

Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report and enclosures
1 - 31 January 1970

Series: AWM95 - Australian Army
commanders' diaries

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Army Component

23 Feb 70

AHQ (C)

AATTV MONTHLY REPORT - JAN 70

1. Attached, for information, is a copy of the AATTV Monthly Report for Jan 70. Special aspects reported upon by the advisers are to be investigated by CO AATTV.

[Signature]

(R.A. HAY)
Major General
Commander Australian Force
Vietnam

Attachment: 1. AATTV Monthly Report - January 1970.

For Information

1 ATF
AATTV (less attachments)

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Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam

15 Feb 70

HQ AFV (3)

AATTV REPORT - JANUARY 1970

General

1. During Jan AATTV continued to be actively involved over the four CTZs and in the Rung-Sat Special Zone in operations, training and in providing advice on territorial security at province to hamlet levels. During the month enemy activity was generally light.

Casualties

2. AATTV casualties for the month of ~~Dec~~^{Jan} were four WIA. WO2 Strachan was wounded on operations with 1st ARVN Div in I CTZ and will return to duty in IV CTZ in Feb. WO2 O'Hara and Powell suffered minor shrapnel wounds on operations with 1 ARVN Div but remained on duty. WO2 McCloskey was wounded by shrapnel on an operation in Kontum Province with II Corps Mobile Strike Force. He was hospitalized and will return to duty in Feb.

3. Capt Smith was hospitalized for three days for a minor ailment.

Deployment

4. No major changes in deployment occurred during the month. The deployment of AATTV as at 5 Feb is attached at Annex A.

I Corps

5. The month opened with increasing enemy activity. This in the main was in the form of increased artillery and mortar fire and small scale enemy initiated incidents. This activity fell away towards the end of the month.

.../2

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- 2 -

6. There are indications that the enemy in I Corps are suffering from lack of food and as a consequence not a very high standard of morale. Quite large quantities of rice have been captured and the enemy appears to be trying to offset this loss by purchasing rice at high prices from the local population. Many instances have occurred where this activity has resulted in either the capture of the rice or the purchasers or both.
7. Many predictions are being made regarding the enemy's intentions and these range from a TET offensive to a major offensive in the winter - spring period.
8. My first impression of the area is that the standard of the various battalions varies over quite a range but that in general the units seem to treat static positions as a bit of a holiday. This is apparently a normal reaction and the battalions are at their best when conducting more mobile operations.
9. Extracts from a report by Maj Johnston, the Senior AATTV Adviser in I CTZ, are attached at Annex B.
10. Attached at Annex C is a summary of significant operational contacts in I CTZ in which ARVN units with AATTV advisers were involved during Jan.
11. Extracts from a report by Maj Connor, the Assistant Province Adviser (Military) in Quang-Tri Province are attached at Annex D.
12. Attached also are extracts of reports by AATTV advisers in I Corps as follows;
 - a. Report by Capt Mogridge 2/6 ARVN Bn showing some of the difficulties experienced in an ARVN unit - Annex E
 - b. Report by WO2 Keioskie 2/51 ARVN Bn showing some of the difficulties experienced by an AATTV adviser. It is understood that the regimental senior adviser is being removed in the very near future. - Annex F
 - c. Report by Capt Sheppard 1/51 ARVN Bn showing some of the problems of an AATTV unit senior adviser as regards the standard of advisers. - Annex G
 - d. Report by WO2 Breakwell 21st Ranger Bn showing in brief form the day by day activities of an assistant adviser. - Annex H

.../3

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- 3. -

- e. Report by WO2 Killion medical adviser Hue showing the work and the problems of a medical adviser at this level. - Annex I.

II Corps

13. During Jan the battalions of 2 MSF in which AATTV are deployed were committed to operations in the areas of Bu Prang, Ben-Het, Dak-Seang and an area nine miles north west of Pleiku. In the latter area 2nd Bn 2MSF had frequent contacts with the enemy.

14. 1st Bn 2MSF should complete its operation in the Ben-Het area on 6 Feb whilst 2nd Bn should finish on 15 Feb. 1st Bn is scheduled for redeployment on 15 Feb.

15. There are indications of an enemy build up in the Dak Pek area which apparently are similar to the build up at Ben-Het last year.

16. The phase down programme of 2 MSF allows for the reduction of the force to two battalions by 30 Jan 70 as follows

1st Bn	-	Remain as a 2MSF unit
2nd Bn	-	Converted to RF/PF
3rd Bn	-	Remain as a 2MSF unit
4th Bn		Converted to RF/PF
1st Recon Coy	-	" " "
2nd " "	-	" " "
MSF Trg Coy	-	Remain as at present

17. There is at present no plan to increase the force level in this sensitive area. It is planned to replace the withdrawal of the US brigade of 4th US Div with a regiment of the 22nd ARVN Div. At this stage it would appear that the reduction of 2MSF is a bit premature unless the ARVN are prepared to take a more active part in operations in the area. As this appears to be unlikely I would not be surprised if the phase down programme was once again postponed.

18. A report by Capt Paul who commands a company in 2nd Bn 2MSF is attached at Annex J.

III Corps

19. ARVN Training - Assistance to 1 ATF. As stated in last month's report the AATTV assistance to 1 ATF for ARVN training has now been reduced to one. Apparently 18 ARVN Div is experimenting with an assault

.../4

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- 4 -

trooper type force. The infantry at present being trained by 6 RAR come from an ARVN regiment and they are to operate under the 5th ARVN Cav when their training is complete. This is the only assault trooper type force in the ARVN and Armoured Command are a little concerned that other infantry/armour training in 18 ARVN Div will suffer. At present there is no "official" approval for this type of force and this has presented some administrative difficulties.

20. RF/PF Training : Phuoc-Tuy. The AATTV team has commenced preliminary work involved in the coordination of the RF, PF, PSDF and RD. The team has visited a VDAT location in IV Corps in order to see how the task is tackled on the ground. The Dep PSA has given the team an area to work in and some preliminary work has been done. However with most of the prominent hamlet members on pre TET leave not much progress has been made. I will visit the team on 14 Feb to see how the project is starting up after the TET holidays.

21. LRP Training : Van-Kiep. The 6/69 LRP Course fell below the standard of previous courses due in the main to the standard of discipline imposed on both students and staff. There are many minor difficulties with the running of these courses which I have discussed with COMAFV. I will endeavour to straighten some of them out on my visit to Van-Kiep on 14 Feb. The Comdt NTC was not available during my last visit.

22. Only 13 students out of an original 41 were credited with having passed the 6/69 Course. One patrol task was not completed as ARVN staff and students were absent for the second patrol immediately prior to insertion.

23. The 1/70 course marched in on 21 Jan and should conclude on 14 Mar.

IV Corps

24. General

a. Enemy activity decreased during the month except in Chau-Doc Province.

b. Extracts from a report by Maj Harkness, Senior Adviser in IV CTZ, are attached at Annex K.

25. AATTV Village Defence Advisory Teams (VDAT's)

a. The redeployment of VDATs mentioned in the last report will be completed on 1 Feb. The team in Chau-Thanh District was redeployed to Cho Gao District on 28 Jan.

.../5

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- 5 -

b. Selected VDAT reports of interest for the month of Jan are attached at Annex L, Annex M, and Annex N.


26. Medical

a. The AATTV Medical Adviser in IV Corps was able to conduct MEDCAPs in the districts being worked by the VDATs. This proved very successful particularly in the district, village/VDAT relationship field. It is proposed to repeat this activity on an opportunity basis.

b. A report by WO2 Hartman, the medical adviser, is attached at Annex O.

Change in Command AATTV

27. Lt Col Clark assumed command of AATTV at 0001 hrs on 27 Jan 70. It is intended that Maj Beale takes over from Maj Brydon on 8 Feb 70.


