

Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report and enclosures
1 - 31 May 1970

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Item: 1/2/77

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AUSTRALIAN FORCE VIETNAM



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HEADQUARTERS

Army Component

26 Jun 70

AHQ (C) ✓

AATTV REPORT MAY 70

Enclosed for information is the monthly report from AATTV for May 70.

(C.A.E. FRASER)

Major General

Commander Australian Force
VIETNAM

Enclosure: 1. AATTV Report May 70.

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R723	1	35
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Headquarters
Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam

12 Jun 70

R723-1-51

HQ AFV (3)

AATTV REPORT MAY 1970

General

1. During May AATTV continued to be actively involved over the four CTZs in operations, training and in providing advice on territorial security at province to hamlet levels. The higher level of enemy activity in I Corps continued.

Casualties

2. AATTV casualties for the month were;

a. Battle

- (1) On 18 May Sgt Miller was WIA in Pleiku Province. He remained on duty.
- (2) On 19 May Capt Sheppard was WIA in Dinh-Tuong Province. He was treated at 9 Med Bn (US) and returned to duty.
- (3) On 19 May WO2 Herschell was WIA in Dinh-Tuong Province. He remained on duty.
- (4) On 22 May WO1 Forde was WIA in Quang-Tri. He was admitted to 91 Evac Hospital and transferred to 1 Aust Hospital 3 Jun 70. He will be medevac to Australia 15 Jun 70.
- (5) On 23 May WO2 Nicholls was WIA in Quang-Tin Province. He was treated at US Hospital and returned to duty.
- (6) On 26 May Capt Erock was WIA in Quang-Tri Province. He remained on duty.
- (7) On 31 May WO1 Murt was WIA in Quang-Nam Province. He remained on duty.

b. Non Battle. There have been nine cases of stomach disorders and heat exhaustion. In almost all instances these have been caused by high temperatures in the areas of operations and in some cases by the lack of a plentiful supply of water. Arrangements have been made for an RMO to visit Quang-Tri to look into this matter.

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The following members were hospitalised during the month;

WO2	Speechley	2 - 22 May
Sgt	Cochrane	16 - 18 May (RTA Medevac)
Sgt	Broadhurst	14 - 1 Jun (RTA Medevac)
WO2	Green	23 - 30 May
Cpl	Kay	18 - 1 Jun (RTA Medevac)

Deployment

3. During the month AATTV advisers were withdrawn from the Province Reconnaissance Units with very short notice. Luckily this was achieved without any great embarrassment to AATTV or the members concerned.

4. Considerable redeployment took place in May as follows;

- a. The 2nd Mobile Strike Force (2MSF) commitment has been reduced to five advisers.
- b. Four Mobile Advisory and Training Teams (MATTs) were raised in Phuoc-Tuy Province.
- c. The Night Operations Advisory Team (NOAT) was raised and commenced work in IV CTZ on 4 May 70.
- d. A small ad loc administrative headquarters was established in Vung-Tau to administer the build up of AATTV advisers in Phuoc-Tuy Province.
- e. The AATTV sponsored Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Wing (LRRP) at the Phuoc-Tuy National Training Centre was closed down.

5. Attached at Annex A is the AATTV deployment as at 1 Jun 70.

I Corps

6. Map references of locations shown in subsequent paragraph are given in Annex D.

7. The level of enemy activity in the northern part of I Corps remained at its previous high level. There is evidence in this area that NVA battalions may be reorganizing on a four company basis with a company of each, infantry, sappers, transportation, and support. This would seem to be a logical step in view of the new enemy tactics which appear to be;

- a. Mortar and rocket any unit that stops, or any Fire Support Base (FSB). FSB Fuller, Carroll, Khe Gio, Barbara, O'Reilly, and C1, A2, and A1 have all been heavily mortared in this area. In addition the US FSBs in the area have received similar treatment.

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b. Sapper and not infantry attacks on ARVN units appear to be the new theme. Infantry appear to be used in establishing well dug in firm bases, and to providing OPs and small recce parties to follow ARVN units in order to report locations.

c. Establish AA guns, and particularly .50 cal AA guns near the important FSBs to shoot at all resupply and medevac helicopters. This is proving to be quite effective and there appears to be a big increase in the number of .50 cal AA guns used.

8. During the month both ARVN and US units deployed into the A Shau valley but later withdrew eastwards. Heavy mortar contact was made during the deployment. Both the Commanding Generals of I Corps and 24 Corps considered that the NVA may cross the DMZ in strength to relieve the pressure on the Cambodian operation. They considered that deployment west into the A Shau stretched their forces too much to meet such a contingency and therefore ordered the withdrawal.

9. During May the 1st ARVN Div carried out its plan as outlined in para 6 of the last report except it deployed three and not two battalions of the 54th ARVN Regt into the area of FSB Henderson when the 101st AB Div vacated the area.

10. The major activity in 12 DTA occurred in the Hiep Duc area where the NVA achieved considerable success in disrupting the pacification programme.

11. Reported incidents from units in which AATTV advisers were involved show that these units accounted for the following NVA casualties up to 28 May (Annex C refers).

Quang-Tri	608	NVA	KIA
Thua-Thien	58	"	"
Quang-Nam	39	"	"
Quang-Tin	266	"	"
Quang-Ngai	307	"	"

12. ARVN Units involved in the above incidents have also received heavy casualties. These in the main have been inflicted by mortars and rockets.

13. Attached are extracts of reports by AATTV advisers in I Corps as follows;

a. Report by Maj Aitken HQ I CTZ adviser	Annex B
b. Summary of significant incidents in I CTZ	Annex C
c. Location of ARVN units in I CTZ as at 27 May 70	Annex D
d. Enemy location in I CTZ	Annex E

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- e. Report by Maj Connor Assistant Province Adviser
(Military) in Quang-Tri Province Annex F
- f. Report by Maj Brown Senior Adviser Nam-Hoa
District Annex G
- g. Report by WO2 Bell Adviser in 2nd Bn
2nd ARVN Regt Annex H
- h. Report by WO2 Palmer Adviser in 3rd Bn
1 ARVN Regt Annex I
- i. Report by WO2 Joyce Adviser in 3rd Bn
5th ARVN Regt Annex J

II Corps

14. Early in May the ARVN and Ranger battalions were withdrawn from the Dak Seang Special Forces Camp area and were subsequently employed in Cambodia. The 4th Bn 2 MSF moved into an area near Dak Pek and the 1st Bn 2 MSF commenced operations in the Dak Seang area on 10 May. Both battalions were only about 300 strong. A MSF battalion from Nha-Trang, strength 450 men, also moved into the Dak Seang area. An ARVN FSB of two 155 guns was established about 6000 metres to the south of Dak Seang. There is still an NVA force in the area and it is thought to be of regimental strength.

15. The 1st Bn 2 MSF strength dropped from 400 to 300 over night when 109 CIDG soldiers went AWOL early in May. The battalion was then moved from an AO 10000 metres east of Pleiku direct to Dak To and then Dak Seang. From 10 May the operation was controlled by the Special Forces (SF) with a forward command post established at Ben-Het. It was pleasing to see the three SF battalions all on the one radio net. A report by Capt Shilston on the 2 MSF activities, including the 1st Bn 2 MSF operation is attached at Annex K.

16. The forward command post of the 22nd ARVN Div mentioned in last month's report was in fact a renamed HQ 24 Special Tactical Zone. After the ARVN and Ranger battalions were withdrawn a conference was held relating to the tactics used by these units. Included in the conference were;

Lt Gen	Collins	CG 1 FFV
Maj Gen	Quang	Dep Comd II Corps
Brig	Thien	Comd 22 ARVN Div
Col	Canh	Comd 23 ARVN Div
Col	Braim	Senior Adviser to 23 ARVN Div.

17. Attached at Annex L is a copy of the minutes of the above conference.

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III Corps

18. The first two AATTV sponsored Mobile Advisory and Training Teams (MATTs) in Phuoc-Tuy Province commenced their work on the 4th and 6th May. Two further teams were raised on 23rd May and commenced on 18 day course at the USARV Advisor School at Di-An on 25th May. A report on the MATTs by Maj Beale is attached at Annex M.

19. With reference to paragraph 25 of Major Beale's report, an AATTV Captain is to be redeployed to assume command of MATT 3. At this stage it is not proposed to add additional numbers to this MATT as it is not clear exactly how the battalion will operate.

20. LRRP Training Van-Kiep. Central Training Command (CTC) of the Joint General Staff has finally decided to concentrate all LRRP training at the Ranger Training Centre at Duc-My. The last AATTV sponsored LRRP course at the Van-Kiep NTC finished on 23 May 70. The CTC decision is a good one and in the interests of all parties concerned. To assist both the Van-Kiep NTC and the Ranger Training Centre the warrant officer instructors involved in the LRRP training were redeployed to the two establishments.

21. RD. During May the RD teams in Phuoc-Tuy Province continued to achieve satisfactory results. There were no major incidents involving RD Cadre. All teams worked well with village and hamlet officials on village self defence projects. Minor civic action projects are being carried out by each team. Much of the material for these projects comes from the 1 Aust Civil Affairs Unit. There were no desertions or absences during the month.

IV Corps

22. The new AATTV Night Operations Advisory Team (NOAT) commenced operating in Ben-Tranh District in Dinh-Tuong Province on 4 May. As this was the initial effort in this sphere the team concentrated on one RF Company for three weeks and then divided into two teams to work with two other RF Companies. If the scheme is successful and therefore repeated in another district it is proposed that the team will commence operating in two teams.

23. There have been a few difficulties in the launching of the NOAT scheme, and this was only to be expected, but most of these have now been overcome. One of the difficulties was in the name NOAT itself. In Vietnamese eyes there is a vast difference between an adviser and a "trainer". I have suggested that the term NOAT be changed to NOTT, Night Operations Training Team.

24. Attached are:

- | | |
|---|---------|
| a. Report by Maj Browne, IV Corps Territorial Security Adviser | Annex N |
| b. Report on Night Operation Techniques in Chau-Doc Province produced by Mr John P. Vann | Annex O |
| c. A short brief on IV Corps produced at HQ IV Corps and including and summary of the NOAT | Annex P |

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General

25. Over the next four months there will be a considerable redeployment within AATTV to cater for the build up in the number of MATTs and the raising of the school in Phuoc-Tuy Province. In effect nearly all Warrant Officers in country will be required to change their present employment in order to allow for experienced advisers to start both the MATTs and the school. As a planning guide all MATTs can be operating on the ground by early Oct 70 providing AATTV's new establishment is up to strength by the end of Aug. To be able to position the school staff on the ground by 1 Oct it will be necessary to approve the further increase in AATTV's establishment and to have the consequential new warrant officer advisers in Vietnam by at the latest the end of August also. A detailed plan is at present being compiled to show the adviser requirement ex Australia by the dates they are required in Vietnam.

26. Attached at Annex Q is a late report by WO2 Watts. It is included at this late stage as it shows many of the problems of working with an ARVN unit.

27. The delay in rendering this report is regretted.

J.A. Clark

(J.A. CLARK)

Lt Col

Comd

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AATTV DEPLOYMENT
AS AT 1 JUN 70

ANNEX 'A' TO
AATTV MONTHLY REPORT
FOR MAY 70

Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>AATTV SAIGON</u>								
1.	ItCol	J.A.	Clark	RA Inf	HQ AATTV	Commander	Jan 71	Saigon
2	Maj	K.R.	Phillips	RAAC	"	Second in Command	May 71	"
3	Capt	J.C.	Hartley	RA Inf	"	Adjutant	Apr 71	"
4	WO1	D.L.	Howells	RA Inf	"	Admin WO (A and Q)	Feb 71	"
5	WO2	L.A.	West	RA Inf	"	Admin WO (Pay)	Jul 70	"
6	WO2	D.I.	Campbell	RAASC	"	Admin WO (Pay) (Desig)	Nov 70	"
7	WO2	B.	Davies	RA Inf	"	Admin WO (Movs)	Oct 70	"
8	Cnl	G.M.	Eldridge	RAASC	"	Clerk	Mar 71	"

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA:	Location
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I CTZ

AATTV : QUANG-TRI PROVINCE

9	: Maj	: C.S.S.	: Connor	: RAAC	: Quang-Tri Sector	: Asst Province Adviser (Military)	: Oct 70	: Quang-Tri
10	: WO1	: B.R.	: Lawrence	: RAAMC	: " " "	: Medical Adviser	: Apr 71	: " "
11	: WO2	: A.J.A.	: Joyce	: RA Inf	: Cam-Lo Sub-Sector	: Assistant Adviser	: Aug 70	: Cam-Lo
12	: Capt	: L.M.	: Opie	: RA Inf	: 2/1 ARVN Bn	: Senior Adviser	: Apr 71	: Near Quang-Tri (Regt HQ)
13	: WO2	: J.T.	: Barnes	: RA Inf	: 1/1 " "	: Assistant Adviser	: May 71	: " " " "
14	: WO2	: D.T.	: Powell	: RA Inf	: 2/1 " "	: " "	: Oct 70	: " " " "
15	: WO2	: G.H.	: King	: RA Inf	: 3/1 " "	: " "	: May 71	: " " " "
16	: WO2	: R.J.	: Oliver	: RAASC	: 4/1 " "	: " "	: Nov 70	: " " " "
17	: Capt	: C.J.	: Brock	: RA Inf	: 3/2 " "	: Senior Adviser	: Apr 71	: Dong-Ha (Regt HQ)
18	: WO2	: B.M.N.	: Ryan	: RA Inf	: 1/2 " "	: Assistant Adviser	: Jan 71	: " " "
19	: WO2	: O.W.	: Bell	: RAA	: 2/2 " "	: " "	: Aug 70	: " " "
20	: WO2	: J.M.	: Lefel	: RA Inf	: 3/2 " "	: " "	: Jan 71	: " " "
21	: WO2	: A.E.	: Gee	: RA Inf	: 4/2 " "	: " "	: Feb 71	: " " "
22	: WO2	: L.J.	: Storan	: RA Inf	: 5/2 " "	: " "	: Jan 71	: " " "
23	: WO1	: E.C.	: Burns	: RAAC	: 3/7 ARVN Cav	: " "	: Oct 70	: Quang-Tri

