

Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report and enclosures
1 - 31 December 1969

Series: AWM95 - Australian Army
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Item: 1/2/72

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Army Component

24 Jan 70

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AHQ (C)

AATTV MONTHLY REPORT - DEC 69

1. Attached, for information, is a copy of the AATTV Monthly Report for Dec 69.
2. The proposal as outlined in sub-para 21. e. of the report is currently under examination by HQ AFV. Meanwhile, no action to implement the proposal has been taken.

R.A. Hay

(R.A. HAY)
 Major General
 Commander Australian Force
 VIETNAM

Attachment: 1. AATTV Report - December 1969.

For Information.

1 ATF
AATTV (less attachment)

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AUSTRALIAN FORCE VIETNAM

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R/ 723-10-β

HEADQUARTERS

Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam

9 Jan 70

HQ AFV (3)

AATTV REPORT - DECEMBER 1969

General

1. During Dec, AATTV continued to be actively involved over the four CTZs and in the Rung-Sat Special Zone in operations, training and in providing advice on territorial security at province to hamlet levels. During the month enemy activity was generally at a decreased level compared with that of Nov with the exception of IV CTZ. The majority of contacts with the enemy by units/teams in which members of AATTV are deployed were light.

Casualties

2. AATTV casualties for the month of Dec were one WIA - WO2 WL Dunstan, who was wounded in operations with 2nd ARVN Div in I CTZ and has now been medically evacuated to Aust.

3. In addition WO2 DC Wilson, who had received a non-operational injury in late Oct, was also returned to Aust during Dec.

Deployment

4. No major changes in deployment occurred during the month. However, several re-deployments of officers were made firstly as a result of the phase-down of the advisory effort with the Province Recce Unit (PRU) Programme and secondly with the aim of providing a better distribution of officers in I CTZ.

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5. The deployment of AATTV as at 1 Jan 70 is attached at Annex A.

I Corps

6. Operational activity by ARVN units and by Regional and Popular Forces in I CTZ resulting in contacts with the enemy decreased during Dec. These contacts, in the majority of cases, were light.

7. In the latter part of the month, enemy initiated incidents fell to one of the lowest levels since Jan 67. This was in sharp contrast to the indications forecast in the AATTV Report for Nov, in which it was stated that there were indications that a relatively strong enemy operational effort could be expected in late Dec 69 or early Jan 70. It would appear that the enemy has not been able to build up in his staging areas close enough to Hue and Quang-Tri to support the expected effort against these cities. It is considered that this in part reflects the higher standard of ARVN, Regional and Popular Force units in 11 DTA and the relatively successful pacification programmes in the two northern provinces, particularly in Quang-Tri Province. Current intelligence estimates in I Corps are that it could now be as late as Mar 70 before the enemy is capable of undertaking worthwhile offensive operations in northern I CTZ.

8. In southern I CTZ (12 DTA) it is considered that the situation is not as bright. Although some improvement seems to have been made in territorial security over the last year, after spending most of Dec on operations with battalions of the 2nd ARVN Div in 12 DTA, my observations are that these improvements have been marginal. Irrespective of the weather, ARVN operations still appear to be largely confined to the coastal plain. This is mainly due to the continued presence of enemy Local and Main Force units in the area, which now have a very high NVA content. It remains my opinion that this area, particularly around Quang-Ngai, is, like the Western and North-Eastern parts of the Delta, of major importance in the enemy's plans relating to a possible future "settlement" of the war.

9. Despite this, it was encouraging during Dec to see the improved operational effectiveness of some of the battalions of the 2nd ARVN Div, particularly the 4th Regt. I took part in one of their battalion operations which involved the combat assault by helicopter of companies into numerous LZs over a relatively large area. The operation was very successful, but more importantly showed clear indications of good use of up to date information, increased delegation of authority to subordinate commanders, intelligent use of helicopters and a real attempt to close with and destroy the enemy. The majority of these aspects are ones in which the ARVN has been somewhat weak. The techniques used by the 4th ARVN Regt are now being passed to the other Regts of the 2nd ARVN Div.

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10. Another type of operation of interest being used in the 2nd ARVN Div, in which I took part in Dec, was the combat assault of a company (normally the regimental recce coy) by helicopter into a village (not under GVN control), in which intelligence information indicated that enemy were located. These operations, mainly conducted by the 6th ARVN Regt, are termed "Eagle Flights" and are normally only of a half or one day duration. Two advisers are attached to the recce coy from one of the battalions and two other advisers stand by to accompany the reaction force (normally two or more other companies) should it be required. These operations proved very successful when first introduced, but results have waned, probably due to them being done too frequently.

11. Extracts from a report by Maj Johnston, the Senior AATTV Adviser in I CTZ, are attached at Annex B.

12. Attached at Annex C is a summary of significant operational contacts in I CTZ in which ARVN and Vietnamese Territorial Security Force units with AATTV advisers were involved during Dec.

13. Attached at Annex D are AATTV adviser reports of interest from I CTZ.

II Corps

14. 2nd Mobile Strike Force (2MSF). During the month of Dec the battalions of 2 MSF in which AATTV are deployed were committed to operations in the areas of Bu-Prang, Ben-Het and Dak-Seang. Both battalions had little or no contact with the enemy in the areas in which they operated. In the Ben-Het area, the 2nd Bn 2 MSF operated in the Tri-Border region, the scene of heavy fighting earlier this year, however no contact was made with the enemy despite reported signs of a build up mentioned in my last AATTV Report. A report by Capt Paul, who commands a coy with 2nd Bn, is attached at Annex E.

15. Province Recce Units (PRU) : II CTZ

a. Montagnard Mobile Training Team (MMTT). Attached at Annex F is the final report by Capt Deane, who was OC MMTT until the Team was handed over to Vietnamese control on 15 Dec 69. It will be noted from his report that the decision to base the MMTT at the Special Activities Training Centre (SATC), Vung-Tau appears now to have been reversed since my last AATTV Report. Such reversals of decision are not abnormal by my experience in the PRU Programme, particularly since the Vietnamese have assumed control. The decision to close down SATC in Jan 70, referred to by Capt Deane in his report, has not been confirmed but is probably a good idea considering the past problems that have occurred there and the

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likelihood of even greater "domestic" problems in the future. Despite the intended re-location of the MATT at Pleiku reported by Capt Deane, it is considered that AATTV should not become involved with it again in view of the phasing out of field advisers from the PRU Programme as a whole. Capt Deane's observations regarding the PRU Programme are based mainly on his contact with a number of provinces in II CTZ. However, they are of interest and from my experience of PRUs in other CTZs and the Rung-Sat Special Zone, I generally support his comments as a description of the current situation in Vietnam regarding most PRUs and the Phoenix Programme. His comments however do not apply at this stage in the same degree to the three remaining PRUs with which members of AATTV are deployed. Nevertheless it is intended that the three AATTV advisers concerned will not be replaced in these PRUs at the end of their current tours.

b. PRU : Binh-Dinh Province. Attached at Annex G are extracts from a report by WO1 Ostara, Senior Adviser PRU Binh-Dinh, on activities for Nov 69.

c. PRU : Tuyen-Duc Province. Attached at Annex H are extracts from a report by WO2 Carter, Senior Adviser PRU Tuyen-Duc, on activities for Nov 69 and also some selected PRU "Highlight" Reports of interest covering Oct/Nov.

III CTZ

16. ARVN Training - Assistance to 1 ATF. As a result of discussion Comd 1 ATF/Comd AATTV during Dec, the number of AATTV members deployed to assist 1 ATF in this training project will be reduced by one. This decision is based on the aspects mentioned in the AATTV Report for Nov and the 18 ARVN Div decision to provide one ARVN company at a time instead of a battalion to 1 ATF for operational training. The reduction of the AATTV commitment will be made during late Jan/early Feb 70 to fit in with end of tour of the members currently deployed at the Horse Shoe and internal AATTV re-deployment requirements.

17. RF/PF Training : Phuoc-Tuy

a. Despite indications that another location would be obtained to replace "Heavyweight" for the AATTV RF Training Cadre (AATTV Report for Nov 69 refers), this has not occurred. Furthermore; it has now finally been admitted by Province that they do not have sufficient RF Coys to meet all their commitments, ie. operations, reserve, provision of coys for training at NTC as directed by JGS and also for training by AATTV. It has been decided by Province, based on this factor rather than accommodation, that the AATTV RF training project can not be resumed. This is

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very unfortunate, as it was agreed by all concerned that it was most worthwhile.

b. Rather than re-deploying the three AATTV members involved in this RF project to another CTZ, it was agreed Deputy PSA/Comd AATTV that the AATTV team would re-orient their efforts into the field of PF. Some start had already been made in this regard while awaiting the final decision on the RF training project (AATTV Report for Nov 69 refers) and based on AATTV findings during this period it was evident that a great deal needed to be done to try to up-grade and to encourage more appropriate employment of the PF in the province. It was mutually agreed that a three man AATTV team would be in excess of the new requirement, at least in the initial stages and therefore it will be reduced to two members with effect from early Jan 70. This AATTV PF Advisory Team will work direct to the Dep PSA.

c. From my observations in IV CTZ over 1969 and from experience with AATTV teams working there on Village Defence (VDATs), it is not only impossible but rather stupid to compartment the problems and activities of PF, PSDF and RD at the village/hamlet level. As this is really the level that the majority of these elements work, their activities of necessity also become part (in fact are the vital ingredients) of village/hamlet defence. I have discussed this with the Dep PSA Phuoc-Tuy and without "pushing" him too hard, I have suggested that what is perhaps needed and what is likely to develop of its own accord among those field advisers involved in PF, PSDF and RD is in fact VDATs, or whatever he likes to call them. As the field advisers essentially concerned are all members of AATTV, the transition from working and discussing together their respective fields (which is inevitable and correct), to the stage of dividing themselves up into two or three teams (VDATs?) with the agreement of the PSA should be relatively easy.

d. In view of the recently stated JGS policy referred to in the IV Corps part of this report regarding assistance to VDATs in all four CTZs, the discussions I have had with Dep PSA Phuoc-Tuy are all the more valid and it will be interesting to see what develops.

18. IRP Training : Van-Kiep. The 6/69 IRP Course is in the operational patrol stage of its training. The course is scheduled to march out on 10 Jan. A report on the course will be included in the next AATTV Report.

19. Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC) and Peoples Self Defence Force (PSDF) : Phuoc-Tuy. Attached at Annex I is a report by WO2 Osborn, RDC Adviser Phuoc-Tuy, on RDC and PSDF in the province.

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IV Corps

20. General

- a. Enemy activity during month continued at the increased level reported in the AATTV Report for Nov. The main areas concerned were Chau-Doc, Chuong-Thien, Dinh-Tuong and Kien-Tuong Provinces.
- b. Extracts from a report by Maj Harkness, Senior AATTV Adviser in IV CTZ, are attached at Annex J.

21. AATTV Village Defence Advisory Teams (VDATs)

- a. The VDATs have continued to make relatively good progress with the exception of the one located in Vinh-Long Province. This VDAT will be re-deployed to Kien-Hoa Province during Feb 70 to make a second team in that province. There it will be able to build on the successful progress already made by the existing VDAT.
- b. The fifth VDAT mentioned in the last AATTV Report was formed and deployed into Phong-Dinh Province on 9 Dec. Early indications are that the desired results are beginning to be achieved by the team.
- c. Selected VDAT reports of interest for the month of Dec are attached at Annex K, Annex L and Annex M.
- d. A translated copy of a JGS message to all CTZs regarding advisory effort on village/hamlet defence, with specific reference to the AATTV VDATs in IV CTZ, is attached at Annex N.
- e. Preliminary discussions have been held with Dep Cords IV CTZ regarding the employment of AATTV VDATs in the enlarged programme of advisory effort on village defence which is due to commence in IV CTZ early in 1970. Final decisions have not been reached, however it has been agreed that at least part of our future effort should be devoted to supervising and training the large number of US MATs which will be involved throughout the Delta. Nevertheless, in order to retain our expertise in the VDAT field and so be able to undertake this training/supervisory role, at least one and perhaps two of the VDATs will need to be maintained by AATTV in the same manner as they are now employed and manned.


