

Australian Army Training Team  
Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report and enclosures  
1 - 30 July 1970

**Series:** AWM95 - Australian Army  
commanders' diaries

**Item:** 1/2/78



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AUSTRALIAN FORCE VIETNAM



LOGGED OPS. 13. 5. 70

HEADQUARTERS Army Component

9 Aug 70

QUOTE IN REPLY

R723 / 1 / 35

AHQ (C)

AATTV MONTHLY REPORT - JUL 70

Enclosed is one copy of the monthly report submitted by AATTV for Jul 70.

*W.G. Henderson*

(W.G. HENDERSON)  
Brig  
Admin Comd  
Australian Force  
VIETNAM

Enclosure: 1. AATTV Monthly Report - Jul 70.

DMO & P	
DDMO	<i>W.G.H.</i>
DDMP	
G1 (O)	<i>19/8</i>
G1 (JW)	
G1 (P)	
G1 (AP)	
G2 (CO-ORD)	
G2 (O)	
G2 (CA/PSY-OPS)	<i>19/8</i>
G2 (SR)	
G2 (NEC)	
G2 (P)	
G3 (O)	<i>19/8</i>
CHIEF CLERK	
CLERK (O)	
CLERK (P)	
CLERK (SEATO)	
CLERK (ADM)	

DDMO  
*Possible deployment of AATTV, see para 10.*

*→ G3 (O) being map & chart up to date.*

*W.G.H.*

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*OPS*



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Headquarters  
Australian Army Training Team  
Vietnam

6 Aug 70

R 723-1-51

HQ AFV (3)

AATTV REPORT JUL 70

General

1. During Jul, AATTV continued to be actively involved over all CMRs in operations, training and in providing advice on territorial security at province, village and hamlet levels.

Casualties

2. There was only one AATTV battle casualty for the month. On 26 Jul Cpl JC Monk, a member of MATT 3, suffered a light shrapnel wound to the right shoulder when a dog activated an M26 grenade rigged as a booby trap by the RF as part of a compound perimeter defence. Cpl Monk was admitted to 8 Fd Amb and returned to duty on 28 Jul 70.
3. There were a number of cases of stomach disorders and malaria. An RMO from HQ AFV concluded a medical examination of all members of IV CMR and most members of I CMR.
4. The following members were hospitalized during the month:
- a. WO2 WES Tillett. Evacuated to 91st Evac Hospital on 9 Jul 70 with an FUO he was later confirmed to have Falciperum malaria. He was subsequently evacuated to Vung-Tau.
  - b. WO2 WJ McInerney was evacuated to 91st Evac Hospital on 11 Jul 70 with an FUO This was later confirmed as Falciperum malaria. He was subsequently evacuated to Vung-Tau.
  - c. WO2 TJ Nicholls was evacuated to 91st Evac Hospital on 13 Jul 70 with an FUO and subsequently evacuated to Vung-Tau. He returned to duty on 22 Jul 70.
  - d. WO1 EC Burns was hospitalized at 18th Surgical Hospital with a back muscle strain.
  - e. WO2 B Davies was hospitalized at 3rd Field Hospital in Saigon on 21 Jul with suspected malaria. He was subsequently transferred to Vung-Tau and released from hospital on 26 Jul 70.
  - f. WO2 WT Jones was hospitalized at a Marine Hospital at Danang on 17 Jul and released from hospital on 22 Jul 70.
  - g. WO2 TH Breakwell was admitted to 1 Aust Fd Hospital at Vung-Tau on 1 Jul for treatment of a tropical ulcer. He was subsequently released from hospital on 8 Jul 70.

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- h. WO2 G. Hodgson was admitted to 1 Aust Fd Hospital on 13 Jul with a back muscular complaint. He was released from hospital on 20 Jul 70.
- i. Capt W. Sheppard was admitted to 1 Aust Fd Hospital on 14 Jul with a bowel/stomach complaint and released from hospital on 17 Jul 70.

I Corps

5. The AATTV activity in I Corps is covered in Maj Aitken's report attached at Annex B. Appendices to that report cover activities in:

- a. I Corps generally.
- b. Quang-Tri Province.
- c. Phu-Thu District in Thua-Thien Province.
- d. Hoa-Vang District in Quang-Nam Province.
- e. The following ARVN battalions:

(1) 3/2 ARVN Bn

(2) 3/3 " "

(3) 3/54 " "

(4) 4/54 " "

(5) 1/51 " "

6. These reports have been selected for inclusion as they represent a good cross section of all reports received. In addition they show:

- a. The different standards in ARVN units.
- b. That the NVA/VC are using non metallic (concrete) mines - Appendix 10 to Annex B refers.
- c. A request for increased AATTV assistance in CORDS - Appendix 4 to Annex B refers. At this stage it is not proposed to significantly increase AATTV assistance in Thua-Thien but it is proposed to gradually increase the WO adviser assistance later in the year. This will be discussed with the Province Senior Adviser late in Aug 70.

II Corps

7. The 1st Bn 2 MSF now has only one AATTV adviser in it; the battalion commander. This unit is on operations near the Cambodian border near Route 509 and therefore no report has been received. When the unit returns from operations it is planned to convert it to a Ranger battalion during Aug. The AATTV adviser will assist with this conversion and is therefore unlikely to be employed on operations again. He returns to Australia on 27 Aug and so on that date AATTV will sever its seven year association with US and Vietnamese Special Forces.

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III Corps

8. The AATTV activity in III Corps is concentrated in Phuoc-Tuy Province except for the new appointment, established this month in CORDS at HQ II FFV. The AATTV activity in Phuoc-Tuy Province is covered in Maj Beale's Report attached at Annex C. In regard to para 16 of Maj Beale's report arrangements have now been made with the Sector Chief of Staff for a cooperative RF Coy to be located at An-Ngai. This should solve most of the problems in the area.

9. On the directive of the Province Senior Adviser a system of contracts is to be initiated that will define the responsibilities of the MATT and the group they are working. This is being produced to ensure that the appropriate Vietnamese officers are aware of and employ the MATTs correctly.

10. On a recent visit to Phuoc-Tuy Province Brig Gen Lam-Son, the Deputy Commander III Corps stated that the Commander III Corps would like a total of 15 AATTV MATTs deployed as follows:

- a. One at Sector (presumably with 302 RF Bn)
- b. One located at each District with RF Coys; total five
- c. One located at each RF Group HQ; total five
- d. Four for co-ordination of PF/PSDF.

11. 302 RF Bn is not being used correctly, nor is it being given time to plan its operations. Even though the Bn is not up to the required standard the main fault at present lies with the Sector Chief of Staff. It appears that in order to ensure the security of the battalions intended operations he informs the units commanding officer of operations at a time that does not allow the latter time for orders or deployment. This has now been pointed out to the Chief of Staff. It has also been stressed to him that the AATTV MATT is not being employed properly, nor is it being kept in the picture. He has promised to take action on these points.

12. ARVN Adviser. As 18 ARVN Div is apparently unable to provide a coy for training at the Horse Shoe the AATTV adviser has been temporarily reassigned to the NTC Van-Kiep.

IV Corps

13. Accelerated Pacification Programme. The programme year for pacification is a 10 month cycle commencing in January of the calendar year. The last two months are utilised to tie up loose ends and plan for the next cycle. A direct result of the DELTA'S focus of interest in Cambodia over the previous two months has been to detract from the pacification effort. The President has injected the staffs and Headquarters with the impetus necessary to revitalise the pacification. - thus the accelerated pacification programme. Simply; the programme has added the unattained goals scheduled to have been completed by 30 Jun to the goals intended for 30 Jun - 30 Oct.

14. 9 and 21 ARVN Divs continued their operations in Cambodia. Four battalions of Cambodians, taken from Special Force camps in III and IV Corps and trained by US and Vietnamese Special Force soldiers are now operating with the two ARVN Divs. Within the Delta some success has been achieved in recruiting by a call to arms to the ethnic Cambodians residing in the Delta.

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15. The Province Chief of Phong-Dinh Province was assassinated and four other Province Chiefs were removed/changed in IV Corps during Jul 70.
16. There was only one outpost overrun in Jul. Jul had the lowest incident rate in the Delta since Feb 70.
17. It is reported that there are 101,500 refugees from Cambodian in the Delta. Of these 27,500 are reported to be permanently resettled. The resettlement areas are, in order of priority:

Dinh-Tuong

Kien-Phong

An-Giang

Kien-Tuong

18. Night Operations Advisory Team (NOAT). As a direct result of a request from the Commanding General IV Corps the AATTV NOAT has accepted the task of training one officer per district (99), one officer per province (16), and 30 officers from 7 ARVN Div in night operations. Each course will have approximately 30 students for 14 days. The first course started on 2 Aug at Dong-Tam in the 7 ARVN Div Training School.
19. The AATTV-NOAT has now been divided into two teams; one is called a Night Operations Training Team (NOTT) and consists of a Capt and five WOs to under-take the course requirement. The other element is called a NOAT and consists of four WOs who are now continuing the original scheme in Cho Gao District of Dinh-Tuong Province.
20. Attached at Annex D is a report by Capt Sheppard.
21. Attached at Annexures E & F are reports by two members of the NOAT. They were requested to answer specific questions on the NOAT scheme on the completion of their tasks in Ben-Tranh District. The warrant officers were in different RF Coys.
22. Attached at Annex G is a CORDS memorandum covering the training syllabus for the night operations course.

General

23. On 23 Jul Lt Col Silverstone AATTV 21C Designate and Lt Col Sullivan AATTV Senior Adviser Designate to the Vietnamese Jungle Warfare Training Centre arrived in Vietnam. They are at present being conducted on a three weeks indoctrination tour around Vietnam. Both should assume duties approximately 20 Aug 70.

*J.A. Clark*  
(J.A. CLARK)  
Lt Col  
Comd

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AATTV DEPLOYMENT  
AS AT 1 AUG 70

ANNEX 'A' TO  
AATTV MONTHLY REPORT  
FOR JUL 70

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>HQ AATTV SAIGON</u>								
1	:LtCol	: J.A.	: Clark	: RA Inf	HQ AATTV	: Commander	: Jan 71	Saigon
2	:LtCol	: W.M.	: Silverstone	: RAA	"	: Deputy Commander(Desig)	: Jul 71	"
3	: Maj	: K.R.	: Phillips	: RAAC	"	: Second in Command	: May 71	"
4	: Capt	: J.C.	: Hartley	: RA Inf	"	: Adjutant	: Apr 71	"
5	: WO1	: D.L.	: Howells	: RA Inf	"	: Admin WO	: Feb 71	"
6	: WO2	: D.I.	: Campbell	: RAASC	"	: Admin WO (Pay)	: Nov 70	"
7	: WO2	: B.	: Davies	: RA Inf	"	: Admin WO (Movs)	: Oct 70	"
8	: Cpl	: G.M.	: Eldridge	: RAASC	"	: Clerk	: Mar 71	"
<u>VUNG-TAU</u>								
9	: Capt	: J.D.	: Gilliland	: RAEME	HQ AATTV Vung-Tau	: QM	: Jun 71	Vung-Tau
10	: WO2	: R.T.	: Cullen	: RA Inf	" "	: RQMS	: Jul 71	"
11	: Cpl	: R.D.	: Davies	: RAEME	" "	: Cpl Veh Mech	: Jul 71	"
<u>JUNGLE WARFARE TRAINING CENTRE</u>								
12	:Lt Col	: J.W.	: Sullivan	: RA Inf	JWTC	: Senior Advisor (Desig)	: Jul 71	Nui-Dat

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>I CMR</u>								
<u>QUANG-TRI PROVINCE</u>								
13	Maj	C.S.S.	Connor	RAAC	Quang-Tri Sector	Asst Province Adviser (Military)	Oct 70	Quang-Tri
14	WO1	B.R.	Lawrance	RAAMC	" " "	Medical Adviser	Apr 71	" "
15	Capt	W.D.	Tear	RA Inf	Phu-Thu Sub-Sector	Senior Adviser	Oct 70	Phu-Thu
16	WO2	J.F.	Leal	RAA	" " "	Assistant Adviser	Apr 71	" "
17	WO2	A.J.A.	Joyce	RA Inf	Hai-Lang Sub-Sector	Assistant Adviser	Aug 70	Hai-Lang
18	WO2	R.P.	Taylor	RAA	" "	" "	Jul 71	" "
19	WO2	J.T.	Barnes	RA Inf	1/1 ARVN Bn	" "	May 71	Near Quang-Tri (Regt)
20	Capt	H.E.N.	Martens	RA Inf	2/1 " "	Senior Adviser	Apr 71	" " "
21	WO2	D.T.	Powell	RA Inf	2/1 " "	Assistant Adviser	Oct 70	" " "
22	WO2	G.H.	King	RA Inf	3/2 " "	" "	May 71	" " "
23	WO2	R.J.	Oliver	RAASC	4/1 " "	" "	Nov 70	" " "
24	Capt	C.J.	Brock	RA Inf	3/2 " "	Senior Adviser	Apr 71	Dong-Ha (Regt HQ)
25	WO2	B.M.N.	Ryan	RA Inf	1/2 " "	Assistant Adviser	Jan 71	" "
26	WO2	J.M.	Lefel	RA Inf	3/2 " "	" "	Jan 71	" "
27	WO2	A.E.	Gee	RA Inf	4/2 " "	" "	Feb 71	" "
28	WO2	J.	Bouveng	RA Inf	5/2 " "	" "(Desig)	Jun 71	" "
29	WO1	E.C.	Burns	RAAC	3/7 ARVN Cav	"	Oct 70	Quang-Tri.



Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA:	Location
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I CMR (Cont)THUA-THIEN PROVINCE

70	WO1	M.R.	Steiger	RAAMC	Thua-Thien Sector	Medical Adviser	Jun 71	Hue
71	WO2	J.	Kendall	RA Inf	HQ 1 ARVN Div	Sensor Adviser	Jun 71	"
71A	WO2	D.B.	Bell	RAE	1/54 ARVN Bn	Assistant Adviser	Dec 70	"
72	WO2	D.A.	Herbert	RA Inf	2/54 ARVN Bn	Assistant Adviser	Jul 71	"
73	Capt	W.R.	Deane	Aust Int	3/54 ARVN Bn	Senior Adviser	Jul 70	Phu-Loc (Regt HQ)
74	Capt	B.J.	Caligari	RA Inf	3/54 ARVN Bn	" " (Desig)	Jul 71	" "
75	WO2	R.E.	Mills	RAEME	3/54 " "	Assistant Adviser	Jun 71	" "
	WO2	G.E.	Paxton	RA Inf	4/54 " "	" "	Jun 71	" "
	WO2	A.W.	Lancaster	RA Inf	1/3 " "	" "	Jun 71	Near Hue (Regt HQ)
	WO2	A.R.	Clutterbuck	RA Inf	2/3 " "	" "	Jun 71	" " "
	WO2	R.E.	Heathcote	RAA	3/3 " "	" "	Nov 70	" " "
	WO2	K.H.	Mavin	RA Inf	4/3 " "	" "	Aug 70	" " "
	WO2	F.L.	Raffen	RA Inf	4/3 " "	" " (Desig)	Jul 70	" " "

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>I CMR (Cont)</u>								
<u>QUANG NAM PROVINCE</u>								
42	: Maj	: R.J.	: Aitken	: RA Inf	: HQ I Corps	: Assistant to Chief of Staff I Corps	: Apr 71	: Danang
43	: WO1	: G.S.	: Munt	: RA Inf	: AATTV Danang	: Admin WO	: Oct 70	: Aust House Danang
44	: WO2	: D.	: Burke	: RA Inf	: " "	: " "	: Aug 70	: " " "
45	: WO1	: J.S.	: Calcutt	: RA Inf	: " "	: " " (Desig)	: Mar 71	: " " "
46	: WO2	: T.H.	: Breakwell	: RA Inf	: 21st Ranger Bn	: Assistant Adviser	: Dec 70	: Near Danang (Gp HQ)
47	: WO2	: L.T.	: Murrell	: RA Inf	: 21st Ranger Bn	: " " (Desig)	: Jul 71	: " " " "
48	: WO2	: L.B.	: Green	: RAAC	: 3/17 ARVN Cav	: " "	: Nov 70	: Hoi-An
49	: Capt	: B.F.	: McGurgan	: RAE	: 1/51 ARVN Bn	: Senior Adviser	: Mar 71	: Mieu-Dong (Regt HQ)
50	: WO2	: C.D.	: Dermody	: RA Inf	: 2/51 " "	: Assistant Adviser	: Jan 71	: " " "
51	: WO2	: F.	: Sykes	: RA Inf	: 2/51 " "	: " " (Desig)	: Jul 71	: " " "
52	: WO2	: W.T.	: Jones	: RA Inf	: 3/51 " "	: " "	: Aug 70	: " " "
53	: WO2	: A.V.	: Pennington	: RAA	: 3/51 " "	: " "		
54	: WO2	: P.J.	: Heslin	: RAE	: Hoa-Vang Sub Sector	: " "	: Oct 70	: Hoa-Vang

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA:	Location
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I CMR (Cont)

QUANG-TIN AND QUANG-NGAI PROVINCE

55	: W02	: W.J.	: McInerny	: RA Inf	: 4 ARVN Regt Recce Coy	: Senior Adviser	: Apr 71	: )
56	: W02	: R.W.	: Cairns	: RA Inf	: " " " "	: Assistant Adviser	: Apr 71	: )
57	: Capt	: W.	: Gunder	: RA Inf	: 1/4 ARVN Bn	: " "	: Apr 71	: ) Quang-Ngai Province
58	: W02	: G.E.	: Munro	: RA Sigs	: " " "	: " "	: Sep 70	: ) (Regt HQ near Quang-Ngai)
59	: W02	: W.E.	: Tillett	: RA Inf	: 2/4 " "	: " "	: Sep 70	: )
60	: W02	: G.D.	: Heath	: RA Inf	: 1/5 " "	: " "	: Feb 71	: )
61	: W02	: S.	: Booth	: RA Inf	: 2/5 " "	: " "	:	: ) Quang-Tin Province
62	: W02	: G.	: Joyce	: RA Inf	: 3/5 " "	: " "	: Jan 71	: ) (Regt HQ near Tam-Ky)
63	: W02	: E.M.	: Schmidt	: RA Inf	: 4/5 " "	: " "	: Jun 71	: )
64	: Capt	: J.J.	: Smith	: RA Inf	: 1/6 " "	: Senior Adviser	: Jul 71	: )
65	: W02	: M.G.	: Rodger	: RAEME	: 1/6 " "	: Assistant Adviser	: May 71	: ) Quang-Ngai Province
66	: W02	: J.I.	: Shaw	: RA Inf	: 2/6 " "	: " "	: Feb 71	: ) (Regt HQ near Chu-Lai)
67	: W02	: J.	: Nicholls	: RAA	: 3/6 " "	: " "	: Apr 71	: )
68	: W02	: J.F.	: Ghilotti	: RAAC	: 2/4 ARVN Cav	: " "	: Aug 70	: Quang-Ngai

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Serial : Rank : Inits : Name : Corps : Unit : Employment : Due RTA : Location

II CMR

PLEIKU PROVINCE

69 : Capt : P.J. : Shilston : RA Inf : 2nd Mobile Strike Force: Bn Comd : Aug 70 : Pleiku (Base)  
Command, Det B-20, 5th  
Special Forces Group  
(Airborne)

KHANH-HOA PROVINCE

70 : WO1 : W.A. : Eade : RAA Pro : Ranger Training Centre : Instructor/Adviser : Feb 71 : Duc-My  
71 : WO2 : P.J. : Pavlenko : RA Inf : " " " : " " : May 71 : "  
72 : WO2 : K.F. : MacDonald : RA Inf : Lam-Son National : " " : Jul 71 : "  
Training Centre  
73 : WO2 : W.S. : Dickey : RA Inf : " " : " " : Jul 71 : "

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
74	Maj	P.W.	Beale	RA Inf	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	MATT Coordinator	Jan 71	Baria
75	Maj	M.W.	Farmer	RAAC	" " "	Sector Psyops Adviser	Nov 70	"
76	WO1	R.	Deed	RA Inf	" " "	Admin WO	Jun 71	"
77	Sgt	W.F.	Roughan	RAA	" " "	Sgt Clerk	Jan 71	"
78	Pte	S.	Sturgess	RA Inf	" " "	Dvr	Mar 71	"
79	WO2	D.F.	Hedges	RA Inf	Phuoc-Tuy National Training Centre	Instructor/Adviser	Aug 70	"
80	WO2	O.	Stevenson	RA Inf	" "	" "	Aug 70	"
81	WO2	D.	Rolph	RA Inf	" "	" "	Nov 70	"
2	WO2	C.	Kealy	RA Inf	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	PF Adviser	Aug 70	"
3	WO2	L.D.	Osborn	RA Inf	" "	Adviser RD Cadre	Jan 71	"

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Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>III CMR</u>								
<u>PHUOC-TUY PROVINCE (Cont)</u>								
84	WO2	J.	Stephens	RAASC	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	Team Leader MATT 1	Oct 70	Binh-Ba
85	WO2	L.J.	Storren	RA Inf	" "	" 21C "	Jan 71	"
86	WO2	A.H.	Franks	RA Inf	" "	" Member "(attached)	Jan 71	"
87	Cpl	W.O.	Parry	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Nov 70	"
88	Cpl	M.N.	McIntyre	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Nov 70	"
89	Cpl	J.A.	Peach	RAE	" "	" " "	Sep 70	"
90	Cpl	M.H.	Dawkins	RAAMC	" "	" " "	Nov 70	"
91	WO2	A.S.	Williams	RA Sigs	" "	Team Leader MATT 2	Oct 70	Dat-Do
92	WO2	R.A.	Barnes	RA Inf	" "	" 21C "	Feb 71	"
93	Cpl	R.J.	Eade	RA Inf	" "	" Member "	Feb 71	"
94	Sgt	H.K.	Karaka	RNZR	" "	" " "	Nov 70	"
95	Cpl	G.J.	Kalembe	RAAMC	" "	" " "	Feb 71	"
96	WO2	F.M.	Moffitt	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Apr 71 (attached)	
97	Cpl	B.	Willis	RAE	" "	" " "	Dec 70	"
98	Cpl	R.P.	Smithson	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Feb 71	"
99	Capt	L.M.	Opie	RA Inf	" "	Team Leader MATT 3	Apr 71	Baria
100	WO2	G.M.	Logan	RA Inf	" "	" 21C "	Oct 70	"
101	Cpl	J.C.	Monk	RA Inf	" "	" Member "	Jun 71	"
102	Cpl	J.H.	Riley	RAAMC	" "	" " "	Jan 71	"

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Serial	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA:	Location
<u>III CMR</u>								
<u>PHUOC TUY PROVINCE (Cont)</u>								
103	: WO2	: D.M.	: Palmer	: RA Inf	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	: Team Leader MATT 4	: Jan 71 ;	Long Dien
104	: WO2	: L.F.	: McIntosh	: RA Inf	" "	: " 21C "	: Jul 71 :	" "
105	: WO2	: L.G.	: Schmidt	: RA Inf	" "	: " Member "(att)	: Jan 71 :	" "
106	: Cpl	: I.A.	: Kuring	: RA Inf	" "	: " " "	: May 71 :	" "
107	: Bdr	: P.H.	: Harding	: RAA	" "	: " " "	: Feb 71 :	" "
108	: Pte	: A.	: Schneider	: RAAMC	" "	: " " "	: Apr 71 :	" "
109	: Cpl	: T.R.	: Hogg	: RAE	" "	: " " "	: Apr 71 :	" "
110	: WO2	: W.C.	: Green	: RAASC	" "	: Team Leader MATT 5	: Nov 70 :	Phuoc Hai
111	: WO2	: R.G.	: Davies	: RA Inf	" "	: " 21C "	: May 71 :	" "
112	: L Bdr	: D.D.	: Keech	: RAA	" "	: " Member "	: Jun 71 :	" "
113	: Cpl	: V.P.	: Stuart	: RA Inf	" "	: " " "	: May 71 :	" "
114	: Sgt	: J.F.	: Kimberley	: RAE	" "	: " " "	: Nov 70 :	" "
115	: Cpl	: J.S.	: Kolaric	: RAAMC	" "	: " " "	: Jan 71 :	" "
116	: WO2	: A.G.	: White	: RA Inf	" "	: Team Leader MATT 6	: Jan 71 :	Hoi My
117	: WO2	: T.	: Lyddieth	: RAASC	" "	: " 21C "	: Jul 71 :	" "
118	: WO2	: A.J.	: Dodds	: RA Inf	" "	: " Member "(att)	: Jul 71 :	" "
119	: Cpl	: M.N.	: Talbot	: RA Inf	" "	: " " "	: Nov 70 :	" "
120	: Cpl	: M.B.	: Byrne	: RAE	" "	: " " "	: Aug 70 :	" "
121	: WO2	: R.D.	: Smith	: RA Inf	" "	: Team Leader MATT 7	: Oct 70 :	Ong Trinh
122	: WO2	: R.A.	: Neagle	: RA Inf	" "	: " 21C "	: Jul 71 :	" "
123	: WO2	: G.	: Hodgson	: RAA	" "	: " Member "	: Jun 71 :	" "

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Serial	Rank	Units	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>IV CMR</u>								
<u>VINH LONG PROVINCE</u>								
124	Maj	J.A.	Browne	RAA	CORDS, IV Corps	Assistant to Chief of Territorial Security	Mar 71	Can-Tho
125	WO2	M.	Muir	RA Inf	AATTV Can-Tho	Admin WO	May 71	"
<u>DINH TUONG PROVINCE</u>								
126	Capt	W.	Sheppard	RA Inf Trg	AATTV RF Trg	OC Night Operations and Training Team	Sep 70	Cho-Gao
127	WO2	O.W.	Bell	RAA	AATTV RF Trg	Team Member	Aug 70	Cho-Gao
128	WO2	A.K.	Jones	RA Inf	AATTV RF Trg	Team Member	Jun 71	Cho-Gao
129	WO2	W.E.	Butler	RA Inf	AATTV RF Trg	Team Member	Jan 71	Cho-Gao
130	WO2	G.J.	Sutherland	RA Inf	AATTV RF Trg	Team Member	Jun 71	Cho-Gao
131	WO2	V.L.	Harris	RA Inf	AATTV RF Trg	Team Member	Sep 70	Cho-Gao
132	WO2	D.A.	Strachan	RA Inf	AATTV RF Trg	Team Leader Night Operations Advisory Team	Oct 70	Cho-Gao
133	WO2	G.	Herschell	RA Inf	AATTV RF Trg	Team Member	Apr 71	Cho-Gao
134	WO2	D.C.	Parker	RA Inf	AATTV RF Trg	Team Member	Oct 70	Cho-Gao
135	WO2	C.N.	McEvoy	RA Inf	AATTV RF Trg	Team Member	Dec 70	Cho-Gao



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Annex B  
to AATTV Report  
Jul 70

REPORT BY MAJ AITKEN  
HQ I CORPS ADVISER - JUL 70

General

1. The intensity of enemy initiated activity continued to decline in the first half of the reporting period.
2. The number of mine incidents reported showed a slight but steady increase over the first two weeks of July and, in the second week, a slight increase in enemy initiated contacts was noted but in all other aspects, eg, incoming rounds, enemy KIA and PWs there was a steady decrease.
3. The decline continued during the latter part of the period, except that the number of incoming rounds increased slightly. FSB Fuller again experienced attacks by fire, but not at the level experienced in Jun and May.

