

# Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report and enclosures  
1 - 31 October 1969

**Series:** AWM95 - Australian Army  
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R723 / 10 / 3

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HEADQUARTERS  
Army Component

13 Nov 69

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AATTV MONTHLY REPORT - OCT 69

Attached, for information, is a copy of the AATTV Monthly Report for Oct 69.

(R.A. HAY)  
Major General  
Commander Australian Force  
VIETNAM

Attachment: 1. AATTV Report - October 1969.

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AUSTRALIAN FORCE VIETNAM

QUOTE IN REPLY

R/723-10-3

HEADQUARTERS

Australian Army Training Team  
Vietnam

8 Nov 69

HQ AFV (3)

AATTV REPORT - OCTOBER 1969

General

1. AATTV has continued to be actively involved over the four CTZs in operations, training and in providing advice on territorial security at province to hamlet levels. During the month, relatively few contacts with the enemy were made by the units and teams in which members of AATTV are deployed.

Casualties

2. AATTV operational casualties for the month of Oct were : one warrant officer WIA. This casualty occurred during operations by 2 ARVN Div in I CTZ and the member concerned has been medically evacuated to Aust.

Deployment

3. The deployment of AATTV as at 9 Nov 69 is attached at Annex A.

I Corps

4. Operational activity by ARVN units in I CTZ resulting in contacts with the enemy remained at a relatively low level during Oct. Reported enemy and allied casualties during the month reached their lowest figures since Jan 68 and Oct 68 respectively.

5. The re-deployment of ARVN and US units in I CTZ, resulting from the withdrawal of 3rd Marine Division (USMC) and the normal requirement for re-positioning due to the northern monsoon season, has been completed. Some detailed comments on this re-deployment are contained in attached reports by Senior AATTV Advisors in I CTZ (Annex B and Annexure 1 to Annex D).

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6. Extracts of a report by Maj Johnston, the Senior AATTV Advisor in I CTZ, are attached at Annex B.

7. Attached at Annex C is a summary of the major operational contacts in I CTZ in which ARVN units with AATTV advisors were involved during Oct.

8. Attached at Annex D are AATTV advisor reports of interest from I CTZ.

II Corps

9. 2nd Mobile Strike Force Command (2MSF)

a. During the month of Oct, the level of operational activity of both battalions of 2MSF, in which members of AATTV are involved, remained high. The 1st Bn has been operating in the Duc-Lap and Bu-Prang areas and the 2nd Bn in the area of Dak-Seang. Contacts with the enemy however have been relatively light.

b. A report by Maj Brydon (AATTV), Commanding the 1st Bn 2MSF is attached at Annex E. Maj Brydon indicated a lack of suitable artillery fire support being available to the 2nd Bn in its operation in the Dak-Seang area, in para 4 of his report. This matter was taken up by CO AATTV with CO 2MSF before moving out to join 223 Coy of the 2nd Bn on their recent operation and again afterwards, when it was also discussed with the CO of Coy B, 5th SFG. CO AATTV's comments on the lack of suitable artillery support and the fault in operational planning in this regard was fully recognised by both these USASF Commanders. It is considered that every effort will now be made to ensure that this situation does not occur again. As far as other types of fire support are concerned, it was observed by CO AATTV that adequate and readily available air support was on call and was used by the 2nd Bn during this operation in the Dak-Seang area.

10. 14 ARVN Cav. A report by WO1 Gason, Senior Advisor 1/14 ARVN Cav Tp, is attached at Annex F. A feature of WO1 Gason's recent reports has been the information regarding the quantity and types of mines being used by the enemy on the main roads in the western part of Pleiku and Kontum Provinces. These roads have largely been sealed in the last 6 months and are relatively well patrolled, however this does not seem to have inhibited the enemy from his mining activity or the successful damage he continues to cause.

11. Province Recce Units (PRU) : II CTZ

a. Montagnard Mobile Training Team (MMTT). Discussions are now taking place between the PRU Directorate and the Vietnamese which will probably lead to the MMTT changing its base of operations from Nha-Trang to the Special Activities Training Centre (SATC), Vung-Tau

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in Dec 69 or early in 1970. This will probably lead to the team being less mobile in its training role. In view of this and the problems experienced earlier in the year at SATC, which could occur again, the probable re-deployment in Dec 69/Jan 70 of the two members of AATTV now with the MMTT has been discussed with the PRU Directorate.

b. PRU : Tuyen-Duc Province. As was expected, early verbal reports from WO2 Carter, the AATTV Senior Advisor recently deployed with the PRU in this province, have indicated that there is a great deal of scope for operations against the VC infrastructure in Tuyen-Duc. It is hoped that a written report may be available from WO2 Carter for inclusion in the AATTV Report for Nov 69.

### III Corps

12.

#### Additional AATTV Deployment to Phuoc-Tuy

a. As directed, four additional members of AATTV have now been re-posted to Phuoc-Tuy Province. Two of these have already assumed their appointments - one with the RD Cadres and one with the PSDF programme. Both these members are attached to and are under the operational control of Sector HQ. The other two members of AATTV reposted to Phuoc-Tuy are, subject to final discussions with HQ 1ATF, to be attached to 1ATF for local administration and for operational control for the specific purpose of assisting 1ATF in the training of battalions of 18 ARVN Div and in providing AATTV advisory assistance to these battalions during the time they are under operational control of 1ATF. These two members of AATTV are expected to take up their duties on 9 Nov approx.

b. The filling of one of the four additional AATTV commitments to Phuoc-Tuy was achieved by the transfer of one member (WO2 Osborne - who was already working in the RD programme in the province) from the Aust, CA Unit to AATTV. Nevertheless the net result of these re-deployments to Phuoc-Tuy has meant an overall reduction in Aust advisory effort elsewhere in Vietnam by a total of four. These reductions have been spread across several programmes in I, II and IV CTZs and have been made in such a way as to minimize their effect on the CTZs and the programmes concerned.

c. AATTV deployment in Phuoc-Tuy Province as at 9 Nov 69 will be:

- (1) Six WOs working under Sector HQ in RF, PSDF and RD.
- (2) Two WOs working under HQ 1ATF on ARVN bn training and operations.
- (3) One Capt and four WOs working under MACV/AATTV/ARVN on LRP training of ARVN. During the operational phase of this LRP training, three of these members of AATTV are under the operational control of 1ATF in its TACR.

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The total number of AATTV deployed in Phuoc-Tuy as at 9 Nov 69 will therefore be thirteen. This represents something like 14% of AATTVs total advisory strength. Those directly involved in the province advisory effort in Phuoc-Tuy will total six. This is three times the number working directly for any other province in Vietnam in which AATTV is deployed. The remaining seven members located in Phuoc-Tuy are also contributing to the advisory and Aust operational effort in the province indirectly.

13. RF Training : Phuoc-Tuy

a. The 6/69 RF Course (771 RF Coy) ended on 20 Oct 69. The overall standard reached was above average. A report by WO2 Kealy, the Senior Instructor of the AATTV RF Training Cadre, is attached at Annex G.

b. The 7/69 RF Course (772 RF Coy) marched in for training on 27 Oct 69. However after completing the first week of the course, training had to be temporarily suspended. Heavyweight ceased to be the 18 ARVN Div Training Centre at the end of Oct and when their staff moved out, confusion existed (and still does exist) as to who was to move in. In the meantime, it has been necessary for the current 7/69 RF Course to be used for security of the training centre. This has been discussed with the PSA Phuoc-Tuy and it is hoped the matter will be resolved without too much further delay so that the training of 772 RF Coy can continue.

14. PRU : Phuoc-Tuy WO2 Ison, the Senior Advisor of the PRU in Phuoc-Tuy, is to be redeployed during Nov to the Rung-Sat Special Zone as the Senior Advisor of the PRU there. This move is in no way connected with WO2 Ison's methods in Phuoc-Tuy, which were referred to in AATTV Reports for Aug and Sep 69. He is to be moved because of the particular advisory problems and special activity in the Rung-Sat, involving combined operations with the US Navy and other forces. The other factor precipitating WO2 Ison's re-deployment is the current reshuffle and phasing out of advisors with the PRU programme as a whole. This phasing out will mean that only one advisor will be with a PRU and it is intended that, over the next 8-12 months, the advisory effort at the unit level will cease altogether. (Para 18 also refers).

15. LRP Training : Van-Kiep. Extracts of a report by Capt Harris (AATTV), Chief Instructor of the LRP Wing, on the 5/69 LRP Course which completed its training on 6 Nov is attached at Annex H.

IV Corps

16. Enemy activity in IV CTZ remained at a low level during the month. Despite the indisputable evidence of increased NVA infiltration into the Tactical Zone, no major contacts were reported. It is apparent that enemy units continue to remain dispersed and that they are avoiding GVN offensive operations.

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17. The AATTV Village Defence Advisory Teams (VDAT) continue to work in the four provinces of the Delta allocated by MACCORDS IV Corps -: Vinh-Long, Vinh-Binh, Kien-Hoa and Dinh-Tuong. Tangible results, which are seldom achieved in this sort of advisory effort, are now starting to become evident in the four provinces. It has been a hard battle for the members of the VDATs and despite loud praise of their successes by Senior US Advisors early in their deployment, it was not until the last two months that satisfactory evidence of some positive progress was accepted by AATTV. Because of the deployment of additional AATTV members to Phuoc-Tuy and other re-deployment problems within AATTV, the strength of the VDATs has fallen in most cases from three members to its original figure of two members per team. It is now considered, after the added experience gained over the last two months, that in fact a two-man team is the better working strength and that the short temporary absence of one member on R&R or because of illness, which was of concern initially, can now be accepted. In consultation with the Deputy for CORDS IV Corps, it has been decided to deploy a fifth VDAT in the Delta, in a province yet to be decided. There will then be five teams, each of two members. The total of ten members of AATTV thus involved in the VDAT project will still be two less than with four teams each of three members, which was the case until recently.

18. Attached at Annex I are extracts of a report by Maj Harkness, the Senior AATTV Advisor in IV CTZ.

Province Recce Units (PRU) - Standing Operating Procedure

19. Attached at Annex J is a copy of the most recent edition of the PRUs Standing Operating Procedure. This copy of the latest SOP was provided by a member of AATTV who is deployed as the Senior Advisor to a PRU. The contents and wording of this SOP reflect the change in control of the PRU programme from the US to the Vietnamese, which is expected to be completed by Jul 70. It is understood that the intention is for funding of the programme by the US to cease and all field advisory effort by the US and Aust also to cease by that time. However, there seems to be a strong likelihood that some outside financial support may have to continue beyond Jul 70, even though the reduction in advisory effort may well be completed as scheduled.



(R.D.F. LLOYD)  
Lt Col  
Comd

AATTV DEPLOYMENT  
AS AT 9 NOV 1969

Annex 'A' to  
AATTV Monthly Report  
for Nov 69

Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>AATTV : SAIGON</u>								
1.	Lt Col	R.D.F.	Lloyd	RA Inf	HQ AATTV	Commanding Officer	Jan 70	Saigon
2.	Capt	G.W.	Dennis	RA Inf	"	Adjutant	Nov 69	"
3.	Capt	D.J.F.	Rowe	RA Inf	"	" (Designate)	May 70	"
4.	WO1	G.S.	Munt	RA Inf	"	Admin WO (Chief Clerk)	Mar 70	"
5.	WO2	T.J.	Colbert	RAE	"	Admin WO (Pay)	Dec 69	"
6.	WO2	G.E.	Munro	RA Sigs	"	Admin WO (Pay)(Designate)	Feb 70	"
7.	Cpl	G.H.	Davison	RAASC	"	Clerk	May 70	"
8.	WO1	J.B.	Staunton-Latimer	RAAC	Armoured School	Instructor ./Advisor	Feb 70	Thu-Duc (near Saigon)

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>I CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV : QUANG-TRI Province</u>								
9.	Maj	H.L.	Bell	RA Inf	Quang-Tri Sector	Asst Province Advisor (Military)	Nov 69	Quang-Tri
10.	Maj	C.S.	Connor	RAAC	" " "	" " " (Desig)	Oct 70	" "
11.	WO2	R.V.	Roney	RAAMC	" " "	Medical Advisor	Apr 70	" "
12.	WO2	J.	Stephens	RAASC	Cam-Lo Sub-Sector	Assistant Advisor	Oct 70	Cam-Lo
13.	WO2	J.	Fitzgerald	RA Inf	1/1 ARVN Bn	" "	Jul 70	Near Quang-Tri (Regt HQ)
14.	WO2	K.A.	Gabriel	RA Inf	2/1 " "	" "	Nov 69	" " " "
15.	WO2	D.T.	Powell	RA Inf	2/1 " "	" " (Desig)	Oct 70	" " " "
16.	WO2	B.L.	Young	RA Inf	3/1 " "	" "	Feb 70	" " " "
17.	WO2	G.M.	Logan	RA Inf	4/1 " "	" "	Oct 70	" " " "
18.	WO2	D.A.	Strachan	RA Inf	1/2 " "	" "	Oct 70	Dong-Ha (Regt HQ)
19.	WO2	O.W.	Bell	RAA	2/2 " "	" "	Aug 70	" " "
20.	WO2	L.A.	West	RA Inf	3/2 " "	" "	Jul 70	" " "
21.	WO2	R.A.	O'Hara	RA Inf	4/2 " "	" "	Jul 70	" " "
22.	WO2	E.A.	Taylor	RA Inf	5/2 " "	" "	Jul 70	" " "
23.	WO2	L.N.	Bootes	RAAC	2/7 ARVN Cav	" "	Mar 70	Quang-Tri
24.	WO2	H.J.	Stuttard	RAAC	1/11 ARVN Cav	" "	Nov 69	Quang-Tri
25.	WO1	E.C.	Burns	RAAC	1/11 " "	" " (Desig)	Oct 70	" "

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Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>I CTZ (Cont)</u>								
: : <u>AATTV : THUA THIEN Province</u> :								
26.	WO2	D.G.	Killion	RAAMC	Thua-Thien Sector	Medical Advisor	Jul 70	Hue
27.	Maj	G.V.	Brown	RAE	Nam-Hoa District	District Senior Advisor	Jun 70	Nam-Hoa
28.	WO2	T.	McNee	RA Sigs	Nam-Hoa Sub-Sector	Assistant Advisor	Oct 70	"
29.	WO2	K.W.	Forden	RA Inf	Black Panther Coy	" "	May 70	Hue (Base)
30.	WO2	D.G.	Parker	RA Inf	1/54 ARVN Bn	" "	Oct 70	Phu-Loc (Base)
31.	WO2	D.F.	Heenan	RA Inf	2/54 " "	" "	Jul 70	" "
32.	WO2	S.	Speechley	RAEME	3/54 " "	" "	Jul 70	" "
33.	WO2	D.E.	Watts	RA Sigs	1/3 " "	" "	Jul 70	Hue (Base)
34.	WO2	J.F.	McKenner	RA Inf	2/3 " "	" "	Jul 70	"
35.	Capt	W.D.	Tear	RA Inf	3/3 " "	Senior Advisor	Oct 70	"
36.	WO2	TPJ	Van Bakel	RAASC	3/3 " "	Assistant Advisor	Nov 69	"
37.	WO2	D.F.	Hedges	RA Inf	4/3 " "	" "	Aug 70	"

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>I CTZ (Cont)</u> <u>AATTV : QUANG NAM Province</u>								
38.	Maj	F.C.	Johnston	RA Inf	HQ I Corps	G3 (Trg) Advisor	May 70	Danang
39.	WO2	P.J.	Heslin	RAE	AATTV Danang	Admin WO	Mar 70	Aust House Danang
40.	WO2	J.M.	O'Donnell	RAAOC	" "	" "	Jan 70	" " "
41.	WO1	R.M.	Almond	RAAC	3/17 ARVN Cav	Assistant Advisor	May 70	Hoi-An
42.	WO2	V.L.	Harris	RA Inf	Hoa-Vang Sub-Sector	" " RF/PF	Feb 70	Hoa-Vang
43.	WO2	R.D.	Aylett	RA Inf	37th Ranger Bn	" "	Dec 69	Near Danang
44.	Capt	W.	Sheppard	RA Inf	1/51 ARVN Bn	Senior Advisor	Sep 70	Mieu-Bong (Regt HQ)
45.	WO2	C.F.	Keioskie	RAASC	2/51 " "	Assistant Advisor	Feb 70	" " "
46.	WO2	W.T.	Jones	RA Inf	3/51 " "	" "	Aug 70	" " "

