

Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report and enclosures
1 - 30 April 1969

Series: AWM95 - Australian Army
commanders' diaries

Item: 1/2/64



MIL. HIST



SD Coord 26760

3000

QUOTE IN REPLY

R723-1-1-35

HEADQUARTERS
Army Component

16 May 69

AHQ(C) ✓
1 ATF

AATTV MONTHLY REPORT - APR 69

Attached for information is one copy of the AATTV Monthly Report for Apr 69.

(B.A. HAY)
Major General
Commander Australian Force
VIETNAM

Attachment: AATTV Monthly Report - Apr 69.

SD Coord


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(May be downgraded to Confidential
when Annexes J and K are removed)



COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA



QUOTE IN REPLY

R/723/19/3

HEADQUARTERS

AUSTRALIAN FORCE
VIETNAM

Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam

9 May 69

HQ AFV (3)

AATTV REPORT - APRIL 1969

General

1. No major change in the overall deployment of AATTV occurred during the month. In IV CTZ however, the majority of AATTV members were re-grouped and re-deployed within the Zone in order to meet changing circumstances in the field of Territorial Security in the Delta.

2. The level of operational activity in which members of AATTV were involved remained unchanged. However, there was generally decreased contact with the enemy compared with the immediate post - Tet period, except for several specific instances in I CTZ.

3. One AATTV casualty occurred during the month. WO2 Bond was killed in action while on operations with an ARVN Cavalry Unit in Quang-Tri Province on 25 Apr 69.

Deployment

4. The deployment of AATTV as at 9 May 69 is attached at Annex A.

I Corps

5. In 11 DTA activity was at a lower level than in March, with the exception of a number of significant isolated incidents.

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One of these incidents resulted in the death of WO2 Bond on 25 Apr (para 3 refers). Attached is an extract from III MAF Periodic Intelligence Report 17-69 which outlines this incident (Annex B).

6. In Quang-Da Special Zone (Quang-Nam Province), activity was also at a low level. Major incidents were rocket attacks on Danang on 20 Apr (25x122mm) and on 24 Apr (6x140mm).

7. In 12 DTA enemy activity was at a lower level during the month. The re-grouping and re-location of Regts of 2 ARVN Div in association with US Forces (Americal Div) in the area is now almost completed. CO AATTIV will be spending some time with units in this area in late May/early Jun. A better indication of the effect of this re-grouping and the method of operating in 12 DTA should then be available.

8. The following reports from I CTZ are attached:

- a. Extract of III MAF PIR 17-69 on incident involving death of WO2 Bond - Annex B
- b. Report by WO2 Gurney : 3/2 ARVN Bn - Annex C
- c. Report by WO2 Robinson : 4/2 ARVN Bn - Annex D
- d. Report by WO2 O'Donnell: Advisor Cam-Lo District (Quang-Tri Province) - Annex E
- e. Report by WO1 Geedrick : 1/2 ARVN Bn - Annex F

II Corps

9. Special Forces - Mobile Strike Force (MSF)

- a. The proposed re-deployment of members of AATTIV within 2 MSF, which was explained in last month's report, has been completed with the exception of two or three members. A visit is planned by CO AATTIV to HQ 5th SFG(A) at Nha-Trang and to 2 MSF at Pleiku in May. In addition to seeing AATTIV personnel on the ground, it is intended to try to expedite the AATTIV re-deployment within 2 MSF and at HQ 5th SFG(A) to obtain information regarding the cut-back in Special Forces and the CIDG. It is understood that such a reduction is being proposed for the second half of this year and if so it may well affect AATTIV deployment quite considerably.

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b. Operational activity during the month by 2 MSF has remained at its normal high level. All members of AATTV have been involved in the current series of operations which commenced in Mar and are still continuing. Reports on these operations are not yet available.

10. ARVN School of Artillery : Duc-My. Attached at Annex G is a report by WO2 Hill on his tour as an instructor/advisor at the ARVN Artillery School from Jan to Apr 69. His report includes some information and on the spot observations of the recent enemy activity in the Duc-My area.

III Corps

11. RF Training - Phuoc Tuy. A report by Capt Guest on this RF Training project is attached at Annex H. Since his report was written, discussions have taken place between the Province Senior Advisor Phuoc-Tuy and CO AATTV. It is hoped that more "command emphasis" will now be placed on the project by the Province Chief and the Sector advisory staff (para 7 of Capt Guest's report refers).

12. Special Activities Training Centre (PRU) : Vung-Tau

a. A report by Capt Kudnig, Chief Instructor of Training and Operations of the Centre, is attached at Annex I.

b. Discussions were held as planned (AATTV Report of 11 Apr refers) with the Director PRU in early Apr 69. As a result, the information stated in Capt Kudnig's report regarding the change in control of the PRU Programme is known to be generally correct. However, although it has been officially directed that PRU advisors are to advise and not command (para 5 of Capt Kudnig's report refers), it is also unofficially recognised by the PRU Directorate that in a number of cases advisors will in fact have to continue to command PRU's for some time to come.

c. Also as a result of discussions Director PRU/CO AATTV, a copy of the Prime Minister's Decree on PRUs was provided - it is attached at Annex J. A copy of the Mar 69 PRU Report was also provided - it is attached at Annex K.

d. It has now been agreed Director PRU/CO AATTV that, in view of the likelihood of the Special Activities Training Centre (SATC) becoming somewhat of a focal point for any future internal GVN arguments regarding the control of the

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Centre itself or the PRU Programme as a whole, Capt Kudnig would not be replaced at the Centre when his tour in Vietnam ends in Jun 69. In lieu, an AATTV Capt will be provided in Aug 69 in the Mobile Training Team (MTT) which operates in II CTZ and ^{out} of Nha-Trang. AATTV officers and WOs have been involved in the MTT before and at present one WO is deployed in the Team.

13. LRP Training.

a. The 2/69 Course graduated from the LRP Wing, Van-Kiep on 3 May 69. A report on the course will be included in the AATTV Report for May.

b. Discussions were held on 30 Apr at Central Training Command/JCS on the future of Regimental Courses at the LRP Wing (AATTV Monthly Report for Mar - Annex J, refers). After some weeks of delay in finalising this matter it has now been accepted by the Vietnamese that the AATTV LRP Wing is not prepared to double its capacity as was proposed. Courses will remain at 40 strength and although occasional courses may consist of Regimental Recce Company personnel, the majority of students will be from Divisional Recce Companies.

IV Corps

14. As a result of a recent visit to a number of provinces in IV CTZ and a close look at the employment of Australian advisors, a regrouping and redeployment of the majority of AATTV members on the Territorial Security field has been made. It was apparent that a real need existed for some additional effort to assist in advising and coordinating the defence at village level. The various security elements available for this defence, ie RF, PF, RD Cadre and now the Peoples Self Defence Force (PSDF) are obviously not working together where two or more of these elements are involved in a village.

15. Our efforts on the RD Cadre training, although successful up till now, had begun to run up against the problems of reduced sized RD Teams and the lack of cooperations between the other security elements found at village level. After discussion with the Regional RDC Chief, the Deputy for COORDS and also the Acting Senior Advisor IV Corps, it was agreed that an AATTV re-deployment was in fact necessary and that initially six members be formed into two-man Village Defence Advisory Teams (VDAT's). Three VDAT's have been deployed by HQ IV Corps and the project will now undergo an evaluation for a month or so. Based on the results of this evaluation, a further VDAT is likely to be formed from the two AATTV members presently employed in MATs and it would probably be deployed in the same province they are currently working (Vinh-Binh).

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
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16. A report by Maj Harkness, the Senior AATTV Advisor in IV CTZ, is attached at Annex L. This deals in more detail with the deployment of AATTV members in this VDAT project.

Administration

17. Two members of AATTV were hospitalised for short periods during Apr in ICTZ with minor illnesses, otherwise the overall health of the Team remains good.



(RDF LLOYD)
Lt Col
Comd.

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AATTV DEPLOYMENT
AS AT 9 MAY 1969

Annex 'A' to
AATTV Monthly Report
for April 1969

| Serial | Rank | Inits | Name | Corps | Unit | Employment | Due RTA | Location |
|-----------------------|-----------|--------|------------|----------|-------------------|--------------------------|----------|------------------------|
| <u>AATTV : SAIGON</u> | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | : Lt Col: | RDF | : Lloyd | : RA Inf | : HQ AATTV | : Commanding Officer | : Jan 70 | : Saigon |
| 2 | : Capt | : G.W. | : Dennis | : RA Inf | : " | : Adjutant | : Nov 69 | : " |
| 3 | : WO1 | : G.S. | : Munt | : RA Inf | : " | : Admin WO (Chief Clerk) | : Mar 70 | : " |
| 4 | : WO2 | : C.F. | : Keioskie | : RAASC | : " | : Admin WO (Pay) | : Feb 70 | : " |
| 5 | : WO1 | : E.W. | : Gason | : RAAC | : Armoured School | : Instructor | : Dec 69 | : Thu-Du (near Saigon) |

