enemy Situation: During January only one minor incident was reported by RD Teams in Thua Thien Province this resulted in 1 RD team member KIA and 2 MIA.

Allied operations have made both enemy overt and covert actions extremely difficult in the lowlands. The enemy has recently increased harassing fire and probing attacks against friendly outposts and other less heavily defended installations. His secondary objective could be an attempt to discredit GVN control through harassing activities directed at the Pacification Programs.

(2) Friendly Situation:

(a) ARVN: The 1st ARVN Division moved out of the lowlands during January and conducted search operations in the mountains of Thua Thien. From 15-30 January an ever increasing number of small contacts were noted and still continue at the present time. Although small these contacts have successfully denied the enemy freedom of movement required to prepare forces for future offensive operations in the lowlands. Rear elements of the 54th Regiment continue to deny the enemy his major route of approach to Hue through Phu Thu District.

(b) US: The 101st Airborne Division have also taken an offensive posture in the mountainous areas of Thua Thien while continuing to conduct search and cordon operations in the lowlands. An increase in contact has been noted in the foothills and mountainous areas, in Base Area 174 and around the Ruong Huong complex. The Division continues its massive assistance to the overall pacification effort.

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(c) Police-NPFF: The National Police have continued to pre-empt the 1969 Pacification Program. Approximately 20% of all National Police personnel assigned to districts are now working in villages, hamlets, and with RD Teams. Six NPFF platoons are assigned to districts of Thua Thien Province. These platoons support local DIOCC, Phuong Hoang and National Police operations.

(3) Status of RF and PF: During January, RF/PF fighting potential significantly increased with the arrival of 4,522 M16 rifles. Distribution of the weapons to 17 RF companies and 80 PF platoons was accomplished in a rapid and efficient manner by the A&DSL Company. Each Regional Force company received 106 weapons, while each Popular Force platoon was equipped with 34 weapons.

After distribution, the A&DSL Company collected 625 M1 carbines, 811 M1 rifles, 2,126 M2 carbines and 555 BAR's from the RF/PF units receiving M16s. The M1 carbines and M1 rifles will be issued to local Self Defense Forces after an inventory and inspection by the A&DSL Company. Some M2 carbines and BARs will be issued to other RF/PF units to fill existing shortages.

All RF/PF units have received an initial course of instruction on the M16. Refresher training and zeroing has also been conducted by all districts. Two new RF companies and three new PF platoons have been recruited within the province to bring sector forces up to 35 RF companies and 143 PF platoons. The two RF companies were organized by selecting five men from each of the existing companies. All new units are presently undergoing basic training.

The A&DSL Company Advisors have initiated a program for conducting English classes in the A&DSL Company. Classes are held three nights a week for two hours per night. The program has been enthusiastically received as evidenced by the high and consistent rate of attendance.

Exclusive of joint operations RF/PF forces conducted 3051 operations, 16 with contact. These operations resulted in 25 VC KIA, 27 VCC and 33 VCI. Friendly losses were 0 RF and 0 PF KIA, 1 RF and 3 PF MIA.

b. PHOENIX/Phung Hoang: The fight against the infrastructure continued successfully during the month. Indications are that combined military operations, in conjunction with all the associated efforts of the Pacification and Development Campaign, and DIOCC initiated operations have all contributed to hampering the infrastructure's ease of operation, therefore causing low morale, which impairs effectiveness. All ten DIOCC Coordinator positions are now filled by MACV assigned personnel. During the month, the transportation problem was alleviated to a degree with the arrival of

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two National Police jeeps. During January, \$245,000VN was paid to informants from Civilian Incentive Rewards Program funds. As a result of the information provided by these informants, one District Chief, 2 members of District Committees, three Village Chiefs, two Deputy Village Chiefs, and two Hamlet Chiefs were killed or captured. For the eighth month in succession, Thua Thien has accounted for more than its assigned quota of VCI to be neutralized. The PRU (Provincial Reconnaissance Unit) apprehended 53 of the 145 VCI neutralized. Also of note is the fact that 90 or 62.1% of the individuals neutralized had been targeted through intelligence input to the PIOC or DIOC. This represents a noteworthy increase over previous months achievements.

c. Improved Local Government: There has been no significant changes for January to report.

d. Popular Self Defense Forces:

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>URBAN</u>	<u>RURAL</u>
(1) Number Recruited	38,937	14,579	24,418
(2) Number Trained	30,300	8,779	21,521
(3) Number Armed	5,385	2,451	2,934

A large quantity of self defense allocated weapons have been received which will permit arming double the present number.

e. Revolutionary Development and Self Help:

(a) The RD Teams spent January training and reorganizing for the thirty-man team and village concept and the move into the new locations. The team also completed their last planned activities for the 1968 RD Plan. During the year 38 of the 54 NID hamlets planned for 1968 were completed. Thirty of the programmed 33 APC hamlets were completed.

(b) As teams prepare to leave the hamlets which they have occupied for 90 days or longer, observations on their recent efforts have indicated that they brought welcome GVN presence into many hamlets and that VC activity in these areas was eliminated or at least badly disrupted. RD/VC contacts dropped to one during the month while RD captured 12 VC and killed 7.

(c) Two significant training activities emphasized self-help in the 1969 Pacification and Development Program were conducted during January, 1969. A one-day orientation training course was held on January 22 which was attended by 263 village and hamlet officials. A three-day seminar-workshop was attended by 153 RD Cadre team leaders from January 21 to 23, 1969. The main objective of the training activities is to provide the participants more skills, broader knowledge and richer training experiences to make them more effective and efficient in discharging their respective roles and functions in the 1969 Pacification and Development Program.

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Completion of the already approved self-help projects was made possible as immediate delivery of materials to project sites as received from Saigon or Danang was accomplished. Ninety-six self-help projects were completed during the month making a total of 454 completed self-help projects for the calendar year 1968. The people's growing enthusiasm to improve their social life through self-help is indeed encouragingly noticeable.

f. Economic Revival:

(a) A giant step was taken this month toward updating centuries old farming practices in Thua Thien Province. The farm tractor has come to Thua Thien. Sixteen Japanese made Kubota tillage tractors are now in operation in the districts of Thua Thien, the result of a major joint effort to get land into production as soon as possible. This effort has been prompted both by the shortages of buffalo and man power, and by the desire of the province chief to introduce more efficient methods to the agricultural facet of the economy. During the month province imported 10,000 baby chicks to offset scarcity and reduce prices of poultry products.

(b) Produce purchase by US military buyers at Hue increased this month to a level of approximately \$60,000 (US) per month, or 15% of total requirements; volume of these local purchases is expected to increase and the beneficial effect to the local economy is already evident.

(c) Rail Transportation: Regular commercial Hue/Danang Train service resumed 15 January, which was the date targeted by local railway officials last fall. One-way third-class fare is 59\$VN, and substantial passenger traffic is being carried. Only five paying passengers rode the first day run from Hue to Danang, but in the last week of the month, the daily average has been 200 passengers.

(d) Hand Crafts: Attention is being focussed on rejuvenation of the hand craft and cottage type industries in the Hue and Thua Thien areas. Initial visits of representatives from the Small Industries Section of the Ministry of Economics at Saigon, and strong support from the Province Chief point to reopening of the Hue Hand Craft Center shortly after Tet.

(e) Fishing: Original concept of the proposed Thuan An fish landing facility has been expanded to a complete fishing industry complex. Technical support from Saigon has been enlisted, and late-month conferences at Hue indicate the project is highly feasible.

g. Resettlement and Care of Refugees: In marked and encouraging contrast to one of the firmest Vietnamese traditions, the operations of the provincial SWR service accelerated considerably in anticipation of Tet. Substantial energies were devoted to regular refugee affairs and to the

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finishing of Project Recovery disbursements before Tet 1969. The percentage of completion in several categories of Tet recovery, such as cement and emergency payments (as opposed to reconstruction grants) increased by more than fifty per cent.

a. National Reconciliation and Chieu Hoi: The returnee input for the month is 30 ralliers. The Chieu Hoi Staff started an aggressive Pre-Tet Chieu Hoi campaign in conjunction with the National "Xuan Que Huong" campaign. On 14 January 1969, the APT was split into 10 man teams, with one team for each of the ten districts with the assigned mission of collecting names of families who may have contact with VC/NVA during Tet. (VC have given passes to their troops to visit friends and relatives in both contested and SVN controlled areas during Tet). Starting on 2 February 1969, these families will be invited to tour the Chieu Hoi Center and the two Chieu Hoi hamlets to see how ex-VC/NVA live. While at the Chieu Hoi Center these families will receive a shopping bag full of propaganda materials and cash reward lists to take back home. These families will be thoroughly briefed on the Third Party Inducement Program, all available rewards for ralliers and present the excellent opportunities for ralliers in Thua Thien Province. However, the number of VC ralliers in Thua Thien Province is expected to decrease as friendly forces continue increased government control over the province's territory. Despite this trend, the aggressive Chieu Hoi Staff and the APT are reworking their present psychological machinery to particularly appeal to the NVA, in the event that NVA main forces units come down out of the mountains. The Chieu Hoi Staff plans to fully exploit the 45 NVA ralliers, out of a 1968 returnee total of 1297 (Total returnees for all previous years, 1963 to 1967, were only 959), for appeals to NVA comrades still in the field. Letters of appeal, leaflet drops, aerial live broadcasts, Radio Hue, TV Hue, also will emphasize appeals to the NVA.

3. Required Actions:

Progress has been so good this month it would be inappropriate to list any required actions.

11 Annexes

- | | |
|---------------|---------------|
| a. Hue City | h. Phu Thu |
| b. Huong Dien | i. Phu Yang |
| c. Huong Thuy | j. Quang Dien |
| d. Huong Tra | k. Vinh Loc |
| e. Nam Hoa | |
| f. Phong Dien | |
| g. Phu Loc | |

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HUE CITY REPORT
THUA THIEN PROVINCE

31 January 1969

1. (U) District Chiefs:

- Dist. 1, Hue - Major Vo Trong Hau, appointed: 4 March 1968.
Dist. 2, Hue - Major Pham Van Mauoc, appointed: 4 March 1968.
Dist. 3, Hue - Captain Tran Van Cui, appointed: 7 November 1968.

2. (C) Overall Status of the Pacification Effort: Numerous indicators point to continued progress in pacification at Hue. Normal patterns of living have been resumed by most of the city's residents, and while no one forgets that the war goes on, confidence continues to grow. For many, particularly visitors from other areas, it is difficult to believe such rapid recovery from last year's damage could have occurred, but it is felt the factors enumerated below fairly indicate present conditions. Enemy actions are continually felt to be possible, but with each day that passes free of terrorist activities, confidence is being restored.

3. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification: As previously reported, generally favorable conditions of security prevailing in Hue and immediate vicinity are regarded as being the principal factors which make effective efforts at pacification possible. An enlightened civil administration staff is also contributory. While the prolonged conditions of war have brought heavy attrition to the corps of civil servants, the effect of improved training of civil administrators is making higher standards of performance evident. This is particularly true among the younger graduates of the National Institute of Administration. Responsive and responsible top-level leadership is bringing the climate for successful pacification to Hue and Thua Thien Province.

4. (U) Miscellaneous Events and Activities of Special Significance During January Include:

(a) Organization of the Provincial Committee for Pacification and Development which will focus on economic development in Hue area.

