

# Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report and enclosures  
1 - 31 March 1969

**Series:** AWM95 - Australian Army  
commanders' diaries

**Item:** 1/2/63



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COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

QUOTE IN REPLY

R723 / 1 / 35

HEADQUARTERS  
AUSTRALIAN FORCE  
VIETNAM

4 May 69

AHQ(C) ✓  
1 ATF

LOGGED

AATTV MONTHLY REPORT - MAR 69

1. Attached for information is a copy of the AATTV Monthly Report for Mar 69.
2. Due to an administrative error, the report was mislaid at HQ AFV. The consequent delay in its despatch is regretted.

DMIT

Please see that Annex D  
is promulgated.

Dec 5  
19/5

(R.A. HAY)  
Major General  
Commander Australian Force  
VIETNAM

Enclosure: AATTV Monthly Report, Mar 69.

Copy to

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HEADQUARTERS  
AUSTRALIAN FORCE  
VIETNAM

Australian Army Training Team  
Vietnam

// Apr 69

HQ AFV (3)

AATTV REPORT - MARCH 1969

General

1. Operational activity in which members of AATTV were involved continued at the same general level of intensity reported for the latter half of Feb, with increased contact with the enemy occurring in the two southern provinces of I CTZ and also in the AO's of 2nd Mobile Strike Force (2MSF) in II CTZ.
2. Two casualties occurred during the month, both as a result of enemy mines - WO2 Wigg while on operations with 2 MSF in Darlac Province and WO2 Stuttgart while on operations with 11 ARVN Cav in Quang-Tri Province. In both cases, injuries received were slight.

Deployment

3. The deployment of AATTV as at 10 Apr 69 is attached at Annex A.

I Corps

4. In 11 DTA operational activity in which AATTV members were involved remained at a similar level to that reported last month, however, few significant contacts occurred. The enemy is estimated to have five NVA Regts and two Local Force Regts in 11 DTA but indications are that he seems unwilling to concentrate and mount operations larger than battalion size.

.../2

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- 2 -

In Quang-Nam Province, the enemy is reported to have the equivalent of twenty four battalions, but as in 11 DTA seems reluctant to concentrate. Operations in which AATTV members have been involved have mainly been part of the effort to clear and sweep the southern approaches to Danang.

6. In 12 DTA operational activity in which AATTV members have been involved has remained at the increased level reported last month, but with some periods of heavy fighting. The main form of enemy activity has been the threatening of Quang-Ngai with ground attack - a threat which continues to exist - and the harassing of main centres of population with rocket and mortar attacks. The enemy is estimated to have the equivalent of twelve battalions in the DTA but once again is not prepared to concentrate.

ARVN and Free World Forces in 12 DTA are currently being re-grouped with a view to an ARVN Regt and an Americal Bde operating in the same slice of the DTA, each with its own AO's but with the intention of carrying out combined operations. The guiding principle appears to be that if a withdrawal of US troops should take place, the ARVN Regts (4, 5 and 6 Regts) would be already positioned to accept responsibility for the entire DTA.

7. The following documents relating to I Corps are attached as shown :

- a. Report on RF/PF Quang-Tri Province - Annex B
- b. Report on Pacification Support to Territorial Forces Quang-Tri Province by 3 Marine Regiment - Annex C
- c. VC/NVA Sapper Attacks - Annex D
- d. Province Report for Feb 69 Quang-Tri - Annex E
- e. Report by WO2 Robinson, Asst Advisor with 4/2 ARVN Bn on Operation Dewey Canyon - Annex F
- f. Report by WO2 Poole, Asst Advisor with 2/4 ARVN Bn - Annex G

II Corps

8. In recent months the type of operation required to be undertaken by 2 MSF, with whom AATTV members are deployed, and the manner in which the MSF battalions and companies were being

.../3

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committed to these operations has not been very satisfactory. During Mar/early Apr however there have been indications that it is intended to revert to the original concept of employment of the MSF, ie. independent operations, as distinct from placing companies and battalions under the operational control of US formations. In addition, it appears that a little more training may now be done between operations than has been the case in the past.

9. As a result of discussions initiated by CO AATTV, the Comd 2 MSF has agreed that members of AATTV employed as platoon commanders are to serve under Aust Company Commanders. Comd 2 MSF has gone further and decided where possible to group Australians together in three companies, with one 'Aust' company in each of the three battalions based at Pleiku. The exceptions to this system are the AATTV WO employed as the Commander of the Training Company and the recently deployed Major who commands the 2nd MSF Battalion. In order to avoid an imbalance of Aust/US Commanders, it has been agreed that the total number of AATTV personnel with 2 MSF should be limited to fourteen, filling the following vacancies:

Bn Comd	: Maj (1)
Coy Comds	: Capt/WO (3)
Pl Comds	: WO/Sgt (9)
Comd Trg Coy	: WO (1)

(Total 14)

The re-deployment of AATTV within 2 MSF to conform with this agreed plan is now taking place. When complete it should produce better results and should overcome many of the problems that have been of concern. An appropriate amendment to the Memorandum of Understanding AATTV/5th SFG(A) will be negotiated in due course.

10. Operations conducted by 2 MSF during late Feb/Mar in which members of AATTV were involved are as follows:

- a. 1st Battalion. North-East of Kontum. No enemy encountered, however two VC hamlets destroyed.
- b. 2nd Battalion. South-West of Ben-Het (a SF 'A' Camp). Two enemy tanks were destroyed in the area just prior to this battalions operation. Significant contact occurred on 16 Mar when the battalion successfully assaulted an abandoned 4 US Div fire support base which had been occupied by the enemy, resulting in 28 NVA KIA at the cost of 2 KIA (USASF) and 13 WIA (Montagnard).

.../4

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- 3 -

- c. Marines live with RF unit at all times.
- d. Marine knowledge/firepower is distributed throughout RF companies.
- e. Transient units had previously created uneasiness; this had to be overcome. Had to develop mutual understanding & acceptance.

8. Initial Problems/Obstacles

- a. Communication - detailed briefs were required to ensure thorough understanding, especially in relation to tactical movement.
- b. The RF were not confident to go beyond the hamlet/village area.
- c. Keeping RF's on the job during operations in the field. USMC went to point of accompanying RF's back to their hamlets.
- d. Overcome fear of VC/NVA - fire support.

9. Accomplishment

- a. Integrated one Mar Coy with 3 RF Coys in the Sub-Sector.
- b. Established close relationship with the District Chief. Presence has increased District Chiefs initiative and aggressive action.
- c. Conducted Search & Cordon operations on individual company and company group level.
- d. Number of night ambushes has increased significantly.
- c. The VC can no longer conduct meetings in the hamlets.

D. MILLIE  
Maj  
S3 Quang-Tri Sector.

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- c. 3rd Battalion South of Pleijerang.  
Results : 6 NVA KIA.

III Corps

11. RF Training - Phuoc-Tuy. As a result of discussions Comd 1 ATF/Province Chief and PSA Phuoc-Tuy/CO AATTV, it has now been agreed that this RF training programme become an AATTV project under the control of Phuoc-Tuy Sector. The present proposal is to conduct courses of 4 weeks duration for three RF platoons at a time. Subject to further negotiation with the PSA Phuoc-Tuy, it is intended that the AATTV members involved be attached to the Sector MACV Advisory Team, however for the time being courses will continue to be conducted and the cadre based at 18 ARVN Div Trg Centre. 1 ATF have agreed to continue to provide additional assistant instructors and certain training stores. A report by Capt Guest (AATTV), Chief Instructor of the RF Training Cadre is attached at Annex H.

12. Special Activities Training Centre (PRU) : Vung-Tau

A report by Capt Kudnig, Chief Instructor of Training and Operations of the Centre is attached at Annex I. Discussions will be held with Director PRU during April to obtain further details of the future of SATC and PRUs so that subsequent AATTV employment in the PRU programme can be properly assessed.

13. LRP Training.- A report by Capt Hinde, Chief Instructor of the LRP Wing, NTC Van-Kiep is attached at Annex J.

IV Corps

14. Territorial Security.- There has been no marked change in territorial security during the period. The VC have not as yet seized the initiative and are continuing to suffer heavy losses when contact is made. Their main efforts have been directed at RF and PF outposts where security is lacking. They have achieved some good successes against outposts that have not deployed adequate security patrols or maintained the required degree of alertness in the base. Of particular note was the attack on Tam Soc operating base in Ba-Xuyen, on the night of 25 March 1969. In this action two MAT members were killed and two captured. A copy of the CORDS IV CTZ Directive on the concept for defence of villages and hamlets is attached at Annex K. The directive has been taken to MACV and to II and III Corps for further study.

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15. Revolutionary Development Cadre Training.- RD training is now under way in Dinh-Tuong and Kien-Hoa Provinces. Both of these provinces contain very high proportions of hard core VC; Kien-Hoa is the birthplace of the VC movement. Both AATTV RD Cadre Trg teams are making steady progress and are receiving good cooperation from the provinces.

16. RF/PF Training.- Advisors in this field are turning more time and effort to the training of PSDF which is a priority program in IV CTZ. These personnel are being moved from MAT to MAT to meet the requirements of newly-formed PSDF groups. There is now a good opportunity for AATTV Advisors to materially assist in the integration of PF, RDC and PSDF in the Delta.

#### Visits

17. The visit by the Aust Ambassador to I Corps in March went relatively well, but would probably have been chaotic but for the efforts on the spot by the Senior Aust Advisors located at Danang and Quang-Tri. These officers, like other officer members of AATTV, have two main roles. Their primary role is to perform the operational/staff advisory duties pertaining to the MACV etc appointment they are filling. The other, by arrangement between CO AATTV and the Senior US Advisor under whom these officers work, entails frequent day to day discussions with local US advisors regarding employment of AATTV members, as well as the personnel management and Aust administration of AATTV in their areas. These two roles together more than fully occupy AATTV officers wherever they are located. Any additional Aust requirements, such as the arranging of VIP visits, can only be met at the expense of these roles. From an AATTV point of view therefore, it is requested that such additional duties not be required of these officers unless it is by direction of their US superior officer that they be so employed and as a result of an Aust request through normal MACV/ARVN channels.

18. On most occasions with Aust VIP visits in I, II and IV Corps areas, AATTV has in the past been requested to arrange internal air movement, eg helicopters. As neither AATTV, or its officers, have any call on aircraft other than by advisors for use in fulfilling their primary role, it is recommended that either a RAAF aircraft be positioned for these visits, or that such requests be made formally through MACV or other appropriate channels. This would avoid placing the AATTV advisor in what could be an awkward position, or involving him in arrangements which he has no authority to be making unless told to do so by his US superior officer.

.../6

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- 6 -


Administration

19. The following members of AATTV were medically evacuated to Australia during Mar/early Apr due to illness; all were deployed in IV CTZ :

W02 EP Grube

W02 HA Patch

W02 BR Rule



(RDF LLOYD)  
Lt Col  
Comd.