(J.A. CLARK)
Lt Col
Comd

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AATTV DEPLOYMENT
AS AT 5 FEB 1970

Annex 'A' to
AATTV Monthly Report
for Jan 70

Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>AATTV : SAIGON</u>								
1	: Lt Col	: J.A.	: Clark	: RA Inf	: HQ AATTV	: Commander	: Jan 71	: Saigon
2	: Capt	: D.J.F.	: Rowe	: RA Inf	: "	: Adjutant	: May 70	: "
3	: WO1	: G.S.	: Munt	: RA Inf	: "	: Admin WO (A and Q)	: Oct 70	: "
4	: WO2	: G.E.	: Munro	: RA Sigs	: "	: Admin WO (Pay and Movs)	: Sep 70	: "
5	: WO2	: L.A.	: West	: RA Inf	: "	: " " " " (Desig)	: Jul 70	: "
6	: Cpl	: G.H.	: Davison	: RAASC	: "	: Clerk	: Apr 70	: "
7	: WO1	: J.B.	: Staunton-Latimer	: RAAC	: Armoured School	: Instructor/Adviser	: Feb 70	: Thu-Duc (near Saigon)

.../2

Serial:	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>I CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV : QUANG-TRI PROVINCE</u>								
8	: Maj	: C.S.	: Connor	: RAAC	: Quang-Tri Sector	: Asst Province Adviser (Military)	: Oct 70	: Quang-Tri
9	: WO2	: R.V.	: Roney	: RAAMC	: " " "	: Medical Adviser	: Apr 70	: " "
10	: WO2	: J.	: Stephens	: RAASC	: Cam-Lo Sub-Sector	: Assistant Adviser	: Oct 70	: Cam-Lo
11	: WO2	: J.	: Fitzgerald	: RA Inf	: 1/1 ARVN Bn	: " "	: Jul 70	: Near Quang-Tri (Regt HQ)
12	: Capt	: R.L.	: Smith	: RAE	: 2/1 ARVN Bn	: Senior Adviser	: Apr 70	: " " " "
13	: WO2	: D.T.	: Powell	: RA Inf	: 2/1 " "	: Assistant Adviser	: Oct 70	: " " " "
14	: WO2	: B.L.	: Young	: RA Inf	: 3/1 " "	: " "	: Feb 70	: " " " "
15	: WO2	: D.M.	: Palmer	: RA Inf	: " " "	: " " (Desig)	: Jan 71	: " " " "
16	: WO2	: G.M.	: Logan	: RA Inf	: 4/1 " "	: " "	: Oct 70	: " " " "
17	: WO2	: B.M.	: Ryan	: RA Inf	: 1/2 " "	: " "	: Jan 71	: Dong-Ha (Regt HQ)
18	: WO2	: O.W.	: Bell	: RAA	: 2/2 " "	: " "	: Aug 70	: " " "
19	: WO2	: J.M.	: Lefel	: RA Inf	: 3/2 " "	: " "	: Jan 71	: " " "
20	: WO2	: L.J.	: Storan	: RA Inf	: 5/2 " "	: " "	: Jan 71	: " " "
21	: WO2	: L.N.	: Bootes	: RAAC	: 2/7 ARVN Cav	: " "	: Mar 70	: Quang-Tri
22	: WO1	: E.C.	: Burns	: RAAC	: 1/11 ARVN Cav	: " "	: Oct 70	: " "

.../3

Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>I CTZ (Cont)</u>								
<u>AATTV : THUA THIEN PROVINCE</u>								
23	WO2	D.G.	Killion	RAAMC	Thua-Thien Sector	Medical Adviser	Jul 70	Hue
24	Maj	G.V.	Brown	RAE	Nam-Hoa District	District Senior Adviser	Jun 70	Nam-Hoa
25	WO2	T.	McNee	RA Sigs	Nam-Hoa Sub-Sector	Assistant Adviser	Oct 70	"
26	WO2	K.W.	Forden	RA Inf	Black Panther Coy	" "	May 70	Hue (Base)
27	WO2	D.G.	Parker	RA Inf	1/54 ARVN Bn	" "	Oct 70	Phu-Loc (Regt HQ)
28	WO2	D.F.	Heenan	RA Inf	2/54 " "	" "	Jul 70	" "
29	Capt	W.R.	Deane	Aust Int	3/54 " "	Senior Adviser	Jul 70	" "
30	WO2	S.	Speechley	RAEME	3/54 " "	Assistant Adviser	Jul 70	" "
31	WO2	D.E.	Watts	RA Sigs	1/3 " "	" "	Jul 70	Near Hue (Regt HQ)
32	WO2	J.F.	McKenner	RA Inf	2/3 " "	" "	Jul 70	" " "
33	Capt	W.D.	Tear	RA Inf	3/3 " "	Senior Adviser	Oct 70	" " "
34	WO2	R.E.	Heathcote	RAA	3/3 " "	Assistant Adviser	Nov 70	" " "
35	WO2	D.F.	Hedges	RA Inf	4/3 " "	" "	Aug 70	" " "

.../4

Serial	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>I CTZ (Cont)</u>								
<u>AATTV : QUANG-NAM PROVINCE</u>								
36	Maj	F.C.	Johnston	RA Inf	HQ I Corps	G3 (Trg) Adviser	May 70	Danang
37	WO2	P.J.	Heslin	RAE	AATTV Danang	Admin WO	Oct 70	Aust House Danang
38	WO2	L.N.	Gorman	RAA	" "	" "	Apr 70	" " "
39	WO1	R.M.	Almond	RAAC	3/17 ARVN Cav	Assistant Adviser	May 70	Hoi-An
40	WO2	T.H.	Breakwell	RA Inf	21st Ranger Bn	" "	Dec 70	Near Danang (Gp HQ)
41	Capt	W.	Sheppard	RA Inf	1/51 ARVN Bn	Senior Adviser	Sep 70	Mieu-Bong (Regt HQ)
42	WO2	C.F.	Keioskie	RAASC	2/51 " "	Assistant Adviser	Feb 70	" " "
43	WO2	C.D.	Dermody	RA Inf	" " "	" " (Desig)	Jan 71	" " "
44	WO2	W.T.	Jones	RA Inf	3/51 " "	" "	Aug 70	" " "

.../5

Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>I CTZ (Cont)</u>								
<u>AATTV : QUANG-TIN and QUANG-NGAI PROVINCES</u>								
45	Capt	J.P.	Nelson	RA Inf	1/4 ARVN Bn	Senior Adviser	May 70	Quang-Ngai Province (Regt HQ near Quang-Ngai)
46	WO2	D.	Burke	RA Inf	1/4 " "	Assistant Adviser	Aug 70	
47	WO2	B.	Davies	RA Inf	2/4 " "	" "	Oct 70	
48	WO2	R.D.	Cameron	RA Inf	3/4 " "	" "	Feb 70	
49	WO2	L.G.	Schmidt	RA Inf	" " "	" (Desig)	Jan 71	
50	WO2	A.H.	Franks	RA Inf	2/5 " "	" "	Jan 71	Quang-Tin Province Regt HQ near Tam-Ky)
51	WO2	G.	Joyce	RA Inf	3/5 " "	" "	Jan 71	
52	WO2	D.	Rolph	RA Inf	4/5 " "	" "	Nov 70	
53	WO2	D.W.	Eather	RA Inf	1/6 " "	" "	Jul 70	Quang-Ngai Province (Regt HQ near Quang-Ngai)
54	Capt	A.J.	Mogridge	RA Inf	2/6 " "	Senior Adviser	Apr 70	
55	WO2	K.J.	Brady	RA Inf	3/6 " "	Assistant Adviser	Oct 70	
56	WO2	R.W.	Cairns	RA Inf	4/6 " "	" "	Jul 70	Quang-Ngai
57	WO2	J.F.	Ghilotti	RAAC	2/4 ARVN Cav	" "	Aug 70	" "
58	WO2	T.J.	Goddard	RAA	23 ARVN Arty Bn	" "	Apr 70	" "

.../6

Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
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II CTZ

AATTV : PLEIKU (SPECIAL FORCES)

59	Maj	W.J.	Brydon	RA Inf	2nd Mobile Strike Force Command, Det B-20, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)	En Comd	Feb 70	Pleiku (Base)
60	Maj	P.W.	Beale	RA Inf	" " "	" " (Desig)	Jan 71	" "
61	Capt	D.F.	Paul	RA Inf	" " "	Coy Comd	May 70	" "
62	WO2	K.H.	Mavin	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Aug 70	" "
63	WO2	J.G.	Pettit	RA Inf	" " "	" (Desig)	Jan 71	" "
64	WO2	S.J.	McLaughlin	RA Inf	" " "	Coy Comd (Trg Coy)	Apr 70	" "
65	WO2	J.R.	Vincent	RAA	" " "	Instructor " "	May 70	" "
66	WO2	L.B.	Scowcroft	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Aug 70	" "
67	WO2	A.B.	McCloskey	RA Inf	" " "	Pl Comd	Jul 70	" "
68	WO2	G.Y.	Jamieson	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Oct 70	" "
69	WO2	A.J.	Shelton	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Feb 70	" "
70	WO2	A.G.	White	RA Inf	" " "	" " (Desig)	Jan 71	" "
71	WO2	A.S.	Williams	RA Sigs	" " "	" "	Oct 70	" "
72	Sgt	D.S.	Cochrane	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Jul 70	" "
73	Sgt	A.J.	Miller	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Jul 70	" "

.../7

Serial	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
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II CTZ (Cont)