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Serial	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>I CTZ (Cont)</u>								
<u>AATTV : QUANG-TIN and QUANG-NGAI Provinces</u>								
47.	Capt	J.P.	Nelson	RA Inf	1/4 ARVN Bn	Senior Advisor	May 70	) Quang-Ngai Province (Regt HQ near Quang-Ngai)
48.	WO2	D.	Burke	RA Inf	1/4 " "	Assistant Advisor	Aug 70	
49.	WO2	M.J.	Poole	RA Inf	2/4 " "	" "	Nov 69	
50.	WO2	B.	Davies	RA Inf	2/4 " "	" " (Desig)	Oct 70	
51.	WO2	R.D.	Cameron	RA Inf	3/4 " "	" "	Mar 70	
52.	Capt	R.L.	Smith	RAE	1/5 " "	Senior Advisor	Apr 70	) Quang-Tin Province (Regt HQ near Tam-Ky)
53.	WO2	D.C.	Wilson	RA Inf	2/5 " "	Assistant Advisor	Oct 70	
54.	WO2	K.W.	Heard	RA Inf	3/5 " "	" "	Oct 70	
55.	WO2	G.S.	Horne	RA Inf	4/5 " "	" "	Nov 69	
56.	WO2	D.W.	Eather	RA Inf	1/6 " "	" "	Jul 70	) Quang-Ngai Province (Regt HQ near Quang-Ngai)
57.	Capt	A.J.	Mogridge	RA Inf	2/6 " "	Senior Advisor	Apr 70	
58.	WO2	K.J.	Brady	RA Inf	2/6 " "	Assistant Advisor	Oct 70	
59.	WO2	W.L.	Dunstan	RAA	4/6 " "	" "	Oct 70	
60.	WO2	J.F.	Ghilotti	RAAC	2/4 ARVN Cav	" "	Aug 70	Quang-Ngai
61.	WO2	T.J.	Goddard	RAA	23 ARVN Arty Bn	" "	Apr 70	" "

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Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>II CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV : PLEIKU (SPECIAL FORCES)</u>								
62.	Maj	W.J.	Brydon	RA Inf	2nd Mobile Strike Force Command, Det B-20, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)	Bn Comd	Feb 70	Pleiku (Base Camp)
63.	Capt	D.F.	Paul	RA Inf	" " "	Coy Comd	May 70	" "
64.	WO2	F.M.	Moffitt	RA Inf	" " "	Coy Comd	Jun 70	" "
65.	WO2	S.J.	McLaughlin	RA Inf	" " "	Coy Comd (Trg Coy)	Apr 70	" "
66.	WO2	J.R.	Vincent	RAA	" " "	Instructor "	May 70	" "
67.	WO2	J.T.	Hoolihan	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Jun 70	" "
68.	WO2	A.B.	McCloskey	RA Inf	" " "	Pl Comd	Jul 70	" "
69.	WO2	C.L.	Black	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Jul 70	" "
70.	WO2	K.H.	Mavin	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Aug 70	" "
71.	WO2	L.B.	Scowcroft	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Aug 70	" "
72.	WO2	O.	Stevenson	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Aug 70	" "
73.	WO2	A.J.	Shelton	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Feb 70	" "
74.	WO2	A.S.	Williams	RA Sigs (SAS)	" " "	" " (Designate)	Oct 70	" "

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Serial	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>II CTZ (Cont).</u> <u>AATTIV - II CORPS AREA</u>								
75.	Capt	W.R.	Deane	Int Corps	Mobile Training Team (Montagnard PRU's II CTZ)	OC MMTT	Jul 70	Nha-Trang (Base)
76.	WO2	G.Y.	Jamieson	RA Inf	" " "	Instructor/Advisor MMTT	Mar 70	" " "
77.	WO2	M.T.	Jensen	RA Inf	Ranger Training Centre	Instructor/Advisor	Nov 69	Duc-My
78.	WO1	S.D.	Rosenberg	RA Inf	" " "	" " (Desig):	Apr 70	" "
79.	WO1	E.B.	Ostara	RA Inf	Province Recce Unit	Senior Advisor Binh-Dinh	Dec 69	Qui-Nhon
80.	WO2	R.G.	Carter	RA Inf	" " "	" " Tuyen-Duc	Jul 70	Dalat
81.	WO1	E.W.	Gason	RAAC	1/14 ARVN Cav	Senior Advisor	Dec 69	Kontum (Base)

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>III CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV : III CORPS AREA</u>								
82.	Capt	P.J.S.	Harris	RA Inf	LRP Wing Van-Kiep National Training Centre	CI	Mar 70	Baria
83.	WO2	C.R.	Ansell	RA Inf	" " "	Admin WO	Mar 70	"
84.	WO2	F.E.	Bell	RA Inf	" " "	Patrol Comd/Instructor	Mar 70	"
85.	WO2	J.W.	Wigg	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Jan 70	"
86.	WO2	K.G.	Latham	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Dec 69	"
87.	WO2	C.J.	Ison	RA Inf	Province Recce Unit	Senior Advisor Phuoc-Tuy Rung-Sat Special Zone.	Apr 70	Vung-Tau (Base)
88.	WO2	C.	Kealy	RA Inf	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	RF Trg Cadre (Senior Instructor)	Aug 70	Heavyweight Trg Centre, near Nui-Dat.
89.	WO2	R.K.	Gurney	RA Inf	" "	" " " (Instructor)	Sep 70	" " "
90.	WO2	AJA	Joyce	RA Inf	" "	" " " ( " )	Aug 70	" " "
91.	WO2	J.H.	Macartney	RAASC	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	Assistant Advisor A & L Coy (RF)	Jan 70	Baria
92.	WO2	R.S.	Simpson	RA Inf	" " "	Advisor PSDF	Feb 70	"
93.	WO2	L.D.	Osborne	RA Inf	" " "	Advisor RD	Jun 70	"
94.	WO2	L.N.	Gorman	RAA	Att 1 ATF	Advisor ARVN Bn Trg	Mar 70	Nui-Dat
95.	WO2	W.J.	Bruce	RA Inf	" "	" " " "	Feb 70	" "

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Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>AATTV : IV CORPS AREA</u>								
96.	Maj	A.	Harkness	RAA	CORDS, IV Corps	Assistant to Chief Territorial Security	Apr 70	Can-Tho
97.	WO2	H.J.	Hartman	RAAMC	HQ IV Corps	Medical Advisor	Jul 70	" "
98.	WO2	A.A.	Welsh	RAE	IV Corps Village Defence Advisory Team (VDAT)	VDAT Advisor Team Leader	Dec 69	Dinh-Tuong Province
99.	WO2	R.D.	Smith	RA Inf	" " "	VDAT Advisor	Oct 70	" " "
100	WO1	W.A.	Eade	RAA Pro	" " "	VDAT Team Leader	Jul 70	Kien-Hoa Province
101	WO2	B.L.	Saxby	RAE	" " "	" Advisor	Jan 70	" "
102	WO2	R.M.	King	RA Inf	" " "	VDAT Team Leader	Dec 69	Vinh-Binh Province
103	WO2	W.E.	Tillett	RA Inf	" " "	" Advisor	Sep 70	" "
104	WO2	R.W.	Cairns	RA Inf	" " "	VDAT Team Leader	Jul 70	Vinh-Long Province
105	WO2	K.J.	Troy	RA Inf	" " "	" Advisor	Mar 70	" "

Danang

30 Oct 69

CO AATTV

EXTRACTS FROM MONTHLY REPORT BY MAJ JOHNSTON  
I CTZ - OCT 69

General

1. The steady decline in enemy activity continued into the second week of the reporting period. In this week the number of enemy initiated ground incidents dropped to 158 the lowest number since the week of 20 to 26 October 1968. Enemy KIA was 367 which is the lowest weekly figure recorded since January, 1968.
2. The final two weeks saw small increases followed by a further downward trend in both these figures, with a sharp increase in the number of Hoi-Chanhs, 222 in the third week, and 233 in the fourth week the highest total for the year.
3. The tempo of enemy operations is characteristically low in October due to resupply activities and preparations for the monsoon season. It is evident that the enemy can and will continue to mount locally sharp attacks to discredit the GVN, cripple the pacification, maintain pressure on the politico diplomatic scenes and public opinion, as well as to maintain the morale and fighting spirit of his own troops. The precise level and tempo of the enemy operations which can be expected from week to week during the current wet season most likely will be a function of the weather.

Withdrawal of 3rd Marine Division

4. October saw the redeployment of ARVN and US troops in 11 DTA to adjust to the withdrawal of 3rd Marine Division. In general terms, the Ashau valley and the western mountains have been left to the enemy. Areas other than the coastal plain and Piedmont area have been designated as Patrol and Reconnaissance areas.
5. It is general comment here, that the enemy will test the ARVN in their new role shortly.
6. Major Bell's report (Annexure 1 to Annex D of this AATTV Report) covers this in a little more detail as far as Quang-Tri Province is concerned.

Casualties

7. WO2 Dolan was wounded by enemy mortar fire on 2 Oct 69 and was a medical evacuation to Australia.

(F.C. JOHNSTON)  
Maj  
AATTV

SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR OPERATIONAL INCIDENTS DURING OCT 69  
INVOLVING AATTV ADVISORS - I CTZ

1. On 1 Oct, the 37th ARVN Ranger Bn, six kilometers west southwest of AN HOA (2C214465) received 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and 100 RPG rounds resulting in no casualties.
2. On 2 Oct the 37th ARVN Ranger Bn engaged an unknown size enemy force five kilometers west of AN HOA (AT 792455) resulting in fifteen enemy killed and two prisoners captured.
3. On 2 Oct, 3rd Bn 6th ARVN Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force 15 kilometers South Southeast of TAM KY (BT 351082) resulting in eight enemy KIA. WO DOLAN was wounded by mortar fire whilst controlling the medevac for ARVN casualties from this action.
4. Southwest of DUC PHO there was a series of five contacts initiated by the 3rd and 4th Bns of 4th ARVN Regt, between 30 Sep and 3 Oct in an area 10 to 15 kilometers South Southwest of DUC PHO (BS 776284 - BS 763237). As a result of these ARVN attacks, the enemy force, most probably elements of the 2nd VC Regiment, lost 33 killed and 15 weapons captured at the cost of no ARVN casualties.
5. On 5 Oct 2nd Bn 1st ARVN Regt conducted a raid on an unknown size enemy force 14 kilometers South Southwest of QUANG TRI City (YD 320397) resulting in eight enemy killed with no friendly casualties. In another incident on 5 Oct, 3rd Bn 2nd ARVN Regt found 20 NVA bodies seven and one-half kilometers north northeast of the ROCKPILE (XD 998630). These bodies were about one month old and had been killed by air strikes.
6. On 12 Oct 4th Bn 3rd ARVN Regt made contact with an unknown size enemy force 14 kilometers West Southwest of HUE (YD 618188) resulting in five enemy killed.
7. On 14 Oct the enemy directed about 100 rounds of 82mm mortar fire against the positions of 2nd Tp 11 ARVN Cavalry along the eastern DMZ approximately seven kilometers Northeast of GIO-LINH (YD 280768). The vigorous response of the ARVN counter-mortar fire apparently surprised the enemy, for a subsequent sweep of the suspected enemy positions uncovered 30 x 82mm mortar rounds, 20 claymore mines and 500 rounds of small arms ammunition, most likely abandoned by the enemy in his haste to withdraw.
8. The most noteworthy friendly initiated engagement occurred on 14 Oct when 3rd Bn 1st ARVN Regt made contact with an unknown size enemy force 12 kilometers Southwest of QUANG TRI City (YD 273427). They killed 10 enemy without friendly casualties.

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9. On 17 Oct 3rd Bn 1st ARVN Regt, while engaged in reconnaissance work received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force 15 kilometers Southwest of QUANG-TRI City (YD 256407). The ARVN engaged the enemy force killing seven.
10. On 19 Oct in the vicinity of YD 307427, 3rd Bn 1st ARVN Regt raided an unknown size enemy position resulting in 3 enemy killed, 1 x B40 and 200 blocks of TNT being captured. On the same day the 4th Bn of the same regt killed 3 enemy in a contact with an unknown size enemy force.
11. On 20 Oct, in the vicinity of YD 617174, the 4th Bn 3rd ARVN Regt contacted a VC platoon resulting in 7 enemy killed. On the same day in the vicinity BS 769565 3rd Bn 4th ARVN Regt in a contact with an unknown size enemy force killed 8 enemy.
12. On 21 Oct 4th Bn 3rd ARVN Regt in vicinity YD 608174 contacted an estimated enemy squad resulting in 3 VC being captured. Whilst in Quang-Nam Province during a search operation in vicinity BT 063464 1st Bn 51st Regt killed 3 VC.
13. On 22 Oct in vicinity BS 750615 3rd Bn 4th ARVN Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force resulting in 3 enemy killed.
14. On 23 Oct, 2nd Bn 6th ARVN Regt searching in the vicinity BS 640750 captured 8 enemy.
15. On 24 Oct, 3rd Bn 1st ARVN Regt ambushed an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 3 enemy killed.
16. On 25 Oct:
  - a. While searching in the vicinity of BT 237163, 1st Bn 5th ARVN Regt killed 3 enemy.
  - b. While searching in the vicinity of BT 237163, 4th Bn 5th ARVN Regt killed 7 enemy.
17. On 27 Oct:
  - a. In the vicinity of BS 710581, 3rd Bn 4th ARVN Regt ambushed 10 enemy resulting in 3 enemy KIA.
  - b. In the vicinity of YD 370257, 4th Bn 1st ARVN Regt contacted an enemy company resulting in 23 enemy killed, 5 individual weapons captured, 4 x 120mm mortars complete captured.

(F.C. JOHNSTON)  
Maj  
AATTV

INDEX TO AATTV ADVISOR REPORTS OF INTEREST  
I CTZ

The following reports of interest from AATTV advisors in I CTZ are attached:

- Annexure 1 - Report by Maj H Bell, Assistant Province Advisor (Military) Quang-Tri Province.
- Annexure 2 - Report by WO1 E Burns, Assistant Advisor 11 ARVN Cav.
- Annexure 3 - Report by WO2 L Bootes, Assistant Advisor 7 ARVN Cav.
- Annexure 4 - Report by WO2 D Heenan, Assistant Advisor 2/54 ARVN Bn.
- Annexure 5 - Report by Capt W Sheppard, Senior Advisor 1/51 ARVN Bn.
- Annexure 6 - Report by Maj G Brown, Senior Advisor Nam-Hoa District.
- Annexure 7 - Report by WO2 D Killion, Medical Advisor, Thua-Thien Province.

CO AATTV

MONTHLY REPORT AATTV QUANG TRI - OCT 1969  
BY MAJ H. BELL

1. 1 ARVN Regt Remained deployed in Base Area 101 despite the logistical problems of air resupply and bad weather. From documents and PW it is obvious that Base Area 101 is now non-operative and the enemy is being forced to enter the lowlands after rice - resulting in the increase of ambush contact on the population fringe.

a. 1/1 ARVN Bn (WO2 FITZGERALD). Located FSB BARBARA. No significant contact.

b. 2/1 ARVN Bn (WO2 GABRIEL). Operated in mobile role in Base 101, concluded month on FSB ANN. No noteworthy contact. 2/1 ARVN is now opcon to 2 Regt and is moving to A1 outpost on the DMZ.

c. 3/1 ARVN Bn (WO2 YOUNG). Now at LAVANG, ready to move out. Operated in Base Area with no major contact. WO2 Young applied for permission to move with a coy but was refused on the grounds that the US type on the FSB would be alone. Meanwhile the other 2 US advisors were at Riverview Compound. I have again emphasised the policy of CO AATTV on the subject to 3/1 Bn, but it seems on unwritten SOP in 3/1 ARVN Bn to keep half a team at base. I have told them it is OK, provided it is half of the American team, and that our advisors are not to be inhibited from taking the field because of American unwillingness to join the ARVN in the field. I have re-emphasised CO AATTV's clear direction to members of AATTV in this regard. It is understood that WO Young has since overcome this problem anyway, through his own initiative.

d. 4/1 ARVN Bn (WO2 LOGAN) Has been in mobile role in Base Area 101. Logan has remained in the field since arrival. I gather that he thinks highly of his unit, which promises well for the future.

2. 2 ARVN Regt. Has taken over part of the 3 Marine Div AO, and deployment is almost complete. Bn AO's centre on A1, C1, C2, ROCKPILE and VANDERGRIFF, with one bn in reserve.

a. 1/2 ARVN Bn (WO1 ROSENBERG). Is covering the establishment of CAMP CARROLL FSB (5 batteries!) and the ROCKPILE area. No contact except attacks by fire. The advisory team set-up has not improved but the unit itself is very good.

