

Series: AWM95
Australian Army commanders' diaries
[Vietnam]

Infantry units

Item number: 7/7/3

**Item: 7 Battalion Royal Australian
Regiment**

Annexes

[1-31 May 1967]

C1

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No 70 of 83

7 RAR
AP AN PHU
SOUTH VIETNAM
vic YS 441684

011330 H May 67

OP: 2

Reference: Maps VIETNAM 1:50,000 Xuyen Moc 6430 11
 Dat Do 6429 1
 1:25,000 6429 - 1 NW
 6429 - 1 NE
 6429 - 1 SW
 6429 - 1 SE
 Picto 6429 IV - N
 6430 III - S

1. Situation.

a. Enemy. Briefing by IO.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) ARVN/RF/PF outposts are loc at:

- (a) YS 552536 - PF Pl
- (b) YS 515536 - ARVN Coy
- (c) YS 511549 - RF Pl
- (d) YS 502557 - RF Coy (-)
- (e) YS 500570 - ARVN Coy
- (f) YS 588637 - RF Coy
- (g) YS 601637 - RF Coy

(2) Mines and booby traps are to be found in and around every ARVN/RF/PF outpost.

(3) 6 RAR is responsible 1 ATF Standby Coy, WP, TAOR ppls

c. Atts and Dets.

- (1) Under comd from 011700H May Two combat engr teams
- (2) Under op con from 020700H May A Sqn 3 Cav Regt less one tp.
- (3) Remaining in DS 161 Bty RNZA
- (4) In DS from 020700H May One H13 161 Recce Flt
- (5) In sp from 020700H May Two air mobile coys
FAC
Rebro sta on HORSESHOE

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.....(6)....

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-2-

- | | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| (6) In sp and on call from 020700H | One lt fire team |
| (7) In sp on 7 May 67 | One airmobile coy
Max RAAF hel lift. |

2. Mission. 7 RAR is to secure LZ MAROUBRA by airmobile aslt then search and destroy in the areas shown on trace Annex A.

3. Execution.

a. Gen Outline.

The op is to be carried out as fol:

- (1) Hel aslt by one coy on LZ MAROUBRA square 6062.
- (2) Hel lift of two coys plus Bn HQ to LZ MAROUBRA.
- (3) One coy mov by APC to AO.
- (4) occupy coy areas of responsibility and prep ambushes along line of SONG RAI. See trace Annex A.
- (5) D + 1 to D + 5 search and destroy in areas as ordered.

b. A Coy.

(1) Grouping. Normal atts plus:

- (a) FO party.
- (b) MFC.
- (c) Combat engr team. From 011700H.

(2) Tasks.

- (a) Second hel lift to LZ MAROUBRA.
- (b) Mov to area shown to trace Annex A and estb coy base.
- (c) From coy base search and destroy in area shown and prep ni ambushes.
- (d) D + 1 to D + 5 search and destroy areas as ordered.

c. B Coy.

(1) Grouping. Normal atts plus:

- (a) FO party.
- (b) MFC.
- (c) Sect aslt pnr. From 020600H.

(2) Tasks.

- (a) Hel aslt to secure LZ MAROUBRA.

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.....(b)....

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(b) On completion of fly in move to area shown on trace Annex A and estb coy base. One pl to remain standby for protection of downed hel until 1100 hrs.

(c) From coy base search and destroy in area shown and prep ni ambushes.

(d) D + 1 to D + 5 search and destroy in areas ordered.

d. C Coy.

(1) Grouping. Normal atts plus:

(a) FO party.

(b) MFC.

(c) Combat engr team. From 011700H.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Fourth hel lift to LZ MAROUBRA.

(b) Mov to area shown on trace Annex A and estb coy base.

(c) From coy base search and destroy in area shown and prep ni ambushes.

(d) D + 1 to D + 5 search and destroy in areas ordered.

e. D Coy.

(1) Grouping. Normal atts plus:

(a) FO party.

(b) MFC.

(c) Sect aslt pnr. From 020600H.

(d) D Coy is under comd A Sqn 3 Cav Regt for mov to AO.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Mov by APC to AO shown on trace Annex A and estb coy base.

(b) From coy base search and destroy in area shown and prep ni ambushes.

(c) D + 1 to D + 5 search and destroy in areas ordered.

f. Mor Pl.

(1) Grouping.

(a) MFC att to A, B, C and D Coy.

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.....(b)...

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- (b) One sect to remain base area under comd CC Admin Area.
- (c) Four mor carriers APC under op con.
- (2) Tasks.
 - (a) Mov by APC to base plate posn vic grid ref 602606.
 - (b) Provide fire sp as required.
- g. Pnr Pl.
 - (1) Grouping.
 - (a) One sect to ^{each of} B Coy and D Coy.
 - (b) Pnr pl less two sects mov by APC to Bn HQ area - trace Annex B - and remain with Bn HQ.
 - (2) Tasks.
 - (a) Carry mine detectors and explosives for dml.
 - (b) Clearance of areas and dml as required.
- h. Fire Aslt Pl.
 - (1) Grouping. Dogs and handlers to remain on call at base area.
 - (2) Tasks.
 - (a) Local protection of Bn HQ.
 - (b) Tracking team on call for tasks as required.
- j. A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.
 - (1) Grouping. Under comd for mov to AO - D Coy.
 - (2) Tasks.
 - (a) Mov D Coy plus pnr pl (-) to AO and escort A Bty 2/35 Arty Bn to HORSESHOE.
 - (b) APCs not carrying pers to carry water.
 - (c) During daylight hours D Day, picquet clear area SOUTH of Route 23.
 - (d) Leaguer ni D Day vic grid ref 602606.
 - (e) D + 1 to D + 5 sp ops as ordered.
- k. 161 Bty RNZA.
 - (1) Grouping. Remain in DS 7 RAR. FO party to A, B, C and D Coys.
 - (2) Tasks.
 - (a) Gun posn YS 495620.

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....(b)...

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(b) Fire plan SECOND CHANCE to be issued seperately.

l. Combat Engrs.

- (1) Grouping. One sect to each of A and C Coy from 011700H.
- (2) Tasks. Clearance of areas and dml as required.

m. 7 13 161 Recce Flt.

- (1) Task. Remain on call in present loc. Be prep to work on admin/air net after original contact on comd net.

n. Avn.

(1) Tasks.

(a) From PZ WEST end of LUSCOMBE FIELD carry out a hel aslt with B Coy to secure LZ MARCOUBRA square 6062 WEST of SONG RAI.

(b) Lift two coys plus Bn HQ from PZ to LZ MAROUBRA.

(c) Details of lifts are as fol:

- (i) Lift 1 B Coy (Hel aslt) 112 pers
- (ii) Lift 2 A Coy 115 pers
- (iii) Lift 3 Bn HQ plus Fire Aslt Pl 81 pers
- (iv) Lift 4 C Coy 114 pers

o. Base Area.

(1) Grouping. Under comd OC Admin Coy - all coy admin pers plus ten (10) fit men per coy.

(2) Tasks.

- (a) Def of base area.
- (b) Normal maint of 7 RAR.

p. Coord Instr.

(1) Outline Timings.

- (a) H Hour 020900H May 67.
- (b) APCs depart SOUTH of WEST end LUSCOMBE Fd 0630 hrs.
- (c) First lift in posn PZ 0845 hrs. Take off 0850 LZ 0900.
- (d) Second lift in posn PZ 0911 hrs. Take off 0915 LZ 0925.
- (e) Third lift in posn PZ 0936 hrs. Take Off 0940 LZ 0950.

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.....(f).....

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- (f) Fourth lift in posn PZ 1001 hrs. Take off 1025. LZ 1034.
- (g) Gun team avail until 1130 hrs.
- (2) Landing in LZ MAROUBRA from NORTH. Staggered trail LEFT.
- (3) Areas of Ops. Annex B.
- (4) Boundaries. Annex B.

4. Admin and Log.

a. Rations.

- (1) 3 x 24 hr rat packs or equivalent plus 1 emergency rat to be carried.
- (2) Goodie boxes at coys discretion are to be delivered on MAINTDEM. Coys are to arrange contents and pre packaging.

b. Water.

- (1) 4 waterbottles per man.
- (2) Standard resup on MAINTDEM. Where possible this will be by APC so as to maintain security.

c. Btys.

- (1) One bty in the set each op to carry two spares.
- (2) One spare set of btys per telephone to be carried.

d. Medical.

- (1) RAP loc with Bn HQ.
- (2) DUSTOFF as normal.

e. Ammo.

- (1) Standard first line carried on the man.
- (2) All empty mags in the base area are to be 2/3 rds filled with ammo and immediately avail at the helipad for emergency resup.
- (3) One full first line of boxed ammo will be immediately avail at the helipad.
- (4) 90 rounds of mor ammo per mor carried in mor carriers. Breakdown by types as follows:
 - (a) 75 HE
 - (b) 10 illuminating
 - (c) 5 smk

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.....(5).....

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(5) 60 rounds mor HE aval at helipad for emergency resup.

f. Laundry Bags.

(1) Coys may arrange sect laundry bags.

(2) Laundry resup by MAINTDEM.

5. Comd and Sig.

a. Bn HQ.

(1) Lift 3 and occupy posn WEST of LZ MAROUBRA see trace Annex A.
Tac party in C in C ship from 0815 hrs until mov completed.

(2) Mov in rear of C Coy and ahead of B Coy to area shown on trace Annex A.

b. Radio.

(1) Radio diagrams are att as Annex B.

(2) Tfc is to be minimised throughout op.

c. Line. Laid in Bn HQ area only as ordered.


d. Codes. As currently issued.

ACKNOWLEDGE

(Eric H. Smith)
Lt Col
Commanding Officer

ANNEXES: A Traces
B Radio Diagram
C Distribution

Official


(D.K. ATKINSON)



Maj
S3

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
1:50 000

MAP XUYEN MOC 6430 11
DAT D_o 6429 1

LE MAROUBRA



NOTE - IN EACH AO THE
NORTHERN BOUNDARY IS
INCLUDED IN THAT AO




TRAR BnI CMD NET

ANNEX B to TRAR OPORD
Dated 1 MAY 67


1 45.60
2 55.1

CALLWORD 1. GZ
2. YC



7 RAR ADM/AIR NET

Freq 43.20



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ANNEX C TO
7 RAR OP ORDER NO 2
DATED / MAY 57

<u>Distribution.</u>	<u>Number of Copies.</u>	<u>Copy No</u>	<u>of 83</u>
A Coy	2	1 - 2	
B Coy	2	3 - 4	
C Coy	2	5 - 6	
D Coy	2	7 - 8	
Sp Coy	1	9	
F/A Pl	1	10	
Aslt Pnr Pl	1	11	
Mor Pl	1	12	
Sig Pl	1	13	
Admin Coy	3	14 - 16	
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt	3	17 - 19	
1 Fd Regt	5	20 - 24	
103 Fd Bty	2	25 - 26	
Bty A 1/83 US Arty	1	27	
161 Fd Bty RNZA	1	28	
1 Fd Sqn	1	29	
103 Sig Sqn	1	30	
6 RAR	1	31	
3 SAS Sqn	1	32	
1 ARU	1	33	
161 (Indep) Recce Flt	1	34	
1 ATF	24	35 - 58	
CO	1	59	
2IC	1	60	
Adjt	1	61	
Asst Adjt	1	62	
IO	1	63	
OC Sp Coy	1	64	
OC Admin Coy	1	65	
RSM	1	66	
Comd's Diary	6	67 - 72	
File	1	73	
Spare	10	74 - 83	

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C2

SECRET

7 RAR
NUI DAT
SOUTH VIETNAM

8 May 67

PATROL TASKS 9 - 11 May 67

1. Attached as an annex is 7 RAR Patrol Task Table for period 9 - 11 May 67.
2. Patrols are to be on 7 RAR Command Net.

Henry Hadden
 Lt Col
 CO

Distribution.

A Coy
 B Coy
 C Coy (3)
 D Coy (3)
 Admin Coy
 Sp Coy
 Mor Pl
 Sig Pl
 F/A Pl
 Pnr Pl
 CO
 2IC
 S 3
 OC Sp Coy
 BC
 IO
 RSM
 File (2)
 Comd's Diary (3)

External.

HQ 1 ATF (2)
 A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
 1 Fd Regt RAA (6)
 1/83 US Arty (3)
 1 Fd Sqn RAE
 6 RAR
 1 SAS Sqn
 1 ARU

SECRET

SECRET

Annex to 7 RAR
Patrol Tasks
dated 8 May 67

PATROL TASKS

1. Serial. 3/67.
 2. Sub Unit. C Coy.
 3. Strength. Platoon.
 4. Type. Fighting.
 5. Time Out. 090700H.
 6. Time In. 101700H.
 7. Task. Ambush vic of YS 419739.
 8. Route Out. By road via Route 2 - Rd junction 442705. Then as Trace P.
 9. Route In. Trace P.
 10. Remarks. Ambush to be established vic of edge of rubber plantation until departure 10 May 67.
-
1. Serial. 4/67.
 2. Sub Unit. D Coy.
 3. Strength. Platoon.
 4. Type. Fighting.
 5. Time Out. 090700H.
 6. Time In. 111000H.
 7. Task.
 - a. Ambush track junction vic YS 378674 night 9/10 May 67.
 - b. Ambush track junction vic YS 379638 night 10/11 May 67.
 8. Route Out. As per trace Q.
 9. Route In. As per trace Q.
 10. Remarks. Ptl to lie up vic YS 388682 by day and establish ambush prior last light 9/10 May 67 until first light 10 May 67. Ptl to move to vic 375645 and lie up and estb second ambush prior last light 10/11 May 67 at 379638. Ambush to remain in position until departure 11 May 67.

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
MAP 6430 III SE

1:25,000.

37
67

Trace Q to 7 RAR
Patrol Task Table
dated 8 May 67.


42
65



MAP 6430 III SE

1:25000

Trace P to 7 RAH
Patrol Task Table
dated 8 May 67



45
X
70

X
38

C \$

7th Battalion
Royal Australian Regiment
AP AN PHU
SOUTH VIETNAM

R617-1-1 (1)

9 May 67

Distribution. List A.

CLOSE TAOR PATROL INSTRUCTIONS

1. Supplied By - Duty coy.
2. Strength. - One sect.
3. Out Points. - Through A Coy clockwise around the wire.
Through D Coy anticlockwise around the wire.
4. In Points. - A Coy for anticlockwise.
D Coy for clockwise.
5. Timings. - Morning - One ptl in the period 0730 to 1200 hrs.
Afternoon - One ptl in the period 1200 to 1830 hrs.
6. Comms. The ptl will carry a radio on the Command Net frequency in use that day.
7. Routes. The ptl will not venture past the line of the Song Cau creek and the 45 easting.
8. Instructions.
 - a. The patrol commander will:
 - (1) Inform by phone the Bn CP that he is about to move out and the proposed direction of move.
 - (2) Test his set on the Bn net, on moving.
 - (3) Report by radio that he is moving.
 - (4) Report when he is about to reach the danger areas of B Coy and D Coy ranges.
 - (5) He is to stop on reaching the above points and move again when given clearance to move across these ranges.
 - (6) On completion of tasks report by phone to the Bn CP and obtain permission to close down.

NOTE 1. It is important that these points are strictly adhered to as casualties from range practices may result.

NOTE 2. The tracking team may exercise their dogs by following these ptls. Pl commanders will liase with OC Fire Aslt to find out if the dogs will be following. The OC tracking team will also abide by these instructions.


MaJ
S3

7 RAR
NUI DAT
SOUTH VIETNAM

Distribution. List B.

9 May 67


DUTIES

1. Coys are rostered for duties as fol:

9 May 67.	Standby TAOR ptls RSMs duties, close TAOR, water pt, check pt	A Coy C Coy, D Coy B Coy
10 May 67	Standby TAOR ptls RSMs duties, close TAOR, water pt, check pt. Minefield	C Coy D Coy B Coy D Coy
11 May 67	Standby TAOR ptls RSMs duties, close TAOR, water pt, check pt. Minefield	B Coy A Coy C Coy D Coy
12 May 67	Standby TAOR ptls RSMs duties, close TAOR, water pt. check pt. Minefield	A Coy C Coy B Coy D Coy
13 May 67	Standby TAOR ptls RSMs duties, close TAOR, water pt. check pt. Minefield, Jeparit	C Coy B Coy A Coy D Coy
14 May 67	Standby TAOR ptls RSMs duties, close TAOR, water pt. check pt. Minefield, Jeparit	B Coy A Coy C Coy D Coy.
15 May 67	Standby TAOR ptls RSMs duties, close TAOR, water pt. check pt. Minefield, Jeparit	A Coy C Coy B Coy D Coy
16 May 67	Standby TAOR ptls RSMs duties, close TAOR, water pt. check pt. Minefield, Jeparit	C Coy B Coy A Coy D Coy.

2. Coy 2ICs of the duty coy are to mount duty in the Bn CP from 0800 to 1300 hrs on the day the coy is rostered for duty.

3. Normal CP staff will be rostered for duty in Bn CP from 1230 to 1330 hrs and 1800 to 0830 hrs daily.


Maj
S3

MESSAGE.

R569-1-1

PRIORITY	—	090755 Z	(MAY 67)
TO - A Coy, B Coy, C Coy, D Coy. Sp Coy, Admin Coy.			UNCLAS A75

OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS @ DUE TO THE
 OPERATIONAL SITUATION THE FOL RESTRICTIONS
 ARE PLACED ON ACTIVITY ON NI 9/10 MAY 67 @
 FIRST @ NO FILMS ARE TO BE SHOWN @ SECOND @
 NO CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS IN ANY ONE AREA
 ESPECIALLY CANTEENS CMM OC'S TO PERSONALLY
 SUPERVISE

DRAFTERS NAME	OFFICE
SMITH	CO

Alul. Sgt for LT.
 RELEASING OFFICER.
 by Direction

C3
C5

SECRET

7 RAR
NUI DAT
SOUTH VIETNAM

10 May 67

PATROL TASKS 11 - 14 May 67

- ... 1. Attached as an annex is 7 RAR Patrol Task Table for the above period.
- 2. Patrols are to be on 7 RAR Command Net.
- 3. Extraction of ptl serial 6/67 para 9 is subject to cfm by CP.

Henry P. Kladenberg
 Lt Col
 CO

Distribution.

A Coy (3)
 B Coy
 C Coy (3)
 D Coy
 Admin Coy
 Sp Coy
 Mor Pl
 Sig Pl
 F/A Pl
 Pnr Pl
 CO
 2IC
 S3
 CP
 OC Sp Coy
 BC
 IO
 RSM
 File (2)
 Comd's Diary (3)

External.

HQ 1 ATF (2)
 A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
 1 Fd Regt RAA (6)
 1/83 US Arty (3)
 1 Fd Sqn RAE
 6 RAR
 1 SAS Sqn
 1 ARU

SECRET


Annex to 7 RAR
Patrol Task Table
dated 10 May 67

PATROL TASKS


1. Serial. 5/67.
2. Sub Unit. A Coy.
3. Strength. Platoon.
4. Type. Fighting.
5. Time Out. 111400H.
6. Time In. 131000H.
7. Task. Ambush track junction vic YS 401638.
8. Route Out. By road to YS 428661 thence Trace P.
9. Route In. SE to road (Route 2) vic YS 404632 thence by veh to 7 RAR.
10. Remarks. Ambush to be established by last light 11 May 67 and remain in posn until departure of ptl 13 May 67.

1. Serial. 6/67.
2. Sub Unit. C Coy.
3. Strength. Platoon.
4. Type. Fighting.
5. Time Out. 120700H.
6. Time In. 141110H.
7. Task. Ambush track vic YS 361701.
8. Route Out. By road to vic YS 439700 thence Trace Q.
9. Route In. Trace Q to PZ vic YS 388683.
10. Remarks. Ambush to be established by last light 12 May 67 and remain in position until departure 14 May 67. Extraction from 388683 to be by air at 141100H.

MAP 643-III-SE
1:25,000



TRACE P TO 7RAR
PATROL TASK TABLE
DATED 10 MAY 67



MAP 6430-III-SE
1:25,000

TRACE Q TO 7RAR
PATROL TASK TABLE
DATED 10 MAY 67



68
37

43
69

C4
C6

SECRET

7 RAR
NUI DAT
SOUTH VIETNAM

12 May 67

PATROL TASKS 13 - 15 MAY 67

- ... 1. Attached as an annex is 7 RAR Patrol Task Table for the above period.
- 2. Patrols are to be on 7 RAR Command Net.
- 3. Extraction of ptl serial 7/67 is subject to cfm by CP.
- 4. Coy comds are reminded that patrol reports are to be submitted to S3 within 24 hrs of the return of a patrol.

Henry Wladimir
JH Lt Col
 CO

Distribution

A Coy (3)
 B Coy (3)
 C Coy
 D Coy
 Admin Coy
 Sp Coy
 Mor Pl
 Sig Pl
 F/A Pl
 Pnr Pl
 CO
 2IC
 S3
 CP
 FCC
 OC Sp Coy
 BC
 IO
 RSM
 File (2)
 Comd's Diary (3)

External

HQ 1 ATF (2)
 A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
 1 Fd Regt RAA (6)
 1/83 US Arty (3)
 1 Fd Sqn RAE
 6 RAR
 1 SAS Sqn
 1 ARU


Annex to 7 PAB
Patrol Task
dated 12 May 67

PATROL TASKS

Serial.	7/67.	8/67.
Sub Unit.	B Coy.	A Coy.
Type.	Fighting.	Fighting.
Strength.	Pl.	Pl.
Time Out.	130400 H.	140800 H.
Time In.	150900 H.	151100 H.
Routes.	Trace P.	Trace Q.
Task.	<p>a. Search sector ALFA 13 and 14 May 67.</p> <p>b. Ni ambush 13/14 and 14/15 May 67 at locs selected by ptl comd. CP to be notified.</p> <p>c. Extraction to be by air at 150845 H. Ptl comd to notify CP exact loc of PZ.</p>	<p>a. Lie up in wooded area map square 4066 and estb ambush by last light ni 14/15 May 67. vic YS 395658. Exact loc to be selected by ptl comd and CP notified.</p> <p>b. Ambush to remain in posn until departure of ptl 15 May 67.</p> <p>c. Coy to arrange vehicle pick up from 1/83 (US) Arty Area.</p>

Map: 1:25,000
Picto Supplement

Trace P to 7 BAR
Patrol Task Table
dated 12 May 67



39

43
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73

69
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40

C7

SECRET7 RAR
NUI DAT
SOUTH VIETNAM

14 May 67

R617-1-3 (1)

See Distribution.

PATROL TASKS 15 - 18 MAY 67

1. Attached at Annexes A B and C are 7RAR Patrol Tasks for the above period.
2. Patrols are to be on 7 RAR Comd Net.
3. Introduction and extraction of Serials 9 and 11/67 are subject to cfm by CP.
4. Patrol reports are to be submitted to S3 within 24 hrs of the return of a patrol.

Heur J. Walker
Maj
OC Sp Coy

Distribution.

A Coy
B Coy (3)
C Coy (3)
D Coy
Admin Coy
Sp Coy (3)
Mor Pl
Sig Pl
F/A Pl
Pnr Pl
CO
2IC
S3
CP
FCC
OC Sp Coy
BC
IO
RSM
File (2)
Comd's Diary (3)

External

HQ 1 ATF (2)
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
1 Fd Regt RAA (6)
1/83 US Arty (3)
1 Fd Sqn RAE
6 RAR
2 RAR
1 SAS Sqn
1 ARU

SECRET

Annex A to 7 RAR
Patrol Task Table
dated 14 May 67

PATROL TASKS
16-18 MAY 67

Serial. 11/67.

Sub Unit. B Coy.

Type. Fighting.

Strength. Coy.

Time Out. 160700 H.

Time In. 181700 H.

Routes. Trace P.

Tasks.

- a. Search and clear WEST and SOUTH WEST from LZ within the area as shown on Trace within the following bdys.
 - NORTH - LINE BRAVO.
 - SOUTH - LINE CHARLIE.
- b. Estb ambushes ni 16/17, 17/18 May 67 as selected by Coy Comd CP to be notified.

Remarks.

- a. Coy to move to BINH BA airstrip by hel 160700 H.
- b. Extraction of coy to be by air 181700 H. PZ to be advised by Coy Comd to CP.

Annex B To 7 RAR
Patrol Task Table
dated 14 May 67

PATROL TASKS
15-16 MAY 67

Serial. 10/67.
Sub Unit. C Coy.
Type. Fighting.
Strength. Pl.
Time Out. 151400 H.
Time In. 161200 H.
Routes. Trace Q.
Task. a. Estb ambush ni 15/16 vic YS 390640. Exact loc to be selected by ptl comd and CP notified.
b. Ambush to remain in posn until departure of ptl 16 May 67.




Annex C to 7 RAR
Patrol Task Table
dated 14 May 67

PATROL TASKS
15 - 17 MAY 67


Serial. 9/67.
Sub Unit. Sp Coy.
Type. Fighting.
Strength. Pl.
Time Out. 150830 H.
Time In. 171600 H.
Routes. Trace R.
Tasks.
a. Search and clear sector XRAY in square YS 3768.
b. Estb ambush ni 15/16 and 16/17 May 67. Locs to be selected by ptl comd and CP notified.
Remarks.
a. Introduction of ptl to be by APC to via YS 395673.
b. Extraction to be by air from PZ at 171600 H selected by ptl comd and CP notified.

TRACE K
NOTE Routes
A-B by APC
B-C " Foot

MAP 1:25000
Picto Supplement



TRACE Q to TRAK
PATROL TASK TABLE
dated 14 May 67



38
+
64

42
+
65

Map 1:25000

Pito Supplement

MAP 1:25,000 N° 6430-III-SE

TRACE P TO 7RAR
PATROL TASK TABLE
DATED MAY 67



Handwritten notes in the bottom right corner, including '7RAR' and 'MAY 67'.

CONFIDENTIAL7 RAR
NUI DAT
SOUTH VIETNAM

15 May 67

R617-1-3 (2)

See Distribution.

PATROL TASKS 18 - 21 MAY 67

- ... 1. Attached as an annex is the 7 RAR Patrol Task Table for the period 18 - 21 May 67.
2. The patrol is to be on the 7 RAR Command Net.

*Henry J. Bladen*Maj
33 Sp CoyDistribution.

A Coy (3)
B Coy
C Coy
D Coy
Admin Coy
Sp Coy
Mor Pl
Sig Pl
F/A Pl
Pnr Pl
CO
2IC
S3
CP
FCC
OC Sp Coy
BC
IO
RSM
File (2)
Comd's Diary (3)

External.

HQ 1 ATF (2)
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
1 Fd Regt RAA (6)
1/83 US Arty (3)
1 Fd Sqn RAE
6 RAR
2 RAR
1 SAS Sqn
1 ARU

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Annex To 7 RAR
Patrol Task Table
dated /5 May 67

PATROL TASKS

Serial. 12/67.
Sub Unit. A Coy.
Type. Area Ambush.
Strength. Coy.
Time Out. 181000H.
Time In. 211100H.
Routes. Trace P.
Tasks. Area ambush in sector Xray. To remain in position three nights.
Remarks. a. Proposed locs as follows:


Comd Gp and FO	GR 375681
1 pl	377684
2 pl (-)	382684
Sect 2 pl	381678
3 pl (-)	377677
Sect 3 pl	375680

b. All gps will have radio and remain on the coy net.

Map: 1:25,000
Picto
Supplement

39
+ 70

Trace P To 7 RAR
Patrol Task Table
dated 15 May 67



CONFIDENTIAL

OP: 3

Copy No. ⁸⁰.....of 807 RAR
AP AN PHU
SOUTH VIETNAM
Vic YS 441684

172200 H May 67

Reference: Maps VIETNAM 1:50,000 Sheet 6430 11 Series OPS L7014
1:25,000 Sheet 6430 - 111 SE
I8020 PICTO1. Situation

a. Enemy Forces. A Chieu Hoi has reported that D445 Bn is to attack the br and police posts at LONG DIEM to mark HO CHI MINH's birthday. Their route is supposed to be 1000 metres WEST of the line of Route 2 to SOUTH of BINH BA thence EAST to the SUOI DA BANG. Follow the SUOI DA BANG to the vicinity of square 4664 thence to the timber, grid reference 440620 and SOUTH to LONG DIEM. The return route is alleged to be similar. On time and space Comd 1 ATF considers it likely that D445 would move into the area 4768 the night before the attack and lay up there by day. They would probably do the same on their return from the attack. It is considered that the attack may take place on the ni 17/18, 18/19, 19/20 or 20/21 May 67.

b. Friendly Forces. 1 ATF forces are to be employed as fol:-

(1) 6 RAR plus elms 2 RAR cordon line SUOI DA BANG WEST of NUI DAT.

(2) A Sqn 3 Cav Regt cordon in rubber SOUTH WEST of NUI DAT.

(3) D and E Pl HQ 1 ATF and two pls of 1 ARU mobile res to cordon EAST of NUI DAT.

(4) A Coy 6 RAR mob res as required.

(5) Five SAS ptls will maint surveillance of area between BINH BA and NUI DAT.

c. Atts and Dets. In DS 106 Bty RAA.

2. Mission

7 RAR is to cordon from YS 475692 to YS 487691 as part of 1 ATF plan.

3. Execution

a. Gen outline. Move on foot and occupy cordon posn in line YS 475692 to YS 487691 with two coys up and one in depth.

b. A Coy

(1) Grouping. No change.

(2) Tasks. RIGHT forward coy. Mov on foot and occupy a cordon posn from YS 475692 to YS 482691. See trace Annex A.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

- c. B Coy. Remain on present task.
- d. C Coy
 - (1) Grouping. No change.
 - (2) Tasks. Depth coy. Mov on foot and occupy a posn 300 metres centre rear of the cordon. See trace Annex 'A'.
- e. D Coy
 - (1) Grouping. Under comd from 172000H Pnr Pl and Fire Aslt Pl.
 - (2) Tasks. LEFT forward coy. Mov on foot and occupy a cordon posn from YS 482691 to YS 487691. See trace Annex 'A'.
- f. Mor Pl
 - (1) Grouping. MFC to each coy.
 - (2) Tasks
 - (a) Occupy a base plate posn fwd present D Coy loc. See trace Annex 'A'.
 - (b) Fire sp as required.
- g. Pnr Pl. Under comd D Coy from 172000H.
- h. Fire Aslt Pl. Under comd D Coy from 172000H.
- j. 106 Bty RAA
 - (1) Grouping. FO party to each coy.
 - (2) Task. Fire sp as required.
- k. Base Protection
 - (1) Normal rear elms plus 10 fit men per coy.
 - (2) Comd by OC Admin Coy.
- l. Co-ord Instr
 - (1) H hr. To be advised on half hour notice.
 - (2) Routes. See trace Annex 'A'.
 - (3) Bdys. See trace Annex 'A'.
 - (4) Assy Areas. See trace Annex 'A'.
 - (5) Order of march
 - (a) Wire gap YS 448682. C Coy
 - (b) Wire gap YS 449679. D Coy, Bn HQ, A Coy.

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- 3 -

4. Admin and Log

a. Rations

(1) 3 days - 24 hr pack rat (or equivalent) carried per man.

(2) 1 days emergency rat carried per man.

b. Water

(1) 4 full water bottles per man.

(2) Resup by maindem using system one for one water bottle replacement.

c. Radio Btys

(1) One bty per set, two res carried by each op.

(2) Normal maintdem resup.

d. Medical

(1) RAP loc with Bn Tac HQ in C Coy loc.

(2) If the tac ~~sit~~ makes it impossible to evac from fwd coys then cas are to be evac to the RAP.

e. Ammo

(1) Normal first line carried.

(2) RSM to ensure holding of unit res mags are filled and available.

f. Admin CP

Admin CP is to function as though complete Bn is in the fd.

5. Comd and Sig

a. Bn HQ

(1) Tac party mov in rear D Coy and remain between A and D Coys.

(2) CP remains present loc.

b. Radio. Radio diagram as Annex 'B'.

c. Codes. As currently issued.

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

d. Nicknames


- | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------|
| (1) Complete in assy area | BUSH RAT |
| (2) Move now | PONY TAIL |
| (3) In cordon posn | BARRACUDA JUNCTION |

ACKNOWLEDGE

(Eric H SMITH)
Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

ANNEXES: A Outline plan.
B Radio Diagram


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


(D K ATKINSON)

Maj
S3

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


MAPS 6430-III-SE 1:25,000
6430-II-SW 1:25,000



ANNEX 'B' TO
7RAR OP 3
DATED 17 MAY 67

FREQ 1. 456
2. 551
3. 558



Samuel Deary

C 10

7 RAR
AF AN PHU
SOUTH VIETNAM

20 May 67

R569-1-1

Distribution. List A.

WITHDRAWAL PLAN FOR WP

Reference - Photo map 1 ATF Base Area 1 ATF Base Area 1:8,500.

1. In the event of a VC attack, the CP may order the WP def pl to withdraw into 7 RAR perimeter. Orders for this withdrawal are attached as Annex 'A'.
2. To implement this plan coys are to take action as fol:
 - a. A Coy. Narrow and strengthen the wire gap at GR 43706890.
 - b. C Coy. Make and clearly mark a gap in the wire and low wire entanglement along the line of the existing track GR 438689. This may be of a zig zag pattern but must facilitate the rapid passage of the pl.
3. Each pl when rostered for duty as WP def pl is to:
 - a. Liase with C Coy for purposes of recce.
 - b. After obtaining permission from the 7 RAR CP rehearse the withdrawal for day and night.
4. Tasks vide para 2 are to be completed by 1 Jun 67. Until the gap in C Coy wire is complete the pl is to withdraw through C Coy wire gap GR 438687. C Coy is to clearly mark this route immediately.