AATTV - II CORPS AREA

74	: WO1	: S.D.	: Rosenberg	: RA Inf	: Ranger Training Centre	: Instructor/Adviser	: Apr 70	: Duc-My
75	: WO1	: E.B.	: Ostara	: RA Inf	: Province Recce Unit	: Senior Adviser Binh-Dinh	: Jul 70	: Qui-Nhon
76	: WO2	: R.G.	: Carter	: RA Inf	: " " "	: " " Tuyen-Duc	: Jul 70	: Dalat
77	: WO2	: L.B.	: Green	: RAAC	: 1/14 ARVN Cav	: Assistant Adviser	: Nov 70	: Kontum (Base)

.../8

Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>III CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV : III CORPS AREA</u>								
78	Capt	P.J.S.	Harris	RA Inf	LRP Wing Van-Kiep, National Training Centre	CI	Mar 70	Baria
79	WO2	C.R.	Ansell	RA Inf	" " "	Admin WO	Mar 70	"
80	WO2	F.E.	Bell	RA Inf	" " "	Patrol Comd/Instructor	Mar 70	"
81	WO2	O.	Stevenson	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Aug 70	"
82	WO2	J.T.	Hoolihan	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Jun 70	"
83	WO2	C.J.	Ison	RA Inf	Province Recce Unit	Senior Adviser Rung-Sat Special Zone	Apr 70	Vung-Tau (Base)
84	WO2	C.	Kealy	RA Inf	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	PF Advisory Team(Leader):	Aug 70	Baria
85	WO2	R.K.	Gurney	RA Inf	" "	" " " (Member):	Sep 70	"
86	WO2	W.C.	Green	RAASC	" "	Assistant Adviser A & L Coy	Nov 70	"
87	WO2	R.S.	Simpson	RA Inf	" "	Adviser PSDF	Feb 70	"
88	WO2	V.L.	Harris	RA Inf	" "	" " (Desig)	Sep 70	"
89	WO2	L.D.	Osborn	RA Inf	" "	Adviser RD Cadre	Jun 70	"
90	WO2	E.A.	Taylor	RA Inf	" "	Adviser ARVN Trg	Jul 70	Nui-Dat (Horse Shoe)

.../9

Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>IV CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV : IV CORPS AREA</u>								
91	Maj	A.	Harkness	RAA	CORPS, IV Corps	Assistant to Chief Territorial Security	Apr 70	Can-Tho
92	WO2	H.J.	Hartman	RAAMC	HQ IV Corps	Medical Adviser	Jul 70	" "
93	WO2	R.D.	Smith	RA Inf	IV Corps Village Defence Advisory Team (VDAT)	V AT Team Leader	Oct 70	Dinh-Tuong Province
94	WO2	D.B.	Bell	RAE	" "	VDAT Adviser	Dec 70	" " "
95	WO1	B.T.	Waters	RA Inf	" "	VDAT Team Leader	Dec 70	Kien-Hoa Province
96	WO2	R.A.	O'Hara	RA Inf	" "	VDAT Adviser	Jul 70	" " "
97	WO2	W.E.	Tillett	RA Inf	" "	VDAT Team Leader	Sep 70	Vinh-Binh Province
98	WO2	C.	McEvoy	RA Inf	" "	VDAT Adviser	Dec 70	" " "
99	WO2	D.A.	Strachan	RA Inf	" "	" " (Desig)	Oct 70	" " "
100	WO1	W.A.	Eade	RAA Pro	" "	VDAT Team Leader	Jul 70	Phong-Dinh Province
101	WO2	R.I.	Oliver	RAASC	" "	VDAT Adviser	Nov 70	" " "
102	WO2	A.J.	Joyce	RA Inf	" "	VDAT Team Leader	Aug 70	Kien-Hoa Province
103	WO2	W.E.	Butler	RA Inf	" "	VDAT Adviser	Jan 71	" " "

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Annex B to AATTV
Report - Jan 70

Danang
31 Jan 70

Comd AATTV

EXTRACTS FROM MONTHLY REPORT BY MAJ JOHNSTON
I CTZ - JAN 70

General

1. The month opened with increasing enemy activity. This increase continued until the third week of the reporting period and then fell away towards the end of the month.
2. It is argued that the falling away of activity may be taken as an indication that the enemy is keeping his major forces out of contact in northern I Corps to prepare for the major offensive phase of the Winter-Spring campaign. A decrease in the logistics associated movement in Quang-Tri Province may indicate that these preparations are nearing completion. A similar decline in action and enemy movement in Southern I Corps may indicate a similar position there.
3. Intelligence estimates are that this push will be at or shortly after Tet.

Casualties

4. Three members of AATTV were wounded in action in January. WO Strachan was wounded on 6 January and will return to duty in February. WOs O'Hara and Powell suffered minor shrapnel wounds and remained on duty. Capt Smith was hospitalized for three days.

(F.C. JOHNSTON)
Maj
AATTV

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Annex C to AATTV
Report - Jan 70

Comd AATTV

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL CONTACTS BY
ARVN UNITS HAVING AATTV ADVISERS - I CTZ
JAN 70

1. At 011930H vicinity of YD 621141 an element of 1st Bn 3rd ARVN Regt ambush two enemy squads resulting in eight enemy killed, four individual weapons, five rounds of B40 and miscellaneous documents captured.
2. At 031115H vicinity of AT 814464 3rd Bn 51st ARVN Regt whilst searching the area contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in three enemy killed and one individual weapon captured.
3. At 041430H vicinity YD 050632 1st Bn 2nd ARVN Regt contacted an estimated enemy company resulting in 17 enemy killed, two crew served weapons, one individual weapon and 30 grenades captured.
4. At 041030H vicinity YD 234786, 4th Bn 1st ARVN Regt whilst searching the area contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in three enemy killed, one individual weapon captured, 26 rounds of 60mm mortar, nine rounds of 82mm mortar, one 60mm mortar base plate and bipod captured.
5. At 040750H vicinity ET 000544, 2nd Bn 51st ARVN Regt contacted an estimated enemy platoon resulting in 12 enemy killed and nine individual weapons captured.
6. At 061100 - 061900 vic YD 052640 at 1100 1st Bn 2nd ARVN Regt received 40x82mm mortar rounds. At 1255 vicinity YD 055653 contacted an estimated two enemy companies, at 1335 received an additional 40x82mm mortar rounds. 1st Bn engaged the enemy throughout the day in several contacts using artillery and gunship support, resulting in five friendly killed 30 wounded (including WO D.A. Strachan mortar fragment in right side of chest) 20 enemy killed, 1 VC captured and one crew served weapon, three individual weapons, 65x82 mortar rounds, 30x60mm mortar rounds and nine claymore mines captured.
7. At 061945H vicinity ET 182452, 2nd Bn 5th ARVN Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force resulting in six enemy killed and two individual weapons captured.
8. At 071100H vicinity ET 204336 2nd Bn 5th ARVN Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in four enemy killed.
9. At 081000H vicinity BS 683584 and BS 695584 3rd Bn 4th ARVN Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in nine enemy killed and three individual weapons captured.

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.../2

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- 2 -

10. At 081250H vicinity YD 314360 3rd Bn 1st ARVN Regt contacted a squad size enemy force resulting in four enemy killed and one individual weapon captured.
11. At 081310 vicinity BT 194453 21st Ranger Bn contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in six enemy killed.
12. At 071500 vicinity BT 198449 21st Ranger Bn contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in three enemy killed and one individual weapon captured.
13. At 091130H vicinity BS 771290 1st Bn 6th ARVN Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in five enemy killed.
14. At 101005H vicinity BS 754583 3rd Bn 4th ARVN Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in three enemy killed.
15. At 101245H vicinity YD 665153 4th Bn 3rd ARVN Regt contacted an estimated half squad with small arms fire resulting in four enemy killed.
16. At 111000H vicinity YD 088446 2nd Bn 2nd ARVN Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in five enemy killed.
17. At 111740H vicinity BS 762584, 3rd Bn 4th ARVN Regt contacted a squad size enemy force resulting in three enemy killed.
18. At 121040H vicinity YD 624176 1st Bn 3rd ARVN Regt ambushed a half squad of VC resulting in three enemy killed.
19. At 121130H vicinity YD 330377 3rd Bn 1st ARVN Regt ambushed an unknown sized enemy force resulting in five enemy killed.
20. At 121640H vicinity BT 193451, 21st Ranger Bn contacted a platoon sized enemy force resulting in three enemy killed.
21. At 122200H vicinity BS 727588, 3rd Bn 4th ARVN Regt ambushed an unknown sized enemy force resulting in eight enemy killed.
22. At 130840H vicinity YD 347347, 2nd Bn 1st ARVN Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in three enemy killed.
23. At 141320H vicinity YD 223379, 1st Bn 1st ARVN Regt ambushed an enemy squad resulting in three enemy killed.
24. At 151330H vicinity BS 875340, 3rd Bn 4th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in eight enemy killed.
25. At 151330H vicinity YD 345407, 2nd Bn 1st ARVN Regt contacted a half squad sized enemy force resulting in four enemy killed.
26. At 171940H vicinity BS 857377, 3rd Bn 4th ARVN Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force resulting in eight enemy killed.

