


Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report and enclosures
1 - 30 September 1969

Series: AWM95 - Australian Army
commanders' diaries

Item: 1/2/69

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HEADQUARTERS
Army Component

19 Oct 69

AATTV MONTHLY REPORT - SEP 69

1. Attached, for information, is a copy of the AATTV Monthly Report for Sep 69.

R.A. Hay
(R.A. HAY)
Major General

Commander Australian Force
VIETNAM

Attachment: 1. AATTV Report - September 1969.

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AUSTRALIAN FORCE VIETNAM

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HEADQUARTERS

Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam

16 Oct 69

HQ AFV (3)

AATTV REPORT - SEPTEMBER 1969

General

1. During Sep, operational activity in all CTZs resulting in contact with the enemy in which members of AATTV were involved was at a relatively low level.

Casualties

2. AATTV operational casualties for the month of Sep were : 1 WIA.

Deployment

3. The deployment of AATTV as at 6 Oct 69 is attached at Annex A.

I Corps

4. The upsurge of enemy activity involving ARVN units in I CTZ in the latter part of Aug, which was reported in the previous AATTV Report, did not continue at the same level during Sep. Harassment of US units however did continue, particularly those scheduled for re-deployment out of Vietnam over the next three months.

5. Extracts of report by Maj Johnston, the Senior AATTV Advisor in I CTZ, are attached at Annex B.

6. Attached at Annex C is a summary of the major operational contacts in I CTZ in which ARVN units with AATTV advisors were involved during Sep.

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7. Attached at Annex D are AATTV advisor reports of interest from I CTZ.
8. Attached at Annex E is a copy of a report by Capt Paul (AATTV), the Senior Advisor 3/3 ARVN Bn, to his Regimental Senior Advisor regarding the performance, methods and shortcomings of 3/3 ARVN Bn. This report in conjunction with those in Annex D, should be of particular interest and assistance to JTC Canungra in regard to the training of advisors for AATTV.

II Corps

9. 2nd Mobile Strike Force Command (2MSF)
- a. During the month of Sep, both battalions of 2MSF in which members of AATTV are involved again operated in the Duc-Lap/Bu-Prang area. Only minor contact was made with the enemy during these operations, despite continued reports of a large enemy build-up in the area along the Cambodian border.
- b. Extracts from a report by Maj Brydon (AATTV), Commanding 1st Bn 2MSF are attached at Annex F. A report by Capt Rowe (AATTV), Commanding 223 Coy of 2nd Bn 2MSF, is attached at Annex G.
10. 14 ARVN Cav. A report by WO1 Gason, Senior Advisor 1/14 ARVN Cav (a tank tp), is attached at Annex H.
11. Province Recce Units (PRU)
- a. Montagnard Mobile Training Team (MMTT). The non-Vietnamese strength of the MMTT has now been reduced to two. Both of these are members of AATTV - the Team Leader and his assistant. A copy of a report by Capt Deane (AATTV) who is the Team Leader is attached at Annex I.
- b. PRU : Tuyen-Duc Province. An AATTV advisor (WO2 Carter), who has been working in the PRU Programme for some seven months, was re-deployed during Sep to be the Senior Advisor PRU in Tuyen-Duc Province and is based at Dalat.
12. Recondo School (5SFG) : Nha-Trang. Due to a shortage of specialist trained (SAS) Warrant Officers in AATTV, the provision of a member of AATTV as an instructor at the Recondo School has had to be temporarily suspended. It is understood however that Aust liaison with the school and access to the US techniques taught there is being maintained by periodic visits by members of the SAS Sqn from 1 ATF.

III Corps

13. RF Training : Phuoc-Tuy
- a. The 5/69 RF Course (910 RF Coy) ended on 17 Sep : The overall

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standard reached was satisfactory. The Course ended on a high note with a successful and rewarding ambush being conducted as part of the final operational training. A report by WO2 Kealy, the Senior Instructor of the AATTV RF Training Cadre, is attached at Annex J.

b. The 6/69 RF Course (771 RF Coy) marched in and commenced training on 26 Sep 69.

14. LRP Training : Van-Kiep.

a. Extracts from a report by Capt Harris (AATTV), Chief Instructor of the LRP Wing, on the 4/69 LRP Course which completed its training in Sep, is attached at Annex K.

b. The tour of ARVN Divs/Regts in III CTZ who have sent groups for training at the LRP Wing has now been completed. Reports by the Chief Instructor of the LRP Wing, who visited the ARVN formations concerned, indicate that a number of Divs/Regts are not employing their trained LRPs correctly. This matter has already been discussed with the Comd and the Senior Advisor of the Ranger Training Centre (which trains ARVN LRPs for I and II CTZs), who find the same problems with LRPs trained there. The matter will now be taken up with the Senior Advisor at Central Training Command by CO AATTV in an attempt to correct and improve this situation.

15. PRU : Phuoc-Tuy. As forecast in the AATTV Report for Aug, somewhat of a stir did occur during Sep as a result of efforts by the Senior Advisor of the PRU (WO2 Ison - AATTV) to improve the efficiency of the PRU. The stir was restricted to US elements. However as a result of discussions with the PSA Phuoc-Tuy and with the PRU Directorate by CO AATTV all problems now seem to have been resolved. WO2 Ison's methods and results are still held in high regard and on his return from pre-extension leave in mid Oct he should be able to continue the good work.

IV Corps

16. Enemy activity in IV CTZ was at a relatively low level during Sep except for several isolated incidents. One of these incidents involved the use by the enemy of 122mm rockets. It is only the second known time that this size of rocket has been employed in the Delta. In addition, numerous reports continue to be received of NVA units infiltrating into IV CTZ and also that for the first time NVA troops are operating in Chuong-Thien and Bac-Lieu Provinces.

17. The AATTV Village Defence Advisory Teams (VDAT) continue to have varying but improved degrees of success. In an attempt to achieve a quicker breakthrough and hence expedite the spreading of the VDAT influence, every effort is being made to produce "example hamlets/villages" in each of the provinces in which the VDATs now operate. Once these are achieved in several locations in

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and for

each province and demonstration/indoctrination sessions have been conducted under the sponsorship of Province Chiefs/PSAs at these "example villages" for District Village Chiefs and District Advisory Teams, the tempo of the VDAT project should speed up considerably. If this method is successful the VDATs could then move around their four current provinces more widely and cover more villages than they have up until now been able to do. It may then be possible, in consultation with Dep Cords IV CTZ, to move the VDATs into other suitable provinces of the Delta. Interest in the method of approach and techniques used by the AATTV VDATs in regard to the problems of village security has grown considerably over the last two months as can be seen from the attached report by Maj Harkness (AATTV). At the request of MACCORDS, Saigon, CO AATTV has briefed an officer of their staff on the background, the guide lines provided and the modus-operandi of AATTV's VDATs in the Delta.

18. Attached at Annex L are extracts of a report by Maj Harkness, the Senior AATTV Advisor in IV CTZ.

Administration

19. 8 members of AATTV were hospitalised through illness during Sep. Two members - WO2 PAYNE VC, WO2 BOOTH - were medically evacuated to Aust.

20. At the request of AATTV, medical officers from AFV are undertaking periodical visits to centres where AATTV are based to assist in up-dating members' medical records, to carry out medical examinations as required and to liaise with the US medical installations which provide immediate medical treatment for AATTV. This program has already started and I CTZ and Pleiku area were visited during Sep/early Oct. These visits have proved very worthwhile and it is hoped that they can continue.



(R.D.F. LLOYD)
Lt Col
Comd

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AATTV DEPLOYMENT
AS AT 6 OCT 1969

Annex 'A' to
AATTV Monthly Report
for Sep 69

Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>AATTV : SAIGON</u>								
1.	Lt Col	RDF	Lloyd	RA Inf	HQ AATTV	Commanding Officer	Jan 70	Saigon
2.	Capt	G.W.	Dennis	RA Inf	"	Adjutant	Nov 69	"
3.	WO1	G.S.	Munt	RA Inf	"	Admin WO (Chief Clerk)	Mar 70	"
4.	WO2	T.J.	Colbert	RAE	"	Admin WO (Pay)	Dec 69	"
5.	Cpl	G.H.	Davison	RAASC	"	Clerk	May 70	"
6.	WO2	T.F.	Malone	RAAC	Armoured School	Instructor/Advisor	Oct 69	Thu-Duc (near Saigon)

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Serial	Rank	Initials	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>I CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV : QUANG TRI Province</u>								
7.	Maj	H.L.	Bell	RA Inf	Quang-Tri Sector	Acting Asst Province Advisor (Military)	Nov 69	Quang-Tri
8.	WO2	R.V.	Roney	RAAMC	" " "	Medical Advisor	Apr 70	" "
9.	WO2	J.M.	O'Donnell	RAAOC	Cam-Lo Sub-Sector	Assistant Advisor	Jan 70	Cam-Lo
10.	WO2	J.	Fitzgerald	RA Inf	1/1 ARVN Bn	" "	Jul 70	Near Quang-Tri(Regt.HQ)
11.	WO2	K.A.	Gabriel	RA Inf	2/1 " "	" "	Nov 69	" " " "
12.	WO2	B.L.	Young	RA Inf	3/1 " "	" "	Feb 70	" " " "
13.	WO2	L.N.	Gorman	RAA	4/1 " "	" "	Mar 70	" " " "
14.	WO2	G.M.	Logan	RA Inf	4/1 " "	" "(Designate)	Oct 70	" " " "
15.	WO1	S.D.	Rosenberg	RA Inf	1/2 " "	" "	Apr 70	Dong-Ha (Regt HQ)
16.	WO2	O.W.	Bell	RAA	2/2 " "	" "	Aug 70	" " "
17.	WO2	L.A.	West	RA Inf	3/2 " "	" "	Jul 70	" " "
18.	WO2	R.A.	O'Hara	RA Inf	4/2 " "	" "	Jul 70	" " "
19.	WO2	E.A.	Taylor	RA Inf	5/2 " "	" "	Jul 70	" " "
20.	WO2	H.J.	Stuttard	RAAC	1/11 ARVN Cav	" "	Nov 69	Quang-Tri
21.	WO1	E.C.	Burns	RAAC	1/11 " "	" "(Designate)	Oct 70	" "