AATTV DEPLOYMENT  
AS AT 10 APR 1969

Annex 'A' to  
AATTV Monthly Report  
for March 1969

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>AATTV : SAIGON</u>								
1	: LtCol	: RDF	: Lloyd	: RA Inf	: HQ AATTV	: Commanding Officer	: Jan 70 :	Saigon
2	: Capt	: D.G.	: Bent	: RA Inf	: "	: Adjutant	: Oct 69 :	"
3	: WO1	: G.S.	: Munt	: RA Inf	: "	: Admin WO (Chief Clerk)	: Mar 70 :	"
4	: WO2	: C.F.	: Keioskie	: RAASC	: "	: Admin WO (Pay)	: Jul 69 :	"
5	: WO1	: E.W.	: Gason	: RAAC	: Armoured School	: Instructor	: Dec 69 :	Thu-Duc (near Saigon)
6	: WO2	: T.P.	: Van Bakel	: RAASC	: (On pre-extension leave in Aust : re-deployment on RTU not yet firm)		: Nov 69 :	

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Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due	RTA	Location
I CTZ									
AATTV : QUANG TRI Province									
7	Maj	D.R.	Millie	Aust Army	Quang-Tri Sector	S3	May 69		Quang-Tri
8	Maj	H.	Bell	Avn Corps	RA Inf	S3 (Designate)	Nov 69		
9	WO2	W.L.	Deanshaw	RAAMC	"	Medical Advisor	Jul 69		Quang-Tri
10	WO1	R.J.	O'Brien	RAE	Trieu-Phong Sub-Sector	Assistant Advisor RF/	Sep 69		Trieu-Phong
11	WO2	J.M.	O'Donnell	RAAOC	Cam-Lo Sub-Sector	"	Jan 70		Cam-Lo Town
12	WO2	H.H.	Beezley	RA Inf	1/1 ARVN Bn	Assistant Advisor	Jan 70		Quang-Tri Area
13	WO2	K.	Gabriel	RA Inf	2/1 ARVN Bn	"	Nov 69		"
14	WO2	E.W.	Snelling	RA Inf	3/1 ARVN Bn	"	Jul 69		"
15	WO2	W.	Tillett	RA Inf	4/1 ARVN Bn	"	Feb 70		"
16	WO1	J.	Geedrick	RA Inf	1/2 ARVN Bn	"	Sep 69		Gio-Linh Area
17	WO2	F.E.	Bell	RA Inf	2/2 ARVN Bn	"	Mar 70		"
18	WO2	K.K.	Gurney	RA Inf	3/2 ARVN Bn	"	Feb 70		"
19	WO2	R.I.	Robinson	RA Inf	4/2 ARVN Bn	"	Aug 69		"
20	WO2	J.E.	Barker	RA Inf	5/2 ARVN Bn	"	Aug 69		"
21	WO2	H.S.	Stuttart	RAAC	11 ARVN Cav	"	Nov 69		Quang-Tri
22	WO2	L.N.	Gorman	RAA	11 ARVN Arty	"	Mar 70		"

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Serial	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due	RTA	Location
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I CTZ

AATTV : THUA THIEN Province

23	: Capt	: D.	: Savage	: RA Inf	: 1 ARVN Div Recce Coy	: Senior Advisor	: Aug 69	: Hue
24	: WO1	: W.	: Brown	: RAAMC	: Thua-Thien Sector	: Medical Advisor	: Sep 69	: "
25	: WO2	: A.J.	: Baxter	: RAA	: Nam-Hoa Sub-Sector	: Assistant Advisor RF/	: Apr 69	: Nam-Hoa
26	: WO2	: J.R.	: MoRae	: RA Inf	: " " "	: (Designate) PF	: Aug 69	:
27	: WO2	: J.A.	: Bond	: RAAC	: 7 ARVN Cav	: Assistant Advisor	: Jan 70	: Hue
28	: WO2	: M.R.	: Lolitho	: RA Inf	: Black Panther Coy	: " "	: Nov 69	: "
29	: WO2	: G.C.	: Neitz	: RA Inf	: Regt Recce Coy 54 ARVN:	: " "	: Aug 69	: Hue Area
30	: WO2	: L.	: Jackson	: RA Inf	: 3/54 ARVN Bn	: " "	: Jul 69	: " "
31	: WO2	: C.	: Ansell	: RA Inf	: 1/3 ARVN Bn	: " "	: Mar 70	: " "
32	: WO2	: M.	: Kelly	: RA Inf	: 2/3 ARVN Bn	: " "	: Aug 69	: " "
33	: WO2	: A.J.	: Joyce	: RA Inf	: 3/3 ARVN Bn	: " "	: Jan 70	: " "
34	: WO2	: K.J.	: Troy	: RA Inf	: 4/3 ARVN Bn	: " "	: Mar 70	: " "

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Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due	RTA	Location
<u>AATTV : QUANG NAM Province</u>									
35	Maj	F.C.	Johnston	RA Inf	HQ I Corps	G-3 (Trg) Advisor	Feb 70		Danang
36	WO1	S.L.	Arblaster	RAASC	AATTV Danang	Admin WO	May 69		Aust House Danang
37	WO2	V.	Stack	RA Inf	" "	" "	Sep 69		" " "
38	WO2	T.F.	Malone	RAAC	11 ARVN Cav	Assistant Advisor	Oct 69		Hoi-An
39	WO2	L.N.	Bootes	RAAC	4 ARVN Cav	" "	Mar 70		Danang
40	WO2	L.I.	Morrison	RA Inf	Hoa-Vang Sub-Sector	" " RF/PF	Jan 70		Hoa-Vang
41	WO2	B.	Taylor	RAAOC	Quang-Nam Sector	Advisor RF/PF - Mobile Advisory Team	Jul 69		Moc-Bai
42	WO2	M.T.	Jensen	RA Inf	37th Ranger Bn	Assistant Advisor	Nov 69		Hoi-An
43	Capt	C.	Spencer	RAE	1/51 ARVN Bn	Senior Advisor	May 69		Mieu-Bong (Regt Base)
44	WO2	E.H.	Martin	RA Inf	1/51 ARVN Bn	Assistant Advisor	Nov 69		" " "
45	WO2	W.J.	Bruce	RA Inf	2/51 ARVN Bn	" "	Feb 70		" " "
46	WO2	P.J.	Heslin	RAE	3/51 ARVN Bn	" "	Mar 70		" " "

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Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>AATTV : QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Provinces</u>								
47	WO2	D.	Truelove	RA Inf	1/4 ARVN Bn	Assistant Advisor	Sep 69	)4,5 and 6 Regts )located and )operating in )12 DTA (Quang- )Tri and Quang- )Ngai Provinces) )Regt TAORS )currently being )re-adjusted.
48	WO2	M.J.	Poole	RA Inf	2/4 ARVN Bn	" "	Nov 69	
49	WO2	V.L.	Harris	RA Inf	3/4 ARVN Bn	" "	Feb 70	
50	Capt	G.	Dennis	RA Inf	1/5 ARVN Bn	Senior Advisor	Nov 69	
51	Capt	R.L.	Smith	RAE	1/5 ARVN Bn	" " (Designate)	Apr 70	
52	WO1	E.J.	Morrison	RA Inf	1/5 ARVN Bn	Assistant Advisor	Dec 69	
53	WO2	B.L.	Saxby	RAE	2/5 ARVN Bn	" "	Jan 70	
54	WO2	K.J.	Rowe	RA Inf	4/5 ARVN Bn	" "	Oct 69	
55	WO2	T.F.	Dolan	RA Inf	1/6 ARVN Bn	" "	Jan 70	
56	WO2	W.S.	Dickey	RA Inf	2/6 ARVN Bn	" "	Jul 69	
57	WO1	J.E.	Staunton- Latimer	RAAC	4 ARVN Cav	" "	Apr 70	Quang-Ngai

.../6



Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due	RTA	Location
II CTZ									
AATTV : PLEIKU									
58	Maj	W.	Brydon	RA Inf	2nd Mobile Strike Force Command, Det B-20, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)	Bn Comd	Feb 70		Pleiku (Base Camp)
59	Capt	P.J.	Harris	RA Inf	" " "	Coy Comd	Mar 70		" "
60	WO2	R.S.	Simpson	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Feb 70		" "
61	WO2	K.	Payne	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Feb 70		" "
62	WO2	J.R.	Stewart	RA Inf	" " "	Coy Comd (Trg Coy)	Aug 69		" "
63	WO2	D.	Tolley	RA Inf	" " "	Pl Comd	Jun 69		" "
64	WO2	F.L.	Wilkes	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Jun 69		" "
65	WO2	K.C.	Latham	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Dec 69		" "
66	WO2	J.W.	Wigg	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Jan 70		" "
67	WO2	R.D.	Cameron	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Feb 70		" "
68	WO2	A.M.	Kelly	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Feb 70		" "
69	WO2	R.D.	Aylett	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Dec 69		" "
70	WO2	M.W.	Gill	RA Sigs	" " "	" "	Feb 70		" "
71	Sgt	A.J.	Shelton	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Feb 70		" "
72	WO2	B.	Walsh	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Mar 70		" "
73	WO2	S.J.	McLaughlin	RA Inf	" " "	) Attending 5 SFG ) Combat Orientation	Apr 70		" "
74	Sgt	D.W.	Scheele	RA Inf	" " "	) Course Nha-Trang - ) prior to deployment ) with 2 MSF	Sep 69		" "

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
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II CTZ (Cont'd)

AATTV - II CORPS AREA

75	Capt	D.	Rothwell	RA Inf	HQ 5 SFG (A)	Assistant S3	May 69	Nha-Trang
76	WO2	I.J.	Jewell	RA Inf	Recondo School 5SFG(A)	Instructor	Jun 69	Nha-Trang
77	WO2	D.G.	Hill	RAA	ARVN Artillery School	"	Apr 69	Duc-My
78	WO2	G.T.	Smith	RA Inf	Ranger Training Centre	"	Jul 69	"
79	WO1	E.B.	Ostara	RA Inf	CSD, Province Recce Unit	Advisor Binh-Dinh Province	Aug 69	Qui-Nhon

.../8



Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due	RTA	Location
III CTZ									
AATTV : III CORPS AREA									
80	Capt	RCM	Hinde	RA Inf	LRP Wing Van-Kiep National Training Centre	CI LRP Wing	Jun 69		Baria
81	WO2	B.C.	Young	RA Inf	" " "	Patrol Comd-LRP Wing	Jul 69		"
82	WO2	R.	Bury	RAEME	" " "	Admin WO	Jan 70		"
83	WO2	C.	Kealy	RA Inf	" " "	Patrol Comd - LRP Wing	Jan 70		"
84	WO2	J.M.	Grafton	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Apr 69		"
85	Capt	F.	Kudnig	RA Inf	PRU Training Centre	Attached	Jun 69		Near Vung-Tau
86	WO2	G.Y.	Jamieson	RA Inf	" " "	"	Jun 69		" " "
87	WO2	C.J.	Ison	RA Inf	CSD, Prov. Recce Unit	Advisor RF Trg Cadre	Sep 69		Phuoc-Long Prov.
88	Capt	R.L.	Guest	RA Inf	Phuoc-Tuy Sector (att):	RF Trg Cadre	Aug 69		18 ARVN Div Trg School near Nui-Dat.
89	WO2	G.E.	Francis	RA Inf	Phuoc-Tuy Sector (")	" " "	May 69		" " " "
90	WO2	J.D.	Frost	RA Inf	" " " (")	" " "	Aug 69		" " " "
91	WO2	T.J.	Golbert	RAE	" " " (")	" " "	Dec 69		Baria
92	WO2	J.	Macartney	RAASC	" " "	Assistant Advisor, A & L Coy (RF)	Jan 70		"