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| Serial | Rank | Init | Name | Corps | Unit | Employment | Due RTA | Location |
|----------------------------|------|------|-----------|--------|------------------------|-----------------------|---------|-------------|
| I CTZ | | | | | | | | |
| AATTV : QUANG TRI Province | | | | | | | | |
| 6 | Maj | H. | Bell | RA Inf | Quang-Tri Sector | S3 | Nov 69 | Quang-Tri |
| 7 | WO2 | W.L. | Deanshaw | RAAMC | " " " | Medical Advisor | Jul 69 | " " |
| 8 | WO2 | R.V. | Roney | RAAMC | " " " | " | May 70 | " " |
| 9 | WO1 | R.J. | O'Brien | RAE | Trieu-Phong Sub-Sector | Assistant Advisor RF/ | Sep 69 | Trieu-Phong |
| 10 | WO2 | J.M. | O'Donnell | RAAOC | Cam-Lo Sub-Sector | " " " | Jan 70 | Cam-Lo |
| 11 | WO2 | H.H. | Beezley | RA Inf | 1/1 ARVN Bn | Assistant Advisor | Jan 70 | Quang-Tri |
| 12 | WO2 | K. | Gabriel | RA Inf | 2/1 ARVN Bn | " " | Nov 69 | " " |
| 13 | WO2 | E.W. | Snelling | RA Inf | 3/1 ARVN Bn | " " | Jul 69 | " " |
| 14 | WO2 | W. | Tillett | RA Inf | 4/1 ARVN Bn | " " | Feb 70 | " " |
| 15 | WO1 | S.D. | Rosenberg | RA Inf | 1/2 ARVN Bn | " " | Apr 70 | Dong-Ha |
| 16 | WO2 | F.E. | Bell | RA Inf | 2/2 ARVN Bn | " " | Mar 70 | " " |
| 17 | WO2 | R.K. | Gurney | RA Inf | 3/2 ARVN Bn | " " | Feb 70 | " " |
| 18 | WO2 | R.I. | Robinson | RA Inf | 4/2 ARVN Bn | " " | Aug 69 | " " |
| 19 | WO2 | J.E. | Barker | RA Inf | 5/2 ARVN Bn | " " | Aug 69 | " " |
| 20 | WO2 | H.S. | Stuttart | RAAC | 11 ARVN Cav | " " | Nov 69 | Quang-Tri |
| 21 | WO2 | L.N. | Gorman | RAA | 11 ARVN Arty | " " | Mar 70 | " " |

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| Serial | Rank | Initis | Name | Corps | Unit | Employment | Due RTA | Location |
|-------------------------------------|-------|--------|-------------|----------|----------------------|-------------------------|----------|-----------|
| <u>I CTZ</u> | | | | | | | | |
| <u>AA'TTV : THUA THIEN Province</u> | | | | | | | | |
| 22 | : WO1 | : W. | : Brown | : RAAMC | : Thua-Thien Sector | : Medical Advisor | : Sep 69 | : Hue |
| 23 | : WO2 | : J.R. | : McRae | : RA Inf | : Nam-Hoa Sub-Sector | : Assistant Advisor RF/ | : Aug 69 | : Nam-Hoa |
| 24 | : WO2 | : L.N. | : Bootes | : RAAC | : 7 ARVN Cav | : Assistant Advisor PF | : Mar 70 | : Hue |
| 25 | : WO2 | : M.R. | : Bolitho | : RA Inf | : Black Panther Coy | : " " | : Nov 69 | : " |
| 26 | : WO2 | : G.C. | : Neitz | : RA Inf | : Recce Coy 54 ARVN | : " " | : Aug 69 | : " |
| 27 | : WO2 | : L. | : Jackson | : RA Inf | : 3/54 ARVN Bn Regt | : " " | : Jul 69 | : " |
| 28 | : WO2 | : C. | : Ansell | : RA Inf | : 1/3 ARVN Bn | : " " | : Mar 70 | : " |
| 29 | : WO2 | : M. | : Kelly | : RA Inf | : 2/3 ARVN Bn | : " " | : Aug 69 | : " |
| 30 | : WO2 | : A.J. | : Joyce | : RA Inf | : 3/3 ARVN Bn | : " " | : Jan 70 | : " |
| 31 | : WO2 | : T.P. | : Van Bakel | : RAASC | : 3/3 ARVN Bn | : " (Designate) | : Nov 69 | : " |
| 32 | : WO2 | : K.J. | : Troy | : RA Inf | : 4/3 ARVN Bn | : Assistant Advisor | : Mar 70 | : " |

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| Serial | Rank | Init | Name | Corps | Unit | Employment | Due RTA | Location |
|-----------------------------------|------|------|-----------|--------|---------------------|--|---------|-------------------|
| <u>AATTV : QUANG NAM Province</u> | | | | | | | | |
| 33 | Maj | F.C. | Johnston | RA Inf | HQ I Corps | G-3 (Trg) Advisor | Feb 70 | Danang |
| 33A | Capt | A.J. | Mogridge | RA Inf | " " | TOC (Temp employment) | Apr 70 | " |
| 34 | WO1 | S.L. | Arblaster | RAASC | AATTV Danang | Admin WO | May 69 | Aust House Danang |
| 35 | WO1 | J. | Geedrick | RA Inf | " " | " " (Designate) | Sep 69 | " " " |
| 36 | WO2 | V. | Stack | RA Inf | " " | " " | Sep 69 | " " " |
| 37 | WO2 | T.F. | Malone | RAAC | 11 ARVN Cav | Assistant Advisor | Oct 69 | Hoi-An |
| 38 | WO2 | L.I. | Morrison | RA Inf | Hoa-Vang Sub-Sector | " " RF/PF | Jan 70 | Hoa-Vang |
| 39 | WO2 | B. | Taylor | RAAOC | Quang-Nam Sector | Advisor RF/PF- Mobile Advisory Team | Jul 69 | Moc-Bai |
| 40 | WO2 | M.T. | Jensen | RA Inf | HQ Ranger Gp | Assistant Advisor | Nov 69 | Danang |
| 41 | Capt | C. | Spencer | RAE | 1/51 ARVN Bn | Senior Advisor | May 69 | Mieu-Bong |
| 42 | Capt | D.G. | Bent | RA Inf | " " " | " " (Designate) | Oct 69 | " " |
| 43 | WO2 | E.H. | Martin | RA Inf | " " " | Assistant Advisor | Nov 69 | " " |
| 44 | WO2 | W.J. | Bruce | RA Inf | 2/51 ARVN Bn | " " | Feb 70 | " " |
| 45 | WO2 | P.J. | Heslin | RAE | 3/51 ARVN Bn | " " | Mar 70 | " " |

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| Serial | Rank | Init | Name | Corps | Unit | Employment | Due RTA | Location |
|---|--------|--------|--------------------|----------|---------------|---------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|
| <u>AATTV : QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Provinces</u> | | | | | | | | |
| 46 | : WO2 | : D. | : Truelove | : RA Inf | : 1/4 ARVN Bn | : Assistant Advisor | : Sep 69 | :) Quang-Ngai |
| 47 | : WO2 | : H.J. | : Poole | : RA Inf | : 2/4 ARVN Bn | : " " | : Nov 69 | :) Province |
| 48 | : WO2 | : V.L. | : Harris | : RA Inf | : 3/4 ARVN Bn | : " " | : Feb 70 | :) (Regt HQ near |
| 49 | : Capt | : R.L. | : Smith | : RAE | : 1/5 ARVN Bn | : Senior Advisor | : Apr 70 | :) Quang-Ngai |
| 50 | : WO1 | : E.J. | : Morrison | : RA Inf | : " " " | : Assistant Advisor | : Dec 69 | :) Province |
| 51 | : WO2 | : B.I. | : Saxby | : RAE | : 2/5 ARVN Bn | : " " | : Jan 70 | :) (Regt HQ near |
| 52 | : WO2 | : K.J. | : Rowe | : RA Inf | : 4/5 ARVN Bn | : " " | : Oct ^{Sep} 69 | :) Tam-Ky) |
| 53 | : WO2 | : T.F. | : Dolan | : RA Inf | : 1/6 ARVN Bn | : " " | : Jan 70 | :) Quang-Ngai |
| 54 | : WO2 | : W.S. | : Dickey | : RA Inf | : 2/6 ARVN Bn | : " " | : Jul 69 | :) Province |
| 55 | : WO1 | : J.L. | : Staunton-Latimer | : RAAC | : 4 ARVN Cav | : " " | : Apr ^{Feb} 70 | :) (Regt HQ near |
| | | | | | | | | : Quang-Ngai |

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| Serial | Rank | Init | Name | Corps | Unit | Employment | Due RTA | Location |
|--------------------------|------|------|------------|---------|---|--------------------------------|---------|--|
| II CTZ AATTV : PLEIKU | | | | | | | | |
| 56 | Maj | W. | Brydon | RA Inf | 2nd Mobile Strike Force Command, Det B-20, 5th Special Forces Group(Airborne) | | Feb 70 | Pleiku (Base Camp) |
| 57 | Capt | P.J. | Harris | RA Inf | " " " | Coy Comd | Mar 70 | " " |
| 58 | WO2 | R.S. | Simpson | RA Inf | " " " | " " | Feb 70 | " " |
| 59 | WO2 | K. | Payne | RA Inf | " " " | " " | Feb 70 | " " |
| 60 | WO2 | J.R. | Stewart | RA Inf | " " " | Coy Comd (Trg Coy) | Aug 69 | " " |
| 61 | WO2 | D. | Tolley | RA Inf | " " " | Pl Comd | Jun 69 | " " |
| 62 | WO2 | P.D. | Wilkes | RA Inf | " " " | " " | Jun 69 | " " |
| 63 | WO2 | K.C. | Latham | RA Inf | " " " | " " | Dec 69 | " " |
| 64 | WO2 | R.D. | Cameron | RA Inf | " " " | " " | Feb 70 | " " |
| 65 | WO2 | A.M. | Kelly | RA Inf | " " " | " " | Feb 70 | " " |
| 66 | WO2 | R.D. | Aylett | RA Inf | " " " | " " | Dec 69 | " " |
| 67 | WO2 | M.W. | Gill | RA Sigs | " " " | " " | Feb 70 | " " |
| 68 | Sgt | A.J. | Shelton | RA Inf | " " " | " " | Feb 70 | " " |
| 69 | WO2 | B. | Walsh | RA Inf | " " " | " " | Mar 70 | " " |
| 70 | WO2 | S.J. | McLaughlin | RA Inf | " " " |) Employment not yet finalised | Apr 70 | " " |
| 71 | Sgt | D.W. | Scheele | RA Inf | " " " | | Sep 69 | " " |
| 71A | Sgt | D.H. | Wright | RA Inf | " " " | | Oct 69 | Attending 5th SFG Combat Orientation Course, Nha-Trang |

