

Series: AWM95
Australian Army commanders' diaries
[Vietnam]

Infantry units

Item number: 7/1/45

Item: 1 Battalion Royal Australian
Regiment

Additional

[1-30 Nov 1965]

KIN

Copy No _____
HQs 173d Abn Bde (Sep)
Bien Hoa, RVN
011800H November 1965
NCB

ANNEX E (Administration) to OPOD 28-65
Reference: Same as OPOD 28-65

1. GENERAL

- a. Purpose. This annex sets forth the policy and procedures for the administrative and logistical support of OPOD 28-65.
- b. Concept. 173d Spt Bn establishes a Brigade Supply Operations Center (BSOC) in the vicinity of Pierson Field (coordinates YTO05151). Resupply for all classes of supply will be by unit distribution by helicopter directly from BSOC. Resupply of artillery ammunition will be supplemented by motor convoy as necessary.
- c. Request for resupply will be relayed over the Bde INTEL/ADMIN LOG net.

2. MATERIEL AND SERVICES.

a. Supply.

(1) Cl I

(a) All Task Forces airlifted into the area of operations will carry one days ration.

(b) All Task Forces introduced into the area of operations by motor transport will carry three days ration.

(c) Cl I supply point remains in present location.

(2) Cl II and IV. All request for Cl II and IV should be placed with the BSOC not later than 1600 hours the day prior to the day distribution is desired.

(3) Cl III and IIIA.

(a) Cl III. All vehicles departing Bien Hoa will depart with a full fuel tank, wheeled vehicles will carry one full 5 gallon can and tracked vehicles will carry two full 5 gallon cans.

(b) Cl IIIA. A/82 Avn maintains Cl IIIA supply point in present location.

(4) Cl V and VA.

(a) Cl V. All Task Forces carry basic load as prescribed by Task Force Cmdrs. Cl V supply point remains in present location

(b) Cl VA. A/82 maintains operational load at armed Helicopter pads in present location.

(5) Water.

(a) Bde WSP is attached to TF 3/319th Arty for movement. Location of WSP to be announced upon opening.

(b) All company size elements deployed by road will take a water trailer in the convoy.

(c) All individuals will carry two full 1 quart canteens or one full 2 quart collapsible canteen.

(6) Salvage. No equipment will be allowed to fall into enemy hands. Destruction of material to prevent capture or reduce interference with tactical operations is authorized. Destruction of material and equipment will be reported to BSOC as soon as possible.

b. Transportation.

(1) Motor Transport.

(a) All Task Forces will submit motor transportation requirements to the Brigade Motor Plans and Operations Officer (Provide 42) not later than 1600 hours 1965. All Task Forces will make maximum effort to meet transport requirements with organic vehicles.

(b) Army Air. Army aircraft sorties allocated for resupply missions will be coordinated by the BSOC.

c. Service.

(1) Organization of Trains. All Task Forces will establish a support element in the vicinity of the BSOC.

(2) Maintenance. 173d Spt Bn provides DS for all maintenance except aviation from present location. A/82 Avn provides aviation maintenance from present location.

3. MEDICAL EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION.

a. Unit aid men will accompany all platoon size units.

b. 173d Spt Bn provides Bde Clearing Station from present location.

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- c. Bn aid stations announce location upon opening.
- d. Bde Surgeon coordinates to insure coverage of deploment and subsequent operations by Helicopter Medical Evacuation.
- e. Request for Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) will be submitted on the Bde Command Net. MEDEVAC requests will include the following
 - (1) Number and type of casualties to be evacuated. The letter "Lima" will be used to indicate litter patients and the letter "Whisky" will be used to indicate walking wounded. Deceased will be indicated by the letter "DELTA"
 - (2) Priority of evacuation required for each type casualty using the following priorities:
 - A = Urgent
 - B = Priority
 - C = Routine
 - (3) Location using point of origin code.
- f. An example of a Dustoff request follows:
 - "Head Shed 3 this is Out House 9 message follows - break -
 - "Item 1 Dustoff" (This indicates that the request is for MEDEVAC
 - "Item 2 Lima 1 Alpha; Whishey 2 Charlie, Delta 1 Charlie"
 - (This item indicates that there is a total of 4 casaulties, 1 of which is a litter patient which requires Urgent evacuation, 2 of the casualties are walking wounded for which routine evcuation is acceptable and one of the casualties has expired).
 - "Item 3 From Luke right 1.2 up 2.1" (This item indicates location using standard point of origin code)
- g. Bde Surgeon will monitor the Bde Command Net and corrdinate all MEDEVAC requests.

4. PERSONNEL.

- a. Personnel
 - (1) Morning Report: Normal submission channels.
 - (2) Casualty Reports: Per SOP
 - (3) Units will submit PDS of personnel to participate in the operation by 1800 hrs 4 Nov 65.
- b. Chaplains: Normal chaplin coverage will be provided by attachment of chaplins to Task Forces.
- c. Provost Marshal. Be prepared to man TCPs as required in coordination with the Bde S3.

5. MISCELLANEOUS.

Reports.

- (1) All Task Forces will submit a report of actual expenditures of significant items of C1 II and IV within 5 days of completion of the operation.
- (2) Class V expenditures will be reported in accordance with letter AVPS-D, HQ 173d Abn Bde (Sep), Subject: Semi-monthly ammunition Reports, 29 Sep 65.

Acknowledge.

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Brig Gen

Distribution: Same as OPORD 28-65

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Bien Hoa, RVN
011800H November 1965
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ANNEX F (Sequence of Events) to OPORD 28-65 (Operation HUMP)

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1	0700	Artillery Fire Support Base completes occupation of Psn ACE and registration
2	0715-0745	TAC Air preparation - LZ QUEEN
3	0745-0755	Arty preparation - LZ QUEEN
4	0755-0800	Armed chopper preparation - LZ QUEEN
5	0800	Assault landing - TF 1/RAR 1st Lift
6	ASAP	2d Lift
7	ASAP	3d Lift
8	0925	Displacement of 105mm How Battery into TF 1/RAR sector to extend coverage
9	1030-1100	Tac Air preparation - LZ KING
10	1100-1110	Arty preparation - LZ KING
11	1110-1115	Armed chopper preparation - LZ KING
12	1115	Assault Landing - TF 1/503 1st Lift
13	ASAP	2d Lift
14	ASAP	3d Lift
15	D-Day to D+5	Search and destroy operations

Acknowledge

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Distribution: Annex Z

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Hq, 173d Abn Bde (Sep)
Bien Hoa, RVN
041800H November 1965
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Annex Z (Distribution) OPORD 28-65 (Operation HUMP)

References: Same as OPORD 28-65

DISTRIBUTION

<u>RECIPIENT</u>	<u>COPY NUMBER</u>
CG, 173d Abn Bde (Sep)	1
DCO, 173d Abn Bde (Sep)	2
XO, 173d Abn Bde (Sep)	3
1st Inf Div	4 & 5
III Corps (Via LNO)	6 & 7
Bde S1	8
Bde S2	9
Bde S3	10 - 13
Bde S4	14
1/503d Inf	15 - 18
2/503d Inf	19 - 22
1/RAR	23 - 26
3/319th Arty	27 - 30
Spt Bn	31 - 34
145th Avn Bn	35 & 36
Bde Surgeon	37 & 38
Bde S5	39
Bde Avn Off	40
A/82 Avn	41 & 42
Hq Cmdt	43
HHC	44
D/16th Armor	45 & 46
E/17th Cavalry	47 & 48
Engr Co	49 & 50
Bde IG/PIO	51
Bde Cml Off	52
RRU Det	53
Bde ALO	54
Bde FSCC	55
MI Det	56
Bde Comm Off	57
Bde PMO	58
COMAAFV	59
Hq Det, C3, 5th SFG	60 & 61
Historical File	62 - 67

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i After firing a single shot the VC immediately
made off down the creek.

9. Nil

10. GPMG need be brought into action, was directed
to fire down VC, to prevent further withdrawal.

11.

La Poudre L.

11 NOV 65

J. B. Dealy Major
of A Coy.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE)
APO U. S. Forces 96250

25/12

AVAB-CG

19 November 1965

File

CRITIQUE OF OPERATION HUMP

1. A critique of this operation was conducted on 13 November 1965. Present for the critique were the Commanding General, the brigade staff, and battalion and separate company commanders.

2. The purpose of the critique was to identify in each functional area, those techniques and procedures which require modification in order to improve the system and increase combat effectiveness for future operations.

3. This has been reproduced for study purposes. Through this approach it is hoped that we can improve future operations.

Ellis W Williamson
ELLIS W. WILLIAMSON
Brig Gen, U.S. Army
Commanding

23/12

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RANGE 6 105mm HOW

HO CHI MINH TRAIL

RANGE 12 105 mm

HOW

5030

SONG DE RIVER

DONG NAI RIVER





LZ KING

LZ JACK
LZ QUEEN

RAR

B NAI

0 500 1000 SCALE IN METERS

-  MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
-  VC WITH DRAWEL
-  ENGAGEMENT
-  LRP

3 3F5th

POSITION ACE

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HEADQUARTERS
173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE)
APO San Francisco 96250

15 November 1965

OPERATION HUMP

I. SITUATION.

A. Tactical Situation:

1. Mission. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) conducted a search and destroy operation in the Viet Cong dominated War Zone "D" in Tan Uyen District of Bien Hoa Province near the junction of the Dong Nai and Song Be River. The operation which began on 5 November 1965 and ended on 9 November 1965, was the fifth operation conducted in War Zone "D" by this Brigade. During the operation the 1st Battalion 503d Airborne Infantry met and virtually annihilated a Viet Cong unit that was later proved to be composed of three battalions.

2. Task Organization:

a. Brigade Headquarters and Staff (Brig Gen Ellis W. Williamson Commanding) Air Force ALO/FAC Section (Operated from Bien Hoa).

b. Task Force 1/503d - Lt Col Tyler, CO
1/503d Infantry
RRU Team
FAC Team
Engr Squad
2 Vietnamese Police

c. Task Force 1/RAR - Lt Col Brumfield, CO
1st Battalion Royal Australian Regiment
Royal Australian Regiment
Royal Australian Artillery Battery
RRU Team
FAC Team
2 Vietnamese Police

d. Task Force 3/319th - Lt Col Surut, CO
A Btry 3/319th Arty
C Btry 3/319th Arty
E/17 Cavalry
D/16 Armor
RRU Team
2 Vietnamese Police

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- e. Task Force Rear
 - 2/503d Infantry
 - 173d Spt Battalion
 - 161st Artillery Battery (RNZA)
 - Admin Company
 - HHC 173d Abn Bde
 - Engr Co (-)

3. Description of Operational Area.

a. The terrain found in the 1/RAR operational area was open paddy in the vicinity of the N-S trail; their west flank. As the unit progressed easterly the paddy gave way to small hill masses seldom reaching an elevation of over 70 feet. The vegetation consisted of rice paddies on the west flank and low shrubbery became predominant as the unit moved generally east. Once the small hill masses were reached a semi-jungle vegetation was encountered. The canopy level was approximately 30 feet to 40 feet in height but open in many places. The undergrowth consisted of many low vines and entanglements but observation was good to approximately 50 meters. Cover and concealment were excellent. Fields of fire were generally poor. The critical terrain features were the hill masses which overlooked the avenues of approach and the numerous E-W trails leading into the area.

b. The terrain in the 1/503d operational area consisted of low paddy initially but as the unit progressed N and NW small hill masses became prominent. These hill masses seldom exceeded 70 feet in height. The vegetation found on the LZ was tall grass/reeds reaching a height of 6 to 10 feet. As the unit moved generally W and NW a semi-jungle vegetation was encountered. The vegetation consisted of thick undergrowth in the vicinity of the stream beds, however, as the streams were crossed the undergrowth became sparse. The canopy was thick, almost without openings and the first canopy reached a height of 40 to 50 feet. While a second canopy was 250 feet high. Observation was good up to approximately 50 meters when maneuvering away from the stream beds. Vegetation within the stream beds limited observation to 5 to 10 meters. Cover and concealment were excellent and fields of fire generally poor. The small hill masses were considered critical terrain because they overlooked the avenues of approach into the area. Numerous E-W trails led from the hill masses to the Song Dong Nai and Song Be Rivers.

B. Summary of Operations:

1. D-Day (5 November 1965).

a. Implementation of OPORD 28-65 (Operation Hump) began at 050530H when the lead elements of TF 3/319th crossed the start point and moved by motor convoy to Position ACE (See Chart) a few kilometers south west of the operational area, and registered its batteries in preparation

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for the helicopter assaults later in the morning. The artillery position was as close to the operational area as the existing road network and surrounding terrain would permit. Because of the distance of Position ACE from the northern area of operations, one battery of Royal Australian Artillery was to be heli-lifted into a forward position in the southern TAOR (tactical area of responsibility) after the First Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment had secured the area.

b. The First Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, scheduled to assault LZ QUEEN from helicopters at 0800 hours and begin operations in the southern TAOR, was delayed because of heavy ground fog which obscured the landing zone area. One and one half hours later the Australians executed their landing on alternate LZ JACK with no opposition. They were preceded by a 45 minute LZ preparation by air strikes, artillery, and armed helicopter fires. They landed in three lifts of three elements each. The Australian 105mm howitzer battery followed shortly after the infantry battalion was on the ground.

c. The 1st Battalion (Airborne) 503d Infantry, also preceded by an intense LZ preparation, began the assault on LZ KING, on the north bank of the Song Dong Nai River, at 1245 hours. This landing also met no resistance on the ground; however, the helicopters were fired upon from the ground prior to landing.

d. Two long range patrols (five men each) were employed on this operation, being helilifted into the south and to the east of LZ QUEEN. They sighted and reported several groups of Viet Cong and when possible, directed air strikes against them. Both patrols were extracted by D+2 by helicopter.

e. The two battalions cleared their immediate areas during the remainder of the first day and encountered only light sniper fire. The 1/RAR sent a unit into the village of Xom Cay Xoai, north of LZ JACK. This village had figured in several previous operations. The area was found to be completely evacuated.

2. D+1 (6 November 1965).

a. TF 1/503d continued to search its sector using platoon sized patrols, operating from three Company patrol bases. Only light contact was made, with several abandoned VC Camps discovered and destroyed. Tear gas was used in a VC tunnel but no enemy were found to be present. Of particular interest was an open area, to the north of LZ KING, that was also suitable for use as an LZ. Fortified positions having excellent observation and fields of fire, had recently been prepared by the enemy around this area about thirty meters in from the woodline.

b. That portion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail just north-west of the confluence of the Song Be and Song Dong Nai Rivers, long reputed to be heavily-used Viet Cong supply route, revealed no indications of

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recent traffic. Signs of usage which had appeared in aerial photographs were actually the results of rain water erosion on the open trail.

c. TF 1/RAR pushed east and southeast against sporadic opposition from sniper fire and small groups of VC. They found several isolated enemy positions and shelters, and five enemy grenades. In the late afternoon of D+1, Company A of the 1/RAR became engaged in a fire fight with an enemy unit of unknown size. There were no friendly casualties but two VC were killed and one was wounded and captured. The prisoner was carrying a plan for an attack on an outpost in the Bien Hoa area. He revealed that he was a member of a larger force and he confirmed the plan before he died of his wounds. The rounding up and capture of this small enemy force was a fine display of teamwork. A small Australian patrol, that was being observed by an Australian pilot in a fixed wing aircraft, made first contact. The Australian artillery battery was in direct support. The US artillery batteries added to the firepower and a US Air Force controller brought in an air strike. The artillery and air fires, coupled with the movement of the small Australian patrol, forced the enemy to move into a complete Australian company that was waiting to make the capture.

3. D+2 (7 November 1965).

a. TF 1/503d moved to a battalion base position and continued to search its sector. At 070955H a VC tunnel system was located and destroyed.

b. Late on the third day of the operation the Brigade S-2 informed the 1/503d Infantry that confirmed intelligence indicated that a VC force was less than 2,000 meters to the west of the battalion. Small patrols were dispatched just before dark. They soon made contact with the enemy and were withdrawn to the battalion perimeter. As the night settled the stage was set for the climactic events of the following day.

c. TF 1/RAR continued to search its sector east of Tue Dong Nai. No contact was established with the enemy.

4. D+3 (8 November 1965).

a. On D+3 TF 1/503d fought and won a major battle. The initial contact was made as C/1/503d moved toward what intelligence reports and patrols of the previous day had indicated as a VC installation. At approximately 0800 hours the right flank platoon came upon an enemy fortified area. The enemy and our troops exchanged a large volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire. The platoon was soon joined by the remainder of the company and it became evident as the fight progressed that they had engaged a battalion-size or larger force.

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The enemy began an attempt to envelop the flanks of Company C. This fighting was frequently at eye-ball contact and hand to hand in an extremely dense jungle area. B Company was effective in securing C Company's right flank. A short time later C Company found its open flank being enveloped also. Elements of Company A were committed at this time, attacking toward the enemy's left flank. The major portion of B Company, twice broke the encirclement. Shortly after noon Company B and Company C consolidated their position and directed intense artillery fire and air strikes against the enemy. The enemy's successive assaults on B and C Company were futile, causing him severe losses. Activity slowed to sniper fire and sporadic machine gun fire in the late afternoon and evening around the perimeter of Company B and Company C. The battalion CP perimeter, approximately 1,000 meters to the east, was brushed several times throughout the night. It was later discovered that these were VC elements attempting to withdraw from the area of the battle.

b. TF 1/RAR, south of the river, after meeting no opposition during most of the day, encountered a well dug-in enemy force estimated to number 100 at approximately 1630 hours and became engaged in a heavy fire fight before the enemy broke contact.

5. D+4 (9 November 1965).

a. During the morning, the primary concern was to determine enemy locations and evacuate friendly casualties from the battle area of 8 November. Elements of 1/503d searched the battle area for any remaining VC forces and to ascertain VC casualties. Only light contact was made and a total of 391 VC bodies were counted in the immediate vicinity. The remainder of the VC force had withdrawn from the area.

b. At 091300H Recon Platoon 1/503d which was located along the river, to protect the battalion rear, was extracted independent of the main body. At 091438H extraction of the remainder of TF 1/503d began and was completed at 091845H.

c. The RAA Battery and TF 1/RAR were extracted from LZ JACK to Base Camp, closing at 091250H.

d. The 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery Task Force returned to Bien Hoa by motor convoy, though not without incident. Troop E, 17th Cavalry fired upon and sank two enemy sampans, with five persons aboard, on the Song Dong Nai River as the convoy moved back to the base camp from Position ACE.

II. CRITIQUE OF OPERATION.

A. Introduction:

1. A critique of this operation was conducted on 13 November 1965. Participating in the critique were the Commanding General, the

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Brigade Staff, Battalion, separate company commanders and representatives of all supporting elements.

2. The purpose of the critique was to identify those techniques and procedures that worked well and those that require modification or substitution in order to improve our combat effectiveness for future operations.

3. A summary of the significant items identified during the critique and proposed corrective action is as follows:

B. Operations:

1. Movement.

a. Ground movement. The ground movement of the artillery, cavalry and tank company to position ACE was conducted without incident. Movement to and from this position was conducted during darkness. Air cover and air relay were available during the moves. (Movement of the artillery during darkness was necessary in order to have the guns in position and registered in time to support the assault landing on D-Day. The return movement during darkness was necessary, since the last forces were extracted from the operational area after darkness fell, requiring the artillery to remain in position to support the extraction. After other movements were completed the artillery fired several missions on the extraction LZ's and on reported and suspected enemy locations.)

b. Airmobile Assault.

(1) Assault of LZ JACK by 1/RAR began one and a half hours later than scheduled, due to ground fog in the objective area. This LZ alternate was chosen for the assault after intelligence was received that two VC Battalions were positioned on a ridge line immediately south of primary landing zone QUEEN. This change, approximately one half hour prior to H-Hour, created no problems or confusion. Air support and artillery preparations were planned for the primary and alternate LZ's, therefore the change to the alternate LZ caused no requirement to designate new preparatory concentrations.

(2) The airmobile assault lift for 1/RAR consisted of 29 UH1D and 8 UH1B helicopters. This lift was formed into three elements, with the initial touchdown at 0930 hours and the last element to close the Battalion in the objective area landing at 1021H. A total of 671 personnel were lifted in the assault.

(3) Troops of 1/RAR were in position on the east bank of the river, to provide protection from that direction, while 1/503d landed across the river at LZ KING using the same amount of airlift. The landings at LZ KING began at 1245 and were completed at 1335, with troops committed in the assault.

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(4) Extraction of 1/503d elements began with the lift-out of the reconnaissance elements of 40 personnel at 1130 9 November from an unnamed LZ north of LZ KING. It was necessary for our elements to clear an LZ, with three helicopter capacity to extract the main force. One of the helicopters in the first element became disabled when a counter-weight became disconnected and damaged a rotor blade. This necessitated the repair of the helicopter on the LZ and reduced the capacity to two helicopters. The extraction continued at this reduced rate.

(5) Simultaneously with the extraction of 1/503d, 1/RAR extraction began from LZ JACK. Whenever helicopters were diverted to pick up personnel at LZ JACK some adjustments of the troop formation were required. These were readily made with the minimum of confusion. (This operation displayed the flexibility that is inherent in the use of helicopters to move ground forces, when directed from an aerial command and observation post. This aerial command post containing the ground commander, his army aviation and artillery representatives and Air Force ALO, provides the means to divert airlift, direct and coordinate armed helicopter, artillery and TAC airfire support as the tactical situation demands. The operation also displayed the need of the ground forces to be able to respond rapidly to changes with the minimum of confusion. To achieve this response, clear, concise and meaningful orders must be transmitted to all elements involved in the change.)

(6) The extraction of 1/503d continued until there were just enough forces remaining to secure the LZ and the disabled helicopter being repaired. When no more forces could be lifted out without risking the capture of the helicopter, the complete lift was diverted to 1/RAR. When the helicopter was repaired and capable of flying out, helicopters were again diverted from 1/RAR to complete the lift-out of the remaining 1/503d forces. A sufficient lull in the activity on the 1/503d LZ had attracted the VC to move forward and investigate the LZ area. He obviously thought that the extraction was completed. The 1/503d security elements killed several of the enemy during the extraction of its remaining elements. A door gunner on one lift helicopter was able to claim three enemy kills while sweeping the area with fire on departure of his lift. No friendly casualties or damage to helicopters was inflicted during the extraction.

(7) Several lessons were learned and proposals made for future extractions that extend into darkness:

(a) All fires in the proximity of the extraction zone must be extinguished. They can readily confuse the lift pilots as the LZ location, or be so bright as to impair their night vision.

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(b) To mark LZ's at night, railroad fuzes, or thermite grenades would be suitable as distinctive lights. The electric batons used for ground control of aircraft are also suitable for marking of the extraction force forward elements. These batons held by the lead man of each lift will enable pilots to land at the intended pick-up point. The batons can be sent into the extraction LZ with the pathfinder element. Another idea for lighting pick-up points proposed was the use of C-4 compound mixed with sawdust in a shoe polish can. This mixture burns well for an extended period; is readily available and light in weight.

(c) During any extraction it is imperative to know how many troops remain in the objective area and where they are located. During the conduct of extraction at night, this becomes even more important to preclude leaving personnel in the area and to insure that supporting artillery and airfires can be pulled in close to the perimeter.

(8) The replacement blade required for the damaged helicopter was available only in Saigon and was flown to the operational area and installed. If a longer replacement time were required a decision would have to be made to air evacuate the damaged helicopter, secure it with ground elements until it could be repaired, or destroy it. An estimate of the time required to repair a downed helicopter must be made immediately in order to determine which course of action should be taken.

c. Airlift of Artillery.

(1) The Royal Australian Artillery Battery was airlifted by helicopter to LZ JACK after that area was secured by TF 1/RAR. There was approximately a half-hour delay in lifting the initial battery into the objective area. Departure control was holding the lift until word came from the objective area, while in the objective area it was assumed that the battery would be lifted as soon as aircraft were available (Everyone must be well read into the operation).

(2) Other than the above mentioned incident the move into and out of the objective area went rapidly and efficiently. A/82d Aviation company conducted the lift. This being our own attached company, they had previously lifted this unit, and therefore had developed techniques and procedures which expedited the lift.

d. Tactical Movement in the Objective Area.

(1) Movement to contact.

(a) TF 1/RAR formed a search pattern similar to other operations. The movement by companies to get into positions

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to establish patrol bases, however, was conducted along ridge lines because the enemy was located in the low ground near sources of water and fish. Contact on two occasions by A Company was made at very close range which is not desirable but difficult to overcome in that type of terrain. Moving with a very narrow front appears to be the only assurance that the entire unit will not become engaged at a very short range before the formation is completely prepared for contact.

(b) TF 1/503d had reconnoitered and prepared by fire to their objective area the night before and on the morning of the day of contact. The enemy was there however, and contact was made at 15 to 30 meters from the enemy. Once contact is made with enemy having automatic weapons the contact forces are relatively glued to their spots and it is difficult to pull them back to allow heavy fire support to be brought to bear on enemy front line forces. Artillery and TAC Air fires brought on the enemy's rear areas after contact was made by 1/503d did not make the enemy's front line withdraw. The enemy stood his ground by getting into holes and continued to fire even while his rear area was being hit.

(c) It was proposed that on the approach march that approximately five fire teams of five men each precede the main body by 100 to 200 yards. The main body would then move to the location of the fire teams and the same pattern repeated, using the same five fire teams or different ones. In this manner the minimum of forces will be committed when contact is made, enabling the maximum freedom of maneuver for the main body. The leading echelon must be thinned out in dense terrain. Another proposed solution was to echelon columns right or left in order to keep a minimum of forces making the contact. The difficulty with such a maneuver is the inability to maintain a true formation in dense jungles. Keeping a formation is virtually impossible unless we maintain a continuous chain of eye contact from the rear man to the man in front of him.

(2) Maneuver after contact. The difficult problem for the battalion commander is to determine where all his forces are located after contact is made. He must know this before committing any more forces to movement or using his heavy fire support. The lead company, in contact with the enemy, must also be given enough time to develop the situation before a decision is made to maneuver other elements. If contact is broken by pulling back in order to get heavier fire power on the enemy forces in contact, the situation will not develop properly. It remains a choice of breaking contact or maintaining contact and maneuvering forces out of contact to hit the enemy's flank. Whenever the situation cannot be developed without excessive personnel losses it was agreed that breaking contact and striking the enemy with artillery and air, with an immediate follow up by friendly maneuvering is the most effective approach. If we can take an objective by fire power, we should do so.

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e. Unit Tactics.

(1) A significant situation in this operation was that we were not in a hurry to take an objective. We are on a time schedule when we deliver forces into an objective area and at times during the movement to contact. After contact is established the time table should be discarded and the battle should be adjusted to the pace of the local commander in contact.