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- 3 -

27. At 171100H vicinity BT 166176, 2nd Bn 5th ARVN Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in four enemy killed.
28. At 181500 vicinity BS 840302, 3rd Bn 4th ARVN Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in thirteen enemy killed.
29. At 201500 vicinity BT 195453, 21st Ranger Bn contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in three enemy killed.
30. At 211300H vicinity YD 345417, 2nd Bn 1st ARVN Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in eight enemy killed.
31. At 220800H vicinity YD 324358, 3rd Bn 1st ARVN Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force resulting in three enemy killed.
32. At 221230H vicinity BT 326106, 2nd Bn 5th ARVN Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in five enemy killed.
33. At 230705H vicinity BT 172483, 21st Ranger Bn contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in four enemy killed.
34. At 241700H vicinity YD 309339, 3rd Bn 1st ARVN Regt contacted an estimated enemy platoon in a complex of eight bunkers resulting in three enemy killed.
35. At 251540H vicinity BT 140506, 21st Ranger Bn killed nine enemy.
36. At 261500H vicinity YD 360380, 2nd Bn 1st ARVN Regt killed four enemy.
37. At 261000H vicinity BS 602508, 1st Bn 4th ARVN Regt killed three enemy.
38. At 271330H vicinity YD 355375, 2nd Bn 1st ARVN Regt killed 11 enemy.
39. At 280720H vicinity BS 514871, 4th Bn 6th ARVN Regt killed five enemy.
40. At 281530H vicinity YD 302320, 3rd Bn 1st ARVN Regt killed three enemy.
41. At 301445H vicinity YD 061643, 5th Bn 2nd Regt found bunkers and contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in six enemy killed.
42. At 301200H vicinity BT 207472, 4th Bn 5th Regt contacted enemy company resulting in 28 enemy killed and nine captured.

(F.C. JOHNSTON)
Maj
AATTV

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CONFIDENTIAL Annex D to AATTV
Report - Jan 70

Quang-Tri Sector
25 Jan 70

Comd AATTV

REPORT BY MAJ C. CONNOR - ASST PROVINCE
ADVISEE (MILITARY) QUANG-TRI PROVINCE - JAN 70

Enemy

1. There have been constant and ominous reports of enemy activity in the unpopulated areas of the province. A logistic build-up is reported by agents; this is confirmed by sightings of vehicle convoys, sensor readings, and the sighting of 44 gallon drums floating down the upper reaches of the Ben-Hai river. There have been radar reports of helicopter activity in the eastern DMZ and Gio-Linh district. On 24 Jan a PAC took a photograph of what appears to be a Ka 4 helicopter just north of the Ben-Hai river in the eastern DMZ. No successful engagements have yet been achieved. Radar sightings have been at night.
2. In the populated area, enemy activity appears to have been restricted to reconnaissance, food gathering and some proselyting. Considerable sums of money have been confiscated in cordon, search and interrogate operations, which tends to verify the report that some 5 million piastre has been introduced to the province in line with the policy of "soft" acquisition of food and other supplies. As yet there is no evidence of enemy infiltration of the military or civil administration.
3. Detailed examination of known enemy activity reveals a marked similarity to enemy activity prior to the 1968 Tet offensive. The situation is now considerably different, but there is ample evidence to suggest that another offensive is imminent.

Friendly Forces

4. 1st & 2nd ARVN Regts and 7th ARVN Cav were joined early in January by 11 ARVN Cav (which had been located here but was dispersed and inactive) which has as a subordinate unit 3/54 ARVN Bn. Although part of one troop of 11 Cav is detached, this unit now has its own AO, south west of Quang-Tri city. 1/5 Bde (Mech) USA continues its activities close to and within the populated area. RF/PF continue their operations in the populated area.
5. Contacts by regular forces have been infrequent and small. Vigorous patrol activity, which is essentially defensive, has detected enemy activity - but after the enemy has left. By comparison the few RF/PF contacts have, with two exceptions, been successful. Unfortunately there have been some accidents in which civilians have been killed, and a clash between an ARVN patrol and an RF ambush.

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6. Redeployment into a more defensive posture is now going on. This will be maintained until after Tet, when, presumably movement into the western parts of the province will coincide with better flying weather.

7. Apart from securing the population and key points, RF/PF activity has been concentrated on cordon and search operations. Neither the cordon nor the area search appear effective. However the identity card check and subsequent interrogation does usually produce results. From a foreigner's view not familiar with the Oriental mind, this process usually stretched over four days of confinement, the alternate proselyting and interrogation would not encourage a formerly neutral peasant to love the GVN.

8. Much to the authors rage and frustration, a small triangular fort and several small bunkers have been constructed in the Province. These offer almost ideal targets for the small rocket projectors so favoured by VC/NVA. These have been constructed on the top of well drained hillocks - where there is no watertable.

Civil Administration

9. The most noteworthy event of the month was the arrival of a new Province Chief. Col Khien is far more active than his predecessor, visited all districts within three days of his arrival and has been busy investigating and presumably correcting the Civil Administration. His evenings are spent investigating and improving various aspects of the Sector forces.

10. There has been a breakdown in the rice distribution system. In an attempt to reduce the amount of rice available to the enemy, imports were restricted. Due in part at least to administrative blunders, and the perceptive avarice of some merchants the price of rice on the open market doubled, and rice became very short. Emergency supplies are being brought in but the citizen has gone short, and has expressed dissatisfaction with the Administration. Obviously this sort of incident puts back the pacification effort.

(C.S.A. CONNOR)
Maj
AATTV

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Annex E to AATTV
Report - Jan '70

Quang-Tin Province
28 Jan 70

Comd AATTV

REPORT BY CAPT MCCRIDGE : 2/6 ARVN BN

General

1. During the month of January the battalion carried out two offensive operations and one security operation.
2. A new battalion commander took command at the beginning of the month. He is Dai-Uy Pham-Ngoc-Hong. Previously Dai-Uy Hong was XO of 3/6 ARVN Bn.
3. A shortage of officers was experienced during the month.
 - a. XO : on leave
 - b. 1st Coy comd : foot blown off by mine
 - c. S-3 acting 1st Coy comd : leg broken in combat assault.
 - d. Headquarter Coy comd : 3 months school.
 - e. One officer is currently filling the role of XO, S-3, HQ Coy comd.

Operations

4. The new bn comd has been improving the tactics of the bn, his knowledge of tactics follows close to the Australian line of teaching, particularly setting up a night defensive posn. He attended JWS Kota Tinggi in 1963.
5. On the night of 7 Jan 70 the bn was partially overrun, due mainly to setting up a position on top of a VC force in tunnels.
6. A security operation in conjunction with Quang-Ngai Province Chief was carried out in Son-Tinh district. It involved bringing in all males and females between the ages of 15 - 50 yrs for a check of ID Cards.
7. During an operation in the mountains West of Quang-Ngai city on 24 Jan 70 a friendly airstrike was directed onto the bn which was moving in single file down a creek bed. The results were 3 ARVN killed and 48 wounded.

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8. An investigation is being carried out by Commanding General Americal Div Chu-Lai.

9. Points that have come to hand are:-

- a. A Helix FAC was circling a suspected enemy target when he spotted smoke in the creek bed which was some 400 metres from the suspected enemy posn. The bn had just completed a 20 minute halt and the smoke was possibly from cigarettes.
- b. The FAC obtained clearance from US sources as there were no US troops in the area.
- c. The ARVN ^{TG} 706 gave clearance although it was inside 2/6 ARVN Bns AO
- d. An immediate air strike was called and a pair of diverted jets came on station. They had only 1600 rounds of 20mm cannon.
- e. 400 rounds were fired on the first pass.
- f. The senior adviser spoke on the radio back to the Regt CP and fired pencil flares through the canopy.
- g. The FAC saw the flares and check fired. He contacted his control and on checking found that there were friendlies in the area.