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA:	Location
<u>I CTZ (Cont)</u>								
<u>AATTV THUA THIEN PROVINCE</u>								
24	: WO2	: D.G.	: Killion	: RAAMC	: Thua-Thien Sector	: Medical Adviser	: Jul 70	: Hue
25	: Maj	: G.V.	: Brown	: RAE	: Nam-Hoa District	: District Senior Adviser	: Jun 70	: Nam-Hoa
26	: Capt	: W.D.	: Tear	: RA Inf	: " "	: " " "(Desig)	: Oct 70	: " "
27	: WO2	: J.F.	: Leal	: RAA	: " "	: Assistant Adviser	: Apr 71	: " "
28	: WO2	: D.C.	: Parker	: RA Inf	: 1/54 ARVN Bn	: " "	: Oct 70	: Phu-Loc (Regt HQ)
29	: WO1	: B.T.	: Waters	: RA Inf	: 2/54 " "	: " "	: Dec 70	: " "
30	: Capt	: W.R.	: Deane	: Aust Int	: 3/54 " "	: Senior Adviser	: Jul 70	: " "
31	: WO2	: S.	: Speechley	: RAEME	: 3/54 " "	: Assistant Adviser	: Jul 70	: " "
32	: WO2	: S.A.	: Birnie	: RAA	: 4/54 " "	: " "	: Feb 71	: " "
33	: WO2	: D.E.	: Watts	: RA Sigs	: 1/3 " "	: " "	: Jul 70	: Near Hue (Regt HQ)
34	: WO2	: J.F.	: McKenner	: RA Inf	: 2/3 " "	: " "	: Jul 70	: " " "
35	: WO2	: R.E.	: Heathcote	: RAA	: 3/3 " "	: " "	: Nov 70	: " " "
36	: WO2	: K.H.	: Mavin	: RA Inf	: 4/3 " "	: " "	: Aug 70	: " " "

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
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I CTZ (Cont)

AATTV : QUANG-NAM PROVINCE

37	: Maj	: R.J.	: Aitken	: RA Inf	: HQ I Corps	: Assistant to Chief of Staff I Corps	: Apr 71	: Danang
38	: WO1	: G.S.	: Munt	: RA Inf	: AATTV Danang	: Admin WO	: Oct 70	: Aust House Danang
39	: WO2	: D.	: Burke	: RA Inf	: " "	: " "	: Aug 70	: " " "
40	: WO2	: T.H.	: Breakwell	: RA Inf	: 21st Ranger Bn	: Assistant Adviser	: Dec 70	: Near Danang (Cp HQ)
41	: Capt	: B.F.	: McGurgan	: RAE	: 1/51 ARVN Bn	: Senior Adviser	: Mar 71	: Mieu-Bong (Regt HQ)
42	: WO2	: C.D.	: Dermody	: RA Inf	: 2/51 " "	: Assistant Adviser	: Jan 71	: " " "
43	: WO2	: W.T.	: Jones	: RA Inf	: 3/51 " "	: " "	: Aug 70	: " " "
44	: WO2	: P.J.	: Heslin	: RAE	: Hoa-Vang Sub Sector	: " "	: Oct 70	: Hoa-Vang

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>I CTZ (Cont)</u>								
<u>AATTV : QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI PROVINCES</u>								
45	: WO2	: W.J.	: McInerny	: RA Inf	: 4 ARVN Regt Recce Coy	: Senior Adviser	: Apr 71	:)
46	: Capt	: W.	: Gunder	: RA Inf	: 1/4 ARVN Bn	: " "	: Apr 71	:)
47	: WO2	: G.E.	: Munro	: RA Sigs	: " " "	: Assistant Adviser	: Sep 70	:)
48	: WO2	: W.E.	: Tillett	: RA Inf	: 2/4 " "	: " "	: Sep 70	:)
49	: WO2	: L.G.	: Schmidt	: RA Inf	: 3/4 " "	: " "	: Jan 71	:)
50	: WO2	: R.W.	: Cairns	: RA Inf	: 4/4 " "	: " "	: Apr 71	:)
51	: WO2	: G.D.	: Heath	: RA Inf	: 1/5 " "	: " "	: Feb 71	:)
52	: WO2	: A.H.	: Franks	: RA Inf	: 2/5 " "	: " "	: Jan 71	:)
53	: WO2	: G.	: Joyce	: RA Inf	: 3/5 " "	: " "	: Jan 71	:)
54	: WO2	: D.	: Rolph	: RA Inf	: 4/5 " "	: " "	: Nov 70	:)
55	: WO2	: D.W.	: Eather	: RA Inf	: 1/6 " "	: " "	: Jul 70	:)
56	: WO2	: M.G.	: Rodger	: RAEME	: 1/6 " "	: " " (Desig)	: May 71	:)
57	: Capt	: H.E.N.	: Martens	: RA Inf	: 2/6 " "	: Senior Adviser	: Apr 71	:)
58	: WO2	: J.I.	: Shaw	: RA Inf	: 2/6 " "	: Assistant Adviser	: Feb 71	:)
59	: WO2	: J.	: Nicholls	: RAA	: 3/6 " "	: " "	: Apr 71	:)
60	: WO1	: T.J.	: Forde	: RA Inf	: 4/6 " "	: " "	: Apr 71	:)
61	: WO2	: J.F.	: Ghilotti	: RAAC	: 2/4 ARVN Cav	: " "	: Aug 70	: Quang-Ngai .../6

Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
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II CTZ

AATTV : PLEIKU (SPECIAL FORCES)

62	Capt	P.J.	Shilston	RA Inf	2nd Mobile Strike Force: Bn Comd Command, Det B-20, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)		Aug 70	Pleiku (Base)
63	WO1	J.S.	Calcutt	RA Inf	" " "	Coy Comd (Trg Coy)	Mar 71	" "
64	WO2	A.B.	McCloskey	RA Inf	" " "	Instructor "	Jul 70	" "
65	Sgt	A.J.	Miller	RA Inf	" " "	Pl Comd	Jul 70	" "
66	WO2	R.A.	Barnes	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Feb 71	" "

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
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II CFZ (Cont)

AATTV - II CORPS AREA

67	: WO1	: W.A.	: Eade	:RAA Pro	:Ranger Training Centre	: Instructor/Adviser	: Feb 71	: Duc-My
68	: WO2	: P.J.	: Pavlenko	:RA Inf	: " " "	: " "	: May 71	: "
69	: WO2	: L.B.	: Green	:RAAC	:1/14 ARVN Cav	: Assistant Adviser	: Nov 70	: Kontum (Base)

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
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III CTZ

AATTV - III CORPS AREA

70	Maj	P.W.	Beale	RA Inf	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	Sector RF/PF Adviser	Jan 71	Baria
71	WO2	D.F.	Hedges	RA Inf	Phuoc-Tuy National Training Centre	Admin WO	Aug 70	"
72	WO2	O.	Stevenson	RA Inf	" "	Instructor/Adviser	Aug 70	"
73	WO2	J.T.	Hoolihan	RA Inf	" "		Jun 70	"
74	WO2	C.	Kealy	RA Inf	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	PF Adviser	Aug 70	"
75	WO2	W.C.	Green	RAASC	" "	Team Leader MATT 5	Nov 70	"
76	WO2	R.G.	Davies	RA Inf	" "	" 21c "	May 71	"
77	WO2	L.D.	Osborn	RA Inf	" "	Adviser RD Cadre	Jun 70	"
78	WO2	E.A.	Taylor	RA Inf	" "	Adviser ARVN Trg	Jul 70	Nui-Dat (Horse Shoe)
79	WO1	E.B.	Ostara	RA Inf	" "	RF/PF Admin WO	Jul 70	Vung-Tau
80	WO2	M.	Muir	RA Inf	" "	" " " (RQMS)	May 71	" "
81	WO2	J.	Stephens	RAASC	" "	Team Leader MATT 1	Oct 70	Phuoc-Tuy Province
82	WO2	A.G.	White	RA Inf	" "	" 21C "	Jan 71	" "
83	Cpl	W.O.	Parry	RA Inf	" "	" Member "	Nov 70	" "
84	Cpl	M.N.	McIntyre	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Nov 70	" "
85	Cpl	J.A.	Peach	RAE	" "	" " "	Sep 70	" "
86	Cpl	M.H.	Dawkins	RAAMC	" "	" " "	Nov 70	" "

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA:	Location
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III CTZ

AATTV - III CORPS AREA (Cont)

87	: WO2.	: R.D.	: Smith	: RA Inf	: Phuoc-Tuy Sector	: Team Leader MATT 2	: Oct 70	: Phuoc-Tuy Province
88	: WO2	: A.S.	: Williams	: RA Sigs:	" "	: " 21C "	: Oct 70	: " "
89	: Cpl	: A.J.	: Eade	: RA Inf	" "	: " Member "	: Feb 71	: " "
90	: Pte	: G.J.	: Kalemba	: RAAMC	" "	: " " "	: Feb 71	: " "
91	: Cpl	: B.	: Willis	: RAE	" "	: " " "	: Dec 70	: " "
92	: L/Cpl	: R.P.	: Smithson	: RA Inf	" "	: " " "	: Feb 71	: " "
93	: WO2	: D.F.	: Heenan	: RA Inf	" "	: Team Leader MATT 3	: Jul 70	: " "
94	: WO2	: D.M.	: Palmer	: RA Inf	" "	: " 21C "	: Jan 71	: " "
95	: Sgt	: H.K.	: Karaka	: RNZR	" "	: " Member "	: To be advised	: " "
96	: Cpl	: I.A.	: Kuring	: RA Inf	" "	: " " "	: " "	: " "
97	: Bdr	: P.H.	: Harding	: RAA	" "	: " " "	: " "	: " "
98	: Pte	: A.	: Schneider	: RAAMC	" "	: " " "	: Apr 71	: " "
99	: Cpl	: T.R.	: Hogg	: RAE	" "	: " " "	: Mar 71	: " "
100	: WO2	: G.M.	: Logan	: RA Inf	" "	: Team Leader MATT 4	: Oct 70	: " "
101	: WO2	: F.M.	: Moffitt	: RA Inf	" "	: " 21C "	: Apr 71	: " "
102	: Cpl	: M.N.	: Talbot	: RA Inf	" "	: " Member "	: Nov 70	: " "
103	: Cpl	: J.C.	: Monk	: RA Inf	" "	: " " "	: Nov 70	: " "
104	: Cpl	: M.B.	: Byrne	: RAE	" "	: " " "	: Aug 70	: " "
105	: Cpl	: J.H.	: Riley	: RAAMC	" "	: " " "	: Jan 71	: " "

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA:	Location
<u>IV CTZ</u>								
106	Maj	J.A.	Browne	RAA	CORDS, IV Corps	Assistant to Chief of Territorial Security	Mar 71	Can-Tho
107	WO2	H.J.	Hartman	RAAMC	HQ IV Corps	Medical Adviser	Jul 70	" "
108	Capt	W.	Sheppard	RA Inf	AATTV RF Trg	OC RF Trg Team	Sep 70	Dinh-Tuong Province
109	WO2	C.N.	McEvoy	RA Inf	" " "	DIOCC Rep	Dec 70	" " "
110	WO2	D.B.	Bell	RAE	" " "	Team Leader	Dec 70	" " "
111	WO2	S.	Booth	RA Inf	" " "	Team Member	Feb 71	" " "
112	WO2	R.A.	O'Hara	RA Inf	" " "	Team Leader	Jul 70	" " "
113	WO2	W.E.	Butler	RA Inf	" " "	Team Member	Jan 71	" " "
114	WO2	D.A.	Strachan	RA Inf	" " "	Team Leader	Oct 70	" " "
115	WO2	G.	Herschell	RA Inf	" " "	Team Member	Apr 71	" " "
116	WO2	V.L.	Harris	RA Inf	" " "	" "	Sep 70	" " "

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ANNEX B
TO AATTV
REPORT 12 MAY 70

REPORT - AATTV ADVISER HQ 1 CTZ
MAJ AITKEN - MAY 70

General

1. This report generally covers the period 29 Apr 70 to 28 May 70.

Enemy Activity

2. Enemy initiated incidents increased sharply during the first two weeks but decreased slightly in the latter two weeks of the reporting period. However, the level at time of reporting remains substantially higher than that of the April period. Details are as follows:

- a. Period 1 - 260001 H Apr to 022400 H May 70. 413 incidents, an increase of 54 over the previous week.
- b. Period 2 - 030001 H - 092400 H May 70 - 551 incidents
- c. Period 3 - 100001 H - 162400 H May 70 - 487 incidents
- d. Period 4 - 170001 H - 232400 H May 70 - 422 incidents

3. Details of the period 24-28 May are not yet available.

4. A similar pattern was reflected in the number of incoming rounds received, and the number of enemy KIA by friendly forces, but a fluctuation was recorded in the number of PW and mine incidents. Details shown are for the same periods as in paragraph 3.

a. Incoming Rounds

- (1) 1165 - an increase of 262.
- (2) 3384
- (3) 2227
- (4) 1469

b. Enemy KIA

- (1) 795 - an increase of 155
- (2) 1331
- (3) 1008
- (4) 695

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c. PW

- (1) 34 - a decrease of 4.
- (2) 46
- (3) 29
- (4) 34

d. Mine incidents

- (1) 56 - a decrease of 30
- (2) 65
- (3) 80
- (4) 46

5. During the reporting period the total of enemy weapons captured was:

- a. Crew-served weapons - 172
- b. Individual weapons - 986

Enemy Intentions

6. The enemy's intentions appear to have been directed toward re-asserting his influence in the coastal areas of the 11th and 12th DTAs. In the 11th DTA his aim appeared to be to draw friendly force to the west in order to defeat them by a process of attrition whilst at the same time moving two battalions south and east along the Ba Long valley with the purpose of moving into the plains area between Quang Tri and Hue. This opinion is supported by the fact that incidents of sabotage and terrorism were carried out in this area during the middle of the month. No evidence exists of any intention to make a major move south across the DMZ in the near future.

7. In the 12th DTA the enemy's occupation of Hiep Duc was aimed at severely disrupting the pacification in this and the Tam Ky areas. He has achieved his aim in the Hiep Duc area, as recent, optimistic estimates indicate that the set back to the programme is in the area of 6 months. At this stage, however, the enemy is still located in the vicinity of Hiep Duc so an accurate assessment of the probable period of set back is not possible.

