

Series: AWM95
Australian Army commanders' diaries

Royal Australian Infantry

Item number: 7/7/31

**Item: 7 Battalion Royal Australian
Regiment**

Annexes, includes photographs of
Long Hoa Village, Shoalwater Bay

1-31 December 1969

02-03 DEC 59

CONTACT SUMMARY

SERIAL	DATE/TIME	LOCATION	CALLSIGN	OWN TPS			EN TPS		
				KIA	WIA	WIA Remaining on Duty	KIA	WIA	PW
1	02 0925		3				-	-	-
2	02 1135	242800	42				1	1	-
3	02 1012	219773	12				-	-	-
4	02 1200	242800	42				-	-	-
5	02 1312	237801	43				2	-	-
6	02 1230	226782	12				-	-	-
7	02 1330	170820	33	1			-	-	-
8	02 1340	164821	33				4	1	-
9	02 1508	176808	31				42	1	-
10	02 1530	227808	43				2-	-	-
11	02 1600	230804	41				+1	-	-
12	02 1705	232787	1E13				+5	-	-
13	02 1755	219827	2E23				87	-	-
14	02 1850	236780	11				4-	1	-
15	02 2200	231805	41				2	-	3
16	03 0115	220825	22				23	-	-
17	03 0510	228800	11				29	-	-
18	03 0855	224813	41				6	-	-

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Comd's Diary

Copy No 41 of 50
7 RAR
SAMUEL HILL
1 DEC 69

OPS10
Op O 7/69 (OP COLD STEEL)

Ref : A. AUST, MT HUMMOCK, Sheet 9052 - 1, Edition 1:50,000.

Time zone used throughout the order : KILO.

1. Situation.

a. En Forces.

(1) See INTSUM 41/69.

(2) Rds within line ALPHA are GREEN. Outside line ALPHA rd cl is AMBER for 5,000 metres and thereafter RED.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) 18 RSQ op in AO PARNASSUS.

(2) 316 RF Coy cont op AO BRISBANE.

(3) 34 (US) Bde cont op AO ABNER.

(4) 11 ACR op in AO CALIFORNIA with FSPB STUYVESCANT estb at 0581.

(5) 6 RAR cont op AO PADDINGTON.

(6) 8 RAR base def inside line ALPHA.

c. Atts and Dets.

(1) Remaining under comd

Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
Tp (-) 18 Fd Sqn.

(2) Remaining in DS and
under comd for mov

106 Fd Bty
One H13 163 Recce Flt

(3) Remaining in DS

One H13 hel

(4) In sp

A Bty 2/35 (US)
C Bty 2/35 (US)
A Bty 3/42 (US)
107 Fd Bty
161 Bty (NZ).

2. Mission. To conduct RIF Ops in AOs BELFAST and DUBLIN.

3. Execution.

a. Gen Outline. Two phase op.

(1) Phase 1. RIF Ops in AO BELFAST pri of tasks elimination of QC.

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(2) Phase 2. RIF Ops in AO DUBLIN pri of tasks elimination of QC.

b. A Coy.

(1) Phase 1.

(a) Grouping.

i. Remaining under comd.

FO Party.
Engr Splinter Team.
MFC.

ii. Under comd until arrival of Sp Coy at FSPB.

Sect Mor.
Sect Aslt Pnrs.

iii. Under comd for mov.

FSPB recce party
(21 personnel).

(b) Tasks.

i. Move by APCs from SAMUEL HILL to secure FSPB FOX.

ii. Prep FSPB FOX hel pad for fly in of Bn HQ.

iii. Conduct ops within FSPB FOX AO until released by CO 7 RAR (not before 030600K).

iv. Conduct RIF ops within coy bdrys, by estb track patterns and ambushing tgts of opportunity, driving from South to North.

(2) Phase 2. Orders issued later.

c. B Coy

(1) Phase 1.

(a) Grouping.

(i) Remaining under comd.

FO Party.
Engr Splinter Party.
MFC.

(b) Tasks.

(i) Move by hel in accordance with Air Planning Table, Annex A.

(ii) Conduct ambushes on, and be prep to block, natural routes towards the MT HUMMOCK Area.

(2) Phase 2. Orders issued later.

/d.

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RESTRICTEDEX SECRETd. C Coy(1) Phase 1.(a) Grouping.Remaining under
comd.FO Party.
Engr Splinter Team.
MFC.(b) Tasks.i. Move by hel in accordance with Air Planning
Table, Annex A.ii. Conduct ambushes on, and be prepared to block,
natural routes towards MT HUMMOCK Area.(2) Phase 2. Orders issued later.e. D Coy.(1) Phase 1.(a) Grouping.Remain under
comd.FO Party.
Engr Splinter Team.
MFC.(b) Tasks.

i. Move by foot direct into Coy AO.

ii. Conduct RIF Ops within coy bdrys by estb track
patterns ambushing tgts of opportunity, driving from
North to South.f. Mor Pl.(1) Phase 1.

(a) MFCs to A, B, C, D Coys.

(b) Sect remains SAMUEL HILL.

