

Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report and enclosures
1 - 31 August 1969

Series: AWM95 - Australian Army
commanders' diaries

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AATTV MONTHLY REPORT - AUG 69

1. Attached, for information, is a copy of the AATTV Monthly Report for Aug 69.

(R.A. HAY)
Major General
Commander Australian Force
VIETNAM

Attachment: 1. AATTV Report - August 1969.


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AUSTRALIAN FORCE VIETNAM



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Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam

13 Sep 69



AATTV REPORT - AUGUST 1969

HQ AFV (3)

General

1. During Aug, with the exception of I CTZ, operational activity resulting in contact with the enemy in which members of AATTV were involved remained at a relatively low level. In the latter half of the month enemy activity in I CTZ increased considerably and this level of activity is continuing.

Casualties

2. AATTV operational casualties for the month of Aug were 2 WIA.

Deployment

3. The deployment of AATTV as at 10 Sep 69 is attached at Annex A.

I Corps

4. Commencing on 12 Aug enemy activity in I CTZ showed a marked increase. This level of activity has continued, particularly in the Southern half of the Zone.

5. A report by Maj Johnston, the Senior AATTV Advisor in I CTZ, is attached at Annex B.

6. In an effort to give a clearer picture of the type of operational activities in which members of AATTV with ARVN Units become involved, extracts have been taken from the HQ I Corps TOC Log for Aug and are attached at Annex C. These extracts show incidents worthy of note involving members of AATTV.

7. Attached at Annex D are AATTV advisor reports of interest from I CTZ.

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8. Attached at Annex E is a copy of a paper written by Maj Bell (AATTV), Senior Military Advisor Quang-Tri Province, on RF and PF in that Province. The paper is, at least at this stage, an internal one within Quang-Tri Province and as at the end of Aug had not been examined or accepted by the Province Senior Advisor. It has been included in this report because it brings out some points of interest which are relatively common to a number of provinces in Vietnam. The fact that a copy of Maj Bell's paper is held by AATTV/AFV should not be disclosed to officers of MACV/CORDS, particularly in Quang-Tri Province.

II Corps

9. 2nd Mobile Strike Force Command (2MSF)

- a. During the month of Aug battalions of 2MSF operated in the areas of Ben-Het and Duc-Lap. No contact with the enemy was made by the 1st Bn (commanded by Maj Brydon AATTV) in the Ben-Het area. It will be noted from Maj Brydon's Report (Annex F) that during this 1st Bn operation the remains were recovered of the body of Capt Green (USASF). Capt Green was the battalion Commander killed in the latter part of the action for which WO2 Simpson was awarded the Victoria Cross.
- b. The performance by the CIDG and VNSF in the 1st Bn in this recent operation in the Ben-Het area seems to have been relatively satisfactory (Maj Brydon's attached Report and AATTV Report for Jul 69 refer). However, as no contact with the enemy occurred on the operation their real test is yet to come. The 1st Bn is at present deployed in the Duc-Lap/Bu-Prang area.
- c. The 2nd Bn 2MSF has been operating in the Duc-Lap area during the month and a number of minor contacts were made with NVA elements. It was considered that a relatively large enemy build-up in that area would have already occurred. Increased contact with NVA in the area is still expected.
- d. Extracts of a report by Maj Brydon (AATTV), commanding 1st Bn 2MSF, are attached at Annex F. A report by Capt Rowe (AATTV), Commanding 223 Coy of 2nd Bn 2MSF, is attached at Annex G.

III Corps

10. RF Training : Phuoc-Tuy

- a. The 4/69 RF Course, made up of 576 RF Coy ended on 14 Aug. The overall standard of training reached by the coy was satisfactory although they did not perform quite as well as the previous Coy.
- b. The 5/69 RF Course (910 RF Coy) marched in and commenced training on 19 Aug.

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11. LRP Training : Van-Kiep

a. The 5/69 LRP Course completes its training in Mid Sep. Comments on this course will be included in the AATTV Report for Sep.

b. Due to problems of weather and operational activity it has not yet been possible to complete the tour of ARVN Divs/Regts in III CTZ who have sent groups for training at the LRP Wing (AATTV Report - Jul 69 refers). However the remaining formations will be visited during Sep and the question of incorrect employment of trained LRP personnel will then be taken up with Central Training Command.

12. Province Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) : Phuoc-Tuy. Based on reports from the PRU Directorate, Province Senior Advisor Phuoc-Tuy and 1 ATF, the PRU in Phuoc-Tuy, which has now a member of AATTV as its senior advisor, has shown a very marked improvement in its operations. It is probable, as result of his efforts to improve the efficiency of the PRU, that the AATTV advisor will cause something of stir in both the Vietnamese and US intelligence and administrative organisations in the Province.

13. RVNAF Armoured School : Thu-Duc. A short report by WO2 Malone (AATTV), who is an instructor/advisor at the School, is attached at Annex H.

IV Corps

14. Enemy activity in IV CTZ remained at a relatively low level until the middle of Aug, when the number of enemy initiated incidents showed a marked increase. At Annex I are extracts of a report by Maj Harkness, the Senior AATTV Advisor in IV CTZ.

15. Most of the AATTV Village Defence Advisory Teams (VDAT) have shown considerable progress in their work in villages and hamlets over the past month. This has been brought about by greater familiarity with their areas, guidance provided by AATTV and a better understanding of the project by district and province chiefs. In Kien-Hoa Province the Province Chief is conducting a Centralised Course to instruct village chiefs and their deputies for security in aspects of village defence. The VDAT in Kien-Hoa is assisting in the conduct of these courses. It now seems that the VDAT project is starting to achieve positive results. Spectacular results, however, are not and should not be expected.

Changes in US Officer Appointments

16. The following changes in US appointments of interest have recently been made or are soon to occur:

a. 5th Special Forces Group (5th SFG). After the now much publicised

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removal of Col Reahlt from the position of CO 5th SFG, a new CO was appointed. He was not a USASF officer and in the first week was badly injured whilst doing parachute jumping. This officer has now been replaced by Col Healy (USASF), who is an experienced commander in both USASF and Conventional Units. He has had considerable previous contact with members of the AMF from AATTV, SAS and others who he has served with in USA.

b. I CTZ . The Senior Advisor at HQ I Corps changes in Sep from Col Renwanz, who has completed an extended tour, to Brig Muller who was Dep CG 101st Air Borne Div.

c. ARVN Ranger Training Centre (RTC) : Duc-My. The new Senior Advisor at RTC is now Lt Col Flemming who recently transferred to the US Army from the British Army. He has had considerable previous contact with AMF Officers in Malaysia, Borneo and the UK. .

Administration

17. Eight members of AATTV, all from I CTZ were hospitalised through illness during August. These were minor except for one case of malaria.



(R.D.F. LLOYD)
Lt Col
Comd

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AATTV DEPLOYMENT
AS AT 10 SEP 1969

Annex 'A' to
AATTV Monthly Report
for Aug 1969

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>AATTV : SAIGON</u>								
1.	Lt Col	RDF	Lloyd	RA Inf	HQ AATTV	Commanding Officer	Jan 70	Saigon
2.	Capt	G.W.	Dennis	RA Inf	"	Adjutant	Nov 69	"
3.	WO1	G.S.	Munt	RA Inf	"	Admin WO (Chief Clerk)	Mar 70	"
4.	WO2	T.J.	Colbert	RAE	"	Admin WO (Pay)	Dec 69	"
5.	Cpl	G.H.	Davison	RAASC	"	Clerk	May 70	"
6.	WO2	T.F.	Malone	RAAC	Armoured School	Instructor/Advisor	Oct 69	Thu-Duc (near Saigon)

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Serial:	Rank :	Initis :	Name :	Corps :	Unit :	Employment :	Due RTA :	Location :
<u>I CTZ</u>								
<u>AATV : QUANG TRI Province</u>								
7	: Maj	: H.L.	: Bell	: RA Inf	: Quang-Tri Sector	: Acting Asst Province Advisor (Military)	: Nov 69	: Quang-Tri
8	: WO2	: R.V.	: Roney	: RAAMC	: " " "	: Medical Advisor	: Apr 70	: " "
9	: WO2	: J.M.	: O'Donnell	: RAAOC	: Cam-Lo Sub-Sector	: Assistant Advisor	: Jan 70	: Cam-Lo
10	: WO2	: J.	: Fitzgerald	: RA Inf	: 1/1 ARVN Bn	: " "	: Jul 70	: Near Quang-Tri (Regt HQ)
11	: WO2	: K.A.	: Gabriel	: RA Inf	: 2/1 " "	: " "	: Nov 69	: " " " " "
12	: WO2	: K.	: Payne	: RA Inf	: 3/1 " "	: " "	: Feb 70	: " " " " "
13	: WO2	: L.N.	: Gorman	: RAA	: 4/1 " "	: " "	: Mar 70	: " " " " "
14	: WO1	: S.D.	: Rosenberg	: RA Inf	: 1/2 " "	: " "	: Apr 70	: Dong-Ha (Regt HQ)
15	: WO2	: O.W.	: Bell	: RAA	: 2/2 " "	: " "(Designate)	: Aug 70	: " " "
16	: WO2	: L.A.	: West	: RA Inf	: 3/2 " "	: " "	: Jul 70	: " " "
17	: WO2	: R.A.	: O'Hara	: RA Inf	: 4/2 " "	: " "	: Jul 70	: " " "
18	: WO2	: E.A.	: Taylor	: RA Inf	: 5/2 " "	: " "	: Jul 70	: " " "
19	: WO2	: H.J.	: Stuttard	: RAAC	: 1/11 ARVN Cav	: " "	: Nov 69	: Quang-Tri

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>I-CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV : THUA THIEN Province</u>								
20	WO2	D.G.	Killion	RAAMC	Thua-Thien Sector	Medical Advisor	Jul 70	Hue
21	Maj	G.V.	Brown	RAE	Nam-Hoa District	District Senior Advisor	Jun 70	Nam-Hoa
22	WO2	W.J.	Bruce	RA Inf	Nam-Hoa Sub-Sector	Assistant Advisor	Feb 70	"
23	WO2	L.N.	Bootes	RAAC	2/7 ARVN Cav	" "	Mar 70	Hue (Base)
24	WO2	M.R.	Bolitho	RA Inf	Black Panther Coy	" "	Nov 69	"
25	WO2	D.F.	Heenan	RA Inf	2/54 ARVN Bn	" "	Jul 70	"
26	WO2	S.	Speechley	RAEME	3/54 " "	" "	Jul 70	"
27	WO2	D.E.	Watts	RA Sigs	1/3 " "	" "	Jul 70	"
28	WO2	J.F.	McKenner	RA Inf	2/3 " "	" "	Jul 70	"
29	Capt	D.F.	Paul	RA Inf	3/3 " "	Senior Advisor	May 70	"
30	WO2	TPJ	Van Bakel	RAASC	3/3 " "	Assistant Advisor	Nov 69	"
31	WO2	D.F.	Hedges	RA Inf	4/3 " "	" "	Aug 70	"

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>AATTV : QUANG NAM Province</u>								
32	Maj	F.C.	Johnston	RA Inf	HQ I Corps	G3 (Trg) Advisor	Feb 70	Danang
33	WO1	J.W.	Mann	RA Inf	AATTV Danang	Admin WO	Nov 69	Aust House Danang
34	WO2	P.J.	Heslin	RAE	" "	" "	Mar 70	" " "
35	WO1	R.M.	Almond	RAAC	3/17 ARVN Cav	Assistant Advisor	May 70	Danang (Base)
36	WO2	V.L.	Harris	RA Inf	Hoa-Vang Sub-Sector	" " RF/PF	Feb 70	Hoa-Vang
37	WO2	R.D.	Aylett	RA Inf	37th Ranger Bn	" "	Dec 69	Near Danang
38	WO2	T.J.	Goddard	RAA	44th ARVN Arty Bn	" "	Apr 70	Danang
39	Capt	D.G.	Bent	RA Inf	1/51 ARVN Bn	Senior Advisor	Oct 69	Mieu-Bong (Regt HQ)
40	WO2	C.F.	Keioskie	RAASC	2/51 " "	Assistant Advisor	Feb 70	" " "
41	WO2	W.T.	Jones	RA Inf	3/51 " "	" "	Aug 70	" " "

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>AATTV : QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Province</u>								
42	Capt	J.P.	Nelson	RA Inf	2 ARVN Div TOC	G3 (Ops)	May 70	Quang-Ngai
43	WO2	D.	Burke	RA Inf	1/4 ARVN Bn	Assistant Advisor	Aug 70) Quang-Ngai Province (Regt HQ near Quang-Ngai)
44	WO2	M.J.	Poole	RA Inf	2/4 " "	" "	Nov 69	
45	WO2	B.L.	Young	RA Inf	3/4 " "	" "	Feb 70	
46	Capt	R.L.	Smith	RAE	1/5 " "	Senior Advisor	Apr 70) Quang-Tin Province (Regt HQ near Tam-Ky)
47	WO2	J.F.	Ghilotti	RAAC	2/5 " "	Assistant Advisor	Aug 70	
48	WO1	R.J.	O'Brien	RAE	4/5 " "	" "	Sep 69) Quang-Ngai Province (Regt HQ near Quang-Ngai)
49	WO2	D.W.	Eather	RA Inf	1/6 " "	" "	Jul 70	
50	Capt	A.J.	Mogridge	RA Inf	2/6 " "	Senior Advisor	Apr 70) Quang-Ngai Province (Regt HQ near Quang-Ngai)
51	WO2	T.F.	Dolan	RA Inf	3/6 " "	Assistant Advisor	Jan 70	
52	WO1	J.B.	Staunton- Latimer	RAAC	2/4 ARVN Cav	" "	Feb 70	Quang-Ngai