(2) In the dense jungle terrain, there is always a danger that friendly forces are being maneuvered to positions where they will mask the fires of other friendly forces.

(3) It is an advantage to be able to set up a battalion base and operate from that base rather than constantly move the battalion as a whole. This procedure expedites logistical support and command and control. Heavier weapons such as 4.2 mortars can also be delivered into the base if needed. This procedure has been found to be the best way to search an area.

(4) There is a slight disadvantage to the battalion patrol base concept in that the forces that are on patrol and exposed to the enemy are thin. In a sweep-type concept with the entire battalion moving, maximum strength is immediately at hand, however, if contact is made in the sweep-type formation the enemy often avoids contact merely by moving to one side or the other.

(5) It was noted that in our tactic of the sweep and the patrol base concept, not enough use is made of blocking forces in the maneuvers. The enemy has the ability to evade our patrols under either concept unless some forces block, while the other forces move toward the blocking positions. As a substitute to using personnel, artillery or mortar fires can be used as the blocking force.

f. Use of Scout Dogs. The value of scout dogs in the operation was limited. They were used on several occasions to go through bunkers, however, no enemy was found in these bunkers. Another way the dogs were used was to help select the best route back to the base camp as the patrol was returning. It is advisable to use the same dogs and dog handlers with each unit. It was also believed that dogs working with ARVN forces on a continuous basis, as these did, and then brought into the operation to work with American Forces disrupts their sense of smell.

2. Firepower:

a. Infantry weapons.

(1) This operation was the Brigade's first battle where it appeared as if the majority of enemy casualties were caused

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by our rifle and machine gun fire, rather than by mortar, artillery and air as in other battles. Interviews with a number of individual riflemen from 1/503d after the battle, revealed that they fired anywhere from 150 to 200 rounds from their M16 rifles during the period of the fire fight. Many of those questioned attested to the fact that they saw the enemy fall after being hit by their rifle fire. Both of these facts are dramatic reversals over World War II post battle analyses.

(2) The M16 rifle performed well during the battle, with relatively few stoppages experienced. Trouble that may have been experienced can be attributed to an accumulation of carbon in the chamber. This has resulted from a lack of chamber brushes for the M16. There are none available for this weapon, therefore, field expedients must be used. Another item needed for the weapon is a ruptured cartridge extractor. Immediate action for the weapon stoppage has been found to be pouring a great amount of oil down the bore several times a day.

(3) In several instances flame throwers could have been used by 1/503d however, the problem of getting the weapon into the area in time was prohibitive. Flame thrower teams are available with the Support Battalion and are being trained in rappeling from helicopters into operational areas.

(4) Two 81mm mortar rounds were exploded in the 1/503d CP area. An investigation revealed cleat marks on tree trunks. This indicated that the rounds were hung in trees and booby trapped by jungle vine tripwires. It is recommended that tree trunks in battalion patrol and base areas be examined for cleat marks in the future.

b. Artillery.

(1) The artillery fired a total of 343 missions with 5352 rounds of 105mm Howitzer ammunition.

(2) As usual the artillery was frustrated by the many cease fires but realized that the man on the ground was king. It is frustrating to the artillery to get a prime target and not be able to fire because a friendly force is maneuvering into position and cannot give troop clearance.

(3) 1/RAR used covering fire frequently which **facilitated** maneuver.

(4) During the extraction of the forces, high angle fire could not be employed due to the location of the flight corridors and the simultaneous extraction from two LZ's.

(5) During one period communication was interrupted between the FSCC and the helicopters in the operational area. Com-

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munication from FSCC was transferred to the artillery air observer who provided information on helicopter traffic in the area and gave clearance to fire artillery. This expedient appeared to work well and may shorten the period of cease fire when helicopters are in the area of operations.

(6) It is a common practice to strike the extraction LZ periphery with artillery when the last element becomes airborne.

(7) There was never a shortage of artillery ammunition during the entire operation.

(8) One of the most significant revelations from the critique was the fact that during the height of the 1/503d engagement, which lasted four to five hours, only six artillery missions were capable of being fired in support. Of the 117 TAC Air sorties used during the operation only 36 were employed on the day of the big battle, and the majority of those were employed after the action had ceased. We must find a way to use the firepower that is at our disposal. The ground commander must, during contact, be obsessed with finding ways to employ artillery and air firepower to assist his forces. On occasions it may be necessary to stop everything in order to carefully adjust artillery fire to place it exactly where its needed. Walk the fire into where you want it. The same can be done with air support. We must use bombs and bullets instead of bodies.

(9) A recurring problem is for the man on the ground to identify his location. Adjustment by calling-in phosphorus rounds to a position is time consuming. Marking rounds for the M-79 are urgently needed. A marker that will designate to the man in the air and to the man on the ground the same location, is needed.

c. Armed Helicopters.

(1) As indicated above, a marking round in the form of a smoke streamer is needed to identify the location of forward ground elements for the armed helicopters in order to provide closer supporting suppressive fires.

(2) The armed helicopters performed exceptionally well in support of the airmobile assault landings, escort of lift helicopters and during the extraction phase. They are also extremely fine reconnaissance vehicles.

d. Tactical Air.

(1) Worthy of note was the flexibility and accuracy of the tactical air preparation. When it was decided on short notice to both delay the initial landing and then to use the alternate LZ (LZ JACK), the tactical air reacted quickly and efficiently. At the last minute an intelligence report indicated that a large enemy force

12
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was just south of the primary LZ. The twelve USAF planes that were aloft for the LZ preparation were called down on the reported force. Twelve more planes were called up from ground alert and the preparation on the alternate LZ was completed in accordance with the revised schedule.

(2) The following tactical air missions were employed to support this operation:

- (a) 5 November 65 - 46 Sorties
- (b) 6 November 65 - 10 Sorties
- (c) 7 November 65 - 10 Sorties
- (d) 8 November 65 - 35 Sorties
- (e) 9 November 65 - 16 Sorties

TOTAL: 117 Sorties

Total ordnance expended - 158.5 tons.

(3) The concept of attaching a FAC, a radio operator, and a radio maintenance technician to each infantry battalion has proven effective. The functions of the ground FAC are to provide close air support to the infantry battalion commander by assisting the airborne FAC in the control of direction of strike aircraft and to advise the ground commander in the planning and execution of tactical air support. This advice is often the FAC's most important function. Communication between the ground and airborne FAC has increased tactical air response and has enhanced friendly troop safety from TAC air fires.

(4) The air preparation of LZ KING for the assault consisted of napalm. Bombs could not be used because 1/RAR was located immediately across the river.

(5) All commanders were unanimous in their praise for the responsive and accurate TAC air support received during the operation.

(6) There was a certain amount of confusion in obtaining and directing AF rescue helicopters for the evacuation of casualties. Request for Air Force helicopters should be treated the same as an immediate tactical air request. The request goes from the ALO to the DASC, is scrambled, and picked up by the requesting ALO. (The Air Force H-43 has a 200 foot cable hoist that can be used to extract casualties from jungle areas where there is no LZ, if the trees are not too tall.)

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C. Logistics:

1. Preparation of landing zones in jungle terrain. A formidable task confronted 1/503; to cut a hole into the jungle to enable medical evacuation helicopters to land. Movement of friendly wounded and dead to a suitable LZ was impractical in the dense terrain. The hacking-out of an evacuation LZ began on the afternoon of 8 November and was completed on 9 November. One helicopter (with extraordinary skill on the part of the pilot) could descend vertically for 250 feet in an 80 foot diameter space to pick up casualties. The task of cutting large trees was difficult, because of inexperienced personnel, even with the use of chain saws. Seven chain saws were lowered to the ground the evening before the evacuation and work progressed most of the night. It is interesting to note that accompanying the 1st Battalion was a civilian photographer (making a documentary film) who had spent 15 years as a lumberjack. He immediately offered his services to help cut trees. His efforts produced almost five times the results of any other person. He knew what he was doing and therefore obtained better results. It was recommended that a special team be trained in cutting LZ's in the jungle. This team would have available the necessary equipment and during operations be on-call to rappel from helicopters into the proposed LZ area. It is anticipated that a team would consist of eight members. Experiments will also be conducted by this team on the use of explosives for clearing LZ's. Power augers must be obtained to place explosives in the wood.

2. After the casualties were evacuated 1/503d moved to an area which afforded a better extraction LZ. When this area was selected, work was begun to improve its size to enable three helicopters to land simultaneously. It is worthy to note that from an airborne helicopter direction can be given to the personnel on the ground as to which trees or brush constitute the obstacles to landing. A smoke grenade dropped on these locations marks the specific area requiring additional clearance. It was determined that the construction of an oval shaped LZ was the most efficient design, however, each pilot that comes into the area for the first time must be specifically informed as to where to place his tail boom.

3. The dense jungle canopy made evacuation of casualties from the 1/503d area virtually impossible on the 8th. Well off to the flank of the perimeter, where there were two casualties, it was discovered that the jungle canopy was not as high as in most other areas. An Air Force H-43 helicopter with a 200 foot lowering cable was used to evacuate these two men. During that night and early morning of 9 November all men worked quite hard to make a helicopter landing zone for casualties to be evacuated. Seven power saws were lowered into the area and some trees 250 feet high and up to six feet in diameter were cut down. A funnel 250 feet deep and approximately 80 feet in diameter was cut into the jungle for casualty evacuation. It took great skill and daring for our Army and Air Force helicopter pilots

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to maneuver their planes in such a restricted area. Each casualty and all equipment that was not needed for the remainder of the operation was evacuated through this "Helicopter Funnel."

4. The supply lift consisted of 112 helicopter sorties during the operation. There was a three-hour delay but this had no effect on supply availability to committed forces.

5. It was recognized early after the Australian artillery battery was heli-lifted into the objective area that they required some form of transport to haul ammunition. The LOLEX parachute drop did not always place the ammunition exactly at the gun positions. A mechanical mule (M274) was lifted to them to alleviate this problem.

D. Intelligence:

1. The two-way Intelligence/Admin/Log net employed during the operation functioned well. The command emphasis on the need to keep information flowing to the rear was evident.

2. A weapon that was captured a great distance from the main battle area was turned in to the Brigade S-2 a couple of days after the operation. It was determined from the type of weapon captured that the unit encountered was another main force unit. Emphasis must be placed on turning in captured equipment immediately for identification.

3. Our long range patrols were launched in conjunction with this operation. This was their first use in combat a great distance from the main force. They made several sightings and gained valuable experience by testing operational procedures.

4. Sufficient cameras are being obtained to provide each company size unit a camera for intelligence purposes. Recording of what we see for later study is important.

E. Command, Control and Communication:

1. Care must be taken that rumors are not started and spread during the heat of battle. There were several instances where personnel received partial and distorted information and passed it on with further magnification. No harm came of these incidents, however, this has a potential danger. Newspaper correspondents may not be desirous of checking the validity of the information before disseminating it.

2. Experience has shown that in requesting a Tactical area of operational responsibilities for a specific operation it must be larger than the area of maneuver. It must encompass the area on the periphery of the intended maneuver area to include those areas from which action may be generated. We must not restrict our fires outside the maneuver area.

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F. Civic Action: While TF 3/319th occupied position ACE it conducted certain civic action activities in the villages on its periphery. A doctor and MEDCAP team treated 258 civilians and a dentist extracted 27 teeth. Seven hundred and fifty pounds of food stuffs were distributed to needy civilian families.

III. SUMMARY.

A. On 8 November 1965 a main line enemy force was destroyed with its few survivors being forced to flee into the jungle leaving their dead and equipment behind. Intelligence reports indicated that in the area of the 1st Battalion 503d Infantry a main line VC Force of three battalions had been soundly defeated. The enemy killed came to 403 by body count. This was the largest kill, by the smallest unit, in the shortest time in the war in Vietnam to date. Heavily engaged by overwhelming numbers, 1st Battalion 503d Infantry, proved the superiority of the American Paratrooper beyond any question of doubt. They decisively defeated a determined and numerically superior enemy force despite all handicaps.

B. There were many things done correctly which are taken as normal which have not been mentioned in the critique. There are, however, many procedures and techniques that we must improve to achieve greater combat effectiveness.

C. It is characteristic of this war that while the battle raged, the supporting artillery for the operation was engaged in civic action operations in an attempt to win the people of these villages for the GVN.


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OPORD 21-65 (OPERATION HUMP)

Reference: Maps, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L701, Sheets 6344 I, 6344 II,
6344 III

1. SITUATION:

a. Enemy: Annex B - Intelligence

b. Friendly:

(1) 173d Abn Bde (Sep) conducts search and destroy operations in TAOR 28-65 during period 5-10 Nov 65.

(2) TF 1/RAR conducts airmobile assault on LZ QUEEN commencing 0800 hrs D-Day and conducts search and destroy operations in sector.

(3) TF 3/319 moves fire support base on D-Day to Psn ACE and provides direct support fires in TAOR thru D+5. (Annex D, Fire Support Plan)

(4) Special Forces conduct operations to the NE and along banks of DONG NAI and SONG BE rivers commencing D+1.

(5) 145th Avn Bn provides helicopter support.

c. Attachments and Detachments:

Attached: Engr Squad
RRU Team
Two RVN Policemen

2. MISSION: TF 1/503 conducts airmobile assault into LZ KING commencing 1115 hrs, D-Day and conducts search and destroy operations in sector (Annex A, Operations Overlay).

3. EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operation: TF 1/503 conducts operation in five phases:

(1) Phase I - TF 1/503 conducts airmobile assault into LZ KING on D-Day in three lifts (Annex C, Air Movement).

(2) Phase II - TF 1/503 secures OBJ 1 and conducts search and destroy operations thru D+1 in areas A1, B1 and C1.

(3) Phase III - TF 1/503 secures OBJ 2 on D+2 and conducts search and destroy operations thru D+3 in areas A3, B3 and C3. (Alt Plan: secure OBJ 3 and conduct operations in areas A2, B2 and C2 during same time frame).

(4) Phase IV - TF 1/503 secures OBJ 4 on D+4 and conducts search and destroy operations thru D+5 in areas A5, B5 and C5. (Alt Plan: secure OBJ 5 and conduct operations in areas A4, B4 and C4 during same time frame).

(5) Phase V - TF 1/503 secures LZ RED on D+5 and extracts by helicopter to BIEN HOA (Alt Plan: secure and extract from LZ BLUE).

b. A1/503 - Attached: Arty FO Tm
Engr Demo Tm
One RVN Policeman

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- (1) Land in 1st lift and secure LZ KING.
- (2) Revert to Bn res and follow Co B to OBJ 1 on order.
- (3) Conduct search and destroy operations in area A1.
- (4) Be prepared to conduct search and destroy operations in areas A2, A3, A4 and A5 on order.

c. BL/503 - Attached: Arty FO Tm
Engr Demo Tm
One RVN Policeman

- (1) Land in 3rd lift and assemble in right portion of LZ KING.
- (2) Secure right half of OBJ 1 on order.
- (3) Conduct search and destroy operations in area B1.
- (4) Be prepared to conduct search and destroy operations in areas B2, B3, B4 and B5 on order.

d. C1/503 - Attached: Arty FO Tm
Engr Demo Tm

- (1) Land in 2nd lift and assemble in left portion of LZ KING.
- (2) Secure left half of OBJ 1 on order.
- (3) Conduct search and destroy operations in area C1.
- (4) Be prepared to conduct search and destroy operations in areas C2, C3, C4 and C5 on order.

e. Recon Plat (+) - Attached: Arty FO Tm

- (1) Land in 1st lift and assemble in right half of LZ KING.
- (2) On order conduct reconnaissance along western bank of SONG DONG NAI and SONG BE and establish contact with Special Forces personnel.

f. HHC (-):

- (1) Provide composite plat to land in 3rd lift on LZ KING and provide CP security.
- (2) Company (-) conduct defense of Bn rear and continue current missions.

g. Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) Units will deploy in normal D-Zone configuration.
- (2) Curfew on DONG NAI River 1900 to 0600 hrs, all traffic regardless of time on SONG BE River assumed to be Viet Cong.
- (3) Authorization for employment of tear gas during this operation under control of Bn CO.
- (4) Attachments effective 041800H Nov 65.
- (5) Special Demo Tm (Spt Bn) available on call.

(2)

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(6) The following numerical challenges and passwords will be used in the operational area only:

<u>EFFECTIVE DATE/TIME</u>	<u>CHALLENGE</u>	<u>PASSWORD</u>
051800 to 061800	6	2
061800 to 071800	4	8
071800 to 081800	7	9
081800 to 091800	5	3
091800 to 101800	9	6

(7) The following Points of Origin will be used during effective time only:

<u>EFFECTIVE DATE/TIME</u>	<u>POINTS OF ORIGIN</u>	
041800 - 051800	CAR = 1226	COUNTRY = 1426
051800 - 061800	RIVER = 1327	DOG = 1427
061800 - 071800	COLOR = 1526	FRUIT = 1428
071800 - 081800	TREE = 1228	MONTH = 1627
081800 - 091800	DAY OF WEEK = 1524	GIRL = 1028
091800 - 101800	BOY = 1724	HOLIDAY = 1329

(8) D-Day tentatively 5 Nov 1965.

(9) Annex D, Fire Support Plan.

(10) Annex F, Sequence of Events

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: Annex E (Administration and Logistics)

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Signal:

(1) Current SOI in effect

(2) Wire will be utilized in Bn perimeter positions

(3) Call signs of Special Forces element: Harvest Night Barber

b. Command:

(1) Bn CO initially with Co C.

(2) Bn Cmd Gp organization as shown in Appendix 1 (Air Loading Table) to Annex C (Air Movement).

Acknowledge.

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Annexes:

A - Operations Overlay

B - Intelligence

C - Air Movement

D - Fire Support Plan

E - Administration and Logistics

F - Sequence of Events

G-Y Not Used

Z - Distribution

Distribution: Annex Z (Distribution)


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Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 21-65

Reference: Map 1:50,000 Series L701 Sheet 6344II

1. (C) SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION: The area surrounding the junction of the Song Be and Dong Nai Rivers has been considered a strong-hold of the VC. Two main force units, Q762 Regiment and D800 Bn, have their home bases in the area. The area is considered to be a major point in the communications route between War Zone "C" and War Zone "D". It is also an important point on the supply route between Phuoc Tuy, Long Khanh and "D" Zone. During the months of June, July, and August, it appeared that units previously located in the area had relocated elsewhere. In September, an increase of activity was noted, including numerous reports on units in the area and increased SPAR activity. It is generally accepted that three battalions are operating in, and immediately contiguous to the TAOR. These are the Binh Duong Province Mobile Bn, the old Phuoc Thanh Provincial Bn, and an unidentified battalion formed from units of district level companies. The area of operations could be affected by Regiment 302 also known as the 5th, believed to be in the Long Khanh Province, and by the Dong Nai Regiment believed to be in Phuoc Tuy Province.

2. (C) EEI and OTHER INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS:

a. EEI

(1) What is the location, disposition, and strength of Viet Cong forces in the area?

(2) What is the identity of VC forces in the area?

(3) What are the VC intentions?

b. Other Intelligence Requirements:

(1) Are there FAVN or Chinese forces in the area?

(2) Does the VC have AA weapons in the area?

(3) What are the location of VC caches and supply points?

(4) Does the VC have artillery in the area?

(5) To what extent has the VC been using the Dong Nai and Song Be rivers.

3. (C) ORDERS AND REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION: All units will report immediately upon contacting VC or VC installations. The key word S-A-L-U-T-E will be used to insure complete reports. This information will be passed on the Brigade Intel/Log Net.

4. (C) MISCELLANEOUS: Combination (VCC/document/equipment) tags will be issued down to squad level to insure proper tagging. Replacement tags are available at Bn S2.

a. Viet Cong Captives: All Viet Cong Captives (VCC) will be properly tagged, blindfolded and evacuated to the Viet Cong Captive Collection Point (VCCCP) by the most expeditious means.

(1) If assistance is required to evacuate VCC, request same on Brigade Intel/Log Net.

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Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 21-65

(2) VCC will be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention and the Rules of Land Warfare.

(3) If the VCC was armed at time of capture, be certain to state this fact under "circumstances of capture" on the VCC tag.

(4) Any documents found on a VCC will be properly tagged and evacuated with the VCC guard.

b. Captured Documents:

(1) Documents will be kept segregated as to place of capture, securely bound or sacked, properly tagged and evacuated by the most expeditious means.

(2) Documents taken from VC KIA will be kept segregated by individual. The fact that documents came from VC KIA will be recorded on tag under "circumstances of capture".

c. Captured Equipment:

(1) All captured material that can be evacuated will be sent by the most expeditious means to the VCCCP. Material too cumbersome to be evacuated will be photographed and destroyed in place.

(2) Captured munitions larger than small arms ammunition will be photographed in place. Samples of unusual munitions will be rendered safe, tagged and evacuated to the VCCCP. The remaining items will be destroyed in place.

(3) Captured weapons will be tagged and evacuated to Brigade S2. All captured weapons will be turned into the Brigade S2 NLT four hours after a unit closes back to Bien Hoa.

d. Intelligence attachments: Detachment 1, 3rd RRU will attach one back pack team to the 1/503d.

e. Photography: Exposed film will be sent to the Brigade S2 as soon as a roll is exposed. All film, regardless of the amount exposed will be turned-in to the Bn S2 NLT four hours after a unit closes back to Bien Hoa.

f. Escape and evasion: The lines of drift toward the junction of the Dong Nai and Song Be Rivers should be followed.

Acknowledge:

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2 Appendices
1 Imagery Interpretation Report
2 Intelligence Overlay

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Appendix 1 (Imagery Interpretation Report) to ANNEX B

(Intelligence) to OPORD 21-65

The following items were detected by interpretation of aerial photography taken on 10 Oct 65 of the area of operation.

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
1	YT111308	3 possible foxholes
2	YT117304	2 possible emplacements
3	YT134306	Possible trench system
4	YT131269	Bridge is in bad condition
5	YT103237	ARVN outpost
6	YT128260	Road cut
7	YT105246 to YT122256	Trench work, bunkers and foxholes

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
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Appendix 2 (Intelligence Overlay) to ANNEX B
(Intelligence) to OPOED 21-65



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Annex C (Air Movement) to OPORD 21-65

References: See OPORD 21-65

1. SITUATION: See OPORD 21-65

2. MISSION: See OPORD 21-65

3. EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Air Operation: TF 1/503d conducts airmobile assault on LZ KING commencing 051045H Nov 65 utilizing twenty-nine (29) UH-1D and eight (8) UH-1B Helicopters.

b. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Staging area for TF 1/503d will be snake pit at BIEN HOA AB.

(2) Load time for initial lift TBA.

(3) Sequence of assault landing: See Appendix 1.

(4) Aircraft Loads:

(a) UH-1D will carry 6 troops or 1,500 lbs; UH-1B will carry 5 troops or 1,000 lbs. Plan on 7 troops for UH-1D on 2nd lift or 2,000 lbs.

(5) Light fire teams on call thru Bde Command Net.

(6) One (1) O1-F airborne from D-Day to completion of mission for aerial FO platform and aerial radio relay.

(7) Commanders will enforce the following:

(a) Troops will not approach helicopters for loading until skids are firmly on the ground.

(b) All personnel will keep legs and arms inside the aircraft while in flight, especially during landing and takeoff.

(c) Upon landing personnel will remain seated until ordered by helicopter crew to leave aircraft.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

(a) See OPORD 21-65

(b) Helicopters are available at Bde LOC from D-Day until mission is complete.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: See OPORD 21-65.

Acknowledge.

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Appendices:

1 - Assault Air Loading Table

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Appendix 1 (Assault Airloading Table) to Annex D (Air Movement) to
 OPORD 21-65.

LIFT	ELEMENT	TYPE AIRCRAFT NO & NO	UNIT	LOAD
1	1	1-13 UH-1D	A Co	78
1	2	1-8 UH-1B	A Co	40
1	2	9-14 UH-1D	A Co	36
1	3	1-5 UH-1D	A Co	30
1	3	6 UH-1D	A Co Recon	3 3
1	3	7-10 UH-1D	Recon	24
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2	1	1-3 UH-1D	Recon	21
2	1	4-5 UH-1D	Cmd Gp #1	14
		6-13 UH-1D	C Co	56
2	2	1-8 UH-1B	C Co	40
2	2	9-14 UH-1D	C Co	42
2	3	1-8 UH-1D	C Co	56
2	3	9-10 UH-1D	B Co	14
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3	1	1-13 UH-1D	B Co	91
3	2	1-8 UH-1B	B Co	40
3	2	9-14 UH-1D	B Co	28
3	2	12 UH-1D	B Co Cmd Gp #2	5 2
3	2	13-14 UH-1D	Cmd Gp #2	14
3	3	1 UH-1D	Cmd Gp #2	7
3	3	2-6 UH-1D	Security Plat	35

COMMAND GROUP #1
 (2nd Lift, 1st Element)
 Acft #4
 CO
 RTO
 RTO
 SMaj
 Arty LO
 Arty RTO
 CO Msgr

Acft #5
 S3
 RTO (S3)
 RTO (S3)
 Arty LO NCO
 Opns Sgt
 S2
 RTO (S2 Clerk)

COMMAND GROUP #2
 (3rd Lift, 2nd Element)
 Acft #12
 WIRE TM
 WIRE TM

KIN

COMMAND GROUP #2
(3rd Lift, 2nd Element)
Acft #13
Commo Plat Sgt
292 Ant
SWBD Tm
RRU
RRU
RRU
RRU

Acft #14
XO
XO RTO
XO Msgr
SWBD Tm
WIRE TM
Commo Officer
PIO

(3rd Lift, 3rd Element)
Acft #1
S3 Air
WIRE TM Chief
WIRE TM
WIRE TM
Opns Asst (S3 Clerk)
292 Ant
Asst Opns Sgt

Acknowledge.

TYLER
Lt Col

Distribution: Annex Z, Distribution

OFFICIAL:

Mit Robert
MITCHELL
S3

KIN

KIN

Copy No _____
HQS 1ST BN (ABN) 503R INF.
GC YT 999145
031500 H NOV 1965

APP 1 TO
ANNEXD (FIRE SUPPORT PLAN) to Opord 21-65

	08	37	38	39				
32		35	34	33	32	31	30	
		24	25	26	27	28	29	
		23	<u>36</u>	22	21	20	19	
		13	14	15	16	17	18	
		12	11	10	9	8	7	
		1	2	3	4	5	6	
								20
								20

Acknowledge

OFFICIAL

MITCHELL
S-3

TYLER
LT COL

KIN

K I N

Copy NO. _____
1st Bn (Abn), 503d Inf
Bien Hoa, Vietnam
031700 Nov 65

Annex E (Administration and Logistics) to OPORD 21-65

Reference: Same as OPORD 21-65

Time Zone: Hotel

1. GENERAL:

a. This annex provides for the logistical and administrative support of the 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Inf for OPORD 21-65.

b. LOC operated in vicinity of Pierson Field.

c. Request for resupplies will be to LOC, utilizing "Firefly" code on Brigade Admin frequency.

d. Unit distribution for all classes of supplies.