(c) One sect under comd A Coy until arrival of remainder
of pl at FSPB FOX.

(d) Pl (-) estb at FSPB FOX.

(2) Phase 2. Orders issued later.g. Aslt Pnr Pl.(1) Phase 1.(a) Sect under comd A Coy to assist in clearing FSPB FOX
hel pad. Sect reverts to under comd Pnr pl on arrival Pnr
pl at FOX.EX SECRETRESTRICTED

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(b) Pl (-) moves by APC from SAMUEL HILL in second APC convoy.

(2) Phase 2. Orders issued later.

h. Recce Pl.

(1) Phase 1.

(a) Move by APC from SAMUEL HILL to FSPB FOX in second APC lift.

(b) On arrival FOX one tracker team on 30 minutes notice to move.

(2) Phase 2. Orders issued later.

i. Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.

(1) Phase 1.

(a) Grouping.

i. Under Comd

Engr Mini Team.

ii. Under Comd for
move from SAMUEL HILL
loc until arrival FSPB.

A Coy Gp (1st lift).
FSPB Gp (2nd lift).

(b) Tasks.

i. Move A Coy from SAMUEL HILL to FSPB FOX.

ii. Return to SAMUEL HILL and move 106 Fd Bty and
Sp Coy elements from SAMUEL HILL to FSPB FOX.

iii. Be prep to conduct ptls within FSPB AO.

(2) Phase 2. Orders issued later.

j. 106 Fd Bty.

(1) Bty remains in DS and under comd for mov 7 RAR.

(2) FO parties to ea A, B, C, D Coys.

(3) Bty recce party (14 pers) moves with A Coy to FSPB FOX.

(4) Remainder of bty moves with second APC lift from SAMUEL HILL to FSPB FOX.

k. Tp (-) 18 Fd Sqn.

(1) Splinter teams to ea A, B, C, D Coys.

(2) Mini team to Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.

(3) Remainder of tp deploys to FSPB FOX with second APC lift.

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(4) Pri of tasks within FSPB

(a) Bn HQ Pad clearance.

(b) Mor Bunds.

(c) Bn CP.

(d) Others CPs as required by local def comd.

l. 163 Recce Flt.

(1) H13 in DS 7 RAR.

(2) Hel to posn 7 RAR HQ pad at 020500K.

m. FSPB.

(1) FSPB FOX SQUARE 2476.

(2) Comd : OC Sp Coy.

(3) Composition : Cp Pers.
 HQ Sp Coy.
 Mor Pl less sect.
 Aslt Pnr Pl.
 Recce Pl.
 Def and Empl Pl.
 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.
 106 Fd Bty.
 Tp (-) 18 Fd Sqn.

(4) FSPB Comd to have a ready reaction force of one pl on one hrs notice to move, from time Sp Coy elements arrive at FOX.

n. COORD INSTRS.(1) Air Mov Table. Annex A.(2) AO Bdrys. Annex B.(3) Timings.

(a) D Coy departs SAMUEL HILL : 020415K.

(b) First APC gp departs SAMUEL HILL : 020415K.

(c) Air Move Commences : 020515K.

(d) Second APC gp : Not before
 departs SAMUEL HILL 020545K.

(e) 106 Fd Bty move to : By 021000K.
 FSPB FOX

(f) 106 Fd Bty ready at : By 021200K.
 FSPB FOX by

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/(g)

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(g) RIF Ops in AO BELFAST complete by : 072359K.

(4) Routes.

(a) Foot move D Coy : Direct route West from present posn into Coy AO.

(b) APC Move : Along axis of rd to FSPB FOX.

(5) Report lines : Annex B.

(6) Air. No change to scale of support.

4. Administration and Logistics.

a. Gen. No change from SOP.

b. Rat. First Resup D + 2. (Note pads may have to be cut).

c. Water. Max use local resources.

d. Ammo.

(1) On the Man : First line.

(2) Mor Scalings : First line.

(3) Res :

(a) In FSPB : one first line.
one mor first line.
built up by 1200 hrs D + 1.

(b) Unit hel pad : one rifle coy first line.

e. Def Stores. FSPB stores to be on unit hel pad, prepacked by 1600 hrs D - 1.

f. Med. Normal.

g. Special Stores. To be posn on unit hel pad by 1600 hrs D - 1 :

(1) 6 Flame throwers.

(2) 4 Mine Detectors.

(3) 1 CP Kit.

5. Command and Signal.

a. Bn HQ Loc and Moves.

(1) CO con deployment from H13 commencing 020500K.

(2) CP moves from SAMUEL HILL to FSPB FOX in accordance with Air Planning Table, Annex A.

/b.

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
RESTRICTEDEX SECRETb. Radio. No change from SOI.c. Nicknames.

<u>Serial.</u> (a)	<u>Nickname.</u> (b)	<u>Meaning</u> (c)	<u>Issued By</u> (d)
1.	ROUGH TRIP	D Coy departing SAMUEL HILL Area.	OC D Coy
2.	GAY GIRL	APC Move off A Coy commenced	Tp Comd A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.
3.	HORSE SENSE	A Coy at FSPB	A Coy
4.	THIN STRING	Completed on ground	B, C Coy.
5.	BEAN STALK	APC move of Bty/FSPB commenced	Tp Comd A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.