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Change in Command AATTV

22. The handover/takeover AATTV and orientation tour for Lt Col Clark (CO Designate), who arrives on 14 Jan, will take place over the period 15-26 Jan. All four CTZs will be visited. It is intended that command of AATTV change on the night of 26/27 Jan and I will emplane for Aust on 28 Jan.



(R.D.F. LLOYD)

Lt Col

Comd

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AATTV DEPLOYMENT
AS AT JAN 1970

Annex 'A' to
AATTV Monthly Report
for Dec 69

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>AATTV : SAIGON</u>								
1	Lt Col	R.D.F.	Lloyd	RA Inf	HQ AATTV	Commander	Jan 70	Saigon
2	Capt	D.J.F.	Rowe	RA Inf	"	Adjutant	May 70	"
3	WO1	G.S.	Munt	RA Inf	"	Admin WO (A and Q)	Mar 70	"
4	WO2	G.E.	Munro	RA Sigs	"	Admin WO (Pay and Movs)	Sep 70	"
5	Cpl	G.H.	Davison	RAASC	"	Clerk	Apr 70	"
6	WO1	J.B.	Staunton-Latimer	RAAC	Armoured School	Instructor/Adviser	Feb 70	Thu-Duc (near Saigon)
7	Sgt	D.S.	Cochrane	RA Inf	} Not yet deployed		Jul 70	} On Pre-extension leave in Aust until 7 Jan 70.
8	Sgt	A.J.	Miller	RA Inf			Jul 70	
9	Sgt	M.J.	Shave	RA Inf			Jul 70	

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>I CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV : QUANG-TRI PROVINCE</u>								
10	Maj	C.S.	Connor	RAAC	Quang-Tri Sector	Asst Province Adviser (Military)	Oct 70	Quang-Tri
11	WO2	R.V.	Roney	RAAMC	" " "	Medical Adviser	Apr 70	" "
12	WO2	J.	Stephens	RAASC	Cam-Lo Sub-Sector	Assistant Adviser	Oct 70	Cam-Lo
13	WO2	J.	Fitzgerald	RA Inf	1/1 ARVN Bn	" "	Jul 70	Near Quang-Tri (Regt HQ)
14	Capt	R.L.	Smith	RAE	2/1 ARVN Bn	Senior Adviser	Apr 70	" " " "
15	WO2	D.T.	Powell	RA Inf	2/1 " "	Assistant Adviser	Oct 70	" " " "
16	WO2	B.L.	Young	RA Inf	3/1 " "	" "	Feb 70	" " " "
17	WO2	G.M.	Logan	RA Inf	4/1 " "	" "	Oct 70	" " " "
18	WO2	D.A.	Strachan	RA Inf	1/2 " "	" "	Oct 70	Dong-Ha (Regt HQ)
19	WO2	O.W.	Bell	RAA	2/2 " "	" "	Aug 70	" " "
20	WO2	L.A.	West	RA Inf	3/2 " "	" "	Jul 70	" " "
21	WO2	R.A.	O'Hara	RA Inf	4/2 " "	" "	Jul 70	" " "
22	WO2	E.A.	Taylor	RA Inf	5/2 " "	" "	Jul 70	" " "
23	WO2	L.N.	Bootes	RAAC	2/7 ARVN Cav	" "	Mar 70	Quang-Tri
24	WO1	E.C.	Burns	RAAC	1/11 ARVN Cav	" "	Oct 70	" "

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>I CTZ (Cont)</u>								
<u>AATTV : THUA THIEN PROVINCE</u>								
25	WO2	D.G.	Killion	RAAMC	Thua-Thien Sector	Medical Adviser	Jul 70	Hue
26	Maj	G.V.	Brown	RAE	Nam-Hoa District	District Senior Adviser	Jun 70	Nam-Hoa
27	WO2	T.	McNee	RA Sigs	Nam-Hoa Sub-Sector	Assistant Adviser	Oct 70	"
28	WO2	K.W.	Forden	RA Inf	Black Panther Coy	" "	May 70	Hue (Base)
29	WO2	D.G.	Parker	RA Inf	1/54 ARVN Bn	" "	Oct 70	Phu-Loc (Regt HQ)
30	WO2	D.F.	Heenan	RA Inf	2/54 " "	" "	Jul 70	" "
31	Capt	W.R.	Deane	Aust Int	3/54 " "	Senior Adviser	Jul 70	" "
32	WO2	S.	Speechley	RAEME	3/54 " "	Assistant Adviser	Jul 70	" "
33	WO2	D.E.	Watts	RA Sigs	1/3 " "	" "	Jul 70	Near Hue (Regt HQ)
34	WO2	J.F.	McKenner	RA Inf	2/3 " "	" "	Jul 70	" " "
35	Capt	W.D.	Tear	RA Inf	3/3 " "	Senior Adviser	Oct 70	" " "
36	WO2	R.E.	Heathcote	RAA	3/3 " "	Assistant Adviser	Nov 70	" " "
37	WO2	D.F.	Hedges	RA Inf	4/3 " "	" "	Aug 70	" " "

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Serial : Rank : Inits : Name : Corps : Unit : Employment : Due RTA : Location

I CTZ (Cont)

AATTV : QUANG-NAM PROVINCE

38	: Maj	: F.C.	: Johnston	: RA Inf	: HQ I Corps	: G3 (Trg) Adviser	: May 70	: Danang
39	: WO2	: P.J.	: Heslin	: RAE	: AATTV Danang	: Admin WO	: Oct 70	: Aust House Danang
40	: WO2	: J.M.	: O'Donnell	: RAAOC	: " "	: " "	: Jan 70	: " " "
41	: WO1	: R.M.	: Almond	: RAAC	: 3/17 ARVN Cav	: Assistant Adviser	: May 70	: Hoi-An
42	: WO2	: V.L.	: Harris	: RA Inf	: Hoa-Vang Sub-Sector	: " " RF/PF	: Sep 70	: Hoa-Vang
43	: WO2	: T.H.	: Breakwell	: RA Inf	: 21st Ranger Bn	: " "	: Dec 70	: Near Danang (Gp HQ)
44	: Capt	: W.	: Sheppard	: RA Inf	: 1/51 ARVN Bn	: Senior Adviser	: Sep 70	: Mieu-Bong (Regt HQ)
45	: WO2	: C.F.	: Keioskie	: RAASC	: 2/51 " "	: Assistant Adviser	: Feb 70	: " " "
46	: WO2	: W.T.	: Jones	: RA Inf	: 3/51 " "	: " "	: Aug 70	: " " "

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Serial : Rank : Inits : Name : Corps : Unit : Employment : Due RTA : Location

I CTZ (Cont)

AATTV : QUANG-TIN and QUANG-NGAI PROVINCES

47	: Capt	: J.P.	: Nelson	: RA Inf	: 1/4 ARVN Bn	: Senior Adviser	: May 70	:)
48	: WO2	: D.	: Burke	: RA Inf	: 1/4 " "	: Assistant Adviser	: Aug 70	:)
49	: WO2	: B.	: Davies	: RA Inf	: 2/4 " "	: " "	: Oct 70	:)
50	: WO2	: R.D.	: Cameron	: RA Inf	: 3/4 " "	: " "	: Feb 70	:)
51	: WO2	: K.W.	: Heard	: RA Inf	: 2 3 /5 " "	: " "	: Oct 70	:)
52	: WO2	: D.	: Rolph	: RA Inf	: 4/5 " "	: " "	: Nov 70	:)
53	: WO2	: D.W.	: Eather	: RA Inf	: 1/6 " "	: " "	: Jul 70	:)
54	: Capt	: A.J.	: Mogridge	: RA Inf	: 2/6 " "	: Senior Adviser	: Apr 70	:)
55	: WO2	: K.J.	: Brady	: RA Inf	: 2/6 " "	: Assistant Adviser	: Oct 70	:)
56	: WO2	: J.F.	: Ghilotti	: RAAC	: 2/4 ARVN Cav	: " "	: Aug 70	: Quang-Ngai
57	: WO2	: T.J.	: Goddard	: RAA	: 23 ARVN Arty Bn	: " "	: Apr 70	: " "

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Serial : Rank : Inits : Name : Corps : Unit : Employment : Due RTA : Location

II CTZ

AATTV : PLEIKU (SPECIAL FORCES)

58	: Maj	: W.J.	: Brydon	: RA Inf	: 2nd Mobile Strike Force Command, Det B-20, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)	: Bn Comd	: Feb 70	: Pleiku (Base)
59	: Capt	: D.F.	: Paul	: RA Inf	: " " "	: Coy Comd	: May 70	: " "
60	: WO2	: K.H.	: Mavin	: RA Inf	: " " "	: " "	: Aug 70	: " "
61	: WO2	: S.J.	: McLaughlin	: RA Inf	: " " "	: Coy Comd (Trg Coy)	: Apr 70	: " "
62	: WO2	: J.R.	: Vincent	: RAA	: " " "	: Instructor " "	: May 70	: " "
63	: WO2	: L.B.	: Scowcroft	: RA Inf	: " " "	: " " "	: Aug 70	: " "
64	: WO2	: A.B.	: McCloskey	: RA Inf	: " " "	: Pl Comd	: Jul 70	: " "
65	: WO2	: G.Y.	: Jamieson	: RA Inf	: " " "	: " "	: Oct 70	: " "
66	: WO2	: O.	: Stevenson	: RA Inf	: " " "	: " "	: Aug 70	: " "
67	: WO2	: A.J.	: Shelton	: RA Inf	: " " "	: " "	: Feb 70	: " "
68	: WO2	: A.S.	: Williams	: RA Sigs	: " " "	: " "	: Oct 70	: " "

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Serial : Rank : Inits : Name : Corps : Unit : Employment : Due RTA : Location

II CTZ (Cont)

AATTV - II CORPS AREA

69	:	WO1	:	S.D.	:	Rosenberg	:	RA Inf	:	Ranger Training Centre	:	Instructor/Adviser	:	Apr 70	:	Duc-My
70	:	WO1	:	E.B.	:	Ostara	:	RA Inf	:	Province Recce Unit	:	Senior Adviser Binh- Dinh	:	Jul 70	:	Qui-Nhon
71	:	WO2	:	R.G.	:	Carter	:	RA Inf	:	" " "	:	" " Tuyen- Duc	:	Jul 70	:	Dalat
72	:	WO2	:	L.B.	:	Green	:	RAAC	:	1/14 ARVN Cav	:	Assistant Adviser	:	Nov 70	:	Kontum (Base)