.../2

- b. 2/2 ARVN Bn (WO2 BELL). Operating out of C2 in conjunction with 1 Bde 5 US Mech Div, mainly in sweeps of the Piedmont area. No contact except light attacks by fire and small night contacts.
- c. 3/2 ARVN Bn (WO2 WEST) In reserve at DONG HA, apparently was to go to DONG DA NTC for training but is preparing for an operation, location unknown.
- d. 4/2 ARVN Bn (WO2 O'HARA) In the VANDERGRIFF area covering a new FSB on the mountains East of VANDERGRIFF. Also ambushing the abandoned CA LU village and has wiped out small NVA recce patrols. (The whole Western mountain area is very quiet)
- c. 5/2 ARVN Bn (WO2 TAYLOR) Located on A1 outpost with little contact except light attacks by fire. The unit is being withdrawn and will either go to DONG DA or to C1 outpost.
3. 1/3 ARVN Bn. (WO2 WATTS) Was opcon to 2 Regt at C1 for the month. The good coordination effected by the unit advisory team with Sub-sector HQ is the first of its kind I have seen in Quang-Tri. This no doubt reflects the closer contact between 3 Regt and the populated area of their home province Thua-Thien than is the case with ARVN in Quang-Tri. (In Thua-Thien the mountains are much closer to the population).
4. 11 ARVN Cavalry (WO1 BURNS & WO2 STUTTARD). Operated out of A2 with little contact. Bn Senior Advisor seriously WIA in a mine incident on Route 1. 11 Cavalry is now in reserve and is believed to be detailed for either service in Thua-Thien or re-training. 2/7 Cavalry has moved up to A2 to take over but WO Bootes is still at HUE with the unit rear party, to arrive this week. 11 Cavalry, after a year of constant mining on the DMZ is ready for a change and the 2/7 looks fresh and spoiling for a fight.
5. Quang-Tri Sector (Maj BELL) The month has seen major changes in the Province.
- a. HAI LANG's new District Chief has produced an overnight change in the RF/PF and letters found on bodies testify to VC bewilderment at the sudden change in the local PF attitude. (The new Chief is a Nhung, and a Military Academy graduate). I think I can justly claim the removal of the previous incumbent as my major contribution to Quang-Tri - it took many hours of delicate argument to get the Deputy Sector Commander (Lt Col De) to relieve a fellow Dai-Viet.
- b. The coordination problems involved in the re-deployment of troops consequent upon the Marine withdrawal, have been largely resolved. 1/5 Mech Bde remains the Senior US HQ and are a positive joy to do business with. Their standing with the Sector HQ is very high. 3 Bde 101 AB Div (airmobile) is also in Province with HQ at Huong Hoa. They also have produced cooperation hitherto not forthcoming from the Marines. Coordination problems have been my main task this month.

.../3

c. Reduction of US effort has, in fact, produced an increase in GVN effort. This was very noticeable in the floods where the GVN have rediscovered the fact that 50 Asians with shovels can rebuild a culvert in less time than it takes to borrow a Marine bulldozer. Whether the increased effort will continue remains to be seen.

d. The basis of the 1970 Pacification Plan is being worked upon and Lt Col De and I are in agreement on the security aspects. We both feel, however, that the Province Chief and the new PSA (when he arrives after Lt Col Mooney's departure) may find our ideas a little too daring. Basically we aim to

- (1) Get RF out of the population onto the fringes, in an ambushing role.
- (2) Conduct RF operations against the suspected guerilla hide-outs in the Piedmont, freeing the US to go after NVA.
- (3) Banish the CAPs to the really contested areas (near the DMZ).

6. Cam-Lo Sub-Sector (WO2 O'DONNELL). This Warrant-Officer has attained a degree of trust with the RF Commander unequalled by any advisor in MACV Team 19. Until the recent arrival of Capt GILBERTSON, USA as DSA, O'DONNELL was the one person that kept the Cam-Lo team running. During the month he has been on daily sweeps with no contact.

7. Sector Hospital (WO2 RONEY). The ARVN saw fit to post a dentist to the hospital without a dental post or equipment. By some feat of negotiation (This time, with official US sanction) Roney obtained a full dental surgery from the departing Marine Medical Battalion, has obtained building materials from the departing Seabees, and using the patients, is building the dental post. The ARVN has allocated money for the post but the expected date of commencement was mid 1970. I can assure CO AATTV that all transactions were overt and with official blessing and were not in conflict with his policy on unofficial methods and "scrounging".

8. Province Overview (See attached). There have been gloom and doom reports over the Marine departure. This is largely a feat of the US Press, fanned by Marine PR. Certain US advisors have taken counsel of their fears and have in their turn unsettled the Vietnamese (despite the fact that the ARVN and Sector have over recent months had little regard for Marine capabilities). I have had many sessions pointing out the facts:-

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	<u>Before the Withdrawal</u>	<u>After it</u>
	6 USMC Bns	3 Mech Bns
	3 5 Mech Bns	1 US Cavalry Bn
	5 Bns 2 ARVN Regt	3 Airmobile Bns (101 Div)
	4 Bns 1 ARVN Regt	2/3 Armoured Bn from 101 Div
	1 ARVN Cav	1 ARVN Cav
	<hr/> 19	5 Bns 2 ARVN Regt
		4 Bns 1 ARVN Regt
Less	1 Bn of 2 ARVN at HUE	
	1 Bn of 1 ARVN on the My-Chanh (now replaced by 5 platoons of PF !)	
	<hr/> 17 Bns facing the NVA	<hr/> 17.2/3 Bns all facing the NVA but with more armour and choppers than possessed by the whole of 111 MAF USMC.

The ARVN and Sector officers now have realised that we are just as well off, but that they have to work harder on logistical problems. When the import of the 3/101st eighty helicopters becomes apparent I believe they will be more than confident. However withdrawal of the 5 Mech, in the near future (say, 6 months?) would I believe have effects on morale.

Noticeable features of the withdrawal have been an increase in criticism of certain allied units (albeit justified in my opinion, may I add), and a definite cooling off towards advisors save those that they respect. The PSA's (Lt Col Mooney) imminent departure is regarded by both US and VN as a definite setback. One thing is certain - Aust advisory stocks are at an all-time high. Combined with a continued reduction in quality of US advisors (regarded almost as an insult, in the ARVN Regiments, particularly), AATTV presence is even more important than before.

(H. BELL)  
Maj  
AATTV

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OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
MACCORDS, Quang Tri Province  
Advisory Team 19  
APO 96495

30 September 1969

TO: Deputy to COMUSMACV, Saigon

THRU: Commanding General, III MAF/Senior Advisor I CTZ, Danang

PROVINCE REPORT  
(RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

Quang Tri Province (01)

Period ending 30 September 1969

OVERVIEW

1. The standdown of elements of the 3rd Marine Division as execution of its redeployment began during the month has not adversely affected security in the populated areas of Quang Tri Province. ARVN, the remaining US units, and the Territorial Forces have continued to provide a security climate favorable for pacification. The necessity for closer ARVN-RF/PF coordination and cooperation became apparent again during the month, however, as an unfortunate accident in Gio Linh District which resulted in 7 dead and 19 wounded demonstrated.

The reaction of GVN officials and officers to the redeployment is one of concern rather than alarm, and concern probably focused more on the long range intentions of US leaders than on the immediate tactical changes. Typhoon Doris was another event during September that saw a mixed GVN reaction. The storm damaged over 10,000 houses and many public buildings. Through use of the Province Pacification and Development Council the immediate needs in terms of food, shelter, medicine, and public utilities were quickly met using GVN assets. However, despite the Province Chief's continued prodding, the repair of public buildings, especially schools, has stalled in a GVN bureaucratic morass. Money and materials are present to handle the repair problems as soon as the service chiefs respond.

12 The move of some 400 Vietnamese and 650 Bru Montagnards to the Cua Valley from the Ca Lu area in western Quang Tri was completed during the period 23-27 September. Thanks to superb support from the 1st ARVN Division, XXIV Corps and the 3rd Marine Division units the people were able to make the thirty kilometer trip moving with them their worldly possessions - to include some 177 water buffalos. (See Operational Synopsis, Appendix 1)

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GROUP 3  
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS  
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED  
DOD DIR 5200.10

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In an effort to put more emphasis into the closing months of the APC the District Chiefs of Hai Lang and Huong Hoa exchanged jobs. Captain Tinh A. Nhi, the new District Chief in Hai Lang replaced Major Phan Van The whose performance at Hai Lang, a priority district, had been unsatisfactory. Promotion of the Cam Lo and Dong Ha District Chiefs to the grade of Major has demonstrably enhanced the sense of purpose of these officers.

2. Priority Pacification Programs:

a. Upgrade Territorial Security: With the departure of the 3d Marine Division, the Territorial Forces in Quang Tri Province are being tasked to assume a greater role in preventing major enemy incursions into the populated areas. Some of the LOC's which were manned by FWMF are in the process of being turned over to the Provincial forces. Territorial units still in training will bolster the existing forces. Province statistics are cited below to depict the current level of activity. (26 August - 26 September)

<u>AREA/UNIT</u>	<u>ENEMY KIA</u>	<u>ENEMY CAPTURED</u>	<u>FRIENDLY KIA</u>	<u>FRIENDLY WIA</u>
Populated Areas	16	2	4	30
Non-Populated Areas	347	13	13*	89*
Totals	363	15	17*	119*

\* US casualties not included

RF/PF	12/4	1/1	2/2	22/8
ARVN	145	5	8	53
CIDG	3	0	0	1
3d Mar Div	139	0	N/A	N/A
1/5th Inf Div (Mech)	60	8	N/A	N/A
Totals	363	15	12	84

(1) Enemy Situation: The enemy has made little effort to interdict LOC's and MSR's. Propaganda incidents remain at a fairly high level with no new trends or themes noted. There was one assassination attempt directed at a village chief which resulted in his receiving minor wounds. The western area of the Province retains the same enemy posture with no new enemy units noted. Quang Binh NVA Provincial units have been confirmed as operating in the central DMZ. No other changes are reported. In the northern part of Base Area 101, the K-11 Sapper Battalion has increased its activity slightly, as has the K-34 Artillery Battalion. The main efforts of the enemy seem to be directed at rice collection, attacks by fire and light harrassing attacks.

(2) Friendly Situation: During the reporting period Sector forces, specifically in Trieu Phong District, have achieved notable results during daylight operations. For example: On 4 September 1969, a one-day clearing operation with a company of 1/5th Inf Div (Mech) in support of the sub-sector, killed one VCI and captured 10 confirmed VCI at Gia Dang. In addition, on 9-12 September on separate clearing operations, two VC were killed. No friendly casualties were incurred on any of the above operations. Three Sector RF companies along with a battalion from the 2d Regiment, 1st ARVN Division conducted a

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combined operation in support of the refugee move from Ca Lu. During the past month there was a total of three Sector operations and forty-seven District operations.

(3) Status of the RF/PF: Quang Tri Province has all authorized 29 RF companies and 124 of 148 PF platoons in Province. The remaining 24 PF platoons are presently in basic training at Lien Tienh. On 20 September the RF companies were organized into five Regional Company Groups to improve command and control and to increase the effectiveness of operations, intelligence, organization, training and logistics. There were 40 Vietnamese awards presented to RF/PF individuals. The MAT Teams have the same mission and are in the same locations as in August. MAT shortages are one officer, one Light Weapons Advisor and two Medical Advisors.

b. Step Up the Attack on VC Infrastructure: During the month of September 1969, VCI activity remained at a relatively low level. Although there were numerous reports of rice collection, propaganda and terrorist activities, very few of these reports were confirmed. The indications were that propaganda and terrorist activities may increase in future months in an effort to convince the people that the GVN can no longer protect them. The VCI situation in Trieu Phong was dealt a severe blow in the early part of the month when a combined District operation neutralized 11 VC/VCI. The total neutralizations for the month of September to this date are 0 Province, 13 District, 4 Village and 1 Hamlet-level VCI.

c. Develop Stronger Local Government: Village government appears to be improving faster than the Province government. Community interest generates projects but approval from the Province Pacification and Development Council for funds and materiel is often slow. The delay seems to have two causes: first, a shortage of trained clerks and administrators at every level; second, Province officials are attempting to maintain control of all programs. Having previously enjoyed control of every plaster and sheet of roofing, the P & D Council Secretary is reluctant to give up this power. Under this Secretary, who was formerly also the Secretary of the RD Council, the Province spent less than 70% of the RD Budget in 1968. Spending for 1969 has not improved to date. Recent GVN directions from Saigon indicate that the expenditure of VSDB funds is to be speeded before fiscal year-end curtailment. At present only 23% of the Province VSDB has actually been spent. GVN officials from Saigon and Danang have not taken the P & D Secretary to task for the poor performance that the slow budget expenditures indicate. One of the goals of 1969, the development of village government, is being realized - officials are being trained and are becoming familiar with the VSDP. While statistics on numbers of projects and percentage of budget spent do not represent the quality of village government, these figures do indicate the level of activity. These statistics are about the same as those reported last month.

d. Expand Self-Defense: During the month of September, PSDF figures took

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a quantum jump again to 83,800 organized, 21,903 trained with 7,251 weapons. Two months ago Province officials jumped to figures over 100,000 despite Advisory protests and finally relented when GVN Corps-level officials disallowed the change. This new total conforms to the 31 May 1969 MOI Directive and is broken down as follows: Combat group - ages 16 and older, 18,149; female support group - ages 16 to 50, 28,444; elders self-defense group - ages 50 and older, 16,110; and youth self-defense group - ages 13 to 15, 21,134. Total weapons issued and total PSDF trained still remain key indicators of PSDF activity.

e. Emphasize Revolutionary Development and Self-Help: When the RD Minister visited Quang Tri on 11 September, Mr. Don, the RDC Control Chief, lamented over the lack of uniforms, but the PSA and RDC Advisor recalled a recent shipment of uniforms. An investigation followed disclosing that the uniforms had arrived but were not to be found. The RD S-1 and S-4 are now in jail. On a more positive note, regular and Truong Son RD Cadre Groups assisted substantially in the Ca Lu resettlement operation. The Assistant RDC Control Group Chief, Lieutenant Dien, deserves the credit for motivating the Cadre on the operation, for the Chief was "sick" for the duration of the operation. On 7 September, RDC Group 29 acquitted itself well when they and two PF platoons fought off an enemy attack which netted four VC KIA and one captured.

f. Revive Rural Economy: The 8th Lunar Harvest was well underway by the end of the month with over 40% of the rice harvested. Yields for the local rice averaged about 1-2 metric tons per hectare, while TN-8 averaged about 3-3.5 metric tons. Typhoon Doris, which damaged local rice as much as 30% only damaged 10% of the TN-8. Over 200 farmers from the area not growing TN-8 rice were taken by GVN Agricultural Service personnel to see the success of the present crop. After the trip the farmers indicated a high degree of interest in planting TN-8 for future crops. The Agricultural Service held a 3-day training program to cross-train all cadre on various aspects of animal husbandry. This is a good effort to stretch the use of present available cadres. The price of imported rice has dropped 200 piasters per 100 kg. while locally produced rice has risen by 400 piasters in a pre-harvest price jump that is probably temporary. An abundance of sea fish on the market has resulted in lower prices. Meat and vegetable prices remain high.

g. Upgrade Refugee Care and Step Up Resettlement: Refugee payments amounting to 31,764,461\$VN were made during this reporting period. Of this total, 10,431,475\$VN was distributed to 15,435 people in Ha Thanh and Trung Gio Refugee Camps in completion of "special" rice allowances, i.e. allowances granted in addition to the regular "refugee resettlement" rice allowances. The balance of the refugee payments made this month - 21,332,986\$VN - represents final resettlement allowances to 8,894 people in ten refugee camps. The Ca Lu operation has generated approximately 1,000 refugees. Registration of these new refugees in Cua Valley was accomplished and the distribution of tin and food-stuffs completed. MHSWR has approved local SWR's request that both temporary and resettlement payments be made to these people.

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h. Revive National Reconciliation and Chieu Hoi: During the reporting period 24 Hoi Chanh arrived at the Chieu Hoi Center. Barring large-scale enemy intrusions into populated areas the trend of declining numbers of Hoi Chanh discussed in earlier reports will probably continue for the next few months. Armed Propaganda Team/Drama Team operations continued to average three per week. Night performances were also used as a forum to discuss other programs such as IR-8 rice and the Paris Peace Talks. The imminent departure of the 3d Marine Division poses a test for the GVN's willingness and ability to assume a greater role in supporting the Chieu Hoi Program.

3. Future Problems and Projections: The departure of the 3d Marine Division places added responsibility on the civil government. As indicated in part 2c, the record of Province officials in spending their budgets and responding to the VSDP has left much to be desired. The civic action contribution of the Division, including medical programs, school construction, road building and repair, and other functions normally satisfied by civil government, is coming to a rapid close. How well the civil government satisfies its responsibilities will be vital to the continued success of pacification and development. Unless the Province government shows more response to programs and direction from the central government, pacification may suffer.

It is of great continuing concern in Quang Tri that, regardless of the terminology in vogue in 1970, this Province will have in Gio Linh and Cam Lo Districts some 30,000 people whose homes were originally in what is now the DMZ and the region just south of that area. These refugees, as they are now called, continue to live in sub-standard conditions and will require considerable and specific assistance if they are to maintain even their present marginal subsistence following the anticipated termination of the formal refugee program.

1 Incl  
as

*H.F. Mooney*  
H.F. MOONEY  
LTC, INF  
Province Senior Advisor

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Quang-Tri  
Fire-Base Alpha 2  
DMZ

23 Oct 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY WO1 E.C. BURNS - 11 ARVN CAV  
OCT 69

1. Subtended is the activity report for firebase Alpha 2 line team, month of October 1969; prepared by 24434 WO1 E.C. Burns.

2. Activities

8 Oct : 1100 hrs - 2 tp made contact at grid 280760, received 40-50 incoming 82mm mortar rds, intermittent sniper fire from grid 2575. 2 ARVN WIA.