Ack Instrs: By phone to CP 7 RAR.

(R.A. GREY)
Lt Col
CO

Authentication:


(F.K. COLE)
Maj
Ops Offr

Annexes: A. Air Movement Table.

B. AO Boundaries.

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ISSUED TOCOPY NO

A Coy	1
B Coy	2
C Coy	3
D Coy	4
Sp Coy	5
Admin Coy	6
Mor Pl	7
Aslt Pnr Pl	8
Sig Pl	9
Recce Pl	10
CP (fwd)	11
Ech CP	12
 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt	 13
106 Fd Bty	14 - 16
Tp 18 Fd Sqn	17
 163 Recce Flt	 18
 HQ 13 TF	 19 - 25
 5 Sqn RAAF	 26
6 RAR	27
8 RAR	28
 CO	 29
2IC	30
Ops Offr	31
Adjt	32
IO	33
QM	34
RMO	35
A QM	36
RSM	37
Ops Sgt	38
Tpt Sgt	39
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AIR PLANNING TABLE

ANNEX A TO
7 RAR OPO 7/69
DATED 1 Dec 69

MISSION NUMBER F669

DATE: 2 Dec 69

Serial	Unit	PZ	Freq	C/S	PZ Time	LZ	Freq	C/S	Complete Time	PAX	Sorties	AC	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)
1	C Coy 7RAR	BLACK	2 46.00	95A	0515	155824	-	-	0525	33	5	5	LZ insecure LFT required.
2	C Coy	BLACK	2 46.00	95A	0535	155824	46.00	3	0545	33	5	5	
3	C Coy	BLACK	2 46.00	95A	0555	155824	46.00	3	0605	33	5	5	
4	C Coy	BLACK	2 46.00	95A	0615	155824	46.00	3	0625	16	3	3	
5	BN HQ	BLACK	2 46.00	95A	0615	FSB FOX 238770	46.00	1	0620	2 loads	2	2	2 slung loads
6	Bn HQ	BLACK	2 46.00	95A	0625	FOX	46.00	1	0630	2 loads	2	2	2 slung loads
7	Bn HQ	BLACK	2 46.00	95A	0635	FOX	46.00	1	0640	5 loads	5	5	5 slung loads
													Refuel
8	Bn HQ	BLACK	2 46.00	95A	0730	FOX	46.00	1	0735	27	4	4	
9	B Coy 7RAR	BLACK	2 46.00	95A	0740	252826			0745	33	5	5	LZ insecure LFT required.
10	B Coy 7RAR	BLACK	2 46.00	95A	0750	252826	46.00	2	0755	33	5	5	
11	B Coy 7RAR	BLACK	2 46.00	95A	0800	252826	46.00	2	0805	33	5	5	
12	B Coy 7RAR	BLACK	2 46.00	95A	0810	252826	46.00	2	0815	14	2	2	

Maj
GS02 (AIR)

ANNEX B TO
7 RAR OFO 7/69
DATED 1 DEC 69



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
G1

13 ATF
SAMUEL HILL

3 Dec 69

Int 4

1. 13 Australian Task Force Intsum 76/69.
2. Period Covered From 011600 K to 021600K Dec 69.
3. Summary of Activities for period 7 RAR commenced RIF in AO BELFAST with medium contacts. It is supported by 106 Bty from FSPB FOX. 6 RAR to the North of AO PADDINGTON contacted enemy carrying long wooden boxes, possibly 107 or 122 mm indicating elements of an artillery battalion in that area.
4. Contacts
 - a. 020924K C/7 RAR at GR 365763 contacted 2 groupes of enemy with nil results. The enemy moved North.
 - b. 021201 2/A/6 RAR at GR 295915 contacted 6 QC with unknown results. The enemy were moving East from the water and were carrying a number of long wooden boxes.
 - c. 0212021c 4/B/7 RAR at GR 242 800 contacted 5 QC with nil results. The enemy fled North West.
 - d. 021213OK 1/2/7 RAR at GR 226 782 contacted a squad of QC with unknown results.
 - e. 021237K 2/V/6 RAR at GR 309 867 contacted 2 QC. Enemy were cooking food over a small fire. Results 2 QC KIA, 1 x SKS rifle, 1 x AK47 captured.
 - f. 021312K 12/D/7 RAR at GR 237 801 contacted 3 QC with unknown results.
 - g. 021340K 9/C/7 RAR at GR 164 821 contact 10 enemy with unknown results, they fled East.
 - h. 021423K at GR 185 745 an ALBATROSS sighted 10 - 12 people and a number of huts.
 - i. 021450K 8/C/7 RAR at GR 176 808 contacted a group of enemy resulting in 4 KIA 1 WIA.
 - j. 021530K 12/D/7 RAR at GR 229 808 contacted 2 QC with 1 KIA
 - k. 021530K 7/C/RAR at GR 176 808 contacted 2 enemy with 2 KIA.
 - l. 021600K 10/D/7 RAR contacted 3 enemy with unknown results. They fled South.
5. Enemy Losses
 - a. 9 QC KIA, 1 QC WIA, 2 small arms captured.


