

Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report and enclosures
1 - 31 March 1970

Series: AWM95 - Australian Army
commanders' diaries

Item: 1/2/75

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14 Apr 70

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R723 / 1 / 35 (VI)

AHQ (C)
1 ATF

AATTV MONTHLY REPORT - MAR 70

Enclosed is one copy of the AATTV monthly report for Mar 70.

W Barrett Mai

W (C.A.E. FRASER)
Major General
Commander Australian Force
VIETNAM

Enclosure: 1. AATTV Monthly Report - Mar 70.

SD Coord

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R 723-10-3

Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam

11 Apr 70

HQ AFV (3)

AATTV REPORT MARCH 1970

General

1. During Mar AATTV continued to be actively involved over the four CTZs and in the Rung-Sat Special Zone in operations, training and in providing advice on territorial security at province to hamlet levels. During the month enemy activity was generally light.
2. This report will include activities in II Corps up to 5 Apr 70.

Casualties

3. AATTV casualties for the month up to 5 Apr 70 were :
 - a. Battle
 - (1) On 4 Apr WO2 Pettit was KIA when leading his CIDG platoon in the northern Kontum Province.
 - (2) On 3 Apr WO2 Sanderson was WIA in northern Kontum Province. He remained on duty after receiving a minor shrapnel wound.
 - b. Non Battle. The following members were hospitalized during the month:

Capt Nelson	1-2 Mar
WO2 Gorman	14-20 Mar
WO2 McNee	2-11 Mar (RTA Medevac)
WO2 Harris	30-31 Mar

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Deployment

4. No major changes in deployment occurred during the month. The deployment of AATTV as at 3 Apr 70 is attached at Annex A.

I Corps

5. The 1st, 3rd and 54th ARVN Regts commenced deployments west of the Piedmont in Mar but the weather proved unseasonable and generally the movement was either abandoned or did not proceed as far as intended. It is now planned for the 1st Regt to assume the major responsibility for the A Shau Valley activities with the 2nd Regt concentrating to the west and north of Camp Carroll. Large scale deployment is expected to commence in the middle of April and indications are that the enemy has made a quite significant build up west of the Piedmont during the winter months. The next few months should provide a major test for the ARVN units in the northern I Corps area. A report by WO Logan on the standard of his particular unit (4 Bn 1 ARVN Regt) is attached at Annex B and is well worth reading as I believe it represents the general standard of units in the 1st ARVN Div.

6. Except for two major contacts in 11 DTA operations in this area during the month were limited due to the very low cloud base. On 14 Mar 3 Bn 2 ARVN Regt and the Hac Bao (Black Panther) Coy engaged a NVA sapper battalion of the 305 NVA Div just north of Camp Carroll and killed 55 NVA sappers for the loss of three. This occurred immediately after an element of the 2 Bn 1 ARVN Regt had been over-run by the sapper battalion whilst defending a company sized outpost. On 29 Mar the 3 Bn 2 ARVN Regt was again successful in accounting for 58 enemy killed approximately 4000 metres to the east of the 14 Mar incident.

7. Further south in the Hoi-An area (just south of Danang) the 1st ARVN Armd Bde operation continued. The brigade is using an ARVN cavalry troop, two ranger battalions and up to five RF companies. Over 500 enemy have now been killed since the end of Jan 70. Generally the RF companies are used in a blocking role and the cavalry troop moves through areas to either flush out or find the enemy. The ranger battalions then do most of the killing. The operation is continuing with both good body counts and very heavy equipment gains.

8. During the month 2 ARVN Div conducted a two regiment sized operation with disappointing results although large caches of equipment and supplies were captured. The regiments have since returned to their normal TACRs. On 27 Mar 2 Bn 5 ARVN Regt combat assaulted into a suspected enemy area and contacted an estimated NVA company which resulted in 31 enemy KIA.

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9. A summary of operational incidents involving units with Australian advisers is at Annex C.

10. All ARVN regiments in I Corps are using sensor devices. Generally the sensors are placed out about 4000 metres from a regimental headquarters/fire support base to give warning of enemy movement. A stand by reaction force is usually available. Although only in an elementary stage by American standards, the present use of the sensors has allowed the regiments to leave the very minimum of troops to protect fire support bases and headquarters areas.

11. Attached are extracts of reports by AATTV advisers in I Corps as follows:

- a. Report by WO2 Logan 4/1 ARVN Bn showing the standard of this particular unit Annex B
- b. Summary of operational incidents in I Corps area Annex C
- c. Report by Maj Brown, Senior Adviser Nam-Hoa District Annex D
- d. Report by Maj Connor, Assistant Province Adviser (Military) in Quang-Tri Province Annex E
- e. Report by WO2 Lefel 3 Bn 2 ARVN Regt Annex F

II Corps

12. 1 Bn 2 MSF completed its operation in the Ben-Het area on 11 Mar 70. Extensive freshly cleared areas were found in the border area North West of Ben-Het that appear to indicate the start of a major farming programme in the coming wet season. During the operation 1 CIIG was KIA and 6 VC/NVA were KIA.

13. On 19 Mar 1 Bn 2 MSF was deployed in the Plei Me AO. Several minor contacts were made. On 3 Apr the bn was redeployed to the Dak Seang area (details later).

14. 2 Bn 2 MSF completed its training/patrolling/protection role in the Eu Prang area on 19 Mar without incident. The Bn returned to Pleiku and is at present undergoing conversion to RF. The conversion is planned to be complete by Jul.

15. Training coy commenced a recruit course of 6 weeks duration on 2 Mar with 189 recruits.

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16. On 1 Apr the SF A Camp at Dak Seang came under seige. An estimated NVA regt plus a sapper bn and an AA bn are believed to be involved. 1 Bn 2 MSF was redeployed by road to Dak To on 3 Apr and most of the bn were combat assaulted into a prepared LZ about 3000 metres south of the beseiged camp. Numerous probing attacks by fire have occurred on the camp. Most of these have been broken up by air support. 1 Bn 2 MSF has also been attacked by fire and their positions have been probed. As at 5 Apr 1 Bn is still 1500 metres short of the beseiged camp. Two ranger bns are also involved in the relief force. It is planned to commit 4 Bn 2 MSF on 6 Apr. Three caribou aircraft have been shot down, and all aircraft are being fired at when in the Dak To - Dak Seang area. Rocket/mortar attacks are also being directed at Dak To and Ben-diet.