(b) Construction activity at extremely high level with many major projects ongoing including primary LCCs (U.S. Seabees), lesser city streets (local PV crews), An Cui canal bridges, Dong Ba marketplace (partially completed at time of TET events), numerous public buildings, and pontoon bridge erected across Perfume River taking vehicular traffic during upcoming renovation of railway bridge and subsequent replacement of temporary span of Nguyen Hoang bridge (estimated to take one year);

(c) Economic activity is high with markets full of shoppers as well as goods to buy.

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(d) Hue University enrollment has increased to over 3,200 students (more than the pre-TET level), with efforts being made to entice medicine faculty members now at Saigon to return to Hue to allow reopening of Medical School in midsummer; also, arrangements were finalized for American academicians to assume teaching posts on a limited but regularized basis.

(e) American Cultural Center was forced to discontinue enrollment of adults for English classes when 1,300 mark passed, due to teachers presently available only for half that number.

(f) Friendly gestures from Buddhists with invitations for selected CORDS personnel to participate in Buddha Illumination Day ceremonies.

(g) GVN civil officials in numerous cases anticipating and effecting 'back-up' support for national programs, particularly in training and orienting hamlet and phuong committeemen, which could well be termed "taking the ball and running with it".

(h) Buddhist memorial services at selected curbside locations in the three city districts for the "unknown" persons killed in the streets of Hue during Tet Mau Than, which of course included many VC, with numerous private services in private homes for the "known" dead (anniversary date being marked by the passing of the 12th lunar month since the TET events).

(i) The tenth month passing without any act of VC terrorism originating within the city.

5. (U) Special Problems: None which cannot be handled at the local level with prompt and sufficient backup support.

ROBERT S. McCARDLISS
Municipal Advisor/CORDS/Hue

PSA COMMENT: None

ANNEX A

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HUONG BINH DIST. ICT
THU. THUA PROVINCE

31 January 1969

1. (U) District Chief: Dai-uy Ton That Bien Appointed 25 July 1967.
2. (C) Overall Status of the Pacification Effort: Pacification is going very well. Many civic action projects are either under way or will be started soon. These projects are mostly at the request of the people and they are more than willing to support them. Such projects help meet the needs and aspirations of the people. It is planned that by the end of March all refugees in the district will be resettled in their homes and outposts completed to provide the necessary security. The presence of an RD Team has helped enhance this program. Security in the district is outstanding and there has not been once VC-initiated incident in the last 7 months.
3. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification: The continued influence of a secure environment and willingness of the GVN to aid and assist the people. This results in a spirit of cooperation that further accelerates the pacification effort.
4. (C) Miscellaneous: No significant problems this month.
5. (U) Special Problems: No problems noted.
6. (C) Operations: Exclusive of joint operations RF/PF forces conducted 2 operations, none with contact. No casualties, friendly or enemy, were incurred.

DAVID J. DRUM
Major, Artillery
District Senior Advisor

PSA COMMENT: None

ANNEX B

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TRUNG THUY DISTRICT
NHA TRUEN PROVINCE

31 January 1969

1. (U) District Chief. CIT Do Nao Thao. Appointed 5 August 1968.

2. (C) Overall Status of the Pacification Effort: Pacification continues to improve with an increase amount of work being done in the reconstruction area. A greater number of VC near the borders of Accelerated Pacification Campaign Hamlets was noted, however, GVN projects and activities have not been retarded as a result of this.

3. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification: A continuation of factors as reported last month, plus timely shifting of forces to areas where the presence of friendly forces are needed most.

A Mobile Advisory Team (MAT I-44) was assigned to the district during the reporting period. This team assignment looks good on paper, however, without an interpreter, they will not be able to accomplish the desired mission for which they are assigned.

4. (U) Miscellaneous: Nothing to report.

5. (U) Special Problems: The shortage of vehicles is causing the effectiveness of this advisory team.

6. (C) Operations: Exclusive of joint operations, district forces conducted 750 operations, 11 with contact. These operations resulted in 18 enemy KIA, 19 captured and 26 VC eliminated. Nine weapons were captured. Friendly losses were 1 WIA.

JAMES E. DAVIS
LTC, Infantry
District Senior Advisor

PSA Comment: None

ANNEX C

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HUONG THA DISTRICT
THUA THIEN PROVINCE

31 January 1969

1. (U) District Chief: Captain Nguyen Chanh Hanh. Appointed: 20 December 1968.

2. (C) Overall Status of the Pacification Effort: The Accelerated Pacification Campaign is progressing in an excellent manner. Roofing tin arrived and was distributed to several hamlets. Large numbers of families moved or are presently in the process of moving to APC Hamlets.

3. (C) Factors Influencing Pacifications:

a. The continued presence of elements of the 101st Airborne Division in the district.

b. The presence of five RF companies and 21 PF platoons located throughout the district.

c. The initiative and drive exerted by the CAP and RD Teams located in the district.

d. The increased operational readiness of three RF companies through efforts of the MAT.

e. The issue of weapons to arm the Self Defense Force created by issuance of M-16A1 Rifles to RF and PF forces in the district.

f. Distribution of 100 sheets of roofing tin and \$4,736,550VNS was completed during the reporting period.

4. (C) Miscellaneous:

a. Efforts to initiate Civil Affairs Plan No. 1 (Operation Nevada Eagle) mentioned in previous reports, have been accelerated.

b. The fourth library to be organized in the district is expected to be in operation prior to 17 Feb 69.

c. Surgeons from the Medical Battalion, 2d Fde, 101st Abn Division conduct regularly scheduled MEDCAMS in the district, treating an average of 150 patients each visit.

5. (U) Special Problems:

a. Non-availability of requested training aids for the MAT.

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b. Excessive speeding on OLA by US and ARVN vehicles causing several accidents.

c. (c) Operations: Exclusive of joint operations, RF/PF forces conducted 1371 operations, 2 with contact, resulting in 5 VC KIA, 6 VCC, 4 VCI, 1 Hoi Chenh, and 4 individual weapons captured. Friendly losses were 1 PF MIA.

FREDERICK E. TELFOR
Major, Infantry
District Senior Advisor

PSA Comments: None

ANNEX D

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NAM HOA DISTRICT
THU THIEN PROVINCE

31 January 1969

1. (U) District Chief: Col. Huong Thac Hiet. Appointed: 13 May 1968.
2. (C) Overall Status of the Pacification Effort:
 - a. Pacification effort remains excellent with no enemy initiated incidents in the government controlled areas of Nam Hoa.
 - b. The District Chief has made and is continuing to make a concerted effort to make personal contact with the people to personally insure that they are receiving the full benefits due them.
 - c. Support of the government of Vietnam is quite evident in all levels of the population.
3. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification:
 - a. The obvious continuation of GVN support for the population.
 - b. Some of the programs starting to show positive results; i.e. refugee resettlement and payments.
 - c. The ever presence of Free World Forces to meet and thwart any possible VC/NVA power move.
 - d. Because of the improved security situation the lumber industry has been able to begin operation again, thereby employing approximately three hundred people.
4. (U) Miscellaneous: None
5. (U) Special Problems:
 - a. Advisory vehicles: Both 1 ton vehicles are in the A&DSL Company for repairs. One vehicle needs a new fuel pump while the second vehicle was picked up from A&DSL Company on the 21st of January, driven to Nam Hoa and parked, on the morning of 22 January it could not start. This was the same problem it was taken in for previously. As of this date there are no vehicles in operation for the advisors to use in Nam Hoa, which greatly hampers operations.
 - b. Shortage of RF/TF troops to meet all commitments.

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6. (C) Operations: Exclusive of joint operations, R¹/PF conducted 30 operations with no contact. There were 2 VCI arrested. Friendly casualties were negative.

WILLIAM J. BELL
Captain, Infantry
District Senior Advisor

PSA Comments: The two advisory vehicles were put in for repair on the 20th and 30th of January 1969. Pressure will be exerted to speed their return to the team.

ANNEX E

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PHONG BIEN DISTRICT
TRUNG BINH PROVINCE

31 January 1969

1. (U) District Chief: Minh Van Thap. Appointed: 4 February 1966.
2. (C) Overall Status of the Pacification Effort: Pacification efforts in Phong Bien have been improved greatly during this reporting period. Directives given the District Chief by the Province Chief have accelerated the distribution of tin and money for Set Refugees. The 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne now conducts LEOCAP in the district on a weekly basis. RF and PF rallies accompany these LEOCAP thus serving a dual purpose; strengthening under strength LEOCAP teams, and receiving on the job training.
3. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification: The lack of storage space at Camp Evans has resulted in Phong Bien Dist not receiving many truck loads of vegetables. These vegetables have been distributed to the various refugee camps in the district. The vegetables have consisted of potatoes, tomatoes, onions, apples, oranges, lettuce and cabbage.
4. (C) Miscellaneous: During January the RF Company and several PF Platoons have been issued M16 rifles. The IAT Team has been training the RF and PF on care and cleaning and zeroing of the M16.
5. (U) Special Problems: None
6. (C) Operations: Exclusive of joint operations RF/PF forces conducted 188 operations, none with contact.

NICHOLAS J. ADLOCK JR.
Major, Infantry
District Senior Advisor

FSA Comments: None

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PHU LOC DISTRICT
THUA THIEN PROVINCE

31 January 1969

1. (U) District Chief: CPT Le Huu Duc. Appointed: August 1968
2. (C) Overall Status of the Pacification Effort:
 - a. The pacification effort continues to move forward even though enemy activities in the district have been stepped up.
 - b. The VC and NVA continue to come into the villages and hamlets to propagandize and tax the people despite heavy losses from Army and Marine ambushes.
 - c. The most significant enemy initiated incident this month was a combined attack on District Headquarters and a near-by Marine-PF ambush on 19 January.
 - d. Even though the enemy activities continue, the people's confidence in the GVN continues to strengthen. This confidence is displayed throughout the district by the large rice crops which have been planted.
3. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification:
 - a. The continuing interest of the American forces in the district for the well-being of the people has strengthened the people's confidence in the GVN.
 - b. The District Headquarters sponsored Peoples' Self Defense Forces rally held in Lang Co, Loc Hai Village from 13-16 January with competition between village units has helped generate interest in the PSDF program.
 - c. Lack of weapons for the Peoples' Self Defense Force has hampered the program.
 - d. A more orderly and organized system of MEDCAPs is needed so that more people can be reached and trained.
4. (C) Miscellaneous:

MAT I-30 has now initiated a program to train all units recently issued M-16 rifles in their use.
5. (U) Special Problems:

There is a shortage of advisory team personnel and advisory vehicles which hampers the completion of the team's mission.

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6. (C) Operations:

Exclusive of joint operations, RF/PF forces conducted 359 operations, 25 with contact. These operations resulted in 49 VC KIA, 9 VCI, one PW, 39 weapons captured. Friendly losses were three PF KIA and four PF WIA.

EDWARD J. BUNKE
MAJOR INFANTRY
District Senior Advisor

PSA COMMENT: The personnel shortage (one radio operator) is most common in the province and can not be resolved at this level. One vehicle assigned to Phu Loc has been in maintenance since 16 December 1968, pressure will be brought to repair and return this vehicle expeditiously.

ANNEX G

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PHU THU DISTRICT
THUA THIEN PROVINCE

31 January 1969

1. (U) District Chief: CPT Nguyen Dinh Doi. Appointed: 8 November 68.