10. When the full results are known, a separate report will be compiled.

11. The bn is at present at Tam-Ky as reserve for the 5th ARVN Regt.

(A.T. MOGRIDGE)
Capt
AATTV

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Annex F to AATTV
Report - Jan 70

2/51 ARVN Regt

25 Jan 70

Comd AATTV

REPORT BY WO2 KEIOSKIE 2/51 ARVN BN

1. Operations

- a. 1 x 5 days - Bn size
- b. 1 x 17 days - 4 and 2 Bn 51 Regt

2. Results

- a. 12 VC killed, 12 weapons captured
1 ARVN killed 3 wounded
- b. Negative. 4 Bn found 1 C46 Marine chopper lost about 2 years ago and recovered 2 x 50 Cal MG

Results achieved by Aust Adviser

3. Owing to a low kill result obtained in night ambushes the bn comd was advised to hold ambush training. Each coy was given one half day lecture and demonstration and one half day practice. This training was probably the cause of 12 VC killed out of 16 in a night ambush.

Problems encountered

4. The Regimental Senior Adviser now has his own policies which unfortunately hamper the bn adviser in his task. Advisers have to record all advice given and actions taken by his counterpart. One is continually compiling reports. He then discusses these points with the Regt Comd who then informs the Bn Comds. This has led to a poor relationship between Bn Comd and Advisers as the former consider us as spies.

5. The desertion rate is very high. The Regt Senior Adviser has decided "this month" that the problem is leadership at the Bn Comd level. Because of pressure applied by the Regt Senior Adviser on the Regt Comd and because the Bn advisers have to submit reports when the Bn Comd visits his coys to let the soldiers see him; we have had on occasions the Bn Comd operating with a Coy whilst his CP remains with HQ Coy

6. The Regt Senior Adviser is not interested in problems given him by the Bn adviser.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

7. The Regt Senior Adviser does not have the trust in his advisers to give them the backing to do a task unless he has a policy on it.

Conclusion

8. Although I feel justified in saying that I have accomplished much in the 15 months I have spent in this Regt as have other Aust advisers, I feel that because of the above problems and others discussed with the previous CO, it is very difficult to accomplish much whilst the present Regt Senior Adviser maintains his present policies.

(C.F. KEIOSKIE)

WO2

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25 Jan 70

Comd AATTV

REPORT BY CAPT SHEPPARD 1/51 ARVN EN

General

1. During the month of January this battalion remained in its two compounds at "Dodge City" (BT 992578) and "Go Noi" (BT 038546) and continued with local security operations. A joint operation with 5 Regt USMC was started on 5 Jan, in the An Hoi area, but was cancelled after 24 hours. Also two rifle companies were detached to other battalions for specific operations. These have now returned.

2. Today we started a joint operation with the ROK marines and 1 Regt USMC to clean out the "Rats Nest" in the NE corner of our AO. This is a particularly bad piece of ground bounded by two rivers. It is also the junction pt for the three AO's: ARVN, USMC and ROKMC..

3. Statistics

a. En : 2 killed. These were reported in today's operation and as yet have not been confirmed.

b. Own : 1 killed
7 wounded
1 US Adviser broken foot.

4. Own Casualties. For the first time in months only two of our wounded are the results of mines and booby-traps. The rest of the casualties were sustained in fire fights. It is a pleasing change, and a boost to the overall morale, to have our soldiers detecting mines and booby-traps with their eyes instead of their feet.

5. Level of Advising. After months of prodding the Regt Senior Adviser has finally obtained an acceptable answer to the question of "How low can you go to advise". Previously I'd been brushed-off with the statement that MACV does not allow advisers below company level. Now I'm told we can go down to platoon and squad level. This is desirable because the platoon and squad level is where the most tactical advice is required. However, even though I've been given a "Go-Ahead" to assist this unit with their minor tactics, and importantly ambush techniques, I have problems with my Advisory Team which prevent me from doing so at the present time. These problems I will mention later in this report.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

6. Movement. In an advance to contact the forward elements of this unit are now moving in much more acceptable formations. However, they have still a long way to go.

7. Aggressiveness. Having moved with the point squad I will state that there is little evidence of aggressiveness and certainly none of any contact drills. Upon receiving fire all go to ground and the comds move up to the point men. There the CO, the OC, the Pl Comd and squad leader have a debate and eventually shoot mortars or artillery at where the enemy fired from; by which time the VC have long since vacated the premises. To date all enemy kills have resulted from them stumbling into our positions and being too close to run away. I have yet to see, or hear of, a follow-up.

8. Advisory Team. The Advisory Team of this battalion numbers five men, myself and four US Army personnel. One lieutenant, 2 sergeants (E6 and E5), and one PFC. Not one of them has been to an Adviser's course, language training, or commanded anything beyond a squad. The lieutenant is straight out of OCS, the PFC is not long out of basic training, and one of the sergeants has spent most of his five years service behind a desk in Berlin. They themselves have little concept of minor tactics, let alone the means of conveying such to the Vietnamese.

Because of the above it will be some time before this team starts advising down to platoon and squad level.

(W. SHEPPARD)
Capt
AATTV

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CONFIDENTIAL Annex H to AATTV
Report - Jan 70

Comd AATTV

REPORT BY WO2 BREAKWELL : 21ST RANGER BN

<u>Unit</u>	21st VN Ranger Bn 1st Ranger Group
<u>Duration</u>	0700 Jan 7th 70 to 1330 Jan 27th 70
<u>7 Jan 70</u>	<u>1430hrs</u> Contact VC Pl plus 1 VC killed - No weapon - 3 grenades captured 3 friendly wounded <u>1610hrs</u> Contact VC 1 VC Eng/Coy Comd killed 1 .45 pistol plus documents captured - Wife Tay-Ninh <u>Airstrike</u> - VNAF, too close, no radio contact.
<u>8 Jan 70</u>	<u>0100hrs</u> Ambush patrol moved back without orders 1 friendly killed by own Tps. <u>0815hrs</u> VC contact Pl plus Friendly 2 killed 7 wounded <u>0930hrs</u> Airstrike 6 VC killed <u>1330hrs</u> Spotted 3VC 2 VC killed 1 VC wounded
<u>9 Jan 70</u>	<u>1430hrs</u> Contact VC Coy Friendly 3 killed 7 wounded 6 civilians dust off as follows - 1 old woman - Napalm about a week previous - 1 6yr old girl shrapnel right leg - 2 boys head wounds - 1yr old baby leg wounds - Artillery <u>Airstrike</u> 3 VC killed 3 helicopters in support hit by ground fire A46 crashed, pilot killed 1 helicopter pilot wounded. <u>1730hrs</u> Self and Sgt Mursich went to locate and report a fix for Bn Senior Adviser. An ARVN Ranger Coy to support. It didn't turn up. Searched till approx 2100 hrs took fix off strobe light and advised that we were in VC country

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

<u>10 Jan 70</u>	<u>0900hrs</u>	<p>Located crashed plane. Wreckage over 800m Located. 4x250 unexploded bombs Located rear posterior and right heel of pilot and genitals, bagged up. Helicopter picked up remains etc. Searched a further 600m forward of troops Fired at by AK 47 at 100m Blew 4x250 lb bombs 1½ C4 - per bomb 10 min fuzes VC activity around plane - Before we arrived (2 of bombs believed to be booby trapped) 21st Bn moved out of area 600m for safety</p>
<u>11 Jan 70</u>	<u>1300hrs</u>	<p>Found VC bunker 2 VC killed - No weapons 3 VC grenades captured Found 3 more bunkers. All new; recently occupied.</p>
<u>12 Jan 70</u>		<p>VC contact. (Delay Group) 1 friendly wounded. Dust off APC took B40. 1 friendly wounded.</p>
<u>13 Jan 70</u>	<u>0900hrs</u>	Sniper fire
	<u>0945hrs</u>	3 friendly wounded A/P mine
<u>14 Jan 70</u>		<p>Bn resupply Med Evac</p>
<u>15 Jan 70</u>		Checked out 5 objectives NTR.
<u>16 Jan 70</u>	<u>1830hrs</u>	To 1840hrs 9x60mm rds received from a distance of approx 400 metres
<u>17 Jan 70</u>		<p>Moved to pick up point No VC contact Change of tactics</p>
<u>18 Jan 70</u>		Moved back to ops area
<u>19 Jan 70</u>	<u>0820hrs</u>	<p>2 VC spotted 1 VC POW - No weapon</p>
	<u>1330hrs</u>	<p>1 VC POW 29 yrs old No weapon</p>
<u>20 Jan 70</u>		Checked out 5 objectives NTR

