

Australian Army Training Team  
Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report and enclosures  
1 - 30 June 1969

**Series:** AWM95 - Australian Army  
commanders' diaries

**Item:** 1/2/66



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AATTV MONTHLY REPORT - JUNE 1969

Attached, for information, is a copy of the AATTV Monthly Report for Jun 69.

(R.A. HAY)  
Major General  
Commander Australian Force  
VIETNAM

Attachment: 1. AATTV Monthly Report for Jun 69.

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Australian Army Training Team  
Vietnam

10 Jul 69

HQ AFV (3)

AATTV REPORT - JUNE 1969

General

1. During Jun operational activity and contacts with the enemy in which members of AATTV were involved in I CTZ were at a lower level than in the previous month. In II CTZ members of AATTV with the 2nd Mobile Strike Force (2MSF) continued to be actively involved in operations in the Dak-To/Ben-Het area in Kontum Province. In III and IV CTZs the level of AATTV activity remained unchanged.

Casualties

2. AATTV casualties for the period 2-30 Jun were 1 KIA and 2 WIA.

Deployment

3. The deployment of AATTV as at 5 Jul 69 is attached at Annex A.

I Corps

4. Except for a short period in the middle of the month, operational activity involving members of AATTV in I CTZ was at a lower level than that of May. Contacts with the enemy were generally light.

5. Attached at Annex B is a summary of operational contacts in I CTZ in which ARVN units with AATTV advisors were involved.

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6. Attached at Annex C is a copy of a translated I CTZ ARVN Briefing which gives a summary of the last six months operational activities in the zone and summarises likely enemy future intentions. It gives a somewhat different view to that reported publicly from United States Government Sources.

7. Attached at Annex D are AATTV advisor reports of interest from I CTZ. They include a report by WO2 M Kelly, an advisor with 3/2 ARVN Bn, regarding the action on "Hamburger Hill" (May 69). This report is of particular interest in view of the small amount of coverage by the Press of the involvement of ARVN in this operation.

II Corps

8. 2 MSF

a. As was the case in the previous month, the majority of 2 MSF operational activity in Jun continued to be centred around the operations in the Dak-To/Ben-Het area, where battalions of 2 MSF formed part of Task Force "Linh". A great deal of publicity has been given to this operation and the successful handling of the battle by the Task Force Commander - Col Linh. Based on personal observations while with the MSF on the ground in the area during May and from discussion with members of AATTV who were involved over the full period of the operation, it is quite clear that this publicity is highly exaggerated. It is considered that statements emanating from US sources indicating that this South Vietnamese "success" supports the official US view that GVN Forces and Commanders are now able to stand on their own feet and are capable of handling enemy operational pressure of the kind involved in the Ben-Het area, is not a truthful representation of the situation as it occurred at Ben-Het and does not accurately indicate the current situation regarding the RVNAF.

b. Attached at Annex E is a report by Maj W Brydon which summarises 2 MSF operations during the month. Para 4 of his report regarding the quantity of US support in the Ben-Het area is pertinent to the remarks contained in para 8 a above.

9. Ranger Training Centre (RTC). Attached at Annex F is a report by WO2 G Smith on his attachment to RTC as an instructor/advisor.

10. Province Recce Unit (PRU) : Binh-Dinh Province. Attached at Annex G is a report by WO1 EB Ostara, Senior Advisor of the PRU in Binh-Dinh Province.

III Corps

11. RF Training : Phuoc-Tuy. A report by WO2 Kealy, the Senior Instructor of the RF Training Cadre is attached at Annex H. The current course being conducted (3/69) is the first of those in which all the students have come from one RF Coy. It is hoped that this system can continue in the future in view of its obvious advantages compared with that of receiving students from a number of coys. It is unfortunate that the comd of the coy currently undergoing

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training has been required to attend a RF Coy Comds Course under Sector arrangements and is therefore not observing the training of his Coy. This aspect will be discussed with the Province Senior Advisor so that, if possible, it does not occur again with future courses.

12. IRP Training : Van-Kiep. A report on course 3/69 by Capt D Savage, Chief Instructor IRP Wing, is attached at Annex I.

13. RVNAF Armoured Centre : Thu-Duc. A report by WO2 T Malone, an instructor/advisor at the centre is attached at Annex J.

IV Corps

14. Assessments of the effects of the withdrawal of 9 US Div elements from the Delta seem to vary from the optimistic view of an upgrading in pacification results due to absence of foreign troops, to the pessimistic view of a concerted enemy offensive in the Upper Delta against 7 ARVN Div and the local RF/PF.

15. General enemy activity in IV CTZ has followed the same pattern as previously reported and has been maintained at a similar level. The pattern continues to show preference for indirect attacks by fire, with ground attacks being launched only against vulnerable targets. These attacks however are generally successful.

16. The AATTV Village Defence Advisory Team (VDAT) project which is now being conducted in four provinces of the Delta, appears to be making somewhat slow but never-the-less steady progress. Included in the areas in which progress is being made is the successful encouragement that has been given to the PF to conduct training for the Peoples Self Defence Force (PSDF) programme in the villages so far tackled by VDAT's. This is an important and necessary step towards establishing a cohesive village defence system. It is evident and not unexpected, that the VDAT's have been unable to limit themselves entirely to military aspects. They have assisted and advised on village self-help and village administration and it is necessary that the Teams be prepared to advise in these and other non-military fields if they are to be accepted at the Village level. The maturity and down-to-earth approach of the older and more experienced members of AATTV makes them admirably suited to this project. An on-the-ground and detailed inspection of the VDAT project will be made by CO AATTV during Jul with a view to gauging the progress and worth of the project from an AATTV point of view and to ensure that logistic and other support, which is the responsibility of IV CTZ to provide, is adequate.

Administration

17. One member of AATTV was hospitalised through illness during Jun. One of the members hospitalised during May and referred to in the previous AATTV report (WO2 Rowe), was medically evacuated to Australia on 14 Jun.



(R.D.F. LLOYD)  
Lt Col  
Comd.



AATTV DEPLOYMENT  
AS AT 4 JUL 1969

Annex 'A' to  
AATTV Monthly Report  
for Jun 1969

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>AATTV : SAIGON</u>								
1	Lt Col	RDF	Lloyd	RA Inf	HQ AATTV	Commanding Officer	Jan 70	Saigon
2	Capt	G.W.	Dennis	RA Inf	"	Adjutant	Nov 69	"
3	WO1	G.S.	Munt	RA Inf	"	Admin WO (Chief Clerk)	Mar 70	"
4	WO2	T.J.	Colbert	RAE	"	Admin WO (Pay)	Dec 69	"
5	Cpl	G.H.	Davison	RAASC	"	Clerk	May 70	"
6	WO2	T.F.	Malone	RAAC	Armoured School	Instructor/Advisor	Oct 69	Thu-Duc (near Saigon)
7	Capt	R.L.	Guest	RA Inf	HQ AATTV (att)	Special Orientation prior to RTA and posting to JTC.	Aug 69	

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Serial	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>I CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV : QUANG TRI Province</u>								
8	Maj	H.L.	Bell	RA Inf	Quang-Tri Sector	Acting Asst Province Advisor (Military)	Nov 69	Quang-Tri
9	WO2	P.V.	Roney	RAAMC	" " "	Medical Advisor	Apr 70	" "
10	WO2	J.M.	O'Donnell	RAAOC	Cam-Lo Sub-Sector	Assistant Advisor	Jan 70	Cam-Lo
11	WO2	E.W.	Snelling	RA Inf	1/1 ARVN Bn	" "	Jul 69	Quang-Tri
12	WO2	J.	Fitzgerald	RA Inf	1/1 " "	" " (Designate)	Jul 70	" "
13	WO2	K.A.	Gabriel	RA Inf	2/1 " "	" "	Nov 69	" "
14	WO2	H.H.	Beezley	RA Inf	3/1 " "	" "	Jan 70	" "
15	WO2	D.N.	Gorman	RAA	4/1 " "	" "	Mar 70	" "
16	WO1	S.D.	Rosenberg	RA Inf	1/2 " "	" "	Apr 70	Dong-Ha
17	WO2	F.E.	Bell	RA Inf	2/2 " "	" "	Mar 70	" "
18	WO2	R.K.	Gurney	RA Inf	3/2 " "	" "	Feb 70	" "
19	WO2	R.E.	Robinson	RA Inf	4/2 " "	" "	Aug 69	" "
20	WO2	J.E.	Barker	RA Inf	5/2 " "	" "	Aug 69	" "
21	WO2	H.J.	Stuttart	RAAC	1/11 ARVN Cav	" "	Nov 69	Quang-Tri