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| Serial | Rank | Init | Name | Corps | Unit | Employment | Due RTA | Location |
|--------|------|------|------|-------|------|------------|---------|----------|
|--------|------|------|------|-------|------|------------|---------|----------|

II CTZ (Cont'd)

AATTV - II CORPS AREA

| | | | | | | | | |
|----|------|------|----------|--------|--|-------------------------------|--------|-----------|
| 72 | Capt | D. | Rothwell | RA Inf | HQ 5 SFG (A) | Assistant S3 | May 69 | Nha-Trang |
| 73 | WO2 | I.J. | Jewell | RA Inf | Recondo School 5SFG(A) | Instructor | Jun 69 | " " |
| 74 | WO2 | G.Y. | Jamieson | RA Inf | Mobile Training Team (PRU's II CTZ) | Assistant Instructor | Jun 69 | " " |
| 75 | WO2 | G.F. | Smith | RA Inf | Ranger Training Cen- tre | Instructor | Jul 69 | Duc-My |
| 76 | WO1 | E.B. | Ostara | RA Inf | Province Recce Unit | Advisor Binh-Dinh Province | Aug 69 | Qui-Nhon |

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| Serial | Rank | Init | Name | Corps | Unit | Employment | Due RTA | Location |
|---|------|------|-----------|--------|--|--------------------------------------|---------|---|
| <p style="text-align: center;">III CTZ AATTV : III CORPS AREA</p> | | | | | | | | |
| 77 | Capt | RCM | Hinde | RA Inf | LRP Wing Van-Kiep National Training Centre | CI | May 69 | Baria |
| 78 | Capt | D. | Savage | RA Inf | " " " | " (Designate) | Aug 69 | " |
| 79 | WO2 | R. | Bury | RAEME | " " " | Admin WO | Jan 70 | " |
| 80 | WO2 | B.C. | Young | RA Inf | " " " | Patrol Comd | Feb 70 | " |
| 81 | WO2 | J.W. | Wigg | RA Inf | " " " | " " | Jan 70 | " |
| 82 | WO2 | A.G. | Urquhart | RA Inf | " " " | " " | Sep 69 | " |
| 83 | Capt | F. | Kudnig | RA Inf | PRU Training Centre | Attached | Jun 69 | Near Vung-Tau |
| 84 | WO2 | C.J. | Ison | RA Inf | Province Recce Unit | Advisor RF Trg Cadre | Sep 69 | Phuoc-Long Province |
| 85 | Capt | R.L. | Guest | RA Inf | Phuoc-Tuy Sector(att) | RF Trg Cadre | Aug 69 | 18 ARVN Div Trg School near Nui- Dat. |
| 86 | WO2 | C. | Kealy | RA Inf | Phuoc-Tuy Sector(") | " " " | Jan 70 | " " " " |
| 87 | WO2 | J.D. | Frost | RA Inf | " " " (") | " " " | Aug 69 | " " " " |
| 88 | WO2 | T.J. | Colbert | RAE | " " " (") | " " " | Dec 69 | Baria |
| 89 | WO2 | J. | Macartney | RAASC | " " " | Assistant Advisor, A & L Coy (RF) | Jan 70 | " Baria |

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| Serial | Rank | Init | Name | Corps | Unit | Employment | Due RTA | Location |
|-----------------------|------|------|----------|---------|---------------------|--|---------|------------------------|
| AATTV : IV CORPS AREA | | | | | | | | |
| 90 | Maj | A. | Harkness | RAA | CORDS, IV Corps | Assistant to Chief of Territorial Security | Apr 70 | Can-Tho |
| 91 | WO2 | J.S. | Hyland | RA Inf | AATTV Can-Tho | Temp ^{Admin} Advisor Duties | May 69 | " " |
| 92 | WO2 | J.D. | Roy | RA Inf | Dinh-Tuong Sector | Advisor Village/ Hamlet Defence | Mar 70 | Dinh-Tuong Province |
| 93 | WO2 | A.A. | Welsh | RAE | " " " | " " " | Dec 69 | " " |
| 94 | WO2 | F. | Forden | RA Inf | Kien-Hoa Sector | " " " | Sep 69 | Kien-Hoa Province |
| 95 | WO1 | J.W. | Mann | RA Inf | " " " | " " " | Nov 69 | " " |
| 96 | WO2 | C.S. | Horne | RA Inf | Vinh-Long Sector | " " " | Nov 69 | Vinh-Long Province |
| 97 | WO2 | C.E. | Munro | RA Sigs | " " " | " " " | Jul 69 | " " |
| 98 | WO2 | W.J. | Grogan | RAEME | Vinh-Binh Sector | Advisor RF Mobile Advisory Team | Aug 69 | Vinh-Binh Province |
| 99 | WO2 | R.M. | King | RA Inf | " " " | " " " | Sep 69 | " " |
| 100 | WO2 | R.G. | Carter | RA Inf | Province Recce Unit | Advisor | Aug 69 | Sadec Province |

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Annex B to
AATTV Report - Apr 69

EXTRACT FROM III MAF PERIODIC INT REPORT 17-69

The following extract outlines the incident in the Lang-Vei Area in which WO2 Bond who was attached to 7 ARVN Cav was killed in action.

"During the early morning hours of 25 April, elements of TF REMAGEN, in night defensive positions one kilometer to the SW of the former Special Forces/CIDG Camp (XD 783358), began receiving mixed 60/82 mm mortar fire at the rate of two to six rds per minute for a period of 90 minutes. During this time frame, it was estimated that friendly units involved received some 400 rds of mortar fire. This unusually heavy concentration was followed by a ground attack from a company size enemy force employing RPG's grenades, small arms and satchel charges. During the encounter, three armoured personnel carriers were destroyed and one armoured personnel carrier and one tank sustained heavy damage. Thirty enemy were killed in the attack while friendly forces suffered moderate casualties".

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Annex C to
AATTV Report - Apr 69

3/2 ARVN Bn
20 Apr 69

AFTER ACTION REPORT
BY WO2 GURNEY - 3/2 ARVN BN
LAM SON 271 - 5

1. Lam-Son 271-5 was conducted from the 20 Mar 69 to 17 Apr 69 both dates inclusive.
2. The location of the operation was SW of Vandergrift Combat Base (VCB) in the area lying between the following grid XD squares 88 to the W - 97 to the E - 35 to the N and 22 to the S.
3. Command and Control
 - a. Regt CP was located at VCB and was under command of the Regt XO.
 - b. Bn CP was established at FSB TORCH (906278)
 - c. Advisors. Located on Torch was the senior advisor for 3/2 Bn and advisor for ARVN Arty. Both were US Army Cpts.
4. Attachments and Detachments
 - a. A doctor and a small medical team were attached to the Bn for the duration of the operation.
 - b. Regt provided a work party of unknown size at VCB to handle Bn resupply and backloading.
 - c. Advisors. Two Inf Advisors were loaned to 3/2 Bn advisory team for duration of operation, bringing the team up to a total of 5 Inf advisors. One Liaison Arty officer, and one H.S.T. man were allocated to FSB Torch for duration of operation.
5. Supporting Arms
 - a. Arty. A 105 battery of ARVN Arty was located at FSB TORCH.

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b. US Batteries located at FSB's SPARK WISHMAN and SAIGON were on call.

c. Air. Was on request.

6. Intelligence

As given to Advisors "We expect to find plenty"!!

MISSION

7. 3/2 Bn was to seek out and destroy the enemy and to disrupt/deny him his line of communications.

EXECUTION

8. On D day-1 the plan called for a Two (2) Bn operation. This plan was changed overnight and ended in being a One (1) Bn operation with the idea of a Bn CP and Two (2) field elements. The Bn CP and one (1) field element landing on TORCH and the other field element landing on QUEEN. These landings were to occur at the same time.

9. Due to lack of Heli support, only the Bn CP and one (1) field element were landed on TORCH. Three days later the landing scheduled for Queen was scrapped and the second field element landed on TORCH.

10. On the 22 Mar 69 one (1) field element, known as the ZULU element moved out into the operational area. This element was of a coy size and had two (2) advisors.

11. On the 23 Mar 69 the second field element, known as WHISKEY element moved out into the operational area. This element was two (2) coys and the Bn Light CP and was commanded by the Bn XO. Two advisors were allocated to this element.