[Signature]
Maj
S3

Annex A to Withdrawal
Plan for the WP of
7 May 67

ORDERS FOR WITHDRAWAL WP DEF PL

1. In the event of an attack you are to defend the WP until ordered to withdraw by the 7 RAR CP.
2. On receiving orders to withdraw you are to thin out by covering two sections through the wire gap GR 43706890. These sections then cover the movement of the remainder of the pl through the wire.
3. Utilizing the existing bounds you are then to withdraw by fire and movement to and through the C Coy wire gap GR 438689.
4. You are to inform C Coy when your complete force is inside the wire then return as quickly as possible to your own coy lines.


Maj
S3

Comd's Diary

CONFIDENTIAL

C 11

7 RAR
NUI DAT
SOUTH VIETNAM

R617-1-3 (3)

20 May 67

See Distribution.

PATROL TASKS 22 - 24 MAY 67

- ... 1. Attached as an annex is the 7 RAR Patrol Task Table for the period 22 - 24 May 67.
- 2. Patrols are to be on the 7 RAR Command Net.
- 3. Details of insertion and extraction of ptl to be cfm by S3.

Henry Hadden
Maj
OC Sp Coy

Distribution.

A Coy
B Coy
C Coy (3)
D Coy
Admin Coy
Sp Coy
Mor Pl
Sig Pl
F/A Pl
Pnr Pl
CO
2IC
S3
CP
FCC
OC Sp Coy
BC
IO
RSM
File (2)
Comd's Diary (3)

External.

HQ 1 ATF (2)
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
1 Fd Regt RAA (6)
1/83 US Arty (3)
1 Fd Sqn RAE
2 RAR
6 RAR
1 SAS Sqn
1 ARU

CONFIDENTIAL

Annex To 7 RAR
Patrol Task Table
dated 20 May 67

PATROL TASKS

Serial. 13/67.

Sub Unit. C Coy.

Type. Fighting patrol.

Strength. Coy.

Time Out. 220900 H.

Time In. 241600 H.

Routes. Trace P.


Tasks.

- a. Estb coy ptl base vic YS 350692.
- b. Search and destroy grid squares 3468, 3469, 3568, 3569, 3688 and 3669.
- c. Estb ambushes ni 22/23 and 23/24 as selected by Coy Comd. CP to be notified.




Remarks.

- a. Insertion to be by air into LZ to be secured by A Coy (Ptl serial 12/67) vic YS 380582. A Coy to be extracted concurrently.
- b. Extraction of C Coy to be by air. Exact PZ to be advised by Coy Comd to CP.

Patrol Trace P to 7 RAR
Patrol Task Table
dated 20 May 67



Map. 1:25,000 Picto Supplement.



Comd's Diary

C 12
1200H

MESSAGE FORM

PRECEDENCE-ACTION

DATE-TIME-GROUP

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ROUTINE

201210Z

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER

G 165

FROM 7 RAR

TO A COY B COY C COY D COY
ADMIN COY SP COY MOR PL
SIG PL F/A PL PNR PL
CO 2IC S3 CP FCC OC SP COY
BC IO RSM FILE COMD'S DIARY
HQ 1 ATF A SQN 3 CAV REGT
1 FD SQN RAA 1/83 US ARTY
1 FD SQN RAE 2 RAR 6 RAR
1 SAS SQN 1 ARU

7 RAR PATROL TASKS 22 - 24 MAY 67 (.) FIRST (.) 7 RAR R617-1-3 (3)
CF 20 MAY 67 REFERS (.) PTL SERIAL 13/67 TO HAVE BEEN PROVIDED BY C COY
IS NOW CANCELLED (.) SECOND (.) NEW PATROL TASK TABLE FOR SERIALS
14 - 16/67 INCL CAN BE ANTICIPATED

DRAFTER'S NAME

OFFICE

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND RANK

BLADEN

OC SP COY

Henry Bladen Maj

Comd. Henry
21 1945 h.

C 13

CONFIDENTIAL

7 RAR
AP AN PHU
SOUTH VIETNAM

21 May 67

R617-1-3 (3)

Distribution below.

PATROL TASKS 22 - 24 MAY 67

- ... 1. Attached at Annexes A and B are the Patrol Tasks for the above period.
2. Patrols are to be on the 7 RAR Command Net.
3. Insertion/extraction by vehicle to be arranged by parent coys as applicable.

Henry
Maj
OC Sp Coy

Distribution.

A Coy (3)
B Coy
C Coy (3)
D Coy
Admin Coy
Sp Coy (3)
Mor Pl
Sig Pl
F/A Pl
Pr.r Pl
CO
2IC
S3
CP
FCC
OC Sp Coy
BC
IO
RSM
File (2)
Comd's Diary (3)

External.

HQ 1 ATF (2)
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
1 Fd Regt RAA (6)
1/83 US Arty (3)
1 Fd Sqn RAE
2 RAR
6 RAR
1 SAS Sqn
1 ARU


CONFIDENTIAL

Annex A To 7 RAR
Patrol Task Table
dated 21 May 67

<u>Serial.</u>	14/67.	15/67.
<u>Sub Unit.</u>	C Coy.	C Coy.
<u>Type.</u>	Fighting.	Fighting.
<u>Strength.</u>	Pl.	Pl.
<u>Time Out.</u>	220800 H.	220800 H.
<u>Time In.</u>	241200 H.	241300 H.
<u>Routes.</u>	Trace P.	Trace Q.
<u>Task.</u>	Estb ambush ni 22/23 and 23/24 May 67, vic YS 432723. Exact location to be advised to CP.	Estb ambush ni 22/23 and 23/24 May 67 at creek and track junction general area vic YS 377637. CP to be notified of exact loc.
<u>Remarks.</u>	a. Ambush to be estb by last light ni 22 May 67 and remain in posn until departure of ptl 24 May 67. b. Extraction of ptl to be by veh arranged by C Coy. Pick up point vic YS 440702.	a. Ambush to be estb by last light 22 May 67 and remain in posn until departure of ptl 24 May 67. b. Extraction may be by veh arranged by C Coy on Engr rd.



Annex B To 7 RAR
Patrol Task Table
dated 21 May 67


<u>Serial.</u>	16/67.	17/67.
<u>Sub Unit.</u>	A Coy.	Sp Coy.
<u>Type.</u>	Fighting.	Fighting.
<u>Strength.</u>	P1.	P1.
<u>Time Out.</u>	221530 H.	221730 H.
<u>Time In.</u>	241100 H.	241400 H.
<u>Routes.</u>	Trace R.	Trace S.
<u>Tasks.</u>	<p>a. Estb ambush ni 22/23 and 23/24 on creek and track junction vic YS 390639.</p> <p>b. During daylight hours 23 May 67 lie up vic YS 394639.</p>	<p>a. Estb ambush ni 22/23 and 23/24 at track junction vic YS 374631.</p> <p>b. Ambush to be estb by last light 22 May 67 and remain in posn until departure of ptl 24 May 67.</p>
<u>Remarks.</u>	Delivery and pick up of ptl to 1/83 US Arty area to be arranged by A Coy.	Sp Coy to arrange vehicle for insertion of ptl from YS 391621 and extraction at 1/83 US Arty loc.




TRACE P TO TRAK
PATROL TASK TABLE
DATED 21 May 67

Map 1/25,000
Picto Supplement






TRACE Q to TRAR
PATROL TASK TABLE
DATED 21 May 67




MAP 1/25,000
Picto Supplement



TRACE S to TRAR
PATROL TASK TABLE
DATED 24 May 67

37
+
65



Map 1/25,000
Picto Supplement

41
+
63

Comd's Diary

221045.

C 14

7 RAR
AP AN PHU
SOUTH VIETNAM

21 May 67

R617-1-3

Distribution. List B plus IO.

PATROL REPORTS

1. Some recently submitted ptl reports have not been submitted in correct form. In future they are to be submitted in the form laid down in SOP's i.e. Card 3 of aide memoir cards issued.
2. Though ptl comds are imbued with a commendable incentive to increase 7 RAR kill ratio they are inclined to overlook some of the apparently more mundane aspects of the card e.g. Terrain and map corrections. Ptl comds are to be reminded that these matters are also valuable intelligence.
3. Ptl reports have also been submitted late and in the case of serials 1 and 2 not at all. Ptl reports must be submitted within 24 hrs of the return of the ptl.
4. In future any ptls making contact or significant finds e.g. recent diggings, ammunition, full caches, booby traps etc are to be debriefed by the IO to ensure that all pertinent facts are included in the ptl report.


Maj
S3

Comd's Diary

22 1045 C 15

7 RAR
AP AN PHU
SOUTH VIETNAM

2* May 67

R617-1-1

Distribution. List B.

CLOSE TAOR PTLs

Reference: 7 RAR R617-1-1 dated 9 May 67.

1. Close TAOR ptls do not appear to be carrying out their task correctly. In future they are to comply with the reference instruction.
2. In particular they are to:
 - a. Enter or depart through the D Coy southern wire gap at GR 449679 NOT through B Coy.
 - b. Move well out to the limits imposed on the route in the reference instruction NOT around the edge of the wire. Close clearance of wire is each coys responsibility.
 - c. Check with the sub-unit from which he departs and the sub-unit through which he returns on leaving and moving in respectively (A and D Coys).
3. It is considered that these ptls properly conducted should take 2 to 3 hrs NOT 30 to 45 minutes as some recent ptls have taken.


Maj
S3

C 16

MESSAGE FORM

240830

PRECEDENCE-ACTION

PRIORITY

DATE TIME GROUP

23 0850 Z (May 67)

FROM: 7 RAR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO : A COY B COY C COY D COY SP COY
ADMIN COY MOR PL PNR PL FIRE ASLT PL
CO 2IC S3 RSO RMO IO RSM
A SQN 3 CAV REGT 106 BTY RAA 1 FD SQN
GLO 1 ATF

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER

G195

WNG O (.) OP LEETON (.) ALFA (.) 7 RAR IS TO COMPLETE THE BARRIER
FROM PHUOC HAI TO HORSESHOE (.) D COY PLUS ONE TP APC'S CMM PNR PL AND
ONE SECT MOR IN MOR CARRIER MOV AT 241200H TO PHUOC HAI (.) TASKS (.)
FIRST (.) PROTECT PNR PL IN CLEARING AREA OF MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS AND
MARKING OUT FENCE (.) SECOND (.) COMMENCE CLEARING BRUSH ALONG LINE OF
FENCE (.) THIRD (.) SECURE LZ FOR FLY IN OF BN VIC PHUOC HAI BY 250800H (.)
FOURTH (.) LOCAL PROTECTION OF WIRING PARTIES (.) A COY AND B COY WIRING
PARTIES (.) C COY DEPTH PROTECTION (.) BRAVO (.) NO MOV BEFORE 241200H (.)
CHARLIE (.) O GP RV 7 RAR BRIEFING TENT 240700H (.) DELTA (.) FIRST
REHEARSALS OF WIRING TO BE CONDUCTED ADMIN COY AREA COMMENCING 240900H (.)
ALL RANKS DOWN TO AND INCL CPL TO ATTEND (.) SECOND (.) ONE LT OR SGT PER COY
TO ACT AS LO TO ARVN POSTS CMM NOMINATIONS TO CP BY 232000H (.) THIRD (.)
COY OP STR STATES TO CP BY 232000H

DRAFTER'S NAME

OFFICE

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AND RANK

ATKINSON

S3

R. Magyarist

Comds Diary (3)

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C17

Copy ⁷⁸.....of 80

7 RAR
AP AN PHU
SOUTH VIETNAM

0800 24 May 67

Op 4 (OP LEEYTON)

Reference Map: VIETNAM 1:25,000 6429

1. Situation

a. En Forces Annex A

b. Friendly Forces

(1) ARVN/RF/PF posts are loc as fol:

(a) 1 Coy 3/48 Bn YS 515535

(b) One Pl 1 Coy 3/48 Bn YS 514541

(c) 2 Coy 3/48 Bn YS 500570

(d) 612 RF Coy (-) YS 502558 (str 126)

(e) 3 Pl 612 RF Coy YS 511549 (str 20)

(f) 36 PF Pl YS 515536 (str 30)

(2) Sector intends to build up pl posts vic YS 523541 and YS 507560.

(3) 2 RAR/6 RAR assume responsibility for TAOR ptls and barrier protection.

(4) 1 ARU assume responsibility for def of WP and check points from 240800 hrs.

(5) ARVN accept responsibility for def WEST of Route 44 and will NOT mov EAST of present locs.

c. Atts and Dets

(1) Under op con from 250600H - One tp and two mor APC. A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.
One tp 1 Fd Sqn.

(2) In DS 106 Bty RAA
One OH13 161 Recce Flt.

(3) In sp Max effort 9 Sqn RAAF
LSM
Two dozers 17 Const Sqn
Rebro (HORSESHOE)
CH47 sorties (as required)

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...Mission...

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-2-

2. Mission. 7 RAR is to erect a wire barrier from the ARVN pl outpost vic YS 523541 to RF pl outpost vic YS 511549 and the proposed outpost YS 507560.

3. Execution

a. Gen Outline

(1) One coy mounted in APC's plus sect pnr and one sect mor in mor carr mov to and secure area NORTH EAST of PHUOC HAI 24 May 67. Pnr pl commence clearance of proposed fence line and layout of markers and stores. Remainder pnr pl fly in when area secure.

(2) Coy secures LZ NORTH EAST of PHUOC HAI for fly in of remainder of 7 RAR. After fly in 25 May 67 one coy each to build two Type 2 catwire fences, one coy on local protection and one coy protecting approaches.

b. A Coy

(1) Grouping. Normal.

(2) Task.

(a) First fly in 25 May 67.

(b) Erect WEST fence, Type 2 catwire, along line marked by pnr pl and navigation party. Protect fence by ni.

c. B Coy

(1) Grouping. Normal.

(2) Task.

(a) Second fly in 25 May 67.

(b) Erect EAST fence, Type 2 catwire, along line marked by pnr pl and navigation party. Protect fence by ni.

d. C Coy

(1) Grouping. Normal.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Fourth fly in 25 May 67.

(b) Maintain ptls and ambushes on approaches to the barrier in the area shown on trace Annex B.

e. D Coy

(1) Grouping. Normal plus:

(a) Under comd from 240600H to 250900H Sect Pnr pl, sect mor pl.

(b) Under comd from 241200H to 250900H Pnr Pl, Bn navigation party, AQ cell.

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.....(c).....

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-3-

- (c) Under op con from 240745H to 250900H Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.
- (d) Att one interpreter.

(2) Tasks

- (a) Mov by APC to PHUOC HAI YS 522540.
- (b) Clear area near LSM YS 529541 beaching point of mines and booby traps and secure it.
- (c) Guide LSM to beaching point and assist as req in unloading.
- (d) Protect pnr pl and navigation party during their marking and laying out of def lines.
- (e) Follow up pnr pl and assisted by APC's clear area of mines and
- (f) Provide protection for dozers working vic map square 5055.
- (g) Secure LZ for fly in of 7 RAR vic YS 522541 by 250700H.
- (h) Provide close protection for work parties for duration of the op.

f. Mor Pl

(1) Grouping

- (a) MFC to each coy.
- (b) One sect under comd D Coy from 240600H to 250900H.
- (c) Two sects under comd OC Base Area.

(2) Tasks

- (a) One sect mov in mor carr with D Coy.
- (b) Two sects remain in base area.
- (c) Provide fire sp as required.

g. Pnr Pl

(1) Grouping

- (a) One sect under comd D Coy from 240600H.
- (b) Under comd D Coy from 241200H to 250900H.

(2) Tasks

- (a) One sect to mov by road with D Coy with all mine detectors.
- (b) Pl less one sect to mov by hel to LZ YS 529541 at 241100H.

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.... (c)...

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- (c) Clear LSM beaching point of mines and booby traps.
 - (d) Clear fence lines, 80 meter gap between fences 20 metres each side of EAST and WEST fence.
 - (e) Clear area, to be cleared by dozers, of mines and booby traps.
 - (f) Provide technical advice to coys doing wiring.
 - (g) Assist tp 1 Fd Sqn in laying minefield (mines without anti-lift devices only).
- h. Fire Aslt Pl
- (1) Grouping Nil.
 - (2) Task. Protection of Fire Sp Base and tasks as ordered.
- j. Base Area
- (1) Grouping
 - (a) Normal rear elms plus 10 fit men per coy.
 - (b) Comd by OC Admin Coy.
 - (2) Tasks
 - (a) Maint of 7 RAR.
 - (b) Def of base area.
- k. Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
- (1) Grouping. Under comd D Coy from 240745H to 250900H.
 - (2) Tasks
 - (a) Mov D Coy plus one sect pnr (103 pers) to YS 529541.
 - (b) Assist D Coy in knocking down scrub along fence lines.
 - (c) Ptl on EAST approaches as ordered by OC D Coy and later Pn HQ.
- l. 106 Bty RAA
- (1) Grouping. FO party to each coy.
 - (2) Task. Fire sp as required from 161 Bty on priority call.
- m. Tp 1 Fd Sqn
- (1) Tasks. Lay mines with anti-lift devices between fences commencing 26 May 67.

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n. OHL3 161 Recce Flt

(1) Tasks. Remain on call in present loc.

o. 9 Sqn RAAF

(1) Tasks. Lift pers as fol:

(a) 241100H. Pnr pl less one sect from LUSCOMBE to YS 529542 (24 pers).

(b) 250730H. A Coy from LUSCOMBE to YS 523542 (94 pers).

(c) Fol by B Coy " " " " (94 pers).

(d) Fol by Bn HQ and Fire Aslt Pl from LUSCOMBE to YS 523542 (81 pers).

(e) Fol by C Coy from LUSCOMBE to YS 523542 (92 pers).

p. Co-ord Instr

(1) Timings

(a) APC's report 7 RAR 240745H.

(b) D Coy, sect pnr pl, mor sect mov 240800H.

(c) Fly in pnr pl less one sect, and AQ cell commences. 241100H.

(d) LSM arrives PHUOC HAI 241100H.

(e) Fly in 7 RAR commences 250730H.

(2) Staff

(a) LOs with radios are appointed as fol:

(1) 1 Coy 3/48 Bn 2Lt O'BRIEN c/s 9F.

(11) Pl 1 Coy 3/48 Bn Sgt ALLEN c/s 9G.

(111) 2 Coy 3/48 Bn WO2 MAHONEY c/s 9H.

(1V) 612 RF Coy 2Lt MARTIN c/s 9J.

(v) 3 Pl 612 RF Coy Sgt MAY c/s 9K.

(VI) 36 PF Pl Sgt ADSHEAD c/s 9L.

(b) LO's to accompany navigation party and AQ cell under comd IO in four trucks $\frac{1}{4}$ ton escorted by two "gun ships". IO to posn LO's and arrange interpreters as required.

(c) IO's party depart 240830H.

(3) Fence Lines

(a) Direction. See trace Annex B.

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....(b)....

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(b) Type. Type 2 catwire with tie down.

(c) Distance between fences. 80 metres.

(4) Navigation Party. SOP.

4. Admin and Log

Rations.

a. All 7 RAR to carry 3 days plus one emergency rat. Further supply by Maintdem.

b. 7 RAR to provide lunch from 25 May to end of op for 100 ARVN per day (US type one meal packs).

c. Armour and Engr atts to provide own rats.

d. LO's (and their att interpreters) to carry 6 days rats.

Water.

a. 4 full water bottles per man - resupply by one-for-one system.

b. 124 filled water cans to move on Landrovers with A/QM to op loc.

c. 7 RAR to provide water for Engrs and ARVN as required.

Med.

a. Med asst with D Coy to handle all cases until arrival RAP.

b. RAP loc Bn HQ 523541 wef approx 0900 hrs 25 May.

c. "Dust-Off" procedures as normal.

Ammo.

a. Normal 1st line on tps.

b. All magazines in base to be filled and aval at TIGER 5 for emergency resup.

c. Mor ammo - 85 HE, 10 Illg, 5 SMK per Mor.

Radio Btys. One bty per set plus one res carried for each set.

POL. 7 RAR vehs - full tanks plus one jerrycan of petrol and one jerrycan of water.

Wiring Stores and Eqpt. Distr to be advised by 2IC in loc on 25 May.

5. Comd and Sig

a. Bn HQ

(1) Mov in third lift.

(2) Remain vic YS 522541.

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...b...

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b. Radio

(1) SOP plus:

C/S 9F LO 1 Coy 3/48 Bn

C/S 9G LO P1 1 Coy 3/48 Bn

C/S 9H LO 2 Coy 3/48 Bn

C/S 9J LO 612 RF Coy

C/S 9K LO 3 pl 612 RF Coy

C S 9L LO 36 PF P1.

(2) Rebro on HORSESHOE.

c. Line. Bn HQ area only as ordered.

d. Codes. As issued plus additional points of origin as fol:


(1)	250800 to 260800 May	CONDIMENT	5255
(2)	260800 to 270800 May	CITY	5156
(3)	270800 to 280800 May	GIRLS NAME	5254
(4)	280800 to 290800 May	CLOTHING	5155
(5)	290800 to 300800 May	TOOTHPASTE	5154
(6)	300800 to 310800 May	COUNTRY	5254

ACKNOWLEDGE

(Eric H SMITH)
Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

ANNEXES: A. En Forces.
B. Layout of Ops.

Official


(D.K. ATKINSON)

Maj
S3

Distribution. List C.

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Annex 'A' to 7 RAR
OP 4 dated May 67

EN FORCES

1. The AO lies astride the southern approach route used by the VC to enter and/or harass the populated areas of southern PHUOC TUY. PHOUC HAI has been the tgt for mor attacks; LO GOM was attacked by a VC Bn on 21 Mar, and other villages on Route 44 have suffered attacks and harassment by main force, provincial and district units.
2. Main base areas used by VC are the thickly timbered country NORTH of the SONG BA DAT and the LONG HAI hills to the WEST. VC def posns (incl up to coy size posn), camps and food caches have been found recently NORTH and SOUTH of the RACH ONG HEM, specifically in squares 5256, 5355 and further to the EAST in 5556.
3. The area has been used as an AO by 2 Bn 275 Regt. It is a traditional AO for D445 Bn, and the LONG DAT District Coy makes forays against it from the LONG HAI hills.
4. VC production units (generally small groups) may be encountered working the fields or sending livestock throughout the AO. These people are contacted by commo-liaison personnel from either VC province procurement cells or VC logistic representatives of Group 84. Logistics units of Group 84 up to coy str may also be discovered on procurement missions in or close to the AO.
5. No main force units are believed to be presently in the AO. Elms of D445 have recently been ident in the northern base area and the LONG DAT Coy is believed to be in base areas in the LONG HAI hills. In the last week there have been minor clashes between ARVN and VC in DAT DO and near PHOUC LOI. LO GOM is a tgt for spasmodic mor attacks and this contingency should be considered in planning.
6. There is increasing evidence that the fence is proving to be a growing source of annoyance and inconvenience to the VC and maximum preventative action should be taken to prevent him from conducting either close recce or undetected assembly for counter-attack at any level against our ops.
7. Once the VC can judge the intended dir of the fence he may attempt to booby trap along that line.


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57

53
51

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GAP 15M WIDE AT
SE CORN. OF OUTPOST

LSM LANDING SITE

FENCE 30M WIDE

55
54

Annex 'B' to 7 FAR
OP 4 dated May 67

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7 RAR
AP AN PHU
SOUTH VIETNAM

29 May 67

PATROL TASKS 30 MAY - 1 JUN 67

- ... 1. Attached at Annex A are the Patrol Tasks for the above period.
2. Patrols are to be on the 7 RAR Command Net.

Heunt/Pladen
Maj
OC Sp Coy

Distribution.

A Coy
B Coy
C Coy
D Coy (3)
Admin Coy (3)
Sp Coy
Mor Pl
Sig Pl
F/A Pl
Pnr Pl
CO
2IC
S3
CP
FCC
OC Sp Coy
BC
IO
RSM
File (2)
Comd's Diary (3)

External.

HQ 1 ATF (2)
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
1 Fd Regt RAA (6)
1/83 US Arty
1 Fd Sqn RAE
2 RAR
6 RAR
1 SAS Sqn
1 ARU

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
Annex A To 7 RAR
Patrol Task Table
dated 29 May 67

<u>Serial</u>	16/67.	17/67.
<u>Sub Unit.</u>	Admin Coy.	D Coy.
<u>Strength.</u>	P1.	P1.
<u>Time Out.</u>	301730 H.	301500 H.
<u>Time In.</u>	310700 H.	010900 H.
<u>Routes.</u>	Annex B.	Annex C.
<u>Tasks.</u>	Estb ambush ni 30/31 May 67 vic YS 424685 on Engr rd.	Estb ambush ni 30/31 May and ni 31 May/1 Jun 67 on creek and track junction vic YS 390639.
<u>Remarks.</u>	a. Ambush to be estb by last light 30 May 67 and remain in posn until departure of ptl 31 May 67. b. Ptl comd to be aware of 2. RAR ptl serial 59/5 time in 301630H.	a. Ambush to be estb by last light 30 May and remain in posn until departure of ptl 1 Jun 67. b. Vehicle insertion and extraction of ptl to be arranged by parent coy.


MAPS 1/25000 PICTO SUPPLEMENT

NOTE:

2 RAR PTL SERIAL 59/5
TIME IN 301630H




ANNEX B to 7 RAR
PATROL TASK TABLE
May 67



68
39

PICTO SUPPLEMENT 1/25000

ANNEX C to 7 RAR
PATROL TASK TABLE
May 67



42
64

Issued 311045

Comd Div

C19

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

7th Battalion
The Royal Australian Regiment
AP AN PHU

May 67

7 RAR GS INSTR No 1 (SVN)

PART 1-BASE SECURITY-GENERAL

PART 2-ORDERS FOR REAR AREA SECURITY

PART 1

ACTION TO BE TAKEN DURING AN ATTACK
ON THE 1 ATF BASE WHEN BN HQ IS PRESENT

GENERAL

1. When it is known that 1 ATF Base is under attack, the 1 ATF Command Post is to order all units to stand to by:-
 - a. Sounding a siren with one continuous blast.
 - b. Informing all stations on the Task Force Command radio net to stand to.

Action by Sub Units

2. Sub units who come under attack are to stand to and immediately inform Bn HQ by radio/and or telephone. Bn HQ will inform HQ 1 ATF by radio. Info required initially is:-
 - a. Type of attack ie, mors, small arms or aslt.
 - b. Where attack is directed and in what strength.
3. All sub units on being ordered to stand to or hearing alarms from other areas are to take the following action:-
 - a. Stand to by means of an alarm system. Sub units are to ensure that an efficient system is devised and is in working order at all times. Sirens, car horns, expended arty rounds with a metal bar, are examples of alarm systems. Any system used must be indep of the main power sup. Each sub unit next to the one sounding an alarm should immediately sound its own.
 - b. The rear parties of Coys who may be absent from the base are to join the Bn comd net. The senior offr/NCO in charge is to man the set.
 - c. Submit MORTREPS over the arty net even if the sub unit itself is not receiving the fire. Speed of reporting is essential and sub units are to ensure that facilities exist for duty personnel to quickly obtain details required for a MORTREP.
 - d. OCs are to man the radio sets.
 - e. Sub units outside the base area are to confirm their locstats. Confirmed locstats will be passed to HQ 1 ATF by Bn HQ.
 - f. The main power supply is to be cut off as detailed in Unit Routine Orders.

Equipment

4. All ranks when standing to are to be in possession of :-
 - a. Arms and ammo.

b. Shell dressing.

c. Water bottle.

5. Steel helmets are to be readily available .

Action after Attack

6. The order to stand down is to be initiated by 1 ATF. Bn HQ will order stand down by telephone to all sub units in the base area. The order to stand down will not be passed over the radio.

PART TWO

ORDERS FOR REAR AREA SECURITY

Routine

1. Normal timings for routine activities within the battalion are to be adhered to by all sub units. Any alterations to these are to be promulgated in Routine Orders Part 1.

Stand To

2. There will be no stand to in the mornings.

3. The time for evening stand to has been promulgated in Routine Orders Part 1.

4. During stand to those members NOT required for clearing ptls or picquets are to stand to at their respective posts.

Clearing Ptls

5. Sub units are to send out clearing ptls:-

a. Morning - at first light.

b. Evening - at stand to.

6. Sub units are to report, by telephone, to the CP when clearing ptls leave and enter the area.

7. Ptl details are :

a. Strength - 1 NCO and 6 OR.

b. Ptls are to depart from the LEFT flank of their sub unit area moving in a clockwise dir to enter the RIGHT flank of their sub unit area.

Stand Down

8. Sub units are to notify the CP by telephone that they have stood down.

Picquets

9. By day the .50 cal MG in each of A, B, C, and D Coy areas is to be manned. At least 10 boxes of ammo are to be held in each MG pit.

10. By night the following are to be manned :-

a. A Coy area - concentrate Coy in 1 and 3 Pl areas . Man an MG in 1 Pl and 3 Pl areas plus the .50 cal MG.

b. B and C Coy areas - man one MG post in each Pl area.

c. D Coy area -

(3)

D. Admin Coy area - Man the following posts:-

- (1) QM Pl
- (2) Tpt Pl
- (3) Coy HQ

Inner TAOR Ptl's

11. Rifle coys will, in turn, provide the inner TAOR ptl which is done twice daily, once before midday and once after midday.
12. Coy comds are to ensure that the senior person in each coy left in base during Bn ops is briefed fully on all requirements for the inner TAOR ptl. The senior coy representative is responsible for briefing the TAOR ptl the afternoon before the ptl is due out.
13. The ptl is to carry a radio and operate on the Admin Net frequency using its parent coy base call sign as detailed at the base def conference.
14. The ptl is to comprise 1 NCO and 6 ORs.
15. Coys are to notify the CP by telephone, the movement out and the return of the TAOR ptl.

Duties

16. Two duty coys are to be nominated on a daily basis to provide the following duties:-
 - a. Inner TAOR ptl - 1 NCO and 6 ORs.
 - b. Garbage collection - 3 ORs (report to Tpt Sgt at 0830 hrs).

Composition of Sub Unit Rear Details

17. The basis for rifle coys on which to plan is:-
 - a. CQMS
 - b. Ord room cpl/payclerk
 - c. Cooks
 - d. Hygiene dutyman
 - e. Storeman
 - f. NCO
 - g. 10 fit men

Preliminary Def Conference

18. A conference for the def coordination of the base area will be held by OC Admin Coy at 1400 hrs on the day prior to Bn moving out on ops in the OC Admin Coy's tent. The following are to attend:-

- | | | |
|----|------------|--------------|
| a. | Bn HQ | Asst Adjt |
| b. | Sp Coy | CQMS |
| | | Mr sect comd |
| c. | Rifle coys | CQMS's |
| d. | Admin Coy | OC |
| | | QM |
| | | PO |
| | | CSM |

Operation of Offrs/Sgts Messes

19. Offrs and Sgts Messes are to remain open but stewards will be pooled to serve in both messes. The bars in the messes will NOT sell alcohol after 1800 hours.

Movies

20. NO movies will normally be screened while the battalion is out on operations.

Consumption of Alcohol

21. Whilst the Bn is on operations Coy canteens are to sell alcohol only in the trading period 1700-1730 hrs.

Manning Details

22. The 7 RAR CP/FCC is to close down and control is to be transferred to the Admin Coy CP.

On Attack

23. In the event of an attack on the 1 ATF base area, con of the area will be through the Admin Coy CP. The SIGCEN will connect all sub units on a conference call to the Admin Coy CP. Sub units are to remain on listening watch. Sub units are to join the AQ net and the senior offr/NCO are to man the sets.

24. Alarms are to be sounded and all ranks are to stand to as described in PART 1.

25. The power sup is to be cut off as detailed in Routine Orders PART 1.

26. MORTREPS are to be submitted as detailed in PART 1 and in accordance with 7 RAR SOP Card 5.

27. Eqpt as described in PART 1.

28. After the attack the order to stand down is to be initiated by HQ 1 ATF. The order is to be passed to sub units by telephone, NOT by radio.

Daily Def Conference

29. A daily conference is to be held at OC Admin Coys tent at 0900 hrs whilst Bn is on ops. The fol are to attend:-

- a. All CQMSs
- b. Mor sect Cpl
- c. RQMS

Security

30. Sub units are to ensure lights are turned off by 2200 hrs.

31. OC Admin Coy is to decide light policy in the Admin Coy area dependent on the requirement for ni work.

Comms

32. The fol comms are to be maintained:-

- a. Line, Emperor and Emperor Rear switchboards are to be manned 24 hours daily.
- b. Radio

- (1) Con set on Admin/Air net - call sign ØA (Admin CP).
- (2) Sub sta set on Bn Comd net (Admin CP)- call sign 95A.

(5)

(3) Each rifle coy a set on the Admin net-call signs as follows:-

- (a) A Coy - 10B
- (b) B Coy - 20B
- (c) C Coy - 30B
- (d) D Coy - 40B

Rules of Engagement

33. The normal rules of engagement within the TAOR apply.
34. Within the base area SA fire is to be opened according to the following rules:-
- a. When the sub unit is receiving direct SA fire and/or gren from an observed en.
 - b. When the sub unit is under attack or the threat of an aggressive act is prevalent (this incls climbing or cutting the perimeter wire).
35. If fire is opened the comd is to ex normal fire con. Where possible MGs are NOT to be used to fire on small perimeter probes.
36. Shots will NOT be fired at suspected noises or movement.