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Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>I CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV : THUA THIEN Province</u>								
22.	WO2	D.G.	Killion	RAAMC	Thua Thien Sector	Medical Advisor	Jul 70	Hue
23.	Maj	G.V.	Brown	RAE	Nam-Hoa District	District Senior Advisor	Jun 70	Nam-Hoa
24.	WO2	W.J.	Bruce	RA Inf	Nam-Hoa Sub-Sector	Assistant Advisor	Feb 70	"
25.	WO2	L.N.	Bootes	RAAC	2/7 ARVN Cav	" "	Mar 70	Hue (Base)
26.	WO2	M.R.	Bolitho	RA Inf	Black Panther Coy	" "	Nov 69	" "
27.	WO2	K.W.	Forden	RA Inf	" " "	" "(Designate)	May 70	On pre-extension leave in Australia 18 Sep - 17 Oct 69.
28.	WO2	D.F.	Heenan	RA Inf	2/54 ARVN Bn	" "	Jul 70	Hue (Base)
29.	WO2	S.	Speechley	RAEME	3/54 " "	" "	Jul 70	" "
30.	WO2	D.E.	Watts	RA Sigs	1/3 " "	" "	Jul 70	" "
31.	WO2	J.F.	McKenner	RA Inf	2/3 " "	" "	Jul 70	" " (1/3 Bn Temp Loc Quang-Tri)
32.	Capt	D.F.	Paul	RA Inf	3/3 " "	Senior Advisor	May 70	" "
33.	WO2	TPJ	Van Bakel	RAASC	3/3 " "	Assistant Advisor	Nov 69	" "
34.	WO2	D.F.	Hedges	RA Inf	4/3 " "	" "	Aug 70	" "

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>AATTV : QUANG-NAM Province</u>								
35.	Maj	F.C.	Johnston	RA Inf	HQ I Corps	: G3 (Trg) Advisor	: May 70	: Danang
36.	WO1	J.W.	Mann	RA Inf	AATTV Danang	: Admin WO	: Nov 69	: Aust House Danang
37.	WO2	P.J.	Heslin	RAE	" "	: " "	: Mar 70	: " " "
38.	WO1	R.M.	Almond	RAAC	3/17 ARVN Cav	: Assistant Advisor	: May 70	: Hoi-An
39.	WO2	V.L.	Harris	RA Inf	Hoa-Vang Sub-Sector	: " " RF/PF	: Feb 70	: Hoa-Vang
40.	WO2	R.D.	Aylett	RA Inf	37th Ranger Bn	: " "	: Dec 69	: Near Danang
41.	Capt	W.	Sheppard	RA Inf	1/51 ARVN Bn	: Senior Advisor	: Sep 70	: Mieu-Bong (Regt HQ)
42.	WO2	C.F.	Keioskie	RAASC	2/51 " "	: Assistant Advisor	: Feb 70	: " " "
43.	WO2	W.T.	Jones	RA Inf	3/51 " "	: " "	: Aug 70	: " " "

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Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>AATTV : QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Province</u>								
44.	Capt	J.P.	Nelson	RA Inf	2 ARVN Div TOC	G3 (Ops) Advisor	May 70	Quang-Ngai
45.	WO2	D.	Burke	RA Inf	1/4 ARVN Bn	Assistant Advisor	Aug 70	} Quang-Ngai Province (Regt HQ near Quang-Ngai)
46.	WO2	M.J.	Poole	RA Inf	2/4 " "	" "	Nov 69	
47.	WO2	R.D.	Cameron	RA Inf	3/4 " "	" "	Mar 70	
48.	Capt	R.L.	Smith	RAE	1/5 " "	Senior Advisor	Apr 70	} Quang-Tin Province (Regt HQ near Tam-Ky)
49.	WO2	D.C.	Wilson	RA Inf	2/5 " "	Assistant Advisor	Oct 70	
50.	WO2	K.W.	Heard	RA Inf	3/5 " "	" "	Oct 70	
51.	WO2	G.S.	Horne	RA Inf	4/5 " "	" "	Nov 69	
52.	WO2	D.W.	Eather	RA Inf	1/6 " "	" "	Jul 70	} Quang-Ngai Province (Regt HQ near Quang-Ngai)
53.	Capt	A.J.	Mogridge	RA Inf	2/6 " "	Senior Advisor	Apr 70	
54.	WO2	T.F.	Dolan	RA Inf	3/6 " "	Assistant Advisor	Jan 70	
55.	WO1	J.B.	Staunton- Latimer	RAAC	2/4 ARVN Cav	" "	Feb 70	Quang-Ngai
56.	WO2	J.F.	Ghilotti	RAAC	" " "	" " (Desig)	Aug 70	" "
57.	WO2	T.J.	Goddard	RAA	23 ARVN Arty Bn	Assistant Advisor	Apr 70	" "

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Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>II CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV : PLEIKU</u>								
58.	Maj	W.J.	Brydon	RA Inf	2 nd Mobile Strike Force Command, Det B-20, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)	Bn Comd	Feb 70	Pleiku (Base Camp)
59.	Capt	DJF	Rowe	RA Inf	" " "	Coy Comd	May 70	" "
60.	WO2	F.M.	Moffitt	RA Inf	" " "	Coy Comd	Jun 70	" "
61.	WO2	S.J.	McLaughlin	RA Inf	" " "	Coy Comd (Trg Coy)	Apr 70	" "
62.	WO2	A.G.	Urquhart	RA Inf	" " "	Instructor (Trg Coy)	Oct 69	" "
63.	WO2	J.R.	Vincent	RAA	" " "	" " (Desig)	May 70	" "
64.	WO2	J.T.	Hoolihan	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Jun 70	" "
65.	WO2	A.B.	McCloskey	RA Inf	" " "	Pl Comd	Jul 70	" "
66.	WO2	C.L.	Black	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Jul 70	" "
67.	WO2	K.H.	Mavin	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Aug 70	" "
68.	WO2	L.B.	Scowcroft	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Aug 70	" "
69.	WO2	O.	Stevenson	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Aug 70	" "
70.	WO2	A.J.	Shelton	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Feb 70	" "
71.	WO1	E.W.	Gason	RAAC	1/14 ARVN Cav	Senior Advisor	Dec 69	Kontum.

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Serial	Rank	Init's	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
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II CTZ (Cont'd)

AATTV - II CORPS AREA

72.	Capt	W.R.	Deane	Int Corps	Mobile Training Team (Montagnard PRU's II CTZ)	OC MMTT	Jul 70	Wha-Trang (Base)
73.	WO2	G.L.	Jamieson	RA Inf	" " "	Instructor/Advisor MMTT	Mar 70	" " "
74.	WO2	M.T.	Jensen	RA Inf	Ranger Training Centre	Instructor/Advisor	Nov 69	Duc-My
75.	WO1	E.B.	Ostara	RA Inf	Province Recce Unit	Senior Advisor Binh-Dinh	Dec 69	Qui-Nhon
76.	WO2	R.G.	Carter	RA Inf	" " "	" " Tuyen-Duc	Dec 69	Dalat

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>III CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV : III CORPS AREA</u>								
77.	Capt	PJS	Harris	RA Inf	IRP Wing Van-Kiep National Training Centre	CI	Mar 70	Baria
78.	WO2	C.R.	Ansell	RA Inf	" " "	Admin WO	Mar 70	"
79.	WO2	F.E.	Bell	RA Inf	" " "	Patrol Comd/Instructor	Mar 70	"
80.	WO2	J.W.	Wigg	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Jan 70	"
81.	WO2	K.G.	Latham	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Dec 69	"
82.	WO2	C.J.	Ison	RA Inf	Province Recce Unit	Senior Advisor Phuoc-Tuy	Apr 70	On pre-extension leave in Australia 18 Sep - 17 Oct 69
83.	WO2	C.	Kealy	RA Inf	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	RF Trg Cadre(Senior Instructor)	Aug 70	18 ARVN Div Trg School, near Nui-Dat.
84.	WO2	R.K.	Gurney	RA Inf	" "	" " " (Instructor)	Feb 70	" " "
85.	WO2	AJA	Joyce	RA Inf	" "	" " " (")	Jan 70	" " "
86.	WO2	J.H.	Macartney	RAASC	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	Assistant Advisor A & L Coy (RF)	Jan 70	Baria

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Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>AATTV : IV CORPS AREA</u>								
87.	Maj	A.	Harkness	RAA	CORDS, IV Corps	Assistant to Chief Territorial Security	Apr 70	Can-Tho
88.	WO2	H.J.	Hartman	RAAMC	HQ IV Corps	Medical Advisor	Jul 70	" "
89.	WO2	R.S.	Simpson	RA Inf	IV Corps Village Defence Advisory Team (VDAT)	VDAT Team Leader	Feb 70	Dinh-Tuong Province
90.	WO2	A.A.	Welsh	RAE	" " "	VDAT Advisor	Dec 69	" "
91.	WO2	E.H.	Martin	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Nov 69	" "
92.	WO1	W.A.	Eade	RAA Pro	" " "	VDAT Team Leader	Jul 70	Kien-Hoa Province
93.	WO2	B.L.	Saxby	RAE	" " "	" Advisor	Jan 70	" "
94.	WO2	R.M.	King	RA Inf	" " "	VLAT Team Leader	Dec 69	Vinh-Binh Province
95.	WO2	W.E.	Tillett	RA Inf	" " "	" Advisor	Feb 70	" "
96.	WO2	G.E.	Munro	RA Sigs	" " "	" "	Feb 70	" "
97.	WO2	R.W.	Cairns	RA Inf	" " "	VDAT Team Leader	Jul 70	Vinh-Long Province
98.	WO2	K.J.	Troy	RA Inf	" " "	" Advisor	Mar 70	" "

CO AATTV

EXTRACTS FROM MONTHLY REPORT BY MAJ JOHNSTON
I CTZ - SEP 69

General

1. Enemy activity in I CTZ declined during the month. The month finishing with activity at a comparatively low level. The expected high point of the "Summer-Autumn" offensive for 1-2 September did not occur probably due to the effects of Typhoon DORIS in I CTZ.
2. The only high point worthy of note was four sapper attacks, 11 mortar attacks and five volleys of rockets in the Danang area during the period 06 0105H and 06 1025H.

Withdrawal of 3rd Marine Division

3. During the month the intention to withdraw 3rd Marine Division from North Western Quang-Tri was announced. Dates mentioned were the two remaining regiments by 15 Oct 69 and the complete Division by 15 Dec 69.
4. The necessary redistribution of AOs between 1st ARVN Div, 1st Bde 5th Mech Div (US), and 101st Airborne Div (US) has not yet been finalized. Indications are however that at least temporarily, there will be a general pull back towards the East, with a decrease for the time being of friendly activity to the West of the mountains. This however is not unusual for this time of the year due to the weather, so the real effect of this plan on offensive operations may not be seen until early next year. Whatever the reason, ARVN seem at this time to be going through a "sitting - on - firebase" phase.