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Serial	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>I CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV : THUA THIEN Province</u>								
22	: WO2	: D.G.	: Killion	: RAAMC	: Thua-Thien Sector	: Medical Advisor	: Jul 70	: Hue
23	: Maj	: G.V.	: Brown	: RAE	: Nam-Hoa District	: District Senior Advisor	: Jun 70	: Nam-Hoa
24	: WO2	: J.A.	: McRae	: RA Inf	: Nam-Hoa Sub-Sector	: Assistant Advisor	: Aug 69	: "
25	: WO2	: L.N.	: Lootes	: RAAC	: 2/7 ARVN Cav	: " "	: Mar 70	: Hue (Base)
26	: WO2	: M.R.	: Bolitho	: RA Inf	: Black Panther Coy	: " "	: Nov 69	: "
27	: WO2	: G.C.	: Neitz	: RA Inf	: 2/54 ARVN Bn	: " "	: Aug 69	: "
28	: WO2	: L.	: Jackson	: RA Inf	: 3/54 " "	: " "	: Jul 69	: "
29	: WO2	: S.	: Speechly	: RAEME	: 3/54 " "	: " "(Designate)	: Jul 70	: "
30	: WO2	: M.	: Kelly	: RA Inf	: 2/3 " "	: " "	: Aug 69	: "
31	: Capt	: D.F.	: Paul	: RA Inf	: 3/3 " "	: Bn Senior Advisor	: May 70	: "
32	: WO2	: TPJ	: Van Bakel	: RAASC	: 3/3 " "	: Assistant Advisor	: Nov 69	: "
33	: WO2	: K.J.	: Troy	: RA Inf	: 4/3 " "	: " "	: Mar 70	: "

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Serial	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>AATTV : QUANG NAM Province</u>								
34	Maj	F.C.	Johnston	RA Inf	HQ I Corps	G3 (Trg) Advisor	Feb 70	Danang
35	Capt	J.P.	Nelson	RA Inf	" "	G3 (Ops)	May 70	"
36	WO1	J.	Geedrick	RA Inf	AATTV Danang	Admin WO	Sep 69	Aust House Danang
37	WO2	V.M.	Stack	RA Inf	" "	" "	Sep 69	" " "
38	WC2	R.M.	Almond	RAAC	4 ARVN Cav	Assistant Advisor	May 70	Danang
39	WO2	V.L.	Harris	RA Inf	Hoa-Vang Sub-Sector	" " RF/PF	Feb 70	Hoa-Vang
40	WO2	D.	Taylor	RAAOC	Quang-Nam Sector	Advisor RF/PF - Mobile Advisory Team	Jul 69	Moc-Bai
41	WO2	R.D.	Aylett	RA Inf	39th Ranger Bn	Assistant Advisor	Dec 69	Danang
42	WO2	T.J.	Goddard	RAA	44th ARVN Arty Bn	" "	Apr 70	"
43	Capt	D.G.	Bent	RA Inf	1/51 ARVN Bn	Senior Advisor	Oct 69	Mieu-Bong (Regt HQ)
44	WO1	E.J.	Morrison	RA Inf	" " "	Assistant Advisor	Dec 69	" " "
45	WO2	W.J.	Bruce	RA Inf	2/51 ARVN Bn	" "	Feb 70	" " "
46	WO2	C.F.	Keioskie	RAASC	2/51 " "	" " (Designate)	Feb 70	" " "
47	WO2	P.J.	Heslin	RAE	3/51 " "	" "	Mar 70	" " "

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Serial : Rank : Inits : Name : Corps : Unit : Employment : Due RTA : Location

AATTV : QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Province

48	: WO2	: I.R.	: Truelove	: RA Inf	: 1/4 ARVN Bn	: Assistant Advisor	: Sep 69	: )	Quang-Ngai Province (Regt HQ near Quang-Ngai)
49	: WO2	: M.J.	: Poole	: RA Inf	: 2/4 " "	: " "	: Nov 69	: )	
50	: WO2	: R.D.	: Cameron	: RA Inf	: 3/4 " "	: " "	: Feb 70	: )	
51	: Capt	: R.L.	: Smith	: RAE	: 1/5 " "	: Senior Advisor	: Apr 70	: )	Quang-Tin Province (Regt HQ near Tam-Ky)
52	: WO2	: B.L.	: Saxby	: RAE	: 2/5 " "	: Assistant Advisor	: Jan 70	: )	
53	: WO2	: S.	: Booth	: RA Inf	: 3/5 " "	: " "	: Jun 70	: )	
54	: WO1	: R.J.	: O'Brien	: RAE	: 4/5 " "	: " "	: Sep 69	: )	
55	: WO2	: W.S.	: Dickey	: RA Inf	: HQ 6 ARVN Regt	: Attached	: Jul 69	: )	Quang-Ngai Province (Regt HQ near Quang-Ngai)
56	: Capt	: A.J.	: Mogridge	: RA Inf	: 2/6 " "	: Senior Advisor	: Apr 70	: )	
57	: WO2	: D.W.	: Eather	: RA Inf	: 2/6 " "	: Assistant Advisor	: Jul 70	: )	
58	: WO2	: T.F.	: Dolan	: RA Inf	: 3/5 " "	: " "	: Jan 70	: )	
59	: WO1	: J.B.	: Staunton-Latimer	: RAAG	: 2/4 ARVN Cav	: " "	: Feb 70	: )	Quang-Ngai

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Serial	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>II CTZ</u> <u>AATV : PLEIKU</u>								
60	Maj	J.W.	Brydon	RA Inf	2nd Mobile Strike Force Command, Det B-20, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)	Bn Comd	Feb 70	Pleiku (Base Camp)
61	Capt	PJS	Harris	RA Inf	" " "	Bn XO	Mar 70	" "
62	Capt	DJF	Rowe	RA Inf	" " "	Coy Comd	May 70	" "
63	WO2	F.M.	Moffitt	RA Inf	" " "	Coy Comd	Jun 70	" "
64	WO2	J.R.	Stewart	RA Inf	" " "	Coy Comd (Trg Coy)	Aug 69	" "
65	WO2	S.J.	McLaughlin	RA Inf	" " "	" " (Designate) (TrgCoy)	Apr 70	" "
66	WO2	K.	Payne	RA Inf	" " "	Instructor (Trg Coy)	Feb 70	" "
67	WO2	R.S.	Simpson	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Feb 70	" "
68	WO2	J.R.	Vincent	RAA	" " "	Pl Comd	May 70	" "
69	WO2	J.T.	Hoolihan	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Jun 70	" "
70	WO2	A.B.	McCloskey	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Jul 70	" "
71	Sgt	D.W.	Scheele	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Sep 69	" "
72	Sgt	D.H.	Wright	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Oct 69	" "
73	WO1	E.W.	Gason	RAAC	1/14 ARVN Cav	Asst Advisor	Dec 69	Pleiku

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>II CTZ (Cont'd)</u>								
<u>AATTV - II CORPS AREA</u>								
74	WO2	I.J.	Jewell	RA Inf	Recondo School 5SFG (A)	Instructor	Jul 69	Nha-Trang
75	WO2	K.C.	Latham	RA Inf	" " "	" (Designate)	Dec 69	" "
76	WO2	G.Y.	Jamieson	RA Inf	Mobile Training Team (PRU's II CTZ)	Assistant Instructor/ Advisor	Mar 70	" " (Base)
77	WO2	M.T.	Jensen	RA Inf	Ranger Training Centre	Instructor/Advisor	Nov 69	Duc-My
78	WO1	E.B.	Ostara	RA Inf	Province Recce Unit	Advisor Binh-Dinh Province	Dec 69	Qui-Nhon