12. Normal Bn operations were disrupted from the 29 Mar 69 to 3 Apr 69 when the ZULU element were dispatched as a security force for a coy of RF/PF work party at a Rice Cache, XD 910230.

RESULTS

13. There were 25 separate contacts with the enemy including three coy size contacts, 2 of which were attacks, one against the ZULU element and one against TORCH and one contact was a coy size ambush set up for ZULU element but was seen and not entered. There were five Pl size contacts and the remainder were all of squad size.

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14.

Own Tps

- a. ARVN - 17 KIA 52 WIA Nil POW
- b. US - 4 WIA
- c. EN (Confirmed) 48 KIA 3 WIA 3 POW
- d. Montagnards - evacuated 50

15.

Weapons

- a. Own Troops - 3 x 105 How damaged
Small Arms : Nil reported
- b. EN - Captured/Destroyed/Found

| <u>Type</u> | <u>Quantity</u> |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|
| RPG | 1 |
| B40 Launcher | 3 |
| B41 Launcher | 1 |
| AK47 | 5 |
| M60 | 1 |
| 12.7 HMG less barrell | 1 |
| AR15 | 1 |
| 60mm Mor | 1 |
| 82mm Mor (Destroyed by Airstrike) | 1 |
| Russian bolt action 7.62 rifle | 1 |

16.

Ammunition

| | |
|----------------------------|------|
| 122 Rockets | 15 |
| 75 RR | 36 |
| B40 extended range charges | 1250 |
| 82mm RR | 124 |
| Chicom Grenades | 8 |

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| | |
|--------------------------------------|------------------|
| Chicom Claymores | 86 |
| 82mm Mor. | 420 |
| 60mm Mor | 750 |
| A/TK Mines | 5 |
| .50 Cal | 30 cases |
| 7.62 | 200 |
| CKC | 9000 |
| AK47 | 7000 |
| 12.7 HMG | 2600 |
| B40 | 454 |
| B41 Rockets & extended range charges | 514 (See Note 1) |

17. Miscellaneous

| | |
|-------------------------|--------------|
| Det Cord | 2,025 metres |
| Anti Aircraft gun sight | 1 |
| Barrell .50 cal | 1 |
| " .30 cal | 1 |
| Time fuze | 80 metres |
| Line | 200 metres |

(Note 1) 246 of these rockets were packed in Russia on 9 Aug 68.
(41 boxes each containing 6 rockets and extended range charges)

ADMINISTRATION

18. With the exception of the following points 3/2 Bn administration worked well.

a. Resupply. On 3 separate occasions resupply was fouled up due to people at VCB giving pilots wrong data for delivery of supplies.

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b. Medical. After 15 days many soldiers were sick from fever and from colds, these soldiers were evacuated all the way back to Dong-Ha, when they could have been sent to the doctor on TORCH for medical attention and rest, without depleting the unit strength.

c. Hygiene. Most of the sickness occurred due to the soldiers habit of defecating within yards of their living areas at overnight stops, and when forced to continually rotate between these area as overnight stops the results are disastrous in the number of soldiers evacuated.

SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES

19. a. Once again the NVA did not use tracer rounds, this was first noted approx 6 weeks ago NW of C1.
- b. The use of a long sling (50 ft sling) for resupplies helps to overcome the problem of waiting (sometimes up to 3 days) on an LZ for resupplies. These slings at the moment are scarce and if dropped must be carried however this can be overcome if the pilot is willing to hover whilst one side of the sling is undone and then have the pilot slowly lift until supplies are clear of the net.

COMMENTS

20. a. The field elements moved and operated well but there was a tendency to become somewhat disorganized at water, especially after periods of days without bathing.
- b. The Arty battery on TORCH were undisciplined and their gunpits and living areas could be seen for miles due to the uncontrolled use of lights and fires.
- c. The RF/PF Coy at the Rice Cache area left .30 cal rounds (5 belts) M79 rds (32) and uncountable rounds for BAR and rifles strewn around their area. This was not appreciated.
- d. Regarding the helicopter smash (80 pers on board - 23 KIA, 41 WIA), the RF/PF soldiers were heavier than they should have been due to the amount of rice each man was carrying back from the rice cache.

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e. Arty Liaison. The Arty liaison officer was an Army Officer and on-call support was from US Marines. Although this officer did an exceptional job, there was confusion and delay in receiving Arty fire because of a lack of understanding on how Marine battery's work. Also on the human side, the Marines did not know him.

f. Radio Comms. Comms between TORCH and field elements were good. Comms with the rear were very poor due to the lack of initiative of people at VCB to use a Relay or Remote facility which would have solved the problem. Either of these facilities could have been set up in the secure area of VCB and could have helped greatly.

(R. GURNEY) WO2
3/2 BN ARVN

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Annex D to
AATTV Report - Apr 69

AFTER ACTION REPORT
BY WO2 ROBINSON - 4/2 ARVN BN

Date : 4 Apr 69
Time : 0945 - 1100
GRID : YD 162698 (LAC SAN Village)

The point platoon was travelling west on the road with a platoon deployed on about 100m frontage on either side, with the light CP central, the Bn HQ plus 2 coys travelling about 500 meters in rear.

At 0945 the lead platoon came under intense small arms and machine gun fire from the right (North) and was pinned in the killing ground. The platoon on the right flank moved forward and made contact with the left flank of the ambush. The right flank platoon not committed at this stage. It was estimated at this stage at least 50 VC in ambush party also VC had two machine guns and at least one 60mm mortar and one B40 rocket launcher.

The Bn XO on finding that the ground behind the enemy position dropped away to paddy fields and light scrub moved the right flank platoon into a better fire position still on the left flank of the enemy and using the .50 cals from the tanks for close support reinforced the platoon in the killing ground with the left flank platoon and personally lead these two platoon into the assaults.

During this time the Bn CP and the two coys were pinned by mortar (the mortar position was not found).

After the assault it was found that the enemy were dug in and holes camouflaged, the holes not more than 12 hours old (diagram of ambush site at end).

Results of contact:

11 NVA KIA
1 x RPD LMG
1 x 7.62 Russian HMG & TRIPOD
3 x AK 47's

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100 x 82mm Mortar Rds
150 x 60mm Mortar Rds
10,000 x HMG & Small Arms Ammo
2 x B40 Rockets
12 x Chicom Grenades
3 x Chicom Claymores
3 x A/TK Mines

2 ARVN KIA

8 " WIA

(R.E. ROBINSON)
WO2
AATTV

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Annex E to
AATTV Report - Apr 69

REPORT BY WO2 O'DONNELL
ADVISOR CAM LO DISTRICT
(QUANG TRI PROVINCE)

1. Carried out Coy size operations with the following units:
127 RF Coy
256 RF Coy
and night ambushes with PF Platoons.
2. Observed & noted the following points with 127 RF Coy.
 - a. Poor leadership
 - b. Extremely bad map reading by the majority of Senior NCO's & officers.
 - c. Only one type of platoon formation eg. single file.
 - d. Bad defensive positions.

There were quite a number of minor mistakes but, these were major ones.
3. I approached the District Chief regarding some lectures on the above points noted. He agreed & will try & arrange time for senior NCO's & junior officers of both RF coys & as many PF Platoons as is possible.
4. Since I approached the District Chief 127 Coy has since been transferred, but, 350 Coy is about the same according to the advisors at their last location.
5. Statistics for the month since last report

| | | |
|-------------------------|---------|----------|
| Friendly | KIA - 1 | WIA - 10 |
| Enemy | KIA - 6 | WIA - Nk |
| 1 NVA soldier Chieu-Hoi | | |

(J.M. O'DONNELL)
WO2
AATTV

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Annex F to
AATTV Report - Apr 69

REPORT BY WO1 GEEDRICK : 1/2 ARVN BN
COVERING PERIOD MAR/EARLY APR 69

3 March 69 Reported to Regt HQ

5 March Went to C1 fire support base which is about 6 clicks North. I was previously there before. Has increased tremendously in size.

7 March Took road convoy to Camp Evans about a 2 hours run South Quang-Tri to bring back 4th Bn.

8 March As agreed by CO AATTV, I am going to the 1st Bn, was previously with them. 10 Bn at present in the Ashau Valley and cloud cover has prevented them moving out.

9 March NTR

10 March 1st Bn arrived back. Had mixed success. Unfortunately lost their XO.

11 March An operation is pending for the Laos border area.

12 March NTR

13 March NTR

14 March Moved out as a Bn - occupied ambush areas.

15 March NTR : Ambush are as in same locality, although we did move out from them at first light and back in at last light.

16 March Got some pretty good info on VC at road in square 1972. Walked from Ha-Thanh to above location, and the VC were there. A hell of a lot of firing, but no results can be gauged although I was bloody cold and wet.

17 March Searched the same general area which is a known infiltration route which skirts the other forward fire base at A2.

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18 March 69 More reports of VC at Ha-Thuong which is in grid square 2271 moved from near the Gio-Linh Sub-Sector at night and moved in and around. Again neg results although we fired near A2 with our mortars causing one great panic.

19 March More ambushes in the same area. Negative results.

20 March 1st Bn now has put one coy on fire base A2 which is about 3 clicks from the DMZ, and the remainder are spread around Gio-Linh Sub-Sector.

Additional Comments

2nd ARVN Regts commanded by Col Yuy (the spelling could be incorrect). He is an able Commander and I believe he is a favourite with Gen Truong.

We lost the US Senior Advisor Col Parsons and this loss keenly felt by all. He went down in the chopper which also took a few other lives including Lt Briggs.