2. (C) Overall Status of the Pacification Effort: Pacification of the district continues to move ahead. The presence of a battalion of the 101st Airborne Division and the 54th RVN Regiment has and will continue to be a key factor in this effort. RF/PF units continue to provide complete security in the locations where they are deployed. Preparations have been completed for the pacification effort along the Phu Vang - Phu Thu Road. Two RF companies and MAT I-38 are prepared to begin the operation on 1 February as planned. Though the VC continues to move at will through Phu Thu, there are no VC controlled areas in the district.

Materials have been received and work is progressing rapidly toward the construction of a new dispensary and reconstruction of the district headquarters, warehouse, and school.

The TET recovery plan has been successfully completed.

Popular Self Defense Forces have completed their training and are presently providing security in the villages of Vinh Ha, Vinh Thai, and Phu Da. Approximately 34,000 pounds of rice were captured and delivered to the district by the 1/501st Bn, 101st ABN. This rice was distributed to the refugees of Hoa Da Tay #2.

Presently two medcaps per week are held by 1/501st ABN in the district. The nurse and team medic provide medical attention in the vicinity of the district headquarters on a daily basis. A greater effort for providing medical attention for the people of Phu Thu is planned.

Joint Operations with the 1/501st Airborne continues to bring good results. On 16 Jan one PF Platoon and one squad of Airborne captured 2 VC with two AK-47's.

The present security situation and lack of VC activity in the district has provided an excellent opportunity for improvements. Where support is supplied progress will be made.

3. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification:

a. Lack of RD Teams.

b. Lack of RF/PF to assist in security.

c. Continued low level of support for Phu Thu in materials and services.

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d. Complete lack of effective transportation system for district officials and advisors.

4. (U) Miscellaneous: None.

5. (U) Special Problems:

a. Lack of interpreter for MAT Team.

b. Overall poor defensive posture of the District Headquarters due to lack of materials.

c. Difficulty in visiting hamlets of the District due to lack of roads and helicopters.

6. (C) Operations: Exclusive of joint operations, RF/PF conducted 4 operations, 2 with contact. These operations resulted in one VCI captured. Friendly losses were 2 PF MIA.

JOHN W. BYERS
Major, Infantry
District Senior Advisor

PSA Comments: None

ANNEX H

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PHU VANG DISTRICT
THUA THIEN PROVINCE

31 January 1969

1. (U) District Chief: CPT Le Ho Trong, Appointed: 7 November 1968.
2. (C) Overall Status of Pacification: The district has completed the 1968 Accelerated Pacification Program with superior results. Plans and actions are continuing and the expected expansion program has already been started. With only seven hamlets in the first phase, twelve hamlets were actually resettled.
3. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification:
 - a. An excellent District Chief.
 - b. Cooperation by local population.
 - c. Fine support by 101st Abn Division.
4. (U) Miscellaneous: None.
5. (U) Special Problems:
 - a. Heavy traffic moving at excessive speeds.
 - b. Difficulty in gaining access to 2 villages currently blocked by Navy camp.
6. (C) Operations: RF/PF conducted 7 operations, 0 with contact. These operations resulted in 0 VC KIA, 0 VCC with 0 friendly KIA and 0 WIA.

WILLIAM R. SHACKLEFORD
Major, Artillery
District Senior Advisor

PSA Comment: None

ANNEX I

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VINH LOC DISTRICT
THU THIEN PROVINCE

31 January 1969

1. (U) District Chief: Major Phan Van Tuong. Appointed: 2 December 1968.

2. (C) Overall Status of the Pacification Effort:

a. The status of the pacification program in Vinh Loc is illustrated by the attitude and actions of an agriculture team that came from Hue on 28 January 1969 to work for four days in the hamlet of Ha Thanh, eight kilometers from District Headquarters. The team chief insisted on transportation each morning and evening so his team could sleep at District Headquarters. He frankly stated he did not trust the security situation. After having arrived in the hamlet, meeting the village chief and talking with the farmers, the team chief emphasized the degree to which he was impressed and chose to remain in the village overnight.

b. General: January 1969 has been the most productive month in a four month old pacification program that had already produced dramatic results. The new District Chief began a reorganization of both his sub-sector and administrative staffs in mid December which has borne positive results. Schools were opened in three villages. The information program improved from less than adequate to excellent. The DIOCC improved from poor to very effective. A second bridge was completed making the southern end of the district accessible. Plans and actions to improve agriculture have lifted that program from dormant to dynamic. One can now drive a jeep from the southern most village to the northern border and make part of the return trip on another road. The Popular Self Defense Force program continues to be a fountain of enthusiasm, action and civic pride. The spirit and enthusiasm of the people of the district is exhilarating.

c. Civic Action/Self Help/Public Works:

(1) Civic action/Self Help/Public Works projects are in effect throughout the district and are proving beneficial to both public spirit and the economy.

(2) In Vinh Xuan (number one priority village for ID '69) the District Advisor showed the people how to assemble a large culvert. They finished the job without supervision and returned to District Headquarters to ask for three more culverts. Two days later a visit to the village revealed they had finished assembly and emplacement of the culverts with no further action on the part of district officials or the advisors.

(3) Eight culverts in four other villages were emplaced and extensive road repair was done by the villagers making motor vehicle travel convenient on roads where it had heretofore been difficult and impractical.

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QUANG DIEN DISTRICT
THUA THIEN PROVINCE

31 January 1969

1. (U) District Chief: Major Tran Tien Dao. Appointed: November 1967.
2. (C) Overall Status of the Pacification Effort: Pacification continues to progress satisfactorily throughout the district with no enemy initiated incidents during the month.
3. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification:
 - a. The District Chief initiated a policy of integrating, on a part time basis, members of Popular Self Defense Forces into PF platoons in order to enhance the training state of Self Defense Forces and to free some PF for use in other areas of the district.
 - b. Unhesitating support and cooperation of 1st Bn 502d, 101st Abn.
 - c. Arrival of the 4th RF Bn C.P. to assume direct supervision and control of the 3 RF companies in the district. This will ease some of the military burden from the District Chief so that he will be able to devote more attention to district civil administration.
 - d. Lack of DIOCC facilities, supplies and an interpreter prohibit efficient and effective operation of the DIOCC and thus hinders elimination of VCI.
4. (U) Miscellaneous: None
5. (U) Special Problems: Shortage of teachers within the district.
6. (C) Operations: Exclusive of joint operations, RF/PF conducted 6 operations, 1 with contact. These operations resulted in 2 enemy KIA, 2 captured and negative friendly casualties. The district had one Chieu Hoi this month.

ROBERT E. TAGGS
Major, Infantry
District Senior Advisor

PSA Comments: None

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(4) In the hamlet of Lixay, Vien, a 25 meter bridge has been completed across an unfordable river opening the local market and the nearby hamlets to commercial and vehicular traffic. The new bridge replaced a bamboo bridge and thereby also opened the river to large sampan traffic. The Hamlet Chief gave the project his personal daily attention and provided up to 60 people each day for labor.

(5) In the hamlet of Phung Chanh, the sampan docking area at the market was rebuilt. Sand and stone were used as fill and cement was used to finish a hard stand. This enabled the people to embark and offload sampans without walking in the mud. It is further planned to build a pier to facilitate docking of more craft. The only advisor support of the project was demonstrated interest. The local people are doing all the planning, coordinating and labor.

(6) Extensive repair has been done on the levee in Vinh Hung and some repair is completed in other villages. The levee is essential to protect the rice fields from salt contaminated river water and the people work on the project willingly and with enthusiasm.

(7) Villagers completed repairs on seven schools as self help project and extensive work was done in the Vinh Hai and Vinh Xuan markets.

(8) The 922d RF Company is repairing the pier in Vinh Thanh as a civic action project.

(9) A survey team from the 101st Airborne Division and the 29th Civil Affairs Company conducted a thorough and detailed civic action survey for inclusion of local projects in the 101st Division's Civic Action plan.

(10) Five U.S. MEDCAPS visited the district during the month and treated about 700 people.

(11) The VN MEDCAP program using local civilian, RF and PF medical aidmen has improved but still needs constant motivation by the advisory team.

(12) An additional project carried out by the advisory team was the receipt and distribution of about 500 pounds of clothing sent to the DSA by the people of Danville, Virginia for needy people in Vinh Loc.

d. Agriculture:

(1) Agriculture has received the close attention of the District Chief and a sound program is developing. Outstanding support by the Province Agricultural Staff and their advisor has been essential to the establishment and progress of this program. Preliminary meetings have been conducted to form a Farmers Association. The Province Staff has been active

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in visiting the fields, inspecting crops and talking to farmers. A province team has come to spray rice fields infected by grasshoppers. Largely due to a visit by agriculture experts from Hue, the villagers of Vinh Giang have harvested their betel nuts which they had believed to be poisoned by American defoliants. Planting of the rice crop is over 90% completed with some villages having planted 98% of their rice fields. Tractors have been given to each of the two villages with APC hamlets. The support and interest shown in the problems of the farmers has done much to establish rapport between the people and the government.

(2) An agronomist from the 29th Civil Affairs Company conducted a survey in mid January to assist in determining means to increase crop yield and the introduction of new crops on now barren land and the introduction of higher profit yield crops.

(3) Two projects being carried out by the advisory team concerns bees and two fodder crops. A bee hive has been obtained and assembled by team members and representatives of selected hamlets are reproducing more hives. The objective of this project is to introduce bees into areas where crops will benefit from the pollination and also the eventual economic value of the honey. The second project is the planting of Paraguayan Bahia grass, a deep rooted, fast growing, soil stabilizing grass of good fodder value and sorghum, a high protein animal food. One quarter acre patches will be planted throughout the district on an experimental basis. One patch has been planted so at this date.

e. Education and Information:

(1) In December, the District Chief suggested independent surveys be made by himself and the ESA to determine areas in need of attention. On both surveys the number one and two priority areas were education and information, respectively.

(2) In January, effort put into the education program has enabled the district to open schools in three villages. Schools in the two other villages are repaired and will open in February. RF and PF soldiers are being used as teachers. There is a serious shortage of teachers in the district. Fifty teachers are needed to fill present vacancies. Coordination is being made with appropriate officials in Hue to provide a teacher training program. Sufficient qualified people in Vinh Loc have indicated an interest in receiving training.

(3) The information program that was very poor eight weeks ago is now excellent. The first two editions of a district newspaper (mimeographed) were published in January. The paper is now a semi-monthly but it is planned to make it a weekly. The hamlet assistants for information have been organized into teams of three or four throughout the district. They visit the houses and families of known VC and encourage the family to convince the VC members to rally. Also they distribute information and make speeches to assembled groups. Posters, banners, leaflets and radios with loudspeakers are all being used effectively in this greatly expanded program.

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f. Popular Self Defense Force: The PPDF is the most dynamic single program in the district. In January the District Chief started a program of weekly bivouacs, training, competition, drama shows and civic action. The self defense form a conducted village assemble on Saturday and training is conducted throughout the day. Saturday night they put on a drama/talent show. As many as 5,000 people have attended these shows and the shows have sometimes lasted until midnight. The Sunday program includes a trip to a nearby village where the self defense from the second village acts as host. Sunday morning is spent in a civic action activity. Repair of roads, bridges and schools are examples. At noon the host group serves a meal and in the afternoon competition is conducted. This program was initiated to perpetuate the enthusiasm and civic interest that was obvious in each village when self defense training started. This civic interest is sometimes manifest in gifts from citizens. Frequently meals are paid for by contributions and in one case an old man gave 10,000\$VN to the village self defense. The unanticipated benefits may eventually prove far more important to the pacification program than the original objective of the self defense. Approximately 700 weapons have been issued and approximately 250 remain to be issued. Concurrently with the training of the last 500, from An Bang and Ha Uc, a retraining program was started for the 460 self defense from Vinh Hien. It is planned to continue retraining on the same cycle that initial training was conducted.

g. Defense and Security:

(1) One RF Company and seven PF Platoons have been issued the M-16 rifle. The MAT Team supervised training and zero firing of all these units.