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>III CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV : III CORPS AREA</u>								
73	Capt	P.J.S.	Harris	RA Inf	IRP Wing Van-Kiep, National Training Centre	CI	Mar 70	Baria
74	WO2	C.R.	Ansell	RA Inf	" " "	Admin WO	Mar 70	"
75	WO2	F.E.	Bell	RA Inf	" " "	Patrol Comd/Instructor	Mar 70	"
76	WO2	J.W.	Wigg	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Jan 70	"
77	WO2	J.T.	Hoolihan	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Jun 70	"
78	WO2	G.J.	Ison	RA Inf	Province Recce Unit	Senior Adviser Rung-Sat: Special Zone	Apr 70	Vung-Tau (Base)
79	WO2	G.	Kealy	RA Inf	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	PF Advisory Team (Leader)	Aug 70	Baria.
80	WO2	R.K.	Gurney	RA Inf	" "	" " "(Member)"	Sep 70	"
81	WO2	A.J.A.	Joyce	RA Inf	" "	" " (" ")	Aug 70	"
82	WO2	W.C.	Green	RAASC	" "	Assistant Adviser A & L Coy	Nov 70	"
83	WO2	R.S.	Simpson	RA Inf	" "	Adviser PSDF	Feb 70	"
84	WO2	L.D.	Osborn	RA Inf	" "	Adviser RD Cadre	Jun 70	"
85	WO2	L.N.	Gorman	RAA	1 ATF (att)	Adviser ARVN Trg	Mar 70	Nui-Dat (Horse Shoe)
86	WO2	W.J.	Bruce	RA Inf	" (")	" " "	Feb 70	" " "

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Serial	Rank	Enits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>IV GPZ</u>								
<u>AATTV : IV CORPS AREA</u>								
87	Maj	A.	Harkness	RAA	CORDS, IV Corps	Assistant to Chief Territorial Security	Apr 70	Can-Tho
88	WO2	H.J.	Hartman	RAAMC	HQ IV Corps	Medical Adviser	Jul 70	" "
89	WO2	R.D.	Smith	RA Inf	IV Corps Village Defence Advisory Team (VDAT)	VDAT Team Leader	Oct 70	Dinh-Tuong Province
90	WO2	D.B.	Bell	RAE	" " "	VDAT Adviser	Dec 70	" " "
91	WO2	B.G.	Saxby	RAE	" " "	VDAT Team Leader	Jan 70	Kien-Hea Province
92	WO1	B.T.	Waters	RA Inf	" " "	VDAT Adviser	Dec 70	" " "
93	WO2	W.E.	Tillett	RA Inf	" " "	VDAT Team Leader	Sep 70	Vinh-Binh Province
94	WO2	C.	McEvoy	RA Inf	" " "	VDAT Adviser	Dec 70	" " "
95	WO2	R.W.	Gairns	RA Inf	" " "	VDAT Team Leader	Jul '0	Vinh-Long Province
96	WO2	J.H.	Macartney	RAASC	" " "	VDAT Adviser	Feb 70	" " "
97	WO1	W.A.	Eade	RAA Pro	" " "	VDAT Team Leader	Jul 70	Phong-Dinh Province
98	WO2	R.I.	Oliver	RAASC	" " "	VDAT Adviser	Nov 70	" " "

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Annex 'B' to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

Danang
27 Dec 69

CO AATTV

EXTRACTS FROM MONTHLY REPORT BY MAJ JOHNSTON
I CTZ : DEC 69 (TO 25 DEC)

General

1. The month saw a gradual decline of enemy activity in the first two to three weeks of the reporting period with a sharp decline towards the end of the period. The enemy activity was scattered ground contacts and attacks by fire. Towards the end of the period enemy initiated incidents were at the lowest level recorded by III MAF since January 1967.
2. Information indicates that the enemy has not been able to build up in staging areas close enough to the cities of Hue and Quang-Tri to support what was thought to be a late December early January push against these cities. Current intelligence estimates are that it could be as late as March before he is capable to make such an attack and that it would then be against Quang-Tri or Fire Support Bases in the North, based on their location which makes support easier for the enemy.
3. Vice President KY said at a briefing in I CTZ that he considered that no major enemy offensive would come until late 1970 early 1971 and that when it did come it would end the war with the SVN winning. There is some US support to this line of thinking at the "Visiting General" level.

Casualties

5. WO Dunstan was wounded on 14 December sufficiently badly to be evacuated to Australia. WO Heard was hospitalized briefly during the period with a fever of unknown origin.

(F.C. JOHNSTON)
Maj
AATTV

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Annex 'C' to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

CO AATTV

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL CONTACTS
BY ARVN AND RF/PF UNITS WITH AATTV ADVISERS
I CTZ : DEC 69

1. On 1 Dec vicinity of YD 316363 4th Battalion 1st ARVN Regiment killed 3 VC and captured 1 individual weapon.
2. On 2 Dec a company of 4th Battalion 6th ARVN Regiment contacted approximately 1 company of VC and engaged with SA fire resulting in 4 enemy KIA.
3. On 2 Dec Recon squad from 3rd Bn 3rd ARVN Regt contacted an estimated enemy squad resulting in 5 enemy KIA and 3 individual weapons captured.
4. On 3 Dec vicinity BT 105293, 1st Battalion 5th ARVN Regt contacted unknown size force resulting in 7 enemy KIA and 3 individual weapons captured.
5. On 4 Dec vicinity BT 115300 same battalion killed 3 enemy and captured 1 individual weapon.
6. On 4 Dec vicinity BS 567795, the Recon platoon of the 6th ARVN Regt contacted unknown size enemy force resulting in 11 enemy KIA, 7 VC captured and 2 individual weapons.
7. On 5 Dec vicinity BT 155503 3rd Troop 17 Armd Cav Regt contacted unknown size enemy force resulting in 5 enemy KIA.
8. On 5 Dec vicinity BT 166497 21st Ranger Bn contacted unknown size enemy force resulting in 7 enemy KIA, 15 VC captured and 2 individual weapons captured.
9. On 5 Dec vicinity YD 240795 3rd Battalion 1st ARVN Regt contacted unknown size enemy force resulting in 8 enemy KIA and 2 crew served weapons captured.
10. On 5 Dec vicinity BT 203443 1st Bn 5 ARVN Regt contacted unknown size enemy force resulting in 6 enemy KIA, 1 individual weapon captured.
11. On 5 Dec vicinity YD 265788 a Recon team from 3 Battalion 1st ARVN Regt established contact with estimated enemy company; 3rd Battalion and 3 Tp 7 Armd Cav Regt pursued them resulting in 25 enemy KIA, 5 individual weapons captured in vicinity YD 243784.

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12. On 6 Dec vicinity BT 140505 21st Ranger^{Bn/} found 1 bunker resulting in 7 VC captured.
13. On 7 Dec vicinity BS 679581 1st Battalion 4th ARVN Regt contacted unknown size enemy force resulting in 8 enemy KIA.
14. On 7 Dec vicinity 200450 1st Battalion 5th ARVN Regt contacted unknown size enemy force resulting in 9 enemy KIA.
15. On 7 Dec vicinity YD 365388 1st Battalion 1st Regt contacted an estimated enemy squad resulting in 7 enemy KIA.
16. On 8 Dec vicinity BS 661576 1st Battalion 4th ARVN Regt contacted unknown size force resulting in 4 enemy KIA.
17. On 9 Dec vicinity YD 232311 and YD 248308 4th Battalion 1st ARVN Regt contacted unknown sized enemy forces resulting in 13 enemy KIA.
18. On 9 Dec vicinity BS 850357 3rd Battalion 4th ARVN Regt raided unknown size enemy force resulting in 5 enemy KIA.
19. On 11 Dec vicinity BS 824886 1st Battalion 6th Regt captured 5 VC (4 females).
20. On 12 Dec vicinity BT 179496 2nd Battalion 5th ARVN Regt ambushed enemy force resulting in 7 enemy KIA.
21. On 14 Dec vicinity BS 730829 6th Regt Recon Coy contacted unknown size enemy force. Resulting in 14 friendly WIA (including 1 US and 1 Australian adviser), 4 MIA and 4 enemy KIA. The Australian adviser wounded was 242988 WO2 W.L. Dunstan. He was subsequently evacuated to Australia.
22. On 14 Dec vicinity BT 195445 1st Battalion 5th ARVN Regt contacted unknown size enemy force resulting in 5 enemy KIA and 1 individual weapon captured.
23. On 18 Dec vicinity BS 814305 and BS 819325 3rd Battalion 4th ARVN Regt ambushed unknown size enemy force resulting in 4 enemy KIA and 2 individual weapons captured.
24. On 19 Dec vicinity BS 763573 2nd Battalion 4th ARVN Regt contacted unknown size enemy force resulting in 8 enemy KIA and 7 VC captured. CO AATTV was with this Bn at the time of the contact.
25. On 21 Dec vicinity YD 622184 2 squads from Black Panther Company contacted estimated 1 squad VC resulting in 7 enemy KIA, 2 crew served and 2 individual weapons captured.
26. On 22 Dec vicinity BT 236460 2nd Bn 5th ARVN Regt contacted unknown size enemy force resulting in 7 enemy KIA and 3 individual weapons captured.

(F.C. JOHNSTON)

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Maj
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INDEX TO AATTV ADVISER REPORTS OF INTEREST
I CTZ - DEC 69

The following reports of interest from AATTV advisers in I CTZ are attached:

- Annexure 1 - Report by Maj C Connor, Assistant Province Adviser (Military) Quang-Tri Province.
- Annexure 2 - Report by WO2 J Stephens, Assistant Adviser Cam-Lo District.
- Annexure 3 - Report by WO2 B Young, Assistant Adviser 3/1 ARVN Bn.
- Annexure 4 - Report by WO2 G Logan, Assistant Adviser 4/1 ARVN Bn.
- Annexure 5 - Report by WO2 R O'Hara, Assistant Adviser 4/2 ARVN Bn.
- Annexure 6 - Report by Maj G Brown, Senior Adviser Nam-Hoa District.
- Annexure 7 - Report by Capt W Sheppard, Senior Adviser 1/51 ARVN Bn.
- Annexure 8 - Report by WO2 V Harris, Assistant Adviser Hoa-Vang District.

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Quang-Tri
23 Dec 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY MAJ C CONNOR - ASST PROVINCE ADVISER (MILITARY)
QUANG-TRI PROVINCE : DEC 69

1. There have been few changes in the tempo and nature of activities this month. RVNAF and FVMAF continue their operations outside the populated area. RF/PF have continued search, defence and ambush activities in the populated area. The civil administration appears to have set itself attainable goals within the 1970 Pacification Plan, although there are some signs of strain.

Enemy Activity

2. The enemy has initiated few incidents within the populated area; only 3 rocket attacks have occurred, and have caused no significant damage. Evidence suggests however, that a build up similar to that of Nov-Dec 67 is occurring outside the populated area. Three mining incidents have occurred on the shoulders of the pavement of Route 1. Proselyting, rice gathering and home visits are apparently still occurring - at least information after the fact is being turned in.

Regular Force Activities

3. Whilst no large scale contacts have occurred this month, friendly forces have had the best of most encounters. The poor flying weather has prevented reaction to intelligence for up to four days. Resupply, support and extraction problems have prevented effective deep patrols, information of enemy build-up is therefore neither confirmed nor denied.

4. Some operations have been conducted in the populated area in co-operation with Regional Forces. Unfortunately these have had little training value, and none has produced spectacular results. Plans for integrated operations and teaching operations are currently being prepared in the face of some Vietnamese indifference.

Regional Forces

5. Territorial Force activities have increased. The results of nightly ambushes have not been as good as for November, wet dark nights and increased day time activity no doubt contributes to this.

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6. Several one day area searches have, with two notable exceptions, produced insignificant results. On 13 Dec 69, two one day searches produced 12 VC POW, 8 VC WIA and 20 weapons. No friendly forces were injured. Two cordon and search operations produced some VCS, and one weapon. Notable defects were the inadequate cordon, almost non-existent searches, and some rough and ready treatment of the civil populace.