Rules of Illumination

37. In the base area NO illumination is to be fired without the approval of HQ 1 ATF. This will be requested through the Admin CP.

Wpn Testing

38. Approval is to be obtained from Admin Coy CP and HQ 1 ATF prior to any test firing.

Arty and Mor DFs

39. All requests for DF s are to be passed through the Admin Coy CP.

Codes

40. The RSO and IO are to ensure sufficient codes are held by the rear area to cover the expected period of absence of the bn.



Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

7th Battalion
The Royal Australian Regiment
AP AN PHU

May 67

7 RAR GS INSTR No 1 (SVN)PART 1-BASE SECURITY-GENERALPART 2-ORDERS FOR REAR AREA SECURITYPART 1ACTION TO BE TAKEN DURING AN ATTACK
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 - b. Where attack is directed and in what strength.
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 - a. Stand to by means of an alarm system. Sub units are to ensure that an efficient system is devised and is in working order at all times. Sirens, car horns, expended arty rounds with a metal bar, are examples of alarm systems. Any system used must be indep of the main power sup. Each sub unit next to the one sounding an alarm should immediately sound its own.
 - b. The rear parties of Coys who may be absent from the base are to join the Bn comd net. The senior offr/NCO in charge is to man the set.
 - c. Submit MORTREPS over the arty net even if the sub unit itself is not receiving the fire. Speed of reporting is essential and sub units are to ensure that facilities exist for duty personnel to quickly obtain details required for a MORTREP.
 - d. OCs are to man the radio sets.
 - e. Sub units outside the base area are to confirm their locstats. Confirmed locstats will be passed to HQ 1 ATF by Bn HQ.
 - f. The main power supply is to be cut off as detailed in Unit Routine Orders.

Equipment

4. All ranks when standing to are to be in possession of :-
 - a. Arms and ammo.

b. Shell dressing.

c. Water bottle.

5. Steel helmets are to be readily available .

Action after Attack

6. The order to stand down is to be initiated by 1 ATF. Bn HQ will order stand down by telephone to all sub units in the base area. The order to stand down will not be passed over the radio.

PART TWO

ORDERS FOR REAR AREA SECURITY

Routine

1. Normal timings for routine activities within the battalion are to be adhered to by all sub units. Any alterations to these are to be promulgated in Routine Orders Part 1.

Stand To

2. There will be no stand to in the mornings.

3. The time for evening stand to has been promulgated in Routine Orders Part 1.

4. During stand to those members NOT required for clearing ptls or picquets are to stand to at their respective posts.

Clearing Ptls

5. Sub units are to send out clearing ptls:-

a. Morning - at first light.

b. Evening - at stand to.

6. Sub units are to report, by telephone, to the CP when clearing ptls leave and enter the area.

7. Ptl details are :

a. Strength - 1 NCO and 6 OR.

b. Ptls are to depart from the LEFT flank of their sub unit area moving in a clockwise dir to enter the RIGHT flank of their sub unit area.

Stand Down

8. Sub units are to notify the CP by telephone that they have stood down.

Picquets

9. By day the .50 cal MG in each of A, B, C, and D Coy areas is to be manned. At least 10 boxes of ammo are to be held in each MG pit.

10. By night the following are to be manned :-

a. A Coy area - concentrate Coy in 1 and 3 Pl areas . Man an MG in 1 Pl and 3 Pl areas plus the .50 cal MG.

b. B and C Coy areas - man one MG post in each Pl area.

c. D Coy area -

(3)

D. Admin Coy area - Man the following posts:-

- (1) QM Pl
- (2) Tpt Pl
- (3) Coy HQ

Inner TAOR Ptl's

- 11. Rifle coys will, in turn, provide the inner TAOR ptl which is done twice daily, once before midday and once after midday.
- 12. Coy comds are to ensure that the senior person in each coy left in base during Bn ops is briefed fully on all requirements for the inner TAOR ptl. The senior coy representative is responsible for briefing the TAOR ptl the afternoon before the ptl is due out.
- 13. The ptl is to carry a radio and operate on the Admin Net frequency using its parent's coy base call sign as detailed at the base def conference.
- 14. The ptl is to comprise 1 NCO and 6 ORs.
- 15. Coys are to notify the CP by telephone, the movement out and the return of the TAOR ptl.

Duties

- 16. Two duty coys are to be nominated on a daily basis to provide the following duties:-
 - a. Inner TAOR ptl - 1 NCO and 6 ORs.
 - b. Garbage collection - 3 ORs (report to Tpt Sgt at 0830 hrs).

Composition of Sub Unit Rear Details

- 17. The basis for rifle coys on which to plan is:-
 - a. CQMS
 - b. Ord room cpl/payclerk
 - c. Cooks
 - d. Hygiene dutyman
 - e. Storeman
 - f. NCO
 - g. 10 fit men

Preliminary Def Conference

18. A conference for the def coordination of the base area will be held by OC Admin Coy at 1400 hrs on the day prior to Bn moving out on ops in the OC Admin Coy's tent. The following are to attend:-

- a. Bn HQ Asst Adjt
- b. Sp Coy CQMS
 Mor sect comd
- c. Rifle coys CQMS's
- d. Admin Coy OC
 QM
 TO
 CSM

Operation of Offrs/Sgts Messes

19. Offrs and Sgts Messes are to remain open but stewards will be pooled to serve in both messes. The bars in the messes will NOT sell alcohol after 1800 hours.

Movies

20. NO movies will normally be screened while the battalion is out on operations.

Consumption of Alcohol

21. Whilst the Bn is on operations Coy canteens are to sell alcohol only in the trading period 1700-1730 hrs.

Manning Details

22. The 7 RAR CP/FCC is to close down and control is to be transferred to the Admin Coy CP.

On Attack

23. In the event of an attack on the 1 ATF base area, con of the area will be through the Admin Coy CP. The SIGCEN will connect all sub units on a conference call to the Admin Coy CP. Sub units are to remain on listening watch. Sub units are to join the AQ net and the senior offr/NCO are to man the sets.

24. Alarms are to be sounded and all ranks are to stand to as described in PART 1.

25. The power sup is to be cut off as detailed in Routine Orders PART 1.

26. MORTREPS are to be submitted as detailed in PART 1 and in accordance with 7 RAR SOP Card 5.

27. Eqpt as described in PART 1.

28. After the attack the order to stand down is to be initiated by HQ 1 ATF. The order is to be passed to sub units by telephone, NOT by radio.

Daily Def Conference

29. A daily conference is to be held at OC Admin Coys tent at 0900 hrs whilst Bn is on ops. The fol are to attend:-

- a. All CQMSs
- b. Mor sect Cpl
- c. RQMS

Security

30. Sub units are to ensure lights are turned off by 2200 hrs.

31. OC Admin Coy is to decide light policy in the Admin Coy area dependent on the requirement for ni work.

Comms

32. The fol comms are to be maintained:-

a. Line. Emperor and Emperor Rear switchboards are to be manned 24 hours daily.

b. Radio

(1) Con set on Admin/Air net - call sign ØA (Admin CP).

(2) Sub sta set on Bn Comd net (Admin CP)- call sign 95A.

(5)

(3) Each rifle coy a set on the Admin net-call signs as follows:-

- (a) A Coy - 10B
- (b) B Coy - 20B
- (c) C Coy - 30B
- (d) D Coy - 40B

Rules of Engagement

33. The normal rules of engagement within the TAOR apply.

34. Within the base area SA fire is to be opened according to the following rules:-

- a. When the sub unit is receiving direct SA fire and/or gren from an observed en.
- b. When the sub unit is under attack or the threat of an aggressive act is prevalent (this incl climbing or cutting the perimeter wire).

35. If fire is opened the comd is to ex normal fire con. Where possible MGs are NOT to be used to fire on small perimeter probes.

36. Shots will NOT be fired at suspected noises or movement.

Rules of Illumination

37. In the base area NO illumination is to be fired without the approval of HQ 1 ATF. This will be requested through the Admin CP.

Wpn Testing

38. Approval is to be obtained from Admin Coy CP and HQ 1 ATF prior to any test firing.

Arty and Mor DFs

39. All requests for DF s are to be passed through the Admin Coy CP.

Codes

40. The RSO and IO are to ensure sufficient codes are held by the rear area to cover the expected period of absence of the bn.



Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

C19

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

7th Battalion
The Royal Australian Regiment
AP AN PHU

13 May 67

7 RAR GS INSTR No 1 (SVN)

PART 1-BASE SECURITY-GENERAL

PART 2-ORDERS FOR REAR AREA SECURITY

PART 1

ACTION TO BE TAKEN DURING AN ATTACK
ON THE 1 ATF BASE WHEN BN HQ IS PRESENT

GENERAL

1. When it is known that 1 ATF Base is under attack, the 1 ATF Command Post is to order all units to stand to by:-
 - a. Sounding a siren with one continuous blast.
 - b. Informing all stations on the Task Force Command radio net to stand to.

Action by Sub Units

2. Sub units who come under attack are to stand to and immediately inform Bn HQ by radio/and or telephone. Bn HQ will inform HQ 1 ATF by radio. Info required initially is:-
 - a. Type of attack ie, mors, small arms or aslt.
 - b. Where attack is directed and in what strength.
3. All sub units on being ordered to stand to or hearing alarms from other areas are to take the following action:-
 - a. Stand to by means of an alarm system. Sub units are to ensure that an efficient system is devised and is in working order at all times. Sirens, car horns, expended arty rounds with a metal bar, are examples of alarm systems. Any system used must be indep of the main power sup. Each sub unit next to the one sounding an alarm should immediately sound its own.
 - b. The rear parties of Coys who may be absent from the base are to join the Bn comd net. The senior offr/NCO in charge is to man the set.
 - c. Submit MORTREPS over the arty net even if the sub unit itself is not receiving the fire. Speed of reporting is essential and sub units are to ensure that facilities exist for duty personnel to quickly obtain details required for a MORTREP.
 - d. OCs are to man the radio sets.
 - e. Sub units outside the base area are to confirm their locstats. Confirmed locstats will be passed to HQ 1 ATF by Bn HQ.
 - f. The main power supply is to be cut off as detailed in Unit Routine Orders.

Equipment

4. All ranks when standing to are to be in possession of :-
 - a. Arms and ammo.

- b. Shell dressing.
 - c. Water bottle.
5. Steel helmets are to be readily available .

Action after Attack

6. The order to stand down is to be initiated by 1 ATF. Bn HQ will order stand down by telephone to all sub units in the base area. The order to stand down will not be passed over the radio.

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2. There will be no stand to in the mornings.
3. The time for evening stand to has been promulgated in Routine Orders Part 1.
4. During stand to those members NOT required for clearing ptls or picquets are to stand to at their respective posts.

Clearing Ptls

5. Sub units are to send out clearing ptls:-
- a. Morning - at first light.
 - b. Evening - at stand to.
6. Sub units are to report, by telephone, to the CP when clearing ptls leave and enter the area.
7. Ptl details are :
- a. Strength - 1 NCO and 6 OR.
 - b. Ptls are to depart from the LEFT flank of their sub unit area moving in a clockwise dir to enter the RIGHT flank of their sub unit area.

Stand Down

8. Sub units are to notify the CP by telephone that they have stood down.

Picquets

9. By day the .50 cal MG in each of A, B, C, and D Coy areas is to be manned. At least 10 boxes of ammo are to be held in each MG pit.
10. By night the following are to be manned :-
- a. A Coy area - concentrate Coy in 1 and 3 Pl areas . Man an MG in 1 Pl and 3 Pl areas plus the .50 cal MG.
 - b. B and C Coy areas - man one MG post in each Pl area.
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(3)

D. Admin Coy area - Plan the following posts:-

- (1) QM Pl
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- (3) Coy HQ

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- FO
- CSM

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31. OC Admin Coy is to decide light policy in the Admin Coy area dependent on the requirement for ni work.

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32. The fol comms are to be maintained:-

- a. Line, Emperor and Emperor Rear switchboards are to be manned 24 hours daily.
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 - (1) Con set on Admin/Air net - call sign ØA (Admin CP).
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(5)

(3) Each rifle coy a set on the Admin net-call signs as follows:-

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33. The normal rules of engagement within the TAOR apply.
34. Within the base area SA fire is to be opened according to the following rules:-
- a. When the sub unit is receiving direct SA fire and/or gren from an observed en.
 - b. When the sub unit is under attack or the threat of an aggressive act is prevalent (this incls climbing or cutting the perimeter wire).
35. If fire is opened the comd is to ex normal fire con. Where possible MGs are NOT to be used to fire on small perimeter probes.
36. Shots will NOT be fired at suspected noises or movement.

Rules of Illumination

37. In the base area NO illumination is to be fired without the approval of HQ 1 ATF. This will be requested through the Admin CP.

Wpn Testing


38. Approval is to be obtained from Admin Coy CP and HQ 1 ATF prior to any test firing.

Arty and Mor DFs

39. All requests for DF s are to be passed through the Admin Coy CP.

Codes

40. The RSO and IO are to ensure sufficient codes are held by the rear area to cover the expected period of absence of the bn.



Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

310900

COMBS DIARY

C20

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

7th Battalion
The Royal Australian Regiment
AP AN PHU

R737-1-1(4)

28 May 67

Distribution below

ROAD SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS
AND STATUS

Aim

1. To clarify the current system of security classifications of roads within PHUOC TOY province.

Definitions

2. The following colour codes are used to describe road status:
- White. Road condition and status unknown.
 - Green. Controlled by GVN, US, or FWMAF. Minimum security forces are required to maintain this status. Isolated incidents may occur.
 - Amber. Only marginal control by either GVN or VC forces exists. The road is used by GVN, US and FWMAF but frequent incidents occur.
 - Red. Controlled by the VC, or extensive interdiction has occurred. The road requires a major military operation to clear it., and considerable engineer effort to maintain it due to enemy interdictions.

Unit precautions

3. Within 1 ATF, unit precautions to ensure security during road movement are directly related to the security status of the intended route, as outlined above.
4. Movement of Personnel/Minor Stores. The following precautions are to take immediate effect:
- Road White. As for Road Red.
 - Road Green. Driver plus one escort, both armed.
 - Road Amber. Minimum of two vehicles with a total of six personnel aboard, all armed.
 - Road Red. 1 ATF vehicles will not travel on Red routes without detailed approval and Instructions from HQ 1 ATF.
5. Movement of Stores. Special precautions should be taken when attractive stores (ammo, mines, engineer stores etc) are to be moved.
- Road GREEN. Two landrover escorts with a minimum of six armed personnel are to escort the stores vehicles. The use of Landrover "gunships" is recommended.
 - Road AMBER. As for para 4d.
 - Road RED/WHITE. As for para 4d.

Road Status

6. Since the status of various routes will change with the tactical situation in the Province, the current position is attached at Annex A. Amendments will be issued to this Annex as required.

The Royal Australian Regiment
7th Battalion
AF HQ

28 May 67

1037-7-1(1)

Promulgation

7. This information is to be promulgated to all drivers/vehicle commanders and all personnel likely to travel regularly by vehicle.

Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

Distribution

List A less 1 ATF plus Tpt 10 extra.

Unit promulgation
Within 1 day, this promulgation to ensure security during road movement are directly related to the security status of the intended route, as outlined above.
Movement of Personnel/Personnel: The following promulgations are to take immediate effect:
1. Road status: as for para 1A.
2. Road status: Driver plus one (both armed).
3. Road status: Minimum of two vehicles with a total of six personnel aboard, all armed.
4. Road status: All vehicles will not travel on road routes without detailed approval and instructions from HQ 1 ATF.
5. Movement of stores: Special promulgations apply to stores when attractive stores (ammunition, stores, engineer stores etc) are to be moved.
6. Road status: Two land-rovers escorted with a minimum of six armed personnel are to escort the stores vehicle. The rest of land-overs "generals" is unescorted.
7. Road status: as for para 1A.
8. Road status: as for para 1A.
Since the status of various routes will change with the tactical situation in the theatre, the current status is attached as Annex A. Promulgations will be issued as they are required.

Annex A to 7 RAR
R737-1-1(4)
Dated 28 May 67

ROAD STATUS/CLASSIFICATION
PHUOC TUY PROVINCE

1. The subtended information is correct to 10 May 67.

	<u>Route</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Engr Classification</u>
a.	<u>Route 2</u>		
	(1) BARIA - NUI DAT	GREEN	60
	(2) NUI DAT - DUC THANH	AMBER	60(via by pass)
	(3) DUC THANH - 11 ACH (vic YS4496)	RED	Unknown
b.	<u>Route 15</u>		
	(1) VUNG TAU - BARIA	GREEN	12
	(2) BARIA - BIEN HOA(prov)	AMBER	12
c.	<u>Route 23</u>		
	(1) BARIA - DAT DO	GREEN	16
	(2) DAT DO- XUYEN MOC	AMBER	45
d.	<u>Route 44</u>		
	(1) BARIA - LONG HAI	AMBER	10
e.	<u>Route 52</u>		
	(1) DAT DO - LANG PHUOC HAI	AMBER	8

Issued 300445.

COMDS DIARY

~~C18~~
C 21

MESSAGE FORM

PRECEDENCE-ACTION

DATE-TIME-GROUP

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ROUTINE

300630 Z (May 67)

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER

FROM 7 RAR

G 228

TO A COY B COY C COY D COY
ADMIN COY SP COY MOR PL
SIG PL F/A PL PNR PL
CO 2IC S3 CP FCC
OC SP COY BC IO RSM
FILE COMD'S DIARY
HQ 1 ATF A SQN 3 CAV REGT
1 FD REGT RAA 1/83 US ARTY
1 FD SQN RAE 2 RAR 1 SAS SQN
1 ARU

PATROL TASKS 30 MAY - 1 JUN 67 (.) PATROL TASKS CANCELLED

DRAFTER'S NAME

OFFICE

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND RANK

LEESON

OC ADMIN

B. Hagan Ltfr

Comd's Diary

CONFIDENTIAL

~~C 19~~
C 22

7 RAR
AP AN PHU
SOUTH VIETNAM

31 May 67

PATROL TASKS 31 MAY - 3 JUN 67

- ... 1. Attached at Annex A are the Patrol Tasks for the above period.
2. Patrols are to be on the 7 RAR Command Net.

Kenneth J Bladen
(Kenneth J Bladen)
Maj
OC Sp

Distribution

A Coy
B Coy
C Coy (3)
D Coy (3)
Admin Coy (3)
Sp Coy
Mor Pl
Sig Pl
F/A Pl
Pnr Pl
CO
2IC
S3
CP
FCC
OC Sp Coy
BC
IO
RSM
File (2)
Comd's Diary (3)

External

HQ 1 ATF (2)
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
1 Fd Regt RAA (6)
1/83 US Arty
2 RAR
1 SAS Sqn
1 ARU



CONFIDENTIAL

PATROL TASKS 31 MAY - 3 JUN 67

<u>Serial</u>	18/67.	19/67.	20/67.
<u>Sub Unit</u>	Admin Coy	C Coy.	Admin Coy.
<u>Strength</u>	Pl.	Pl.	Pl.
<u>Time Out</u>	311730 H.	311730 H.	011730 H.
<u>Time In</u>	010700 H.	010730 H.	020700 H.
<u>Routes</u>	Annex B.	Annex C.	Annex B.
<u>Task</u>	a. Estb ambush vic YS 424685 on Engr rd. b. Ambush to be estb by last light 31 May 67 and remain in posn until departure of patrol 1 Jun 67.	a. Estb ambush vic YS 435695. Exact loc to be selected by ptl comd and CP notified. b. Ambush to be estb by last light 31 May 67 and remain in posn until departure of ptl 1 Jun 67.	As for serial 18/67.

<u>Serial</u>	21/67.	22/67.	23/67.
<u>Sub Unit.</u>	C Coy.	D Coy.	D Coy.
<u>Strength.</u>	Pl.	Pl.	Pl.
<u>Time Out.</u>	011730 H.	021730 H.	021730 H.
<u>Time In.</u>	020730 H.	030700 H.	030730 H.
<u>Routes</u>	Annex C.	Annex B (reverse routes).	Annex C.
<u>Task</u>	As for serial 19/67.	As for serial 18/67.	As for serial 19/67.




ANNEX B TO TRAR
PATROL TASK TABLE
31 MAY 67



MAP 1:25000 PICTO SUPPLEMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C TO 7RAR
PATROL TASK TABLE
31 MAY 67



MAP 1:2500 PICTO SUPPLEMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

H 1

7th Battalion
The Royal Australian Regiment
AP AN PHU

8 May 67

R495-1-1

Distribution below.

7 RAR DISTRIBUTION LIST

..... Attached is the current 7 RAR distribution list.

J. W. B. Hayman
Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

Distribution

List C

To whom	A	B	C
A Coy	5	1	2
B Coy	5	1	2
C Coy	5	1	2
D Coy	5	1	2
Sp Coy	7	1	1
Admin Coy	2	1	3
Bn HQ Pl	1	1	-
CO)			1
2IC)			1
S3) one only	1		1
IO)			1
Adjt)			1
RSM	1	-	1
RMO	1	-	-
Tpt	1	-	-
WO CATERER	1	-	-
PRI	1	-	-
Padre	1	-	-
Salvation Army Rep	1	-	-
1 ATF	3	-	24
Spare	3	4	10
File	1	1	1
Float	-	1	-
Reece Pl	-	-	1
Aslt Pnr Pl	-	-	1
Mor Pl	-	-	1
Sig Pl	-	-	1
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt	-	-	3
1 Fd Regt	-	-	5
103 Fd Bty	-	-	2
Bty A 1/83 US Arty	-	-	1
161 Fd Bty RNZA	-	-	1
1 Fd Sqn	-	-	1
103 Sig Sqn	-	-	1
6 RAR	-	-	1
3 SAS Sqn	-	-	1
1 ARU	-	-	1
161 (Indep) Recce Flt	-	-	1
OC Sp Coy	-	-	1
OC Admin Coy	-	-	1
Comd's Diary	-	-	6
TOTAL	46	9	83

RESTRICTED

The information given in this document is not to be communicated, either directly or indirectly, to the press or to any person not authorised to receive it

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

ROUTINE ORDERS PART 1

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ERIC H SMITH

COMMANDING OFFICER

SEVENTH BATTALION THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT

Serial 17

8 May 67

Numbers 245 - 268

- 245. BURNING OF LEAVES/RUBBISH
- 246. UNAUTHORISED STRIPPING OF WEAPONS
- 247. COLLECTION OF AMMUNITION
- 248. AMENDMENT
- 249. DAILY ROUTINE
- 250. PALUDRINE BOOKS
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- 252. VEHICLES TO VUNG TAU
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- 266. BOUNDS - VUNG TAU
- 267. INTERNATIONAL HEALTH CERTIFICATE
- 268. IDENTITY CARDS (AAF-A129)

NOTICES

- 1. DISCIPLINE

245. BURNING OF LEAVES/RUBISH^{2.}

1. Leaves/rubish is to be burnt only under the following conditions:-

- a. Prior to 1100 hours.
- b. Fire to be at least 20 feet from any tent.
- c. Fire must be attended until burnt out.

2. If there is any wind, extra precautions are to be carried out. (1 ATF G657 of 290200Z Apr 67).

246. UNAUTHORISED STRIPPING OF WEAPONS

No member is to remove any portion, e.g., swivels etc. from any rifle, sub-machine gun, GPMG, HMG or pistol under any circumstance.

247. COLLECTION OF AMMUNITION

1. All ammunition will be drawn through the Regt Duty WO and RP Sect.

2. Any ammunition to be returned must be through the Regt Duty WO and RP Sect.

3. Ammunition will NOT be left lying outside the unit AP.

248. AMENDMENT

RO Serial 15 numbers 200-209 is amended by inserting 24 Apr 67 after serial 15.

249. DAILY ROUTINE

1. 7 RAR RO Serial 15 No 210 is hereby cancelled. Numbers on cover sheet of Serial 15 now to read as 200-209.

2. The following timings are effective from 7 May 67.

First light - clearing patrols out.

0630 - Revielle.

0635 - Paludrine parade.

0715 - Breakfast.

0800-0900 - Dental parade.

0815 - First morning parade.

0825 - Sick parade.

0945 -1000- Morning tea.

1215 - Stop work.

1230 - 1345 - Lunch break.

1345 - First afternoon parade.

1700-1730 - Wet Canteen open.

3.

1730-1830 - Evening meal.

1830 - Sleeves down.

1900-1930 - Stand to.

1945 - Wet canteen opens - Film commences.

2145 - All canteens close.

2200 - Tattoo - all Canteens cleared - all personnel to be in lines except if film is not finished, in which case personnel will proceed to lines immediately on completion of film.

250. PALUDRINE BOOK

1. A marked improvement in the standard of Paludrine books is required.

2. The following Paludrine books are to be raised:-

a. Roll book for personnel LOB (B Coy excl).

b. Roll book for Bn HQ in field.

3. The following specific points are to be corrected by sub-units.

a. A Coy - 1 Pl squares not divided.

b. C Coy - 7 Pl Not initialled 1-30 Apr.
8 Pl Incorrect procedure. Only one figure is being made then it is divided by a line to separate two occasions.

c. D Coy - 10 Pl Not initialled 13-19 Apr.
11 Pl From Patterson to Jansz, only one daily entry has been made indicating that only one Paludrine parade was held.
12 Pl Only one Paludrine was administered on 30 Apr 67.

d. Sp Coy - FA Pl Paludrine book illegible.

Aslt Pnr Pl Not initialled 24-30 Apr.

e. Admin Coy - QM Pl No entry for Pte J.H. Bowley on AM Parade 1 May 67.

251. TELEPHONE PRIORITIES

1. If any telephone message has a current operational aspect the caller is to notify the switchboard operator that it is an "Operational Call". Operational calls take priority over all other calls, and if necessary, an engaged line may be disconnected by the operator to ensure that the operational call is put through.

2. The Bn CP and the CO take priority in any normal traffic calls.

252. UNIT VEHICLES

1. Unit vehicles must be clear of VUNG TAU by 1615 hours so that vehicles can return to the Unit lines before the road is closed and still satisfy laid down speed limits.
2. If vehicles have NOT left VUNG TAU by 1615 hours then dvrs/passengers must remain overnight at the transit area in VUNG TAU and 7 RAR CP must be informed accordingly, immediately the decision is made. The CP will inform the Tpt Duty NCO and any other Coy involved.

253. CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL

Whilst the Bn is on operations, rear area details are not to consume alcohol except between the period 1700-1730 hours. Coy canteens may remain open normal trading hours but soft drink only is to be sold in trading periods other than 1700-1730 hours. If this privilege is abused it will be withdrawn as it is essential that members in the Admin Area are completely capable of efficiently supporting their mates on operations at all times.

254. AMENDMENT NO1 TO 7 RAR SO's FOR OPS

Amendment No 1 to 7 RAR SO's for Ops has been issued.

255. ASCO/PX CANTEEN

The ASCO/PX canteen at 1ATF will be closed all day 10 May 67 and the morning of 11 May 67 for a handover/take-over stocktake.

256. UNIT BARBER SHOP

1. The Unit Barber Shop is located in the rear of the Salvation Army building.
2. Timings are:- 0815 hrs - 1200 hrs and
1345 hrs - 1630 hrs.

257. VACANCIES ON ESTABLISHMENT

1. The following vacancies exist in Sp Coy:-
 - a. Sigs - 6.
 - b. Storeman Mor Pl - 1.
2. Nominations from Coys are to reach Bn HQ by 1200 hours 16 May 67. NIL returns are required.

258. ELECTRICAL INSTALLATIONS

1. Electricity in the base area is generated at a voltage which can be fatal on contact. Deaths have occurred in the field in AUSTRALIA because of the ignorance about temporary electrical installation. To ensure maximum safety the following is to be observed:-
 - a. Frequent inspections of wiring are to be carried out by RAE tradesmen and warning notices placed where necessary to avoid accidents, e.g.,

5.

clearance height where lower lines cross a road.

b. Installation and modification of wiring is to be carried out by the following people only:-

(1) RAE electricians.

(2) Soldiers of other arms and services who possess civilian qualifications and who have a certificate of competence issued by the clerk of Works Electrical of 198 Works Section.

(3) Soldiers who have qualified in an army trade test for electricians.

c. All electrical work is to be executed in accordance with regulations made by the Standard Association of Australia.

d. Lights are not to be extinguished by loosening the pricker fittings attaching lamp holder to a distribution cable.

259. LEAVE - PERSONNEL ARRIVING IN THE THEATRE

1. No officer or soldier is to be granted leave outside 1 ATF base area during the first three weeks following his arrival in South Vietnam. (1 ATF RO Part 1 64/67).

260. TANDEM TOWING OF TRAILERS

1. It has been observed that units of the Task Force are adopting the practice of towing trailers in tandem. The rear towing hook of trailers is provided for:-

a. Recovery purpose.

b. Moving trailers, unloaded, in depot areas at speeds NOT in excess of 5 miles per hour.

c. Operational emergencies.

2. Owing to the possibility of damage to the rear towing hook, and the trailer body, this practice is to cease. (1 ATF RO Part 1 65/67)/

261. STANDARD OF DRESS - LEAVE DRAFTS

1. To ensure that officers and soldiers are correctly and neatly dressed before moving on an R & R or an R & C draft they are to be inspected by:-

a. For Major Units. Company (or equivalent) Comd.

b. For Minor Units. Officers Commanding.

2. No authority is given to delegate this requirement to Seconds-in-Command except in the case of the OC of a minor unit. (1 ATF RO Part 1 62/67).

362. BOUNDS

The lane off no 11 Hoang Thieu St, VUNG TAU, behind the RAAF Villa, is out of bounds to all members of Australian Forces VIETNAM. (1 ATF RO Part 1 55/67).

363. NARCOTICS

1. Certain narcotics, including marihuana, are readily available in VUNG TAU.
2. If a member is offered narcotics, he should immediately report to the Military Police with all relevant detail concerning the offer.
3. It is an offence, both civil and military, to be in possession of, traffic in or partake of narcotics unless authorised by competent authority. (1 ATF RO Part 1 58/67).

264. WATER - NEED FOR ECONOMY

1. The present water point facilities and delivery media are barely adequate to meet the TF daily water requirements. Any mechanical breakdown of pumping equipment and/or water delivery vehicles has an immediate effect on water supplies.
2. Until further notice all ranks are to exercise economy in the use of water. In particular shower buckets are not to be filled more than half way for any one shower. (1 ATF RO Part 1 59/67).

265. UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OR DISPOSAL OF FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES

1. In this instruction "explosive" means explosive substance of any kind and includes any ammunition containing a propellant, explosive filling or live cap.
2. Any member in possession of firearms or explosives, unless such are on issue to him as part of his authorised Army equipment, is amenable to the laws of the state or ordinances of the Territory in which he is serving.
3. In accordance with DA 79, former enemy equipment, other than personal effects of captured enemy personnel, is Commonwealth property, and unless the member has been duly authorised to retain it as a souvenir, its retention is an offence against the Act.
4. Except when acting in the course of his duty, a member is not to deliver or transmit to, or attempt to deliver or transmit to, any person, or acquire in any way from, or attempt to acquire in any way from, any other person, firearms or explosives which are the property of the Commonwealth. (1 ATF RO Part 1 11/67).

266. BOUNDS - VUNG TAU

1. The following restaurants in VUNG TAU are approved for patronage by Europeans:

Grand Hotel
Cyrnos Restaurant
Neptune Restaurant
Rendevous Restaurant
Pizzeria Restaurant

2. All other restaurants are out of bounds to Australian Troops. (1 ATF RO Part 1 69/67).

267. INTERNATIONAL HEALTH CERTIFICATE

1. All IHC's are to be held in the Coy Orderly room and accounted for the same as any other Regimental Document.
2. Coys are to submit a certificate by 1200 hours 20 May 67 signed by an officer stating that all certificates are held for each man in the Coy.

268. IDENTITY CARDS (AAF-A129)

1. Before a Coy/Pl proceeds on operations, each soldier is to hand his AAF-A129 into the Orderly room.

B. G. ... Lt
Adjnt

Distribution List "A".

NOTICES1. DISCIPLINE

CO 7 RAR has investigated and disposed or confirmed the following offences, as subtended below:-

- a. 3789327 Pte B.J. McRAE, B Coy on the charge of an act to the prejudice of good order and military discipline WOAS (discharge of weapon). Was found guilty of the offence on 1 May 67 and awarded the punishment of 14 days field punishment and 14 days forfeiture of Pay.
- b. 1411214 Pte R.G. CARTHEW, Admin Coy on the charge of neglecting to obey 5 RAR Unit Routine Orders (possession of a fire arm NOT on issue to him) was found guilty of the offence on 1 May 67 and awarded the punishment of an admonition.
- c. 471809 Pte M.J. CAWLEY, A Coy on the charge of an act to the prejudice of good order and Military discipline WOAS. Was found guilty of the offence on 30 Apr 67 and awarded the punishment of \$10 fine and 7 days CB.
- d. 3789250 Pte A. HOLSTER, B Coy on the charge of an act to the prejudice of good order and Military discipline WOAS. Was found guilty of the offence on 30 Apr 67 and awarded the punishment of \$10 fine and 7 days CB.