Operations

4. As stated in the June report, the intentions of US, ARVN and ROKMC forces during July were to conduct operations in the Khe-Sanh Plain, the Da Krong Valley, the A Shau Valley and Base Areas 112 and 127.
5. In all cases, except the move into the A Shau Valley, these intentions were carried out. Plans for the move into the A Shau Valley received a setback, when on 22/23 Jul 70, elements of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) evacuated FSB Ripcord as a result of intensive attacks by fire and limited ground attacks mounted by the 6th NVA Regt, the 7th Front and possibly the K34 Rocket Arty Bn and 803rd Regt, 324 B Division.
6. On 24 Jul 70 1st Bn 1st ARVN Regt received 130 rounds of 82mm mortar fire approximately four kilometres West of FSB Ripcord, which confirms that the force which attacked Ripcord has not moved out of the base area they have occupied for the past few months.
7. Intentions of friendly forces in regard to future operations, in the light of the abandonment of FSB Ripcord, are not clear at time of reporting.
8. Another significant action took place on 1/2 Jul 70 when K8 Bn, 808 Regt attacked Hai Lang District. This operation resulted in a resounding defeat for K8 Bn. Enemy losses were: 143 KIA, 19 VCC, 12 crew-served weapons, 62 individual weapons, 50 blocks of TNT and one round of 75mm RR.
9. Opposed to K8 Bn (strength - 200) in this operation were:
  - a. 3rd Bn 1st ARVN Regt.
  - b. Tp 11 Cav Regt.
  - c. 121 RF Coy.
  - d. 122 RF Coy.
  - e. 148 RF Coy.

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10. On 11/12 Jul 6th ARVN Regt deployed into the area of Kham Duc (ZC 0008). The initial insertion was "cold" but on 12 Jul some 60mm rounds were received. Since the operation started contacts have been relatively light, but sizeable quantities of stores and weapons have been found or captured.

11. At time of reporting the number of incoming rounds is increasing and now includes 82mm mortar, suggesting that enemy forces previously located slightly West of Hiep Duc are withdrawing West to contact 6th ARVN Regt. There is also evidence to suggest that enemy forces are moving towards Kham Duc from the North West.

12. On 21 Jul 70 a Hoi Chanh - PFC from 231st Trans Bn, 230th Trans Regt surrendered to the 6th Regt Recon Coy. He indicated the location of an 8 ton rice cache in the vicinity of ZB 0495, and three weapons caches located in the vicinity of YC 9500, YB 950985 and YB 9698.

#### Adviser Reports

13. Attached as Appendices are those Adviser reports to hand at this time. Many advisers are engaged on operations at present and are expected to submit their reports on their return.

14. It is interesting to note in Capt Tear's report, the reference to the Province Senior Adviser's attitude to an increase in the number of Australian advisers in Thua-Thien Province.

15. Not mentioned in WO Heslin's report are the accounts of three incidents involving the waylaying of US vehicles by SVN civilians.

16. The situation arose when a soldier travelling on the back of a truck reached over to snatch the hat of a child on a bicycle as the truck passed. As the soldier grasped the hat the chinstrap caught under the child's chin, causing him to be pulled off his bicycle and thrown under the wheels of the truck. The child died instantly. Subsequently compensation of 500,000 piastre was asked for and received. The situation was ugly but WO Heslin, after arriving at the scene, succeeded in averting any further trouble, and freed the vehicle.

17. Two further incidents followed on separate days after the child was killed. Since then the general situation has quietened.

#### Significant Contacts

18. A summary of significant contacts of ARVN units having Australian Advisers is attached at Appendix 1.

#### Adviser Replacement

19. The replacement of US Army advisers continues to cause concern. Replacements are not arriving at the rate required to sustain a satisfactory level within ARVN units. In many units the adviser strength with ARVN battalions is down to two and in one case there is only one adviser with a battalion.

20. AATTV and the USMC are providing replacements, in most cases, with an overlap period.

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21. The situation regarding replacement of US Army advisers does not look like easing until at least October 1970.

Friendly Forces Locations (ARVN)

22. Attached at Appendix 2 is a list of locations of ARVN forces in I CMR as at 2400 hrs 25 Jul 70.

Enemy Forces Locations

23. An overlay of enemy locations will be forwarded as soon as possible.

Attachments

24. Attached are:

- Appendix 1. Summary of Significant contacts involving units having Australian Advisers in I Corps - Jul 70.
- " 2. Battalion etc Night Locations as at 25 2400hrs - Jul 70.
  - " 3. Report by Maj Connor - S3 Quang-Tri Sector - Jul 70.
  - " 4. Report by Capt Tear - District Senior Adviser Phu-Thu District, Thua-Thien Province - Jul 70.
  - " 5. Report by Capt Deane Battalion Senior Adviser 3/54 ARVN Bn - Jul 70.
  - " 6. Report by Capt Brock Battalion Senior Adviser 3/2 ARVN Bn - Jul 70.
  - " 7. Report by WO Paxton, Adviser 4/54 ARVN Bn - Jul 70.
  - " 8. Report by WO Heslin Adviser RF/PF Hoa-Vang District, Quang-Nam Province - Jul 70.
  - " 9. Report by WO Heathcote Adviser 3/3 ARVN Bn - Jul 70.
  - " 10. Report by Capt McGurgan Senior Adviser 1/51 ARVN Bn - Jul 70.

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Appendix 1 to  
Annex B to  
To AATTV  
Report Jul 70

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS OF  
ARVN UNITS HAVING AATTV ADVISORS

JUL 70

1. At 300800H in the vicinity of YD 147238, 1st Bn 1st Regt ambushed an unknown sized enemy force killing eight and capturing three individual weapons.
2. At 300130H in the vicinity of BS 613628, 2nd Bn 4th Regt ambushed an unknown sized enemy force killing six and capturing two individual and one crew served weapons.
3. At 301400H in the vicinity of YD 156226, 2nd Bn 1st Regt searching found one hospital, 50 huts with bunkers (30 huts 10x5 m, 20 huts 4x6 m), one grave yard with 200 graves and a list of sick and wounded men. Hospital ident as 88th NVA hospital.
4. At 300900H in the vicinity of YD 004586, 3rd Bn 2nd Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force killing four and capturing two AK47 rifles.
5. Between 301100H - 301605 in the vicinity of YS 180304 and YD 181305 3rd and 2nd Coys of 4th Bn 1st Regt found and destroyed by burning 10 VC huts (10x5m) and 40 VC huts (4x6m) and captured four Chicom telephones.
6. At 011100H in the vicinity of ZC 186623, 2nd Bn 51st Regt clearing, contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in two friendly soldier WIA, and four VC KIA and two individual weapons captured.
7. At 011400H in the vicinity of YD 460414, 3rd Bn 1st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in one friendly KIA and 7 WIA, and 21 enemy KIA and the capture of eight individual and two crew served weapons.
8. At 011030H in the vicinity of YD 233192, 1st Coy 2nd Bn 1st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force sustaining one friendly KIA and 11 WIA; killing three enemy and capturing a quantity of medical documents. Twenty bunkers were destroyed and one ammo cache estimated to contain 100,000 rounds AK47 ammo was purportedly destroyed by artillery.
9. At 020820H in the vicinity of YD 460494, 3rd Bn 1st Regt found 24 VC bodies, captured one VC officer and 2xB40, 2MG, 5xAK47 and one carbine.
10. At 021120H in the vicinity of YD 427043, 1st Coy 1st Bn 3rd Regt contacted one VC squad, capturing 1x82 mm mortar sight, 20x82 mm rounds and 10x60 mm rounds.
11. At 021145H in the vicinity of YD 137274, 3rd Coy 1st Bn 1st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force killing 5 enemy and capturing 2xAK47 and one K44 carbine.
12. At 021000H in the vicinity of BS 471640, 4th Bn 4th Regt clearing killed 5 VC and destroyed 10 empty huts.
13. At 030845H in the vicinity of AF 982086, 1st Bn 5th Regt searching contacted an unknown sized enemy force killing five and capturing three individual weapons, without loss to themselves
14. At 030830H in the vicinity of YD 267386, 1st Coy 2nd Bn 54th Regt found a tunnel containing 25x122 mm rockets. The rockets were destroyed in situ.

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15. At 031015H in the vicinity of YD 353366, 4th Bn 3rd Regt minus convoying from FSB SALLY to FSB BARBARA detonated an unknown size anti-tank mine, sustaining 10 WIA. The 2½ ton truck was 80% damaged.
16. At 032000H in the vicinity of BS 404742, 4th Bn 4th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in two friendly WIA, four enemy KIA and the capture of one carbine, one M16 rifle, 8 grenades and four packs.
17. At 032235H in the vicinity of YD 219754, 4th Coy 1st Bn 2nd Regt ambushed an unknown sized enemy force killing five and capturing three AK47 rifles.
18. At 041530H in the vicinity of YD 190212, 2nd Coy 4th Bn 1st Regt contacted an enemy platoon sustaining one friendly WIA and killing 10 enemy, and capturing three individual and two crew served weapons. The company destroyed 40VC huts.
19. At 042140H in the vicinity of BS 332814H, 3rd Bn 6th Regt detonated a 105 mm bocby trap sustaining 2 KIA and 25 WIA.
20. At 051310H in the vicinity of YD 344387, 2nd Coy 2nd Bn 54th Regt received 10x82 mm mortar rounds sustaining 6 WIA.
21. At 051730H in the vicinity of YD 344392, 2nd Bn 54th Regt captured 6x60 mm mortar and found two VC bodies killed by air (KBA) estimated to be one day old.
22. At 061100H in the vicinity of BS 272818, 3rd Bn 6th Regt searching contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 6 enemy KIA and the capture of two individual weapons.
23. At 070030H in the vicinity of YC 834966, 4th Bn 54th Regt in it's night defensive position (NDP) found 5 VC crawling toward the perimeter. Results 5 VC KIA and 1xB40 and 2xAK47 captured.
24. At 081240H in the vicinity of YD 353413, 1st Coy 2nd Bn 54th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force sustaining 1xKIA and 1xWIA, and killing 5 enemy and capturing 1 xAK47 and 8x82 mm rounds.
25. At 091430H in the vicinity of AT 953595, 1st Bn 51st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force killing 6 enemy and capturing one individual and one crew - served weapon and 4xB40 rounds.
26. At 091200H in the vicinity of AF 957589, 1st Bn 51st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force killing four and capturing one VC suspect and one individual weapon.
27. At 091300H in the vicinity of BS 020928, 3rd Bn 5th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force killing 6 and capturing two individual weapons, two typewriters, 4x50kg bags of rice. Twenty-five huts were destroyed by burning.
28. At 111315H in the vicinity of XD 838362, 1st Bn 3rd Regt engaged an unknown sized enemy while searching a bunker complex. Results: Enemy - 5KIA, and captured 1x60 mm mortar complete, 1xAK47.
29. At 1400 hrs in the same area the Bn found 13 bodies killed by Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA) one day old, 1xB40, 1xAK47, 200x60 mm rounds, 20 cans Chinese fish, 50 packs and a package of documents. At 1440 hrs in the same area 25 bodies KB ARA, one flare pistol, 50x B40 rounds, 80x60 mm rounds, 150 Chicom grenades, 20 grenade launchers for K44 rifles, 20 machetes, 65 NKA rucksacks, 20 cooking pots, 100 prs sandles, 20 prs gym shoes, 62 NVA helmets,

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34 protective masks, 200 x AK47 magazines, 40 individual shovels, 420 kg rice, 5000 x AK47 rounds and miscellaneous medical document were found.

30. During the remainder of 11 July, 1st Bn 3rd Regt found an additional 100 bodies killed by air, 1x12.7 mm MG, 2 x AK47, 1 x 60 mm mortar baseplate, 165 VC grenades, 50 x B40 rounds, 20 x 82 mm rounds, and 15 x 60 mm rounds.

31. At 120810H in the vicinity of XD 824364, 2nd Coy 1st Bn 3rd Regt found three individual weapons, one PRC 25 radio, 200 kg rice, 31 canteens, 35 local hats, 15 grenades, 34 gas grenades, 5 kg of documents, 67 x B40 and B41 rounds and 12 bodies, killed by air, two days old.

32. At 120815H in the vicinity of XD 837362, 1st Bn 3rd Regt found 50 field packs, 20 grenades, 40 x B40 rounds, 50 x 82 mm rounds 30 cooking utensils and 30 new graves.

33. At 121200H in the vicinity of YC 908092, 1st Bn 6th Regt received an unknown number of 60 mm rounds resulting in 7 friendly WIA.

34. At 121230H in the vicinity of XD 844354, 3rd Coy 1st Bn 3rd Regt, searching, contacted 40 enemy, resulting in negative friendly casualties. The enemy lost 30 KIA, three individual and 6 crew-served weapons, and 7kg of documents.