7. An ambush school is being conducted for all PF platoon leaders and RF squad leaders by 1/5 Bde (Mech). This promises to upgrade performance; unfortunately officers are to attend a different school, which could produce conflicts. A mine sweep school for two teams per RF company is being conducted by 1st ARVN Div, in addition to a small FO's school. It is hoped that integrated US/RF operations will be conducted in the near future.

Other Matters

8. The following unrelated matters are worthy of note;
- a. The Province Chief, Col Am is to be replaced in January by Col Kim, who is currently Province Chief of Quang-Ngai.
 - b. There are reports of strains in the Province Administration due to political faction fights. The full nature and effect of these are not yet apparent.
 - c. For the past four days I have been at Huong-Hoa District Headquarters with the Deputy Province Chief. Constant agent reports suggest that Huong-Hoa is to be attacked soon, with a view to abducting refugees. The current activities in Huong-Hoa could better be done by the replacement of the present absentee District Chief with a more effective soldier.

(C.S.A. CONNOR)
Maj
AATTV

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CONFIDENTIAL Annexure 2 to
Annex D to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY WO2 J STEPHENS : CAM-LO DISTRICT
DEC 69

During the month of December the RF/PF have continued search operations both North of Cam-Lo river and South of Route 9. These operations average approximately two a week and include one operation heli-borne and assisted by 3/5 Mech (US).

No contact with the enemy has been made on any of these operations.

Including above operations and normal ambushes and activities within Coy & Pl AO's there have been no incidents involving contact with the enemy during the month.

MAT Team training was halted during the first two weeks of the month owing to the PF being put to strengthening defences following the withdrawal of US forces from immediate vicinity of Cam-Lo. This task has been completed and the defences, mainly in the District HQ Compound, are now much more satisfactory than previously. Training is now back to normal.

On 27 Dec the RF Company Group now in Cam-Lo District will be moved and replaced by No 3 Company Group, which includes 189 Coy (RF) whose task is security of C3 bridge in Cam-Lo District.

P.S.D.F. activity in the district is progressing. Weapon handling and firing instruction was given by members of ADV Tm during December, but much time and work are still required in this direction.

(J. STEPHENS)
WO2
AATTV

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Annexure 3 to
Annex D to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY WO2 B YOUNG - 3/1 ARVN BN
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES

Period : 25 Nov 69 to 22 Dec 69.

Area of Operations. 2nd Regt TAOR - Eastern Edge/South of DMZ.

Deployment of Bn Bn HQ plus 1 coy loc at F/Base ALPHA ONE.
1 coy at F/Base ERAVO ONE, 1 coy at F/Base
ERAVO TWO . Coys were rotated in each F/Base.

Gen Outline of Operations

Bn moved ex LAVANG by TCV to DONG-HA, then by foot to respective F/Bases. The mission of Bn was to prevent enemy infiltration from Nth of DMZ South to Village Areas South-West of AO.

Execution. During day, section and platoons patrolled AO. During night AO was saturated with section and platoon ambushes. Coys were also employed in mobile daylight roles. Two Bn (Minus) operations with Cavalry and Armoured elements were also initiated.

Results Bn KIA 62, WIA unknown, POW Nil.

Wpns captured: 8xAK47, 2xM16, 3xIMG, 2x82mm Mor, 320xrds 82mm,
105xrds 60mm.

Friendly Forces: KIA 4, WIA 8, MIA Nil.

Remarks. Most of KIA (en) were a direct result of air support. However the speed & impetus of Inf elements were the main underlying factors responsible for the overall success.

(B. YOUNG)
WO2
AATTV

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Annexure 4 to
Annex D to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

22 Dec 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY WO2 G LOGAN - 4/1 ARVN BN

Period. 22 Nov - 20 Dec

Area of Ops. 1st Regt TAOR. From FB Anne to the West and South of that FB.

Gen Outline. The Bn was deployed into the area of FB Barbara on 9 Nov and operated in that general area until 23 Nov. On 9 Nov, 3/4 coy was detached to an area SSW of LZ Nancy as security for 59 L.C. Eng (US) until 21 Nov, then they rejoined the bn on the 22 Nov. On 23 Nov the bn was redeployed to FB Anne. The Bn CP and 1 Coy remaining on Anne till the end of the op and LCP + 2 coys being used in a search and destroy role in the area South of Anne initially; then later in the area West of Davis Hill RTB 20 Dec.

Execution For the most part the op consisted of day patrols by pls & coys with area pl and squad ambushes being used by day and by night. There was one 2 coy night advance to contact which was unsuccessful because of faulty info.

Remarks The success of this op were largely the result of multiple, well sited ambushes. The en did not appear to be particularly well trained or well armed. The use of a "Chieu-Hoi" and the info received from the PWs were also instrumental in gaining kills. Marksmanship was very poor, on both sides.

Recommendations

I have spoken to the Bn Comd on poor marksmanship and as a result approx two coys wpns were zeroed. It was found that in some cases the only firing a soldier had done, other than in basic, was op firing. Some wpn sights were not adjustable due to lack of maintenance. The bn comd has been made aware of this.

Redeployment of claymore mines. One claymore per squad is carried; it has been pointed out that if a squad is going on ambush it should collect the mines off the other squads in the pl or in some cases coy to bolster that squads' fire power. When claymores were used in ambush they appeared to be well sited and effective.

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Results of Ops

Friendly

KIA : 3

WIA : 5

Enemy

KIA : 74

WIA : Unknown

PW : 4

Captured Materials

1 82mm Mor
600 82mm Ammo
1 60mm Mor
110 60mm Ammo
80 B40 rds
32 AK 47
3 LMG-RPD
1 SKS
1 CKC
1 Pistol
1 PRC 25
1 Fd Phone
20 AT Mines
1 M1 Carb.

Approx 300 lbs rice

500 Maps - mostly US (Q.T. area and Northern I Corps)

(G. LOGAN)

WO2

AATV

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Annexure 5 to
Annex D to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY WO2 R O'HARA - 4/2 ARVN BN
22 NOV - 22 DEC

1. On the 22nd and 23rd of Nov 4/2 Bn combat assaulted into the Mountains North of Ba-Long Valley onto LZ Tokyo with the HQ & 2 companies and LZ Cathy with 1 coy the 4th Coy with one Battery of Arty was positioned the day before an LZ Cindy.

The operation was a search and destroy mission, however due to poor weather and bad resupply, time was wasted.

During the operation the Bn lost 4 KIA and 5 WIA by suspected mines and booby trap M26 grenades. It is thought that the booby traps were laid by a previous ARVN Bn (?).

2. On the 5th of December the bn was combat assaulted into an area West of Camp Carrol; Bn HQ & two coys into LZ Scotch, Light CP and two coys LZ Winchester. The bn then moved on a parallel axis East toward Highway 9. During this operation the bn had negative contact.

3. 11 - 17 Dec the bn was regimental reserve at Dong-Ha.

4. 17 Dec Bn HQ and two coys moved to FSB-A2, Light CP and two coys moved to FSB-C1.

5. 19 - 20 Dec Bn conducted a joint op with 7ARVN Cav West of A2 - negative contact.

6. 22nd Dec Bn preparing for a bn operation at time of this report being written. It is to be a joint operation with 7 ARVN Cav, 3/1 ARVN and 4/2 ARVN.

7. Bn Operations. Three were conducted during the last month over a period of 21 days.

8. Bn Weak Points. Sub unit commanders are not given the freedom that they need in controlling their particular sub unit. This seems to be from the top to the bottom of the chain of command. It is hard to convince them to split into smaller than platoon size. Movement at times is much too fast therefore likely enemy locs are not searched.

The resupply system is poor as much as 2 days in some cases out of 5 is wasted waiting for resupply.

(RA O'HARA)
WO2
AATTV

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Annexure 6 to
Annex D to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

HUE
25 Dec 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY MAJ G.V. BROWN : SENIOR ADVISER
NAM-HOA DISTRICT : 23 NOV - 25 DEC 69

Introduction

1. As no major matters regarding other AATTV members in Thua-Thien Province have come to my attention, this report deals with Nam-Hoa District only.
2. Despite the low level of enemy activity in the District the period has been a busy one for the District Advisory Team with domestic team problems, liaison problems, training and general military and civil affairs problems. This has involved the Australians (DSA and DDSA) in a lot of work, a large proportion of which has devolved on the DDSA during my absence on R and R leave.
3. A summary of the scope of work of a District Advisory Team is included in this report.

Enemy Activity

4. Enemy activity in the whole district has been extremely light, most of the contacts being made by 3 ARVN Regt and the Hac Bao (Black Panther Coy). In the District Chief's AO the activity has been limited to rice gathering, propaganda and reconnaissance patrols of two to seven men. No contact has been made by either US or District forces in the District Chief's AO despite an increase in friendly patrolling.
5. Four mines have been found in separate locations in the District Chief's AO. All have been recovered or blown in-site. These are the first mining incidents in over nine months. One of the mine locations was pointed out by local inhabitants.

Friendly Activity

6. Four one-day operations were carried out by RF/PF. In addition there has been an increase in clearing patrol activity. The RF/PF are still reluctant to conduct other than local standing patrols by night. At least one RF platoon, however, has been continuously on joint medium range patrol with US troops in the period and the range of this patrolling is increasing. One

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half-squad of PF is under operational control of a US platoon all the time and conducts short range day and night patrolling with the US troops.

7. One joint operation involving an RF platoon, US platoon and CAP from the next district took place in the populated area. This was a failure due to poor coordination. The lesson re-learned was that there is no safe short-cut to the classic principles of joint planning, joint orders and joint control, a simple plan and clear command relationships.

Training


8. 101 (Abn) Div and Sector HQ have instituted a scheme to up-grade territorial forces in the sector. In general, the means employed are a number of mobile training teams and an increase in emphasis on joint US/RF/PF operations. The organisation of a training team is :

- 1 Officer or E7
- 2 NCOs
- 2 Enlisted men
- 1 Radio operator
- 1 Medical assistant
- 1 Kit Carson Scout


9. No training teams have been deployed to Nam-Hoa. In this district, one RF platoon at a time goes out on five-day patrols with a US platoon (ie they stay out for the full five days); one US platoon is co-located at a hamlet with a PF platoon; one PF half-squad is under operational control of the US platoon providing the POHL Bridge garrison. The US platoons involved are from the one company. In the new year it is intended to co-locate the US and RF company headquarters. The present and planned deployments are shown diagrammatically below:

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a. Present Deployment



b. Proposed Future Deployment



Personnel

10. The performance of the District Advisory Team is severely limited by the quality of men in the US component. Most of them are poorly trained except in narrow fields (often inapplicable to their posting (eg the radio-operator is a mortar number and the hamlet security NCO is a transport NCO). Two of them are illiterate to the stage where one has difficulty in reading messages they have logged. Their all-arms training is of a poor standard. The NCO's lack initiative and drive and are incapable of accepting responsibility. Both the officer and the NCOs are little used to accepting or imposing discipline. From my observations, however, no better material is available and these comments therefore are not intended as a complaint but merely to describe the state of the team.

11. A further personnel problem is that one of the two interpreters posted to the team is a civilian who is present for only 48 hours per week. There is a limit to the number of hours one can work the ARVN interpreter although naturally most of the arduous tasks fall to him. This in turn limits the efficiency of the team as frequently an interpreter is not available for all the tasks requiring an interpreter.