.../9



Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due	RTA	Location
<u>AATTV : IV CORPS AREA</u>									
93	Maj	G.	Templeton	RAAC	CORDS, IV Corps	Assistant to Chief of: May 69			Can-Tho
						Territorial Security.			
94	Maj	A.	Harkness	RAA	" " "	" " " (Designate): Apr 70			" "
95	WO1	J.N.	Harrower	RAAC	AATTV Can-Tho	Temp Admin duties	Apr 69		" "
96	WO2	J.S.	Hyland	RA Inf	CORDS, IV Corps	Instructor-RD Cadre	May 69		" " (Base)
						Training			
97	WO2	J.D.	Roy	RA Inf	" " "	" " " (Designate)	Mar 70		" " "
98	WO2	A.A.	Welsh	RAE	" " "	Instructor - RD Cadre	Dec 69		" " "
						Training			
99	WO2	C.E.	Munro	RA Sigs	" " "	" " " " "	Jul 69		" " "
100	WO2	R.	Forden	RA Inf	" " "	" " " " "	Sep 69		" " "
101	WO1	J.W.	Mann	RA Inf	" " "	Advisory RF - Mobile	Nov 69		Kien-Hoa Prov.
						Advisory Team			
102	WO2	C.S.	Horne	RA Inf	" " "	" " " " "	Nov 69		" " "
103	WO2	W.J.	Grogan	RAEME	" " "	" " " " "	Aug 69		Vinh-Binh Prov.
104	WO2	R.M.	King	RA Inf	" " "	" " " " "	Sep 69		" " "
105	WO2	R.G.	Carter	RA Inf	CSD Prov. Recce Unit	Advisor	Aug 69		Sadec Prov.
106	WO2	A.G.	Urquhart	RA Inf	Co D, 5SFG (Attached)	Instructor	Sep 69		Ha-Tien



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Annex B to  
AATTV Report - Mar 69

22 March 1969

REPORT ON RF/PF - QUANG TRI PROVINCE

1. Introduction: This paper is to examine the status, successes, failures, objectives, and the prospects of achieving these objectives by the RF/PF in Quang-Tri Province, RVN.

2. Status:

a. RF/PF Units:

	<u>1 Jul 68</u>		<u>1 Nov 68</u>		<u>28 Feb 69</u>	
	<u>RF</u>	<u>PF</u>	<u>RF</u>	<u>PF</u>	<u>RF</u>	<u>PF</u>
Auth	19	120	19	122	29	124
Assn	15	117	19	122	25	124
Present	13	116	19	122	19	122
	<u>Training</u>				<u>Training</u>	
	2	1			6	2

b. RF/PF Strengths:

	<u>1 Jul 68</u>			<u>1 Nov 68</u>			<u>28 Feb 69</u>		
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>EM</u>
Auth	236	836	5551	238	844	5611	294	1014	6546
Assn	184	619	5473	201	686	5879	246	814	6534
Present	165	525	4729	180	602	5507	234	756	6063

c. Expansion:

(1) There has been a 25% increase in the assigned strengths of RF units. There has not been a corresponding increase in the number of junior leaders, both officers and NCO's. Thus, attention must be given to training soldiers to become leaders and consideration should be given to conducting leadership courses within the Province.

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- 2 -

(2) The RF now have five company group headquarters. It is essential that advisory elements be assigned to these Headquarters to insure that they are trained to a satisfactory level in all aspects of command, control, and tactics. The personnel for this effort are available within the present strengths of MACV Team 19.

d. Equipment Upgrading:

(1) M 16's: Weapons have been issued to 70 PF platoons and 10 RF companies. All personnel issued M 16's have been trained. There has been no significant increase in the performance of the RF/PF as a result of this issue. It is recommended that the automatic firing capability of the M 16's be deleted. It is sufficient that the weapon of a rifleman be self-loading only. The Phase 2 issue of the M 16 is to be later this year.

(2) Radios:

(a) The Phase 1 issue of the AN/PRC 25 radio is now complete and Phase 2 is underway.

(b) RF Companies: The Phase 2 issue will bring the total number of AN/PRC 25 sets to four, of a total of six authorized. The AN/PRC 10 makes up the balance.

(c) PF Platoon. The Phase 2 issue will bring the total number of AN/PRC 25 to two, of a total two authorized.

(3) The present scale of issue of water bottles and rations does not allow the RF company a capability of mounting a mobile independent operation of duration greater than twenty four hours.

e. District Organization of PF:

(1) In this Province, one District has 36 PF platoons, one has 25 platoons, four have between 10 and 18 platoons and one District has six platoons.

(2) All are commanded from the District Headquarters. If this structure is to continue, it is recommended that the District Chief should have an experienced and capable officer to assist him in his duties as Commander of Security Forces. This officer should have at least the equivalent experience of an ARVN Battalion Commander.

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(3) The SOP for the RF/PF in Sector and Sub-Sectors should be reviewed, especially in respect to routine, communications, and coordination.

(4) PF platoons stationed in the same hamlet for an extended period of time could be influenced, or come to an unwritten agreement, with the VC. To overcome this possibility, platoons should be moved from time to time within the District.

f. RF Mission:

- (1) Territorial Security
- (2) RD Support
- (3) Mobile Operations

g. PF Mission:

- (1) Protect villages and hamlets
- (2) Support PD
- (3) Destroy the enemy

h. RF/PF Employment (Primary Missions):

	<u>RF</u>			<u>PF</u>		
	1 Jul	1 Nov	28 Feb	1 Jul	1 Nov	28 Feb
Security	13	17	17	106	113	118
Offensive Opns	-	1	-	4	2	3
Others	2	1	8	7	7	3

i. RF/PF Operations (Unit x Days):

(1)	<u>1 Jul - 30 Oct 68</u>	<u>1 Nov - 28 Feb 69</u>
RF	240	185
PF	360	346

(2) The forces do not mount sufficient operations to maintain basic infantry skills. As an example the Sector company group has mounted eight daytime operations in four months.

(3) It is recommended that RF company groups be allotted AO's in the same manner as that of the ARVN Battalions.

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- 4 -

j. Results of RF/PF Operations:

	<u>1 Jul - 30 Oct 68</u>			<u>1 Nov - 28 Feb 69</u>		
	<u>Enemy</u>	<u>Fr</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Enemy</u>	<u>Fr</u>	<u>Civ</u>
KIA	148	11	-	148	52	25
WIA	-	49	3	-	99	81
POW	169	-	-	-	-	-

(Enemy KIA may include US figures)

k. RF/PF Night Operations:

(1)		<u>1 Jul - 3 Oct 68</u>		<u>1 Nov - 28 Feb 69</u>	
	Contacts	93		92	
		<u>Enemy</u>	<u>Fr</u>	<u>Enemy</u>	<u>Fr</u>
	KIA	73	17	61	37
	WIA	-	40	-	59
	MIA	-	4	-	2
	POW	7	-	-	-

(2) During each period, over 3,000 ambushes were set at night.

(3) There is no mobile night patrolling conducted by RF/PF/

l. MACV/USMC Assistance:

(1) In addition to the seven District Advisory Teams in Quang-Tri Province, there are 8 MAT's and 18 CAP's of the 4th CAG, USMC.

(2) A study should be made of the CAP concept and a review made of the time it takes to upgrade the PF element of a CAP to the point where the PF platoon is capable of independent operations.

m. Unity of Command: As an overall view, RF/PF should be integrated with the ARVN. Better organized in the traditional structure of companies, battalions and regiments, the RF/PF strength could continue the same mission in the same areas, and be termed as an example, the Quang-Tri Regiment ARVN. The advantages would be in the Maintenance of the Aim, Economy of Effort, Administration, and Cooperation.

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- 5 -

n. Conclusions: The review of the status of RF/PF leads to the following conclusions:

- (1) Train junior leaders to make up deficiencies.
- (2) Assign advisors to the five RF company group Hqs.
- (3) M 16's should not be capable of firing automatic
- (4) Examine scale of issue of water bottles and rations.
- (5) Review RF/PF SOP's
- (6) Move PF platoons periodically
- (7) Mount more operations
- (8) Allot AO's to RF company groups
- (9) Encourage mobile night patrolling
- (10) Study CAP concept
- (11) Review CAP/PF platoon upgrading
- (12) Integrate RF/PF into ARVN structure.

3. Successes:

- a. Territorial Forces supported the consolidation of 12,000 people under GVN control during Operation Fisher, Oct/Nov 1968.
- b. Territorial Forces are presently supporting the return of 6,000 people to their homes, Operation Kangaroo.
- c. During the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, the entry of PF platoons into previously VC contested hamlets allowed the GVN to regain control of those hamlets.
- d. The first phase of the 1969 PD Plan was commenced on 1 Feb 69 and has continued without incident. A total of 35 PF platoons are supporting the plan.

4. Failures:

- a. The RF are not capable of mounting sustained independent mobile operations.
- b. The PF have not yet mastered the concept of mobile hamlet defense.

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- 6 -

c. The RF/PF are not proficient in the techniques of counterinsurgent operations by night.

d. RF/PF seem to perform better when accompanied by US elements.

5. Objectives:

a. PF :

(1) The goal for the PF's is to continue to provide protection to the villages and hamlets.

(2) An additional 30 platoons are required for the PF to accomplish this task.

(3) In the event that people in the refugee camps in Cam-Lo and Gio Linh return to their hamlets, additional platoons will be required.

b. RF :

(1) The RF is to continue to provide Territorial Security in the Province.

(2) The RF company groups must become as proficient as a standard infantry battalion to achieve this goal.

c. Pacification and Development: Provided the objectives of the PF and the RF are achieved, the 1969 PD Plan should be accomplished.

DAVID R MILLIE  
Maj, AATTV  
S-3 Advisor



20 Mar 69

CO AATTV

REPORT ON PACIFICATION SUPPORT TO  
TERRITORIAL FORCES QUANG TRI PROVINCE  
BY 3 MARINE REGIMENT

1. The following is an outline of the way a Battalion of the 3rd Mar Regt, of 3 Mar Div assisted the GVN during the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC).
2. The 2/3 Marines were allotted to work in the area of Cam-Lo & Huong Hoa Sub-Sectors from 26 Oct 68 to 2 Feb 69.
3. The GVN Objectives included:-
  - a. Destroy the VCI
  - b. Organise the hamlets & establish Self Def Forces.
  - c. Institute Self Help projects.
4. The CG 3 Mar Div gave the following guidance to CO 2/3 Marines :-
  - a. Work closely with the District Chief to accomplish the objectives of the National Pacification Plan.
  - b. Upgrade the training & stimulate initiative of RF & PF units to improve combat effectiveness.
  - c. Integrate Marine Units with RF companies, then, train & conduct operation with District units on a permanent basis.
5. 2/3 Marine Mission
  - a. Institute Pacification Assistance Program with GVN Forces in the District.
  - b. Conduct search & clear operations in coordination with District Forces.

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


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- 2 -

- c. Establish permanent liaison at District HQ.
  - d. Maintain security of GVN location
  - e. Provide reaction forces to assist District Forces.
6. 2/3 Plan. Emphasise the role of the GVN in protection of villages and de-emphasise. Marine participation in the program.
- a. Improve security of populated areas to prevent VC/VCI interference with GVN Pacification efforts.
  - b. Upgrade effectiveness of District Forces by integrating Marines into units to assist in training & conducting combined operations.
  - c. Provide forces/support for joint cordon & searches of hamlets to capture VC/VCI/VCS, caches & weapons, & to conduct accurate census for better population control.

d. INTEGRATION OF UNITS



7. Comments

- a. USMC Offr/NCO is advisor to Vietnamese leader of unit which assigned & is also assistant leader.
- b. Each RF Coy is assigned a TAOR.