35. At 120800H in the vicinity of YD 175240, 3rd Bn 1st Regt, searching, found 65en killed by air 1 day old, 8 individual and two crew - served weapons, and one switchboard destroyed by air. One of the enemy bodies may be the CO of K5 bn (unconfirmed)

36. At 121020H in the vicinity of KD 840395, 3rd Coy 1st Bn 3rd Regt, searching, contacted three enemy resulting in three enemy KIA, 1x60 mm mortar, 1xB40, 1xAK47 and 14 enemy bodies killed by air.

37. At 121025H in the vicinity of XD 840357, 3rd Coy 1st Bn 3rd Regt, searching, found 1xB40, 1xAK47, 2x60 mm sights, 30 field packs and 12 x 1 : 100,000 maps.

38. At 121430H in the vicinity of YC 995090, 1st Bn 6th Regt captured one 106 mm RR.

39. At 121500H in the vicinity of BS 037953, 1st Bn 5th Regt, searching, contacted 10 VC, resulting in 5 VC KIA and the capture of 5 grenades.

40. At 130715H in the vicinity of YC 985099, 1st Bn 6th Regt, clearing,, captured 15 x.50cal MG mounts and 63 Chicom grenades.

41. At 141505H in the vicinity of YC 987097, 1st Bn 6th Regt, searching, contacted an unknown sized enemy force, killing four, and capturing one AK47.

42. At 141600H in the vicinity of YC 985098, 1st Bn 6th Regt captured 32x82 mm rounds and 2000 x 51 cal MG rounds.

43. Between 141800 - 141900H in the vicinity of YC 983101, 1st Bn 6th Regt found 9VC bodies, est two days old, killed by arty: and captured one 82 mm mortar and 7 grenades.

44. At 150130H in the vicinity of YC 984103, 1st Bn 6th Regt ambushed an unknown sized enemy force killing 5 VC and capturing 10 grenades.

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45. At 151330H in the vicinity of BS 506764, 1st Coy 1st Bn 4th Regt lead by a Hoi Chanh found a weapons cache containing 1 x 57 mm RR, 6 x 60 mm mortar 3 BAR's plus updated report of 17 carbines, 4 M1 rifles, 3 x AK47, 1 MAS 49, 1 Thompson SMG, 1CKC and 63 x K44 rifles.
46. At 160700H in the vicinity of XD 988588, 5th Bn 2nd Regt found 10 VC bodies killed in contact with the battalion on 15 Jul 70. Captured were two crew - served weapons, 20 grenades and 40 x B40 rounds.
47. At 180625H in the vicinity of BS 775512, 1st Bn 4th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force killing 5 enemy and capturing one individual and one crew served weapons.
48. At 180900H in the vicinity of YC 964043, 3rd Bn 6th Regt, searching, contacted an unknown sized enemy force killing 6 and capturing one individual weapon, one crew-served weapon and 8 bicycles.
49. At 181730H in the vicinity of YD 677203, 2nd Bn 3rd Regt checking the site of a mechanical ambush discovered an en, said he was part of a rocket team which was supposed to rocket Hue.
50. At 191320H in the vicinity of BS 500672, 1st Bn 4th Regt captured two 60 mm base plates, two individual weapons, 50xB40 rounds and three anti tank mines.
51. At 191315H in the vicinity of YD 348365, 3rd Bn 54th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in friendly: 5 KIA and 6 WIA; Enemy 8 KIA and two individual weapons captured.
52. Between 192100H and 200545H in the vicinity of YD 156236, a squad of 1st Coy, 3rd Bn 1st Regt received 80 rounds of mixed 82 mm and 60 mm mortar rounds followed by a a ground attach from an unknown sized enemy force. Results: Enemy; 5 KIA and 1xB40, 1 x AK47 and 60 blocks of TNT captured.
53. At 201035H in the vicinity of YC 980092, 2st Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 4 enemy KIA and one M16 captured.
54. At 201230H in the vicinity of BS437736, 4th Bn 4th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in one friendly WIA and 7 en KIA, 1 xKA47, one carbine, one M16 and 10 grenades captured.
55. At 201000H in the vicinity of BS 500573, 1st Bn 4th Regt captured 30 x 82 mm rounds, 10 x 57 mm RR rounds, 10,000 rounds SAA, 1,000 metres of wire, 12 x 82 mm fuzes all of which was evacuated to LZ DRAGON.
56. At 211030H in the vicinity of YD 134271, 3rd Bn 1st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in one enemy KIA and the capture of one individual weapon and two 122 mm rockets.
57. At 221345H in the vicinity of BT 188124, 1st Bn 5th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 4 VC KIA and the capture of two individual weapons.
58. At 221355H in the vicinity of BS 590827, 3rd Bn 4th Regt killed 5 VC and captured two carbines.

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59. At 230430H in the vicinity of BS 750487, 2nd Bn 4th Regt ambushed an unknown sized enemy force, resulting in four enemy KIA and the capture of two carbines, one AK 47 and four grenades.
60. At 231030H in the vicinity of YD 250206, 2nd Coy, 1st Bn 1st Regt searching found 12 enemy bodies KBA, 5xAK47 and 10 huts.
61. At 240550H in the vicinity of YD 227212, 1st Bn 1st Regt Lt CP and 1st Coy, 1st Bn 1st Regt received 130 x 82 mm mortar rounds resulting in 7 friendly WIA. Counterbattery of 142 x 105 mm rounds was fired from O'Reilly into YD 240198, YD 238206 and YD 231200.
62. At 241200H in the vicinity of YD 245205, 2nd Coy 1st Bn 1st Regt found 102 hourses, 53 NVA bodies, 5 crew-served and 21 individual weapons and one ton (est) mixed 82 mm and B40 ammo, all destroyed by B52 strike.
63. At 251030H in the vicinity of YD 194742, 4th Bn 3rd Regt contacted un unknown sized enemy force resulting in one friendly WIA; 8 VC KIA and the capture of one crew-served weapon, one individual weapon, 8xB40 rounds, 10 x 82 mm mortar rounds and four AT mines.
64. At 251250H in the vicinity of YD 872955, 4th Bn 6th Regt found 15 VC bodies KBA estumated to be three days old.

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Appendix 2  
to Annex B  
to AATTV Report  
Jul 70

BATTALION NIGHT LOCATIONS

25 JUL 70

1ST DIV CP HUE	2 REGT CP CARROLL YD 063544
1 REGT CP FSB BARNETTE YD 199324	1/2 DONG HA
1/1 YD 240214	2/2 LZ SARGE YD 029478
2/1 FSB BARNETTE YD 199324	3/2 KHE GIO
3/1 YD 131295	4/2 DONG DA
4/1 LA VANG YD 345496	5/2 FSB FULLER YD 018593
54 REGT CP FSB ANZIO YD 934072	7TH ACAT GP C-1 YD 213674
1/54 ANZIO	1/7 A-2 YD 213734
2/54 FSB ANNE YD 290402	2/7 C-1 YD 213674
3/54 FSB BARBARA YD 327337	3/7 A-2 YD 213734
4/54 FSB ROY ZD 058033	RNGR GP CP DAGGER
BLACK PANTHER CO HUE	21ST RNGR ZC 070390
QDSZ AT 977727	37TH RNGR ZC 051418
REGT CP ZC 967617 HILL 55	39TH RNGR DANANG
1/51 ZC 967617 HILL 55	4TH ACAT CP TAM KY
2/51 AT 991579	2/4 ACAT QUANG NGAI
3/51 ZC 089536	
4/51 AT 820604	5 REGT CP HAWK HILL BT 2131315
2ND ARVN DIV CP QUANG NGAI	1/5 BT 188158
4 REGT CP LZ DRAGON BS 731528	2/5 BT 113335
1/4 LZ DRAGON BS 731528	3/5 BT 253317
2/4 BS 674537	4/5 BT 173226
3/4 QUANG NGAI	
4/4 BS 456774	

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3 REGT CP	FSB T. BONE YD 659203	1ST ARM BDE CP	: HOA CAM
1/3	FSB T. BONE YD 659203	1/17	DUONG SON 2
2/3	LZ SALLY YD 638274	2/17	DUONG SON 2
3/3	OP LION YD 601189	3/17	HOI AN
4/3	A-2 YD 213734	1/4 ACAT	TAM KY
		3/4 ACAT	TAM KY

11TH ACAT CP SHARON

1/11	NANCY YD 442394	6 REGT CP	KALA
2/11	FSB SHARON YD 340493	1/6	ZC 034005
3/11	YD 333455	2/6	YC 884049
		3/6	YC 896090
		4/6	YB 870952

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Appendix 3  
to Annex B  
to AATTV Report  
Jul 70

REPORT BY MAJ CONNOR  
S3 QUANG-TRI SECTOR  
17 JUN - 24 JUL

## Enemy

1. The enemy appears to have used this period for reconnaissance and logistic build up. One notable exception was the incursion into Hai Lang district by K8 Bn 808 Regt (7th Front). The result was another sound beating by GVN forces. It is known that the remaining regiment of 304 NVA Div (9th) is now in the province. It is presumed that the Div has also moved.
2. Route 616 (NVA) has been the scene of enemy truck activity east of the Da Krong valley. His use of headlights suggests either confidence or carelessness. Some vehicles have been destroyed. Units of 1st ARVN Regt operating in the area report many well constructed bunkers but little contact. Another unusual event was the location of an unfriendly sampan off Trieu-Phong District. This may herald a new venture by the enemy.
3. The 7th Front attempt to degrade Pacification deserves comment. The K8 Bn was much depleted in its first attempt, and was reinforced from K6 and K14 Bn. Interrogation of prisoners revealed that all were told to say that they came from K8, thus discrediting the GVN claims from the first incursion on 27-28 May. A further attempt is expected. (A MACV "Lesson Learned" is being written about this action).
4. Having failed to honour promises to disrupt the Jun 28 Province Council elections and to celebrate the 20 Jul anniversary of the Geneva Accords, an offensive should be imminent. Likely targets are Hai Lang district and the fire bases in the western portion of GVN controlled Quang-Tri.

## Friendly Forces

5. Friendly activities have produced some pleasing results. Of particular note were:
  - a. In Hai Lang district on 1-2 Jul, 143 NVA were killed, at the expense of 12 friendly soldiers killed. 18 civilians were assassinated by the NVA. There were 19 NVA prisoners taken.
  - b. On 14-15 Jul, near Khe Sanh, some 400 NVA from 9 NVA Regt were killed by air and ground action.
  - c. 1st ARVN Regt has found some 200 graves of enemy recently killed in air strikes.
  - d. An intercepted radio message suggests that a battalion of 27 NVA Regt was caught on the move by an air strike. This is supported by a two week silence around FSB Fuller, the alleged destination of the bn.
6. Regular forces have continued operations in the Ba Long valley, east of the Da Krong valley and in the central DMZ. In the eastern DMZ, activity has been low, with air and artillery apparently quietening enemy ambitions in respect of Gio-Linh and Cam-Lo districts. Regional forces continue near the populated area, with isolated contact with small parties.

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
Other Matters

7. USARV and MACV replacements are not coming forward at a rate equal to departures. Airy predictions of a stable situation do little to alleviate the burden on the remaining advisers (in particular). USARV units, at least here, are not demonstrating great flexibility in meeting this problem.
8. The Éru problem in Huong Hoa and Cam-Lo districts appears to be easing. Farming land has been allocated and ploughed and Village Self Development Funds have at last provided some water buffalo and cattle. However, until the promised crops are in the ground, the situation is precarious. Some movement to Hue continues. The security situation still looks bad, in spite of 1/5 Bde (M) efforts to clear the thick country to the south of Huong-Hoa.
9. The province council elections on 28 June were decided without incident. I have not yet been able to determine what parties won; the of visits by politicians since suggests that there was some sort of upset.

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REPORT BY CAPT TEAR  
SENIOR ADVISER - PHU THU DISTRICT  
THUA THIEN PROVINCE - JUL 70

General

1. A handover/takeover was conducted during the period 9-12 Jul and I assumed the role of the Phu-Thu District Senior Adviser (DSA) on the 13 Jul 70. WO2 Leal is to assume the role of the Assistant DSA on 27 Jul 70.

Phu-Thu District

2.
  - a. Location. The district is situated SSE of Hue and the district HQ is at YD 896178. The HQ is about 20km from Hue and can be reached by all weather roads in about 20 minutes.
  - b. Terrain. The district covers an area of 130,000 square metres, is generally flat with a large area of sand dunes, mainly in the N and central area.
  - c. Vegetation. There are few but there are large areas of bamboo and palms. Only about one half of the suitable land is being cultivated due to the lack of manpower. The main crop is rice with some sweet potatoes and beans.
  - d. Population. There are seven villages and 53 hamlets with approximately 24,500 people with an additional 4,500 being in the Phu-Bai area awaiting re-settlement.
  - e. Roads. There are some good roads capable of carrying up to 2½ ton trucks, they run from the district HQ SW, NW and NE. It is proposed to construct a road from La Xa Tay to Thon La Xa Dong. Work is scheduled to start in about 10 days.
  - f. Friendly Forces. There are six RF companies with a present strength of 482 (Establishment of 526), 12 PF platoon with a present strength of 385 (Establishment of 405) and 1207 PSDF of whom 975 are armed. There are also 16 RD teams at present in the district.
  - g. Enemy. The Phu Vang Special Action Unit operates in the Phu-Vang, Phu-Thu and Vinh-Loc Districts, The strength within Phu-Thu are:
    - (1) VC 20-40
    - (2) VCI 268 confirmed.

They operate from bunkers within the thick bamboo and palm areas mainly on food gathering tasks. There has been some mining of roads and booby traps in friendly AOs but only on a small scale. They are armed with AK 47 and B 40 RPGs.