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>II CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV : PLEIKU</u>								
53.	Maj	W.J.	Brydon	RA Inf	2nd Mobile Strike Force Command, Det B-20, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)	Bn Comd	Feb 70	Pleiku (Base Camp)
54.	Capt	DJF	Rowe	RA Inf	" " "	Coy Comd	May 70	" "
55.	WO2	F.M.	Moffitt	RA Inf	" " "	Coy Comd	Jun 70	" "
56.	WO2	S.J.	McLaughlin	RA Inf	" " "	Coy Comd (Trg Coy)	Apr 70	" "
57.	WO2	A.G.	Urquhart	RA Inf	" " "	Instructor (Trg Coy)	Sep 69	" "
58.	WO2	J.R.	Vincent	RAA	" " "	Pl Comd	May 70	" "
59.	WO2	J.T.	Hoolihan	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Jun 70	" "
60.	WO2	A.B.	McCloskey	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Jul 70	" "
61.	Sgt	D.W.	Scheele	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Sep 69	" "
62.	WO2	C.L.	Black	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Jul 70	" "
63.	WO2	K.H.	Mavin	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Aug 70	" "
64.	WO2	L.B.	Scowcroft	RA Inf	" " "	" " (Designate)	Aug 70) Attending 5SFG(A)) Combat Orientation) Course Nha-Trang) 29 Aug - 9 Sep
65.	WO2	O.	Stevenson	RA Inf	" " "	" " (")	Aug 70	
66.	WO1	E.W.	Gason	RAAC	14 ARVN Cav	Asst Advisor	Dec 69	Pleiku

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Rank	Init s	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
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II CTZ (Cont'd)
AATTV - II CORPS AREA

WO2	K.G.	Latham	RA Inf	Recondo School 5SFG(A)	Instructor	Dec 69	Nha-Trang
Capt	W.R.	Deane	Int Corps	Mobile Training Team (Montagnard PRU's II CTZ)	OC MTT	Jul 70	" " (Base)
WO2	G.Y.	Jamieson	RA Inf	" " "	Instructor/Advisor MTT	Mar 70	" " "
WO2	M.T.	Jensen	RA Inf	Ranger Training Centre	Instructor/Advisor	Nov 69	Duc-My
WO1	E.B.	Ostara	RA Inf	Province Recce Unit	Senior Advisor Binh-Dinh	Dec 69	Qui-Nhon
WO2	R.G.	Carter	RA Inf	" " "	Advisor Ninh-Thuan	Dec 69	Phan-Rang Bay

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>III CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV : III CORPS AREA</u>								
73	Capt	PJS	Harris	RA Inf	LRP Wing Van-Kiep National Training Centre	CI	Mar 70	Baria
74	WO2	C.R.	Ansell	RA Inf	" " "	Admin WO	Mar 70	"
75	WO2	F.E.	Bell	RA Inf	" " "	Patrol Comd/Instructor	Mar 70	"
76	WO2	J.W.	Wigg	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Jan 70	"
77	WO2	A.J.	Shelton	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Feb 70	"
78	WO2	C.J.	Ison	RA Inf	Province Recce Unit	Senior Advisor Phuoc-Tuy	Apr 70	Baria
79	WO2	G.	Kealy	RA Inf	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	RF Trg Cadre (Senior Instructor)	Jan 70	18 ARVN Div Trg School, near Nui-Dat.
80	WO2	R.K.	Gurney	RA Inf	" "	" " " (Instructor)	Feb 70	" " "
81	WO2	AJA	Joyce	RA Inf	" "	" " " (")	Jan 70	" " "
82	WO2	J.H.	Macartney	RAASC	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	Assistant Advisor A & L Coy (RF)	Jan 70	Baria

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>AATTV : IV CORPS AREA</u>								
83	Maj	A.	Harkness	RAA	CORDS, IV Corps	Assistant to Chief Territorial Security	Apr 70	Can-Tho
84	WO2	H.J.	Hartman	RAAMC	HQ IV Corps	Medical Advisor	Jul 70	" "
85	WO2	R.S.	Simpson	RA Inf	Dinh-Tuong Sector (Att)	Village Defence Advisory Team (VDAT)	Feb 70	Dinh-Tuong Province
86	WO2	A.A.	Welsh	RAE	" " (")	" " "	Dec 69	" "
87	WO2	E.H.	Martin	RA Inf	" " (")	" " "	Nov 69	" "
88	WO2	K.W.	Forden	RA Inf	Kien Hoa Sector (")	" " "	May 70	Kien-Hoa Province
89	WO2	B.L.	Saxby	RAE	" " (")	" " "	Jan 70	" "
90	WO1	W.A.	Eade	RAA Pro	" " (")	" " "	Jul 70	" "
91	WO2	R.M.	King	RA Inf	Vinh-Binh Sector (")	" " "	Dec 69	Vinh-Binh Province
92	WO2	W.E.	Tillett	RA Inf	" " (")	" " "	Feb 70	" "
93	WO2	G.E.	Munro	RA Sigs	" " (")	" " "	Feb 70	" "
94	WO2	G.S.	Horne	RA Inf	Vinh-Long Province(")	" " "	Nov 69	Vinh-Long Province
95	WO2	R.W.	Cairns	RA Inf	" " (")	" " "	Jul 70	" "
96	WO2	K.J.	Troy	RA Inf	" " (")	" " "	Mar 70	" "

Danang
31 Aug 69

EXTRACTS FROM MONTHLY REPORT - I CTZ
AUGUST 1969

General

1. Enemy initiated activity remained very low in I CTZ until the early hours of 12 August when the North Vietnamese "Summer-Autumn" campaign commenced. Enemy initiated activity continued at a relatively high level from this time through the end of the month.
2. The enemy appear to have returned to a pattern of activity which resembles the activity during March and early May of this year. The principal features include widespread attempts to cut lines of communication and extensive ground and indirect fire attacks directed against populated areas and particularly refugee areas. Agent reports and captured documents give indications that increased levels of activities will continue for the immediate future, the traditional local indicators of increased food collection, recruitment of local laborers, intensive propaganda with more emphasis on aggressive themes, preparation of banners and flags and other VCI activities, which have usually preceded extensive military operations, have not been discernible.
3. All things taken into account it seems that the enemy has lost some of his ability to sustain operations.
4. Continuing emphasis is placed by the enemy on those activities designed to either destroy or otherwise render ineffective the local government administration, GVN military forces, and pacification assets and programs.

11 DTA

5. In spite of the increase in incidents from 12 Aug, the only major contacts in which members of AATTV were involved were those of 1st Battalion 2nd ARVN Regt on 18 and 19 Aug.

Quang-Da Special Zone

6. Once again in spite of the increase in incidents no ARVN unit was involved in heavy contact.

12 DTA

7. The heaviest activity in I CTZ during the period took place to the North East and South East of Hiep-Duc (Quang-Tin Province) in which over 800 enemy were killed in a weeks fighting.

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8. Conclusions from months operational activities. Facts show that the US Forces in I CTZ were the ones mainly involved in the heavy contacts for the month of August. Whether the US units were "set upon" deliberately is not known. This does however give an indication of the scale of activity which it would be necessary for Vietnamese Forces to handle if US forces withdrew and it is hard to see the justification for removal of US troops from 12 DPA. Developments in September may well indicate that the same is true of 11 DPA.

(F.C. JOHNSTON)
Maj
AATV.

EXTRACTS HQ I CTZ DUTY LOG - AUG 69
NOTES ON ABBREVIATIONS

1. Abbreviations used by US personnel in the I CTZ Log (extracts of which are contained in this Annex) and their meanings are shown below:

Vic	-	vicinity
cptrd	-	captured
capt	-	captured
unk	-	unknown
res	-	results
frd	-	friendly
IWC	-	individual weapon captured
neg	-	negative
opn	-	operation
ACAT	-	armoured cavalry assault team
QDSZ	-	Quang-Da Special Zone
det	-	detonated
mtr	-	mortar
IW	-	individual weapon
sqd	-	squad
revd	-	received
grnds	-	grenades
grd	-	ground
dam	-	damage
dest	-	destroyed
rkt	-	rocket
commo	-	communications
CSWC	-	crew served weapon captured
lnd	-	landed
intel	-	intelligence
comt'd	-	committed
AS	-	air strike, air support
cont	-	continued, continues, contacted.
accm	-	accumulation
est	-	estimated

2. Unit abbreviations have been written by US duty personnel as "3/6", "1/5" etc. These units are 3rd Bn 6th ARVN Regt and 1st En of 5th ARVN Regt etc.

EXTRACTS HQ I CTZ - DUTY LOG - AUG 69

0600 31 Jul 69 to 0600 1 Aug 69

- 2230 At 310630H Vic BS 704806, 2/6 searching cptrd 1 VC.
- 2230 At 311400H Vic BT 283354, 4/5 searching cptrd 3 VC.
- 0520 At 311215H Vic YD 090300, 3/2 cont unk size en force.
Res Frd/neg - En/2KIA 1 IWC.
- 0520 At 311500H Vic YD 061278, 3/2 cont unk size en force.
Res Frd/neg - En/1 KIA, 1 IWC.
- 0520 At 311630H Vic YD 072279, 3/2 cont unk size en force.
Res Frd/neg - En 1 KIA, 1 IWC.

0600 1 Aug 69 to 0600 2 Aug 69

- 0800 Operation Vu-Ninh 6A1 51st Regt cont opn S of Hoi-An, commenced. Area of operations is bounded by BT 048524, BT 060480, BT 112427, BT 144460 and BT 100512. Units participating are 2/51, 3/51 and 2/17 ACAT. Opn is in reaction to report of V-25 Bn being in this area. Expected duration 1 week. Reserve is 4/51.
- 1915 Vu-Ninh 6A a QDSZ cont clearing opn South of Hoi-An and bounded by BT 1451, 1725, 1749, 1547, with 2/51 and 2/17 ACAT terminated at 310600H July 69. Final Accm
Cas Frd - 1 WIA. En- 1 KIA.
- 2150 At 010955H Vic YD 254709, 2/2 det mine. Frd - 1 WIA.
- 2150 At 010955H Vic YD 237317, 3/1 cont unk size en force.
Res : Frd - 1 KIA. En - 2 KIA, 1 CSWC.
- 2150 At 011100H YD 185247, 2/1 cont unk size en force.
Uncovered cache. Res: Frd - 2 WIA. En - 7 KIA,
8 x 60mm mtr's cptrd, 7 MG cptrd, 55 AK47 and 300 rds
of B40 cptrd.
- 2150 At 011400H YD 185247, 2/1 cont unk size en force.
Uncovered cache. Res: Frd - 1 WIA. En 6 KIA, 6 IWC,
100 rds of B40 and 600 rds of 60mm mtr cptrd. 5 Chicom
radios cptrd, 1 Chicom telephone cptrd.
- 0530 At 012030H Vic BT 283363, 4/5 searching found 1 IW and
1 document.

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0600 02 Aug 69 to 0600 03 Aug 69

- 0845 At 020530H Vic BS 719845, 2/6 cont unk size en force. Res Frd/neg; En 4 KIA, 1 IWC.
- 0846 At 020400H Vic BS 733584, 3/4 cont unk size en force. Res: Frd/neg. En 1 KIA, 1 IWC.
- 1633 At 021335H Vic BT 293357, 4/5 while searching killed 5 VC, cptd 2 VC, 4 VCS, 1 IWC, 8 grenades.
- 1635 At 020900H Vic BS 734596, 3/4 cptd 1 VC and 2 VCS.
- 1637 At 020930H Vic BT 068478, 3/51 cont est VC sqd. Res: Frd/neg En 1 KIA.
- 1640 At 021030H Vic BT 075492, 2/51 det mine (unk type). Res Frd/1 KIA, 2 WIA, En/neg.
- 1641 At 021120H Vic BT 070489, 3/51 det AP mine. Res: Frd 1 KIA, 1 WIA. En/neg.
- 0550 At 021940H Vic BS 744594 3/4 det booby trapped WP mtr rds. Res: Frd 2 Adv WIA.
1. E5 WILLIAM C. PARTIN 156-66-459 (US). WP burns on both hands. Cond good, will be evac to CHU LAI on 03 Aug.
 2. WO2 ROBERT D. CAMERON 214866 (AUST). WP burns on back and legs. Cond good will be evacuated to Chu-Lai on 03 Aug. Both advisors at Duc-Pho awaiting trans to Chu-Lai. Both Adv have 2nd & 3rd degree burns.

0600 03 Aug 69 to 0600 04 Aug 69

- 1300 At 030745H Vic BS 727833, 2/6 Det mine (AP). Res: Frd 1 KIA, 4 WIA. En/neg.
- 2145 At 031050H Vic YD 214742 (A2 base), 11 ACAT revd 2 rds of 82mm mtr, Res neg.
- 2145 At 031905H Vic YD 182232, 2/1 cont unk size en force. Res: Frd 1 WIA. En 1 KIA, 1 IWC.
- 2145 At 031905H Vic YC 424954, 2/3 revd 20 rds of 82mm mtr. Res: neg. En location YC 371919.
- 0430 At 032340H Vic YD 950082, 2/54 amb unk size en force. Res: Frd 1 WIA, En 1 KIA, 1 IWC.
- 0510 At 031120H Vic BS 106337, 2/5 revd 1 Hoi-Chanh.

.../3

0600 04 Aug 69 to 0600 05 Aug 69

- 0800 At 040005H Vic BS 632557, 2/4 continued contact unk size en force. Res: Frd 1 KIA, 1 WIA. En 2 KIA, 2 IWC.
- 0800 At 040250H Vic BS 640564, 2/4 revd 6 rds of 82mm mtr. Res neg.
- 0530 At 041725H Vic BS 693812, 2/6 det mine. Res: Frd 1 WIA.