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ANNEX C TO
AATTV REPORT
MAY 70

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS INVOLVING
UNITS HAVING AUST ADVISERS

1. At 291600H Apr 70 in the vicinity of ZC 207626, 2nd Bn 51st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 6 VC KIA and the capture of one individual and two crew served weapons.
2. At 300830H Apr 70 in the vicinity of ZC 208629, 2nd Bn 51st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 3 enemy KIA and the capture of three individual weapons and three 82mm mortar sights.
3. At 301025H Apr 70 in the vicinity of YD 270168, 1st Bn 1st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 14 enemy KIA and the capture of three individual weapons and 9 tons of rice.
4. At 010530H in the vicinity of YD 271176, 1st Bn 1st Regt was attacked by an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 5 enemy KIA and the capture of 20 blocks of plastic explosive.
5. At 010800H in the vicinity of YD 287313, 3rd Bn 1st Regt contacted an estimated enemy company resulting in 15 enemy KIA and the capture of two crew served weapons, three individual weapons, 30 stick grenades, 300 kilos of mixed AK and B40 ammunition. The engagement lasted until 011430H. Five bunkers were destroyed by own troops.
6. At 011600H in the vicinity of AT 916245, 1st Bn 5th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 10 enemy KIA and the capture of two AK47 rifles, one carbine and one M1 carbine.
7. At 011615H in the vicinity of AT 915250, 1st Bn 5th Regt searching found 50 bodies killed by air or artillery.
8. At 011620H in the vicinity of AT 914256, 1st Bn 5th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 15 VC KIA and the capture of two AK47 rifles.
9. At 011650H in the vicinity of AT 914256, 1st Bn 5th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 14 VC KIA and the capture of one 75mm PR and one round.
10. At 011720H in the vicinity of ES 604464, 4th Bn 4th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 7 enemy KIA and the capture of one AK47 rifle, two carbines, 10 grenades, 450 kilos of rice and the destruction of 30 huts.
11. At 011720H in the vicinity of YD 050320, 2nd Bn 54th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 5 enemy KIA and the capture of one VC and two B41 launchers.
12. At 020630H in the vicinity of YD 050330, 2nd Bn 54th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 7 enemy KIA and the capture of two individual and one crew-served weapon.
13. At 021300H in the vicinity of BT 328570, 1st Bn 5th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 5 enemy KIA and the capture of two individual weapons and one PRC 10.

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14. At 031100H in the vicinity of BS 591462, 4th Bn 4th Regt searching contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 8 VC KIA and the capture of two individual weapons.
15. At 031800H in the vicinity of YD 258148, 4th Bn 1st Regt contacted a VC Coy resulting in 8 VC KIA and the capture of two crew-served and two individual weapons.
16. Period 031000H - 032000H in the vicinity of AT 942262, 3rd Bn 5th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 10 KIA and 36 WIA. Enemy casualties are not known.
17. At 040625H in the vicinity of BS 604504, 4th Bn 4th Regt ambushed an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 5 enemy KIA and the capture of one AK47 rifle.
18. At 040625H in the vicinity of BS 609924, 6th Regt Recon Coy contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 5 enemy KIA and the capture of one B.R. A further contact at 040810H resulted in 5 enemy KIA and the capture of one Thomson SMG, one M1 rifle and 19 rounds of B40 ammo.
19. At 050955H in the vicinity of YD 042365, 1st Bn 54th Regt contacted a VC Pl resulting in 18 VC KIA and the capture of one B41 and 5 AK47 rifles.
20. At 051945H in the vicinity of YD 043360, 1st Bn 54th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 10 enemy KIA and the capture of 1500 kilos of mixed 82mm mortar, 75PR and LMG rounds.
21. At 052305H in the vicinity of YD 288751, 4th Bn 3rd Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 26 enemy KIA and the capture of two B41 and 8 AK47 rifles.
22. At 061845H in the vicinity of AT 913257, 1st Bn 5th Regt received a ground attack resulting in 17 friendly troops wounded and 10 missing in action. Enemy losses unknown.
23. At 070720H in the vicinity of YD 043345, 1st Bn 54th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 13 enemy KIA and the capture of two individual and one crew-served weapon.
24. At 070730H in the vicinity of YD 283133, 4th Bn 1st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 5 enemy KIA, one VC captured and the capture of one B40 launcher and one AK47 rifle.
25. At 071000H in the vicinity of YD 645354, 2nd Bn 3rd Regt contacted a VC Pl resulting in 5 VC KIA and the capture of one AK47 rifle, 80 kilos of rice and 30 grenades.
26. At 071330H in the vicinity of BS 664796, 3rd Bn 6th Regt searching contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 5 enemy KIA and the capture of two individual weapons and 10 grenades.
- *27. At 070900H in the vicinity of YD 045367, 1st Bn 54th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in three friendly troops KIA, 19 enemy KIA and the capture of two individual weapons. The action continued until 071845H.

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28. At 080300H in the vicinity of AT 925269, 4th Bn 6th Regt received a ground attack by an unknown sized enemy force resulting in three friendly troops KIA, 10 VC KIA and the capture of one RPG launcher (type not specified) and one AK47 rifle.
29. At 080730H in the vicinity of BS 662545, 4th Bn 4th Regt clearing killed three VC and found 15 VC bodies killed by air, estimated as being 24 hours old.
30. At 080750H in the vicinity of YD 635137, 2nd Bn 3rd Regt ambushed an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 8 enemy KIA and the capture of 5 maps of HUE, one VC flag, one NVA flag and one pair of binoculars.
- *31. At 080940H in the vicinity of YD 045367, 1st Bn 54th Regt clearing found 23 VC bodies estimated killed in contact night 7/8 May. Serial 27 refers.
32. At 081200H in the vicinity of YD 045365, 1st Bn 54th Regt clearing found an ammo depot destroyed and 30 VC graves.
33. At 081205H in the same vicinity 1st Bn 54th Regt found 92 VC killed by air, one container of VC uniforms. These bodies estimated to be elements of 3rd Song Han Bn.
34. At 081810H in the vicinity of YD 040610, 4th Bn 2nd Regt received 700 rounds 82mm mortar sustaining four wounded in action. The number of rounds was double checked and was reported accurate.
35. At 080845H - 081300H in the vicinity of YD 295135, 4th Bn 1st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 7 VC KIA and the capture of one crew-served and two individual weapons.
36. At 091200H in the vicinity of BS 350580, 1st Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 5 friendly troops WIA, 25 VC KIA, one VC and 7 VC suspects captured and the capture of one crew-served and six individual weapons and 69 grenades.
37. At 092300H in the vicinity of YD 285750, one pl of 4th Bn 3rd Regt received a VC ground attack sustaining two KIA and two WIA. En losses were 22 VC KIA, 6 crew-served and 6 individual weapons. The pl was supported by 3/7 ACAT.
38. At 100830H in the vicinity of AT 965573, 1st Bn 51st Regt searching contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 5 VC KIA and the capture of three individual weapons, 10 x 60mm rounds and three packs.
39. At 101000H in the vicinity of AT 803615, 3rd Bn 51st Regt searching found 5 x 82 mortar sights.
40. At 101200H in the vicinity of AT 963572; at 101230H in the vicinity of AT 961572 and at 101255H in the vicinity of AT 961571, 1st Bn 51st Regt contacted unknown sized enemy forces resulting, respectively, in : 3 VC KIA and one individual weapon captured; 3 VC KIA and one CKC and 5 grenades captured, and 3 VC KIA and 9 grenades captured.
41. At 101455H in the vicinity of AT 960570, 1st Bn 51st Regt searching contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 2 VC KIA and the capture of one AK47 rifle.

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42. At 101510H in the vicinity of AT 969567, 1st Bn 51st Regt contacted a small enemy force killing 2 VC and capturing one pack.

43. At 101900H in the vicinity of AT 905265, 4th Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 7 enemy KIA and the capture of two individual weapons.

44. At 110600H in the vicinity of BS 746554, 1st Bn 4th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results 8 VC KIA.

45. At 110820H in the vicinity of AT 917266, 4th Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: En 11 KIA; 1 x M16 captured.

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46. At 1116aOH in the vicinity of AT869271, 2nd Bn 5th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: En 6KIA; 1x B41 and one CKC rifle captured.
47. At 112215H in the vicinity of AT800620, 2nd Bn 51st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: En 4KIA and one Chicom MG captured.
48. At 121020H in the vicinity of AT911253, 3rd Bn 5th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: En 2VC KIA and 5x 82 mm rounds captured. Eight bodies MIA from 1st Bn 5th Regt from contact at 061800H in the vicinity of AT912244 were also found.
49. At 121130H in the vicinity of YD299333, 3rd Bn 1st Regt contacted an enemy platoon. Results: 21 NVA KIA, 12 NVA KBA AND one LMG, four AK47 rifles and one B41 launcher captured.
50. At 131000H in the vicinity of BS584654, 4th Bn 4th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: En 12KIA and one 75mm RR captured.
51. At 131700H in the vicinity of YD293331, 3rd Bn 1st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: 8VC KIA and three individual weapons captured.
52. At 130930H in the vicinity of YD292152, 4th Bn 1st Regt found 10x 122 mm rockets.
53. At 131945H in the vicinity of BS593665, 4th Bn 4th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: 9VC KIA and three individual weapons captured.
54. At 130705H in the vicinity of BS593660, 4th Regt Recon Coy contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: 6VC KIA and one crew served weapon and eight B41 rounds captured.
55. At 131830H in the vicinity of BS616603, 3rd Bn 4th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: 15VC MIA, 11VC KBA and four individual weapons captured.
56. At 140730H in the vicinity of BS620594, 3rd Bn 4th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: 8VC KIA and 13x B40 rounds, 14x 82 mm mortar rounds, one B41 sight, one 57 mm RR sight and one B40 launcher captured.
57. At 140740H in the vicinity of BS584655, 4th Bn 4th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: 4VC KIA and one individual weapon captured.
58. At 141100H in the vicinity of BS687930, 1st Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: 6VC KIA and one BAR and two individual weapons captured.
59. At 141500H in the vicinity of BS597593, 3rd Bn 4th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: 20 VC KIA and two AK 47 rifles and 37 grenades captured.
60. At 161715H in the vicinity of AT893270, 2nd Bn 5th Regt was fired on by 22 ARVN Arty Bn, suffering 4KIA and 60MIA.
61. Between 161615H and 161730H in the vicinity of YD009599, 4th Bn 2nd Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: Friendly; 2KIA, 7MIA. En; 5VC KIA.
62. At 161330H in the vicinity of YD297337, 2nd Bn 1st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: Friendly; 3KIA, 8MIA. En; 4VC KIA and two individual weapons captured.
63. At 170520H in the vicinity of YD295331, 2nd Bn 1st Regt in a light defensive position received a mortar and ground attack. Results: Friendly, 6KIA, 20MIA. En; 19KIA and eight individual weapons, 200x 1 lb blocks TNT and 50x B40 rounds captured.

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64. At 170915H in the vicinity of YD024597 4th Bn 2nd Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: En 5KIA and two individual weapons captured.
65. At 171015H in the vicinity of YD330335, 2nd Bn 1st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: En 4KIA and one crew served weapon captured.
66. At 171130H in the vicinity of YD449061, 3rd Bn 1st Regt was ambushed by claymores. Results: Friendly negative, En 4KIA and one crew served weapon and 10x B40 rounds captured.
67. At 171100H in the vicinity of YD640143, 2nd Bn 3rd Regt contacted an enemy platoon. Results: En 5KIA and two crew served weapons, 200x B40 rounds and 60 mm rounds, five claymore mines, 50x 1 lb blocks of TNT and 200 Kg of unpolished rice were captured.
68. At 171300H in the vicinity of AT888274, 2nd Bn 5th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: Friendly; 1KIA, En; 5VC KIA.
69. At 171200H in the vicinity of AT905268, 4th Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: 12VC KIA and three individual weapons captured.
70. At 171515H in the vicinity of YD027598, 4th Bn 2nd Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: Friendly 7WIA.
71. At 171440H in the vicinity of YD469064, 3rd Bn 3rd Regt was ambushed by claymores. Results: 2VC KIA and one individual weapon captured. There were no friendly casualties.
72. At 171420 in the vicinity of YD070405 4th Bn 54th Regt contacted two enemy companies. Results: Friendly; 3KIA, 1WIA. En; unknown.
73. At 171830H in the vicinity of AT888273, 5 helicopters on a mission to extract a company of 2nd Bn 5th Regt received AA fire. One helicopter was destroyed and the others were damaged. The extraction was aborted.
74. At 180300H in the vicinity of AP900263, 4th Bn 6th Regt ambushed an unknown sized enemy force. Results: En; 8KIA and two B40 launchers captured.
75. Between 180920H and 181100H in the vicinity of BS' 6856 2nd Bn 4th Regt had small contacts. Results: 3VC KIA and three individual weapons and one PRC 25 radio captured.
76. At 181300H in the vicinity of YD473052 a patrol of 3rd Bn 3rd Regt contacted a VC platoon/ Results: 9VC KIA and four crew served and four individual weapons. 200x 1 lb blocks TNT and 15x 61 mm mortar rounds captured.
77. At 181815H in the vicinity of LZ SALLY, 3rd Bn 3rd Regt received 5x 122 mm rockets. Results: 7 friendly troops seriously wounded and 5 lightly wounded.
78. At 181840H in the vicinity of AT902270, 4th Bn 6th Regt while searching found 40 VC bodies, one 60 mm mortar and five AK 47 rifles.
79. At 181625H in the vicinity of YD164706, 2nd Bn 2nd Regt and 2/7 ACAT contacted an enemy company during which action a friendly gunship was shot down. Results: 18 VC KIA and one individual weapon captured. Friendly; 3 KIA, 25 WIA.
80. At 191140H in the vicinity of YD036588, 1st Bn 2nd Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: Friendly 3WIA, En 9 NVA KIA and one B40 and one AK 47 rifle captured.