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>III CTZ</u>								
<u>4ATTV : III CORPS AREA</u>								
79	Capt	D.G.	Savage	RA Inf	LRP Wing Van-Kiep National Training Centre	CI	Aug 69	Baria
80	WO2	C.K.	Ansell	RA Inf	" " "	Admin WO	Mar 70	"
81	WO2	B.L.	Young	RA Inf	" " "	Patrol Comd/Instructor	Feb 70	"
82	WO2	J.W.	Wigg	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Jan 70	"
83	WO2	A.G.	Urquhart	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Sep 69	"
84	Sgt	A.J.	Shelton	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Feb 70	"
85	WO2	C.J.	Ison	RA Inf	Province Recce Unit	Senior Advisor Phuoc-Tuy Province	Apr 70	Baria
86	WO2	C.	Kealy	RA Inf	Phuoc-Tuy Sector (Att)	RF Trg Cadre (Senior Instructor)	Jan 70	18 ARVN Div Trg School, near Nui-Dat.
87	WO2	W.D.	Frost	RA Inf	" " ( " )	" " " (Instructor)	Aug 69	" " "
88	WO2	AJA	Joyce	RA Inf	" " ( " )	" " " (Instructor)	Jan 70	" " "
89	WO2	J.M.	Macartney	RAASC	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	Assistant Advisor A & L Coy (RF)	Jan 70	Baria

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>AATTV : IV CORPS AREA</u>								
90	Maj	A.	Harkness	RAA	CORDS, IV Corps	Assistant to Chief of Territorial Security	Apr 70	Can-Tho
91	WO2	W.L.	Deanshaw	RAAMC	HQ IV Corps	Medical Advisor	Jul 69	" "
92	WO2	A.A.	Welsh	RAE	Dinh-Tuong Sector	Village Defence Advisory Team (VDAT)	Dec 69	Dinh-Tuong Province
93	WO2	S.K.D.	Roy	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Mar 70	" " "
94	WO2	E.H.	Martin	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Nov 69	" " "
95	WO1	J.W.	Mann	RA Inf	Kien-Hoa Sector	" " "	Nov 69	Kien-Hoa Province
96	WO2	K.W.	Forden	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	May 70	" " "
97	WO1	W.A.	Eade	PRO	" " "	" " "	Jul 70	" " "
98	WO2	R.M.	King	RA Inf	Vinh-Binh Sector	" " "	Dec 69	Vinh-Binh Province
99	WO2	W.J.	Grogan	RAEME	" " "	" " "	Aug 69	" " "
100	WO2	W.E.	Tillett	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Feb 70	" " "
101	WO2	G.E.	Munro	RA Inf	Vinh-Long Province	" " "	Feb 70	Vinh-Long Province
102	WO2	G.S.	Horne	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Nov 69	" " "
103	WO2	R.W.	Cairns	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Jul 70	" " "



SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL CONTACTS IN WHICH  
AATTV ADVISORS WERE INVOLVED - I CTZ

1. During the period 24 to 31 May the Eastern DMZ area was quiet with the only significant contact occurring four kilometers SE of Con-Thien. Elements of 5/2 ARVN Bn (1 ARVN Div) made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in light friendly casualties and unknown enemy casualties. During the contact the battalion received 150 rounds of 82mm mortar rounds. Attacks by fire were recorded on battalion CP locations of 4/1 ARVN Bn and 3/1 ARVN Bn. (1 ARVN Div)
2. On 6 Jun 5/2 ARVN Bn in A2 Base (YD 2274) received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire.
3. On 8 Jun 4/2 ARVN Bn (1 ARVN Div) three kilometers west of Gio-Linh (YD 188730) received 80 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in light casualties.
4. On 10 Jun 4/2 ARVN Bn in the same general area received 65 rounds of mixed 60/82mm mortar rounds resulting in light casualties.
5. In the early morning of 17 Jun 1/2 ARVN Bn (1 ARVN Div) and 3/11 ARVN Cav at G1 Base (YD 215671) received a ground attack from an unknown size enemy force. The attack was a failure costing the enemy 58 confirmed enemy KIA and 45 weapons captured with light friendly casualties, seven enemy were taken prisoner.
6. 2/1 ARVN Bn 18 kilometers South of Quang-Tri City (YD 350347), made contact with an estimated enemy company which lost 13 KIA and 13 weapons captured in this engagement.
7. On 18 Jun, 12 kilometers West-North-West of Quang-Ngai City a UH-1D, while lifting troops into an LZ, was shot down. The 2/4 ARVN Cav based out of Quang-Ngai were involved in a day and night operation to recover the bodies of the crew under fire from the enemy. CO AATTV was with WO1 Staunton-Latimer (AATTV) an asst advisor with the unit, during this operation.
8. On 20 June 2/6 ARVN Bn (2 ARVN Div), 11 kilometers North-West of Quang-Ngai City were mortared (82 mm) and received ground attack by an estimated two NVA Coys. The attack was repulsed and resulted in ARVN : 7 KIA, 23 WIA - enemy 25 KIA. CO AATTV was also with Captain Mogridge (AATTV), Senior Advisor to the Battalion during this contact.

(F.C. Johnston)  
Maj  
AATTV



I CTZ ARVN BRIEFING  
COVERING PERIOD JAN TO JUN 69

1. GENERAL SITUATION

Even though the enemy has been involved in peace talk in Paris, he has not changed his conduct of the war in South Vietnam during the past six months. The intensity and frequency of the enemy's attacks remained high compared with the average level of activity in 1968. As shown on the following slide (Slide# \_\_\_) the enemy has launched four offensive efforts since the first of the year, one in February, March, May and June. In addition to launching offensive actions, the enemy has continued to infiltrate military equipment and personnel into South Vietnam. These actions serve to indicate that the communists have maintained, if not increased, their aggressive intentions toward South Vietnam.

Although the enemy's activity in the 11th DTA has been greater this year than during the same period of 1968, the enemy's main effort has been directed toward impeding and countering friendly operations along the DMZ and the Laotian border. The enemy has directed his efforts toward these missions in an attempt to protect his major logistical bases and lines of communication. It has also been in these areas that the enemy has attempted to inflict the heaviest casualties on US Forces in order to enhance his political position at the Paris peace talk. Several major engagements occurred in the areas North of Cam-Lo, South of Khe-Sanh and in the A Shau Valley. The most significant incident was the attack by US and Vietnamese Forces on the "AP BIA" stronghold which was defended by the enemy's 29th Regiment of the 325th NVA Division. Although the attack was the subject of much criticism in the United States, the success of the Allied Forces eliminated the 29th Regiment as an effective combat unit. Recently however, the enemy has increased his troop strength and efforts in the coastal lowlands. Two examples of the enemy's increased efforts along the coast are: the attack on the C-1 fire support base on 18 June 1969 which resulted in 4 friendly WIA. Enemy losses totaled 59 KIA, 7 captured, 39 individual weapons, 4 B40 and 3 B41 launchers and captured. The second major attack occurred on 19 June against TOMAHAWK fire support base and resulted in 10 friendly KIA, 40 WIA, 3 x 155 self propelled howitzers damaged, 10 trucks destroyed. Enemy losses totaled 10 KIA, 1 captured and 4 individual weapons captured.

The enemy activities in the 11th DTA have indicated two major aspects of the enemy's intentions and capabilities. First, it is believed that the units which withdrew from the 11th DTA in 1968 have completed their re-fitting and training and since March of 1969 have begun to return to areas on the borders of the 11th DTA. This would indicate the possibility that the enemy intends to greatly increase his efforts in the 11th DTA. Secondly, the enemy operations in the coastal lowlands appear to be an effort to divert our attention from the highlands in a continued attempt by the enemy to protect his supply bases and transportation routes.

Following the Mar offensive, the enemy entered a one month period of re-fitting and training. After this period of unit improvement, the enemy



initiated the first phase of his summer campaign on the night of 11/12 May by launching numerous attacks by fire and ground forces. Although the enemy carefully planned his offensive, deployed and committed his main force units in selected objective areas, he was unable to achieve any major success in fact during the past two months, the enemy has only been able to gain the initiative in a few battalion sized attacks in the Corps area, in addition to those already mentioned.

On the night of 6 and 7 June, the enemy launched the second phase of his summer campaign with numerous attacks by fire and several small attacks by ground forces in Quang-Nam Province and the 12th DTA.