There are five Bns in the Regiment. Their present locations are;

| | |
|--------|---|
| 1st Bn | 1 Coy A2 remainder tween Dong-Ha and A2 fire Base |
| 2nd Bn | A1 fire Base |
| 3 Bn | On operations in the West |
| 4 Bn | C1 fire Base |
| 5 Bn | Training Phu-Bai |

Since I've been here there have only been two serious incidents. The Coy base tween A2 and A1 was over run by NVA sappers causing great damage and loss of life.

The other was the C.A.P team which was damaged in the same way. This situated in the old fort area about 3 clicks north of Dong-Ha.

It's pretty noticeable how slack some of these US personnel get. You travel north to A2 and it's quite common to see US pers wandering around singly in known VC villages. Big battles were fought last year in some of these areas and we have two known infiltration routes here.

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1st and 3rd Bns were scheduled for an operation South of Khe-Sanh, in conjunction with 2 Bn of Marines, however due to Marines exploiting much farther than anticipated they moved into our AO, only 3rd Bn now on operations. So far from my point of view nothing dramatic has occurred, with the exception of myself and another US advisor had four rounds flung at us near Ha-Thanh. I fired back but only in the general direction.

I notice that great flag is still flying from the Freedom Village, probably would get a \$1000 for it.

Our role here is certainly essential, but I do not think the term advisor is quite correct. Liaison tween ARVN & US would be more like it.

Not a very productive month so far.

Operation Lam-Son 271/5

23 March 69. First contact map square 1572 Quang-Tri map. 4 VC hidden in grass disappeared North. Large contacts in map square 1573, raged for 3 hours myself and marine gunny Sgt with leading elements. FAC cover tremendous, however when our large contact was made I got him to buzz the area, but he could not see through the canopy. We took 60mm & 81mm plus B40's & grenades. At one stage I was with the leading squad trying to pin point our leading group. Finally I got gunship in, later as a result of the gunship, their hill was shelled & five weapons recovered. However there were many bodies dragged away as the signs indicated. The country was swampy, low brush & thick brush, and as hot as hell.

We had 11 medevacs. I brought the medevacs in and they were shot up the first time, the second & third time they made it. We captured:

- 50 sets webbing
- 2 60mm
- 2 Hvy 30 cal machine guns
- 1 81mm
- 1 CKS
- 40 rds 60mm
- 40 rds B40
- 30 cal ammo
- 30 cal barrels

We put an ambush in map square 1472 by 2 Coys, Heavy contact by 3 NVA Coys. Killed 6, captured 4 weapons.

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On 24 March moved back into 1573 grid square moved through bunker complex. Obviously a heavy machine gun and weapons Coy. All entrances covered by fire. A lot of garbage, food, etc recovered. As a result of the gunships strike 2 RPD 2 CMK 1 AK plus bodies were recovered.


It obviously looked like those NVA left scooted back into the DMZ.

More contacts in grid square 1672. Captured 2 AK and killed 3 VC, one died of wounds.

Pertinent notes about NVA. From 270 Regt 66th Bn weapons Coy. They were, we think, a type of holding weapons Coy, or a collecting organisation where NVA from the north were ferried through them for operations in the Quang-Tri Sector.

Killed another five NVA later on.

A rather rough sketch of the main defensive line of the NVA.



Scouts well forward. Tracks obscured from air.

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
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
NVA food consisted of rice, baked hard with granulated sugar, not bad eating. Tinned meat, fish, rucksacks in good condition. Clothing on bodies poor, some in shorts, sandals.

What tracks looked like



many bodies had been dragged into DMZ probably by hooks.

A mortar base plate recovered.



Co-operating with us were APC and dusters. I believe they had a hell of a time losing many through mines. Mines had tin containers. I understand they had a big battle with the NVA. We sent out patrols again past A3. On a dead NVA found a good Quang-Tri map with the firebase C1 ringed. Vietnamese soldier too slow to read. Junior NCO and Junior Officer influence missing, laid many ambushes.

Night 25 March, our position probed by VC drove them off.

Today 26 March moved to 1572, found many bunkers also well used tracks to the DMZ.

Found more 82mm bombs.

Had night ambushes.


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Additional points on the NVA. One we struck in open fields had grass matting, with palm fronds attached to helmet. Camouflage around body had, affixed, below



made of bamboo looks like an aircraft sight, tied around front & rear of body. Camouflage inserted between.

All captured weapons were in good shape.

At 1130 hours 29 Mar 69 by Huy choppers from Charlie 1 to LZ Orange, West of Con Thien, approx 10 clicks from the DMZ moved forward from the area which had been secured by US Marines. Country frightful tall grass, broken undergrowth, hot. After about one hour, called in medevac - heat exhaustion.

Struck VC booby traps. One column to LZ Blue also secured by marines.

Struck VC in bunkers - fire fight. Killed many, recovered weapons etc. Called in cobra gunships etc.

Marines are to West & 5 US Mech to North - all engaged in fire fights.

| | |
|----------------|-------------------------------|
| Weapons taken: | 3 B40 |
| | 2 RPD |
| | 1.50 cal |
| | 1 tripod |
| | 2 AK |
| | 4 CKC |
| | 2 .45 pistols |
| Ammo | 200 B40 |
| | 100 hand grenades |
| | 10 mines |
| Food | 33 bags rice |
| | 3 bags salt |
| | 240 cans pork (very good too) |
| | cooking fat |
| | medical goods |

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GR 048658 : Bunkers, for living in, 200 fighting pits, heavy logs, 3-4 ft dirt unseen from the air.

Water resupply received at 1000 hrs 30 Mar 69.

Moved to about 1 click from the DMZ. VC in the hundreds - calling artillery down. Every hill now seen to be occupied by the VC. Our biggest fight soon started for Objective ALFA - approx 100 metres from the DMZ. It was estimated about 2 pls were there. Heavily equipped with weapons.

The ARVN started to move, and fire came not only from the Objective ALFA but from the ridge lines running into the DMZ.

I called in artillery, air, gunships.

We could see bunkers being blown sky high.

The Hill was taken. I figure I was then 50 metres from the DMZ. Our casualties were not light.

Recovered : 7 AK, 2 RPD, 1 B40. I stood on a mine. Blew my left foot off the ground. Bruised foot. 17 VC killed. VC claymores rigged every where, we dug in on the feature. Resupply wouldn't come in as cannons VC type were firing at them from about 150 metres. We located one, brought in gunships, cobra etc. Made a decision, we would stop on features 100 metres away. Our ammo was low.

Uneasy night, 100 percent stand to. 0610 1 April VC attacked. Saw many bodies afterwards. Ammo was then finished. Endeavoured to get out our wounded and dead. VC were on our rough pad and a fire fight started. Killed more VC, recovered more weapons. Heavily mortared from 2 clicks away. I got on to it and called in artillery and air. Ready to take resupply, mortared from another position, pulled back to the hill but mortared there. Impossible to go further as we were on DMZ. Moved back South East. Put gunships in on 2 suspected areas.

Comments.

All the VC killed were young. Clothes khaki, weapons well kept. Some kids probably 14-16, fought bravely. Very fair complexion and features more regular than our ARVN soldiers. There is not a hill west of Con Thien and in particular approaching the DMZ that is not occupied by the VC. They can be seen in the hundreds everywhere. His assaults a counter assaults have been early morning, firing B40 and firing AK. The hills in the DMZ are well fortified and bunkers and personnel are easily seen. Much Russian material in the area.

(J. GEEDRICK)
W01

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Annex **G** to
AATTV Report - Apr 69

REPORT BY WO2 D. HILL ON TOUR OF DUTY
AT ARVN SCHOOL OF ARTY - DUC MY
FROM 22 JAN 69 TO 26 APR 69

On arriving at Duc My I observed the operation of the school for approx a week to 10 days. The senior advisor then gave me the job of supervising the training and reporting on the methods and standard of instruction to both himself and the ARVN Chief of Trg along with any recommendations.

1. The instructors for the most part are fairly competent, however the new instructors coming into the school are not good and I estimate it's at least 1 to 2 months before they are really capable of giving a decent lesson. This is not always the case but nearly always applies. I have not seen any, (during my tour) new instructors being taught methods of instruction to prepare them for the job. Some of the NCO instructors are just not good enough for the job. Because of the increase in overall build up of the ARVN Arty. The student load is way above the load that the instructor faculty was designed to cope with. This means that the instructors don't always have sufficient time to prepare the lessons as they should do. An increase in the instructors has been recommended but is awaiting approval.

2. The training areas at the school are both many and varied but the time allowed to get the class from Point A to B is insufficient in some cases to allow many of these to be utilized. This means that sites are poorly chosen and distractions are many, consequently instruction suffers.

3. Because of the student load the school has not sufficient training aids, stores etc to cope with the increase.

Work is progressing on obtaining the extra aids & stores. but it is going very slowly.

4. The general standard of training and instruction is fairly good, judging by ARVN standards, the students being turned out are about the best under the circumstances.

5. The points noted on the above paras have all been brought to the attention of the senior advisor and the Chief of Trg.

Moral among the instructors is not really good because the promotion opportunities that exist in the field no longer applies at the school and a lot of instructors due for promotion are passed over. Again this is being pushed for a change in policy.

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6. Projects are being worked on all the time but a lot still requires doing in this field. This covers the field from defences to Hygiene.