2. MATERIAL AND SERVICES:

a. Supply.

(1) Class I.

(a) "A" rations for breakfast on "D" Day.

(b) Units deploy with three (3) meals class "C" rations.

(c) Class "A" rations for rear detachment.

(d) Ration cycle is Noon meal, Evening meal, Breakfast.

(2) Class II & IV.

(a) Units deploy with TO&E as required.

(b) Units deploy with two (2) BA 386 per radio.

(c) Personnel deploy with fuel ration tablets, water purification tablets, foot powder, insect repellent and salt tablets as required.

(3) Class V. Initial load as prescribed by unit commanders.

(4) Water.

(a) Every effort will be made to use natural water sources.

(b) Units deploy with full canteens.

b. Transportation: Transportation for movement to air base for chopper lift TBA.

K I N

K I N

Annex E to OPORD 21-65 (Con't)

3. MEDICAL SUPPORT:

- a. Normal Aidmen attached.
- b. Normal helicopter evacuation (Hickory Smoke)

4. MISCELLANEOUS:


- a. Units submit to S4 within 4 days of termination of exercise Class II and IV expenditures.
- b. Units will insure that pistols Caliber .45 M1911A1 are tied to the individual to preclude loss.
- c. When weapons or other serial numbered items are evacuated through medical channels units will record time, date and tail number of aircraft for future reference.

Acknowledge:

TYLER
Lt Col

DISTRIBUTION: Same as OPORD 21-65.

OFFICIAL:


SHARBER
S4

K I N

K I N

Copy No _____
Hqs, 1st Bn (Abn), 503d Inf
GC YT 990145
032000H November 1965
HUH

Annex F (Sequence of Events) to OPORD 21-65

References: Same as OPORD 21-65

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1	0940	1st lift departs Bn area
2	1030-1100	TAC Air preparation on LZ KING
3	1025	2nd lift departs Bn area
4	1045	1st lift loads helicopter
5	1100-1110	Arty preparation on LZ KING
6	1110-1115	Armed Helicopter preparation on LZ KING
7	1110	3rd lift departs Bn area
8	1115	1st lift lands LZ KING
10	1140	2nd lift lands LZ KING
11	1150	3rd lift loads helicopters
12	1205	3rd lift lands LZ KING
13	D-Day to D+5	Search and destroy operations

Acknowledge.

TYLER
Lt Col

Distribution: Annex Z, Distribution

OFFICIAL:

Mitchell
For MITCHELL
S3

K I N

F-1

KIN

Copy No _____
Hqs, 1st Bn (Abn), 503d Inf
GC YT 999145
032000H November 1965
HUH

Annex Z, (Distribution) to OPORD 21-65

References: Same as OPORD 21-65

DISTRIBUTION

UNIT/ORGANIZATION

COPY NO

TF 1/503	
CO	1
XO	2
S1	3
S2	4
S3	5-6
S4	7-8
HHC	9-10
Co A	11-12
Co B	13-14
Co C	15-16
Recon Plat	17
Med Plat	18
Commo Off	19
Arty LO	20
173d Abn Bde (Sep), S3	21-22
3rd Bn (Abn), 319th Arty	23-24
1/RAR	25-26
Spares	27-

Acknowledge.

TYLER
Lt Col

OFFICIAL:

J. P. Smith
Pvt. MITCHELL
S3

KIN

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No 49
Hq, 173d Airm Bde (Dep)
VO DAT, RVN
030900H Dec 65

POINTS OF ORIGIN

042000-052000	COUNTRY	YT 7050
	FISH	YT 7043
	CAT	YT 6934
	BRIDGE	YT 6825
	DOG	YT 8038
	STATE	YT 8545
052000-062000	GIRL	YT 7149
	BOY	YT 6942
	CITY	YT 7033
	ANIMAL	YT 6624
	FLOWER	YT 7937
	TREE	YT 8444
062000-072000	CAT	YT 6951
	COUNTRY	YT 7042
	FISH	YT 7034
	DOG	YT 6726
	STATE	YT 8039
	BRIDGE	YT 8645
072000-082000	CITY	YT 7151
	GIRL	YT 7142
	ANIMAL	YT 7033
	TREE	YT 6924
	BOY	YT 7939
	FLOWER	YT 8446
082000-092000	COUNTRY	YT 7051
	BRIDGE	YT 7240
	DOG	YT 6932
	STATE	YT 6826
	CAT	YT 8137
	FISH	YT 8645
092000-102000	FLOWER	YT 7248
	BOY	YT 6844
	TREE	YT 6836
	GIRL	YT 6625
	CITY	YT 8139
	ANIMAL	YT 8543
102000-112000	FISH	YT 7050
	DOG	YT 7040
	STATE	YT 7030
	CAT	YT 7024
	BRIDGE	YT 8040
	COUNTRY	YT 8544
112000-122000	GIRL	YT 7150
	BOY	YT 7241
	FLOWER	YT 6931
	TREE	YT 6823
	CITY	YT 8139
	ANIMAL	YT 8644

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POINTS OF ORIGIN (CONTINUED)

12000-13000	CAT	YT 7249
	FLM	YT 6944
	COUNTRY	YT 6833
	POC	YT 6823
	STATE	YT 7838
	BRIDGE	YT 0544
13200-14000	WHEE	YT 7149
	WHEEL	YT 6943
	LOT	YT 6835
	GERL	YT 6726
	CITY	YT 8036
	WAGON	YT 8440

Admiral

WILLIAMSON
Brig Gen

HIGH COMMISSION: Annex 224

OFFICIAL

W. Williamson
MAY 1949
CS

CONFIDENTIAL

SUB - UNIT OPERATION ANALYSIS

1. Sub-unit A Coy
2. Comd Maj JB HEALY
3. Operation Name / No 14/65
4. Duration 5 - 9 Nov 65.

5. Outline of Sub-unit tasks Phase 1 3rd Coy in OOM, ^{RV to WEST.} ~~of LZ~~

Phase 2 ^{Secure} area opposite altn LZ for 1/503 by 1100hrs.

Phase 3 patrol in sectors 4, 5, 6,

Phase 4 Return through Sectors 7 and 11 to extraction LZ

6. Sequence of Events and comments

Phase 1

a No problems in the move in, despite the usual last minute changes in lifts. ~~Tea urns and~~ and ~~the~~ the set back of 11 hr.

COMMENT

i The Bn organisation seemed to work

7. Assessment of operation

well - improvement must come from higher up in the form of better info to both the aviation units and user units.

ii Tea urns and water should always be brought to the SNAKE PIT area as an SOP.

b The Coy was slightly delayed in clearing the LZ because 1 Coy were held up by some injuries suffered during their landing.

~~COMMENT~~Phase 2

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

- c The area to the WEST of the LZ was secured without incident. However the foliage along both banks of the river is such that the Coy would not have been able to assist 1/503 if they had used their altn LZ.

Phase 3

- d ~~Coy harboured in 1/501 at~~
~~the~~ Coy moved through Sector 10 towards har posn. One soldier became very sick and ~~was~~ was in great pain from what appeared to be appendicitis at GR 142259. DUST OFF was requested, and took 50 minutes to arrive.

COMMENT

If there is a delay in obtaining DUST OFF it may be possible to use POSSUM or available ATOLL to extract casualties or medevac cases.

e Coy harboured in D/D+1 at GR 153250. On the morning D+1 another soldier, ^{with a fever} was evacuated using ~~POSSUM~~. ATOLL.

ADDRESS

Quote in Reply

f On D+1 Coy patrolled through sector ~~to~~ to an RV at GR 165243. ~~2 cars were~~ ~~sup~~ 1 pl suffered 2 cars at that loc (see Incident Report) at 1600 hrs. There was no LZ in the immediate area, so SEAGULL came to the area in a UH1B and located a bomb crater with a cleared area sufficient to allow lift out by winch. He gave distance and bearing to the area of the crater, which was 200 m from the harbour. At this time 2 pl and 3 pl reached the loc, and there was a further contact with 3 VC being killed (see 1 pl

and 3pl contact Reports) 2 pl were
 guided to the crater by SEAGULL and
 secured the area, and 1pl carried
 down the two cas, who were evacuated
 by H43 HUSKY helicopters using winches.

This task was completed at 1835hrs.
~~On~~ ^{During} the return to the harbour there
 was a burst of firing in the area
 of the clearing but no VC were seen.

COMMENT

~~On~~ The extraction of the
 cas was greatly ~~assisted~~ ^{facilitated} by the
 presence of SEAGULL and then SUNRAY
 in the air, providing assistance
 in navigation, communications and
 liaison with the HUSKIES.

Resupply was taken in the same
 position on the morning of D+2.
 Rations and ammo were free dropped
 into the position and all were

recovered. Of the three parachute loads of water, only one was recovered - the second one was seen in the air but could not be found; the third was not seen at all.

COMMENT

The position was marked by a marker balloon, which was blown down by the first helicopter pass, so the pilots could then not be sure of the exact location. Free dropping from a hovering helicopter is far more accurate than parachuting, and should be used for preference. A simple method of packaging jerrycans for free dropping is required.

h. The coy moved out of the position by stages from 1230 hrs on D+2, 3 pl remaining in the area in ambush until 1515 hrs.

J. The coy patrolled through sectors 8 and 9 and harboured for the night at GR 182235. The CO visited the Coy on the morning of D+3 and ~~advised~~ ordered redeployment for possible commencement of phase 4 on D+4. The coy then moved back through sectors 6 and 5 towards sector 7. The rear pl killed one VC at GR 178235 at 1030 hrs (see 3pl contact report)

K. The leading pl crossed the creek at GR 168235 and found themselves in an area well used by VC. They were fired on by one VC (see 2pl contact report) Two more VC approached the area along the creek and were killed by 1pl (see 1pl contact report)

1 The coy redeployed in this area and started up the ridge line on the same bearing with ~~one~~ 1pl leading. The leading section was just approaching the top of the ridge at GR 165234 when they were heavily engaged by 3 machine guns plus ~~the~~ rifles and grenades from a dug in posn on the ridge (see contact report). They^{pl} received 5 casualties in two or three minutes, which reduced their strength to 14 men. Sp Sec was sent forward to assist them, and 3pl was directed to move up onto the ridge to the left and sweep through the en posn from SOUTH to NORTH. At this time 3pl killed two VC who approached their posn. 3pl manoeuvred into position and began the sweep in the face of increasingly heavy fire (see 3pl contact report)

The pl was unable to move forward and the enemy began working around their left flank and rear.

The pl had one casualty whom they were unable to recover, and they were ordered to return down the hill which they did with great difficulty. 1 pl, who were also unable to recover one of their casualties, were then ordered to break contact and move back.

j 2 pl had been given the task of securing and clearing an area for ~~evac~~ caserac by which. The Coy was redeployed in this loc, approximately 120 metres down the hill from the en posn. The time was now 1830 hrs, and there was

some doubt as to whether the helicopters would arrive, so the decision was made to withdraw to the NORTH and harbour for the night. The Coy moved to a position at GR 167237 and formed a harbour there at 1930 hrs. Armed helicopters attacked the ~~area~~ en position when the Coy cleared the immediate area, and artillery fire was directed on the position and along the ridge line.

COMMENT

- i From the volume of fire and the size of the en position it is estimated that it was occupied by one Coy.
- ii Once again the command helicopter in the air proved invaluable in assisting with communications

iii

The arky fire was extremely accurate and directed with great skill by the opo. It was not possible to use PYTHON at the time because of the closeness of the contact. PYTHON hit the area the next morning, but it seems probable that the VC would have moved by then.

m On the morning of D+3/4 the coy moved at 0625 hrs to the clearing at GR 167244, being guided into the area by SEAGULL in a helicopter. The area was secured at 1030 hrs and the casualties were lifted out by 1443 helicopters. The coy then moved through area 4 past B Coy's posn, and on receipt of new orders continued on to LZ PRINCESS, arriving at 1635 hrs.

n. The extraction commenced at 1715 hrs and the last elements of A Coy were clear by 1800 hrs.

7. Assessment of Operation

- a. Once again it was proved that the group which is stationary has the advantage in jungle. 7 of the VC killed ~~one~~ walked into some element of the Coy that was stationary at the time of the contact.
- b. The M60 proved its worth ~~on~~ during this op ~~this occasion~~. 5 VC were killed by M60 fire; ~~only~~ only one gun had trouble with stoppages, and this was after a number of belts had been fired through it during the final incident.
- c. The size of the TAOR precludes proper searching in the time available.
- d. Use of an LZ is a certain indication to the enemy that we are

in the area, and should not be used until resupply becomes necessary ~~and~~ or there has been a contact

e Security of a LZ takes at least two pls. It is of great assistance to know the exact time that resupply is coming so that the coy is not tied up unnecessarily on this task.

J. B. Walsh, Major
OC A Coy

B Coy
1 RAR
10 Nov 65.

1 RAR.

B Coy Operational Analysis 1 RAR Op 14/65

1. Comd : Maj 1 D McFARLANE.

2. Duration of Op: 5-9 Nov 65.

3. Outline of Coy tasks:

- D Day:
- Second coy in order of hel insertion.
 - On arrival LZ move div to secure Twin Knolls and East bank of Song Dong Nai opposite LZ KING.
 - Search Xóm Cây Xơai, collect villagers for interrogation and destr def works with 3 Fd Tp (-)
 - Commence search & destr ops Sector 1.

D+1 :- Complete search & destr op Sector 1.

D+2 :- Search & destr op Sector 2.

D+3 :- a. " " " " 3

~~D+4~~ :- b. Evac by hel Dog Handler att.

D+4 :- a. Move to Sector 4 as reaction force during A Coy air evac op.
b. Extract from LZ PRINCE.

4. Sequence of Events.

D Day: Coy deployed and secured high wooded ground immed to East of LZ.

4 Pl moved to high ground at GR 145264 and secured it.

5 Pl secured Twin Knolls GR 142267.

CHQ moved to Twin Knolls.

6 Pl and 3 Fd Tp remained at GR 139260.

On completion of air strike on LZ KING, 4 Pl left one section at GR 145264 and cleared North to GR 145269.

6 Pl moved fwd to South edge of Xóm Cây Xơai and commenced search.

On completion of search during which nothing of mil importance was found (the village was completely deserted and cleaned out) 3 Fd Tp was called fwd to destroy bunkers. In view of the deserted condition of village, this task was postponed and 3 Fd Tp

returned to BuHQ.

4 Pl then commenced detailed search of Sector 1, South of the main axis and 5 Pl searched North of the axis, 6 Pl moved out of the village into reserve with CTP at GR 152268.

5 Pl discovered a ~~concealed~~ ^{small VC camp} village at GR 145278 and recovered a number of docus which were bld when the CO ~~arrived~~ arrived at the CTP area by Possum.

The coy conc at GR 152268 for in harbour.

D+1. 4 Pl continued search of Sector 1, South of main axis and discovered fresh tracks of 4 pers moving South into Sector 4. Contact was estb with a pl of A Coy which fol these tracks up within Sector 4.

5 Pl continued search of Sector 1, North of main axis and discovered 4 VC camps at GR 160278, GR 153285, GR 152283, GR 155283. Docus, medical, ^{and food} sups, grenades and 1 woman and 4 children were discovered. The docus, medical sups and the woman & children were bld by hel.

6 Pl remained with CTP at har posn until 1400hrs when it secured the LZ for resupply at GR 155270.

The coy conc for har at GR 158267.

D+2. 4 Pl searched Sector 2, South of main axis and discovered a cache of 40 ^(sam bag size) rattan bags of saltpetre (still under analysis) which were dispersed and destroyed at GR 163265.

5 Pl searched Sector 2, North of main axis with particular emphasis on River bank, without success. ^{Visual} Contact was estb with Special Forces on North bank.

6 Pl cleared both sides of main axis the road, the coy conc for in har at GR 183254

D+3. 4 Pl fol an East/West trail from GR 188246 which ~~led~~ led onto the main trail at GR 162255. A number of small trails led off this trail to

both North and South without success.

5 Pl, 6 Pl & CHQ followed up trails leading West South of 4 Pls route. These trails died out and this force then moved to join 4 Pl at GR 162 255.

An LZ was secured and prep at GR 153 255 for the extraction of the dog handler and his dog, however a shortage of hel prevented this from taking place and the coy har for ni at GR 157 258. As the coy left the LZ, a salvo of mor bombs fell on it - origin of these rounds could not be found. ~~through~~ The coy dug in for the ni. Ambush was laid just north of the LZ without result.

D+4.

The coy moved at first light to GR 162 248 in anticipation of reaction tasks connected with A Coy ~~evacs~~ ^{cas} evacs.

~~The coy~~ After A Coy cleared the area, the coy returned to LZ PRINCE for extraction.

Comments.

a. It was hard to assess the value of the dog as it was not possible to get from his handler what he was trained for. He was used as both tracker and patrol but because no VC were encountered it is not possible to assess his value in either of these roles. It is considered however that the potential of these dogs is considerable and I would seek to take dogs in future on the basis of 1 per pl. The dog however suffered considerably from leech bites in what was the most heavily leech infested country encountered in this country.

b. It is requested that every effort be made to obtain Aust 24 hour rat packs. On this op, my company carried 3 days rats after the resupply so that our presence in what was anticipated to be well occupied areas could remain concealed. These 3 days of rats filled

The 1937 pad pack completely and made movement through this particularly dense scrub extremely slow and tiring. Much of the food is palatable only to a hungry man and is not suited to hot, dry conditions. The incidence of skin complaints ~~of~~ amongst troops eating these rations, compared to what seems to be ~~be~~ a much lower incidence amongst troops in similar climatic conditions in Malaya eating Ausd rats is a subject worthy of detailed investigation.

P. H. Taylor Maj.

SUB - UNIT OPERATION ANALYSIS

1. Sub-unit *C Coy*
2. Comd *Maj S. LATHAM*
3. Operation Name / No *14/65*
4. Duration *5.9 Nov 65*
5. Outline of Sub-unit tasks
 - a. Secure gun posn and protection of 105 Tol Bty
 - b. Patrol sees 10-11-12

6. Sequence of Events and comments

EVENT	COMMENTS
<p><u>5 Nov</u></p> <p>a. Bty and Coy secure Gp moved into gun pos from LZ and sighted gun posn</p> <p>b. Coy moved in and secured area</p> <p>7. Assessment of operation</p>	<p>a. Due to change of LZ the recon gp was on the ground with little or no protection. Bty and Coy recon gps did not mov until first elements of C Coy arrived on LZ</p> <p>b. Gun posn and Coy layout for defence went smoothly - This was helped to a great extent by the study of air photos beforehand.</p>
<p><u>6-8 Nov</u></p> <p>a. AT in sees 10-11-12 and protected elms of 3 Tol Tp whilst on amb work in the village Xom Can Xoon</p> <p>b. Close protection of 105 Tol Bty by night</p>	<p>a. After a report from Sn HQ that helicopters were being fired at from approximately GR 146257 a pl was dispatched to clear the area. 9 pl contacted 4 VC at GR 148258 - See contact report by LT 104705</p> <p>b. Three attempts were made to penetrate the gun posn - the guns were fired over open sights on two occasions and this method of fire support for close protection of the gun posn would achieve good results if the VC could be definitely pinpointed. See contact report by Cpl CORRISS (8 pl) for action carried out against one VC who penetrated area between C Coy and Sn HQ.</p>

FINDS	COMMENTS
<p>9 Nov a. Extraction from LZ P. K. W. (By night)</p>	<p>a. Although somewhat confusing^{ed} at times the coy eventually were extracted b. It is felt that more use of the radios could have been made to con the final elements for the extraction</p>

7. Assessment of operation.

After initial settling in woods, the defense procedure with the 105 let the work proceed smoothly and valuable experience was gained both by the coy and the Bty.

Weapon malfunctions are costing the coy opportunities to kill the VC - closer attention must be paid to condition of weapon and ammo before patrolling commences each day

William May
11 Nov 65

1RAR

SUB-UNIT OPERATION ANALYSIS

1. Sub Unit D Coy 1RAR
 2. Comd OC D Coy Capt D P. ROTHWELL

Pl Comds:-

- 10 Pl 2 Lt LINB
 11 Pl Lt GILES
 12 Pl 2 Lt BOURKE

3. Op Name Number 14/65

4. Duration 5-9 Nov 65.

5. Outline of Subunit tasks

a 5-10 Nov 65 See 1RAR Operations Order 14/65 dated 3 Nov 65

b 7 Nov 65 received verbal orders change of phase 4 of operation which concluded the operation one day early.

6. Sequence of Events and Comments

Serial	Date/time	Event	Comment
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	05 0640 05 0700	Road movement to SNAKE PIT Phase one	a Went smoothly received wardog and handler at SNAKE PIT.
2	05 0930 05 0945	a Heli movement to Alternate LZ b movement off LZ to the WEST to move to secure ridge line SOUTH of LZ QUEEN.	a a) D Coy arrived as a group and moved quickly off the LZ. (1) one soldier twisted his ankle and could NOT walk. (2) this presented a problem as the helicopters had departed and the D Coy had to remain in location until the soldier could be evacuated on the helicopters which brought in B Coy (3) When the soldier was evacuated D Coy moved NORTH WEST then SOUTHWEST towards the SƯỜI BÀ GIÁ. b) During the move it was noticed that the pre assault Air and Artillery had produced excellent results along the EAST bank of the SÔNG ĐÔNG NAI

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
			<p>c the move to the SŨI BA BÊN 133255 creek was uneventful.</p> <p>d the bridge at 133255 is destroyed and is completely overgrown with bamboo.</p> <p>(1) A detailed recon was carried out to find a suitable crossing place. Because of the nature of the creek it took some considerable time to cross the obstacle.</p>
3	05 1430	Phase two completed.	<p>It was noticed that the guns of 105 Field Battery were being flown in before the ridge was secured.</p>
4	05 1830	D Coy harboured at 142 241	<p>Very effective blowdown was evident in this area from aerial bombing.</p>
5	6 Nov	Patrolling of sector 7	<p>a. Movement was noticed at 149 239 (see after action report attached)</p> <p>b. 12pl (+) during a period when they were ROUGH SPOT were only 500 meters WEST of the area where they encountered the enemy in a large concentration on 8 Nov.</p> <p>c. considerable difficulty was found in the locating of the area of secondary growth at 155 230. The air recon presented a very different picture to the terrain encountered by foot movement.</p> <p>d. D Coy harboured at 156 233.</p> <p>e. During the harbour the maintenance arrived.</p> <p>(1) With NO warning the rations were free dropped on top of the harbour in BISCUIT BOMBER fashion.</p> <p>(2) Two soldiers were hit by boxes.</p> <p>(3) In my opinion this system of delivery is dangerous and could cause fatalities.</p> <p>(4) The pilot should hover over a selected area which is clear of troops then free drop into the canopy if the area is secured.</p> <p>(5) The rations damaged amounted to 5%.</p>

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
6	7 Nov	Patrolling of sector 8	<p>a Moved to new harbour at 159 224</p> <p>b Before harbour ^{was} completed PYTHON STRIKE from 160 211 to 167 218 at 1800hrs</p> <p>(1) Strike was right on target except for two bombs which strayed about 300 meters to the NORTH WEST.</p> <p>c the two NORTHERN grid squares were searched without incident.</p> <p>d At 071730 received orders regarding change in Phase 4</p> <p>e During period at 159 224 the LZ was searched for water and rations which were dropped by mistake on 6 Nov.</p> <p>(1) Six serrucable water cans only were recovered.</p> <p>(2) It would appear that metal water cans would be more suitable for para delivery.</p> <p>(3) D Coy was informed that 42 ration boxes had been dropped at 159 224 with the water drop.</p> <p>(4) A detailed air recce and ground search failed to reveal the rations.</p> <p>f On return to BISH HOA a check with OC Adm Coy revealed that NO rations only water had been dropped at 159 224.</p>
7	8 Nov	Patrolling of sector 9	<p>a the area patrolled had some years previously been used for timber getting.</p> <p>(1) Because of this the tops of the ridges which ran with the grain of the country were tracked with wide clearly defined routes.</p> <p>(2) these tracks are NOT marked on maps.</p> <p>(3) A study of these tracks does permit planning for rapid deployment if required when the enemy are encountered.</p>

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
			<p>b. At approximately 1500 hrs 10pl(t) were in Location at 139 238.</p> <p>(1) The platoon received 106REL fire which landed 100 meters from them.</p> <p>(2) The fire which came from LZ ACE was eventually stopped by complaint to CO.</p> <p>(3) Apparently it was an honest mistake by E17 cavalry of an error of 700 Mils too far EAST ^{in sighting calculation} which could have caused casualties.</p> <p>c D Coy harboured for the Night at 137 245</p>
8	9 Nov	Extraction from LZ PRINCESS	<p>a Moved to and secured SOUTH WESTERN end of LZ PRINCESS</p> <p>b D Coy assisted with the evacuation of A Coy WIA and the preparation of 1/503 KIA for movement to CCS BIEN HOA</p> <p>c D Coy was extracted from LZ PRINCESS at approx 1600 hrs.</p>

Assessment of the Operation

The sectors allotted were adequate to be covered in the time allocated. It was a constant hazard to be operating in areas that did not afford LZ natural facilities for immediate evacuation if casualties were taken.

It is suggested that small hatchets with protective pouches be supplied for LZ clearance and that explosives be carried for the blowing of trees. A short demolition course could be held in IRAR to train two or three soldiers per platoon in demolition techniques.

Before coming to VIETNAM it was stated by IRAR that heavy bladed goloeks would be provided after arrival. The present machete is NOT suitable for hurried LZ clearance.

The gunnery of 105 Field Battery was excellent and their efforts left little to be desired with regard to close artillery support.

A standard procedure needs to be adopted for the delivery of rats by the free drop technique.

D ROTHWELL Capt
A/oc D Coy IRAR
11 Nov 65

IRAR

IRAR OPERATION 14/65 - SUB-UNIT

OPERATION ANALYSIS

1. Sub-Unit Administration Coy IRAR, working as A Echelon. Some operational attachments were made within IRAR.
2. Comd. Maj P. S. Sharp visited by Maj B. J. Harpa.
3. Operation Name / Number . 14/65.
4. Duration . 5-9 Nov 65.
5. Outline of Sub-Unit Tasks
 - a. See IRAR Operation Order 14/65 dated 3 Nov 65, paragraph 4.
 - b. Daily maintenance of IRAR Group was conducted using helicopters (Incoquin, Sioux) working direct from the Battalion Base at Bien Hoa.