On 6 June the enemy suffered 155 KIA in two contacts with the US Marine Forces operating out of the An-Hoa combat base. Friendly casualties were negligible in the contacts.

On 12 May the enemy launched two attacks on the 39th ARVN Ranger Battalion in the Northern portion of GO NOI island area. Friendly losses were 6 KIA, and 14 WIA, while the enemy suffered 112 KIA, 1 VCC and 34 individual weapons captured.

Also on 12 May, elements of the 1st Regt/2D NVA Division attacked and overran NUI YON outpost. Both airmobile and ground relief forces were unsuccessful in re-taking the outpost for three days. When the outpost was re-taken on 15 May, the enemy had suffered only 60 known KIA, while friendly casualties totaled 26 US KIA and 72 WIA, and 10 PF KIA.

Recently in the MO-DUC and DUC-PHO areas, in Quang-Ngai Province, the enemy has significantly increased his offensive actions. During the past two weeks MO-DUC and DUC-PHO have been subjected to almost nightly mortar attacks; and the area along highway #1 between these two cities have been targets of harrassing raids and ground attacks directed primarily against the RD program.

During the past few months the enemy has placed an increasing emphasis upon the use of sapper techniques throughout the Corps area. A majority of the enemy units have received sapper training recently and most of the enemy's manoeuver battalions now contain at least one company of sapper trained personnel. The increased emphasis upon sapper tactics and techniques appears to be based upon the theory that sappers techniques require fewer personnel, thereby enabling the enemy to make more effective utilization of his troop strength.

Since the first of the year, the enemy has tried to achieve some kind of victory in order to enhance his political position at the peace negotiations in Paris. However, his offensive efforts have failed to produce the desired victories. Each of the enemy's recent campaigns has been weaker than the preceding one; and his capability to attack the major cities of I Corps have decreased significantly, indicating the enemy is faced with some rather critical internal problems.

## 2. ENEMY STRENGTH AND FORCES

The disposition of the enemy follows as shown on the following slide (Slide # \_\_\_\_\_).

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The B5 Front, North of national road 9, is composed of one division and 11 Regiments. The main reason for separating the B5 Front from the other areas is to aid in the estimation of the enemy forces in and around the DMZ. In addition to the sizeable enemy force which is north of the DMZ and can cross the DMZ and engage in combat at any time, the enemy also rotates the units which operate on the south side of the DMZ, thus producing surprising changes in the enemy order of battle. Additionally, there are units which enter South Vietnam to perform a specific mission and immediately withdraw to the North, the total enemy forces in the I Corps Tactical Zone south of Route 9, with the exception of the B5 Front is:

2 Division Headquarters

18 Regiments

35 Battalions and

56 Local Force Companies

with a total strength of 36,343

### 3. INFILTRATION AND REPLACEMENTS

Since the first of the year the enemy has infiltrated approximately 29,230 men into the I Corps area. 22,930 were utilized as individual replacements, while approximately 6,300 composed infiltration groups, which have operated as entire units.

Although the enemy has maintained the capability to infiltrate large numbers of replacements, his combat strength has remained low. Based upon statements of captured prisoners of war and recently captured documents, the average strength of an enemy battalion is 275 men, or 55% of its authorized strength. When compared with strength from the end of 1968, the enemy's strength has increased by 7%. The main reason for such a low enemy strength is the heavy casualties sustained by the enemy. During the first five months of 1969, the enemy has suffered 25,279 personnel killed, a number almost equal to the 29,230 personnel infiltrated since the first of the year in estimating the total casualties sustained by the enemy, 50% of the confirmed number killed in action was utilized as the basis for the unconfirmed kills and personnel wounded, thus giving an estimated total of 38,550 casualties sustained by the enemy. In addition to the confirmed infiltration strength there is an estimated strength of 13,000 for local recruitment, troop upgrading and unconfirmed infiltration; thus giving the enemy a total replacement capability of 42,230 men. When comparing this figure with the estimated total casualties figure, the enemy's strength has shown an estimated strength increase of 9% (which closely approximates the 7% computed from known data).

Based upon captured documents, statements from PW's and recent enemy activities, it is believed that there has been a change in the enemy tactics. It appears that the enemy's policy has changed from achieving decisive victories to a step by step manner of accomplishing his goals - in an effort, not aimed



at seizure of power, but rather at the preparation of a strong operational base to be utilized during the post-war period. In this context the enemy's concept for future military operations is to attack small objectives which will ensure him a victory, and to use a small force to attack objectives having superior strength combined with the tactic of "strong points in coordination with mobile striking forces".

The reason for the enemy's change of tactics is that he realizes that he has no hope of gaining victory through strictly military action. His ability to attack and occupy the population centers has been greatly reduced, as evidenced during the enemy's recent spring and summer campaign. During the past two offensives, the enemy was unable to penetrate the security perimeters of the cities, and the attacks which occurred were limited and largely unsuccessful.

At the current time the enemy possesses the following capabilities:

- a. To continue his countersweep operations of company to battalion size, along the DMZ and the Laotian-Vietnamese border in Quang-Tri and Thua-Thien Provinces.
- b. To continue, or increase, offensive operations in the coastal lowlands of the 11th DTA in an attempt to divert our attention away from the highlands in an effort to protect his logistical bases and transportation corridors.
- c. To initiate ambushes and small attacks throughout I Corps Tactical Zone, especially in Quang-Nam, Quang-Ngai and Quang-Tin Provinces.
- d. To increase terrorism and assassination activities directed at GVN structures in rural areas.
- e. To attack and destroy lines of communication
- f. To launch waves of activities of the same or lower frequency and intensity as in the most recent offensives. There is also a high probability that there will be another campaign during the 3rd quarter of 1969.
- g. To launch a general offensive throughout the Corps area with his existing forces, should the political situation demand such action and should the enemy be willing to accept the casualties inherent in such an offensive.



INDEX TO AATTV ADVISOR REPORTS OF INTEREST - I CTZ

The following reports of interest from AATTV advisors in I CTZ are attached:

- Annexure 1 - Report by Maj H Bell, S3 Quang-Tri Sector
- Annexure 2 - Report by WO2 L Bootes, Advisor 7 ARVN Cav
- Annexure 3 - Report by WO2 M Kelly, Asst Advisor 3/1 ARVN Bn  
on operation on Hamburger Hill
- Annexure 4 - Report by WO2 M Poole, Asst Advisor 2/4 ARVN Bn.



QUANG TRI REPORT : JUN 69

1. 1 ARVN Regt

a. 1/1 ARVN Bn (WO2 Snelling)

Moved out on detachment to 3 ARVN Regt. No information to hand but it is known to be protecting FSB's for 3 Regt.

b. 2/1 ARVN Bn (WO2 Gabriel)

2/1 ARVN Bn moved into Base Area 101 on Operation LAM SON 276. This is a two battalion operation astride the Thua-Thien/Quang-Tri border and so far has inflicted a number of casualties in small contacts.

c. 3/1 ARVN Bn (WO2 Beezley)

In pacification operations in Hai-Lang District with no significant contact. There is little justification in keeping an ARVN unit in Hai-Lang and overtures are being made to handover the area to RF/PF.

d. 4/1 ARVN Bn (WO2 Gorman)

With 2/1 Bn in LAM SON 276. No significant contact.

2. 2 ARVN Regt

a. 1/2 ARVN Bn (WO1 Rosenberg)

In C1 post north of Dong-Ha. On the night 17 Jun C1 was assaulted by elements of a battalion from 270 NVA Regt and 33 NVA Sapper Bn. The attack was repulsed with 58 NVA KIA and 7 PW plus 45 weapons captured. There were no ARVN KIA and 4 slightly wounded. (I arrived early in the morning to help organize PF to round up stragglers in the 13,000 refugee camp adjacent to C1, and to verify the destruction by illumination rounds of 60 houses.

b. 2/2 ARVN Bn (WO2 Bell)

North of Khe-Sanh on operation LAM-SON 276. No significant contact.

c. 3/2 ARVN Bn (WO2 Gurney)

As for 2/2 ARVN Bn.

d. 4/2 ARVN Bn (WO2 Robinson)

On outpost duty at A1. No contact except attacks by fire.



e. 5/2 ARVN Bn (WO2 Barker)

Detached to HUE citadel

3. 11 ARVN Cav

WO2 Stuttard is with the troop operating out of C1, and participated in the pursuit of the enemy defeated in the attack of 17 Jun. Otherwise the unit has not been in contact.