(F.C. JOHNSTON)
Maj
AATTV

Danang
30 Sep 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY MAJ JOHNSTON SUMMARISING MAJOR
OPERATIONAL INCIDENTS DURING SEPTEMBER 69
INVOLVING AATTV ADVISORS
IN I CTZ

1. During the week to 7 Sep 69

- a. 1st Bn 3rd ARVN Regt engaged an unknown size enemy force 15 kilometers West South West of HUE (YD 603194). This contact lasted for two hours. Twelve enemy were killed and two prisoners captured.
- b. 4th Bn 3rd ARVN Regt made contact with an estimated enemy platoon 11 kilometers East South East of A Shau Valley (YC 606817) resulting in seven enemy killed, probably from 5th NVA Regt.

2. During the week to 14 Sep 69

- a. On 9 Sep, 1st Bn 2nd ARVN Regt operating in the Central portion of Quang-Tri Province, North of the Ba-Long, while searching the area of the previous days contacts (YD 195435) found 8 NVA bodies and miscellaneous arms, ammo and equipment (See report by WO1 Rosenberg at Annexure 1 to Annex D)
- b. On 12 Sep, 1st Bn 3rd ARVN Regt in the same general area (YD 173427) received 28 rounds of 82mm mortar with no reported casualties.
- c. South of Ba-Long Valley, 4/1 ARVN Bn killed five enemy on 7 Sep (YD 193296) and killed another eight enemy on 10 Sep (YD 168282)
- d. Early morning, 11 Sep, 3rd Bn 6 ARVN Regt engaged an unknown size enemy force 11 kilometers South East of Binh-Son (BS 667836) killing five of the enemy.

3. During the week to 21 Sep

On 17 Sep elements of 2nd Bn 1st ARVN Regt engaged an estimated enemy platoon 15 kilometers South South East of Quang-Tri City (YD 356376) killing 11 of the enemy. In addition, 15 individual and six crew served weapons along with 100 B-40 and B-41 rockets were captured. On 19 Sep a 2nd Bn 1st ARVN Regt patrol encountered an unknown size enemy force in the same area and killed seven enemy.

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4. During the week to 28 Sep

In the same general area South South East of Quang-Tri during the period 25 to 29 Sep, when CO AATTV was with the Bn on operation, 2nd Bn 1st ARVN Regt:

a. On 25 Sep in the vicinity of YD 307433 contacted an unknown size en force. Results: En - 1 KIA, 3 grenades and 30 kg of rice captured.

b. On 26 Sep in civinity of YD 307427 while searching the area killed 1 VC and captured 1 weapon.

c. On 28 Sep in civinity of YD 320393 while searching the area killed 1 VC and captured 1 weapon.

5. On 25 Sep, 10 kilometers South West of Ba-Long (YD 212316) 4th Bn 1st ARVN Regt on a search mission engaged an estimated VC company. Identified by captured documents as the K-14 Battalion of the 7th front, the enemy lost 19 killed in the action.

6. On 26 Sep, 2nd Bn 4th ARVN Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force three kilometers West Northwest of Duc-Pho (BS 776386) killing five of the enemy.

(F.C. JOHNSTON)
Maj
AATTV

INDEX TO AATTV ADVISOR REPORTS OF INTEREST
I CTZ

The following reports of interest from AATTV Advisors in I CTZ are attached:

- Annexure 1 - Report by WO1 S. Rosenberg, Asst Advisor 1/2 ARVN Bn.
- Annexure 2 - Report by WO2 R. O'Hara, Asst Advisor 4/2 ARVN Bn.
- Annexure 3 - Report by WO2 D. Heenan, Asst Advisor 2/54 ARVN Bn.
- Annexure 4 - Report by Capt D. Paul, Senior Advisor 3/3 ARVN Bn.
- Annexure 5 - Report by WO2 D. Hedges, Asst Advisor 4/3 ARVN Bn.
- Annexure 6 - Report by WO2 L. Bootes, Asst Advisor 7 ARVN Cav.
- Annexure 7 - Report by WO2 T. Goddard, Asst Advisor 44 ARVN Arty Bn.
- Annexure 8 - Report by Maj G. Brown, Senior Advisor Nam-Hoa District.
- Annexure 9 - Report by WO2 D. Killion, Medical Advisor Thua-Thien Province.

1/2 ARVN Bn
Dong-Ha
20 Sep 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY WO1 S.D. ROSENBERG
MONTH ENDING 20 SEP 69

1. During the period 30 Aug 69 - 18 Sep 69 1/2 ARVN Regt have been engaged on operation LAM-SON 341 Phase 3.
2. This operation is to "Search and Clear" the Cam-Lo - Mai-Loc areas. The areas allocated to 1st Bn for this operation were to the East and South-East of Mai-Loc.
3. Supporting the operation was 5US Cav as a blocking force to the North and East of the Bn AO. In direct support a battery of 105mm from 62 ARVN Arty from LZ ANGEL.
4. The operation was conducted in two stages.
Stage 1 - Area East of Mai-Loc - 5 days
Stage 2 - Area South East of Mai-Loc - 13 days
5. During Stage 1 - the only significant action was the sighting of a 10 man VC element moving in the direction North towards Cam-Lo. Artillery was fired on the enemy. A search of the area failed to reveal any enemy losses.
6. On the 4 Sep the battalion less a company was withdrawn to Mai-Loc to prepare for the next stage of the operation. A company trained in the use of the starlight scope was left in the old AO to patrol the area. This company had no enemy contact in this area.
7. During Stage 2 the following significant events took place:-
 - a. 1/2 ARVN was air lifted into the new AO less one company still patrolling the previous AO. The air lift was complete by 1100 hrs on 6 Sep.
 - b. 2100 hrs 7 Sep at 194430 the 1/2 Bn CP was attacked by approx two platoons of enemy from the N.E. At 189441 4th Coy 1/2 Bn was attacked by one enemy platoon. The attack on the CP was fierce using automatic weapons and B4Os. After a fire fight lasting approx 5 minutes the enemy withdrew. Illumination from US Artillery was provided from LZ Sierra also a flare ship was used.

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Results - <u>ARVN</u> (C.P.)	-	<u>4th Coy</u>
2 KIA		NIL
2 WIA		NIL
<u>EN</u> unknown		unknown

c. 0800 hrs 8 Sep whilst clearing an LZ for the evacuation of KIA and WIA, a VC booby trap was tripped seriously wounding 1 ARVN soldier.

d. 1135 hrs 8 Sep a visual recce of the near area by helicopter discovered a number of VC houses at 193434. These were fired on by the V.R helicopter causing enemy movement to be seen. A light fire team of gunships were brought on station and strafed the enemy area.

e. Because of the size of the located enemy area, further gunship support was requested. Two light fire teams were quickly on station. However these gunships were refused clearance to fire from their command owing to the three day truce for the mourning of Ho-chi-Minh.

f. The USAF Aerial Recce on Station-Trail 37 managed to scramble three light fire teams of HUEY COBRA gunships. Their command having a different interpretation of the cease fire conditions.

g. During the interval of the unfired gunships departing and the arrival of the ARA COBRAS two companies were sent to clear the enemy position. Both companies met heavy resistance from well dug in enemy.

h. The firepower and accuracy of the ARA gunships allowed the assaulting companies to secure most of the enemy position. Because of the light conditions the companies were ordered to go into defence for the night.

i. 0900 hrs 9 Sep the companies had secured the enemy position.

Results

<u>ARVN</u>	- 3 WIA
<u>EN</u>	
<u>KIA</u>	8
<u>Captured</u>	2 - AK 47 1 RPD Maps of area " " enemy locations Documents Food

.../2

Clothing and equipment
Binoculars 2 pair
15 sets womans clothing

Destroyed

28 houses (large enough
for 4 persons)
(Bunkers located underneath each house)

j. 1600 hrs 9 Sep approx 600 metres to the East of the enemy location
an arms cache was found. The area of the cache was heavily booby
trapped. As a result of the traps 3 ARVN were seriously wounded.

Results of Cache

Captured

3 60mm mortars
6 AK 47
7 AK 51
1 .45 US pistol
2 B40 sights
2 RPD
2 RPG5
1 M16

Destroyed by
ARVN

4 B40 rounds
15 B41
25 82mm H.E Bombs

Destroyed by
ARVN

SAA

Large quantity
AK 47
.38 - 9mm
5.56 - 7.62

B40 - B41 Boosters Large quantity
TNT " "
Blasting Caps " "

k. 2145 hrs 9 Sep 69

Bn CP was probed by Squad size enemy elements.

ARVN casualties NIL

EN unknown

.../4

l. 0915 hrs 10 Sep 69 at 196436

2nd Coy 1/2 Bn captured:

1 PW

1 AK 47

- (i) The PW was NVA. He had been abandoned because he was too sick to walk.
- (ii) He passed very valuable information to the Bn Comd regarding enemy locations.
- (iii) He claimed he was sent from North Vietnam with 80 others to reinforce the VC element operating in the Mai-Loc - Quang-Tri areas. During the first gunship strike on the enemy area he said at least 30 enemy had suffered wounds. He claimed the main element had withdrawn East towards Quang-Tri taking their wounded.

m. 0900 hrs 10 Sep 69 during an air VR more VC houses were seen at 206428. The aircraft was fired upon from the ground. An air immediate air strike was requested. This strike was by VNAF and on target at 1030 hrs. Houses destroyed, secondary explosions

n. 1130 hrs 10 Sep 69 recce patrols found:-

7 VC houses

9 VC bunkers

at GR 195 435 - 205424 - 199419. These were destroyed by air strike and ground troops.

o. 1730 hrs 12 Sep 69 2nd Coy 1/2 Bn made contact with Squad size en force at 170426.

<u>Results</u>	<u>AEVN</u>	1 WIA
	<u>EN</u>	1 KIA
		1 AK51 captured.

p. 2100 hrs 12 Sep 69 3rd Coy 1/2 Bn received 28 rounds 60mm mortar. Results ARVN - 9 WIA.

q. 1100 hrs 14 Sep 69 2nd Coy 1/2 Bn made contact with approx platoon size enemy element at 210434. Air immediate requested, USAF on target 1200 hrs.

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Results of Contact

<u>ARVN</u>	KIA - 1
	WIA - 1
<u>EN</u>	KIA - 3
	Captured - 1 AK 47

Results Air Strike unknown

n. 17 Sep at 234 445 En bunker complex approx 12 months old large enough for battalion plus found.

s. 18 Sep Battalion air lifted to Dong-Ha.