1430 hrs - Unknown number of 82mm mortar rds incoming at fire-base Alpha 2, 1 ARVN WIA, medevac. 2 tp sighted 50 NVA at grid 253779 in bunker complex, estimated 1 NVA KIA, 1 NVA WIA. Enemy equipment captured:

2 140mm RL  
1 A-Tk mine  
1 NVA type claymore  
20 82mm mortar rds  
1 Russian gas mask  
500 rds of AK 47 ammo  
4 AK 47 magazines  
1 pair of shoes  
1 NVA uniform  
quantity of documents.

11 Oct: 1030 hrs - 1 Tp track destroyed by mine at grid 190715, 7 ARVN WIA. Tp Ldr did not take advisor on operation. WIA returned to fire-base for medevac.

1145 hrs - 2 tp track damaged by mine at grid 282763, 5 ARVN WIA, medevac completed at 1230 hrs. Medevac lifted off just before 20 incoming 82mm mortar rds.

.../2

- 12 Oct: 1645 hrs - 3 x 82mm mortar rds incoming at firebase Alpha 2. Negative damage, negative casualties.
- 14 Oct: 1000 hrs - 2 Tp reported 10 incoming 82mm mortar rds north of fire-base. Negative casualties, negative damage.
- 1100 hrs - Undisclosed number of incoming 82mm mortar rds at firebase Alpha 2, 4 ARVN WIA, medevac at 1200 hrs.
- 1110 hrs - 2 tp reported on earlier contact, picked up 90x82mm mortar rds and 15 claymores on rd to DMZ at 27 grid.
- 15 Oct: 0900 hrs - 1 Tp moved out on sensor planting operation in DMZ. Negative contacts.
- 1515 hrs - OP tower spotted 4 NVA at grid 240768. 8 inch guns fired.
- 1555 hrs - Received 3x82mm mortar rds incoming, 1 US WIA, medevac at 1620 hrs.
- 17 Oct: 0820 hrs - Received 2x82mm mortar rds incoming. Negative cas, negative damage.
- 22 Oct: 1005 hrs - 11 Cav Regt, Senior Advisor, Major Eddie B. Story, severely wounded by mine explosion on highway one 4000 metres South of firebase Alpha 2. Jeep and trailer totally destroyed. Explosion was beneath small asphalt section, evidence of digging from side of road, mine probably command detonated. Nature of wounds to Senior Advisor : severe depressed skull fracture, shrapnel wounds to right arm, shoulder, and back.
- 1640 hrs - Received 3x82mm mortar rds incoming, negative cas, negative damage.
- 1941 hrs - Received 1x82mm mortar rd incoming, neg cas, negative damage.
- 2100 hrs - Fire fight 600 metres North of our TOC, ARVN standing patrol and NVA. 3 ARVN WIA (2 seriously) medevac called urgently. Advisor TOC used as aid post. 1 ARVN died.
- 23 Oct: 1345 hrs - FAC called 8 inch gun fire on bunkers in grid square 2077. 4 NVA observed hit by fire.

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26 Oct: 1040 hrs - FAC called in B52 air strike on target at grid 783152, NVA bunker system in area from which Alpha 2 receives most incoming mortar fire.

3. Comments

It is yet too early for the writer to comment on the unit standard of training. However local observation of the tank troop at firebase Alpha 2 reveals an apparent lack of daily routine checking and testing of armoured vehicles and equipment. There is apparently a definite requirement for introduction of a daily and periodical task system, e.g. there is no daily stand-to and run-up of AFV's at first and last light.

(E.C. BURNS)

WO1

AATTV

RHQ  
7th Armd Cav Sqn  
AN CUU - HUE

20 Oct 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY WO2 L BOOTES - 7 ARVN CAV  
FOR PERIOD 21 SEP - 20 OCT 69

General

During the above period two APC troops of the 7th Cav operated on search and cordon missions in the Phong-Dien District (The street without joy) NE of HUE. A Coy of RF with each troop.

Operation Details

The AO was split in two, with a troop responsible for searching and securing areas within each half.

Operations commenced on 21 Sep 69 and ran through to 14/10/69 when the troops returned to Hue for maintenance and briefing on new operation.

The above operation was moderately successful, with 18 of the enemy killed, captured or surrendered. Several caches of weapons, papers and food were found. The enemy were VC with 1 NVA officer. A VCI was found to be the village youth leader at Phong-Dien.

Change of AO

The 7th Cav, now organic to 1st ARVN Division, has been given a new AO which is in the NE corner of SVN at the DMZ, encompasses A1, A2, B1, B2 with the CP at C1, just North of Dong-Ha.

The Sqn Comd will be in complete charge of the AO, purely ARVN, no US units, and will have 2 battalions of the 2nd ARVN Regt under his control.

It is thought that the 7th Cav is taking over from the 11th Cav, with the 11th Cav coming to Hue for re-deployment & training. This is not confirmed at this time.

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Conclusion

3 troop will depart Hue at AM 20th Oct 69 and stay 3 days at FB NANCY for Road Security. 2 troop and HQ will go direct to C1 AM 20th Oct 69, with the tank troop moving on the 26th Oct. The two APC troops will have a Tank Platoon during this operation,

Time on the ground could be upwards of 3 months.

Good working relations exist between the writer and the Vietnamese and American forces.

(L. BOOTES)  
WO2  
AATTV

2/54 ARVN Bn  
HUE

25 Oct 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY WO2 D HEENAN - 2/54 ARVN BN  
FOR PERIOD 26 SEP - 25 OCT 69

1. UNIT ACTIVITIES. The unit continued the operation outlined in <sup>the</sup> last report, with Bn HQ stationed at Los Banos Fire Base, and the 3 Coys operating in separate AO's, in general area 5-8000 metres South of Phu-Loc and extending east to Los Banos FSB.

This operation concluded at 1200 hours 22 Oct. The unit is now based near 54 Regt HQ, Anzio, for a 6-7 day rest period.

2. MY ACTIVITIES

- |                      |                                |
|----------------------|--------------------------------|
| (a) Sept 26-27       | Stand down in Hue              |
| (b) Sept 28          | Worked at BHQ. Los Banos       |
| (c) Sept 29 - Oct 22 | Operations in field with 1 Coy |
| (d) Oct 23-25        | Stand down Danang              |

3. 1ST COY OPERATIONS

The Coy continued to operate with pls searching likely areas by day and squad/pl ambushes at night. The Coy covered a fair amount of ground, however I think they tend to concentrate too much on the higher ridge lines areas, and do not pay enough attention to the larger creek areas in the valleys, a lot of which appear to be obvious infiltration routes. In general the whole Bn area was still very quiet. The Bn had only 3-4 contacts in the period. Most of the VC activity still appears to be confined to the lowland coastal areas.

4. RESULTS OF 1ST COY OPERATIONS

The Coy had two contacts. On 12th Oct the point squad was ambushed by an estimated enemy squad. At the time the Coy was moving up a steep narrow ridgeline. The enemy fired only a few bursts of small arms and then withdrew, having probably remained in position only 2-3 minutes after contact. The company sustained 3 WIA. The weather was completely unsuitable for use of gunships. Artillery was used on likely wdr routes, but after searching these areas, appeared to have had nil results. On 14th Oct the lead squad was again fired on

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by an estimated enemy squad with both SA fire & B40's. The en again wdr almost immediately. Gunships were used extensively however, they took 15 minutes to arrive in the area. The Coy sustained 1 WIA. Nil en results.

5. POINTS ARISING FROM CONTACTS

Although the Coy was contacted on both occasions on very difficult ground. I could not get the Coy Comd to use either fire and movement or to attempt flanking movements to attempt to cut off the withdrawing enemy. The side of the ridgeline was very steep, but in my opinion an attempt at a flanking manoeuvre could have been tried.

I had a US Arty FO with me and although he called immediate fire missions, the US Battery in Sp was far too slow, taking from 15-30 minutes to get a round on the ground. I do not believe this time lag was caused entirely by clearance problems.

Although surrounding areas were searched after the contact no attempt at follow up was made. The policy seems to be that if Gunships & Arty do not get results, the incident is then closed.

6. GENERAL

In spite of the points above, the coys do work fairly well apart from the noise element and bunching up on halts. Although I believe I have very good working relations with my counterparts, most attempts to discuss tactics with them seems to go in one ear and out the other.

7. FORECAST.

I have no details of our next operation as yet, but I believe the Bn may get a new area of operations in the lowlands.

(D. HEENAN)  
WO2  
AATTV

1/51st ARVN Regt (Separate)  
Quang-Nam

29 Oct 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY CAPT W SHEPPARD - 1/51 ARVN BN  
OCT 69

General

1. During the month of October the 1st Bn's main tasks were to secure three other battalion compounds, apart from its own, and to occupy 12 posts on the "Danang Rocket Belt". This requirement was brought about by two of the battalions being engaged on operations in another area and the fourth battalion having gone North to retrain. These positions were occupied each night and during the day the 1/51st carried out Coy and Pl sized sweeps throughout the area.

2. Apart from the above the 1/51st also took part in three operations working with other units. The last of these, OP "DUONG-SON 1/69", is still in progress having commenced on 19 Oct 69.

Statistics

3.       a. EN       12 KIA (VC)  
              1 POW (VC)  
              4 AK47 captured  
              200 rds AK47  
              500 kilos rice, destroyed  
              5 kilos uniforms destroyed
- b. OWN       1 KIA  
                      6 WIA  
                      1 wounded by accidental discharge
- c. CIV       1 male killed by ambush.

4. All friendly casualties, apart from the accidental discharge, resulted from mines and booby-traps. The civilian killed by ambush was an elderly male who broke curfew to relieve himself at night and walked into the ambush.

Observations and Points noted

5. Pl Ambushes. Because of MACV directives (not allowing advisors to move with units below Coy size) rarely does an advisor see a platoon ambush carried out. I witnessed one during the current operation in broad daylight. Our Bn CP was on a high feature with cliff-like sides giving me the opportunity to

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observe the whole drama below through binoculars. The platoon was to ambush a waterpoint on a flat, open, piece of ground with the killing ground 30-40 metres from the adjacent undergrowth where the ambush was sited. Soon after the ambush was set 3 VC walked into the killing ground, sporadic shots were exchanged and the enemy beat a hasty retreat, leaving behind one raincoat and a hat. After much milling around a hesitant follow up was commenced but did not get very far. The only good point in the whole episode was the fast reaction of a 60mm mortar man who fired in the general direction that the enemy retreated to. The only person upset by it all was me, the advisor. The general attitude seemed to be "So we didn't get them today, maybe we'll get them tomorrow".

6. Cooking Fires. During meal times, and especially early in the morning, one can look around the mountain ridges and spurs and pinpoint the whole battalion by the smoke of its cooking fires. I have spoken about this to my counterpart and to the Regt Snr Adv. The ARVN are not about to change their habit of cooking rice in large quantities, in big pots, over open wooden fires, just because it gives away their positions. The lesson may only be brought home once sizeable casualties can be attributed directly to that give-away smoke.

7. Housing Project and Rest Centre. Two houses (capacity 10 families each) are already occupied and another two are almost complete. The project will continue as funds and building materials become available. The unit is also setting up a small rest centre so that Coys can have a 24 hour break from all duties in rotation. It is hoped that these two projects will have some effect on the high desertion rate, of which there were 25 this month.

8. Use of VNAF Helicopters. This month we began employing VNAF helicopters for both medevac and resupply. At first the process was both lengthy (up to 3 hours for a medevac), and dangerous to all within range of the rotor blades, as there were some pretty shakey landings and take-offs. However, both their reaction time and flying are improving. It was particularly rewarding to witness a Vietnamese helicopter brought in by Vietnamese troops through dense fog even though it took them 30 minutes to "talk" him in with the use of many flares and smoke grenades. We, the advisors, who took no part in this episode, felt it was a credible performance by both the pilot and the people on the ground.

(W. SHEPPARD)  
Capt  
AATTV

Hue  
27 Oct 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY MAJ G.V. BROWN : SENIOR ADVISOR  
NAM-HOA DISTRICT - 28 SEP-25 OCT 69

PART I - NAM HOA DISTRICT

Weather and Flooding

1. Over 30 inches of rain fell up to 8 Oct. The Perfume River overflowed its banks in many places and reached deck level on the Pohl Bridge. Debris piled up on both sides of the bridge, the downstream pile-up being caused by turbulence induced by the up-stream blockage. The debris was over 40 feet deep, stretched nearly the whole width of the river and stretched up and down stream for up to 50 feet.
  2. The most successful method of clearing the debris at the height of the flood was by use of a truck-mounted excavator fitted with a clam-shell bucket and operating off the bridge. Explosives were not successful as the charges failed to move the debris far enough to prevent re-jamming. Subsequent to the flood, the local civilians cleared the debris by hand.
  3. Very little property damage occurred. Although most hamlets were cut off for several days, only about 20 homes in the whole district were flooded. Even if the flooding had been more severe the relatively hilly countryside in Nam-Hoa places this district in a better position than those nearer the coast. It is unlikely that large-scale evacuation would ever be necessary.
  4. The district's major event in the period was its involvement in the assembly, laying out and preparation for burial of the 250 bodies found in the mass grave at Nui-Ke last month. The district had to handle a large number of visitors and we had our first traffic jam. Subsequently the security measures associated with the funeral procession took a lot of time and effort. The funeral was held in Hong-Thuy District on 14 Oct 69. President Thieu attended.
- 1/502 (AB) Bn
5. Relations with 1/502 (AB) Bn have been cordial and fruitful. Both the CO and S3 have served previously as advisors in Vietnam. Unfortunately both are due to move shortly. The CO, however, is going to the G5 appointment in HQ 101 (AB) Div. The incoming CO is now the G5.

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### Land Clearing

6. All hamlets but one now have clear fields of fire out to 200 metres. The clearing was done by US engineers largely as a result of Comd 2 (AB) Bde's drive. Civilians cleared some of the smaller areas.

### Security

7. Security in the populated areas of Nam-Hoa has improved considerably. The only contact in the period was on 10 Oct when a US patrol ambushed one man near the Gia-Long Tomb. Four other sightings were reported but there were unconfirmed and our patrols failed to make contact. Local intelligence sources indicate that the VC/NVA threat within a radius of 6 km of District HQ is no more than two to three squads worth of guide/courier type soldiers.

8. Since last month's debacle at Dinh-Mon, one US rifle company has been conducting squad and platoon sized patrols in the area bounded by the two branches of the Perfume River and the YD 10 Northing.

9. The general standard of RF in Nam-Hoa has improved with the reforming of 177 Coy reported last month. One RF platoon now patrols jointly with the US company mentioned in paragraph 8. It goes out with three days rations, comes in for one day for rations and rest and then goes out for another three days. Platoons are rotated weekly. The chief aim of this is to develop self-confidence in the RF but there are several obvious training by-products.

10. Land clearing has also made it extremely difficult for small groups to approach and penetrate the hamlets undetected.

11. In the hamlet of Lien-Bang (YD 759140) adjacent to the Pohl Bridge, two ambush patrols are now conducted each night. These are conducted jointly by the US bridge garrison and the local PF platoon. (Past experience has shown that, because of the close proximity of Lien Bang to the Pohl Bridge, neither wholly US nor wholly Vietnamese patrols can operate successfully). The new system is working well.

### MAT Team

12. MAT Team I6 was deployed into Nam-Hoa District last month for an indefinite period. Its mission is to raise the standard of training of RF and PF. The team leader and his team are very enthusiastic. Under direction the team is surprisingly competent. At present it spends five mornings each week instructing 177 RF Coy in squad tactics and individual skills. Results so far have been only fair, largely due to lack of motivation on the part of RF soldiers.

13. The team leader and I believe that the most efficient use of the MAT team would be to use it to train a Vietnamese "District Training Team". Following this the MAT team should be used to advise the Vietnamese team until such time as it can stand on its own feet.

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14. The District Chief has agreed to this concept. Verbal approval has been given by Sector HQ. Written approval is awaited.

15. In the meantime the MAT team spends its afternoons and week ends gathering material and planning the training of the District Training Team. One RF WO has so far been selected for the Vietnamese team and he is working jointly with the planning.

#### Operation Kim-Ngoc

16. The enthusiasm of the Vietnamese for operation Kim-Ngoc, i.e. the fortification of Kim-Ngoc hamlet, waxes and wanes. No work has been done there for four weeks despite urging by the District Advisory Team. Last week I told the District Chief that nothing had been accomplished for three weeks. He told me I was wrong and that trenches had been dug.

17. I have some new persuasion methods in mind, however, which may encourage the Vietnamese to start work there again.

#### District Chief

18. The District Chief appears to be somewhat reluctant to act on advice whether it be the structural design (or even the requirement) for a retaining wall or tactics or command. However I keep trying.

#### Accommodation

19. With the addition of the MAT Team, eating and sleeping space is even more overcrowded than before. Some additional temporary accommodation has been offered by the District Chief and a new hut is on order through Sector S4 channels. The onset of the monsoon will pose some morale problems due to overcrowding.