17. 3 Bn 2 MSF was planned to commence conversion to RF on 4 Apr. Both 1 and 4 Bn 2 MSF were planned to start the conversion of one coy to RF on 1 May. It is not known at this stage what effect the present threat will have on this conversion programme.

18. At this stage AATTV proposes to run down its contribution to 2 MSF on a phase down no replacement basis. This, at present, fits in with the overall conversion programme.

19. It is also proposed to convert two A Camps (total in II Corps, 12) each month to RF or ARVN. The complete phase out of 5 SFG(A) in this area is planned at present to be complete by the end of 1970.

III Corps

20. IRRP Training Van-Kiep. I visited the NTC at Van-Kiep on 31 Mar/1 Apr and held discussions with the Chief Instructor and the American Senior Adviser on the future of IRRP training at Van-Kiep. It was obvious that the Chief Instructor wished to run the wing himself; accordingly it was decided at that level that AATTV would start a gradual handover of responsibilities and change over the AATTV role from instructor to adviser. Eventually one adviser is to stay with the wing. This programme has been discussed with the US advisers in Central Training Command and they will support it in discussions with Central Training Command.

21. RD - PSDF. Attached at Annex G is an extract of a report by the AATTV adviser on RD in Phuoc-Tuy Province.

22. Village Defence. Attached at Annex H is an extract of a report by the AATTV adviser on village defence in Phuoc-Tuy Province.

IV Corps

23. Enemy Activity

a. Enemy initiated activity continued at a low level this month. A number of relatively large scale actions took place but these were initiated by friendly forces with moderately heavy enemy casualties.

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- b. Increasing pressure is being placed on VC/NVA forces located within Cambodian sanctuaries to force their withdrawal from Cambodian territory. The pressure may force the enemy to attempt infiltration of larger forces and supplies into IV CTZ. If such infiltration occurs, it will probably force at least one of the NVA regiments in Base Area 400 to exfiltrate off the Seven Mountains to make room for the new elements. Any movement from the Seven Mountains would probably be towards the U Minh Forest Base Area 483.
24. During a discussion between Dep CORDS (Mr John P Vann) and Comd AATTV on 7 Mar it was decided and agreed that:
- a. The AATTV effort in the Village Defence Advisory Team (VDAT) programme had been a pilot and very successful scheme resulting in all of IV Corps converting to the programme.
- b. The AATTV effort should now be employed on a new pilot scheme on night operations in a district.
25. Subsequent to the discussion Mr Vann has stated that Australian advisers will be concentrated in Ben-Tranh District, Dinh-Tuong Province.
26. This new scheme will involve a considerable AATTV redeployment and a significant administrative load in setting it up. It is proposed at this stage to commence the programme early in May, if the necessary doctrine, liaison, administration and support is available by the end of Apr 70. In brief the scheme envisages advice and training at district level, and involving RF, PF and district staffs on the conduct of night operations. A team of about eight is envisaged.
27. It may be possible to continue with one or two VDATs and this and the details required in para 26 above will be discussed at the appropriate levels on 7 Apr when Comd AATTV visits the province and district concerned. At this stage I can see no major difficulties.
28. Attached at Annex I is a report by WO2 Smith, the VDAT team leader in Dinh-Tuong Province.

General

29. Training. In very general terms there are two quite different types of warrant officer in AATTV. One type is a commander at platoon level in SF and can be young and a dasher. The other type is an adviser and should be a mature, tolerant and knowledgeable man at battalion and company level tactics. With the run down in SF there will be no requirement for the young dasher type. There will in the future be a requirement for a mature, tolerant and reliable adviser who has a sound knowledge of company and platoon tactics. He should also have a knowledge of tactics at battalion level. Training in Australia should be directed towards this end.

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30. It is becoming more important that advisers arrive in country with at the least a smattering of the Vietnamese language as most Vietnamese junior leaders do not speak English. At present the advisers language training is done at the beginning of the three courses and as a consequence the advisers forget this essential requirement before they arrive in country. With the present shortage of interpreters and the level that most advice is required it is considered that a colloquial language course conducted immediately prior to arriving in country is almost essential.

J. A. Clark

(J.A. CLARK)
Lt Col
Comd

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AATTV DEPLOYMENT
AS AT 3 APR 1970

Annex 'A' to
AATTV Monthly Report
for Mar 70

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Inits</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Corps</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Employment</u>	<u>Due RTA</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>AATTV SAIGON</u>								
1	:LtCol	: J.A.	: Clark	: RA Inf	: HQ AATTV	: Commander	: Jan 71	: Saigon
2	: Capt	: D.J.	: Rowe	: RA Inf	"	: Adjutant	: May 70	"
3	: WO1	: D.L.	: Howells	: RA Inf	"	: Admin WO (A and Q)	: Feb 71	"
4	: WO2	: L.A.	: West	: RA Inf	"	: Admin WO (Pay and Movs)	: Jul 70	"
5	: Pte	: G.M.	: Eldridge	: RAASC	"	: Clerk	: Mar 71	"

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>I CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV : QUANG-TRI PROVINCE</u>								
6	Maj	C.S.	Connor	RAAC	Quang-Tri Sector	Asst Province Adviser (Military)	Oct 70	Quang-Tri
7	WO2	R.V.	Roney	RAAMC	" " "	Medical Adviser	Apr 70	" "
8	WO1	B.R.	Lawrence	RAAMC	" " "	" " (Desig)	Apr 71	" "
9	WO2	J.	Stephens	RAASC	Cam-Lo Sub-Sector	Assistant Adviser	Oct 70	Cam-Lo
10	WO2	J.	Fitzgerald	RA Inf	1/1 ARVN Bn	" "	Jul 70	Near Quang-Tri
11	WO2	D.T.	Powell	RA Inf	2/1 " "	" "	Oct 70	" " "
12	WO2	D.M.	Palmer	RA Inf	3/1 " "	" "	Jan 71	" " "
13	WO2	G.M.	Logan	RA Inf	4/1 " "	" "	Oct 70	" " "
14	WO2	B.M.	Ryan	RA Inf	1/2 " "	" "	Jan 71	Dong-Ha (Regt)
15	WO2	O.W.	Bell	RAA	2/2 " "	" "	Aug 70	" " "
16	WO2	J.M.	Lefel	RA Inf	3/2 " "	" "	Jan 71	" " "
17	WO2	A.E.	Gee	RA Inf	4/2 " "	" "	Feb 71	" " "
18	WO2	L.J.	Storan	RA Inf	5/2 " "	" "	Jan 71	" " "
19	WO1	E.C.	Burns	RAAC	3/7 " "	" "	Oct 70	Quang-Tri