0600 05 Aug 69 to 0600 06 Aug 69

- 0800 At 050640H Vic BS 683830, 2/6 det mine (unk type). Res: Frd 4 KIA, 9 WIA, 2 IWL, 1 IW dest, 1 PRC - 25 dest.
- 1720 At 051400H Vic BS 552883, 4/6 det mine (unk type). Res: Frd 2 WIA. En/neg.
- 1727 At 051000H Vic BS 684854, 2/6 while searching cptd 12 rds 60mm mtr.
- 1729 At 051324H Vic BS 568689, 2/4 det mine (unk type) Res: Frd 1 WIA; En/neg.
- 0410 At 050920H Vic YC 313940, 2/3 rcvd 8 rds of 82mm mtr. Res neg.
- 0410 At 051010H Vic YC 313940, 2/3 searching killed 1 VC.
- 0410 At 051215H Vic XD 988320, 3/2 searching found and dest 10 huts and 10 bunkers.
- 0500 At 051840 Vic BS 684824, 2/6 searching found cache with 1,400 rds of AK47 ammo, 50 rds of 81mm mtr, 30 rds of 60mm mtr, 42 81mm mtr fuses.
- 0500 At 060340H Vic BS 739794, 2/4 rcvd 4 rds of an unk cal from frd arty. Arty unit unk. Res: Frd 1 WIA.

0600 06 Aug 69 to 0600 07 Aug 69

- 0640 Hung-Quang 1/9G, a 51 Regt cont'd search & clear opn North of Dien-Ban will commence at 060800H Aug 69. 1/51, 2/51, 51 Regt Recon Co will be cont'd to an area bounded by : BT 025695, 030650, 045644, 095630, 110658, 100670 and 050690 for period of 10 days. Hung-Quang 1/9G is not combined or heliborne.
- 0841 At 060340H Vic BS 739794, 2/4 ACAT and Recon 6 rcvd 4 rds 82mm mtr. Res: Frd 1 WIA. En neg.

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- 0844 At 060655H Vic BS 614548, 2/4 recd 1 rd M79.
Res: Frd 3 WIA; En/neg.
- 0848 At 060630H Vic BS 684824, 2/6 while searching killed 2 VC
and cptd 4 VC (women), 1 document and 1 medicine bag.
- 2100 Hung-Quang 1/9G, at 061855H Vic BT 071659, 1/51 cont unk
size en force. Res: Frd/neg; En 1 KIA, 1 IWC, 2 grnds.
- 2100 Lam-Son 341, at 062000 Vic YD 195429, 5/2 recvd 8 rds 82mm mtr.
Res neg.
- 2100 Lam-Son 342. At 061030H Vic YC 304930, 2/3 searching killed
1 VC, cptrd 2 IW.
- 2100 Lam-Son 342. At 061250H Vic YC 300930, 1/3 recvd 2 rds
82mm mtr. Res neg.

0600 07 Aug 69 to 0600 08 Aug 69

- 1045 At 070730H Vic BS 522768, 3/6 det mine (AP).
Res: Frd 2 KIA, 2 WIA, 1 IW dam; En/neg.
- 1046 At 062100H Vic BT 003534, 3/51 amb unk size en force.
Res: Frd/neg; En/7 KIA, 4 IWC.
- 1725 At 071045H Vic AT 947087, 4/5 found 2 tons rice and dest it
in place.
- 1726 At 071100H Vic at 943087, 4/5 while searching found 1 CSW
and 11 IW, plus 20 grenades, 3000 rds small arms ammo, 6 MG
magazines, 30 black uniforms and released 2 CIV and PF being
held prisoner by the VC.
- 1727 At 071430H Vic AT 943087, 4/5 while searching killed 1 VC.
- 2150 At 071225H Vic YD 223203, 2/1 searching killed 1 NVA,
cptrd 1 IW.
- 2150 At 071530H Vic ZC 054866, 3rd Co. 3/54 searching dest 3 VC
houses, cptrd 1 CSW (.50 cal MG), 3 boxes .50 cal ammo, and
unk no .50 cal MG barrels.

0600 08 Aug 69 to 0600 09 Aug 69

- 1145 At 072140H Vic BS 667727, 1/6 recd 4 rds 82mm mtr.
Res: neg.
- 1146 At 080600H Vic BS 680807, 2/6 while searching killed 1 VC,
and captd 6 grenades.
- 1337 At 081100H Vic BS 645533, 2/4 det mine (M-14)
Res: Frd 1 WIA; En/neg.

- 1338 At 080830H Vic at 957084, 4/5 while searching cprd 1 IW.
- 1339 At 080910H Vic AT 956084, 4/5 while searching cprd 33 IW, 6 CSW, 10 magazines (AK-50), 12 magazines (French Mauser), 4 magazines (CSW), 12 transistor radios, 3 Chicom watches.
- 1547 At 081445H Vic BS 603593, 2/4 det mine (AP).
Res: Frd 1 WIA; En/neg.
- 0500 At 080715H Vic YD 213661, 1/2 at C1 base rcvd 4 rds of 140mm rkt. Res: Frd 2 USMC, 1 Civ KIA, 5 USMC 4 Civ WIA, 2 Jeeps 50% dest, 2 houses 100% dest.
- 0500 At 081025H Vic XD 999372, 4/2 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd/neg; En 3 WIA, 2 IWC.

0600 09 Aug 69 to 0600 10 Aug 69

- 1036 At 090800H Vu-Ninh 6 terminated. A 1st Rngr Gp cont opn in Que-Son mountains. 21st and 37th Rngr were committed in an area bounded by AT 9432, 9836, 8844, 8644, and 8135. Period of opn 21 days. Final res: Frd 10 KIA, 11 WIA, 15 IW dam, 1 CSW dam, 1 PRC-25 dam; En 4 KIA, 3 VCC, 4 VCS, 1 IWC, 22 rds 122mm rkt cprd, 1,500 kg rice cprd.
- 1145 At 090805H Vic BS 760374, 1/4 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd/neg. En/2KIA, 1 IWC.
- 1500 At 091440H Vic BS 604559, 2/4 det booby -- trapped mine
Res: Frd 1 WIA; En neg.
- 1501 At 091505H Vic BS 735800, 2/4 ACAT recd sniper fire.
Res: Frd 1 WIA; En unk.
- 0505 At 091300H Vic YD 312358, 4/1 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd neg; En 3 KIA, 2 IWC, 100 kg rice.
- 0505 At 091630H Vic YD 362358, 4/1 cont unk size en force.
Res Frd/neg; En/2 KIA, 1 IWC.

0600 10 Aug 69 to 0600 11 Aug 69

- 1450 At 092250H Vic BT 008526, 3/51 searching cprd 2 VC.
- 1450 At 100845H Vic BT 004366, 2/5 rcvd 1 Chieu Hoi.
- 1630 At 101000H Vic BS 515872, 1/6 searching found 2 rolls of commo wire.
- 2230 At 101215H Vic YD 250223, 2/1 searching killed 2 VC, cprd 500 kg rice, dest 10 houses.

.../6

- 0500 At 101615H Vic BS 500790, 3/6 Bn recvd SA sniper fire.
Res: Frd/1 WIA; En/neg.
- 0500 At 101745H Vic BS 604526, 2/4 recvd VC thrown grnd.
Res : Frd/3 WIA. En/neg.
- 0500 At 110140H Vic YD 234678, 5/2 cont unk size en force.
Res : Frd/2 WIA; En/2 KIA, 2 IWC.

0600 11 Aug 69 to 0600 12 Aug 69

- 1014 At 110610H Vic BS 760363, 1/4 cont unk size en force.
Res : Frd/2 WIA; En/2 KIA, 1 IWC.
- 1630 At 110840H Vic BS 495864, 2/6 det VC mine (type unk).
Res Frd/5 WIA.
- 2315 At 091000H Vic ZC 304917, 2/3 found 3 acres of un
harvested rice.
- 2315 At 111130H Vic YC 361402, 1/1 cont est 1 sqd of VC.
Res : Frd 1 WIA. En 2 KIA, 2 IWC.
- 2315 At 111425H Vic YC 361402, 1/1 cptrd 1 VC 1 IW.
- 0530 At 111700H Vic BS 728820, 2/6 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd 2 KIA, 4 WIA. En 3 KIA, 3 IWC.
- 0530 At 111830H Vic BS 779379, 1/4 det VC mine. Res: Frd 3 KIA.
- 0530 At 120315H Vic YD 766090, Nam-Hoa Dist recvd 6 rds of unk
type rkt. Res: Frd 1 RF WIA.
- 0530 At 111905H Vic BS 696586, 4/6 recvd 60 rds of 60mm mtr &
20 rds of B40. Res: Frd 3 KIA, 12 WIA. En 8 KIA, 3 IWC.
- 0530 At 120145H Vic BS 631853, 2/6 recvd a ground attack and 70 rds
of 60&82mm mtr. Frd 1 KIA, 1 WIA. En 4 KIA.
- 0530 At 120300H Vic BT 187158, 4/5 recvd 12 rds of 60mm mtr.
Res: Frd 1 child KIA, 1 child WIA, 3 houses dest.
- 0530 At 120345H Vic BT 035342, 2/5 recvd 10 rds of 82mm mtr.
Res: Frd 7 WIA.

0600 12 Aug 69 to 0600 13 Aug 69

- 0540 At 120145H Vic BS 631853, 2/6 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd/1 KIA. En/20 KIA, 2 VCC, 1 IWC, 1 IWC, 1 rd B41 rkt,
5 rds B40 rkt, 10 bangalore torpedoes, 90 grenades. X

.../7

0550 At 120905H Vic YD 247754, 2/2 searching found 1 KBA 5 days old cptrd 5 AT mines. Vic YD 255754 2/2 loc cache containing 5 bags rice, 21 AT mines, 1 Block plastic explosive.

0550 At 121600H Vic BT 188156, 4/5 rcvd 5 rds 82, mtr. Neg cas.

0550 At 120810H Vic BT 020355, 2/5 det mine. Res: Frd 1 KIA, 1 WIA. En/ 1 Chieu-Hoi.

0550 At 121900H Vic BT 024342, 2/5 rvd 7 rds RR fire. Neg cas.

0550 At 121400H Vic YD 237233, 2/1 dest 25 VC houses.

0550 At 120645H Vic YD 598137, 4/3 rcvd 6 rds 60mm mtr. Neg cas.

0550 At 120855H Vic YD 664223, 3/3 searching found en rkt pos used to shell frd pos night of 11 Aug 69.

0550 At 121515H Vic YD 625155, 4/3 cont VC. Res: Frd/neg. En/3 KIA, 1 IWC, 3 field packs.

0600 13 Aug 69 to 0600 14 Aug 69

1630 At 131400H Vic BS 482773, 3/6 cont en force size unk. Res: Frd/neg. En/4 KIA, 2 IWC, 5 grnds captured.

2138 At 131645H Vic BT 023368, 2/5 searching killed 2 VC, cptrd 6 hnd grnds.

2138 At 130800H Vic BT 076646, 2/51 rcvd SA sniper fire. Res: Frd/1 WIA.

2138 At 131115H Vic BT 050620, 1/51 det VC mine. Res: Frd/1 WIA.

0520 At 130715H Vic YD 535436, 1/1 det mine. Res: Frd/5 WIA.

0520 At 131000H Vic YC 331959, 2/3 cont unk size en force. Res: Frd/5 WIA. En/3 KIA, 2 IWC.

0600 14 Aug 69 to 0600 15 Aug 69

1440 At 140945H Vic B 496770, 3/6 cont en force size unk. Res: Frd/2 WIA. En/5 KIA.

1440 At 141120H Vic BS 503880, 1/6 cont en force size unk. Res: Frd/2 WIA. En/5 KIA, 1 IWC.

1440 At 141220H Vic BS 428771, 3/6 cont en force size unk. Res: Frd/2 WIA.

1615 At 141445H Vic BS 500769, 3/6 cont unk size en force. Res: Frd/1 KIA, 3 WIA, En/unk.

- 2200 At 140635H Vic YD 628186, 10 rds 60mm mtr. Res: Frd/1 KIA
- 2200 At 141530H Vic YD 850014, Blk Panther Co. cont unk size en force. Res: Frd/4 WIA. En/unk.
- 2200 At 141900H Vic YD 854016, Blk Panther Co. rcvd 20 rds 60mm mtr. Res: neg.

0600 15 Aug 69 to 0600 16 Aug 69

- 1020 At 150000H Vic BS 497777, 3/6 searching cptrd 6 VC.
- 1020 At 150215H Vic AT 960582, 3/51 cont unk size en force. Res: Frd/neg. En/1 KIA.
- 1520 At 150800H Vic YD 624184, 4/3 cont unk size en force. Res: Frd/1 KIA. En/unk.
- 1520 At 150840H Vic YD 672150, 1/3 cont unk size en force. Res: Frd/neg. En/unk.
- 1520 At 151025H Vic YC 405945, 2/3 at FSB Currahee rcvd 6 rds of 122mm rkt. Res neg.
- 1520 At 151150H Vic YC 405945, 2/3 at FSB Currahee rcvd 15 rds of 122mm rkt. Res neg.
- 1520 At 151200H Vic BT 026340, 2/5 det booby trapped hnd grnd. Res: Frd/1 KIA.
- 1520 At 151200H Vic BT 188158, 4/5 rcvd 1 rd of 82mm mtr. Res neg.
- 2145 At 151430H Vic YD 847017, Black Panther Co cont unk size en force. Res: Frd/neg. En/4 KIA, 1 CSWC, 6 IWC.
- 2145 At 151350H Vic YD 847017, Black Panther Co rcvd 6 rds 60mm mtr. Res : neg.
- 2145 At 152040H Vic YD 664140 1/3 cont unk size en force. Res Frd/neg. En/2 KIA, 1 IWC.