#### Conclusion

20. The general security position has improved greatly in the last month. How long this will continue now that pressure has been taken off the enemy in the Ashau Valley remains to be seen.

### PART II - THUA-THIEN PROVINCE

#### Command and Control

21. The flood crisis showed up the weaknesses of the command structure in the Province. The engineers here do not have clear boundaries and unit responsibilities are poorly defined and often overlap. Command relationships are often unworkable. Although it was only the engineer aspects of command and control which showed up badly in the flood, it is my opinion that the problem goes right through the whole command structure. I suspect that similar problems occur in other provinces. I recommend that this matter be studied by the AMF for future reference.

(G.V. BROWN)

Maj  
AATTV

CO AATTV

REPORT BY WO2 D KILLION - MEDICAL ADVISOR  
THUA THIEN PROVINCE - OCT 69

Introduction

1. This report will be dealt with in two parts, they are;
  - a. The CC1 Medical Course
  - b. Medical Supervisory Work, Province.

The CC1 Medical Course

2.
  - a. The current course was to be completed about the 10th Oct 69. The OIC of the course (Capt Xuong) could not give me a firm date, but has now stated the course should finish on the 30th Oct 69. The examinations were finalised last week and the students are now being employed on odd jobs.
  - b. The program is produced on a weekly basis and instructors do not know their course commitments until the Saturday of each week.
  - c. Now that films are available, (which must be returned to Danang within one month of receipt) instructors must pre-plan their lessons, well in advance, if they are going to use films in their lessons.
  - d. Summary of Faults, with the Program:
    - (1) No one is sure when the course should finish
    - (2) The program is produced weekly
    - (3) Introduction of films into the program will cause chaos during the present system.
  - e. Evolution. I am trying, with little result so far, to persuade the OIC of the course, to produce a program, which covers the whole course, or as an alternative, produce the program on a monthly basis.
  - f. Improvements to the Classroom. The additions to the classroom have not been started as yet.

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g. I visited the Senior US Medical Advisor, I Corps, on Fri 24 Oct 69. On his advice I intend to visit the Vietnamese Training Aid Section, located in Danang, with the OIC of the CC1 course, Capt Xuong, within the next two weeks.

Medical Supervisory Work - Province

3.
  - a. Our first meeting of all US Medical Advisors, of Team 18, was held on Thur 16 Oct 69. This meeting was very successful and I now intend to conduct meetings once a month.
  - b. I have instructed all district medical advisors to arrange and conduct an advanced first aid course for RF/PF medical members within their districts. There has been some minor opposition to this plan from district medical advisors, but I have reminded them that this is laid down quite clearly as part of their responsibility and that they will do their best to ensure success.
  - c. An active campaign is in progress to find and refer patients suffering from, HAIR LIPS, Loss of limbs and spastics, to our office. Hair lips are repaired at Hue city hospital and the others are referred to the Vietnamese Rehabilitation Hospital at Danang. I toured this hospital and it is one of the most impressive Vietnamese medical establishment that I have encountered.

Conclusion

4. I am concentrating quite a bit of my time on the CC1 course, at this time, to ensure the following aims are achieved;
  - a. Pre-plan the entire program or as an alternative, on a monthly basis.
  - b. To ensure that the aids, films etc are available before the next CC1 course starts.

(D.G. KILLION)

WO2

AATTV

24 Oct 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY MAJ W BRYDON - 2 MSF  
OCT 69

Deployment

1. Proposed movements and employments of members of AATTV were submitted to CO AATTV during his visit to PLEIKU 19-24 Oct 69.

Visitors

2. Since the last monthly report was submitted the following Aust visitors have been in Pleiku.

Col	THOMSON	- D Inf (Accompanied by CO and Adjt AATTV)
Lt Col	LLOYD	- CO AATTV (On route to 1st Bn on ops in Dak-Seang area)
Capt	ROYLANCE	- PR (HQ AFV) (and PR team)
Capt	JORM	- Edn (AFV)
Capt	JOHNSTON	- Med (AFV)
Chap	GORMAN	- AFV
Chap Gen	BEGBIE	- AHQ
Chap	DILLON	- AFV

Operations

3. The operations of 2MSF continued to be centred on a 2MSF Task Force at NHQM CO with Bns in the DUC-LAP and BU PRANG AO's. This operation is now under the Operational Control of 23rd ARVN Div operating a fwd HQ at GHIA-NHIA. Present implications are that no more Bns will be employed in this area and as they become available from standown and training they will be deployed in KONTUM Province.

a. 1st Bn. Deployed in the Duc-Lap AO from 17 Sep to 16 Oct 69. The operation was generally quiet with three contacts with trail watchers. On completion of a training period from 25 Oct to 1 Nov 69 the Bn will be deployed in Kontum Province.

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b. 2nd Bn Deployed in Dak Seang AO from 12 Oct to 1 Nov 69. Minor contacts were made with the enemy - details of which are already known to CO AATTV who was present on the ground during part of the operation with 223 Coy.

4. Arty Sp Fire bases each of 3x105mm US Arty were set up for Bn AOs in the Bu Prang and Duc-Lap areas. No fire base was located for Dak Seang the only coverage was from 175mm US Arty located at BEN-HET.

(W. BRYDON)

Maj  
AATTV

16 Oct 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY WO1 E.W. GASON  
ADVISOR 1 TROOP 14 CAV SQN

Since the last report, no significant changes have been made.

1 Troop (Tanks) continue to carry out daily security tasks between Kontum and Vo-Dinh with four large groups of US engrs preparing the road for bitumen surface. This will go through to Dak-To and completion is expected by early January 70.

2 Troop (APCs) security from Dak-To to Ben-Het.

3 Troop remain over on the east coast under 22 Div.

It has been confirmed that 14 Cav is now organic to 22 Div - it is expected at this stage 22 Div will move over to this location in the near future.

Activity in 14 Cav AO has been light with indications of a stepping up of enemy activity over the last few weeks.

Numerous mines continue to be found between Kontum and Dak-To - four varieties of AT mine - however the VN engrs carrying out the sweeps have reduced the number of road casualties since taking over. No close security is provided for Viet engrs and they are finding the mines, mainly by probing.

Sniper fire on the Comd Veh has been experienced without casualty. The maximum number of sniper rounds on any occasion has been three and heavy return fire no doubt, has been discouraging the enemy.

Many reports of squad and Pl sized NVA have been reported throughout the AO.

Ambushes are now set every night at varying locations and appears at the moment to be preventing the mining incidents in what is regarded as the "bad areas".

The small Christian Montagnard village of NGO TRANG boasted they had never been touched by the VC for five years. It happened two nights ago when the enemy came in late at night. They received a "warm" welcome, returned a little fire and fled to the west. This location is only about 800 yds from an important H'way 14 bridge. There are two such bridges in this AO which are vital to the Rd Coms through to Ben-Het.

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For the last four days Dak-To has been again taking 122mm rockets and 82mm by day and night and 75mm RCL last night, this could mean the requirement for 1 Troop back in that AO (they were asked for to-day).

Vo-Dinh is the only base that a significant ground attack has been launched on by a Pl sized group of NVA wearing greens over khaki. They got onto the wire carrying rocket launchers, satchel charges, grenades, supported by 82mm mortars.

The damage inflicted by the NVA. Wire was cut to the last strand at two points. 1 APC destroyed, 1 APC damaged, 1 bulldozer damaged 7 ARVN wounded (2 died later). Enemy : 1 dead on wire, 5 dead about 500 yds from the compound in creek line and 2 wounded (later died), 1xB41 launcher, 1xB41 rd, 3xB40 launcher, 11xB40 rounds, 7 grenades, 3 satchel charges, bundles of leaflets.

The Senior Advisor departs this location on 26 Oct (Maj Reel).  
The staff advisor departs late Nov (Capt Scott)

My assistant, Sgt Jones departs early December.

At the moment, no replacements have been advised to this HQ.

(E.W. GASON)  
WO1  
AATTV

AATTV RF TRG CADRES  
HEAVYWEIGHT

29 Oct 69

COURSE REPORT

1. General

The 6/69 course consisting of 4 Officers 87 Ors of 771 Coy marched in for training 26 Sep 69 and commenced training immediately. They graduated on 20 Oct 69.

2. Training

The standard reached by 771 Coy was good. They are the best Coy that has been at this school. This was mainly due to the control of the Coy Comd and XO. They are both experienced Officers and control the Coy accordingly. They believe in Aust tactics and joined in all phases of training, setting a fine example to their troops. All Officers attended all training.

3. Accommodation

One more building will be made available to our school after 18 Div have moved out of Heavyweight.

4. Staff

We have our complete complement of instructors.

5. Pass Out Parade : 23 Oct 69

Certificates were presented to 84 of the students. Refreshments were served after the parade.

6. Post-Course Visit by 771 Coy Pers : 31 Oct 69

On 31 Oct the Coy Comd, Pl Comds, and about eight NCO's of 771 Coy called in to tell us of their successful four-day operation in the LONG DIEN hills. They suffered no casualties from mines or small arms fire. Although they did not capture any weapons or kill any VC they chased some out of their hiding places. They assured me that they continue to use the Aust tactics and security measures we taught them at all times. They were very pleased with themselves and visits back to us of this nature are to be encouraged.

(C. KEALY)  
WO2  
AATTV

AATTV  
LRP WING  
NTC VAN-KIEP  
PHUOC-TUY

Nov 69

EXTRACTS FROM  
COURSE REPORT - 5/69 LRP COURSE  
15 SEP 69 - 8 NOV 69

General

1. This course, all volunteers, had an unfortunate beginning because of malaria striking some ten students on the first day of training, and another four students in the first week of training.
2. A total of 38 students commenced the course, and 16 successful students graduated:
  - a. 14 from the 9th Regiment Reconnaissance Company, 5th ARVN Division.
  - b. 2 from the National Training Centre, Van-Kiep.
3. 16 students failed due to physical inability, and sickness. 3 students failed due to disciplinary reasons. 3 students failed due to other reasons.

Standard

4. The standard attained by graduates is above average. This course has been quick to grasp instruction, and lessons, and has maintained a high standard throughout the course.

Minor Tactics

5. A very satisfactory standard has been reached, and retained.

Marksmanship

6. All students fired the M16 rifle, M79 grenade launcher, and the M60 GPMG. Only one case of extreme inaccuracy was found, and attributed to very poor eyesight. The remainder were consistent, average, and above average shots. A tendency to expend ammunition in bursts has been suppressed.

Physical Fitness

7. The outward good physical condition of all students belied the inward disabilities encountered, mainly malaria. However successful students have improved under supervision, and an above average standard has been reached.

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### Map Reading

8. Throughout this course the standard of map reading, and navigation has been good. The standard reached by this course in comparison with other courses is above average, to very good.

### Discipline

9. Breaches of discipline amongst the students have been very few, and have been handled in a satisfactory manner. A tighter grip by the Vietnamese staff on self discipline is an essential requirement.

### Operational Phase

10. Due to lack of numbers only two patrols were deployed twice during this phase. There were no enemy contacts during these patrols.

### Administrative Support

11. Support is satisfactory. A requirement still exists for one  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton, and one  $2\frac{1}{2}$ , or  $3\frac{1}{4}$  ton vehs. Ammunition requirements have been forwarded to NTC HQ.

12. The units forwarding students to this course must ensure that all students have good footwear to be worn on the course. Students with inadequate footwear, and equipment should be returned to their units.

(P.J.S. HARRIS)  
Capt  
C1 LRP WING  
AATTV

AATTV IV CTZ  
Can Tho  
931-2308

31 Oct 69

CO AATTV

EXTRACTS FROM A REPORT BY MAJ A HARKNESS  
IV CTZ - OCT 69

General

1. During the month there was little enemy activity in the IV Corps Tactical Zone. Not only was there a lull in enemy activity, but there was also a concerted effort by major enemy units to avoid GVN offensive contacts. All evidence indicates that enemy units continue to be dispersed throughout either their base areas or normal AO's.

2. Reports continue to be received concerning VC intention during the announced Winter-Spring Campaign. This offensive will continue the three pronged attack against the cities and towns. In November, emphasis will be placed on the political struggles in which it is intended that youths participate in the campaign demanding the withdrawal of US forces. Military activity will concentrate on large scale attacks on the suburbs of cities and towns. In the rural areas, guerilla forces will concentrate on attacks against GVN outposts. VC forces are being ordered to keep the enemy occupied with attacks for the next two months and to recognize that sacrifices will be necessary. Previous predictions of increased activity have not been realized. However, in view of the prolonged period of light enemy activity, a relatively greater possibility of an increase throughout the Corps Tactical Zone does exist now.

Deployment

3. During October WO Simpson and WO Munro were deployed from IV CTZ. Current locations within IV CTZ are:

a. Can-Tho	Maj Harkness WO2 Hartman	
b. Dinh-Tuong	WO2 Welsh WO2 Martin WO2 Smith (replacement for WO Martin due to RTA Nov)	- VDAT
c. Kien-Hoa	WO1 Eade WO2 Saxby	- VDAT

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d. Vinh-Binh	WO2 King WO2 Tillet	- VDAT
e. Vinh-Long	WO2 Cairns WO2 Troy	- VDAT

Village Defense Advisory Team (VDAT)

4. I have visited each team in the field during the month and am able to concur generally with their reports. At this stage it appears that the program is finally producing more tangible results. The results are not spectacular but are apparent.

5. Perhaps the most significant result is the acceptance of the listening post/standing patrol initial line of early warning/defense. To see this elementary principal actually being employed instead of just being discussed is most encouraging. The other elements of the defense are more easily organized once small groups are prepared to operate tactically at night.

Dinh-Tuong

6. Despite some previous pessimism, progress has been made in the village of Ton Ly Tay. The proposed fixed defenses have not been fully completed but a substantial amount of barbed wire and punji stakes have been erected. Outpost defenses have also been repaired and improved.

7. More important though, is that the Village Deputy for Security has a strong control of the PF and PSDF. These forces are now operating in an effective manner. The combined PF/PSDF listening posts/standing patrols are well deployed, I observed the method of posting these groups on the night 30/31 October. The techniques used were good.

8. On 30 October a demonstration was conducted at the village. It consisted of a lecture on the village defense system. This was quite well done. Explanatory charts had been prepared and were used to illustrate various points. A tour of an example hamlet followed where the principles were applied to the ground. The entire demonstration was conducted by the Vietnamese which was a strong point in its favor.

9. After discussion with the PSA I arranged for the team to move to Chau-Thanh District commencing 3 Nov 69. I selected this date to enable WO Smith to observe and participate in the movement into a new district from the initial stages. I was also able to arrange the replacement of the team vehicle.

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Kien-Hoa

10. The Kien-Hoa team continues to report steady progress. Good support from both Vietnamese and US has greatly assisted the work of the VDAT in this province. I am confident that this team will continue to produce good results.

Vinh-Binh

11. In Tieu-Can District, considerable progress has been made in the village of Hieu-Tu. PF/PSDF groups are now operating as suggested and reaction forces exist. Practice alerts and rehearsals are conducted on a regular basis.

12. Administration problems have occurred during the month. The major problem of a faulty vehicle has been solved by the issue of a new jeep to the VDAT.

13. During the first week of November I have arranged for the team to move to Tra-Cu District.

Vinh-Long

14. Although there are less results in this province it is encouraging to see a tangible result at least in Phu-Quoi village. Much work remains to be done in this village but it involves repairs of outposts and redistribution of weapons. This can be followed through by the District Advisory group. The mobile defense is in operation and that is the major achievement.

15. Because of the breakthrough I have decided to retain the team in Vinh-Long Province. I requested a change of districts during the coming week and recommended a relocation in Tan-Binh District.

Additional VDAT

16. DEPCORDS and MSA are very anxious to have the additional VDAT as you discussed with them recently. Further discussions have been held and I hope to finalize the location of the new VDAT within the next week, subject to your approval.

Medical

17. WO Hartman has commenced his new advisory role with RF Medical Training. Progress is slow but interest has been shown. I intend to arrange short visits by WO Hartman to VDAT's. During these visits he will function in both his admin and medical role. There is scope for minor MEDCAP operations in many hamlets and this experience will be of value to WO Hartman and of course to the recipients.

(A. HARKNESS)  
Major  
AATTV

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REVIEWED BY AATTU ADVISER WITH PRU

PROVINCIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNITS (PRU)

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

I. GENERAL

A. OBJECTIVE - This SOP has been compiled for the purpose of explaining the following points:

1. PRU Organization
2. Command System
3. Concept of operation and management/training procedures
4. Personnel

B. All previous directives and memorandums relative to the Subject are herewith rescinded.

II. ORGANIZATION & MISSION

ORGANIZATION

A. BASIC UNIT: For the purposes of operational and administrative standardization, as well as to establish a planning base for the PRU Program, the 18-man unit, composed of three six-man teams, will continue to be utilized as the primary PRU organization. It has been found that this type and size unit has the necessary operational flexibility to meet diversified operational requirements, a capability for survival with limited personnel losses, and can be applied to most PRU organizations. This basic unit will be used when considering expansion of PRU strengths, training of units, allocation of leadership slots, salary scales and equipment issue.