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Serial	Rank	Init s	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>I CTZ (Cont)</u>								
<u>AATTV THUA-THIEN PROVINCE</u>								
20	: WO2	: D.G.	: Killion	: RAAMC	: Thua-Thien Sector	:Medical Adviser	: Jul 70	: Hue
21	: Maj	: G.V.	: Brown	: RAE	: Nam-Hoa District	:District Senior Adviser	: Jun 70	: Nam-Hoa
22	: WO2	: J.F.	: Leal	: RAA	: " " "	:Assistant Adviser	: Apr 71	: " "
23	: WO2	: K.W.	: Forden	: RA Inf	: Black Panther Coy	: " "	: May 70	: Hue (Base)
24	: WO2	: D.G.	: Parker	: RA Inf	: 1/54 ARVN Bn	: " "	: Oct 70	: Phu-Loc (Regt HQ)
25	: WO2	: D.F.	: Heenan	: RA Inf	: 2/54 " "	: " "	: Jul 70	: " "
26	: Capt	: W.R.	: Deane	: Aust Int	: 3/54 " "	:Senior Adviser	: Jul 70	: " "
27	: WO2	: S.	: Speechley	: RAEME	: 3/54 " "	:Assistant Adviser	: Jul 70	: " "
28	: WO2	: S.A.	: Birnie	: RAA	: 4/54 " "	: " "	: Feb 71	: " "
29	: WO2	: D.E.	: Watts	: RA Sigs	: 1/3 " "	: " "	: Jul 70	: Near Hue (Regt HQ)
30	: WO2	: J.F.	: McKenmer	: RA Inf	: 2/3 " "	: " "	: Jul 70	: " " "
31	: Capt	: H.D.	: Shortt	: RA Inf	: 3/3 " "	:Senior Adviser	: Feb 71	: " " "
32	: WO2	: R.E.	: Heathcote	: RAA	: 3/3 " "	:Assistant Adviser	: Nov 70	: " " "
33	: WO2	: K.H.	: Mavin	: RA Inf	: 4/3 " "	: " "	: Aug 70	: " " "

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Serial	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>I CTZ (Cont)</u>								
<u>AATTV : QUANG-NAM PROVINCE</u>								
34	Maj	F.C.	Johnston	RA Inf	HQ I Corps	G3 Trg Adviser	Apr 70	Danang
35	Maj	R.J.	Aitken	RA Inf	HQ I Corps	" " " (Desig)	Apr 71	"
36	Capt	J.P.	Nelson	RA Inf	HQ I Corps	" " " (Attached)	May 70	"
37	WO1	G.S.	Munt	RA Inf	AATTV Danang	Admin WO	Oct 70	Aust House Danang
38	WO2	D.	Burke	RA Inf	" "	" "	Aug 70	" " "
39	WO1	R.M.	Almond	RAAC	3/17 ARVN Cav	Assistant Adviser	May 70	Hoi-An
40	WO2	T.H.	Breakwell	RA Inf	21st Ranger Bn	" "	Dec 70	Near Danang (Gp HQ)
41	Capt	W.	Sheppard	RA Inf	1/51 ARVN Bn	Senior Adviser	Sep 70	Mieu-Bong (Regt HQ)
42	Capt	B.F.	McGurgan	RAE	" " "	" " (Desig)	Mar 71	" " "
43	WO2	C.D.	Dermody	RA Inf	2/51 " "	Assistant Adviser	Jan 71	" " "
44	WO2	W.T.	Jones	RA Inf	3/51 " "	" "	Aug 70	" " "
45	WO2	P.J.	Heslin	RAE	Hoa-Vang Sub Sector	" "	Oct 70	Hoa-Vang

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Serial	: Rank	: Inits	: Name	: Corps	: Unit	: Employment	: Due RTA	: Location
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I GTZ (Cont)

AATTV : QUANG-TIN and QUANG-NGAI PROVINCE

46	: WO2	: B.	: Davies	: RA Inf	: 4 ARVN Regt Recce Coy	: Senior Adviser	: Oct 70	:)
47	: WO2	: W.J.	: McInerny	: RA Inf	: " " " "	: " " (Desig)	: Apr 71	:)
48	: WO2	: G.E.	: Munro	: RA Sigs	: 1/4 ARVN Bn	: Assistant Adviser	: Sep 70	:)
49	: WO2	: W.E.	: Tillett	: RA Inf	: 2/4 " "	: " "	: Sep 70	:)
50	: WO2	: L.G.	: Schmidt	: RA Inf	: 3/4 " "	: " "	: Jan 71	:)
51	: WO2	: G.D.	: Heath	: RA Inf	: 1/5 " "	: " "	: Feb 71	:)
52	: WO2	: A.H.	: Franks	: RA Inf	: 2/5 " "	: " "	: Jan 71	:)
53	: WO2	: G.	: Joyce	: RA Inf	: 3/5 " "	: " "	: Jan 71	:)
54	: WO2	: D.	: Rolph	: RA Inf	: 4/5 " "	: " "	: Nov 70	:)
55	: WO2	: D.W.	: Eather	: RA Inf	: 1/6 " "	: " "	: Jul 70	:)
56	: Capt	: A.J.	: Mogridge	: RA Inf	: 2/6 " "	: Senior Adviser	: Apr 70	:)
57	: WO2	: J.I.	: Shaw	: RA Inf	: 2/6 " "	: Assistant Adviser	: Feb 71	:)
58	: WO2	: K.J.	: Brady	: RA Inf	: 3/6 " "	: " "	: Oct 70	:)
59	: WO1	: T.J.	: Forde	: RA Inf	: 4/6 " "	: " "	: Apr 71	: Quang-Ngai
60	: WO2	: T.J.	: Goddard	: RAA	: 23 ARVN Arty Bn	: " "	: Apr 70	: " "
61	: WO2	: J.F.	: Ghilotti	: RAAC	: 2/4 ARVN Cav	: " "	: Aug 70	: " "