General Comments

1. The area allotted for Stage 2 of the operation is ideal VC country. It provides good cover, good observation, has good land and water routes to it. The area is close to populated areas.
2. It was apparent the enemy had free run of the area for a considerable time.
3. All enemy positions were in the low ground close to permanent water and were in places well chosen for their cover from view (both ground and air) also protection by the land formation from artillery fire.
4. Booby traps were very effective and cunningly placed but gave warning of enemy installations.
5. The five females with the enemy element were for cooking and other housekeeping duties including taking care of the physical needs of the Commanders.
6. The PW claimed the VC went off in small groups for R&R to CUA ^{VIET} MAI-LCC (a far cry from Sydney - Hawaii or Bangkok) !

(S. ROSENBERG)

WO1
AATTV

36680 WO2 R.A. O'HARA
4th Bn 2nd ARVN Regt

CO AATTV

MONTHLY REPORT
PERIOD 1 SEP 69 - 22 SEP 69

1. From the 1 Sep until the 7 Sep, 4th Bn operated out of FSB A2. The Bn in this period conducted platoon & company patrols around the A2 area.

Results of this patrolling;

2 NVA	KIA
1 AK47	captured

2. The Bn departed A2 on the 7th of Sep and remained in their Rear Area at Dong-Ha until the morning of 11 of Sep during this period the Bn refitted.

3. On the 11 of Sep the battalion left Dong-Ha for FSB-C2. The Bn was given an AO to the East of C2 and it has been patrolled by 2 Coys in Coy size patrols since the date we arrived. The two remaining Coys have a rest area to the South of C2 and they ambush the road from Cam-Lo to C2 of a night. These ambushes resulted in a contact with 2 NVA Squads on the night of 18 Sep at 2140 hrs.

Results

1 ARVN	WIA
2 NVA	KIA
2 AK47	captured
2 Mines A/T	captured. These mines are the new all plastic made in East Germany.
2 Packs	
1 Stretcher	

Ambush received 5-6 B40 rockets.

The Bn has conducted 3 operations since it has been in the C2 Base. The first one was a Bn op to the North of A4. There was no contact made but the following items were found

1 Anti tank mine
20 Electric detonators
40 Rds 82mm mortar
50 82mm Fuses
1 82mm mortar base plate
4 Grenades
4 60mm mortar rounds
1 Case 50 cal anti-aircraft ammo.

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This operation was from the 14th to the 15th of Sep.

The second operation was a two Coys ARVN/one Coy 5th Mech combined op. This was not successful. Owing to the weather the APCs could not reach their objectives as planned due to the fact that some of the ground was unpassable. No contact made with the enemy on this op, however 2 APCs hit mines - 1 APC was towed back to C2, the other was left as a battle cas it has since been destroyed. 20 Sep 4/2 ARVN Bn element of this op returned to C2.

On the 22 Sep the CP & two coys conducted a joint op with two Inf Coys of 5th US Mech plus one tank platoon. This was a sweep & search in the area West of C2 from the G2 to the G6 Grid line with the 4/2 ARVN Bn element in the Southern 1200 metre strip. No contact at the time of this report.

0800 on the 22 Sep the light CP and two Coys provided protection for a US Mine Sweep Team to clear the road & Camp Carrol Grid Square 0654. We then secured an LZ for the incoming 2/2 ARVN Bn who will provide security while this FSB is being re-established.

Personal Comment since being with this Bn.

The standard of this battalion is quite high in most aspects, however I have noticed that during a withdrawal from an area or night locations they seem to be bunched up & there appears to be little overall control. On one withdrawal from the area of the DMZ when people became tired or hungry they sat & rested or ate & the Bn continued on. I have brought these points up with my counterpart.

(R.A. O'HARA)
WO2
AATTV

36394 WO2 D.F. HEENAN
2/54 ARVN Bn
HUE

25 September 69

CO AATTV

MONTHLY REPORT
PERIOD 26 AUG TO 28 SEP 69

1. Unit activities during this period were as follows:-
 - a. 26 Aug to 12 Sep - continuation of operation described in last report.
 - b. 13 Sep to 16 Sep Bn rest and refit in area of Regt HQ (ANZIO)
 - c. 17 Sep to 25 Sep Bn operation in area - 10 kilos South of Phu-Loc and extending east to Los Banos Fire Support Base. The companies are operating in 3 separate Coy AO's, adjacent to one another, and each about 7 kilos square in size. Each company is conducting a search and destroy operation, and ambushing at night.
2. On both of the operations, the Bn Senior Advisor has organized the Bn Advisory Team as follows:

He and 1 Asst Advisor remain with BHQ. No advisor goes to the coy operating nearest BHQ. The other 2 Asst Advisors operate separately with the other 2 companies. In each case they have US Arty FO's with them. About every 9 or 10 days the Asst Advisor attached to BHQ exchanges with one of the advisors with the coys.
3. My personal movements were 23 days on field operations with the Coys, 3 days with BHQ and 5 days stand down in Hue taken in two separate lots.
4. The Coy Commanders method of operation, moving short distances, patrolling likely areas in squad and pl size patrols, and ambushing likely VC infiltration routes at night, appears to be sound in view of the expected amount of en movement and strs in our A.O.
5. I still have no trouble working with the other members of the Bn Advisory Team nor with my counterparts, however I am making slow headway in trying to correct some of the deficiencies in basic soldiering techniques, such as : noise, security on short halts, bunching up and moving too close together etc.

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6. Results of Operations

There appears to be very little en activity in the AO's allotted to my unit. We have been working in the mountains, while most of the VC activity in the general area, at this time, seems to be in the lowland coastal areas.

One of the coys I worked with contacted 3 VC on 20 Sep, killing one and captured 1 AK50 rifle. The Bn has had only two or three contacts in the last month. Some of my tasks have been calling medevacs, radio relay for Regt HQ, registering DF's at night and supervising construction of LZ's. I have worked daily with several FAC's, who agree that the area shows little or no sign of en activity.

7. Forecast

My unit is to continue field operations in the area South of Phu-Loc, possibly in a new AO within the next week or so.

8. General

I am enjoying the assignment, and apart from the lack of activity, find the job both rewarding and instructive.

(D.F. HEENAN)
WO2
AATTV

MACV Compound HUE

8 Sep 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY CAPT D.F. PAUL SA 3/3 ARVN BN 17 AUG - 6 SEP 69
3RD ARVN REGT OPERATION IN SOUTHERN THUA THIEN PROVINCE

AIM

1. The aim of the operation was to contact and trap the 5th NVA Regt.

General

2. The operation was conducted in two phases:-

Phase I - 17 - 25 Aug - NORTH, WEST & SOUTH of FIREBASE NUTS (YC7585)

Phase II - 26 Aug - 6 Sep 69 - NORTH & EAST of FIREBASE NUTS.

Friendly Force

3. The following forces ARVN were under the operational control of the 3rd ARVN Regt and were controlled from a forward CP of the 3rd Regt located at Firebase NUTS (18 Aug - 2 Sep 69) & PISTOL (2 Sep - 7 Sep 69):-

1/1 Bn
3/3 Bn
Hac Bao Co (Phase II only).

4. US Forces from 1st Bde, 101 Div, also took part in the operation.

Intelligence

5. Intelligence sources both US & 1st ARVN DIV located units of the 5th NVA Regt WEST of Firebase NUTS. Later a map recovered by 3/3 Bn placed the Regt further to the NORTH and caused the second phase to be mounted. The known tactic of the 5th NVA Regt was to avoid contact.

Comment: The operation located only squad size elements of the 5th Regt who appear to have been left behind as recce elements and guards of the Regt's supply areas.

3/3 BN

Location of Aust Advisors

6. (a) Capt Paul - Bn HQ & 1st Co
(b) WO2 Van-Bakel - 3rd Co.

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PHASE I (17 Aug - 25 Aug)

Move to AO

7. 17 Aug - by TCV to Firebase BIRMINGHAM (YC7110)
18 Aug - CA by 50 sorties to LZ at YC7992

Significant Contacts - only TWO

8. (a) 20 Aug at 0730 hrs at YC764915 whilst moving out of the night loc, the rear of Bn HQ saw 6 NVA and engaged them. The firefight continued for an hour as the NVA on the high ground which we had just vacated fired SA & B40 rockets to prevent HQ Co from closing on NVA casualties. With artillery and a reinforcement platoon from the 1st Co, the HQ Co closed on the enemy to find 3 NVA KIA & 3 AK47s. ARA Gunships were then employed on possible escape routes. Documents captured included a sketch map of the 5th NVA Regt units. There were no friendly casualties.
- (b) 23 Aug at 0900 hrs at YC 729904 whilst in a supply area of the 5th NVA Regt, the 1st Co killed 2 NVA & captured 1 CKC & 1 M1 carbine. Supplies recovered in the general area included:-

2 x 122mm Propellant portion of rocket
31 x 81mm mortar rounds
30 NVA Hammocks (new)
20 pr NVA Sandals (new)
Documents on activities in this supply base
(Latest date 30/7/69)

PHASE II (26 Aug - 6 Sep 69)

Move to new AO

9. 26 Aug - CA by 59 sorties to two LZs vic of YC 7998

Significant Contact - only ONE

10. 31 Aug at 0900 hrs at YC 808938 the 1st Co contacted 1 NVA Squad. The enemy fired AK47 & B40 rockets and withdrew along a new trail to South. Result 1 NVA KIA & 1 AK 47. Regt ordered two airstrikes on the trail and these were complete by 1100 hrs. The airstrikes although extremely accurate (5 HE & 3 Napalm direct hits on the trail plus HE effect cutting the trail in 7 other places) produced no result. An ambush was laid on the trail and body with no results.

Completion

11. On 6 Sep 69 the operation was completed and 3/3 Bn moved back to Hue by helicopter.

(D.F. PAUL)
Capt
AATTV

4/3 Regt
HUE

CO AATTV

PERIOD OF THIS REPORT
23 AUG TO 25 SEP 1969

1. After a good handover by WO2 Troy, I became the advisor to 1 Coy 4 Bn 3 Regt for the period that this report covers.
2. On the 23 Aug we moved from HUE to the ASHAU Valley, to relieve the 2 Bn, after a number of CAs our first contact was made on the 30 Aug at GR 596.823, the enemy was of squad size, enemy killed, 3 NVA, Eqpt captured: 200 round 60mm, 50 lbs TNT, 4 6x4 hooches which we burnt down.
3. The going at times was quite rough, some days we were down to only 1,000 meters a day. Our next contact was made on the 4 Sep, 7 NVA were killed, 2 AK-47 captured, three quarters of an hour later, 1 NVA was sighted & killed, 15 hooches were located and burnt to the ground, eqpt captured 2 packs, 6 AK MAGS, 1 MG MAG, the NVA were dressed in khaki shirts & shorts. The GR of the contact was GR 606817.
4. The last op we carried out was with 4 Coys of 187 American Infantry Bn, we all had our own LZ and area of deployment. No contact was made from 14th to 18 Sep, the op was called off on the 18th owing to monsoon rains we then returned back to PK 17, on the 19th refitted, weapon cleaning etc, then took up duty on the wall in HUE.