B. PRU STRENGTH CLASSES: Nine classes ("A" through "H") of PRU strength levels have been established for the PRU. These classes include PRU strengths from the basic 18-man unit up to a PRU of eight units or 146 assets in strength.

CLASS OF UNIT

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL  
FROM TO

A	--	18
B	19	38
C	39	56
D	57	74
E	75	92 (93)
F	93	110 (111)
G	111	130 (131)

H

129

146(47)

C. PRU ASSETS, LEADERS, AND MEMBERS:

1. Leadership Slots Authorized: Set forth below are the maximum number of PRU leadership slots for all classes of PRU. These leadership slots are limited to those required to lead units which number up to and including eight 18-man units -- or a total of 146 assets. In those cases where a PRU exceeds 146 in number, the following alternatives are suggested:

(a) Form 18-man units of the excess personnel, utilizing the necessary leadership titles but without the leadership stipend;

(b) Utilize an authorized unit-leader who is salaried as such to act as leader of a second, or reserve, unit;

(c) Maintain a pool of the excess assets in 18-man increments.

PRU LEADERSHIP SLOTS:

<u>CLASS OF UNIT</u>	<u>CHIEF</u>	<u>DEPUTY CHIEF</u>	<u>UNIT LEADERS</u>	<u>TEAM LEADERS</u>
A	1	1	-	1
B	1	1	2	4
C	1	1	3	6
D	1	1	4	8
E	1	2	5	10
F	1	2	6	12
G	1	2	7	14
H	1	2	8	16

2. PRU Leader and Member Titles and Definitions:

The following sets forth the PRU leader titles authorized, defines the PRU member who is not designated in a leadership billet, and comments on staff or support tasks for PRU.

(a) Chief, PRU (C/PRU): The asset designated as overall leader of a PRU, whether the PRU consists of one 18-man unit or multi 18-man units. The C/PRU is responsive to the Province Chief, and the command system of the DGNP through PRU Forces Commander, for the PRU and its operations. C/PRU will, in all cases, be assisted by at least one - and possibly two - Deputy Chiefs, PRU (DC/PRU).

PA6-C

(1) In the case of the single 18-man PRU, the C/PRU is one of the 18-man and is also leader of a six-man team. The DC/PRU leads the second six-man team and a team leader (T/L) leads the third six man team.

(2) In PRUs consisting of two to four 18-man units the C/PRU and DC/PRU are carried outside the 18-man units and the individual 18-man units are led by a Unit Leader (U/L). The U/L leads one six-man team and has two team leaders, each of whom leads a six-man team.

(3) In PRUs consisting of five to eight 18-man units, the C/PRU may have two Deputy Chiefs, each deputy to be responsible to the C/PRU for half of the PRU units.

(b) Deputy Chief, PRU (DC/PRU): The asset designated as Deputy to the C/PRU, responsive thereto, and who acts as C/PRU in the absence or disability of the latter. In the case of a Class A (Single 18-man PRU), the DC/PRU is one of the 18 men and leads the second six-man team. In PRUs of two to four 18-man units the DC/PRU, with the C/PRU, are carried outside the 18-man units and the units are led by unit leaders. In units of five to eight 18-man units there may be two DC/PRU, each responsive to the C/PRU for one half of the units.

(c) Unit Leader (U/L): The asset designated leader of an 18-man unit in PRUs which have more than one such unit. The U/L acts as leader of the first six-man team in his unit and has two subordinate Team Leaders to lead his second and third teams.

(d) Team Leader (T/L): The asset designated as leader of a six (or, operationally, two, four, or more assets "team") man team within the 18-man unit, responsive to the unit leader or C/PRU if only one such unit comprises the PRU.

(e) PRU Member: That indigenous asset who serves as a PRU in an operational status or combined operationa/staff status, but who is not designated as a Team Leader, Unit Leader, Deputy Chief, or Chief, PRU.

MISSION:

Decree Law number 044 SL/NV dated 31 March 1969 by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam stated that owing to

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
NC

national defense requirements, a unit designated PRU was officially established; The Provincial Reconnaissance Units are responsible for:

- (1) Collecting intelligence information relating to the Viet Cong infrastructure;
- (2) Conducting paramilitary operations and special operations in order to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure;
3. Participating in combined (military) operations organized by the Phoenix Center and District and Provincial (military) Operational Intelligence Coordinating Centers ((Trung tam Phoi hop Tinh Bao Hanh quan Tinh, Quan));
4. Assisting Republic of Vietnam and Allied Forces in special reconnaissance, and the collection of specialized intelligence, target locations, etc.

### III. COMMAND SYSTEM


#### A. SAIGON



Remarks:

\_\_\_\_\_ Command KIN  
 ..... Coordination CONFIDENTIAL

B. PROVINCE



Remarks:

\_\_\_\_\_ Command  
..... Coordination

IV. TRAINING

A. OBJECTIVE

For the purpose of training the PRU members for special operations capabilities in order to destroy the VCI.

B. SCOPE

1. It is assumed that all students have had basic military training or have received previous PRU training.

2. The training course at SATC covers the fields of Leadership, Intelligence, Communications, Special Operations, Mapcraft, Weaponry, Demolition, and Combat Medicine. Teams completing the course should be capable of independent, professional, and semi-sophisticated anti-VCI operations.

C. PHASES OF TRAINING

The Program is geared to producing 18 man units in which all members undergo general training and selected members from each unit undergo specialist training. Self contained specialist cells within the unit give it the capacity of performing independent and varying tasks.

D. TRAINING TIME

The course is scheduled over a five week period with thirty (30) training days, each day consisting of ten (10) fifty (50) minutes periods.

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E. SELECTION OF STUDENTS FOR SPECIALIST TRAINING

1. All students will undergo General Training outlined in B-2 above. Members designated by Provinces as unit leaders will undergo Leadership Training after General Training:

a. One additional man per unit will be selected for Leadership Training.

b. Half of the remaining students will undergo Operations Training; the other half Intelligence Training.

2. Prior to Advanced Specialist Training the following selections will take place:

a. LEADERSHIP - As for Basic Specialist.

b. INTELLIGENCE/COMMUNICATIONS - Four (4) men from each unit (Selected from the Intelligence Group of Basic Specialist Training).

c. MAPCRAFT - Four (4) men from each unit.  
(Selected from the Intelligence Group of Basic Specialist Training).

d. WEAPONS - Four (4) men from each unit (Selected from the Operations Group of Basic Specialist Training).

e. ~~DESCRIPTIONS~~ - 4 men

F. GENERAL SCHEDULE OF PRU TRAINING PROGRAM

The training course of the SATC (PRU Training Center) consists of 30 days of training; 10 hours of class every day - Each student must attend a total of 300 hours of class in one cycle in order to study the following subjects:

1. INTELLIGENCE/COMMUNICATIONS: (Consist of the following titles)

The Concept and Organization of PRU

Program and Operational Security

Viet Cong Infrastructure and Modus Operandi

Sources of Information

Cover

✓Physical Description of Individuals

✓Layout of Villages and Hamlets

Observation and Reporting

Conduct of Intelligence/Recon Mission

DIOCCs and PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG

The Targeting Process

Informant Nets

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Interrogation Techniques

Elicitation

Planning of Intelligence Recon Mission

Post Operational Debriefing

Verbal Reports

Written Reports *increase*

Field Photography

HT.1 Radio

The AN PRC 10/25/77 Radio

Voice Procedure

Cryptography

SOIs and Authentication

Expedient Antennas

Practical Exercise

Test

2. SPECIAL OPERATIONS:

Consists of:

Tactics and Techniques of Anti-VCI Operations

Handling of CEPS (POWs)

House Searching

Camouflage and Concealment

Observation

Individual Movement

Maritime Training

Immediate Action Drills

Security at the Halt and on the Move

Air Operations

Raid for Capture

Ambush for Capture

Covert Abduction (Day)

Covert Abduction (Night)

Road Blocks and Check Points

Tracking

Hand to Hand Combat

Planning of Operation

Operational Briefing

Review, Exercise, Test

3. LEADERSHIP:

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Introduction to Leadership and Its Characteristics

Human Behavior

Leadership Traits

Leadership Principles

Indications of Leadership

Leadership Problem Area

Leadership in Combat

Examples of Small Unit Leadership

Seminar

Local Relationship

Training Techniques

Security of PRU Operation

Operational Planning

Review, Exercise, Test

4. MAPCRAFT:

Introduction Marginal Info, symbols and Colours

Military Grid, Reference system

Scale and Distance

Elevation and Relief

Compass, Protractor and Map Orientation

Intersection and Research

Judging Distances

Overlays and field Sketching

Use of the Sand Table

Pace and Compass Course (Day)

Pace and Compass Course (Night)

Military Grid System and Polar Coordinates

Night Compass Course

Review, exercise, Test

5. WEAPONS:

Preliminary Rifle Instruction

Sighting and Aiming

Markmanship and Zeroing.

Quick kill

Instinctive Firing (Day)

Instinctive Firing (Night)

Target Detection/Instinctive Reaction Course

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Moving Targets (Day)

M16, M1D with Scope-Sniper Training

Carbine M2

Grenade Assault Course M79

Use of the M18 Claymore

Review, Exercise, Test

6. DEMOLITION/MEDICAL:

Personal Sanitation

Basic First Aid including Chest and Stomach Wounds

Introduction to Explosives

Time Fuzes and Detonating Cord

Firing Devices

VC Mines and Booby Traps

Basic First Aid

Electrical Firing Systems

Improvised Booby Traps

Destruction of Caches

Rigging Charges

Description/Reporting of VC Mines and Traps

Burns, jaw and head wounds

Transportation of Sick and Wounded


Review, Exercise, Test

The above mentioned training schedule aims to give the PRU Leader a general explanation of the Training Program of the SATC; however, the hours of class and titles of certain subjects may be changed in accordance with the requirements of the situation.

V. OPERATION

A. Targeting will be formulated by the PHOENIX Combined Center as follows:

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B. OPERATION ORDER: "Secret".

Map for reference

Sheet Number

Scale

1. Situation

- a. Enemy
- b. Friendly

2. Mission

3. Execution

- a. Concept of operations
- b. Support (Air, Sea, Artillery)
- c. Reserved
- d. Recognition signals

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- e. Joint Instructions
- 4. Logistics
  - a. Food Stuffs, Rations
  - b. Ammunition
  - c. Transportation
  - d. Medical evacuation
- 5. Command and communication
  - a. Command
  - b. Operations

C. OPERATIONS RESULTS REPORTS:

- 1. Casualties
  - a. Friendly
  - b. Enemy
  - c. Weapons

(1) Remarks: If there are weapons captured during the operation, the amount, type, and serial number of each weapon must be clearly reported on the after-action report. These weapons will be turned in to the authorities who initiated the operations in accordance with RVNAF and DGNP's regulations. In addition, a report on the weapons must be forwarded to the PRU Directorate for information.

- 2. Comments on operations
- 3. Information collected

VI. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

A. Spotting - Personnel spotting is very important for the PRU activities to obtain exceptional results. The spotting process should be done according to the following fundamentals:

- 1. Area of operation
- 2. Residing and traveling conditions
- 3. ID card trace
- 4. Traveling

Area of Operation: Category of the candidate, is he suitable for the area of operation.

Residing or traveling conditions: Can he stay at the local place? Does he have the capacity to go deep into the operational area?

Pre-recruitment: Ready for recruitment and training when

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paperwork is approved.

B. Recruitment: All PRU personnel are to be jointly hired, regardless of types and ranks. A sample recruiting dossier is attached.

1. Basic Principles of recruitment: (These principles will apply only to future recruits and will not be applicable for PRU presently serving in the field.

(a) Conditions:

Vietnamese national

Height: Minimum 1.50 meters

25 years of age or older

Without previous convictions

Not a military deserter

In good health

C. Dossier

1. Procedures to process in for a PRU member:

(a) CIVILIAN APPLICANT

01 legal birth certificate

01 good conduct certificate issued by village authorities and certified by District administrative office, validity: 6 months

01 police clearance. Validity: 6 months

01 primary school certificate or primary diploma

10 photographs 4 x 6 (Full face, not bent down, uncovered, no glasses)

(b) VETERAN: In addition to the above papers, if applicant is a veteran, the following papers are required:

01 Military Service certificate

01 good conduct certificate issued by the Armed Forces

01 discharge certificate

2. Different forms provided by the recruitment section:

01 Request to join PRU, hand written and signed by the individual. (Printed Form)

02 Enlistment in PRU for 3 years

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01 guarantee declaration on draft status (Printed Form)

04 Personal History Statement

ID card investigation; investigation of previous records and criminal book.

To make out <sup>(HENRY)</sup> "HENRY" card; if applicant is in province, the provincial police are charged with conducting the investigation. If he is in Saigon, the DGNP/ID card section will assume responsibility in this matter.

Motivation - The recruiting authority should question the applicant in order to know the motivating force which leads him to join the PRU.

Signature and hand writing samples

In addition to the above, all applicants' dossiers must have a sample of the individual's signature and own hand writing. A short sentence or verse or a portion of a poem or folk song, etc. and .3 copies of his signature will be a part of his personal record.

D. BENEFITS OF EMPLOYEES:

1. Assets wounded in action (WIA)

a. Light wounds. Will receive hospitalization or treatment at public or military hospitals or US facilities, whichever has been made available for them, and will continue to receive their regular salary during their period of recuperation or until such time as it becomes necessary to change the asset's status in the PRU due to the injury. Hospitalization fees authorized are those which are normal for a class "B" civil servant and will not exceed \$VN 100 per man per day. Hospitalization fees in excess of this amount must be reviewed and approved by the PRU Directorate. If able to return to duty after hospitalization or treatment, the asset will do so when adjudged fit by a qualified doctor or medical technician.

b. Serious wounds: Assets who are unable to return to full PRU duty, due to the seriousness of their injuries, will be placed, if possible, in a valid but limited duty assignment in the PRU, or in such other activity as may be arranged for with

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another agency and appropriate with the health status of the individual. If it is necessary to certify to his status, then the Provincial Advisor will submit to the office of the PRU staff at CTZ level, a report of the wound status and the individual's time in service in PRU. This will be attached to a recommendation from the Province Advisor and CTZ Staff for action on the type of assistance that should be granted to the individual. All recommendations and comments should be forwarded to the PRU Directorate for final decision.

2. Assets Missing in Action (MIA)

The next of kin of PRU MIA will continue to draw the asset's monthly pay during the first six months following the PRU being declared MIA. If, after this period, the whereabouts or fate of the asset has not been determined, the next of kin of the asset will be given a termination pay of an additional three months of his salary and the case closed. Thus, a total of nine months' salary will have been paid to the next of kin of the MIA. All cases of assets who have been MIA for any period of time and who reappear to serve with the PRU should be carefully evaluated as to the possibility of the asset's having been "doubled" or being used as a Viet Cong penetration into the PRU, GVN, or US community.

3. Asset's death from natural causes

Upon the death, from natural causes, of an asset currently on the rolls of the PRU, the next of kin of such an asset will receive one month of the asset's salary as termination pay.

4. Asset's Death due to Operational Causes (KIA)

The next of kin of assets killed in action or who die as a result of wounds or injuries incurred in action, are authorized to receive the following terminating allowances:

- a. Asset's salary for the month in which death occurred.
- b. Twelve additional months' salary of the asset.
- c. An allowance of up to \$VN 7,500 to cover funeral expenses.

In cases where a PRU member's family is authorized death benefits his next of kin will be paid compensation, based

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on the following priority:

- 1 - Wife (if living)
- or 2 - Son (or daughter) of manhood, or those who are responsible for bringing up minor children of the individual killed.
- or 3 - Father or mother of the individual

5. Absence Without Leave

Personnel who absent themselves for a certain time without informing their superiors of their whereabouts are considered Absence Without Leave. Their salary will be stopped effective on the day they go AWOL. If, in some case, the individual returns later for work, he will be reinvestigated to avoid penetration by the enemy. NC

6. Desertion

Any personnel, absent without leave in excess of 48 hours will be considered a deserter.

All Unit commanders must report such absences to the PRU Directorate. After 07 days a request for a search <sup>WARRANT</sup> notice should be initiated in three copies, one copy will be submitted to PRU Directorate and one will be sent to the provincial National Police, and one retained in file. If the deserter returns in less than 15 days his unit commander must report by message to PRU Directorate, and to the provincial national police to request cancellation of the search <sup>WARRANT</sup> notice. If a request for search notice has been made out, a decision must be approved first before the deserter can return to his job. If the deserter returns to his unit after 15 days or if he is arrested, his unit commander must send him to the sector or garrison for draft service, after approval from the PRU Directorate. NCW

(Note: If the deserter returns to his unit within 15 days and the search notice has already been issued, the unit commander must conduct an investigation and the deserter must not be used for any assignment. The Unit commander must report his recommendation and <sup>send</sup> the deserter's personal records to the PRU Directorate. The deserter must report himself to the unit commander during working hours.