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h. Civic Action. There are numerous civic action projects conducted by the 101st Div (Air Mobile) 27 Engineer and 45th Engineer Group. Some of these projects are:

- (1) Construction of Schools.
- (2) " " Wells and rice drying racks.
- (3) " " and repairing of roads.
- (4) MEDCAPS and construction of dispensaries.
- (5) Land clearing (for resettlement of hamlets and security).

There is also a large government project the Village Self Development Scheme, where the villages and hamlets are provided with funds and material for projects similar to those above.

Enemy Activity - Jul 70

3. Enemy activity was generally very low during Jul and there were no enemy initiated contacts. Results of friendly operations were:

a. 23 1008H at GR YD 858235 RF 257 contacted 2 VC, result - a blood trail and some food and equipment captured.

b. 24 0830H at GR YD 935190 PF 104 contacted 3 VC in a bunker .  
Result:

- 3 VC KIA
- 2 AK 47 CIA
- 3 Radius (Transistor) CIA
- Clothing CIA
- Food CIA
- Documents CIA

c. 24 1930H a VC hoi-chanh to RF 257 and indicated that there was another VC who would like to hoi-chanh at GR YD 840230, Para 3a. refers.

Result: 2 VC Chieu Hoi (1 WIA)

- 2 AK 47 CIA
- Document CIA

d. 25 0040H at YD 839229 acting on info from the hoi-chanh-vien RF 257 ambushed the above location.

Result: 1 VC WIA (Escaped)

- 1 B40 CIA
- 3 B40 rockets CIA

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Deployment of Addition Aust Personnel

4. Col Chism has indicated that he would appreciate that the Aust team be increased to include 1 or 2 more WOs and a MAT. This would increase the Aust presence and image in Phu-Thu and create a more balanced team as the present US MAT is lacking in drive and tends to let things go by and goes about its work half heartedly.

Replacement Personnel


5. It is suggested that my replacement be given at least 14 days handover/takeover. This will allow sufficient time for orientation both at Phu-Thu and in the CORDS system.

MACV Support

6. It is noted that the support by MACV to the district teams is poor and many man hours are wasted trying to repair worn out equipment and scrounging the necessities of day to day functions, such as defence materials, petrol, food and repairs to equipment at other than MACV Units.


Conclusion

7. The job of a DSA is interesting and worthwhile but in my opinion addition, Australian personnel would be a asset to the district team.  
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Appendix 5  
to Annex B  
to AAFV Report  
Jul 70

REPORT BY CAPT DEANE  
SENIOR ADVISER 3/54 ARVN BN  
JUL 70

1. The general aims of the unit for the period under review were:
  - a. 18-23 Jun. Search and destroy mission in Ba-Long Valley GR 1540 (South of Dong-Ha).
  - b. 24 Jun/17 Jul. Defence of Fire Base (FB) ANZIO and Fire Base ROY (10 kms East of ANZIO) with 1 Coy patrolling foothills 7 km South of Anzio.
  - c. 17 Jul - Continuing Defence of FB BARBARA GR 328337 (20 kms South of Quang-Tri).
2. The methods used to achieve the aims were:
  - a. Ba Long ops: Patrol in two elements of two coys each.
  - b. Defence of Anzio - Roy: one coy screen around Anzio, one coy on Roy, one coy patrol foothills with one RF Coy.
  - c. Defence of Barbara: HQ Coy plus one rifle coy on Barbara, two coys operating separately as screen to North and East.
3. My opinion of how successful the unit was in achieving the aims is as follows:
  - a. Ba Long ops. Not successful due largely to the Vietnamese habit of operating in large groupings along a single axis; in this case two coys on a single track. The only excuse given by ARVN is that there are "beaucoup VC", therefore a larger element is necessary. The fact that only the first four or five men in the lead section are usually only involved in a contact, and the remaining 200 are wasted, is lost on them and there seems to be an inherent fear of covering a wider area, and increasing the chances of contact, by breaking down into smaller parties, eg. platoon size.
  - b. Defence of Anzio and Roy. The theory is that sub-units performing these tasks patrol the local villages by day and ambush by night. However as the troops involved have usually just spent a month on so ops, it is an unofficial standown period, no serious or conscientious military activity is carried on. At least one adviser must always stay at night on FB Roy and I did this on 25 Jun. At 1930 hrs the Bn XO, who was in charge of the defences, as light CP Comd, suddenly informed me he had to go to Hue and after telling me he had arranged for about 180 rounds of 105mm to be fired during the night in lieu of having an ambush screen, drove off. I checked with the ARVN arty battery who said they had no orders to fire during the night apart from a little H+I. I then checked the perimeter wire and found that, with regard to the North and South access roads, no wire had been pulled across the North Road and only half heartedly across the South road allowing a person to walk through without undue difficulty. I contacted the company commander

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who was playing cards, and who seemed disinclined to take much interest. At about 2100 hrs radioed to the Deputy Senior Adviser at 54 Regt at Anzio and asked him to contact 3/54 CO and instruct him to issue orders up the wire. After much radio traffic and shouting around the FB, arty was fired at about 2230 hrs for a short while, and some wire was pulled over, with much grumbling about the Co-Van. The following day the Regt Comd flew into the FB and put all defenders through a two hours, practise alert besides bawling out the coy comd. Since then wire seems to be pulled across at night, but the incident is typical of the way ARVNs are liable to "switch off" when danger is neither apparent or immediate. Two nights later one of our companies was supposed to be in ambush on the Truoi river; approaches to Truoi bridge and the hamlets about 4 kms east of Anzio. At about 2200 hrs there was an engagement between the RF/PF at the bridge and a party of NVA who had slipped past our coy positions, resulting in 6 enemy KIA. At about 2300 hrs the Regt Comd went aloft in a Comd Helic and spoke to the coy on the ground asking them to identify their positions. It turns out that the coy was not in the positions it had reported, causing another stir.

4. Highlights during the period were:

a. A surprising number of small contacts with small parties of VC and NVA in the foothills of Truoi mountain about 5 kms, south of Anzio. The canopy starts as the ground rises out of the coastal plain, and it appears that the area is held by understrength enemy units, who need access to the villages on Route 1 for rice, etc. At present 54 Regt operates there occasionally in coy size units - A good battalion on bigger size op in smaller formations would probably bring a good haul.

b. Move to Barbara on 17 Jul. Contact was made with an estimated enemy coy in bunkers on 19 Jul about midday and after support from 105, 8", gun ships, fighter bombers and the Barbara dusters 8 enemy KIA and 5 friendly KIA had been reported by am 20 Jul. The area is still being searched.

5. The overall standard of the unit is as follows:

a. By Australian standards, poor, by Vietnamese standards, probably no better or worse than other ARVN battalions in the same circumstances.

6. Major weaknesses in detail are as follows:

a. 81mm mortar firing is very poor. However, this is probably mainly due to lack of practice owing to the 81mm mortar not normally being taken on search and destroy ops. Now that the Bn appears to be settled on Barbara for a month they should be able to improve.

7. My major duties during the period were:

a. 18/23 Jun - with Bn CP in field in Ba Long valley.

b. 23 Jun - 2 Jul . With unit at FB Anzio and Roy, meet and brief W02 Mills and accompany minor ops in Anzio area.

c. 3/9 Jul. Ops near Truoi mountain with W02 Mills.

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- d. 9/16 Jul. Meet and brief Capt Caligari and accompany on minor ops around Anzio.
- e. 17-20 Jul with Capt Caligari to FB Barbara.
8. Desertions - These appear to be in direct proportion to casualties and contacts during the month. For Jun, 2/54 which was involved at Tun Tavern, had about 15/20 desertions during the two days at Dong-Ha, immediately before the operation, and about 30/35 of the 118 survivors went absent immediately afterwards. 3/54 has had only seven desertions for Jun.
9. An NVA prisoner captured recently has said that his regt, the 66th, was moving to attack FB Holcombe, the 54 Regt Fwd CP about 15 kms south of Dong-Ha, when they heard of an impending combat assault to Tun Tavern, and they were pulled back to attack it a few days before the assault.
10. There is some concern in the 101st AB Div about the low ratio of kills in fire fights with NVA before the arrival of arty and air support. In a discussion with some of the 1 ARVN Div staff advisers, it appears that in firefights 101 AB Div are at best only getting a 1:1 kill ratio.

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Appendix 6  
to Annex B  
to AAITV Report  
Jul 70

EXTRACTS OF A REPORT BY CAPT BROCK  
SENIOR ADVISER 3/2 ARVN BN - JUL 70

1. Three distinct phases occurred during the period; consisting of 13 days at FSB FULLER, 10 days in reserve at DONG HA, then 8 days at KHE GIO.

a. FULLER. There is little to add to the report of last month. Activity remained at a generally low ebb. The FSB continued to take 120mm mor daily but fewer rounds than were fired earlier in the month. The only significant event occurred on 30 Jul when a recon element from NVA 246 Regt was ambushed at GR 004581 killing all 5 members without friendly loss.

Documents captured from this recon team confirmed that the NVA planned to mount a similar seige of FSB FULLER that had occurred before.

One point of interest was that on 4 Jul the FSB took mortar fire from a position that was inside a B52 strike. The first rounds were fired whilst the strike was in progress!

b. Reserve at DONG HA. Nothing to report.

c. KHE GIO. The Bn took over at KHE GIO on 16 Jul. Deployment is one coy at KHE GIO, one coy guarding CAMP CARROLL and two Coys patrolling in pl size groups the ridge lines East of FSB FULLER.

To date there has been no contact or signs of recent enemy activity in the AO.

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Appendix 7  
to Annex B  
to AATTV Report  
Jul 70

EXTRACTS OF REPORT BY WO2 PAXTON  
ADVISED 4/54 ARVN BN - 2-25 JUL 70

1. Tasks included:
  - a. Defense of Fire Support Base BRICK Grid 835995.
  - b. Clear AO up to about 6000 metres radius.
2. On 2 Jul I was attached, with an American Lt, to the 3rd Coy for a total of 14 days. Most of my comments therefore are based on this Sub-Unit's performance over that period. Only 4 or 5 times during the 14 days did the coy actually search to its flanks, most of the time was spent in walking from one location to another. The total time spent in Pl sized patrolling would not exceed 24 hours. The Coy Comd will not or cannot move or use his initiative without CO's approval/direction, I should be able to confirm this in my next report.
3. Major weaknesses are:
  - a. Navigation, by all lead Pl Comds.
  - b. As a consequence of 3a excess noise caused by "Scrub Bashing".
  - c. Reluctance to carry SP wpns eg; only 2 M60s in Coy and no mors (7xM79 in lieu).
  - d. It is a well used area and each night they occupied either an old American or ARVN posn, (one night it was an old VC posn!).
4. The strong points are:
  - a. They dig in every night.
  - b. They do not make any noise after dark.
  - c. They are very fit.
5. My advance intentions are uncertain. If I remain with the 3 Coy Comd I intend to slowly convince him to:
  - a. Carry more MGs (not sure on this one yet)
  - b. Clean up the wpns (all)
  - c. Tidy up the movement by day. (navigation).
6. I have collected the overall impression that the unit is avoiding contact. I gained this impression from the following;

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- a. They make so much noise when moving, I think that they must be doing it deliberately. Once when they thought they were in contact, they made no noise at all deploying.
- b. The reaction to 50 rounds 82mm mor onto BRICK and vicinity (dropped short) was to call Arty and Gunships and then (2 days later) send the 3rd Coy to search area. At the time the mor was fired 3rd Coy was 2000 metres to the West.

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Appendix 8  
to Annex B  
to AATTV Report  
Jul 70

REPORT BY WO2 HESLIN  
RF/PF ADVISER HOA VANG DISTRICT - JUL 70

1. During the month:
  - a. Four RF Coys conducted 154 small day and night operations; only 9 with contact.
  - b. 37 PF Pls conducted a total of 824 small day and night operations 8 with contact.
2. Not all of these operations were as successful as they could have been. I think this was because most of the District officers were used for the planning of the elections during the month of Jun 70. Due to this most of the operations that I was present on had Warrant Officers or Sgts as commanders, who did not have the normal interest or control.
3. A report from one PF Pl on 8 Jul 70 at 1935 hrs indicated that they were receiving mortars, however the contact only lasted 5 minutes which resulted in 6 USMC WIA (member of a CAP team working with this Pl) 3 PF KIA and 4 WIA. Next day I checked this area and found that the report was incorrect. I found in the area electric cable about 20 yds long, and running past the house of the Hamlet Chief. The cable was placed at about 4" below ground level. A charge of about 25 lbs PE plus an M18 mine placed in the centre of a garden with 6 small type charges at the corners and sides of the garden covered an area 30 yds by 30 yds. All charges was connected to the one wire and it was command detonated. I questioned the PF and Marines and they told me they had not checked the area out as they had been using the house in the rear of the garden. There was a number of family type bunkers in this area. I checked 2 of these bunkers and one of them had been used to set this booby trap and that there was one VC in there during the day time and that he had waited till the max number of pers will in the garden area. This was when the Marines and PF were putting their packs on to move out. As a result an operation was conducted two days later which resulted in 6 VC KIA and 1 WIA. The WIA made a statement that the hamlet chief had supported the VC in that area, and he is now in jail.
4. After some discussion with the S3 on the problem of booby traps we now have all units in the district using a day or night rest area formation; a complete circle and probe all soft earth with bayonets and search all family bunkers and houses. So far two large type booby traps have been found without any friendly losses.
5. The overall standard is much the same as in my last report but the district has now the use of a MAT with 2 officers and 2 NCOs. They have covered about 6 week training, each platoon gets two weeks training.
6. The major weaknesses are:
  - a. The supply of defence stores has been very slow; some of the RF Coys have been waiting months for items such as sand bags, wire etc.