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81. At 190700H in the vicinity of YD068388, 4th Bn 54th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: En; 7KIA and one crew served weapon, 2000 rounds of 50 cal ammunition, 50x 1 lb boxes PE and 13x 82 mm mortar rounds captured.
82. At 191300H in the vicinity of YD037586, 1st Bn 2nd Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: 6NVA KIA and one RPD captured.
83. At 190720H in the vicinity of YD025598 4th Bn 2nd Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Result: Friendly; one WIA, En; 11VC KIA and two individual weapons captured.
84. On 20 May 70 a report was received at ARVN TOC HQ I Corps that at 161615H in the vicinity of Hiep Duc 2nd Bn 5th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. In this contact 69 members of 2/5 Bn were MIA and one PRC 25 and one PRC 10 were lost.
85. At 211020H in the vicinity of AT905266, 3rd Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: Friendly two WIA, En 6KIA and one AK47, 10 packs and 1000 rounds SIA were captured.
86. At 211710 in the vicinity of FSB FULLER, 4th Bn 2nd Regt received 4x 122 mm mortar rounds. Results Friendly 4 KIA (incl Bn Comd and Bn S 3) and 5WIA.
87. At 211450H in the vicinity of YD012600, 4th Bn 2nd Regt contacted an NVA company. Results Friendly 4WIA, En; 30 NVA KIA and three AK47, one RPD SMG, one B40 launcher, one 12.7 mm A/MG and a quantity of packs and documents captured.
88. At 211540H in the vicinity of YD490044, 3rd Bn 3rd Regt contacted a VC squad. Results: 4VC KIA and one crew served weapon, four grenades and 10 Kg rice captured.
89. At 211940 in the vicinity of BS626566, 3rd Bn 4th Regt contacted a VC platoon. Results: 5VC KIA.
90. At 221130H in the vicinity of ZC106543, 1st Bn 51st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: En; 4KIA and one crew served weapon captured.
91. At 220900H in the vicinity of YD01602, 4th Bn 2nd Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Result: En; 5KIA and two individual weapons captured.
92. At 221100H in the vicinity of ZC106593, 1st Bn 51st Regt contacted an unknown sized force of enemy resulting in four enemy KIA and one crew served weapon captured.
93. At 221250H in the vicinity of AT902267, 2nd Bn 5th Regt received 30x 82 mm rounds. The Bn CO and S 3 were wounded.
94. At 220850H in the vicinity of AT903256, 2nd Bn 6th Regt found 15 bodies killed by air and 24 destroyed huts.
95. At 221400H in the vicinity of AT905256, 2nd Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: Friendly one KIA, En; 7KIA and three individual weapons captured.
96. At 221400H in the vicinity of AT902267, 4th Bn 6th Regt received 30x 82 mm mortar rounds. Results: Friendly one KIA and four WIA. WO1 FORDE was wounded in this action and was evacuated to 27th Surgical Hospital, Chu Lai.
97. At 221620H in vicinity of YD305341, 2nd Bn 1st Regt contacted a VC Coy. Results are unknown.
98. At 221315H in the vicinity of YD338384, 1st Bn 1st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in two friendly WIA, 10 NVA KIA and the capture of one crew served and one individual weapon, 10,000 rounds SA, 100x B40 rounds and 200x 2 lb blocks PE. Five VC huts were destroyed and 15(46 Kg) bags of rice were also captured.

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99. At 221845H in the vicinity of YD075387, 4th Bn 54th Regt contacted a VC company. Results: Friendly 6WIA, En, unknown.
100. At 222000H in the vicinity of AT974785, One platoon of mixed RF and PF from HOA VANG sub sector contacted a VC squad resulting in the capture of three VC, one B40 launcher, two grenades and a quantity of documents.
101. At 231300H to 231330H in the vicinity of AT907258, 2nd and 3rd Bns 6th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 20 HVA KIA and the capture of seven individual and one crew served weapon. WO2 NICHOLLS received graze wounds to the head in this action. He returned to duty the following day.
102. At 240600H in the vicinity of YD075392, 4th Bn 54th Regt received an unknown number and type of incoming rounds and a ground attack by an unknown sized enemy force. Results: Friendly 12 KIA, 19 WIA, En 52 KIA and the capture of two B40s, 20 individual weapons and three crew served weapons.
103. At 240920H in the vicinity of AT910256, 3rd Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in one friendly KIA and one WIA, 5VC KIA and one VC captured, one B40, one M79 and one AK 47 also captured.
104. At 241130H in the vicinity of AT910257 4th Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in two friendly WIA, 7VC KIA and the capture of one MG and two AK47.
105. At 241315H in the vicinity of YD327381, 1st Bn 1st Regt contacted a VC squad resulting in one friendly WIA, three VC KIA and the capture of one AK47, 80x B40 rounds, 70 mixed 60 mm and 82 mm rounds, 5000 SAA, 20x 1 lb blocks TNT and three bags(138 Kg) rice. Four huts, 4x 8 m and 30 tunnels were destroyed.
106. At 251520H in the vicinity of AT904258, 3rd Bn 6th Regt found 30 enemy bodies killed by air on 22 May 70.
107. At 250900H in the vicinity of YD488036, 3rd Bn 3rd Regt destroyed 30 tunnels, 10 huts, one generator and 3000 metres of wire.
108. At 261530H in the vicinity of AT892268, 2nd Bn 5th Regt found three enemy bodies killed by air three days ago and two friendly bodies of the Bn reported missing 16 May 70.
109. At 261700H in the vicinity of BS634584, 3rd Bn 4th Regt found 8 enemy bodies killed by artillery 3 days previously, two individual weapons, 15x 75 mm RR rounds and 20 B40 rounds.
110. At 261600H in the vicinity of AT 897255, 4th Bn 5th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in one friendly WIA, 5VC KIA and two individual weapons captured.
111. At 261300H to 261900H in the vicinity of BS736614, 4th Bn 4th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 6VC KIA and the capture of one VC, three individual weapons and six grenades.
112. At 261510H to 261600H in the vicinity of AT897255, 4th Bn 5th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in four friendly KIA, five friendly WIA, 5VC KIA and the capture of two individual weapons.
113. At 270825H in the vicinity of AT905270, 3rd Bn 6th Regt found 5 VC bodies killed by air two days previously.
114. At 271000H in the vicinity of AT893267, 2nd Bn 6th Regt found 8 bodies from 2/4 Bn missing from contact 16 May 70.
115. At 271345H in the vicinity of YD 625178, 4th Bn 3rd Regt contacted a VC platoon resulting in 7VC KIA and the capture of one 61 mm mortar, 7x 61 mm rounds, one AK 47.

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116. At 271430H in the vicinity of YD956040, 1st Bn 54th Regt searching 5 tunnels captured one BAR, one M1 rifle and two carbines.

117. At 271200H in the vicinity of YD677436, 3rd Bn 1st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 7 friendly KIA, 15 friendly WIA, 14 VC KIA, two VC captured and seven individual and two crew served weapons captured.

118. At 271230H in the vicinity of YD247324, 4th Bn 1st Regt contacted a VC platoon resulting in 4VC KIA and one individual weapon captured.

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Annex D
to AATTV Report
May 70

LOCATION OF ARVN UNITS IN I CORPS AS AT 27 MAY 70

1st ARVN Div CP:	HUE	2nd REGT CP	: CARROLL YD 063514
1st Regt CP:	NANCY YD 442394	Bn 1/2	: KHE GIO
Bn 1/1 :	BARBARA YD 327337	2/2	: A-2 YD 213734
2/1 :	YD 287319	3/2	: FULLER YD 019593
3/1 :	YD 480437	4/2	: DONG HA YD 205605
4/1 :	YD 250326	LZ SARGE 5/2	: YD 029478
54th Regt CP	: ANZIO YD 934072	7th Cav Regt CP	: C-1 YD 213674
Bn 1/54	: ANZIO YD 934072	1/7 Cav	: A-2 YD 213734
2/54	: DONG HA YD 205605	2/7 Cav	: C-1 YD 213674
3/54	: YD 098402	3/7 Cav	: A-1 YD 270734
4/54	: HOLCOMB YD 119432	Black Panther Co	: HUE
QDSZ CP	: DANANG	1st Rngr Gp CP	: PHU LOC
51st Regt CP	: HILL 55 AT 967617	21 Rngr	: DANANG
Bn 1/51	: ZC 129589	37 Rngr	: PHU LOC
2/51	: AT 967615	39 Rngr	: MIEU BONG
3/51	: AT 992578	4th Cav Regt CP	: QUANG NGAI
4/51	: ZC 160572	2/4 Cav	: QUANG NGAI
2nd ARVN Div CP:	QUANG NGAI	5th REGT CP	: HAWK HILL ET 231315
4th Regt CP	: DRAGON BS 731528	Bn 1/5	: BT 188158
Bn 1/4	: BS 638563	2/5	: BT 893266
2/4	: DRAGON BS 731528	3/5	: BT 259295
3/4	: BS 612654	4/5	: AT 894264
4/4	: BS 735628		

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3rd REGT CP : T-BONE YD 659203

Bn 1/3 : ANNE YD 290402

2/3 : SALLY YD 638274

3/3 : VEGHEL YD 550035

4/3 : LION YD 601189

11th Cav Regt : SHARON YD 340493
CP

1/11 Cav : YD 368471

2/11 Cav : NANCY YD 442394

3/11 Cav : SHARON YD 340493

1 Armd Bde CP : HOA CAM

1/17 Cav : DUONG SON

2/17 Cav : DUONG SON

3/17 Cav : HOI AN

1/4 Cav : QUANG NGAI

3/4 Cav : TAM KY

6 REGT CP : WEST AT 990250

BN 1/6 : BS 728895

2/6 : AT 896265

3/6 : AT 906262

4/6 : AT 912253

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Annex E
to AATTV Report
May 70.
NVA

MF


LF/VL

ANNEX A (DISPOSITION AND STRENGTH) to XXIV CORPS PERINTREP 14-70 (U).


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
14-70 14-70



ANNEX A (DISPOSITION AND STRENGTH) to XXIV CORPS PERINTREP 14-70 (U).
THUA THIEN (P)




ANNEX A (DISPOSITION AND STRENGTH) to XXIV CORPS PERIMETER 14-70 (U).
QUANG NAM (P)



A-14 A-24

ANNEX A (DISPOSITION AND STRENGTH) to XXIV CORPS PERINTREP 14-70 (P)
QUANG TIN (P)



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QUANG TIN

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ANNEX A (DISPOSITION AND STRENGTH) to XXIV CORPS PERINTREP 14-70 (U).
QUANG NGAI (P)

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Annex F
to AATTV Report
May 70

REPORT BY MAJ CONNOR
QUANG TRI PROVINCE MAY 70

Enemy

1. Enemy activity continued at the same high level in the month of May. Apart from two company sized incursions into Gio Linh District, most activity has been outside the populated area between regular forces of the ARVN and NVA. If the enemy's intention has been to inflict maximum casualties on ARVN and US forces, he has met with some success. The enemy did not gain ground or contact with the people, and has suffered heavy casualties.
2. Two major successes may be recorded to the enemy. He has succeeded in preventing friendly forces from disrupting his activities in the Ashau Valley (there is a further comment), and conducted a successful attack on FSB Henderson in the Ba Long valley. The fact that friendly commanders have been forced to change their plans radically may be held as a win for the enemy. It may also be due to the lack of reserves against a major enemy offensive. No large scale reserve is available due to the Cambodian operation; the enemy still has large reserves available across the DMZ and in western Quang-Tri.
3. Enemy tactics have emphasised the application of mortars on friendly troops when vulnerable, and an upsurge of effective anti-aircraft fire. The organisation of improvised sapper teams within battalions, the constant pressure on FSB Fuller, and the continued employment of advanced minor tactics against the ARVN soldier have all produced results.
4. Activity in the populated area continues at the same level. The enemy has had some success in extracting local rice from the current harvest, but captured documents suggest that the VCI, already heavily reinforced with NVA, is experiencing difficulty in maintaining its contact with the population.
5. The enemy retains the capability to mount a large scale offensive. Friendly action probably preempted the May offensive; reinforcement has already begun, and it must be assumed that the offensive is at present merely postponed.

Friendly Forces

6. The westward movement of First and Second ARVN Regts continued until about 8 May. Additional forces from 3rd and 54th Regts were and still are being used in the province. US troops from 101st AB Div and 1/5 Ede (M)

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have also been employed outside their normal AOs in support of this operation. After considerable see-saw movement, friendly forces are now positioned a little farther west than in March. Significant exceptions are the occupation of firebases on the western end of the Ba Long valley on the north and south sides and the deployment of surveillance elements in the far west of the province. The security of Huong Hoa District is enhanced by the new firebase in the Ba Long valley; this also blocks a well used infiltration route.

7. The 1st ARVN Div has taken severe casualties in the period. They are still somewhat off balance from the enemy's changed tactics. Some bad habits, such as lack of security at night, failure to destroy enemy fortifications on capture, and improper use of fire support are still apparent. Morale is apparently still high, in spite of casualties and some reverses.

8. Regional force tasks have not changed significantly, although units have moved with a bewildering speed and frequency. In Gio Linh District the results of some contacts suggest that luck is with the GVN. Intelligence gained from captured documents has hastened the reduction of the VCI. These documents have also confirmed that the enemy is still trying to buy rice. Both money and dealers have been brought into custody.

Other Matters

9. There has been considerable minor sickness and some movement among AATTV members. Gastric ailments and heat exhaustion have been the main problems. The Warrant Officers selected for MATTs have gained some experience of how one province uses its MAT. The increased tempo of ARVN activities, combined with increased temperatures and casualties among advisers, has placed some strain on the remaining advisers.

10. Normal activity in the province continues in spite of the increased threat and obvious signs of increased activity. The rice harvest is nearing completion, without interference. The May Day and Buddhas Birthday celebrations passed without incident. Two rather abortive mining incidents failed to stop the resettlement of refugees in Gio Linh; Province officials look forward to the La Vang RC procession and Province council elections as the next threat periods. If these pass without interference, the NVA will have failed to disrupt any major activity this year.

11. There are some religious disturbances brewing among both the Buddhists and Catholics. The Province Chief has been held to ransom by both sides; at present he has managed to placate both, and appears to be gathering support. Unfortunately economic development is still moving at its customary snail's pace.

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Annex G
to AATTV Report
May 70

REPORT BY MAJ G.V. BROWN
AATTV ACTIVITIES IN NAM HOA DISTRICT
25 APR - 24 MAY 70

Introduction

1. This reporting period showed a significant increase in the level of enemy activity in the unpopulated Western portion of Nam-Hoa District and a slight increase in the populated area although this in no way interfered with the Pacification and Development Programme.

Intelligence

2. There has been a significant increase in enemy activity around FSB Bastone (YD 620095) and to the West astride Route 547. The number of indirect fire attacks on FSBs Vehget (YD 545035), Bastone and Birmingham (YD 705102) have increased although casualties have been relatively light due to a high proportion of rounds impacting outside the perimeters.

3. In the pacified area an enemy patrol of seven men and one woman was ambushed at 0315 hrs 1 May 70 at YD 771125 as it approached Duong Pham Hamlet. The ambush was laid by National Police and DIOCC/VIOCC personnel and was the culmination of an "enticelement operation" conducted by the District Chief. One male was KIA (the Deputy Village Chief and Village Chief Designate, a South Vietnamese who had just returned from a six month course in North Vietnam) and one male and one female subsequently died of wounds. No friendly casualties were sustained.