4. Quang-Tin Sector

a. WO2 O' Donnell (Cam-Lo Sub-Sector)

Is performing duties of Deputy DSA as a junior Captain has moved in as DSA from elsewhere. Participated in operation QT 21 (Cordon of HUONG-HOA 24/27 Jun) and was instrumental in disentangling a friendly clash on the night of 24 Jun.

b. WO2 Roney (Sector Medical Advisor)

Has overcome the shocking accommodation situation in the Sector hospital, (2 men to a bed, beds pushed tightly together - 90 bed patients to a 20 bed ward). Because of the projected amalgamation with the Province Hospital, now three months overdue and likely to be three more months, both ARVN and US have refused WO2 Roney materials to build more wards. WO2 Roney requested permission from the Province Advisory Staff, (without my knowledge - out in the field) for an interview with the Province Chief. He was told that this was impossible so he went to the Province Chief direct. The result was materials for a building and a building allotted from the RD Centre next door. Building has commenced, with the patients supplying the labour. Everyone now professes to be shocked at the condition of the hospital, (conditions which WO2 Deanshaw had long reported and had worked hard to try and correct).

c. Maj Bell

With PSA at present on extension leave, now performing duties of Sector Military Advisor. Went out on operation QT 21 as Senior Advisor.

(H. BELL)  
Maj  
AATTV



REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS  
7th Armd Cav  
An Cuu

23 Jun 69

MONTHLY REPORT - PERIOD 21 MAY - 20 JUN 69  
7 ARVN CAV

GENERAL

During the above period the writer served as Senior Advisor 2nd Troop from 21 May until 11 Jun, due to the American Senior Advisor to the troop being hospitalized, and Senior Advisor to 1st Troop from 11 Jun to date.

1 Troop, or part of it, is operating at Ocean View and it is proposed to return the whole troop to HUE at the end of this month. As SA, the writer has been held at the RHQ to assist in re-establishing it, and also to work on a night training programme, mounting 106mm RCL's on two APC's and range practices for 2 Troop. An extensive gunnery programme is proposed for 1 Troop and will take effect on its return to HUE.

It is also planned for 2 Troop to change with 3 Troop, which is currently operating in the Ashau Valley, about the middle of next month. The writer anticipates being re-assigned to 2 Troop for this operation.

There is a shortage of advisors with the 7th Cav and the Senior Advisor has had to re-shuffle the existing advisors to ensure the two APC troops were at full strength.

1 Troop, the tank troop, has tanks at three separate locations - 7 at OCEAN VIEW - 5 at C1 - 4 at the HUE CITADEL and 1 at RHQ. The need for advisors is with the APC troops as they normally work with US elements.

OPERATION DETAILS

From 21 May to 31 May 2 Troop worked in the 7th Cav AO, which extends from HAI LANG to AN LAO Bridge and from the Gulf of Tonkin to the Mountain Range. Centre of AO and usual night location was CAMP EVANS. The operations were usually of one day duration, of a reconnaissance nature. The troop worked independently from other elements, except on two occasions:-

1. 22 May - Acted as blocking force for 3 Troop on a combined operation to the EAST of CAMP EVANS.
2. 24 May - Security for two 'Duster' M41 Tanks with twin 40mm cannons.



The only significant events during the period occurred on the following dates:-

- 23 May - Whilst searching SOUTH of CAMP EVANS, 2 Pl 2 Tp discovered an old bunker, at GR 518274, which had recently been used by a VC team (3 people). The bunker was camouflaged and subsequently destroyed by burning the timber and filling with earth.
- 26 May - 1 Pl 2 Tp discovered 750 lb bomb booby trap at GR 578259. Destroyed by an EOD team.

On 31 May 2 Troop moved to HUE to prepare for new operation at PHU LOC. The new operation commenced on 2 Jun when the troop was assigned to secure a light fire support base, QUICK ONE, comprising 1 Bty of 105mm GUNS from 12 ARVN ARTY and the CP for 4 Bn 54 Regt.

The American Senior Advisor returned to the troop and the writer was re-assigned to 1 Troop, as Senior Advisor.

On 13 Jun the RHQ returned to it's home station at AN CUU, HUE and the writer has been employed there. Nothing definite at this time on further deployment.

#### CONCLUSION

Since arriving in country, the longest period served with any one unit is one month, however in that one month the writer feels that he has a congenial working arrangement/relationship with both American and Vietnamese. Language is the main problem, though a better understanding on both sides was achieved over this period.

(L.N. BOOTES)  
WO2  
AATTV



2/3 ARVN Bn

13 Jun 69

CO AATTV

HAMBURGER HILL - REPORT BY  
WO2 M KELLY : 2/3 ARVN BN

Ref : Map Ban-Ko, 6441 (111)  
1 : 50,000

You asked me to write an account of the Bn's effort at Dong-Ap-Bia (Hill 937 : Hamburger Hill). As there are no Staff Duties in the Field up here to outline things properly I will give you an outline of what happened from the time we were warned to move out until the time when our part in "Apache Snow" ended and we resumed our part in Lam-Son 278.

All extracts are taken from my own notebook and all available data from the May journal of events which was put at my disposal by G3 of 1 ARVN Div TOC. I also went to Camp Eagle requesting information, but just as the ARVN TOC only had the ARVN account of the action so the 101st TOC only had the American account and little or no information of 2/3 Bn's part except much the same as what appeared in the Stars and Stripes paper.

On 18 May at approximately 2030 hrs whilst we were on duty at the Citadel Wall we were informed that 2/3 Bn was to be ready on the Citadel Strip for movement to LZ Currahee at YC 405947 by 0800 hrs on 19 May. Movement was by Chinook each carrying 45 troops.

The move to LZ Currahee was completed by 1030 hrs the same morning. We were then warned that we would Combat Assault to YC 339968, the move being by Slick helicopters each carrying seven (7) personnel. The lift commenced at 1230 hrs and was completed by 1430 hrs. We moved out to occupy our harbour for the night, and the following night locations were recorded, CP plus 1 Coy at YC 337975, 2 and 3 Coys YC 339974.

On 20 0730 hrs the bn moved out with 1 Coy in the lead and at YC 337977 encountered a bunker complex at approximately 1130 hrs. The Coy was halted, 2 Coy moved forward to take the lead and 1 Coy was ordered to destroy the complex and all stores. List of stores will follow at the end of this narrative.

At approximately 1230 hrs word was received from the Commander 3 Bn 187 Inf Bde (Callsign Black Jack) for a coy to move up and occupy one of the features which comprise the 937 feature. The map is misleading in reference to the ground for there are two features on the Eastern side plus the peak of 937. The Coy occupied 937 which was outside of our AO. This, plus the fact that artillery preparation on the NW slope was just about to commence and an element of 1 Bn 506

.../2



Inf was proceeding from the West with 937 as their ultimate objective, 2/3 Bn was ordered to withdraw. After the withdrawal we were ordered to take up a position on the left flank of A Coy 3 Bn 187 Inf and commence an assault on the NE ridge of 937. In the meantime our other coys had occupied the SE knoll. The 2nd Coy moved forward to assault the position and came under heavy fire from the NVA, mainly small arms fire with a few 60mm mortar rounds and fire from a captured M79 grenade launcher. The Coy received fire from our right flank from the A Coy 3 Bn 187 Inf and the Coy Comd halted the advance. As the advisor with the coy I notified Blackjack who was in a LOH above the battle field of what had happened and was told to continue the advance and that we were receiving fire from the NVA and not friendly forces.

The Coy advanced again and came under fire from the enemy, we also received fire from the flank. The Coy Comd again halted the advance for the same reason as before and called the Bn Commander who ordered him to stop the advance. I also informed Blackjack of this decision and was again informed that we were not receiving fire from American troops. I have no doubt in my own mind that we were being fired on by friendly troops, from the angle it was coming from and from the observation of the other Advisor, Sgt Henry USMC.