Comments

5. It seems that there is now a set down order in which helicopter the advisor will ride in on a C.A. I know in this Bn we go in on the 1st, there are a good many reasons for and against this.
6. The only trouble as regards helicopters was on the last C.A. in which we had a total of 20 helicopters. This lifted the coy complete. I have to give the time the 1st helicopter arrives on the LZ and the time of the last. The X ray was unable to tell me who he had on the last one therefore I could not identify which was the last one. However he now sees my point and in future will put his 2 i.c. on the last one.
7. The Coy worked very well except for quite a few minor points, closing up at the halt, walking about like brown cows on the L.Z., talking - noise etc., map reading was very good only once was he wrong on his location, the X ray has been advised on these points.
8. The American FOs I had with my Coy, were not fit and could not keep up, all they could do was winge & moan from morning till night, at times they dropped back to the rear were they were of no use at all.

(D.F. HEDGES)
WO2
AATTV

Annexure 6 to
Annex D to AATTV
Report - Sep 69

RHQ
7th Armd Cav Sqn
AN CUU HUE

20 Sep 69

CO AATTV

MONTHLY REPORT - PERIOD 21 AUG - 20 SEP 69

General

3 Troop moved into their new compound at Phu-Bai on 21 Sep '69, 3 days prior^{to} moving to operations in A Chau Valley.

The operation, which was of a security nature, ended 10 Sep 69 as the rain made the valley untrafficable for the Armd Force and Dozer elements.

Regimental operation in vicinity of Phong-Dien commence 21 Sep 69, and it is thought that this area will be 7th Cav AO during the rainy season.

Operations

Security for Bulldozer and Rome ploughs on valley clearing mission, 24 Aug - 10 Sep 69.

Conclusion

The writer has been Senior Advisor to the troop since the American captain was re-assigned on 12 Sep 69.

Congenial working relationships still between American, Vietnamese and the writer.

(L.N. BOOTES)
WO2
AATTV

44th ARVN Arty Danang

28 Sep 69

CO AATTV

REPORT FOR SEP 69 BY WO2 GODDARD
44 ARVN ARTY BN

The following is an overall outline of my activities with the 44th ARVN Arty over the last (5) five months.

I was assigned to the 44th in late April and at this time the unit had been formed for approximately 1½ to 2 months and were in the very early stages of training. I must add however that the training was of an advanced nature, the reason being that most personnel had had previous gunnery experience though mostly 105mm. Thus the training they were undergoing was basically a conversion course from 105mm to 155mm.

During this period of 2½ months I was personally involved in the training syllabus in the capacity of assessment, with the job of supervising gunnery and Command Post activities. Any mistakes or short cuts etc, I reported to the Battalion Commander and he in turn would correct same. The majority of faults tendered to be ammunition storage and handling, and small incorrect settings on gun sights.

Also in this period I was involved in assisting in the construction of the compound itself, with my main task being the ammunition storage bunkers and perimeter defense. To a lesser degree small constructions throughout the rest of the compound such as kitchen, HQ building etc.

As the battalion moved into the live firing stages of training, my employment increased in the supervisory role, at the gun firing positions, obtaining firing clearances and controlling check fires etc. This proved to be quite a confusing task as we had at that time to clear through three individual controlling units, which was not only time consuming but under most circumstances unnecessary. This lack of coordination between units was eventually solved, allowing me to move from the gun positions to the observation posts where supervision was required over the forward observers, who were all new officers without any previous experience. It was during this period of training I felt my reason for being here truly justified as I was able to get across methods of calling fire which was readily accepted by the Battalion Commander and students alike, resulting in reasonably quick and very accurate fire.

I make further note here that during the live firing stages of training I was involved in the senior supervisory capacity for a greater period than my Senior Advisor. The reason being that Major Corbly was completely tied up in unit coordination, equipment issues on battalion level, coordination of training and the more general problems of establishing a new battalion.

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On completion of training in early July we had both 'A' and 'B' batteries ready for operations, with enough essential equipment to deploy, and in fact the day after deployment day celebrations 'B' battery was deployed to Hoi-An area. Four guns going to Hoi-An and the remaining two to Dien-Ban. 'A' battery remained operational within our battalion compound. The battalion then turned its full attention to 'C' battery, for as they were last to be equipped both with material and men they had participated in training only as far as the dry firing stages and it was not until late August that they were able to deploy as an operational element on "hill 55" which was occupied by the 7th Marines at that time. Here again my task was bunker and compound construction, and liaison between the Marines and Vietnamese on operational problems. The first two weeks after 'C' battery's deployment we moved almost daily between Danang, Dien-Ban, Hoi-An and Hill 55. We spent the greater period of time at Hill 55 as the area occupied by 'C' battery was virgin ground while Dien-Ban and Hoi-An had already been constructed by the 30 ARVN Arty which we relieved.

The battalion's mission was one of general support reinforcement to our parent unit 64 ARVN Arty who in turn was the direct support artillery to Quang-Da Special Zone. So until 5 Sep the battalions missions were confined to H and I type firings. On the 5 Sep the battalion deployed four guns of 'C' battery in direct support of a Ranger operation to Phu-Lac 6. Myself and one other team member accompanied them for the purpose of liaison, clearances etc between the 1/5 Marine and the 44th ARVN Arty Bn as the 1/5 Marines area of operations overlapped our given A.O. and any fire missions called within the 1/5 A.O. had first to be cleared through their C.P. As 1/5 also occupied Phu-Lac 6 it was also necessary for us to liaise for reasons of day and night marine activities so as we could reinforce and control our own activities, and after ten days of smooth running the 44th ARVN Arty Bn was moved to AN HOA for operational reasons. Here at An-Hoa in the 5th Regiment's Command Post was the 44th battalion's X.O. who was liaison officer. As he could now directly control the 44th element there was no requirement for us as advisors so we returned to Danang.

The last fifteen days have been taken up with further construction within the 44 ARVN Arty Bn's compound in forms of maintenance building (Vehicular), additional perimeter bunkers and enlarging 'A' Battery's Command Post.

In conclusion I would say although at this time the unit has had very little operational experience in the field and by all accounts received from fellow members of AATTV that are at present being supported by the 44th, the unit has acquitted itself very well indeed. This is due, I feel, to the method, time and accuracy spent during the training phases. This training could have been improved only by having had all the required pieces of equipment on hand before starting rather than having to train around available equipment. This would have also enabled the battalion to complete training as a whole rather than having to train a battery at a time.

All in all I believe the battalion to be of a standard where they can meet their operational requirements as general reinforcement artillery without

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requiring any further aid from a 4 man advisory team. A senior advisor only would be a necessary person for coordination.

It is understood that you are intending to have me re-posted to help form 23rd ARVN Arty Bn in Oct and this therefore fits in well. From experience gained with the 44th Bn I should be able to provide worthwhile assistance to the newly forming Bn.

(T.J. GODDARD)
WO2
AATTV

Hue
26 Sep 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY MAJ G.V. BROWN
ON AATTV ACTIVITIES IN NAM HOA DISTRICT
AND THUA THIEN PROVINCE
26 AUG - 27 SEP 69

PART I - NAM HOA DISTRICT

Resettled Hamlets

1. The hamlets of La Khe Trem (YD 758 128) Kim-Ngoc (YD 773 120) and Dinh-Mon (YD 785 117), which were resettled commencing 1 Jul 69, have all received more attention from the enemy this month. Groups of 3 to 4 men have repeatedly visited La Khe Trem and Dinh-Mon for tax collection and propaganda purpose.
2. The chief reason for the penetration of La Khe Trem has been its long perimeter of 5000 metres coupled with its small garrison of one PF platoon one RD team and 17 PSDF members. Currently the fields of view and fire are being improved together with strengthening the wire obstacles. I propose to persuade the District Chief to allocate an additional PF platoon to this hamlet.
3. Dinh-Mon, on the other hand, was garrisoned this month by the extremely low-grade 177 RF Coy (see paragraph 6 below). In addition, Dinh-Mon has received two harrassing attacks; the first attack produced one RF KIA and one civilian KIA and the second produced one VC KIA. Three RF soldiers have also been accidentally wounded when out of contact with the enemy.
4. The first harrassing attack on Dinh-Mon occurred on the night 8/9 Sep. On the night 9/10 Sep 177 RF Coy redeployed itself away from Dinh-Mon without prior reference to the District Chief. At that stage the company was in a very mutinous mood. The following day, 72 of the 94 families there evacuated the hamlet. The District Chief and myself went to Dinh-Mon that day and stayed with 177 Coy (who by that stage had returned) for 48 hours. The troops were very nervous at that stage and, as a result of an imagined VC attack on the night 12/13 Sep, they badly wounded one of their own men with a grenade and frightened the life out of a civilian family with another grenade.
5. On 13 Sep 224 RF Coy was redeployed from Hung-Thuy District to Dinh-Mon and placed under command of the District Chief. The situation stabilized and all families are back in Dinh-Mon.

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177 RF Coy

6. 177 RF Coy was originally formed by directing each RF Coy Commander to provide men. Naturally they gave their worst soldiers. This error was then aggravated by giving the company very weak officers.
7. The District Chief and I had repeatedly complained of the poor standard of 177 Coy and in particular its poor discipline and leadership. Our views were strongly supported by the Senior Advisor for Military Operations, Lt Col Miller. The only response was to send the OC away for re-training.
8. Nevertheless, on 13 Sep the Province Chief acted quickly and 177 Coy was dismembered. The rifle platoons were exchanged with designated rifle platoons from other companies and a new company HQ was formed including a new OC. The reforming of the company was largely completed by 15 Sep.
9. MAT Team 6 was redeployed to Nam-Hoa and co-located with 177 Coy at Dinh-Mon. Its mission is to conduct squad level training in ambush and counter ambush, patrolling and defence. Training started on 22 Sep 69.