4. On 7 May 70 at 2200 hrs, an enemy patrol was engaged by fire from an RF patrol base at YD 778125 just South of Duong Pham Hamlet. The enemy patrol withdrew to the South with negative results.

5. In Huong Tra District (North and West of Hue City) there has been an increase in enemy patrol activity and two large-scale kidnappings of males have occurred. Those who "refused to be kidnapped" were shot. Five successful escapes were made by those kidnapped before they were removed from the populated area.

Operations

6. RF patrols now operate by day and by night on the Eastern side of the Perfume River (South towards FSB Arsenal) down to the YD 09 Northing in accordance with the plan mentioned in paragraph 8 of last month's report.

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7. There is a general willingness on the part of the RF to patrol in smaller numbers whereas before this month they were unwilling to patrol far out in less than half-company strength. They are now patrolling in platoon strength or less. The main inhibition remains the number of MGs which are available, together with the scarcity of radios.

Training

8. Four Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) have been deployed into Nam-Hoa District from 2 Bde 101 AB (Div). They are under my operational control. Similar increases in the number of MTTs have occurred in other Districts. The scale is one MTT per RF Coy plus one per RF group and one per district for PF/PSDF training. The latter one is to be withdrawn on redeployment of 101 AB Div and replaced by a MAT in each district. The establishment of an MTT is one Lt/E7/E6, one E5, two radio operators and one interpreter (Kit Garson Scout). The PF/PSDF MTT also has a driver, jeep and trailer and has the additional job of providing liaison, (previously carried out by a liaison officer and two radio operators).

Pacification and Development

9. It is interesting to note that the HES Readout for 30 Apr 70 rates Thua-Thien Province as being in Category "B" overall whereas Nam-Hoa District (excluding "non-hamlet population" i.e. the pacified area) is rated as "A". Out of the 21 populated hamlets (i.e. all those in the pacified area), all except four are rated as "A" hamlets. This compares with the situation in Jun 69 when we had a few "B" hamlets and the majority were rated "C". Although this improvement can in some measure be attributed to an improvement in reporting and analysis, nevertheless it is in the main due to actual improvements in the overall security, political and socio-economic situation.

Conclusion

10. Favourable progress continues to be made although the rate of progress appears painfully slow when viewed from month to month. As before, the civilian side of affairs in Nam-Hoa are in considerably better shape than military affairs.

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Annex H
to AATTV Report
May 70

REPORT BY WO2 O.W. BELL
2ND BN 2ARVN REGT - MAY 70

1. The aim of the unit during the period was to kill and harass VC in our AO by using heliborne assaults and active patrolling.
2. This month has been rough and we have been unsuccessful in achieving our aim. I believe this was due to bad operational planning, co-ordination and unrealistic time and space requirements.
3. From 1-6 May we conducted operations to the west of FSB Sarge. The aim was to locate and destroy an NVA battalion. We combat assaulted (CA) into two LZs. The CP on Victory 943476 and the light CP (LCP) on Thunder 929473. We were to operate to the NW and SW for an indefinite time. On LZ Thunder we had two soldiers injured because of the terrain on the LZ. Due to the slope some soldiers were leaving the chopper at 15 to 18 ft above the ground. We had one soldier with a broken back and one with a broken ankle. During the operation the only other incident was one KIA with a mine. We experienced problems getting these people out as the jungle penetrators of the Dust off were out of use, and we had no LZ's.
4. On the 5 May we received an order to move back to route 9 and secure the road for an artillery raid. The distance was 18000 metres, a good hike over rough terrain. On the 6th we moved to the airstrip at VCB to be extracted to Dong-Ha. The word was my unit would move to A2 and C1. However this was not the case. On arrival at Dong-Ha, we were given a quick briefing and 30 minutes later C.A.'d into the area around FSB Henderson. The aim was to take the pressure of Henderson, which was hit by two Coys of NVA, and suffered very heavy casualties. Also after the night attack on 5 May, they were under a constant mortar threat.
5. My element, the LCP CA'd into LZ Eden 037384 at 06 1700 and the CP into 097378. The LZ on Eden was small, and one slick crashed, due to excitement on the part of the pilot. I assisted the pilots and also got all the ARVN out, some of whom were seriously injured. Fortunately there were no fatalities. Shortly afterwards the gunships became excited and shot up friendlies. Eight ARVN from my unit were wounded. Shortly before I advised the Cobras - on station not to engage any target without my authority - I believe the accident occurred due to other elements on the net being in contact, and lack of coordination on the part of the 54th Regiment. I expressed my opinion in no uncertain manner. We moved to the south east to seek and destroy the enemy. We had sporadic contact with some success, the enemy was on the move, as we found many bunkers and two 82mm mortar posns. I believe we were only hours behind the enemy. At 082412 we came under 82mm fire and took casualties, and responded with artillery and TAC Air which was able to silence it. At 079379 in an enemy contact, the senior adviser was wounded with small arms fire.
6. On the 10th the LCP moved into Henderson 080410, as security. Any movement on the hill drew mortar fire. On 11th at 1800 hrs the CP moved into Henderson. On 12th at 0600 the LCP moved out of Henderson to the SE to conduct a search of the area. We found one 60mm and ammo, also a quantity of B40's. We then moved back to the south of Henderson, and attempted to move across open ground. I questioned the order and strongly advised against it. We were hit with a very heavy barrage of 60mm. The first round killed the XO and the whole of the LCP HQ became casualties. The only ones uninjured were myself and the US adviser. We dispersed and moved after each barrage. It took

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50 minutes for Arty CB, after we had passed on the co-ordinates. We did not move till gunships arrived on station. We then moved back into Henderson in small groups to re-organise. At 2000 hrs the ARVN artillery dump blew up and got out of control. At 2230 we seriously considered abandoning the hill. On 13th at 0500 we moved out to LZ Sandborne for extraction to A2 and C1. The only incident on the extraction was the last lift was a slick short. I was on the LZ with the acting XO and two signallers for 8 minutes. This was poor as I kept the Senior Adviser 54 Regt, continuously aware on the number of ships I required from 15 down.

7. Results of operation;

9 VC KIA

1 60mm mor captured

Quantity of 60mm ammo and a number of B4Os.

Friendly Casualties

9 KIA

41 WIA

Senior Adviser WIA.

8. Points of Interest. We located two 60mm mortar posns within 300 metres of Henderson which were used in the attack. Also the VC came up the re-entrants from the south. They were there quite some time prior to the attack as they had dug in.

9. Since arrival at C1 I moved out on operations on the 15th to 158709 with the 3rd Coy and made contact with two Pls of NVA. In my opinion they were ambushed. The LCP moved to reinforce. At 172707 we were fired on by ARVN artillery. We took seven 105mm, from A2, the first round exploded 10 feet from the US sergeant and 14 feet from myself. We were extremely lucky, we had one KIA and four WIA. The accident is being investigated. I used gunships and one gunship was shot down by enemy small arms fire. He made an emergency landing on my position and was later lifted out.

Casualties for the operation.

9 VC KIA

Friendly casualties

5 KIA

24 WIA

10. Major weaknesses are the lack of leadership at Pl and squad level. As all contacts are company, there is no opportunity for junior leaders to develop initiative. Also in contact they manoeuvre, rather than hold contact and exploit. The desertion rate of this unit is the lowest in 2nd Regt. I believe due to the good guy approach of the battalion cmd.

11. At A2 we get a daily mortar barrage. Movement to the north of this location by day is not possible. I have been trying to convince my counterpart that we should operate at night. Particularly at platoon level to cut off the infiltration. I have been continuously trying to sell my counterpart fire and movement as we know it. The Battalion Cmd has a good battle record, as Cmd of the Hac Bao. He is the only Capt Bn Cmd in the Regt. The Coy Comds I believe are all very capable. However when something happens, orders come from as high as Regt level. I have had a good relationship with my previous two XOs. However the new one is due to come to the unit shortly, and it takes time to establish a good relationship.

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ANNEX I
TO AATTV REPORT
MAY 70

REPORT BY WO2 PALMER
3rd BN 1 ARVN REGT

1. The unit was to combat assault into the Fire Base BRADLEY area on approximately 28 Apr 70, but this was changed due to a recon team being lost in our normal area of responsibility Fire Base BARBARA. The unit was called out about 1800 hours on 26 Apr to combat assault the area to search for the Recon team. The light CP and one Coy was inserted about 1900 hours and the remainder of the unit was left at Quang Tri.
2. Next morning, on leaving the LZ and about 50 metres out, a prisoner was taken without any firing. The prisoner was well equipped and had good food, including condensed milk, sugar and coffee. He also had a 'National' radio. He spoke very good English and from the conversation I had with him, he was glad to be a PW but would not consider Chieu-Hoi at any price. He said he was lost and on the wrong trail. This of course was a good lie, as our troops were ambushed about another 100 metres further along the trail. We suffered two KIA and 11 WIA, one of the KIA being stabbed to death. The enemy had no casualties. About another 75 metres further on, we found that the NVA had fallen back to fully prepared positions. We could not move them and gun ships and air were used. The first set of air was a VNAF flight and dropped well off target by as much as 500 metres. The NVA then came out of the bunkers and waved us on! After this, we took some sniper fire and morale dropped.
3. Another FAC came on station and I got him to bend the safety factor a little and drop one bomb (500lb and napalm) at a time and then corrected each fall. This was very successful. Along the ridge line were another five positions, all a platoon plus. Over the next few days and nights, we used air and gunships as close as 40m and up to 300 metres to our front. We took 60mm and 82mm mortars mostly at night and were sappered one morning at 0200 hours. The last position contained seven very large bunkers and five houses. We had been in this area two weeks before and I would say the positions were about four days old. The bunkers were very well camouflaged, sited and with up to three feet of overhead cover.
4. Everywhere we turned, we found listening posts and rocket squads for the next two days. Small contacts continued, mostly without casualties to either side. We had our second successful ambush on 9 May. We were also mortared twice on 9 May with about 15 rounds each time. There were no casualties.
5. About 1700 hours on 12 May, whilst in low ground, we heard digging which was very close to us. We were then fired on from the left and again mortared. Their ambush was sprung too early and we got off lightly, but when we turned to move to the high ground, the NVA were also on that and we were caught from both sides. The thick under bush saved us and by using gunships, we took the high ground.
6. Whilst on this position, a sniper wounded one more man. The gunships and a FAC reported a good secondary explosion and after that, the mortar stopped, but I could not get my counterpart to check it out and we moved away from the contact area. Once we got back on the high ground of the main spur, morale came back to normal.

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7. We found more positions as before, there were more sapper attacks and we were mortared almost continuously and were just about repeats of the first contact. Up to the time I left, enemy casualties were enemy 79 KIA and one PW.

8. The unit I left is, I feel, very good overall and any adviser should not have too much trouble. They are very much pro-Australians and do ask for advice at times, mainly because we work on our own and so get to know them.

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ANNEX J
TO AATTY REPORT
DATED MAY 70

REPORT BY WO2 JOYCE
3 BN 5 APVN REGT
1 MAY TO 26 MAY 70

1. The general aims of the unit for the month were to continue operating the LZ YOUNG (BT188157) area of operation until approximately 10 May when it was due to be relieved by the 4/5 Bn. However substantial action in the Hiep Duc area caused the Bn to be airlifted into that area on 2 May. This movement was very hurried and the aim was to engage what was believed to be the 1st NVA Regt.

2. The Bn was airlifted into GRID 9627 on the morning of 2 May. No contact with the enemy was made that day. On the morning of 3 May the battalion moved towards GRID 9426 where heavy contact was made at 994268. The Bn received eight KIA and 20 WIA. At approximately 1830 hours that evening the battalion was attacked by an estimated enemy battalion, which almost succeeded in overrunning the Bn CP.

4 May. The Battalion remained in location until mid afternoon to be resupplied and have the wounded and dead extracted, having been re-inforced by the 4th Bn 6 Regt at approximately 1000 hours.

5 May. The Battalion was in location in GRID 9325. An enemy sniper attack was repulsed at approximately 0400 hours resulting in three APVN WIA and four enemy KIA. 100 grenades, two RPG 7's and one AK47 were captured. Later in the day three APVN were killed due to a follow up action by the battalion moving up in the area. Three enemy were KIA.

6-8 May. The Battalion continued to move towards GRID 9225. Movement was very slow.

9 May. The Battalion remained in the location occupied the previous day, (Million Dollar Hill). An enemy location to the West (GRID 923253) was attacked late in the afternoon, the attack being repulsed.

10 May. A further attack on 923253 was also repulsed.

13 May. The Battalion moved into HIEP DUC leaving elements at Million Dollar Hill and objective 33 (GRID 923253).

14 May. The Battalion was joined by a US Coy which had withdrawn to our location after being ambushed approximately 1000 metres East of HIEP DUC. The Battalion remained in HIEP DUC until 19 May when it moved back to Objective 33 and Million Dollar Hill to occupy blocking positions and remained there until the morning of the 25 May when the battalion was airlifted back to TAM KY.

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4. The overall standard of the unit is quite good. The major weakness is still a reluctance to move close to and follow up an airstrike and artillery preparations on objectives. There is also a reluctance by the battalion Commander to use organic weapons, especially those close to the CP, as he says this will give away his CP location. This results in the Sub-units having to move without support of the unit's MG's, RR's and 81MM mortars. The troops are also unable to use the L.A.W. effectively against bunkers, because they have not received sufficient training in the use of this weapon.

5. The first weakness is something over which I have no control. To overcome the second weakness I have suggested to the Regt Senior Advisor that the Bn receive instructions on the correct use of handling the L.A.W.

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Annex K
to AATTV Report
May 70

REPORT BY CAPT SHILSTON
2 MOBILE SPECIAL FORCES - PLEIKU
MAY 70

Training

1. For the period 3 May to 8 May 70 the 1st Bn was deployed in AO LOK for training. It was intended that the Bn receives training in night firing, patrolling at night and ambushes, all of which were to have included live firing with particular emphasis on live firing at night from the Coy Mortar crews.
2. After the Bn had deployed and considerable effort had been made to produce snap shooting and jungle lanes, I was informed that the only live firing to be carried was to be done on the range and that there was to be absolutely no live firing at night because of the possibility of friendly retaliatory fire. Consequently, more emphasis was placed on fire and movement techniques during daylight training.
3. During the training period the following Australian personnel assisted in the training:
 - a. WO2 Sanderson
 - b. WO2 Barnes
 - c. Sgt Miller
 - d. Sgt Cochrane
4. Recruit Training. The 2/70 training cycle commenced on the 17 May 70 with a recruit strength of 169. After pay on the 29th May this strength was reduced to 158, eleven recruits being AWOL and struck off the rolls after three days. The present strength is expected to remain stable until completion of cycle. The Coy has now completed three weeks of training.