RESTRICTED

H3

MESSAGE FORM

PRECEDENCE ACTION		DATE TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
ROUTINE		09 2100 H	May 67
FROM	7 RAR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
TO	A COY, B COY, C COY, D COY, Sp COY, Admin COY	UNCLAS	
		ORIGINATORS NUMBER	
		A 71	

GROUP 6 QUAL (.) COYS ARE TO SUBMIT PARTICULARS OF ALL PERS WHO REQUIRE ONLY
 AHQ SCHOOL TO COMPLETE QUAL FOR Gp 6 MIL SKILL (.) RETURNS TO Bn HQ BY
 111600H

Drafters Name	Office
CALIGARI	ADJT A

RELEASING OFFICERS SIGNATURE AND RANK

B/Caligari A

Cancelled
H 4

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

7th Battalion
The Royal Australian Regiment
AP AN PHU

15 May 67

Distribution List 'B'

SAIGON GUARD

1. Listed below are the SAIGON GUARD for the periods shown.
2. Any amendments are to be notified to Bn HQ immediately.
3. The guard Sgts are to report to the RSM at 1630 hrs 19 May 67 for briefing.

GUARD No 3 20 - 27 MAY 67

GUARD No 4 27 MAY - 3 JUN 67

Sgt J. SEXTON	A Coy	Sgt R. NELLIGAN	C coy
Cpl R. SAVAGE	C Coy	Cpl T. H. PORTER	D Coy
Cpl SPADBROW	A Coy	Cpl A. R. BEST	SP Coy
Pte EAST	A Coy	Pte K. D. KING	A Coy
Pte REIHERTSEN	A Coy	Pte HARLOND	A Coy
Pte BURGE	A Coy	Pte HOWLETT	A Coy
Pte BALMER	B Coy	Pte COFFEY	B Coy
Pte R.M. DART	B Coy	Pte D.W. KENNEDY	B Coy
Pte J.W. BELFORD	C Coy	Pte R.K. ALBERT	C Coy
Pte G. GERLACH	C Coy	Pte P.J. STAPELTON	C Coy
Pte D.J. TREASE	C Coy	Pte R.C. WELSH	C Coy
Pte J. NORRIS	D Coy	Pte R.N. DALY	D Coy
Pte A.M. PEAT	D Coy	Pte G.J. KEONIG	D Coy
Pte D.J. SPARKES	D Coy	Pte R.W. RYE	D Coy
Pte GATES	SP Coy	Pte K.M. GREER	SP Coy
Pte CHARLESTON	SP Coy	Pte B.C. GAMBLE	ADMIN Coy
Pte G. EASTON	ADMIN Coy	Pte R. DARE	BHQ

B. Caligari
Lt
Adj. A

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

HS

ROUTINE
7th Battalion
The Royal Australian Regiment
AP AN PHU

R270-4-2(4)

15 May 67

List B

DISCHARGE 2/65 NSM

Reference : A ARO 35/65
B MB1 171-1
C AFV Admin Instr 13/67
D MB1 219-1

1. To ease the administrative burden of discharge procedure of NSM, Coys are to start actioning the 2/65 Intake NSM now.
2. Attached are forms that are to be filled out by each member of 2/65 intake NSM who have not extended their service. Two copies are required of appendix 2 to Annex B of ARD 35/65 and one copy of the L and NS form. These forms are to reach Bn HQ no later than 1200 hrs 31 May 67.
3. Coys are to enter suitability or otherwise for RAER service into the soldiers AAB83 on page 15, as per MB1 219-1.
4. ARL credits will be entered into the soldiers AAB83 in accordance with MB1 171-1 para 591 and MB1 128-1. Seven days terminal leave is to entered in the AAB83 also, clearly marked as "Terminal Leave".
5. Married personnel who are entitled to a removal at departmental expense are to submit AAF H10's and inventories ASP.
6. No new allotments or variations to existing ones will be accepted after 1 Jun 67.

for
Eric H. Smith
(Eric H. Smith)
Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

Comd. P. Coy

H6

7th Battalion
The Royal Australian Regiment
AP AN PHU

R495-1-1

16 May 67

Distribution below.

7 RAR DISTRIBUTION LIST

Reference : 7 RAR R495-1-1 dated 8 May 67.

1. The above reference is cancelled.
2. Attached is the current 7 RAR distribution list.

for *E. H. Smith Lt*
(Eric H. Smith)
Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

Distribution

List C

To whom	Serial	A	B	C
A Coy	1	5	1	2
B Coy	2	5	1	2
C Coy	3	5	1	2
D Coy	4	5	1	2
Sp Coy	5	7	1	1
Admin Coy	6	2	1	3
Bn HQ PL	7	1	1	-
CO)	8			1
21C)	9			1
S3) one only	10	1	-	1
IO)	11			1
Adjt)	12			1
RSM	13	1	-	1
RMO	14	1	-	-
Tpt	15	1	-	-
WO CATERER	16	1	-	-
PRI	17	1	-	-
Padre	18	1	-	-
Salvation Army Rep	19	1	-	-
1 ATF	20	3	-	24
Spare	21	3	-	10
File	22	1	1	1
Float	23	1	1	-
Reece Pl	24	-	-	1
Aslt Pnr Pl	25	-	-	1
Mor Pl	26	-	-	1
Sig Pl	27	-	-	1
A Sqn 3 Can Regt	28	-	-	3
1 Fd Regt	29	-	-	5
103 Fd Bty	30	-	-	2
B ty A 1/83 US Arty	31	-	-	1
161 Fd Bty RNZA	32	-	-	1
1 Fd Sqn	33	-	-	1
103 Sig Sqn	34	-	-	1
6 RAR	35	-	-	1
3 SAS Sqn	36	-	-	1
1 ARU	37	-	-	1
161 (Indep) Recce Flt	38	-	-	1
OC SP Coy	39	-	-	1
OC Admin Coy	40	-	-	1
Comd's Diary	41	3	3	3
Total		50	12	80

Comds Diary

H 7.

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

PRIORITY
7th Battalion
The Royal Australian Regiment
AP AN PHU

R370-1-1(2)

17 May 67

List B

FIRE PREVENTION

1. With the exception of A Coy, the request by the Bn Fire Officer for each Coy or sub-unit to furnish a report showing the fire equipment holdings has not been forthcoming.
2. No area is immune to fire. No officer is immune to correction if he has not taken adequate precautions. Please pay your part in fire prevention.
3. Returns are required by 1200 hrs 19 May 67.

E. H. Smith Lt
(Eric H. Smith)
Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

Leah Okey

H 8

7th Battalion
The Royal Australian Regiment
AP AN PHU

R284-1-1

19 May 67

LIST B.

SGCE TEXTBOOKS

1. Attached hereto as Annex 'A' is a list of the approved textbooks for all subjects except Navigation.
2. The texts listed are those recommended for the preparation of students for the 1967 and subsequent examinations. It is hoped that apart from minor changes from time to time (such as new editions) this list will remain fixed for many years.
3. SGCE Handbooks are to be despatched in the near future. Addressees should note that the references listed with each syllabus in this Handbook are not exactly the same as those shown in Annex A. (The Handbook was published over twelve months ago and as a consequence certain of the books listed in it have been revised or have gone out of print). The references on the attached list supersede those shown in the Handbook.

W. Halpern

Lt
Adjt

<u>Author</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Publisher</u>
1. <u>English Expression - Recommended Texts</u>		
Aughterson, W.V.	Precis Writing	Whitcombe and Tombs
Clay, N.L.	Advanced English Exercises	Heinemann
Dow, G.M.	Uncommon Common Sense	Cheshire
Schoenheimer, H.P.	Expressive English	Cheshire
2. <u>English Literature - Prescribed Texts</u>		
a. <u>Poetry</u>		
(1) Parker & Heddle (ed)	A Galaxy of Poems Old and New	Longmans (Aust. Ed.)
Reeves, J. (ed)	The Poets' World	Heinemann
b. <u>Plays</u>		
(1) Shakespeare	Macbeth	Signet or any other
(2) Shaw, B.	Pygmalion	Longmans
* (OR Lawlor, R.	The Summer of the Seventeenth Doll)	
c. <u>Novel</u>		
Le Carre, J.	The Spy Who Came in From the Cold	Gollancz or Hutchinson or Pan
* (OR Hardy, T.)	(The Mayor of Casterbridge)	
d. <u>Prose</u>		
Christensen, C. (ed)	Australian Heritage	Angus and Robertson
* (OR Heseltine, H.P. (ed)	Australian Idiom	Cheshire)
* It is suggested that Commands buy few (if any) of these alternative books. In each case (in para 2) where alternatives are given, the study guide has been prepared on the first alternative but not on the second which has been bracketed.		
3. <u>Modern History - Prescribed Texts</u>		
** Hayes and Faissler	Modern History	Macmillan
Shaw, A.G.L.	Modern World History	Cheshire
<u>For Students' Reference</u>		
Firth, C.B.	From Napoleon to Hitler	Ginn
Slosson, P.L.	From Washington to Roosevelt	Ginn

Priestly & Betts	The Momentous Years	Dent
Taylor	Sketch Maps in Modern History	Harrap

4. Economics - Prescribed Texts

*** Nankervis	Descriptive Economics (6th or 7th editions) Pocket Compendium of Australian Statistics	Longmans
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Reference Books

	Commonwealth Yearbook	
Williams, G.	Economics of Everday Life Current Affairs Bulletins	Pelican

5. Geography - Prescribed Text

Coghill, I.G.	World, Region and Man	Cheshire
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6. Chemistry - Prescribed Text

Graham & Cragg	The Essentials of Chemistry	Harrap
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7. Mathematics 1 - Prescribed Texts

Potts and Clark	Mathematics 1 for leaving Certificate	Hall
Lockwood and Down	Algebra	University of London Press
Maxwell and Ghong	Elementary Co-ordinate Geometry	Oxford
Rowlands and Evans	Leaving Maths 1	Cheshire

** This book supersedes Hayes and Moon which is out of print. However, Hayes and Moon would be most valuable as a background reference.

*** The 6th ed. is preferable as the study guide refers to it. The handbook refers to the 5th ed. which is out of print.

8. Mathematics 2 - Prescribed Texts

Wilson and Rose	Geometry and Trigonometry for Intermediate Certificate (1957, revised edition)	
Borchhardt	First Course in Mechanics	
Siddons and Hughes	Trigonometry Pts 1 and 2	Cambridge
Rowlands and Evans	Leaving Maths 2	Cheshire

9. Physics - Prescribed Texts

Physical Science Study Committee (PSSC)	Physics, 2nd edition	
"	Laboratory Guide	
"	Victorian Supplement	
"	Teachers' Guide	

Smith's Diary

H 9

RESTRICTED

The information given in this document is not to be communicated, either directly or indirectly, to the press or to any person not authorised to receive it

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

ROUTINE ORDERS PART 1

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ERIC H SMITH

COMMANDING OFFICER

SEVENTH BATTALION THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT

Serial 18

17 May 67

Numbers 269 - 282

- 269. DUTY SERGEANT
- 270. DRESS
- 271. MEDICAL DOCUMENTS
- 272. AMENDMENTS
- 273. DUSTOFF/MEDEVAC FROM OPERATIONS
- 274. IDENTITY DISCS
- 275. ISSUE OF ROUTINE ORDERS
- 276. AIRMAIL PARCEL POST
- 277. CANCELLATION OF ROUTINE ORDER
- 278. AMENDMENT
- 279. DRY CELL BATTERIES
- 280. WALLABY COURIER BOOKINGS
- 281. ROUTINE SUNDAY
- 282. TELEPHONE SECURITY

NOTICES

- 1. DISTRICT COURTS MARTIAL
- 2. MALARIA

269. DUTY SERGEANT

The duty Sgt is to report to the RSM at 1630 hrs on the day of mounting.

Tue 16 May 67	Sgt A SUTHERLAND
Wed 17 May 67	Sgt A SUTHERLAND
Thu 18 May 67	Sgt A SUTHERLAND
Fri 19 May 67	Sgt B J BOSLEY
Sat 20 May 67	Sgt B J BOSLEY
Sun 21 May 67	Sgt B J BOSLEY
Mon 22 May 67	Sgt A F BARRIE
Tue 23 May 67	Sgt A F BARRIE
Wed 24 May 67	Sgt A F BARRIE

270. DRESS

1. WEF Sun 21 May 67, all officers are to wear badges of rank on bush hats or wear shirts at all times.
2. The badges of rank from JG epaulettes are to be cut down and sewn vertically on the bush hat. The rank is to be worn to the front.
3. Rank on hats will be turned in outside 7 RAR area.

271. MEDICAL DOCUMENTS

Under NO circumstances will any member of 7 RAR remove any document from the RAP without the prior approval of the Bn 2IC or the RMO.

272. AMENDMENTS

1. RO 362/67 BOUNDS is amended by:
 - a. Deleting 362/67.
 - b. Inserting 262/67.
2. RO 363/67 NARCOTICS is amended by:
 - a. Deleting 363/67
 - b. Inserting 263/67.

273. DUSTOFF/MEDEVAC FROM OPERATIONS

It is the responsibility of the patrol/platoon commander to ensure that before placing a casualties equipment into a helicopter it does not contain detonators, bulk explosives, grenades or claymore mines etc.

274. IDENTITY DISCS

1. Instances have occurred where the round identity disc has been removed from a casualty on dustoff.

/2. This

2. This is incorrect procedure. A casualties identity discs are to remain intact unless the member is buried in the field.

275. ISSUE OF ROUTINE ORDERS

1. ROs serial 9 to 14 both inclusive, NOT issued.
2. ROs numbers 142 to 199 both inclusive, NOT issued.

276. AIRMAIL PARCEL POST

1. RO 235/67 Parcel Post (Air Mail) is cancelled.
2. Members are entitled, if they so desire, to send parcels by air mail. This method is very costly and as it is routed through HONOLULU and treated as priority 2 mail, it has been found through experience that the minimum transit time to Australia is two weeks and the normal time is up to four weeks.
3. It is suggested that as all parcels marked surface mail and stamped accordingly are automatically sent on RAAF courier, departing from VUNG TAU each Mon. This, is the cheapest and quickest way of sending parcels to Australia.

277. CANCELLATION OF ROUTINE ORDER

1. RO 77/67 is cancelled.

278. AMENDMENT

1. RO 91/67 is amended by:
 - a. PARA 3.c.
 - (1) Deleting 1845 hrs where appearing.
 - (2) Inserting 1830 hrs.
 - b. PARA 3.e.
 - (1) Deleting 1845 hrs.
 - (2) Inserting 1830 hrs.

279. DRY CELL BATTERIES

1. The usage rate of the above batteries has been excessive in recent months.
2. Sub units are reminded that these items are provided for use with military equipment only. (AFV RO PART 1 29/67)

280. WALLABY COURIER BOOKINGS

1. Instances have occurred when members have booked on Wallaby flights and have failed to report by the laid down time. In many such cases other members have been unable to obtain a seat, when in fact they could have been booked on the flight.
2. In order that maximum use may be made of available space on Wallaby flights, it is essential that any member, who is unable to make his flight, advises Q(Mov) of the cancellation immediately. (AFV RO PART 1 31/67)

281. ROUTINE SUNDAY

1. RO 249/67 Daily Routine is for Monday to Saturday inclusive. Sunday daily routine is listed below:-

0700 - Revielle
 0800 - Breakfast
 1130-1230 - Wet Canteen open.
 1230 - Lunch
 1630-1730 - Wet Canteen open.
 1730 - Evening Meal.
 1830 - Sleeves down.
 1900-1930 - Stand To.
 1945 - Wet Canteen opens - film commences.
 2145 - All Canteens close.
 2200 - Tatoo
 2215 - Lights out.

282. TELEPHONE SECURITY

1. Reports received indicate that military operations are being compromised through the uncontrolled use of telephone communications. These compromises do not result necessarily from disclosure of classified information, but the great volume of conversation reveals information which becomes highly sensitive when correlated. It must be assumed that the enemy has the capability of monitoring all telephone conversations and that these conversations are analysed and compared in search of information of intelligence value. Monitoring by the 509th Radio Research Group during the three month period ending 30 April has revealed that 35 percent of all transmission security violations concerned plans and operations.

2. Addressees should conduct operational planning and coordinating far enough in advance to allow maximum use of secure means of communication. When telephone communication is unavoidable, dates, times, places and units should not be discussed.

R. Bulgari LT
 ADJT

Distribution list A

NOTICES

1. DISTRICT COURTS MARTIAL

1. The following is the results of District Courts Martial held on 30 Mar 67:-

a. 1731463 Pte D L MACDONALD on the charge of AWOL fined \$40.

b. 1731624 Pte G J HAUPT on the charge of AWOL fined \$30.

c. 1731535 Pte R J ALLSOP on the charge of AWOL fined \$40.

2. MALARIA

1. Malaria is a very common disease in many parts of the world. There are still many people who die from it. Malaria is caused by a parasite and man is infected by being bitten by a mosquito (the Anopheles) which is carrying the parasite. Two forms of malaria are encountered in this area:-

a. Benign Tertion (vivax malaria)

b. Malignant Tertion (falcipercim malaria)

2. The prevention of malaria consists of:-

a. Prevention of being bitten by the Anopheles mosquito, by such means as mosquito nets at night, mosquito repellent, long trousers and sleeves rolled down at night and destroying mosquito breeding areas.

b. Taking drugs which will kill the parasite if it gets into the blood stream. In SVN, the Australian Army is taking PALUDRINE in a dosage of one tablet twice a day. It is very important to take two tablets a day to ensure the best concentration of PALUDRINE in the blood.

3. The worst form (malignant tertion) may break through the PALUDRINE cover, so that as well as taking the drug, mosquito precautions are very necessary.

7th Battalion
The Royal Australian Regiment
AP AN PHU

R571-14-1(1)

21 May 67

INSTRUCTIONS FOR 7 RAR BISLEY RANGE

General

1. The present B Coy 7 RAR range is to be re designated 7 RAR Bisley Range. The range will be laid out and prepared by direction of Bn HQ with assistance from companies. Basically the range will consist of:-

- a. Small arms firing point (incl M79)
- b. Claymore mine firing point
- c. Grenade throwing area
- d. Safe waiting area

2. The proposed sites for these is shown on trace "P".

3. Instructions for claymore mine firing and throwing of grenades are shown at Annex "A" and "B".

Allocation

4. Bids for use of the range will be made to 7 RAR CP at least 24 hours in advance.

Responsibilities

5. User units/sub units are responsible for range cleanliness and safety of troops.

Procedure Before Firing

6. Prior to entering the range units/sub units are to carry out the following actions:-

- a. Report to 7 RAR CP.
- b. Ensure radio is on 7 RAR frequency and C/S is established.
- c. Be familiar with close TAOR ptl programme.
- d. Not fire before obtaining clearance from CP.

Procedure on completion of firing

7.
 - a. Report to 7 RAR CP that firing is complete.
 - b. Arrange to destroy any blinds that may have occurred.
 - c. Ensure range is in a tidy condition and all produce is collected.
 - d. Remove all produce/rubbish from range.
 - e. Report to 7 RAR CP before leaving the area.

8. All users are to strictly adhere to this instruction to ensure smooth running of the range. Users are to ensure that the radio is manned at all times.

[Handwritten Signature]

Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

DISTRIBUTION
LIST 'C'

ANNEX "A" to 7 BAR
R571-14-1(1) dated May 67

21

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FIRING OF CLAYMORES ON BISLEY RANGE

1. Troops firing claymores will be fully protected and below ground level if within 16 metres of the mine.
2. All troops within 100 metres of the mine must be behind protective cover.
3. Mines are to be placed so that there is some form of obstacle to take up the main backblast.

ANNEX "B" to 7 RAR
R571-14-1(1) dated 21 May 67

THROWING OF GRENADES M26

1. Grenades must be thrown from a position that is clear of overhead obstructions.
2. Troops throwing grenades must be able to obtain FULL PROTECTION immediately after throwing.
3. Only one man at a time should throw grenades.
4. If a blind occurs no more grenades are to be thrown until the blind is destroyed.
5. Should a blind occur then 15 mins delay must be observed before attempting to destroy the blind.
6. Waiting troops within 300 yds must be behind protection walls.

ANNEX P to 7 RAR
R571-14-1(1) dated

May 67



↑
TGT AREA




CLAYMORE AND GRENADE THROWING AREA

TREE LINE

TREE LINE

SMALL ARMS/M79 FIRING POINT

TREE LINE



PROTECTION WALL

①

H 11
23 0830

RESTRICTED

The information given in this document is not to be communicated, either directly or indirectly, to the press or to any person not authorised to receive it

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

ROUTINE ORDERS PART 1

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ERIC H SMITH

COMMANDING OFFICER

SEVENTH BATTALION THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT

Serial 19

22 May 67

Numbers 283 - 296

- 283. DAILY ROUTINE AMENDMENT
- 284. MAIL AND PARCELS GENERAL
- 285. WEAPON COLOUR BANDS
- 286. INVESTIGATING OFFICERS REPORTS
- 287. TRAFFIC SAFETY
- 288. UNCLASSIFIED TELEPHONE CIRCUITS
- 289. PETS
- 290. INDECENT LANGUAGE OVER TELEPHONES
- 291. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESS
- 292. BASE CAMP BOUNDS - INTERNAL NIGHT MOVEMENT
- 293. CARRY FORWARD OF ARL
- 294. WEAPON PITS
- 295. PERSONNEL MOVEMENT OUTSIDE 1 ATF AREA
- 296. OVERNIGHT STOPS OUTSIDE 7 RAR

NOTICES

- 1. ITEMS FOR SALE
- 2. ITEM FOUND
- 3. DISCIPLINE

283. DAILY ROUTINE - AMENDMENT

1. Reference 7 RAR Routine Order Part 1 249/67
Delete 1700 hrs Wet Canteen opens
Insert 1645 hrs at OCs discretion, or at 1700 hrs - Wet Canteen opens.
2. Reference 7 RAR Routine Order Part 1 281/67
Insert 0705 hrs - Paludrine Parade
Insert 1615 hrs - Paludrine Parade

284. MAIL AND PARCELS GENERAL

1. The only department that have the authority to open mail addressed to other persons, are:-
 - a. The Dead Letter Office
 - b. The Customs Department
2. If mail is opened by these authorities they will reseal the article and plainly mark which department opened the mail.
3. All instances of mail being tampered with will be immediately reported to the Adjt. The member will bring the parcel / letter to the Adjt in the same condition he received it and will make a Statutory Declaration to this effect.

285. WEAPON COLOUR BANDS

1. All weapons without exception, including QMs holdings are to have colourbands completed by Wednesday 24 May 67.
2. QMs holding of weapons only require a maroon band.
3. Coy weapons are to have the maroon band, plus their own respective colour

286. INVESTIGATING OFFICERS REPORTS

1. From the time of appointment, an investigating officer has exactly 7 days to:-
 - a. Investigate the incident vide the terms of reference.
 - b. Submit the report to his OC who will check it to ensure:-
 - (1) It complies with the terms of reference
 - (2) It is in accordance with Staff Duties
 - (3) The content is sufficient
 - (4) The logic is sound
 - c. Have the investigation typed by his coy clerk, re-checked and submitted to Bn HQ

287. TRAFFIC SAFETY

1. The number of traffic accidents involving military vehicles which have resulted in fatal injuries to Veitnamese civilians is much too high and creates a serious threat to the favourable impression which Australian troops must maintain with the Veitnamese people. Unless immediate action is taken to reduce traffic fatalities, the Australian image in Veitnem will suffer greatly.

2. As guests of the Veitnamese people we must make every effort to protect their lives and property while accomplishing our military mission. Although detailed planning of tactical operations is directed towards this goal, we are injuring and killing many Veitnamese while operating our military vehicles on the highways.

3. Traffic conditions in Veitnam are very hazardous with the highway systems being completely inadequate to handle the large volume of military and civilian traffic in and around heavily populated urban areas. Additionally the light-weight construction of most Veitnamese vehicles provides very little protection to the occupants when involved in a accident with heavy Australian vehicles. These conditions require extra-ordinary skill and safety consciousness on the part of military vehicle drivers. Excessive speed and improper passing, a primary cause of many fatal accidents, must be eliminated.

4. Commanders should schedule additional safe driving classes with particular emphasis on defensive driving techniques for all assigned drivers and periodically review the qualifications of all drivers. The mental attitude of drivers which is an important factor in safe driving must be continuously monitored by all supervisors.

5. Summary of Typical Vehicle Accidents

a. A Veitnamese boy (age 4) was struck by a 2½ ton truck while crossing the road. CAUSE: Improper crossing (VN).

b. Vietnamese bus forced a M151 ½ ton truck off the road. The vehicle overturned pinning the passenger under water. CAUSE: Reckless driving (VN).

c. EM backing a 5 ton truck without a ground guide fatally injured a Vietnamese riding a bicycle. CAUSE: Backing without a ground guide.

d. Vietnamese vehicle struck 5 ton truck while entering highway from a side road. CAUSE: Failure to yield (VN).

e. EM in rear of ¾ ton truck leaned over the side and was struck by a passing vehicle. No contact made by vehicles. CAUSE: Leaning over body of vehicle.

f. EM apparently sleeping under 5 ton trailer crushed when trailer was moved. CAUSE: Sleeping under vehicle.

g. Five ton truck passing on the right of a vehicle that was making left turn struck Vietnamese motorcycle. Vietnamese child (age 4) killed. CAUSE: Improper passing.

h. Truck in US convoy struck 2 Vietnamese on a cyclo vehicle on the side of road. CAUSE: Misjudging clearance.

i. US 2½ ton truck traveling at excessive speed overturned on curve. CAUSE: Excessive speed.

j. US 2½ ton truck in convoy following too close was blinded by dust and went off road into rice paddy and overturned. Driver drowned. CAUSE: Following too close.

288. UNCLASSIFIED TELEPHONE CIRCUITS

1. All telephone circuits available to subscribers in NUI DAT are graded UNCLASSIFIED. This includes all local lines as well as trunk circuits to other areas. Security warnings are given by EBONY switchboard operators when making connections to trunk circuit. It is impracticable to give such warnings for all local connections but the lack of a warning does not imply that the circuit is in any way secure.
2. No classified matter is to be discussed in clear over any telephone circuit unless action is required by the recipient and the enemy would not have time to react. (1 ATF RO PART 1 80/67)

289. PETS

1. Due to risk of infection and for hygiene reasons no pets are to be kept in 1 ATF Base Area.
2. Pets are capable of carrying such diseases as plague, malaria, rabies, enteric diseases etc.
3. Any officer or soldier found keeping a pet is committing an offence and will be charged. (1 ATF RO PART 1 84/67)

290. INDECENT LANGUAGE OVER TELEPHONES

1. The regulations which govern the installation and operation of Australian and Allied communication circuits specifically forbid the use of profane, indecent or obscene language. It has been noticed particularly in the case of telephone circuits such language is common.
2. Profane, indecent or obscene language is not to be used over any communication circuit. Disciplinary action will be taken against breaches of this order. (1 ATF RO PART 1 85/67)

291. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESS

1. Press representatives have been arriving in the Task Force Area by "hitch-hiking" on vehicles leaving VUNG TAU.
2. Many of these persons are not accredited press representatives and their presence causes both embarrassment and unnecessary inconvenience.
3. Drivers of vehicles belonging to units of 1 ATF or units attached to 1 ATF, are not to carry pressmen or presswomen to the 1 ATF area unless the person(s) concerned can prove he/she is an accredited press representative.
4. An accredited press representative should be able to produce two identity cards. These are:
 - a. A Vietnamese Identity Card.
 - b. A Press Identity Card issued by MACV. This card will have the following heading

"UNITED STATES
Military Assistance Commander VIETNAM
Information Officer"

(1 ATF RO PART 1 87/67)

BASE CAMP BOUNDS - INTERNAL NIGHT MOVEMENT

1. On Foot. No movement is permitted outside or between unit areas from last to first light daily.

2. Mounted.

a. Minimise to essential traffic using parking lights only.

b. No movement is permitted on ROUTE 2 from 1900H to first light daily between:

(1) A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and 7 RAR

(2) 4 Fd Regt and 1 Bn 83 Arty (US) (1 ATF RO PART 1 88/67)

293. CARRY FORWARD OF ARL

1. Approval vide S Comd 274/S31/9 dated 10 Apr 67, has been granted for all members of 7 RAR ex PUCKAPUNYAL to carry forward leave credits not taken before departure from AUSTRALIA till 30 Jun 68.

2. Coys to make entry in the members AAB 83 and submit a certificate when the entries have been completed, but in all cases, entries are to be completed by no later than 5 Jun 67.

294. WEAPON PITS

Instances have occurred where soldiers have been injured from falling into weapon pits. From this date all weapon pits will be clearly marked, so they can be clearly seen at night.

295. PERSONNEL MOVEMENT OUTSIDE 1 ATF AREA

No member of 7 RAR, irrespective of rank, is to proceed outside the 1 ATF area, without first obtaining a duty pass from Bn HQ. Bn Hq will only issue a duty pass when, the member has in his possession a statement signed by his Company Commander (or 2IC) stating:-

a. No, Rank, Initials, Name

b. Reason for travel and destination.

c. Time leaving and returning to unit lines.

296. OVERNIGHT STOPS OUTSIDE 7 RAR

No member of 7 RAR, except those on authorised duty, is permitted to remain overnight outside the 7 RAR base area unless he has first obtained, the express permission of the CO or Bn 2IC or in their absence, the duty officer.

B. J. Balyari LT
ADJT

DISTRIBUTION

LIST A

NOTICES

1. The following items are for sale:-
 - a. One x Phillips 23 inch Television Set. 240 volt Purchased from SINGAPORE in Feb 67. Cost \$220. As new condition. Price \$200.
 - b. One x "National" Portable AC/DC Stereogram, and a selection of 20 records. Purchased in Nov 66, Cost total \$100. Price \$50.00
 - c. Twenty (20) x Pre-Recorded U.S.A. Stereo Tapes. Original cost \$8.50 each. In as new condition. Selection available ranges from Popular Tunes to Musicals. 4 Track stereo. Price each \$4.00.
 - d. Six (6) as new bar stools. Cost \$5.00 each. Price \$3.00 each.

The above items can be inspected at D Coy 6 RAR. Cash sale is open until 26 May 67.

2. A watch has been found in Sp Coy area. The owner can claim by identifying it at Sp Coy Orderly Room.

3. DISCIPLINE

CO 7 RAR has investigated and disposed or confirmed the following offences, as subtended below:-

- a. 2783190 Pte A J CONLAN, B Coy on the charge of WOAS an Act to the Prejudice of Good Order and Military Discipline - whilst a sentry was not alert. Was found guilty of the offence on 11 May 67 and awarded the punishment of 28 days field punishment and 14 days forfeiture of pay.
- b. 3787915 Pte O G DENYS, C Coy on the charge of WOAS an act to the Prejudice of Good Order and Military Discipline - whilst a sentry was not alert. Was found guilty of the offence on 11 May 67 and awarded the punishment of 28 days field punishment and 14 days forfeiture of pay.
- c. 6708547 Pte P T ARCHER, A Coy on the charge of WOAS Neglecting to obey Unit Routine Orders - Consuming liquor in living quarters. Was found guilty of the offence on 16 May 67 and awarded the punishment of \$10.00 fine.
- d. 3788853 Pte R E DOWNING, A Coy on the charge of WOAS Neglecting to Obey Unit Routine Orders - Consuming liquor in living quarters. Was found guilty of the offence on 17 May 67 and awarded the punishment of \$10.00 fine.
- e. 4718089 Pte M J CAWLEY, A Coy on the charge of WOAS Drunkenness. Was found guilty of the offence on 17 May 67 and awarded the punishment of 14 days Field Punishment and 14 day Forfeiture of pay and Forfeiture of 1 days pay - Close Arrest.

f. 3788961 Pte W H TOVEY, Admin Coy on the charge of WOAS Neglecting to obey Unit Routine Orders - Drinking liquor in living quarters. Was found guilty of the offence on 15 May 67 and awarded the punishment of \$10.00 fine.

g. 33677 Pte W J MOORE, Admin Coy on the charge of WOAS Neglect to the prejudice of good order and military discipline - Not alert whilst on switchboard duties. Was found guilty of the offence on 16 May 67 and awarded the punishment of \$10.00 fine.

h. 19958 Cpl C B JOHNSON, A Coy on the charge of WOAS Neglecting to obey Unit Routine Orders - Drinking liquor in living quarters. Was found guilty of the offence on 16 May 67 and awarded the punishment of a Reprimand.

i. 3789004 Pte W M ANDERSON, A Coy on the charge of WOAS Act to the prejudice of good order and military discipline - Caused his firearm to be discharged without just cause. Was found guilty of the offence on 11 May 67 and awarded the punishment of 14 days field punishment.

j. 1731603 Pte B J FULTON, C Coy on the charge of WOAS Conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline - In possession of 5 cans of Beer. Was found guilty of the offence on 1 May 67 and awarded the punishment of 14 days field punishment.

H12

PRECEDENCE ACTION

PRECEDENCE INFO

DATE TIME GROUP

ROUTINE

22/630 H MAY 67

FROM 7 RAR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO A COY B COY C COY D COY SP COY

UNCLASSIFIED

ADMIN COY BN HQ PL COMDS DIARY (3)

ORIGINATORS NUMBER

FLOAT FILE

G172

MARKING OF PITS (.) OC's ARE TO ENSURE THAT ALL PITS ARE SUFFICIENTLY WELL
MARKED TO AVOID PERS ACCIDENTLY FALLING INTO THEM AT NI

DRAFTERS NAME

OFFICE

ATKINSON

S3

RELEASING OFFICERS SIGNATURE AND RANK

W. G. ...

Maj

COMDS DIARY

241230 HRS

H 13

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

7th Battalion
The Royal Australian Regiment
AP AN PHU

R211-1-1

23 May 67

7 RAR SHARPSHOOTING CONTEST

General

1. It is intended to conduct a contest on section level throughout the Bn. Basically a section is to consist of 9 men equipped with SLR or M16 and 1xM60. Tracer ammunition will not be used.