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

	<u>1410hrs</u>	VC contact estimated strength 20 5 VC killed 5 B40 rounds 1000 AK47 rounds captured No weapons.
<u>21 Jan 70</u>	<u>0800hrs</u>	1 VC POW wounded M-79 in thigh 1 grenade - No weapon
	<u>1030hrs</u>	2 friendly wounded (VNAF chopper fire)
	<u>1230hrs</u>	Contact 20 VC 2 friendly wounded
<u>22 Jan 70</u>	<u>1300hrs</u>	1 friendly wounded sniper fire
	<u>1600hrs</u>	3 VC M-79 rounds our posn
<u>23 Jan 70</u>	<u>0710hrs</u>	4 VC walked into ambush. All killed Captured 4 grenades 2 AK 47
	<u>0930hrs</u>	1 friendly killed (A/P mine 1 " wounded
	<u>1000hrs</u>	Crossed river in boats. Took fire
	<u>2115hrs</u>	4 VC killed in an ambush 5 grenades captured
<u>24 Jan 70</u>		Rece river banks for boats to recross river.
<u>25 Jan 70</u>	<u>1313hrs</u>	VC contact 3 VC killed 1 SKS
	<u>1613hrs</u>	VC contact 7 VC killed 2 AK 47 captured 50 grenades " 5 Rpg boosters 5000 rounds AK47 captured 1 SKS
		1 Pl Comd: Warrant Officer from 320B Division killed included in above tally - 528 En.
<u>26 Jan 70</u>		Nil VC contact 2 friendly wounded A/P mine

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CONFIDENTIAL

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- 4 -

27 Jan 70

Move out of area to Phu-Loc

Casualties

Enemy 73 KIA
 6 POW

Captured

1 .45
7 AK47
2 SKS
6000 rounds AK47
68 Hand gren.
7 rounds B-40
10 Combat packs
Unlimited Med supplies
5 rounds of RPG

Friendly (21st Ranger Bn)

9 KIA
30 WIA. Probably 5 will die of wounds.

Observations

1. VC always fire at about 100m to 70m. We take dead and wounded with first burst.
2. They seem to be a delay group for larger force to disperse.
3. The medical supplies could have been from a hospital on accelerated stockpiling.
4. When we first went on operation there was difficulty in obtaining airstrikes, gunships up to 3 hr delay. As soon as choppers took hits no trouble from then on.
5. First 10 days should have been done to locate enemy areas. Second 10 days airmobile op; on objectives would have taken less casualties and more prisoners.
6. Bunkers are left because we have no time to blow. Suggest white phos grenades be carried to salt bunker walls : make them uninhabitable for 2 to 3 mths.
7. In retraining at Duc-My Ranger unit and troops should work more with APC's. When mounted we were hit with 2 B-40's. The APC's created havoc running around in the coys assault line. It was fully $\frac{1}{2}$ an hour before Coy Comd could re-organize troops to assault.

.../5

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

8. The APC's fire was spectacular but ineffective. Without the APC's we could spot groups of VC. With the APC's firing it did nothing but defoliate.

9. APC's could be invaluable if used as a blocking force and Inf for flushing out the VC.

10. Coy Comds have men ready 50 metres away to go in after airstrike but have to await orders to go in. Sometimes this is up to $\frac{1}{2}$ an hour and we lose the initiative.

(J. BREAKWELL)

WO2
AATTV

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CONFIDENTIAL Annex I to AATTV
Report - Jan 70

Hue
25 Jan 70

Comd AATTV

REPORT BY WO KILLION : MEDICAL ADVISER HUE

1. This report will be dealt with, in two parts, they are:
 - a. Medical Course (CC1)
 - b. Medical Supervisory Employment
2. Attached to this paper is a report on the A and DSL Coy, Med Pl. This report covers the period 1 Dec 69 to 4 Jan 70.
3. Medical Course
 - a. I have completed my teaching assignments on the present course. The results were extremely pleasing. The students, to my surprise, absorb very quickly and there were very few students who needed correction, during practical periods.
 - b. Many months ago, I stated, in one of my monthly reports, that my suggestion for a raised platform and dividing wall (dividing the office and classroom) for the classroom, had been accepted. Material had been obtained, but unfortunately the project was abandoned. Recently I approached my new counterpart, Lt Quan, about this project, he agreed with my suggestion and now the project, has finally been completed.
 - c. Since Lt Quan has taken over control of the CC1 Course, there has been a marked improvement, in all facets of the course. He is also fortunate in that he has the complete support of the new commander of the hospital.
4. Medical Supervisory Employment
 - a. Because of a letter (a copy of this letter, was sent to the CO, some three weeks ago) I submitted to sector (Reference employment of Medical Advisers in this province) I have been instructed to produce a detailed S.O.P.
 - b. My task would be made so much easier, if the majority of medical advisers in this province, were motivated and not lacking in initiative. There is so much that can be done, in the medical field but I'm afraid if the type of person that work in this province continue to appear in Vietnam, no real progress will be achieved.

CONFIDENTIAL (D.G. KILLION)
WO2
AATTV

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THUA THIEN PROVINCE, I CTZ
MACV ADVISORY TEAM 18
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96258

MACCZ-ITT

9 January 1970

SUBJECT: Report on the Medical Plt - A&DSL Company

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. This report deals with my evaluation of the Medical Platoon and also contains certain recommendations that I consider will improve the efficiency of this organization.

2. Role of the Medical Platoon:

a. The Medical Plt has two roles; they are:

(1) Obtain medical supplies from the 711 (Annex) Medical Depot and hold for distribution to the RF/PF field medical personnel.

(2) Provide minor aid to sick or injured personnel from Sector HQ and the A&DSL Company

(3) Administration

b. Comments:

(1) The ten RF dispensaries obtain their medical supplies from the Nguyen-Tri-Phuong Hospital (1st ARVN Division), while the field medic obtains his medical supplies from the Medical Platoon within the A&DSL Company. Both the Nguyen-Tri-Phuong Hospital and the Medical Platoon obtain their medical supplies from the 711 (Annex) Medical Depot, here in Hue.

(2) Major Tate, the Senior Medical Adviser for I Corps, telephone Puma 146, has stated that the procedure employed by RF dispensaries and field medics in obtaining medical supplies is incorrect. He has informed me that all medical supplies for RF/PF medical personnel, in this province, should come from the Medical Platoon of the A&DSL Company, who in turn obtain their medical supplies from the 711 (Annex) Medical Depot.

(3) Major Tate intends to visit the A&DSL Medical Platoon and the Nguyen-Tri-Phuong Hospital, accompanied by a Senior Vietnamese Medical Officer, around the 15th of January 1970. The purpose of his visit is to resolve this situation.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

3. Medical Platoon Staff:

a. Duties:

- (1) Maintain the stock records (about 100 items)
- (2) Action requisitions from field medics every two months.
- (3) Treat minor ailments
- (4) Attend to minor administrative tasks

b. Employment of Staff:

(1) 2Lt Ngoc - This officer is the commander of the Huong-Tra District RF Dispensary. He also commands the Medical Platoon on a part-time basis. This officer should not be wearing "two hats". His place of duty should be at his dispensary which is of more importance, compared with the minor role he fills at the medical platoon.

(2) The undermentioned members have been reassigned to departments within the A&DSL Company, in one instance, to a district, but these men still work at the Medical Platoon.

- | | | | |
|-----|----------|-------------|------------------------------|
| (a) | E7 Thuan | assigned to | supply section (non-medical) |
| (b) | E7 Huy | " " | Sector HQ, Admin |
| (c) | E6 Lai | " " | Phu-Vang RF Dispensary |
| (d) | PFC Ti | " " | supply section (non-medical) |

(3) There are two permanent members of the staff, both are female:

- | | | |
|-----|----------|---------|
| (a) | Sgt Loan | - nurse |
| (b) | Civilian | - " |

(4) These seven people work in a room 5 meters by 3 meters. They seem to have nothing to do but avoid tripping over one another. 2Lt Ngoc is only a figure-head, used to sign a few papers. He appears to have no control over the staff. E7 Thuan rules this platoon and appears to disagree with 2Lt Ngoc at all times. I have spent many hours trying to encourage 2Lt Ngoc to make decisions, but his excuse is that E7 Thuan has been in the army fifteen years and we must respect his judgement as he knows best. E7 Thuan, in my opinion, is a trouble maker and obviously "anti-adviser", as all my advice has been rejected although 2Lt Ngoc agrees with me on most points.

4. Medical Supplies:

Below is a list of medical supplies that I have selected at random

CONFIDENTIAL

.../3

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

from the supply room. Under the present setup, these drugs should never have been obtained from the 711 (Annex) Medical Depot. These supplies are used by unauthorized medical personnel, and as they are prescribed drugs they can only be dispensed by higher trained medical personnel, eg doctors and medical assistants.