US Forces

10. Following the events described above, the US reaction was swift, massive and disorganised. Engineer plant was deployed here to clear fields of fire in the resettled hamlets and generally help construct defences. Apart from accidentally sinking one raft and a bulldozer in the river, the effort is proving successful despite the detonation of several old blast-type anti-personnel mines.
11. A US Infantry Company has also been redeployed to provide closer security to the resettled hamlets and to re-assure the inhabitants.

Operation Kim-Neoc

12. WO2 Bruce (AATTV), Sgt Macon (US) and I reconnoitred Kim-Neoc and produced a plan for its defence. With minor changes, the plan was agreed by the District Chief who issued verbal orders to the local military commander. Any questions were to be directed to either WO Bruce or myself who were to provide the close supervision. In the following week only 50 metres of cattle fence were constructed and work then ceased altogether despite repeated visits, exhortation and explanations of the plan. Later this month the advisors were fully occupied elsewhere and so we did not visit Kim-Neoc again for about two weeks. I was able to visit Kim-Neoc again briefly on 23 Sep and was pleased to note that a lot of wiring and digging had been carried out along the lines we had suggested.
13. The papers forwarded by the CO AATTV concerning similar operations in IV Corps with VDATs were helpful although naturally some ideas had to be modified to suit local conditions.

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Vietnamese Personnel

14. A new dynamic Deputy (Military) Chief has replaced the old one. This was the culmination of two months persuasion on the part of the District Chief, the Province Senior Advisor and myself.

Mass Grave

15. A mass murder site containing 250 bodies was discovered by 101 (AB) Div in the Nui Khe (YD 7605) area. Recovery took two days and disposal of the bodies continues.

I G Inspection

16. The District Team was inspected by the MACV I G Team on 23 Sep. No major comments were made.

MACV Personnel

17. Eight of the District Team and attached personnel have changed in the last month.

Conclusion

18. This month has been an extremely active one for the District and has put a severe strain on the District Team, particularly so in view of personnel changes and shortages. Because of the activity the team has had to cope with a number of visitors (up to 15 separate visits by officers and senior NCOs in one day was not uncommon). We also have 8 US engineers attached. In addition the local US Bn changed over with another bn and this brought many problems.

19. Despite a few temporary set backs, however, the general situation in the District is a distinct improvement over what it was last month.

PART II -- THUA THIEN PROVINCE

20. The major activity once again has been the work of WO2 Killion, the Medical Advisor for MACV Team 18. He has now visited all districts at least once and steady progress is being made in co-ordinating the previously unco-ordinated activities of the District Medical Advisors. He is well thought of by the Staff co-ordinator of Team 18 - Major GLAZE.

21. Activities of other members of AATTV operating in Thua-Thien Province (3rd ARVN Regt) are covered in their individual reports.

(G.V. BROWN)
Maj
AATTV

Hue

28 Sep 69

CO AATTV

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MONTHLY REPORT

This report will be dealt with in two parts, they are:

- a. The CC1 Medical Course
- b. Medical Supervisory Work, Province

The CC1 Medical Course

1. a. Vietnamese Instructors

The instructors on this course are untrained and in most cases, have never before stood in front of a class, until this type of course was commenced earlier this year. The instructors don't have to be told they are below average, on instructional ability, they readily admit this fact and are eager to receive advice to improve themselves in this field.

(1) Aims for Improvement

I intend to conduct a short four day course, for Vietnamese instructors, on the principles and techniques of teaching. This course will be conducted during the break between the current CC1 courses. This idea has not yet been approved by the CO of the military hospital yet, but I intend to discuss my ideas with him early next week. I have been given permission by the CO of the hospital to conduct six lessons on the next course. My aim here is to have as many instructors as possible present, in the classroom, to observe my techniques, in the hope that they may gain useful ideas for their own presentations. These lessons will be varied. The series will contain, outdoor/indoor practical activities, and formal lessons in the classroom.

b. Instructional Aids

After many long delays and numerous phone calls, concerning information on how to obtain training aids (in this department, the course has some charts, one blackboard and chalk) from the US Senior Medical Advisor, I Corps, we have finally received the information we required, and are now in the process of indenting for supplies, hoping that we will receive them before the beginning of the next course.

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c. Improvements to the Classroom

The materials for the additions to the classroom have now been obtained, and work will commence next week on this project and should be completed within ten days.

Medical Supervisory Work : Thua-Thien Province

2. The majority of my advisory work is in this field. All US district medical and Mobile Advisory Team medical members are guided by my office in regard to their advising in medical work. I visit frequently, each district where I meet and talk with the following people.

- a. US District medical advisors.
- b. Mobile advisory team, medical advisors
- c. RF/PF officer or NCO in medical charge
- d. District medical chief.
- e. Senior US District Advisor

Broadly I carry out the following functions;

- a. I discuss problems that arise, and advise or direct how to overcome each problem.
- b. I trace Vietnamese civilian and military personnel who have been admitted to a Vietnamese or US medical installation.
- c. I inspect all RF and civilian medical installation within each district.
- d. I work closely with my US civilian "counterpart".
- e. I arrange for consultations or admissions for spastic, disfigured, etc, children, who are cared for by US doctors.
- f. Ensure that US medical personnel are used in the role that they are trained for.

Our department has five long term aims, they are;

- a. Encourage district and MAT medical advisors to train military and civilian medical members to a higher level. The advisor has two channels to achieve this aim, firstly US med CAP teams are encouraged to use Vietnamese medical members in treating their own people under the direction of a US doctor. Secondly US medical advisors are asked to conduct short medical courses within their districts.

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- b. To ensure an efficient medical supply system both in military and civilian organisations, by ensuring these people use their own system of supply and not US sources.
- c. Encourage cleanliness in civilian and RF dispensaries, and personnel, in the hope that villagers may imitate.
- d. Encourage Vietnamese to take a more active interest in these patients (I realize that this is a difficult aim to achieve, but we will try).
- e. An evenly distributed US/Vietnamese medcap program.

Conclusion

3. In the short time I have been engaged in this work I have noticed a marked improvement in most districts. Previously no one held this position and consequently this field was not progressing as it should. I can see nothing but improvement for the future and it is hoped that in time the Vietnamese will lift these standards and be in a position to give an efficient medical service to their people, which is sadly lacking at this time.

(D.G. KILLION)
WO2
AATTV.

3/3 Bn
1 ARVN Div
Thua-Thien Province
I CTZ

23 Sep 69

Senior Advisor
3rd Regt, 1 ARVN Div

Copy - CO AATTV

COMMENTS ON PERFORMANCE OF 3/3 BN - 3 JUN TO 23 SEP 69
BY CAPT D.F. PAUL - SENIOR ADVISOR 3/3 BN

Basis

1. The following report is submitted on the basis of my observations of the Infantry Minor Tactics employed by 3/3 Bn between 3 Jun to 23 Sep 69, whilst operating against NVA & VC in the Thua-Thien Province in the following areas of operations:-

- (a) The 3rd ARVN Regt AO West of HUE - (The HUE Rocket Belt).
- (b) The A Shau Valley
- (c) An AO in Southern Thua-Thien Province (Near NUTS & PISTOL).

Aim

2. The aim of this report is to discuss the aspects of 3/3 Bn Infantry Minor Tactics which need to be improved in order to produce more effective operations against the enemy. The more important changes that are required are summarized at the end of the report.

Trails

3. Tactic: 3/3 Bn make the maximum use of existing trails.

- Comment: Advantages * (a) Since the enemy also use the trails contact is often made.
(b) Since the enemy build these trails into their supply staging areas, caches are often discovered.
(c) Often the trails are the only means of reaching the ordered objective in the time ordered.

Disadvantages (a) Vulnerable to ambush (although it did not occur in the reporting period)

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Solution Continue to use the trails but add the following suggestions

- (a) The Point Platoon is always to clear either side of the trail for at least a distance of 800 metres along the trail from the NDP.
- (b) Patrol dogs be introduced into 3/3 Bn on the basis of 1 dog / Axis and used with the point squad. (2 dogs & 2 dog handlers (ARVN) required).

Same Routes

4. Tactic: All Companies normally send one of their daily searching platoon patrols out & back along the route the company is to take the next day to their objective. If there is no trail, this patrol normally cuts one.

Comments: Advantages (a) Easier navigation for Co Comd'
(b) Easier walking conditions for troops
(c) More time available in the afternoon for searching.

Disadvantages Vulnerable to ambush (although did not occur in the reporting period)

Solution: Discontinue this poor tactic or at least limit its use to rare necessary occasions provided para 3 (Trails) above is observed. Where it is tactically feasible (including consideration of enemy threat) employ a small recce patrol & delete cutting trail.

Night Defensive Positions (NDP)

5. Tactic: All companies normally move into their NDP by 1200 hrs daily.

Comment: Advantages Allows maximum time for effective searching from the tactically important ground from which the Co Comd can commit his reserve troops quickly to reinforce platoons in contact.

Disadvantages The enemy has in the past been able to easily pin point our NDP & when he desired engage us with mortars & B40 rockets.

Solution: Base up temporarily on tactically important ground before moving into NDP. Do NOT move to NDP before 1600 hrs.

Bald Hills

6. Tactic: NDPs are often chosen on bald or sparsley timbered hills.

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Comment: Advantages None

Disadvantages As for para 5 above.

Solution: Do NOT use these features.

Overpopulated NDPs

7. Tactic: Quite often the feature chosen for NDP are small areas of high ground. The pits & hutchees are sighted too close to each other.

Comment: Advantages: (a) Allows a smaller target area for enemy indirect fire which is not always accurate.
(b) Gives the ARVN "dutch courage" in night fighting making it unlikely they would withdraw without an order.

Disadvantages: Means more casualties than are acceptable whenever the indirect fire is accurate.

Solution: Spread the fighting positions away from the top of the hill to give more depth to the position.

Use of NDPs for 2 Nights

8. Tactic: On a few occasions companies have not changed their NDP daily.

Comment: Allows enemy to pinpoint NDP.

Solution: Commanders at all levels are to supervise subordinate commander so that they move daily.

Lack of Ambushes

9. Tactic: 3/3 Bn is reluctant to employ ambushes - either day or night. The Battalion Commander has pointed out that he feels his junior leadership is not strong enough to ensure that the ambush does NOT backfire by the troops taking part (without fighting pits) fleeing once the ambush is "sprung".

Comment: The possibility of casualties being caused by the Battalion Commanders predictions has to be accepted as part of a programme to build up the confidence of all the troops involved. This programme will never get off the ground unless the number of ambushes employed is greatly increased.

Solution: The 3rd Regt Commander has to pressure the Battalion Commander into more ambushes.