7. A lot of pushing needs to be done on improving the standard of the new instructors in a shorter time and on the use of trg areas away from distractions. A report was submitted by me to the senior advisor on the condition of the school defences and the sighting of crew served weapons. Time did not allow me to follow this up. The defences are deplorable at this time and a lot of work needs doing fast, particularly after the attack on Lam-Son as the school defences are in my opinion worse though the area defended is very small.

The condition of the mine field is unknown and possibly non effective.

8. I would recommend that any advisors being posted to Arty School DUC MY should have first served with a field arty unit. Any points observed in the field worth noting could then be brought to the schools attention and possible changes or improvements could then be made to include or adjust or emphasise these points on the Trg programme.

Douglas L. Hill Woz
29 APR 69

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Attachment to
Annex G to
AATTV Report - Apr 69

REPORT ON ATTACK ON LAM SON TRG CENTRE
DUC MY AREA

The report given on the attack on Lam-Son Trg Centre Duc-My on 20/21 Apr 69 as given on the weekly Intelligence briefing at Duc-My MACV Compound.

| | | | | |
|----------------|--------|-----|------|----------|
| <u>Results</u> | approx | 48 | ARVN | killed |
| | | 127 | " | wounded |
| | | 2 | VC | killed |
| | | 1 | " | captured |

About 20 VC marched down the road in daylight to Lam-Son and on nearing the camp hid out in the scrub till dark.

It consisted mostly of a sapper team broken onto 3 groups.

1. The assault party carrying satchel charges
2. 8 females to carry out wounded
3. A supporting fire group outside the wire in a creek bed

Supporting 82mm Mortars of which approx 40 to 60 were fired also a 75mm Gun which was used to shell the arty school or to suppress counter Bty fire. The tgt could have been the ammo dump next to the school. Nothing definite this. 5 rds only were fired by the 75mm gun. Under cover of the mortar barrage, the assault party breeched the mine field about 0130 hrs and split up into 3 groups. The tgts being the navy, airborne, and a graduating class of army barrack lines, charges were thrown into the sleeping quarters, a water installation and a bunker, with the above casualties resulting and a vast amount of damage was done to the buildings and installations.

After the initial confusion some small arms fire was brought to bear on the attackers and as they withdrew left 2 dead in the wire. No mines were set off in the penetration nor were VC they sighted by the sentries.

The Arty school fired about 47 rds in the area of the mortars no results known.

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Annex H to
AATTV Report - Apr 69

Heavyweight
Phuoc-Tuy Province

2 May 69

HQ AATTV

MONTHLY REPORT - 14-30 APR 69

1. On 14 Apr 69, 68 RF soldiers commenced a 4 week retraining course. The trainees are individuals from several RF companies and did not come as organic squads or platoons, as requested and agreed upon by the Province Chief. Further negotiations with the Vietnamese and Advisory Staff at Sector are scheduled to enable organic platoons or companies to be released for retraining.
2. Negotiations are also underway with Sector for a permanent Vietnamese staff of a clerk, supply NCO cooks and guards to be stationed at Heavyweight. At present these duties are carried out by the trainees.
3. During the reporting period the control of the RF training program was transferred from HQ 1 ATF to Phuoc-Tuy Sector HQ. This included the attachment of AATTV members, together with the junior instructors from 1 ATF already attached to AATTV, being attached to MACV Advisory Team 89.
4. As the RF Training Program is supplementary to the normal MACV advisory effort, Phuoc Tuy Sector were not able to adequately support the program in stores and equipment. Consequently HQ 1 ATF confirmed that they would continue to support the program with both instructors and materials.
5. The three Vietnamese interpreters originally requested for the program have now been obtained - one from Sector and two from 1 ATF.
6. An alternate location for the conducting of the RF training program has been examined and a possible site is now under examination. A new location is considered desirable though not essential - as the large numbers of trainees in the 18 Div Trg Centre and the consequent overcrowding of facilities, training areas and the small arms range, is taxing these resources to the maximum.

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7. Due to staff changes at Phuoc Tuy Sector it is considered that full command emphasis is not being placed on the RF Training Program; but education of the new staff officers involved together with a firm programming of RF troops for training in the immediate future is expected to resolve this.

(RL GUEST)

Capt
AATTV

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Annex I to
AATTV Report - Apr 69

Special Activities Training Centre

1 May 69

CO AATTV

MONTHLY REPORT - APRIL 1969

General

1. PRU Training Cycle 1/69 concluded with graduation 6 April
2. Due to a change in the Vietnamese control of the program, JGS to Ministry of Interior, the Training Centre stood down from training during the period 7-27 Apr.
3. Cycle 2/69 marched-in on 28 Apr and commenced training 1 May.

Program Control and Management

4. Following recommendations from the US Embassy to the GVN Ministry of Interior (MOI), certain decisions as to the conduct of the program, both in operational and administrative aspects, have been awaited.
5. Few direct and clear instructions have been received but it has clearly been directed that PRU Advisors are now to function in a purely advisory, and not command, capacity.
6. The Minister of Interior has delegated administrative control of the program to the Director General of National Police (DGNP), but at this stage complete operational control appears to rest with the local Province Chief.
7. The following points still remain unclear undecided:
 - a. The authority of Regional and Provincial Police Chief in regard to PRU.
 - b. Whether the program will be further subordinated to either the National Police Field Force (NPFF) or the Police Special Branch (PSB)

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c. Details of the previously proposed reduction in PRU strength combined with a possible integration of some NPFF and/or PSB assets with a view to establishing a more capable and professional capacity.

d. Details of the division of responsibility and authority between US and Vietnamese members both in the field and at SATC.

Training

8. At this stage, until clearer directions are given as to the possible alternations in PRU's status, mission and techniques, training shall continue as previously implemented.

9. It is proposed to conduct the normal PRU courses "back to back" again. Additional course requirements for orientation and/or re-orientation of Vietnamese persons involved in the program are also foreseen.

Australian Personnel

10. During the reporting period WO2 CARTER passed through SATC for orientation prior to assumption of duties as PRU advisor in SA DEC Province. I have heard encouraging reports of his efforts to date.

11. On 14 Apr WO2 JAMIESON was re-assigned from SATC to the Montagnard Training Team based in NHA TRANG. His efforts during his month at SATC were good and he left with a recognised good reputation from the US personnel.

(F.M. KUDNIG) Capt
Chief Operations & Training
SATC

SECRET

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Office of the Prime Minister

Number: 044 - SL/NV

PRIME MINISTER

In accordance with the Republic of Vietnam Constitution of 1 April 1967;

In accordance with Decree number 234-TT/SL, of 25 May 1968, and the subsequent documents defining the elements of the Government;

In accordance with Decree number 19-SL/NV, of 19 November 1967, defining the duties of the Minister of Internal Affairs;

In accordance with Decree number 176-SL/NV, of 26 December 1968, defining the responsibilities, organization, and operation of the National Police branch;

In accordance with national defense security requirements,

DECREE

SECTION 1. This Decree officially establishes at the Province level, special units known as Provincial Reconnaissance Units ((Don vi Than sat Tinh)).

SECTION 2. Provincial Reconnaissance Units are responsible for:

1. Seeking intelligence information about the Viet Cong infrastructure;
2. Conducting paramilitary operations and special projects, in order to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure;

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3. Participating in combined (military) operations organized by the Phoenix Center and the District and Provincial (Military) Operational Intelligence Coordinating Centers ((Trung tam Phoi hop Tinh bao Hanh quan Tinh, Quan));

4. Assisting Republic of Vietnam and Allied Forces in special reconnaissance, seeking specialized intelligence, target locations, etc.

SECTION 3. The Provincial Reconnaissance Units are placed directly under the mobilizing authority of the Province Chief.

General administration of the Provincial Reconnaissance Units is the responsibility of the Directorate General of National Police.

SECTION 4. The organization, specific duties, and operational policy of the Provincial Reconnaissance Units shall be defined by the Minister of Internal Affairs in consultation with the Minister of National Defense.

SECTION 5. All stipulations in contradiction to this Decree are abolished.

SECTION 5. The Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Pacification and Revolutionary Development concurrently Minister of Internal Affairs, Minister of National Defense, and Minister at the Prime Minister's Office are responsible for enforcing this Decree.