0600 16 Aug 69 to 0600 17 Aug 69

- 1045 At 160800H Vic BS 719825, 2/6 rcvd sniper fire. Res: Frd 2 WIA.
- 2210 At 161040H Vic YD 257752, 2/2 Cont unk size en force. Res: Frd/neg. En/2 KIA 1 IWC, 1 82mm recoilless rifle capt, 5 grnds capt, 1 mine capt.

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- 2210 At 161300H, 2/3 rcvd 6 rds 122mm Vic Currahee Base.
Res: neg. Enemy location YC 405924.
- 2210 At 161430H Vic YC 526891, 2/3 searching found 1 VC body.
- 2210 At 161615H Vic YC 515885, 2/3 searching dest 2 houses and 1 BAR.
- 0530 At 162310H Vic BS 508882, 1/6 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd/1 WIA; En/1 KIA, 3 grndes captured.

0600 17 Aug 69 to 0600 18 Aug 69

- 1100 At 170600H Vic BS 670714, 1/4 cont unk size en forces.
Res: Frd/1 KIA.
- 1100 At 170845H Vic BS 728782, 2/4 ACAT det AT mine.
Res: Frd/5 WIA, 1 APC 100% dest.
- 1630 At 171340H Vic BS 518870, 1/6 rcvd sniper fire. Res neg.
- 1630 At 171145H Vic BS 621715, 1/4 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd 1 KIA, 1 WIA.
- 1630 At 171315H Vic 623715, 1/4 rcvd sniper fire. Res: Frd 1 WIA.
- 1630 At 171425H Vic BS 622715, 1/4 searching killed 1 VC.
- 1630 At 171430H Vic BS 623715, 1/4 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd/neg. En/5 KIA, 3 IWC.
- 2150 At 171700H Vic BS 513874, 2/6 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd/2 KIA, 4 WIA; En/unk.
- 2150 At 170700H Vic YD 228302, 3/1 cont unk size en force.
Res: En/4 KIA, 1 IWC, 1 GSWC (B40 rkt), 40 lbs TNT captured.
- 2150 At 170935H Vic YD 632201, 1/3 rcvd 1 rd B40 rkt. Res: neg.

0600 18 Aug 69 to 0600 19 Aug 69

- 1630 At 172020H Vic AT 966637, 1/51 rcvd VC thrown grnd.
Res: Frd/1 KIA.
- 1630 At 171850H Vic BS 641571, 2/4 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd/4 KIA, 1 WIA, 1 IW dam. En/3 KIA, 1 IWC, 5 grnds cptrd.
- 1630 At 180630H Vic BS 628584, 2/4 det grnd booby trap. Res: Frd/2 WIA.
- 1630 At 180820H Vic BS 525886, 1/6 det mine (AP) :
Res: Frd/1 KIA, 5 WIA, 15 Civ WIA.

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1630 At 181500H Vic BT 182180, 4/5 searching found 3 VC KBA.
2200 At 181730H Vic YD 067675, 1/2 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd/neg; En/2 CSWC, 4 IWC.
2200 At 180750 Vic YD 624201, 1/3 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd/neg. En/4 KIA, 2 IWC.
2200 At 181715H Vic BS 493760, 3/6 rcvd sniper fire.
Res: Frd/1 WIA.
0340 At 181730H YD 067675, 1/2 cont an est reinforced NVA Co
from the 27th NVA Regt. Res: Frd/15 WIA. En/32 KIA, 14 IWC
and 2 Chicom radios cptrd. En unit was identified by the
27th Regt's shoulder patch on the uniforms.

0600 19 Aug 69 to 0600 20 Aug 69

1050 At 190630H Vic BS 516759, 3/6 searching cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd/neg; En/3 KIA.
1415 At 191115H Vic BT 147324, 1/5 cont unk size en force.
Res: 1 CSWC (.50 cal AA Gun).
1420 At 191230H Vic YD 060682, 1/2 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd 1 WIA; En/50 KIA, 8 IWC, 5 CSWC, 1 D-702 radio
captured, 5rds B40 rkt, 500 rds 82mm mtr captured.
2215 At 190155H Vic YD 065675, 1/2 rcvd VC thrown grnd.
Res: Frd/1 WIA.
2215 At 190600H Vic YD 065675, 1/2 searching found 4 VC bodies.
Res: Frd/neg; En/4 KIA, 2 IWC (result of return fire by
item 1 above)
2215 At 190630H Vic YD 065675, 1/2 rcvd 50 rds 60mm mtr.
Res: Frd/5 KIA, 3 WIA.
2215 At 191600H Vic YD 056682, 4/2 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd/1 WIA; En/5 KIA, 1 CSWC (60mm mtr).
2215 At 190915H Vic YC 515900, 2/3 found 1 VC house, cptrd
1 block TNT, 2000 rds 7.62mm ammo.
2215 At 191020H Vic YC 741843, 1/1 rcvd 3 rds 81mm mtr.
Res: Frd/2 WIA.
2215 At 191600H Vic YC 750904, 3/3 searching found 2 VC houses
and 1 VC outpost 12m high.

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2215 At 190630H Vic YD 948052, 4/54 searching killed 1 VC.

0550 At 191800H Vic BT 114300, 2/5 rcvd 7 rds 82mm mtr.
Res: Frd/3 WIA.

0600 20 Aug 69 to 0600 21 Aug 69

1215 At 200915H Vic BT 188158, 4/5 rcvd 7 rds of 82mm mtr.
Res: Frd/3 WIA W/1 Aust Adv WIA WO2 Ronald J. O'BRIEN.
Ecvd to 91st Evac Hospital in Chu-Lai. Cond not serious.

1430 At 200740H Vic YC 763912, 3/3 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd/neg. En/3 KIA, 3 IWC.

1430 At 201050H Vic YC 713837, 1/1 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd/neg; En/1 KIA, 1 IWC.

1430 At 200900H Vic BT 093653, 1/51 cont unk size en forces.
Res: Frd/1 KIA, 1 WIA. En/unk.

0600 21 Aug 69 to 0600 22 Aug 69

2200 At 210830H Vic YC 712833, 1/1 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd/1 WIA. En/1 KIA, 1 IWC.

2200 At 211630H Vic YC 701825, 1/1 det mine. Res: Frd/2 WIA.

2200 At 211130H Vic YD 668148, 1/3 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd/1 KIA, 1 WIA; En/4 KIA, 2 IWC.

2200 At 210845H Vic YD 982156, 2/54 det mine. Res: Frd/1 WIA.

0600 22 Aug 69 to 0600 23 Aug 69

1535 At 220400H Vic BS 503774, 3/6 cont unk size en force.
Res: En/8 KIA, 2 IWC.

1545 At 221420H Vic BT 078642, 1/51 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd/1 KIA, 8 WIA.

2315 At 221400H Vic YD 228303, 2/1 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd/1 KIA, 4 WIA; En/2 KIA, 2 IWC.

2315 At 221250H Vic YC 710842, Recon Plt of 1/1 cont unk size en
force. Res: Frd/neg. En/3 KIA, 2 IWC, 20 rds B40 rkt,
50 rds 82mm mtr, 3000 rds SA ammo, 300 kgs rice cptrd.

2315 At 221600H Vic YC 703806, 1/1 searching killed 1 VC cptrd
1 IW.

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2315 At 221100H Vic BT 188228, 1/5 rcvd SA sniper fire.
Res: Frd/1 WIA.

2315 At 222100H Vic AT 990250, 5th Regt CP rcvd 4 rds 82mm mtr.
Res neg.

0600 25 Aug 69 to 0600 26 Aug 69

1035 At 250835H Vic BS 422806, 3/6 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd/1 KIA; En/4 KIA, 1 IWC, 1 CSWC.

1315 A 2nd Div con combat Swp Opn, SW of Quang-Ngai commenced
250700H Aug 69. 2/4 Bn will operate in an area bounded by:
BS 6051, 7059, 7151. Opn will last approx 30 days. Reaction
to Intel report that elements of 5th & 6th NVA Regt were in
this area.

1615 At 251405H Vic BS 425799, 3/6 searching cont unk size en
force. Res: En/1 KIA.

0530 At 252230H Vic YD 665224, 1/3 amb unk size en force.
Res: neg.

0600 26 Aug 69 to 0600 27 Aug 69

1535 At 261345H Vic BS 494798, 1/6 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd/2 KIA. En/8 KIA, 1 CSWC, 1 IWC.

2305 At 261150H Vic BS 425819, 3/6 led by a Hoi-Chanh, burned
25 houses.

0600 27 Aug 69 to 0600 28 Aug 69

1725 At 271455H Vic BT 189121, 1/5 searching killed 3 VC, cptrd
2 IW.

1725 At 271535H Vic BT 195118, 1/5 searching killed 1 VC.

2045 A 51st Regt con Search and Clear opn South of Danang comm
at 260630H Aug 1969. 4/51, 3/51 (-), 2/51 (-) and 2/17 ACAT (-)
are cont'd in an area bounded by: At 978583, 973610, 985635,
BT 032640 and BT 010568 for an indef period.

2205 At 271945H Vic YD 195683, 3/2 det en mine. Res: Frd/1 WIA.

2205 At 271550H Vic YC 730878, 1/1 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd/2 WIA. En/12 KIA, 9 IWC, dest 1 ton of mixed SA
and mtr ammo.

2205 At 270745H Vic YD 371292, 3/1 rcvd 30 rds of 60mm mtr.
Res neg.

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2205 At 271600H Vic YD 377287, 3/1 cont unk size en force.
Res: Frd/neg. En/16 KIA, 1 CSWC, 11 IWC.

0600 28 Aug 69 to 0600 29 Aug 69

2000 At 280630H Vic BS 474790, 1/6 rcvd SA sniper. Res Frd/1 WIA.

2000 At 51st Regt con S & C opn S of Danang term 271800H Aug 69.
4/51, 3/51(-), 2/51(-), 2/17 ACAT(-) were comm in an area
bounded by AT 978583, 973610, 985635, BT 032640, 010568.
Period of opn : 1½ days. Final Res : Frd/3 WIA; En/unk.

2000 A 5th Regt con com Swp W of Tam-Ky term 260800H Aug 69.
2/5 and 4/5 were comm in an area bounded by BT 158278, 2227
2216, 1516. Period of opn : 128 days. Final Res: Frd/82 KIA,
194 WIA, 1 MIA, 7 IWL; En/684 KIA, 87 VCC, 22 Hoi-Chanh,
19 CSWC, 142 IWC.

2000 A 5th Regt con com Swp W of Tam-Ky commenced 260800H Aug 69.
1/5, 3/5, and 4/5 will be committed in an area bounded by BT
0403, 2823, 1442, at 9225 for an indef period.

0510 At 281400H Vic BT 015648, 2/51 searching killed 1 VC.

0600 29 Aug 69 to 30 Aug 69

0835 A 57th Regt con Search & Clear opn SW of Danang comm at
x 260600H Aug 69. 1/51 is com'td in an area bounded by: AT
966870, 989670, 990643 and 954642 for a period of 4 days.

0600 30 Aug 69 to 0600 31 Aug 69

2150 At 300830H Vic YD 642202, 1/3 searching found 2 VC bodies
approximately 2 wks old. They had been killed by AS's.

2150 At 301445H Vic YC 603836, 4/3 cont unk size en force.
Res : Frd/1 KIA, 6 WIA. En/2 KIA.

INDEX TO AATTV ADVISOR REPORTS OF INTEREST
I CTZ

The following reports of interest from AATTV advisors in I CTZ are attached:

- Annexure 1 - Report by WO1 S. Rosenberg,
Asst Advisor 2nd ARVN Regt.
- Annexure 2 - Report by WO2 J. McKenner,
Asst Advisor 2/3 ARVN Bn.
- Annexure 3 - Report by WO2 D. Heenan,
Asst Advisor 2/54 ARVN Bn.
- Annexure 4 - Report by WO2 V. Harris
Advisor RF/PF, Hoa-Vang.
- Annexure 5 - Report by WO2 Gurney
Asst Advisor 3/2 ARVN Bn.

1/2 ARVN Regt
Dong-Ha

26 Aug 69

MONTHLY REPORT BY 33887 WO1 S. ROSENBERG
MONTH ENDING 26 AUG 69

1. On the 30 Jul I replaced WO2 R. GURNEY Aust Advisor with 3/2 ARVN Regt. WO2 R. GURNEY was a medevac from his unit on an operation in the DAKRONG River Area. The operation was a three battalion "Search and Clear".
2. During the operation which ended on the 11 Aug the 3/2 had killed 4 VC and discovered a cache of approx 10 tons of mortar, rockets and small arms ammunition. This cache was destroyed by an EOD Team. Many VC farms and livestock were found and destroyed during the operation.
3. I was impressed by the manner in which 3/2 ARVN Regt operated. All officers and senior NCOs were most professional in their tasks due mainly to the excellent advising that had been given to the unit by WO2 GURNEY.
4. On the 18 to 24 Aug 1/2 ARVN Regt took part in a "Search and Clear" operation in the Cam-Lo Area of the DMZ. Two battalions took part with ARVN & US Arty support.
5. The operation was logistically support by 3 Mar Div.
6. Command and Control was by 2 ARVN Regt.
7. 1/2 ARVN battalion was divided into two elements for the operations. I was in the advisory team of two who were with the light CP. The light CPs mission being to search, clear and secure the North East portion of the battalion AO.
8. The battalion flew into an LZ secured by 5th Mech and then advanced to contact on the morning of 18 Aug 69.
9. At approx 1700 hrs 18 Aug 69 the forward company of the light CP made contact with about pl strength NVA unit to its left flank. No sooner had contact been made to the left the enemy opened fire from the right flank and rear. It was ascertained that the enemy unit was approx two company strength.
10. Artillery fire was quickly brought onto the enemy positions which were mostly in large clumps of low trees and not on the high ground.