6. Comments

a. Statistics

(1) Demands Received	34
Helicopter sorties flown	89
SRT Aircraft (Caribou) sorties flown	6 (arranged by Comd 173 ABde for delivery of gun ammunition)
(2) Total weight of all Resupply items	56.9 tons.

(3) Breakdown of Total Resupply Weight (lbs)

Gun Ammunition:-

By Helicopter	65925
By Casibon	25652
By	
81mm Mortar Ammunition.	5580
SAA, Grenades.	267
Water.	19206
Rations.	9194
Batteries.	411
Miscellaneous.	<u>1291</u>
Total	<u>127526 lbs.</u>

b. Grouping

(1) The administrative grouping of 105 Field Bty was not finalised until D Day. Arrangements were duplicated by A Echelon IRAR and 3/319 Arty Bn until IRAR was given sole responsibility for daily maintenance of 105 Field Bty. Administrative Grouping must be finalised as early as possible during planning to prevent any restrictions on the operational plan arising because of administrative requirements.

(2) Units/sub-units grouped with IRAR must understand that their echelons come under control of A Echelon IRAR for the duration of the operation.

c. Resupply by Parachute and Free-Drop

(1) Resupply of D Coy on D+1 and A Coy on D+2 was carried out by airdrop from helicopters. Rations were free-dropped. Water was delivered by parachute.

(2) The D Coy water was parachute-dropped in the wrong location due to pilot error. This pack was recovered the following day. One parachute failed to operate correctly and three (3) water cans were damaged.

Sixteen (16) cases of rations were not recovered.

(3) Water and rations for A Coy were parachute-dropped through a thick canopy. Results were apparently satisfactory.

(4) One parachute returned by D Coy, had the rigging lines missing. This parachute was therefore unusable. If parachutes are to be returned for further use, the canopy and rigging lines must remain intact.

d. Information. A Echelon ~~40~~ was not given accurate up-to-date information throughout the operation. This information is required for planning, particularly when aircraft forecasting is ~~demanded~~ demanded by higher headquarters.

e. Aircraft Availability

(1) Six helicopters were allotted for the immediate build-up of stocks on the ground and daily

maintenance. These aircraft were allotted on a brigade basis.

- (2) Helicopters were removed without warning for many and varied operational tasks (casualty evacuation tasks, insertion of a reserve sub-unit). Sub-unit commanders must understand that the timings they stipulate for their demand to be delivered may not be met because of the non-availability of aircraft. In any case, sub-unit commanders would be notified if alterations to a demand become necessary. Alternative delivery means would also be arranged, subject to COIRAR approval.

f. Evacuation of Gun Produce. Gun produce should be removed from the gun area by any available delivery means. This did not happen during the Operation. Opportunity loads must be continually available. Sufficient slings must be provided for the task. Where helicopters are in use, every aircraft stopping at the gun area should return produce to the Echelon area.

g. Communications. Frequency changes were made during the Operation without notification to OC A Echelon. Some confusion resulted when some helicopters on maintenance tasks D+2 could

not contact the particular companies concerned because of frequency changes.

7. Recommendation. Experience on this operation indicates a need to free drop water from airdrops. Canned water is apparently available from USA sources in 10 oz containers. An experiment in such a method of delivery is recommended to supplement the existing delivery means.

Bernard J. Hampton Maj,
OC Admin Coy.
11 Nov 65.



AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

Quote In Reply

ADDRESS

161 Recce Flt
BIEN HOA
// Nov 65

1 RAR

SUB-UNIT OPERATION ANALYSIS

Reference: Appx 3 to Annex R, 1 RAR SOP dated 14 Aug 65.


1. 161 Recce Flt.
2. Maj P D LIPSCOMBE RAASC.
3. 1 RAR OO 14/65.
4. 050700H to 092015H.
5. Provide air support to 1 RAR and 173 AB Bde (Sep) as required in conjunction with A Coy 82 Avn Bn.
6.
 - a. Hours flown:
 - (i) SIOUX 38 sorties 24.40
 - (ii) CESSNA 17 sorties 55.20
 - b. Type sorties:
 - (i) Recce;
 - (ii) Air OP;
 - (iii) RR;
 - (iv) Resup;
 - (v) Liaison; and
 - (vi) Medivac.
7. The operation was extremely successful so far as this unit was concerned as it gave valuable experience to all pilots. CESSNA cover was limited due unserviceability and lack of UHF.
8. It is anticipated these problems should be solved prior next operation.

.../2.

9.

Recommendations:

- a. That sub-units be warned where only one CESSNA available sorties are limited to 3.15 hours from take-off to landing. Time of return to the TAOR will vary from 30-40 minutes dependant on delays in ATC BIEN HOA and distance involved.
- b. Pilots have been briefed to offer RR at the earliest possible time to speed communications.
- c. That PIGEON PIE procedure be practiced in TAOR prior next operation. At present technical difficulties exist with ARC-54 (SIOUX) due lack test equipment. Procedure outlined in SOP may require revision.
- d. That application be made to increase aircraft strength to three of each type.


Maj
OC 161 Recce Flt

8. d Were VC cas disposed of by
- i Mol evac.....Time.....
 - ii Buried.....Location... *left on the spot* .
 - iii Other means.....

e. Summary of docus and kit recovered

f. Type and number of wps recovered

g. Wps identified on action

2 folding bayonet type rifles.

h. VC dress *Dark coloured civ clothing and us web belts.*

j. Summary of VC actions

There were other VC behind the 2 we shot who stated to now find on the flanks as soon as the firing started.

9. Own cas

KIA

WIA

10. Lessons learned

Phillips (3rd Comd)

11. Comments by Coy Comds

Comd.....

Coy Comd.....

Pl was unable to search bodies and recover wps because at the time of the contact they were moving to assist 1pl who were already heavily engaged.

*J. B. Mealy Maj
oc A Coy*

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation No.....
2. Report by No. 2412088 Rank EPL Name WEBSTER
3. 7 Sec 3 Pl A Coy
4. a. Time of Action 1630
b. Duration 30 secs
c. Date 8 Nov 65
d. Location 170234 168234
5. Unit / Sub-unit tasks
tail end pl in coy
6. Was it?
a. Contact YES
b. Incident.....
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence.

2 VC came down a track alongside the creek which we had just crossed. They were seen by the last 2 men of the pl who opened fire. Both were hit and fell to the ground. An ammalite mag was emptied into them and several SLR rounds. We were unable to search the bodies as coy then had a contact front and we had to mov fwd.

8. VC
a. Strength 2
b. Type of VC (Guerrilla, RF or Main Force) Mob
c. VC cas
i KIA 2
ii WIA
iii VCC

8. d. Were VC cas disposed of by
i. Hol' evac.....Time.....
ii. Buried.....YES.....Location.....165244. (also booby trapped)

iii. Other means.....

e. Summary of docs and kit recovered
Docs and kit collected by int rep consisted mainly of US webbing

f. Type and number of wps recovered

g. Wps identified on action
1 Thompson sub machine gun
1 Home made Claymore type mine + 60 feet wire and bty

h. VC dress Dark coloured civilian clothing and US web belts.

j. Summary of VC actions

9. Own cas

KIA

MIA

10. Lessons learned

MA gunners should be in a fire position at all times when the pl is halted.

C. Williams (3 Pl Comd)
Sgt

11. Comments by Coy Comds

Comd.....

Coy Comd.....

J. M. Mearns
or A. Coy

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation No.....
2. Report by No. 38175 Rank 2LT Name WILLIAMS
3.Sec 3 Pl A Coy
4. a. Time of Action 1630
b. Duration 30 secs
c. Date 6 Nov 68
d. Location 165244

5. Unit / Sub-unit tasks deployed
The pl was just waiting to enter the coy harbour posn.

6. Was it?
a. Contact YES
b. Incident.....

7. Summary of action in chronological sequence.....

3 VC had struck the other end of the coy. thinking it was only a sec size force they tried to circle the sec to have a go at its rear. This took them straight into 3 pl. 2 VC were shot by an M60, the 3rd ran off in another direction and was shot by 1 pl.

8. VC
a. Strength 3
b. Type of VC (Guerrilla, RF or Main Force) Mobile
c. VC cas
i KIA 2
ii WIA
iii VCC

(J) SUMMARY OF VC ACTION: THEY withdrew down track.

9. OWN CAS. KIA NIL
WIA 2.

10. LESSONS LEARNED. Sentries must be alert at all times and watch their front. In this case Pte McIvor and Woodward were settled into their positions when I left them and there was no reason why they should not have seen the VC first if they were doing their job.

11. Comments by Coy Comd.

The position chosen by Sgt Peterson was well concealed. The VC detected it because Pte McIvor moved. Neither soldier was looking to his front at the time, and the VC fired at the position and withdrew without casualties.

Both soldiers were idle, and were lucky not to have been more seriously injured.

J. Healy Maj
OC A Coy.

CONTACT No 1.

1. Operation No. 14/65
2. Report by 37267 Sgt Peterson Lt.
3. Acting Pl Squad 1Pl A Coy.
4. (a) Time of action 1630
(b) duration ~~2~~³ min
(c) Date 6 Nov 65.
(d) Location GR 165243.
5. Unit/Sub unit tasks. Provide standing patrol on track along ridge line
6. Was it (a) contact YES.
(b) incident NO.
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence
after the previous incident in which Pte McEwen + Woodward were wounded Ptes Webster + Diamond were placed a further five yards down the track to cover the northern approach. 3Pl had just had a contact when 1 Vc moved out on the track and Pte Diamond shot him with his rifle. ~~and~~ ~~the~~ Pte Webster then opened up with his machine gun and hit the same Vc who was trying to get up. ~~the~~
8. Vc
(a) strength 3.
(b) Type of Vc main force
(c) Vc cas

i	KIA 1 (3Pl killed other 2.)
ii	WIA. NIL.
iii	VCC. NIL.

Contact Not. Cont.

ii Buried at GR 165243.

(c) Summary of docs and kit recovered. one belt with basic pouch with 20 Rds of Rimmed 7.62

(d) Type and number of wps recovered. 1 CHI COMM. 7.62 bolt action rifle

(h) Vc Dress Black shirt & trousers.

9. Own cas KIA NIL.
WIA NIL.

10 Lessons learned

11 Comments by coy Comd.

VC did not die for 2 hrs. He was questioned and gave information to Sgt WELSH of 1RAR 2nd Sect, which indicated that there was only 3 of them in the group.

J. Stealy Maj
of A Coy.

INCIDENT No. 1.

1. Operation No. 14 of 65
2. Report by 37267 SGT. PETERSON. GH.
3. acting Lt Colud 1PL Accy.
- 4 (a) time of action 1600
 (b) Duration 15 MIN.
 (c) Date 6 Nov 65
 (d) location GR 165243.
- 5 Unit / sub-unit tasks. Provide standing patrol on track along ridge line.
6. Was it (a) contact No.
 (b) Incident YES.
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence.
 I placed Pte McIvor with an M60 and Pte Woodward with an S&R to cover the northern approach of the track and while Maj Healy and myself were inspecting the track junction ~~at~~ running South east and south covered by Pte Webster ~~with~~ with an M60, two shots were fired followed by a burst from the M60. Then Pte McIvor ~~and~~ called out that he and Pte Woodward were hit. Maj Healy who was closest to the incident told Pte McIvor to fire another burst down the track then with the second machine gun ~~we~~ we moved up to the wounded personnel and began evacuation. A clearing patrol was sent out to search both sides of the track and found nothing.
8. (a) strength 2.
 (b) Main Force
 (c) VC CAS NIL.

ASSESSMENT OF OPERATION

7. The operation was considered successful from the gunners view.
Items of major interest are:

- (a). (1) Number of missions fired 90
(2) Number of rounds expended 1396

(b). LOLEX resup of ammo .

This has certain disadvantages already discussed. With the addition of 2x MOLES to the establishment most of these disadvantages may disappear. Helicopter slung loads still remain first priority.

(c). Movement by Helicopter.


Certain new techniques in movement by helicopter were used and worked well. However more emphasised need for detailed briefing of all pilots associated with moving slung loads. A/82 Avn Coy provided excellent support. 1/18th Avn Coy had obviously not been briefed thoroughly.

(d). Use of Air OP

Communications with PW Air OP were bad limiting his use. However without an Air OP on Bty net as SOP observation would be extremely difficult. A HW aircraft is far more satisfactory allowing the observer to be more thoroughly briefed regarding future or possible targets. Nevertheless without Possum 1 the fire Sp would have suffered considerably.

Distribution

1 RAR 2
Comds Diary 2
Spars 1


Maj
BG 105 Fd Bty RAA

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation No.....
2. Report by No. 15985 Epe Name SEIPEL
3. 9 Sec 3 Pl A Coy
4. a. Time of Action 1030
b. Duration 30 secs
c. Date 8 Nov 65
d. Location 178234

5. Unit / Sub-unit tasks

Coy was moving on a compass bearing. 3 pl was lost pl.

6. Was it?
a. Contact YES
b. Incident.....

7. Summary of action in chronological sequence

1 VC tried to creep up on ^{the right flank of the rear sect.} ~~the tail end of the pl~~
He was spotted by 3 members of the sect who opened fire. One of the rounds struck a hand grenade the VC was carrying which promptly demolished him.

8. VC

- a. Strength 1
- b. Type of VC (Guerrilla, RF or Main Force) Mobile
- c. VC cas
i KIA 1
ii WIA
iii VCC

8. d Were VC cas disposed of by

i. Hel evac.....Time.....

ii. Buried.....Location..... 178234

iii. Other means... We did not have time to do an evacuation of the VC.

e. Summary of docs and kit recovered

1 wallet US equip and Chinese equip.

f. Type and number of wps recovered

1 7.62 Chicom sub machine gun.

g. Wps identified on action

h. VC dress Dark coloured civ clothing (shorts)

j. Summary of VC actions

9. Own cas

KIA

MIA

10. Lessons learned

When now with coy all pls need to be alert, due to the noise factor any VC in the area are attracted to the second and last pls.

11. Comments by Coy Comds

Phillip L... (3rd Land)

Comd.....

Coy Comd.....

J. Healy Maj
OC A Coy.

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation No... 14/65
2. Report by No. 38049 2LT Name LIND
3. 4 Sec 10 Pl D Coy
4. a. Time of Action 1100 hrs
- b. Duration 10 min
- c. Date 6 Nov 65
- d. Location 149239
5. Unit / Sub-unit tasks Point sec of point D1 were
so ptl and clear the particular feature
6. Was it?
 a. Contact —
- b. Incident —
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence Ind scout saw
movement ahead and estimated it as
a number of persons moving across his
front, He did not identify them or actually
see them, he passed back this information
and on further investigation it was
found to be the movement of a number
of animals. (probably pigs)
8. VC
 a. Strength NIL
- b. Type of VC (Guerrilla, RF or Main Force) NA
- c. VC cas —
 i. KIA —
 ii. WIA —
 iii. VCC —

8. d. Were VC cas disposed of by
- i. Hel evac.....Time.....
 - ii. Buried.....Location.....
 - iii. Other means.....
- e. Summary of docus and kit recovered —
- f. Type and number of wps recovered —
- g. Wps identified on action —
- h. VC dress —
- j. Summary of VC actions —

9. Own cas

KIA *NIL*

MIA *NIL*

10. Lessons learned

NIL

11. Comments by Coy Comds

a. The forward scout carried out the correct action as he could NOT identify the movement which could have been enemy troops.

Comd. *Shind*

Coy Comd. *Bottwell* Capt.

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation No.....
2. Report by No 215573, Rank 2Lt, Name LOFTUS
3.Sec 9 Pl C Coy
4. a. Time of Action 1309 hrs.
b. Duration 30 mins.
c. Date 6 Nov 65
d. Location GR 148258
5. Unit / Sub-unit tasks A1 had been patrolling NORTH and had stopped for a brief rest.
6. Was it?
a. Contact
b. Incident.....
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence Two sentries, Ptes Rehder and Payne spotted 4 VC moving towards them up the side of the hill and opened fire, with an M16 and M79 however the M16 jammed after the first round and could not be cleared and the M79 GRENS failed to explode in about 2 out of 3 cases allowing the VC escaped to the WEST. The A1 swept WEST for 200 yds then NORTH for 400 yds but no traces of the VC were found.
 - a. VC Strength 4
 - b. Type of VC (Guerrilla, RF or Main Force) Mobile
 - c. VC cas
i KIA
ii WIA
iii VCC
} Not known

8. d were VC cas disposed of by

i Hel evac.....Time.....

ii Buried.....Location.....

iii Other means.....

e. Summary of docus and kit recovered

NIL

f. Type and number of wpns recovered

NIL

g. Wpns identified on action 1 Thompson SMG returned fire however the other 3 were seen to be carrying rifles

h. VC dress

Multi coloured - White and Green Tshirts identified

j. Summary of VC actions

VC returned fire with the SMG only and fled to the WEST

9. Own cas

KIA *NIL*

MIA

10. Lessons learned

1. M16 ammo must be checked, especially the cases.
2. M19 fire is NOT effective at ~~close range~~ if the projectile strikes a tree before arming itself.

11. Comments by Coy Comd

Comd. *Lt LOTTIS*

Coy Comd. *Maj J. TAYLOR*

8. d. Were VC cas disposed of by

i. Method.....Time.....

ii. Buried.....Location.....

iii. Other means.....

e. Summary of docus and kit recovered

20 rounds M1 ammo

f. Type and number of wpns recovered

g. Wpns identified on action

M1

h. VC dress

Dark coloured clothing and US web belt.

j. Summary of VC actions

Ran off down the hill till he hit another track then followed that.

9. Own cas

KIA

MIA

10. Lessons learned

More ambushes would pay off.

C. Wilkin Det (3 Pl Cavel)

11. Comments by Coy Comd

Comd.....

Coy Comd.....

The last man in the section, 2/cpl PARKES, states that he definitely hit the VC with a burst of automatic fire in the body. The 9mm rounds did not wound the VC sufficiently to stop him.

J. B. Mealy Maj
OC A Coy.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
9 Nov	1415 1445 1838	<p>WMC O issued. Aircraft arriving for extraction at 1445 hrs</p> <p>Extraction of guns commenced.</p> <p>Battery Commander's Party extracted from LZ Princess</p> <p>Forward observers returned with respective Coys</p>	

a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
8 Nov	1350	Gun position instructed by Battery Commander not to return excess ammunition as it will be needed to assist extraction of 1/503.	Friendly cas 2 KIA, 4 WIA
	1610	Battery target GR 165222 in support of A Coy who have stron contact.	
	1900	Intelligence reports RRV indicate increase threat on gun position.	
	2020	H&I tasks allotted to 3/319	
	2155	A Coy contact broken	Ammo return HE PD 218 Addl 500 rds required ASP.
9 Nov	0635	Engaged A3 engagement continued with corrections.	
	0752	Completed A3	
	0808	Engaged A2	
	1030	Ammunition resupply critical to ensure completion of SURRAY FOXHOUND plan to clear enemy dug in position at GR 161 231. Registration to be done by Possum 1. Dark Castor 7 may be required to assist.	
	1140	Registration orders passed to Possum 1.	
	1201	India foengaged target at GR 164221.	
	1230	Completed engagement at GR 160 227. Recorded as target X G 850	
	1230	LOLEX delivery of ammunition on gun position.	
	1255-	Registration of Dark Castor 7 onto XC 851 and Dark Castor 6 onto XC 852 By Possum 1.	
	1300	Approx 400 rounds on position. LOLEX damaging considerable number of rounds. Mule lifted in to assist in clearing of DZ.	
	1400	Engaged target XC 850 twice 126 rounds each engagement.	

-/ 1235 H&I O 12307

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
6 Nov	1740	Battery Target GR 151 235.- Possible VC resting area.	
	1812	Contact report from c/s 11	
	1953	Battery target A2 VC probing patrol.	
	2018	Battery target GR 120260 more preparing to fire on guns.	Int received from BRU
	2331	Commenced H&I	
7 Nov	0413	Completed H&I	
	1036	Contact report from c/s 11	0800 Ammo Return
	1103	Incident report by c/s 11	HEFD 319)
	1118	From c/s 21 40 bags of salt pots found at GR 116 268, bags have been destroyed	MPSQ 30) on hand
	2025	105 Standing patrol reported 4 men moving east from their position.	WP 28)
	2110	Mortars and No 1 gun engaged area of suspected VC reported by standing patrol.	
	2130	Commenced H&I	
8 Nov	0218	Completed H&I	
	0912	Guns laid on GR 105312 to support 1/503 who had made contact with VC in strong dug in position. Air strikes used guns did not engage.	
	1137	Battery target GR 0967 3147. In support of Dark Caster 2	Shoot observed by 3/319 Air OP c/s 24 relayed
	1245	Contact report from c/s 11.	fire orders on bty net
	1246	2 VC KIA confirmed by body count on last target anticipated more later	1225 hrs ammo return HE FD on Hand 520
			WP on Hand 44

5.

(a) To move by air from HIEN HOA to operational area.

(b) In direct Sp 1 RAR, In Sp 1/503.

(c) To move by air from operational to HIEN HOA.

6.

Date (a)	Time (b)	E V E N T (c)	Remarks (d)
5 Nov 65	0615	Forward observers and reconnaissance party R.V 1 RAR	Confusion arose regarding source of codeword. Suggest issued by Coy providing protection to Bn Control or G29 and thence by bty net to guns. Ammo Return as at 052000 hrs . A. 4 mns fired B. 54 rds expended C. 773 HE FD)-on posn E. 30 WP)
	0630	Gun group move to PIERSON FIELD.	
	0915	Forward observers and reconnaissance party move by helicopter with 1 RAR to QUEEN (Alternate) LZ.	
	1100	Codeword passed to despatching LZ that gun LZ is secure and to commence despatching loads.	
	1215	Battery ready, 6 rounds per gun.	
	1604	LOLEX Ammunition delivery of ammunition commences	
	1951-2000	H&I Fired	
6 Nov 65	0430-0451	H&I Fired	CB fired on suspect mov loc
	1200	A Coy mortrep 2x81 mm rds	
	1620	A Coy contact GR 164242	
	1640	Battery target GR 161252 - Escape route.	
	1708	c/s 11 reported contact at his location	
	1720	c/s 11 reported contact at GR 124242	

105 FIELD BATTERY ROYAL AUSTRALIAN ARTILLERY
SUB UNIT OPERATION ANALYSIS

12 NOV 65

1. 105 Field Battery, Royal Australian Artillery
2. Major P N O TEDDER
3. Operation "HUMP" 2/65 105 Fd Bty 14/65 1 RAR
4. 5 Nov 65 - 9 Nov 65

INCIDENT. No 2.

1. Operation No. 14/65
2. Report by 37267 Sgt Peterson Lt.
3. Acting Pl Squad 1 Pl Coy.
4. (a) Time of action 1630.
(b) Duration 2 Hours.
(c) Date 8 Nov 65
(d) Location. GR 165 234.
5. Unit/Sub unit tasks - Leading Pl in order of march to sector 7
BN 140R
6. Was it (a) contact No.
(b) Incident YES.

7. Summary of ~~action~~ action in chronological sequence.

RHQ was organised into two sects of 7 men.

Pte Townsend who was forward scout reached the top of the hill and LCPM Parker the sec comd was about 5 yds behind him when the en opened fire with automatic weapons.

The remainder of the sec and RHQ further down the hill were caught in the fire also. The platoon went to ground and returned fire. Info came back that there were 3 automatic weapons dug in at the top of the hill. (Having only 2 sec of 7 men each in the platoon)

I told CPM Hayes to move his sec up on the left to support the leading sec. Lpl Hayes called for his gun and he was then hit and out of the battle. Pte Prior got the gun up on the ~~left~~ left and returned fire. At the same time I told the OC over the radio that the platoon was pinned down and we had casualties. He then told me 3 PM were coming up to assist us. Lt Williams came forward and I told him to move up on the left. This did relieve us from most of the fire. ~~During this time~~ Before this and while this was going on info came back that Pte Townsend and LCPM Parker had been hit. Then Pte Cave called out his gun would not fire and that he also was hit. More automatic fire was received in RHQ area and Pte Basster was wounded. Some of the wounded had made their own way down the hill but Pte Basster ~~and~~ had to be carried down the hill. ~~At~~ Five minutes before this Pte Townsend rolled him self down ~~the hill~~ from the top of the ^{hill} and said he had not seen LCPM Parker. ~~Through out the action we continually~~

several attempts were made to move forward but the ~~the~~ ^{enemy} automatic cross fire made it impossible to move forward without receiving more casualties. At this stage I had no see comds left and the men worked magnificently. As it was impossible to recover ~~corp~~ Parker's body and the weapons and equipment left up the hill by some of the wounded and the coming darkness the platoon then withdrew back off the hill after all the casualties and equipment had been evacuated to the rear. Through out the action the enemy fired several grenades at our position.

8. Vc (a) strength - a coy dug in.

(b) Type of Vc - chain force.

(c) Vc cas KIA UNKNOWN.

WIA UNKNOWN

VCC NIL.

(g) Weapons identified. LMG'S + SMG'S Rifle grenades.

(H) Vc Dress - ~~green~~ unknown

9. Own cas. KIA. 1.

WIA 4.

10 Lessons learned

11 Comments by coy comd.

See sub unit of analysis of ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~action~~ ^{action}.

1. Operation No 14/65.
2. Report by 37267 Sgt Peterson 4th.
3. closing Pl bond 1st Coy.
4. (a) time of action 1600. hrs.
(b) Duration 10 min.
(c) Date 8 Nov 65
(d) Location 1682384
5. Unit/Subunit tasks. Move as second Pl in order of march behind CHQ to sector 7 BN TAOR.
6. Was it a contact YES.

7. Summary of action in chronological sequence

The Coy Column had stopped and the forward sec of 1 Pl placed a machine gun on the northern bank to cover up the creek and remainder of the sec to cover down the creek and a track running roughly east west. Pte Basten saw 2 VC coming down the track to cross the creek; he shot the second VC at the same time Pte Cave with the M60 killed the first VC and fired into the second body. The second sec then cleared through to the west and confirmed 2 VC killed.

CONTACT No 2 cont.

8 Vc (a) strength

(b) Type of Vc. ~~at the~~ ~~Force~~. Mobile

(c) Vc CAS. i KIA 2.
 ii WIA Nil
 iii Yce Nil

(d) were Vc Disposed of. No. They were left at the scene of the contact.

(e) Summary of docs recovered and equip.