Maj J.E. Jenvy
(GS02 Int)

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13 ATF
SAMUEL HILL

Int 58

8 Dec 69

1. 13 Australian Task Force - Intsum 81/69.
2. Period Covered - 061600K to 071600K Dec 69.
3. Summary of Activities for the period - RIF's continued in AO's BELFAST and ENOGERRA with minor contacts.

4. Contacts

- a. 070205K C/TRAR at GR 160817 contacted a probable squad of enemy with unknown results. The en squad carried out a small probe on FSPB LION.
- b. 070734K Sp Coy/TRAR at GR 199764 contacted 7 enemy resulting in 7 KIA, 2 RPG captured.
- c. 070905K Sp Coy/TRAR at GR 187778 contacted 10-15 enemy resulting in 8 KIA, 8 x 303 captured. The remainder were engaged by artillery fire as they fled South West.
- d. 070940 A/TRAR at GR 248574 contacted 4 QC resulting in 1 KIA and 1 x SKS captured. They were engaged with artillery as they moved to the North West.
- e. 071030K D/TRAR at GR 312961 contacted 3 QC resulting in 3 KIA, 2 x SKS, 1 x AK47.
- f. 071131K 5/B/TRAR at GR 184867 contacted 3 Main Force resulting in 1 KIA, 1 WIA. The remainder moved to the West leaving blood trails.
- g. 071402K A/TRAR at GR 267985 contacted 3 QC resulting in 1 KIA, 1 WIA 1 x pistol, 1 x AK47. The remainder fled North.


5. Enemy Losses

- a. 21 - KIA
- b. 2 - WIA
- c. 13 - Small Arms
- d. 2 - RPG

6. Comment

En activity can be anticipated to decrease until the commencement of the Summer Offensive. It is likely however that ATF units in their present blocking position will encounter large enemy main force groups as they move in a Southernly direction through AO BELFAST.

Distribution
List A


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GS02 (Int)

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13 ATF
SAMUEL HILL
6 Dec 69

Int 55

1. 13 Australian Task Force - Intsum 79/69.
2. Period Covered - From 051600K to 061600K Dec 69.
3. Summary of Activities for the period - RIF's continued in AO's GOODWOOD and ENOGGERA with 7 RAR and 8 RAR having minor contacts.
4. Contacts
 - a. 051625K Pnrs/7RAR contacted 3 En at GR 200762 resulting with 1 KIA 1 WIA (poss) captured 1 M60.
 - b. 051620K 2/A/8RAR contacted 4 En at GR 258003 resulting with 2 WIA and 2 SKS captured.
 - c. 051717K 4/B/8RAR contacted 5 en at GR 303992 results , 1 KIA, 1 WIA 2 x AK47's being captured.
 - d. 060230K 7/C/7RAR contacted En at GR 160818 resulting with 2 WIA and 3.SKS rifles, 1 M60, 1 Radio, 4 Maps 5MK 14 mines being captured.
 - e. 060855K 11/D/8RAR at GR 322948 contacted 10 En resulting in 1 x 12 gauge shotgun and 10 RPG2 rds being captured.
 - f. 061157K 4/B/7RAR at GR 193832 contacted 2 En resulting in 1 KIA.
 - g. 061102K A/7RAR contacted 12 En at GR 097832 resulting with 4 KIA.
 - h. 061054K 4/B/7RAR contacted 2 En at GR 193832, - 2 En KIA.
 - j. 061128K 7RAR(Rear) contacted en at GR 286809 resulting with 2 KIA (Poss)
 - k. 061310K A/8RAR contacted En at GR 248011 resulting with 4 KIA.
 - l. 061334K 4/B/7RAR contacted En at GR 251891 resulting with 1 KIA.
 - m. 061400K Sp/7RAR contacted En at GR 237764 resulting with 1 KIA.
5. Incidents
 - a. 051635K D/8RAR located a landing/staging camp at GR 349938.
 - b. 060240K C/7RAR received a probe on the perimeter and a light mor attack (10 rds) at GR 164821.

/Airstrikes.

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6. Airstrikes

- a. 060930K Airstrike at GR 341930 opened a supply dump and destroyed 4 bunkers and a quantity of supplies also killed 3 En.
- b. 060958K Airstrike at GR 174906 opened up 4 bunkers caused 4 secondary explosions and killed 5 En.
- c. 061020K Airstrike at GR 117813 destroyed a wireless station and 7 bunkers caused 5 secondary explosions and killed 5 En.