(2) Scout dogs were used for four days at mid-month to search for hidden VC bunkers. This program was effective in that three holes were found with some food and/or water in them, but no VC were found. It is planned to continue the use of scout dogs when they can again be made available to the district.

(3) One hundred and seven men are being trained to form a twelfth PF Platoon and bring the other platoons up to full strength.

(4) An MPFF Platoons has been assigned to support the DIOCC.

h. Resettlement:

(1) There have been no new refugees generated and there are no refugees in any kind of settlement in the district. There are some 1,300 persons from Vinh Loc living in Phu Bai. Committees from their hamlets have gone to Phu Bai to coordinate details of their return. Village Chiefs are formulating a plan to receive these people when they return to their homes. Coordination is being made with the appropriate agencies at Province to have resettlement materials and money available in their hamlet when the people return.

(2) A recent shipment of tin and money for resettlement was issued to the final recipients within 24 hours of delivery.

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3. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification:

a. The 1/501 Bn, 101st Airborne Division has been responsive to the needs of the District Chief.

b. An ARVN unit of company or battalion size is usually in operation within the district.

4. (U) Miscellaneous: None.

5. (U) Special Problems: None.

6. (C) Operations: Exclusive of joint operations, District RF/PF conducted 700 operations. These operations resulted in no contact. There were no friendly KIA or WIA.

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District Senior Advisor

PSA COMMENTS: None.

ANNEX K

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BRIEFING OUTLINE
Cam Vu Resettlement Plan

Attachment 2
Annex B - AATV
Report - Feb 69

I - Background and Situation

II - Concept of Operation :

- A. Management of Operation
- B. Mission and Objectives

III - Phases of Operation :

- A. Phase One - Preliminary Operations
- B. Phase Two - Operations Prior to Resettlement
- C. Phase Three - Resettlement of People
- D. Phase Four - Operation after Resettlement

IV - Units Required - Strengths and Duties

A. Military Units

- 1. Forward CP Staff
- 2. 2 RF Companies

B. Paramilitary Units

- 1. APT's - 1 squad
- 2. NPFF - 1 platoon
- 3. FRU - 1 squad

C. Civilian Units

- 1. Refugee Service
- 2. Agricultural Service
- 3. Public Health Service
- 4. Police Special Branch
- 5. National Police ID Service

I - SITUATION :

In late February and early March, 1968, approximately 6,000 people from 19 hamlets were evacuated from the fertile Cam Le Valley. At that time, the lack of military security for the area and the fact that NVA/VC operations and artillery were based near and in the subject area, made necessary the relocation of these people. At the request of the 3d Marine Division, in order to facilitate the delivery of supporting arms to approximately 15 square kilometers, the people were moved to 3 principal refugee camps.

The military situation has now changed so that the return of these people can be considered. Since May, 1968, little military activity has taken place in the area. If the people are allowed to return, the economic potential of the valley, complemented by the large Colombo Han Irrigation System, can again be tapped. If the National Program of "Return to hamlet" can be effected so that the people have adequate time to repair the irrigation dikes and ready their paddies by May, the largest irrigation system in the province can again be used. This irrigation complex, coupled with IR-8 rice, could raise the province rice production to a nearly self-sufficient level. At present, considerable amounts of rice must be imported. In addition to the economic gain, there is the opportunity to return people to their homes, relieving 2 overcrowded refugee camps and demonstrating the government's concern for resettlement whenever the situation permits.

II - CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION :

A. Management of the Operation :

The operation should be managed by a Sector forward CF similar to that deployed for the Gia Dang Project. This will minimize the complications that invariably arise in connection with a project involving more than one district.

B. Mission and Objectives :

1. The objectives of this operation are: to return some 6,000 people to their native hamlets in an orderly manner; to secure for them benefits to which they are entitled; to remove VC elements from the hamlets; to secure the area and the people following their return from VC infiltration; and to restore the people to a level of economic viability where their sympathies for the GVN will be stimulated and their resistance to communist incursions fortified.
2. The complex and subtle nature of this mission involves the closest coordination of nearly all the Sector and Province agencies.

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C. Phasing of the Operation :

1. The operation may be viewed as having four phases :
 - a. A preliminary phase involving an engineering and survey effort and during which the participating agencies should prepare for their involvement.
 - b. A phase of operations prior to the relocation of the people.
 - c. A phase wherein the physical resettlement of the people and their final screening is the main area of emphasis.
 - d. A phase of operations following the resettlement wave.
2. These phases are described in greater detail below.

III - PHASES OF THE OPERATION :

As described above, the operation may be viewed as having four main phases. It should be understood from the outset that these phases need not be mutually exclusive; that is, activities described as part of Phase I may still be on-going after activities included under Phase II have commenced. Despite this lack of distinct differentiation between the phases, and despite a certain amount of over-lap, each period or phase should, in fact, be characterized by a distinct emphasis of effort and a discernable focus of resources on the activities that constitute the given phase.

A. Phase One - Preliminary and Planning Activities :

Phase I should be comprised of four major activities: engineering efforts, survey projects, planning, and preliminary sweeps.

1. Engineering efforts should be directed towards the following:
 - a. The repair of Road 83 and its bridges (a task which the 14th U.S. Engineering Battalion has agreed to undertake and which is now being executed).
 - b. The repair of public buildings in the 13 hamlets comprising the resettlement area, (a task the 7th CB Battalion, headquartered at Dong Ha, has agreed to undertake).
 - c. The temporary repair of the warehouse at Dong Ha by means of tarpaulin as a convenient storage point for cement and commodities which must be secured as a part of the operation, (CORDS, Quang Tri, is prepared to undertake this task).

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- d. Repair of the pumping and irrigation system upon which the ultimate success of the operation is premised, (a task accepted by the 7th CB Battalion and is now being executed).
2. The second aspect of Phase I includes a survey of the people to be moved. This survey should be conducted on two levels: first, the refugee service should bring its family name lists up to date and survey each family to determine whether they prefer cement or cash for home rebuilding and whether the family is currently in possession of its allocated ten sheets of tin. (The 29th Civil Affairs Company has agreed to assist the Refugee Service in the conduct of their survey if the Service so desires.); second, the provincial intelligence services should prepare detailed black lists and activate or upgrade the existing informant-agent network in the thirteen hamlets to be re-located.
3. The third aspect of Phase I involves the preparation of detailed plans by each of the civilian agencies and military staffs named by the Province Chief as participants in the operation. Each section should include in its plan a statement of their objectives, the number of personnel they plan to assign to the operation, and the support arrangements they contemplate for these personnel.
4. Military sweeps to ascertain the absence of main force enemy units in the proposed resettlement area should be run prior to the move. In fact, such sweeps have already been run by Sector and Sub-sector forces, and the sweep operations discussed below as part of the operation's second phase should serve as a continuing security barometer.

Phase I, especially its last three aspects, should be completed by the time the Province-Sector forward CP is established.

B. Phase Two - Operations Prior to the Resettlement :

Phase II of the operation should commence after a Province-Sector Forward CP has been established. This CP should be completely mobile so that it can co-locate with the pre-move operations that are part of Phase III and, later, with the return of the people discussed as a part of Phase III.

The primary objective of the operations comprising Phase II is VC infrastructure removal. To this end (and to secure the AO) operations of four kinds are recommended:

- 1, Military Sweeps: Occasional military sweeps of the AO should be conducted by a battalion-size force to prevent VC guerrilla groups from coalescing into main force units and thereby jeopardizing the forward CP and the hamlets to be moved. A sweep of this nature should occur every ten days or so, and should involve no more than a one day operation in each case, assuming negative contact.

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2. Intelligence Reaction Operations: Intelligence reaction operations are generally small scale, swiftly mounted operations devised on an ad hoc basis in response to specific intelligence generated in the field. These operations are generally executed by special units such as FRU's or NFFF's but may, should the occasion merit, involve up to a company-size unit.
3. Major Cordon and Screening Operations: The key to operation Kangaroo's success lies in the effectiveness of a series of cordon and screening operations, at least one of which should be conducted at each of the five refugee locations, where the people from the thirteen hamlets are now located.

In the course of these operations, the entire refugee hamlet should be cordoned off and where appropriate, in larger camps, inner cordons should be inserted to sub-divide the camps into sections each of which may be dealt with one at a time. When the cordon has been inserted, the forward CP's intelligence units should begin a systematic screening and interrogation of everyone inside the cordon.

In view of the size of some refugee camps involved, more than a one-day operation must be envisaged for each location. The District Senior Advisors for Cam Lo and Dong Ha, in consultation with their counterparts, the District Chiefs, have come up with the following proposed schedule for these operations and the troop requirements for the cordons involved in each:

<u>Location</u>	<u>No. of days for Operation</u>	<u>Troop requirements for Cordon</u>
Vinh Dai	5	3 companies
Thiet Trang	3	2 companies
Bich Giang	2	1 company - reinforced
Nga Tu Song	6	3 companies
Moc Bai*	3	2 companies

*Figures for Moc Bai based on the assumption that people are still in the refugee village. If they have already returned to their hamlets, the operation will involve 3 companies and require 4 days for completion.

In addition to an intelligence and anti-infrastructure orientation, these operations should call into play the full spectrum of the Province psychological apparatus. Psychological operations and black psychological operations should be conducted by APT's, VIS, and S-5 units while the cordon is still in place. These psychological operations should have five objectives:

1. To plant false information to confuse the enemy.
2. To induce potential Hoi Chanh to rally to the GVN.

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- c. To inform the people about the mechanics of the move.
 - d. To inform the people about the benefits that will accrue to them as a result of the move.
 - e. To inform the people about the responsibilities that they must fulfill as resettled, economically gifted citizens of the GVN and the unfortunate consequence that will follow if these responsibilities are not fulfilled.
4. Minor Cordon and Screening Operations: Minor cordon and screening operations described above. These should be company (or company minus) operations lasting for one day or less. The object of these operations is to discourage VC re-infiltration of the refugee camps after the major cordon effort has been completed. Some VC, seeing that a major cordon of their camp lasting several days has been completed, may conclude that it is safe to re-enter the hamlets since, in their view, a second cordon shortly after such a major effort should be unlikely.

In order to counter this situation, it is proposed that occasional, random "spot check" cordons be inserted around part of a refugee camp and the population inside the cordon be given a quick intelligence screening.

These are the four major types of operations envisaged as comprising Phase II of Operation Kangaroo.

C. Phase Three - Resettlement of the People:

1. After all the people to be resettled have been examined in the series of operations described above, the physical relocation of the people must be undertaken. This should be undertaken on a systematic hamlet-by-hamlet basis. As each hamlet is moved from its refugee location to its original home site, all the inhabitants of the hamlet should pass through a final screening center, established somewhere in the vicinity of their hamlet, where a final screening will take place, ID cards will be issued, agricultural information will be made available, immunization shots will be administered, and refugee and commodities and payments will be made available.
2. Where necessary, logistical support should be provided for the aged and infirm in the transportation of their household belongings, but, generally speaking, the proximity of the refugee camps to the resettlement area indicates that the majority of the move can be accomplished by the people themselves.