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OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
QUANG TRI PROVINCE  
Advisory Team 19  
APO 96495

MACTN-HUQT

6 March 1969

SUBJECT: VC/NVA Sapper Attacks

TO: All Concerned

1. (U) The following information and guidance concerning enemy Sapper attacks is forwarded for information and appropriate command attention at all levels of command. (From COMUSMACV 2 Mar 69)
2. (C) In a recent Sapper attack according to the captured plans, four enemy groups each consisting of 3-4 man teams, moved to within 100 meters of the wire at 1800 hours, moved to the wire by 0200 hours, breached the wire with wire cutters and by throwing limbs and branches over the wire, then moved quickly throughout the entire position all under the cover of mortar and artillery noise plus a very thick bank of fog. Attacks by small arms and rigs from outside the position plus the heavy damage done by very accurate 82mm fire led to conditions within the perimeter which allowed the Sappers to destroy many bunkers and kill several defenders with satchel charges and point blank AK-47 fire throughout the interior of the perimeter. Mortar crews, headquarters installations, and artillery crews, appeared to be the priority target, consequently they suffered most of the casualties. Three listening posts outside the perimeter were not aware of the enemy presence. None of the trip wires were set off, although a majority of the Sappers in attacks of this type are usually killed inside the position, the cost of allowing the penetration is often excessive.

In analysing the action, the commander concluded that:

a. Under cover of enemy mortar fire, plus the noise of our own artillery and mortar fire, the enemy had displayed a capability to penetrate our well prepared defensive positions with up to 50 Sappers without being detected.

b. Once inside the wire, these small, well organized Sapper teams who have been previously briefed in great detail, have a capability of inflicting major damage against the interior of the position.

c. Major revisions of our approach to the security of our vital installations are necessary.

3. (C) To counter this threat:

a. The best defensive action for any base or unit position continues to be active patrolling, ambushes, and listening posts outside the position.

b. Since it is obvious from enemy plans and sketches that he is able to precisely plan his attacks, we must therefore present him with a continuous changing arrangement of our defenses/installations wherever possible.

c. Periodic enemy incoming has led us to increased reliance on bunkers for protection. Once ground action commences, these bunkers are death traps. On the other hand, a few rifleman/machine gunners in open fox holes in the interior area could kill the relatively few enemy before they do any major damage.

d. Units should experiment with all means of improving immediate alarm, some kind of illumination in fog, fool proof trip flares, increased use of tangle foot barriers outside and inside the positions, and other methods for increasing the enemy's difficulties.



4. (C) In light of the information contained herein, commanders at all echelons should review defensive measures to ensure their adequacy. Such review will include, but is not limited to:

a. Appropriate counteractions to inherent dangers in reoccupation of fire support bases and landing zones on an intermittent basis. Unoccupied positions can be thoroughly reconnoitered and attack rehearsals can be conducted while positions are unoccupied.

b. Counterreconnaissance operations must be improved and constantly varied.

c. Plans and battle drills for defense of installations and positions will be frequently rehearsed to preclude confusion of friendly troops.

d. Use of early warning alarms, listening posts and night patrols must be improved with locations and routes constantly changing to avoid setting patterns.

e. Passive defenses and barriers require continuous inspection, upkeep and improvement as long as positions are occupied. Periodically, major shifts will be made in protective fighting positions and fields of fire to reduce effectiveness of enemy reconnaissance.

f. Fields of fire will be carefully selected and properly prepared for each man and each crew served weapon. Each individual will have a prescribed battle station and area of observation. Defenses will be established and manned all around and in depth throughout positions. Dispersion of personnel must be improved. One and two man fighting positions are required instead of large protective bunkers. Incoming fires must not be regarded as a signal to hide, but as a signal to increase observation and detection techniques as incoming fires and other noises often are used to cover the sounds of an attack.

g. An internal reaction force will be organized and prepared to counter and breaches in perimeter defenses or attacks upon vital internal facilities and installations.

h. Insofar as possible, key facilities such as comm centers, headquarters, ammo and fuel storage must be moved from time to time. Coupled with this, deceptive measures such as erecting antennas over dummy bunkers while leaving command posts and comm centers unmarked, positioning of empty ammo cannisters and pol drums tend to deceive enemy of true locations.

i. Ammo and pol must be properly segregated and separation distances maintained whenever possible to prevent single Sapper teams from causing massive destruction. Comm centers and command posts must also be separated from high risk areas, such as ammo and pol storage to prevent disruption of operations.

5. (C) In summary, the enemy will continue to undertake extensive preparations to attack and destroy primary targets such as aircraft, isolated psns, ammo, headquarters and communications. Our goal must be to rob the enemy of surprise he has previously enjoyed. In turn, the enemy must be slowed, surprised, confused and defeated in his mission regardless of his extensive preparations and infinite patience.

#### Notes by AATTV

Enemy observation posts were later found in well camouflaged positions in high trees very close to the position (s) attacked.

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Annex E to  
AATTN Report - March

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OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
MACCORDS, Quang Tri Province  
Advisory Team 19  
APO 96495

28 February 1969

TO: Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS, Saigon

THRU: Commanding General, III MAF/Senior Advisor ICTZ, Danang

PROVINCE REPORT  
(RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

Quang Tri Province (01)

Period ending 28 February 1969

1. Overall Status of Pacification Effort: Despite increased enemy activity, the security climate in Quang Tri remained favorable for pacification. Territorial forces displayed a recovery of poise during the month and on balance demonstrated a capability to deal effectively with the VC threat under the umbrella of security provided by the 3d Marine and 1st ARVN Divisions.

US Seabees began repair of the Colombo irrigation system as the first step in a program to relocate some 6,000 refugees to their former lands in the Cam Vu basin.

Construction of Highway 560 from Quang Tri to Cua Viet and Highway 8B from Dong Ha to the Cam Vu area began during the month. This road construction and irrigation repair by US Army Engineers and Seabees has been favorably received by the people of the province.

The Tet period slowed and delayed the positioning of the RD teams in the assigned hamlets for Phase I of the 1969 Pacification Plan. By the end of the reporting period, all RF and PF re-deployments in support of the 1969 Pacification Plan had been completed. The training programs initiated by the Community Development offices has continued and plans were formulated to handle the training of additional officials created by the March elections.

The Province Chief developed a bold and imaginative plan for the village and hamlet elections to be held in March.

MAT locations remain as stated in the January Province Report. MAT 1-40 at Huong Hoa had five team members wounded on 25 February. Shortage of radios, 292 antennas and vehicles continues to be a limiting factor on MAT effectiveness.

2. Priority Pacification Programs:

a. Upgrade Territorial Security: Pacification '69 has received

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support from territorial forces by the redeployment of Popular Force Platoons to support all RD teams. Enemy activity has not affected the start of 1969 Pacification Program.

Road and water LOC's remain secure. Construction and repair of Route 560 from Quang Tri to Cua Viet has reached the 50% completion mark. Construction has started on Route 8B for support of the coming Cam Vu Resettlement operation.

(1) Enemy Situation:

a. There were no enemy initiated actions that significantly affected pacification efforts. Attempts to disrupt pacification were:

(a) An emphasis on propaganda and proselyting operations conducted at the hamlet and village level.

(b) Attempts to interdict LOC's and MSR's (Cua Viet River, Highway 9).

(c) An increase in the number of harassing attacks directed against territorial forces, to include RD teams.

b. The major threat to important GVN population and economic centers is attack by fire.

(2) Friendly Situation: The 69th PF platoon and a platoon of 127 RF company, contacted an enemy element at 0230 hrs on 25 February at YD095592. The enemy sustained 14 KIA. Friendly casualties were 3 KIA and 3 WIA.

At YD084519, at 2030 hrs on 25 February, an enemy element fired two RPG-2 rounds into the Team Hut of MAT 1-43. Five members were wounded, one seriously. Night contact by territorial forces was made on 19 occasions, inflicting 32 KIA to the enemy.

The Sector RF Company Group took part in two operations, each of one day duration, however, no contact was made. A total of 48 people were detained.

(3) Status of RF and PF: Authorized RF/PF units remain at 29 and 124 respectively. Five (5) new RF companies have been constituted and are now undergoing basic training. Quang Tri now has 24 of its authorized 29 companies. The province has a total of 18 CAP's working with 19 PF platoons, an increase of five (5) CAP's over January. Current locations of CAP's are: Mai Linh 4, Trieu Phong 8, Hai Lang 2, and Dong Ha 4. There is also one (1) MTT working in the Hai Lang District.

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Under the present upgrading of RF/PF, Quang Tri has received 3,495 M-16 rifles which completes Phase I of the issue. All training with the M-16 rifle is completed. This training included assembly and disassembly; functioning; care and cleaning; zeroing; marksmanship training; and techniques of fire. Twenty-eight warrant officers for RF were received during the month. RF/PF's were awarded 15 decorations during the month. The desertion rate of RF/PF remained below one per cent during the reporting period.

b. Step Up the Attack on VC Infrastructure: During February, 19 VCI - oriented operations were conducted in the province by GVN and FWMF agencies and units, reflecting a decrease in operations over the previous months, due primarily, to the Tet holiday period. As of 25 February, 82 significant VCI cadre were either killed, captured, or had cause to rally. Utilizing available Phoenix/Phung Hoang assets, emphasis was directed towards "rifle shot" operations as opposed to "shotgun" operations. As a result of these operations, 9 significant VCI cadre were captured, 1, a district level cadre and 4 Village Liberation Committee cadre.

To date, 1 district Liberation Committee, 19 village Liberation Committees, and 20 hamlet Liberation Committees have been reported in Quang Tri Province. The majority of these committees are appointed and consist of 5 to 7 members. Continued emphasis was placed during the month on the detection, location, and neutralization of such committees through the use of "rifle shot" operations.

c. Develop Stronger Local Government: Plans were made for the election of village councils and hamlet chiefs next month. The election schedule is surprisingly ambitious in that, by the end of March, all villages and populated hamlets in the province will have elected officials. The 1969 program for training officials and providing for village budgets remains a matter of concern, in that specific information is lacking.

d. Expand Self Defense: Quang Tri has a total of 12,870 individuals participating in the Popular Self Defense Forces. Of these, 10,838 are trained, 220 are in training, with 1,812 yet to be trained. There are 3,191 arms now issued to the PSDF.

e. Emphasize Revolutionary Development and Self-Help: On February 1, the 43 RD teams moved to their new location in accordance with the 1969 Pacification Plan. On 3 February however, President Thieu announced there would be two phases instead of the planned four, and he increased the number of hamlets to be pacified during the first phase to 62. This increase necessitated further planning, logistical stretching, and hamlet selection. The Province Chief delegated directly to the District

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Chiefs, the responsibility for selection of the additional hamlets. He assigned the number of hamlets each district must pacify and the number of teams each district would command. After about two to three weeks, the teams were in their new locations.

Initially the teams received a scattering of VC attacks on their new positions. However, their presence seems to be accepted now, and the attacks have ceased.

Communication and transportation have become a problem with the spreading of teams. We now have almost double the number of teams dispersed over an area six to eight times greater than last month. Increased radio and logistics support is needed.

f. Revive Rural Economy: A very small amount of rice was transplanted this month, most of it being planted in December and January. Due to a shortage of insecticide, the rice stem borer is causing damage which will lower yields, depending upon the intensity of the infestation.