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>II CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV : PLEIKU (SPECIAL FORCES)</u>								
62	Maj	P.W.	Beale	RA Inf	2nd Mobile Strike Force Command, Det B-20, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)	Bn Comd	Jan 71	Pleiku (Base)
63	Capt	D.F.	Paul	RA Inf	"	"	May 70	"
64	Capt	P.J.	Shilston	RA Inf	"	"	Aug 70	"
65	WO1	J.S.	Calcutt	RA Inf	"	Coy Comd (Trg Coy)	Mar 71	"
66	WO2	J.R.	Vincent	RAA	"	Instructor	May 70	"
67	WO2	L.B.	Scowcroft	RA Inf	"	"	Aug 70	"
68	WO2	A.S.	Williams	RA Sigs	"	"	Oct 70	"
69	WO2	A.B.	McCloskey	RA Inf	"	Pl Comd	Jul 70	"
70	WO2	J.G.	Pettit	RA Inf	"	"	Jan 71	"
71	WO2	G.Y.	Jamieson	RA Inf	"	"	Oct 70	"
72	WO2	A.G.	White	RA Inf	"	"	Jan 71	"
73	Sgt	D.S.	Cochrane	RA Inf	"	"	Jul 70	"
74	Sgt	A.J.	Miller	RA Inf	"	"	Jul 70	"
75	WO2	R.A.	Barnes	RA Inf	"	"	Feb 71	"
76	WO2	P.N.	Sanderson	RA Inf	"	"	Feb 71	"

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Serial : Rank : Inits : Name : Corps : Unit : Employment : Due RTA : Location

II CTZ (Cont)

AATTV - II CORPS AREA

77	: WO1	: W.A.	: Eade	: RAA Pro	: Ranger Training Centre	: Instructor/Adviser	: Feb 71	: Duc-My
78	: WO1	: E.B.	: Ostara	: RA Inf	: Province Recce Unit	: Senior Adviser Binh-Dinh	: Jul 70	: Qui-Nhon
79	: WO2	: R.G.	: Carter	: RA Inf	: " " "	: " " Tuyen-Duc	: Jul 70	: Dalat
80	: WO2	: L.B.	: Green	: RAAC	: 1/14 ARVN Cav	: Assistant Adviser	: Nov 70	: Kontum (Base)

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>III CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV - III CORPS AREA</u>								
81	Capt	W.D.	Tear	RA Inf	LRP Wing Van-Kiep, National Training Centre	CI	Oct 70	Baria
82	WO2	D.F.	Hedges	RA Inf	" " "	Admin WO	Aug 70	"
83	Sgt	R.T.	Broadhurst	RA Inf	" " "	Patrol Comd/Instructor	Aug 70	"
84	WO2	O.	Stevenson	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Aug 70	"
85	WO2	J.T.	Hoolihan	RA Inf	" " "	" " "	Jun 70	"
86	WO2	C.J.	Ison	RA Inf	Province Recce Unit	Senior Adviser Rung-Sat Special Zone	May 70	Vung-Tau (Base)
87	WO2	C.	Kealy	RA Inf	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	PF Adviser	Aug 70	Baria
88	WO2	W.C.	Green	RAASS	" "	Assistant Adviser A & L Coy	Nov 70	"
89	WO2	R.S.	Simpson	RA Inf	" "	Adviser PSDF	Apr 70	"
90	WO2	V.L.	Harris	RA Inf	" "	" " (Desig)	Sep 70	"
91	WO2	L.D.	Osborn	RA Inf	" "	Adviser RD Cadre	Jun 70	"
92	WO2	E.A.	Taylor	RA Inf	" "	Adviser ARVN Trg	Jul 70	Nui-Dat (Horse Shoe)

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>IV CTZ</u>								
<u>AATTV : IV CORPS AREA</u>								
93	Maj	A.	Harkness	RAA	CORDS, IV Corps	Assistant to Chief of Territorial Security	Apr 70	Can-Tho
94	Maj	J.A.	Browne	RAA	" " "	" "(Desig)	Mar 71	" "
95	WO2	H.J.	Hartman	RAAMC	HQ IV Corps	Medical Adviser	Jul 70	" "
96	WO2	R.D.	Smith	RA Inf	IV Corps Village Defence Advisory Team (VDAT)	VDAT Team Leader	Oct 70	Dinh-Tuong Province
97	WO2	D.B.	Bell	RAE	" " "	VDAT Adviser	Dec 70	" " "
98	WO1	B.T.	Waters	RA Inf	" " "	VDAT Team Leader	Dec 70	Kien-Hoa Province
99	WO2	R.A.	O'Hara	RA Inf	" " "	VDAT Adviser	Jul 70	" " "
100	WO2	A.J.	Joyce	RA Inf	" " "	VDAT Team Leader	Aug 70	" " "
101	WO2	W.E.	Butler	RA Inf	" " "	VDAT Adviser	Jan 71	" " "
102	WO2	C.N.	McEvoy	RA Inf	" " "	VDAT Team Leader	Dec 70	Vinh-Binh Province
103	WO2	D.A.	Strachan	RA Inf	" " "	VDAT Adviser	Oct 70	" " "
104	WO2	R.I.	Oliver	RAASC	" " "	VDAT Team Leader	Nov 70	Phong-Dinh Province
105	WO2	S.	Booth	RA Inf	" " "	VDAT Adviser	Feb 70	" " "

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Annex B to AATTV
Report - Mar 70

REPORT BY WO2 LOGAN ON
STANDARDS IN 4/1 ARVN BN

1. It is now six months since I joined 4/1 Bn, in that time I have gained a number of impressions of the effectiveness and efficiency of the bn. The following are the points for and against.

General Op Background.

2. In general the type of operation they have undertaken is mobile ops against small (up to coy) sized units, they have only had one month in a static defensive role (26 Dec - 25 Jan DMZ). Against these smaller units they have enjoyed a considerable success. On the one occasion that we struck a unit with strength parity - they stopped us dead.

Organisation

3. The bn org is pretty well tailored to effectively deal with the smaller sized unit, although there is a shortage of M60 MG (2-3 per coy) and they do not carry enough claymores per coy (1 per squad; they say weight is the consideration here). Organic to the coys is 1x57mm RR and 1x60mm Mor; normally these are not carried by the coy, again they claim weight as the consideration. In the field our rifle coy strength is about 100-110.

4. Bn HQ is small, well organised and the tasks of each member dovetail neatly. (The bn comd seems much more closely involved in detailed running of the bn than our bn comds are).

5. Probably through trial and error and time, the Admin tail of the bn seems to function well and is handled without fuss. That is, it functions well on the supplies available.

Leadership

6. The bn comd is a pretty smart man. He thinks well and has a sound knowledge of en tactics and consequently the tactics he must use to best beat him. He is a super egocentric and this makes it hard for him to accept ideas and suggestions from both superiors and subordinates.