.../2

11. The light CP after having quelled the initial contact regrouped to evacuate the casualties . At this time the element had received 14 WIA mainly gunshot wounds. Whilst awaiting for a medevac helicopter the LCP was hit by approx 5 B40 rounds. En casualties at this stage was not known.
12. The LCP then moved with the wounded to a more secure area so the medevac could be effected without undue danger to the aircraft.
13. On contact gunships were requested. The first light fire team were on station in a matter of minutes. The gunships had no sooner expended their ordnance then another fire team was on station to take over.
14. As the light started to fail a Spooky aircraft was requested. This aircraft was quickly on station. Though the Spooky aircraft did not actually fire its guns the illumination it provided was used by gunships, medevac aircraft and for ground observation.
15. The medevac was complete at approx 2100 hrs. The LCP moved its location and secured a defensive position for the night with the two rifle companies. At this stage ammunition was low and an emergency resupply was requested. This arrived approx 0630 hrs the following morning.
16. During the night the position was subject to two grenade assaults possibly as a cover to recover enemy dead. Two men were wounded during these assaults.
17. At 0600 hrs on the morning of the 19 Aug 69 the position received approx 100 rounds of 82mm mortar fired in a rapid barrage. This claimed 5 KIA and 6 WIA. The Bn CP group on high ground were able to locate the enemy mortar base plate position and bring effective fire onto it with artillery.
18. Immediately following the mortar attack gunships and tactical air were on station. These were directed onto enemy positions. Response and co-operation from all support was excellent.
19. Companies from the battalion assaulted the enemy positions after a re-distribution of ammunition.
20. On the completion of the action the following enemy losses were counted:

	KIA	-	88
	PW	-	1
Captured	AK 47	-	20
	M16	-	1
	RPD	-	2
	RPG 5	-	7
	Radios	-	3
	Mortar	-	1
	60mm		

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Friendly losses :

KIA - 5

WIA - 20

21. General Comments

a. Air and Artillery support played a major role in the success of the operation.

b. The NVA unit were well dispersed and using cover very effectively. It appeared they were "lying up" before moving either North into the DMZ or South towards CAM-LO.

c. During the daylight hours they were reluctant to fire but became effective once the light faded.

d. The PW was aged about 16-17 years dressed in camouflage top and khaki shorts.

e. Advising commanders during a contact is near on impossible they were very exciteable but effective in what they did.

22. The operation continued until the 24 Aug without any further contact. On the 23 Aug a further 7 enemy bodies approx 4 days old were found. It is possible these were from the contact of 18/19 Aug 69.

(S. ROSENBERG)
WO1
AATTV

MONTHLY REPORT BY 38124 WO2 J.F. McKENNER
2/3 ARVN BN
AUG 69

On the 5 August 69 I reported to 2/3 Bn replacing WO2 Kelly.

The Bn was at this time employed in the Ashau Valley. 1 Coy with the 2/7 APC Sqn in the valley itself and 2 Coys working in the Laos Vietnam border on Coy operations. The HQ Coy & Bn CP were positioned on fire base Currahee.

During the period of this report only 2 small contacts were made, the first on 13 Aug resulting in 5 WIA friendly 2 En KIA, and 2 AK47 captured. The 1st Coy had the contact. The second occurred on the 16 Aug with 1 KIA & 1 WIA both friendly, en cas nil.

The HQ Coy & CP were consistently hit by B122, 82mm & 60mm mortar and the total ARVN cas for the operation 25 July - 25 Aug were 3 KIA & 28 WIA. En casualties for the same period was estimated to be 10 KIA.

My employment for the period of this report was as follow : the first week until the 11 Aug with the Coy operating in the valley with the APC's. On the 11th the senior advisor and the American Lt left the field to go on R&R. I was then moved from Coy to Coy, dependant on who the Bn Comd thought required an advisor.

On the 25 Aug, the Bn was replaced in Ashau by the 4/3 Bn and took up positions on the Citadel wall Hue where it is likely to remain until the 31 Aug.

(J. McKenner)
WO2
AATTV

Annexure 3
to Annex D
to AATTV Report - Aug 69

36394 WO2 DF HEENAN
AATTV
2/54 ARVN BN
ANZIO - THUA THIEN

27 Aug 69

Senior Australian Advisor
Australia House
Danang.

MONTHLY REPORT - ACTIVITIES 2/54 ARVN BN
PERIOD 3 AUG - 25 AUG 69

1. I joined the unit at 1400 hrs 3 Aug 69.
2. Period 3-5 Aug. Bn conducted security operations in lowlands - Grid squares 9507 9508 Phu-Loc map. At 2300hrs on 3 Aug Bn HQ and 3 Coy contacted 5 VC at grid 945084. Results;
2 VC KIA, 1 Colt 45 pistol captured
1 ARVN soldier WIA was satisfactorily medevaced.
3. Period 5-13 Aug. Bn conducted search and destroy operation in area SE of Dong-Truoc - Bach-Ma Map. This operation was launched by a combat assault into LZ on Duong Truoi. The Bn operated in two groups, BHQ & 3rd Coy on 1 axis and 1 and 2 Coys on the other. I was assigned to 1 and 2 Coys. This group had nil contact during the operation. On 9 Aug BHQ group contacted 2 VC at grid 9794. Results: 2 VC KIA 1 Chicom LMG and 1 Soviet sniper scope captured.
4. Period 11-14 Aug. I was hospitalized for 3 days with FUO.
5. Period 13 Aug to 25 Aug. Bn was assigned to protection of FSB SLEDGE, Bach-Ma mountain grid 0692 with 2 Coys to be on search and destroy ops at all times. During this period BHQ & 3 Coy stayed at SLEDGE, while 1 and 2 coys operated in separate AO's - area SW of Bach-Ma.
6. On leaving hospital I had 2 days with BHQ on Sledge until the return of my SA from leave. From 17-25 Aug I was in the field with the first coy.
Results : Nil contact during the operation.
3 ARVN soldiers were medevaced because of injuries/disease.
7. General During the period of this report I have had no trouble settling in and working the other 3 members of the Bn advisory team. I feel I have been able to establish good relations with the counterparts I have worked with - The Bn Comd and Comds of 1&2 Coys. I have not yet worked with the 3rd Coy.
8. Forecast. Present intentions are that the Bn will continue to operate as per para 5 of this report, for approx 1 month. Coys will rotate from field ops to protection of SLEDGE FSB.

WO2 DF HEENAN
AATTV

15628, WO2 V.L. HARRIS
RF/PF Advisor Hoa-Vang

31 Aug 69

MONTHLY REPORT

Operations

1. Throughout the month a number of operations were carried out without remarkable results. Some small caches of weapons were found and some VC were eliminated in isolated actions.
2. Generally operations fall into 3 categories;
 - a. Offensive sweeps
 - b. Police-type checks
 - c. As a result of specific information, Offensive Sweeps are carried out 2 or 3 times a month with up to 12 or 15 PF platoons. Results are generally not impressive. Police-type checks are carried out more regularly with the intention of picking up draft-dodgers, desertors, soldiers illegally carrying weapons, prostitutes, etc. Again results are not good, usually only one or two people are picked up out of hundreds screened. Intelligence initiated operations can produce results and in some cases have been successful. The District intelligence set up works pretty well. If the S1, S3 and S4 shops worked as well as the S2 there would be an overall improvement in District HQ.

Training

3. Three new PF platoons are at present in basic training at Hoa-Cam and will be ready for operations in October. This will increase PF strength in Hoa-Vang district to 35 platoons.
4. The in-place training program needs to be supervised thoroughly but unfortunately District HQ has nobody to do this. The training supervisor is a Corporal without transport or influence over the platoon leaders. I am trying to get the Marines to take an interest in the training of the PF through the CAP units.

Administration

5. I have been accompanying the paying officer on his pay run. If there are any irregularities on pay I can only assume there are many in on it. Pay is made up by AD & S Coy in Hoi-An. I could see nothing wrong with the system.

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6. Any similiarity between the posted strength and present for duty strength of the PF platoons and what the S1 has on his books is purely coincidental. But platoons are so scattered throughout the district with unreliable radio communications that I suppose this is to some extent unavoidable.

(V.L. HARRIS)
WO2
AATFV

MONTHLY REPORT - 3/2 BN
JULY 69

1. This month the Bn for purposes of this report is divided into 2 separate operational roles.

First

On the 1 Jul 69 Bn returned from a months operation around Khe-Sanh. From the 1st to the 9th Jul the Bn was involved in refitting and providing a Coy for Dong-Ha Camp security.

On the 9th Jul at 1200 a 24 hr operation was conducted NW of CI. Approx 1 enemy coy was encountered resulting in 14 KIA NVA 1 POW 3 AK47 4 B40 rocket launchers captured. Friendly casualties 5 WIA.

From 101300H to 130900H the Bn operated between C1 and Dong-Ha providing patrols, ambushes and village security.

Second

2. LAM SON 377. This operation is being conducted in the Ba Long Valley area. Expected duration is 3 months but this is to be reviewed every 30 days.

3. The operation is controlled by 2nd ARVN Regt from a fwd CP based at Vandergrift Combat Base. Liason officers from 3Mar Div and 5th Mech are located at this fwd CP, because of adjoining AO's.

4. Task and Organization. This operation employs the 3rd, 4th and 5th Bn's of the 2nd ARVN Regt.

5. Located at F.S.B. Henderson

1 Bty 105mm How ARVN

1 Bty 105mm How ARVN

Air support on call US

Mission

6.
 - a. To seek out and destroy the enemy
 - b. To locate and secure/destroy enemy food and ordnance caches
 - c. Deny to the enemy infiltration/exfiltration routes.

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General Outline

7. a. Fourth Bn . Security of FSB Henderson and search area bounded by XD 9740, YD0238, YD 0637, YD 0935, YD 1232, YD 1229, Northern Boundary RIVERIE DE QUANG TRI Western boundary. A line around the Western foothills of Dong Ta Ri and following the Cam-Lo boundary up to the river.
- b. Fifth Bn. From 4th Bn Northern boundary into Trieu-Phong district. 5th Bn joined the operation on the 28 Jul 69 and at this time their actual N, W and S Boundaries unknown as there have been some boundary changes.
- c. Third Bn. West. A line from CO PAT (XD 9530) out to Dong Rieng Juan (XD 9336) and curving back to the stream at XD960400. South. Along the Laotian border from CO PAT to YD 0226, YD0826 thence to YD 3030. Northern and Eastern boundaries are 4th Bn's Southern boundary.

Execution

8. 15 Jul 0810-1015 - Airlift to LZ Langley YD 025355
1030 - Bn divided into 2 groups.
Heavy CP with 2nd Coy and 3rd Coy
Light CP with 1st Coy and 4th Coy
- 16-18 July - Patrolled YD 1235, YD 0236, YD 0435 YD 0535
- 19 Jul 1300 - At YD 044361 Ordnance cache found
- 20 Jul 1000 - EOD team arrived with explosives
1720 - Cache destroyed
- 21-24 Jul - Patrolled YD 0535, YD0636, YD 0734, YD 0833, YD 0932.
- 25 Jul - YD 093330 1 newly constructed house vacated approx 2 hours contained clothing of NVA and VC types - Destroyed.
- New cornfields and yucca fields ranging from 2-6 weeks old destroyed.
- 26-27 Jul - Patrolled YD 1032, YD 1130 YD 1031.
271000 destroyed 7 houses with bunkers YD 1031. These were old houses but were being repaired with new thatching.
More corn and yucca fields destroyed.

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28-30 Jul

- Patrolled YD 1129, YD 1130, YD 1029, YD 0930.

Unable to give accurate details of heavy CP groups movements. Basically they moved SW from LZ Langley, following the high ground through YD 0335, YD 0433, YD 0532 to the 612 feature and down the Dong Co Tien to the river and then to YD 095281. Results of heavy CP to date 1 mauser rifle found.

Results : Cache YD 044361.

This cache was approx 5 months old and consisted of 15 holes covered with attap roofing

Contents :

60mm Mor	200 rds
82mm Mor	400 rds
75 R.R.	500 rds
Chicom Claymores	21
B40 Rockets & boosters	700
122 Rockets	50 rockets
57 R.R	100 rds
Anti Tank mines	10
B50 Rockets	200
CKC rds	300 boxes
AK 47 rds	200 boxes
12.7 HMG rds	300 rds

All ordnance was in excellent condition.

One of the RPG 2 containers was marked OSAKA JAPAN on its side. EOD team say that the 75 RR fuzes are of Japanese origin. Estimated tonnage is 10 tons.

Administration

9. As with the Khe-Sanh operation the Bn had to rely wholly and solely on the ARVN resupply system with no help from the Marines by the way of bolstering the rations by 1 case of "C" rations per man per 4 days and some ordnance supplies such as flares of all types and CS grenades such as used to happen in the past.

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Not having the issue of 'C' rations from the Marines causes some slight problem for the advisor if he is not partial to rice and the rest of the ARVN goodies, as the advisor resupply system is catch as catch can unless they make arrangements beforehand with their Bn Rear and have resupply bags made up and numbered for each resupply. This system works well depending on the availability of 'C' rations at the time of preparing these bags.

Comments

10. As this will be my last report for this Bn, included are some comments on the Bn and personalities.
11. There has been a marked improvement in the patrolling techniques and system of searching areas noticed on this operation to previous operations.
12. Hygiene standards are improving, more soldiers are carrying a shovel on their early morning walks and one doesn't have to be so wary when moving out of a night harbour area. In conjunction with this the rate of soldiers suffering with 'FEVER' seems to have lowered.
13. Discipline on arriving at a water point has improved slightly to the extent that when officers are present normal precautions are taken. However on 2 occasions on arrival of the CP group at water, the XO had to sternly police security of the fwd elements. This has most probably been one of the Bn's weakest security points.
14. Movement into and out of night harbour positions, whilst it has improved, is still not the best.
15. Movement into the harbour usually causes a congestion right in the centre and this sometimes takes 20/30 minutes to clear.
16. Night clearing patrols are sent out prior to last light moving in after last light laying trip flares and booby traps on the way in.
17. Night discipline is good.
18. Movement out in the morning is not good. Everybody ups & moves at the same time and "We clear as we go out" is the clearing patrol. They are very vulnerable at this time.
19. Movement and March Discipline.- The majority of the time this is good, however at times they lapse back into the gibbering and blaring transistors for short periods. This occurs after they have been in an area for a while and have not made contact.
20. The worst offenders for noise are by far the ARVN FO parties.