At this stage the US forces coming from the SW up to the NW peak appeared on top of 937 and started to move down the ridge going to the NE. The advance of the 2nd Coy ARVN was halted and our coy was ordered to 937 to move through the US troops of the 1st 506 Inf to clear the ridge. After proceeding down the ridge line for approximately 100 yards the resistance from the NVA position ceased and all coys were ordered to halt and consolidate. Our two coys on the hill were then ordered to move back to YC 329977 while the CP and the other Coy was located at YC 332976. This was the end of the part we played in Operation Apache Snow as the next morning we were told to resume Operation Lam-Son 278. On 23 May we moved out from the location after searching Grid Squares 3297 and 3397.

On the morning of the 21 May, Gen Stilwell visited the unit and told them that by coming up the way we did we took a lot of pressure off the US troops and stopped the NVA from re-inforcing their unit on 937.

It must be realized that at no time did we have an actual AO as such as we were restricted by a line from Easting 32-34 and Northing 96-98. We were told not to call artillery above Northing 98 as US elements were there, and not to call it between Easting 32-34. On the map you will see the disposition of the bns as at the morning of 20 May.

In concluding this narrative, the coaxial cable mentioned in Stars and Stripes was an ordinary copper wire cable normally used for telephone lines. Following in chronological sequence are times, dates, grid references of stores etc, found.

18 May Warned for movement to LZ Currahee

19 May By Chinook to Currahee

.../3



19 1230 hrs CA to YC 339968. CA complete 1430 hrs

Moved to NI LOC. CP YC 337975

2 and 3 Coy YC 339974

20 0730 hrs Bn moved out and at YC 337977 the lead element  
discovered a bunker complex of 50 new huts (4x6 metres)  
50 bunkers (4x6 metres)

Stores found were 1000 lb rice

400 lb salt

100 NVA uniform (no marking )

1 case of assorted medicine  
(quinine vitamins)

5000 rds SAA AK 47 type

50 metres Det Cord

2000 metres electric cable

200 rds B40

200 rds 60mm mortar

200 Chicom grenades

9 cases TNT

5000 metres commo. wire

50 gas masks

100 pr NVA boots

50 documents (one document mentioned  
C47 and K18 units)

20 1130 hrs 1 Coy contacted enemy squad at YC 328978  
Results 6 NVA KIA 3 AK 47 captured  
Friendly NIL.

20 1350 hrs This occurred to 2 Coy whilst we were advancing and/or  
while we were halted between advances. Received 3 rds  
B40. Results : Friendly 2 WIA.

.../4



20 1500 hrs Received 35 rds of 60mm mortar from YC 318972.  
Results Friendly 1 WIA.  
No counter measures were taken as we could not get US clearance as disposition of 1/506 troops were hazy. In the fighting that day 22 NVA bodies were counted mostly killed by Arty and Air strikes.

21 0940 hrs YC 337977 3 NVA were engaged.  
Results 3 NVA KIA; 1 M16 rifle captured

21 0955 hrs YC 334974 4 huts and bunkers (4x6 ) were found and two anti-personnel mines.

21 0955 hrs YC 337977 8 NVA bodies approximately 2 days old were found, also 1 60mm mortar, 20 anti-tank mines.

50 blocks of TNT

1 case of assorted medicines and tablets

10 NVA uniforms. Uniform patch on shirts were T2/7

300 kilos polished rice

50 stick grenades

25 Chicom gas masks

40 rds B40 rockets

10 pair jungle boots

10 mosquito nets

1 mess hall (8x21 )

Whilst searching this area one NVA threw a satchel charge wounding one friendly.

21 1120 hrs Whilst searching same area discovered 5 NVA bodies one day old and one M79 grenade launcher. Later discovered same area at 1145 hrs two (2) NVA bodies one day old. Found 15 new huts with underground bunkers (4x6 )

170 rds 60mm mortar

135 rds B40 rockets

100 rds 82mm mortar

1 M3 Sub-machine gun.



21 1030 hrs Found 25 huts and underground bunkers (4x6 )  
at YC 340978

- 18 Chicom gas masks
- 15 NVA packs
- 20 NVA uniforms (marking T2 and T2/5)
- 15 mosquito nets
- 25 Chicom canteens
- 15 Mess Kits
- 2 Cases of assorted medicines and pills
- 1 pair wire cutters
- 12 entrenching tools
- 4 machetes
- 100 60mm mortar rds
- 150 B40 rockets
- 150 Stick grenades
- 5000 AK 47 rds
- 25 AK 47 magazines

Discovered 6 new graves in this area

22 1435 hrs YC 341978 . Discovered 10 NVA bodies (3 day old)

- 1 Cleaning rod for 37mm A/A gun.
- 1 Labour ID Card

23 May Told Apache Snow finished and moved out YC 341970 to  
commence Lam-Son 278.

(M. KELLY)  
WO2  
AATTV



2/4 Bn  
Quang-Ngai

31 May 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY WO2 POOLE - ASST ADVISOR  
2/4 ARVN BN : MAY 69

Operations

1. a. 1 May - 16 May. West of Quang-Ngai in the Horse Shoe area, near the Old French Airfield. 2/4 Bn contacted between squad and coy sized elements: the area of the contact was heavily mined and 7 friendly casualties were caused by mines. Because of poor and slow passage of info from higher comd downwards the operation was not as successful as it might have been. This area is well known to have many VC booby traps deployed in an effort to deter the ARVN from sweeping the area. Result of the operation was 7 en KIA, 3 weapons and 20 grenades captured. Various articles of equipment were found and about 150 civilians suspects were sent to Quang-Ngai. Friendly casualties were 11 KIA, 16 WIA and 5 MIA, these five were believed to have gone over to the enemy. They left the unit one night taking their weapons and equipment. The five were members of a group of 25 replacements received by the battalion 2 days prior to the operation. The replacements came from Saigon. The Bn Comd had the remaining 20 soldiers disarmed, searched and questioned then sent back to the Division as he would not accept them.
- b. 16 May - 19 May. South West of Quang-Ngai near the coast. Contacts at first were with squad and platoon size enemy elements of the NVA. On the 17 May contact was made with a Bn size NVA unit which almost ambushed 2/4 Bn. The Bn was engaged from three sides by the enemy with mortar, HMG and RCL. Air and artillery support helped to push the enemy back and the contact was broken. The enemy attacked our night position in the early morning, after daylight contact was very light. Results of the contact were, 11 NVA KIA, 2 NVA PW's, 2 VC PW's and 1 weapon captured. Other weapons and items captured included grenades, B41 rounds, SA ammo, a HMG mount, 82mm mortar sight and NVA field packs. Friendly results were 3 KIA and 13 WIA. Blood trails indicated that many more enemy wounded or dead had been dragged off by the enemy during the night.
- c. 19 May - 23 May. 2/4 moved to Mo-Duc - general security of the area.
- d. 24 May - 31 May. West-North-West of Nghia-Hanh. In the first stage of the operation contact was made with squad sized NVA units. On 23 May the Bn received intelligence reports of 2 NVA bns in the area. Approx 2 hrs later contact was made with enemy, 2/4 Bn received fire from three direction, but air support and artillery beat back the enemy attack. Enemy resumed his attack during the night, mainly by fire,



B40 and 57 RGL. Spooky aircraft supported the bn in its night position. Contact continued for the next two days, during this time APC's were in support of 2/4 Bn.

Results of the operation were, 6 enemy KIA, 7 B40 rockets, 18 grenades captured, also other items including packs, ammunition and equipment.

Friendly casualties were 7 KIA, 20 WIA and one radio destroyed.

2/4 Bn's morale is very low and they are not as aggressive as they were two months ago. The Bn has had very little rest in the last month and should soon be withdrawn to Mo-Duc for retraining and rest and reinforcement.

M J Poole  
2/4 Bn  
Quang-Ngai



HQ 2 MSF  
PLEIKU

30 Jun 69

CO AATTV

AATTV MONTHLY REPORT - JUN 69  
2ND MOBILE STRIKE FORCE COMMAND

1. Deployment

- a. Changes made during the month among AATTV personnel have caused some reshuffle in existing appointments.
- b. Employment of the following members of a temporary nature is:

Maj	BRYDON	Deputy CO 2MSF until CO (Maj LUNDY) completes his leave.
Capt	HARRIS	CO MSF Task Force until XO 2 MSF completes his R&R.
WO	MOFFIT	OC 223 Coy until Capt ROWE is fit from his wound to resume duties as OC of that Coy.