7. En Losses

a.	KIA	-	17 (incl 2 poss)
b.	WIA	-	4 (incl 1 poss)
c.	KBA	-	13
e.	M60	-	2
f.	AK47	-	2
g.	SKS	-	3
h.	Shotgun	-	1
j.	MK14mines-		5
k.	Radio	-	1

8. Comment: 11 ACR in AO CALIFORNIA are still making medium contacts with elms of 275 Bn DRQA (Main Force).

J. R. Davis
Maj
GS02 (Int)

Distribution
List A

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13 ATF
SAMUEL HILL

6 Dec 69

Int 52

1. 13 Australian Task Force - Intsum 79/69.
2. Period covered - From 051600K to 061600K Dec 69.
3. Summary of Activities for period - 7 RAR and 8 RAR continued RIF within AO's BELFAST and ENOGERRA respectively encountering minor contacts. Six airstrikes were conducted on enemy concentrations with 80% effect.
4. Contacts
 - a. 041547K C/7RAR at GR 157817 contacted approximately a section of enemy resulting in 7 KIA, 6 x 303, 1 x MG, 1 x compass being captured.
 - b. 041554K 5/B/7RAR at GR 209849 contacted unknown number of enemy resulting in 2 KIA, 1 x M60, 1 x AK47 captured.
 - c. 041745K 10/D/7RAR contacted 6 QC at GR 226811 resulting in 4 QC KIA. The enemy moved North.
 - d. 042006K Sp/7RAR received 6 x 82mm HE and again 4 x HE at 042027K.
 - e. 050105K HQ COY 7 RAR Echelon at GR 278805 received 6-10 82mm mortar rounds.
 - f. 050210K C/7RAR engaged an unknown number of enemy on their perimeter.
 - g. 050523K 10/D/7RAR at GR 223814 contacted 6 QC resulting in 4 KIA, 3 x rifles, 1 x MG, 1 x radio.
 - h. 050600 12/D/7RAR at GR 220807 contacted 4 QC resulting in 4 KIA, 1 x AK47, 3 x 303, 1 radio.
 - i. 050811K 11/D/7RAR at GR 222817 contacted 3 QC resulting in 3 QC KIA.
 - k. 050924K APC elements at GR 158875 contacted a group of enemy with unknown results.
 - l. 050925K 2/A/7RAR at GR 211833 contacted 6 QC resulting in 1 KIA. They moved to South East.
 - m. 050930K 8/C/7RAR at GR 162815 contacted 4 QC resulting in 2 KIA.
 - n. 050958K 6/B/8RAR at GR 357942 contacted a squad of QC resulting in 1 KIA, 2 WIA, 1 x AK47 the remainder fled South-South West.
 - o. 050920K 4/B/7RAR at GR 178812 contacted 4 enemy resulting in 1 KIA, 1 x WIA, the remainder fled North East.
 - p. 051134K elements of 106 Battery at GR 159817 contacted 8 QC with nil results, they fled to the West.
 - q. 051320K A/8RAR at GR 251989 contacted 2 sampans resulting in 2 KIA possible.
 - r. 051134K elements of 106 Battery at GR 159817 contacted 6 QC with nil result they moved to the West.
 - s. 051420K D/8RAR at GR 325968 contact with 8 QC, 1 KIA, 1 WIA, and 2 x AK47's captured.
 - t. 051445K 4/B/8RAR at GR 062161 were ambushed by 8/10 QC - 2 QC KIA.

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060930K*

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u. 051500K 8/C/7RAR at GR 162817 contacted 3 JC resulting with 4 KIA, 4 WIA, and 6 X SKS, 1 x AK47 1 x M60 and 1 x radio being captured.

5. Air Activities

a. 050925K An airstrike was conducted on an enemy staging post at GR 328882 during which 6 x bunkers, 3 x fighting positions 2 KBA.

b. 051005K An airstrike was directed at an enemy defensive position and assembly post at GR 172908 resulting in 8 bunkers, 2 caches and 4 fighting positions destroyed as well as 2 KBA.

c. 051040K An airstrike was conducted on enemy fighting positions at GR 317893 resulting in 10 fighting positions destroyed, 3 fighting positions and 2 structures damaged.

d. 050430K Airstrike at GR 330005 destroyed 1 Rocket site 50m of trench uncovered, 7 fighting positions destroyed and 7 KBA.

e. 051505K Airstrike at GR 325925 (an En staging camp) destroyed 2 structures, sunk 2 Sampons and 2 KBA.

f. 051537K Airstrike on an bunker system at GR 322888 destroyed 3 bunkers, 6 fighting positions, 1 x.50 cal AA Gun and 8 KBA.

6. Incidents

a. 051330K Deputy District Chief was ambushed at GR 200760 and ready reaction force from 7 RAR was sent to assist.

7. Comments

a. 051450K 1/4/11ACR sustained a heavy attack from A Coy of 274 DRQA at GR 072804. En broke contact at 051610K and withdrew SW and SE results of contact 28 KIA, 2 WIA 16 possible KIA and 2 MMG's 32 AK47 being captured.

En Losses

a. KIA - 38 (Incl 2 poss)
b. WIA - 7
c. KBA - 21
d. MMG - 4
e. SKS's - 18
f. AK47's - 6
g. radios - 3

Distribution
List A

[Signature]
Maj
GS02 (Int)

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2A 77
FOXTROT (.) MAP DETAIL AS FOLLOWS (.)