Fertilizer is returning to a more normal price since its supply has reached adequate levels. Due to the "Tet" festivities, prices were considerably higher than usual for this time of year. Fish prices remained stable with considerable influence from the Gia Dang area to maintain an adequate supply.

Rototiller type tractors given to three of the more progressive hamlets in the province should do much to advance mechanized agriculture in Quang Tri.

Road security continues good throughout the province. When repair of the road from Quang Tri to Cua Viet is completed even more of the people will have a more accessible market for their produce.

g. Upgrade Refugee Care and Step-Up Resettlement: The MHSWR, under the able guidance of Mr Hoang Duc Thac, the MHSWR Service Chief, continued to take advantage of the relatively stable military environment to carry on the piastre distribution plan launched last month. Last month, despite his meager administrative resources, Thac succeeded in fruitfully spending more of his budget than all of the other MORE agencies combined. In addition to resettlement and temporary relief payments, Thac has finally begun to dip into his educational and public health budgets with the happy result that five classrooms, twenty latrines, and two dispensaries are now under construction in camps in the Province's southern districts - Hai Lang and Trieu Phong. Finally, planning for the Cam Vu Resettlement Operation - whereby some 6,000 refugees will be returned to their native hamlets - is now in the final stages and, subject to concurrence by the appropriate military authorities, the operation should begin during the first week in March.

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h. Revive National Reconciliation and Chieu Hoi:

a. Seven VC have rallied since the last report. This brings the total to 14 since 1 January. This current rate parallels last year's pre- and post-Tet period.

b. Major improvements were made in physical facilities of the Chieu Hoi Center and Hamlet. Defenses at both sites were strengthened and living conditions ameliorated courtesy of US Marine civic action projects.

c. Emphasis is also being placed on increasing the rallier rate by focusing on target areas such as Bru, refugees, and local scattered guerrilla units and by improving intelligence exploitation and coordination.

3. Future Problems and Projections: The 1969 Pacification Program in Quang Tri may be headed for serious problems, particularly in the Phase I portion unless certain events occur. To begin with, the 1969 Plan was based on an eleven-month year running from 1 February to 31 December. Tet activities have been a damper on the initiation of the program and March, with its emphasis on elections, may be an equally slow month. This, coupled with the absence of an approved budget for '69, will have a marked effect on the Pacification Program as projected. Phase I will in essence be April, May and June and will undoubtedly see some village officials absent for training outside the province.

A further problem is the lack of specific information about the 1969 village budgets and training schedules. The province officials are still without guidance on the mechanics of handling funds for villages. The only recent information available at this time indicates a long time frame, and is vague in detail. A memo from NLD, Danang, indicates training for village officials in Vung Tau, to be conducted through November, 1969. A Vietnamese lesson plan for in province training, undated, outlines some financial procedures, but is far short of being a specific guide. The 1969 emphasis on villages and village budgets marks a considerable departure from the previous system of MORD budgets and logistical support. Delay in implementing the new plan can be extremely costly. After the shock of Tet, 1968, months passed before significant progress was made under the 1968 Pacification Plan. Efforts such as the APC, and the improvement in security have given confidence and momentum to the province officials and to the people. This momentum appears threatened by administrative delay in providing funds and training to match the new focus



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on village councils. The 1969 Pacification Plan depends on prompt, simple instructions for the village chiefs, and timely receipt of funds.

*H.F. Mooney*  
H.F. MOONEY

LTC, INF

Province Senior Advisor

Incl: District Reports

Cam Lo  
Dong Ha  
Gio Linh  
Hai Lang  
Huong Hoa  
Mai Linh  
Trieu Phong

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CAM LO DISTRICT  
Advisory Team 19

26 February 1969

MONTHLY REPORT

1. Status of Pacification:

a. Military:

(1) Enemy Activity: During the first two weeks of this reporting period, enemy activity was minimal except for one mining incident on Highway 9, vicinity of Rockpile on 13 February. After Tet, enemy activity increased significantly with mining incidents on Highway 9 west of the populated areas and numerous ambushes and attacks by fire against FWMAF in the northern portion of the district. Of significant note is the attack by a VC/NVA company against the APC hamlet of Quat Ia on the morning of 25 February. The local RF/PF killed 16 enemy and wounded an unknown number, friendly losses were 1 RF KIA and 1 PF KIA.

(2) Friendly Activity: Local RF/PF units continue to operate north and west of the populated areas. Elements of the 3d Marine Regiment are still operating with and supporting the pacification effort. The effectiveness of the RF/PF has increased with the issue of the M-16's. District forces conducted 10 company sized operations and numerous smaller sized operations during the period with 17 enemy KIA; 8 VCS captured, friendly losses were 4 KIA and 3 WIA. MAT 1-29 continues to operate with the PF elements in the district.

b. New Life Development: Early in the month a visit from GVN officials from Danang and Quang Tri gave renewed encouragement and promise of support to officials working on the irrigation and drinking water systems for the Cam Lo Resettlement area.

In spite of all encouragement and assistance offered, district officials continued to procrastinate on opening the Cam Lo Bakery on a cooperative basis. Two RD teams were assigned to Cam Lo and began work in the Vinh Dai refugee camp preparing accurate population statistics for the Cam Vu move. The district ARVN medical team continued its excellent Medcap program.

2. The Cam Lo District Chief is Captain Nguyen Van Rao.

HAROLD W HEALY  
MAJ, ARM  
District Senior Advisor

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DONG HA DISTRICT  
Advisory Team 19

26 February 1969

MONTHLY REPORT

1. Status of Pacification:

a. Military:

(1) Enemy Activity: An increase in enemy activity and movement was noted during the month of February. Two mining incidents were reported by 14th Engineers working on road 8B running thru the Cam Vu Valley area. Four other mines were removed by EOD teams. Two mines were discovered on Highway 1 and removed by EOD. Numerous mines were discovered during the land clearing operation in the northern section of the district. An increase of propaganda distribution was noted during the month, most of the propaganda was directed at US personnel.

(2) Friendly Activity: The friendly forces of the district experienced their most successful month to date in combat with the VC. On 1 February, a PF platoon ambushed an estimated VC squad resulting in 3 VC KIA, 1 AK-47 captured. On the night of 21 February, PF platoon 34 and CAP team 4-1-6 ambushed an estimated VC platoon resulting in 2 VC KIA and 2 AK-47's captured, friendly losses in both incidents were negative. A combined operation of 5 days in length with 1/61st Inf, 5th Mech Division resulted in the capture of a large quantity of medical supplies and 6 VC, to include a nurse, captured in the Lop Thach area. CAP 4-1-8 was assigned on 2 February, giving this district a total of 4 CAP's and two Marine squads working with the PF's. One NVA corporal was turned in by a woman of Truc Khe hamlet on 19 February, thus providing us with some hard intelligence on the 325th Division. She was paid a 2,000\$VN reward by the District Chief.

b. New Life Development: Planning continues for the resettlement of the people from Cam Vu Valley. Six (6) RD teams have been assigned to the district. Presently they are working with the people in the refugee camp who will be returned to their native hamlets. The hospital renovation continues at a slow pace due to workmen shortages. Expected date of completion is 30 March. Medcaps during the month saw 3,350 people.

2. The Dong Ha District Chief is Major Le Quang Khiem.

ROBERT W WEARY, JR  
CPT, INF  
District Senior Advisor

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GIO LINH DISTRICT  
Advisory Team 19

26 February 1969

MONTHLY REPORT

1. Status of Pacification:

a. Military:

(1) Enemy Activity: NVA main force activity continued at a low level until 23 February when an outpost of the 1st AMTRAC Bn (USMC) located at YD291751 was unsuccessfully attacked by a force of approximately 100 NVA. VC Guerrilla incidents have maintained a steady increase during the past month. VC initiated action included mortar barrages on the District Headquarters and on A-2. RD teams operating in the district were harrassed by sniper fire and Ha Thanh Refugee Village was penetrated for propaganda purposes.

(2) Friendly Activity: Local RF and PF forces were placed in readiness for Tet. The introduction of five RD teams into the district aided the readiness posture. Cordons have been placed around the two refugee villages in the district in an attempt to eliminate penetration of these areas. The cordon for Ha Thanh Refugee Village is maintained by local PF forces in conjunction with the 2d Regiment, 1st Inf Div (ARVN) from C-1, while the cordon of Gio Hai Refugee Village is maintained by the 1st AMTRAC Bn (USMC) in conjunction with local PF forces. M-16 training within this district has been completed with the exception of those men who are attending formal training at the South Vietnamese Training Center. These men will be trained with the M-16 immediately upon return to the district.

b. New Life Development: Work generally slowed during the Tet period but some progress was made. Tin distribution for those refugees suffering war damage in 1968 was completed. The district warehouse in Ha Thanh Refugee Village has been completed and will greatly augment this districts ability to meet its program commitments. Five RD teams have been inserted into the hamlets of Gio Le Village and will be utilized in the 1969 Pacification Program. The district dispensary (15 beds) has been completed and is staffed by a team of ARVN medical personnel. Work is continuing on the Civilian Administration Complex in Ha Thanh Refugee Village with the completion of the protective wire around the perimeter and the initiation of construction of bunkers within the compound itself.

2. The Gio Linh Acting District Chief, in the absence of Captain Le Thanh Thang is Captain Dang AUC Quoc.

CHARLES O SLABY, JR  
MAJ, ARM  
District Senior Advisor



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HAI LANG DISTRICT  
Advisory Team 19

26 February 1969

MONTHLY REPORT

1. Status of Pacification:

a. Military:

(1) Enemy Activity: Enemy activity remained light with only two incidents of propaganda distribution.

(2) Friendly Activity: Elements of the 1st Bde, 5th Div (M) and 1st ARVN Regiment continue to operate throughout the district. District forces in conjunction with US elements conducted 3 joint operations. There were 15 company size or larger operations and many smaller unit operations. Results of operations were 5 VC KIA, 13 VCI captured and 2 draft dodgers picked up. There were no friendly casualties. Also 3 weapons, a small quantity of munitions and approximately 1 ton of rice were captured. There were 2 ralliers to the GVN.

(3) Mobile Advisory Teams: Both teams continued their training programs as well as accompanying the units on operations. The Marine MTT completed training of PF platoon 8 and is presently training platoon 9.

b. New Life Development: A Roto Tiller tractor was presented to the hamlet of Giap Trung by the CSM of 24th Corps in the name of the enlisted men of that unit. The 54th CA platoon completed the distribution of excess foods to the APC hamlets. They also distributed food and building materials for the repair of a school and the building of desks for the refugees of Tam Dien hamlet. Building materials are being delivered to Hai Lam refugee village in order to build a bridge connecting it to Mai Dan hamlet. Medcaps continue to be performed by US/RF medics, treating a total of 1,730 people.

2. The Hai Lang District Chief is Major Phan Van The.

PAUL E FITZPATRICK  
MAJ, INF.  
District Senior Advisor

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HUONG HOA DISTRICT  
Advisory Team 19

26 February 1969

MONTHLY REPORT

1. Status of Pacification:

a. Military:

(1) Enemy Activity: Enemy initiated activity for the month consisted of one attack on a Marine patrol inflicting two casualties, and on 25 February, an attack by fire on the compound housing MAT 1-40, wounding all five members of the team. There were two instances of squad size infiltration into contested hamlets. Propaganda leaflets were found scattered outside several hamlets, but no attempt at direct distribution was made.