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- b. Pay. I found that some of the RF/PF soldiers have problems with their pay c some RF have not received their enlistment bonus, and some squad leaders have not been paid for their position.
- c. Some PF soldiers complained to me that they had paid for rice that is authorised to be sold from district and they had not received it.
7. a. I have checked with the S4 on defence stores and he tells me lack of material and transport, so I requested the indent number and dates. I passed this info on to the DSA who will bring it up at the next PSA meeting and see if something can be done to hurry the matter up.
- b. Pay. The S1 told me he was not aware of these problems but will look into it and try to fix it up. I will keep checking on him.
- c. Rice issues on payment. The S4 states that all rice that has been paid for has been issued. To keep a check on this I have asked all PF Pl leaders to give me a list of names on the 10th of each month of any soldier that has paid for food and has not received it.
8. Most of my duties has been covered, however I have to complete a Territorial Forces Evaluation System card. There is a card for each RF Coy and PF Pl with 29 questions on it. To complete this card I have to visit each unit to find the answers at the end of the month. I complete the TFES report and assist the Vietnamese to do their section.
10. My advance intentions are:
- a. To come up with a more workable training programme as now the MAT carry out in place training. The result is that the platoon in training has still got daily tasks of security and this results in only 2/3 of the unit getting trained and only about 4 hours per day - Monday to Friday. My opinion is that it would be better to train each platoon at District HQ and use one of the Reaction Force Pls to take their place. More time could then be spent on training, and more training aids are available plus a range. When I complete this revised training programme I will forward it to the District Chief for approval, but the MAT may not go for it as it involves a lot of work for the US instructors.
- b. In my last report I stated that I would try to get PF Pl leaders trained in the use of fire support I have not been successful as the S3 has the idea in his mind that if support is required he or I will go to that area and call for support fire and control it.

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Appendix 9  
to Annex B  
to AATTV Report  
Jul 70

REPORT BY WO2 HEATHCOTE  
ADVISED 3/3 ARVN BN - JUL 70

1. Aims of the unit were:
  - a. To interdict and deny the enemy access to Hue from the North West.
  - b. To provide local and perimeter protection for:
    - (1) FSB T. BONE YD 653203.
    - (2) Regimental Rear Base SALLY YD 633240.
2. Methods used to achieve the aims were:
  - a. From 13 Jun to 23 Jun, the Bn Light CP (LCP) plus one coy manned the perimeter of FSB T. BONE.
  - b. Bn HQ, HQ Coy and one coy manned Regt Rear Base SALLY.
  - c. The remaining coys patrolled the road between T. BONE and SALLY, for the purpose of :
    - (1) To providing local protection for T. BONE.
    - (2) To providing road clearance and security.
  - d. On 24 Jun, the Bn CP plus the HQ coy, were airlifted to OP LION YD 600189, the 1st coy were airlifted to OP VIPER YD 694158, the 2nd coy less 1 Pl were combat assaulted (CA) to an LZ at YD 623143. The platoon from the 2nd Coy, were inserted into the same LZ with the 185th RF/PF Coy. Their task was to make the RF/PF Coy, familiar with ARVN type operations and to teach the Coy Commander navigation in the jungle. The 3rd Coy were CA into an LZ at YD 609129. On 24 Jul, the 2nd Coy replaced the 1st Coy on OP VIPER YD 694158 and the 1st Coy assumed the role of patrolling the AO from VIPER to the West.
3. It is difficult to assess how successful the unit have been in achieving their aims. It is known there are small groups of enemy from half squad to squad size in the AO of the 3rd Regt. Despite all efforts of my Bn, the enemy were able to mortar FSB T. BONE, on 23 Jul, during the visit of a VIP party. Some days prior to this, the enemy also fired 4x122mm rockets into the city of Hue from a location in close proximity and visual sight of OP VIPER YD 694158, the approximate location of the firing sight was YD 710142. This, however, does not imply that the unit have completely failed in their aims, but it does show they have not been as successful as on previous operations in this area. I think that the size of the AO and the small amount of troops actually employed on the ground to search for and take the enemy into contact, can be blamed for the extra freedom of movement of the enemy.

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4. Major Weaknesses. Since the submission of my last report, concerning the major weaknesses of the unit, I have spent very little time with any Sub Unit in the field, and so I am unable to report any new weaknesses, that may have developed, in the last few weeks.

5. After my experiences with the 2nd Coy, I spent a considerable amount of time with the Bn Comd, Maj Phong, discussing the situation with him and giving him my recommendations for the improvement of this Company. What has been done about it, to date, I am unable to tell as I have not been back to the field with this Sub Unit, although he must have made mention of my recommendations to his Sub-Unit Commanders, because when the 1st Coy walked from OP VIPER YD 694158 the Coy Commander remarked to me "you do not like noise do you" and then issued orders which stopped all talking and excessive noise.

6. Strong points remain un-changed since my last report.

7. Major Duties. From 10 Jul to 15 Jul, I was the Senior Adviser to the 1st Bn on an operation into the Khe-Sanh Valley. I was responsible for:

- a. Running of Medevacs.
- b. Running of Re-supplies.
- c. Employment of Pink Teams.
- d. Employment of FAC.
- e. Employment of ARA.
- f. Authentication and sending of reports of contacts etc to Regiment.

8. The advance intention of the unit, and myself, are un-known at this time, except that we will be remaining in the 3rd Regt AO, for an unknown period. Beyond this, no one seems to have any knowledge, because of a tightening of security at Regt HQ.

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Appendix 10  
to Annex B  
to AATTV Report  
Jul 70

REPORT BY CAPT MCGURGAN  
SENIOR ADVISER 1/51 ARVN BN - JUL 70

General

1. For the majority of the month of Jul the battalion operated as a security element for the Engineers and Seabees working on Route 4 and NS road from Hill 55 (ZC 967617). The battalion was deployed in Coy size elements with the Bn HQ at Dodge City (AT 992577). Rifle Coy HQs were located at 963584, 969585, 983584 and BT 037546 (Go Noi Island). A number of sweeps, normally of two coys (+) and either a heavy/light CP, were conducted during this period, these were carried out on three separate days during the month. On 23 Jul 70 we were relieved of all road security operations and returned to Hill 55 to prepare for coming operations at "Charlie Ridge".

Security Ops

2. The battalion was responsible for security of 7/8 "Clicks" of highway with three Rifle Coy plus HQ Coy with the remaining Rifle Coy at Go Noi Island (approx 4/5 Clicks SE). During this time the VC (aided by NVA instructors) were successful in blowing up the road in several locations and as well as severely damaging equipment, a number of US personnel were KIA and WIA. A total of 3 US personnel were KIA and 11 WIA by these mine incidents.

3. Although mine-sweep teams were used extensively they were unsuccessful in locating any of the already buried "ROCK" type mines. This is so as there are no metallic parts in these pressure mines and the only way to locate them is by probing and by visible detection on the road surface and shoulders of the road proper. Vehicles demolished were one jeep, one 3/4 truck and a small water tanker. Numerous scrapers had wheels blown off but no serious complications as a result of mines.

Mines

4. The "rock" mines with a concrete base and either M14 or VC pressure device held from 60/150 lbs of C4 and upon detonation had various effects. In most cases personnel were wounded badly/burnt or killed as indicated by the figures already given. Mines are laid in already existing "Pot Holes" or dug in from the side of the road; the road being built up from 4/8 ft from the level of the paddy fields.

Ambushing on Road Security Ops

5. Once again we had a US Marine Pl (+) operating with us. Ambushes were made up in the majority of cases of 3/4 ARVN and 3/4 MG. Limited success was had by our ambush teams. A total of 1 VC prisoner and 3 VC KIA were a direct result of our ambush teams; the first success we have had since early May 70 (a total of 284 ambushes laid).

Day Sweep Ops

6. Three of these were held with numerous successes. The first one yielded quite satisfactory results and the other two not so good. On the last two Coy (+) sweep, negative VC/NVA were contacted and by 1100 hrs of that particular day 4 ARVN were KIA and 5 WIA by mines and booby traps. This operation terminated at 1200 hrs of that day.

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7. Total results for the month were:

ARVN: - 5 KIA  
14 WIA  
1xM16 (damaged by booby trap)

EN : - 17 KIA  
8 POW (2 female and 6 male)

8. During this period we captured 2xM16, 1xM14, 1xAK47, 1x45 Cal Pistol, 3xB40 Rocket Launchers (total of 8 weapons). We destroyed 14 bunkers, 15 kilos of uniforms, 30 VC grenades, 3xM16 mines, 100 kilos of rice, 21 B40 rounds, 120 AK47 rounds, 4xM14 mines and 1xM18 A-Tank mine.

9. A total of 3 "Dustoff" helicopters and 1 "Black Cat" were utilized during the month.

10. To go on operations we have, right now, 328 combat troops, this is well below our normal combat strength.

Comments

11. Ambushing seems to be improving as indicated by our results. This is due to more frequent use of "claymore" mines in ambush sites and resultant casualties to en. troops.

12. Morale amongst the troops seems to be back to normal after a lapse as a result of our last operation in the mountains where fairly heavy casualties were received.

13. Replacement officers and senior NCOs have arrived but we are still low in soldier strength in each Rifle Coy.

14. Patrolling at night was stepped up to counter-act VC access to the highways and although negative results were obtained we did manage to keep VC from tampering with certain road lengths in our AO.

15. Negative training was conducted this month due to security commitments.

16. Numerous inspections of mess and equipment of each Coy were carried out, at least once weekly. I went around with Maj Tanh on each occasion and as a result further inspections were carried out to get the soldiers up to a good standard. I feel weapons/ammo/grenades are now in a reasonable condition as a result of these inspections. Particularly in poor condition were the M72s, grenades and claymore mines (firing devices mainly). The 106mm and 57RR plus the 60mm mortars were in good servicable condition and most important kept clean and ready to use at a moments notice.

17. We are scheduled to go on ops to Charlie Ridge either 27 or 28 Jul 70.

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Annex C  
to AATTV Report  
Jul 70


REPORT BY MAJ BEALE - SENIOR AUSTRALIAN ADVISER  
PHUOC TUY PROVINCE JUL 70

General

1. During the month MATT 5 and a percentage of MATT 6 have been deployed. The month is noted for the increase of RF activity with encouraging results. The effectiveness of the MATTs continues to be limited by the lack of interpreters.

HQ Baria

2. Since his return from leave the Province Senior Adviser has re-organized the Territorial Forces (TF) Advisory personnel and when adjustments are complete will have the following structure:



a. The OC Territorial Forces (TF) Div is to be the Senior Australian Adviser Phuoc-Tuy who will have the following responsibilities:

- (1) Control of AATTV personnel within the Province.
- (2) Supervision and co-ordination of both AATTV MATTs and US MAT.
- (3) Counterpart to the Vietnamese Deputy Chief of Sector.
- (4) Supervision and direction of the advisory staff of the TF Division.

b. The RF/PF Adviser position currently filled by a US Capt is to be taken over by AATTV from mid Aug 70, with a US Lt as assistant.

c. The PSDF Adviser position is to be held by the AATTV Admin WO assisted by a US Sgt.

The re-adjustment will give full and active employment to AATTV personnel permitting greater control of MATT activities and influence of TF employment.

MATT 1 (655 Coy RF - Binh-Ba)

3. The team has increased training activity with both RF and PF in the area and accompanied operations designed to confirm instruction. There has been a marked increase in operations and ambushes that have resulted in 2 VC KIA in an ambush in Binh-Ba village on 19 Jul 70.

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- 2 -

4. Additional bunkers and further wiring under the guidance of the MATT have increased the defences of the Binh-Ba compound but generally they continue to be inadequate.
5. Consideration is being given to the redeployment of the MATT to another location in Duc-Thanh District. It is considered that the standard of 655 Coy will have soon been raised to a satisfactory level and that the MATT could be more effectively employed elsewhere. This matter is currently under discussion with the District Senior Adviser.
6. WO2 Storan replaced WO2 White as 2IC on 8 Jul 70 and is currently attending the USARV Advisors' Course.

MATT 2 (578 Coy RF - Dat Do)

7. The activity of the MATT has increased considerably over the month. Combined training of RF and PF has progressed very satisfactorily and steps have been taken to introduce advanced training for officers and NCOs.
8. Operations of 575 Coy continue to be restricted to the Dat Do Village complex but during the month this restriction started to produce encouraging results with contacts that resulted in 2 KIA (incl the VC Chief of Security and Training for Phuoc-Hoa Long) and one POW (the Chapter Party Secretary for the three villages of Dat Do). With these successes the morale of the Coy is very high.
9. The MATTs contact with village and hamlet officials continues and the team is becoming well accepted throughout the area. It is hoped to commence a training programme with the PSDF in the near future and members of the team are assisting with various village and hamlet projects.
10. WO2 Williams replaced WO2 Smith as Team Leader and WO2 Moffitt was redeployed from MATT 3 as 2IC during the month.

MATT 3 (302 Bn RF)

11. The general deployment of the Bn is unchanged from the last report with  
Bn HQ and one Coy - Northern Baria town.  
One Coy - Southern Baria town.  
One Coy - permanent protection for the refugee camp Lo-Voi.  
One Coy - An Ngai compound Long-Dien.  
The Bn has concentrated (less the Coy providing security for the refugee camp) for three operations during the month.
  - a. 7-9 Jul a three day sweep around the foothills of the Nui Dinh Hills.
  - b. 15-21 Jul a series of two day Coy operations in the Rung-Sat South and South West of Baria.
  - c. 24 Jul and continuing cordon, and search of South West Dat Do village.