ONE (.) HOSPITAL 657657 (.)

TWO (.) DOCTOR'S RESIDENCE 259653 (.)

THREE (.) EVAC STATION 273664 272694 (.)

FOUR (.) WPN / AMMO CACHES VIC 2369 & 2368
2468 (.)

FIVE (.) OVERNIGHT HALT STATION 274 REGT
VIC 2469 2569 2568 (.) 235 REGT
2064 2164 2264 (.)

SIX (.) RKT ASY CELL OP IN CAVES
VIC 3116 (.)

GOLF (.) MEMBER SAID THAT HIS PRODUCTION
CELL HAD RECENTLY BEEN REQUIRED
TO MANUFACTURE MORE THAN ONE
HUNDRED UNIFORMS IDENTICAL TO PF RF
AND NFPP (.)

SECOND (.) QUESTIONING OF HOI CHANH CONTINUES

2 2

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Clarke GINT

11

John Helby Capt
10

ROUTINE

06 0615Z

FROM : 13 ATF

TO : ASON 3 CAN REGT 6RAR

4th REGT

131 DIV LOC BTY

7RAR

130 SIG SQN

8RAR

LO 18 RSG

EX SECRET

INT 39

INFO : LIST A INTERVIEW

INTREP SERIAL 55 (.)

FIRST (.) HOI CHANH WHO SURRENDERED TO 7RAR (RAR
FOX) AT 061400ZK APPROX WITH DOCUMENT
AND MAP HAS PROVIDED FOL INFO EVALUATED B2 (.)
ALFA (.) SOURCE WAS MEMBER OF 87A REAR SVCS
GP LOC VIC MT PITHERTON VIC 3974 (.)

BRAVO (.) MEMBER HAD TASK OF ESCORTING VOLUNTEERS
AND ABDUCTED CIVILIANS FROM BYFIELD INTO
MT CARROLL REGION (.) MEMBERS WERE THEN TO
OPERATE AS ASSISTANTS IN HOSPITALS AND CAS
EVAC STATIONS AND TO PROVIDE CARRYING
PARTIES FOR WOUNDED SOLDIERS (.)

CHARLIE (.) SOURCE INDICATED THAT A MAJOR BATTLE
WAS TO BE FOUGHT IN BYFIELD BEFORE
15 DEC 69 (.) PARTICIPANTS WOULD INCLUDE 274
AND 275 REGT (.)

DELTA (.) BEST FRIEND OF SOURCE WAS KILLED BY
MINE WHILST MOVING INTO REGION MT
CARROLL AND MEMBER DECIDED TO DEFECT (.)

ECHO (.) SOURCE WAS ABLE TO PROVIDE SMALL PHOTOGRAPH
OF HIS IMMEDIATE SUPERIOR (HO VAN GIAP)
AND ALSO PRESENTED TRACE OF MAP (.)

1 of 2.

IMMEDIATE

**At Colours
Reg**

IMMEDIATE

060530Z

FROM : 13 ATF

TO : A SQN 30th REGT
4th REGT
131 DIV LOC BTY
130 SIG SQN

6RAR
7RAR
8RAR

EX SECRET

INT 38

INFO: LIST A INTERNAL

INTREP SERIAL 54 (.)

EN INTENTIONS AD BELFAST 6-8 DEC 69 (.) DOCK
CAPTURED BY D/7RAR IN CAMP AT GR 174831 ON
061115K GIVES FOLW INFO (.)

ALFA (.) 6 DEC 69 (.) C/S 23 and 24 (PLS?) TO
RECEIVE IN GREATER STRENGTH UP TO SUB UNIT
LEVEL (SQUAD?) (.) SUBUNITS TO BREAK
CONTACT (.)

✓ BRAVO (.) N1 6 DEC 69 (.) C/S 24 TO PROVIDE SUB UNIT
ATTACK (SQUAD?) ON FSPB LION (.)

CHARLIE (.) 7 DEC 69 (.) TWO SIMULTANEOUS ASSAULTS
ON 7RAR (.) TIMINGS NOT SHOWN (.) ASSAULTS
TO BE MINIMUM 2 SUBUNIT STRENGTH (.)

DELTA (.) 8 DEC 69 (.) FURTHER ACTIVITIES FOR PERIOD
TO BE ADVISED BY SUNRAY (OC C/S 2?)

ECHO (.) RV mentioned throughout is SENVIEW? (.)

COMMENT (.) NOTES APPARENTLY WRITTEN BY PL COMD
C/S 23 (6 PL B COY 1/274) (.) EVALUATION CMM POSSIBLY TRUE
WHEN COMPARED WITH INFO ISSUED IN INTREP SERIAL 50 //

1 1

✓

CLARICE

GINT

11

AUTHENTICATED: Refusey way

Myth 1/274 Capt

05/0556

021

120

PRIORITY

050450Z

FROM: 13 ATF

TO: ASON 3 CAN REGT

6RAR

4 FO REGT

7RAR

131 DIV LOC BTRY

8RAR

130 SIG SQN

EX SECRET

INT 37

INFO: LIST A INTERNAL

INTREP SERIAL 53 (.)