Scope of District Advisory Team Activities

12. Having been a District Senior Adviser for six months, I think it worthwhile to describe the scope of the activities performed by (or expected of) a district team. The width of scope may give some indication of the volume of work involved and the flexibility of approach required. Once again, these comments are offered neither as a complaint nor as an excuse but to describe actual conditions. In the light of the personnel problems described above, however, it can be seen that an inequitable proportion of the work and responsibility devolves on the DSA, DDSA and, to a lesser extent, on the DIOCC officer.

13. From the advisory standpoint, the team has to satisfy both the military and the CORDS branches of the Province Advisory Team, together with attached units. In addition, the DSA is responsible to the CO AATTV for executing his advisory policy. A lot of liaison is involved with US units and HQs in the area. Currently there are two US battalions in the District Chief's area of interest which involve liaison often down to platoon level. Other liaison is involved with Brigade, Divisional, and Corps HQ's.

14. In Nam-Hoa the DSA is also Senior Australian Officer in Thua-Thien Province.

15. The district team also has to maintain itself administratively.

16. Tasks in Detail

a. Advisory Tasks. The team is responsible for advice on all aspects of district administration, including both military and

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civil affairs : implementation of the current Pacification and Development Plan; elections, civic action; rice collection; food control; improvements to the economy; population control; civil government at district, village and hamlet level; RD cadres, education; public health; medical services and so on; operational planning and control, staff work, and execution; training of RF/PF and PSDF; defensive works and equipment inspections and control. These involve frequent lengthy conferences, lectures and briefings (in Dec the DSA and DDSA spent at least 18 man-hours on briefings at Province Advisory Staff HQ alone). Several lengthy reports are involved including the monthly HES (two types) Report, TFES Report, Civic Action and "Province" Reports. In addition reports are frequently called for on such things as the price of riceland, distribution of arable land by crops and so on. There are several lengthy Phoenix reports to compile. In addition the DSA is frequently required to attend long and often tedious official and social engagements at Vietnamese functions.

b. Liaison Tasks. More time is spent on this than on any other task. One man is continuously employed manning two outstations on two radio nets. Frequently another radio is used. Liaison tasks include : artillery clearances, planning and controlling fire support; medevacs; medcaps; civic action food distribution; concert parties; psyops; scrounging of stores for Vietnamese (in accordance with Province policy and direction); civilian population control (eg. civilians in unauthorized areas or with insufficient or incorrect identification); road and bridge works; military operations; traffic control; preliminary investigation into such things as short artillery rounds, property damage, alleged rape, prostitution; narcotics and other racketeering and so on. On top of this there are briefings and conferences with numerous visitors. The visits usually became more numerous at periods of peak activity. On one day I counted fifteen visitors not below the rank of full-colonel and on another the team consumed 13 pots of coffee before 10 am on entertaining visitors; such instances are not uncommon.

c. AATTV Tasks. The DSA is responsible to the CO AATTV through the Senior Australian Adviser I Corps for the conduct of the Australian advisors in Thua-Thien Province. This frequently involves visits by Australian and Commonwealth military and civilian VIPs and consequent liaison with the advisory staff of 1 ARVN Div and Province HQ. The DSA also submits this monthly report to the CO AATTV. While these tasks are not onerous they are frequently time consuming bearing in mind the travelling time involved between Nam-Hoa and Hue City.

d. Administrative Tasks. After liaison tasks, administrative tasks are the next most time-consuming, taking about 40 percent of the available effort. Included are:

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- (1) New Works. Works to improve the scale and standard of accommodation and defensive works of the team. Very little stores support is available from MACV sources so a lot of time is spent scrounging for materials.
- (2) Recurring Maintenance. Recurring maintenance of accommodation, electrical and water reticulation, again largely using scrounged stores.
- (3) Routine Maintenance. Routine maintenance and repair of vehicles, radio equipment, generators and weapons again using scrounged parts and technical assistance to a large degree.
- (4) Daily Maintenance. Water pumping and purification, generator operation. POL and ammunition resupply, mail and food.
- (5) Team Training. Weapon handling and zeroing, alert and escape and evasion practice, range practices. This is a constant commitment in view of the large turn-over of personnel and the attachments we have from time to time.

Quality of Work

17. In view of the volume and diversity of work involved, the personnel problems and the immediate and pressing nature of liaison tasks and daily maintenance it is inevitable that advisory duties and less pressing administrative tasks are often pushed into the background. The end result is that it is difficult from the time point of view to perform any task satisfactorily, particularly the advisory ones. Even when advice is given (and taken) it is often impossible to take the necessary follow-up action.

Sector HQ

18. After six months of inadequate direction, supervision and support the district team is now suffering a surfeit of all but the last, although that has increased also. The CO AATTV is no doubt aware of this following his recent visit so I will not elaborate except to say that the pressure is continuing.

(G.V. BROWN)
Maj
AATTV

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Annexure 7 to
Annex D to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

25 Dec 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY CAPT W SHEPPARD - 1/51 ARVN BN
DEC 69

1. General

During the month of December this unit maintained operational bases at "Dodge City" (BT 992578) and "Gonoi Island" (BT 036546), and patrolled in the immediate vicinity of each base. The battalion has occupied these bases since 22 Nov 69 and is scheduled to remain here till mid Feb 70. Bn HQ, HQ Coy and two Rifle Coys are at Dodge City whilst the remaining two Rifle Coys are stationed on Gonoi Island. Our Advisory Team of four is divided to provide two advisers at each base.

2. Statistics

- a. Enemy - Nil
- b. Own - 5 WIA. All by mines or booby-traps.

Unit Activities

3. Our AO is small and is bounded on all sides by USMC and ROK MC units. It is patrolled daily by at least coy-sized patrols. At night three platoon outposts are manned, as well as 7-9 squad ambushes within 1000 metres around the two bases.

4. When not patrolling the unit is engaged in repairing and building up defence works weakened by the rains; cultivating gardens to supplement their rations, and training.

Marksmanship

5. Accuracy in shooting seems to be non-existent. In one day of patrolling we had nine contacts with small groups of VC, including a 5-man team completely surprised whilst digging a bunker. Many rounds were expended but there was nothing to show for it : not even a blood-trail.

6. For over a month now I have been advising the CO to conduct live firing practices. He is finally taking steps in that direction. Ammunition has been requested for training and pending its arrival lectures are being conducted on weapon handling and firing positions. I have been attending these lectures and intend to take an active part in the live firing practices once they commence.

CONFIDENTIAL (W. SHEPPARD)
Capt
AATTV

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Annexure 8 to
Annex D to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

Hoa-Vang
26 Dec 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY WO2 V HARRIS : HOA VANG DISTRICT
DEC 69

Operations

1. No large scale operations were used against the VC, only the normal platoon patrolling and ambushing ops directed by District HQ were concentrated on elimination of VCI and the rounding up of draft dodgers, deserters, etc. The anti-prostitution campaign has run its course and more pressure is being brought to bear on VCI.

2. Two large cordon and search ops in conjunction with the US Marines were carried out. Unfortunately the second attempt was worse than the first. Because the first went off with a fair degree of success, the Viets must have decided they were proficient and so they went slapdash into the second op. Anyway the first netted VCI and assorted draft dodgers, deserters, prostitutes. The second op brought in 16 suspects who are still being investigated.

3. The S3 and his staff are showing more imagination in carrying out their police-type raids. Info and intel is collected and a house or area targeted. A squad of PF and a few police move out at a moments notice and swoop in the dead of night. These, naturally have more success than several PF platoons, police, Q.C's and NFFF lumbering around in daylight.

Training

4. Each platoon has 2 or 3 men training either at Hoa-Cam Training Centre or at District HQ at any one time. In addition, 4 PF platoons and some RF personnel are put through a combined Motivation Indoctrination and Rural Development course of 11 days, each month.

5. I'm dubious about the necessity for all this M1 and RD training. The RF and PF also got a lot of similiar stuff in other training sessions at District and during in place training. But before all this good stuff can be put into effect, the VC guerilla must be eliminated or driven out of the villages, and to do this, the soldier requires basic military skills.

6. The Marines are pulling out of several locations in the district and turning over the responsibility of the defences to the PF. They require heavier weapons for jobs such as bridge defence so we have procured some M60s from Marine sources. The MAT team was assigned the task of training the PF on the M60s but, in fact, they did not require training, being fairly proficient.

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Generally the PF can look after and handle his weapons fairly well. But he is still a lousy shot!

Administration

7. Shortages occur in some items. Notably M79 rounds and M26 grenades in the ammo line and packs, ponchos in clothing and equipment. I don't think the fault is at district. The supply requests go back to Hoi-An. Whether the bottleneck is at Hoi-An or further back, I haven't been able to determine. But all in all their system seems to work. They don't have critical shortages of essentials - just constant shortages of basics.

(V.L. HARRIS)

WO2

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Annex 'E' to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

Pleiku
19 Dec 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY CAPT D.F. PAUL ON BEN-HET OPERATION
BY 2ND BATTALION 2 MSF - 29 NOV-19 DEC

Intelligence

1. Int Reports made available from the "C" Team by the Battalion Commander listed all the contacts in the Ben-Het AO for the month of November. Apart from a two company NVA probe on the Ben-Het A Camp, all reported contacts were insignificant. This and the sensor readings around Ben-Het indicated that the enemy threat in the Ben-Het AO was slight. Recon Coy 2 MSF also spent 21 days in our specific AO without contact or signs of the enemy.

AO Change

2. On arrival at Ben Het A Camp on 29 Nov our AO was changed to an area adjacent the Tri Borders of Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. C & C info suggested battlefield preparations and build up by NVA South West of Ben Het, presumably Cambodia. The new AO was bounded by the Laos and Cambodian Borders on the West, 7527, 8027, 7521 & 8021.

Mission

3. Recce in Force.

Aust Advisers 223 Coy

4. Coy Comd : Capt DF Paul
1 Pl : WO2 G. Jamieson
2 Pl : " A. McCloskey
3 Pl : " A. Williams

Movement Ben-Het Area

5. Movement to and from Ben-Het from Pleiku was by road convoy. The convoys were well conducted. Cav units secured the route between Dak-To and Pleiku.

Summary

6. The 21 day operation resulted in no contact being made with the NVA or VC. No recent signs of enemy movement through the AO were detected.