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21. The Bn in bases such as C1 and A2 are vigorous in patrolling and ambushing moving well out from the wire. Also in base defence and base improvements

22. When on village security roles the Bn Comd where time permits runs small civic aid type projects such as gardens, repairs for widows and the aged.

23. Bn Comd. has been with the Bn 13 yrs - all this as an officer. He has been Bn Comd for 35 mths and is good in all aspects until Regt Comd gives him a time to be somewhere by, then he pushes onwards and leaves quite a few machine gunners and mortar numbers from the fwd elements along the track to stagger in with the rear elements.

24. Bn XO has been an officer for 11 yrs and with the Bn 5 yrs - is a good leader & never fazed or rushed into things and if can't comply with a certain timing will say so. He has attended course at JWS and is very easy to discuss things with and will speak out when he doesn't agree with the principles involved in the discussion.

25. Coy Comds. With the exception of 3rd Coy Comd (Capt) all Coy Comds are Lt. It is when working with coy's you get the chance to be of real benefit as an advisor. These Coy Comds will often seek advice - that is after a rapport has been established with them, usually after a long period of time working with them.

WO2 GURNEY
AATTV

QUANG TRI PROVINCE NARRATIVE RF/PF EVALUATION - OVERVIEW

PART I - INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction. Quang Tri Sector has an RF/PF strength of 8000 men, to which must be added some 10000 para-military personnel bearing arms. The question now arises as to:
 - a. Whether present performance justifies the manpower resources involved, and
 - b. Whether the present forces will be adequate to meet future requirements.
2. Aim. The aim of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of RF/PF in Quang Tri and the means by which it could be improved.
3. Weaknesses. The main defects of the territorial forces in Quang Tri are considered to be:
 - a. Professional inadequacy.
 - b. Poor command and coordination.
 - c. Weak discipline and morale.
 - d. Inadequate organic fire-power and limited access to supporting fires.
 - e. Under-employment of even the present capability.

PART 2 - WEAKNESSES

PROFESSIONAL INADEQUACY

4. It must be remembered that professional standards of the RF are usually, but not always, superior to PF units. However the following assessments are considered to apply to both, in varying degrees.
5. Night Training. The standard of night training is rock-bottom. Annex A details the major defects in this field. Annex B lists results of night contacts in the period March-May 1969, and of 141 contacts, 75 produced negative results and 26 were unsuccessful (i.e. friendlies suffered the greater loss). The almost obsessional demand for illumination, even when it could reveal a small RF/PF party to a large enemy force, is indicative of RF/PF fear of fighting in the dark.
6. Weapon Training. Usually poor, in particular the tactical employment of weapons. Examples are:
 - a. Sighting machine guns on top of buildings, thus producing "plunging fire".
 - b. Little use of enfilade fire.
 - c. Failure to sight obstacles and machine gun fires in relation to each other.
 - d. Over-use of the M-79 (it is the faint-headed method of engaging enemy at night without incurring the retaliatory fire that use of machine guns attracts. It also invariably produces negative enemy casualties.)
 - e. Malfunction and accidental or premature discharge of claymores.

- f. The incompetent and dangerous employment of 81 mm mortar crews which:
 - (1) Often do not have dial sights.
 - (2) When they do, have no night aiming lamps.
 - (3) Rarely have mortar plotters, so lack the ability to translate fire adjustments onto dial sight settings.
 - g. Knowledge of fire adjustment is non-existent below company level. Standard procedure is to call fires down onto one coordinate and leave it there. Invariably the enemy are not at the previous spot and, if they are, soon shift.
 - h. The continual casualties through accidents and indiscriminate discharge of weapons.
7. Slack Security. All units, even those which are efficient in other respects, suffer from slack security. Normal deficiencies are:
- a. Using the same ambush sites night after night.
 - b. Using the same routes to and from ambushes.
 - c. Sleeping in ambushes. (This is common, many units take sleeping gear with them on night activities).
 - d. Siting troops too close together with resultant multiple casualties from single rounds of mortar or B-40.
 - e. Daylight movement without scouts.
 - f. Movement with weapons not at the ready position.
 - g. Indiscriminate shooting revealing position of unit.
- Even units in Gio Linh and Cam Vu, which have NVA incursions regularly, share these carefree habits.
8. Poor Field Defenses. There is little understanding of field defense construction, and the emphasis by the enemy on sapper attacks is making this aspect only too painfully obvious. Examples are:
- a. Reliance on bunkers as opposed to open foxholes. Once enemy supporting fire falls down everyone ^{retires} returns to bunkers and are thus vulnerable to satchel charge attacks.
 - b. Above ground bunker construction which, silhouetted against the sky, makes perfect targets for RPG's and/or thrown satchel charges. (High water tables doubtless influence this, but bunkers should be constructed for reasons of safety and not comfort).
 - c. Flimsy bunker construction which makes the bunker, once hit, a death trap of falling beams and sandbags.
 - d. Erection of berms which:
 - (1) Silhouette the defenders against the sky, while the attacker, being lower, merges into the background.
 - (2) Often reduces effectiveness of automatic weapons which have "plunging fire" in such situations.
 - (3) Make it easy, in darkness, for sappers to know exactly where the defenders are sited.
 - (4) Once sappers get to a berm, they have a protected area from which they can throw their charges.
 - e. Erection of high parapets in front of foxholes, obviously to reduce the digging depth. Having to shoot over the parapet the firer silhouettes his head and exposes his upper body to fire from the rear and sides. In any case the loose soil of the parapet is seldom bullet-proof.

← POOR COMMAND AND COORDINATION

9. Even where effective units do exist (e.g. 124 RF co., 913 RF co.) their effectiveness is reduced by poor command and coordination. This poses no vital problem under the present scale of enemy activity but any major NVA intrusion would reveal fatal weaknesses. These weaknesses are listed hereunder.
10. Absence of direction. It can be stated that such control as is exercised by Quang Tri Sector HQ amounts to interference in rather than promotion of sub-sector activity. In the weaker sub-sectors this perhaps causes little harm but the more able district chief's efforts are retarded by the current set-up. Main aspects are:
 - a. There is little long-range planning and such as there is amounts to "window dressing". A typical case was the "Protection of the 1969 rice harvest" for which there were high-level briefings, impressive overlays and daily reports. In fact, on the ground, no forces re-deployed and life went on as normal. The harvest was protected but only because of the generally weak enemy situation and not because of any implementation of Quang Tri Sector's plan.
 - b. Sector HQ appears to be over staffed. Controlling operations are a Deputy Sector Commander, Chief of Staff, Chief of Operations (all majors) and an S-3 (captain). It is thus difficult to ascertain just who is the coordinator of any particular operation.
 - c. The Deputy Sector Commander tends to control particular operations directly. Whilst he is doing so no one remaining at Sector HQ is prepared to exercise control over events in the rest of the Province. Meanwhile, not being concerned with the minutiae of the operation, the Deputy Sector Commander cannot exercise effective operational control. The result is that neither the operation, nor the rest of the sector, are under effective command. Additionally the subsector staffs in whose district the operation is conducted are by-passed and rendered less effective.
 - d. Operational routine is controlled by a TOC staff who are permitted no decision-making. In an emergency this often leaves Vietnamese reaction in the hands of an aspirant who will do nothing until the Deputy Sector Commander arrives on the scene.
11. Lack of follow-up. Preparatory staff work is very well done but once orders are issued there is little follow-up and almost no direction to subordinate commanders. Operations rarely conclude --- they just tend to expire and fade away.
12. Poor Coordination with ARVN. While not the fault of Territorial Forces, a dangerous weakness is the lack of communication between ARVN and Quang Tri Sector. It would be fair to say that Quang Tri Sector has closer relations with 1st Ede 5th Mech Division (US), than with 1st and 2nd ARVN Regiments. Examples of this rift are:

- a. Reluctance of Sector staff to accompany advisors to ARVN Regimental HQ's.
 - b. The absence of ARVN unit representatives at Sector briefings even those which are concerned with ARVN unit locations.
 - c. The attitude of the Commanding Officer of 2nd ARVN Reg't that district chiefs north of the Cam Lo River are his own subordinates.
 - d. Overbearing attitudes of certain ARVN commanders towards Territorial Forces.
 - e. Reluctance by Sector to consider combined operations with ARVN units even when suggested by advisors. The implications of this situation are in the light of possible future withdrawals of US units.
13. Disunity of Command. Although hardly a Vietnamese monopoly, the presence of "private armies" with their own chain of allegiance greatly hinders progress. Although obviously this situation results from high level policy it nevertheless greatly minimizes effectiveness of resources. Examples are:
- a. Presence of CIDG at Huong Hoa who report not to US or ARVN forces surrounding their AO, but directly to Danang. The effectiveness of Huong Hoa sub-sector RF/PF is greatly restricted by CIDG presence and CIDG troops, rarely ones for good discipline, play their own LLDB commanders against district officials.
 - b. PSDF, being controlled by Interior Ministry officials and not directly by Sector.
 - c. RD cadre, notorious for low work level and absenteeism, playing their own chain of command which rarely sees them in the field, against the control by district chiefs, who do.
 - d. National Police and NPPF have their own command channels, little understood by advisors, and are not effectively under control of sub-sector commanders.
 - e. RF Company Group HQ's, although ~~normally~~ ^{NOMINALLY} under command of the sub-sector of location appear to deal direct to Sector HQ (The extent varies from district to district).

WEAK DISCIPLINE AND MORALE

14. The most discouraging feature of RF/PF is weak discipline. This leads to inefficiency, idleness, and reluctance to fight. Typical examples, witnessed by advisors in the preceding few weeks are:
- a. Deliberate selection, by PF, of ambush positions on trails known not to be used by VC.
 - b. Moving to different night positions than those ordered, or not moving at all.
 - c. Failing to remain in night ambush past midnight.
 - d. Failure to stay awake even when specifically ordered to 100% alert.
 - e. PF platoons melting away to their homes by day, without maintaining radio watch.
 - f. Constant unauthorized discharge of weapons.

- g. PF, on being ordered to perform some duty, work at it for a few minutes and then walk off.
- h. Reluctance of PF, and some RF, to make serious attempts to search on operations.
- j. Reluctance of PF to deal firmly with civilians in cordon operations, even after receiving firm orders on the subject.
- k. Reluctance of both RF and PF when in ambush positions to stand their ground in a fire-fight, even against a smaller enemy force. (This is not the case when a compound is attacked).
- l. Tendency of certain RF companies when in contact in night ambushes to:
 - (1) Refrain from firing small arms.
 - (2) Merely withdraw and call down artillery on the ambush area.
- m. RF companies, on embarking on aircraft or landing ships at conclusion of an operation, milling onto the vehicles, pushing aside officers, and abandoning supplies and equipment.

15. This weakness is considered to arise from the following:

- a. The poor control exercised by Sector (as explained previously).
- b. An apparent disinclination to recognize commanders who perform and penalize those who do not.
- c. Apparent acceptance of slack discipline in RF/PF as the norm. The troops of Sector HQ itself are very poorly disciplined. It is noteworthy that the most soldierly-looking RF/PF are those in our most efficient sub-sector (Trieu Phong).
- d. Once again the absence of "follow-up". Most officers consider that once plans are drawn up and orders are issued, their work has ended.
- e. The "old soldier" complex, typical of any army in a long war, where troops consider that they "cannot be told", particularly by junior officers (aspirants) who command little obedience from RF soldiers.
- f. The close association of RF/PF with their locations of duty has a weakening effect on morale as:
 - (1) They are subject to local and family pressures to the detriment of discipline.
 - (2) Discipline tends to weaken much in the manner of a US National Guard unit in a small town, where everyone is known to all in civil life.
 - (3) When away from their families they fear VC retaliation against relatives.
 - (4) When close to families they tend to rush off and attend to family affairs when wanted elsewhere.
 - (5) They have more avenues of evading work.

- g. An acute shortage of officers (except aspirants). Most RF companies have only one real officer and if he goes the unit just collapses.
- h. Poor leadership on the part of small unit commanders owing to:
 - (1) Stifling of initiative by superior
 - (2) Inadequate supervision by superiors.
 - (3) Knowledge that enterprise will merely bring danger without promotion and that slackness will bring, at worst, transfer to a non-critical (and safe) appointment.

INADEQUATE FIRE-POWER AND ACCESS TO FIRE-POWER

16. Whilst insignificant against the preceding deficiencies mentioned, the lack of fire power available to RF/PF is important. It can be argued, rightly, that increased fire-power merely encourages RF/PF to avoid getting close to the enemy (the M-16 program arouses some fears in this direction). However it is asking much of a squad of militia to engage an unknown body of NVA, at night, with nothing heavier than a rifle. It can also be argued that any increase in weaponry will find its way to compound defense and not to ambush locations. This is a matter for training and is covered in Annex A.
17. Existing deficiencies which demand remedy are:
- a. A scale of claymores sufficient for each squad ambush to employ at least one.
 - b. A belt-fed machine gun down to at least platoon level, and preferably squad.
 - c. Increased load of trip-flares.
 - d. A massive training program in artillery fire-adjustment procedures.