Practices to be Fired


2. These are detailed in Annex A, B, C, and D.

Procedure to be Followed

3.
 - a. The Commanding Officer will select a number of sections throughout the Bn and inform companies concerned at least 12 hours in advance.
 - b. These sections with their Pl comd or Pl Sgt will report to the RSM on the range at the specified time.
 - c. The Pl comd/Pl Sgt will be in possession of the Pl Roll Book and nominal roll of the section.
 - d. The RSM will put the section through the practices as mentioned in para 2.
 - e. Dress will be:-
 - (1) Fd dress incl hat.
 - (2) Basic webbing to include 2 filled w/bottles and two basic pouches US or Aust.
 - (3) Personal weapon.

Prizes and Trophies

4. Regt Funds will donate a shield to the company with the highest aggregate total on percentage basis. This shield will not be retained as a permanent trophy but will pass on or be retained as the case may be on the completion of the next contest. In addition the Sgts Mess will donate a permanent trophy and one carton of beer to the champion section.


Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

DISTRIBUTION
LIST A

Comd 2 Div

H 13

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

Annex A to 7 RAR

R211-1-1

Dated 23 May 67

TIMED EXPOSURE 100x


- 1. 9 targets to be exposed for 25 secs.

AMMO

- 2. Riflemen to have 15 rounds, M60 - 30 rounds.
- 3. On exposure of targets firers may engage targets in any manner they wish from any position other than standing.

SCORING

- 4.
 - a. Hit inside circle = 5 points
 - b. Hit elsewhere on target = 2 points
 - c. Rounds returned = 1 point per round.
- 5. Total points will be counted and average taken.



[Faint signature]
 Lieutenant Colonel
 Commanding Officer


AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

Annex E to 7 RAR
R211-1-1
Dated 23 May 67

SNAP SHOOTING 100x

AIMO

1. Riflemen 15 rounds , M60 30 rounds.
2.
 - a. 15 exposures of 3 secs.
 - b. Firing positions anywhere except standing.
 - c. Butt must be out of shoulder between exposures.
 - d. Scoring as for timed exposure except that the size of target will be:-



AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

Annex C to 7 RAR
R211-1-1
Dated 23 May 67

BALLOON SHOOT 100x

Targets

1. 1 balloon per man.

Ammo

2. 15 rounds per rifle , M60 30 rounds.
3. a. Firers will be situated about 30 yds to rear of the firing point, weapons unloaded.
b. On the command go, firers will run forward to the firing point. On reaching the firing point the section will engage the balloon indicated to them prior to moving from the start point. Only when this balloon has been destroyed may the section engage the other balloons. The time will be taken from the command "GO" until the last balloon is destroyed. Should any other balloon be destroyed before the one first indicated, the section will lose 50 points per balloon so destroyed.

Scoring

4.	25-30 secs	-	100 points
	31-35 secs	-	90 points
	36-40 secs	-	80 points
	41-45 secs	-	70 points
	46-50 secs	-	60 points
	51-55 secs	-	50 points
	56-60 secs	-	40 points
	61-65 secs	-	30 points

For each round returned one additional point will be added.

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

Annex D to 7 RAR
R211-1-1
Dated 23 May 67

WEAPON HANDLING CONTEST 100x

Targets

1. Balloons 1 per man.

Ammo

2. Rifles 15 rounds, M60 30 rounds.
3. a. Weapons and magazines will be stripped down as for normal cleaning and left at the firing point with ammunition, (Note GPMG not to have op Gp removed.)
- b. On command "GO" firers will double forward, assemble their weapons, fill magazines and engage targets. Time will be taken from command "GO" until the last balloon is destroyed.

Scoring

4.	65 - 70 secs	100 points
	71 - 75 secs	90 points
	76 - 80 secs	80 points
	81 - 85 secs	70 points
	86 - 90 secs	60 points
	91 - 95 secs	50 points
	96 - 100 secs	40 points
	101 - 105 secs	30 points

For each round returned, one additional point will be added.

7 RAR ADMIN INSTRUCTION NO 4 (SVN)

PART 4

HYGIENE/ MEDICAL GENERAL

- (1) CAMP HYGIENE
- (2) KITCHEN HYGIENE
- (3) PERSONAL HYGIENE
- (4) MALARIAL PRECAUTIONS AND MARKING OF ROLL BOOKS
- (5) WATER HYGIENE
- (6) IMMUNISATION REQUIREMENTS

HYGIENE DUTIES.

DAILY TASKS

1. Skim grease traps.
2.
 - a. Scrub out the WET and DRY bins with hot soapy water daily after being returned by rubbish trucks.
 - b. 44 Gal drums may be burned out.
 - c. The rubbish stand is to be swept down and surrounding area tidied up.
 - d. Combustible dry rubbish is to be burnt in an incinerator near the rubbish stand and ash disposed of daily.
3. All shower and ablution points to be inspected at least once daily and the following work to be carried out:
 - a. Remove all litter, small portions of soap etc.
 - b. Floor, benches, shelves scrubbed down with hot soapy water. Use a little soda ash on floor.
 - c. Check ropes, pulleys etc to ensure they are serviceable.
 - d. Surrounding area to be emu bobbed out to a distance of ten feet on all sides.
 - e. Ensure drains are clear and unblocked.
4. All latrines are to be checked and the following tasks to be carried out:
 - a. All the rubbish out to a distance of 10 Ft to be picked up and removed, NOT thrown down the latrines.
 - b. At least 2 Aerosol sprays left in each latrine.
 - c. Supply adequate toilet paper.
 - d. Scrub latrine seats with hot soapy water and apply germicide solution, this job is particularly important. Dry seat thoroughly.
 - e. Check urinals and water points, apply slaked lime to "splash area".
 - f. Ensure adequate supply of antiseptic handwash available.

WEEKLY TASKS

5.
 - a. Grease traps to be bailed out twice weekly and water (only) poured down bailing hole between grease trap and sullage pit.
 - b. Grease and sludge is to be placed in a rubbish tin with a lid on and removed by rubbish truck.
 - c. Grease trap is scrubbed out with hot soapy water and soda ash.
 - d. Concrete surrounds are to be treated likewise.
 - e. Traps refilled with clean cold water.
 - f. Best time to work on trap is before HOT water is poured in.
6. Shower and ablution points:
 - a. Scrub walls to a height of 6ft with hot soapy water and soda ash (this includes WOODWORK).

b. Apply creosote to all accessible surfaces of timber liable to splashing. (This protects wood and kills harmful organisms).

7. Latrines. Scrub sides of canopies latrines, floor, and walls if necessary with hot soapy water.

OTHER DUTIES

8. a. Carry out any repairs or maintenance required on hygiene installations within your capabilities, and report those which are not IMMEDIATELY to the Unit Hygiene Inspector.

b. Inspect your area to ensure there are no conditions existing which could be hazardous to health and report any to a Coy OFFICER or CSM.

KITCHEN HYGIENE

1. The following rules are to be observed by all personal employed in the kitchen and mess halls. The senior cook present is to ensure that they are strictly enforced.
 - a. A wash basin, soap and nail brush is to be provided, close to the kitchen. All personell are to wash their hands frequently and particularly on commencing duty and after visiting the latrine.
 - b. All foodstuff left unattended is to be either placed in the refrigerator, the fly proof preparation room, containers with lids, or covered with clean muslin. The muslin is obtainable through the CQMS from the J&K store. Bread, butter and condiments placed on mess tables are to be in a central position and covered with clean muslin.
 - c. All spilt food is to be cleaned up immediately, or as a temporary measure out of doors, is to be covered with clean sand or earth.
 - d. All areas are to be sprayed frequently with suitable insect spray as recommended by the unit Hygiene Inspector.
 - e. All wet garbage bins are to be removed at all times. Use improvised lids where necessary.
 - f. Shirts are to be worn by all personnell serving meals.
 - g. All personnell employed in the kitchens and mess halls are to be cleanly dressed and clean shaven at all times. They must have clean hands and cut finger nails.
 - h. Smoking during the handling, preparation, cooking or serving of food is forbidden.
 - i. Food handlers suffering from any ailment what so ever are to report immediately to the RAP and are not to re-commence work without the permission of the RMO or his assistant.
 - j. All cooking implements are to be washed after use or at least once per day if not used. Before using implements they are to be rinsed in boiling water.

The method of cleaning is:-

 - (1) Wash and scrub in soapy boiling water.
 - (2) Rinse in hot clean water (if the hand can be held in the water it is not hot enough.)
 - (3) Items are then to be placed so that they can drain and air dry.
 - k. Cooked foodstuffs are not to be kept at temperatures between 70F and 130F for prolonged periods as fermentation and food poinoning can occur.
 - l. All fittings and fixtures in kitchen and preparation room should be scrubbed daily with hot soapy water.
 - m. The pantry shelving and fixtures and refrigerator should be emptied and scrubbed down twice weekly. Any spillages must be cleaned-up immediately .
 - n. The above rulings, where applicaible should be implemented, in the butcher's shop, butcher's refrigerator and ration store.

PERSONAL HYGIENE

It is the responsibility of the individual to maintain the highest level of personal hygiene. This is important to keep him healthy and fit.

THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT

1. The Hair to be kept short.
2. Teeth - to be cleaned if possible within 20 minutes after each meal, but at least once a day.
3. Finger and toenails should be cut regularly, and kept short.
4. Washing - one shower a day if possible, with thorough rinsing after using soap. In the shower thongs should be worn to prevent the spread of Tinea. In the field, where water is short, regular attention to the crutch, arm pits and feet if necessary.
5. Clothing - where possible washed regularly and changed frequently. Sox and underwear should be changed daily.
6. Go to the toilet regularly.
7. Moderation in alcohol and tobacco.

"FREE FROM INFECTION" INSPECTIONS (FFI)

8. FFI's will be conducted at the following times:-
 - a. Within 12 hrs on return from operation.
 - b. Not less than once fortnightly.
 - c. When ordered.

All FFI's will be supervised by an officer and carried out by a member of the medical staff of the Battalion where possible.

The FFI consists of the following inspection:

- (1) Skin (rashes, cuts, blisters)
- (2) Hair (lice, dandruff)
- (3) Armpits (rashes)
- (4) Crutch and groin (rashes VD)
- (5) Feet (rashes, blisters, corns)

MALARIAL PRECAUTION

1. Preventing mosquitoes biting you, by such means as mosquito nets at night, using mosquito repellent, wearing long trousers, rolling sleeves down at night and destroying mosquito breeding areas.

2. Taking drugs which will kill the parasite in the blood stream. In SVN the Australian Army is taking PALUDRINE, one tablet twice a day. This may be varied by direction of the S.M.O.

Marking of Roll Books

3. Because of the importance of drugs in the prevention of malaria, it is necessary to maintain a record as to whether or not an individual soldier has taken his PALUDRINE.

4. The method of recording the administration of PALUDRINE in 7 RAR is as follows:-

Marking 1. The soldier was present on the parade and has been given the PALUDRINE under supervision of an officer.

Marking 2. The soldier has not been on parade but has been given the PALUDRINE to take, but its ingestion has not been supervised by an officer.

Marking 3. The soldier has not been on parade and has not been given the PALUDRINE.

5. A PALUDRINE parade is to be held at 0635 hrs and 1630 hrs daily. On each parade the soldier is to be administered one PALUDRINE tablet. The officer in charge is to record the taking of PALUDRINE in the platoon or sub unit roll book in the following manner:-



Each triangle to be marked as in paragraph (4)

WATER HYGIENE

1. All untreated water in SVN must be regarded as unsafe. Where possible water should be obtained at a water point where it will have been treated and tested to ensure that it is safe before issue. If not the water should be sterilised before drinking.
2. The basic procedure for treating water is:
 - a. Filter
 - b. Sterilise
 - c. De-taste

INDIVIDUAL TREATMENT

3. Filtration is carried out by means of a Millbank Filter bag. Filtration increases effectiveness of chlorine by reducing organic matter. Filter the water into an empty water bottle crush one "White" tablet and add to filtered water, shake well. After 30 minutes crush one "Blue" tablet and add to water, this will remove the taste of the chlorine.
4. A rather safe source of water is rain, caught by the shelter's individual.
5. Another method of sterilising water is to bring it to the boil.

IMMUNISATION REQUIREMENTS

1. The immunisation programme and detailed documentation are in conformity with Theatre Directives, International Agreements, and the special requirements for the R & R programme.

SMALLPOX

2.
 - a. Every 12 months.
 - b. To be entered in I.H.C., entry to include origin and batch number and whether freeze-dried or liquid. To be signed by a medical officer, and medical officer's signature to be verified by stamp of a medical officer authorised to do so on behalf of Commonwealth of Australia. The page is to be fully identified as referring to the soldier including the soldiers signature.

CHOLERA

3.
 - a. Every 4 months.
 - b. For entry to THAILAND, injection within four months but at least six days prior to entry. Elsewhere valid for six months, from six days after first injection in series. That is, if more than six months have not passed, single injection gives immediate validity to certificate. If more than six months, two injections are needed to ensure protection.
 - c. To be entered in I.H.C., entry to include origin and batch number. To be signed by a medical officer, and medical officer's signature to be verified by a stamp of a medical officer authorised to do so on behalf of Commonwealth of Australia. The page to be fully identified, including the soldiers signature.

PLAGUE

4.
 - a. Every six months.
 - b. To be entered in I.H.C., (in section of "other immunisations") and each entry to be signed by a medical officer. Page to be identified as referring to soldier.

TYPHOID AND PARATHYPHOID (TAB)

5.
 - a. Every 12 months.
 - b. To be entered in I.H.C. and each entry to be signed by a medical officer, Page to be identified as referring to soldier.

TETANUS

6.
 - a. Every 5 years, or on departure for active service, unless a booster has been received in previous six months, and also on wounding.
 - b. To be entered in I.H.C., and each entry to be signed by a medical officer. Page to be identified as referring to soldier.

POLIOMYELITIS

7. Oral twice on entry and when ordered.

DIPHTHERIA

8. Injection twice on entry, only after skin test.

TYPHUS

9. On orders from AHQ.

INFLUENZA OR ENCEPHALITIS

10. On orders from AHQ.

PASSIVE IMMUNISATION

11. On specific medical order after exposure only.

N.B.

Entry on each specific immunisation to be made in Med 4.

W. A. Roberts Major

Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

H15

PRECEDENCE ACTION
ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE INFO

DATE - TIME - GROUP
24 0800 Z

FROM 7 RAR
TO LIST A (1 COPY ONLY)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
ORIGINATORS NUMBER
A196

AMENDMENT No 1 TO 7 RAR ADMIN INSTR No 1 PART 2 ANNEX C (.) AMEND
TUES 31 MAY 67 TO READ WEDNESDAY 31 MAY 67

DRAFTERS NAME OFFICE TEL No
CALIGAPI A/ADJT EMP 24

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND RANK

R. Gaby Lt

Condo Diary 1130
H 16

MESSAGE FORM

PRECEDENCE-ACTION

ROUTINE

DATE-TIME-GROUP

31 0330 Z (May 67)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTED

ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER

A 236

FROM 7 RAR

TO 2IC S3 BC IO
RMO OC MOR PL
B COY LT TRESISE

INFO OC SP

VISITS (.) FIRST (.) LT COL BOIOOSN FRENCH MILITARY ATTACHE FROM CAMBODIA IS TO VISIT 7 RAR FOR APPROXIMATELY 50 MINUTES AT A TIME TO BE NOTIFIED 31 MAY 67 (.) SECOND (.) PROPOSED ITINERARY IS TO BE AS FOLLOWS CLN
ALFA (.) H HR (.) MET BY BN 2IC AND OC SP COY AT BN HQ (.)
BRAVO (.) H - H PLUS 10 BRIEFING AT CO TENT BY IO AND S3 BC AND RMO TO BE IN ATTENDANCE (.)
CHARLIE (.) H PLUS 10 - H PLUS 20 (.) VISIT CP AND FCC (.)
DELTA (.) H PLUS 20 - H PLUS 30 (.) VISIT MOR PL AREA AND CP MET BY OC MOR PL (.)
ECHO (.) H PLUS 30 - H PLUS 45 (.) VISIT B COY AREA CMM MET BY OC B COY (.)
FOXTROT (.) H PLUS 45 - H PLUS 50 RETURN TO BN HQ AND DEPARTURE (.)
THIRD (.) LT COL BOIOOSN IS TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY OC SP COY WHILST IN 7 RAR AREA (.)
FOURTH (.) SUITABLE NON ALCOHOLIC REFRESHMENT IS TO BE PROVIDED BY LT TRESISE AT COS TENT AT 1 HR

DRAFTER'S NAME

OFFICE

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND RANK

BLADEN

OC SP

P. Bladen MAJ

1435

COMIDS
DIARY

H 17

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

7th Battalion
The Royal Australian Regiment
AP AN PHU

R54-1-1(69)

31 May 67

Distribution List 'B'

Check of 'A' Systems and Procedure
Sub Units 7 RAR

General

1. A routine check of 'A' matters in 7 RAR on 27/28/29 May 67 revealed that sub-units are not complying with basic procedure in the efficient running of orderly rooms.

Anomalies were found in:

- a. Recording of ROs part 2.
- b. Amendments to MBI's and ARO's.
- c. Filing and amending ROs part (1)
- d. Marking, compilation and certification of roll books.
- e. Filing systems
- f. Pay procedure
- g. Parade states

2. Each of the above subjects will be dealt with in turn. Sub units are to take action to correct errors mentioned and to institute procedures and systems that are at present non-existent.

Recording RO's Part 2

3. Prior to the unit proceeding to SVN all unit AAB83's were taken to CARO and checked against CARO records. The checking involved 1 Sgt and 2 Cpl clerks from Bn HQ for 7 days, at a time when the Bn could least afford to spare 3 clerks. Approximately three months later it is found that little or no recording has taken place since the CARO check.

4. Individual serials of RO's Part 2 were checked in each Coy with the fol result.

a. A Coy-good.

(1) Filed and all entries made

b. B Coy-poor.

(1) RO's Part 2 NOT FILED

(2) No check on unit file numbers.

(3) Don't know whether all RO's issued, have been received.

(4) No Specser entered.

(5) AAB83 entries missing.

- (a) Pte UPTON - inf 220/8 - now 7 RAR
- (b) Pte STANFORD - inf 220/4 - now 7 RAR
- (c) Pte BENNETT - inf 220/8 - now 7 RAR
- (d) Pte MAQUIRE - inf 220/9 - now 7 RAR
- (e) Pte DOYLE - inf 220/12 - now 7 RAR
- (f) Pte GRECH - inf 220/8 - now 7 RAR

NOTE: All of the above RO's ticked but no entries whatsoever.

COMIDS
DIRTY

(2)

- (g) Pte STEIN - Duplicate AAB83 - No leave pages.
- (h) Maj MEALEY - inf 395/18 - No course entry.
- (i) Pte CONNOR - 13 Dec 66 inf 4123/26 - no re-eng entry.
- (j) Sgt BROWNING - now 7 RAR - no entry
incr 4st GC1 - no entry.
- (k) Sgt CLINGHAM - incr 4st GC1 - no entry.

c. C Coy - good.

All RO's Part 2 kept and maintained correctly.

d. D Coy - average - considerable work to be done but is all marked to be done and is in hand.

- (1) RO's Part 2 neatly filed.
- (2) No check of unit serial No's.

e. SP Coy - poor.

- (1) RO's not filed.
- (2) No check on unif file No's
- (3) Don't know whether all RO's issued have been received.
- (4) No Specser entered.
- (5) Anomalies found in fol AAB83's.

(a) Pte WILKIE - debited $\frac{1}{2}$ day ARL - progressive total $12\frac{1}{2}$ days out.

(b) Cpl HOLDOM - fol entries not made in AAB83.

- (1) Clerical course - inf 4294/20
- (2) Rank - inf 467/23
- (3) Group - inf 403/22
- (4) Specser.

(6) Maj BLADEN

- (a) NOK entered in INK
- (b) NO authority for ARL carry forward.

(7) Pte DENNIS - no GP 6 entry.

(8) Pte FOGARTY

- (a) Course JTC - not entered
- (b) Trans 7 RAR- not entered

(9) Pte DAVIS

- (a) Course JTC - not entered
- (b) Trans 7 RAR- not entered

(10) Pte GREEN - no address of NOK entered.

f. Admin Coy - good

- (1) Correctly filed
- (2) All entries made.

5. It is stressed that only a random selection of RO's were checked. However this random check is sufficient to justify criticism of the overall system.

Amendments to MB1 and RO's

6. Amendments to and new issued of MB1's, ARO's and other publications must be properly maintained and sighted by the Coy OC and 21C, at present few coys are doing either.

- a. A Coy - average.
 - (1) Not completely up to date but attempts being made to adjust.
 - (2) No file covers.
- b. B Coy - poor
 - (1) Amendments - well behind.
 - (2) Not being passed to OC/21C.
- c. C Coy - Average.
 - (1) Not completely up to date but attempt being made.
- d. D Coy - Average.
 - (1) Amendments a little behind.
 - (2) Maintained neatly.
- e. SP Coy - Poor.
 - (1) Amendments well behind.
 - (2) Not being passed to OC
 - (3) Many MBI's and ARO's not even filed.
- f. Admin Coy - Good
 - (1) Up to date
 - (2) Properly filed.

Amendments to and filing of 7 RAR RO Part 1

7. The standard of maintainance of Routine Orders Part 1 within 7 RAR is poor. It is obvious that 7 RAR RO Part 1 No 218 is not being complied with. This could be due to the fact that after RO's Part 1 reach the coy they are NOT distributed to platoons. A routine check reveals that RO's Part 1 are NOT:

- a. Amended.
- b. Passed to OC/21C
- c. Filed.

8. The distribution of RO's Part 1 allows for 1 set of RO's to each Pl in the Bn. At a future date ALL RO's Part 1 files will be withdrawn and thoroughly checked.

9. The fol errors were found in amending and filing 7 RAR RO's Part 1.

- a. A Coy - average.
 - (1) Filed and amended.
 - (2) RO Serial 5 missing.
- b. B Coy - below average.
 - (1) Not fully amended.
 - (2) RO Serial 15 missing.
- c. C Coy - ?
 - (1) RO's Part 1 could not be located.

(4)

d. D Coy - average.

(1) NOT fully amended.

e. SP Coy- poor.

(1) Fol RO's missing Serials 4,5,16,18 and 19.

(2) No attempt to ammend.

(3) NOT properly filed.

f. Admin Coy - good.

(1) Fully amended.

(2) Properly filed.

Roll Books

10. In general the condition of Roll Books in 7 RAR is below average.

11. The fol ref lay down the procedure and responsibilities connected with the correct compilation and certification of roll books.

a. AMR&O 1208 to 1237.

b. DA 110A

c. AAB76 instructions inside front cover.

12. The fol errors were found in the marking and certification of Coy Roll books.

a. A Coy - average.

(1) NOT being initialled daily - one month outstanding.

(2) Erasures being made contrary to para 15 to instrs on front cover.

(3) General appearance and layout - good.

b. B Coy - below average.

(1) Corrected entries not being initialled in accordance with para 16 of front cover.

(2) Apr/May entries in back of book NOT initialled.

(3) Too many errors being made in the figures at bottom of each page, more care to be taken as figures are illegible.

(4) General appearance and layout - average.

c. C Coy - average.

(1) Not signed full month of May.

(2) Too many errors in back of roll book.

(3) General appearance and layout - good.

d. D Coy - poor.

(1) Too many errors.

(2) NOT signed - period NOT signed 21/22/23 May.

(3) Attached pers NOT marked 21/till/28 May.

(4) Pde States 27/28 May submitted but roll book not marked.

(5) General appearance and layout - good.

(5)

e. SP Coy - average.

- (1) Too many errors being made.
- (2) Not being signed daily from 19-24 May.
- (3) General appearance and layout - good.

f. Admin Coy - poor.

- (1) Corrections not being initialled - more care to be taken.
- (2) Erasures contrary to instrs.
- (3) WRONG entries.
Recommend book be re-written.

Filing System

13. The standard of index/filing of correspondence by sub-units in 7 RAR is below average. In some cases coys have not even attempted to file correspondence. It is also a reasonable indication that correspondence NOT recorded by coys has in fact been received by them and LOST.

a. A Coy - good

b. B Coy - poor.

- (1) No filing system exists.

c. C Coy - average.

- (1) NOT being filed efficiently.

d. D Coy - good.

e. SP Coy - below average.

- (1) Inwards correspondence book NOT up to date.
- (2) No correspondence has been placed on file since arrival in SVN.

f. Admin Coy - average.

Pay Procedure and Leave Records

14. Leave. Leave records in general are good however continuous checking is required to ensure that members do NOT:

- a. Forfeit leave carried forward.
- b. Forfeit leave through incorrect calculations.

15. Pay Procedure. Pay procedure is poor throughout the Bn. Prior to proceeding to SVN all paybooks were checked by APAC. The result of this check was a 75% error rate throughout the Bn. HQ S Comd required this unit to explain the high error rate. Complaints received from coys that coy members are being confused by sudden debits in paybooks can in all cases be traced back to the coy concerned making incorrect entry or an addition error in paybook.

a. A Coy - good.

- (1) Correspondence register NOT being kept.
- (2) Leave OK.

(6)

b. B Coy - below average.

- (1) Credit advices NOT placed in back of paybooks.
- (2) PUA's not filed in state and alphabetical order.
- (3) Credit advice for Pte McRAE entered wrong side of paybook.
- (4) Travelling time, public holidays NOT entered in AAB83.
- (5) Blank spaces on leave pages of AAB83's not ruled out.
- (6) Too many "NO ENTRY" lines - more org required.
- (7) Over drawn codes NOT entered on paylists.

c. C Coy - average.

- (1) No paybook register.
- (2) Write backs not effected.
- (3) Correspondence register not up to date.
- (4) Allotment register not up to date.
- (5) Leave OK.

d. D Coy - poor

- (1) Leave Records. A 50% check was carried out and no errors were found.
- (2) Pay. The condition of pay media within the company can only be described as disgraceful. It became necessary to carry out a complete check of the whole pay system supposedly operating. Consequently the following errors were located:
 - (a) Allotment forms and claims dated back to 17 May had been signed by members but still held in coy.
 - (b) No registers of any nature are being maintained.
 - (c) Outstanding pay media to be actioned (no member left behind from operation to keep work up to date).
 - (d) Paybooks are in a mess generally. 38 books found where HDA, Credit Advices, Debit Advices had been entered on wrong side of paybook. Calculations in some cases found to be incorrect.
 - (e) PVAs not filed in correct order.

(7)

e. SP Coy - good

- (1) No paybook register.
- (2) Debit advices NOT placed in paybook.
- (3) Leave OK.

f. Admin Coy - average.

- (1) Not in possession of Pay book register.
- (2) Not in possession of Pay correspondence register.
- (3) Not in possession of allotment registers.
- (4) Leave good.

Parade States and misc returns

16. Parade States. The daily parade state is to be submitted to Bn HQ daily at 0900 hrs or if this cannot be accomplished coys are to contact the Chief Clerk and give some indication of how long it is likely to be. In future disciplinary action will be taken against coy clerks if the above order is not complied with.

17. Miscellaneous returns. Invariably returns requested by Bn HQ from some coys are late. It is pointed out that returns are normally requested through 7 RAR RO's Part 1.

Conclusion

18. No company is up to the standard required in 'A' systems and procedure. In some cases only a limited amount of work is required in other cases a major effort is required to bring coys up to a workable standard.

Recommendation

19. It is recommended that coy clerks and coy orderlies NOT be employed on any other duties other than clerical and pay.

20. Unless a marked improvement occurs in the next month, the B Coy clerk and the SP Coy clerk will be re-trade tested. ~~reduced in rank for inefficiency.~~



Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer.

91

F - Form 52 - 1
Revised July 1966

MESSAGE FORM

NUMBER.....

FOR COMM CEN/SIGNALS USE.....

PRECEDENCE - ACTION PRIORITY	PRECEDENCE - INFO DEFERRED	DATE - TIME GROUP 091500H.	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
From 7 RAR			PREFIX GR
To A, B, C, D, Sp, Admin Coy.			SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Info			ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER

INTREP (.) EN ACTIVITY (.) ALPHA (.) B 2 agent report indicates presence of VC Bn in grid square 4172 (.) Task could be coord with local guerillas in attack or mortaring of BINH BA or 1 ATF BASE (.) BRAVO (.) FAC reports on morning of 9 May reveal fresh bunkers and five metres of trench at grid ref 394748 CMM 200 metres trench with bunkers at 40ft intervals at grid ref 406731 CMM 10 bunkers which all appear to be used at grid ref 409731 (.) CHARLIE (.) 7 RAR ptl reports sighting one man who fled at grid ref 434712 (.)

Comment (.) Could be Bn of 274 Regt coord with Chau Duc District Coy (C41) (.) Probable task is in connection with BINH BA and NOT 1 ATF BASE (.) Unlikely that they would attack BINH BA compound with only one bn so task is more likely to be aimed at BINH BA Village or Route 2

Page _____ of _____ pages		REFERS TO MESSAGE CLASSIFIED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		DRAFTER'S NAME R.K. PETTIT		OFFICE IO		TELE No.			
FOR OPS. USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND RANK Capt

SECRET

Copy No 32
7 RAR
AP AN PHU
SOUTH VIETNAM

11 May 67

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
OPERATION LISMORE
2 MAY - 8 MAY 67

Introduction

1. Operation LISMORE took place in the LONG DAT District which is the VC district comprising the SVN districts of LONG DIEN and DAT DO. The VC guerilla force that operates locally is known as the LONG DAT DISTRICT UNIT, the concentrated military company of which is designated C-25. The area of operations at least until recently, was the traditional area of responsibility of the BARIA PROVINCIAL MOBILE BATTALION, D445. The same area has been used occasionally by main force units.
2. The VC forces contacted during Operation LISMORE were essentially guerilla elements of C-25 company.

Organization of Long Dat District Unit

3. The organization of the LONG DAT DISTRICT UNIT is outlined below :-

SECRET

SECRET

-2-

Enemy Forces Contacted

4. 7 RAR made contact with at least three separate elements of C-25 company. These were the SECURITY SECTION based at YS 579594, the ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION based at YS 591585, and The HOI MY GUERRILLA CELL located in the general vicinity of YS 554570.
5. C Coy located the base of the SECURITY SECTION who evacuated the area at the approach of the company. Prior to their rapid withdrawal from the base, they machine-gunned four prisoners being held by the section. Those four PWs were bound and gagged when shot. One died soon after the arrival of the company and the remaining three were evacuated to 1 ATF BASE for medical treatment and interrogation. All three members were subsequently suspected to survive. Interrogation of the least wounded revealed that he had been captured by LONG DAT DISTRICT guerillas on Route 44 near PHUOC LOI, the morning prior to D445 Battalion's attack on PHUOC LOI and HOI MY in mid-February. He stated that since that date he had been held by The LONG DAT SECURITY SECTION (strength 7) and, along with other prisoners, had been moved from base to base in the local jungle. He had heard the guerillas in that section mention the LONG DAT ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION (strength 12) which was located about one kilometre to the south of the base YS 579594. This section was commanded by a woman HONG TRINH aged 21 years.
6. A Company's contact at YS 569582 with three enemy resulting in two enemy KIA was probably with an element of the ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION. One of the KIA was a woman aged approximately 20 years who could well have been HONG TRINH. The section base was undoubtedly the installation at YS 591585. This was located by A Company earlier the same day and had only recently been evacuated. It was estimated that the installation had been occupied by approximately twelve persons. These events correspond with information resulting from the interrogation of the released prisoner.
7. C Company's two enemy KIA at YS 569589 were probably from the ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION. An examination of the bodies by the previously released prisoner did not produce any identification, however he said the names that appeared on letters found on the bodies sounded familiar and he thought that they belonged to the ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION. Further examination of the letters revealed that the two VC KIA were brothers.
8. A Company's contacts in the vicinity of YS 556573 were probably with the HOI MY GUERRILLA CELL whose base camp location was given by a HOI MY guerilla "chiou hoi" as being in this general area. The contact at YS 542563 with three VC resulted in one VC KIA.

Enemy Action After Contact

9. In all cases it would appear that the guerilla sections were in about full strength in their respective bases or contacted by 7 RAR troops. Following the initial evacuation of their bases they fragmented, but stayed in the general area of operations. This resulted in numerous small contacts that followed. It seems that the guerilla forces did not intend withdrawing completely from the area even when they must have realized a sweep of considerable size was taking place. The only explanation for this is the existence of a major cache in the area or the possibility that they were expecting a major VC force in the same area during or about the time of the operation.
10. Whatever the reason for the guerilla's persistence in remaining in the general area of their bases, their actions resulted in more casualties to their forces than would have normally been expected.

SECRET

....11....

SECRET

-3-

D Company's Contact

11. D Company's contact on the evening 3 May at YS 587618 warrants special mention as this enemy force remains unidentified. It is probable that it may have been a local guerilla section, however it is believed that the ~~Sapper~~ Recon element of D445 Battalion was responsible for blowing the wire near DAT DO during the night 1/2 May. If this is so, then D Coy may have contacted this force on its return to its base.

Documentation

12. Numerous documents were captured during the operation and the preliminary examination of these revealed no immediate information that was of value during the operation. However, a letter taken from one of the VC killed in A Company's initial contact, was addressed to a member of C5/D445. This does not indicate the presence of the unit in the area at the time. It would appear that the letter was in transit at the time of capture.