Daily Summary

7. A Daily Summary of the operation is attached.

(D.F. PAUL)

Capt AATTV

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Attachment to
Annex E to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

DAILY SUMMARY

- 29 Nov : Road convoy. Remained vicinity of Ben-Het overnight.
- 30 Nov : Moved as a Bn to hill 763 (833251)
- 1 Dec : Moved as a Bn to hill 990 (815277)
- 2 Dec : Moved as a Bn to 801254. Local patrols & LZ preparation.
- 3 Dec : 1800 hrs resupply complete. No change in location
- 4 Dec : Moved as a Bn to 791259. Local patrols.
- 5 Dec : Moved as a Bn to hill 947 (777244)
- 6 Dec : 222 Coy moved separately to 781238. 221 & 223 Coys moved to 775238.
- 7 Dec : Each coy moved separately. 221 - 757257; 222 - 771249; 223 - 761258.
- 8 Dec : 223 Coy ordered to build LZ & accept C&C Patrol. Patrol arrived 1700 hrs, no change in location. 221 Coy closed on 223 Coy. 222 Coy moved to 773257.
- 9 Dec : 222 Coy moved separately to 766234. 221 & 223 Coys moved to 759234. LZ Prep.
- 10 Dec : 222 Coy closed on LZ. 1800 hrs resupply complete. No change in location.
- 11 Dec : Each coy moved separately. 221 - 756215; 222 - 767218; 223 - 761266.
- * 12 Dec **: Each coy moved separately. 221 - 761205; 222 - 763206; 223 - 768214.
- 13 Dec : 223 Coy moved separately to 776206. 221 & 222 Coys moved to 766200.
- 14 Dec : Each Coy moved separately. 221 - 787189; 222 - 779196; 223 - 782204.
- 15 Dec : 221 & 222 Coys moved to 794203. 223 Coy no change in location, awaiting medevac.
- 16 Dec : 221 & 222 Coys held position because of 223 Coy mission to hold location & LZ for C&C patrol. 1600 hrs permission given to abandon mission and 223 Coy moved to 787207. (2 Pl 223 Coy was in ambush at 788201 from 141400 hrs until 170730 hrs)
- 17 Dec : Bn RV and moved to Hill 742 (814220)
- 18 Dec : Bn forced march to Ben Het by 1200 hrs.
- ** AO EXTENDED TO THE SOUTH BY 3000 METRES

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Annex 'F' to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

Saigon
15 Dec 69

CO AATTV

FINAL REPORT BY CAPT W DEANE - MMTT
DEC 69

1. On 21 Nov I flew Saigon/Nha-Trang and after sending the MMTT on leave returned to Saigon with WO2 Jamieson on 24 Nov.
2. On 25 Nov I went to Vung-Tau to arrange details of the impending MMTT visit, and on 30 Nov/1 Dec returned to Nha-Trang via Saigon.
3. On 4 Dec I flew with MMTT directly from Nha-Trang to Vung-Tau and settled the team into SATC.
4. The first few days at SATC were spent in planning the syllabus for the Montagnard course and allocating a specific number of lectures, demonstrations and practical exercises to each subject. From thence forward until I left the PRU programme on 15 Dec, instructors were busy making out new lesson plans, hand-outs, etc. The best that can be said is that they all now know clearly what is expected of them but there is a danger that, unless closely supervised, they will slip into their previous bad habits, particularly now that they will be influenced by the regular SATC instructors.
5. Due to bad feeling between Maj Lang DGNP and Maj Hiep C/SATC, and a subsequent breakdown in communication between them, DGNP have decided to;
 - a. Close down SATC at the end of the January course
 - b. Carry on training by means of Mobile Training Teams in each CTZ.
 - c. Conduct the Montagnard course at an old Truong-Son Training Centre at Pleiku.

The above information has been restricted to DGNP and the SATC advisers.

General Impressions of PRU Programme

6. If the four provinces in which I have seen PRU and Phoenix operating (Kontum, Pleiku, Darlac, Quang-Duc) are typical of the whole

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country, then the effectiveness of the PRU programme at least in these provinces has not justified the expense and effort put into it. However, ignoring the lack of success in achieving the aim of the programme in these areas, an important side-benefit accruing to the US Agent may be that they now have a much clearer idea of SVN's ability and inclination to resist VC activity away from the battlefields. There appears to be a marked lack of commitment to the Allied cause amongst the population, chiefly manifest in the paucity of information on VCI activity and the very low level of VCI captured, so low in fact that few of them can be classified as VCI.

7. Although the thinking which led to the PRU and Phoenix programmes is probably quite sound in theory, practical success can only be achieved by drive at the Province level and at least some enthusiastic co-operation at village and hamlet level. Generally speaking, neither of these two factors have been apparent to me in my tour in II CTZ. There are a number of reasons contributing to this, some of them outside our control. However, two deficiencies that could have been corrected are;

- a. The policy of moving PRU advisers between units at frequent intervals, and
- b. Lack of control by the adviser over the PRU, either because the adviser was not up to the mark or the unit was too big. It was noticed at Pleiku and Darlac, that in spite of a unit strength of about 80, the same people were used over and over again for operations. This probably would do little for morale, and blunt the enthusiasm of the willing and brighter assets who could see the same people hanging around the compound during operations, drawing pay and avoiding danger. For smaller units, with everyone kept busy all the time, would I feel have given assets a higher motivation.

(W.R. DEANE)
Capt
AATTV

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Annex 'G' to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

CO AATTV

REPORT BY WO1 A. OSTARA - PRU ADVISER
BINH-DINH PROVINCE - NOVEMBER 69

I. Personnel

A. 73 TOTAL Strength, end of last month
B. Nil KIA Nil WIA (not included in totals)
C. Nil MIA/POW
D. Nil Deserted
E. 1 Other losses (Discharged)
F. 1 Total losses
(72) Sub Total
G. Nil Gains
H. 72 TOTAL Strength, end of current month.

II. Operations

A. 110 Intelligence operations
B. 18 PRU operations against VC/VCI
C. 3 PRU/Joint operations against VC/VCI
D. 21 Total anti VC/VCI operations
E. Nil Operations in support of military forces
F. 131 Total operations

III. RESULTS

A. 33 VC/VCI captured (Annex A)
B. Nil Suspects captured (Annex B)
C. 1 VC/VCI killed (Annex B)
D. 39 Intelligence reports disseminated

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IV. Finances

- A. 455,200 Total PRU Payroll
- B. 26,715 Operation expenses
- C. Nil Other expenses
- D. 481,915 TOTAL PRU expenses

V. Narrative

1. Situation/Operations

- a. The continued lull in enemy initiated activity is still having an adverse effect on all District Staff. (See Oct report)
- b. During the latter part of Oct. I visited Phu-My District with the object of deploying a PRU team there for the month of Nov.
- c. I was given the assurance by the District Senior Advisers, both Military and Civilian and also by the DIOC Officer that they were eager to have PRU work in the District and would co-operate with us in every way.
- d. A similar assurance was given to the PRU Chief by the District Chief and the DIOC Officer on the Vietnamese side of the shop.
- e. The first mission given the PRU was a cordon and search with an RF Coy due to move out at 0800 hrs on the 3rd Nov. At 1200 hrs no RF Coy had shown up and nothing was known of them so PRU moved back to the Police Station. This was the first of a constant stream of poor administration and lack of planning and the misuse of the PRU Unit in the District.
- f. The PRU were given many missions against VC/NVA Coys which they would not accept but nothing against VCI from the DIOC. When clearance for operations against VCI was requested by PRU wanting to act on their own information, excuses such as "That area is the 22nd ARVN AO" or another RF operation is to be conducted in that area" were used to block PRU from operating.
- g. Meetings were held with District Officers but it was not until the final few days of the month that PRU moved out on operations and this was only a cordon and search type operation which resulted in nothing of value.
- h. These things combined with a Unit Leader (Pham-Dinh-Dan) who wants only half an excuse not to operate in wet weather gave the Phu-My team a very poor result for Nov.

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- j. The team has been withdrawn from Phu-My and the Unit Leader changed.
- k. A combined operation is being conducted in the Phu-Cat District under the direction of Capt Sang, who has under his command, RF PF PD PFF and PRU.
- l. The main mission of the operation is to pacify Cat-Thanh Village and PRU have the task of capturing the VCI. Results have been poor for obvious reasons VCI with half a brain have left the village.
- m. The Phu-Cat DIOC Officer is very keen and wants to see PRU do a good job and get a good result but the targets are just not there.
- n. Wet weather has had an adverse effect on all operations.
2. Targeting. Again this month the lack of targets was mentioned at the Phoenix Monthly Meeting and the Phoenix Co-ordinator (Maj Roberts) again stressed the need for DIOC's to feed targets to PRU but I feel that the result will be the same. A new Phoenix Co-ordinator is now in Binh-Dinh and it is to be hoped that Phoenix will improve.
3. Reporting. The need for a quick report on any action is still something that I cannot seem to instil into Unit/Team leaders. Reports lag days behind the action and cause no end of worry. I remain hopeful.
4. Discipline. During the first week of the month the mother of the PRU Chief became seriously ill and was taken to hospital where she subsequently died on the 8th of Nov. The PRU Chief was on leave and the Unit leaders were asked to control their own Units. Their efforts were deplorable as the results show. Three of them have now been replaced, (Pham-Dinh-Dan, Trinh-Van-Vinh, Nguyen-Thuan) and a better result is expected of their successors.
4. Administration. The "New" compound remains the same as the day we took it over.

(A. OSTARA)
WO1
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Annex 'H' to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

REPORT BY WO2 RG CARTER - PRU ADVISER
TUYEN-DUC PROVINCE - NOVEMBER 69

I. Personnel

- A. 78 TOTAL Strength, end of last month
- B. 00 KIA 00 WIA (not included in totals)
- C. 00 MIA/POW
- D. 01 Deserted
- E. 00 Other losses
- F. 01 Total losses
(77) Sub-total
- G. 5 Gains
- H. 82 TOTAL Strength, end of current month

II. Operations

- A. 23 Intelligence operations
- B. 16 PRU operations against VC/VCI
- C. 74 PRU/Joint operation against VC/VCI
- D. 90 Total anti-VC/VCI operations
- E. 00 Operations in support of military forces
- F. 113 TOTAL operations

III. Results

- A. 04 VC/VCI captured (Annex A)
- B. 19 Suspects captured (Annex A)
- C. 03 VC/VCI killed (Annex B)
- D. 23 Intelligence reports disseminated

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IV. Finances

- A. 525,700,00 Total PRU Payroll
- B. 5,060,00 Operational expense
- C. Nil Other expenses
- D. 530,760,00 TOTAL PRU expenses

V. Narrative

Attached (page 3)

VI. Highlights

Attached (Attachments 1 to 4)

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NARRATIVE

Nov 69

1. As mentioned in earlier narratives the PRU have been conducting joint ambush operations in Dalat City with the PSB. However it was felt that the ambushes were not being planned well enough and were not being set against Known Targets on specific intelligence. On the 1st of Nov the PRU Chief had a meeting with the PSB Chief and it was decided that ambushes would only be used if the above conditions could be met. On the night of the 3rd of Nov an ambush was set in Nam-Thien Hamlet (EP 199203) under the new system. Results of the ambush were as follows:

Enemy : KLa 3 Captured 2 AK47s, 1 B41, 5 AK Mags, 3 B41 rockets and 4 grenades.

Friendly : No Casualties.

2. From the 10th to the 13th of Nov Bob Sell a medical specialist was in province to discuss any medical problems, training of medics and to check hospital and sick call facilities for PRU members. This visit was considered to be very helpfull to the PRU adviser and did a lot to straighten out some minor medical problems.

3. On the 10th of November a Commo Liaison NCO visited the Province for two days. During this time he checked all PRU Radio equipment and spoke with the head PRU RTO. No problems were encountered during this visit and the NCO stated that the equipment was in good repair and was being maintained correctly.

4. Saturday the 22nd of November the PRU were inspected by the PRU Directorate from Saigon. The inspection party consisted of three Vietnamese and two US. Results of the inspection were very good. One comment was to the effect that Tuyen-Duc was one of the few Provinces working exactly as the PRU should.

5. 35 PRU are now in training at SATC and will be in training until the 22 Nov. With the large number of PRU absent from the Province, it was thought that results would suffer. However results have been quite pleasing. This can only be the result of much better intelligence and targeting. The PRU are making up an organisation of all the known VCI in the Province and from this they will make up a dossier on each VCI. This will give the PRU much more and better targets than they have at the present time.

6. Relations with the Province Officials continues to be good.

(R.G. CARTER)
WO2
AATTV

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CONFIDENTIAL Attachment 1 to
Annex H to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

PRU Tuyen-Duc
25 Oct 69

HIGHLIGHT

On the 21 Oct a meeting was held at the NP Chief's office and was attended by the following persons : NP Chief, NP Adviser, POIC, PSE Chief, PSB adviser, two NPPF Company Commanders, PRU Chief and the PRU adviser.