UNDEREMPLOYMENT OF EVEN PRESENT CAPABILITIES

18. In spite of all the weaknesses quoted the RF/PF in Quang Tri, without any future training or equipment could be capable of greater effort. With certain notable exceptions both Sector and Sub-sectors are reluctant to deploy resources overnight at any distance from their HQ. Examples are:
- a. Reluctance to conduct operations in the "no mans land" between the populated areas and the normal areas worked in by ARVN/FWMAF units (examples: area west of Quang Tri Combat Base, "Jones Creek" in Gio Linh, foothills north of Cam Lo HQ).
 - b. Lack of ambush coverage by concentrating RF companies in too small an area. The greater the strength, the more reluctant RF commanders appear to be to dispose it in ambush positions.

- c. A lack of initiative in suggesting combined operations both with FVMAF and ARVN.
 - d. Under-employment of Sector RF units which tend to be too much of a "Palace Guard".
 - e. Non-employment of the Sector mechanized platoon which remains in the city.
 - f. Failure to train, utilize or maintain existing mine-sweeping resources.
 - g. Too ready a desire to request US logistical support when the existing Vietnamese logistics system is quite adequate to cope with many of these demands.
 - h. In general, a lessening of effort as a result of Quang Tri's comparatively peaceful state.
19. The above is largely due to personality causes and constant effort is made by advisors, with some success, to generate activity in these matters. What is needed is a high-level direction that, with reduction of US presence, the RF and PF will be required to shoulder greater burdens and shoulder them quickly.

PART 4

DEFICIENCIES IN ADVISORY SUPPORT OF RF/PF

GENERAL

20. Advisory support has 4 main areas of deficiency:
- a. Unbalanced assessment of RF/PF effort by undue concentration on the sensational rather than normal aspects of performance.
 - b. Attempts to influence RF/PF efficiency by piece-meal efforts from below rather than direction from higher HQ.
 - c. The CAP program which in Quang Tri is now of questionable value.
 - d. The failure of the MATS program.

UNBALANCED ASSESSMENT

21. Publicity of RF/PF performances unduly concentrates on the sensational victory or disaster. The reaction of senior commanders to this type of reporting makes it clear that they are not receiving from their staffs a balanced picture of overall capability. Examples:
- a. Adulation awarded the RF in the attack on Nhat Le, 20 July 69, when 17 NVA were KIA, overlooked the facts that:
 - (1) The enemy company penetrated deep into an area, supposedly ambushed by 300 RF/PF/PSDF, without detection, (and withdrew back through the same area).
 - (2) The enemy penetrated 30 meters of barbed wire before being detected.
 - (3) Claymores sited were both not fired and failed to detonate.

- (4) Bunker construction was so flimsy that roofs fell in without having been penetrated by B-40's.
 - (5) The reserve mortar ammunition was concentrated, not under ground, and if hit would have demolished the defenders.
- b. Undue pessimism and criticism levelled at 73 pf platoon, which broke contact and abandoned 2 advisors at Huong Hoa on 13 June 69. Not fully appreciated was:
- (1) The platoon, armed only with carbines, held its own for 15 minutes in a fire-fight against considerably superior fire-power.
 - (2) That only when 2 PF were KIA and 3 WIA, was the withdrawal started.
 - (3) The platoon leader gave the order to withdraw knowing that more troops were further back.
 - (4) The platoon had almost run out of ammunition.
 - (5) That if the Vietnamese commander gives the order to retire then advisors who don't follow suit have only themselves to blame if left behind.
22. Unbalanced assessment is almost entirely due to:
- a. Senior commanders reacting to events rather than concentrating on the unspectacular normal activity.
 - b. The bulk of reporting on field performance is done by MATS leaders who however keen, usually lack the experience for balanced assessment.

PIECE-MEAL EFFORTS AT ADVISORY EFFORTS

23. Vietnamese officers do not change a system unless authorized to do so by their seniors. It is therefore rarely possible for advisors at unit level to effect reforms even in rare cases where their counterparts listen to advice. Yet continual directives come down advisory channels as to what RF/PF should or should not do. Unless initiated with Vietnamese agreement at the level of initiation, and paralleled with directions to the RF/PF down the Vietnamese command chain, such directives are absolutely worthless.
24. Junior advisors are in the invidious position of responsibility without authority. They are directed to produce results, or suffer in their careers, when those directing have not produced similar results at their level. The Vietnamese know this, and tend to politely "blackmail" advisors into acquiescence.

CAP PROGRAM

25. Without detracting from the courage of the young Marines involved the CAP program in now of doubtful value in Quang Tri. However, it must always be borne in mind, that in contested areas, the presence of CAP's forces the PF to committ themselves and break any truce with the VC. In a very short time there will be few such contested areas left in Quang Tri.
26. The deficiencies of the CAP presence are:
- a. CAP/RF performance is, judged on contact results (see Annex B) considerably less efficient than the RF or even PF on their own.
 - b. Although arrival of a CAP team inveriably produces contact where previously a truce had prevailed, arrival of RF produces exactly the same effect.
 - c. Presence of CAPs, although obviously of excellent training value, is negated by the reduction in PF activity. The PF usually produce a minority of their number for activities and many so-called "combined" activities are really Marine operations with a few PF tagging along.
 - d. Presence of CAPs produces problems of culture clash and accidental casualties which may well be doing harm to participation greater than the purely military gains being made. *Pacification*

MATS PROGRAM

27. This appears to be the greatest failure of all country-wide RF/PF programs. It is doubtful if the combined instruction given by all 8 MATS teams in Quang Tri this year exceeds the basic training man-hours of a single RF company at Dong Da RF/PF Training Center. For the resources and man-power involved the program produces pitifully little. The teams are useful as a monitoring and reporting agency, to augment the short-staffed District teams and to give a US presence to remote areas (e.g. Cua Viet, Gia Dang). Some instances occur of worthwhile training being effected but they are few.
28. The causes of the failure appear to be:
- a. Vietnamese officers just refuse to accept the fact that they can learn anything from newly-commissioned officers most with no combat experience.
 - b. Being so long at war, both ARVN and RF/PF have little appreciation of need for re-training.

- c. RF/PF units have operational tasks to perform and are not going to alter their orders to fit the training plans of a 21 year old US lieutenant.
 - d. Certain teams have unfortunately not set a very good standard of professionalism and personal conduct and as a result MATS teams generally are poorly regarded by RF/PF unit commanders.
 - e. Language. Most armies find difficulty in producing satisfactory instruction in their own language let alone someone elses.
29. Most of MATS officers are potentially good but that cuts no ice with Vietnamese as the MATS officers:
- a. Are too young to be appreciated in a nation that respects age.
 - b. Either have had no combat experience in country or often have been levied from US units with all that any levy entails (i.e. not the unit's best).
 - c. In many cases, through no fault of theirs, they just do not have sufficient military knowledge.
 - d. It is asking too much to demand in such great quantity, young officers who:
 - (1) Are nature
 - (2) Are combat experienced
 - (3) Are good instructors
 - (4) Get on well with Vietnamese
 - (5) And can do all this in remote areas with little supervision. Such people are needed elsewhere.

PART 5

POSSIBLE AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

30. Steps which could be taken to improve the Territorial Forces are those:
- a. Which can be effected by US.
 - b. Which require US/RVN agreement at national level.
31. On a US basis the following could be implemented:
- a. An openly stated policy of withdrawal of US assets from those RF/PF who do not perform (provided care is taken not to direct this against commanders who merely do not agree with advisors).
 - b. Steps to increase the night fire-power of RF/PF by extra claymores, machineguns and trip-flares.
 - c. A policy of not releasing a new type of equipment to the RVNAF until the Vietnamese have first initiated a sound policy of training in the new weapon prior to its general issue.

- d. Insistence on balanced reporting of RF/PF performance by refraining from undue emphasis on the more sensational victories or defeats.
 - e. A policy that no directions on RF/PF improvement be sent down advisory channels unless paralleled through VN channels. (This may already occur but, if so, does not get down the lower VN levels).
 - f. CAP's be withdrawn from pacified areas.
 - g. Serious consideration be given to the future of the MATS program.
32. On a combined US/VN level the following would seem to be applicable:
- a. All "private armies" (e.g. CIDG, FRU, NFFF, PSDF) be brought clearly into one chain of command either Sector or ARVN Divisional.
 - b. ARVN and Territorial Forces must be forced to cooperate, in the interest of their own survival after US troop withdrawal.
 - c. An examination be made of the officer structure, particularly the apparent over-staffing of HQ and under-staffing of units.
 - d. Increased junior leader training, particularly at NCO level.
 - e. A critical examination be made of the concept of PF under the village chief. It may be possible to assign the PSDF to this role (remembering that originally the PF were run on the same basis as the present PSDF). The PF could then be recruited on an RF basis (i.e. for service anywhere in the province) and re-assigned, on rotation, as separate RF platoons for village level defense.
 - f. A nation-wide campaign of minimizing unauthorized discharge of weapons, supported by the most rigorous penalties.
 - g. A training program specifically aimed at:
 - (1) Night ambush techniques.
 - (2) Adjustment of fires.
 - (3) Retraining of all 81 mm mortar crews.
 - h. Consideration of the MATS program being handed over to Vietnamese, possibly with one US advisor with each team.

PART 6

CONCLUSION

33. From the foregoing it could be assumed that the Quang Tri Territorial Forces are in bad shape. This is not so. For a militia force they are quite good. But for the opposition they may face they are just not good enough.

34. It is considered that the present capability is:
- a. Deficient in performance when the manpower invested (8000) is weighed against the current level of enemy activity.
 - b. Presuming that withdrawal of FVMAF forces would result in NVA incursions of up to company strength in populated areas, inadequate to cope.

ANNEXES, a to c

- a. Aush performance Quang Tri Territorial Forces
- b. Summary night contact results March-June 1969
- c. Comparison of RF company contact results March-June 1969.

H.L. BELL
MAJ, AATTV
SENIOR TERRITORIAL FORCES ADVISOR

ANNEX A
TO QUANG TRI PROVINCE NARRATIVE RF/PF EVALUATION OVERVIEW
AMBUSHING BY TERRITORIAL FORCES, QUANG TRI SECTOR

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.

1. A large number of night activities are reported as "ambushes". An average total is about 40 platoon and 140 squad-sized "ambushes" each night
2. It is obvious that the efficiency of these "ambushes" is not good as in April 1969, for example:
 - a. Few made contact (42 out of approximately 6000 "ambushes laid).
 - b. Most of the contacts had negative or unsuccessful results (24 negative, 7 unsuccessful, 11 successful).

AIM.

3. The aim of this paper is to examine the methods by which Territorial Force ambush performance may be improved.
4. The FM 21-75 definition of an ambush is "a surprise attack from a concealed position upon a moving or stationary target". It is suggested that for our usage the definition be amended to "a surprise attack by a force lying in wait upon a moving or temporarily halted enemy" for the following reasons:
 - a. Ambush positions at night may not necessarily be concealed.
 - b. A surprise attack on a stationary target (e.g. a company attack on a known enemy defensive position) may not necessarily be an ambush.
 - c. The term "lying in wait" is the key to the function of an ambush -- it is sited to await arrival and attack on enemy known or hoped to be entering the area as opposed to an outpost merely designed to give early warning to its parent unit.

FACTORS AFFECTING AMBUSH PERFORMANCE.

5. Many ambushes, described as such, are not in fact, as:
 - a. They are not sited lying in wait on an expected enemy but are merely sited as listening posts. These constitute the majority of all PF squad "ambushes".
 - B. All troops are not necessarily required to be awake and their activity is in fact a night defensive locality with sentries.

DEDUCTION.

The practice of describing such activities as ambushes should be ceased.

6. Ambush alertness is not always satisfactory for the following reasons:
 - a. Participants are permitted to become too comfortable by being allowed to carry sleeping gear on ambushes. (This has occurred even with CAP teams present).
 - b. The number of activities run by some units are such, that if they were genuinely ambushing each night, alertness would be a physical impossibility. A man cannot lay in ambush all night, work by day, and do this for years (or even days) on end.

DEDUCTION.

- a. Specific orders must be given to prohibit carriage of sleeping gear on ambushes.
 - b. The number of activities should be consistent with the requirements of adequate rest.
7. Ambush strengths and fires are usually inadequate to combat enemy of squad-plus strength or to completely destroy smaller enemy groups. The reasons are:
 - a. Absence of an organic belt-fed machine gun which can be sited along the ambush killing ground.
 - b. Most units appear to only take a proportion of their strength on ambush e.g. most PF squads associated with CAPS usually muster 2-3 men per activity.
 - c. Even when at full strength a squad cannot produce effective fire on the killing ground, once members of the squad are detailed for flank and rear early warning and security. A regular squad is able to overcome this reduced capability by the firepower of its machine-guns and claymores. An RF/PF squad does not possess these equipments. This applies even more to those units still equipped with M-1 rifles and carbines.

DEDUCTIONS.

- a. The equipment of the Territorial Forces needs additional fire-power if squad ambushes are to have any hope of success.
- b. Units must be directed to employ all available personnel on ambushes. If the requirement for adequate rest or other duties prevent full attendance at an activity, then the number of activities should be reduced to that which can be effectively executed.

8. Training in ambush techniques is deficient. Some examples are:
- a. Rear protection is often not considered. (This may result from the inadequate strength of squad ambushes not having men to spare for rear security).
 - b. There is often no method of intercommunication and the ambush commanders sometimes walk up and down to insure alertness of their troops, and have to talk to alert the ambush to an enemy approach. A simple system of cord signals does not seem to be a local technique.
 - c. There is too much reliance on indirect fire and hand-held illuminations. The former is too slow for ambush use, the second gives away the commander's location. A command detonated trip-flare is the best but its use in ambushes does not appear to be widely known.
 - d. Checks of personnel to remove smoking gear, sleeping equipment and noisy gear, do not appear to be normal.
 - e. Ambushes continue to return by their outward route and to occupy the same positions night after night.

DEDUCTION.

There is a requirement to re-train RF/PF in simple ambush techniques.

CONCLUSIONS.