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"Bad Orders" at all Levels

10. Tactic: Objectives for commanders at all levels are often chosen off the map without reference to the subordinate commander who is more familiar with the ground and local indications of enemy presence.
- Comment: The dissatisfaction generated at all levels leads to ineffective patrolling being explained away by the phrase "all the time bad order!"
- Solution: Commanders at all levels should NOT command two down, but only plan two down. Before giving new objectives the Commander should seek the intentions of his subordinate which, provided they are within the scope of the mission, should not be changed without good reason or better intelligence.

Use of Gunships

11. Tactic: Normally called for only when the target and size of contact warrants their employment. However their use becomes the signal for both sides to break contact. 3/3 Bn normally only follow up as far as the enemy position - rarely around or beyond.
- Comments: This does not inflict maximum casualties on the enemy or exploit this much sort after contact to its fullest advantage.
- Solution: The Battalion Commander must be forced to employ IMMEDIATE follow up in the direction of enemy withdrawals.

Platoon Size Patrols

12. Tactic: In the AOs of the HUE Rocket Belt Company size patrols are often used, especially in the NORTH of AO.
- Comments: This limits the incidence of contact against squad size enemy forces which continue to operate in this AO.
- Solution: Company patrols must be broken down to platoon patrols and platoon NDPs whilst the enemy situation remains at squad size.

Reaction in Rocket Belt

13. Tactic: The 3rd Regt seldom reacts to contacts in the AO by committing reaction forces.
- Comment: The enemy has probably become accustomed to withdrawing a thousand metres and stopping feeling relatively safe from pursuit.
- Solution: 2 Companies should be held in readiness to CA into the HUE Rocket Belt once contact is made.

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Lack of Aggressive Spirit

14. Tactic: Although it is easy to understand the 3/3 Bn ARVN soldier's reluctance to become involved in heavy contact, I feel it has reached an alarmingly high level.

Comment: The normal incentives of good results ensuring promotion do not interest most of 3/3 Bn commanders. The Battalion Commander feels he has been promoted over by his juniors and desires only to last the war out so he can retire to civilian life. Most of his subordinate commanders have little confidence in their ability to survive should they become engaged in heavy contact and are perhaps confused by the American withdrawals and Paris Peace Talks.

Solution: Peace.

Summary

15. The points discussed on pages 3, 4 & 5 of this report must be improved if 3/3 Bn is to be effective in the current wet season. Ambushes, platoon sized patrols, reaction force and an aggressive spirit will have to be forced upon the Battalion Commander, provided it is not taken by him to be just another "bad order". All these points will be brought up at appropriate times to my counterpart as they have been in the past.

(D.F. PAUL)
Capt
AATTV

Pleiku
12 Sep 69

CO AATTV

EXTRACTS FROM REPORT BY MAJ BRYDON
1ST BN 2MSF -- AUG/SEP 69

Operations

1. 2MSF operation planning remains the same with two Bns in the Duc-Lap area and one Bn in the Ben-Het AO.
 - a. 1st Bn. Completed their operation in the BU PRANG (BU KRAK) AO on the 9 Sep 69. The operation was generally quiet with only two small contacts with trail watchers. Intelligence reports indicated and continue to indicate large enemy buildups along the Cambodian Border in this area and as a result additional US supporting troops (Arty and Air Cav) have been deployed at BU PRANG, DUC LAP and NHAM CO. Redeployment will be on 17 Sep 69.
 - b. 2nd Bn. Deployed in the DUC LAP AO and will complete their operation on the 16 Sep 69. They have had one small contact with trail watchers to date. On completion of their standown they will have a seven day retraining period in the Pleiku area.
 - c. Planning. Proposed schedules for the 1st and 2nd Bns are as follows:

<u>1st Bn</u>	<u>Standown</u>	<u>DUC LAP</u>	<u>Standown</u>	<u>Training PLEIKU</u>
	- 16 Sep	17 Sep - 8 Oct	9-15 Oct	16-23 Oct
<u>2nd Bn</u>	<u>DUC LAP</u>	<u>Standown</u>	<u>Trg PLEIKU</u>	<u>Operation ?</u>
	- 16 Sep	17-24 Sep	24 Sep-2 Oct	2-14 Oct

Change-In-Command

2. Lt Col COLLINS will assume command of 2MSF on the return of Maj LUNDY from R&R in late Sep 69. It is understood that Maj Lundy will then become XO 2MSF.

(W.J. BRYDON)
Maj
AATTV

2Bn 2MSFC
Pleiku

26 Sep 69

CO AATTV

REPORT ON OPERATION CONDUCTED BY
2BN 2MSFC IN DUC-LAP AO

Reference A : Map Duc-Minh 1:50,000

General

1. 2Bn conducted a reconnaissance in force type operation in the Duc-Lap AO adjacent to the Vietnam/Cambodia border with the aim of detecting any enemy infiltration from a suspected concentration across the border.

2. Duration. 29 Aug - 23 Sep 69, however a great deal of this time was spent waiting to move from LZ Helen and Ban Me Thuot. Time actually in the AO was 30 Aug - 13 Sep 69.

3. Strength. Average strength was:

USASF	7
AATTV	3
CIDG	340

Summary of Contacts/Incidents

4. 221 Coy. 09 1420hrs contacted 2 VC. Result 1 VC WIA, fled to the West.

5. 222 Coy. 10 1640 hrs contacted squad NVA. Results 1 NVA KIA, 1AK 47.
11 1100 hrs contacted NVA squad plus. Results 1 NVA KIA 1 AK47.

6. 223 Coy. Negative contact, negative incidents.

Sequence of Events

7. a. 29 Aug - 31 Aug, deployment

b. 31 Aug - 3 Sep, patrolled North from LZ Helen moving into the Southern area to Bn location grid ref 808 625 ni 3 Sep.

c. 3 Sep - 13 Sep, patrolled by companies as shown on map enclosed.

d. 13 Sep - 20 Sep, remained in area of LZ Helen waiting for extraction.

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- e. 20 Sep - 23 Sep, remained at Ban Me Thuot awaiting transport to Pleiku. This was a road move on 23 Sep.

Summary

8. The operation was successful in that the companies operated well when actually in the AO. However there were at times shortages in support. Coordination at Task Force level was not good and sometimes very bad as is shown by the amount of time spent waiting to move into the AO. Internally 2Bn is just starting to operate much better as a unit team.

(DJF ROWE)
Capt
AATTV

CO AATTV

REPORT BY WO1 E.W. GASON
SEN ADV TO 1 TROOP (TANKS) 14 CAV ARVN

Since my last report, the troop has continued to work in the Kontum Vo-Dinh area and on occasions South of Kontum, HQ are located in Kontum and I believe this should continue to be the case for at least the next two months.

It was advised that 14 Cav HQ would remain in Kontum and at the moment the site has been selected, plans for a compound submitted, it appears that work on the site should begin within the next two weeks by ARVN Engineers. The Comd of 14 Cav does not expect too much assistance in the early stages because of Engr commitments up here in the general area.

Disposition of troops.

14 Cav HQ	Kontum
1 Troop Tanks	"
2 Troop APC	Dakto
3 Troop APC	East coast

A troop of 3 Cav is at present employed on Vo-Dinh - Ton Canh. Some difficulty is being experienced by the Comd 14 Cav in getting his 3 troop re-located together with the rest of 14 Cav, however he is over on East coast at the moment continuing his "battle" and told me before he left that "if he didn't have any success with the 22 ARVN Div Comd (under whose control 3 TP operates) he was going direct to the Corps Comd". The reasons for this will come later in the report.

1/14 Troop Task

a. Open and secure the road from Kontum to Vo-Dinh, and provide close security for the mine sweep team, daily task, by night provide security in Kontum where required by 24 STZ and assist dismounted elements (Rangers) to AO's when necessary.

No major contacts with the enemy have been made, except on one night ambush, when the ambush was sprung at 1945 hrs by the (two scouts) NVA. 1 KIA and 1 WIA who lived until 0300 and informed us that his unit was within 40 minutes walk from the road, that 500 metres from and behind him was a squad to do the mine laying and they would be supported by a Pl. Gunships and Arty were used in the general area but a search by Inf next day revealed nothing. Results: 1 KIA 1 WIA (later died), 2 AK-47 captured. Friendly : no casualties.

Many mines were found in the road, this has been daily except, 7 Sept - 11 Sept, no mines were found. As many as five in one day are found, under the

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bitumen and in unsealed sections, on the shoulders of the road. Three different types have been found in this AO - Box type 20 lbs very hard to find only by probing. Two types of Russian AT mines usually found when probing and sweeping is not carried out (off the roads).

On the 21 Aug mines which were not detected in the road were responsible for 1 Jeep, 1 Dump Truck and 1 APC with the following, 1 US KIA (Sweep Team Comd) 5 US wounded (1 later died) 3 VN wounded.

On the 25 Aug the road had been blown the full width of the road, 8 ft across and 7' deep, there was no way around this spot. 3 APC's and 2 tanks bogged in attempts to by-pass, AVLB had to be used to allow traffic through. 13x5 ton loads of filling were required before even tanks could cross this section. Five other box type mines were located, lifted and blown all within 300 metres.

On 29 Aug one of our tanks hit a mine and was a "write off". After "dusting off" the two wounded, I walked around the tank a couple of times to assess the damage and get some idea of the size mine. The tank had actually fallen into the hole made. After sweeping around the tank and checking a path for the VTR to recover the tank, the VTR arrived and pulled up behind the tank one of the crewmen jumped off to hook up and was blown to pieces, jumping onto a mine which had not been detected, another was wounded. It took the VTR and 2 tanks to pull the wrecked tank out of the hole.

On 10 Sep a VC flag was raised at TRI DAO in the NW sector of our AO at 0730. At 0800 RF local group went to investigate and took 1 x B40 round when a squad size group took off to the SSW, by 0830 we were in the general area and carried out a restricted check which revealed nothing.

On 12 Sept three Russian AT mines were found in the road, these were lifted and blown on the side of the road, the first time this troop has found this type of mine in road.

On 13 Sept after the road had been swept and secured the particular section 300^x was swept by ARVN Engrs to allow our tracked vehicles through the same area as for 25 Aug, this sweep was followed by the US Engrs. After giving a "Green" on the road US Engrs commenced dumping rock in the area, 40 ft from where the road was blown hit a mine and wounded 2 US. The rear duals were blown off and a hole^{blown} in the road 6'x8' across and 7' deep. Every indication that professionals are on the job in this area.