Purpose of the meeting was to discuss how the units mentioned above could start working more closely together. Some of the points put forward were:

1. The NP Chief said that he would like to see the PRU and the NPPF conduct, where over possible, joint operations. He also said that a weekly meeting could be held to review intell reports and to conduct a critique on past operations.
2. The POIC spoke on intelligence and assured the meeting that he would make all efforts to ensure close co-operation between these present.
3. The PRU adviser suggested that a list of the most active VCI in the province be drawn up and all units be directed towards getting information on them so that when an arrest is made a jail sentence would be assured. This was met with approval.
4. The PRU Chief brought up the point of the Province Chief or someone delegated by him having to sign mission orders before the PRU could go on operations. The NP Chief said he was aware of this and that he was getting written authority to use the PRU on joint operations.

It was felt by those that attended the meeting that only good can come of it.

(R.G. CARTER)
WO2
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Attachment 2 to
Annex H to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

PRU Tuyen-Duc

Nov 69

HIGHLIGHTS

1. On the night of the 3 Nov a combined PRU and PSB force consisting of two PRU and three PSB members, set an ambush in Nam-Thien Hamlet (199203) Dalat City. At about 2330 hrs between thirty and forty VC infiltrated to the hamlet and fired a number of RPG 7 (B41) rounds at a house located about two hundred meters from the ambush site. The VC then proceeded to the ambush site (see sketch) and started to pass thru it, at this time the PRU and PSB members detonated four Claymore mines resulting in the following :

3 VC KIA One of these was identified as a Medical Cadre

Captured: 1 RPG 7 and three rockets
2 AK 47s and 5 magazines
4 Hand grenades of local manufacture

In addition at least two more VC were wounded or killed, this has been confirmed by local residents and by the fact of a blood trail which was followed to a distance of one thousand meters, before being lost. The PRU adviser has seen the site of the ambush and the blood trails.

2. The above operation is considered a significant one for two reasons, first, the combined nightly ambushes with the PSB mentioned in earlier reports were not having much success, so the PRU Chief had a meeting with the PSB Chief and suggested that ambushes were not being professional enough and that more and better intelligence should be gathered before setting ambushes. This new plan had only been in effect for two nights. Secondly the size of the ambush party in relation to the size of the VC force and the results that were achieved now has proved that with the use of Claymore mines a very small force can successfully ambush a much larger force with safety.

(R.G. CARTER)
WO2
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Attachment 3 to
Annex H to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

HIGHLIGHTS

1. On the 11th of November the PRU combined with the PSB and Phung-Hoang to conduct a capture operation in Dinh-An Hamlet (EP 235130) Duc-Trong District. Results of the operation were as follows:

Captured : 1. Nguyen-Thuc-De
2. Nguyen-Thuc-Bieu
3. Nguyen-Thi-Dan

2. According to information collected on De he is a PRP member at hamlet and quiet possibly District level. For some two weeks before the operation a dossier was made on De and a surprising amount of information collected, some of it dating back to 1966. When De's dossier was shown to the Province Chief he had no hesitation in signing the mission order for De's arrest and that of other suspects in Dinh-An Hamlet.

3. The operation was requested and conducted by the PRU Chief.

(R.G. CARTER)
WO2
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Attachment 4 to
Annex H to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

HIGHLIGHTS

PRU Tuyen-Duc
18 Oct 69

ABDUCTION OF A PRU MEMBER REPORT FOLLOWS:

Due to mechanical trouble with the evening flight of Air Vietnam on the 14 Oct the flight was cancelled. At 1725 hrs the Air Vietnam bus departed Lien-Khuong airfield to return passengers to Dalat.

On the trip back to Dalat at 1825 hrs the bus was stopped at K Long A hamlet (BP 217067) by an estimated thirty VC. The VC were dressed in assorted clothing and were armed with AK 47s, B40s and K54s.

According to the passengers the VC asked if there were any soldiers among them. After asking the above question several times and promising that no harm would come to anyone who was a soldier, one man admitted that he was an Aspirant in the ARVN. The VC took him away for about ten minutes then returned with him to the bus and said to the other passengers "See no harm will come to those who admit to being a soldier, step out now and you will be spared". At this a Chinese named Tiet-An who is a PRU member stepped forward. Before doing so however Tiet-An slipped his PRU ID Card, Service Certificate and Leave Permission Form to another passenger sitting along side of him. These have since been collected and are now at PRU headquarters.

The VC took the Aspirant and Tiet-An with them when they finally departed at 2130 hrs. In addition to abducting the two persons above they (VC) also took most of the passengers baggage and stole the drivers old ID card, drivers license and the sum of 4,000 piastres. The VC were thought to have gone in the direction of VCI mountain. (BP 189071) At 2230 hrs an ARVN unit appeared and escorted the bus back to Lien-Khuong airfield.

Advisers Comment: It is felt that Tien-An whose position in the PRU is that of a guard, will pass himself off as an ARVN and keep his identity as a PRU a secret. Because he (Tiet-An) is a Chinese and speaks little Vietnamese, he could very well get away with it. However measures have been taken to change the defences at the PRU compound ie change round of automatic weapons, relocation of some guard stations etc. I have also advised the PRU Chief not to give too much publicity to Tiet-An's capture as it could get back to the VC.

(R.G. CARTER)
WO2
AATTV

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Annex I to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

REPORT BY WO2 OSBORN - RDC ADVISER PHUOC-TUY ON RDC AND PSDF - DEC 69

RD Cadre

1. Incidents

- a. At 2300 hrs 27 Nov 69 a listening post set by PT 4 in An-Nghi Village contacted an estimated VC squad infiltrating into the village after the exchange of SA fire the VC withdrew.
- b. At 0130 hrs 28 Nov 69 PT 4 at An-Nhut village were fired on by a group of VC with no results.
- c. At 2200 hrs 28 Nov 69 a small ambush from PT 5 in An-Nghi village fired on a VC group, en returned fire then withdrew.
 1. An inspection of the site early on the 29 Nov revealed some blood trails.
- d. At 0005 hrs 11 Dec 69 PT 4 in An-Binh Hamlet received into their area 2 rifle grenades and SA fire, there were no cas.
- e. At 0025 hrs 11 Dec 69 PT 5 in An-Phuoc Hamlet received 2 x B40 rockets the group returned fire, there were no cas.
- f. At 0230 hrs 11 Dec 69 PT 9 in Hoa-Hiep Hamlet received 3 x B40 rockets and small arms fire, there were no cas.

2. Activities

- a. All teams are working very well on all tasks allocated them by Village/Hamlet officials.
- b. All teams have minor civic action projects of their own, ie, building and repairing houses for the needy in the hamlets, teaching young children how to read and write also conducting propaganda meetings etc.

3. Visits

All teams in Phuoc-Tuy Province have been visited at least 3 times during reporting period.

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4. Training

A course of 4 days duration 16 - 19 Dec 69, in Political Indoctrination was conducted by the mobile training staff, who have recently attended a course in Saigon on this subject. The course was attended by all team and deputy team leaders.

This course was very well planned and conducted.

5. Morale

Morale of all members in Province remain high.

6. Desertions

During the period Oct-Dec 69 there have been 3 desertions from the RD Cadre in Province.

PSDF

1. Incidents

During reporting period there have been no incidents against PSDF.

2. Training

a. Training in all districts is continuing, with an emphasis on the training of combat members.

b. A course for PSDF group leaders was conducted 15-19 Dec 69. There were 54 members who attended this course. The standard of instruction during the course was very good.

3. Visits

a. All hamlets have been visited at least once by either the Province PSDF Chief, Province PSDF adviser or District PSDF advisers.

b. An inspection team from the PSDF Directorate Saigon visited the Districts of Long-Le and Long-Dien.

4. Strengths

The strength of PSDF in Phuoc-Tuy as of 25 Dec 69 is as follows:

<u>ORGANISED</u>	<u>TRAINED</u>		<u>WEAPONS ISSUED</u>
	<u>Combat</u>	<u>Support</u>	
32,161	7,556	13,347	3,210 *

* Note: Last month weapons issued showed 3,216, since last report 6 weapons have been withdrawn for repairs.

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SUMMARY

1. It has been noticed that training of PSDF has increased a great deal, due I think to pressure being applied by Province and District Chiefs.
2. The support for the RD Cadre has shown a big improvement during the last month. This has been specially noticed in villages/hamlets where MATS teams have been deployed.
3. There has been 6 minor incidents aimed at the RD Cadre this month; an increase of 4 from last month. It has been noticed that there has been no incidents involving the PSDF this month.
4. All round there has been a big improvement in support of the RD Cadre and training of the PSDF in the Province during this reporting period.

(L.D. OSBORN)
WO2
AATTV

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Annex 'J' to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

Can-Tho
26 Dec 69

CO AATTV

EXTRACTS FROM REPORT BY MAJ A. HARKNESS
IV CTZ - DEC 69

General

1. Enemy activity continued at a moderate level as the VC Winter Offensive entered into its second phase. Military Region 2 (MR2) continued to be the area of greatest activity. Within MR2, Chau-Doc Province suffered the greatest number of enemy-initiated incidents. The enemy continues to impose a strong and increasing threat in this area. Latest intelligence indicates a strong probability of a second NVA Regiment (101D) being infiltrated into the Seven Mountains to join the resident 18B Regiment.
2. The most significant enemy-initiated incident occurred in Kien-Tuong Province on 3 December when an estimated 600 NVA, believed to be 88 NVA Regiment, attacked Tuyen Binh District town after staging for the action in Cambodia. A quick reaction by friendly troops and extensive use of air assets resulted in a decisive victory over the NVA force. The ground attack, which was preceded by a heavy mortar and rocket barrage of some 400 rounds was turned back with heavy enemy losses.
3. Elements of 9 ARVN Division are now operating in Dinh-Tuong Province following a series of successful operations in the Chuong-Thien/U Minh Forest area. Their operations in the western area of Dinh-Tuong have not been very successful in that relatively little contact has been made with the enemy. They have suffered a fair number of casualties, however, most these from booby traps.
4. Despite agent reports of a probable attack against Can-Tho city, I consider this most unlikely. At this stage, there are no main force enemy units in the area and my opinion is that any attack would be limited to harassing with indirect fire combined with sapper activity. My-Tho city is also likely to receive indirect fire and sapper attacks in the near future. It is hoped that the combined efforts of 7 and 9 ARVN Divisions will minimize that threat.
5. Chau-Doc city remains the most probable target if the enemy wishes to overrun a province capital. Contrary to some intelligence reports, I believe that the enemy will continue to consolidate in the Seven Mountains,

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dominate the surrounding population and develop his base area with a view to establishing a consolidated zone for the future. At this stage of the war, he has little to gain from temporary seizure of a province capital. His continued presence in a relatively secure area imposes the threat against Chau-Doc and is effective psywar without costing him casualties. Development of an extensive base area and control of the countryside in the vicinity will stand him in better stead for the inevitable political agreement in the future.

Village Security Planning Guide

6. The Village Security Planning Guide for district and mobile advisory teams mentioned in last month's report has been distributed.

Village Defence Advisory Teams (VDATs)

7. Evidence of top level Vietnamese recognition of the VDAT programme is shown in the message received by IV Corps RF/PF. DCG, IV Corps has also requested copies of Planning Guide for distribution through Vietnamese channels. Translations are now being prepared.

8. The VDAT programme has been fully accepted by the US advisory group in IV CFZ. This is evident in the orientation of all mobile advisory teams (MATs) towards advice on village security during 1970. The acceptance of our methods of operation should be regarded as a compliment and as a measure of our success.