7. The XO is the workhorse of the bn. Unlike our 21Cs he usually has comd of the light CP (2 coys under his comd patrolling the AO whilst the bn comd directs from a FSB). In this bn in the last six months the XO has virtually run all the contacts and been responsible for all the victories. He has an uncanny knowledge of the en intentions and once contact has been initiated he manoeuvres squads and platoons beautifully, generally with a good deal of success. I think there might be a touch of Viet-Minh in his background.

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8. The coy comds are pretty good hands. Of the four coy comds only one is useless. He was evidently a good aggressive pl cmd but lacks the character and drive of a successful coy cmd. The remaining coy comds have strong grips on their coys. They tend to lead by talking loudly and carrying a big stick, but in contact they move well forward and exert close control over the battle. They are, because of the system, restrained from showing much initiative and strangely enough do not always make use of the right weapons to the ground and situation. (On one occasion the en were using B-40s against us quite effectively, causing us casualties and keeping our heads down whilst he maneuvered. I asked the coy cmd why we didn't use the M72 in the same way and he told me that the M72 took too long to prepare. I pointed out that reloading a B-40 took about the same time as preparing the 72 but he wouldn't be convinced, consequently the en kept the initiative in their hands for that contact).

9. Pl Comds. Here is where the big problem lies. They are mostly young Warrant Officers or Aspirants who although reasonably keen lack the basic knowledge to effectively lead and fight a platoon. This I feel is a direct result of the method used to train them. The US system is used and from what I gather from the Americans, all they learn is how to low-crawl, and suffer innumerable acts of pointless bastardry. These young pl comds have to learn whilst on the job and because of the stifling of initiative they learn by what Joe Blow says not by their own experiences.

10. Other ranks are the same as ORs anywhere. Well led and well administered they'll tackle any task given to them. Their basic standard of living is such that it doesn't take a great deal to make them happy. Generally they are not well trained, again the fault of the system. Each bn should put in a month each year at the National Trg Centre. This Bn has not been for about 2 years. Their shooting is atrocious; only the fact that the VC cannot shoot either, saves us a lot of casualties.

General Points.

11. The body count system is a farce. They tell me that they must lie on this to satisfy the Div Comd and to keep the Americans happy. From observation I would say that they overcount by approximately 30%.

12. On weapons, they can use mortars very well and have a well trained mortar team. The M16 is used enthusiastically even if not very effectively. The wpns are as well maintained as circumstances will allow, all except the sights which I think are regarded, particularly the foresight, as a handy place to attach a sling.

13. The coy comds are starting to realise the value of the claymore in ambush, but they have a control problem in stopping the soldiers from using the C4 as fuel. M79s are used vigorously and grenades are used in every contact. Boiled down it comes to this : if its a crew served or an area weapon they're OK, if it's an individual point target weapon, they are hopeless.

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Annex F to AATTV
Report - Mar 70

REPORT BY WO2 LEFEL
3/2 ARVN BN - MAR 70

1. This period covers 3 Bn's operation "LAM SON 350" involving 3 combat assault (CA's) into the AO West from "FSB Fuller".
2. Detailed info of activity involving Light Command Post (LCP) is recorded on a day to day basis only in cases of enemy actions.
3. Summary at completion involves the whole 3 Bn, from information received from 3 Bn commander.

25 Feb 70. Operation to commence from an area near "Cam-Lo" as PZ. 3 Bn divided into main Command Post (MCP) and LCP. Separate LZs allocated for each element.

CA commenced with MCP element at 1530 hrs. Followed by LCP element at 1610 hrs. Both elements landed on wrong LZ's.

MCP in contact, receiving 82mm mortars and ground fire.

Casualties. Own 2 KIA. 1US + 22 ARVN WIA.
En 1 KIA, 2 POW's.

LCP no en contact.

26 Feb/9 Mar. 3 Bn moved from LZ's, through AO to the South of Highway 9 clearing while advancing. No further en contact. Received briefing and warning order on combat assault to commence on the 10 Mar 70.

10 Mar 70. CA to start at 1000 hrs with 3 Bn again divided into two elements MCP and LCP, to land on separate LZ's.

1100 MCP lift off commenced, 4 slicks landed their loads on LZ. Enemy contact with 82 mortars and SA fire concentrated on LZ. Landing aborted and changed to alternate LZ. This LZ was well within mortar range so plan was changed and whole Bn landed on unprepped LZ, 4000 x to East of original. Rest of landing was unopposed and the original landing force extracted from hot LZ. Resulting in 2 WIA ARVN.

11 Mar 70. MCP in contact, no results available. LCP nil en contact.

12 Mar. LCP in contact with 1 pl NVA, took 15/60mm mortar rounds and MG fire.

Gunships and Arty employed on target ARVN assaulted en poen using gunships as supt fire.

Cas. Own 2 KIA, 10 WIA. En 8 KIA, 2 AK 47.

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14. Supply. I confess I'm not au fait with the supply system but from what little I have seen it appears pretty rancid other than the ration and ammo system for the field.

15. Advisers. There is a definite need for advisers, particularly from coy level down. There is a real problem in trying to work below coy; the Vietnamese are loathe to let one go below coy level in this bn and of course there is a communication problem at the lower levels. Advice is normally done by example at the lower levels.

16. The comds are reluctant to accept on the spot advice, any gains made in advising seem to be made during discussions particularly after a contact. Whoever picked the team motto knew what he was about. It seems that the only way any achievements will be made is by plugging away at various points and continuing to persevere.

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Annex C to AATTV
Report - Mar 70

SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS CONCERNING ARVN UNITS
WITH AATTV ADVISERS - ICTZ MARCH 70

1. 011100H vicinity YD 387504 1st Bn 54th ARVN Regt searching a village captured 1 VC. 1 carbines and 10 VCI.
2. 012010H vicinity AT 872520, 3rd Bn 51st ARVN Regt ambushed estimated VC squad resulting in 5 enemy KIA 1 individual weapon captured.
3. 020500H vicinity YD 219382, 3rd Bn 1st ARVN Regt ambushed unknown sized enemy force resulting in 2 enemy KIA 1 VC captured 1 AK47 captured.
4. 021025H vicinity YC 957974, 2nd Bn 54th ARVN Regt on a raid of suspected enemy location contacted unknown sized enemy force resulting in 2 enemy KIA 1AK51 captured.
5. 031410H vicinity YD 504092 1st Bn 3rd ARVN Regt contacted unknown sized enemy force resulting in 4 enemy KIA 4 individual weapons captured.
6. 031230H vicinity BS 517872, 3rd Bn 6th ARVN Regt contacted estimated enemy platoon resulting in 6 enemy KIA.
7. 040645H vicinity BS 518867, 3rd Bn 6th ARVN Regt ambushed an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 4 enemy KIA.
8. 052030H vicinity BS 473882, 3rd Bn 6th ARVN Regt ambushed unknown sized enemy force resulting in 4 enemy KIA.
9. 071120H vicinity YD 666147, 4th Bn 3rd ARVN Regt contacted 1 squad of VC resulting in 3 enemy KIA 2 AK 47 captured.
10. 071500H vicinity AT 830480, 1st Bn 51st ARVN Regt contacted unknown sized VC force resulting in 7 enemy KIA 3AK44 captured.
11. 081600H vicinity BS 408584, 4th Bn 4th ARVN Regt searching discovered a group of huts and contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 4 enemy KIA.
12. 091700H vicinity BS 404598, 4th Bn 4th ARVN Regt clearing contacted an unknown sized NVA force resulting in 3 enemy KIA.
13. 101300H vicinity YD 352367, 4th Bn 4th ARVN Regt contacted 1 squad VC resulting in 5 enemy KIA.
14. 110231H vicinity BS 276607, 3rd Bn 6th ARVN Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force resulting in 4 enemy KIA.
15. 111745H vicinity BS 307560, 3rd Bn 6th ARVN Regt searching contacted unknown size NVA force resulting in 5 enemy KIA.

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16. 131840H vicinity XD 948609, 3rd Bn 2nd ARVN Regt HQ contacted 3 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA.
17. 131530H vicinity YD 307204, 4th Bn 1st ARVN Regt contacted an estimated enemy platoon resulting in 4 enemy KIA.
18. 140845H vicinity BS 306590, 3rd Bn 6th ARVN Regt clearing contacted unknown size enemy force resulting in 6 enemy KIA.
19. 141300H vicinity YD 015586 Black Panther Co and 3rd Bn 2nd ARVN Regt contacted an unknown size NVA force identified as 2nd Sapper Bn 305 NVA Div. The contact lasted approximately 20 minutes being supported by ARVN Arty, resulting in 55 enemy KIA.
20. 141700H vicinity YD 308204, 4th Bn 1st ARVN Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in 5 enemy KIA.
21. 150930H vicinity BS 444496, 3rd Bn 4th ARVN Regt searching contacted unknown sized enemy force resulting in 8 enemy KIA.
22. 151030H vicinity BS 440540, 4th Bn 4th ARVN Regt searching contacted unknown size enemy force resulting in 3 enemy KIA.
23. 151730H vicinity BT 154215, 2nd Bn 5th ARVN Regt contacted and unknown size en force resulting in 5 enemy KIA.
24. 160915H vicinity BS 447524, 4th Regt recce coy searching contacted unknown size enemy force resulting in 4 enemy KIA.
25. 160130H vicinity BT 132215, 2nd Bn 5th Regt raided a suspected enemy location resulting in 5 enemy KIA.
26. 171335H vicinity YD 626172, 1st Bn 3rd ARVN Regt searching contacted unknown sized enemy force resulting in 7 enemy KIA.
27. 181030H vicinity BT 192456, 21st Rangers contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in 7 enemy KIA.
28. 191400H vicinity XD 985615, 4th Bn 2nd ARVN Regt contacted one VC platoon resulting in 3 enemy KIA.
29. 191530H vicinity BS 465446, 4th Bn 4th ARVN Regt searching contacted unknown sized enemy force resulting in 7 enemy KIA.
30. 201245H vicinity BT 185465, 21st Rangers contacted one squad size VC force resulting in 2 enemy KIA 5 VC captured.

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31. 201530H vicinity BT 265065, 3rd Bn 5th ARVN Regt clearing contacted unknown sized VC force resulting in 4 enemy KIA.
32. 211210H vicinity BT 263054, 3rd Bn 5th ARVN Regt contacted unknown size enemy force resulting in 3 enemy KIA.
33. 250550H vicinity BT 226084, 4th Bn 5th ARVN Regt ambushed a VC squad resulting in 6 enemy KIA.
34. 241630H vicinity BS 708571, 3rd Bn 4th ARVN Regt searching contacted unknown size enemy force resulting in 10 enemy KIA.
35. 261520H vicinity BT 174188, 2nd Bn 5th ARVN Regt searching contacted 5 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA.
36. 270835 vicinity BT 176184, 2nd ^{Bn/} 5th ARVN Regt contacted estimated 1 coy NVA resulting in 31 enemy KIA.
37. 270940 vicinity YD 162710, 5th Bn 2nd ARVN Regt searching contacted unknown sized enemy force resulting in 11 NVA KIA.
38. 271845 vicinity YD 155680, 5th Bn 2nd ARVN Regt contacted unknown size NVA force resulting in 3 NVA KIA.
39. 291730H vicinity YD 040610, 3rd Bn 2nd ARVN Regt contacted platoon sized enemy force resulting in 23 enemy KIA.
40. 292140 vicinity YD 040610, 3rd Bn 2nd ARVN Regt NVA counter attacked resulting in 13 enemy KIA.
41. 301450H vicinity BS 750700, 4th Bn 4th ARVN Regt searching contacted unknown sized enemy force resulting in 5 enemy KIA.
42. 301800H vicinity YD 039609, 3rd Bn 2nd ARVN Regt contacted platoon sized NVA force resulting in 15 enemy KIA.

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Annex D to
AATTV Report - Mar 70

EXTRACTS OF REPORT BY MAJ BROWN
NAM-HOA DISTRICT - MAR 70

Intelligence

1. There has been no major change in the intelligence picture this month. Enemy patrol activity within 10 Km of the pacified area continues to diminish. One mine incident occurred 15 km West of Pohl Bridge and an engineer vehicle was ambushed by 1-2 men approximately 10 km West of Pohl Bridge. Some minor courier and reconnaissance movement is still going on near Camp Eagle in the North-Eastern corner of Nam-Hoa.

Operations

2. RF/PF operations have continued at the same pace as last month. In the last two weeks, however, one reinforced RF platoon patrol has been operating 10 km out in thick jungle by itself (but with a US fire support liaison team). A 122mm rocket launching site was discovered and a rocket launcher tripod was captured. The logistic resupply of these troops is being handled well by the Vietnamese using US helicopters for resupply every four to five days. The chief value of these operations is to give the RF some self-confidence and confidence in their logistic back-up.