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D. Phase Four - Operations Following the Resettlement:

1. The fourth and final phase of Operation Fisher should be conducted after the Province-Sector Forward CP has been dismantled and the situation vis-a-vis district control of the area has been normalized.
2. The fourth phase of the operation is a long term and continuing effort. The two tasks involved in this final phase are the most subtle and difficult to perform. These two tasks are: first, the economic development of the area; and second, continued harassment of VC elements in the area. In effect, what must be done during the final phase is to develop the area to an economic level where its inhabitants constitute a sturdy yeomanry. Ultimately, it is hoped they will be capable, self-sufficient, and willing to participate in the defense of their hamlets against communist incursion. In the opinion of the advisory team, keys to this effort are IR-8 rice and the Colombo Plan Irrigation System. Taken together, these two elements could transform the Cam Vu Valley from a desolate free-fire zone into one of the richest rice-producing areas in northern I Corps. In so doing, of course, a new level of prosperity would be achieved for the valley inhabitants.
3. During this period of development, an especially watchful eye must be kept on the area lest the VC sweep in and destroy the developing villages or - an even more sinister possibility - re-penetrate the village thereby securing for themselves a new source of rice and other foodstuffs. A constant series of cordon-search-ID check operations should be conducted by troops in the area after the departure of the special resettlement CP in order to assure the ultimate success of the operation. In addition of course, "rice denial" operations whereby the VC are prevented from taxing the people for their surplus rice at harvest time, must play an integral and essential part in the future of the Cam Vu Valley area.

IV - UNITS INVOLVED - STRENGTHS AND DUTIES :

A. Military Units :

1. Forward CP Staff: The S-2, S-3, S-4, and S-5 Sections of Sector should provide at least one officer or non-commissioned officer to serve as the Operation Commander's staff. In addition, one officer should be nominated to serve as the Operation Commander's Executive Officer and Chief of Staff.
2. RF, two companies: Two RF companies should be assigned to the operational control of the Operation Commander. These companies would participate in the operations described above and assist in securing the Operation CP, screening center, etc.

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The Senior Advisor of Cam Lo District, after discussions with the District Chief, has indicated that Cam Lo could provide one company which it would temporarily release to the Operation Commander for the duration of the operation. The second company should be provided by Sector. The 3d Division, USMC, or the 2nd Regiment, ARVN 1st Division, should be approached for troops in connection with operations requiring three companies as cordon or sweep forces, or FP platoons should be tasked for this purpose.

B. Paramilitary Units :

1. APT's, one squad: The APT's would be used on the major cordon operation described above to provide psychological support. They should also be prepared to play a role in securing the CP at the discretion of the Operation Commander.
2. NFFF, one platoon: The NFFF should be prepared to participate in the cordon operations described above. They should search each hamlet in depth as it is cordoned off and, following the fulfillment of this mission, should participate in the cordon itself. They should also be prepared to be responsive to the Operation Commander in all questions concerning security.
3. PRU's, one group: The PRU contingent should be no smaller than 10 men, and no larger than 18. Their principal mission would involve the "intelligence reaction" type of mission described above. In view of the sophisticated intelligence apparatus deemed a necessity for this operation, it can be anticipated that a good deal of information which the PRU's could react to, will be developed.

C. Civilian Units :

1. Refugee Service: The Refugee Service should be prepared to insert at least one mobile cadre team to oversee the distribution of refugee payments and commodities.
2. Agricultural Service: The Agricultural Service should have on hand a representative from the Land Service, and a team prepared to assist the people in the development of their first IR-8 rice crop.
3. Public Health: The Public Health Service should have on hand an immunization and medical team similar to their establishment at Gia Dang.
4. Police Special Branch: A Police Special Branch contingent should be inserted to coordinate and direct the anti-infrastructure intelligence effort.

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All military and para-military units described above should be inserted at the outset of the operation with the forward CP. Three days after the establishment of a Forward CP, the FSB element should be inserted. Following Phase II of the Operation and two days prior to the resettlement of the first hamlet as part of Phase III, the appropriate civilian and RD elements should be inserted.

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OPERATION KANGAROO

Annex I : S-2 Input

1. Intelligence activities will concentrate in two major areas:
 - a. Collection of information
 - b. Tactical operations
2. Present on-hand information will provide the initial data base. All available agencies will be tasked in the collection effort to provide Essential Elements of Information (EEI) and Other Intelligence Requirements (OIR) as necessary.
3. Information currently available will provide the basic input for -
 - a. an initial intelligence estimate
 - b. blacklists

The estimate and the blacklists will be continuously up-dated during the course of the operation as new information becomes available.


4. Tactical Operations :
 - a. Screening (to include interrogation)
 - b. Search and identification
 - c. Reconnaissance
 - d. Ambush and raid (limited)

Tactical operations will be conducted by the Sector Intelligence platoon and HOLLIX (Phung Hoang) assets as required by the current situation.

5. Phasing :
 - a. Collection of information - continuous
 - b. Preparation of initial intelligence estimate - prior to Phase II (military sweeps)
 - c. Up-date of intelligence estimate - continuous
 - d. Preparation of blacklists - prior to Phase I (former resident identification)
 - e. Up-date of blacklist - as required
 - f. Tactical operations - as required; during Phase II and III primarily.

Annex II : Civil Intelligence Input (PHOENIX - FSB)

1. For your request, the attached diagram illustrates one approach to a screening center, based on SP experience. While actual physical conditions may vary, the technique does not change.
2. In step one, the people are held temporarily. PFF should be responsible for this area. The people are sent from here, one or two at a time, to step two, where biographic data is recorded and checked against current blacklists by the SF.
3. In step three, SF interrogation of VCI or VCS identified in step two takes place, and interviews of IC's are made to obtain tactical intelligence information. This information is passed to the S-2 and S-3 elements of the security forces involved in the operation, for reaction.
4. The S-2 provides requirements to the interrogation center, and may become directly involved in the interrogation of potential sources of tactical intelligence information.
5. After interrogation, VCI and VCS are sent to a detention facility, secured by PFF (step 4A). These VCI and VCS are returned to step three for interrogation as necessary. This more detailed interrogation is usually carried out in the evening, after general screening has ended for the day.
6. IC's, after having been fully exploited, are sent to step 4B, where a temporary identification card is issued by the NF ID Section. This card is signed by the Screening Center Chief, and serves as a pass out of the screening center to other agencies and services.
7. Identified VCI, after tactical exploitation, are taken from the center and processed through normal police channels at district and province level (step 5).
8. Adequate latrine facilities should be available before screening begins. Security forces (PFF) should be ordered to make sure that the facilities are used, to prevent contamination of the center water supply. This order should be enforced.
9. A definite decision should be made on the responsibility for supply of food and water to detainees, and the decision fully implemented before the screening begins.
10. Firm arrangements for transportation of screening center personnel and equipment from Quang Tri to the screening area should be made well before the move begins, to avoid last-minute confusion and scrambling for transportation.
11. Vietnamese counterparts should be brought in on the planning of the move immediately.



OPERATION KARGAROO

Annex III : S-4 Input

1. The following is the recommended plan for logistics support of the operation :

a. Class I -

During Operation Fisher, C-rations were utilized almost exclusively to feed both US and GVN personnel. For this operation, one hot meal daily should be furnished US advisors from the MACV mess by helicopter. Personnel will be fed through normal S-4 channels.

Recommendation: That the Detachment Commander be tasked to furnish one hot meal daily (preferably the noon meal); that the S-4 advisors furnish C-rations for other meals and that the GVN provide rations for their own personnel.

b. Class II -

Required batteries, cots, tents, lanterns, tables, chairs, etc., will be furnished for advisors by S-4 advisor. Sector S-4 will do the same for GVN personnel. Approximately 60 tents will be needed for all purposes. These are on hand now in conditions ranging from new to almost salvage. Poles for 45 of these tents must be obtained by S-4 advisor.

c. Class III -

FOL for advisor vehicles and equipment can be trucked or flown into the area from the A and L Co. ARVN vehicles will draw from the A and L Co.

d. Class IV -

Unlike Gia Dang, no compounds will be built. However, barrier materials will still be needed for CIC's, detention cages, bunkers to protect the operation staff, etc. The Sector S-4 should, therefore, requisition at least the following:

Concertina	200 reels
Stake (2m40)	2000
Barbed wire	100 rolls
Sandbags	100,000

In addition, some 200 sheets of FSP should be obtained by the S-4 advisor for bunker construction and a chopper pad.

e. Class V -

Advisor ammunition will be obtained as required from the Sector ASP by the S-4 advisor thru MACV supply.

Ammunition for GVN units will be drawn through the A and L Co.

f. Transportation :

Although the people to be moved can walk from their present location, trucks will still be required to transport at least a portion of their goods to their new homes. In addition, trucks will be needed to haul the supplies required to initiate and conduct the operation. It is believed that twenty trucks for a thirty-day period will suffice. Ten of these should be furnished by the GVN on a permanent basis. Ten more should be on an "on call" basis from US sources. Recommend that a GVN official on the scene be appointed as Transportation Officer to properly coordinate the fleet.

g. USAID Commodities -

The number of families involved in this move varies from 1000 (US figure) to 1500 (probable GVN figure). By GVN law, each family is entitled to ten (10) bags of cement and ten (10) sheets of roofing. Based on these figures, not less than 10,000 bags of cement and sheets of tin should be requisitioned nor more than 15,000 of each. If we consider future public buildings, the higher figure would be more accurate.

h. Water -

A water trailer is available from the S-4 advisor to provide for advisor needs. Sector S-4 also has trailers available for GVN needs.

2. As in Operation Fisher, logistical requirements should be passed to the TOC during the evening hours for the following day.

OPERATION KANGAROO

Annex IV : S-5 Input

PsyOps/Civic Action is support of the Cam Vu Operation. The returnees presently live in Dong Ha, Dong Thanh and Cam Hieu Villages of Dong Ha and Cam Lo Districts.

Purpose: Notify the people to return to their original home "Cam Vu". These people had been moved due to VC activities and are now refugees.

Recently, we had a large operation which have been held by ARVN and Allied Forces, in an attempt to secure the area. We will attempt to help these people enjoy a good life after their return, and aid them to earn profits from their crop production. The Sector Polwar Division plans a PsyOps/CA effort in support of this campaign. Duration for the campaign: the PsyOps/CA Supporting Plan is divided into three phases:

Phase I - Coordinate with the Sector Polwar Div Advisor, VIS, RD, and Chieu Hoi: using all capabilities to support this effort to propagandize the people and to notify the people of the duration of return. The benefits they will derive, and that security will be provided.

Phase II -

1. Coordinate with staff agencies in building of houses, wells, etc.
2. Use the local troops to help the people move their houses and equipment.
3. Help the National Police and Refugee Officer to receive the people when they return to the Cam Vu Hamlet.
4. Use the means of broadcasts, leaflets and newspaper to remind the people when to remove. This will decrease confusion.
5. Use of cultural drama teams.

Phase III - Train the people so they can defend themselves; establish family records so we can determine the distribution of foodstuffs and materials.