Meprobamate Tabs Diphenhydramine Hydrochloride Capsules
Calcium Gluconate Injection
Caffeine and Sodium Benzoate Injection
Nikethamide Injection
Prednisolone Sodium Phosphate Ophthalmic Solution
Thiamine Hydrochloride Injection
Bicillin CR and Bicillin
Plaque and Cholera Vaccine

5. Medical Platoon - Aid Station

a. The aid station takes up an area of the office. It consists of one cupboard, one small table and a primitive stove device. The cupboard is filled to capacity with medical supplies, why, no one can answer my question. I have advised them to remove the bulk of these stores to the supply room, leaving a small supply in the cupboard, but this advice has been neglected. The majority of the patients are given an injection of some type, under the most primitive conditions, but this is typical of the Vietnamese medical setup.

b. There is \$463.80 worth of drugs eg. penicillin, cholera vaccine etc, in the storeroom, not refrigerated, as they should be. I have advised Lt Ngoc that the drugs are now useless, but they are still using them.

c. To summarize, provision should be made for a dispensary or aid station, to be set-up in a separate room. This room should be equipped with, at least, the minimum items, including a refrigerator, are required to carry out this type of work.

6. I submitted a design for shelving, but before this project could be implemented, 101st Abn Division supplied ready made shelves. More shelving is needed, but Sgt Thanh objected (Lt Ngoc fully agrees with my suggestion). I approached the commander of the A&DSL Company, and he agreed with my advice, however he did not want anymore material used in new projects at this time because of the impending move of the A&DSL Company, to a new location.

7. Visit to 101st Abn Division:

While this visit was very interesting, I can think of no way in which they can help us. The Platoon needs instruments, a refrigerator, and other items of equipment for their aid station and office. I do not believe we should ask for these items. The Vietnamese should attempt to obtain these items through their own system, if they fail, then keep trying until they

CONFIDENTIAL

.../4

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- 4 -

are supplied. I have been in a position to see the giving of many items to the Vietnamese on the pretext that they had tried their system, but failed. We all know that this is the easy way out for them, therefore, I cannot participate in any form of "scrounging" for these people.

8. Conclusion:

a. Until Major Tate visits the platoon, I feel I can do no more at this time. I intend to visit, once weekly, the Medical Platoon, while I'm in Hue. When the Platoon eventually moves to the new location, I will make myself available to Lt Ngoc, to assist in any way I can.

b. Recommendations:

- (1) Elimination of prescribed drugs, except a small amount that Lt Ngoc can dispense for "out patients". These drugs should be locked up and Lt Ngoc should hold the only key.
- (2) Reduction of the staff. Suggested number, two female nurses (both can be utilized for office work). One Sgt, male (to issue supplies and coordinate office).
- (3) Another officer for control (not necessarily medical) from within the headquarters of the A&DSL Company.
- (4) Separate room for the Aid Station
- (5) Equipment needed:
 - (a) 1 small refrigerator
 - (b) 1 treatment bench (storage space beneath)
 - (c) 1 drug cupboard
 - (d) shelves for medication
 - (e) 2 beds
 - (f) 1 small sterilizer
 - (g) Instruments and Stainless Steel equipment
 - (h) 1 waste disposal bin
 - (i) 2 filing cabinets - medical records
- (6) Tiling the floors.

(D.G. KILLION)
WO2 Medical Supervisor
AATTV

Distribution:
Senior RF/PF Adviser
A&DSL Company Adviser
Comd AATTV

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Pleiku
18 Jan 70

Comd AATTV

REPORT ON 2ND BATTALION 2MSF OPERATION
AT BU PRANG AO FROM 27 DEC TO 14 JAN 70 BY CAPT D.F. PAUL

Intelligence

1. Prior to leaving for the Bu Prang area, a good S2 briefing was given by the C Team. It was thought that troops of the NVA regiments involved in the Nov/Dec Bu Prang seige had withdrawn back into Cambodia to move on new objectives to the North.

Mission

2. Recce in force.

General Summary

3. The 19 day operation was well conducted from start to finish. There were no contacts with any enemy in the AO which was to the North & East of Bu Prang Special Forces A Camp and all signs of his previous occupation were at least a month old and indicated a hasty withdrawal.

Support

4. The support for this operation was good. Both the move to and from Bu Prang was as planned by C 130 from Pleiku to Nhon Co on the designated days and by helicopter from Nhon Co to Bu Prang Camp. All resupplies were well conducted. A C&C helicopter was available for missions almost daily. FACs were on station every morning and afternoon. Artillery was provided by 2x105mm guns from Bu Prang Camp which were always in range.

Aust Personnel

5. Coy Comd : WO2 A. McCloskey (27 Dec - 2 Jan) *Changeover for R&R
Capt D.F. Paul (2 Jan - 14 Jan) in the field on 2 Jan.
Pl Comd: WO2 G. Jamieson
WO2 A. Williams

Comments

6. The Bn HQ now consists of:-
Capt R. McDonald * Bn Comd
M/Sgt Hammond * OP Sgt (an extremely valuable addition to the
2nd Bn on his 3rd tour & very competent.

(D. PAUL) Capt - AATTV
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Can-Tho
28 Jan 70

Comd AATTV

EXTRACTS FROM REPORT BY MAJ A. HARKNESS
IV CTZ - JAN 70

Enemy Activity

1. Enemy activity decreased from a moderate level at the beginning of the month to a relatively light level at this stage. The exception to this pattern was in Chau Doc Province where several indirect fire attacks and ground probes occurred. These were probably carried out to screen enemy infiltration.
2. Agents continue to report intensive enemy preparation for the initiation of a major offensive prior to TET. There were also several reports which indicated the enemy is experiencing difficulty moving supplies and troops into position for this offensive.
3. In view of the apparent lull in enemy offensive activity this far during January, it is now considered likely that the enemy intends to initiate the third and final phase of the VC Winter Offensive over the TET period.
4. My personal opinion is that if a surge of activity does occur it will be limited to indirect fire and sapper attacks against major population centers, allied with limited ground attacks in the provinces of Chau-Doc, Dinh-Tuong, Kien-Hoa, Vinh-Binh and Phong-Dinh.

Handover Orientation Tour

5. A handover/orientation visit was made by Lt Col Lloyd and Lt Col Clark on 16/17 January 1970. All VDAT locations were visited.

Deployment

6. Current locations are:
 - a. Can-Tho - Maj Harkness
W02 Macartney
W02 Hartman (R&R)
 - b. Dinh-Tuong - W02 Smith
VDAT 1 W02 Bell

.../2

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- 2 -

c. Kien-Hoa VDAT 2	- WO1 Waters WO2 O'Hara
d. Vinh-Binh VDAT 3	- WO2 Tillett WO2 McEvoy
e. Phong-Dinh VDAT 5	- WO1 Eade WO2 Oliver

7. VDAT 4, consisting of WOs Joyce and Butler will be deployed in Ea-Tri District, Kien-Hoa Province on 1 February 1970.

(A. HARKNESS)
Maj
AATTV

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Annex L to AATTV
Report - Jan 70

Chau-Thanh District
Dinh-Tuong Province

Jan 70

Comd AATTV

REPORT OF VDAT ACTIVITIES : DINH-TUONG PROVINCE
23 DEC 69 - 19 JAN 70

1. During the above period the Team consisted of the following members;

WO Smith
WO Bell

Team Activities

2. Period 23 Dec to 24 Dec. The Team visited Can-Tho for briefing.
3. 25 Dec. No work was carried out on christmas day
4. 26 Dec. Complete check of ammunition holdings in the district for PSDF.
5. Period 27 Dec 69 to 4 Jan 70. Finalizing the Defence Plans complete with overlays showing enemy routes, PF and PSDF positions, reaction forces and artillery registrations for the following villages;
 - a. Thanh-Phu
 - b. Toi-Son
 - c. Phuoc-Thanh
6. 5 Jan to 10 Jan
 - a. During this period artillery was registered by smoke in the following villages;
 - (1) Tan-My-Chanh
 - (2) My-Phong
 - (3) Thanh-Phu
 - (4) Phuoc-Thanh
 - (5) Toi-Son
 - b. WO Hartman arrived on the 5 Jan for five days Med Cap duties. During this period WO Hartman with the S5 covered four (4) villages in the district, WO Hartman moved out to Kien-Hoa Province on 10 Jan.

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

7. 11 Jan to 12 Jan. During this period a detailed recce and a check of outposts and night positions was made in My-Phong village.
8. 13 Jan. Preparation of a master overlay of Chau-Thanh District showing enemy routes, PF and PSDF AOs, reaction forces and artillery registrations.
9. 14 Jan. Monthly service of Team vehicle at ADS&L Coy including the fitting of new tyres.
10. 15 Jan to 16 Jan. A complete survey of all radio holdings in the villages and hamlets of Chau-Thanh District.
11. 17 Jan. Visit by the CO of AATTV to Chau-Thanh District.
12. 18 Jan to 19 Jan. Paralleling the requests for radios from village level through District to Province to ensure the requisitions have been forwarded to Saigon. After a lot of red tape this has now been completed.