(f) Type ~~of~~ and number of weapons recovered. 2 CHI COM Bolt action rifles

(h) Vc Dress 1. wore greens the other wore ~~khaki~~. Khaki.

9. Own cas KIA Nil.
 WIA Nil.

10 Lessons learned.

11 Comments by Coy Comds.

These 2 Vc were probably attracted to the scene by the firing by 2 pl in their incident 20 min previously.

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation No.....
2. Report by No. 38175 ~~Rank~~ 2LT Name WILLIAMS
3.Sec 3 Pl A Coy
4. a. Time of Action 1630
 b. Duration 2 1/2 hrs
 c. Date 8 Nov 65
 d. Location 165233
5. Unit / Sub-unit tasks
PI ATK.
6. Was it?
 a. Contact.....
 b. Incident..... YES
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence

Fwd pl of the coy was pinned down by 3 mgs. I took my pl fwd on the left flank so that I could do a sweep through. I had advanced approx 50 yds on a front of 120 yds when the whole of my left flank was pinned down by heavy MA fire from 3 MAs. We returned fire and continued advancing by fire and mov until we suffered 1 cas. We halted and returned fire I pulled in my right flank under cover of fire from the remainder of the pl. At this time they were only

3. VC
 - a. Strength receiving sub machine gun fire. My Sgt then Coy dug in.
 - b. Type of VC (Guerrilla, RF or Main Force) moved to the left flank to try and recover the
 - c. VC cas
 - i. KIA
 - ii. WIA
 - iii. VCC

cas. Despite the fact that we returned fire and threw grenades the VC continued to pour fire into the body and we could not extricate him.
- ~~The~~ VC by this time had moved an automatic upn behind my left flank. I had great difficulty in extricating the left flank sec as they were under continuous fire. We then withdrew by fire and mov down the hill. Several upns had been mov in on the left since we had swept through which made the withdrawal extremely difficult. We managed to reach coy without further losses. VC cas could not be ascertained but a large number of M79 gren were fired into their upn posns.

8. d. Were VC cas disposed of by
 i. Hol.ovac.....Time.....
 ii. Buried.....Location.....
 iii. Other means.....

e. Summary of docs and kit recovered

f. Type and number of wps recovered

g. Wps identified on action

At least 3 MGs + at least 5 sub machine guns + rifles.

h. VC dress

Unknown

j. Summary of VC actions

Once they had us pinned down they tried to flank us.

9. Own cas

KIA

MIA

10. Lessons learned

Fire and mov is extremely effective under these conditions. The VC had all approaches to their pos covered with automatic wps. M79 fire is very effective against dug in pos especially if they detonate off the ground. Most of the fire was about 2' above the ground. The VC used voice commands to coor their fire.

11. Comments by Coy Comd

Chellian (3rd Land)
 2nd

Comd.....

Coy Comd.....

VC fire control was extremely good. They appeared to use fire and movement in a similar fashion to ourselves. It is estimated, ^{from the type and volume of fire} that at least 2 sects tried to outflank the pl. If VC fire had been closer to the ground the pl would have taken heavier cas.

J. Stealy
 OC ALM

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation No. 14/65
2. Report by No. 7020 ... Rank ... CPL ... Name ... B.J. Collett
3. Sec ... 8 ... Pl ... C ... Coy
4. a. Time of Action ... 0135 ...
- b. Duration ... 5 min ...
- c. Date ... 9 Nov 65 ...
- d. Location ... C.R. 138 256 ...
5. Unit / Sub-unit tasks ... PROTECTION FOR GUNS

6. Was it?
 - a. Contact ... YES
 - b. Incident ... ~~YES~~

7. Summary of action in chronological sequence

At 0135 on the 9 Nov 65, the sentry on ^{one of} our gun hit heard a person walking through the grass to his front. He quickly woke the acting Sec Comd Lt Col Nelson who also heard the noise. They waited with the M.C. and grenades ready. Lt Nelson said he could see the V.C. stop and stand about 15 metres from his position. The enemy was in a position between our M.C. and C/S 8

- a. Strength (1) only
- b. Type of VC (Guerrilla, RF or Main Force) ... CONT ON BACK
NOT KNOWN (TOO DARK)
- c. VC cas
 - i. KIA
 - ii. WIA *one*
 - iii. VCC

CONT FROM BACK PAGE

Rain was heavy during the night and could have washed away any traces of blood. However I believe he was badly wounded and may have staggered some distance before dying.

Acting Pl Comd B.J. Collett CPL

8. d. Were VC cas disposed of by
 i. Hel evac.....Time.....
 ii. Buried.....Location.....
 iii. Other means.....

e. Summary of docus and kit recovered

nil

f. Type and number of wpns recovered *nil*

g. Wpns identified on action *None seen*

h. VC dress *NOT KNOWN (TOO DARK)*

j. Summary of VC actions

After seeing & hearing pl he propped and then escaped in the thick undergrowth.

9. Own cas

KIA*nil*.....

MIA

10. Lessons learned

Flanking pits can be called on to fire. In this case the men on the left could have fired without endangering the most pl of 8 pl

11. Comments by Coy Comds

Comd. *Gil Corbett*

Coy Comd. *Pattem May*

so the M.C. could not fire, however Capt Nelson ~~threw~~ ^{threw} a grenade to where the enemy was standing. The enemy saw the grenade being thrown and made a run ~~for~~ ~~to~~ in the opposite direction, and then went to ground as the grenade went off. More noises were heard so another grenade was thrown. Myself and three men went out as far as the place the first grenade went off, but found nothing. Later that night ~~was~~ ^{was} heard in the vicinity of the contact and a search the next morning ~~but~~ found nothing.

INSTALLATION REPORT

Report on (instl) _____ at GR 145278 found at Date/
Time 05 1515 by (name, rank, No.) 2LT HINDSON 37479
comd 5 PL B Coy 1 RAR.

1. Type of instl Hamlet Bunkers _____ Panjis _____ Trenches _____
Single Bunkers _____ Wpn Pits _____

2. Area covered by instl: 400 Square Yards.

3. DEFENSIVE LAYOUT

a. Were there (1) Wpn Pits & Tunnels _____
(2) Wpn Pits only _____
(3) Tunnels only

b. Were tunnels and pits interconnecting? If so to What extent tunnels below huts opening into river bank.

c. Depth underground of tunnels tunnels connecting huts. 10-12 feet.

d. Type of construction used.

	<u>TUNNELS</u>	<u>WPN PITS</u>
Cement	_____	_____
Revetted	_____	_____
Dug Only	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____
Other Types	_____	_____
(Give Details)	_____	_____

e. Number of Pits _____ Tunnels 7.

f. Size of unit or sub unit you estimate would occupy defensive layout 5 families.

g. Were pits in ALL ROUND DEFENCE _____ If not which direction were they facing _____.

h. Were the pits (1) Individual _____
(2) 2 Man _____
(3) 3 Man _____
(4) Crew served wpn pits _____ Type of wps _____
Direction of fire _____.

j. How old were (1) Pits _____
(2) Tunnels _____
(3) Bunkers _____
(4) Huts _____
(5) Other Instl _____
Several years old, & in present use.

k. Was the defensive layout near: River Track
Road _____ Ford _____ Or only for own protection _____

l. Were there any early warning posts or devices _____
Which direction from instl _____.

4. VILLAGE INSTL

a. Number of huts 5
Family Individual _____

b. Presently occupied 4 Nov on Calendar in list.

c. Not presently occupied _____ How old _____
When occupied _____.

INSTALLATION REPORT Cont.

4.

d. Do you consider this instl was used as:

Supply Training _____ Hospital _____
Base Camp _____ Transit Other families.

e. Occupied by how many people 5 families (10-20)

f. Was defensive layout (1) Part of hamlet _____
(2) Separate from _____

g. Were building materials used (1) Local timber & bamboo
(2) Plastic _____
(3) Others (describe briefly) _____

5. Obstacles _____ Brief description _____

6. Does it appear that the area was bombed or strafed recently Yes, area
How long ago _____ across river bombed & strafed that mornin

7. Remarks (including your unit/sub unit actions or destructions of village defensive complex etc)

15 x 4 gall tins rice and other grain tipped into river
Huts burned down
4 x grenades - 2 Home made, 1 x M26, 1 x French type Fragmentation.
thrown into river
Documents returned to unit.

Blindson 217
.....

INSTALLATION REPORT

Report on (instl) _____ at GR 160 278 found at Date/
 Time 061015 by (name, rank, No.) 2LT HINDSON 37479
 comd 5 PL 8 Coy 1 RAR.

1. Type of instl Hamlet Bunkers _____ Panjis _____ Trenches _____
 Single Bunkers _____ Wpn Pits _____

2. Area covered by instl: 1000 Square Yards.

3. DEFENSIVE LAYOUT

- a. Were there (1) Wpn Pits & Tunnels _____
 (2) Wpn Pits only _____
 (3) Tunnels only
- b. Were tunnels and pits interconnecting? If so to What extent _____
- c. Depth underground of tunnels 15 feet
- d. Type of construction used.

	<u>TUNNELS</u>	<u>WPN PITS</u>
Cement	_____	_____
Revetted	_____	_____
Dug Only	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____
Other Types	_____	_____
(Give Details)	_____	_____

- e. Number of Pits _____ Tunnels 6.
- f. Size of unit or sub unit you estimate would occupy defensive layout _____
- g. Were pits in ALL ROUND DEFENCE _____ If not which direction were they facing _____
- h. Were the pits (1) Individual _____
 (2) 2 Man _____
 (3) 3 Man _____
 (4) Crew served wpn pits _____ Type of wpons _____
 Direction of fire _____
- j. How old were (1) Pits _____
 (2) Tunnels _____ *Many years old but recently used.*
 (3) Bunkers _____
 (4) Huts _____ *as above*
 (5) Other Instl _____
- k. Was the defensive layout near: River Track
 Road _____ Ford _____ Or only for own protection _____
- l. Were there any early warning posts or devices _____
 Which direction from instl _____

4. VILLAGE INSTL

- a. Number of huts 7
 Family Individual _____
- b. Presently occupied Calendars dated 5 Nov in 2 huts.
- c. Not presently occupied _____ How old _____
 When occupied _____

INSTALLATION REPORT Cont.

4.

d. Do you consider this instl was used as:

Supply Training Hospital
Base Camp Transit Other

e. Occupied by how many people 5 or more families and possibly 10 others.

f. Was defensive layout (1) Part of hamlet
(2) Separate from

g. Were building materials used (1) Local timber & bamboo
(2) Plastic
(3) Others (describe briefly) _____

5. Obstacles _____ Brief description _____

6. Does it appear that the area was bombed or strafed recently
How long ago _____.

7. Remarks (including your unit/sub unit actions or destructions of village defensive complex etc)

Huts burnt down.
Food tipped into river.
3 Dogs barking in village when unit entered. 1 was caught and shot.
Documents returned to unit.

Blindson
.....

INSTALLATION REPORT

Report on (instl) ~~3/11/46~~ at GR 155283 found at Date/
 Time 061230 by (name, rank, No.) 2nd Lt W Hindson 37479
 comd S PL B Coy 1 RAR.

1. Type of instl Hamlet Bunkers _____ Panjis _____ Trenches _____
 Single Bunkers _____ Wpn Pits _____

2. Area covered by instl: 500 Square Yards.

3. DEFENSIVE LAYOUT

a. Were there (1) Wpn Pits & Tunnels _____
 (2) Wpn Pits only _____
 (3) Tunnels only

b. Were tunnels and pits interconnecting? If so to what extent _____

c. Depth underground of tunnels 15 feet.

d. Type of construction used.

	<u>TUNNELS</u>	<u>WPN PITS</u>
Cement	_____	_____
Revetted	_____	_____
Dug Only	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____
Other Types	_____	_____
(Give Details)	_____	_____

e. Number of Pits _____ Tunnels 3.

f. Size of unit or sub unit you estimate would occupy defensive layout _____

g. Were pits in ALL ROUND DEFENCE _____ If not which direction were they facing _____

h. Were the pits (1) Individual _____
 (2) 2 Man _____
 (3) 3 Man _____
 (4) Crew served wpn pits _____ Type of wps _____
 Direction of fire _____

j. How old were (1) Pits _____
 (2) Tunnels Many years old but in present use
 (3) Bunkers _____
 (4) Huts _____ as above
 (5) Other Instl _____

k. Was the defensive layout near: River Track
 Road _____ Ford _____ Or only for own protection _____

l. Were there any early warning posts or devices _____
 Which direction from instl _____

4. VILLAGE INSTL

a. Number of huts 4
 Family Individual _____
 b. Presently occupied 1 woman 4 children in village
 c. Not presently occupied _____ How old _____
 When occupied _____

INSTALLATION REPORT Cont.

4.

d. Do you consider this instl was used as:

Supply _____ Training _____ Hospital _____
Base Camp _____ Transit _____ Other _____ ?

e. Occupied by how many people 3-4 families

f. Was defensive layout (1) Part of hamlet _____
(2) Separate from _____

g. Were building materials used (1) Local timber & bamboo
(2) Plastic _____
(3) Others (describe briefly) _____

5. Obstacles _____ Brief description _____

6. Does it appear that the area was bombed or strafed recently _____
How long ago _____

7. Remarks (including your unit/sub unit actions or destructions
of village defensive complex etc)

Food emptied into river. — grain, fish, bananas.
Cache of clothing and medical supplies found by river edge.
— clothing burnt — medical supplies sent back.
Documents and photographs, woman's ID card returned to unit.
VCC taken out by Helicopter.

Blindoo 25.
.....

INSTALLATION REPORT

Report on (instl) _____ at GR 153283 found at Date/
 time 061350 by (name, rank, No.) 2nd W HINDSON 37479
 comd 5 Pl B Coy 1 RAR.

1. Type of instl ^{Nuts} Hamlet 1 Bunkers _____ Panjis _____ Trenches _____
 Single Bunkers _____ Wpn Pits _____
2. Area covered by instl: 75 Square Yards.

3. DEFENSIVE LAYOUT

- a. Were there (1) Wpn Pits & Tunnels _____
 (2) Wpn Pits only _____
 (3) Tunnels only _____
- b. Were tunnels and pits interconnecting? If so to What extent _____
- c. Depth underground of tunnels _____
- d. Type of construction used.

	<u>TUNNELS</u>	<u>WPN PITS</u>
Cement	_____	_____
Revetted	_____	_____
Dug Only	_____	_____
Other Types	_____	_____
(Give Details)	_____	_____

- e. Number of Pits _____ Tunnels _____
- f. Size of unit or sub unit you estimate would occupy defensive layout _____
- g. Were pits in ALL ROUND DEFENCE _____ If not which direction were they facing _____
- h. Were the pits (1) Individual _____
 (2) 2 Man _____
 (3) 3 Man _____
 (4) Crew served wpn pits _____ Type of wpons _____
 Direction of fire _____
- j. How old were (1) Pits _____
 (2) Tunnels _____
 (3) Bunkers _____
 (4) Huts _____
 (5) Other Instl _____
- k. Was the defensive layout near: River Track
 Road _____ Ford _____ Or only for own protection _____
- l. Were there any early warning posts or devices _____
 Which direction from instl _____

4. VILLAGE INSTL

- a. Number of huts 2
 Family 1 Individual 1?
- b. Presently occupied
- c. Not presently occupied _____ How old _____
 When occupied _____

INSTALATION REPORT Cont.

4.

d. Do you consider this instl was used as:
Supply Training _____ Hospital _____
Base Camp _____ Transit _____ Other _____

e. Occupied by how many people not known

f. Was defensive layout (1) Part of hamlet _____
(2) Separate from _____

g. Were building materials used (1) Local timber & bamboo
(2) Plastic _____
(3) Others (describe briefly) _____

5. Obstacles _____ Brief description _____

6. Does it appear that the area was bombed or strafed recently _____
How long ago _____

7. Remarks (including your unit/sub unit actions or destructions
of village defensive complex etc)

6 x 4 gall tins rice dumped into river
10 bottles approx of unknown spirits & oils emptied into river.
Huts burnt down.

Blindon 20

INSTALLATION REPORT

Report on (instl) _____ at GR 152283 found at Date/
 T e 061430 by (name, rank, No.) 2LT W HINDSON 37479
 comd 5 PL B Coy 1 RAR.

1. Type of instl Hamlet Bunkers _____ Panjis _____ Trenches _____
 Single Bunkers _____ Wpn Pits _____

2. Area covered by instl: 200 Square Yards.

3. DEFENSIVE LAYOUT

a. Were there (1) Wpn Pits & Tunnels _____
 (2) Wpn Pits only _____
 (3) Tunnels only

b. Were tunnels and pits interconnecting? If so to What extent _____

c. Depth underground of tunnels 10-15ft

d. Type of construction used.

	<u>TUNNELS</u>	<u>WPN PITS</u>
Cement	_____	_____
Revetted	_____	_____
Dug Only	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____
Other Types	_____	_____
(Give Details)	_____	_____

e. Number of Pits _____ Tunnels 3.

f. Size of unit or sub unit you estimate would occupy defensive layout 2 families

g. Were pits in ALL ROUND DEFENCE _____ If not which direction were they facing _____

h. Were the pits (1) Individual _____
 (2) 2 Man _____
 (3) 3 Man _____
 (4) Crew served wpn pits _____ Type of wpns _____
 Direction of fire _____

j. How old were (1) Pits _____
 (2) Tunnels had been in use many years.
 (3) Bunkers _____
 (4) Huts as above
 (5) Other Instl _____

k. Was the defensive layout near: River Track
 Road _____ Ford _____ Or only for own protection _____

l. Were there any early warning posts or devices _____
 Which direction from instl _____

4. VILLAGE INSTL

a. Number of huts 2
 Family Individual _____

b. Presently occupied Calendar dated 5 Nov in hut.

c. Not presently occupied _____ How old _____
 When occupied _____

INSTALLATION REPORT Cont.

4.

d. Do you consider this instl was used as:

Supply Training _____ Hospital _____
Base Camp _____ Transit Other _____

e. Occupied by how many people 2 families

f. Was defensive layout (1) Part of hamlet _____
(2) Separate from _____

g. Were building materials used (1) Local timber & bamboo
(2) Plastic _____
(3) Others (describe briefly) _____

5. Obstacles _____ Brief description _____

6. Does it appear that the area was bombed or strafed recently _____
How long ago _____

7. Remarks (including your unit/sub unit actions or destructions
of village defensive complex etc)

Notes burnt down.
Clothing - burnt.
Food emptied into river.
Documents returned to unit. - incl ID Card of 63 year old woman.

Blundell 211.

YEAR

KIN

OPORD 28-65

"HUMP"

173⁰ ABN BDESEA

MAY '65

MAY '66

KIN

COPY NUMBER 26

Copy No
Hq, 173d Abn Bde (Sep)
Bien Hoa, RVN
011800H November 1965
NCB

OPORD 28-65 (OPERATION HUMP)

1. SITUATION:
- a. Enemy: Annex B - Intelligence
 - b. Friendly:
 - (1) USAF provides tactical air support to 173d Abn Bde (Sep)
 - (2) 145th Avn Bn provides helicopter support.
 - (3) Special Forces conduct operations to the NE of 173d Bde TAOR during the period 6-10 Nov 65.
2. MISSION: 173d Abn Bde (Sep) conducts search and destroy operations in TAOR 28-65 during the period 5-10 Nov 65.
3. EXECUTION:
- a. Concept of Operation: 173d Abn Bde conducts search and destroy operations in five phases: (Annex A - Operations Overlay)
 - (1) Phase I - Fire support base moves by convoy to Psn ACE.
 - (2) Phase II - TF 1/RAR conducts airmobile assault on LZ QUEEN.
 - (3) Phase III - TF 1/503 conducts airmobile assault on LZ KING.
 - (4) Phase IV - Task Forces conduct search and destroy operations in sector.
 - (5) Phase V - Forces are extracted by helicopter and convoy.
 - b. TF 1/503 - Attached:
 - Engr Squad
 - RRU Team
 - 2 Vietnamese Policemen
 - (1) Conduct airmobile assault into LZ KING commencing 1115 hours, D-Day. Stage at the SNAKE PIT. Plan on three lifts with 35 slicks.
 - (2) Be prepared to assist Special Forces personnel in making assessment of river and river banks, vic YT 1429 on D+1.
 - (3) Conduct search and destroy operations in sector.
 - c. 2/503d Inf:
 - (1) Assume responsibility for 1/RAR base camp TAOR effective 051200H Nov to 111200H Nov 65.
 - (2) Be prepared to provide company size reaction force on two hour notice; Bn on four hour notice.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

KIN

d. TF 1/RAR - Attached: RRU Team
2 Vietnamese Policemen

- (1) Conduct airmobile assault LZ QUEEN commencing 0800 hours, D-Day. Stage at the SNAKE PIT. Plan on three lifts with 35 slicks.
- (2) Select and secure LZ for artillery battery.
- (3) Secure East Bank of Dong Nai River opposite LZ KING prior to and during TF 1/503 airmobile assault.

e. TF 3/319 - Attached: E/17th Cavalry
D/16th Armor (w/security force furnished by Admin Co)
Engr Squad & Water Point, 173d Engr Co
RRU Team

- (1) Move fire support base (Two 105mm How batteries) by convoy to Psn ACE and register prior to 0700 hours, D-Day.
- (2) Fire landing zone preparations:

LZ QUEEN 0745 - 0755 hours D-Day

LZ KING 1100 - 1110 hours D-Day
- (3) Move by helicopter airlift RAA battery from Bien Hoa to LZ secured by Task Force 1/RAR upon completion of airmobile assault on LZ QUEEN. Plan on lifting battery commencing 0925 hours, D-Day.
- (4) E/17th Cavalry and D/16th Armor remain attached to provide security during movement and while in Psn ACE.

f. E/17th Cavalry: Attached to TF 3/319.

g. Engr Co:

- (1) Attach engineer squads to Task Forces 1/503 and 3/319.
- (2) Establish water point vic Psn ACE.
- (3) Co (-) continue present mission.

h. A/82 Avn: Provide helicopter support. Annex C - Army Aviation.

i. Admin Co:

- (1) Attach 20 personnel to D/16th Armor for security force.
- (2) Co (-) continue present mission.

j. Bde (-): Continue present mission.

k. Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) Annex C - Area Grid System.
- (2) Annex E - Sequence of Events.
- (3) Suppressive Fires:

Preparation of LZ QUEEN:


Tactical Air	-	0715	-	0745
Artillery	-	0745	-	0755
Armed Helicopters	-	0755	-	0800

- 2 -

KIN

KIN

Appendix 1 (Route O/L) to Annex A (Opn O/L) to OP ORD 28-65



A-1-1

KIN

KIN


Copy No _____
Hq 173d Abn Bde (Sep)
Bien Hoa, RVN
011800H Nov 65
NGB

Annex A (Opn Overlay) to
OPORD 28-65 (OPERATION HUMP)

References: Same as OPORD 28-65

Time Zone: HOTEL

VC RESUPPLY ROUTE



173 X SF


Acknowledge

WILLIAMSON
Brig Gen


Distribution: Annex Z

OFFICIAL:

Minturn
MINTURN
S3



SF
X
173



PSN
ACE

page A-1

KIN

KIN

Preparation of LZ KING:

Tactical Air	-	1030	-	1100
Artillery	-	1100	-	1110
Armed Helicopters	-	1110	-	1115

- (4) Armed helicopters will cover road movement of TF 3/319 and will be available on call thereafter.
- (5) Curfew on Dong Nai River 1900 to 0600 hours, all traffic regardless of time on Song Be River assumed to be Viet Cong.
- (6) Control/Coordination party during conduct of airmobile operation:

Command Liaison	-	Lt. Col. Joost
Artillery Liaison	-	Capt Ryder
Air Liaison	-	Major Snow

- (7) Authorization for employment of tear gas during this operation to be announced.
- (8) The following numerical challenges and passwords will be used in the operational area only:

<u>EFFECTIVE DATE/TIME</u>	<u>CHALLENGE</u>	<u>PASSWORD</u>
051800 to 061800	6	2
061800 to 071800	4	8
071800 to 081800	7	9
081800 to 091800	5	3
091800 to 101800	9	6

- (9) The following Points of Origin will be used during effective time only:

<u>EFFECTIVE DATE/TIME</u>	<u>POINTS OF ORIGIN</u>	
041800 - 051800	CAR = 1226	COUNTRY = 1426
051800 - 061800	RIVER = 1327	DOG = 1427
061800 - 071800	COLOR = 1526	FRUIT = 1428
071800 - 081800	TREE = 1228	MONTH = 1627
081800 - 091800	DAY OF WEEK = 1524	GIRL = 1028
091800 - 101800	BOY = 1724	HOLIDAY = 1329

- (10) Attachments effective 041800H Nov 65.
- (11) Air relay will be provided.
- (12) FAC will accompany maneuver task forces. Airborne FAC will be provided as required.
- (13) Special Demolition Team (Spt Bn) available on call.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: Annex E - Administration.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Current SOI in effect.

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- b. Call Signs of Special Forces element: Harvest Night, Barber or China Boy.
- c. Brigade CP remains in present location.
- d. Units report CP locations.

Acknowledge

WILLIAMSON
Brig Gen

Annexes:

- A - Operations Overlay
- B - Intelligence
- C - Army Aviation
- D - Area Grid System
- E - Administration and Logistics
- F - Sequence of Events
- G thru Y - NOT USED
- Z - Distribution

Distribution: Annex Z (Distribution)

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4

TTT - TTT
TTT - TTT
TTT - TTT

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Hq, 173d Abn Bde (Sep)
Bien Hoa, RVN
011800H November 1965
NCE

Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 28-65

Reference: Same as OPORD 28-65

1. (C) SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION: The area surrounding the junction of the Song Be and Dong Nai Rivers has been considered a strong-hold of the VC. Two main force units, 0762 Regiment and D800 Bn, have their home bases in the area. The area is considered to be a major point in the communications route between War Zone "C" and War Zone "D". It is also an important point on the supply route between Phuoc Tuy, Long Khanh and "D" Zone. During the months of June, July, and August, it appeared that units previously located in the area had relocated elsewhere. In September, an increase of activity was noted, including numerous reports on units in the area and increased SPAR activity. It is generally accepted that three battalions are operating in, and immediately contiguous to the TAOR. These are the Binh Duong Province Mobile Bn, the old Phuoc Thanh Provincial Bn, and an unidentified battalion formed from units of district level companies. The area of operations could be affected by Regiment 302 also known as the 5th, believed to be in the Long Khanh Province, and by the Dong Nai Regiment believed to be in Phuoc Tuy Province.

2. (C) EEI and OTHER INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS:

a. EEI

(1) What is the location, disposition, and strength of Viet Cong forces in the area?

(2) What is the identity of VC forces in the area?