Deployment

5. The Bn deployed into Dak Seang on the 10 May 70 and was moved back into Pleiku on the 31 May 70. Attached to this report is a copy of the execution paragraph of my after action report. This gives a detailed account in chronological order of the complete operation. The only additional comments I have are as follows.

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- a. Air Support was available whenever required.
 - b. Artillery support from Camp Dak Seang (105 How) was always available and effective.
 - c. Arty support from Camp Ben-Het 8 inch and 175mm was always available and effective, except that:
 - (1) Because of the safety factors it could not be used for close support.
 - (2) There was a 40 minute wait from the time a fire mission was called to the time a round was fired.
 - d. The resupply system for the unit was not up to the required standard;
 - (1) On the first food resupply, there were 14 cases of PIR short;
 - (2) One complete ammunition resupply was dropped to the enemy.
 - (3) One ammunition resupply included five times the amount I had requested consequently one Coy had to be used as a porter party.
 - (4) One ammunition resupply contained .30 and .50 cal ammo.
 - (5) A request was sent in for 30 M16 rifles, eight GPMGs, two M79s and one 60mm mor. Only two GPMGs were received from the original request.
6. Australian personnel on the operation were employed as follows:
- a. 211 Coy WO2 Barnes : Coy Comd & Coy 21/c
 - b. 212 Coy Sgt Miller : Adviser to LLDB.
7. Since the completion of the operation I have spoken to WO2 Barnes and Sgt Miller in respect to their future employment within the team. Both have expressed a desire to remain with the 1st Bn.
8. Future Plans . As far as I am aware, the Bn will be re-deployed on the 14 Jun 70. The soldiers have been informed that they will not be required to operate in areas where NVA are known to be, ie Dak Seang and Dak Pek but will be employed against VC in Plei-Me or Ple-Merong.

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Para 11 Execution from After Action Report for the 1st MSF Bn covering dates 09 May 1970 - 31 May 1970:

- 09 May 70 0900 hrs: 1st MSF Bn departed from AO Lok by convoy to Dak To. The intention at this time, was for the Bn to be deployed in the Dak Pek area. Due to a change in the enemy situation, the Bn AO was changed from Dak Pek to Dak Seang and the Bn convoy was diverted to Ben-Het.
- 10 May 70 0900 hrs: Bn was airlifted into Dak Seang airstrip; lift completed at 1200 hrs. At 1300 hrs the Bn moved to objective nr 1 and established a perimeter. At approx 1600 hrs the Bn was ordered to move to YB 903426, establish a firm base and make contact with the CRP's 3 & 4 of the 2nd Bn 5th MSFC. The Bn arrived at the new location at approx 1830 hrs. At this time, the CRP's were in heavy contact in the vicinity of YB 904437, one USSF with the CRP had been killed and the remainder had been wounded. Because of the high casualty rate, the CRP could not move away from the area of contact.

At approx 1900 hrs, 213 Co was given the mission to locate the CRP and assist them back to the 1st Bn area. 213 Co established contact with the CRP at approx 2300 hrs, formed a perimeter around the CRP and proceeded to dig in. At approx 2330, 213 Co and CRP's 3 & 4 were subjected to an intense 82mm mortar and ground attack from an estimated NVA platoon with heavy weapons in support. Artillery fire from Dak Seang and Shadow aircraft were used to give suppressing fire to break up this attack. Supporting fire from both of these sources was used continuously throughout this action. After the initial attack, the position remained under fire from 82mm mortar and B-40 rockets. NB: During this action the NVA used WP mortar rds.

- 11 May 70 At approx 0100 hrs the Cmdr of 213 Co (SFC G. Hetzler) decided that the position was untenable and to attempt to break out to the South-east. With the assistance of Artillery and Shadow support, the attempt was successful and the force broke contact with the NVA at approx 0145 hrs.

At approx 0230 hrs the force was ambushed by an estimated NVA squad at YB 902434. After the initial contact the NVA withdrew to the North and the force continued to move Southeast.

At approx 0700 hrs the force reached the Bn perimeter. At 0800 hrs the 1st Bn escorted the CRP to Dak Seang Camp, this move was completed by 1200 hrs.

- NB: 1. Due to the intense enemy activity the body of Sgt Drake from the CRP could not be recovered.
2. 75% of CRP's 3 & 4 were wounded, some of whom were stretcher cases.
3. During the action, 2 USSF and 16 CIDG from 213 Co were wounded.
4. Enemy casualties are unknown.

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- 11 May 70 At 1200 hrs the 1st Bn was given a new AO and was ordered to move to YB 891433, the Bn moved as far as YB 900416 and was then informed that there was a large NVA force (probably a regiment) in the vicinity of YB 896414. The Bn was then ordered to move back to objective Nr 1. Bn remained in vicinity of YB 891433 for the night.
- 12 May 70 The 1st Bn moved to objective Nr 1 arriving in that location at approx 1200 hrs. The Bn was then ordered to remain in the vicinity of objective Nr 1 until the completion of the 5th MSF C/A into Nui Ek.
- 13 May 70 The 1st Bn moved to objective Nr 2.
- 14 May 70 At approx 1200 hrs, received resupply of rations on objective Nr 2.
NB: 1. 14 Cases of PIR's short.
- 15 May 70 Cleared objective Nr 3 and moved to objective Nr 4, move complete by approx 1500 hrs.
NB: 1. Used 8 inch and 175 Artillery preparatory fire on objectives 3 & 4 whilst Bn moved.
- 16 May 70 At 0800 hrs, Bn prepared to move to objective Nr 5. At approx 0900 hrs, at YB 871428, the leading element of 213 Co were fired on by an estimated NVA platoon in bunkers, 213 Co withdrew to objective Nr 4. Airstrikes and Artillery from Dak Seang were called onto the enemy positions. At approx 1530 hrs a patrol was sent forward to check the enemy positions, this patrol received heavy MG and AK-47 fire from the same enemy locations and withdrew back to the Bn perimeter on objective Nr 4.
NB: 1. 1 USSF and 1 CIDG were wounded in action.
2. Cpt Albracht and Cpt Childers were lifted in to objective Nr 4 and took command of 213 and 211 Co's.
- 17 May 70 At approx 0100 hrs, the enemy could be heard digging in approx 50 meters West of the Bn perimeter. At this time, the Bn 60mm mortars and Artillery from Dak Seang were fired on the enemy position. At 0900 hrs, the Bn came under an intense indirect fire attack from recoilles rifles, 82mm mortars, 60mm mortars, and B-40 rockets. This was followed by a ground attack from an estimated two NVA Co's from the North, West, and South of the RON position. Airstrikes and Artillery from Dak Seang Camp were called onto the enemy positions and contact was broken at approx 1015 hrs. During the period 1015 hrs to 1500 hrs, the Bn received sporadic mortar and recoilles rifle attacks and ground probes.
At approx 1500 hrs, 211 Co was ordered to move to the Southeast in an attempt to break through the enemy positions. After moving approx 75 meters, 211 Co came under heavy automatic and small arms fire from fortified positions, and withdrew back to the RON position.
Airstrikes and Artillery from Dak Seang were called onto the enemy positions.
NB: 1. 1 USSF wounded in action

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During the period 171800 to 180600 the Bn received continuous indirect 82mm mortar fire and ground probes.

NB: 1. Throughout the hours of darkness Artillery fire Dak Seang was called onto the enemy positions.

2. Shadow aircraft could not be used because of low cloud cover.

18 May 70

At 0630 hrs, received critical ammo resupply.

NB: 1. 1 helicopter load of ammo was dropped into the enemy position.

At 0900 hrs the Bn came under an intense indirect fire attack from Artillery, mortar, recoilles rifle, 12.7 MG, and B-40 rockets, with a strong ground attack from the North, South and West. Air-strikes were called in around the Bn perimeter and at approx 1000 hrs enemy ground troops withdrew. The Bn continued to receive enemy mortar, 12.7, and RA fire.

At approx 1030 hrs the Bn Commander decided that the position was to fast becoming untenable and to attempt to break out to the East. This decision was based on the following factors:

a. Ammo was down to approx 1 magazine of 5.65 per man, 50 rds of 7.62 per MG, nil 60mm mortar ammo;

b. 30 M-16 rifles and 3 M-60 MG were inoperable;

c. NVA had moved a 12.7 MG close to the Bn position (This gun fired at all aircraft flying over the position and consequently the Bn LZ could not be used for further resupply of ammo);

d. That the shape of the ground to the East was such that it was extremely unlikely that the enemy would be there in any great strength.

At approx 1045 hrs the Co Commanders were given the following briefing:

a. The Bn would break out to the East at 1230 hrs with 211 Co leading followed by the Bn HQ, 212 Co, and 213 Co;

b. Prior to the move, the route to the East would be bombed, napalmed, and strafed;

c. There would be continuous airstrikes around the Bn position whilst the Bn moved;

d. There would be two Cobra gunships giving suppressing fire around the Bn perimeter and on completion of the breakout these gunships would escort the Bn as long as their petrol and ammo lasted.

At 1230 hrs, the 1st Bn moved to the East of objective Nr 4. At 1300 received automatic fire from NVA bunkers at YB 877437, the Bn returned fire and moved around the bunker complex to the North. At this point, Co Commanders were ordered to move their companies by separate routes to Dak Seang Camp. All companies had closed into the Camp by 1600 hrs.

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NB: 1. 1 NVA dressed in tiger suit and carrying B-40 Rocket Launcher was KIA at YB 877437.

At 1630 Bn moved onto Western end of Dak Seang airstrip. Received RR fire from East and West. Artillery from Dak Seang Camp called in on enemy gun positions. Mike FAC called in airstrikes on enemy gun positions.

At 1700 hrs received resupply of ammo. At 1730 hrs moved to objective Nr 1 and established Bn position. At 1745 hrs received further resupply of ammo. At this time, Mike FAC reported a large enemy force at YB 884407 and called in an airstrike on the enemy position. Mike FAC reported 6 NVA KBA from this airstrike.

At 1750 hrs 213 Co reported hearing digging approx 75 meters West of the Bn perimeter. At this time, the Bn had 30 M-16 rifles, 8 M-60 MG, 1 60mm mortar, and 2 M-79 and 5 AN/PRC-25 sets that were unoperable. Consequently, the Bn Commander decided to move back inside of Dak Seang Camp to await further resupplies.

At 1815 the Bn moved towards Dak Seang Camp. At 1830 the Bn came under attack from 82mm mortar and RR fire from the West. Move into Camp completed by 1930 hrs.

NB: 1. Initial ammo resupply contained great quantities of 30 and 50 cal ammo.

2. Subsequent ammo resupplies had not been called for and had to be carried back to Dak Seang.

3. 1 ARVN and 5 CIDG WIA.

19 May 70 Bn remained within the perimeter of Dak Seang Camp, received resupply and refitted.

20 May 70 Bn remained within perimeter of Dak Seang Camp to receive further resupply.

21 May 70 Attempted to get CIDG personnel out of Dak Seang Camp. CIDG refused to move. Put CIDG to work inside of perimeter digging tunnels and filling sandbags.

22 May 70 At 0800 and 1400 hrs platoon sized clearing patrols cleared for approx 500 meters around Dak Seang Camp. Remainder of CIDG employed in Camp.

23 May 70 At 0700 and 1400 hrs company sized patrolled area around camp for 1000 meters around camp. No sightings or contacts.

24 May 70 At 0700 and 1400 hrs company sized patrols cleared area 1000 meters to East, South, and West. No contacts or sightings.

25 May 70 At 0700 and 1400 hrs company sized patrols cleared area 1000 meters to East, South, and West. No contacts or sightings.

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26 May 70 At 0700 and 1400 hrs company sized patrols cleared area 1000 meters around Camp. Patrols found 7 bodies plus a grave estimated to contain 5-10 bodies at YB 900417. 5 bodies believed to be ARVN, 2 bodies believed to be NVA. Bodies in grave of unknown origin.

27 May 70 At 0700 and 1400 hrs company sized patrols cleared for 1000 meters around Camp. At YB 900418, 211 Co found 4 NVA bodies KEA, with pith helmets and web gear. No weapons.

28-29 May 70 At 0700 and 1400 hrs daily, company size patrols cleared area for 1000 meters around Camp. No contacts or sightings.

30 May 70 0900 hrs Bn moved to YB 909420 in order to link up with 5th MSF. Linkup completed at 1445 hrs. Bn moved back into Dak Seang at 1600 hrs.

31 May 70 At 0930 Bn was airlifted from Dak Seang to Dak To and moved from Dak To to Pleiku by road convoy. Move completed by 1700.

Summary of Casualties:

1. Own TPS:	KIA	WIA
	USSF-0	5
	LLDB-1	2
	CIDG-1	58
2. Enemy TPS:	KIA-39	KEA-10

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Annex L
to AATTV Report
May 70

CONFERENCE ON TACTICS WITH CG IFFORCEV

1. At 251445 April, LTG Collins called a conference in his office on the subject of tactics and lessons learned from the fighting at Dak Seang. In attendance were the following: MG Quang; BG Trien and his adviser, COL Barth, COL Canh and his adviser, COL Braim.