(2) Friendly Activity: District forces and F Company, 2/3 Marines made two contacts during the month, resulting in 2 NVA killed and two AK-47's captured. A cordon and search operation yielded 2 VCS.

b. New Life Development: A protective fence was completed around all Bru resettlement villages. Detailed plans for an additional school for the Bru village was submitted to G-5, III Marine Division, which will partially support the project. The pig and home garden projects continued to develop; distribution was made to the refugees of substantial supplies of tools, food and clothing. The GVN refugee department continues to be remiss in the payment of monthly supplements and in registering new refugee families.

2. The Huong Hoa District Chief is Captain Tinh A Nhi.

EDWARD J F THOMAS  
MAJ, INF  
District Senior Advisor

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MAI LINH DISTRICT  
Advisory Team 19

26 February 1969

MONTHLY REPORT

1. Status of Pacification:

a. Military:

(1) Enemy Activity: Enemy initiated activity increased during the month of February. 7 kidnappings were noted including 2 women and 5 boys between the ages of 15 and 18. One of the women later escaped and contributed information leading to the discovery of 5 VC hootches and bunkers. Other activity included one mortar attack on LZ Sharon resulting in one WIA and VC propaganda found in two locations during the Tet holiday.

(2) Friendly Activity: Local RF/PF conducted nightly saturation patrolling and ambushes showing negative results with only two contacts. Of the 12 company or larger size operations, one half were conducted by the National Police in and around Quang Tri City.

b. New Life Development: 4 RD teams have been assigned to this district and are beginning to implement their programs. Civic action projects completed by the district team included a newspaper with circulation of 4,000, sponsorship of 35 scholarships, and 21 school desks being built. Also medcap teams were made available to all district refugee and pacification hamlets previously without service. Finally, a new road has been completed to one of the district pacification hamlets, thus allowing vehicles to enter the area for the first time.

2. The Mai Linh District Chief is Captain Le Van Thanh.

EDWARD G HUNTLEY  
CPT, INF  
District Senior Advisor

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TRIEU PHONG DISTRICT  
Advisory Team 19

26 February 1969

MONTHLY REPORT

1. Status of Pacification:

a. Military:

(1) Enemy Activity: Although there has been an increase of intelligence reports indicating enemy presence, the level of enemy initiated incidents remained relatively low. It is significant to note that the enemy has changed his pattern of movement, where in the past he moved in small 2 and 3 men groups, he has started to move in squads varying from 10 to 20 men.

(2) Friendly Activity: Friendly activity continued at a relatively high level. In addition to combined operations with elements of the 1st Bn, 61st Inf, RF and PF units conducted numerous platoon and squad size ambushes and patrols. Of significance was a patrol conducted on 19 February by a squad of PF platoon 52 which resulted in 2 VC KIA and the capture of 8 VC along with 5 individual weapons. On 25 February, PF platoon 25, acting on intelligence information obtained from a captured VC, conducted a successful raid, recovering an 82mm mortar. That same day, PF platoon 29, also acting on police developed information, recovered a 60mm mortar and 1 CKC rifle. In keeping with the districts plans towards RD '69, 3 new CAP's were added providing a fortified line between the areas to be pacified and the VC and contested area.

(3) Mobile Advisory Teams: MAT 1-3 continued training of RF in the Gia Dang area, while MAT 1-48, operating in the Dai Hoa area, continued the 2 week training cycle for PF platoons. In addition, both MAT's conducted M-16 training for those PF platoons issued M-16 rifles and not trained by CAP's. A total of 1 RF company and 18 PF platoons have been issued and have been trained on the M-16 rifle. Shortage of authorized radios for MAT 1-48 continued to be the only significant equipment shortage experienced by the MAT's.

b. New Life Development: Due mainly to the efforts of 24th Corps, the Farmer's Association of Trieu Phong was able to provide the farmers with 2,000 bags of fertilizer at a greatly reduced price. By providing free transportation from Danang to Trieu Phong, 24th Corps made it possible to sell fertilizer at 625\$VN per bag as compared to the normal price of 900 to 1,200\$VN. The farmers of An Phung hamlet were presented a tractor from 24th Corps. Work continued on the improvement of Route 560, linking the port facility at Cua Viet with Quang Tri City.

2. The Trieu Phong District Chief is Major Nguyen Duc Nhiem.

JOHN M D SHALIKASHVILI  
MAJ, ARTY  
District Senior Advisor

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Annex E to  
AATTV Report - Mar 69

REPORT BY ASST ADVISOR TO 4/2 ARVN BN  
OPERATION DEWEY CANYON  
30 JAN - 7 MAR 69

1. 4th Bn 2nd Regt flew into LZ "Tornado" at 1200 hrs 30 Jan and patrolled from this base until 12 Feb with negative contact, but found about 6 old gardens with tapioca and sweet potatoes. These gardens had not been worked for at least 6 months or longer.

2. On 12 Feb the Bn moved to and prepared LZ "Valentine" and patrolled from this location until 20 Feb. During this time patrols had 4 contacts and found a 4 line telephone line at GRID 235195. The results of the contacts were:

2 VC POW

2 VC KIA

one of the PW's was a Doctor (NVA Captain)

The telephone line was followed for about 5,000 metres. The line was heavy gauge single strand copper wire secured to trees with "screw in" type insulators. The line was badly damaged in places by artillery and airstrikes.

3. On 20 Feb Bn was airlifted to LZ "Patton" and patrolled from there until lifted out on 7 Mar. Patrols had 4 contacts during this period resulting in.

3 VC KIA

Unknown WIA (Blood Trails)

2 ARVN KIA

4 " WIA

During the early stages of the operation weather made normal resupply almost impossible and resupply was tried by parachute from C130s dropping by radar. One drawback of this method is the drop aircraft not being able to assess wind drift. In almost zero visibility it was not possible to get a good compass shot onto the chutes as the observers could only see them for about 1-2 seconds and could not assess the drift of the loads. The steepness and narrowness of the ridges also did not assist. This method used in flat or less steep country however should be very effective.

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- 2 -

Results of airdrop:

8	parachutes	dropped
2	"	recovered
3	"	unobserved
3	"	observed not recovered

5. Total results of operation for 4/2 ARVN Bn were as follows:

8	Contacts
2 VC	POW
5 VC	KIA
Unknown	WIA
1	Telephone Line

RF Robinson  
WO2  
AATTV

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Annex G to AATTV  
Report - Mar 69

REPORT BY ASST ADVISOR TO 2/4 ARVN BN  
20 FEB - 31 MAR

21-23 Feb 69

2/4 ARVN Bn conducted search & clear type operation south west of Nghia Hanh. Light contact was made with VC local force company. We did run into a VC propaganda unit and 5 VC were captured.

Results : Other enemy losses undetermined.

Friendly : 1 KIA  
4 WIA

23 Feb 69

Nghia-Hanh received ground & mortar attack estimated coy plus.

24 Feb 69

1 Coy 2/4 Bn with APC's in heavy contact just north of Nghia Hanh. In contact most of day.

Results of days action:

En : 30 NVA KIA  
Captured: 9 weapons, numerous  
grenades ammo etc.

Friendly: 9 WIA

That evening coy returned to Nghia Hanh and about 1800 hrs received mortar attack.

1 x 57 RCL hit conex near advisor bunker

Results : 4 US advisor WIA

2/4 Bn ) 10 KIA  
          ) 15 WIA

25 Feb 69

Remained protecting Nghia-Hanh: received mortar attack

3 friendly WIA.

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- 2 -

26 Feb till 4 March

Operation approx 4 kms North of Nghia-Hanh : estimated NVA Battalion plus.

2/4 Bn remained in contact for most of operation.

Results : 102 NVA KIA  
Captured 1 NVA  
1 NVA Chieu Hoi  
10 AK 47 captured  
4 B40 launchers  
3 machine guns  
1 sight for 82mm mortar  
Numerous field packs found, ammunition,  
Grenades, Map etc.  
Many graves blood trails etc.

- 20 friendly KIA  
47 " WIA  
7 weapons lost to enemy

Enemy losses where confirmed body count I estimate the enemy suffered many more dead & wounded.

5 March till 7 March

2/4 Bn moved to Quang-Ngai for city security.

8 March - 10 March

Regt size operation. West of Nui Dep and South of river. Bn did combat assault into area.

Results 8 NVA KIA  
1 NVA Captured  
1 Machine Gun captured  
2 B41 launchers captured  
Numerous grenades, ammo, equip,  
Some B41 rounds capt. Mortar rounds etc.

- 2 Friendly KIA  
10 " WIA

11 March to 14 March

2/4 Bn Quang-Ngai security.

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14 March to 19 March

Moved to Nghia-Hanh for security of Compound.

18th & 19th Mar Nghia-Hanh was hit by mortar & rocket fire : very accurate.

On the 18th Mar PF & RF ambushes broke up a possible ground attack on Nghia-Hanh.

20-23 March

2/4 Bn moved out on operation East & South of Nghia-Hanh.

0900 hrs made contact with 207 Heavy Wpns Battalion, they had 2 x 50 cal MG 82 & 60 30 cal MG's mortars. We were in heavy contact most of day. Also had fairly good contacts during 21st Mar.

22 March

Contacted a enemy battalion plus. In contact all afternoon. Fixed spooky all night.

23 March

Very little contact.

Results of Operation (20-23 Mar)

42 NVA KIA  
2 Friendly KIA  
20 " WIA

APCs on right flank killed 27 NVA

2/4 Bn captured : 7 AK 47  
1 B40 launcher & numerous rounds  
1 Machine Gun  
57 Grenades capt.  
Numerous ammunitions for AK weapons  
4000 metres of telephone cable  
Various shovels machettes, clothing,  
Field packs & equipment.

Many blood trails in airstrike areas.

25 March 2/4 Bn position near Nghia-Hanh received mortar & rocket fire also CS was used by enemy. Battalion less one Coy moved to MO DUC, one Coy stayed at Nghia-Hanh.

Bn is now training and refitting.



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Annex H to AATTV  
Report - Mar 69

RF TRAINING CENTRE  
AATTV  
HEAVYWEIGHT

6 Apr 69

HQ AATTV

MONTHLY REPORT - MAR 69  
RF TRAINING - PHUOC TUY

1. On the 5 Apr 69 45 RF soldiers were graduated from the second patrol course run by the AATTV/1ATF Cadre. Of the original 53 who commenced the course 3 were withdrawn during the course and 5 were failed at the completion, having failed to achieve a satisfactory standard.
2. A demonstration of the proficiency of the RF troops on the course was given on the 5 Apr 69 to approximately 90 spectators. The spectators were made up of 50 US advisors from Province, Sector, District and MAT's teams; 25 Vietnamese officers from Province, Sector and District HQ and 15 officers and NCOs from 1 ATF. After the demonstration a buffet lunch was given to the spectators at the 1 ATF Offrs Mess. Also on the 5 Apr 69, the Deputy Commander 1 ATF attended the march-out parade by the course and presented course certificates.
3. Command and control of the RF Training Program is to revert to Phuoc-Tuy Sector with effect Apr 69. Final details are still to be worked out by CO AATTV and the PSA Phuoc-Tuy, but in general the AATTV personnel will be attached to Sector (RF advisors' office) and will work directly under him on all matters affecting training and administration of the RF courses. 1 ATF has agreed to continue to assist in the training program by the provision of assistant instructors and certain stores and equipment. The location of the training is subject to further study but will remain at Heavyweight for the time being.
4. Phuoc-Tuy Sector have agreed to a shorter and more general training course (4 weeks duration and training 3 platoons at a time) but are having difficulty in releasing the platoons at this time. The new course was due to commence on 7 Apr 69 but as only 52 troops were available for training it was decided not to start until the 3 platoons were released, thus ensuring that the new program is fully accepted and correctly initiated.