(3) What are the VC intentions?

b. Other Intelligence Requirements:

(1) Are there PAVN or Chinese forces in the area?

(2) Does the VC have AA weapons in the area?

(3) What are the location of VC caches and supply points?

(4) Does the VC have artillery in the area?

(5) To what extent has the VC been using the Dong Nai and Song Be rivers.

3. (C) ORDERS and REQUESTS for INFORMATION: All units will report immediately upon contacting VC or VC installations. The key word S-A-L-U-T-E will be used to insure complete reports. This information will be passed on the Brigade Intel/Log Net.

4. (C) MISCELLANEOUS: Combination (VCC/document/equipment) tags will be issued down to squad level to insure proper tagging. Replacement tags are available at Brigade S2.

a. Viet Cong Captives: All Viet Cong Captives (VCC) will be properly tagged, blindfolded and evacuated to the Viet Cong Captive Collection Point (VCCCP) by the most expeditious means.

(1) If assistance is required to evacuate VCC, request same on Brigade Intel/Log Net.

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Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 28-65

(2) VCC will be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention and the Rules of Land Warfare.

(3) If the VCC was armed at time of capture, be certain to state this fact under "circumstances of capture" on the VCC tag.

(4) Any documents found on a VCC will be properly tagged and evacuated with the VCC guard.

b. Captured Documents:

(1) Documents will be kept segregated as to place of capture, securely bound or sacked, properly tagged and evacuated by the most expeditious means.

(2) Documents taken from VC KIA will be kept segregated by individual. The fact that documents came from VC KIA will be recorded on tag under "circumstances of capture".

c. Captured Equipment:

(1) All captured material that can be evacuated will be sent by the most expeditious means to the VCCCP. Material too cumbersome to be evacuated will be photographed and destroyed in place.

(2) Captured munitions larger than small arms ammunition will be photographed in place. Samples of unusual munitions will be rendered safe, tagged and evacuated to the VCCCP. The remaining items will be destroyed in place.

(3) Captured weapons will be tagged and evacuated to Brigade S2. All captured weapons will be turned into the Brigade S2 NLT four hours after a unit closes back to Bien Hoa.

d. Intelligence attachments: Detachment 1, 3rd RRU will attach one back pack team each to 1/503, and 1/RAR.

e. Photography: Exposed film will be sent to the Brigade S2 as soon as a roll is exposed. All film, regardless of the amount exposed, will be turned into the Brigade S2 NLT than 4 hours after a unit closes back to Bien Hoa.

f. Escape and evasion: The lines of drift toward the junction of the Dong Nai and Song Be Rivers should be followed.

Acknowledge:

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2 Appendicies

- 1 Imagery Interpretation Report
- 2 VC Unit Disposition

Distribution: Same as OPORD 28-65

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Appendix i (Imagery Interpretation Report) to ANNEX B

(Intelligence) to OPORD 28-65

The following items were detected by interpretation of aerial photography taken on 10 Oct 65 of the area of operation.

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
1	YT111308	3 possible foxholes
2	YT117304	2 possible emplacements
3	YT134306	Possible trench system
4	YT151274 ✓	Road cut by bombs
5	YT096214	Bridge will accomodate bicycle and foot traffic only
6	YT099218	Old unoccupied triangular fort
7	YT128260 to YT131267	Road in poor condition
8	YT131269	Bridge is in bad condition
9	YT136262 to YT138267	Road in poor condition
10	YT142268 ✓	Possible underground entrance
11	YT151273 ✓	Road cut by bomb
12	YT170262 ✓	Logs across road
13	YT182262	Foot bridge, and a building
14	YT183262	Possible building and pier on island
15	YT191259	3 foot bridges in area
16	YT192260 ✓	Logs across road
17	YT159174	2 fishing nets with supporting poles
18	YT109179	Foot bridge
19	YT115172	Foot bridge
20	YT094331	Road cut (Road is not on map)
21	YT073323	3 unoccupied emplacements
22	YT078235	Trench system
23	YT139242	Bridge intact
24	YT099217	Old unoccupied triangular fort
25	YT103237	ARVN outpost
26	YT105230	Military area
27	YT132225 ✓	Possible emplacement
28	YT132226 ✓	Washed out bridge
29	YT136223 ✓	Possible foxhole
30	YT135235 ✓	Possible foxhole
31	YT136238	Road in very poor condition
32	YT072240 ✓	Possible caved-in bunker
33	YT128260	Road cut

Acknowledge

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B-1-1

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Appendix 2 (VC Unit Disposition) to Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 28-65

The following VC units have been reported. The reporting sources vary widely as to reliability and the frequency of movement of certain units is noteworthy:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
✓ Phuoc Bien Bn	29 Sep	YT 075321 to 058322
	31 Sep	YT 153345 to 152333
	12 Oct	YT 1638, 1740, 1037, 1338
	14 Oct	Same Location
	22 Oct	Hit by Air Strike at YT 1638 1631.
D 900 Bn ✓	29 Sep	YT 065363
	14 Oct	YT 062337
	22 Oct	YT 080330
	23 Oct	YT 085278 w/303 Bn
	27 Oct	YT 004386
✓ 762 Regiment U/I Bn U/I Ele using code name	8 Oct	YT 080369
	30 Sep	YT 053275
	18 Oct	YT 113258
A 300 Bn ✓	18 Oct	YT 0224, 0324, 0425
	19 Oct	YT 065324
	23 Oct	YT 0329, 0427, 0430
353 Bn	21 Sep	YT 0621
	28 Sep	YT 070245
303 Bn	23 Oct	YT 085275 w/D 900 Bn
C 304 Bn (-)	23 Oct	YT 085278
500 Bn (Old designation of D800 Bn)	24 Oct	YT 105237
	28 Oct	YT 043270
324 Bn (Rptd to form a new Regt w/Phuoc Bien Bn. Not confirmed)	14 Oct	YT 1435 to 1632
C800 Bn	20 Oct	YT 108364
Commo Liaison Station w/25 people	20 Oct	YT 160208

Acknowledge:

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Distribution: Same as OPORD 28-65

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B-2-1

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Copy No _____
Hq, 173d Abn Bde (Sep)
Bien Hoa, RVN
011800H November 1965
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ANNEX C (Army Aviation) to OPORD 28-65 (OPERATION HUMP)

Reference: Same as OPORD 28-65

1. SITUATION:

- a. Enemy: Annex B (Intelligence)
- b. Friendly: 145th Avn Bn provides troop lift helicopters.

2. MISSION: Same as OPORD 28-65

3. EXECUTION:

a. Concept: OPORD 28-65

b. A/82:

- (1) Provide one C&C helicopter to CG, 173d Abn Bde per SOP.
- (2) Provide one helicopters to CO, 1/RAR D-Day 0700 until termination of operation for Command and Liaison.
- (3) Provide ten (10) slicks and five (5) armed helicopters to CO, 145th Avn Bn D-Day 0700 hours during Phase II, III & V.
- (4) Provide six (6) slicks to Brigade LOC during Phase IV for resupply.
- (5) Provide one light fire team to cover convoy to Psn ACE.
- (6) Establish Army Aviation elements of FSCC in Brigade TOC D-Day until termination.
- (7) Company (-): General support.

c. 145th Aviation Battalion:

- (1) Provide thirty-five (35) slicks to airlift 1/RAR, RAA and TF 1/503 into respective landing zones (thirty-five includes ten of A/82).
- (2) Control and coordinate landing zone activities.
- (3) Provide 24 hour OLF coverage for aerial FO and radio relay. Aerial FO 0700-1900 daily. Radio relay 1900-0700.

d. Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) Helicopter loading to be SOP. Plan for all UH-1D loading six (6) troops on initial lift and seven (7) troops on subsequent lifts until next refueling is required.
- (2) Staging area will be A/501st parking ramp at Bien Hoa Air Base (SNAKE PIT).

C-1

KIN

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- (3) Loading time for initial lift of 1/RAR will be 050730H Nov 65 and 051045H Nov 65 for initial lift of TF 1/503. Plan twenty five (25) minute turn around for subsequent loads.
- (4) Royal Australian Artillery Battery be prepared to use nineteen (19) slicks. Initial pickup time estimated to be 050925H Nov 65.
- (5) All Army Aircraft entering TAOR on other than pre-planned airmobile assaults will contact COWBOY Control for clearance into area and information on artillery fire and tactical air strikes.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: Annex E

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Signal: OPORD 28-65

b. Command: OPORD 28-65

Acknowledge

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Brig Gen

Distribution: Annex Z

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C-2

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EXEMPT FROM
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Hq 173d Abn Lde (Sep)
Bien Hoa, RVN
011800H November 1965
NCB

ANNEX D (Area Grid System) to OFORD 28-65

		37	38	39		
32	35	34	33	32	31	30
	24	25	26	27	28	29
	23	<u>36</u>	22	21	20	19
	13	14	15	16	17	18
	12	11	10	9	8	7
	1	2	3	4	5	6
						20

Acknowledge

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Brig Gen

Distribution: Same as OFORD 28-65

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D-1

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INSTALLATION REPORT

Report on instl ~~at~~ VC CAMP SITE at GR. 168234
at 1440 hours by LT. I. GUILD

date?

1. Type of instl (hovel, bunkers complex, single bunker,
wpn pits, trenches, panjis.)

*TRENCHES LEADING INTO HOLLOWED OUT ANT HILLS
AHEAD FOR OVERHEAT PROTECTION.*

2. Area covered by instl (in square yds) ~~100~~ 200 sq yards

3. Defensive layout (answer fol questions and any more details
that can be given.)

(a) Were there wpn pits and tunnels NO

(i) wpn pits only Yes

(ii) tunnels and pits NO

(iii) tunnels only NO

(b) Were there tunnels and pits interconnecting and if so to
what extent? NO

(c) Depth underground of tunnels -

(d) Type of construction used

(i) Tunnels -

(ii) Wpn pits -

(e) Number of pits and tunnels and units or sub-unit you estimate
would occupy them. 6 hollowed out ant hills

(f) Direction pits were facing ALL ROUND DEFENCE

(g) Were the pits
(i) individual YES

(ii) 2 man -

(iii) 3 man -

(iv) Crew served wpn.....if so what type of wpn do you
estimate.....and what direction.....

(h) How old were

(i) pits AT LEAST SIX MONTHS

(ii) tunnels -

(iii) bunkers -

(iv) any other instl ANT HILLS AT LEAST SIX MONTHS

(j) Was the defensive layout near, river, track, road, ford etc.

NEAR A CREEK AND TRACKS. Secondary jungle
had been cleared in the area.

(k) Were there any early warning posts or devices?

NOT SEEN.

4. Village, hamlet, hut etc

- (a) How many?
- (b) Family or individual.
- (c) Presently occupied or not?
- If not how long ago do you estimate:-
- (i) Built
- (ii) Occupied
- (d) For what use do you consider this instl was used?
- (E) By how many people
- (f) Was the defensive layout
 - (i) part of hamlet
 - (ii) separate from
- (g) Brief description of building materials used.

5. Obstacles. Attach diagram showing obstacles relative to pits, bunkers, huts etc (Obstacles are panjis, natural vegetation, thorns etc, fallen logs, fences, barbed wire, booby traps etc)

THE AREA SURROUNDING THE CAMP HAS EXTREMELY THICK VEGETATION WITH PANJIS, ^{THICK} CREEPERS PREVENTING ANYBODY APPROACHING APART FROM ALONG ^{THE} TRACKS SILENTLY.

6. Does it appear that the area has been bombed or strafed recently
How long ago

NO.

7. Remarks (incl your unit/sub-unit actions on destruction of village, defensive complex etc)

The installation was approx 300 meters short of the ridge crest where the VC were digging in. A strength of north column contact was later made.

Date

Signature

Typical Trench



PRECEDENCE ACTION
ROUTINE

Nov 65
DATE TIME GROUP
13 1032 H

119/1/6 (G)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLAS

FROM: 1 RAR

ORIGINATORS NUMBER
G50

TO: A Coy B Coy C Coy D Coy Sp Coy Admin Coy

all patrolling in TAOR will be coord through A Adjutant (.) patrol programmes
are to be at CP by 0800 hrs the day before departure (.) call signs and locs
of standing patrols and check points are to be included in this daily return

James Paul
Maj

PRECEDENCE ACTION
PRIORITY

Nov 65
DATE TIME GROUP
12 1626 H

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

FROM: 1 RAR

ORIGINATORS NUMBER
G49

TO: A Coy, B Coy, C Coy, D Coy Sp Coy, Atk Pl,
Aslt Pnr Pl, Mor Pl, Admin Co y, LAPC Tp PWLH,
3 Field Tp RAE

Info: 173 AB Bde
3/319 Arty Bn
105 Field Bty RAA
161 Field Bty RNZA
Bde Avn Offr
ALO 173 AB Bde
RRU
161 Recce Flt

WARNING ORDER (.) OP 15/65 search and destroy 15-17 Nov 65 (.) NO move
before 0700 hrs 15 Nov except D Coy moving NOT before 0300 hrs 15 Nov 65 (.)
NO recce (.) Orders Gp 0900 hrs 14 Nov 65 at CP (.) Admin SOP (.) A CK


Maj

SECRET

Copy No

1RAR

BIEN HOA

Nov 65

OpO 15/65

Maps: Tan Uyen 6344 II, 6444 III.

1. Situation

a. Enemy Forces: Annex A. Overlay Annex P.

b. Own Troops: Overlay Annex P.

(1) E/17 Recce Patrols operate East of TAOR.

(2) Special Forces operate North of TAOR.

(3) 3/319 Arty Bn less two batteries at Posn ACE.

(4) USAF provides Tac Sp throughout op.

(5) A/82 Avn Coy provides Air lift for assets
and sp throughout op

c. Atts and detts

(1) Under comd from 1700 hrs
14 Nov 65.

RRU team

two FAC teams USAF.

det 709 Sig Tp R Ant Sys

two dog teams ARVN.

(2) In DS from 0900 hrs
15 Nov 65.

3/319 Arty Bn less

two blys.

2. Mission: To search and destroy enemy within allotted boundaries from 15 Nov to 17 Nov 65

(e) Phase 5. Extraction. On order from Butta. Be prepared to move to posn ACE on LZ PRINCESS.

C. B Coy

(1) Grouping

(a) Remaining under comd

MFC
Med asst
Vietnamese Interpreter

(b) Under comd from 1700 hrs
D-1

four SBs.
Foo Patch 105 Field Bldg
ARVN dog team

(2) Tactics

(a) Phase 1.
i 2nd Coy in order of move.
ii RV previous Mor pt posn on landing
iii Move from RV on receipt JOCK STRAP.

(b) Phase 2.
i Move behind C Coy ~~then~~ from RV
ii Move through C Coy Intermediati posn GR 148251
iii Move to FUP at GR 156234. Harbour ~~at~~
on NW slope of 82 Feature ~~KING KONG~~.
GR 157233 (nickname KING KONG.)
iv. Ni Dday/D+1 probe enemy defences on
BROKEN CUP to establish
A. extent of position from ~~N to S~~ ^{NW to S} to South
B. MG positions.
C. ~~establish~~ establish enemy identification.
v. Mark SL ^{in relation} ~~in relation~~ to centric ^{to} axis to centre
en position.
vi. establish protection of SL.
vii. ~~place~~ erect marker balloon on centric ~~of~~ point
~~axis~~ of SL.

(c) Phase 3.
i 2nd Coy to assault.
ii Be prepared to
A. assault through A Coy
B. Consolidate on enemy position

3. Execution.

a. Gen Outline. The op will be conducted in five phases.

(1) Phase 1 ^{Day} Rtd move of D Coy to posn ACE and hel assault by Bn (-) on LZ PRINCESS.

(2) Phase 2 ^{Day} Move to FUP and stop positions ~~near~~ near objective BROKEN CUP at GR 162 230.

(3) Phase 3 ^{D+1} ~~Artillery~~ Arty and Air assault followed by Bn Attack BROKEN CUP by Band A coys, ~~with~~ D Coy moving to stop positions in South: ~~and~~ C Coy in reserve.

(4) Phase 4 ^{D+1} Search in allotted area.

(5) Phase 5 ^{D+2} Extraction by hel ~~on~~

b. A Coy.

(1) Grouping.

(a) Remaining under comd.

MFC
Med Asst.

(b) Under comd from 1700 hrs ~~to~~ D-1.

four SBS
Interpeller IRAR
FOO party 161 Field Bty

(c) Under comd from 1700 hrs ^{as} Daan

FAC team USAF,
Section Aslt Pwr
(Flame Thrower)

(2) Tasks.

(a) Phase 1: i 3rd Coy in adv of move.

ii RV ^{previous gun posn 105 Field Bty.} ~~at~~ LZ on landing.

iii Move from ~~to~~ on receipt of. nickname JOCK STRAP

(b) Phase 2: i Move behind B Coy to FUP ^{position at} GR 155 235. ^{Regimp} ~~at~~ ^{nickname IRON COBRA} ~~at~~ NW of B Coy

(c) Phase 3. Assault Coy. Move through B Coy to SL. Cross SL at H hr (0700 hrs D+1). Reorg

(d) Phase 4. Search on adv. Be prepared to search section 2 of search area on receipt nickname ANARY ANT

Albu

Le Harbanc, in person,

5. Comm & Sig:

a. BW HQ

b. Signals

(1) Radio

(a) Codes: SOI items 20-11 and 25-11, KAE code HE-740 and authentication for ~~Nov~~ in effect.

b. BW comm net / Adms net - Max B

c. Netting: BW comm net and Adms net are to open at ~~max~~ H.

d. Allocation of equipment - Max B

(2) Line

(a) Refl coys: 1 sub unit ^{filled} CE 11 and 1 telephone is to be carried for use in BW def posn. Line is to be laid on order.

(b) BW HQ Coy: BW HQ, Sp coy pls, and 3 Fd Tp KAE are to lay line as per SOP.

(c) Sig Pl: 400 metres of cable electric DR is to be carried as a res

(3) CALL SIGNS: The fol call signs are an addition to SOPs -

(a) FALCON - ARMED bel (pigs)

(b) MAD - helo with 81 mm mortar delivery system.

(c) RAZOR BACK -

c. Nicknames(1) Tac nicknames

Serial	Nickname	Meaning	Issued by
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	FALCON JOCK STRAP	TO MOVE, moving.	ALL
2	ANGRY ANT		Am 40
3.			

(2) Block Nicknames

Serial	A Coy	B Coy	C Coy	D Coy
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1.	RUSTY BLADE	AND GIVE	GREEN TAPE	LONG DROP
2.	WET NURSE	RUSSIAN CORLETTE	FLIP TOP	RIP. COLE
3.	KID GLOVE	MASTER SPY	HERBY BAR	ROMAN CANDLE
4.	COAT TAILS	ELEPHANT WALK	SEVEN UP	FLY BLOWN
5.	BETH HARRY	NEW CAR	WEATHER CHANGE	SUN GLASSES
6.	WOOD NICKEL	ROLLER SKATE	PISTOL BELT	BROKEN WING
7.	CRUMPLED PAK	JACK KNIFE	FLINT STONE	SWEATY BROW
8.	NOSE HAIR	PLASTIC BAG	LIGHT ENDERS	MAD DOG.
9.	ANGER STALL	RUBBER BAND	TOBIN BRONZE	POTATO CHIP
10.	BEER CAN	LAW PARKES	PRINCE CAMILLO	SHOE STRINGS

Serial	BMHQ.
(8)	(9)
1.	TIN CAN
2.	MERSY FERRY
3.	GUN SLINGER
4.	FINGER NAIL
5.	CLEAR SKY
6.	SPEED TRAP
7.	RAILWAY HOTEL
8.	BENT FENDER
9.	MANY WAYS
10.	SWEET THING.

d. Air Relay :- Air relay is to be working from
150700 H.

e. Q hrs : Q hrs for the complete operation is
0500 ~~hrs~~ hrs

f. Passwords: The fol challenges and passwords are
to be used for the operation only:

Serial	Time	Challenge	Password
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.		2	7
2.		4	9
3.		5	3
4.		6	1

SECRET

(4)

g. Points of Origin : The pl pts of origin are to be used for the period of the op only.

Serial	Time	Pts of origin	
(a)	(b)	(c)	
1.	141800 - 151800	COUNTRY 1030	FRUIT 1124
2.		BOY 1227	TREE 1321
3.		GIRL 1429	CITY 1028
4.		RIVER 1322	FLOWER 1125

h. Synchronization :

- (1) Pre-operation : Synchronization is to be by AFRS radio.
- (2) During op : A synchronization is to be given at 2100 hrs on D day. All units involved in the operation are to receive this from ^{HQ} 1RAR Gp. This time check is to be as per AFRS time. The importance of the time check at 2100 hrs is stressed.

Phase 1

1)

To ACE 0700
0700 hrs
BBty . D.16.
105Bty
161 Bty.
D Coy.
1RAR - To princess (H-hm) 1500

Prep of princess

0910-0960
~~0810-0840~~
~~0840-0855~~
0955-1000 Armed Chopper 0855-0900

Track for Eng

total

Phase 2.

Move to sup. by 1700. in posn.

7 1/2

Assault

~~Assault~~

Phase II

Arty 0600-0630.
Inf 0630-0700.
Hm. 0700 hrs.

11
4
44

20

D Coy att TF 3/319

Hel 6 + 7 heli

D models 26 hel
13 in each lift
6 in first lift
7 in 2nd lift

ALT LZ QUEEN.

Land + control hel. 0800 hrs?

Rats 2 days.

Water Resup. ? D day + mes Area

A B Bn HQ

Phase III

Order of move in

C, B, A, Bu HQ

Assault on broken cul.

Art 0600 - 0630
Air 0630 - 0700
Med.
Hk. 0700h.

0700 - mad
- 0930 followed by.

Co-ord

Tear Gas

Carried by
Coys + Engineers.

Extraction from Prison.


632

D+2 0800 hrs

- 1 Ljt 6
- 2 Ljt 6
- 3 Ljt 7
- 4 " 7

— If refuelling necessary

Land at Bde



1st Ljt 26 @ 6.
2nd Ljt 26 @ 7.
3rd Ljt 26 @ 7.

156
189
189
534



9"


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C.B.A. Bu HQ

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OP OVERLAY IRRR TAOR 15/
ROUTES, FUP, SL, D DAY 15NO




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ROUTES, FUP, SL, D DAY 15NO



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
ANNEX P TO IRRR

OPD 15/65

dated 14 Nov 65

OP OVERLAY IRRR TAOR 15/65

ROUTES, FOP, SL, D DAY 15 NOV 65



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
ANNEX B TO IRRR

CO 15/65

closed 14 Nov 65

OP OVERLAY IRRR TAOR 15/65

ROUTES, FUP, SL, D DAY 15 NOV 65



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ANNEX P TO 1RAR
OpO 15/65
dated 14 Nov 65.

OP OVERLAY 1RAR TOR 15/65.
ROUTES, FUP, SL, Day 15 Nov 65.



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
Route P to 1st

SLD 15/65

dated 15 May 65

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OP OVERLAY IRAA TADR 15/65
ROUTES, FUP, SL, D DAY 15 NOV 65



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
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D

SECRET

OP OVERLAY 1RAR TADR 15/6

ROUTES, FUP, SL, D DAY 15NOV



ROUTES, FUP, SL, D DAY 15NOV

OP OVERLAY 1RAR TADR 15/6

SECRET

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
ANNEX P TO IRRAR

OpO 15/65

dated 14 Nov 65

OP OVERLAY IRRAR TADR 15/65

ROUTES, FUP, SL, D DAY 15 NOV 65



SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96250

20 November 1965

AVPCG

SUBJECT: Operation

TO: Battalion and Separate Company Commanders
173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)
APO U. S. Forces 96250

1. The operation discussed 181330 November this Headquarters will be executed.
2. From 1300-1800 hours this date, only those personnel who have a need to know will discuss this operation. Effective 1800 hours this date Troops may be briefed. After individuals have been briefed they will be restricted to the immediate vicinity of their base camp. (Personnel of the 1st Infantry Division may be briefed as appropriate).
3. Written instructions will follow.

ELLIS W. WILLIAMSON
Brig Gen, U.S. Army
Commanding

PA

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NR.
2d Bn (Abn) 503d Inf
VO DAT, RVN
201430 H November 1965
MIS-1

OPORD 35-65

TASK ORGANIZATION:

TF ALPHA

A 2/503 (-)
C 2/503
AT Plat 2/503
Hvy Mort Plat 2/503
Sel Veh Hq 2/503

TF BRAVO

B 2/503
Plat A 2/503
8 APC D/16 Armor
14 APC 1/RAR

TF CHARLIE

Recon Plat 2/503
Hq 2/503 (-)
Sel Veh 2/503
Ground Sur Plat

1. SITUATION:

a. Enemy Forces: Current INTSUM.

b. Friendly Forces:

- (1) 173d Abn Bde continues moving forces north of the SONG IA NGA River.
- (2) 1/503d Inf (Abn) continues expanding airhead vic village of KA PHUONG LAM after heliborne assault 300830 Nov 65.
- (3) 1/RAR crosses SONG IA NGA in heliborne assault vic 846388 to secure bridge and clear area south of 2/503 Inf. 1/RAR prepared to replace knocked out bridge vic 856399.
- (4) 3 Btry 105 Arty GS.
1 Btry 155 Arty GS.

2. MISSION: 2/503 Inf (Abn) conducts mechanized and heliborne assaults north of SONG IA NGA River to secure area vic THANH DUC.

3. EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operation:

- (1) Phase I (301500 Nov) - C Co moves by vehicle to area vic Bde Hq and provides security for that area. B Co (+) moves by vehicle to vicinity northwest airstrip and receives 14 ea APC 1/RAR and 8 ea APC D/16 Armor.
- (2) Phase II (010630 Dec) - TF BRAVO moves to crossing point SONG IA NGA River; crosses and seizes Obj 1 and Obj 2. LZ SOUTH or EAST is selected and secured.
- (3) Phase III (010830) - TF ALPHA conducts heliborne assault LZ SOUTH or LZ EAST, moves thru Obj 2 and secures Psn KNIGHT and Obj 3.
- (4) Phase IV (010830 +) - TF BRAVO moves by road thru VO DU - crosses bridges secured by 1/RAR and joins 2/503 elements.
- (5) Phase V - Task organization ceases. A and B Co occupy village of THANH DUC and consolidate in perimeter defense.

b. A 2/503:

- (1) Move airstrip VO DAT prior to 010800 Dec.
- (2) Conduct heliborne assault LZ TBA, marry up with mechanized platoon and seize Obj 3.
- (3) Allow B 2/503 to pass thru positions on Obj 3 and support their attack by fire.
- (4) Pass thru B Co positions on Obj 4 and seize Obj 5.
- (5) Be prepared to seize Obj 6 ON ORDER.

c. B 2/503:

- (1) Move by vehicle 301600 Nov to vic 715328 with one plat A 2/503 and marry up with APC's from 1/RAR and D/16 Armor.
- (2) Move to crossing point (TBA) along SONG IA NGA and effect crossing seizing Obj 1, with attached plat, and Obj 2.
- (3) Move thru A Co position on Obj 3 and seize Obj 4.
- (4) Be prepared to seize Obj 6, by moving northwest of village along woodline ON ORDER.

d. C 2/503:

- (1) Move by vehicle 301500 Nov to Bde Hq and provide security force.
- (2) Move to airstrip VO DAT prior to 010800 Dec.
- (3) Conduct heliborne assault LZ TBA, passing thru Obj 2 and seize Psn KNIGHT.