2. Casualties

WO	WALSH	KIA	:	27 Jun	Ben-Het	AO
Capt	ROWE	WIA	:	27 Jun	Ben-Het	AO
		(Hospitalised Pleiku)				
Capt	HARRIS	WIA	:	27 Jun	Ben-Het	AO
		(Remained on duty)				

3. Operations

- a. Ist Bn : Returned to Pleiku from Ben-Het area on 27 May 69  
Standown to 2 Jun 69  
Trg in Pleiku to 19 Jun 69  
Trg in An-Khe to 17 Jul 69  
Intended re-deployment - 21 Jul 69
- b. 2nd Bn Operation in Dak-To/Ben-Het area for period 28 May to 16 Jun as part of MSF commitment of two Bns to Task Force LINH as follows:



- (1) 28 May to 5 Jun. Moved by vehicle from Pleiku to Ben-Het. This phase of the operation was Recon in Force generally SE of Ben-Het.
- (2) 6 Jun to 10 Jun. Moved by hel to area S of Dak-To with specific tasks of locating and destroying rocket caches and to stop rocket attacks on Dak-To.
- (3) 11 Jun to 16 Jun. Moved by hel to area NE of Dak-To with specific tasks of denying enemy access to Dak-To/Ben-Het road including bridge at Dak-Mot-Lop and to prevent rocket attacks on Dak-To.
- (4) The main limitations of the operation 28 May to 16 Jun were:

- Inadequacy of briefings on :

Specific missions  
Intelligence situation  
Operations of other TF LINH units

- Appreciation of Time and Space

: One task was not able to completed prior to movement to another area

: Lack of central control of all available air assets in the TF which resulted in CA's generally late in the afternoon.

- (5) Current 2nd Bn Operation in Ben-Het AO commenced on 23 Jun 69. Movement was by air to Dak-To and CA into AO north of Ben-Het on 24 Jun. One significant contact to date on 27 Jun which resulted in;

EN KIA 3

US KIA 2

AATTV KIA 1

AATTV WIA 2

CIDG WIA 2

- c. 3rd Bn : Deployed in Cheo-Reo area from 31 May 69 to 29 Jun 69. NIL contacts. To be re-deployed on 7 Jul 69 in the Ben-Het area.  
No AATTV members are deployed with this Bn.

.../3



- d. 4th Bn : Deployed in Dak-To area TF LINH from 30 May to 23 Jun. Nil contacts. Standown to 1 Jul then to area N of Qui-Nhon under operational control of 173rd Airborne for 30 days. No AATTV members are deployed with this bn.
- e. 5th Bn : Standown to 5 Jun 69, trg in Ban-Me-Thuot to 15 Jun. TF LINH from 16 Jun. Nil contacts to date. No AATTV members are deployed with this bn.

4. Summary

The main employment of 2 MSF during the month was with TF LINH in the Dak-To/Ben-Het area. Viewed statistically TF LINH operations could be considered successful. This success was due to :

1. Maximum number of B52 strikes in AO's by USAF.
2. Continual US fighter cover
3. Continual US gunship support
4. US air cav assistance
5. US arty support
6. US FAC and hel support

(JW BRYDON)  
Maj  
AATTV



CO AATTV

REPORT BY 61242 WO2 G. SMITH  
ADVISOR RANGER TRAINING CENTRE

1. General

I was posted to the ARVN Ranger Training Centre (RTC) in late March 1969. I was replaced by WO2 M.T. Jensen on 30 Jun and I am due to RTA on 2 Jul 69. The following is a report on my tour at RTC.

2. Duties

My employment at RTC was advisor to the Jungle, Mountain, Swamp Committee (JMS Course) which is designed to follow as near as possible the American Ranger Course programme. The course is of 6 weeks duration and caters for upwards of 100 students, all of which are Vietnamese officers or NCOs. Basically the course is divided into two parts, the first three weeks occupying "close" training area subjects - fieldcraft, squad fms & signals, communications, map reading, tracking, vehicle and foot ambushes etc together with the theoretical side of battle procedure. The last three weeks are spent with one week at each of the jungle, mountain and swamp training areas. In addition, helicopter rapelling, Mcquire rig and rope ladder techniques are also taught and practised. For this the advisor is required to requisition for and brief pilots of helicopters and control their employment during this training.

Frequently training conferences are held with the Senior Advisor RTC at which suggestions are called for and discussed with a view to improving training methods and techniques after which the results are discussed with the commandant RTC and committee chiefs. I am happy to report that an atmosphere of professionalism and mutual respect highlighted all of these occasions. I believe the posting to be a worthwhile and beneficial commitment and recommend its continuance at either or both of JMS and LRRP committees.

3. Relationship with US Personnel

All advisors in the Duc-My area which comprise the National Trg Centre at Lam-Son, RTC and Artillery School at Duc-My are quartered at MACV compound Duc-My with the official unit designation "MACV Team 40". I experienced nothing but excellent relations with all members both on and off the job and there is good team spirit.

.../2



4. Language Requirement

I consider a "working knowledge" of the Vietnamese language desirable if not essential for this posting, as conversation in English/Australian is at times slow and difficult with the majority of Vietnamese counterparts. It is interesting to note that all US advisors at RTC do in fact speak a high standard of Vietnamese, their postings to that area are however, of much longer duration than is the case with Aust personnel.

5. Conclusion

Australian advisors enjoy a very high reputation at Duc-My and I have been asked on a number of occasions about the likelihood of an increase in advisors to Team 40 - particularly in the Medical and artillery fields. I have explained that the "Team" is only small in number and has commitments countrywide. This is accepted and understood. I enjoyed being a member of a team held in such high regard and enjoyed equally working with Americans and Vietnamese alike who showed me nothing but hospitality and professionalism for the whole of my tour at RTC.

(G. SMITH)  
WO2



PRU MONTHLY REPORT  
REGION II - PROVINCE BINH DINH - MAY 69

1. PERSONNEL:

- A. 76 Total strength, end of last month.  
B. nil KIA nil WIA (not included in totals)  
C. nil MIA/POW  
D. nil DESERTED  
E. 1 OTHER LOSSES (Discharged, unfit from VUNG-TAU)  
F. 1 TOTAL LOSSES  
       SUB TOTAL  
G. nil GAINS  
H. 75 TOTAL STRENGTH, END OF CURRENT MONTH

2. OPERATIONS:

- A. 70 INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS  
B. 29 PRU OPERATIONS AGAINST VC/VCI  
C. nil PRU/JOINT OPERATIONS AGAINST VC/VCI  
D. 29 TOTAL ANTI VC/VCI OPERATIONS  
E. nil OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS  
F. 99 TOTAL OPERATIONS

3. RESULTS:

- A. 57 VC/VCI CAPTURED (Annex A)  
B. nil SUSPECTS CAPTURED (Annex A)  
C. nil VC/VCI KILLED  
D. 9 INTELLIGENCE REPORTS DISSEMINATED



4. FINANCES:

A. 416,700 \$VN TOTAL PRU PAY ROLL  
B. 26,900 \$VN OPERATIONAL EXPENSES  
C. nil OTHER EXPENSES  
D. 443,600 \$VN TOTAL EXPENSES

5. NARRATIVE:

A. \_\_\_\_\_ ATTACHED.

AUSSIE OSTARA  
PRU ADVISOR



PRU BINH DINH  
31 May 1969

PRU NARRATIVE MAY 69

1. Without accomplishing the TARGET figure of one VCI for each PRU member each month, Binh-Dinh PRU continued to operate with limited success.
2. Although the level of VCI captured has not been high, the effort by the teams has been sustained and persistent.
3. Possible causes or the nonappearance of high level VCI among the PRU captures may be because:
  - a. Operation WASHINGTON GREEN is a success, causing:
    - (1) High level VCI to move into the hills
    - (2) VCI activity to be limited in all districts
    - (3) RF/PF Units to participate in counter VCI roles, thus limiting the PRU's areas in which to operate.
    - (4) Lack of intelligence from DIOCC's and PRU nets. (Sixteen PRU intelligence members training at Vung-Tau)
    - (5) General easing off of the situation on all fronts.
  - b. Binh-Dinh Province is approximately seventy miles long by fifty miles wide and has densely populated, pacified areas and sparsely populated, unpacified areas, which raises a number of problems:
    - (1) The "needle in the haystack" in populated areas requires trained surveillance agents to uncover them.
    - (2) The size of the PRU (numerically) limits the conduct of operations in unpopulated areas without "outside" help from other units.
    - (3) Distance involved to travel after receiving information on specific targets can be considerable.
    - (4) Time lost in receiving information from outlying Districts, due to lack of transport is sometimes prohibitive to the conduct of the operation.