Summary of Contacts and Destruction

13. The following is a summary of contacts with the enemy and destruction to many installations, equipment and supplies.

a.	Contacts with Enemy	-	16
b.	Enemy KIA	-	5
c.	Enemy WIA (hit but bodies NOT recovered)		7
d.	VC suspects detained for interrogation		5
e.	Miscellaneous incidents (eg. heli fired on)		4
f.	Weapons captured	-	5
g.	Installations destroyed	-	1 x Regt 3 x Coy 3 x Pl 23 x Misc
h.	Miscellaneous weapons destroyed	-	7 x grenades 3 x claymores
j.	Rice captured	-	1 $\frac{3}{4}$ tons unpolished 1000 lb polished
k.	Booby traps destroyed	-	13
l.	Miscellaneous destruction	-	6 x sampans 4 x fish ponds 1 x Booby trap factory 5 x Oxen 2 x Ox carts

SECRET

-4-

Conclusion

14. Operation LISMORE'S most significant result will be the ultimate effect on the morale of The LONG DAT DISTRICT UNIT and particularly those guerilla sections contacted. It should result in some Chiou Hois in the immediate future from these elements. The destruction of installations and interdiction of supplies should hamper the efforts of main force units that choose to operate in the area in the future. This destruction to installations and disruption to supply routes will take some time to reinstate.

Roger Pettit
Capt
Intelligence Officer

SECRET

LONG DRF DISTRICT UNIT.



DISTRICT COMMITTEE

ASSIST SECRETARY

MILITARY

POLITICAL

FRONT COMMITTEE



SECRET

Lands Day.

93

MESSAGE FORM

R1000-1-1

PRECEDENCE-ACTION

DATE-TIME-GROUP

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ROUTINE

18 14 00 H

RESTRICTED

ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER

FROM 7 RAR

A 146

TO A COY B COY C COY D COY
SP COY ADMIN COY

INTREP (.) VC IMPROVISED MINES (.) ATTACHED REPORT BY OC PNR PL CONTAINS
DETAILS OF MINES FOUND BY 9PL C COY

Roger Pettit

DRAFTER'S NAME

OFFICE

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AND RANK

PETTIT

IO

R1000-1-1

7 RAR
AP AN PHU
SOUTH VIETNAM

May 67

VC IMPROVISED MINES

1. Report by 235295 Lt V. THOMPSON. A 106
2. Report on VC improvised mine field.
3. Mines cleared 1400 hrs 14 May 67 at YS 382687.
4. Area covered by minefield 50m x 100m, total 5,000 sq metres.
5. The mines were sewn with a definite layout. The layout can be broken into two parts.
 - a. In thick scrub close to a creek crossing where the vegetation was bamboo. The mines were positioned in natural gaps which would be used moving from the creek crossing. The depth of these mines from the creek was approx 50 metres. The mines were sewn at five pace intervals in gaps and cleared spaces. It should be noted that the pattern in the immediate area of the crossing would cover effectively the deployment of a section sent across as cover for a large forces crossing.
 - b. Approx 75 metres to the north on the western side of the creek, where a force might deploy for open ground movement, there was a continuation of the mine field. The pattern was of a similar nature to our own methods. Every 5 paces there were a cluster of three mines staggered to a centre line.
6. Total number of mines recovered was 50.
7. The mines were 24 to 48 hours sewn, well concealed with bamboo leaves. However age had not allowed the disturbance of leaves to completely blend with surrounding dead (ground) foliage.
8. The placement of mines indicate that the party had some experience in mine laying, however they had not allowed sufficient height of pressure plate above ground to effectively detonate the ignitor. The mine had been placed in a 4 inch diameter hole, 4 to 5 inches deep.
9. Description, CBU with tail fins removed, used as anti-personel inverted employing pressure plate.
10. Pressure required varies from 10lb plus, to as low as 1 lb, the pressure applied centrally and vertically is reduced to a minimum. On delousing mines it was found that approximately eight had been walked on. It is thought that the explanation included in para 8 accounts for their non-initiation.
11. There were no anti lift devices on this occasion however the utmost care in the future should be taken. Noone other than trained personel of either Aslt Pnrs or Engrs should attempt to delouse these mines.

Raymond Little for
Lt

OC Aslt Pnr

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

7th Battalion
The Royal Australian Regiment
AP AN PHU

12 MAY 67

OPERATION PUCKAPUNYAL

COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT

- Reference
- A. 1 ATF SOP Anx A , Appendix 4.
 - B. 1 ATF OP instr 11/67 (OP PUCKAPUNYAL) of 161630H Apr 67
 - C. 7 RAR OP plan 1 of 261100H Apr 67.
 - D. MAP: VIETNAM 1:25,000 sheet 6430 #11 (SE)

Name and type of Operation

- 1. Operation PUCKAPUNYAL, an airmobile assault and search and destroy operation.

Dates of Operation

- 2. 270700H-281930H Apr 67.

Location

- 3. Area NORTH WEST OF Nui Dat in the NUI NGHE area (YS 3972) within line BRAVO.

Command Headquarters

- 4. HQ 7 RAR.

Task Organization

- 5. 7 RAR with:
 - a. In direct support
161 Bty RNZA.
 - b. In support from 270700H
Two air-mobile coys. CH47 sorties to lift one fd bty and mortar pl less one sec.
 - c. In support from 281700H
CH47 sorties to lift one fd bty.
 - d. In support from 270900H
One Sioux.

SUPPORTING FORCES

- 6. 161 Bty ANZA provided support from a fire base at grid reference YS 389683. Initially the fire base was secured by Hel aslt using a coy.
- 7. 103 Bty was on priority call to 7 RAR during the move by 161 Bty into the fire base. 1Fd Regt(-) and 1/83 (US) Arty Bn were in support.
- 8. The fly in of 161 Bty started at 0730 hrs and the first gun was in action prior to 0800hrs. The flyout of the guns commenced at 281400H and was completed by 1600 hrs.

AUST Aviation

- 9. 161 (Indep) Recce Flt
 - a. One H13 SIOUX was in direct support of 7 RAR for the two day operation and was held on standby at NUI DAT. The aircraft was used for:-

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- (1) Liaison
- (2) Reconnaissance
- (3) Arty OP
- (4) Battlefield surveillance.
- (5) Casevac/medevac
- (6) Movement of stores and light equipment by landing and hovering.

b. As anticipated these tasks were most effectively carried out and the aircraft was used constantly. The availability of an H13 in direct support is invaluable.

USA Aviation

10. Two air-mobile coys were used to lift the whole battalion (less the Mortar platoon and Tracker teams) in five (5) lifts. A Coy was lifted into YS 389683. C Coy, B Coy, Bn HQ, and D Coy in that order were lifted into an LZ at YS 354716.

11. The practice gained by 7 RAR in the use of helicopter for air-mobile operations was of great value and a new experience for most members of the unit.

12. CH47 aircraft were used to lift 161 Bty and two sections of mortars into the fire base at YS 389683.

13. In conjunction with artillery two light fire teams were used effectively to suppress the LZs prior to the hel aslts.

Intelligence

14. Prior to the operation it was considered that recce elements of 274 VC Regt and CHAU DUC District Coy C21 could possibly be operating in the general area. The AO had recently been traversed and searched by an ARVN force during Op PORTSEA and the enemy positions located throughout were believed to be old.

15. The terrain encountered varied between open paddi and patches of springy bamboo which in parts restricted the rate of movement to 500 metres per hour. Some patches of light rain forest were also encountered, particularly on the EAST and WEST banks of the SONG CA.

16. The operation enabled 7 RAR to familiarize its members with the various types of terrain in the TAOR and for its first operation was invaluable.

17. The weather was hot and humid but water was plentiful in the SONG CA and the SUOI SUOI.

Mission

18. 7 RAR was to conduct an airmobile operation into the area YS 3571 on 27 Apr 67.

Concept of Operations

19. Trace P. (not to all addressees).

Outline plan

20. The operation was to be conducted in three phases as follows:-

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- 3 -

- a. Phase 1. The securing of the fire base at YS 389683 by A Coy at 0700 hrs.
- b. Phase 2. A hel aslt on the LZ at YS 354716 by C Coy at 0830 hrs.
- c. Phase 3. A search and destroy operation returning to NUI DAT on foot.

21. B Coy to move along axis of NORTH route and occupy area YS 408739 in battalion harbour ni 27/28 Apr 67. C Coy followed by Bn HQ, Aslt Pnr Pl and Fire Aslt Pl less tracker team to move along axis of centre route and harbour in area YS 410736. D Coy to move along SOUTH route and harbour ni 27/28 Apr 67 rat YS 406732.

22. Return route to NUI DAT 28 Apr 67 was to be along two routes - C Coy, Bn HQ and elements Sp Coy followed by B Coy along NORTH route, D Coy along the axis of the SOUTH route.

Conclusions

23. Op PUCKAPUNYAL was considered to be ideal for the first operation of a new battalion serving in VIETNAM. Not only were members of the battalion introduced to the various types of terrain in a situation which was devoid of actual enemy contact but thoroughly exercised in the techniques of the air mobile assault into an unsecured LZ. This operation enabled troops to overcome their initial 'in theatre' nervousness and the nature of the operation enabled a good degree of practice of all procedures to be achieved.

Eric H. Smith

(Eric H SMITH)
Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

Enclosure

Trace P (not to internal addressees).

Distribution

A Coy
B Coy
C Coy
D Coy
Sp Coy
Admin Coy
Mor Pl
Pnr Pl
F/A Pl
CO
2IC
S3
CP
OC Sp Coy
BC
IO
RSO
RSM
RMO
QM
B n TO
File (2)
Comds Diary (3)
Spare (10)

External
1 ATF (2)

Comds Diary (3)
Issued 2100hr

M2

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7 RAR
NUI DAT
SOUTH VIETNAM

22 May 67

OPERATION LISMORE

COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT

- References:
- A. 1 ATF SOP Annex A, Appendix 4.
 - B. 1 ATF Op Instr 13/7 Op LISMORE of 300800 Apr 67.
 - C. 7 RAR OP 2 of 011330 H May 67.
 - D. Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000 XUYEN MOC 6430 11
DAT DO 6429 1

1:25,000 6429 - 1 NW
6429 - 1 NE
6429 - 1 SW
6429 - 1 SE
Picto 6429 IV - N
6430 III - S

Name and Type of Operation

- 1. Operation LISMORE, search and destroy operation.

Dates of Operation.

- 2. 020845H - 081600H May 67.

Location

- 3. Area SOUTH EAST of NUI DAT YS 4367, centre of area YS 5558.

Command Headquarters

- 4. HQ 7 RAR.

Task Organization

- 5. 7 RAR with
 - a. Under Command
from 011700H May TWO combat engineer teams.
 - b. Under Op Control
from 020700H May - A Sqn 3 Cav less one tp.
 - c. In Direct Support
161 Bty RNZA
One H13 - 161 (Indep) Recce Flt.

...d...

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d. In Support

Two air-mobile coys.

FAC

Rebro sta on HORSESHOE (YS 4962)

Supporting Forces

6. A Sqn 3 Cav Regt

a. The squadron was used initially to lift D Coy and its attachments, two sections of mortars and the Aslt Pnr Pl less two sections into the area of operations. Simultaneously armour escorted A Bty 2/35 (US) Arty Bn to the HORSESHOE (YS 4962).

b. The initial task of the squadron was to picquet the clear area SOUTH of Route 23. Once the squadron arrived at the area of operations, the four M125 vehicles carrying the two sections of mortars remained with Battalion Headquarters throughout the operation, together with the squadron headquarter vehicles.

c. On D Day (2 May 67) the squadron less one element remained with Battalion Headquarters and leaguered at YS 599605 ni 2/3 May 67. During this night elements of the squadron established an ambush on the SONG RAI at YS 599604 in conjunction with the Fire Aslt Pl. One element of the squadron continued surveillance duties SOUTH of Route 23 throughout the operation.

d. Throughout the operation elements of the squadron were allotted tasks in conjunction with companies of the battalion, thus providing 7 RAR with those extra facilities which only the Armoured Corps can produce, simultaneously/^{i.e.} greater mobility over all types of terrain; additional fire power; a protected and mobile fire base for the battalion mortars; good communications and finally an additional stores carrier for such stores as water, extra ammunition including 84 mm HEAT and chain saws and explosives.

161 Bty RNZA

7. In order to support 7 RAR the guns were relocated on the HORSESHOE feature at YS 495620 where they remained during the entire operation. Protection of the guns was afforded by A Coy 6 RAR who were permanently located in the area prior to the operation.

8. Throughout the operation close fire support was continually available and artillery was used on DF, H & I tasks and opportunity targets. During the early stages whilst the battalion was close to its EASTERN boundary, the SONG RAI, the initial safety margin of 1000 metres could not have been met owing to the extreme range. In addition, and during the entire operation the guns were so located that all fire was from the front, since the direction of movement of the battalion was initially towards the gun position.

9. On one occasion, owing to the distance between A Coy and the Mortar Pl fire base located with Battalion Headquarters, the company had to rely entirely on gun support. It was not immediately possible to shift the fire base at the time owing to its relation to the other companies of the battalion.

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....On several ...

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On several occasions where mortar support could have been used, it was not requested. This tendency should be rectified in further operations. Mortar support is generally more quickly available than artillery and this fact should be well understood by commanders at all levels.

Combat Engineer Teams

10. There were two teams consisting of an NCO and 6 OR from 1 Fd Sqn RAE, who were attached to A and C Coy. The task of the combat engineer teams included assistance to rifle companies with the delousing and destruction of booby traps, chicom claymores and destruction of base installations. The battalion Pioneer Platoon performed a similar function in that a section was attached to B and D Coys.

11. Both Engineer Combat Teams and the Pioneers performed admirably. During future operations of this nature an engineer team per rifle company would be ideal since this would free the Aslt Pnrs for use on other tasks thus allowing the Commanding Officer greater flexibility in the allocation of troops to tasks.

12. AUST Aviation

a. One H13 Sioux was in direct support by 7 RAR for the duration of the operation and was held on standby either at NUI DAT or more frequently at a secure LZ adjacent to Battalion Headquarters where it was tasked as required. The aircraft was used for:

- (1) Liaison.
- (2) Reconnaissance -- Used frequently by CO, 2IC and Coy Comds.
- (3) Arty OP.
- (4) Battlefield surveillance and movement of tracker dogs.
- (5) Casevac/medevac.
- (6) Movement of stores and light equipment by landing and lowering.
- (7) Backloading of captured documents, weapons, equipment etc.
- (8) Communications.

b. On several occasions during the operation an urgent requirement existed to use a Sioux during the period the allocated one was at NUI DAT, refuelling. It is desirable, therefore, that a replacement be automatically available if required during the refuelling period on subsequent operations.

c. The great value of the Sioux at all times to the battalion cannot be overstated. The tasks were always effectively carried out and the aircraft was used constantly.

d. 9 Sqn RAAF

Two UHIBs were used by 7 RAR for resupply of water and rations and the evacuation of some minor medevacs. In addition, troop lifts with the use of UHIBs occurred as follows:

(1) Fire Aslt Pl lifted from YS 585605 to YS 574604 at 030700H and subsequently returned at 031400H.

(2) C Coy lifted from YS 576603 at 050930H to YS 553593. This move was accomplished to completion in 25 minutes.

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e. In addition, on 8 May 67, six (6) UHIBs were made available and used during the extraction of the battalion back to NUI DAT in conjunction with US Aviation.

f. At all times the utmost cooperation was afforded to 7 RAR by the RAAF and there is no reason to doubt that the good relations which currently exist between the two services should not continue during operations in the future.

USA Aviation

13. Two air mobile companies were used on D Day to lift B Coy, A Coy, Bn HQ and Fire Aslt Pl and C Coy in that order, into LZ MAROUBRA. Timings were as follows:

<u>Grouping</u>	<u>PZ Time (NUI DAT)</u>	<u>LZ Time (MAROUBRA)</u>
B Coy	020850H	020900H
A Coy	020915H	020925H
Bn HQ	020940H	020950H
C Coy	021025H	021034H

14. One air mobile company was used on 8 May 67 in conjunction with RAAF to extract 7 RAR from Op LISMORE. Both the introduction of the battalion and the subsequent extraction were conducted in an efficient, fast and professional manner which reflects great credit not only on the US Aviation companies concerned, but also on the battalion and the pre planning teams involved.

15. Dust Off aircraft were used as follows:

2 May 67	2 x medevac cas
3 May 67	1 x medevac cas
5 May 67	2 x medevac cas
	1 x WIA
6 May 67	1 x medevac cas

16. On all occasions evacuations were carried out successfully and well.

Intelligence

... 17. Intelligence of the enemy anticipated in the objective area prior to the operation is contained at Annex A. This intelligence was from all sources.

Summary of Contacts/Incidents

18. Operation LISMORE, the second operation conducted by 7 RAR in VIETNAM, was marked with distinct success as the statistics below indicate. 7 RAR suffered no casualties as a result of enemy action:

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....16 x contacts...

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7.62	ball	40 rds
.45 cal	ball	100 rds
.38 cal	ball	60 rds
CUBs		60
Chicom D 10 Claymores		3
Chicom stick grenades		15
Dets/Nose caps (used for booby traps)		60
WP Grenades		1

Miscellaneous

6 x large rolls chicken wire
4 x rolls sheet aluminium
7 x Sampans
11 x huts
2 x ox carts
2 x booby trap factory/workshop (underground)
5 x oxen
1 x class room (underground) seating for 56.
5 x fish farms
1 x cross-cut saw
100 x sets of greens
12 gals petrol
4 x gals Kero
80 x rice bags empty and in good condition
2 x fish nets
2 x medical books
4 x mess huts
40 x feet black cloth.

... 19. A comprehensive Intelligence Summary written as a result of Operation LISMORE is attached as Annex B.

Terrain.

20. The AO was bounded on the WEST by a line running 1000 metres EAST of Route 44. The NORTHERN boundary was the cattle line SOUTH of Route 23 while the EASTERN boundary was the SONG RAI. The AO consisted in the NORTH of a thickly wooded area bounded to the SOUTH by the SONG BA DAP. SOUTH of the SONG BA DAP the AO conveniently consisted of paddy and savannah NORTH of the RACH ONA HEM and SOUTH to the coast, mangrove and sand dunes.

21. The weather was hot and humid by day with rain falling on three nights during the operation.

Mission

22. 7 RAR was to:

- Conduct an air mobile op into the area YS 6062 on 2 May 67 and
- Conduct a search and destroy op in an allotted AO.

Concept of Operations

... 23. Trace P.

24. General Outline

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- a. The operation was to be carried out as follows:
- (1) Hel aslt by B Coy to secure LZ MAROUBRA square YS 6062.
 - (2) Hel lift of A Coy, Bn HQ and C Coy into LZ MAROUBRA.
 - (3) D Coy, two sections of Mor Pl and Aslt Pnr Pl less two sections to move by APC to AO.
 - (4) Each company was to occupy areas of responsibility on D Day and to lay ambushes on the SONG RAI ni 2/3 May 67.
 - (5) Search and destroy operations were to be conducted subsequently from D + 1 to D + 5 in areas as ordered.
- b. The concept of operations was that the battalion would search and destroy in a general SOUTH WEST direction with each company being given a particular AO. Rifle companies employed the tactic of the multi-directional search in their respective AOs and as the results indicate this method proved to be most fruitful.

25. Despite the fact that Operation PORTSEA had been conducted in the same area a few weeks earlier, 7 RAR located and destroyed thirty (30) installations including one of regimental size that had apparently been missed by previous forces operating in the area.

26. One of the most unusual and interesting finds was the discovery of five (5) fish farms which were subsequently destroyed. The largest was 100 x 150 metres and 1 metre deep and contained great numbers of live fish up to an estimated 3 lbs in weight. It is estimated that this pond contained sufficient fish to feed a company for six months. The pond was well camouflaged with logs and could not be seen from the air.

27. Another unusual find was located by B Coy on 3 May 67 at YS 573608. The find consisted of a large enemy base camp which had obviously been used previously as a supply point. Four large holes 24 ft x 8 ft x 8 ft were also located, adjacent to which were found heaps of rice husks, medicine bottles and empty serum containers indicating a possible medical and or supply installation. Beneath some rice husks and buried beneath the ground was found a large earthen ware jar containing many documents in a well preserved condition. The documents were backloaded under the auspices of IO 7 RAR.

Tracker Dogs

28. For the first time on active service in VIETNAM dogs were used by Australian troops. On 3 May 67 a patrol of A Coy encountered 3 VC at GR 570583. One VC was shot and killed instantly and the subsequent follow up with the aid of dogs resulted in another kill. Two days later the dogs were again flown in after a contact to assist in the follow up. On this occasion an enemy party of approximately 10 VC had conducted a fighting withdrawal leaving a blood trail. After moving only a few hundred metres the platoon accompanying the dogs was suddenly fired upon by the estimated 10 enemy. Luckily no casualties were incurred to our side.

29. On each of these occasions only the two dogs and handlers were used. It is considered that had the team including visual trackers and cover men been employed, the friendly platoon may not have been led into what was very nearly a successful though hastily prepared enemy ambush.

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30. On one other occasion the dogs were employed but were unsuccessful in following up the scent. It is considered that there is need for a patrol dog trained to 'point' when the possibility of entering an enemy ambush is imminent. This however will be the subject of a separate submission. It is understood that the type of dogs currently being used by 7 RAR can be trained to 'point' but unfortunately ours either can not or will not.

Battalion Headquarters

31. On two occasions during Operation LISMORE, Battalion Headquarters was involved in two incidents with the enemy. First, on 4 May 67 at 1400 hrs, one enemy was seen to approach the perimeter to within fifty metres before disappearing in thick scrub. The enemy soldier was observed to be highly camouflaged - blending in skilfully with the surrounding terrain. A series of subsequent clearing patrols however failed to locate him.

32. On 7 May 67 at 1600 hrs, what was thought to be two similarly dressed enemy were again observed, this time while the Headquarters was on the move. The two enemy were approximately seventy metres away on the left flank and the Headquarters was on the point of arriving at its new location for that night. Once again a clearing patrol sent out failed to reveal any trace of the two enemy. There were no incidents ni 7/8 May 67.

33. On 8 May 67 the Headquarters moved again and on the assumption that it was still being 'shadowed', arranged for a half platoon-sized ambush to be 'dropped off.' The force left behind to deal with the enemy in fact started out with the Headquarters as part of the leading elements. Once 'dropped off' along the axis the remainder of the Battalion Headquarters passed through. Unfortunately however no enemy were seen. It is considered that in future operations this tactic may pay dividends.

Commanders' Analysis and Recommendations

34. The battalion AO was divided into 10 smaller AOs each suitable in size for a coy gp search and destroy operation. 4 Coy AOs were searched simultaneously. The direction of search in each case was different. On day 4 of the operation the same AOs as for day 3 were researched. It was intended to confuse the enemy with a multi-directional search in order that he should not be able to establish our pattern and so arrange ambushes. It is probable that this tactic succeeded, as 16 contacts indicate, where his previous action has been to slip around the searches and vacate the area. It is almost certain that several contacts resulted when enemy fled from one AO and bumped our troops moving in a different direction in the adjoining AO.

35. The tracker dogs worked efficiently and in following up blood trails were responsible for 2 contacts. However, in both instances, neither dog pointed. In the second case the failure to point almost had serious consequences as the platoon was lead into an enemy ambush of 10 men. It was only because of poor enemy shooting from a hastily prepared ambush position that our troops suffered no casualties. The lesson here is clear - at least one of the two dogs must be able to point. Additionally it is thought that a support element of 2 handlers and 9 ORs for 2 dogs is too large. In practise this is 2 Iroquois loads and it may neither be convenient to have an Iroquois available immediately the dogs are required, nor to suspend operations until an Iroquois is available. In addition such a large number of men from the A/Tk Pl tends to render that platoon considerably less effective.

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...It is suggested...

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It is suggested that the tracker dog team should be raised against the establishment of the surveillance Platoon and if possible reduced in numbers to 5 or 6.

36. The air mobile assault was very satisfactory. Such an assault is an intricate manoeuvre of war requiring:

a. Detailed planning by CO and Bn planning staff jointly with CO of Air mobile Bn and his planning staff followed by an air recce to determine:

- (1) LZ or LZs
- (2) Direction of fly in
- (3) Exact point of touch down on LZ of lead AC
- (4) Formation of AC flight to be used at PZ and LZ.

b. A timed fire suppression programme using air, arty and gun ships.

c. Careful control from C in C Ship.

Eric H Smith
Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

Enclosures

Annex A : Enemy Intelligence prior to the Operation
Annex B : Intelligence Summary
Annex C : A Coy Operational Analysis
Annex D : B Coy " "
Annex E : C Coy " "
Annex F : D Coy " "
Trace P : Map Concept of Operations
Trace Q : Map: Contacts/Incidents/Installations

Distribution

A Coy	2IC	Spare (10)	<u>External</u>
B Coy	S3		
C Coy	CP		HQ 1 ATF (3)
D Coy	FCC		
Admin Coy	OC Sp Coy		
Sp Coy	BC		
Mor Pl	IO		
Sig Pl	RSM		
F/A Pl	File (2)		
CO	Comd's Diary (3)		

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Annex A To 7 RAR
Combat Operations After
Action Report dated
May 67

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ENEMY INTELLIGENCE PRIOR
TO THE OPERATION

1. The thickly wooded area to the EAST of DAT DO, colloqually known as "the long green" is a known VC base area. It is used by the VC for equipment and arms caches for the local district and guerilla forces. It also provides and has been used as a covered approach by VC main forces when moving in from the EAST to attack targets in SOUTHERN PHUOC TUY Province. Elements of main force, district forces and guerillas may occupy positions in the area at any time. Although recently searched during Op PORTSEA it must be expected that VC base elements will gradually slip back to rebuild and restock as long as there is not continuous surveillance of the areas.

2. Although the main towns and villages in the area between LONG TAN (YS 4965) and PHUOC HAI (YS 5153) are nominally under GVN control the area and people are largely VC dominated. Domination is maintained by a continuous VC presence in the area and the small ARVN/RF/PF forces employed in static security roles are ineffective. The VC forces which have made this possible are:

D445 Bn
C25 Coy (LONG DAT District Coy)

Village Guerilla Squads from -

LONG TAN	AN NGAI
AN NHUT	LONG DIEN
PHUOC THO	PHUOC TINH
PHUOC THANH	LONG HAI
PHUOC HOA LONG	PHUOC LOI
TAM PHUOC	HOI MY
PHUOC HAI	

3. The VC maintained their interest in the DAT DO area mainly because of its value as a procuring and provisioning centre and because of its proximity to the jungle bases and covered tracks and trails EAST to the SONG RAI and thence to the main force base areas to the NORTH EAST. Control of the area gives the VC access to the main population centres of PHUOC TUY, and to the rice, fish, salt and fruit producing region. It also gives them free access to the town market where they are able to purchase unlimited quantities of medical supplies, cloth, batteries and other supplies obtained in VUNG TAU and SAIGON.

4. Many PW, ralliers and agents have given information that the main supply routes from the area are:

- a. Via Route 52 to the vicinity of LONG TAN.
- b. Via Route 23 to the vicinity YS 5561.
- c. Via various routes and tracks to the area of the SONG RAI (YS 5959).

These routes however are general axes of movement rather than the exact paths.

5. Mines and booby traps are likely to be found in a line taken in prolongation of the barrier.

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Annex B To 7 RAR
Combat Operations After
Action Report dated 22 May 67

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
OPERATION LISMORE
2 MAY-8 MAY 67

Introduction

1. Operation LISMORE took place in The LONG DAT District which is the VC district comprising The SVN districts of LONG DIEN and DAT DO. The VC guerilla force that operates locally is known as The LONG DAT DISTRICT UNIT, the concentrated military company of which is designated C-25. The area of operations at least until recently, was the traditional area of responsibility of The BARIA PROVINCIAL MOBILE BATTALION, D 445. The same area has been used occasionally by main force units.
2. The VC forces contacted during Operation LISMORE were essentially guerilla elements of C-25 company.

Enemy Forces Contacted

3. 7 RAR made contact with at least three separate elements of C-25 company. These were The SECURITY SECTION based at YS 579594, The ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION based at YS 591585, and The HOI MY GUERILLA CELL located in the general vicinity of YS 554570.
4. C Company located the base of The SECURITY SECTION who evacuated the area at the approach of the company. Prior to their rapid withdrawal from the base they machine-gunned four prisoners, being held by the section. These four PWs were bound and gagged when shot. One died soon after the arrival of the company and the remaining three were evacuated to 1 ATF Base for medical treatment and interrogation. All the members were subsequently expected to survive. Interrogation of the last wounded revealed that he had been captured by LONG DAT DISTRICT guerillas on Route 44 near PHUOC LOI on the evening prior to D445 Battalion's attack on PHUOC LOI and HOI MY in mid-February. He stated that since that date he had been held by The LONG DAT SECURITY SECTION (strength 7) and, along with other prisoners, had been moved from base to base in the local jungle. He had heard the guerillas in that section mention The LONG DAT ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION (strength 12) which was located about one kilometre to the South of the base YS 579594. This section was commanded by a woman HONG TRINH aged 21 years.
5. A Company's contact at YS 569582 with three enemy resulting in two enemy KIA was probably with an element of The ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION. One of the KIA was a woman aged approximately 20 years who could well have been HONG TRINH. The section base was undoubtedly the installation at YS 591585. This was located by A Company earlier the same day and had only recently been evacuated. It was estimated that the installation had been occupied by approximately twelve persons. These events correspond with information resulting from the interrogation of the released prisoner.

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6. C Company's two enemy KIA at YS 569589 were probably from the ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION. An examination of the bodies by the previously released prisoner did not produce any identification, however he said the names that appeared on letters found on the bodies, sounded familiar and he thought that they belonged to the ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION. Further examination of the letters revealed that the two VC KIA were brothers.

7. A Company's contacts in the vicinity of YS 556573 were probably with the HOI MY GUERRILLA CELL whose base camp location was given by a HOI MY guerilla 'chiou hoi' as being in this general area. The contact at YS 542563 with three VC resulted in one VC KIA.

Enemy Action After Contact

8. In all cases it would appear that the guerilla sections were in about full strength in their respective bases until surprised or contacted by 7 RAR troops. Following the initial evacuation of their bases they fragmented; but stayed in the general area of operations. This resulted in the numerous small contacts that followed. It seems that the guerilla forces did not intend withdrawing completely from the area even when they must have realized that a sweep of considerable size was taking place. The only explanation for this, is the existence of a major cache in the area or the possibility that they were expecting a major VC force in the same area during or about the time of the operation.

9. Whatever the reason for the guerilla's persistence in remaining in the general area of their bases, their actions resulted in more casualties to their forces than would have normally been expected.

D Company's Contact

10. D Company's contact on the evening of 3 May at YS 587618 warrants special mention as this enemy force remains unidentified. It is possible that it may have been a local guerilla section also, however, it is believed that the Sniper/Recon element of D445 Battalion was responsible for blowing the wire near DAT DO during the night 1/2 May. If this is so, then D Company may have contacted this force on its return to its base area.

Documentation

11. Numerous documents were captured during the operation and the preliminary examination of these revealed no immediate information that was of value during the operation. However, a letter taken from one of the VC killed in A Company's initial contact, was addressed to a member of C5/D445. This does not indicate the presence of the unit in the area at the time. It would appear that the letter was in transit at the time of capture.

Summary of Contacts and Destruction

12. The following is a summary of contacts with the enemy and destruction to many installations, equipment and supplies.

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7.62 ball	40 rds
.45 cal ball	100 rds
.38 cal ball	60 rds
CBUs	60
Chicom D 10 Claymores	3
Chicom stick grenades	15
Lets/Nose caps (used for booby traps)	60
WP Grenades	1

Miscellaneous

6 x large rolls chicken wire
4 x rolls sheet aluminium
7 x Sampans
11 x Huts
2 x ox carts
2 x booby trap factory/workshop (underground)
5 x cxen
1 x class room (underground) seating for 56.
5 x fish farms
1 x cross-cut saw
100 x sets of greens
12 gals petrol
4 x gals Kero
80 x rice bags, empty and in good condition
2 x fish nets
2 x medical books
4 x mess huts
40 x feet black cloth.

Conclusion


13. Operation LISMORE'S most significant result will be the ultimate effect on the morale of The LONG DAT DISTRICT UNIT and particularly those guerilla sections contacted. It should result in some Chieu Hois in the immediate future from these elements. The destruction of installations and interdiction of supplies should hamper the efforts of main force units that choose to operate in the area in the future. This destruction to installations and disruption to supply routes will take some time to reinstate.

(R. PETTI~~F~~)
Capt
S2 7 RAR

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Annex C To 7 RAR
Combat Operations After
Action Report
dated 22 May 67

A COY OP ANALYSIS REPORT
OP LISMORE

Map: 1:25,000.

1. a. Sub Unit. A Coy 7 RAR
- b. Comd Maj E.J. O'DONNELL
- c. Op Name Op LISMORE
- d. Duration 020915H - 081330H May 67.
- e. Outline of Tasks. Search and destroy between SONG RAI and Route 44.
- f. Sequence of Events. See Appendix I attached.
- g. Assessment of Op. The coy achieved its aim in that the allotted areas were thoroughly searched and anything of value to the VC was destroyed. The following is a brief summary of results:

VC put out of action:

3 VC KIA
4 VC WIA

Stores captured included:

3 rifles
3 Chicom DH 10 Claymores
7 stick grenades
12 CBU
1 WP grenade
200 lb rice
4 gals kerosene
40 lbs assorted clothing and uniforms, medical stores with penicillin. Numerous documents and letters.