2. General Collins presented four situations which occurred at Dak Seang, and which, he felt, provided some lessons which should result in changes in training and tactics.

a. In the first situation, a battalion attacks and is met by an enemy force. The battalion halts and calls for supporting fires. During the time that the battalion is waiting for air support, the enemy surrounds the battalion in very small groups. The enemy then delivers a high volume of direct fire which pins the battalion in an area which has been pre-registered by the enemy's indirect fire weapons. The enemy then delivers a high volume of mortar and recoilless rifle fire, which accounts for a high percentage of the battalion's casualties. In this circumstance, the battalion must, immediately upon contact, lay down a base of fire to include calling for artillery (which is the most responsive supporting weapon) and maneuver with one or more of its elements, including short range maneuver by lead elements in contact. The battalion should in no case remain in the killing zone, but should press forward, hugging the enemy. (The best defense is a strong aggressive offense. You cannot win with defensive tactics or thinking -- added by DSA).

b. The battalion is in the same circumstance as before; however, this time the battalion retreats and calls for gunships. The enemy continues to hug the battalion, moving forward and picking up the battalion's wounded and weapons. The gunships take 20 to 30 minutes to get on station, and in the meantime the battalion may be badly hurt. In this circumstance, the battalion should again lay down a heavy volume of fire, including its organic weapons and supporting artillery. It should then maneuver to engage the enemy on the flanks, and should, under no circumstances, retreat.

c. In the next case, a unit runs into a group of enemy bunkers. Our troops are stopped and spend a great deal of time attempting to call for air and non-organic support. Apparently, our soldiers are afraid to fire the LAW or recoilless weapons organic to them. These are the weapons to use against bunkers. If the LAWs often misfire, as reported, they should be frequently fired and new ones issued. (In the 4th Division we found that LAWs carried too long often malfunctioned when they were used.) ARVN should

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be trained as to the manner in which a bunker can be outflanked while it is being taken under fire. Use of base of fire, smoke grenades, and LAWs will often eliminate or neutralize a bunker.

d. In the last case, the enemy lets a battalion assemble in a tight perimeter, throws a few rounds into the battalion, then ceases fire to allow an evac helicopter to come in. When the helicopters come in for evacuation and resupply, all of the enemy rise up and fire directly at the choppers, destroying them. Thus, to avoid this, a battalion's temporary defensive position should be broadly spread. Units should move out to attack and seize the high ground around a firebase or Night Defensive Position. Recoilless weapons and automatic weapons should be taken under fire by our direct fire weapons when they open fire. Small aggressive patrol units should move out to attack the specific locations of these weapons. Men should be trained to take azimuths on the flash of weapons. Artillery should engage the weapons by flash. Teach units to get shell reports.

3. General Collins reiterated his points. Training must be given in the laying down of a base of fire, manoeuvring at all levels, and the use of artillery, rather than overreliance on air, and especially in using artillery as a rolling barrage, firing overhead, to develop the soldier's confidence in his artillery. Training should also be given in the attack upon bunkers and the firing of LAWs and recoilless rifles. Training should be given in locating the enemy weapons, and in destroying enemy weapons with direct fire weapons. (Added: Troops should also be trained not to open up with direct fire weapons when they are in night defensive positions). The enemy is reacting faster than we are which is not good. These things we must teach our young NCOs and officers. Start tomorrow on this. It is the most vital activity we can undertake in any of the divisions in II Corps.

4. Major General Quang had the following comments upon General Collins' points:

a. I agree with all that has been said by General Collins. Col Long was of the opinion that the enemy would defend the high ground around Dak Seang strongly, and that it was best to land on the low ground with reinforcements. We now know that the VC planned to react against just such a tactic.

b. My idea is that we must send only small units first to develop the enemy's location and his weapons, then react with larger units to block the enemy's withdrawal and to destroy him by fire.

c. At present the VC are putting only small units into the area to pin us down, then are using mortar and recoilless rifle to cause the majority of US and ARVN casualties.

d. Over the past few weeks at Dak Seang, all we have been able to do is rescue the 1st and 3rd Battalions; otherwise we have not in anyway resolved the battle.

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e. Morale is now low in the 42nd Regiment, and we are not getting good response to orders.

5. In response to these comments by General Quang, General Collins said the following:

"Really, we are not fighting as battalions in this war; we are fighting with smaller unit encounters."

6. General Quang : If ARVN could learn to manoeuvre, we would win the war.

7. All ARVN officers present agreed that this is a Captain's, Lieutenant's, and Sergeant's war. It is in this area that we are weakest, and in this area that we must train so that we can win. Battalion Commanders must be strong also.

8. General Trien: "We must repeatedly train, starting with squad ambushade. Once we perfect the ambush; then the patrol operations; then we will defeat the Viet Cong."

9. Colonel Canh requested permission to say a few words about lessons he had learned at Bu Prang, and stated as follows:

"a. General Collins' explanation of problems at Dak Seang reveal the same problems we encountered and the same VC tactics at Bu Prang.

b. The VC know our reactions and they take infinite pains and a great deal of time to organize the terrain. The VC practice for a long time to train every man to know his job.

c. The VC move slowly and organize the terrain for basically a defensive battle.

d. We are doing the wrong thing to attack the VC in this position. The VC will not attack us generally, but, after the initial attack, will go into defense in a position to cover the area, digging in well and putting in good overhead cover against our massive fire power.

e. The VC attack by sappers, mortars, and recoilless rifle fire only.

f. If we are caught in a VC killing zone, sometimes we can't manoeuvre because of restrictive terrain and casualties taken. If we stay in the killing zone to call for medevac, we take even more casualties while choppers are coming in and evacuating our wounded.

g. We must change the tactics drastically:

(1) First of all, small reconnaissance units should be inserted to develop the enemy's position.

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(2) We must use artillery to support the reconnaissance units, then supporting air.

(3) We should use eagle flights to spot, locate and move in on enemy supporting weapons.

(4) Major forces should be lifted outside of the VC battle area to attack the VC defensive positions from the rear."

10. General Collins asked the question as to whether this excellent dissertation given by Colonel Canh had been made available to others. Colonel Canh answered that he had given a lecture on Bu Prang at the General Staff College and to officers in his DTA.

11. Colonel Canh also stated that he had directed that his senior officers go with the junior officers in the attack and in operations in general; specifically, the battalion commanders will go with the lead company, and the company commanders will go with the lead platoon. Colonel Brain made the point that he had given similar instructions to his advisers which would require them to get with the lower units.

12. As a Postscript to this conference, General Quang made the point to General Collins that there were a number of mistakes observed in the conduct of defensive operations, particularly ambushade, by RF/PF operating with US units in some cases.

a. Often the ambushade or night defensive operation would be conducted from exactly the same location for a number of nights.

b. Units going into position would not dig in, and would have no fighting positions from which to operate.

c. There was often a difficulty in communication, and in calling for fire support because of language problems. General Collins and General Quang agreed that this matter has to be straightened out through discussion in both command channels.

13. The above remarks, lessons learned, and tactical principles are inclusive of both good and bad aspects of ARVN and RF/PF operations. As such they should be studied by all elements and individuals on the Advisory Team. Each adviser will emphasize deliberate planning and violent, aggressive execution of plans and orders at all echelons. It is my desire that the good points cited above be used as the situation dictates in all training and operations. On the other hand we must assure ourselves that the "boners" are not repeated. On the battlefield aggressive tactics must be recognized and pushed by all advisers.

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14. An ARVN unit has the same combat support a US unit has, but may lack the leadership ingredient. It is our job to develop, nurture it, guide and direct. Solid basic training is required -- use of fire and manoeuvre -- supporting fires. We should be pushing the NVA/VC all over the II Corps area. We can if we press hard and develop our counterparts as aggressive, professional combat leaders.

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Annex M
to AATTV Report
May 70

REPORT BY MAJ BEALE
PHUOC TUY PROVINCE - MAY 70

General

1. The month was a period of reorganization and redeployment of the AATTV effort within the province.
2. Two MATTs were raised and deployed with RF Coys. Portion of a third team were deployed with an RF Bn undergoing initial training while the remainder of this team and a fourth have been raised and are currently attending the MATT Course at the USARV Advisor School.
3. A HQ for the AATTV organization within the Province was established with the OC and a driver located at Van-Kiep and two WOs with Orderly Room, Q Store and barrack facilities in 1 ALSG area at Vung-Tau.
4. The final AATTV controlled Long Range Patrol Course was completed at Van-Kiep Training Centre. The course CI was withdrawn, two WOs redeployed to general instructional duties within the Centre and one WO reposted to the Ranger Training Centre at Duc-My to assist in future the Vietnamese conducted LRP Courses.
5. The WO PSDF Adviser was withdrawn and reposted to the NOAT in the Delta.
6. The WO Adviser to the A&DSL Coy while still held against this posting was re-employed assisting the Village Adviser and the RF Bn MATT, a build up in US Advisers in the Coy leaving him without effective employment.

AATTV HQ Phuoc-Tuy

7. The embryo HQ has been established and will assume the following functions;
 - a. Administration and discipline of all AATTV personnel within the Province.
 - b. Command and control other than operational control of AATTV MATTs.

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8. Current organization of the HQ is;

a. Van-Kien.

OC	- Maj Beale
Driver	- Pte Bean (det from 8 RAR)
Admin WO	- WO2 Hedges
One Land Rover	

b. Vung-Tau

21C	- WO Ostara
CCMS	- WO Muir
One Land Rover	

9. Adequate accommodation for the HQ has been provided in 17 Const Sqn lines at 1 ALSG with one building for Orderly Room and Q Store and two barrack huts.

MATT 1

10. MATT1 was deployed with 655 RF Coy at Binh Ba on 4 May 70, the team taking over responsibilities and stores from an 8 RAR MATT previously located in the area.

11. The team comprises;

Team Leader	WO Stephens
21C	WO White
Instr Inf	Cpl McIntyre
" "	Cpl Parry
Instr RAE	Cpl Peach
Instr RAAMC	Cpl Kay (subsequently RTA (med) and replaced by Cpl Dawkins)

12. The team has assumed responsibility for training in the area of Binh Ba, Duc-My and Ap Sui May and has concentrated initially on training and operations with 655 Coy. Activities have been severely limited by 8 RAR operations within the area, the District Chief having allocated

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the entire AO to 8 RAR to the exclusion of the RF Coy and PF Pls. Operations have been confined to night ambushes, check point and road clearing operations and cordon and search, often without adequate information of adjacent 8 RAR activities. The DSA has managed to obtain a one thousand meter square AO as a training area for the Coy but Coy operations are restricted by the lack of a clear AO. The training activities of the MATT are progressing satisfactorily.

13. The MATT has established a good rapport with the RF Coy Comd and close cooperation with the District Advisory Staff.

14. The MATT Leader's report is attached.

MATT 2

15. MATT2 was deployed with 578 RF Coy at Dat Do on 6 May 70, the team taking over from a 7 RAR MATT.

16. The team comprises;

Team Leader	WO Smith
2IC	WO Williams
Instr Inf	Cpl Smithson
" "	Cpl Eade
Instr RAE	Cpl Willis
Instr RAAMC	Pte Kalembe

17. The team has assumed responsibility for training and operations with the two RF Coys (578 and 772) located Dat Do Village.

18. Due to a heavy operational commitment of the RF, little opportunity has been available for formal training by the team.

19. Operations have been confined to night ambushes, day sweeps and cordon and search. Operations have been generally hastily mounted and inadequately briefed and not conducted within clearly defined AOs. In the early part of the month ambushes were located outside the village between 7 RAR ambushes where locations were not known in detail raising major difficulties of coordination, safety and control. In the later part of the month the ambushes have been confined to within the village.

20. The team has established good rapport with the RF Coy Comd and initial problems of coordination with the District Advisory Staff are being slowly rectified.

21. The team leaders report is attached.

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MATT 3

22. The Team Leader and 21C of MATT 3 were deployed with 302 RF Bn on 18 May. The remainder of the Team was raised on 23 May and is currently attending the MATT Course at the USARV Advisor School.

23. The team comprises.

Team Leader	WO Logan
21C	WO Moffit
Instr Inf	Cpl Talbot
" "	Cpl Monk
Instr RAE	Cpl Byrne
Instr RAAMC	Cpl Riley

24. 302 RF Bn is currently undergoing initial Bn training at Van-Kiep Training Centre. The Team Leader and 21C are supervising and assisting in the training and preparing operational plans for the Bn after the completion of its training on 14 Jun 70.

25. It is planned after the completion of its training that the Bn be held concentrated and be employed on Bn size operations. In view of this proposed employment it is considered that as special enlarged MATT organization is required. The following is proposed;

Team Leaders	- Capt)	
Instr Int	- Cpl)	
Instr RAE	- Cpl)	Bn HQ
Instr RAAMC	- Cpl)	
Coy Advisers	- WO)	
" 21C	- Cpl)	ea of 4 Coys
Total Team:	1 Capt		
	4 WO		
	4 Cpls Inf		
	1 Cpl Int		
	1 Cpl RAE		
	1 Cpl Med		

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MATT 4

26. MATT 4 was raised on 23 May 70 and is currently attending the MATT Course at the USARV Advisor School.

27. The team comprises;

Team Leader	WO Heenan
21C	WO Palmer
Instr Inf	Cpl Kuring
Instr Inf	Bdr Harding
Instr RAE	Cpl Hogg
Instr RAAME	Pte Schneider

28. Deployment of the team on the completion of its course on 11 Jun 70 has not been finalized but will probably be with an RF Coy in Long Bien Village.

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ANNEX N
TO AATTV
REPORT

May 70.

REPORT BY MAJ J.A. BROWNE
IV CORPS MAY 70.

Enemy

1. Enemy activity remained fairly constant throughout the month. Nine RF/PF outposts were overrun. Elements of 95A Regiment NVA were reported in contact with RF companies south of the U Minh Forest. Contact was broken when the acting sector commander withdrew his companies by helicopter and watercraft.

Cambodian Operations.

2. The Cambodian operations curtailed any pre-planned enemy operations which were anticipated for the period 16-19 May 70.
3. Initially units involved from IV Corps were concentrated in the Parrots Peak area. These units were then withdrawn south into Kien-Tuong and Kien-Phong Provinces. On the 16 May 70 operations commenced in the area of the Seven Mountains. 21 ARVN Division deployed west of the mountain Nui O (West of Highway 2), 9 ARVN Division to the east of Nui O and the STZ to the east of 9 ARVN Division. By the end of the first day ARVN units had reached Takeo.
4. ARVN forces have further consolidated their positions. 9 ARVN Division reached Highway 2 and part of 21 ARVN Division is operating to the north of the Seven Mountains while the remainder of the Division is concentrated east of Highway 3. Operations are now aimed at locating caches, several of which have been found to date. As yet no plans have been revealed for the withdrawal of ARVN forces from Cambodia.
5. Information was received by the District Chief of Tinh-Bien in Chau-Doc Province which indicated that three days prior to the Cambodian offensive 160 civilians were impressed by the NVA to carry small arms from Nui O to the southern features of the Seven Mountains area. The District Chief was also informed that 1 Div had redeployed into Nui O where elements of Cambodian forces loyal to Sihanouk were also reported to be located.