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ORD 35-65 (Cont)

- (4) Remain KNIGHT and be prepared to assist in securing THAN DUC or securing Bn perimeter ON ORDER.
- e. Recon Plat 2/503:
 - (1) Recon routes for movement of B and C companies to vic Bde Ho and airstrip.
 - (2) Recon route to river crossing site.
 - (3) Recon route thru VO DU.
 - (4) Form and escort vehicle convoy thru VO DU and 1/RAR area to marry up with units vic Obj 2.
 - (5) Be prepared to be airlifted vic Obj 2 ON ORDER.
 - (6) Screen east of THAN DUC along road.
- f. Hvy Mort Plat 2/503:
 - (1) Move by vehicle prior to 010730 Dec to area vic Bn LOC.
 - (2) Air assault on LZ TBA after 010830.
 - (3) Occupy positions vic 855410 or 855415.
- g. AT Plat 2/503:
 - (1) Move by vehicle prior to 010800 Dec to west portion of airstrip VO DAT.
 - (2) Air assault on LZ TBA after 010830.
 - (3) Provide security and blocking force for Hq 2/503.
- h. Coordinating Instructions:
 - (1) Commander TF ALPHA - Maj Carmichael.
 - (2) Commander TB BRAVO - Maj Terry.
 - (3) Programed Time Schedule 01 Dec 65:
 - 0630 - TF BRAVO moves from vic airstrip.
 - 0715 - Airstrike on Obj 2.
 - 0730 - Artillery preparation of Obj 1 and 2.
 - 0745 - 1/RAR lands with 10 helicopters north of bridge.
 - 0830 - TF ALPHA moves for heliborne assault.
 - D Day - TF CHARLIE moves.
 - D Day + - Selected elements moves north of river.
 - (4) Crossing Point TF BRAVO will not be secured.
 - (5) 2 armed helicopters and 1 HUL HCPTR for use of Bn after completion of movement of TF ALPHA.
 - (6) Selected vehicles TF ALPHA be prepared to move with TF CHARLIE.
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: ADMINO.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:
 - a. Signal: No Change.
 - b. Command: CO 2/503 heliborne with CG 173d Abn Bde (Sep) during initial phases of assault. CP loc vic 855412.

Acknowledge.

DEXTER
Lt Col

Distribution: Special

Annex A - Operation Overlay

OFFICIAL:

TERRY
S3

OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS

3 Fd TP

1. Sub Unit 3 Fd Tp
2. Comd Capt AH Mac GREGOR
3. Operation No 14/65
4. Duration 5 Nov 65 to 9 Nov 65
5. Outlined Sub Unit Tasks
 - (a) Be Prepared to demolish tunnels, buildings and other installations.
 - (b) Be Prepared to assist in neutralizing booby traps and mines
 - (c) Carry reserve tear gas, explosives and demolition equipment
6. Sequence of Events and Comments

- (a) After arrival at the LZ 3 Fd Tp (-) was to report to B Coy HQ. B Coy HQ was in fact to guide 3 Fd Tp (-) into ^{their} loc once 3 Fd Tp (-) had reached the spurline. This did not happen for B Coy HQ were not located on the spurline however 3 Fd Tp (-) was ordered to report to "their SUNRAY" at the northern end of the spurline by B Coy HQ. "Their SUNRAY" was understood by this unit to be OC B Coy for this unit was under

page 2 of 4 pages

comd B Coy for D and D+1 days. Hence the search for B Coy HQ continued. It was known by this unit that Bn HQ was in fact at the northern end of the spurline.

Comment Where possible particularly in the beginning of an operation 3 Fd Tp (-) should travel with Bn HQ - from this position and almost as readily this unit can be available to any Rifle Coy.

(b) 3 Fd Tp (-) were called forward to give engineer assistance on D day at 1430 hrs at a village known as Xom Cay Xoai. On arrival at the village protected by a platoon from B Coy this unit commenced the search in detail. It became obvious quickly that the search was not going to be completed until 1900 hrs. A message to this effect was passed to OC B Coy whence this unit was informed to proceed to Bn HQ loc and revert to their command.

(c) D+1 The village search continued protected by a platoon from C Coy. Two demolition teams were used for the village search. Each team had four infantry attached as ~~spot~~ local protection and began the task at the south end of the village either side of the road moving North. The rest of the protection party were at either end of the village. Several documents, some clothing and

some magazines were found. The village in fact was deserted. The village ~~contained~~ consisted of some 150 huts and small buildings. Nearly ^{one} every of these had some form of bunker or air raid shelter either inside or attached to the outside of the hut. Approximately 20 tunnels six to fifteen feet long were found. One tunnel 12 feet deep and 20ft long and another 6 feet deep and 35 feet long were found and demolished. Several booby trap switches (not set) were found.

Comment For future calculations it can be assumed that a village consisting of some 120 huts can be searched in detail by two demolition teams in 6 hours.

(d) D+2 Two demolition teams with a protection party were to destroy two wells 32 ft deep after being resupplied with explosive and equipment in the village mentioned above. The resupply helicopter did not land until 1130 hrs thus allowing insufficient time for 100% demolition to occur.

(e) D+3 Two demolition teams again with a protection party completed the demolition of the aforementioned wells and demolished a third.

(f) D+4 The only task completed by this unit was to blow 12 mortar bomb blinds - this was accomplished successfully.

Assessment of operation

(a) From this unit's point of view much experience was gained from the operation; mainly in the form of sappers familiarizing themselves with battle noises, village search, tunnels (although small) and demolitions of several types. The helicopter assaults and extractions were also valuable experience.

(b) This unit was not able to use or had no call to use the MIGHTY MITE machine with tear gas. It is felt that if any ~~friendly~~ tunnel in a relatively friendly area is known to exist then very valuable experience would be gained by the troop practising searching employing the use of tear gas.

~~W. Woodruff~~ Capt
10 Nov 65

OC 3 FOTP RAE

SECRET

Amuse C to 11/1/65
OpO 1/1/65
dated 5 Nov 65

ALLOCATION OF RADIO EQUIPMENT

Sub Unit	AN/PRC 25	AN/PRC 10	Remarks
A Coy	5	1	1 x 10 set minimum
B Coy	5	1	"
C Coy	1	5	5 x 10 set minimum
D Coy	5	1	1 x 10 set minimum
Mor Pl	6	NIL	
Sig Pl (fwd)	4	NIL	
Sig Pl (rear)	2	-	
Atk Pl	NIL	2	
ASH Par Pl	NIL	2	
CO	1	NIL	
3 Fd Ty RTR	1	5	3 x 10 set provided by 1 RTR
Spare	2	-	

SECRET

1 RAR
BIEN HOA
29 Dec 65

Ops 59

Maps: 6242/1, 4. 6243/1, 2, 3, 4. 6244/2, 3. 6342/4. 6343/3, 4. 6344/3.

OpO 18/65.

1. Situation.a. Enemy Forces. See Annex A.b. Own Forces.

(1) 173 Bde with under comd addl medium arty sp to conduct search and destroy ops in area DUC HOA (5996), BAO TRAI (5304) and SE to SONG DONG (5096) and WEST of SONG DONG .

(2) Bde less Fwd LOC and 319 Arty Bn (-) to be airlifted BAO TRAI .

(3) Fwd LOC and 319 Arty Bn (-) moves by rd to BAO TRAI .

(4) 1RAR, 1/503, 2/503 airlifted to op areas .

(5) USAF provides air cover throughout.

c. Atts and dets .

(1) Remaining under comd FAC Team USAF

(2) Under comd from 1700 hrs 31 Dec. RRU Team

(3) det to comd 3/319 Arty Bn from 1700 hrs 31 Dec . 105 Bty RAA less four FO teams

(4) det to comd 173 Engr Coy from 0600 hrs 1 Jan . Plant 3 Field Tp RAE.

(5) det to comd 173 Bde from 0600 hrs 1 Jan until release. 1 APC Tp (PWLH)

2. Mission. To locate and destroy 506 LF Bn within TAOR 18/65 from 1 Jan 66 to 14 Jan 66 .3. Executiona. Gen Outline.

(1) Overlay Annex P (issued)

(2) Op conducted in five phases.

(a) Phase 1. Move to op base.

i. Rd move to SNAKE PIT .

ii. Airlift to BAO TRAI (RUBBER STAMP).

(b) Phase 2. Airlift from BAO TRAI (RUBBER STAMP) and to LZ SCOTCH (altn GIN) estb Bn Base for nights D/D+1 and D+1/D+2..../2. (c) Phase 3

- (c) Phase 3. Patrolling allotted sectors.
- (d) Phase 4. Repositioning of Bn bases by hel and allocation of new TAOR . NOT before D+5.
- (e) Phase 5. Extraction to BIEN HOA.

b. A Coy.

(1) Grouping.

- (a) Remaining under comd. Med Asst
- (b) Under comd from 1700 hrs 31 Dec. four SBs
FO Party 161
Field Bty

(2) Tasks.

- (a) Phase 1. Last in order of mov.
- (b) Phase 2.
 - i. Last in order of mov.
 - ii. Bn Reserve.
 - iii. Harbour to NORTH in Bn Base at LZ SCOTCH.

c. B Coy.

(1) Grouping.

- (a) Remaining under comd MFC
Med Asst
Interpreter
(ARVN)
- (b) Under comd from 1700 hrs 31 Dec. Four SBs
FO Party 105
Field Bty.

(2) Tasks.

- (a) Phase 1. 3rd coy in order of mov after Bn HQ Gp.
- (b) Phase 2.
 - i. 3rd coy in order of mov after Bn HQ Gp.
 - ii. Harbour to EAST in Bn Base at LZ SCOTCH.
- (c) Phase 3.
 - i. D+1. Patrol sector 3 return to base.
 - ii. D+2. Patrol sector 7.
 - .../3. D+3 Patrol sector 9

iii. D+3. Patrol sector 9; complete search of RIVER BANK by 1200 hrs.

d. C Coy.

(1) Grouping.

- (a) Remaining under comd MFC
Med Asst
- (b) Under comd from 1700 hrs 31 Dec. Four SBs
FO Party 105
Field Bty.
Interpreter
(1RAR)

(2) Tasks.

- (a) Phase 1. 1st coy in order of move.
- (b) Phase 2.
- i. Assault Coy onto LZ SCOTCH.
- ii. Harbour to WEST in Bn Base.
- (c) Phase 3.
- i. D+1. Patrol sector 1.
- ii. D+2. Patrol sector 5.
- iii. D+3. Patrol sector 8; complete search of RIVER BANK by 1200 hrs.

e. D Coy.

(1) Grouping.

- (a) Remaining under comd. Med A sst
- (b) Under comd from 1700 hrs 31 Dec. MFC
Four SBs
FO Party 105
Field Bty.
Interpreter
(1RAR)

(2) Tasks.

- (a) Phase 1. 2nd Coy in order of mov.
- (b) Phase 2.
- i. 2nd Coy in assault
- ii. Harbour SOUTH in Bn Base.
- (c) Phase 3.
- i. D+1. Patrol sector 2.
- ii. D+2. Patrol sector 6.
- .../4. iii. D+3. Patrol

iii. D+3. Patrol sector 10, complete search of RIVE R BANK by 1200 hrs.

f. Mor Pl.

(1) Grouping.

- (a) One sect with Bn HQ Gp.
- (b) One sect with 1 APC Tp PWLH.
- (c) One sect remains BIEN HOA.
- (d) MFCs to B, C and D Coys.

(2) Tasks.

- (a) Moves with Bn HQ Gp less APC sect.
- (b) Provide fire sp throughout op.

(c) Ammo.

- i. Carried by pl (-) 26 rds HE
4 rds WP.
- ii. Carried by APC 120 rds HE
20 rds WP
10 rds illg

iii. First line to be carried by mor veh with fwd LOC.

g. Aslt Pnr Pl.

(1) Grouping.

- (a) Phase 1. Moves with Bn HQ Gp.
- (b) Phase 2. Remains BAU TRAI. Moves fwd with 1 APC Tp PWLH on D+1.

(2) Tasks.

- (a) Protection Bn HQ.
- (b) Carry sufficient explosives for immediate tunnel dmls.
- (c) Carry tear gas (10 grenades) and 4 masks.
- (d) Two ZODIAC aslt craft with Fwd LOC.
- (e) One flame unit prepared with Fwd LOC.

h. Anti Tank Pl.

- (1) Provide protection Bn HQ Gp.
- (2) Carry M72 on scale 3 rds per sect.

.../5.

j. 1 APC Tp PWLH

- j. 1 APC Tp PWLH.
- (1) Grouping. Under comd 173 Bde until revert to comd 1 RAR (possibly on D+1).
- (2) Tasks.
- (a) Provide tactical tpt and fire power throughout op.
- (b) Be prepared to effect RIVER reconnaissance.
- k. 105 Field Bty.
- (1) Grouping.
- (a) FO party to each rifle coy.
- (b) BC party with Bn HQ.
- (c) LO with 3/319 Arty Bn.
- (2) Tasks.
- (a) Fire sp throughout op.
- (b) Fire Plan Annex C (to follow).
- l. 3 Field Tp.
- (1) Grouping.
- (a) Aslt Engrs with Bn HQ Gp.
- (b) Limited plant with 173 Engr Coy.
- (c) Remainder effect projects op base BIEN HOA under direction 2IC 1RAR.
- (2) Tasks.
- (a) Provide engr assistance for tunnel, bunkers, booby trap clearance, destruction, and gas clearance.
- (b) Protection Bn HQ Gp.
- m. Coord Instrs.
- (1) Order of mov phases 1 and 2.
- C Coy
D Coy
Bn HQ Gp
B Coy
A Coy.
- (2) Timings. Sequence of Events Annex B.
- (3) Embussing. As for op 16/65 with new order of mov.

.../6. (4) Air Mov

- (4) Air Mov.
- (a) Emplaning details to follow.
- (b) Unit DACO (2IC/UEO) responsible move from SNAKE PIT.
- (c) Asst S3 responsible move from BAU TRAI.
- (5) On arrival at assault LZ (SCOTCH or GIN) coys will assume same posture as for Bn Base.
- (6) Rules of engagement. SOP.
- (7) Reports. SOP
- (8) Recognition. SOP
- (9) Ammo. SOP. 2 each M72 per rifle sect or equivalent to be carried.
- (10) Tear Smoke.
- (a) Report codeword CRY BABY immediately following use.
- (b) 2 grenades per sect to be carried.
- (11) Coloured Smoke. SOP.
- (12) Poaching. SOP.
- (13) D Day. 1 Jan 66.
- (14) Air Sp. Air Sp on request throughout op. AGS Annex
- (15) Marker Balloons. SOP.

4.

Admin and Log.

- a. Rats.
- (1) Breakfast present loc 1 Jan.
- (2) 2 days rats carried. Expire after breakfast 3 Jan 66.
- b. Water.
- (1) SOP
- (2) Local sources are to be used. Water is to be sterilized and filtered.
- c. Resupply. SOP
- d. Batteries.
- (1) AN-PRC 25 one spare bty.
- (2) AN-PRC 10 two spare bty's
- e. VCC, en docus. SOP
- f. Casevac. SOP

.../7. RAP be with

g. RAP. Loc with Bn HQ Gp

h. Clothing.

(1) Sect Kitbags. These are NOT only to include a spare set of clothing but also

(a) Spare pair boots per man.

(b) Spare pair socks per man placed inside the boot.

(2) Each man is to carry two spare pairs of socks in his pack.

5.

Comd and Sig.

a. Bn HQ. Located in area LZ SCOTCH on arrival. Further moves related to coy movement during op.

b. Signal.

(1) Radio.

(a) Codes: SOI 25 - 12, KAC Code HE 741, KAC - JJ Code 287 (numbers code and authentication) are in effect throughout operation.

(b) Equipment Allocation. Annex C attached.

(c) Radio nets: Annex D attached. Bn comd net is to open at 010730 hrs. Bn Adm log net from Bn HQ to open on estab of A Ech. Adm Log net (HF) is to open on estab of A Ech.

(d) Spare Equipment. One spare handset H33 and one antenna AT 271 per 10 set is to be issued.

(2) Line.

(a) Rifle Coys: 1 reel unit CE11 filled and 1 x tele are to be carried. Line is to be laid immediately on joining Bn Har posn.

(b) Bn HQ. SOP

(c) Sig Pl. 400 metres of D10 cable to be carried as reserve.

.../8

c. Nicknames

c. Nicknames.(1) Tac.

Serial	Nickname	Meaning	Issued by
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	GUT RUMBLE	am moving, or move.	
2.	COW PAT	have reorg, have RV, or am in harbour, or as executive command.	
3.	PACK SADDLE	Am ready to move, prepare to move.	
4.	RUBBER STAMP	BAU TRAI	
5.	WET SOCK	SONG DONG or ORIENTAL RIVER.	
6.	UNCLE TOM	CAMBODIA/CAMBODIANS.	
7.	BARNEY RUBBLE	ARVN/PF	
8.	CASTLE PEAK	Bn Harbour or Def Posn	
9.	PIRATE PLANK	River/Canal/Stream crossing Pt	
10.	BIG DIPPER	Possible APC Entrance/Exit on Waterways.	
11.	ARNHEM LAND	Area WEST of WET SOCK	

(2) Block Nicknames.

Serial	A Coy	B Coy	C Coy	D Coy	Bn HQ
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1.	SQUARE LEG	BAR RAIL	OLD SALT	FLAT HEAD	LAST POST
2.	TENT PEG	THICK MALLETT	LAMBS WOOL	SNAIL SHELL	YARD STICK
3.	PINE TENT	KEY RING	STEEL CLIP	DEAD FISH	KITCHEN SINK
4.	TORN PACE	STAB KICK	PEPPER TREE	STUMPY DOG	GUEST BED
5.	LIFE BELT	HEAVY SLAG	DIM LIGHT	TINY TOP	STRIP HEATER
6.	PAINT WORK	CAR BRAKE	HOT SLING	TABLE END	STALE FRUIT
7.	WATER BOY	DRY BED	SHORT CAKE	BRAIN STORM	PLASTIC DISH
8.	CURRY TIN	MEAL TICKET	ROW BOAT	SHARP POINT	HALF NIP
9.	LONG BOARD	SAND HEAP	HOT BRANDY	TRAFFIC LIGHT	WET DECK
10.	ROUND PIPE	DIRTY LOOK	GOLD TOOTH	ROUGH GLUE	MONEY BAGS

.../9. d. Q Hr

- d. Q Hr. Q hr for the period of the operation is 1400 hrs
- e. Passwords. To be issued separately.
- f. Points of Origin.

Serial	Date/Time	Point of Origin
(a)	(b)	(c)
1.	300001 - 310001	FISH 3699, BOY 0752, STATE 9957
2.	310001 - 010001	CITY 0138, COLOUR 9344, GIRL 0456
3.	010001 - 020001	COUNTRY 9448, BOY 0052, CAR 0750
4.	020001 - 030001	FISH 0442, CITY 5093, COLOUR 0655
5.	030001 - 040001	COUNTRY 4001, CAR 5090, DOG 5008
6.	040001 - 050001	BOY 5410, CITY 6099, GIRL 4392

- g. Synchronization.

- (1) Pre-operation By radio at 010745 hrs.
- (2) During op. Approx 0800 hrs daily.

Authentication.

James [Signature]
Maj
OC Sp Coy

A V PREECE, MWO
CO 1 RAR

Annexes.

- A - Intelligence (Issued)
- B - Sequence of Events
- C - Equipment Allocation
- D - Radio Nets
- E - Fire Plan (To follow)
- F - Admin and Log (To follow)
- P - Op Overlay
- Q - AGS

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION

	<u>Copy Number incl Annexes</u>	<u>Annex F</u>
A Coy	1	1
B Coy	2	2
C Coy	3	3
D Coy	4	4
Sp Coy	5	5
Admin Coy	6-8	6-8
Mor Pl	9-10	-
Aslt Pnr Pl	11	-
Anti Tank Pl	12	-
Sig Pl	13	-
1 APC Tp PWLH	14	9
3 Field Tp RAE	15-16	10
105 Field Bty RAA	17-20	-
161 Field Bty RNZA	21-23	-
RRU	24	-
FAC USAF	25	-
173 AB Bde (Sep)	26-27	11
1/503	28	-
2/503	29	-
3/319	30	-
Bde Avn Offr	31	-
Bde ALO	32	-
CO	33	-
2IC	34	12
Oc Sp Coy	35	13
Adjt	36	-
Asst Adjt	37	14
IO	38	-
LO	39	-
RSM	40	-
Int Sect	41	15
AAFV	42	16
Comds Diary	43-45	17-19
File	46	20
Spare	47-50	21-23

SECRET

SECRET

Annex B to
1RAR OpO 18/65 dated 29 Dec 65

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Serial	Time	Event
(a)	(b)	(c)
	<u>D-1</u>	
1.	310900 hrs	O Group
2.	311800 hrs	UEDs conference
	<u>D Day</u>	
3.	010810 hrs	SUEDs leave for SNAKE PIT
4.	010815 hrs	Coys at Embussing Pt
5.	010820 hrs	Loading commences
6.	010825 hrs	Depart for SNAKE PIT
7.	010850 hrs	Arrive SNAKE PIT
8.	010905 hrs	Prep to load on helis
9.	010915 hrs	1st Lift 1RAR
10.	011015 hrs	RAR lift complete BAO TRAI
11.	011515 hrs	} 15 minutes notice to move from BAO TRAI to LZ SCOTCH. } SUEDs to Asst S3 for briefing at BAO TRAI
12.	011535 hrs	Air Force preparation LZ SCOTCH.
13.	011600 hrs	1st elements 1RAR load LZ WHISKEY (BAO TRAI)
14.	011605 hrs	arty preparation LZ SCOTCH
15.	011615 hrs	H Hr 1 st elements 1RAR land SCOTCH.
	<u>D+1</u>	
16.	-	1 APC Tp PWLH follow up to SCOTCH.
17.	020730 hrs	Patrolling commences

SECRET

SECRET

Annex C to -
1RAR OpO 18/65 dated 29 Dec 65



EQUIPMENT ALLOCATION

Sub Unit	25set	10set	A510	Aerial RC 292
A Coy	4	2	-	-
B Coy	3	3	-	-
C Coy	3	3	-	-
D Coy	4	2	-	-
Md Pl	5	-	-	-
Htk Pl	-	1	-	-
Pnr Pl	-	1	-	-
Sig Pl (fwd)	5	1	1	2
Sig Pl (rear)	1	-	2	1

Note:- The complete issue of AN-PRC 25 sets is dependant upon their arrival. A revised allocation is to be effected if this occurs.