3. Nevertheless, this type of operation is an incorrect use of RF and it is planned to switch to shorter range patrols of four to five days' duration (without helicopter resupply) in the near future. This will be more in keeping with the RF role and capabilities. One side light of these operations is the often-voiced RF complaint that their scale of machine-guns is too light for these operations, particularly in view of their problems in obtaining indirect fire support.

4. A PSEF standing patrol ambushed a small enemy party at YD 772141 early this month. Unfortunately, the enemy did not oblige by walking directly into them and the result was only one (new) AK 47 magazine captured. The enemy, however, were forced to withdraw and abandon their mission. The trend of PSEF even being on patrol, let alone being willing to engage the enemy, is very heartening.

Nam-Hoa Building Programme

5. Steady progress has been made in most areas of the building and defence programme but, due to the erratic and uncertain supply of materials and availability of earthmoving plant, the results do not appear

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spectacular. One could almost say we are employing "the indirect approach" to rebuilding the Sub-Sector Compound. Advantage, however, was taken of some surplus US Engineer effort to lay two floor slabs adjacent to the Sub-Sector Compound for new office blocks for the new site for District HQ, to assist in the resettlement of Hai Cat hamlet and to improve our PSDF training site.

Resettlement

6. Hai Cat hamlet is being resettled at YD 752143 near its old site from which it was evacuated in 1967. The people were formerly living very close to the Pohl Bridge on the East side of the Perfume River. Resettlement, apart from its obvious social and economic benefits, was instigated primarily to separate the civilians from close proximity to the Pohl Bridge garrison for their mutual safety.

7. Preliminary plans have been made for the resettlement of three more hamlets on the East side of the Perfume River. Timing depends on the availability of engineer effort to repair the route to these hamlets but it is not anticipated that we can actually resettle the population before at least six months. It is hoped, however, to undertake some cultivation and clearing in the area as a preliminary step.

8. After we have moved back these hamlets, most of our refugees in the District will have been resettled.

HES Report

9. The District Chief and Deputy Chief participated fully for the first time in the preparation of the Quarterly Update to the HES Report. This resulted in a more accurate and fuller report than previously.

Conclusion

10. The "pacification" of the populated area of Nam-Hoa is progressing very satisfactorily. We have no viable VCI and contact between the VC/MVA and the population has been virtually cut off. No terrorist activities have occurred in the last 10 months and the last harassing attack on a hamlet occurred last Sep. Old fields are steadily being re-opened for cultivation and new ones added. All but one of the village and hamlet chiefs are elected. The rapport between FWMA and Vietnamese is very sound. GVN administration, as it affects the District, is improving slowly but steadily although it certainly still has a long way to go. Without being over-optimistic, the general feeling among officials, soldiers, civilians and advisers in this District is that we are going in the right direction.

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Annex E to AATTV
Report - Mar 70

REPORT BY MAJ CONNOR
QUANG-TRI PROVINCE - MAR 70

Enemy

1. The enemy has concentrated on food collection, proselyting and some harassment of the fringes of the populated area in this month. There were three sapper attacks launched; in two the enemy were caught before reaching their start line and turned back with heavy casualties. In the third the sappers penetrated the defences at the Khe Gio bridge YD 202662, killing eight of the defenders and wounding some 12. 30 sappers were killed, and they failed to attack the actual bridge.

2. Sensors have revealed considerable activity on the DMZ on a few nights. No significant troop concentration has been located as a result. Most agencies in this area consider that the enemy cannot support any large scale offensive in this area at present.

Friendly Forces

3. Movement toward the west of the province by friendly forces has been considerably reduced by bad flying weather. The area covered by patrols has been increased, and further movement is planned when possible. The few contacts that have occurred have been heavily in favour of friendly forces. Heavy mining on the eastern and central DMZ continues.

4. Regional forces have been active, and are in the process of reorganisation; RF Coy Gps are to become self administering, and are to be given a part of the SM & DSL Coy. This is a considerable improvement over the system of having all directly supported from the Sector HQ. The chain of command has been straightened, but is still far from perfect, suffering from the heavy hand of the Sector HQ. RF and PF have had the majority of contacts near the populated area, and have performed extremely well.

Development

5. Village self development plans are being pushed by province and district officials. There is a constant stream of small trade and development projects coming forward, which suggest confidence in the present government. Approximately 1/3 of the province held village and hamlet elections in the last fortnight, to select officials as replacements for those retiring after their 3 year term (most of the province held elections in 1967). There was no enemy interference. Unfortunately, it is difficult to believe that all voters understood the principles of free elections.

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6. As predicted the Jones Creek resettlement did not take place. One of the contributing factors was the absence of engineer support (as the PSA had warned). It now appears that the Province officials have accepted the fact that the US cornucopia is rapidly becoming empty (at least here) and are making their own arrangements with the resources they control. The movement is now scheduled to start on 1 Apr 70.

7. The Province Chief, the dynamic force behind most province activities is recovering from a major operation. In his absence, province officials were predictably unwilling to make decisions. They did much better than in Nov/Dec 69, when the previous Province Chief was ill. This is a most encouraging sign.

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13 Mar. No en contact.

14 Mar. MCP CA to LZ 500 x West of Fuller to assist Mac Bao. LCP remained to provide security for PZ, then to move towards FSB Fuller. Received 12 rds 82 mortar during MCP lift off and used gunships to silence. Was successful, no further firing experienced.

1 WIA ARVN. Medevac

15 Mar. Moved towards Fuller along high ground. En contacted at 1715 hrs. Received 25 rds of both 60mm and 82mm mortar and also HMG fire. Some B40 rds hit the forward element. Used gunships. Continual contact during night. All SA fire.

16 Mar. 1000 hrs. Mortars opened up on forward elements; spotted smoke from mortar site and gunships destroyed same. Noticed secondary explosion and flash of burning cordite charges.

Information gained from one of our casualties disclosed a heavy bunker position.

During day used 6 sets of gunships and artillery. Company assaulted en posn with gunships as support fire (direct). Gained posn, came under heavy fire from 82 mortars, B40's and MG from another posn further along ridge. Airstrikes which had been requested at first contact cancelled due to weather conditions. Ordered to withdraw.