Destroyed:

4 huts
2 sampans
2 ox carts
4 large installations.

Own Casualties.

NIL.

E.J. O'Donnell Maj
OC A Coy

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Appendix I
To Annex C

OP LISMORE
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

2 May. 0925 hrs airmobile landing at GR 600623. An ambush was set up on the SONG RAI at GR 591588. 2 pl discovered a sampan, some fishing eqpt, salt and food at GR 592587.

3 May. 2 pl were allotted the task of clearing along the SONG RAI to its mouth. At GR 596586 they found another sampan and destroyed it. At GR 589585 they found a small camp with two huts, a quantity of rice and other food, two medical books, and some kerosene. The camp was destroyed.

The coy eventually concentrated with a troop of APC's under comd at GR 566586. 3 pl were given the task of patrolling parallel to the SONG BA DAP. At GR 570583 the patrol commander by 2Lt W. BANNON encountered 3 VC. One was killed by the forward scout, Pte K.B. LANG, and another, a female, was killed in a subsequent follow up with the aid of the tracker dog team. Some documents were recovered.

4 May. A clearing patrol from 1 pl located an enemy camp at GR 565586 containing documents and then found that this was part of a larger installation in the same area. While the area was being searched, one VC walked towards the sentry post at GR 564586 and was shot in the stomach by Cpl D.R. AYLETT. The enemy although seriously wounded evaded the subsequent follow up. The installation was then destroyed.

The remainder of the coy secured an LZ for D Coy at GR 558586 and then estb a coy base at GR 557563 and 3 pl went off to ambush a track junc at GR 565574.

5 May. 2 pl found an enemy notice at GR 554571, proclaiming a VC restricted area. They then noticed what appeared to be an enemy camp at GR 553566. While preparing to assault through it they were seen by the enemy who then conducted a fighting withdrawal leaving one obvious blood trail. 2 pl occupied the posn initially until the tracker dog team could be flown in and then handed it over to 3 pl so that they could continue the follow up. 2 pl followed the blood trail to GR 550563 when they were fired on by approx 10 en. The pl comd called in arty and a helicopter light fire team strike, and then cleared the area. No casualties were found.

3 pl evacuated what was useful from the camp including a 2 x 7.92 mm rifles and many documents and destroyed as much as they were able.

6 May. 2 pl moved back to the enemy installation and completed its demolition after one minor contact. They then moved to an ambush posn at GR 542566. 1 pl located an old VC camp at GR 544576 which had probably been a medical centre. They killed 3 oxen at GR 550577 and later found a battalion sized position in the vicinity of GR 552573 but then did not have the means to destroy it.

3 pl found an empty rice cache and a bunker at GR 554572 and caught a brief glimpse of a VC running away when they destroyed the bunker. In the area of GR 550572 they found a large enemy installation with two huts and numerous bunkers.

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6 May.

From the large quantity of rice husks it could be deduced that it had once been a major rice storage area. Two ox carts were found there and destroyed. 3 pl then moved down the spur to the SW and found continuous pits and bunkers extending for about 1400 metres - enough to hold several battalions.

3 VC walked into the 2 pl ambush at 1535 hrs. One was killed by a Claymore while two escaped. A lesson was learned regarding the best siting of Claymores. The company harboured for the night at GR 537574.

7 May.

While D Coy established a blocking force parallel to Route 44, A Coy carried out a sweep SW towards them. Although the sweep was methodical and thorough it failed to yield any sign of VC. An incident occurred at GR 524557 when Sgt SEXTON from 3pl went to check the ID Card of a Vietnamese seen in the open. The man refused to stop and was fired on and wounded by 3 pl. He was picked up by a helicopter and taken in for interrogation. The company laid a number of unsuccessful night ambushes.

8 May.

The company secured an LZ at GR 516564 and was flown out of the area at 1300 hrs.

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Appendix II
to Annex C

INCIDENT REPORT
(INSTALLATION)

1. 38215 2Lt R.C. Smith.
2. Bunkers. GR 553573.
3. 1200 hrs 7 May 67.
4. 40,000 sq yds (at least, could be 80 to 100,000 sq yds).
5.
 - a. Wpn pits and bunkers with heavy overhead cover.
 - b. None found.
 - c. None seen.
 - d.
 1. N/A.
 2. Wood overhead protection about 2-3 ft thick, no revetting.
 - e. Hundreds, total not known.
 - f. 1,000 to 1,500 men.
 - g. Every direction.
 - h. Pits were all sizes, mainly 2 - 3 men.
 - j.
 1. 2 - 3 mths.
 2. Nil.
 3. N/A.
 - k. There are many ox cart tracks in the area, used very often by woodcutters.
 - l. No, there were none found.
 - m. Nil.

R.C. Smith 2Lt
OC 1 pl A Coy

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CONTACT REPORT

1. Op LISMORE.
2. 38215 2Lt R.C. Smith.
3. 1 pl A Coy 7 RAR.
4. 1130 hrs. 3.5 secs. 4 May 67.
5. GR 564586.
6. Search and destruction of bunkers.
7. 1 pl was deployed, 2 section providing protection to the East covering a well used foot track. The MG No. noticed movement to his front and notified his sect comd, who then saw a male asian, about 20 metres away. The enemy upon sighting or hearing our forces turned to run.

The sect comd then shot him, inflicting a stomach wound. The enemy fell to the ground arose and ran into the scrub and disappeared. The sect followed up and a search of the area using the tracker team was made but to no avail.
8. Flat country, low thick scrub. Visibility ranging from 5 to 25 metres.
9. 20 metres.
10. MG No. 1.
11. Sitting by his gun.
12. Shine of his body as he was not wearing a shirt.
13. One, black shorts only.
14. Sect comd. 20 metres.
15. M 60. 1 x M 16.
16. Turn and run.
17. Move to a good fire posn and observe.
18. 1 WIA.
19. M 16.
20. Nil.
21. N/A.
22. 10 x 7.62 link belt, 20 x 5.56 ball.
23. Nil.
24.
 - a. An adequate sentry system must be maintained.
 - b. Person manning the MG must always be in a good posn behind the gun.
 - c. A visual tracker as well as the dogs is necessary when used in a follow up.

25. Nil.

26. After initial contact pl Comd moved forward to investigate. Remainder of pl provided protection to rear and flanks.

27. 10 x 7.62 link belt. 20 x 5.56 ball.

R.C. Smith 2Lt
OC 1 pl A Coy

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation LISMORE.
2. Report by 37277 2Lt G.H. Ross.
3. 2 pl A Coy 7 RAR.
4. Time of action 1030 hrs. Duration $2\frac{1}{2}$ hrs. 5 May 67.
5. Location YS 553566.
6. Two section patrol.
7. The platoon was moving SOUTH SOUTH WEST along a track in vic YS 553566 when Cpl Henderson noticed that a number of trees had been recently cut. He took half of his section into the brush to investigate. He sighted what he thought to be an enemy position and four enemy. The platoon cmd came forward and decided to put a section on the track to the EAST as cutoff and use Cpl Henderson's section and Pl HQ to sweep through the enemy position.

The Pl cmd had just finished giving his orders and was moving back with Pl HQ and the remainder of four section when Cpl Henderson's MG opened fire on four enemy. Pl HQ and the remainder of four section were quickly deployed and commenced the attack on the enemy position. The enemy upon having fire opened on him returned it and it appeared if he would stay and fight. On seeing the section commence to sweep towards his position, he fired several more bursts and started to withdraw. As the sweep came closer to him he ceased to return fire and turned and fled.

The section continued to sweep through until reaching the SOUTH side of the position where they were put to ground. Pl HQ plus two attached Engineers then moved back into the enemy position and commenced to search it.

During the attack a blood trail was found and was later followed for about 150 metres. The tracker team was then requested to continue the follow up. By this time 3 pl had moved up to the enemy position and carried on the search commenced by 2 pl.

2 pl then moved 150 metres EAST of the position to secure an LZ for the fly in of the tracker team. As POSSUM was taking off three shots came from thick bush 150 metres to the EAST. A sweep of the area was done by four section but no enemy were sighted.

With the arrival of the tracker team a follow up was commenced which took the Pl to vic YS 550563 where the team lost the track. It was decided to fly the team out from YS 552564. Before doing so the pl was to secure the high ground at YS 552562. Cpl Henderson's section was sent to secure the feature. While moving onto it they came under fire from approximately four enemy with automatic weapons. Cpl Henderson's section went to ground and returned fire. Cpl Tredrea's section (five) were sent 200 metres WEST to get on top of the feature and sweep through to the enemy position.

The enemy seeing five section begin to move, withdrew to the SOUTH. Artillery was called down on their escape route and gunships were called in to give the complete length of the feature a going over.

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8. Terrain was thick secondary jungle. Visibility varied from 10 to 40 metres.
9. Distance to enemy when first sighted was 40 metres.
10. Pte ARCHER of four section was the first to see the enemy.
11. He was with Cpl Henderson doing a recce of the area.
12. Enemy were noticed due to movement.
13. Enemy strength was approximately 10. He was dressed in black.
14. Fire was opened by Pte HULIN, the MG No 1 of four section from 40 metres.
15. All section weapons except the M 79 fired.
16. The enemy returned fire and appeared to be ready to stay and fight.
17. The reaction of the section was to continue to fire on the enemy until Pl HQ arrived and the attack was commenced.
18. Enemy casualties were 1 WIA by blood trail.
19. The enemy was wounded by M 16 fire.
20. Nil.
21. Nil.
22. a. M 60, 120.
b. M 16, 102.
c. SLR, 145.
23. 2 x 7.92 mm semi automatic rifles, 5 hand grenades, 3 claymore mines and numerous documents were captured.
24. Quick immediate action is essential once contact is opened.
25. N/A.
26. See para 7.

G.H. Ross 2Lt

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation LISMORE.
2. Report by 37277 2Lt G.H. Ross.
3. 2 pl A Coy 7 RAR.
4. Time of action 1535 hrs. Duration 10 mins. Date 6 May 67.
5. Location YS 541566.
6. Pl on ambush.
7. The platoon laid an ambush on the track at YS 541566. At 1535 hrs 3 VC walked into the ambush. They were allowed to penetrate to approximately the centre, where Pte HILL of six section triggered the ambush with a claymore mine. One enemy fell to the ground, the remaining two immediately fled into the bush. A sweep was done but no sign of the two enemy were found.
8. Terrain was thick secondary jungle. Visibility was 10 - 15 metres.
9. 10 metres.
10. Pte BELL of 6 section was the first to see the enemy.
11. He was the first man on the Western edge of the ambush.
12. Movement.
13. Enemy strength was 3. Dress was black shirt and shorts.
14. Fire was opened by Pte HILL of 6 section from 10 metres.
15. Claymore mine and M 16 rifles.
16. Enemy immediately fled into bush.
17. Those that could see the enemy fired. The remainder stayed in position until ordered to do a sweep by the Pl Comd.
18. 1 KIA (body count).
19. Caused by Claymore mine.
20. Nil.
21. N/A.
22. a. 1 Claymore mine.
b. M 16, 11 rounds.
23. 1 x M 1. .30 semi automatic rifle.
24. Much more care must be taken in siting of claymore mines.
25. N/A.
26. Remainder of pl stayed in ambush position.
27. N/A.

G.H. Ross 2Lt

INCIDENT REPORT

1. Report by 37277 2Lt G.H. Ross.
2. Report on enemy camp at YS 589587.
3. 1150 hrs 3 May 67.
4. 1800 sq yards.
5.
 - a. 2 wpn pits only.
 - b. N/A.
 - c. Wpn pits were not interconnecting.
 - d. Fighting pit with 2' overhead cover.
 - e. Two wpn pits.
 - f. Approx half a section.
 - g. Wpn pits were facing SOUTH.
 - h. Individual.
 - j. (1) Wpn pits were approx one week old.
(2) N/A.
(3) Two huts constructed near the wpn pits were in the final stage of construction.
 - k. No.
 - l. No.
 - m. No.

G.H. Ross 2Lt

EQUIPMENT RECOVERED

1. 40 lbs rice.
2. 10 lbs fish and assorted meat.
3. 4 lbs salt.
4. 1 cross cut saw.
5. Quantity of clothing and cooking utensils.
6. 2 medical books.
7. 4 gals kerosene.

INCIDENT REPORT

1. Report by 37277 2Lt G.H. Ross.
2. Report on def instl at YS 553566.
3. 1030 hrs on 5 May 67.
4. 4900 sq yds.
5.
 - a. (1) Wpn pits only.
 - b. N/A.
 - c. Six of the wpn pits were interconnecting by crawl trenches.
 - d. Fighting pits with 2' of overhead cover.
 - e. 14 wpn pits.
 - f. Occupied by one to two sections.
 - g. All directions.
 - h. (1) Individual.
 - j. (1) Wpn pits were one to two weeks old.
 - k. Near both a river and a track.
 - l. There were three sentry posts.
 - m. Nil booby traps. Three claymore mines were set ready to be detonated.

G. H. Ross 2Lt

EQUIPMENT RECOVERED

1. 2 x 7.92 rifle.
2. 1 x folding bayonet.
3. 5 x hand grenades.
4. 3 x claymore mines with stands and ignitor sets (DH 10).
5. 3 x magazines, 100 rds of .45.
6. 7 x clips of M1 ammo.
7. One Aust patten entrenching tool (new).
8. One Aust patten clasp knife.
9. Two homemade knives.
10. 60 rounds .38 ammo.
11. 2 water bottles.
12. Several magazine pouches.
13. Two shovels GP.
14. 150 lbs rice.
15. 50 lbs various meats and fish.
16. 5 lbs salt.
17. Numerous documents.
18. Medical supplies including penicillin.
19. Quantity of clothing and cooking and eating utensils.

CONTACT REPORT

1. Op LISMORE.
2. Report by 3786779 2Lt W. Bannon.
3. 3 pl A Coy 7 RAR.
4. Time of action - 1630 hrs. Duration 1½ hrs 2 May 67.
5. Location 570583.
6. Ptl consisted of 7 and 8 sects comd by myself.
7. We had travelled south east to the 57 E where we found a number of fresh enemy tracks. At this stage I put 8 sect in front. After travelling due north for just over 50 yds, Pte K B LANG, who at this stage was forward scout, sighted three enemy travelling towards us in a south westerly direction. The signal for enemy was given but before Lcpl D J KELLY could complete the deployment of his section, Pte LANG was spotted. He fired immediately and the rest of the section opened fire. One enemy was killed immediately and after finding a heavy blood trail the dogs were brought in. Seven sect were now leading. The dogs took us straight to the wounded enemy. Cpl SANDERSON at this stage opened fire at the bushes and as a result killed this person. APCs were brought in to cover the open padi to the north.
8. Country flat, vegetation fairly open. Visibility about 30 metres.
9. 25 metres.
10. Pte K B LANG.
11. Forward scout 8 section.
12. They were walking along track.
13. En strength 3. Dress. The first killed was a man wearing blue shorts and black pyjama top. Second was a woman dressed in normal black pyjamas.
14. Pte K B LANG at 20 metres.
15. 2 x M 16.
1 x GPMG M 60.
3 x SLR
16. En tried to run away.
17. Leaving 8 sect where it was I immediately carried out a sweep with 7 sect. 8 sect were fire base for this sweep.
18. 2 KIA.
19. Caused by small arms.
20. Nil cas. to own troops.
21. N/A.

...22...

22. 25 ball.
50 link.
23. Docs captured passed immediately to CHQ. Nil wpns captured.
24. Lesson learned.
25. N/A.
26. N/A.
27. N/A.

W. Bannon 2Lt
OC 3 Pl.

INCIDENT REPORT

1. Report by 3786779 2Lt W. Bannon.
2. Report on instls found along 5 metre feature from GR 552572 to GR 545568.
3. Found on 6 May 67.
4. Wpn pits, bunkers and rice husking plants covered most of the area between these grid references.
5.
 - a. Wpn pits bunkers and rice husking plants only. No tunnels were found in the area.
 - b. N/A.
 - c. N/A.
 - d. Revetting on bunkers.
 - e. There were so many bunkers that to try to give even an estimate of the number would be difficult.
 - f. Main installation at GR 550571 would take a Bn to man if all pits were being used. A pl posn was found at GR 548569. In addition there were sect posns everywhere.
 - g. All groups of pits were sited in all round defence.
 - h. Pits were individual.
 - j. All instls were fairly old but had been used recently.
 - k. Def layouts were just off the main tracks.
 - l. Nil.
 - m. Nil.

Own Remarks.

At GR 550571 we found an estimated $3\frac{1}{2}$ ton of rice husk. Animal manure in this area was fresh and I therefore consider that the VC had shifted out their store of rice less than 24 hours before we got there.

One hundred metres north east of this point we found 2 x ox carts. These were in very good repair before we destroyed them but had not been used for at least a couple of days because of the rust accumulation on the steel wheel rims.

W. Bannon 2Lt
OC 3 Pl.

OPERATION LISMORE

B COY OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS REPORT

- a. B Coy 7 RAR
- b. Major D.J. Mealey
- c. LISMORE
- d. Duration:- 020800H to 081400H
- e. (1) Secure LZ at 600624.
- (2) Search for and destroy enemy and enemy installations in areas ALFA DELTA HOTEL JULIET (See trace)
- f. Sequence of events.
- (1) The landing at MAROUBRA LZ was NOT opposed. The heli lift went very smoothly and provided invaluable training for future operations.
- (2) The Coy moved to a night harbour position at grid 5960. The move and the harbour were uneventful.
- (3) Area ALFA was searched on D+1. On this occasion, 6 pl was detached to search along the treeline to the NORTH of the two large clearings which formed the SOUTHERN boundary of the Coy AO. The remainder of the Coy searched the thickly timbered area to the NORTH. The following installations were discovered:
- (a) Empty rice bags, rice husks and ox cart tracks were discovered at 584614. Further search revealed an area where the VC apparently loaded or unloaded rice from ox carts. A well used ox cart track runs from SW to NE along the NORTHERN edge of the AO in 5861. This track then turns NORTH at 585612 and leads to the open padi at 584615.
- (b) A large base camp was located at 573608. This base had been used as a supply point as 4 large open holes about 24ft x 8ft x 8ft were found. Heaps of rice husks were found alongside one of the holes. Several medicine bottles and empty serum containers were found in the area, indicating the presence of either a medical installation or medical supply point. A search of the area revealed a quantity of documents hidden in a large earthenware jar half buried in the ground and covered with rice husks. The documents were well preserved. The camp has been destroyed.
- (c) A fish breeding pool was discovered at 581608. The pool was 100 metres by 150 metres and about 1 metre in depth. It was full of fish of the catfish type, and some fish were quite large. A small camp was located adjacent to the pool. The camp and the pool have been destroyed.
- (d) A tunnel system was located at 568603. These tunnels were about 18 months old, but had been used very recently. These tunnels are quite close to an obvious navigation mark (the clearing edge) and probably are used frequently. They have been destroyed.

(e) A dug in workshop and defence system was located at 567609. Evidence was found to indicate that booby traps or mines had been manufactured here. About 30 nose caps of shells and mortar bombs, with wires leading from them, were located. This installation was destroyed during the next 2 days.

(f) Bunkers and fighting pits were located and destroyed at 558605, 531590, 539595 and 548604. These were destroyed.

(g) A booby trapped hut was located at ~~55591~~ 55591. This hut was constructed about 4 feet from the ground on a platform which had a wooden floor covered with flattened out tins. The walls were of small mesh wire netting and a corrugated iron roof covered all. The booby trap consisted of a chicom grenade tied under the tin on the floor and connected by a pressure/pull device to the wire netting. It is assumed that the fuse was instantaneous. The hut was probably a rice storage hut and it was destroyed by explosive.

(4) The following incidents/contacts occurred.

(a) At 041400 hrs, at 562608 4 pl made contact with a lone rifleman. The scout was in heavy scrub and had his weapon on safe. His shot was hasty and he missed.

(b) At 041700 hrs at 555610 the Coy was moving into a harbour position and a small patrol led by Sgt BROWNING of 5 pl was sent to convey a message to the Coy 2IC who was moving in the rear. He moved by a different route to the Company and arrived at a spot from which the tail of the column had just left. He was fired upon by one rifleman at point blank range. This VC had obviously been following the company. Sgt BROWNING did not return fire immediately as he was in some doubt as to whether the fire came from a B Coy soldier. He quickly established that this was NOT so and returned fire. By this time the enemy had withdrawn.

(c) At 051230 hrs, 4 pl was moving to the area of the camp at 567609 which had been found the previous day. The platoon was to complete the demolition. As 4 pl approached the camp area, a harbour was formed and a small patrol was sent to recon the position. A number of VC were based nearby and were preparing lunch. They heard the pl harbouring in the thick undergrowth and withdrew, abandoning their meal (rice) and equipment.

(d) At 051730 hrs the Coy harboured at 550608 in order to effect a medivac. During stand to, at last light an unknown number of enemy fired 2 quick shots into the perimeter and quickly withdrew. The enemy weapon was either 9mm or US Mk 1 tracer.

(e) At 071430 hrs at 521580, 5 pl made contact with 2 - 3 VC. Shots were exchanged and the enemy fled SW. A sweep of the area was organised by 2 platoons and the third platoon, mounted in APCs formed a blocking force to the WEST. The contact occurred in a narrow jungle peninsula with the open padi to the NW, SE and SW. APCs were positioned to cover the treeline and artillery was used in rear of the sweeping platoons in an attempt to discourage the enemy from moving NE. The sweep concluded at 1830 hrs without again making contact.

(5) The following medivacs were necessary

(a) 2 May - two heat exhaustion cases.

(b) 5 May - one suspected appendicitis case.

(6) a. Assessment of Operation

The operation was valuable both from an orientation and operational point of view. A number of well established VC bases and facilities were uncovered and destroyed. A pattern of VC movement can probably be drawn from this, and the enemy will be denied the security and comfort of his bases.

(7) a. Appendices.

The following appendices are attached.

Appendix I Installation Report - Lt McGuinness
" II Incident Report - Lt McGuinness
" III Contact Report - Lt McGuinness
" IV Installation Report - Lt McGuinness
" V Installation Report - 2Lt Harris
" VI Installation Report - 2Lt Harris
" VII Installation Report - 2Lt Harris
" VIII Contact Report - 2Lt Harris
" IX Installation Report - 2Lt Harris
" X Installation Report - 2Lt Cameron
" XI Installation Report - 2Lt Cameron
" XII Installation Report - 2Lt Cameron
" XIII Installation Report - Capt Stokes.

D.J. Mealey Maj
OC B Coy 7 RAR

Appendix I
To Annex 3

1. 47049 Lt P.L. McGUINNESS
2. Rice collection point GR
3. 031030
4. 20 sq yds
5. N/A
6. (a) Point consisted of small platform 4 ft x 4 ft raised 8 ins from the ground and made of small logs.
(b) About a dozen rice bags all in good condition, were found nearby. All were empty.
(c) The point was sited in a dry creek bed about 30 metres from a track which ran NORTH - SOUTH. Bullock cart tracks led up to the point from the SOUTH in the creek bed.
(d) Some scattered rice was found under the platform and around the area.

P.L. McGuinness
Pl Comd 4 Pl

Appendix II
To Annex D

47049 Lt P. L. McGUINNESS

- a. Incident
- b. 051230
- c. 567609
- d. Three or four.
- e. Probably local or mobile
- f. NK
- g. South
- h. The platoon was moving EAST in search of an installation reported the previous day.

When in the area of the installation the platoon formed a harbour and sec recce patrols moved out to locate the position.

One sec returned and reported having heard noise to their front. After investigation the sec Comd, Cpl B. LAURENCESON, had found the area we were looking for and signs of three or four enemy. The position was 50 metres to the EAST of the platoon base.

- i. Items found included
 - (1) Large pot of freshly cooked rice
 - (2) Four bandoliers of polished rice
 - (3) A VC pack made of cloth and containing personal effects, normal equipment used by soldiers.

P L. McGuinness
Pl Comd 4 Pl

CONTACT REPORT

- a. Contact
- b. 041400
- c. 562608
- d. One rifleman
- e. Probably local. Dressed in black trousers, green/black shirt.
- f. N/A
- g. SOUTH EAST
- h. At the time of the contact the platoon was moving with one sec up in open file with the gun on the right. The country was thick secondary growth and movement was very slow.

The platoon had stopped to allow the scout to clear ahead for the next forty metres. The enemy was seen by the scout at a distance of forty metres off to his left front. As the scout raised his rifle the enemy ran off to the SOUTH. Three shots were fired after the enemy by the scout but all missed.

The forward section swept through the area for seventy yards but failed to make contact again. The gun had been unable to engage the target area because some members of the section were between the gunner and the target.

The scout was the only man to see the enemy.

A small quantity of rice and dried fish was found beside a fire place, also a sheet of plastic 5' x 2' and a pair of shorts.

i. Lessons Learned.

(1) The scout had his weapon on safe because he was afraid of an accidental discharge in the very thick growth. This probably lost us the VC. In moving the weapon off safe one click he was only on semi automatic. This fact and the time taken to move off safe probably gave the VC time to run away. Scouts in the future are to have M16s on auto at all times

(2) The fact that the gun was restricted by having own troops between him and the target means the formation was not satisfactory. He would be better positioned centrally behind the section Comd, to give him an unrestricted arc to the front and very quickly able to fire to either flank.

Alternately travel two sections up with machine guns to the front and one of the forward section Comds and a scout navigating. In this case the scout has the protection of the two MGs and quick flanking movements could be made to either side by a section with fire sp from the other forward section. The rear section could be used to support either section.

P.L. McGuinness
Pl Comd 4 Pl

Appendix IV
To Annex D

1. 47049 Lt P.L. McGuinness
2. Rice storage Hut at GR 535591
3. 061330
4. 150 sq yds
5. (a) No
(b) N/A
(c) N/A

(d) Hut built off the ground on 2' stilts. The roof was of iron sheets and the walls were of chicken wire. The floor was covered with iron sheets. A number of empty rice bags were in and around the hut.

6. Dimensions.

Floor 12' x 10'. Walls 6'

7. The hut was booby trapped with a VC grenade so that a person attempting to pull the wire from the walls would set it off. The grenade was then tied under the floor with a wire leading to the chicken wire of the walls. WO2 ROBINSON discovered the trap when he lifted the tin from the floor.
8. The hut was built recently, probably within the last month.
9. A similar building was found nearby.

P.L. McGuinness
Pl Comd 4 Pl

Appendix V
To Annex D

INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 216488 2Lt W.R. Harris
2. Report on Installation Bunkers and fighting pits at grif ref 558605
3. 1050 hrs 5 May 67
4. Area covered by installation was 25 sq yds.
5. Defensive Layout.
 - (a) Two large bunkers. Fairly old and had no signs of recent activity.
 - (b) Several fighting bays which were also in fairly old condition.
 - (c) Capable of housing a small section.
 - (d) Pits were individual.
 - (e) Several tracks were, in area.

W.R. Harris
PL Comd 5 Pl

Appendix VI
To Annex D

INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 216488 2Lt W.R. Harris
2. Report on Camp site at Grid ref 531590
3. 1000 hrs 7 May 67
4. Area covered 15 sq yds
5. Defensive Layout
 - (a) Two old huts.
 - (b) 5 fighting bays.
 - (c) Fighting bays had overhead protection of timber and packed soil.
 - (d) Capable of housing a section.
 - (e) Pits were individual.
 - (f) Pits and camp was about 18 months old and had not been used for at least 3 months,
 - (g) There was a well worn ox track nearby as well as a large pond.
 - (h) There were several wells in the area. About 4' deep and 5' diameter

W.R. Harris
Pl Comd 5 Pl

Appendix VII
To Annex D

INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 216488 2Lt W.R. Harris
2. Report on defended camp site at 539595
3. 1330 hrs 6 May 67
4. Area covered 50 sq yds
5. Defensive Layout.
 - (a) Pits and Tunnels
 - (1) Small pit 3' x 3' x 18" deep. It was covered with timber which was covered with packed soil. Came to the conclusion that this was a toilet
 - (2) A well 20' deep and 5' diameter. Apparently used in wet season for storage of water.
 - (3) Huts above ground with two fighting pits attached.
 - (b) Fighting pits were 3' deep x 2' wide and 4' long. Had thick overhead protection.
 - (c) There were 6 fighting bays
 - (d) Occupied by about ten men at most.
 - (e) Pits were one man
 - (f) No older than 1 year. Used about 1 month previously.
 - (g) Camp was sited in thick jungle. The usual tracks were present.
 - (h) Sentry posts were small seats made from light timber. It was very close to camp.

W.R. Harris
Pl Comd 5 Pl

Appendix VIII
To Annex D

CONTACT REPORT

- a. Contact
- b. 071430H
- c. Grif ref 521580
- d. Enemy Strength 2 - 3
- e. Not known
- f. -
- g. Direction of enemy withdrawal SW

Remarks:

The platoon was searching the narrow jungle peninsula in the area of the contact when noises were heard to the right of the patrol. The patrol stopped to investigate, when a man broke cover to the LEFT. He was engaged immediately and he disappeared. It was subsequently found that he was in a sort of canal about 3 ft deep. Only his head was seen for a brief moment. Then it disappeared. 4 Pl followed up but lost the trail. 4 Pl then joined 5 Pl in an unsuccessful sweep of the area.

W.R. Harris
Pl Comd 5 Pl

Appendix IX
To Annex D

INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 216488 2Lt W.R. Harris
2. Report on fortified position at grid ref 573611
3. 1330 hrs 3 May 67
4. Area covered by installation 100 sq yds
5. Were there any weapon pits and tunnels
 - (a) Large Bunkers
 - (b) Interconnecting crawl trenches
 - (c) Crawl trenches connected to bunker by sleeping bay with overhead protection.
 - (d) Bunkers were 4' deep 15' long and 10' wide. Crawl trenches were 3' deep and 2' wide.
 - (e) Sleeping bays had wooden cross beams and were covered with soil.
 - (f) There were 6 large bunkers and approximately 37 sleeping bays, Most of the sleeping bays could be used as fighting pits.
 - (g) Occupied by at least a platoon.
 - (h) Most sleeping bays were one man, but several could have housed two
 - (i) The installations were at least a year old and still quite usable.
 - (j) There were various track systems in the area. This was common right throughout the region.
 - (k) There were wooden frames about 18" high in two places which could have indicated sentry posts.
 - (l) Bunkers had

W.R. Harris
Pl Comd 5 Pl

Appendix X
To Annex D

INSTALLATION REPORT

1. 215116 2Lt I.L. Cameron
2. Defensive position at grid fef 548604
3. 1030 hrs on 6 May 67
4. 100 metre by 50 metres
5. (a) (1) Weapon pits only except for 1 large hole.
(2) No tunnels
(b) N/A
(c) Pits not connected
(d) Weapon pits
(e) Enough for an estimated platoon
(f) Probably platoon sized unit
(g) Radiating all directions
(h) Individual
(i) All installations at least 6 months old, and had not been used recently.
(j) Layout not near any feature, but in close country.
(k) No
(l) Nil
(m) The large hole was approx 6' across and 20' deep, dug out of sand and not supported. A considerable amount had caved in at the bottom. The bottom was probed to a depth of 3' to 4', but produced nothing. The hole was then blown in with PE, filling it to a depth of 8' from the top. All weapon pits were demolished and filled.

I.L. Cameron
Pl Comd 6 Pl

INSTALLATION REPORT

1. 215116 2Lt I.L. Cameron
2. Fish cultivation farm ar grid ref 581608
3. 1430 hrs on 3 May 67
4. 150 metres long by 50 metres wide
5. (a) (1) N/A
(2) N/A
(3) N/A

A Camp site was found on Eastern end where approx 4 - 6 persons had slept and eaten on different occasions. Remnants of both American and Australian rations were found in this camp site. Two documents were found, one of which could be a personal letter.

- (b) to (h) N/A
- (i) Camp site had not been used for 2 - 3 days, and had been established along with a fish farm, at least 6 months ago. The divisions built in the water had been repaired in the last 2 - 3 days.
- (j) The installation was not near any features. The farm was formed from a natural recess in the ground, with no creeks leading to or away from it.
- (k) No
- (l) Nil

The water ranged from 6 inches to 3 feet in depth and was divided by 4 walls of earth, bolstered with wood. Four sticks of PE were used in an attempt to destroy the walls, but only succeeded in producing 4 gaps approx 4' wide. Two grenades were used in an attempt to kill the fish, but failed to do more than stun a few. The water was crammed with fish up to at least 1' long. The installation held sufficient fish to feed an estimated company for a long period.

I.L. Cameron
Pl Comd 6 Pl

INSTALLATION REPORT

1. 215116 2Lt I.L. Cameron
2. Dug in workshop and defense system at GR 567609
3. 1130 hrs on 4 May 67
4. 200 metres by 100 metres
5. (a) (1) Weapon pits with overhead cover and sleeping bays.
(2) Only one tunnel was found.
(b) Tunnel 3' deep underground.
(c) Tunnel connected workshop with a covered weapon pit.
(d) Weapon pits
(e) One tunnel, 30 - 35 weapon pits
(f) Coy sized unit.
(g) All directions
(h) Most individual, some two man.
(i) All installations at least 6 months old.
(j) Not near any feature. Placed in close country.
(k) No
(l) No booby traps found

The workshops held a forge used for shaping metal. It was made of concrete 3' square and raised 2'6" off the floor, of the workshop, which was dug in to 5' with an arched roof of leaves. Under the forge there was a large head of metal off cuts. There was a weapon pit beside the workshop, which held at least 30 fuses and explosive cases from such shells as 105mm, 81mm mors and 20mm cannon (HE). This suggests strongly that the workshop was used to produce booby traps and mines. Five 20 mm cannon shells had been cut open and the propellant charge removed. A 105mm shell case was also found.