7. Annual Leave. To PRU Commanders.

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a. PRU Commanders must have the approval of the Province Chief and the Unit Advisor before obtaining annual (15 days) leave. The PRU Directorate will be notified of all PRU Commanders on leave.

b. For PRU Members: for purpose of granting PRU members to have an opportunity to rest and take care of their family, they are granted 15 days of annual leave per year. For personnel whose family are in the same operational area, the days of annual leave will be divided into two periods. Personnel whose family are out of the same operational area will receive one 15-day leave, plus 2 days for travel. Personnel on leave will be charged with paying for travel and making arrangements to return to the unit immediately when their leave expires. No extensions will be approved. When the leave expires, an absentee will be considered AWOL if he has failed to return. The unit commander must report the absence to the PRU Directorate and all procedures applied. Unit commanders should urge their personnel to take leave to promote their morale, and conversely should apply strict punitive measures towards those who report late after leave. Personnel who go on leave should not be exceeded 5% of present strength.

8. Special Leave: Permitted only in the following cases and will not exceed 4 days:

Wedding

Death of Parents

Birth in family

Sickness of children &/or wife

Physical examination

← Leave granting authorities:

PRU chief

Unit commanders: 48 hours within operational area.

1 copy of leave request must be sent to the PRU Directorate for info. When on leave in another area, personnel must report to local PRU Unit to certify their arrival and departure. All leave in insecure areas will be prohibited.

#### E. SALARY

1. Base Salary and Annual Step Increase for PRU

"Non Leader"

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### Years of Service

0-1 (year)	4,900\$VN
1-2	5,300\$VN
2-3	5,700\$VN
3-4	6,100\$VN
4-5	6,500\$VN
5-6	6,900\$VN

### 2. Base Salary for PRU Leaders

Unit Class	PRU	Chief/PRU	Deputy Chief/PRU	18 man Unit Leader	6-man Team Leader
A	0-15	7,500	6,500	-	5,500
B	19-38	8,000	7,000	6,500	5,500
C	39-56	8,500	7,500	6,500	5,500
D	57-74	9,000	8,000	6,500	5,500
E	75-92	9,500	7,500*	6,500	5,500
F	93-110	10,000	7,500*	6,500	5,500
G	111-128	10,500	8,000*	6,500	5,500
H	129-146	11,000	8,000*	6,500	5,500

\*In units of classes E through H two Deputy Chiefs/PRU may be employed.

### 3. Annual Salary Step Increase for Chiefs of PRU

Years of Service	Classes of PRU							
	0-18	19-38	39-56	57-74	75-92	93-110	111-128	129-146
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
0 - 1	7,500	8,000	8,500	9,000	9,500	10,000	10,500	11,000
1 - 2	7,900	8,400	8,900	9,400	9,900	10,400	10,900	11,400
2 - 3	8,300	8,800	9,300	9,800	10,300	10,800	11,300	11,800
3 - 4	8,700	9,200	9,700	10,200	10,700	11,200	11,700	12,200
4 - 5	9,100	9,600	10,100	10,600	11,100	11,600	12,100	12,600
5 - 6	9,500	10,000	10,500	11,000	11,500	12,000	12,500	13,000

### Annual Salary Step Increase for Deputy Chiefs of PRU

Years of Service	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
	0-18	19-38	39-56	57-74	75-92	93-110	111-128	129-146
0 - 1	6,500	7,000	7,500	8,000	*(In classes E thru H, <sup>2</sup> Deputy Chiefs should be employed)			
1 - 2	6,900	7,400	7,900	8,400				
2 - 3	7,300	7,800	8,300	8,800				
3 - 4	7,700	8,200	8,700	9,200				
4 - 5	8,100	8,600	9,100	9,600				
5 - 6	8,500	9,000	9,500	10,000	*			

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4. Base Salary and Annual Step Increase for Intell  
Cell Leaders (District)

YEARS OF SERVICE

0 - 1	5,200
1 - 2	5,600
2 - 3	6,000
3 - 4	6,400
4 - 5	6,800
5 - 6	7,200

5. Annual Salary Step Increases for Unit Leaders

YEARS OF SERVICE

UNIT CLASSES B THROUGH H

0 - 1	6,500
1 - 2	6,900
2 - 3	7,300
3 - 4	7,700
4 - 5	8,100
5 - 6	8,500

6. Annual Salary Step Increases for Team Leaders of  
all Units

YEARS OF SERVICE

0 - 1	5,500
1 - 2	5,900
2 - 3	6,300
3 - 4	6,700
4 - 5	7,100
5 - 6	7,500

7. Per Diem

Generally speaking, per diem is not authorized for PRU assets. If PRU are requested by the PRU Directorate to undertake special assignment in provinces other than that in which they normally are assigned, a per diem of \$VN 150 will be paid them during such periods in which they so serve. Per diem of \$VN 150 will be paid to members of the PRU Training Center when they travel by the direction of Chief, PRU Training Center. Per diem is not authorized for local operations conducted within the Province to which the PRU are assigned.

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8. Operational expenses

Operational expenses, transportation, and miscellaneous costs, specifically accounted for, but not to include food costs, will be allowed PRU assets when actually on operations. PRU are not normally issued operational rations or provided food allowances. In those cases where, in the opinion of the Province PRU Advisor, rations or equivalent monies are justified, indigenous dry rations may be requisitioned or a food stipend of \$VN 50 per day paid.

9. Remuneration for secret agents or informants

The expansion of PRU intelligence-collection capabilities often develops informant-nets within circles of PRU relatives, friends and other contacts. All such services of informants will be kept on a non-reimbursable basis, particularly when the data acquired often directly serves to increase the operational survivability of the PRU. Informants of this type are not to be carried as regularly salaried assets on PRU rolls. Spot payments should be modest, are not to be considered salaries, nor should such payments be on such a regular basis as to be so interpreted. Reimbursements to informants will be subject to review by the Regional office and the PRU Directorate.

M O N T H L Y   R E P O R T

See printed Report Forms attached.

VIII. APPOINTMENTS

A. The PRU Director has full authority to nominate PRU Chiefs or other personnel as required upon the recommendations of the Province Chiefs or the US Counterparts. Higher ranks will be nominated by the DGNP upon the proposal of PRU Director.

B. The PRU Detachment Commanding Officer and PRU Chief have full authority to nominate unit commanders or lower ranking personnel and recommendations should be sent to PRU Directorate for info.

IX. TRANSFER

A. PRU Director has full authority to transfer personnel at every level in the PRU organization.

B. PRU Detachment C.O. at Corps or PRU Chiefs have authority to transfer personnel from within the region or province (by Recommendation for Transfer) and must report it to the PRU

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Directorate Personnel) for formal approval and record. While making out a Recommendation for Transfer to be sent to the PRU Directorate, the PRU Detachment C. O. at Corps or PRU Chief should issue necessary documents to the transferee for his new assignment. The strength change in the unit will not be official until the recommendation for transfer has been approved by the PRU Directorate.

C. For the transfer and assignment of PRU personnel at unit commander level, the PRU Detachment C.O. at Corps or PRU Chief must write a recommendation and send it to PRU Directorate for approval of such action. In addition the attachment of a report on service requirement, disciplinary action, and/or request for transfer must accompany the recommendation. The transfer is carried out only upon approval by the PRU Directorate. In order to avoid possible problems, all of the following points concerning the transfer must be considered:

1. Unit commander must release the transferred individual within a period of 15 days from the effective date of issuance of a travel order. (Except in the case of transfer for disciplinary action in which case the transferred personnel must report immediately to their new unit.)

2. In exceptional circumstances, the unit commander may retain the transferred individual for 5 days beyond the 15 day limitation.

3. Effective the date of leaving his old unit, the transferred personnel must report to the new unit commander within 3 days.

4. In all circumstances, if the transferred personnel does not present himself to the new unit 15 days from the effective date of issuance of the travel order, he will be considered a deserter. The new unit commander is charged with reporting his absence to the PRU Directorate.

5. In any transfer due to official requirements, disciplinary measures, or request of the interested party, if personnel do not wish to transfer or desire to file a complaint against an unjust transfer, they must first obey the order and await the decision of the PRU Directorate. All transfer orders must be strictly observed.

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D. Province Chiefs, PRU Chiefs and PRU Advisors have authority to recommend transfer of their personnel to meet official requirements or per disciplinary reasons.

E. Transferred personnel must supply their own transportation to their new unit. Transportation expense <sup>will</sup> ~~can~~ be reimbursed by the new unit commander ~~when necessary~~.

#### X. AWARD & PROMOTION

A. PROMOTION: Promotions must be just, equitable and impartial. There are two kinds of promotions:

1. Annual promotion
2. Special promotion
1. Annual Promotion:

a. Comment slip: PRU personnel are yearly recommended for promotion if they meet both of the following conditions:

Have served two years in grade (2 years or more)

Have good conduct and high morale

(See pay scale footnote)

b. Authority in promotion

PRU Director will rate : PRU Chiefs, PRU Detachment at Corps and other personnel in the Program.

PRU Chiefs rate : Deputy PRU Chief, Unit Commanders, Team Leaders, and members.

Direct Team Leader rates: His members.

Paper for rating personnel consists of:

Comment slip

Copy of the personnel hiring action or copy of the last promotion, or a copy of a special promotion to prove that he is at the present rank.

Certificate of hazardous duty during that period and list of decorations received.

Copy of all the punishment (warnings, reprimands, delays of promotion, reduction to lower rank, etc.)

2. Special Promotion:

a. Personnel distinguished on missions will be promoted as follows:

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Grade promotion, step promotion

.....

b. Paper for promotion includes

Proposal by the supervisor

Service record (Form 14) (See sample)

Decision of last promotion board

REMARKS: The annual promotion for ARVN officers, non-commissioned officers and service men attached to the PRU will be made according to a circular from RVNAF/Joint General Staff. The G-1 is charged with making liaison with DGNP/Personnel Service and Administrative Unit No. 3 for action.

B. AWARDS

1. PRU personnel who distinguish themselves in operations should be recommended for the National Police Medal. However, where warranted by action with US elements and witnessed by US personnel, PRU can be recommended for US decorations. [In cases where military decorations are effected, monetary awards should be omitted.]

2. Monetary rewards (captured weapons)

Monies from the PRU budget will <sup>NOT</sup> no longer be utilized for the purchase of captured enemy weapons and material. Monies from the Phoenix Rewards Programs, or other like sources available in Province, will be utilized for this purpose. Reference, Memorandum, Phoenix Director, dated 25 September 1968, Subject: Rewards Program.

XI. DISCIPLINE:

A. Depending on the severity of the offense, the offender may be subjected to the following punishment:

1. Warning )
2. Reprimand) To be made a part of his personal record.
3. Disciplinary transfer
4. Promotion Delay for 1 or 2 years
5. Reduction to lower step
6. Dismissal from the PRU

B. Besides punishment measures formulated in PRU statute, the PRU Directorate is permitted to apply the following disciplinary measures:

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1. Periods of hard labor
2. In-unit military prison
3. Prosecution in field military court, if necessary.

C. Power of Authorities to Punish:

- |                                      |   |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| 1. PRU Director                      | 20 days of close confinement                                  |
|                                      | 30 days of PRU military prison                                |
|                                      | 30 days of arrest without confinement                         |
| 2. PRU Detachment Commander at Corps | 10 days of close confinement                                  |
|                                      | 15 days in PRU military prison, or arrest without confinement |
| 3. PRU Chiefs                        | 6 days of close confinement                                   |
|                                      | 8 days in PRU military prison, or arrest without confinement  |

Authorities should recommend to their superiors the type of punishment that should be meted out to an offender if the disciplinary measures outlined above appear inadequate for the seriousness of the offense.

4. In addition, PRU Detachment Commanders at Corps have authority to:

Prosecute their subordinates through official GVN  
Judician channels

Recommend termination of the PRU who break the law.

XII. SECURITY

A. INTERNAL

Sub-security-committee for personnel and files:

Responsible for:

1. The follow up on motivation, political, and judicious activities of all personnel.
2. Establishing, classifying, and updating all personal security records (see attachment).

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B. INSTALLATIONS:

Sub-security-committee for installations:

Responsible for:

1. Preventing enemy sabotage, infiltrations aimed at PRU bases and Headquarters.

2. Orienting the PRU Units in consolidating and establishment of defensive systems.

C. PRESS RELATION:

Due to the classified nature of the Program, any dissemination of information concerned with PRU must be approved by the Director General of National Police and be disseminated by the Press Directorate of the Ministry of Information or by the PRESS SECTION of the Directorate General of Political Warfare.

XIII. LOGISTICS & SUPPLY:

The logistics of PRU Forces is presently supported by American Advisors through the CORDS logistical System. For the purpose of standardizing the logistic procedures, guiding personnel in charge of logistics to understand the application of Supply Accounts, utilization and operation of various forms/ records; such as requisitions, turn in slips, property disposal forms, report of commodity losses etc; As well as helping related command officials of the PRU Forces to understand the procedure and methods of ordering following-up and controlling their subordinate personnel's jobs in supply, the PRU Directorate has decided to utilize the standard forms of the National Police.

In order for all the personnel in charge of logistics to understand the application of all the Forms and Procedures of the DGNP, it requires a long period of time for study. In the meantime, certain forms and basic procedures of the National Police, as indicated below, will be applied to PRU.

National Police Forms:


- 1 - OOA. OOB, OOC/NP
- 2 - O1A, O1B, O1C/NP
- 3 - 009
- 4 - .....
- 5 - Report of commodity loss form
- 6 - Vehicle control Slip A & B

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7 - Request for Repair

XIV. INSPECTION

ORGANIZATION SYSTEM OF STUDY & INSPECTION SECTION OF PRU FORCES



A. ORGANIZATION:

1. An inspection group is established at PRU Directorate and supervised by a chief under the direct supervision of the PRU Director.

2. The inspection group of the PRU Directorate is made up of:

Office:

Chief 1

.....

.....

3. The inspection teams, at the PRU Detachment Commander's Staff level, are placed under the supervision of the PRU

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Detachment Commander concerned.

B. MISSION:

1. The inspection group at the PRU Directorate has the responsibility to assist the PRU Director in the following tasks:

Studying and formulating PRU developments and plans.

Developing programs and projects for improving PRU activities.

Translating into Vietnamese all foreign documents relating to PRU.

Making periodic or surprise inspection tours to all PRU units throughout the country.

Making reports and contributing constructive suggestions to the PRU Director after each inspection tour.

Conveying requests from the unit commander to the PRU Director for action.

Transferring instructions of the PRU Director to all unit commanders concerned.

Following up the correction of deficiencies noted in inspection tours.

Following up and directing inspection by the PRU Detachment Commander's Staff.

Preparing documents for inspection tours conducted by the PRU Detachment Commander's staff at Corps so that they are able to conduct their inspections (see Attached Annexes).

2. The PRU Detachment Commander's Inspection Staff is charged with:

Improving PRU activities in the region.

Making at least one inspection tour per month to all dependent units and filling out inspection forms and forwarding them to the PRU directorate.

Insuring compliance with all directives issued by PRU Directorate and by PRU Detachment Commander's Staff.

C. SYSTEM OF OPERATION

1. From PRU Directorate (Inspection group) to PRU units:

a. For official requirements, all directives from the PRU Directorate (Inspection Group) will be sent to the PRU Staff concerned through the PRU Detachment Commander's Staff

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(Inspection team).

b. For urgent requirements, for immediate action, directives will be sent directly to PRU staff concerned. A copy will be sent to PRU Detachment Commander's staff for information only.

2. From local PRU staff to PRU Directorate:

All reports or suggestions of any kind, routine or immediate, prepared by local PRU, must be submitted to PRU Commander Staff. A copy will be sent to PRU Directorate for information..

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GENERAL INSPECTION FORMSI. GENERAL:

- A. Unit to be inspected
- B. Date/Time
- C. Inspecting authority
- D. Orienting authority

II. GENERAL SITUATION:

- A. Deficiencies noted during last inspection but still not corrected.
- B. Particular points (Security situation at the station area).
- C. Special directives from PRU Director.

III. INSPECTION COMPONENTS:A. Conduct and discipline of personnel:

- 1. Morale of personnel.
- 2. Conduct and uniforms.

B. Strength status:

- 1. Total
- 2. Present
- 3. Detached
- 4. Absence with leave
- 5. Absence without leave
- 6. Hospitalized
- 7. Desertion
- 8. Killed in action ? DEAD? ?

C. Weapons:Crew served weapons

- 1. Total
- 2. Serviceable status
- 3. Unserviceable status
- 4. Preventive maintenance.
  - a. In stock
  - b. Individual equipment; cleaning and caring
- 5. Weapon required
- 6. Surplus

D. Individual weapons:

- 1. Total
- 2. Serviceable status

3. Unserviceable status
4. Preventive maintenance:
  - a. In Stock ) cleaning and caring
  - b. Individual equipment)
5. Weapons required
6. Surplus

E. Supplies:

1. Office supplies (sufficient, insufficient)
2. Individual clothing (sufficient, insufficient)
3. Radios (how many/serviceable, unserviceable, additional required, etc.)
4. Vehicles, (total, type, serviceable, unserviceable).