FIRST (.) INTERROGATION REPORT AFTER INITIAL QUESTIONING ON SIX PORTERS CAPTURED BY C/PRAR AT GR 157817 041745K DEC 69 AS FOL (.)

ALFA (.) MEMBERS WERE CIVILIANS UNTIL ABDUCTED FROM ELANDORA 28 NOV 69 BY QC INTRA STRUCTURE (.) ELANDORA CENSUS LIST AGREES (.)

BRAVO (.) MEMBERS WERE MARCHED FOR MAJORITY OF NIGHT INTO SUMMIT AREA OF MT HUMMOCK WHERE THEY WERE HELD CAPTIVE FOR TWO DAYS IN A LARGE CAVE CONVERTED INTO PRODUCTION CENTRE (.)

CHARLIE (.) ON 1 DEC 69 THEY WERE GIVEN BAGS OF SUPPLIES TO CARRY AND WERE PUT UNDER CHARGE OF TWO GUARDS (.)

DELTA (.) THEY WERE TOLD THEY WERE GOING TO THE WARATAH CREEK CAMP (.) (POSSIBLY GR 1372) (.)

SECOND (.) COMMENT (.) LEADS FURTHER CREDENCE TO INTREP SERIAL 50 (.)

1 of 1

✓

CLARKE G INT

11
Cap
10

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13 ATF
SAMUEL HILL

4 Dec 69

Int 77/69

1. 13 Australian Task Force - Intsum 77/69.
2. Period Covered - From 021600K to 031600K Dec 69.
3. Summary of Activities for period - 7RAR supported by 106 Bty continued RIF within AO BELFAST with medium contacts. 6RAR and 8RAR also encountered minor contacts during the period and three airstrikes were conducted on enemy concentrations situated on MT HUMLOCK.
4. Contacts
 - a. 021750K 3/A/7RAR at GR 232787 contacted 8 QC with unknown results, they moved towards the South.
 - b. 021743K 3/B/7RAR at GR 219827 contacted 9 QC resulting in 7 KIA, 1 WIA, 3 x AK47, 4 x 303, 1 x GPM6 and 1 Radio.
 - c. 022200K 10/D/7RAR at GR 230805 contacted 5 enemy within 30 metres of perimeter with unknown result.
 - d. 030115K 2/B/7RAR at GR 220825 contacted 2 enemy 3KIA 3 AK47 captured.
 - f. 030145K 8/RAR at GR 304897 contacted 3 enemy carrying AK 47's. They fled to the East after probing the perimeter.
 - g. 030510K 1/A/7RAR at GR 228800 contacted 20QC resulting in 9 KIA, 1x AK47, 7xbolt actioned rifles, 1xM60, 1x radio.
 - h. 030825K elements 6RAR at GR 314854 contacted 10 QC resulting 4 KIA, 4 rifles captured and the enemy moved to the South West.
 - j. 030910K 10/D/7RAR at GR 224813 contacted 6 QC resulting in 6 QC KIA and one GPMG, 5 SMLE and equip.
 - k. 031325K C, 6RAR at GR 373776 contacted 3 QC resulting in 3 KIA and 2 SKS rifles 1 P38 pistol and 1 chicom hand grenade being captured.
 - l. 031320K 3/V/6RAR at GR 325866 contacted 3 QC resulting in 3 KIA and 2 SKS 1 AK47 and a small quantity of documents being captured.
 - m. 031300K 4/B/7RAR at GR 211833 contacted 5 QC with nil results.
 - n. 031250K 6/B/7RAR at GR 217828 contacted 5 QC resulting in 5 KIA and 1 radio, 5 rifles, 1 MG and a qty of ammo and equipment being captured.
 - o. 031405K B/7RAR at GR 213831 contacted 6 QC resulting in 6 KIA.
 - p. 031505K 5/B/7RAR at GR 220825 contacted 1 QC resulting in 1 KIA plus 1 AK47 and equipment being captured.

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5. Incidents

- a. 021619K 2/A/7RAR at GR 210827 received mortar round HE.
- b. 021648K 5/B/7RAR at GR 220825 received 1 mortar round HE.
- c. 021649K 8/C/7RAR at GR 217829 received 1 mortar round HE.
- d. 022155K 5/B/7RAR at GR 220 825 received 1 mortar round HE possibly 82mm.
- e. 031100K W/6RAR at GR 319829 encountered a booby trap which wounded 3 pers. This was a Chicom type mine ignited by a trip wire.

6. Air Activities

- a. 031043K Airstrike conducted at GR 172902 resulting with 1 listening post destroyed and 6 KBA.
- b. 031123K Airstrike conducted at GR 166905 resulting with 4 bunkers destroyed and 10 QC KBA.
- c. 031350K VR sighting report fresh diggings at GR 150763.
- d. 031502K Airstrike on GR 173907 resulted in 3 caves being destroyed, 6 caches opened and 5 KBA.