Refugees

6. 43,000 ethnic Vietnamese who were living in Cambodia have been relocated in IV Corps. On the 22 May 70, Dr Phan Quang Dan, chairman of the Inter Ministerial Relief Committee visited IV Corps to discuss the refugee problem. He was accompanied by the Australian Ambassador, Mr Harry and the Japanese Charge D'Affaires. As a result of this visit the following plan was formulated:

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- a. Refugees are to be absorbed in border areas where possible.
- b. Refugees transported by government agencies are to be located at My Tho or in An Giang Province.

7. A number of interesting points were made by Dr Dan. A quarter of the refugees wish to return to Cambodia. The main reasons for leaving Cambodia in the first place were to escape the war, the VC/NVA and Cambodian discrimination. South Vietnam will not accept any more refugees from Cambodia, the reason being that Cambodia is responsible for the refugees regardless of ethnic nationality.

Night Operation Advisory Team (NOAT).

8. The major problem with training 203 RF Company has been its employment by the District Chief on day operations. This problem has now been overcome by the use of a province reaction company. Col Dao, the Province Chief, has now given orders for 203 RF Company to undergo training by the NOAT.

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
Annex O
to AATTV Report
May 70

NIGHT OPERATION TECHNIQUES CURRENTLY EMPLOYED IN CHAU DOC

The following has been put together from discussions with: Sector S-2; Sector S-3; District Chief, Tinh Bien; Intelligence Squad, Tinh Bien; Lien Doi Battalion Commander, Nui Tuong; RF Company Commander, Nui Tuong; RF/PF Assistant Adviser; Deputy PHOENIX Coordinator; DSA, Tan Chau and MAT Leader, Nui Tuong.

1. Techniques (GVN Forces)

- a. Some success has been achieved with linear set ambushes parallel to enemy approach route utilizing command-detonated claymores. GVN forces are not co-located with the killing area but are positioned at approach lines to the killing area. This force is utilized to follow up on the enemy reaction as a result of the initiated ambush.
- b. Practically all night operations involve foot insertion into the area of operations.
- c. A reconnaissance of the ambush area is carried out by two to three soldiers after dusk.
- d. Great emphasis is placed on the employment of the mechanical ambush. It is not unusual to carry out a successful ambush of this type two or three nights in a row and where the ambush is placed almost in the same area.
- e. Many night ambush sites are selected - a percentage being mechanical and a percentage personnel. Of the ambush utilizing GVN forces, up to four ambush sites are selected to be occupied during the night period. Some of these sites are being occupied up to only two hours.
- f. Where a specific line of enemy approach is indicated, two rows of linear set claymores are positioned opposite but adjacent to each other. The ambush is sprung by two trip mines on the trail; e.g.,



- g. Where infiltration routes exist in open plain areas with sparse features, some success has been achieved in setting night ambushes in areas containing guide features; e.g., clumps of bamboo, graves area.

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h. In a night linear ambush involving at least two platoons, a firm base is set remote to the ambush site. The ambush commander is positioned in the center of the ambush force. Claymore are set at each end point of the linear ambush. The claymores are initiated to spring the ambush by observers set at each end point of the ambush, not by the ambush commander. A quick search is made of the bodies. The bodies are not booby trapped and withdrawal is made through the firm base. The killing zone is covered by artillery concentrations to engage enemy follow up.

i. Deception is achieved by conducting a sloppy ambush on a likely area. Twenty to 25 GVN troops are employed on an ambush target which would require perhaps only ten. The ambush party returns along the same route used as route in (chancey), at about 2300. A well placed, pre-sited ambush of the ten troops required remain at the site as a stay-behind ambush.

2.

Enemy Tactics

a. Local VC wear black pajamas and employ B-40s and carry AK-47s. Satchel charges are also employed at night. In all actions involving night harassing tactics, the enemy apply camouflage material to their equipment and bodies.

b. Of the many infiltration routes in the province, three are well defined. They are divided: personnel, supplies and mixture. No specific pattern exists on the numbers involved as infiltration may be in total numbers of 10-20 or 100-200. A pattern has, however, emerged on the supplies route in that of an ambushed supply party all were found to be carrying one item, B-40s. The route used involving a mixture of both personnel and supplies is apparently for quick reinforcements.

c. Infiltration routes are used in the period 2200-0400, movement being covered by harassing attacks on GVN outposts.

d. The enemy prefer to move in dead ground to observation, along ditches to avoid silhouette.

e. Enemy shows reluctance on inability to alter set infiltration routes.

f. When using sampans, enemy generally swims beside the sampan to insure a low silhouette.

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3. VCI or Sympathizer Tactics. Hamlet sympathizers may indicate the presence of GVN forces to the enemy at night, in the following manner:
- a. Whistles imitating a bird repeated a set number of times in succession.
 - b. Safehouses - lights on or off as appropriate.
 - c. Mother calls loudly to baby a pre-arranged phrase a set number of times.
 - d. Pigs are made to squeal.
 - e. Hamlet dwellers burn some trash at a pre-designated location.
 - f. A cigarette lighter is lit three or four times and blown out quickly in succession.
 - g. Cigarettes are moved in large circles or are held at shoulder length or waist height.
4. General Opinion. Currently, in Tinh Bien insufficient forces are available to employ the night operation technique. Suggest that one other RF Company could be assigned with the task of night operations in Tinh Bien.

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BRIEF ON IV CORPS

Annex P
to AATTV Report
May 70

GEOGRAPHY

1. IV Corps generally comprises the Delta of the Bassac and Mekong Rivers. The area of 14,000 square miles is about half the size of Tasmania.
2. The Delta has the characteristic features of all Deltas. The elevation varies from zero at the long stretches of shoreline mangrove swamps to about six feet at the Cambodian border. There are a few hills in Chau Doc, the highest being about 2300 feet.
3. The climate is typically tropical. Dry season is January - March. Increasing rains April - June; with the real wet season in July - September.

SOCIAL and POLITICAL

4. The population is approximately six million, predominantly Vietnamese. The majority live near the many rivers and canals that course through the area.
5. The Delta is divided politically into 16 provinces. Each province is headed by a province chief, appointed by the Central Government. The province chief does not have complete control over the representatives of the various ministries that compromise the provincial government. Despite this, the province chief is by far the most powerful man in the province.
6. Each province is, in turn, divided into districts in which a district chief represents the province chief. Except for province and district chiefs, the provincial and district officials are career civil service employees of the government. Rarely are they natives of the province in which they work.
7. Below district, the land and people are divided into villages and hamlets. The village is the lowest effective level of government. It has the power to assess and collect taxes and has a budget. Village and hamlet chiefs are, in most cases, elected by "popular" vote

ECONOMIC

8. The Delta economy is based on rice. Main cropping is single crop planted at the beginning of the wet monsoon in June/July and harvested in December or January. Average yield is about one ton per acre. IR-8 rice has made some successful inroads and introduction is being made of yet another--IR-22--but its effect is not yet significant.
9. In addition to producing most of the country's rice, the Delta also produces about 80% of its poultry, pigs, cattle, duck and fish.

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SECURITY

10. About 35% of the area of the Delta is effectively controlled by the enemy. This is generally swamp, mangrove and isolated areas. In these locations, the enemy has developed strong base areas. However, the majority of the population is controlled by the GVN with varying degrees of real security.
11. The Delta is designated the IV CTZ. The headquarters is in Can Tho. There are three DTAs and an STZ extending along the Cambodian border.
12. Each province is also designated as a sector with the province chief the sector commander. Each district is also designated as a sub-sector with the district chief as the sub-sector commander. Provinces are assigned Regional Force (RF) companies and Popular Force (PF) platoons for territorial security.

Currently, 558 RF companies
2,866 PF platoons

Overall strength is over 184,000 RF/PF

AUSTRALIAN ADVISORY EFFORT

13. The Australian Advisory Effort concentrates on RF and PF. The team is as follows:
 - Captain - OC Night Operations Advisory Team
 - 1x Warrant Officer - DIOCC member (intelligence)
 - 6x Warrant Officer - Formed into three night operations advisory teams, each of two
14. Specifically, the team is to advise in the following areas:
 - a. Re-training in night operations.
 - b. Conduct of night operations.
 - c. Intelligence gathering on enemy night operations.
15. In principle, the following steps are taken both in the selection of areas of operations and sequence of unit re-training.
 - a. Selection of province/district:
 - (1) No enemy main force units operating in area.
 - (2) Identified infiltration routes with maximum use frequency.
 - b. Selection of RF Company/PF Platoon:

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Selection made by team from initially accompanying all RF companies on night operations. No advice is made on these operations.

c. Selection of area of operations for selected RF company/PF platoon:

The area so selected is based on intelligence gained by DIOCC advised by the WO2 member located there.

16. Method of operation of team is as follows:

a. At the time of accompanying all RF companies of the district on night operations, comprehensive critical note is made by all team members. When all RF companies have been checked, a selection is made of the RF company whose night operating technique is considered to be of the highest standard. The team then concentrates on this company as a whole.

b. At the completion of the refresher training of the initial company, the team then splits into sub-teams each of two members and concurrently carry out refresher training of three other RF companies.

c. Where the province senior advisor (PSA) has allotted US MATs to this project, the MAT concurrently conducts refresher training with the PF platoons based on the above principles. Thus, RF and PF training is conducted concurrently at this stage.

DISTRICT/PROVINCE OPERATIONS

17. At the point of entry of night operations advisory effort into the RF/PF, the area so selected is to concentrate all RF and PF elements on night operations limiting day operations to light screening patrols.

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Annex C
to AATTV Report
May 70

REPORT BY WO2 D. WATTS
1ST BN 3 ARVN REGT - MAY 70

The following is my report for May. I apologise for this late return. I was unable to get in from the field to get it through the AATTV system on time.

The 1st Bn 3rd Regt arrived Quang-Tri on the 24th Apr, the CP plus HQ Coy set up at "Barbara" in defence of that Fire Base.

The Light CP under Bn XO and one Coy set up at Anne in defence of Fire Base. Two Rifle Coys committed to field.

Using the "Ba-Long" map our AO was bordered by the following squares NW 25/43, SW 35/29, SE 40/31 and NE 29/46. The northern boundary followed the river and took in a portion of the Rocket belt, this was our approx AO till early May, when the 1st Regt took over the bottom portion of our AO and the Bn concerned took over Barbara and set up their CP on that Fire Base. Our AO was then extended further west towards "Ba Long", as the Bn CP moved to Anne our 3rd Coy was then committed to the field, and I requested to join one of the Coys, I did join the 1st Coy on the 14th and walked with this Coy till the 24th, when I was compelled to call a medevac for myself.

During the 10 days I spent with this Coy I was surprised to see some of the habits they had developed and the lack of interest in the job shown by the Coy Commander, and the majority of soldiers. I had walked with this Coy before Tet, and couldn't fault them then, however I did feel insecure moving with them on this occasion.

Some of the problems I faced, follows, and my answer to those problems.

1) Air burst artillery prep. on the night defensive position (NDP) for the end of the days march, prior to leaving our present NDP.

I spoke to the Coy Commander and pointed out to him, that as it normally took us 3 hours to reach our NDP, we were giving pre-warning of our destination, and our line of march. Thus giving the enemy plenty of time to prepare a reception for as on ground of his own choosing. He broke this habit after 3 days, and also waited till he had the forward elements of his Coy on the approaches before he prepped crest of hill.

Another obvious one was leaving the NDP at same time each day, at my request he finally staggered the time of his departure.

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I found few soldiers moving in the ready position with weapons, plus M60 gunners carrying weapons over the shoulder, with belts not fixed to gun, but tied round waist.

Troops moving along trail in single file at approx 3 paces interval, no flank security and lack of control by Coy Commander when forward element in contact.

I also found that he was sending out non tactical water parties late in the day.

I found the morale very low with this Coy, they had previously been in contact the week before with an estimated Pl of NVA and lost 3 friendlies KIA and 7 WIA, for an enemy body count of 3 KIA. Also this Coy Commander has been in the field for 4 years, he could be getting stale.

Prior to Tet this year we had 4 Advisers with this Battalion, all infantry except for myself. The 2 Sgts US and I spent most of our time in the field with the Companies, and we were quite happy with their work. Since Tet, there has only been one the Battalion Senior Adviser and myself permanently with the Battalion, and it is only since I have been up in Quang-Tri, that I have been able to obtain permission, to walk alone with the field elements.

It was common knowledge that the old Regt Senior Adviser had no trust in the ARVN and refused to let Advisers go it alone. His reasons were that he was not sure that the ARVN would look after the Adviser if the going got tough, I believe it was this attitude, or policy that has caused these people to loose interest. Myself I have always spoken highly of them, and have been well looked after in the field, I also have been asked why the US advisers don't trust the Coy Commander and his soldiers.

All I could tell them, was that I can't speak for the US but as far as the Australian advisers are concerned, we will go anywhere with the ARVN but if we are ordered to remain behind by our US Senior Advisers, that's it, we just can't go.

The Bn Senior Adviser I have now is the 3rd I've had since I've been here. The previous two were both Infantry and with the assistance of the advisers under them, we did a lot of good work with this Battalion. My present Senior Adviser is a missile man and is lost when it come to Inf work. I have tried to confide in him, and tell him the problems I've found starting to build up, and the general decline in the Battalion, I don't know whether or not he is taking this to the Bn Commander. If he is, the Colonel is not listening to him, as there is no improvement.

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When I think of the work that was put into this Bn by previous advisers, it is pretty frustrating to think that all that work may have been wasted, only because it has not continued.

This report is based mainly on the 1st Coy, the 2nd Coy is extremely good and they have an excellent Coy Commander. I haven't been with the third Coy for a while, this Coy has been extremely unlucky with Commander, 1 KIA, 2 medevac, 1 AWE. I have spent most of my field time here with the 2nd Coy, I have a good working relationship with Lt Tun and his people; I have told him about the new Australian adviser who is to replace me, WO2 Lancaster, and I'm sure WO2 Lancaster will enjoy working with this officer.

I have been concentrating mainly on ambush techniques, and have had some success with the 2nd Coy. On our return to our Base Area, next month June, I will continue this, night ambushes this time, on the trails leading into the villages west of Hue.

General

I mentioned that I had to call a medevac for myself.

The 7th day out I developed a fever, plus aching legs and felt generally sick, plus the fact that I had a number of scratches on both hands that had infected.

I was admitted to 18th Surge QI with a blood disorder, caused by the infection, remained 4 days. OK now.

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