SAIGON, 31 March 1969

Signature: TRAN VAN HUONG

((Seal: Chief of Cabinet
Republic of Vietnam
Office of the Prime Minister))

Supplement:
Director of Cabinet:
Signature: TRUONG THOI LAI

S E C R E T

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ADDRESSEES:

- Office of the President
 - Office of Special Commissioner for Administrative Reform
 - Office of General Commission for National Plans
 - Directorate General of Budget and ((Personnel?))
- Office of the Vice President
- Office of the Upper House ((Senate))
- Office of the Lower House
- Office of the Supreme Court
- Office of the Superintendant General
- Office of the Prime Minister
 - The Directorates and Bureaus at the Office of the Prime Minister
- Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
- Ministry of Internal Affairs
- Ministry of National Defense
 - Republic of Vietnam Forces Joint General Staff
- Ministry of Revolutionary Development
- Census Grievance Offices of the Tactical Areas
- The City Halls and Province Capitals

S E C R E T

Provincial Reconnaissance Unit Monthly Report
As of 31 March 1969

| Area | I. P E R S O N N E L | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------|----------------------|---------------|------------|------------|--------------|--------|-----|-----|----------|------------|-------|
| | Strength | | | | NEW RECRUITS | Losses | | | | | |
| | LAST MONTH | CURRENT MONTH | VIETNAMESE | MONTAGNARD | | KILLED | MIA | POW | DESERTED | DISCHARGED | TOTAL |
| TOTAL | 5020 | 4848 | 4450 | 398 | 61 | 17 | - | - | 42 | 174 | 233 |
| I CORPS | 916 | 909 | 904 | 5 | 5 | 3 | - | - | 2 | 7 | 12 |
| QUANG NAM | 143 | 145 | 145 | - | 4 | 2 | | | | | 2 |
| QUANG NGAI | 346 | 345 | 340 | 5 | - | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| QUANG TIN | 179 | 173 | 173 | - | - | | | | | 6 | 6 |
| QUANG TRI | 140 | 138 | 138 | - | 1 | | | | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| THUA THIEN | 108 | 108 | 108 | - | - | | | | | | - |
| II CORPS | 789 | 787 | 449 | 338 | 22 | 4 | - | - | 10 | 10 | 24 |
| BINH DINH | 79 | 77 | 77 | - | 2 | 3 | | | | 1 | 4 |
| BINH THUAN | 74 | 73 | 77 | 1 | 4 | | | | | | - |
| DARLAC | 104 | 103 | 18 | 85 | - | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| KHANH HOA | 43 | 41 | 41 | - | - | | | | | 2 | 2 |
| KONTUM | 95 | 95 | 15 | 80 | 4 | 1 | | | | 3 | 4 |
| LAM DONG | 38 | 46 | 24 | 22 | 9 | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| NINH THUAN | 59 | 58 | 55 | 3 | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| PHU BON | 40 | 37 | - | 37 | 1 | | | | 4 | | 4 |
| PHU YEN | 82 | 81 | 81 | - | - | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| PLEIKU | 63 | 63 | - | 63 | - | | | | | | - |
| QUANG DUC | 17 | 18 | 3 | 15 | 1 | | | | | | - |
| TUYEN DUC | 95 | 90 | 58 | 32 | - | | | | 5 | | 5 |
| III CORPS | 1235 | 1183 | 1128 | 55 | 2 | 1 | - | - | 5 | 48 | 54 |
| BIEN HOA | 136 | 122 | 122 | - | - | | | | 1 | 13 | 14 |
| BINH DUONG | 133 | 134 | 134 | - | 1 | | | | | | - |
| BINH LONG | 60 | 59 | 31 | 28 | - | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| BINH TUY | 68 | 60 | 51 | 9 | - | | | | | 8 | 8 |
| GIA DINH | 118 | 116 | 116 | - | - | 1 | | | | 1 | 2 |
| HAU NGHIA | 87 | 70 | 70 | - | - | | | | 1 | 16 | 17 |
| LONG AN | 250 | 250 | 250 | - | - | | | | | | - |
| LONG KHANH | 79 | 78 | 78 | - | - | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| PHUOC LONG | 40 | 35 | 17 | 18 | - | | | | | 5 | 5 |
| PHUOC TUY | 104 | 98 | 98 | - | - | | | | 2 | 4 | 6 |
| TAY NINH | 89 | 88 | 89 | - | - | | | | | | - |
| RUNG SAT | 71 | 72 | 72 | - | 1 | | | | | | - |
| IV CORPS | 1855 | 1732 | 1732 | - | 20 | 9 | - | - | 25 | 109 | 143 |
| AN GIANG | 57 | 57 | 57 | - | - | | | | | | - |
| AN XUYEN | 97 | 96 | 96 | - | - | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| BA XUYEN | 148 | 119 | 119 | - | - | | | | 3 | 26 | 29 |
| BAC LIEU | 93 | 90 | 90 | - | - | | | | | 3 | 3 |
| CHAU DOC | 121 | 119 | 119 | - | - | | | | | 2 | 2 |
| CHUONG THIEN | 98 | 104 | 104 | - | 13 | 1 | | | | 6 | 7 |
| DINH TUONG | 133 | 128 | 128 | - | - | | | | 3 | 2 | 5 |
| GO CONG | 107 | 84 | 84 | - | - | 2 | | | 2 | 19 | 23 |
| KIEN GIANG | 186 | 170 | 170 | - | - | 1 | | | 5 | 10 | 16 |
| KIEN HOA | 114 | 113 | 113 | - | 1 | | | | | 2 | 2 |
| KIEN PHONG | 77 | 64 | 64 | - | 4 | | | | 1 | 16 | 17 |
| KIEN TUONG | 69 | 65 | 65 | - | 1 | | | | 2 | 3 | 5 |
| PHONG DINH | 146 | 138 | 138 | - | - | | | | 1 | 7 | 8 |
| SADEC | 97 | 82 | 82 | - | - | 2 | | | 5 | 8 | 15 |
| VINH BINH | 187 | 158 | 158 | - | - | 3 | | | 2 | 4 | 9 |
| VINH LONG | 145 | 145 | 145 | - | 1 | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| SATC | 225 | 237 | 237 | - | 12 | - | - | - | - | - | - |

Provincial Reconnaissance Unit Monthly Report

As of 31 March 1969

| AREA | II. O P E R A T I O N S | | | | | | | |
|--------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|---|-------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Intelligence Operations | COVERT P.M. OPS | | | | | P.M. Support Operations | Total Number of Operations |
| | | Capture Operations | Raids, Sabotage, or Interdiction | Recover Allied Pers. | Other Covert Special Ops | Total Covert P.M. Ops | | |
| TOTAL | 3208 | 500 | 668 | 3 | 366 | 1537 | 459 | 5204 |
| I CORPS | 428 | 94 | 93 | - | 130 | 317 | 71 | 816 |
| QUANG NAM | 74 | 21 | 2 | | 23 | 46 | 45 | 165 |
| QUANG NGAI | 185 | 22 | 41 | | 103 | 166 | 24 | 375 |
| QUANG TIN | 47 | 15 | 14 | | | 29 | - | 76 |
| QUANG TRI | 45 | | 35 | | 4 | 39 | 1 | 85 |
| THUA THIEN | 77 | 36 | 1 | | | 37 | 1 | 115 |
| II CORPS | 540 | 137 | 128 | 1 | 27 | 293 | 22 | 855 |
| BINH DINH | 97 | 25 | | | | 25 | - | 122 |
| BINH THUAN | 92 | 14 | | 1 | | 15 | 2 | 109 |
| DARLAC | 33 | 25 | 44 | | | 69 | 9 | 111 |
| KHANH HOA | 21 | 43 | 2 | | 1 | 46 | - | 67 |
| KONTUM | 100 | 6 | 13 | | 1 | 20 | 8 | 128 |
| LAM DONG | 15 | 3 | 28 | | | 31 | 1 | 47 |
| NINH THUAN | 9 | 2 | | | 8 | 10 | - | 19 |
| PHU BON | 12 | | 13 | | | 13 | - | 25 |
| PHU YEN | 120 | | 25 | | | 25 | - | 145 |
| PLEIKU | 19 | 13 | | | | 13 | - | 32 |
| QUANG DUC | 6 | 1 | 3 | | | 4 | 2 | 12 |
| TUYEN DUC | 16 | 5 | | | 17 | 22 | - | 38 |
| III CORPS | 1168 | 112 | 213 | - | 95 | 420 | 230 | 1818 |
| BIEN HOA | 66 | | 7 | | 5 | 12 | 134 | 212 |
| BINH DUONG | 35 | 3 | 28 | | 5 | 36 | 5 | 76 |
| BINH LONG | 5 | 6 | 4 | | | 10 | 4 | 19 |
| BINH TUY | 47 | 7 | 5 | | 10 | 22 | 5 | 74 |
| GIA DINH | 94 | 18 | 22 | | 20 | 60 | 33 | 187 |
| HAU NGHIA | 127 | 5 | | | | 5 | - | 132 |
| LONG AN | 75 | 25 | 68 | | 15 | 108 | 13 | 196 |
| LONG KHANH | 109 | 4 | 9 | | 5 | 18 | 14 | 141 |
| PHUOC LONG | 90 | 1 | 5 | | 1 | 7 | 4 | 101 |
| PHUOC TUY | 32 | 7 | 7 | | 23 | 37 | - | 69 |
| TAY NINH | 382 | 27 | 19 | | 1 | 47 | - | 429 |
| RUNG SAT | 106 | 9 | 39 | | 10 | 58 | 18 | 182 |
| IV CORPS | 1072 | 157 | 234 | 2 | 114 | 507 | 136 | 1715 |
| AN GIANG | 24 | 9 | 2 | | | 11 | 2 | 37 |
| AN XUYEN | 17 | 14 | 12 | | | 26 | - | 43 |
| BA XUYEN | 29 | 8 | 15 | 1 | | 24 | 4 | 57 |
| BAC LIEU | 10 | 9 | 51 | | | 60 | 3 | 73 |
| CHAU DOC | 55 | 10 | 7 | | 3 | 20 | 15 | 90 |
| CHUONG THIEN | 26 | 11 | | | | 11 | 1 | 38 |
| DINH TUONG | 34 | 25 | 18 | | 1 | 44 | - | 78 |
| GO CONG | 120 | 4 | 11 | | 2 | 17 | 30 | 167 |
| KIEN GIANG | 105 | 4 | 12 | | 3 | 24 | - | 129 |
| KIEN HOA | 57 | 13 | 11 | | | 24 | - | 81 |
| KIEN PHONG | 178 | 20 | 3 | 1 | 42 | 66 | 35 | 279 |
| KIEN TUONG | 104 | 1 | | | 37 | 38 | - | 142 |
| PHONG DINH | 98 | 15 | 9 | | 10 | 34 | - | 132 |
| SADEC | 37 | 8 | 10 | | 3 | 21 | 5 | 63 |
| VINH BINH | 71 | | 54 | | 4 | 58 | 41 | 170 |
| VINH LONG | 107 | 6 | 19 | | 4 | 29 | - | 136 |