(A. HARKNESS)
Maj
AATTV

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Annex 'K' to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

Chau-Thanh District

CO AATTV

REPORT OF VDAT 1 ACTIVITIES : DINH TUONG PROVINCE
PERIOD 23 NOV - 22 DEC

1. During the above period the Team consisted of the following members;
WO Smith
WO Welsh
WO Bell

Team Activities

2. Period 23 Nov to 24 Nov
 - a. The Team was visited by the CO, Lt Col Lloyd. During his visit he spent the night 23 Nov at Tan My Chanh village where he spoke to the village chief and carried out a recce of the closest hamlet.
 - b. On the morning of the 24 Nov the CO inspected a PF outpost and the PSDF positions of Binh-Duc village.
 - c. On the afternoon of 24 Nov the CO was present at a briefing of the Defense Plan for Tan My Chanh village. Present at this briefing were PF Pl Leaders, Hamlet Chiefs, Deputies for Security and PSDF Leaders. At the completion of the briefing a rehearsal of the Defence Plan was carried out. The CO then returned to Saigon by road.
3. Period 25 Nov to 27 Nov
 - a. A foot recce and drawing up the Defence Plan for Long An village.
 - b. The Defence Plan included AOs, reaction forces, enemy routes and artillery registrations overlays.
4. Period 28 Nov to 30 Nov
 - a. At the request of PSA, Col Vallery the Team lectured all MAT Team Leaders of Dinh-Tuong Province on the concept of VDAT. The Team was commended on the success of these lectures, by the PSA.
 - b. On the afternoon of 29 Nov WO Oliver marched in for a one week orientation on VDAT.

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5. 1 Dec
- a. The final rehearsal of the Defence Plan for Long-An village.
 - b. Registration of pre-planned artillery by smoke at Long-An village. During this registration the Village Chief, Hamlet Chiefs and Pl Leaders were practiced in adjusting and correcting fire.
6. Period 2 Dec to 5 Dec
- a. Preparing the Defence Plan for Trung-An village including the overlays for enemy routes, PF and PSDF AOs, reaction forces and artillery registration.
 - b. WO Welsh marched out to Can-Tho for RTA.
7. Period 6 Dec to 8 Dec
- a. WO Bell marched in to replace WO Welsh.
 - b. Briefing and orientation of WO Bell to VDAT and the Chau-Thanh district.
 - c. WO Oliver returned to Can-Tho on the pay run.
8. Period 9 Dec to 18 Dec
- a. During this period the Team completed the Defence Plans, rehearsals, overlays, registering artillery by smoke and monitoring night ambushes in the following villages;
 - (1) Binh-Duc
 - (2) Tan-My-Chanh
 - (3) Long-An
 - (4) Tan-Long
 - (5) Trung-An
 - (6) Dao-Thanh
9. Period 19 Dec to 22 Dec
- a. Preparing the overlays of enemy routes, PF and PSDF positions, reaction forces and artillery registration for the following villages;
 - (1) Toi-Son
 - (2) Phuoc-Thanh
 - (3) Thanh-Phu
 - (4) Tam-Hiep
 - (5) My-Phong

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Future Intentions

10. To complete the Defence Plans, overlays and the monitoring of night positions in the Chau Thanh district.
11. To plan a conference with the Province Chief, District Chief and all Village Chiefs to co-ordinate mutual support between villages.

General Remarks

12. Artillery registration by smoke has been proved to be of value to the villages for the following reasons;
 - a. 24 hours after registering artillery at Binh-Duc village artillery was used to disperse a VC harassment of a PF outpost.
 - b. During registration at Dao-Thanh village, one (1) VC was KIA and one (1) AK47 captured. (note; clobbered on head by smoke round)
 - c. During registration at Trung-An village intel was received that a VC Pl was in the area. Immediately registration was changed to HE and 72 rounds were fired. Blood trails were reported, but no bodies found.

Administration

13. The Team still has not received a vehicle on permanent issue, at present the Team is using a vehicle on loan from the DSA of Chau-Thanh.
14. An attempt was made by the ADS&L Coy to issue an unsatisfactory vehicle until a replacement become available. The PSA was approached and told of the situation. The PSA then directed that the current arrangement with the DSA of Chau-Thanh be continued until a new vehicle becomes available.

(R.D. SMITH)
WO2
AATTV

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Annex 'L' to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

Ham-Long District
Kien-Hoa Province

22 Dec 69

CO AATTV

REPORT OF VDAT ACTIVITIES : KIEN-HOA PROVINCE
DEC 69

1. General

A rather short month due to the move to Ham-Long on the 5th December.

2. Villages Inspected In Binh-Dai

a. Long-Than

It is regretted that this village has slipped back into some of it's old ways, although listening posts are still used.

b. Phu-Thuan

This village on inspection appeared to be adhering to the VDAT plan better than this team expected.

c. Long-Thanh

No doubt the best village Tm #2 has worked in. The VDAT plan in operation is as presented by the team with two minor modifications.

d. Binh-Dai

It is regretted that the operating time in this village was too short to gain a 100% result. However the VDAT plan is in operation in five of the seven hamlets, of the other two hamlets one does not have PSDF and the other is contested.

3. Enemy Contacts Binh-Dai

Only 2 enemy contacts, on the 2nd and 3rd of December, when the District HQ received a total of 7 rds of 82mm and 4 rds of 60mm mortar fire.

The same RF Company that was ambushed last month were ambushed again this month causing 14 KIA and 9 WIA.

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4. Villages Worked In - Ham-Long, Thanh-Trieu

The introductory phase is nearing completion, ground recces and the defence plan diagrams are completed. The plan is to be presented to the District Chief to-day.

5. Enemy Contacts - Ham-Long

Four rounds of mortar fire were received at the District HQ on the 20th December.

6. Movements and Visits

On the 20th November attended the monthly meeting in Can-Tho

On the 21st WO1 Eade left for R&R.

On the 29th WO1 Waters joined the team.

On the 4th December WO1 Eade returned from R&R.

Commanding Officer AATTV visited the team on the 6th and 7th December, owing to the move to Ham-Long at this time we were unable to show the CO the team at work.

On the 8th December WO1 Eade moved out to form new VDAT in Phong-Dinh.

(B.L. SAXBY)
WO2
Team Leader
AATTV

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Annex 'M' to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

Phong Thuan District
Phong Dinh Province

23 Dec 69

CO AATTV

REPORT OF VDAT ACTIVITIES : PHONG DINH PROVINCE
DEC 69

1. General

The team was physically formed on 8 Dec 69, with the arrival of WOs Eade and Oliver at Can-Tho from their previous assignments. The 9/10 Dec was spent in administration (interview with PSA, briefing, drawing of stores etc) and the team moved to Phong-Thuan District on the afternoon of 11 Dec. At this stage the team was without an interpreter, however Sgt Tran-Van-Chanh reported for duty on 15 Dec and to date appears to have settled in quite happily.

The period 12 - 16 Dec was spent in initial settling-in at the new location. The 'Joint Agreement' for the team was prepared and approved by the District Chief and DSA and a series of orientation trips by boats and helicopter were made throughout the District. On 17 Dec work was commenced on the first village (see details in para 2).

A certain amount of difficulty was experienced initially in obtaining team stores, due apparently to lack of prior warning to the Province Adv Tm S-4 of the formation of the team; however once the requirements were known, all possible assistance was provided by all personnel concerned.

At the District level assistance and co-operation has been of the highest level, both from the District Chief and all members of the District Adv Tm. This has eased the VDAT through many of the minor problems that tend to occur in the initial raising of a small team such as this.

One of the MAT teams in the district (MAT 101) has been transferred to Village/Hamlet Defence duties under the 1970 Pacification Plan and will commence these duties in a village in the near future. Arrangements have been made for close liaison with this team.

2. Villages worked in

a. Phu-Huu. This village has 6 hamlets, 3 of which are under VC control. The necessary initial information on the 3 GVN controlled hamlets has been obtained and the initial ground reconnaissance completed in 2 of them. The Village Chief, though appearing rather ineffectual, has proved quite co-operative to date (possibly due to

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pressure from the District Chief); whether this co-operation will extend to implementing any changes needed remains to be seen. However the hamlet committees appear keen and willing to co-operate. Reasonable defence plans already exist in the hamlets visited but it is thought that improvements can be made and these will be suggested in the execution phase.

3. Problem Areas

The only difficulty is the lack of roads in the District, caused by the network of rivers and canals, necessitating all movement between hamlets being by boat. This has been overcome thanks to the availability of the District Team's boat and the use of local sampans. Inside the hamlets the size of both team members has caused some casualties to the local 'monkey bridges' but no serious damage has occurred to either side (as yet).

4. Enemy Contacts

There have been minor contacts and sightings of the enemy almost daily in the district since the team's arrival; to date the team has had one direct contact with enemy forces on the night 22/23 Dec when a PF outpost they were staying at was harassed by an estimated enemy squad.

5. Movements and Visits

Nil.

(W.A. EADE)
WO1
AATTV

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Annex 'N' to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

TRANSLATION OF COPY
RECEIVED BY IV CTZ

MESSAGE

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TOP PRIORITY

FROM: JGS/OFFICE OF THE DEP JGS & RF/PF COMMANDER
TO: 4 CTZs (Office of the Commander, RF/PF)
INFO: Office of Chief, JGS, ARVN
Office of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
G-3, JGS
RF/PF Inspection Bloc
Sub-Sector, Sectors and Special Sectors in Country
MACCORDS

REF : JGS Memo No. 266 4/TTM/P3/BD, dtd 3 Jul 69
JGS Directive No 950-3/TTM/P3/BD, dtd 10 Nov 69

1. The JGS has been informed that a number of Australian Advisory Teams for village and hamlet defense have been formed in IV CTZ. These teams are operating effectively in villages and hamlets.
2. In order to provide security to the rural areas in accordance with the referenced documents, request that CG'S CTZ order sectors and sub-sectors:
 - a. Cooperate with Village Defense Advisory Teams (VDATs) to organize mobile teams to operate in villages and hamlets.
 - b. These teams are to assist and guide PF units in villages and hamlets:
 - To improve the village and hamlet defense.
 - To encourage proper training to minimize losses when attacked.
 - To organize suitable security operations (particularly at night) in order to enable them to withstand the enemy's attack.
 - c. The duration of the teams' operation will be decided by sectors and sub-sectors according to a suitable time table depending on local situation and circumstances.
3. Report your results to JGS/Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff and Commander of RF/PF.

Copy to:
Major Harkness
Australian Adviser attached to
CORDS - Request that you supply
defense information.

APO 3402, 6 Dec 69
Major Phan-Quang-Vinh
Chief, Study Section
/s/ Maj Phan-Quang-Vinh

(Seal and Signature)
KBC 4002, 23 November 1969 for
General Cao Van Vien, Chief of JGS
General Nguyen Van La, Deputy

Republic of Vietnam - ARVN 4 CTZ
Office of Dep Commander for Territorial
Security & RF/PF Commander, IV CTZ
No _____ V4CT/VP/TLPLT/NQ

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Annex 'M' to AATTV
Report - Dec 69

TRANSLATION OF COPY
RECEIVED BY IV CTZ

MESSAGE

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Australian Adviser attached to
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APO 3402, 6 Dec 69
Major Pham-Quang-Vinh
Chief, Study Section
/s/ Maj Pham-Quang-Vinh

(Seal and Signature)
KBC 4002, 23 November 1969 for
General Cao Van Vien, Chief of JGS
General Nguyen Van La, Deputy

Republic of Vietnam - ARVN 4 CTZ
Office of Dep Commander for Territorial
Security & RF/PF Commander, IV CTZ
No. _____ V4CT/VP/TLPLT/NQ

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