UNITS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION :

1. Request that 1st Div/101st Company Polwar Division join with Sector PsyOps/CA during this campaign.
2. Chieu Hoi Office provide one APT with propaganda equipment.
3. VIS with their broadcasting equipment meet with the people and explain the policies of GVN.
4. RD Office using all their teams in Dong Ha and Cam Lo for the campaign.
5. Quang Tri Military Hospital with a medic team join with an American medical team to set up MedCap program.

MEANS OF PROPAGANDA :

1. Request the Tactical Zone provide leaflet drops and leaflets upon request.
2. Request Quang Tri JUSPAO (PsyOps CORDS) provide material to print leaflets, slogan, posture, etc.
3. Sector and District Polwar Teams will constantly be at Cam Vu propagandizing the people.

REPORT :

Sector Polwar Division will make a daily report to 1st Div and I Corp.

RECOMMENDED :

1. S-4 provide one deuce and a half for Polwar Div during the campaign.
2. VIS provide broadcast instruments as required.
3. Show movies, use drama teams, teach children songs.

OPERATION KANGAROO

Annex V : VIS Input

1. Mission: APA/PSYOP Advisory Team 19 will conduct an aggressive Psychological Warfare Campaign in the Cam Vu Operation code named "Operation Kangaroo".
2. Execution :
 - a. Concept of Operation: Commencing on a date to be announced, operations will incorporate a variety of PsyOps measures to ensure maximum dissemination of GVN policies, programs, and education to the citizens involved in "Operation Kangaroo".
 - b. APA/PsyOp will :
 - (1) Coordinate all PsyOp assets of this operation.
 - (2) Initiate photo coverage immediately with APA/PsyOps assets, 3d Marine Division, 7th PsyOp Bn, XXIV Corps and Vietnamese MOPIX Team, from JUSPAO Saigon. Requests have been submitted to the last four organizations listed.
 - (3) During the identification and screening phase, APA/PsyOp will print instructions in Vietnamese as requested. VIS Cadre at Quang Tri level and VIS Cadre in districts involved can be tasked to assist in this work.
 - (4) During the military sweeps, insert HE Mobile Team and HB loudspeaker Team from 3d Mar Div. This support has been requested from PsyOps Officer, 3d Mar Div. These teams will include the capability of on-the-spot quick reactions to PsyOp situations. Two three-man APT teams will be utilized in the operation during this period as well as movement of people to their new location. Sector Psywar assets - cultural drama team - can be phased in at this time.
 - (5) Posters, leaflets, and other PsyOps material as necessary will be phased into the operations.
 - (6) Aerial broadcasts will be requested as desired by operational control throughout the operation via 3d Mar Div PsyOp Office.
 - (7) Following the settling of phase, VIS and Chieu Hoi Cadre will continue to work in the areas as directed by the District Advisor and District Chief in Cam Lo and Dong Ha areas.

OPERATION KANGAROO

Annex VI : Refugee Input

The Refugee Division has adopted a plan similar to their arrangements at Gia Dang.

The benefits each family will receive are as follows :

1. 5,000-piastre resettlement allowance
2. A rice allowance of 500 grams per person per day plus a per diem food purchase allowance of 5 piastres per diem. This allowance will continue for a period of three months and will be made in three monthly installments. If, at the end of three months, a continuance of the rice allowance is deemed necessary, application may be made to the Ministry for another three months' allowance.
3. A cement allowance of either 2500 piastres or ten sacks of cement.
4. An initial commodity issue to each family of one sack of foodstuffs (cornmeal, wheat, etc.) along with 5 gallons of cooking oil.
5. An issue of ten sheets of tin to those families who did not receive tin when first evacuated and an issue to those families whose tin roofs were completely or partially destroyed during the May offensive of the Dong Ha ammo dump explosion so that each family returning will have ten sheets of tin with which to work.

The Refugee Service has already registered the hamlets in question and is now in a position to submit their plan, requests, and supporting documents to Saigon for ministry approval. In order to expedite the project, Major William Reiff, CORDS/Refugee, Saigon, will carry official copies of these papers to Saigon to push for speedy clearance through the ministry.

In order to administer this program, one mobile cadre team (probably the one used at Gia Dang) will be deployed.

In support of this team, the service has requested one tent for office space at any screening center that may be established, one tent for storage space at the center, and $\frac{1}{2}$ tent for residential quarters at the CP.

With a priority classification and advisory pressure at the Saigon level, the Service Chief and Major Reiff agree that the plan could be approved and funds received at Province for its implementation within two weeks of receipt of the plan in Saigon.

OPERATION KANGAROO

Annex VII ; Agricultural Input

Total area affected by Harland Irrigation System: 2000 hectares
Realistic goal for spring planting, 1969: 750 hectares
(This figure agreed upon by Agricultural Services Chief.)

Rice production for Quang Tri in 1968 would have been about 27,000 metric tons if there had been no flood.

The 1969 crop yields (two crops) with the Cam Vu area of 750 hectares included, should increase by over 20 percent up to 33,000 metric tons.

When the full potential of 2000 hectares is achieved, the province rice-land should produce about 43,000 metric tons each year which is over 50 percent greater than at the present time.

The value of the rice produced on 750 hectares would be about 9,000,000 piastres and when the ultimate goal of 2000 hectares is planted, its production will be worth 24,000,000 piastres.

These estimates use the conservative figure of an average of only 4 metric tons per hectare, so with more likely yields, the production and income will be even higher.

The above figures are in reference to TN-8 and TN-5, better known as the "Miracle Rice".

Land Titles: The Land Tenure Service Chief foresees no problem since the people will be going back to their former lands. The Chief is eager to talk with the people and assist them as he can.

Agricultural Credit: The ADB Chief and a representative of ADB from Saigon stated that credit will be available as long as the farmers raise TN-8 and TN-5 varieties of rice. The Chief also mentioned that they can make loans to groups of farmers if they are interested in buying a roto-tiller.

Condition of the Canals of the Harland Irrigation System: Upon aerial observation by chopper, it was revealed that many small breaks do exist and about 2 large holes exist. These breaks should be repairable by the farmers to benefit from the system.

The Agricultural Services has agreed to carry out the necessary educational program necessary to teach these farmers how to properly grow these new varieties of rice.

Logistically, to plant 750 hectares of TN-8 or TN-5, we will need the following :

30 tons of rice seed or 600 bags
150 tons of Ammophosko fertilizer or 3000 bags
112.5 tons of fertilizer Urea or 2250 bags
37.5 tons of BHC insecticides or 750 bags

OPERATION KANGAROO

Annex VIII : Public Health Input

The Medicine Chief of Quang Tri Province shall provide adequate personnel and logistic support for the Cam Vu Operation. Screening of the personnel being relocated will be of primary concern to the medical team assigned to this operation. This screening will consist of a preliminary examination to separate those persons suspected of being carriers of contagious disease. In conjunction with the screening process, immunizations will be given and for those persons requiring definitive medical care, a referral system shall be established whereby those patients may be diagnosed and treated at the Province Hospital.

REPORT BY WO2 J. BARKER - ASST ADVISOR TO 1/2 BN
FOR PERIOD 27 DEC 68 - 26 JAN 69

27 DEC 68 At 1500 two Coy of 1/2 Bn made contact with 1 pl plus NVA in GS 2676 moving Sth. Results of contact.

En Cas 3 NVA KIA

En Equip & Wms Cap

3	SKS
30	Mines
100	75RR Rds
1	60mm Mor Base Plate
1	RPD
1	50 Mg
100	Chickens
3	Pigs

Friendly Cas

1 WIA

28 DEC 68 Daily patrolling and night ambushes continue.

to
18 JAN 69 Negative results from these actions.

19 JAN 69 WO2 Barker transferred to 5/2 Bn as this advisory team were short (2) advisors.

20 JAN 69 5/2 operated out of HAI LANG South of
to QUANG TRI City.

26 JAN 69 Negative results.

27 JAN 69 5/2 Bn moved to A1 outpost and relieved 1/2 Bn.

5/2 Bn will remain at A1 until the 26 April 69 and will then be mobile until the 6th of June and thence to DONG DA TRAINING CENTRE PHU BAI for retraining.

POINTS OF NOTE ON THE 5/2 BN

1. This Bn patrol aggressively and appear by far one of the better Bns.

2. Their discipline in ambush sites is above average, particularly under abnormal conditions, i.e. heavy rain, sandstorms. One important point noted is they have a tendency not to let the whole enemy party get completely into the KILLING AREA.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

3. The Bn maintain a very good standard of weapon maintenance and their general bunker area.

4. The above points noted are due to the efforts of the Coy Comds and their staff and is most rewarding to see in an ARVN Unit.

WO2 Barker
AATTV.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT

4/1 ARVN BN (TEMP ATT) - WO2 E.W. SNELLING

NAME : LAM SON 261

DATES : 13 Feb 68 - Continuing

OTHER UNIT : -

SP : ARVN Arty (105mm F.B. DAVIS) US Air & RVNAF Air.

AREA : West of HUE, 15 Klms from LAOS Border.

MSN : Search & Destroy

EXEC : Coy Size Patrolling

INSERTION : 13 Feb 68 by Heliborne Assault

RESUPPLY : By Air

CONTACTS : 15 Feb 1045 - Found old hospital 179276

1145 - Found new camp 199297

1200 - Contacted Est NVA Coy - GR 203297

1230 - Reserve Coy moved to Contact Area

Afternoon - 3 US Airstrikes, 3 RVNAF Airstrike, Arty, Mortars, Airstrikes drew some ground fire.

1830 - 6 WIA 1 KIA Fr CAS from last airstrike

16 Feb 1000 - Moved into VC posn

1530 - At LZ for MEDEVAC but not possible due to weather.

17 Feb 6 hrs - Uphill climb with casualties to alternate LZ for MEDEVAC.

1630 - I was extracted.

.../2

FRIENDLY CAS. 2 KIA 1 by airstrike
1 by rotor blades of CH47 during resupply
6 WIA by airstrike.
ENEMY CAS. 13 KIA probably by air

EN EQUIP & WPNS CAPTURED

2 AK47 12 Houses dest.
1 CKC 10 Bunker dest.
1 K43 Small amount Med Supplies.
1 CARBINE
1 K 47
1 60mm MCR.

TERRAIN Mountainous Jungle.

WEATHER Cloud Ceiling about 1200 ft

Cloud Layer 1200 ft to 1600 ft, above that clear generally after 1000 hrs. Use of air was uncertain because of clouds at lower levels but resupply OK because LZ was at 4000 ft.

NOTES

I was temporarily attached to 4/1 ARVN Bn from 3/1 ARVN Bn because of Advisor shortage with 4/1. On 17 Feb replacements became available & I was extracted. This operation is continuing.

E.W. SNELLING
WO2
AATTV

Attachment to
Annex B - AATTU
Report Feb 69

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN
PF PLATOON - AFTER ACTION REPORT
CONTACT AT PHU LE

On the night of 25 January 1969, the 111th PF Platoon at PHU LE hamlet, Dong Ha District, had established three ambushes. About 2250 hours the platoon heard movement to the southwest of their positions and opened fire without seeing the enemy. Single shots were fired in return by the enemy.

When the enemy returned fire, the platoon withdrew to an unprepared defensive position within the hamlet, astride the east-west jeep trail, orienting their defense towards the east. This move was reported to Sub-sector Headquarters after the redeployment at 2245 hours and was the last radio contact between the Headquarters and platoon. The platoon leader could not later give a clear reason why radio communication was broken.