F. Barracks:

1. Barracks: GVN or private property
2. Serviceable status (Example: 80% serviceable)
3. Required repairs
4. Sanitation

G. Unit security:

Light system (flood light around fence).  
Fence.

Guard Posts, firmly constructed?

Are the defensive fortifications satisfactory?

Is there a communication system with the guard posts  
or duty room?

Are there emergency or secondary means of communication?

1. Security guard force:

Are there any vacant guard posts?

Are the security guards stationary or mobile?

Any special order or general order at the guard

houses?

Any communication tranches built?

Are practice alerts conducted?

Are guards permitted to change their location and  
vary their routines frequently?

2. Main guard post

Enough ammunition?

Are incoming or outgoing personnel checked upon entrance and exiting of camp?

Is there an area available for visitors?

3. Duty room:

Are personnel permanently on duty in this room?

Is there a stand-by force immediately available?

4. Restricted area: (Tank farm, ammo dump, armory).

Is frequent check applied on ammo dump, armory, tank farm?

Is the entrance and exit controlled closely?

5. Is there an organized fire prevention system?

H. Personnel security:

1. Total personnel

2. Personnel already cleared

3. Personnel not yet cleared

4. Are personnel familiar with individual security

measures?

5. Are security passes made out for personnel entering and exiting the camp?

6. Is a visitor's log maintained?

I. Material security:

1. Is classified material filed and secured?

2. Is the material secured after working hours?

3. Are there any classes conducted for personnel on security regulations?

IV. DIRECTIVE REGULATION: REVIEW

Review and discuss all pertinent directives and regulations from higher authorities.

V. REQUESTS OF THE INSPECTED UNIT:

VI. GENERAL COMMENT AND CONCLUSION:

A. Comment of US Advisor

B. Comment of PRU Chief

C. Comment of inspection officer

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REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM  
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR  
DIRECTORATE GENERAL  
NATIONAL POLICE

PRU DIRECTORATE

INSPECTION

I. GENERAL:

- A. UNIT.....
- B. Date/Time of Control
- C. Control Officer
- D. Orienting Officer

II. GENERAL SITUATION:

- A. Deficiencies noted during the inspection on ...
- B. Particular points: (Note enemy situation in particular as it affects unit security)....
- C. Special directives: (Note important points to draw to the attention of the control officer of unit concerned)...

III. CONTROL RESULTS:

- A. Check the status of recommendations made during last inspection...

B. Note new deficiencies:

- 1. Defensive fence
- 2. Barracks
- 3. Guard house
- 4. Conduct of personnel on guard duty
- 5. Lights (defensive fence and guard posts)
- 6. Fire prevention - Fire rescue ...
- 7. Miscellaneous...

- C. Weapons and ammunition (weapons TE on hand, how many weapons that are serviceable; non-serviceable; ammo TOE, sufficient; insufficient; requirements).

IV. GENERAL COMMENT:

Comments of the inspecting officer

V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES IN THE UNIT:

VI. SUGGESTION OF THE INSPECTED UNIT:

Distribution:

PRU Directorate

R980/500/47

Headquarters  
Australian Force  
VIETNAM

14 Nov 69

ADMS

RELATIONSHIP OF MALARIA INCIDENCE TO GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION  
FORS PRELIMINARY REPORT 1/69

Reference: A. Tests and Trials - Dapsone/Paludrine Malaria Suppressant -  
HQ AFV File R980/500/47.

B. AFV Daily SITREPS.

Introduction

1. Following a request by ADMS (HQ AFV), a trial to determine the effectiveness of a Dapsone/Paludrine combination in suppressing Malaria was prepared by FORS and commenced in Oct 68. In Jul 69, ADMS (HQ AFV) requested FORS to determine if there is a relationship between the location of personnel and the incidence rates of Malaria.

Aim

2. To determine if there is a relationship between the location of personnel and the incidence rates of Malaria.

Approach

3. The Dapsone/Paludrine trial commenced in Oct 68 and data quoting name, unit, sub-unit and type of Malaria are available from 1 Nov 68 (Reference A). The AFV Daily SITREPS give the night locations of the main Task Force Sub-units (Reference B). Information from these two sources should provide the type of data needed for a study of this type.

4. Following a preliminary review it was decided that a pilot study over the period 18 Oct 68 to 17 Nov 68 should be carried out to determine if a more exhaustive study was warranted.

Assumptions

5. In the pilot study certain assumptions were made to avoid any unnecessary complexity in the analysis of the results. The main assumptions are listed below.

- a. All reported cases of Malaria were contracted fourteen days prior to date of diagnosis.
- b. The Task Force Base at Nui Dat is Malaria free.

- c. Infected personnel were within 1,000 metres of the night locations of their unit as specified in the AFV Daily SITREPS (Reference B).
- d. The average strength of a rifle company on operations is 95 pers.

#### Limitations

6. There are a number of factors which will limit the accuracy of this study and must be considered in conjunction with the results.

- a. Based on advice by the ADMS (Reference A) the probability that a soldier was infected twelve to sixteen days before diagnosis is 0.85. In other words 85 men out of every 100 will be infected with Malaria in this period. The nomination of exactly a fourteen day incubation period would produce a probability of infection significantly below 0.85. This degradation is modified by the fact that sub units, as a general rule, remain in or near the same locations for periods in excess of four days. Taken overall it is considered that the information will have adequate accuracy for the purpose of the test.
- b. Stringent precautions in the form of spraying, mosquito traps and nets are in force at Nui Dat, and it has, in the past, been accepted that the area is malaria free. In light of these precautions Nui Dat must be classified as a "special area" for the purpose of the study and excluded from the analysis.
- c. Specifying that individuals from an infantry company may be located within 1,000 metres of the night position for that company is an acceptable limit in determining the probable location of infection. A small element of the company would be involved on administrative or other tasks away from the company area, but it is considered that this number is small and would not significantly affect the final result.
- d. To define precise locations for units sub-units other than Infantry or Artillery is beyond the scope of this study from the available data.
- e. There were only two main areas occupied by 1 ATF units during the period of the study, from 18 Oct 68 to 17 Nov 68

Results

6. a. Annex A gives a consolidated table of Malaria cases, unit/sub-unit and probable date and location of infection.
- b. Annex B shows a breakdown into units of Malarial cases reported over the period 18 Oct 68 to 17 Nov 68 for those personnel whose night locations could be determined. The most interesting result is the number of NZ personnel who contracted Malaria, ie. over half the number of cases. A simple mathematical test applied to these results (Annex C) shows beyond "statistical doubt" that within 1 ATF, NZ personnel are a different population from Australian personnel. In order to determine the affect of location on Malaria incidence rates they have been excluded from any tests.
- c. The only suitable figures available for a test to determine the affect of location on Malaria incidence rates, are those for 3 RAR over the period 18 Oct 68 to 1 Nov 68. A statistical test (Annex D) compared the area centred around Cu My (YS 5787) with the Thai Thien area (YS 2279). The test demonstrates that the two areas do not have the same incident rates of Malaria. The sample is small, but it can confidently be stated that the incidence rate of Malaria in the Cu My area is greater than for the Thai Thien area.
- d. An attached map (Annex E) shows the locations of 127 Malaria cases for the period 18 Oct 68 to 30 Jun 68, plotted at the probable locations of infection.


Summary of Results

7. a. Malaria incidence rates differ between the Cu My and Thai Thien areas, and are higher for the Cu My area.
- b. For 1 ATF during the period of the study the incidence rate of Malaria for NZ personnel was higher than for Australian personnel.

Recommendations

8. It is recommended that:
- a. Due to the present lack of cases to analyse that the study be discontinued.
- b. In order to aid any possible future studies that the ADMS HQ AFV Form 1, be completed in detail, and in the space marked "Any other movements" the location of the patient for the period 12 to 16 days

prior to malarial diagnosis be recorded.

  
(N.F. GOMM)  
Captain  
GS03 FORS

- Annexes:
- A. Table of Location of Malaria Cases.
  - B. Table of Unit Incidence of Malaria Cases.
  - C. Analysis of Aust/NZ Malaria incidence.
  - D. Analysis of Malaria Incidence by Geographical Location.
  - E. Map of Locations of Malaria cases.

For Information:

AHQ (C) (SAO)

ANNEX A TO  
HQ AFV R980/500/47  
DATED NOV 69

## LOCATION OF MALARIAL CASES

DATE REPORTED	UNIT	SUB/ UNIT	PROB DATE OF INFECTION	WHEN INFECT PROB DATE	NO. OF CASES		REMARKS
					FALCIPA- RIUM	VIVAX	
a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.	g.	h.
1 Nov 68	4 RAR	W Coy	18 Oct 68	YS 5289	4		initially diagnosed as Vivax.
	"	V "		5583	1		
	3 RAR	B "		5487	1		
	12 Fd	104 Bty		5289	1		
2 Nov 68	4 RAR	W Coy	19 Oct 68	5289	7		
	"	V "		5583	1		
	"	Sp "		5086	1		
	"	Adm "			1		
	3 RAR	A "		5689	4		
	"	B "		5487	1		
	"	D "		5689	1		
3 Nov 68	"	A "	20 Oct 68	5689	3		
	"	B "		5689	1		
	"	D "		5689	2		
	4 RAR	W "		5289	5		
	"	V "		5682	3		
	"	C "		5785		1	
	1 RAR	B "				1	
4 Nov 68	3 RAR	D "	21 Oct 68		1		
	4 RAR	W "		5289	3		
	"	V "		5681	2		
	"	C "		5882	1		
	12 Fd	104 Bty		5289	2		
5 Nov 68	4 RAR	W Coy	22 Oct 68	5289	3		
	"	V "		5779		1	
	1 ED				2		
6 Nov 68	4 RAR	W "	23 Oct 68	5289	8	1	
	"	V "		5778	2		

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a.	c.	e.	d.	e.	f.	g.	h.
6 Nov 68	4 RAR	D Coy	23 Oct 68	YS 5579		1	
	1 Fd Sqn	Plant			1		
	4 RAR	BHQ	24 Oct 68	5086	1		
	"	W Coy		5289	4		
	"	V		5786	3		
	"	D		5086	1		
8 Nov 68	4 RAR	BHQ	25 Oct 68	5086	1		
	"	Sp Coy		5086	2		
	"	W		5289	5		
	"	V		5786	3		
	"	C		5836	1		
	12 Fd	104 Bty		5289	2		
	1 Fd Sqn	1 Tp			1		
9 Nov 68	4 RAR	C Coy	26 Oct 68	5886	3		
	"	V		5789	3		
	"	Sp		5086	2		
	1 Fd Hyg Coy				1		
10 Nov 68	4 RAR	V Coy	27 Oct 68	5690	2		
	"	W		5289	2		
	"	Sp		5086	1		
	1 Fd Sqn	1 Tp			1		
11 Nov 68	4 RAR	V Coy	28 Oct 68	5591	2		
	"	W Coy		5289	1		
	"	C		5688	2		
	"	D		5689	1		
	12 Fd	104 Bty		5289	1		
12 Nov 68	1 Fd Sqn		29 Oct 68		1		
	4 RAR	V Coy		5491	2		
	"	W		5289	1		
	"	D		5789	3		
	"	C		5788	1		

a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.	g.	h.
13 Nov 68	4 RAR	V Coy	30 Oct 68	YS	5		
	"	D			1		
	"	Sp			1		
	8 Fd Amb				1		
	1 Armd	C Coy			1		
	1 Armd	3 Tp		YS 4584	1		
14 Nov 68	4 RAR	V Coy	31 Oct 68		2		
	"	W			1		
	"	Adm			1		
	"	D			1		
	"	Sp			3		
	"	BHQ			1		
	1 Armd	1 Tp		YS 4588	1		
	1 Fd Sqn				1		
	12 Fd	102 Bty		6181	1		
	3 RAR	B Coy			1		
15 Nov 68	4 RAR	C & BHQ	1 Nov 68	2181	2		
	"	V Coy			4		
	"	D			1		
	"	Sp			1		
	1 RAR	D		6483	1		Mixed
16 Nov 68	4 RAR	D	2 Nov 68		1		
	"	V			4		
	12 Fd	HQ Bty			1		
	HQ ATF				1		
	1 Armd	C			1		
17 Nov 68	4 RAR	V Coy	3 Nov 68	5686	1		
	"	Adm			1		
	12 Fd	104 Bty		5289	1		
18 Nov 68	4 RAR	V Coy	4 Nov 68	5686	1		Mixed
	"	V		5686	3		
	3 Cav	A Sqn			1		

a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.	g.	h.
19 Nov 68	4 RAR	V Coy	5 Nov 68	YS 5586		1	
	1 RAR	Sp		5981	1		
20 Nov 68			6 Nov 68				
21 Nov 68	1 Fd Sqn	1 Tp	7 Nov 68	6265	1		
	3 Cav	A Sqn			2		
24 Nov 68	1 Armd	C Sqn	10 Nov 68		1		
25 Nov 68	2 SAS	HQ Tp	11 Nov 68		1		
27 Nov 68	9 RAR	Adm Coy	13 Nov 68		1		
29 Nov 68	1 RAR	A	15 Nov 68		1		Mixed
30 Nov 68	4 RAR	B	16 Nov 68			1	
1 Dec 68	1 Fd Hosp Dep		17 Nov 68		1		

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ANNEX B TO  
HQ AFV R980/500/47  
DATED NOV 69

UNIT INCIDENCE OF MALARIAL CASES

1. For period 18 Oct 68 to 17 Nov 68.

a.	Total No. of cases plotted	= 127.
b.	No. of cases from 1 RAR	= 1.
c.	No. of cases from 3 RAR	= 14 (13 between 18-20 Oct)
d.	No. of cases from 4 RAR	= 102 (incl 75 NZ).
e.	No. of cases from 104 Bty 12 Fd Regt	= 7 (all at YS 5289).

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ANALYSIS OF AUST/NZ MALARIAL INCIDENCE

1. A simple  $\chi^2$  test to determine the probability that the incidence rate of Malaria is the same for both NZ and Australian personnel is presented.
2. Postulate the null hypothesis that Aust and NZ personnel came from the same population in regard to incidence of malaria.
3. Consider the following 2 x 2 table. C Coy, D Coy, and V Coy were operating in the same area.

Coys.	No. in Coy	No. of Cases	TOTAL
C & D Coy (Aust)	190 (cell 1)	16 (cell 2)	206
V Coy (NZ)	95 (cell 3)	33 (cell 4)	128
TOTAL	285	49	334

Expected frequency of Cell 1

$$f1 = \frac{285 \times 206}{334} = 176$$

Expected frequencies

Coys.	No. in Coy	No. of Cases	TOTAL
C & D Coys (Aust)	176	30	206
V Coy (NZ)	109	19	128
TOTAL	285	49	334

$$\begin{aligned}
 \chi^2 &= 14^2 \left( \frac{1}{176} \times \frac{1}{109} \times \frac{1}{19} \times \frac{1}{30} \right) \\
 &= 14^2 \left( \frac{1}{100} \times \frac{1}{20} \right) \\
 &= 14^2 \times \frac{6}{100} \\
 &= 11.7
 \end{aligned}$$

Reference to a table of  $\chi^2$  values in Statistical Methods and Formulae (RMC of Science), shows that for one degree of freedom, the probability of the hypothesis being true is less than 0.001.

In other words the chance that NZ and Australian personnel have the same incidence rates of Malaria is less than 1 in 1,000. It can be concluded therefore that the incidence rates of Malaria for NZ and Australian personnel are different, and from inspection the rates for NZ personnel are higher.

ANALYSIS OF MALARIA INCIDENCE BY GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION (3 RAR)

1. A simple  $\chi^2$  test to determine the probability that the incidence rate of Malaria is the same at the different locations.
2. Postulate the null hypothesis that the Thai Thien and Cu My areas have identical incidence rates of Malaria.
3. 3 RAR operated in these two areas over period 18 Oct - 1 Nov 68.
4. Consider the 2 x 2 table as follows:

AREA	No. in area	No. of Cases	TOTAL
Cu My	380	13	393
Thai Thieu	380	0	380
TOTAL	760	13	773

Expected frequency of Cell 1

$$\begin{aligned}
 f_1 &= \frac{760 \times 393}{773} \\
 &= 386
 \end{aligned}$$

5. Table of expected frequencies:

AREA	No. in Area	No. of Cases	TOTAL
Cu My	386	7	393
Thai Thieu	374	6	380
TOTAL	760	13	773

$$\begin{aligned}
 \chi^2 &= 6^2 \left( \frac{1}{386} + \frac{1}{374} + \frac{1}{7} + \frac{1}{6} \right) \\
 &= 36 \times \frac{5}{14} \\
 &= 12
 \end{aligned}$$

6. Reference to table of  $\chi^2$  values in Statistical Methods and Formulae (RMC of Science). Shows that for one degree of freedom the probability of the hypotheses being true is less than 0.001. Therefore the chance that the Cu My and Thai Thieu areas have the same rate of incidence is less than 1 in 1,000. It can be concluded from this result and from inspection that the two areas differ in incidence rates of Malaria and that the Cu My area is higher.

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