9. The following appear to be the steps necessary to improving the situation:
- a. Clarify with Sector as to the definition of an ambush, and correctly define night activities.
 - b. Upgrade efficiency by reducing the number of activities to those which can be mounted at full strength and kept fully awake.
 - c. Improve fire-power by instruction in the use of, and supply of, trip-flares and claymores.
 - d. Improve ambush preparations, particularly the checking of equipment prior to movement.
 - e. Conduct training aiming at disseminating ambush techniques down to squad level, and on-the-ground checking to see that the training has been absorbed.

ANNEX B

NIGHT CONTACTS MARCH 1969

	<u>CAPS</u>	<u>RF</u>	<u>PF</u>	<u>OTHERS</u> (RD, PSDF, PHU)
Number of contacts	59	39	43	9
% of activities- that had contact	2.0%	.4%	.2%	
Successful	12	18	10	3
Not successful	15	4	7	2
No results	32	17	26	4
Enemy kia	21	42	18	4
wpns	17	26	10	3
Friendly KIA	18 (Susmc)	6	3	1
WIA	52 (20 ")	19	24	8
wpns lost	8	6	3	

Summary

CAPS	21 ene	17 wpns	18 KIA (8 US)	52 WIA (20 US)
RF/PF	60 ene	36 wpns	9 KIA	43 WIA
RF only	42 ene	26 wpns	6 KIA	19 WIA

ANNEX C

RF CONTACTS MARCH-JUNE 1969

<u>RF Co #</u>	<u>CONTACTS</u>	<u>SUCC.</u>	<u>UNSUCC.</u>	<u>NEG.</u>	<u>CAS.</u>	<u>EN. WPNS.</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>FR. WIA</u>	<u>WPNS.</u>
121 (good)	5	3	1	1	7	1	---	1	---
122 (good)	2	2	-	-	6	5	---	---	---
123 (good)	2	2	-	-	2	1	---	---	---
124 (very good)	6	5	-	1	10	7	---	---	---
145 (very poor)**	7	1	3	3	2	1	2	9	---
151 (fair)	1	1	-	-	2	-	1	---	---
152 (good)	7	3	-	4	3	2	---	---	---
256 (poor)	1	-	-	1	-	-	---	---	---
350 (fair)	4	2	-	2	5	2	---	---	---
459 (poor)	1	-	-	1	-	-	---	---	---
560 (poor)	1	-	-	1	-	-	---	---	---
911 (poor)	1	-	-	1	-	-	---	---	---
912 (poor)	2	1	1	-	2	3	2	4	6
913 (very good)	2	1	-	1	8	5	---	1	---
914 (good)	1	1	-	-	7	4	1	1	---
915 (very good)	4	2	-	2	3	1	1	---	---

NO CONTACT: 148, 174, 127, 125, 246, 149, 229 cos.

** On 2 negative contacts, merely called artillery without engaging with SAF

EXTRACTS FROM REPORT BY MAJ EBYDON
1ST BN 2MSF - AUG 69

Operations

1. General. Because of the proposed relocation of the 4th US Div nearer the coast 1 FFV have designated the following AO's for 2 MSF until at least Oct 69.

BEN HET AO - 1 Bn

DUC LAP AO - 2 Bns or if possible 3 Bns.

Both the 1st and 2nd Bns will be deployed in the DUC-LAP AO for this period.

2. Ist Bn. Deployed in the Ben-Het AO from the 23 Jul to 12 Aug. The first mission was the recovery of a body (Capt GREEN), this was completed on 30 Jul. The Bn then moved into a new AO for the remainder of the period to * search for enemy arty posns. The attached map shows a road built by NVA/VC which despite all the arty and air strikes during the BEN HET operations is still in relatively good condition. Two arty bunkers located were undamaged. They were approx 15x15x7ft high with 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ /4ft overhead being built into a ridge itself directly off the road.

3. Results of Training at MSF Training Centre : An-Khe. I can only estimate the value to the Bn of the retraining period at the MSF Trg Centre as I had not been with them previously nor have any other members who are actually in the field now. However the absentee rate for the operation was very low and they finished still reasonably fresh.

4. Generally their movement, security and protection were good during the operation. Some aspects such as river and obstacle crossings do need a definite improvement.

5. 212 Coy (containing VNMF Commanders). A separate report, I submitted to the CO 2MSF, and which has been forwarded to the Comd Coy B 5th SFG is attached.

Maj EBYDON
AATTV

* Map not attached.

Attachment to
Annex F
to AATTV Report - Aug 69

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DETACHMENT B-20
COMPANY B, 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO 96318

AVGB-SFB-MSF

19 August 1969

SUBJECT: Performance of the 212 MSF Company on Operation Ben Het AO from
23 July 1969 to 18 August 1969.

THRU: Commanding Officer
Det B-20, Co B, 5th SFGA, 1st SF
APO 96318

TO: Commanding Officer
Co B, 5th SFGA, 1st SF,
APO 96318

1. General. The overall performance of the company during the operation was satisfactory, but is still inconclusive as there were no enemy contacts.
2. Organization. The LLDB assigned are adequate for control down to Platoon Leader level with additionally one (1) medic and the company headquarters. They showed, particularly at platoon level, enthusiasm and good control. The Company Commander has been advised to do more himself and if possible integrate himself more into the company.
3. Communications. From Battalion Headquarters to Company Headquarters no problems existed, but some changes for the next operation will be brought in:
 - a. Radio set for LLDB Battalion Commander on the alternate frequency.
 - b. Placement of an interpreter in the Company Headquarters.
 - c. Placement of an ARVN FO party with the company and also an ARVN Artillery LNO at the FSCC.
4. Protection. Aspects of this were brought to the Company Commander's attention throughout the operation. These included:
 - a. Short Halts - The Company Commander tended to move up to the Battalion Commander at every short halt, with the result of overcrowding in that location.

.../2

b. Bunching - Both on the move at obstacles and at short halts the company tended to lose their flank protection.

c. Night location - More coordination was needed at the platoon level to prevent gaps in the depth portion of the night perimeter and overcrowding around the company headquarters. This was pointed out and improved during the operation.

5. Patrolling. This was the major subject which must be improved:

a. During the first phase of the operation (recovery of Captain Green's body) my plan was for 212 company to form a base and screen west of the given locations. 211 company had a similar task to the northwest. The screen was provided, but unfortunately to the east. On this occasion the battalion commander declined to accompany me on the patrol. This hindered communications.

b. Due to time out/in and the company tracks crossed by the other companies during two one (1) day patrols in phase two (search for road and enemy artillery positions), I am not convinced the task as given was fully carried out. The patrol routes submitted on return show the task as completed. However, the company commander himself did not go on the patrol on the second occasion.

WILLIAM J. BRYDON
Major, AATTV
CO, 1st MSF Bn

Pleiku
23 Aug 69

HQ AATTV

REPORT BY CAPT ROME ON OPERATION CONDUCTED
BY 2BN 2MSFC 3 AUG - 22 AUG

Reference : DUC XUYEN 1:50000

General

1. The battalion conducted a search and destroy operation in an AO Southeast of Duc-Lap "A" Camp. The operation was aimed against suspected enemy troop movements and caches both of which had been previously encountered by 3Bn 2MSFC.
2. Duration. The actual dates of time on the ground in the AO were 5 Aug - 19 Aug; the remainder of the time was spent waiting for aircraft at Ban-Me-Thuot.
3. Strength. The average for the operation was :

AATTV	3
USASF	9
CIDG	330
VNSF	3
(LLDB)	
4. Summary of Contacts. Five contacts were made during the operation.
 - a. 06 1130 hrs. A two platoon patrol from 222 Coy encountered a NVA squad 300m from the fire base at GR 000694. Both sides withdrew after initial contact; results MSF 6 WIA NVA, unknown.
 - b. 08 0415 hrs. An unknown enemy group were fired on by a standing patrol from 223 Coy. The enemy withdrew immediately and a sweep of the area in the morning found complete web and rucksack equipment-both were heavily bloodstained. A blood trail was followed which led to a discarded pair of bloodstained trousers. Results. MSF nil, Enemy 1 WIA. GR 021697.

.../2

c. 09 1300 hrs. 221 Coy contacted an estimated NVA squad at GR 029699. The enemy broke contact when 221 Coy immediately assaulted their position. Results MSF nil, NVA nil.

d. 15 1830 hrs. 222 Coy contacted three NVA on company perimeter at GR 092697. The enemy withdrew at 1930 hrs the friendly position received 12x60mm mortar rounds at a distance of 200m from the perimeter. Results MSF nil. NVA nil.

e. 16 1600 hrs. A platoon ambush from 222 Coy contacted 1NVA at GR 085681. Results MSF nil NVA 1 KIA.

5. Concept of Operation. The three companies moved independently to search the valley and foothills in the area bounded by GR 0273, 0268, 1070, 1073. The companies remained within reasonable reaction distance most of the time with the exception of 222 Coy on the South side who were at times completely separate. It was intended to move south into the next valley but time did not allow this. 223 and 221 Coys concentrated on ambush while 222 Coy moved at a faster rate and employed platoon patrols up to 2000m.

Summary

6. Although the results are not outstanding the operation was successful in that the Montagnards improved to a marked degree. It appeared they felt "at home" in an area where the enemy were in squad size groups and were unwilling to make sustained contact. Support available, with the exception of the movement into and out of the AO, was good. It is still my opinion that this unit requires further training. There is an eight day period scheduled after the next operation which should raise the standard.

Capt ROWE
AATTV

REPORT BY WO2 T F MALONE - RVNAF ARMOR SCHOOL
20 JUL TO 20 AUG 69

1. Since my last report there has been no courses completed but two (2) additional Cav Sqns have commenced training. The 1/17 Cav troop will complete their training on Friday 22 Aug, they will then move to operational area in I CTZ. Until the beginning of this phase, training moved at a rather slow rate, however at present it is flowing smoothly.
2. A range practice for 76mm, 107mm mortar, 82mm mortar, 106mm RCL, 57 RCL, .50 and .30 cal MG was conducted in the 1 ATF area on the 24 Jul and again on the 14 Aug. These were highly successful and great credit must go to the operations section of 1ATF for their help and co-operation. The firing range at Trang-Bom is still under construction and it is hoped to be used for the next shoot on the 28 Aug.
3. In conclusion after recent discussions Senior Advisor/CO AATTV, the advisory effort is again flowing smoothly and the senior advisor is putting some good ideas into operation, this is going to be much easier when the staff advisor (Capt) arrives, the posting of whom has been approved by higher command.

(T.F. MALONE)
WO2
AATTV

AATTV IV CTZ
Can-Tho
931-2308

Aug 69

Commanding Officer
AATTV
Saigon

EXTRACTS FROM MONTHLY REPORT - IV CTZ
AUGUST 1969

General

1. During the early part of the month general enemy activity remained at a low level. Infiltration reports continued to be received from agents operating along the Cambodian border. The majority of these reports located VC units, usually battalion size, in Base Area 704 moving from east to west. Indications are that the majority of these troops are NVA.
2. The mid-portion of the month saw a marked increase in enemy activity. This followed the normal monthly "high point" pattern except that the number of incidents, was lower than in previous months. Conservation of force tactics employing indirect fire attacks and harassing fire were prevalent in the recent high point. The number of road interdictions; primarily on Highway 4, rose appreciably.
3. The IV Corps G-2 estimate concerning the locations of the elements of the 273rd Regiment is as follows: It is felt that the 10th Battalion moved from the Seven Mountains to Kien-Giang Province and was followed by the 9th and 8th Battalions. The 10th and 9th Battalions subsequently pushed through to an area south of Rach-Gia city. The 8th Battalion probably returned to the Three Sisters Mountains. The 7th Battalion along with the Regimental HQ is still in the Seven Mountains area and will remain until the 8th Battalion has completed its infiltration into the U-Minh Forest area.
4. Agent reports continue to indicate a large unidentified unit, composed mostly of NVA, moving south from Lo-Go Mountain (Cambodia) towards the Ca-Hang base area adjacent to Chau-Doc City. Scattered unconfirmed reports in the past six weeks have indicated the possible presence of elements of the 1st NVA Division in Cambodia near Base Area 704.

A. HARKNESS
Major
Senior Advisor

AATTV IV CTZ
Can-Tho
931-2308

Aug 69

Commanding Officer
AATTV
Saigon

EXTRACTS FROM MONTHLY REPORT - IV CTZ
AUGUST 1969

General

1. During the early part of the month general enemy activity remained at a low level. Infiltration reports continued to be received from agents operating along the Cambodian border. The majority of these reports located VC units, usually battalion size, in Base Area 704 moving from east to west. Indications are that the majority of these troops are NVA.
2. The mid-portion of the month saw a marked increase in enemy activity. This followed the normal monthly "high point" pattern except that the number of incidents, was lower than in previous months. Conservation of force tactics employing indirect fire attacks and harassing fire were prevalent in the recent high point. The number of road interdictions; primarily on Highway 4, rose appreciably.
3. The IV Corps G-2 estimate concerning the locations of the elements of the 273rd Regiment is as follows: It is felt that the 10th Battalion moved from the Seven Mountains to Kien-Giang Province and was followed by the 9th and 8th Battalions. The 10th and 9th Battalions subsequently pushed through to an area south of Rach-Gia city. The 8th Battalion probably returned to the Three Sisters Mountains. The 7th Battalion along with the Regimental HQ is still in the Seven Mountains area and will remain until the 8th Battalion has completed its infiltration into the U-Minh Forest area.
4. Agent reports continue to indicate a large unidentified unit, composed mostly of NVA, moving south from Lo-Go Mountain (Cambodia) towards the Ca-Hang base area adjacent to Chau-Doc City. Scattered unconfirmed reports in the past six weeks have indicated the possible presence of elements of the 1st NVA Division in Cambodia near Base Area 704.

A. HARKNESS
Major
Senior Advisor