Results: En 9 KIA, 1 PW. Own 3 KIA, 4 WIA

17/18 Mar. Withdrawal to the South. No en contact

19 Mar. Have taken over security of Tan Lam and Khe Gio.
En working on reconstruction of defences at Khe Gio.

Summary

Operation "Lam-Son 350" (2nd phase)

<u>En</u>	<u>Cas</u>	29	KIA
		3	POW
	<u>Wpns</u>	3	Crewserved
		8	Ind. wpns + (Qty grenades)
<u>Fr</u>	<u>Cas</u>	14	KIA
		47 - 1US	WIA
	<u>Wpns</u>	1	M79
		2	M16

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Remarks

1. From enemy opposition experienced on both CA's it seems that they were aware of the actual LZ's either due to security leaks or to the prepping of the LZ's.
2. Weapons have improved greatly and are being cleaned daily.
3. During the period 1 Mar to 19 Mar I was the only adviser with the LCP. This presented no difficulty and relations with the XO are very good.

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Annex G to AATTV
Report - Mar 70

RD CADRE REPORT - MARCH 1970

EX 102 0900N

Incidents

1. The only incident of any significance occurred on the night of 9/10 March when group 6 located at Hoi My Village Dat Do District ambushed a group of VC entering the village, results are:

- 1 VC KIA
- 2 VC WIA (Possible, Blood Trails)

RD Cadre casualties nil.

The VC KIA was discovered to be the secretary for the VC of the Dat Do District.

Activities

2. All groups have been very active during the month of March, at present there are (3) three houses under construction; materials being supplied by 1 Aust CA Unit.

Visits

3. a. On the 7 Mar a delegation from the RD Directorate visited the Province and visited groups in each District.

b. On the 14 March 42 RD Cadre control chiefs from other provinces visited and inspected all groups in Dat Do and Long Dien Districts.

c. All groups in Province have been visited by Control Chief and Adviser at least three times during March.

Training

4. A very effective training programme is in progress at this time, mainly to ensure every member of the RD Cadre is aware of the 1970 Pacification programme.

Morale

5. The morale of all members remains very high, desertions for the month of March nil.

New Groups

6. a. There is to be two new groups raised in the Province, they will be TRSD Cadre, or Montagnard Cadre. The first group will enter NTC Vung-Tau on 1st April 1970.

b. On completion of training the groups will be assigned to Duc-Thanh District.

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Annex I to AATTV
Report - Mar 70

REPORT OF VDAT 1 ACTIVITIES
PERIOD 21 FEB - 20 MAR
BY WO2 SMITH

1. During the above period the team consisted of the following members;

WO2 Smith
WO2 Bell

Team Activities

2. Period 21 - 23 Feb

a. During this time the team, together with representatives from District, checked the state of outposts in the five (5) villages that the team is working in.

3. Period 24 - 25 Feb

a. The Security Plan and overlays showing PF and PSDF AOs, enemy routes, reaction forces and artillery registrations was completed for Long Binh Dien village.

4. 26 Feb

a. The team explained the concept of village security to the officials of Tan Thuan Binh village.

5. 27 Feb - 28 Feb

a. The team travelled to Saigon, WO2 Bell was required to have his cars tested.

6. 1 Mar

a. Pay run.

b. Briefing on VDAT activities to a visiting Vietnamese senior officer and Col Brown from IV Corps.

7. 2 Mar

a. The team completed a foot recce of Tan Thuan Binh village.

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8. Period 3 - 4 Mar
- a. The team travelled by road to Saigon to drive the CO, AATV to Cho Gao district.
 - b. On his arrival, the CO was briefed and he then inspected Binh Phuc Nhut village.
9. Period 5 - 6 Mar
- a. A meeting was held at Binh Phuc Nhut village and the Security Plan was read to all village officials.
 - b. A daylight rehearsal was held in Binh Phuc Nhut village.
10. Period 7-8 Mar
- a. Preparation for the reading of the Security Plan and rehearsals for Quon Long and Long Binh Dien villages.
11. 9 Mar
- a. Vehicle service.
 - b. Preparing the overlays for Dang Hung Phuoc village.
12. Period 10 - 11 Mar
- a. A meeting was held at Quon Long village and the Security Plan was read to all village officials.
 - b. A daylight rehearsal was held in Quon Long village.
13. Period 12 - 13 Mar
- a. Preparation for the reading of the Security Plan and rehearsals for Dang Hung Phuoc and Tan Thuan Binh villages.
14. Period 14 - 15 Mar
- a. Map reading lesson for all Village Chiefs and Deputies for Security.
 - b. Air recce of Cho Gao district.
 - c. The team attended a graduation ceremony for PSDF.

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15.

Period 16 -- 17 Mar

a. Overlays showing PF and PSDF AOs, enemy routes, reaction forces and artillery registration were completed for Tan Thuan Binh village.

b. Final preparation was made for the reading of the Security Plan in Tan Thuan Linh.

16.

18 Mar

a. Team vehicle required repairs to rear axle.

17.

Period 19 -- 20 Mar

a. Artillery was registered at Binh Phuc Nhut village, using both HE and smoke.

b. Phong Huong meeting and map reading lesson for all Village Chiefs and Deputies for Security.

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Annex H to AATTV
Report - Mar 70

REPORT BY WO2 KEALY
VILLAGE DEFENCE ADVISER
PHUOC TUY PROVINCE - MAR 70

1. This month has been a most satisfying one as the defence of the villages and hamlets that I work in is improving slowly.

2. My areas of responsibility are (unchanged)

An Nhut
An Phuoc
An Ngai

3. An-Nhut and An-Phuoc villages are continuing to work well as a team (Police PSDF-PF-RD). Both of these Village Chiefs have good isolated areas and good support from their leaders of the other units eg (PF-RF)

4. An-Ngai is improving slowly but still has a long way to go. I am getting along well with the Village Chief and Security Chief. The PSDF and the RD support the Village Chief but the PF Platoon Comd does not. I have suggested to the District Chief that he or they be replaced. It appears that the PF Platoon will be replaced as a unit in about 3 weeks.

5. An-Thanh (hamlet) part of An-Ngai Village and situated closer to the infiltration route (by sea) of the VC have a very badly sited, incomplete compound. I was approached by the Security Chief (village) and the Hamlet Chief for advice. I told them that it was poorly sited and during the wet season it would be flooded. They agreed and we have resited it and the building of a new compound has commenced. The District Chief is helping out with stores - others are coming from three recently evacuated RF compounds.

6. I am receiving assistance from the District Chief - US Senior Adviser and all Chiefs and Comds - except for 49 PF Pl and this should be fixed in about three weeks.

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Annex H to AATTV
Report - Mar 70

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