The commitments of Cav in this area call for 7 days a week and 24 hours a day. This has been the case since some time in April, consequently the only servicing on vehicles and training of replacement personnel has to be done on the "run". As a result vehicles are now showing signs of this lack of the essential servicing required, and this could be very embarrassing in event of "contact". This situation is realised by Comd 14 Cav and is the reason for wanting the 3/14 Tp back in this area.

(E.W. GASON)
WO1
AATTV

CO AATTV

PRU/MMTT TRAINING REPORT ON KONTUM PROVINCE

1. SUMMARY OF TRAINING

- a. Period : 17 August 1969 to 19 September 1969.
- b. Advisors and Instructors : Capt Deane, WO2 Jamieson, Dol, Moan, Tan, Dong Dzu, K'biang, Sen.
- c. Type of Course:
 - (1) 18 - 30 August. Leader/Intelligence Advanced training.
 - (2) 2 - 17 Sep.. Basic training with emphasis on intelligence.
- d. Course Strength:
 - (1) 18 - 30 August. 20
 - (2) 2 - 17 Sep.. 19
- e. Subjects and Performance:
 - (1) The following subjects were taught on both courses - intelligence, marksmanship, first aid, life-saving, special operations.
 - (2) In addition, the second course included several periods of Bren gun, BAR and fieldcraft instruction.
 - (3) It was originally planned to assess all students at the end of both courses but a high level of operational activity by the unit precluded the first course from being tested. In the event, a verbal test was given to the second course as only about 7 assets were literate. The results of the test appeared to reflect the standard of literacy of the asset tested, and were not conclusive.
- f. Province PRU Advisor : Capt. Smith.

2. DETAILED TRAINING REPORT

- a. Level of Pre-course knowledge : Average for MPRU assets.

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- b. Ability to assimilate knowledge: The second course, composed mostly of assets who had recently been transferred to Kontum from Dakto, with a sprinkling of recruits, appeared to be more enthusiastic towards training than the advanced course. However, the illiteracy of many assets, coupled with the fact that some of them have difficulty understanding each other, let alone an instructor made it difficult to evaluate how much knowledge was being absorbed.
- c. General standards achieved: In practical exercises and marksmanship, the overall standard of performance was generally slightly higher than other MPRUs that have been visited in the last 12 months.
- d. Problem areas: Languages spoken by PRU assets in Kontum include Bahnar, Sedang, Rengao and Vietnamese, and it was sometimes necessary to use an interpreter, particularly for lectures involving subjects that were slightly abstract in concept e.g. VC infrastructure, security, etc ...
- e. Time spent on instruction.
 - (1) Leader/Intelligence Course 96 hrs
 - (2) Basic Course 112 hrs
- f. Recommended changes: The form and content of some of the lectures will be scrutinized closely on return to Nha-Trang on 19 Sept, when it will be possible to marry up English copies of lesson plans with the mostly Vietnamese copies that have in fact been carried around with the team. The aim will be to assess each lesson with relation to its relevance, accuracy and any means by which it may be made more interesting and stimulating. However, no radical changes in the POI will be made without the approval of SA/SATC.
- g. In-place training being conducted: Weapons, medical and demolitions.
- h. Further training recommended:
 - (1) Monthly range practices in all weapons each asset is likely to use.
 - (2) Fieldcraft and squad tactics. As Kontum PRU operates over sparsely populated areas in a role likely to bring it into contact with VC or NVA, more training in purely military techniques would be useful.

3. ADMINISTRATION

- a. Training facilities: The best in the circumstances prevailing during the course. The transfer of Dakto PRU detachment to Kontum during the training period led to overcrowding that the completion of 2 large huts, at present under construction, should ease. Classes had to be held in a section of the living accommodation. Supplies, equipment and support were available when required.

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- b. Transportation: No air transportation problems. Vehicle transport was always obtainable.
- c. As there is no interpreter with the MMTT, POIC/Kontum allowed the team to use his civilian staff for various typing and translating tasks in connection with the training programme and the current hand over/take over between advisors and counterparts.

4. CONCLUSIONS:

- a. There is a pressing need for a Vietnamese speaking interpreter in the MMTT.
- b. A "method of instruction" course would be of value to MMTT instructors.

(W.R. DEANE)
Capt
AATTV

AATTV RF TRG CADRE
HEAVYWEIGHT

22 Sep 69

CO AATTV

5/69 RF COURSE REPORT

1. General

The 5/69 course marched in on 19 Aug 69. The strength of 910 Coy was 4 Offrs 88 ORs. They completed their training on 17 Sep 69.

2. Training

a. The Officers of 910 Coy were very helpful and attended training regularly. They were not afraid or backward in entering into any phase of training. As a group they are the best we have trained. However the NCO's were of a lower standard than usual. I have suggested to Sector that two Sgts be removed from the Coy. The general standard of the soldiers was better than previous courses.

b. Operational training of the Course - see para 6.

3. Accommodation

Accommodation is improving and the new kitchen and stoves should be available for the new Coy. Sector is now supplying all workmen and tools.

4. Staff

1 ATF have raised a new organisation called 1 TALU. A copy of this instruction will be forwarded with this report. We have our complete complement of instructors and assistant instructors. The 1 TALU system is working quite satisfactorily so far as Heavyweight is concerned.

5. Passing Out Parade - 17 Sep 69

Certificates were presented by VIP's to 74 of the 92 students. Refreshments were served after the parade. The VIP's included Province Chief and the PSA.

6. Field Exercises - 5/69 Course

During our final phase of trg we had some success in ambush. The body

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- 2 -

count - 5, weapons - 5, probables 8. There were some very heavy drag marks in the area. The area was not searched as well as it should have been owing to difficulty of trying to keep control of the Coy. The group ambushed numbered between 22-25. All were aged between about 20-30 years. They were well clothed in dark clothing (black & blue). One female VCI was killed. The time of springing the ambush was 2045 hrs - we remained in position until next morning.

(C. KEALY)
WO2
AATTV

AATTV
IRP WING
NTC VAN KIEP
PHUOC-TUY

CO AATTV

5 Sep 69

EXTRACTS FROM : COURSE REPORT - 4/69 IRP COURSE
14 JUL 69 - 6 SEP 69

General

1. Of a total of 45 students whom attended the 4/69 IRP Course, there were 20 successful students:
 - a. 16 from 8th Regiment Reconnaissance Company, 5th ARVN Infantry Division.
 - b. 4 from the National Training Center, Van-Kiep.
- 8 students failed due to physical inability and sickness. 13 students failed due to disciplinary reasons. 4 students failed due to other reasons.

Standard

2. The overall standard reached by graduates is above average.

Minor Tactics

3. Graduates were quick to grasp Australian IRP minor tactics, and constant revision insured retention.

Marksmanship

4. Marksmanship with the M16 rifle, and M79 grenade was satisfactory at the completion of the course. Earlier gunshyness was evident but was overcome. The M60 GPMG was fired, also the M72 anti-tank rocket.

Physical Fitness

5. Very few students were fit at the commencement of the course. However physical fitness did improve under supervision, and an above average standard has been reached.

Map Reading

6. The overall standard of map reading at the start of the course was unsatisfactory. In practical application most students produced very satisfactory results after instruction but returned poor written results. The standard now at completion of the course is average.

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Discipline

7. Minor breeches of discipline were handled internally, and the usual course policy on students AWOL applied. Breaches of discipline by members of the Vietnamese staff were noticed:

- a. Lack of punctuality,
- b. Indifference,
- c. Absence without leave,

and in most cases punished.

Operational Phase

8. Each of the three patrols in training conducted two operational patrols. The first of seven days duration, and the second of five days duration. There were no contacts with the enemy during these patrols.

Administrative Support

9. Administrative support from the National Training Center at Van-Kiep was satisfactory. Units forwarding students to the LRP Wing must insure that students are adequately equipped with serviceable boots, and equipment.

10. A noticeable lack of ammunition for operational use must be overcome, and adequate stocks of new camouflage clothes should be available for exchange with the Supply Sergeant LRP Wing.

11. An ARVN jeep has been temporarily obtained for use as a backup/safety, and co-ordination vehicle but the transport carrying, stores carrying, liaison, and range safety vehicles are still required. The one vehicle at present provided from Australian sources is only on temporary loan and will have to be returned.

(PJS HARRIS)

Capt
AATTV

Headquarters
Delta Military Assistance Command
USAAG, IV CTZ, APO 96215
Office of the Deputy for CORDS

28 September 1969

CO AATTV

MONTHLY REPORT - SEPTEMBER 1969

General

1. The enemy continued his relatively low level of activity throughout the CTZ during the month of September. The overall intensity of enemy initiated activity remained relatively light except at Cai-Cai Special Forces Camp and Operational Base where the enemy attacked with mixed 82mm mortar and 107/122mm rocket fire on six separate occasions. This is only the second known time that 122mm rockets have been employed by VC forces in the Delta. The first time being in April, 1969, against Cai-Cai Special Forces Camp.

2. Numerous reports were received during the period indicating that NVA units continued to infiltrate along the border area adjacent to Chau-Doc Province. Once again, agents reported infiltration concerning the disposition of large VC units in the Delta. During the past two weeks several reports have been received that indicate NVA troops are operating in the provinces of Chuong Thien and Bac Lieu for the first time. There were no positive indications of major offensive activity in the near future however. The enemy is expected to retain his conservation of force tactics overall with a relatively small number of major incidents against opportune targets.

Village Defence Advisory Team (VDAT)

3. On 23 September 1969 a meeting of VDAT leaders was held at Can-Tho. CO, AATTV attended this meeting. Reports were presented and methods of operation discussed.

4. The major recommendation arrived at from this meeting was the decision to endeavor to spread the VDAT effort over a wider area. To achieve this it will be necessary to impose a time limit per village, district and province. The time frame envisaged is about 18 days for a village and about 6 weeks for a district.

5. This proposition was discussed with MSA to DEPCORDS. Col Brown is in favor of this proposal and will give it his full backing. He further stated that he is prepared to allow me to exercise a closer more detailed control over the targeting and actions of the VDAT.

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6. I accepted this suggestion however I stated that we do not wish this to become a purely Australian effort and to find ourselves "out on a limb." In this regard I am encouraging US Advisory interest in our VDAT operations.

7. The Methods of Operation Guidelines for VDAT was presented at the recent Central Pacification and Development Council meeting where it was recommended by DEPCORDS as an ideal method for approaching the solution of the problem of village security. Col Brown is making a similar presentation to MACCORDS Saigon next week. The object is to obtain authority to re-orient at least a percentage of Mobile Advisory Teams to the role of advising on village security.

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