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- 2 -

5. With the delay in commencing the next course the team has undertaken to train a MATs team from 5 RAR from 9 to 12 Apr inclusive.

6. A PR film unit accompanied the course on a day patrol on 21 Mar 69 and made a film which has been shown on TV in Australia. An ABC film unit made a longer and more comprehensive film on the training of RF by the team on the 28 Mar 69. PR coverage was also given to the demonstration and graduation parades.

RL GUEST  
Capt  
AATTV



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Annex I to AATTV  
Report - Mar 69

VUNG TAU  
1 Apr 69

CO AATTV

MONTHLY REPORT - MAR 69

General

1. Training cycle 1/69 commenced on 3 Mar after instructors returned to work on 28 Feb.
2. This cycle is undergoing the first "Revised PRU Course" which I formulated late in 1968. The course has generally been very successful but a number of minor changes are required. In the Revised PRU Course the major areas of change are:
  - a. Instructional repetition of subject matter.
  - b. More emphasis on small team covert operations (incl operations in conjunction or support with Police agencies)
  - c. Greatly increased practical work and exercises
  - d. A greater emphasis on developing "independant thinking" and initiative on the part of PRU members.

Operations

3. For the first time, I have managed to have our student intelligence specialists deployed on surveillance missions in PHUOC TUY Province. This activity acts as field confirmation of training and achieves :
  - a. Realistic training
  - b. Assistance to PHUOC TUY PHOENIX intelligence gathering facilities.
  - c. An opportunity for Training Advisors to co-ordinate and participate in an intelligence operation.
4. Further advances in operations are planned for the future.

Labor Difficulties

5. Ostensibly the labor problems and strike in late February are overcome. There is however an undercurrent of mistrust and discontent among the instructors.

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- 2 -

6. The active participation in the strike by the SATC/JGS Liaison Officer has been proven, to my way of assessment, but no action appears to be anticipated by US officials.

7. In fact the entire incident has enabled the LO to strengthen his influence in the running of 3 ATC - however he is exploiting this position cautiously.

Program Management

8. It is understood that the PRU program is now under MOI (GVN) management but the exact implications in both status, employment of PRU and Training are still not clear.

9. It is almost certain, however, that SATC will remain in its current location until 30 Jun 69.

Capt FM KUDNIG  
Capt  
AATTV



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Annex J to AATTV  
Report - Mar 69

29 Mar 69

CO AATTV

MONTHLY REPORT - MAR 69

Training

1. The course has progressed very well over the first three weeks and no major difficulties have arisen as yet.

Course Status

2. a. Division : There are twelve disqualification so far for the following reasons :
- |     |                    |   |   |
|-----|--------------------|---|---|
| (1) | Tactical inability | - | 5 |
| (2) | Physical inability | - | 2 |
| (3) | Map reading        | - | 2 |
| (4) | Medical disability | - | 1 |
| (5) | Discipline         | - | 1 |
| (6) | Transfer           | - | 1 |
- b. Regimental : Below are the disqualifications so far and the reasons for other dismissal.
- |     |                          |   |   |
|-----|--------------------------|---|---|
| (1) | Map reading (ILLITERATE) | - | 8 |
| (2) | Medical disability       | - | 3 |
| (3) | Physical inability       | - | 3 |
| (4) | Disciplinary             | - | 2 |
- c. This leaves a total of 26 with the Divisional Sub Wing and 22 with the Regimental Sub Wing to continue the course.

Administration

3. There have been a few problems during this present course caused by scarcity of stores for both Sub Wings but these have generally been of a minor nature. There is now a stock of ARVN field rations held by Van-Kiep for our use.

Visits

4. There have been two visits to the Wing this month. The first on 27 Mar by Col HILLS Deputy Senior Advisor 4 CTZ and the second on 31 Mar by LTC FINK SA 5 ARVN Division. Both visitors expressed satisfaction on their visit and promised to re-visit with other interested parties.

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- 2 -

General

5. I am still awaiting a decision from CTC on the future of the Regimental course and confirmation of my new schedule of courses for this year. Further discussions will be held with US advisors at CTC to expedite a decision on this matter.

Capt R. HINDE  
Chief Instructor  
Long Range Patrol Wing  
Van-Kiep NTC

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Annex K to  
AATTV Report - Mar 69

OFFICE OF CIVIL OPERATIONS  
AND  
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT  
IV CORPS

MACCZ-IV-C-DADC/EC

25 March 1969

CORPS IV CORPS DIRECTIVE NO. 41-69

SUBJECT: Village and Hamlet Defense

I. GENERAL

A. Attached as Inclosure 1 is a concept for the coordination of all military and para-military forces in the defense of villages and hamlets. This concept is based on the 1960 Pacification and Development Guidelines which delegates responsibilities for local security to village chiefs.

B. The concept will be implemented gradually. There is probably going to be some inertia on the part of Province and District Chiefs in allowing village chiefs to have operational control of security forces. However, if we are to gain security, it is necessary that the span of control be reduced to practical proportions. The Village/Hamlet Defense concept achieves this. Considerable advisory effort will be necessary to achieve this goal.

C. The necessity to achieve coordination of the RVN forces is quite apparent. What may not be so obvious is the necessity of coordination and cooperation between the advisors responsible for different groups, RF/PF, RDC, PSDP and NP. Unless complete cooperation between advisors is maintained, it is unlikely that we will achieve this on the CVN side. This aspect cannot be overemphasized.

II. POLICY

A. Advisory emphasis is to be placed on the implementation of this concept.

B. PSAs are to insure the complete coordination and cooperation of all advisors in effecting Village and Hamlet Defense.

1 Incl a/s  
w/Anxs thereto

WILBUR WILSON  
Acting  
Deputy for CORPS

DISTRIBUTION:

A, E, 1, 2  
+ 2 ea MATs  
+ 30 DADC/TS



INCLOSURE L TO CORDS DIRECTIVE "VILLAGE AND HAMLET DEFENSE"

VILLAGE AND HAMLET DEFENSE

REFERENCES

- a. CORDS IV CORPS DIRECTIVE 36-69, Subject: Concept for Defense of Hamlets by PF Platoons, dated 13 November 1968.
- b. CORDS IV CORPS DIRECTIVE 9-69, Subject: Guidance for Organization and Training of PSDF, dated 21 January 1969.
- c. JGS Directive 300-12TTM/P3, Subject: Mobile Defense of Hamlets, dated 20 January 1969.

BACKGROUND

1. Towards the end of 1968, the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) considerably increased the area and the total population brought under GVN control. The 1969 Pacification and Development (PD) Plan aims at maintaining the momentum initiated by the APC so that by the end of 1969, 90% of the population will be under GVN control.
2. One of the major lessons that was derived from the APC was the necessity of coordinating the activities of all military and para-military forces in achieving our pacification goals. As we move forward in the 1969 PD Plan and the area and population under GVN influence increases, the requirement for territorial security also becomes increasingly important. The forces available for this task are unlikely to increase in size in proportion to the area and population gained. It is, therefore, necessary to insure that the most efficient and best use is made of all forces so that the enemy is denied the ability to cause any regression in the program. No one group can live on its own. Only by coordination of all groups, RF, PF, PSDF, RDC and NP--can each and every one of them survive.

PURPOSE

3. The purpose of this paper is to provide guidance in establishing a coordinated defense system for villages and hamlets.

VILLAGE ORGANIZATION

4. The outline of the functions and duties of village government is attached as Annex A. An understanding of this organization is necessary to implement a proper defense plan.

INCLOSURE 1



## COORDINATION OF THE DEFENSE OF A VILLAGE

5. Under the 1969 PD Plan, the Village Administrative Committee Chairman (the village chief) is commander of the local PF. In addition, he has operational control over National Police, RD cadre teams and PSDF in the area. Sometimes this function is delegated to the village commissioner for security, an appointed official, but in some areas the district chief will still retain control of the PF. The intention is for the above forces to be under the operational control of the village chief. The executive that performs the day-to-day coordination of the military and para-military forces is the village commissioner for security. At hamlet level, coordination is carried out by the assistant for security. (See Annex B).

6. The commissioner for security, in addition to the responsibility for coordinating the defense of the village, has the task of maintaining order, organizing the collection of intelligence, arresting lawbreakers and the supervision of the inter-family system.

### FORCES AVAILABLE

7. The forces available to provide security of a village normally consists of PF or RF platoons, an RD cadre team and the PSDF groups that have been organized in the hamlets. In addition, six National Policemen are to be placed in the village. There can be cases where some of these forces are not available.

8. Functions and responsibilities of the various military and para-military forces in a village or hamlet are as follows:

#### a. RF Company or Platoon

Provides security to a village or hamlet by defending and securing the village. It is capable of assuming responsibility for an assigned area of operations (the village or designated portion) and exerting tactical command and control of PF platoons and para-military forces within the assigned area, when directed. The company will be responsive to requests from the village security commissioner and the hamlet assistant for security, but remain under command of the district chief. The district chief retains responsibility for administrative and logistical support of the company or platoon.

#### b. PF Platoon

Provides security to a village or hamlet by defending and securing the hamlet or village. The district chief commands the PF platoon and provides administrative and logistical support to it. The platoon is usually under the operational control of the village security commissioner or the hamlet assistant for security. When this is not feasible, operational control is exercised by an RF company, an RF company group, or



the district chief. The platoon, in supporting the pacification RD program is required to coordinate its actions with RD cadre teams, PSDF and the National Police. In some cases, where there are insufficient PF available, the RF platoons are assigned this task. They have the same tasks as PF platoons and the RF company commander assists the village chief in planning and advice on employment.

c. National Police

The deployment of National Police will be to a sub-district headquarters which will be located at the village. The National Police will conduct visits to the hamlets within the village. The NP assigned to a hamlet will coordinate their activities with the village chief. At no time will the NP be held responsible for a defense role for any village. The basic National Police responsibilities will be to maintain law and order, establish intelligence nets, resources and population control and other duties as assigned by the district police chief.

d. Peoples' Self-Defense Forces

Except in secure areas, PSDF should not be deployed without PF platoons. PSDF should have one PF per 10 PSDF. The armed cells provide support to the overall hamlet defense plan. Their positions, tactics and operations will be closely tied with RF/PF and RDC personnel in order to provide the desired protection. This group will be employed in fixed and mobile defense positions. Fixed when guarding public utilities, offices, etc.,--mobile for outskirts or outer perimeter of hamlet. The reserve or reaction forces will be used only for hamlet defense in normal circumstances. They will not be used outside the hamlet except for emergencies and then, only if they are well trained and armed and with concurrence of hamlet and village chief. The intelligence gathering is accomplished through the old men and boy groups, a runner group is used for transmitting information when no other means are available. Women's groups are made up of two sections--first aid and support section which will include cooking and dispensing of food, as well as fire fighting and helping in moving defensive materials and construction of defensive positions. PSDF should not be placed in a watchtower or outpost by themselves. They may reinforce a PF platoon in a fixed installation. Experience has shown that if they are left alone they are targeted and the PF platoon in support is not responsive. If they are reinforcing a PF platoon, then the p. platoon leader remains responsive and will support them. Another important action is to provide bodyguards for elected village/hamlet officials, if required. An outline organization of PSDF groups is attached as Annex C.