SECRET

RADIO NETS



Bn comd Net VHF

f1 - 50.7 Mc/s
f2 - 42.3 Mc/s

Bn Adm Log Net VHF/HF

f1 - 40.7 Mc/s, 2056 Kc
f2 - 38.8 Mc/s, 3172 Mc/s

Auth: *ef* 29/12


SECRET

Maps: PHU QUONG
SAIGON
DUC HOA 1:50,000
CU CHI

Annex P to IRAR
OpO 18/65 dated
29 Dec 65

OVERLAY BOUNDARIES, SECTORS

AIRPHOTOMOSAIC issued 28 December 65




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SECRET

Appendix 3 to
Annex F to IRAR
Op 18/65 dated
29 Dec 65



52

OVERLAY FOR ALPHEO MOSAIC
issued 13 Dec 65




Appendix 1 to
Annex Q to LRAR
Opj 18/65 dated
29 Dec 65

AIR GRID SYSTEM



90

40



~~CO (EP)~~
FILE

OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS

3 FIELD TROOP RAE

1. SUB UNIT 3 Field Troop RAE
2. COMD Capt A. H. MacGREGOR
3. OPERATION No 16/65
4. DURATION 21 Nov 65 to 17 Dec 65

5. OUTLINE SUB UNIT TASKS

- (a) Protection Bn HQ
- (b) Be prepared to demolish tunnels, buildings and other installations
- (c) Be prepared to assist in neutralising booby traps and mines.
- (d) Carry reserve tear gas, explosives and demolition equipment
- (e) Read maintenance and repair as allotted.
- (f) Bridge and culvert maintenance and construction
- (g) Assist in village search
- (h) LZ Construction
- (j) Engineer Support to 2/503 Bn

6. ORGANISATION AND EQUIPMENT

Annex A written under the following headings:

- (a) Concept of Operation
- (b) Organisation
- (c) Vehicles and plant

7. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

DAY	EVENT AND/OR TASK	PERSONNEL AND/OR EQUIPMENT	COMMENT
D	Air assault to VODAT with 1 RAR	1 officer & 9 OR (Two demolition teams)	
D+1	Bn attack feature BRASS MONKEY and move to DUCHANH	As above with Bn HQ	
			⚡ D+2 Investigate tunnel


DAY (a)	EVENT AND/OR TASK (b)	PERSONNEL AND/OR EQUIPMENT (c)	COMMENT (d)
D+2	Investigate tunnel 8' deep 6' long then room about 6'x6'x6'. Booby trapped hand grenade was found set up and was neutralised.	Demolition team of four	Strong light is needed to pick up nylon cord or wire incorporated in the booby traps.
D=2	Move up by road to VODAT of remainder of brigade Convoy about 8 miles long) Troop harbour at VODAT on brigade perimeter.	<p>Vehs: 1xLandrover&trlr 4x2½ ton tipper 1x2½ ton truck GS 1x25 ton low loader</p> <p>Plant: 1x Cat 12 grader 1xTd15B 1xOliver dozer 1xOliver FEL</p> <p>Attached: 8x5ton bridging trucks (60ft SS Bailey Bridge) plus 16 EM</p> <p>Personnel: 1 Offr& 7 ORs main body travelling in 2x2½ ton (Mk 111)</p>	Move of approx 60 miles took 8 hrs. At many stages the vehicles were doing 2mph and at others 50 mph. Control of each element was hard to keep as some civilians who were travelling along the road and the move was through small towns where the road traffic wasn't halted
D+3	Set out at 1630 to join bn by road. Road cut in seven places within 100 yds. Gaps 1 yd to 5 yds wide and up to 4 ft deep. Water is actually flowing thru gaps. Furthermore many craters are in the road.	All equipment and stores with the exception of 1 offr and 9 ORs with 1 RAR. The attached BB section now detached.	The repair of the road was assessed to take 4 hrs work and would include laying a 23' dry spah bridge. The US Eng Coy was asked to aid with provision of approx 60 yds of rock for fill. This was available at the airfield at VODAT about 7000 yds WEST. Burnt or scorched wood (used as charcoal) lined 200 yds of both the EAST & WEST approaches. The width between the stacks of charcoal was only wide enough for an oxen cart (say 6 ft).
D+3	House and bunker search	Demolition team of 1 NCO and 3 ORs	/ D+4

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
D+4	<p>Repair road at charcoal area and join 1 RAR ASP. Task completed at 1430 hrs to a stage 2 wheel drive vehicles could negotiate successfully. Engr responsibility for further improvements now US Engr Coy. This unit allotted an extension of road forward from 1 RAR position.</p>	<p>All RAE requirements stores and personnel on site but used in the main a TD 15B. US 5 ton dump trucks and 23' dry span bridging used. TD 15B pushed rocks into cut road and dozed charcoal off road.</p>	<p>One 36' culvert (similar to ARMCO culverting) was laid together with the 23' dry span bridge. This aluminium bridge is excellent for its purpose and was built in an hour with 15 men, complete with approach ramps. The US Engr Coy subsequently recovered this bridge replacing it with 3 x 36" culverts. The US 5 ton dump trucks carted 15 loads of rock and co-operation with the US Engr Coy was pleasing. It is of interest to note that this unit was on the Engr Coy net with an AN PRC 25.</p>
	<p>3 culverts repaired on road before joining 1RAR</p>	<p>The repair was in the main done by replacing stringers (15' long) and laying PSP (12' x 2') over the culverts. In one case the culvert was rebuilt completely.</p>	<p>The PSP was carried on a 2½ ton tipper but the supply at this stage was nearly exhausted (some used at charcoal area).</p>
	<p>Cat 12 Grader attached to 173 Bde Engr Coy for work in VODAT (roads and airfields)</p>	<p>One operator detached to US Engr Coy</p>	<p>The grader was used on many projects aiding the villagers mainly roads and market squares</p>
D+5	<p>Bn operation centred at VOSU 5000 yds from DUCHANH. Eng task was to repair road to VOSU and thence to right boundary in preparation for movement of 10 Div (ARVN) through our TAOR.</p>	<p>All engrs with all equipment with the exception of detached personnel.</p>	<p>Engrs moved escorted by PCs after ground troops cleared the area and before any other wheeled vehicles. The grenades were inexpertly set. The nylon cord breaking when the VC intended to detonate the charge. The grenades were the CHINESE hand thrown type with a bamboo handle. The grenade has a friction type igniter and may or may not have a time fuse of 3 to 4 seconds incorporated. These grenades in fact had a fuse.</p>
	<p>Engr ground party recce of road found nylon cord on the road going down to booby traps. On extraction found to be three hand grenades.</p>	<p>1 officer and 2 ORs with mine detector rope and prodder,</p>	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
D+5	Repair culvert	Two demolition teams	12 ft culvert - in fact small bridges with rotten decking
D+6	Relocated in DUC HANH	All	No engineer tasks
D+7	Extended LZ Cut down trees (3"dia) for Arty fire	Dozer TD 15B Chain saws in the main for tree cutting	This unit has 9 chain saws each of them being issued to a sapper. The requirement exists for more chain saws and sharpening files in the CES.
D+8	Engr recco Bn relocated in VOZU	Bde Engr (Maj) and OC 3 Fd Tp in section of PCs All engineers and equipment	10 Div (ARVN) with their heavy equipment had depressed the road for a length of 35' and depth 2' 6" to 3' in a particular soft wet patch. Nearly all our vehicles had to be towed through with PCs
	Repair road. A simple bridge 40' long was built over the depressed yards. Three trees cut on site and used as bearers and timber decking taken from the village was used.	TB 15B - placed curves. Extensive use of chain saws, hammers, nails etc. 12 men on site working. Sec PCs protection together with 16 engineers as protection.	Timber and PSP was asked for Answer none. A supply of these engineers stores should be readily available in some separate engineer stores dump in BIEN HOA. This task commenced 1400 hrs (D+6)
D+9	Continue road repair	As above plus a latterite pit was opened up at VOZU. 4 tippers and a 5 ton US veh attached with OLIVER FEL worked to cart gravel to boggy site.	Latterite was plentiful mainly on the tops of hills. A TD 15B opened up the pit. Task completed by 1315 hrs. Must be realized that besides the bridge a section of road 200 yds long with water either side was built up one foot. Trouble with rotten timber decking - good timber available.
	Reallotment of engr responsibilities which now are (a) Road from VOZU to MAPU (14,000 yds) (b) WP at VOZU (c) Provide engr sp to 2/503 Bn at MAPU	Bde Engr (Maj) OC 173 Bde Engr Coy OC 3 Fd Tp	By air recce main tasks on roads was 100' bridge steel truss (Eiffel) existing with no abutments. Early road recce is necessary before any accurate assessment is made. Arrangements to be made for grader to be returned to 3 Fd Tp next day.


D-10
and
D-11

Task: Fix bridge half way between VOZU - DUC HANH. An engineer recon and work party with PCs and infantry protection arrived bridge site at 1500 hrs. Another bridge either upstream or downstream would be a difficult and long task. A relatively quick but chancey solution would be to lower the bridge by demolishing the concrete piles and cutting the bridge trusses at the already broken point of one of the trusses.



15' from the end this truss was cut through in most places but still held together

The BRIDGE had been Bombed By USAF



Rough Side View of CD
(Side AB was not Damaged at all)

The solution was to lower or drop the bridge to new abutments (bush timber to points at X and Y). On D+10 the bridge was cut at E and F and thus dropped to an abutment at X. The concrete piles at C was blown with a beehive charge and shattered leaving a BB stringer sitting upright as reinforcement. At B and D the solution was not as simple. The bank was soft and only 3 ft existed between the piers and the river so that it was hoped to blow the bridge piers first and then in a separate charge blow the BB stringer which would then be revealed. (Assuming all piers were the same).

A TD 15B anchored on the road beyond AC with winch cable to points on the bridge at B and D would prevent the sudden dropping of the bridge when concrete and steel piers demolished.


D+11 Tippers carted laterite to road on points BD side of bridge (stock-piling)

TD 15B was bogged for over 2 hrs in endeavouring to cross the river. Main reason so much time was taken in extraction was trouble with the winch working in the water. Two PCs aided by providing an anchor for the dozer cable.

The concrete piers at B and D had far more reinforcing in than did the piers at A and C thus the original idea was changed. The dozer was able to winch the bridge in the direction B to A so that the bracing frame at the end of the steel truss was the only necessary cutting needed to drop the bridge at Y. It can be seen that a 100% certainty of correct cutting charges was required on the bridge at B and D (so that the bridge would not twist when the cutting charges exploded).

The gravel carted was sufficient to repair the bridge abutments once the bridge sat at X and Y, At 1310 hrs the bridge was completed

1 Officer and 14 ORs worked at the site throughout with associated plant and vehicle drivers



(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
D+11	Water point turn around area near river at VOZU	Grader and vehicles carting latterite Operational by 1800 hrs.	WP is a US 1500 galper hr truck mounted type. This was detached to the troop from US Eng Coy for a WP for 2/503 Bn and 1 RAR. Protection at the WP was a company from 1 RAR.
	Replace rotten decking on bridge at WP	Demolition team	
	Search river bank for tunnels and bunkers	1 officer and 8 ORs plus a platoon of infantry	Many small bunkers found in river banks with clothing and equipment in them but no weapons.
D+12	Repair road towards MAPU	Latterite pit FEL trucks and grader working with small protection party from infantry	
	Repair culvert (little bridge 15' wide)	Two demolition teams	Had to use all local material These are difficult to come by
	Search and destroy small tunnel in C Coy TAOR	Two demolition teams	The area contained a number of rice caches. The tunnel was nothing more than a hole in the ground.
	Recce to MAPU	OC and wireless operator plus 2/503 protection party	Security provided by 2/503 Bn. Required to build 50' 3 span bridge piers existing and timber stringers on site.
	TD 15B blown head gasket		
D+13	Build bridge at MAPU	1 offr 12 ORs plus protection party	Again all decking taken from village but much of it was rotten. Constant repair and slow driving will be necessary. Bridge completed 1700 hrs
	Clear an area (about 3 acres) marked with danger signs in VOZU village	Two demolition teams with mine detectors and prodders	Found steel pangee stakes placed in small pits covered with grass. Sharpened bamboo stakes found placed at 30 deg to the ground in the ground. 8' and 4' bamboo stakes placed vertically in ground to presumably prevent area being used as an LZ or para landing

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
D+13	<p>Village search in conjunction with infantry and Popular Force pln</p> <p>Road repair</p> <p>Fill in trenches in VOZU dug along all streets</p>	<p>Two demolition teams</p> <p>As for D+12</p> <p>OLIVER dozer infantry protection party</p>	<p>Tunnels virtually non-existent. Each house has a bunker presumably for protection against air attack</p> <p>Trenches were 18" wide and 3' deep fairly straight but often zig zagging</p>
D+ 14	<p>Village search, trenches refilled cleared booby trapped area, and road repair.</p> <p>TD 15B detached to US Engr Coy.</p>	<p>As for D+ 13</p>	<p>Villagers very happy about backfilling trenches. Village search fruitless.</p> <p>Head gasket repaired.</p>
D+ 15	<p>As for D+ 14</p> <p>Rec to 2/503 loc - Main need for 28' single span bridge.</p>	<p>As for D+ 13</p> <p>OC and wireless Op with protection party from 2/503</p>	<p>Main problem of bridge will be placement of stringers. Cleared the use of PCs with 2/503.</p>
D+ 16	<p>Village search Refilling trenches, road repair.</p> <p>Bridge at 2/503 loc. 28 ft single span</p> <p>On RTU a bridge was repaired, on leaving this site the mortar red - this on checking was reputed not to be US was the first round received.</p>	<p>As for D+ 13</p> <p>1 Offr 12 Ors sided by PCs and a platoon inf for protection.</p>	<p>A need for an interpreter exists with our troops working with PF platoon.</p> <p>Finished in 5 hrs-used local timber for decking and trees for stringers. PCs hauled stringers to and across bridge site.</p> <p>the working party was although a white phosphorus</p>
D=17	<p>30 ft Single span bridge 2/503 location</p> <p>Village search and road repair.</p>	<p>As for D=16</p> <p>As for D+ 13</p>	<p>Again PCs aided in placing stringers.</p> <p>Village now finished. Searching yielded nothing of value except scale diagram of owners of rice paddies. TD 15B returned this loc.</p>

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
D+ 17	Oliver dozer out of action.		Should be able to fix tomorrow.
D+ 18	Road repair up to MAPU now. Oliver repaired and worked filling trenches. Tools reconditioned in defence location.	Along with TD 15B.	Main supply route is now in fairly good condition. Trucks carted average of 105 yds of gravel per day. This requirement is continuing but today was the first day available.
D+ 19	Servicing Refilling trenches. Recce bridge site 50 ft x 6 ft over swampy area in rice paddies.	Trucks and Grader Oliver and TD 15B OC, Tp Sgt Wireless Op and protection party.	This job ^{is} for villagers and is only just outside the village. Villagers very pleased and will provide materials.
D+ 20	Urgent task LZ in 2/503 TAOR, called 1300 hrs (The LZ was to be built in the hills on a side slope to take out a huge cache of rice found). Oliver repaired and worked filling trenches. Tools reconditioned in defence location.	1 Offr and 7 Ors (3 chain saws).	An air recce was done and a timing made to RV at an LZ 1000 yds from the Coy posn in the middle of which was situated the required LZ. The party from 3 rd Tp was not met at the LZ and continued to the Coy posn without escort-apologies followed. A large area had to be cleared (with 20 trees 2' in dia) because of the wind down drafts and the slope the LZ would be on. A helicopter was ordered to land at 1900 hrs (dusk) but the size of LZ would not enable him to extract full loads. The party was all back to 1 RAR at 2000 hrs and arrangements made for 2 men to return to finish LZ tomorrow.
D+ 21	Servicing Refilling trenches. Recce bridge site 50 ft x 6 ft over swampy area in rice paddies.	Trucks and Grader Oliver and TD 15B OC, Tp Sgt Wireless Op and protection party.	This job ^{is} for villagers and is only just outside the village. Villagers very pleased and will provide materials.
D+ 22	Urgent task LZ in 2/503 TAOR, called 1300 hrs (The LZ was to be built in the hills on a side slope to take out a huge cache of rice found).	1 Offr and 7 Ors (3 chain saws).	An air recce was done and a timing made to RV at an LZ 1000 yds from the Coy posn in the middle of which was situated the required LZ. The party from 3 rd Tp was not met at the LZ and continued to the Coy posn without escort-apologies followed. A large area had to be cleared (with 20 trees 2' in dia) because of the wind down drafts and the slope the LZ would be on. A helicopter was ordered to land at 1900 hrs (dusk) but the size of LZ would not enable him to extract full loads. The party was all back to 1 RAR at 2000 hrs and arrangements made for 2 men to return to finish LZ tomorrow.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
D+ 20	Finish LZ at 2/503	2 Ors 1 Chain saw	Completed 1000 hrs
	Bridge 50' x 6' at VOZO (Civil action project).	9 Ors	Completed at 1600 hrs (5 span of 10') Villagers immensely pleased.
	Refilling trenches	Both dozers.	
D+21	Refillin trenches	Both dozers and grader.	Grader limited to straight trenches only-finished today have filled approx 12 miles trenches.
	Lent US Engr Coy trucks to work on road back from VOZU towards DUCHANU	3 Tippers	Broke a rear axle. Move planned for 1 RAR to go VODAT tomorrow-will have to tow.
	Repair decking on small bridges	9 Ors. and tipper	This was caused through fast a careless driving. 2/503 was warned about rotten timber decking in relation to speed. Tp Sgt reported many more bridges need repair and XO of 2/503 required an engr recce of all the bridges ASP. Movement plan for 1 RAR to VODAT commencing 1030 hrs Recce to be before 1030hrs
D+ 22	Recce to 2/503	CC and wireless Op	State of small bridges is unbelievable. Absolutely no care or effort has been made on 2/503 part . Requires immediate attention
	Repair small bridges in 2/503 loc.	1 Offr 16 Ors - Rover and Tipper.	Replacement of decking was the main problem this had to be stripped from deserted houses. 9 bridges were repaired. As 2/503 planned to stay in loc further 3 days permission was granted for NCO and 7 men to stay in loc with 2/503 (with a tipper) for a constant progressive repair task.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
D+ 22	Moved to VODAT	All except those at MAPU (2/503 location)	Uneventfull - had to tow a tipper.
D+ 23	Dug in, Rest and service machines Repair bridges MAPU	8 Ors	Warning order for another operation commencing 17 Dec.
D+ 24	Repair bridges MAPU Clear Village site <u>Movement Plan</u> TD 15B Olive FEL and Tipper Oliver Dozer and Tipper NCO - Attached to A Ech	8 Ors Dozer TD 15B with operators attached to 173 Bde US Engr Coy for next operation. 1 RAR	Returned this loc at 1600hs Attached to US Engr Coy.
(e)	7 Demo Team OC and Tp Sgt 2 Wireless Ops	Total 32 to continue on to next operation	(d)
D+ 25	Movement to BIEN HOA Dug in, Rest and service machines Repair bridges MAPU	Pers and equip mentioned in D+ 24 8 Ors	Low loader blew 5 tyres consequently left with TD 15B and operators at XUAN LOC. Alternative arrangements made by Tp Offr at BIEN HOA for another low loader and protection party to pick up the TD 15B and low loader, 3 days later.
D+ 24	Repair bridges MAPU Clear Village site <u>Movement Plan</u> TD 15B Olive FEL and Tipper Rest day for most Sprs Pers and Equipment mentioned to D+ 24 attached to US Engr Coy.	Dozer TD 15B with operators attached to 173 Bde US Engr Coy for next operation. 1 Offr 31 Ors 1 RAR	The dozer walked 10 miles into XUAN LOC at 5 MPH with small protection party - remainder of party had to continue to BIEN HOA. 173 Bde US Engr Coy
D+ 26	Commencement operation 17/65 Stores truck required by owners and could be released. All other personnel and equipment return with Bde Column to BIEN HOA next day.	1 Offr 31 Ors	a tipper.
D+ 25	Movement to BIEN HOA Dug in, Rest and service machines	Pers and equip mentioned in D+ 24	Low loader blew 5 tyres consequently left with TD 15B and operators at XUAN LOC.

8. ASSESSMENT OF OPERATION

(a) This troop had a tremendous amount of work to do on this operation particularly in providing and maintaining a main supply route. Much was learnt and valuable experience gained on the construction aspects of field engineering (particularly bridge building).

(b) All the plant and equipment used proved valuable - particularly the FEL and the TD 15B. The TD 15B on some occasions was very close to bridge limitations. Its large side could be a limitation. Lessons were learnt with protection parties working with plant but it must be stressed that the enemy were particularly inactive and thus protection parties were relaxed particularly in size.

(c) It is thought that the bridge which was lowered or dropped by mainly using explosives was probably the most interesting and valuable task to the FE. On one occasion in this bridge (luckily not important) some explosive did not detonate. In fact the detonating cord detonated but shattered the TNT around which it was wrapped. It can be seen that had this happened during the latter stages of the task the results would have proved almost certainly disastrous. A 100% certainty cannot be assured with the US explosives and some steps will be taken by this unit to obtain AUST explosives.

(d) The need has arisen in this operation for a brigade dump of engineers stores eg. timber and PSP. This dump should be a BIEN HOA under Brigade Control - the authority for the stores to be released being an operational demand from say B Echelon in our organisation.

(e) Throughout this operation two M 60's have been carried in the Tp perimeter. There is a very real need for further instruction on this weapon.

(a) CONCEPT OF OPERATION

The operation took place in the PHUOC TAY Province which is the fifth largest rice bowl in VIETNAM. Essentially allied troops were to provide security for the civilian population whilst they harvested the rice but more important still to stop the VC taking the rice. Therefore from the outset it was thought that the operation would take a considerable time, in fact it was 26 days and then the brigade moved to a new location 20 miles further SOUTH to conduct a search and destroy operation for five days.

The area as one can imagine is flat and low lying. Many parts of the country is swamp. Flanking the 'bowl' were extensive mountain ranges with their accompanying heavy forest cover. Many streams laced the area they were wide with the usual eroded banks typical of lowland waterways. Secondary growth existed in part around the higher area but in the main there was little vegetation with the exception of long (3') grass.

The operation was conducted by 173 ABN BDE plus two attached infantry battalions. A fire support base, with A Ech complete with kitchens, LAD etc was established at VODAT. At VODAT there was an airstrip capable of taking C130s.

Battalion was allotted a separate TAOR and worked independantly of each other. After an initial period 1 RAR established a battalion base with two companies and Bn HQ and had two independant companies operating in an area 5,000 yards away. The main tasks of the engineers was road maintenance, river crossings, (culverts and bridges) and village search.

(ii)

(b) ORGANISATION (Personnel)

During the complete operation the unit organisation changed several times as can be seen from the following table:

DAY	ORGANISATION	REMARKS
D D+5	1 officer 9 ORs travelling with Bn HQ	This consisted of 2 demolition teams of 4 men each and a recce element of an officer and 1 OR. Aim was to give bn comd an estimate as to when the road would be open for A Ech vehicles.
D+2 D+5	1 officer and 32 ORs Att 4 ORs (US Army) Det 5 ORs	Opening of MSR for A Ech vehicles. 20 ton flat bed and 10 ton tractor 5 ton dump truck 1 Det to A Ech - stores 4 det 173 Bde Engrs with plant.
D+5- D+24	2 officers and 43 ORs Att 4 ORs (US) Det 2 ORs	7 demolition teams HQ element, Plant Ops, Dvrs and stores. Annex A (cont)
D+25	1 Officer 12 ORs Att 4 ORs (US)	This element with majority of plant and vehicles returned in brigade convoy to BIEN HOA
D+2 to D+25	1 NCO (Lance corporal)	Situated in A Ech to handle all Engr maintenance on operational demands.
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D+25	1 Officer 12 ORs Att 4 ORs (US)	This element with majority of plant and vehicles returned in brigade convoy to BIEN HOA
D+2 to D+25	1 NCO (Lance corporal)	Situated in A Ech to handle all Engr maintenance on operational demands.

(c) VEHICLES AND PLANT

TYPE	USE/ COMMENTS	REMARKS
3/4 ton truck utility GS	OCs Rover	
1/2 ton trailer GS cargo	Stores trailer	
4x2 1/2 ton truck dump	Haul vehicles	2 of these vehs used as unit transport.
1x TD 15B		Proved invaluable in opening pits and hauling
1x OLIVER FEL) 1x OLIVER Dozer)	Because of their size and portability these tractors have proved an asset. where large machines would 'sink' these tractors can work.	
1x CAT 12 Grader		
<u>ATTACHED</u>		
1x trailer 20 ton flat bed	This was attached from 588 Engrs for transporting the TD 15B. The requirement exists for a low loader per TD 15B.	
1x tractor 10 ton		
1x truck dump 5 ton	Haul vehicle	Att from 173 Eng Coy
1x truck cargo 2 1/2 ton	Stores truck - a theatre increment of one 2 1/2 ton GS truck has been submitted in a previous report. Obviously if a 2 1/2 ton GS tipper is used the hauling capability of the unit is reduced - this is undesirable.	Att from 3/319 Arty
<u>DETACHED</u>		
1x TD 15B		Det to 173 Bde Engrs
Other machines that were also detached for periods up to four days are:		
1x TD 15B 1x trailer 20 ton flat bed 1x tractor 10 ton 1x OLIVER Dozer 1x OLIVER FEL 1x CAT 12 Grader	} } All det to 173 Bde Engrs }	

OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS3 Field Troop

1. SUBUNIT 3 Field Troop RAE
2. COMD Capt A.H. MacGREGOR
3. OPERATION NO 17/65 Continuation from 16/65
4. DURATION 17 Dec 65 to 21 Dec 65
5. OUTLINE SUBUNIT TASKS
 - (a) Protection Bn HQ
 - (b) Be prepared to demolish tunnels, buildings and other installations
 - (c) Be prepared to assist in neutralising booby traps and mines
 - (d) Carry reserve tear gas, explosives and demolition equipment.

6. ORGANISATION AND EQUIPMENT(a) Concept of Operation

In general terms the operation was to be a two brigade operation taking place EAST of SAIGON (about half way between SAIGON and VUNG TAU) 173 Bde were to operate on the Eastern half of the two brigade TAOR. 1 RAR were to land in the north and work south towards 2/503 Bn who were to land in the South and work North of the 173 Bde TAOR. A fire support base and supporting units together with 1/503 Bn were to be at COURT NEY on the Eastern side of the Bde TAOR.

A river was the dividing line between the TAOR belonging to 1/503 Bn and 1 RAR. A large VC base and training camps was reported to be along the general line of the river. The area was hilly covered with dense primary and secondary growth with many streams existing.

(b) Organisation and Equipment

(i) With 1 RAR 7 Demolition teams of 4 men each and 4 men on HQ. All demolition teams carried 30 lbs explosive.

(ii) With US Engr Coy - 1 x TD 15B, 1 x Oliver dozer 1 x Oliver FEL, two x 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton tipper with an NCO and 5 men (drivers and operators).

/Sequence of events and Comments.

7. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AND COMMENTS

DAY (a)	EVENT AND/OR TASK (b)	PERSONNEL AND/OR EQUIPT (c)	COMMENTS (d)
D	Move by CHINOOK VODAT to XUAN LOC	1 Offr 31 Ors	
	XUAN LOC to Heliborne assault LZ	1 Offr 31 Ors	Bn harbour at this posn. Move off from here NOT coordinated with this unit - Runner never got to OC 3 Fd Tp . Consequently on move out Engrs left behind in fairly thick jungle near LZ.
	Movement to Bn Harbour posn	1 Offr 31 Ors	On realization of above contacted Atk (next in order of march) by radio who sent a guide back. Moved into posn very late and unable to prepare pits perimeter vines, communic- ation cord etc. Found to be vital that night, several personnel got lost for several minutes on changing sentry - Good experience.
D+ 1	Reloc in Bn HQ perim- eter.	1 Offr 31 Ors	
	Searched small bunkers in area	Demolition team	No result except: recent (2 month) occupants
	Ambush patrol 1000 hrs to 1800 hrs	NCO and 7 with wireless Op and M60	A need for all NCO's and more wireless operators within the troop becomes obvious (two drivers only at present trained in use of radio.
	Ambush patrol 1830 hrs to 0630 hrs.	S/Sgt and 8 with M60 and wireless CANPRC 25	Uneventful but good experience - only 100 yds from main posn.

/D+ 2

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
D+ 2	Moved to new location 0900 to 1745 hrs	1 Offr 31 Ors	Distance about 3,000 meters Thick country Bn HQ and reserve Coy in single file all way. Helped a Pte from mortor platoon over and up a steep cliff when he broke his arm (water crossing) This unit last in order of move.
	LZ Cut	8 Ors Axes and Machettes	Will have to carry axes in future - these belonged to Aslt Pioneer Platoon.
D+ 3	Moved to new location 1000 hrs to 1730 hrs	1 Offr 31 Ors	About 3,000 meters very thick country. Last in order of march. We had an accidental discharge in our area which is the third since this unit commenced operations - Further training on arms mainly familiarization is needed.
D+ 4	Moved over river to extraction LZ thence to COURT NEY thence to BIEN HOA	1 Offr 31 Ors	Glad to be back at BIEN HOA
D to D+ 4	TD 15B used to clear road blocks and fill craters.	TD 15B one day only.	The plant was NOT really required by the US Engr Coy on this op.

8. ASSESSMENT OF OPERATION

(a) The troop was used in fact in a purely infantry role. No Engr tasks as such arose. The closeness of the country in harbour or defensive positions made it vital for perimeter and communication vines to be erected for one could not see ones hand held a few inches away. The troops benefited greatly in that a different type of experience was gained.

(b) It has become necessary for both wireless operators and weapon training (particularly M60) courses to be run. Thought will be given to amending 3 Fd Tp's establishment weapon wise. This is justified when it is realized the troop works as part of the Bn HQ perimeter and more often than not this is the outside perimeter of Bn defence. (ie when Coys are operating independently).