Future Intentions

13. To complete all phases in Chau-Thanh District and move to Cho Gao District by 31 Jan 70.

General Remarks

14. The Med Caps performed by WO Hartman were very successful during his visit. This was not only due to the fact that the District Team has no medical adviser but in the way WO Hartman carried out his duties.

Administration

15. During the period 7 Jan to 15 Jan Sgt Xuan, the Teams interpreter was absent on leave. The DSA of Chau-Thanh District was most helpful during this period by making available an interpreter to assist the Team to carry out their duties.
16. The Team has now been issued with a permanent vehicle.

(R.D. SMITH)
WO2
AATTV

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Annex M to AATTV
Report - Jan 70

Ham-Long District
Kien-Hoa Province

Jan 70

Comd AATTV

REPORT OF VDAT ACTIVITIES : KIEN-HOA PROVINCE
JAN 70

1. General

Progress is being maintained in Ham-Long. A particularly gratifying point is the support the PSA and DPSA are giving the village defence system.

2. Villages worked in

a. Thanh-Trieu.

The team finished this village on the 31 December 1969, Although the village officials were cooperative, the team did not have a great deal of success in this village.

b. Phu-Long

This village has 4 hamlets and 130 PSDF although we have been getting different figures and answers to all questions asked. Phase 1 and part of phase 2 are complete. MAT 5 worked in this village with us for orientation to the 1970 Village Defence Plan.

c. Tien-Long

Phase 1 has just been started in this village. The village has 7 hamlets, but only 4 are workable. MAT 5 are again observing the methods used by this team.

3. Visits

8-9 Jan SP4 Toliver - Stars and Stripes - visited the team for a story on the Village Defence Programme.

8 Jan Major Harkness visited the team.

Medics. 10 Jan WO2 Hartman conducted 2 Medcaps with the District and Seabees

17 Jan Comd AATTV visited the team.

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(B.T. WATERS)
WO1
AATTV

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Annex N to AATTV
Report - Jan 70

Phong-Thuan District
Phong-Dinh Province

Comd AATTV

REPORT OF VDAT ACTIVITIES : PHONG-DINH PROVINCE
JAN 70

1. General

The work of the team has continued quite smoothly for the month, despite some delays, mostly occasioned by the holiday period.

Co-operation and assistance from District Staff and the District Adv Tm has continued at the highest level at all times.

The team interpreter (Sgt Chanh), although still rather shy, has settled in and is working well.

MAT 101 has now commenced Village/Hamlet Defence duties at Phong-Nam village and the other MAT team in the district (MAT 92) will be on these duties at Xuan-Hoa village by the end of the month. Some advice and suggestions has been given to both teams, in the light of experience gained by this team, and it is proposed to spend some time with each team to observe their methods and to assist them (if possible).

During the period 21-23 Jan, the team was visited by WOs Kealy and Gurney who are to form a VDAT in III Corps. Within the limits of the time available they were shown the system followed by this team and taken over the ground at Phu-Huu village.

2. Villages Worked In

a. Phu-Huu

This village is now at the completion of the execution phase in the three GVN controlled hamlets. The new defence plan, having been approved by the District Chief and Village Chief, has been explained by the team to the Hamlet Deputies for Security and all appears to be running smoothly. A delay was experienced due to the reluctance of the Village Chief to make any changes without written authority from the District Chief, this authority has been obtained. This reluctance seems to be more reluctance on the part of the Village Chief to 'stick his neck out' than opposition to the plan. A close watch will be kept on the implementation of the plan during the consolidation phase but no major problems are expected.

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- 2 -

3. Problem Areas

The difficulty of movement in the district (referred to in last month's report) has been largely overcome by the loan of a sampan and motor for use by the team.

4. Enemy Contacts

The team was involved in two contacts, on 22 Dec 69 and 12 Jan 70. Both were small arms harassment only and both incidents occurred in Phu-Nghia hamlet, Phu-Huu village.

Enemy activity within the hamlets worked in appears to have decreased during the past month, possibly due in part at least to the energetic implementation of the defence plan by Hamlet Committees; however enemy movements in the VC dominated areas appears to be on the increase, possibly tied in with the approach of Tet.

5. Movements and Visits

6 Jan Visit by Lt Col Lloyd and Maj Harkness
16 Jan Visit by Lt Cols Lloyd and Clark, Maj Harkness
21/23 Jan Visit by WOs Kealy and Gurney.

(W.A. EADE)
WO1
AATTV

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Annex 0 to AATTV
Report - Jan 70

Can-Tho
25 Jan 70

Comd AATTV

REPORT BY AATTV MEDICAL ADVISER
IV CTZ - JAN 70

1. During Jan 70, I had the opportunity of being able to conduct Medcap programmes in three provinces where our VDAT teams are located within the delta.

2. These Medcaps were undertaken in the following provinces over the dates shown:-

<u>Period of Medcap</u>	<u>Team Visited</u>	<u>Location</u>
a. 7 to 9 Jan 70	VDAT No 1	Dinh-Tuong Province
b. 10 to 13 Jan 70	VDAT No 2	Kien-Hoa Province
c. 14 to 15 Jan 70	AATTV Can-Tho (Re-called for Jan 70 stocktake)	Phong-Dinh Province
d. 16 to 24 Jan 70	VDAT No 3	Vinh-Binh Province

Visit Dinh-Tuong Province

3. To ensure that my Medcap coverage within this district functioned satisfactorily, the Vietnamese sources supplied a S-5 (Psyops) officer, a civilian VN medic and a interpreter to assist me in the running of it.

4. From 7 to 9 Jan 70, the Medcap activities proved very welcomed and successful in the following locations:-

a. Bien-Duc village and adjacent hamlets;				
b. Thanh-Phu	"	"	"	"
c. Tan-Hiep	"	"	"	"

Visit Kien-Hoa Province

5. On arrival in this province, I had been informed by WO2 B. Saxby, that a Medcap had been arranged in conjunction with the US Medics commencing 12 Jan 70. The villages of Than - Long and Phu-Long in the Ham-Long district had been selected as suitable locations to work.

6. The conduct of the Medcaps in this province were run slightly

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- 2 -

different to that of other provinces. To ensure that the VN medics gained the necessary training and experience; a majority of cases over the two day period were seen by a VN Aspirant (who had 12 months University training in Medicine) and two VN Medics, who carried out treatment of the villagers satisfactorily, but always under the watchful eyes of Free World Force Medics.

Visit Vinh-Binh Province

7. After the completion of the CO's handover/takeover stocktake 14-15 Jan 70 Can-Tho, I moved to Tra-Cu district (Vinh-Binh province) where I carried out a Medcap coverage of the Long-Hiep village and adjacent hamlets from 17 to 23 Jan 70.

8. With prior liaison by VDAT team No 3 and the Long-Hiep village administrative personnel, the Medcap got underway rather quickly. AM 17 Jan 70 and continued at a satisfactory pace each day.

Health Problems Affecting the People during Visits

9. Taking a general picture of the people seen by the Medcap programme in three provinces, the following complaints seemed fairly common in each area visited:

Common Complaints

- a. Irritating coughs/colds
- b. Influenza cases
- c. Mild fevers (particularly in babies)
- d. Back complaints (fibrositis & lumbago)
- e. Ear/Eye complaints
- f. Skin complaints (incl boils to scalp & body and tinea)
- g. Diarrhoea cases
- h. Minor cuts/gashes to body
- i. Insect bite rashes
- j. Vitamin deficiencies in the body (amongst young and aged people)

Additional Complaints Noted

* (Referred to higher medical authority, eg., Province Hospitals or Mil Phap Teams).

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.../3

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- 3 -

- a. *Injuries to the body through situations caused by war or accidents;
- b. Asthma sufferers
- c. Chicken pox outbreak (Thanh-Phu village only
(Chau-Thanh district;
- d. *Suspected cases of TB.

Daily Average of People seen by Medcap

10. Within each three provinces, the daily average figure of people seen by the Medcap programme ranged from 50 to 70 persons.

Conclusion

11. Realising the success of the recently conducted Medcap programme, it is requested that a "follow-up" Medcap be approved by HQ AATTV when time is available. These Medcap coverages not only improve the health standards of the people, but assist VDAT teams greatly in a better working relation with the people.

(J. HARTMAN)
WO2
AATTV

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- 3 -

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(J. HARTMAN)
WO2
AATTV

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