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12. The operations have been planned in brief outline by the Province Chief of Staff and passed to the Bn Comd at the latest possible time in an endeavour to protect the security of the operation, normally late afternoon for an operation starting the following morning. Consequently the operations to date have been noted for their inadequate planning and preparation and as a consequence their poor execution.

13. The MATT has been able to have little influence on the preparation and conduct of operations and has provided little more than back up communications. Because of the dispersion of the Bn it has been unable to institute a training programme in the many apparent weaknesses existing in the Bn. A recommendation has been submitted to the PSA to either increase the employment of the MATT or re-assign it elsewhere.

14. In view of the limited employment of the MATT personnel WO2 Moffitt has been transferred to 21C MATT 2 and Cpls Talbot and Byrne transferred to MATT 6.

## MATT 4 (An Ngai Compound)

15. Until the 22 Jul 70, 787 Coy 302 Bn occupied the compound. This coy is probably the worst in the Province with very weak leadership resulting in infrequent and badly conducted patrols and ambushes. The MATT was unable to develop any rapport or influence with the Coy. Co-located in the compound is 3/47 Group HQ the commander of which has given maximum possible cooperation to the MATT.

16. 787 Coy is periodically withdrawn to join 302 Bn in operations leaving only the Group HQ and MATT with the defence of the compound which lacks basic barrier materials. The defences are being slowly improved by the MATT, the Group HQ and other companies of the Group brought in by the commander to assist. No support has been given by 787 Coy which is outside the control of both the Group Commander and the District Chief. Continued strong representation by the OC MATTs, District Chief and District Senior Adviser has failed to have the Coy replaced by either another company of 302 Bn or ideally a permanently allocated company under the control of 3/47 Group other than the temporary assignment of 612 Coy of 302 Bn for a period of two days when they both operated effectively and gave maximum support and cooperation to the MATT.

17. The situation is particularly frustrating to the MATT Team Leader and the team would be withdrawn but for the loss of the good rapport that has been established by the team with the Group Commander and the village and hamlet officials who are enthusiastic over the presence of the MATT. Once a permanent company is located in the compound the MATT is ideally located to achieve good results both in training with PF and PSDF and operations with the RF in the area. There have been over 30 penetrations of the area by VC in the last two months on food gathering, taxation and propoganda missions.

18. The MATT is severely hampered by a lack of interpreter. Two interpreters have been provided by 1 ATF both of whom have become AWOL within two days of their arrival.

19. WO2 McIntosh replaced WO2 Heenan (RTA) as team 21C on 12 Jul 70.

## MATT 5 (Hoi-My Compound working with 124 RF Coy Phuoc-Hai)

19. 124 Coy is deployed in three small compounds on the outskirts of Phuoc-Hai Village none of which are large enough to accommodate a MATT. The team was initially deployed in FSB Bridgette and a bunker to accommodate half the team

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- 4 -

constructed in the compound containing the Coy HQ. The team has been redeployed to Hoi My compound and currently operates from there.

20. The MATT has established a good rapport with the Coy Commander, Village and Hamlet officials, Police, RD and PF commanders. Team members have accompanied a number of RF operations and are providing liaison to the 1 ATF company located at FSB Bridgette.

21. The MATT is actively encouraging the development of a single compound on the South Western corner of the corner of the village into which it is hoped to redeploy the Coy from its three posts. The area is currently being cleared by the 1 ATF Land Clearing Team. It is hoped that under direction of the Province Chief and with the release of the necessary defence stores that the Coy will be concentrated with the MATT within a month.

22. The MATTs activities are currently restricted by:

- a. Being located away from their designated company and village
- b. Lack of an interpreter.

23. The smooth deployment and quick establishment of rapport in the area is largely due to the assistance and cooperation of OC B Coy 7 RAR, Maj Thompson.

MATT 6 (Hoi My Compound working in the 3/48 Group HQ and 189 RF Coy)

23. A US MAT located in Hoi My Compound was withdrawn through lack of personnel on 18 Jul 70. On the request of the PSA and DSA Dat Do MATT 6 was raised and deployed in the area on 20 Jul 70 and currently comprises:

Team Leader	WO2 White (from MATT 1)
Instr Inf	Cpl Talbot (from MATT 3)
Instr RAE	Cpl Byrne ( " )

The MATT is due to be formally raised on 7 Aug 70 and then undergo training at the USARV Advisors Course until 28 Aug 70 when it will be ready for deployment. The current group exists to:

- a. Maintain a MATT presence in the area.
- b. Establish initial contact.
- c. Continue the liaison function between the Group HQ and 1 ATF previously provided by the US MAT.
- d. Limited training and operational functions.
- e. Assist the divided MATT 5 with security.
- f. A 'housekeeping' function over the Team House.

24. The MATT has established a limited contact with the Group HQ, RF Coy and Village officials. Again its efforts are considerably frustrated by the lack of an interpreter.

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
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MATT 7 (3/15 Group HQ)

25. On 24 Jul 70 a US MAT located with 3/15 Group HQ at Ong Trinh on Route 15 was withdrawn through lack of personnel. This MAT had provided essential liaison between the Group HQ and 2 RAR. A role then assumed by the Operations Officer 2 RAR. On 27 Jul WO2 Smith, the future Team Leader of MATT 7, was deployed to FSB Gale to:

- a. Assist the Ops Officer 2 RAR with liaison
- b. Establish initial contact in the area to which his team will be deployed on the completion of their training on 28 Aug 70.
- c. Provide assistance as requested in the 2 RAR programme of joint operations with RF.

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Appending 1  
To Annex C  
To AATTV Report  
Jul 70

REPORT BY WO2 STEPHENS  
TEAM LEADER MATT 1 - JUL 70

1. ACTIVITIES FOR JULY

(a) RF

(1) Ambushing Ambushing was the most concentrated effort by MATT 1 with 655 Coy RF. A total of sixteen (16) ambushes were accompanied by MATT 1, one of which, on Mon 20 Jul, was successful in making contact with VC element in the village of Binh Ba. Though MATT 1 witnessed heavy blood trails and a VC sandal soaked in blood, there was no evidence of bodies, however the District Chief credited the Coy with two kills and this was a great morale booster to both the SVN and Australians at Binh Ba.

Quite a great improvement has been noted in the operation of ambushes, this includes selection of sites, movement into position and discipline during hours of ambush.

(2) Operations The Coy carried out only four (4) daylight operations, none of which resulted in contact. MATT 1 took the opportunity to use these to bring out practice of previous training and point out faults. The Coy's willingness to accept Australian training and adapt it into their everyday operations and activities, was a point brought out during the month.

(3) Training The only classes carried out by MATT 1 for 655 Coy RF during the month was a four (4) day Advanced Map Reading Course for the NCOs in the Coy. Their standard at the commencement of the course was very low; but a marked improvement was noted at the conclusion. This training is carried on into operations, when a NCO is given the task of map reading and is not interfered with in any way by MATT members unless they make bad mistakes. This method seems to be improving both the NCOs map reading and their morale.


(4) Stores and Compound Improvements

Stores for improvement of compound defence have still not been forthcoming through SVN channels, however MATT 1 has been fortunate in obtaining materials and assisting the Coy in the improvement of defence on the western fence of the compound, erection of latrines and sand floors for living quarters.

Apart from the above work the MATT has also concentrated on health and hygiene of the children in the compound. Work by the MEDIC and the issue of toilet soap, when available, have been instrumental in the success of this venture.

(b) PF

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(1) Training When the Pl of 655 Coy RF stationed at AP Suoi Nghe returned to Binh Ba on 28 Jun 70, they were replaced by two Pl's of PF. These Pl's were issued with one (1) M60 and one 60 mm. As the troops had not been previously trained in the use of these weapons MATT 1 conducted a course on the handling, care and firing of these weapons. The outstanding factor in this training was the lack of interest of PF troops. At one stage the MATT arrived for classes and five (5) men out of a total of fifty (50) available from the two P's turned out for training. Liason with Duc Thanh partly solved the problem; but at no time were there any more than eighteen (18) at classes.

2. FUTURE AIMS

The MATT 1 has been requested to assist in the training of PSDF in AP Suoi Nghe in the drive to bring them to a standard where they can be armed and work with the PF by the middle of August. Though this will be a challenge, the Team has requested training pamphlets from the US at Duc Thanh and certainly will endeavour to have both PSDF and PF at the standard where they will be capable of being armed and working together for the security of AP Suoi Nghe.

3. PERSONNEL

The Coy Comd 655 Coy RF continues to co-operate well with the MATT 1 and has endeavoured in all ways to achieve his role of security of AP Suoi- Nghe, Duc My, Binh Ba and Duc Trung. Unfortunately he has been left short-handed for officers and his NCO's standard is below average.

The Coy appears, to the MATT 1, to have the capabilities to find and destroy the enemy if given the opportunity. Their morale is high and they accept training well, showing a keen interest and a desire to learn.

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Appending 2  
To Annex C  
To AATTV Report  
Jul 70

REPORT BY WO2 WILLIAMS  
TEAM LEADER MATT 2 - JUL 70

TRAINING

1. The team has been able to average approx 1 hr training each day since the 7 Jul 70.

2. Both RF and PF have been trained and this training will be continued when operational commitments allow.

3.	<u>Subjects</u>	<u>Number of Periods</u>
	Weapons training	8
	Map reading	3
	Field craft	3
	First Aid & Hygiene	2

4. Average attendances

- a. RF 35
- b. PF 12

5. The team has been given permission to utilise the range adjacent to the Horseshoe, but unfortunately each time a range practice is arranged it has to be cancelled owing to operational commitments.

6. PSDF At this time we are trying to liase with the Village Chief and the Chief of RD Cadre for a training program for the PSDF. They are at this time doing nothing towards the security of the area and we are endeavouring to get them functioning.

7. The exact numbers of PSDF, weapons and distribution will be obtained at a meeting to be held on 27 Jul.

8. It has been discussed with the OC 578 RF Coy the possibility of running a training Cadre course. On completion this will enable the Coy to run their own training programs with their own trained instructions. He agrees it is a good idea but it has yet to be agreed to by the District Chief.

OPERATIONS

9. The team has been directly involved in the following operations for the period:-

Night ambushes	9
Day operations	11
Cordon & Search	
Phuoc Hoa Long Village	1

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10. Enemy Contacts 19 Jul 70 - 578 RF Coy killed 1 VC. (Chief of security and training for Phuoc Hoa Long area).
11. Ralliers 1 Chieu Hoi to 578 RF Coy. The follow up produced one bunker and some personal papers.

MEDICAL

12. Talked with Phuoc Hoa Long Village Chief and other leaders about getting the Village Medical Post operational. It was decided that the old Medical post be renovated and that a Medcap be run each Saturday morning. The Medcap to consist of the Village nurse, 578 RF Coy medic, RD Cadre medic with the MATT 2 medic advising. The MATT assisted in the renovation of the medical post.

TEAM CHANGES

13. 20 Jul 70 W02 R.D. Smith to MATT 1  
W02 F. Moffitt to MATT 2

GENERAL

14. On the 22 Jul arranged meeting with Phuoc Hoa Long Village chief, Head of Village council, RD Cadre chief, Police chief and the OC 578 RF Coy and MATT 2.

15. Topics discussed were as following:-

- a. Formation of a Vietnamese medcap and the completion of medical post.
- b. General security of the area.
- c. The fact that the MATT was not in the area just for the training of RF and PF, but was here to try and help the village generally. ie Village Chief, PSDF etc.

16. Finally it was decided that the personnel mentioned in para 14 would conduct a general meeting each Monday at 0900 hrs. The District Chief has since told us he would be attending the meeting.

SUMMARY

17. The team has for this period been able to involve itself more with the training of the RF & PF than it had been able to do during the previous periods.

18. The number of operations have remained reasonably constant however there seems to be a decrease in operations of 4 - 5 hr duration and an increase in 24 - 48 hr operations.

19. The team now appears to have developed a working relation with the majority of the leaders in the area and is working to improve these relations with the people.

A.S. WILLIAMS W02

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Appendix 3  
To Annex C  
To AATTV Report  
Jul 70

REPORT BY WO2 GREEN  
TEAM LEADER LATT 5 - JUL 70

1. The team moved into this area on the 8th July and initially set up in the Aust F.S.B. Daily we have gone to the R.F. compound to construct our bunker and establish a relationship with 124 Company. The bunker has taken some time to construct and was occupied for the first time last night, it will now be manned at all times, personnel permitting. The delay in completion of the bunker was caused by several factors, operations, move to Hoi My and lack of essential stores which are not on our entitlement, although they are a necessity, such as 12" x 12" timber for supports.

To date we have managed to organise a road block, consisting of 2 RF and 1 National Policeman at the village gate, this however operates at rather infrequent intervals. The RD are working out a training program for the PSDF, and will commence training in the near future, calling on us for assistance as required. At this stage the Village Defence Plan is inadequate, and an attempt is being made to alter their current thinking. A Company 7 RAR have left the area and D Company 8 RAR have moved in, there will be no combined operations with D Company, however they will react for us. Two vehicles are being provided by 26 Company RAASC on the 26th July to assist the RD cadre on a project of putting sand in the village market to ease the flooding problem. Our interpreter left us rather rapidly, since his arrival on the 14th, he has been sighted over a broken period of 3 days, now absent since 1630 hours on the 19th July. This makes our work rather difficult to say the least. No progress at this stage with the construction of the new Company base to the South Western area of the village.