e. RD Cadre Teams

The primary mission of RDC is to foster pacification. Although they have quite a defensive capability all of the cadre's efforts, to be successful, must be focused or applied within the confines of a



hamlet's geographic boundaries. Surveillance of the terrain immediately surrounding the hamlet is also necessary to provide early and timely warning of an enemy attack. The area of surveillance is also the area of RD cadre influence and extends outwards from the hamlet boundaries to a distance of approximately 300 meters. This is the maximum area that RDC teams can effectively influence with the small arms currently assigned to RD teams. Within each RDC team there are three operational teams composed of eight cadre each. Each of the operational teams has a militia cell of three men (one cell chief and two militiamen). The duties of the militia cell are: (a) study, advise and assist the hamlet chief in the hamlet security status, defense plan and people's intelligence system; (b) take the hamlet census and draw the hamlet map; (c) identify the VCI; (d) organize and train the Peoples' Self-Defense Force; and (e) participate in various activities for the village and hamlet development and defense. When an RDC team initially moves into a new hamlet they establish a series of listening posts/ambush cells around the outer perimeter of the hamlet. As organization and training of a PSDF progresses, selected members of the PSDF join the RDC and contribute additional firepower to the defensive system. In time, an adequate size force of PSDF can be trained and armed that will, in many instances, exceed the number of RD cadre who initially provided security to the hamlet. At this juncture, the PSDF, PF and NP, working as a totally integrated force should be capable of defending their hamlet against intrusion by local guerrillas. At this time, the RDC team prepares to move on to another hamlet and begin anew. Within each cadre team there are two liaison cadre who operate communications equipment and perform liaison missions. Each team also has an organic Intelligence and Research Cadre who collects and provides to higher authorities all intelligence information collected during RDC operations. This cadre also assists the deputy hamlet chief for security in the organization and training of the Peoples' Intelligence Cells and conducts the hamlet census. Coordination and control of cadre teams' activities is provided by an inter-team leader and his two mobile instructor assistants. Each inter-team leader will normally exercise control over an average of five cadre teams. It has been recommended that this echelon of RDC command be located at district level. Radio communications are shown here as Annex F.

9. An RF company can be placed in direct support of a village. It must be responsible to the intelligence and operational needs of the village chief. To achieve this, close coordination and liaison is required between the company commander and the village chief, so that the most effective deployment and employment of all forces is achieved.

10. ARVN forces or RF companies under sector or a district control should establish liaison and communications with the village when operating within or adjacent to the village boundaries. These forces are not responsive to the village chief but their operations in support of pacification can have a marked effect on the overall security of the village.



#### COMMUNICATIONS

11. The following communications are available for tactical operations. A schematic diagram is hereto as Annexes D, E and F.

- a. US Advisory Net
- b. Province and District Military Nets
- c. National Police Nets (not shown)
- d. Village and Hamlet Radio System (VHRS)
- e. RDC Radio Net

12. The point to note is that the VHRS is in its infancy at this stage. It is not fully operational in all provinces. Its prime purpose is to handle civil and local government traffic. However, as it is the only radio net that goes right down to village and hamlet level, it provides the only means of the hamlet/village chiefs to make contact with PF platoons, RF companies of ARVN/FWMAF operating in support of pacification. It should be appreciated that there could be 50-70 radios operating on the one district frequency. The short range of the sets and limited tactical use that is likely to be made of the net should not make this a major problem. The NP radio net only extends as far as the district. RDC teams have a separate inter-team net. They are equipped with HTI radios. To be able to work on the VHRS, RDC radios will require a change of crystals.

13. Radios on both the VHRS and military nets should be co-located at district and province level. The administrative and security communications should be sited in the same office at village and hamlet level. Operators must be trained in radio telephone procedures and current SOIs. This will be a major requirement.

#### INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

14. The prime essential for a security force to be able to react aggressively and successfully is to have adequate timely information at hand. Also enemy must be denied information of friendly intentions, dispositions and plans. To this end, every means must be employed to achieve these goals.

15. The principal elements able to assist in information collecting are RDC teams and NP deployed at hamlet level. They should form intelligence cells in the PSDF groups and train them in their tasks. However, the whole of the population of a hamlet and village must be regarded as an information pool. All security forces who have contact with the population should be employed in the information gathering process.

16. Much information will be produced that will require collation. The commissioner for security has the responsibility to carry out this task. Probably the most simple method would



be to channel it through the National Police office which will be located in the village offices. This operation can be likened to a DIOCC operating on a reduced scale. The organization that handles intelligence and information will require personnel to be trained for the task. These people should be part of the PSDF, trained by NP and RDC. The following sources will provide intelligence:

- a. Commissioner for Propaganda
- b. National Police
- c. PSDF Group Leaders
- d. RDC Team Leaders
- e. PF Platoon Leaders
- f. Hamlet Assistant for Security

17. The Village Commissioner for Security is also responsible to see that information is rapidly passed back to the DIOCC. However, this is a supervisory task and in no way interferes with or impedes the flow of information through the channels that already exist.

#### TOTAL COMMITMENT

18. The aim in the 1969 PB Plan is to gain a total commitment of the people to the GVN. Not the least important aspect in achieving this goal, is to gain commitment of the people to their own defense. All persons in a village should be committed in some way in the defense of that village. The bulk of the population will be engaged in passive measures, such as information, early warning systems, checking on strangers, etc. Those who are not trained and armed in PSDF should be considered as a part of the PSDF and nominated as a reserve from which new recruits are drawn. It is imperative that all of the people have some function in the task of their own protection. The complete hamlet population must be motivated towards its own protection. To achieve this goal, the whole population must be instructed in passive defensive techniques. The VC must be presented with a hostile environment if they penetrate the hamlet.

#### TACTICAL CONCEPT

19. The general concept for the tactical employment of PF platoons, RDC teams and PSDF in defense of hamlets is laid down in CORDS IV Corps Directive 36-39, subject: Concept for Defense of Hamlets by PF Platoons, dated 13 November 1968 (Ref a). Further guidance is given in JGS Directive 300-12/TTM/P3, subject: Mobile Defense of Hamlets, dated 20 January 1969 (Ref c).

20. In summary, the mobile defense concept requires that standing patrols and small ambushes be placed out on enemy avenues of approach. These groups provide early warning and can delay the approach of an enemy party. The positions are occupied after dark and are changed each night and, if practicable, during the night. The aim is to create



2  
1

a zone of insecurity around the hamlet so that the VC have difficulty in concentrating and attacking a specific target. A reaction/counter penetration force is held centrally and is ready to move to a number of previously reconnoitered positions to meet the threat. Rehearsal and practice by the reaction force is essential so that positive and rapid defensive measures are taken. This should ensure that attacks by up to enemy platoon strength can be repelled or alternatively that company plus attacks can be held until reaction forces from district are deployed.

21. With the reduction in strength of the RDC teams to 30 men, and the increased importance being placed on their pacification and development role, less emphasis should be given to their self-defense tasks. RD should, therefore, be used more in the reaction force role rather than in patrolling and early warning. This will allow more time for sleep.

22. PSDF must also be employed in the mobile defense concept. Initially, their limited training will limit their effectiveness. They must be able to apply the concept of mobile defense and their activities must be integrated with the PF and RD in defense of the hamlet. Probably the best area of employment is as close guards and as a reaction/counter penetration force.

23. Within a village, each hamlet should have an area of responsibility which has clearly defined boundaries. A schematic layout is shown here as Annex G. In this area, the hamlet forces provide security patrols and collect information. The boundary need not be permanently fixed where there is an RF company assigned to the village, it may be assigned an area of operations. Hamlet areas of responsibility will be restricted to prevent a clash between friendly forces.

#### FIRE SUPPORT

24. All hamlets should have one or two prearranged fires on the most likely enemy approaches. A simple numbering system or letter system should be employed to allow identification. Adjustment on a target can then be effected by the moving of the concentration to the east or west, north or south, by the required number of meters using RF/PF communications. All prearranged fires should be coordinated at village level.

#### CONCLUSIONS

25. A successful defense system for a village complex requires:

- a. Coordination of all military and para-military forces in the area.
- b. An efficient information intelligence organization.



c. An effective local government so that the people are motivated toward the GVN.

d. The employment of principles of mobile defense of hamlets throughout the village.

e. Good communications. In this case, the utilization of all available resources.

26. The plan must be simple and flexible otherwise the villagers will have difficulty implementing the procedures

#### ANNEXES

- ANNEX A - VILLAGE GOVERNMENT w/Appendix 1 - Village & Hamlet Admin
- ANNEX B - SECURITY ORGANIZATION
- ANNEX C - SUGGESTED ORGANIZATION FOR PSDF FOR A HAMLET
- ANNEX D - RADIO NETS
- ANNEX E - VHRS
- ANNEX F - RD CADRE RADIO NET
- ANNEX G - SCHEMATIC LAYOUT OF VILLAGE/HAMLET DEFENSE



APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A  
TO VILLAGE/HAMLET DEFENSE

VILLAGE AND HAMLET ADMINISTRATION

VILLAGE

VILLAGE PEOPLES' COUNCIL (ELECTED)
---------------------------------------

VILLAGE		ADMINISTRATION	COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN - VILLAGE CHIEF			
AGRICULTURAL COMMISSIONER	SOCIAL WELFARE COMMISSIONER	PROPAGANDA COMMISSIONER	SECURITY COMMISSIONER


HAMLETS

HAMLET CHIEF	
DEPUTY HAMLET CHIEF	
ASSISTANT FOR MOTIVATION	ASSISTANT FOR SECURITY



ANNEX B TO VILLAGE/HAMLET  
DEFENSE

SECURITY ORGANIZATION




LEGEND: OPERATION CONTROL - - - -  
COORDINATION RESPONSIBILITY - x - x - x



ANNEX C TO VILLAGE/HAMLET  
DEFENSE

SUGGESTED ORGANIZATION FOR PEOPLES'  
SELF-DEFENSE FORCE FOR A HAMLET



NOTE: 4 Groups -- 2 sections per group.



ANNEX D TO VILLAGE/HAMLET  
DEFENSE

## RADIO NETS


LEVEL

ADVISORY NET

MILITARY NET (ARVN)

VHRS

DISTRICT






# VILLAGE HAMLET RADIO SYSTEM

## ANNEX E TO VILLAGE/HAMLET DEFENSE

DISTRICT

VILLAGE

HAMLET




NOTE: FOR SIMPLICITY NOT ALL STAs shown.  
RDC MUST HAVE ADDITIONAL HT1 OR NEW  
CRYSTALS ON VHS FREQUENCY.



ANNEX F TO VILLAGE/HAMLET  
DEFENSE

RD CADRE RADIO NET



NOTE: At present there does not exist a single typical RD Cadre Radio Net. When the Cadre groups were reorganized from 59-man teams into 30-man teams, available communications equipment was distributed so that the Cadre Control Groups, Inter-Team Leaders and Cadre Teams could communicate. A single typical network cannot be established until such time as additional HT-1 and PRC-10 radios are made available for issue to the Cadre program.



ANNEX G TO VILLAGE/HAMLET  
DEFENSE