At approximately 2315 hours the initial VC assault was made on the platoon position from the east. The PF Platoon returned fire and the enemy withdrew. Five minutes later, the VC attacked again, but this time they fired about four to six rounds of RPG-2 rockets into the hamlet. During this attack the PF Platoon fired one claymore mine.

After the second attack the platoon leader ordered a withdrawal towards the northwest. The platoon leader based his decision on the dwindling ammunition supply of the platoon. After moving about 200 meters, the platoon was fired upon by yet another enemy element, which was set up in a small graveyard on the route of withdrawal. This action by the enemy caught the PF Platoon out in the open without any covering fire. The PF Platoon lost ten men during this part of the engagement; four additional bodies were later found 250 meters farther to the north. It is believed that these four were captured by the enemy and later shot, since all four bodies had bullet wounds in the head.

Once the platoon leader saw what was happening to his lead element, he and five men moved south out of the contact area and then west to Highway 1. This group arrived at the Sub-sector Headquarters about 0200 on 26 January 1969.

At 2315 hours the District Senior Advisor heard gunfire in the vicinity of PF Platoon 111. Radio contact was made with all units in the near vicinity with negative enemy contact reported. All units reported they heard firing in the area where the 111 PF Platoon was located. Radio contact with the platoon could not be established so the situation remained unknown until arrival of the platoon leader.

A reaction force was formed for movement to the position of PF Platoon 111. The reaction force was not dispatched until the platoon leader reported to the District Headquarters at 0200 hours, 26 January 1969. The District Chief had refused to dispatch a reaction force until more information was available. Approximately 0315 the reaction force departed and arrived at the battle site about 0530 hours.

On 26 January 1969, a detailed on-site analysis was made of the actions of the

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
platoon. The following points are significant:

1. The platoon failed to utilize available terrain to the best advantage. If the platoon had moved to the forward positions, 50 meters to the front, this would have resulted in improved observation, and the commanding terrain would have been occupied by the defenders.
2. Communications were not maintained with District Headquarters. This mistake cost the platoon its means of fire support and denied the Headquarters essential information on which to base a decision for action.
3. Rear security during the withdrawal was not maintained.
4. Command control did not exist during the withdrawal. Soldiers dropped ammunition, weapons and equipment throughout the area of withdrawal.
5. Defensive firing positions were not prepared.
6. Fire discipline was absent; consequently ammunition was exhausted very quickly.
7. The platoon leader let panic set in when the platoon lost fire superiority to the enemy.

RESULTS OF THE CONTACT:	KIA	WIA	WPNS LOSS	RADIO
FRIENDLY:	14	5 Civ	1 M16	1 PRC 10
			1 BAR	
			1 M1 RIFLE	
			9 CARBINES	

ENEMY: UNK, with one possible KIA

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Est VC CO

SNIPER Fire 0300 hrs

Ambush site #2

CLAYMORE

2 SQ'S DEPLOYED HERE

WITHDRAWAL ROUTE 2300 hrs

HOUSE H.T BY B-40

ALT CP & CP AFTER 230023 JAN

WITHDRAWAL 2345 hrs

1 KIA

4 KIA Found

9 PP KIA Found

SCATTERED GRAVES

VC PLATOON (EST)

PLAT LEADER + 5 MEN WITH DRAWAL to Hwy #1

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Annex C to AATTV
Report - Feb 69

HUE
24 Feb 69

MONTHLY REPORT : THUA-THIEN

OPERATIONS

1. Units are either on operations or occupying defensive positions throughout the Province. Those units on operations have been kept busy with either cordon and search operations in the lowlands or disrupting VC base areas in the NAM HOA mountains.
2. The Black Panther Company (WO2 Bolitho) had considerable success in NAM HOA mountains during 20-28 Jan 69 when it overran an element of HUONG THUY District VC HQ. A considerable number of important documents were captured, these have been of great assistance in the anti VCI campaign.
3. Capt SAVAGE with 1 Div Recon Coy has been away on an operation since the last reporting period.

MISCELLANEOUS

4. To this date there has been no attempt by the VC to initiate any form of a Tet offensive or activity in THUA THIEN.
5. NAM HOA District HQ (WO2 Baxter Assistant Advisor with Sub Sector) has been attacked twice during the past month, each time with B4Os from across the river (1PF KIA but no damage). These have been the first attacks on NAM HOA since Tet 68.
6. The THUA THIEN Monthly Province Report (Jan) is attached.

M. NORRIS
Maj
AATTV HUE

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Annex D to AATTV
Report - Feb 69

29 Feb 69

MONTHLY REPORT - FEBRUARY 1969
1/51 ARVN BN

1. During the month of Feb the battalion conducted two major operations South of DANANG. Results of these operations were : Friendly 8 KIA, and approx 70 WIA. Majority of WIA were as a result of mines and booby traps. Enemy casualties were approximately 180 KIA and large quantities of Mortar and B40 ammo captured (approx 300 of each). This is an increase of about 200% on the activity in the area for the preceeding month.

2. The morale of the ARVN soldiers in the battalion is at its highest peak since I have been with the unit despite the fact that all leave was stopped during TET. There has been a 50% drop in the desertion rate (9 deserters in Feb. 20 in Jan). One factor assisting morale is the quick and accurate support received from US sources such as Medevac, Arty, Air and Resupply.

(C.F. SPENCER)
Capt
AATTV

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Annex E to AATTV
Report - Feb 69

26 Feb 69

MONTHLY REPORT - HOA VANG SUB SECTOR
FEBRUARY 1969

1. During the month of February the following activities took place;

No. of Operations	15
VC KIA	66
VC Captured	6
VCS	26
VC Weapons captured	18

PF KIA	5
PF WIA	11
PF Weapons missing	1 M16

2. All RF Coys and PF Pls were visited during the month.

RD Coys	3
PF Pls	17
PF CAPs	14

WO2 K. VINCENT
AATTV

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3 Mar 69

MONTHLY REPORT - FEBRUARY 1969
RF TRAINING CADRE : NUI DAT

1. On 10 Feb 69 Patrol Course No 2 commenced. Prior to this, on 6 to 8 Feb inclusive an orientation course for the Australian Junior NCOs from 9 RAR & 4 RAR was conducted to prepare them for the patrol course. Two NCOs from the first course have remained for the second.
2. 53 RF soldiers including 2 officers and 5 sergeants commenced the course, the short fall from the planned number of 60 being due to operational requirements.
3. A modified training program has been introduced, based on experience from the first course.
4. The present course is made up of RF soldiers from 12 different companies. As this is at variance with the original concept of training complete patrols capable of being employed as such after training it is recommended that the aim of future courses be broadened to improve the overall standard of RF within Phuoc Tuy province with less emphasis on patrolling.
5. Future courses could be reduced to 4 weeks and the vacancies increased to 100. No increase in personnel assistance from 1 ATF would be required though an increase in material assistance, mainly ammunition would be needed.
6. In view of the shortage of AATTV officers, and the fact that RF training at Heavyweight is soundly established it is recommended that an officer from 1 ATF be put in charge of the training. Hand over could ideally be made during the second week of training of the new course (approx the first week in May).
7. The eventual requirement for AATTV WOs could be reduced to one after the new courses are established.
8. On the 16 Feb (eve of Tet) food and clothing gifts, purchased by AATTV members with a \$VN20,000 gift from 1 Aust Civil Affairs unit were distributed to 38 ARVN soldiers families of the 18 Div Trg Centre.

(R.L. GUEST)
Capt
AATTV

2 Mar 69

MONTHLY REPORT - FEB 69
SATC VUNG-TAU

General

1. The delay in submitting this report is due to critical activities during the period 25 Feb - 1 Mar.

Activities During The Period

2. One student course was completed on 10 Feb. During the period 11-22 Feb, all indigenous staff proceeded on TET leave. Course 1/69 marched in to commence training on 24 Feb but due to circumstances covered below, are not due to commence until 3 Mar.

3. Revision of teaching material continued but was severely limited by:

- a. Absences of instructors
- b. Commitments of advisory staff
- c. Unavailability of translators/interpreters.

"Strike" by Indigenous Staff

4. During the TET leave period approximately 70% of the instructional staff were AWOL. The times and lengths of these AWOLs varied.

5. Due to the requirement to commence the Revised PRU Course on 24 Feb, considerable work was scheduled to be accomplished by two half staff groups during the leave period. The blatant absences by the instructors negated the schedule.

6. Stern but just disciplinary action was commenced against offenders on 24 Feb. A strike by instructors followed. Indigenous support staff joined the strike, some voluntarily - but most by co-ercion.

7. During the strike period 25 Feb - 28 Feb, a number of potentially dangerous situations arose including:

- a. Physical action, short of using firearms, by strikers against non-strikers and US property.

.../2

- b. Threats against non-strikers families.
- c. Attempted denial of food re-supply to SATC by the strikers.
- d. Alleged sanction of the strike by the Mayor of Vung-Tau.
- e. Apparent participation in the urging of the strikers by the JGS (J2) Liaison Officer attached to SATC.
- f. Unrest by students.

8. Following numerous deputations, meetings and solution proposals, all staff returned to work pm 28 Feb. Considerable compromises had been granted by both parties during the negotiations.

9. A degree of undercurrent discontent still exists and at this stage, I do not consider the situation resolved.

10. On 26 Feb I contacted CO AATTV by phone advising that there may be cause later to withdraw WO2 JAMIESON and myself temporarily from SATC and the problem environs.

11. I took this action based on the possibility of becoming involved in an internal Vietnamese conflict. The possibility definitely existed but did not or has not to this time, eventuated.

(F.M. KUDNIG)
Capt
AATTV

6 Mar 69

CO AATTV

REPORT ON TRAINING
LRP WING VAN KIEP NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER

Course 1/69

1. This course was to be composed of 40 students from 7 ARVN Div, Recon Company and 5 Regt 9 Div, Recon Company. The students from the latter did not arrive at Van-Kiep and after a seven day delay the course commenced on 30 Dec 68 with the Divisional students only plus three officers from Van-Kiep and two interpreters.

2. Because of the delay of one week in commencement I was forced to reduce the operational phase from three weeks to two weeks to allow our planned schedule of courses for this year to remain unchanged.

3. The course commenced with a total of 45 students of whom 27 successfully graduated. The failures were for the following reasons:

a. Disciplinary	2
b. Below Standard - Map Reading	8
Physical Ability	1
Medical	2
Tactical Ability	5
	<hr/>
Total	18

4. The course overall was very satisfactory and were quite professional in their attitude and applied themselves extremely well to all phases of instruction.

Course 2/69

5. This course was due to commence on 24 Feb 69 but owing to non arrival of students is postponed until 10 Mar 69. The students from 9th ARVN Division and 33 Regiment (21st Division), finally arrived in the evening of 4 Mar 69. The time available before commencement of this course will be spent in building bunkers and defences in their barracks area as at present there is no protection at all for them from mortar attack.

6. Owing to the delay in commencing this course I will alter all the scheduled courses for this year to give a two week later starting date than that previously planned. I will notify Central Training Command of the new dates and request that they pass it to all concerned.

.../2

Incorrect Employment of Graduates

7. There is apparently a great lack of understanding on the part of ARVN field commanders in the correct employment of trained LRPs. Whether this is due to ignorance of their capabilities or reluctance to commit highly trained troops in small tactical groups I am undecided on, however it does raise serious doubts in my mind about the value of the ARVN LRP programme and AATTV's large contribution to it.