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Provincial Reconnaissance Unit Monthly Report

As of 31 March 1969

| AREA | III RESULTS | | | | | |
|--------------|-------------|--------|---------------------------|--------------|---------------------|-------|
| | VC CAPTURED | VC KIA | INTEL/REPORT DISSEMINATED | | | |
| | | | US ELEMENTS | GVN ELEMENTS | JOINT INTEL CENTERS | TOTAL |
| TOTAL | 1078 | 715 | 1118 | 1000 | 1956 | 2427 |
| I CORPS | 204 | 206 | 250 | 258 | 247 | 359 |
| QUANG NAM | 42 | 25 | | 45 | | 45 |
| QUANG NGAI | 58 | 119 | 106 | 106 | 106 | 106 |
| QUANG TIN | 19 | 29 | 47 | 47 | 47 | 47 |
| QUANG TRI | 38 | 32 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 |
| THUA THIEN | 47 | 1 | 52 | 15 | 49 | 116 |
| II CORPS | 167 | 70 | 160 | 137 | 323 | 419 |
| BINH DINH | 46 | - | | | 24 | 24 |
| BINH THUAN | 9 | 4 | 1 | 13 | 13 | 17 |
| DARLAC | 40 | 44 | 23 | 11 | 62 | 62 |
| KHANH HOA | 1 | 2 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 |
| KONTUM | 13 | 10 | 8 | 3 | 55 | 55 |
| LAM DONG | 16 | 1 | 68 | 15 | 10 | 68 |
| NINH THUAN | - | - | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 |
| PHU BON | - | - | | 2 | 3 | 5 |
| PHU YEN | - | 9 | | 32 | 80 | 112 |
| PLEIKU | 26 | - | | | 15 | 15 |
| QUANG DUC | 1 | - | | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| TUYEN DUC | 15 | - | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 |
| III CORPS | 255 | 150 | 353 | 358 | 550 | 635 |
| BIEN HOA | 8 | - | | | 66 | 66 |
| BINH DUONG | 9 | 17 | 22 | 9 | 15 | 27 |
| BINH LONG | 3 | - | 4 | | 2 | 6 |
| BINH TUY | 6 | - | 3 | 2 | 44 | 49 |
| GIA DINH | 69 | - | 70 | 94 | 70 | 94 |
| HAU NGHIA | 4 | - | 127 | 127 | 127 | 127 |
| LONG AN | 91 | 76 | 21 | 35 | 35 | 35 |
| LONG KHANH | 12 | - | 15 | | 100 | 100 |
| PHUOC LONG | - | 7 | | | | 40 |
| PHUOC TUY | 11 | 9 | 39 | 39 | 39 | 39 |
| TAY NINH | 28 | - | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| RUNG SAT | 14 | 41 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 |
| IV CORPS | 452 | 239 | 355 | 247 | 836 | 1014 |
| AN GIANG | 15 | - | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 |
| AN XUYEN | 46 | 22 | 31 | 31 | 31 | 31 |
| BA XUYEN | 46 | 12 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 |
| BAC LIEU | 74 | 15 | 30 | 10 | 20 | 60 |
| CHAU DOC | 7 | - | 9 | 7 | 11 | 27 |
| CHUONG THIEN | 46 | 20 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 26 |
| DINH TUONG | 29 | 26 | 10 | 13 | | 13 |
| GO CONG | 8 | 4 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 |
| KIEN GIANG | 9 | 62 | 48 | | 48 | 48 |
| KIEN HOA | 15 | 53 | | | 81 | 81 |
| KIEN PHONG | 41 | 27 | 43 | 51 | 84 | 127 |
| KIEN TUONG | 11 | 3 | 80 | 30 | 30 | 84 |
| PHONG DINH | 48 | 15 | | | 49 | 49 |
| SADEC | 6 | 2 | 5 | 6 | 9 | 21 |
| VINH BINH | 45 | 23 | | | 284 | 284 |
| VINH LONG | 6 | 5 | | | 90 | 90 |

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ANNEX L TO
AATTV Report - Apr 69

AATTV IV CORPS
CAN THO
931-2729
May 1969

Commanding Officer
AATTV
SAIGON

MONTHLY REPORT - APRIL 1969

General

1. On 5 April 1969, Maj A. Harkness, RAA arrived in Can-Tho and after a handover period assumed the position of Assistant DADC/TS : Senior Advisor, AATTV on 21 April 1969, vice Maj G.M. Templeton, RAAC.
2. This month has seen a slight increase in VC activity. The major incident was an attack against Vinh-Long City. During this attack the casualties were mainly civilian and were inflicted by a mortar attack on the market place.
3. CO, AATTV visited IV Corps area from 17 - 21 April. During this period discussions were held and consequently details already discussed are not included in this report.

Deployment

4. During the month there were a number of redeployments. Members previously employed in RDC training and RF/PF MAT were deployed as Village Defense Advisory Teams (VDATs), in three provinces.
5. Locations on 30 April were :
 - a. Can-Tho - MAJ A. Harkness - CORDS/Territorial Security
W02 Hyland - Admin WO (temp)
 - b. My-Tho - W02 Welsh - VDAT
W02 Ray - VDAT
 - c. Vinh-Long - W02 Munro - VDAT
W02 Horne - VDAT

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| | | | | |
|--------------|---|--------------|---|--------|
| d. Ba-Tri | - | WO1 Mann | - | VDAT |
| | | WO2 Forden | - | VDAT |
| e. Sa-Dec | - | WO2 Carter | - | PRU |
| f. To-Chau | - | WO2 Urquhart | - | 5 SFGA |
| g. Vinh-Binh | - | WO Grogan | - | MAT |
| | | WO King | - | MAT |

Injuries and Illness

6. There have been no reported cases of injuries or illness.

Territorial Security

7. No significant change has occurred in territorial security. Main VC targets are RF and PF outposts which are either undermanned or not employing good security techniques.

8. VC continue to demonstrate the ability to concentrate battalions by day. Local friendly forces show a reluctance to close with these VC concentrations, however, and most engagements are inconclusive.

9. The acceptance of the concept for defense at village level will be a slow process. With this in mind three Australian VDATs were formed and deployed in Dinh-Tuong, Kien-Hoa and Vinh-Long Provinces.

10. The concept of their employment is that they will be assigned under the operational control of the PSA. He will deploy them to target villages where their specific task will be to advise on the integration of the various defense groups into a cohesive village defense system. Emphasis will be placed on the practical implementation of the defense system doctrine.

11. I was present at Vinh-Long on 28/29 April during the deployment of WO Munro and WO Horne. The briefing of the members and the provision of support were satisfactory. I assisted in the drafting of terms of agreement as to the employment of WO Munro and WO Horne. A copy of this agreement is attached as Inclosure 1.

12. At this stage, detailed reports have not been received from other teams. Telephone conversations; however, indicate that the redeployment has been satisfactory in the initial stages. I will make a detailed inspection within the next two weeks.

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Other Training

13. All Australian effort is now withdrawn from RD training. The Regional RDC Chief, Mr. Rogers, verbally expressed his appreciation of the work done in this field. He further stated an intention of formally expressing this appreciation.

14. Other aspects of RF/PF training, PRU operations and SF training were inspected by CO, AATTV during his visit.

(A. Harkness)

Maj
AATTV

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Joint Agreement as to the Employment of
Village Defense Advisory Teams

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide a statement of agreement concerning the employment of the Village Defense Advisory Team which will be deployed on _____ to _____ Village.
2. It is jointly agreed that the mission of the team is:
 - a. To assist in providing a coordinated defense and defense plan for the village by working with the village Popular Force, Peoples' Self-Defense Force, National Police, Regional Force and any other necessary elements of the village population, administration or security forces.
 - b. To improve, by advice and training, the leadership capability of the Deputy Village Chief for Security and the leaders of other security elements under his direction.
 - c. To assist the Deputy Village Chief for Security in organizing all village security forces under his control and that of the Village Chief.
 - d. To assist in improving the combat skills and morale of the village security forces by training and accompanying elements thereof on operations, with emphasis on night security ambushes and patrols.
 - e. To assist the leaders in developing an adequate fire support plan and to assist in developing plans for the support or relief of security forces or other elements of the population threatened by or in contact with the VC.
 - f. To assist in the development of a comprehensive intelligence network in the village, tapping all possible sources of information among the people and channeled through the Deputy Village Chief for Security for action or forwarding to District.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

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 - b. To improve, by advice and training, the leadership capability of the Deputy Village Chief for Security and the leaders of other security elements under his direction.
 - c. To assist the Deputy Village Chief for Security in organizing all village security forces under his control and that of the Village Chief.
 - d. To assist in improving the combat skills and morale of the village security forces by training and accompanying elements thereof on operations, with emphasis on night security ambushes and patrols.
 - e. To assist the leaders in developing an adequate fire support plan and to assist in developing plans for the support or relief of security forces or other elements of the population threatened by or in contact with the VC.
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