PE was used to blow the pit and destroy these objects. Due to shortage of Det cord, the blowing was not completed, and some of these items are still in the pit. The installation was not totally destroyed due to lack of explosives.

I.L. Cameron
Pl Comd 6 Pl

INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 335124 Capt P.A. Stokes
2. Report on installations and tunnels at grid ref 568603 (Map 1:25000 Dat Do Area)
3. 0930 hrs on 5 May 67
4. Area covered by installation 900 sq yds
5. Defensive Layout
 - (a) Were there any weapon pits and tunnels.? Yes tunnels and weapons pits.
 - (b) Depths of underground tunnels 2 - 3 feet
 - (c) Where the tunnels and weapons pits interconnecting. Yes. The pits were hastily constructed bunkers with HP primarily designed probably for escape but obviously could be used to fight from for a limited time before withdrawal.
 - (d) Types of construction used:
 - (1) Tunnels - plain digging in sandy soil with no revetments. The small bunkers were single man size about 3 feet deep with no revetment but with built up OHP about 18 ins thick supported mainly by short logs.
 - (e) No of pits and tunnels

In the immediate area there were 10 or so small bunker/pit entrances - each had tunnels. It is not known to what extension there was inter connection.
 - (f) Est occupation by 8 - 10 men a section - probably occupied generally by much fewer around 2 - 3 men.
 - (g) The pits were facing all around with approximately 15 - 20 metres radius from centre.
 - (h) The pits were individual.
 - (i) The pits were 18 months - 2 years old as were the tunnels, although there was evidence of camouflage placed as recently as 4 weeks. Tunnels were of similar age but one small atap hut was comparatively new - 3 or months. There was evidence that the position may still be used as a resting/staging area as ashes indicated small fires no more than a week old.
 - (j) The installation was near no natural feature.
 - (k) Nil
 - (l) Nil



P.A. Stokes
2IC B Coy 7 RAR

Annex E To 7 RAR
Combat Operations After Action Report
dated 22 May 67

SUB UNIT OP ANALYSIS
OP 'LISMORE'

- I. This report is submitted by Maj G.K. CHAPMAN, commanding C Coy group during the above operation 2 - 8 May 67 inclusive.
2. The outline tasks of the Coy Gp were:
 - a. Clear the route into the operational area for Bn HQ.
 - b. Establish an ambush in the area of the Song Cai along likely enemy routes.
 - c. Search the areas nominated and destroy any installations found.
3. The Coy Gp was in the fourth heli lift into LZ "Maroubra" and immediately moved off on its clearance tasks. The going soon became extremely difficult because of the many creeks and mangrove swamps in the area. Several creeks slowed the Coy Gp down considerably for up to an hour per obstacle even using two or more toggle rope crossing places. The Coy's proposed night position was not reached on day I. On the second day the Coy moved into Area "Bravo" and initially commenced its search and destroy operations as a coy entity. At approximately 1600 hours 3 May 67 just as the Coy was moving into a harbour posn for a short halt two bursts of SA fire followed some minutes later by yelling from a group of Vietnamese were heard approximately 70-100 meters away. After checking that there were no friendly troops in the area and ensuring that the coy was closed up in an all round def posn, 7 Pl was ordered to clear towards the firing. (See incident - report - Lt J.R. PAGET). The clearing operation discovered a VC Camp (see Installation Report No I) which contained three Vietnamese hostages who had recently been shot and the body of a hostage who had been killed about 24 hours before. Although one of the wounded hostages was most talkative no worthwhile information was immediately available because of the lack of
 - a. Interpreter at coy level.
 - b. Suitable LZ to fly in the unit interpreter.

After organizing a platoon to carry two of the three wounded hostages 1000m to the nearest suitable LZ the remainder of the coy harboured in the vicinity of the VC Camp. During the early hours of the evening enemy movement was suspected around the perimeter and Arty illumination was requested and eventually given.

On 4th May the VC camp was demolished and the coy continued its search of area Bravo. At approx 1100 hrs a VC camp of estimated coy size was located at
570590 (See Installation Report No 5). Explosives were flown in, Approx 200 lbs of rice and some documents were flown out and the camp was demolished. Continuing the search the coy discovered an old VC coy size camp which contained a new tin shed with 144 cubic feet of unpolished rice and a well stocked fish pond. (See Installation Report No 2) Because of the new well - trapped tracks in the area 7 Pl was ordered to ambush the area whilst the remainder of the coy harboured 500m away from Bn HQ.

2/ On 5 May 67.

On 5 May 67 7 pl commenced to destroy a rice cache and fish pond whilst the remainder of the coy accepted a resupply of water, rations, MG ammo, smoke grenades and clean greens. When 9 pl were resupplied they were ordered to search an area which had not been covered previously. The platoon was fortunate to have three possibly four armed VC walk into their harbour posn at GR 571592 and two were killed (see Contact Report: 2Lt J.A. FITZSIMON). The bodies were subsequently evacuated and the platoon continued its task and rejoined the coy. That night another platoon ambush on a well used VC track, again had no success.

On 6 May the coy concentrated for a heli lift of 3,000 metres which was completed in 25 minutes using three RAAF helis. The coy was then given the task of searching an area at the junction of two other coys AO's but could not commence its task immediately because of the danger of patrol clashes. This search conducted by section fan patrols from a coy harbour soon located a massive Bn sized installation (see Installation Report No 4) which took an afternoon and a morning to demolish.

On the afternoon of 7 May 67 the coy searched Area Juliet and discovered three old VC Pl sized camps which were too old and delapidated to warrant destruction. That night another Pl ambush again had a negative result.

4. Comments.

- a. Crossing of comparatively minor creek obstacles can take a Coy gp up to an hour.
- b. There is a need for an interpreter at Coy level so that immediate benefit is gained from PW's, freed hostages and new documents found.
- c. More pers of rifle coys must be trained in minor demolitions so that assistance can be given to the attached Fd Engrs in major demolition projects.
- d. The links of GPMG belts will rust in a matter of two days if exposed to continued wet conditions.
- e. Fourteen smoke grenades were thrown before one fired ^{after} two immersions in mangrove swamp water.
- f. In search and destroy operations provided the VC threat is only minor it is considered that the area can best be covered by the use of Pl gps which incl Fd Engrs and a fire sp element employing a box search technique.

G. K. CHAPMAN
Maj
OC C Coy 7 RAR

Appendix I
To Annex E

INSTALLATION REPORT No I

- I. Report by 235303 Lt J.R. PAGET
2. Report on enemy installation at GR 578596.
3. 1600 hours 3 May 67.
4. Area covered by installation 3000 sq yds.
5. Defence Layout
 - a. Weapon pits and OHP only.
 - b. N/A
 - c. Not interconnecting.
 - d. Types of construction:


(2) Weapon pits. Dug in with logs and sand forming OHP. A frame raised about 4' above ground level was covered with leaves, branches etc to provide means of concealment.
 - e. Number of weapon pits - 7
 - f. At least platoon position.
 - g. Pits facing to W & E.
 - h. Pits both individual, two man and 3 - 4 man bunker.
 - i. Pits and installation was occupied on our arrival.

NB

Large well provided reasonable water in large quantities.


OC 7 Pl C Coy Lt
9 May 67


INSTL N°1
DIAGRAM OF LAYOUT



Appendix II
To Annex E

INSTALLATION REPORT No 2

- I. Report by 235303 Lt J.R. PAGET.
2. Report on enemy installation at GR 572597.
3. At 1200 hours 4 May 67.
4. Area covered by installation 2000 sq yrds.
5. Defence Layout
 - a. Weapon pits only.
 - b. N/A
 - c. Pits not interconnected.
 - d. Pits. Some had log and sand OHP.
 - e. Number of weapon pits - 8
 - f. Platoon position - not used recently
 - g. Pits facing N - S - E and W.
 - h. Pits - most individual. Some 2 man pits.
 - i. A new shack had been built of logs and galvanized iron. 6' x 6' x 4'. It contained unpolished rice filled to capacity.
 - j. Camp was near a creek line (into which the rice was dumped) and a series of recently used (within the previous 12 hours) tracks going N/S & E/W.
 - k. N/A
 - l. N/A




Lt
OC 7 Pl
9 May 67

JP/CF


INSTL REP No 2

(2)



INSTALLATION REPORT No 3

- I. Report by 235303 Lt J.R. PAGET.
2. Report on fish farm at GR 569597.
3. At 1000 hours 5 May 67.
4. Area covered by installation 5000 sq yds.
5. Defence Layout
 - a. Only one pit found.
 - b. N/A
 - c. N/A
 - d. Dug in, log OHP
 - e. I
 - f. Small caretaker party I - 2 men.
 - g. South.
 - h. Individual.
 - i. 2 months.
Camp site was recent. A cooked rice meal was found indicating occupants had left in a hurry.
 - j. Layout was on the banks of a creek line.
 - k. N/A
 - l. N/A



NB


1. Installation was beyond own capabilities to destroy as considerable quantities of poisons and petrol were not available.
2. This installation is in reality part of another installation - see installation report No 2

Peat
Lt
OC 7 Pl
9 May 67

INSTALLATION REPORT No 4


- I. Report by 235303 Lt J.R. PAGET.
2. Report on installation at GR 548597.
3. 1325 hours on 6 May 67.
4. Area covered by installation - 20,000 sq yds.
5. Defence layout
 - a. Trench system approximately 600 meters.
 - b. About 50 weapon pits.
 - c. 10 Major bunkers.
 - d. One school room seating 56.
 - e. 4 mess huts.
 - h. One storage hut (contained 40 Ft black cloth).
 - i. Several small cooking places.
6. All pits on perimeter were interconnected by the trench system.
7. Pits used logs, ground sheets, tin and sand for OHP.
8. Weapon pits secured to concentrate areas of fire to the west, though trench system gave a measure of all round defence.
9. Pits were both individual and two man and what seem to be Command Posts.
10. Age of installation, going by the lack of leaves in the trenches considerable amounts of the earthworks had been constructed within the week.
 - j. The layout was located on a knoll above the 5 meter contour.
 - k. N/A
 - l. Booby traps:
 - (1) Foot traps were made from CBUs (x2)
 - (2) Five Chicom grenades wired up a booby traps.

Diagram as follows.


Lt
OC 7 Pl
9 May 67

(3)


INSTL REP N°4



INSTALLATION REPORT No 5

- I. Report by 2353I4 Lt M.A. MOLONEY.
2. Report on Defensive Position at GR 570950.
3. 1000 hours on 5 May 67.
4. Area covered 100' x 100'.
5. Defence layout
 - a. Many pits
 - (1) N/A
 - (2) Weapon pits and one small tunnel
 - (3) N/A
 - b. Depth of underground tunnel - 4'6" to 5'.
 - c. The tunnel and a weapon pit were interconnected and looked like a storage place for documents.
 - d. Types on const used
 - (1) Tunnel was lined with timber.
 - (2) Weapon pits had OHP.
 - e. There were 14 bunkers, 1 tunnel, 2 shell scrapes and a well.
 - f. Estimated size: - a company position.
 - g. Direction weapon pits were facing - all round defence.
 - h. The pits were:
 - (1) N/A
 - (2) Mainly two man pits with -
 - (3) A couple of 3 man pits.
 - (4) N/A.
 - i. How old were the pits:
 - (1) The oldest was approximately 3 weeks old but all had been occupied in the last 36 hours.
 - j. No
 - k. No
 - l. A group of 8 disarmed CBUs were found, these were ready to be set up as pressure mines.

M.A. Moloney Lt
OC 8 Pl 7 RAR



INCIDENT REPORT

1. OP LISMORE.
2. Report by 235303 Lt J.R. PAGET
3. 7 Pl C Coy 7 RAR.
4. 1600 hours 3 May 67.
5. 578596
6. Platoon advancing as right rear platoon in coy search and destroy operation.

7. Action

At the above grid reference the company heard SA firing on our right flank at a distance of approximately 70 yards.

After the OC had cfm there were no friendly troops in the area, I advanced with 3 section towards the point where we considered the firing had come from.

At this point Vietnamese voices were heard and we were concerned in case the whole contact was a trap. After moving a group around to a flank to provide a fire box I took the remainder of the section into the enemy camp and called forward on HOLDFAST members when we discovered the bunkers.

At the site of the camp we found 4 Vietnamese (3 wounded, 1 dead). The section made up a stretcher and evacuated the first Vietnamese while we buried the dead person. All the Vietnamese were bound with wire.

We then stretchered the remaining Vietnamese out and continued the search of the installation with the coy HOLDFAST members.


The only trace of weapons used to shoot the Vietnamese was a .45 bullet lying near the body of the dead Vietnamese.

After a thorough search the coy then occupied the general area of the camp (which was destroyed in the morning prior to move off).

J.R. Paget Lt
OC 7 Pl
9 May 67

INCIDENT REPORT

(29)




CONTACT REPORT

- I. Operation LISMORE.
2. Report by 2I6966 2Lt J.A. FITZSIMON.
3. 9 Pl C Coy 7 RAR.
4. 1215 hours - 45 minute duration 5 May 67.
5. LOCATION - GR 57I592.
6. Platoon on search and destroy operations.
7. As the platoon was moving along the right hand forward section commander noticed fresh enemy tracks near a position that had been blown the day previous. The remainder of the platoon halted and went to ground while the right forward section went to investigate the tracks. The section commander found more tracks near some undestroyed bunkers and informed the platoon commander. As the platoon commander was moving forward to investigate, three enemy were seen moving on the left by the forward section and the rear section. The No 2 of the left forward section and the section commander of the rear section opened fire simultaneously on two of the enemy and killed both almost immediately, the third one disappeared before either could alter their aim.
8. The action occurred in a creek bed. The area was fairly thick with scrub and visibility about 25 yards.
9. The range to enemy when first sighted was about 20 - 22 yards.
10. The No 2 MG on the left forward section was first to see the enemy.
11. He was in a fire position observing his arc of fire.
12. The enemy were noticed because of their movement.
13. The enemy strength was three and they were dressed in shorts, thongs bush hats and one was wearing a khaki shirt.
14. The No 2 MG of the left forward section fired first, range about 15 - 20 meters.
15. The No 2 was armed with 7.62mm SLR and immediately after he fired the MG M60 opened fire and section commander with MI6 shot the 2nd enemy.
16. Enemy Reaction: Two enemy fell dead and one turned and ran into the scrub at first in a NW direction and later in a Southerly direction.
17. Both the sections confirmed the enemy dead and followed up the fleeing enemy until they came across some bunkers which they proceeded to clear as the enemy could have taken refuge in them.
18. En casualties were (2) two KIA.
19. Caused by 7.62mm SLR and 5.56mm MI6.
20. One friendly force slightly wounded.

(2)

21. Caused by a piece of schrapnel from M79 fired by own forces.
22. 100 rounds GPMG
40 7.62 Bdr
27 5.56mm

No 7 Diagram



23. Weapons captured: 1 - 7.92mm Mauser, model 98.
1 - 30 cal SPRINGFIELD.

Documents : Wallet papers propoganda leaflets.

24. Lesson learned, quick reaction by soldiers and the force stationery has the upper hand.

26. The 2 left sections followed up the enemy whilst the remainder of platoon remained on the ground to provide fire support.

27. 100 rounds link belt 7.62 - 40 bdr 7.62 - 28 5.56mm - 2 M26
2 M 79.

J. H. Johnson 2Lt
OC 9 Pl

Annex F To 7 RAR
Combat Operations After
Action Report
dated 22 May 67

D COY OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS
OP LISMORE 2-8 MAY 67

- References: 1. 7 RAR Op 2 011330 H (May 67)
2. DAT DO (SW) Sheet 6429-1-NW Edition No 1
(as marked Int Sect for Ops)

General

1. D Coy deployed initially in APCS, established a company base in squares 5762 and 5862 then remained with the APCs on D Day carrying out surveillance role along the northern edge of the 7 RAR AO. D Coy was then required to carry out ambush and destruction tasks in area "D" on night 2/3 May and 3 May 67. On 4 May D Coy was moved by helicopter from an LP in the East of area BRAVO to an LP secured by A Coy in the south of area ECHO. Areas Echo and India were searched during the period 4-7 May and VC installations destroyed. D Coy set night ambushes in the area of the last enemy contacts then flew out of the AO to NUI DAT base area on 8 May.

Contacts

2. During this operation D Coy had one contact.

The company was moving into a night harbour position when the sentry positioned at the rear of the halted company sighted a VC party of about twelve men following up the company tracks. The sentry alerted those ahead of him and an immediate ambush was ordered. A recent reinforcement fired at the VC party before being ordered to do so by his section commander. Contact report at Appendix I refers.

Comments

3. This contact reinforced the need for the existing company SOP which requires the last platoon in the company to leave a standing patrol on the track leading to the night harbour area until the defences of the harbour are co-ordinated. This patrol should, in the opinion of OC D Coy, be equipped with the spare Sig and have with it an FO.

Enemy Installations

4. The details of the main installations found are described at Appendixes II and III. Time did not permit the open trench systems to be collapsed but OHP was destroyed. In many cases it was difficult and sometimes impossible to see these trench systems from the air because of good camouflage.

Comment

5. a. It is considered that a force of one rifle platoon and one assault pioneer section be employed for the destruction of each Company/Battalion size area. A standard demolition pack based on the Sioux load should be developed for this task.
- b. It is believed that infra red aerial photography would assist in the location of trench systems similar to the ones found during this operation.

....Casualties...

Casualties

6. D Coy 7 RAR did not sustain any casualties during the operation. As a result of the contact at 1850 hrs 3 May the enemy are believed to have suffered at least two casualties which should be classified as "two suspected wounded in action" as no bodies were found.

Documents/Weapons Captured

7. No weapons were captured. A letter was found in the camp at YS 595614 and dispatched for examination.

Suspects Detained

8. Two suspects were detained at the north edge of the blocking force established on May 7 as the blocking force was being positioned. One was a woman aged about 60 years and the other a male child of about twelve years. They did not carry weapons or identity cards. They were evacuated by helicopter for security reasons and interrogation.

General Comments

9. D Coy worked well during this operation. Detailed comments are contained earlier in this report.

(D.E. Paterson)
Maj OC D Coy

CONTACT REPORT

17122 Lt G R ELLIS

1. Contact 11 pl D Coy 7 RAR.
2. 3 May 1850 hrs.
3. YS 589612.
4. 8 possibly 12.
5. Black uniform, no hat, small waist belt (with small pouch carrying weapons)
6. Nil.
7. Following company from behind.
8. Description of Contact.

While stopped for a 5 minutes rest, the last man heard noises from behind. He passed on signal, the 2IC of the sect put the last 2 riflemen and himself and the last man across the clearing. Sec Comd moved remainder of the sect to give fire support. At a distance of 15 yards one man opened fire prematurely, not at a clear target. Thereafter, the remainder of the riflemen opened fire at 4 targets, i.e. men. Enemy returned fire. Two enemy were then attacking from their respective flanks. Fire on enemy being too strong, they pulled back, collecting two of their men who were hit by our initial fire. In the meantime I had collected 5 sect and began a left hook sweep. After I had swept some 50 yds, I was told by fire support section that the enemy had moved out. Movement was difficult owing to the darkness. I gathered my platoon together and intended pushing forward, but it was too dark. We returned to the company position.

9. Points to note from contact.
 - a. Enemy threw one grenade.
 - b. Enemy was not aware we had stopped and spotted them.
 - c. Premature action by rifleman was due to nervousness.
 - d. M 79 failed to fire first round.
 - e. Action by rear section commander in having men across clearing was good.
 - f. Control throughout the contact from my point of view was good.

G.R. Ellis Lt
OC 1 Pl

INSTALLATION REPORT

1. 17122 Lt G.R. Ellis.
2. Report on instl fd defence from 557592 to 561592 to 560591 to 568591.
3. 0700 hrs 10 May 67.
4. 200 yds x 150 yds.
5.
 - a. Weapon pits and trenches. No tunnels.
 - b. Both were about 3'6" deep.
 - c. Yes the trenches contained small hides every 20 paces with OHP. Remainder of trench was open. When trenches stopped weapon pits did not connect.
 - d. Trenches were generally straight with occasional bends. Wpn pits were L shaped or rectangular.
 - e. Altogether there were approx 30 pits in area A, 20 pits in area B, possibly 40 pits in area C and 50 hides along the trenches. In the immediate area N of the trench system there were innumerable wpn pits without OHP.
 - f. Bn.
 - g. S and SE.
 - h. Generally pits were individual, but several could take 2 men, obviously MG pits.
 - j. 3 months.
 - k. River.
 - l. EW posts approx 100 metres in the jungle N from instl.
 - m. Nil.

G.R. Ellis Lt
OC 1 Pl

INSTALLATION REPORT

1. By 38439 2Lt N.L. Reeves 10 pl D Coy.
2. Trench complex at 556594.
3. 1430 hrs 5 May 67.
4. 250 sq yds.
5. a. (1) Wpn pits.
(2) tunnels only in wpn pits.
(3) N/A.
b. Tunnels for about 5'.
c. Trench complex was one continuous system running in the main E-W for 250 yds and branches N & S which ran for about 150 yds in length.
d. (1) Continuous trench with overhead cover every twenty yards.
(2) Weapon pits were found only at eastern extremity.
e. 7 wpn pits - 3 interconnecting trenches.
f. This was part of the Bn posn.
g. Pits facing SW.
h. (1) Pits were all 2 man.
(2) 1 x MG & 6 x rfn pits.
i. Wpn pits would have been up to 12 months old.
Trench complex would range from 3 - 12 months old. Maintenance has been carried out from time to time.
j. Tracks all round the area led to this position. There was a water hole 50 yds S and E extremity this had been used as a water supply and provided fish. Like the trench system this was blown too.
k. EW posts were the wpn pits on the E extremity.
m. Panji stakes 8 - 10 deep covered the E flank and a 2 strand barbed wire fence ran E - W along the S side of the trenches for 150 yds. No booby traps were found.

N 1


AFTER CONTACT REPORT

- 1. Operation LISMORE.
- 2. Report by 2I6966 2 Lt J.A. FITZSIMON.
- 3. 9 Pl C Coy 7 RAR
- 4. I2I5 hours - 45 Minute duration 5 May 67.
- 5. LOCATION - GR 57I592.
- 6. Pl on search and destroy operations.
- 7. As the platoon was moving along the right hand forward section commander noticed fresh enemy tracks near a position that had been blown the day previous. The remainder of the platoon halted and went to ground while the right forward section went forward to investigate the tracks. The section Comd found more tracks near some undestroyed bunkers and informed the Pl Comd. As the platoon Commander was moving forward to investigate, three enemy were seen moving on the left by the forward section and the rear section. The No 2 of the left forward section and the Sect Comd of the rear section opened fire simultaneously on two of the enemy and killed both almost immediately, the third one disappeared before either could alter their aim.
- 8. The action occurred in a creek bed. The area was fairly thick with scrub and visibility about 25 yards.
- 9. The range to enemy when first sighted was about 20-22 yards.
- 10. The No 2 MG of the left forward section was the first to see the enemy.
- 11. He was in a fire position observing his arc of fire.
- 12. The enemy were noticed because of their movement.
- 13. The enemy strength was 3 and they were dressed in shorts, thongs bush hats and one was wearing a kahki shirt.
- 14. The No 2 MG of left forward section fired first, range about 15 - 20 meters.
- 15. The No 2 was armed with 7.62mm SLR and immediately after he fired the MG M60 opened fire and Sect Comd with MI6 shot the 2nd enemy.
- 16. Enemy reactions: Two enemy fell dead and one turned and ran into the scrub at first in a NW direction and later in a Southerly direction.
- 17. Both sections confirmed the enemy dead and followed up the fleeing enemy until they came across some bunkers which they proceeded to clear as the enemy could have taken refuge in them.
- 18. EN casualties were (2) two KIA.
- 19. Caused by 7.62mm SLR and 5.56MM MI6.
- 20. One freindly force slightly wounded.

2.

21. Caused by piece of schrapnel from M79 fired by own forces.
22. 100 rounds GPMG
40 7.62 Bdr
27 5.56mm

No 7 Diagram



- 23 Weapons captured: I - 7.92mm Mauser, Model 98.
I - 30 Cal SPRINGFIELD

Documents: Wallet papers propoganda leaflets.

24. Lesson learned, quick reaction by soldiers and the force stationary has the upper hand.

26. The two left sections followed up the En whilst the remainder of platoon remained on the ground to provide fire support.

27. 100 rounds link belt 7.62mm
40 Bdr 7.62mm
28 5.56mm
2 M26
2 M79

John James 2Lt
OC 9 Pl

Comments by Coy Comd:

- a. The stationery force always has the drop.
b. Excellent snap shooting and follow up action.

11 MAY

INCIDENT REPORT

- I. OP LISMORE.
2. Report by 235303 Lt J.R. PAGET
3. 7 Pl C Coy 7RAR.
4. I600 hours 3 May 67.
5. 578596.
6. Pl advancing as right rear Pl in coy Search and destroy Op.
7. Action

At the above Grid Reference the coy heard SA firing on our right flank at a distance of approximately 70 yds.

After OC had checked with Bn HQ as to the likelihood of FF in the area and receiving a negative reply I advanced with 3 Sect towards the point where we considered the firing had come from.


At this point we heard voices calling and in Vietnamese and was concerned lest the whole contact was a trap. After moving a group around to a flank to provide a fire box I took the remainder of the sect into the en camp and called forward on HOLDFAST members when we discovered the bunkers.

At the site of the camp we found 4 Vietnamese (3 wounded, 1 dead). The section made up a stretcher and evac the **FIRST** Vietnamese while we buried the dead person.

We then stretchered the remaining Vietnamese out and continued the search made of the installation made by the Coy HOLDFAST members.


The only trace of the weapons used to ^{SHOOT} the Vietnamese was a .45 bullet lying near the body of the dead Vietnamese.

After a thorough search the Coy then occupied the general area of the camp (which was destroyed in the morning prior to move off).


Lt
OC 7 Pl
9 May 67

INCIDENT REPORT N°3

(2)



INSTALLATION REPORT No 1

1. Report by 235303 Ly J.R. PAGET.
2. Report on enemy installation at 578596.
3. 1600 hours 3 May 67.
4. Area covered by installation 3000 sq yds.
5. Defence Layout
 - a. Weapon pit and OHP only.
 - b. N/A
 - c. Not interconnecting.
 - d. Types of construction


(2) Weapon pits. Dug in with logs and sand froming OHP. A frame raised about 4' above ground level was covered with leaves, branches etc to provide means of concealment.
 - e. Number of weapon pits 7
 - f. At least Pl position.
 - g. Pits facing to W & E.
 - h. Pits both individual, two man and 3 - 4 man bunker.
 - i. Pits and installation was occupied on our arrival.

NB Large well provided reasonable water in large quantities.

J. R. Paget
 Lt
 OC 7 Pl C Coy
 9 May 67

INSTL N°1


DIAGRAM OF LAYOUT



√4



INSTALLATION REPORT No 2

1. Report by 235303 Lt J.R. PAGET
2. Report on enemy installation at 572597.
3. At 1200 hours 4 May 67.
4. Area covered by installation 2000 sq yds.
5. Defence layout
 - a. Weapon pits only
 - b. N/A
 - c. Pits not interconnected.
 - d. Pits. Some had log and sand OHP.
 - e. Number of weapon pits - 8
 - f. Platoon position - not used recently.
 - g. Pits facing N - S - E and W.
 - h. Pits - most individual. Some 2 man pits.
 - i. A new shack had been built of logs and galvanized iron. 6' x 6' x 4'. It contained impoushed rice to its capacity.
 - j. Camp was near a creek line (into which the rice was dumped) and a series of recently used (within the previous 12 hours) tracks going N/S & E/W.
 - k. N/A
 - l. N/A


Lt
OC 7 Pl
9 May 67

INSTL REP NO 2


(2)



N/S

INSTALLATION REPORT No 3

- I. Report by 235303 Lt J.R. PAGET.
2. Report on fish farm at 569597.
3. At 1000 hours 5 May 67.
4. Area covered by installation 5000 Sq yds.
5. Defence layout
 - a. Only one pit found.
 - b. N/A
 - c. N/A
 - d. Dug in. LOG OHP
 - e. I
 - f. Small CARETAKER PARTY 1-2 MEN.
 - g. SOUTH.
 - h. Individual
 - i. 2 months.
Camp site was recent. A cooked rice meal was found indicating occupants had left in a hurry.
 - j. Layout was on the banks of a creek LINE.
 - k. N/A
 - l. N/A



NB

1. Installation was beyond own capabilities to destroy as considerable quantities of poisons and petrol were not available.
2. This installation is in reality part of another installation - see installation report No 2.

Project
 Lt
 OC 7 Pl
 9 May 67




N 6.

INSTALLATION No 4

- I. Report by 235303 Lt J.R. PAGET.
2. Report on installation at . . . 548597.
3. 1325 hours on 6 May 67.
4. Area covered by installation - 20,000 sq yds.
5. Defence layout
 - a. Trench system approximately 600 meters
 - b. About 50 weapon pits.
 - c. 10 major bunkers.
 - d. One school room - seating 56.
 - e. 4 mess huts.
 - h. One storage hut (contained 40 ft black cloth).
 - i. Several small cooking places.
6. All pits on perimeter were inter-connected by the trench system.
7. Pits used logs, ground sheets tin and sand for OHP.
8. Weapon pits secured to concentrate areas of fire to the west. Though trench system gave a measure of all round defence.
9. Pits were both individual, two man and what would seem to be Command Posts.
10. Age of installation. Going by the lack of leaves in the trenches considerable amounts of the earthworks had been constructed within the week.
 - j. The layout was located on a knoll above the 5 METER contour.
 - k. N/A
 - l. Booby traps:
 - (1) Foot traps made from CBUs (x2)
 - (2) Five Chicom grenades wired up as booby traps.

Diagrams to follow.

Page
Lt
OC 7 Pl
9 May 67



DIR of Mov
5100 m

COOKING PLACE

EVIDENCE OF A RECENT PARTY
FOUND HERE

WELL

WELL

MESS HUT

~~~~~ TRENCH  
□ PIT  
▨ HUT  
- - - TRACK



N 7


13 MAY

INSTALLATION REPORT No 5

1. Report by 2353I4 Lt M.A. MOLONEY.
2. Report on Defensive Position at GR 570<sup>590</sup>~~950~~.
3. 1000 hours on 5 May 67.
4. Area covered 100' x 100'.
5. Def Layout
  - a. Many pits.
    - (1) N/A
    - (2) Weapon pits and one small tunnel
    - (3) N/A
  - b. Depth of underground tunnel 4'6" to 5'.
  - c. The tunnel and a weapon pit were interconnecting and looked like a storage place or a hide for documents.
  - d. Types on const used:
    - (1) Tunnel was lined with timber.
    - (2) Weapon pits had OHP.
  - e. There were 14 bunkers, 1 Tunnel 2 shell scrapes and a well.
  - f. Estimated unit to occupy - A coy position, it could have been a
  - g. Direction weapon pits were facing- All round defence.
  - h. The pits were
    - (1) N/A
    - (2) Mainly two man pits, with -
    - (3) A couple of 3 man pits.
    - (4) N/A
  - i. How old were the pits:
    - (1) The oldest was approximately 3 weeks old but all had been occupied in the last 36 hours.
  - j. No
  - k. No
  - l. A group of 8 disarmed CBU's were found, these were ready to be set up as **PRESSURE MINES**

M.A. Moloney LT  
OC 8 PL 7 RAR







SECRETPATROL REPORT

12 May 67

Pl Ambush TAOR

Maps: PICTO 1:25,000  
1:50,000

- a. Platoon group 8 platoon C Coy 7 RAR.
- b. To check the area alining the route and ambush the edge of the BINH BA Rubber Plantation .
- c. Time out 090900H.
- d. Time in 101630H.
- e. Routes Annex 'P'.
- f. When we moved out from where we were dropped by the truck the going was through an overgrown banana plantation with the underground quite soggy. We then moved through the edge of a dirty rubber plantation and then into the bamboo.

Most of the timber was about 20 to 25 feet high and the going was quite slow, 800 m an hour was the fastest we could move.

Around the BINH BA rubber plantation is cut a bump as illustrated:



The only river with water in it is the SUI SON this is clear and quick flowing.

g. The only sighting we made was at GR 4367I4 when a local sentry ran from left to right, at about 300m. Only a slight glimpse was seen as the visibility is poor due to the undergrowth in the rubber. A follow up sweep revealed no trace. A saw and a wood cutters track was found at GR 419738, we destroyed the materials.

h. Nil

i. On the way back at GR 416723 whilst conducting an Arty Shoot we had a tree burst injuring 4 of our own troops.

j. Nil

k. Pte D.R. YOUNG, Cpl M.J. POOLE, in hospital at 8 Fd Amb, Pte R.J. WILLIAMS held by 8 Fd Amb Det at 1 ATF, Lcpl T.J. CLARKE a piece of schrapnel removed from his back. *The remainder of the platoon in good condition.*



1. I believe that due to the distance of the levy around the BINH BA Rubber Plantation you are unable to ambush it securly, you either accept a small killing ground and ranges of the weapons, down to 30m, with likely escape routes or you expose your rear too much. I believe you would have to pick a track ~~forward~~ <sup>JUNCTION</sup> within the plantation to lay a secure ambush.

m. Nil

n. Routes - Annex P.

*M.A. Moly* Lt  
OC 8 PL 7 RAR



ANNEX 'P' TO PATROL REPORT