2. UNITS WITHIN THE VILLAGE

124 RF Company: This Company works well on operations, the weapons are carried at the alert position, and troops appear to be on their toes at all times. Single file is the normal formation, it may be a valid thing with the number of known and reputed minefields in the area. Only one days training has been witnessed by this team, that was map reading and compass work for the NCO's, and conducted by A Coy 7 RAR. The interior of the compound is maintained at a reasonable standard by a daily fatigue party.

PF Platoon: Not yet contacted, however, we know they have combined with the RD Cadre on one internal ambush. Their prime mission seems to be providing protection for the village chief.

RD Cadre: Appear to be working well, have a reasonably reliable intelligence set up. Have participated in ambushes in the village. Team streng of 26, 4 away on course at this time.

PSDF: An unknown quality at this stage, they do not appear to be actively used at nights. The reported strength is 155, of which only some 50 have received any training, these include the Group Commander and Squad Leaders. They have 198 weapons, a break down follows:

Carbines ..... 54.

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M1 Garand ..... 22  
Thompsons ..... 16  
Shotguns .....106.

These weapons have not been sighted, this report is based on village records.  
National Police: Not a great deal of contact so far, but appear co-operative.

3. VILLAGE PERSONALITIES

Lt NGUYEN VAN NINH (124 Coy) Appears to have good control and leadership whilst on operations, but spends very little time with the unit when in Lang Phuoc Hai.

SANG (RD Cadre Chief) Aggressive personality, reflected by his unit. Very co-operative and helpful.

LE TAN CHAY (National Police Chief) Very co-operative, has a great deal of information to pass on, however, this information is very rarely confirmed, or refuted by other sources.

TRAN VAN CU (Village Chief) Has recently returned, difficult to formulate an opinion at this stage. Today he passed on information that the VC have left the hills and are now believed to be in the scrub, this report is unconfirmed at this time.

TRAN VAN HUOC (Village Committee Chairman) Seems to be the power behind the throne at this stage, said he was pleased to see a MATT in his village, he offered what ever assistance he could give us.

DUONG VAN HOA (Deputy for Security) Is keen to have a MATT in the village, has combined PF and RD ambushes at times acting on our suggestions.

4. VC INCIDENTS

- 9 July. 1930 hours, 20 - 30 VC reported moving along the beach from the SW, RF sighting. 2130 hours, RD Cadre opened fire on 3 - 5 VC on their perimeter, negative results.
- 10 July. Unconfirmed report of 4 VC in the village.
- 12 July. 4 VC in village. Hamlet Hai Truong GR 514534.
- 14 July. As above.
- 15 July. 3 Australians wounded by M16 mine at GR 537560.
- 16 July. Minefield marker located at GR 499514.
- 20 July. 0730 hours. 1 RF slightly wounded by M26 booby trap at GR 513525. This booby trap could have been RF one. Reported by RF as VC laid.
- 21 July. 2130 hours. Firing from SW outpost on people on the beach. People ran away.
- 23 July. Position for 20 men located by RF ambush party, position 24 hours old. Being checked out by 8 RAR.

5. RF OPERATIONS

Company Operations:	3	MATT Accompanied	2
Combined Ambushes	6	MATT Accompanied	6



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Annex D  
To AATTV  
Report Jul 70

REPORT BY CAPT SHEPPARD  
NIGHT OPERATIONS ADVISORY TEAM

JUL 70

General

1. This report is for the period 23 June to 25 July 1970. The training of 174 and 408 RF companies was completed on 10 July 1970. From that date, until the end of July, it was intended to accompany all three companies on operations to assess the completed project in Ben Tranh District.
2. This assessment phase did not work as well as it was hoped to because two of the three companies (174 and 203) are now involved in a pacification project and are conducting very limited night operations, if any. 408 RF company is the only unit still operating as planned in the original night operations concept. The performance of the 408 RF company has been written of in previous reports and there have been no significant changes to warrant any new comments.

Statistics

3. These, together with the other charts, hours of training, etc, will be made available on 28 July 1970, when the Assessment Team assembles at Ben Tranh District. The statistics this month will not present a true picture as only one contact was made in the presence of NOAT members.

Future Employment of the NOAT

4. In accordance with the instructions of the Deputy CORDS the team has been divided into groups. One group is moving to Cho Geo District to continue training RF companies whilst the other group has moved to Dong Tam to establish a night operations school. The first course of this school is due to commence on 1 August 1970.

Conclusion

5. The project is a success. Our initial high kill ratio, compared to the rest of the province, has dropped off sharply since May 1970. Friendly night activities have increased and improved, yet that number of contacts have decreased. This is only indicative of the fact that the enemy no longer feels free to move how and when he wants to at night. His night movements have been restricted. The night has been taken away from him, and this, after all, was the whole aim of the project.

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Annex E  
To AATTV  
Report Jul 70

REPORT BY WO STRACHAM  
NIGHT OPERATIONS ADVISORY TEAM  
TEAM ONE - JUL 70

General

1. As this team was employed to train the 203 RF company and 174 RF company all remarks and suggestions are based on this.
2. Quality of Soldiers:
  - a. Field craft of the soldier varies according to the degree of readiness required. Main faults noted are:
    - (1) Carriage of weapons.
    - (2) "Bunching" especially near obstacles.
  - b. Night firing by members of both companies is good. It should be noted that this point is based on results at figure targets and without illumination.
3. Conduct of Night Operations:
  - a. In the main, operations follow the initial plan.
  - b. Success of an operation can be measured in two ways.
    - (1) Number of contacts with body and weapon count.
    - (2) Nil contact when it must be assumed movement of the VC had been restricted.If both these occur then the answer to success is "yes".
4. Intelligence:
  - a. It is quite good.
  - b. Where time and assets are available it is acted upon.
  - c. If either RF Company Commander has his own intelligence net I am not and have not been aware of it.

Training Syllabus

5. This program is based on experience and need not necessarily be changed, however, the now lack of a specialist in mine warfare and mortar training should be borne in mind for further postings.
6. Problem Areas:
  - a. Operational: Nil.
  - b. Administrative:

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Annex F  
To AATTV  
Report Jul 70

REPORT BY WO BUTLER  
NIGHT OPERATIONS ADVISORY  
TEAM TWO - JUL 70

Quality of Soldier

1. The field craft of the average soldier of the company is quite good. They tend to bunch a good deal moving into ambush positions. Noise control is good.
2. Not having been on an operation that required shooting I cannot assess the success of night firing training. During the night firing training the members of the company showed a marked improvement over the training period. I feel that the night firing must be a part of normal training as they tend to fire automatic. Fire control is lacking in this respect.

Operational Planning

3. The planning of night operations was sound. The plans made were feasible. The time factor between district and the company at times does not allow enough time for detailed plans to be made.

Conduct

4. During the period of training the operations followed the initial plan. On several occasions the operations were curtailed by district. This was brought about by the district having day operations in which the company was to take part.
5. Measure of Success: If lack of contact means that the enemy are curtailing their actions because of night operations then I feel we are having some success.

Intelligence

6. Intelligence appears to be good enough.
7. In the main it is acted upon.
8. The company has its own intelligence net.

Training

9. The subject matter taught during the period appears to be successful.
10. It is obvious that there should be much more emphasis placed on the basic infantry skills.

Problems

11. The only operational problems seem to be the time lag between district and the company.

Remarks

12. The concept of NOAT appears to be very sound and should they continue with the training program suggested it will prove to be very successful.

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(1) Long delay for stores.


(2) Lack of an armourer to repair weapons which cannot be sent in for repair due to operational requirements, i.e. M79.

c. After a suggestion that a sick parade be conducted at a laid down time each morning brought forth the remark that "all" soldiers would report sick. When pointed out that soldiers with minor complaints were left untreated until the complaint became major did not appear to sway the issue.

Summary

7. I am of the opinion that this program has been of great value to the soldiers of both companies. Officer training is hard to assess and results are not always tangible due to reluctance of the recipient to change "overnight".

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HEADQUARTERS  
DELTA MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND  
USAAG, IV CMR, APO CORDS

Office of the Deputy for CORDS

MACCZ-IV-CR-SAA

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT: Training Syllabus - Night Operational Techniques.

General

1. The syllabus as attached embodies in the main the areas found necessary for retraining RF/PF in night operational techniques.

Concept

2. The concept is to instruct in the Australian method of conducting retraining for the RF in night techniques.

3. It has been established by the Australian Team that in some areas basic soldiering skills have been lacking which may have been a major contributing factor to mediocre results in some night operations.

Course Attitude

4. The course will deploy for training as a PF platoon. The retraining that has been directed to the RF soldier by the Australian Team will be directed at the course.

Course Structure

5. a. The course initially concentrates on techniques in teaching basic skills.
- b. The course then turns to instruction and problem setting on tactical exercises without troops. These tactical problems are actual successful operations experienced during the conduct of the Australian project with RF companies.
- c. Towards the end of the course three night operations are conducted.
- d. Finally, the course will carry instruction on the techniques in conducting overall night operations retraining directed at RF/PF.

JOHN P. VANN  
Deputy for CORDS.

Incl  
as

NOTT - 6  
Each course member  
HQ AATTV (2)  
Territorial Security IV CMR  
DMAC G-3.



SERIAL	TIME	SUBJECT	METHOD	LOCATION	REMARKS
<u>DAY - 1</u>					
1.	0800-1130	March in & Initial Administration			Opening Address - CPT Sheppard and Staff.
2.	1330-1630	Opening Address/Administration			
<u>DAY - 1</u>					
3.	0730-1130	Coaching/Zeroing	Lecture/Practical	25 M. Range	Instructors
	1130-1130	L u n c h			
4.	1330-1420	Target Analysis	Lecture	Lecture Room	
5.	1430-1510	M79 Strip Clean Assy	Practice	Close Trg Area	
6.	1520-1600	Weapon Handling M60	Practice	Close Trg Area	
7.	1930-2010	Reserved			
	2020-2100	Reserved			
<u>DAY - 2</u>					
8.	0730-0810	Formations	Lecture	Lecture Room	
9.	0815-0855	Obstacle Crossing	Lecture		
10.	0900-1000	Cordon & Search	Lecture		
11.	1000-1130	Confirmation of Zeroing	25 M - Range		
	1130-1330	L u n c h			
12.	1330-1630	Practice Formations & Obstacle Crossing		Close Trg Area	
<u>DAY - 3</u>					
13.	0730-0940	Characteristics/Employment of Claymore.	Lecture	Lecture Room	CPT Sheppard ALL
14.	0950-1130	Zeroing M60	Lecture/Practical	25 Range	
	1130-1330	L u n c h			
15.	1330-1410	Contact Drills	Lecture	Close Trg Area	
16.	1420-1630	Contact Drills	Practical	Close Trg Area	
17.	1930-2100	Night Firing	Practical	25 Range	
<u>DAY - 4</u>					
18.	0730-1130	Shooting Gallery	Practical	25 Range	
19.	1130-1330	L u n c h			
20.	1330-1630	Mechanical Ambush	Lecture/Practical	25 Range	
21.	1930-2100	Night Firing	Practical	25 Range	
<u>DAY - 5</u>					
22.	0730-0840	Ambush	Lecture	Lecture Room	CPT Sheppard
23.	0850-0930	Protection	Lecture	Lecture Room	
24.	0940-1130	Firing M-79	Practical	Range	CPT Sheppard
25.	1130-1330	L u n c h			
26.	1330-1630	Battle Procedure	Lecture	Lecture Room	



SERIAL	TIME	SUBJECT	METHOD	LOCATION	REMARKS
<u>DAY - 6</u>	0730-1130 1130-1330 1330-1630	Zeroing L u n c h Administration	Practical	25 Range	Mutual Instruction
<u>DAY - 7</u>	AM	Withdrawal	Practical		
<u>DAY - 8</u>	0730-0810 0820-1130 1330-1630	Fire & Movement Tactical Exercise Without Troops Tactical Exercise Without Troops	Lecture Practical Practical	Lecture Room Lecture Room Lecture Room	
<u>DAY - 9</u>	0730-1630	Preparation for Operational			
<u>DAY 10</u>		Operational Debriefing			
	1330-1630	Tactical Exercise Without Troops			
<u>DAY - 11</u>	0730-1630	Preparation for Operation 2			
<u>DAY - 12</u>	1330-1630	Operational Debriefing Tactical Exercise Without Troops			
<u>DAY - 13</u>	0730-1630	Preparation for Operations			
<u>DAY - 14</u>		Preparation Debriefing			
<u>DAY - 15</u>	0730-0830 0830-0930 1000-1200	Night Operations Advisory Team Concept March Out Administration Release			



SERIAL	TIME	SUBJECT	METHOD	LOCATION	REMARKS
<u>DAY - 6</u>	0730-1130 1130-1330 1330-1630	Zeroing L u n c h Administration	Practical	25 Range	Mutual Instruction
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<u>DAY - 8</u>	0730-0810 0820-1130 1330-1630	Fire & Movement Tactical Exercise Without Troops Tactical Exercise Without Troops	Lecture Practical Practical	Lecture Room Lecture Room Lecture Room	
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<u>DAY - 12</u>	1330-1630	Operational Debriefing Tactical Exercise Without Troops			
<u>DAY - 13</u>	0730-1630	Preparation for Operations			
<u>DAY - 14</u>		Preparation Debriefing			
<u>DAY - 15</u>	0730-0830 0830-0930 1000-1200	Night Operations Advisory Team Concept March Out Administration Release			