AUSSIE OSTARA  
PRU Advisor



AATTV RF TRG CELL  
18 DIV TRG CENTRE  
HEAVYWEIGHT

23 June 69

AATTV MONTHLY REPORT

1. General

The second RF Course 69 (2/69) comprising 1 Offr, 68 ORs from 876 RF Coy, (Pl) 772 Coy, (Pl) 820 RF Coy, (Sec) 613 RF Coy (Sec), which marched in on 21 May 69 completed training on 13 Jun 69. The third RF Course 69 (3/69) comprising 3 Offrs - 75 ORs from 612 RF Coy marched in on 20 Jun 69. Their training has commenced.

2. Training

The standard of the 2/69 RF Course was satisfactory. 52 soldiers were presented with certificates by VIPs at a pass out parade conducted at HEAVYWEIGHT on 13 Jun 69. VIPs included the Phuoc-Tuy Province Chief and the Province Senior Advisor, Mr Joseph, CO AATTV, the US Province Military Advisor, Lt Col BERTRAM, CO 18 Div Trg Centre, Representative 1 ATF.

The 17 soldiers who were not presented certificates were AWOL during the latter part of the course. The officer, who was considered responsible in part for their absence was found lacking in ability and duty. Consequently, on a report to this effect, the officer and soldiers were disciplined by Sector.

The standard of march in of the 3/69 RF Course is good. It suggests good results. The Coy Comd is attending the current Coy Comds course at 18 Div Trg Centre whilst the Coy does our course.

3. Training Problems

Ranges and Field Training Areas close to HEAVYWEIGHT are very limited and frequently in use by 18 Div Trg Centre. To reduce this problem assistance was sought through sector to the National Training Centre, Baria for the use of their ranges and field firing areas. The granting of approval has reduced, but not fully solved the problem.

4. Staff

AATTV staff are unchanged and are working well. 1 ATF personnel are attached from 5 RAR & 9 RAR. Three personnel have returned to 5 RAR and one to 9 RAR. Three replacements came from 5 RAR but 9 RAR has yet to



provide a replacement, however 1 ATF have advised that this will be done soon. We have now six personnel from 5 RAR and five from 9 RAR. Currently two personnel are R&R (Aust) and one is in hospital (VUNG TAU)- Effective strength of 1 ATF attachments is therefore seven.

5. Liaison

Good liaison continues with 1 ATF (Dep Comd), Sector and Team 89. WO2 Macartney (Aust Advisor A+L Coy (RF) is providing good liaison on the logistics side through Sector to the RF Trg here.

6. Interpreters

Have been increased to three, the quality varies but is improving.

7. Visitors

In addition to those at the pass out pde for 2/69 RF Course. Col MCKENZIE (1 ATF) Lt Col GREY (CO 7 RAR) and Maj POPHAM (G3 Sector) Capt SAVAGE, WO MACARTNEY visited the RF Trg Cadre during the period.

C. KEALY  
WO2  
AATTV Advisor HEAVYWEIGHT



LONG RANGE PATROL WING  
VAN KIEP NATIONAL TRAINING CENTRE

4 JULY 69

CO AATTV

MONTHLY REPORT - JUN 69

Training

1. The five weeks training at Van-Kiep NTC of 3/69 LRP Course was completed satisfactorily on 14 Jun 69. The first of the two patrols of the operational phase commenced on 16 Jun 69 and the patrols were extracted on 21 Jun 69. Two patrols were inserted and extracted by helicopters and one patrol was inserted and extracted by APCs. Results of encounters with the enemy by patrol I, commanded by WO2 B. YOUNG, were 1 VC KIA (confirmed) and 1 VC WIA (unconfirmed). There were no friendly casualties.

2. Disciplinary problems were encountered with the students prior to their planned insertion on the second patrol on 26 Jun 69. After discussions with Commander AATTV, Senior Advisor Team 78 and CO Van-Kiep NTC it was decided to insert the patrols on 28 Jun 69.

The results of these insertions are :

a. Patrol 1 : A helicopter insertion was commenced on the afternoon of 28 Jun 69 but the helicopters were diverted in flight and the patrol was returned to Van-Kiep. Another insertion was planned for the afternoon of 29 Jun 69 but had to be cancelled because of other aircraft commitments and weather. The patrol was inserted on the morning of 30 Jun 69 by helicopter. The patrol was extracted at 03 1115 Jul 69. This was a day earlier than intended but was necessary because of the restriction on the number of 3 SAS Sqn air missions.

b. Patrol 2 : This patrol was inserted on the afternoon of 28 Jun 69 by helicopter and extracted at 03 1145 Jul 69 for the same reason as Patrol 1.

c. Patrol 3 : An APC insertion was executed on the afternoon of 28 Jun 69. On the morning of 29 Jun 69 the patrol was extracted by APCs because the interpreter had paralysis of the legs. The patrol was again inserted by APC's on the afternoon of 30 Jun 69 and extracted by APCs on the morning of 4 Jul 69 without further incident.

.../2



3. There were no contacts on the second patrol.
4. The course is now scheduled to graduate on 8 Jul 69.

Course Status

5. On 13 Jun 69 four students were removed from the course because of non attendance through ill health. On 28 Jun 69 Lt PHU was removed from the course for disciplinary reasons and one other student was removed because of below standard performance on the first patrol. The number of students still on the course who will graduate is 21.

General

6. On 17 Jun 69, Van-Kiep NTC was visited by Col L. MILLETT, Deputy JUS MAAG Thailand, and party. He was primarily interested in LRP training. As all patrols were on operations, he was briefed by CI LRP Wing and OC 3 SAS Sqn.

(D. SAVAGE)  
Capt  
Chief Instructor



REPORT BY WO2 T.F. MALONE  
RVNAF SCHOOL OF ARMOR - THU DUC  
COVERING PERIOD FROM 2 MAY TO 20 JUNE 69

1. This being my first report from this location I do not intend to pad it with facts and figures. Suffice to say the school strength holds at 778 students spread over 12 courses.

The 1st Troop of the 16 ARVN Cav Regt has completed training and has moved to its operational location in the Delta. 2/16 Troop is now in training

2. The standard of class room instruction is high but the standard of Field training falls short of good. This I feel is lack of operational experience of the Junior Officer Instructors. To make my point; the hardened old Warrant Officers and Senior NCO's when in charge of a class, especially in the field turn in a first class effort.

3. Training Areas are too small to accommodate the volume of troops in training especially for night training. The terrain does not lend itself to instructional Inf/Tank training so the Training Staff and advisors recce'd several areas one of which met all the requirements, however clearance could not be obtained owing to the number of friendly people in the area. A plane for a Tank Firing Range was submitted some time ago and was approved in the TRANG BOM area GR 205127. Work by the 92nd Coy of US Engineers was begun and went well for a couple of days. VC moved in at night and laid heavy anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. The net result was 1 Bulldozer, 1 Scraper wrecked and (6) six Engineers wounded. III Corps appear reluctant to order further work on the project.

4. 1 ATF was approached for a Free Fire Area through HQ AATTV and HQ AFV. Approval was given to use an area in the NUI THI VAI, NUI TOC TIEN, NUI ONG TRINH at GR 253705 and fire in an Easterly direction. This is perfect and 1ATF produced an overlay showing areas where contact has been made in the last couple of weeks also the location of enemy installations such as bunkers and camp sites. These are ideal as targets for the 81mm and 4.2 mortars. There is an abundance of targets for the 106mm RCL, .50 cal and .30 cal MG's.

5. It is anticipated that this area will be available until the completion of the Range at TRANG BOM. I consider that since Field Firing has begun we are beginning to achieve good results and will continue to improve.

(T.F. MALONE) WO2  
Advisor



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(T.F. MALONE) WO2  
Advisor