8. There have been repeated reports to me through unofficial channels of misuse of graduates once they have returned to their parent units. This is extremely disappointing after the effort and dedication given to their training by both staff and students.

9. This problem is not only confined to LRP teams we have trained for III CTZ as I have already been informed unofficially that Course 1/69 (7th ARVN Div) have gone back to their old employment as a normal infantry platoon. In my last discussion with you, you indicated that the Deputy Senior Advisor IV CTZ may pay the Wing a visit during this next course, if this occurs I will discuss the problem with him in relation to IV Corps.

10. I believe however that the whole programme should be inspected and re-evaluated for justification of AATTV's continued heavy commitment. To achieve this I think a detailed inspection of all teams previously trained by the Wing should be carried out by me and their combat effectiveness and employment since graduation investigated. This could be undertaken during the latter stages of the Training Phase when I should be able to get away for three or four days.

Regimental Sub-Wing and Future Courses

11. Course 2/69 will be the first course with Vietnamese Instructors commanding their own patrols in the Regimental Sub-Wing.

12. I have sought support from 1 ATF to assist in the running of Regimental Sub-Wing but have so far been unsuccessful. The SAS are fully committed and cannot spare three Sergeants to act as advisors to the Vietnamese instructors. The ARVN assets in the Province are almost non-existent and I have been assured by the Van-Kiep staff that they will not improve in the near future. As a result of these factors I am reluctantly cancelling the operational phase for the Regimental Sub-Wing.

13. I will seek a conference as soon as possible with Col Quy to discuss the advisability of cancelling future Regimental courses and of limiting the LRP Wing to handling courses of 40 students only (from Div Recce Coys) as this is the maximum number we can handle with our limited assets.

.../3

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- 3 -


14. I will prepare a report for Col Quy containing my recommendations, and the reasons for them, so that he can forward it to CTC with his own comments for a decision regarding future Regimental Courses.

Capt R. HINDE
Chief Instructor
Long Range Patrol Wing
Van-Kiep MTC

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Annex I to AATTV¹³
Report - Feb 69

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222



MACCORDS-RF/PF

13 February 1969

SUBJECT: Mobile Defense of Hamlets (U)

TO: See Distribution

1. Reference JGS Directive 300-12/TTM/P3, 20 January 1969, subject as above (Incl 1).
2. Inclosure 1 is sound guidance on the proper role of RF and PF units in hamlet defense. It stresses the provision of security to the hamlet by conducting operations outside the hamlet and unit operating base to prevent enemy infiltration and attacks rather than static defense, which has too often been the ineffective tactic employed in the past by RF and PF units.
3. Field advisors should be familiar with this JGS directive and may find reference to it helpful in proper advisory efforts to RF and PF.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Charles A. Corcoran
CHARLES A. CORCORAN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:
1 ea SA/CTZ
2 ea PSA
3 ea DSA
2 ea MAT

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5 MACJ3
5 MACMA

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES: dated at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years.

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K I N

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
JOINT GENERAL STAFF, RVNAF
J3

D I R E C T I V E

No. 300-12-TTM/P3

APD # 4002, 20 Jan 69

SUBJ: Mobile Defense of Hamlets.

REF: - Memo #983/TTM/P3/HQ of 12 Mar 68.
- Directive # 330-4/TTM/P3/HQ of 12 Dec 68.

(

1. Background:

In the mission of hamlet defense, posts are an effective means to guarantee safety to the hamlets against enemy attacks, and at the same time to promote the confidence of the people in the Government's power in the rural areas.

However, the NVA's employment of their effective B40 and B41 weapons in their offensive actions has prevailed, and the Government's posts have become more vulnerable and untenable if attacked.

Because of this, the concept of mobile defense is designed to prevent enemy attacks on hamlets and also to provide an effective defense structure.

2. Concept:

a. The mobile defense system for hamlets is the best means to preclude enemy harassment and attacks. With their high mobility, the small defense units will operate successfully and are not vulnerable to enemy attacks.

b. These elements will be so positioned that they can expeditiously alert one another for mutual support, and repel enemy attacks.

c. Two-thirds of the Unit's strength will operate outside the hamlet or post, conducting patrols and ambushes, and establishing outposts in order to prevent enemy infiltration and attacks and to alert the Unit Commander so he can destroy the enemy before they penetrate the hamlet, thus preventing damage to the hamlet.

K I N

K I N

3. Operational Procedures:

a. Each squad will move to the designated position only after dark so as to avoid hostile observation and detection.

b. Troop night positions will also be changed to avoid hostile attacks. The Unit's mobility effectively serves to deceive the enemy as to its exact position, and precludes enemy movement and infiltration into the Hamlet (See annex A).

c. The positions must be defiladed and so selected as to permit observation of the enemy's avenues of approach.

d. Unarmed RD cadre, people's self defense members, and civic groups will also participate in the hamlet defense:

(1) Armed forces will be positioned at the hamlet's gates to control the entry and exit of the hamlet residents and prevent enemy infiltration.

(2) Unarmed people may be assigned guard duty around the Hamlet to alert the armed forces to any enemy approach and allow time to prepare for the hostile attacks.

The unarmed forces may designate 5 or 6 families to take charge of a watch tower near their homes and may employ people from 10 to 50 years of age (See annex B).

4. Duties of Platoon Leader:

a. Prepares duty assignments in accordance with the terrain.

b. Organizes several counterattack groups consisting of reserve Squads and, if possible, self defense members and RD cadre.

c. Frequently conducts alert drills to insure that all members of the platoon are familiar with the duties assigned them, and prepares for mutual support among the squads. He will not employ the reserve force except in emergencies.

d. Designates the final defense line, retreat position, assembly area, and issues clear instructions on when to commence firing, request support, and cease fire.

e. Establishes artillery and air support plans for the unit and for elements operating outside the hamlet.

f. Establishes signal communications between the post and mobile elements, and between these elements, in order to permit prompt alert, support, and rescue, and especially between the post and the District HQ to request support.

K I N

g. Prescribes alert procedures for the unarmed hamlet residents in charge of guard posts within the hamlet.

h. Designates zones of fire for each element to permit mutual support, and enforces fire discipline. Crew-served weapons must be so positioned as to permit:

- (1) Covering fire for the squad's area of responsibility.
- (2) Protective fire for the neighboring squads.
- (3) Direct fire support of the unoccupied areas or special points.

i. Assigns appropriate duties to personnel and insures their alertness and physical fitness for the battle.

5. Special Provisions:

The following are typical cases which will help the platoon leader apply the mobile defense system:

a. Each RF or PF squad (consisting of 8 to 10 men) is formed into two groups: a fire power team and a shock team. Each team has 2 cells, each consisting of 2 to 3 men. Disposition is described in Annex C.

In this way, each team of 4 to 5 men is able to assume guard and combat duties, and its members can rest at their night position.

The rear position (fire power team) consists of a squad leader, gunners, and signal men, and is ready to provide support and rescue when necessary.

b. One platoon may position 2 squads at 3 different points concurrently. One of the 2 squads is divided into 2 teams and is positioned in an important area near the post where it can be supported and rescued by reserve elements of the platoon. (See Annex B).

c. The remaining squad is the reserve and defending force of the post and is reinforced by members of the Hamlet Executive Board, RD cadre, or people's self defense personnel, when necessary. This squad will be alternated at night so that its members can rest and sleep.

d. The defense of 2 or more hamlets by the RF Platoons is very necessary, so day patrols are conducted at several Hamlets by one Squad which becomes a reserve force at night. The other two squads conduct night patrols and night ambushes according to the mobile defense concept.

This system is applicable only to PF units in secure hamlets near RF posts which are ready to provide relief in emergencies.

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6. In order that the mobile defense of hamlets can succeed, the Platoon Leader, Squad Leader and members must be given on-the-job training in night operations.

Platoon Leaders and Squad Leaders must be sent to training courses to further their command and leadership capabilities.

An adequate supply of radio sets for the platoon is as important as training, as it permits effective patrols, ambushes, and alerts in emergencies.

The CTZ HQs are requested to direct all Sector HQs to disseminate this concept to the RF and PF Platoon Leaders and provide help so that the hamlet defense can be successful.

By order of: GEN CAO-VAN-VIEN
Chief, Joint General Staff, RVNAF
LTG NGUYEN-VAN-LA
Deputy Chief, JGS, concurrently
Commander, RF and PF


ADDRESSEES:

- Office of the Chief, JGS,
RVNAF
- Office of the Deputy Chief,
JGS, RVNAF
- Office of the Chief of Staff, JGS
"For info"
- I, II, III and IV CTZ
- All Sector HQs
"For action"
- JGS/J3 (Plans and Finance Branch)
"For info"
- Adjutant General Division
(Reports and Forms Section)


/Signed and Sealed/


ANNEXES A, B, C (Attached)

ANNEX A



ANNEX B





RD CADRE TRAINING
REPORT BY WO's PATCH AND MUNRO - FEBRUARY 1969

- 1-6 Feb Vung-Tau Trg Centre visit for familiaration RD Cadre Trg programme.
VINH-BINH Province
Province Chief : Col DONG
District : 7
Population :
Villages : 56
Hamlets : 500
RD Teams : 25 (To be increased to 50)
Present strength : 1600 RD Cadre
RD Chief : Lt PHUCNG
- 07 Feb Visited Team 21 preparation of demonstration 3 man concept for visiting Indonesian Colonels : Under direction from Saigon (MACV/CORDS)
- 08 Feb Start of 3 day course for RDC deputy leaders,
31 present plus 4 region instructors.
- 09 Feb Took course to Team 21 location to observe demonstration of 3 man concept to Indonesian offrs, and then practiced course remainder of day at Team 21 location.
- 10 Feb Last day of course included very satisfactory night firing programme.
- 11 Feb Preparation for move to hamlets.
- 12 Feb Visit Team 21 for overnight stay
Team leader : Mr HAIR
Assigned strength : 60
Present : 50
Civil defence trained : 70
Armed : Nil
Hamlet. Population : 559
Location : 446837
- 16-19 Feb TET Period stand down alert.

.. / 2

20 Feb Visited Team 19 for overnight stay

Team leader : Mr DUONG
 Assigned strength : 62
 Present : 58
 Civil defence trained : 38
 Armed : 25
 Population : 811
 Location : 486893

21 Feb Visit Team 22 for overnight stay

Team leader : Mr TAAM
 Assigned strength : 63
 Present : 48
 Civil defence trained : 40
 Armed : 25
 Population : 1018
 Location : 476937

22 Feb Visit Team 17 for overnight stay.

Team leader : Mr TINHS
 Assigned strength : 64
 Present : 49
 Civil defence trained/armed : Nil
 Population :
 Location : 427973

23 Feb Stand down preparation of reports and make ready for move down to Tra-Cu District for hamlets visit.

General Comments

1. Province Chief, RD, Cadre Chief and Mr Jim Baker are very cooperative and assisted in every way possible, to complete our mission.
2. Region trg team initiated trg activities of a sort such as weapon trg etc but had not delved into 3 man concept. At present after attending 3 day course are performing quite well.
3. Every team to date visited have without any difficulty incorporated the RF/PF in the night activity.
4. All teams visited have applied the concept satisfactorily and moved from fixed positions-in one case Team 17 moved 1500 meters.
5. In conclusion we would like to add that we anticipate no difficulty in visiting each team and the completion of our mission.

WO2 PATCH
 WO2 MUNRO

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