7. En Losses

The enemy losses for the period covered are as follows:-

KIA	47
WIA	1
AK47	11
pistol	1
Rifles	26
GPMG	4
Radio	3

8. Amendment

Reference Intsum 76/69 para 4a, Delete GR 365763 insert GR 184603.


J. E. Senvey
Maj
(GS02 Int)

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EX CONFIDENTIAL

13 ATF
SAMUEL HILL
2 Dec 69

Int 45

1. 13 Australian Task Force - Intsum 75/69.
2. Period Covered - From 301600K to 011600K Dec 69.
3. Summary of activities for period. 7 RAR moved into AO CANBERRA and cordoned and searched FRESHWATER VILLAGE in the COLCARRA District. 6 RAR continued RIF in AO PADDINGTON with light contacts and medium sightings.
4. Contacts
 - a. 301608K 1/V/6 RAR at GR 257888 contacted 8 QC in small staging camp resulting in 2 QC KIA 2 x AK47, package of documents which were forwarded to Div Int Unit, Task Force for exploitation.
 - b. 301850K 9/C/7RAR at GR 409899 contacted 2 unknown enemy with unknown results.
 - c. 302138K 7RAR rear echelon at GR 287805 received 1x82 mm mortar round.
 - d. 302010K 6/B/6RAR at GR 275870 contacted 4 QC with unknown results. They fled North West.
 - e. 010215K2/A/6RAR at GR 250862 contacted 3 QC resulting in 1 QC KIA, 1xSKS rifle. The remainder fled North.
 - f. 010400K 7RAR commenced cordon and search of FRESHWATER village resulting in 1 QC KIA, 4 suspects detained 1x303 rifle, 500 lb rice cache, 1xradio batteries, documents, 2 tunnels and a number of booby traps being discovered.
 - g. 010525K elements of 7RAR echelon at GR 288807 contacted 2 QC with unknown results.
 - h. 011120K 5/W/6RAR at GR 254833 contacted 10 QC with unknown results. The enemy fled North West.
5. Comments
 - a. The cordon and search in FRESHWATER has been successful in that government control has been returned to the village. The QC Infrastructure and the remaining members of 2 Pl D445 Coy are thought to have split up, with a portion moving into the CAPE CLINTON sector and the remainder withdrawing S into the DSSZ (Dismal Sector Secret Zone)
 - b. An initial readout of documents captured by 6RAR (see para 4(a)) mentioned 1/274 Regt. An INTREP will be issued as soon as exploration is complete.


Maj
GS02 (INT)

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N E2

R569-1-9

7th Battalion
Royal Australian Regiment
Finschhafen Lines
HOLSWORTHY NSW 2173

16 Dec 69

Distribution: List D.

VC-NVA BUNKER SYSTEMS

1. Attached as ANNEX A and B are answers to queries put to two HOI CHANHS by the AUSTRALIAN BATTLE ANALYSIS TEAM which is currently working at HQ 1 ATF NUI DAT.
2. The queries concern VC/NVA bunkers and the principles and tactics used to site bunkers, construct them, to fight from them and when necessary, withdraw from them.
3. The information provided should be read by all down to Sect comd level but it should be remembered that the comments by the HOI CHANH from D445 VC (LF) Bn refer specifically to that battalion and do not necessarily apply in detail to all VC or NVA battalions or regiments.

M. P. O'Brien Lt Col
(R.A. GREY)
Lt Col
CO

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
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ANNEX A TO
7RAR R569-1-9
DATED ~~1~~ DEC 69

ANSWERS BY LE DINH LONG COMMO PL COMD, STAFF SECT,
BA LONG PROVINCE UNIT.

Question 1 (a). What is the criteria for the construction of individual or groups of bunkers?

Answer 1 (a). In accordance with the Resolutions from COSVN and the orders from Unit HQ, at present, the VC and NVA usually build their bunkers in a "T" shape to avoid concussion and blast from B52 airstrikes.



Approximately 6 persons sleep in each bunker.

Question 1 (b). Who decides on the position of the bunkers?

Answer 1 (b). The commander or Chief of Staff of the Province Unit, and the commanders of mobile battalions position the bunkers.

Question 1 (c). Is there usually a system used for positioning bunkers?

Answer 1 (c). The bunker systems are usually formed in an "I" or "Z" formation. eg,


/"I" formation -

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2.

"I" formation -



"Z" formation -



The maximum distance from one bunker to another is:
70m (for agencies)
30 m (for troops)

The aim of the bunker system is to afford as much protection as possible from Arty and B52 Strikes. From experience the VC have noted that bombs dropped in B52 strikes are spaced 50 metres apart and in line.

Question 1 (d) What is the best method for destroying bunkers?

Answer 1 (d) The best methods are: Bombs, artillery or tear gas - after that by using air-burst shells.

Question 2 (a) Why do NVA and VC have bunkers?

Answer 2 (a) NVA and VC use the bunkers as protection against artillery/air-strikes and ground attacks.

Question 2 (b) What type of locality is selected for bunker systems?

Answer 2 (b) Agencies. Selection of locations are usually based on the following principles:

- (1) Enemy activities (sweep operations, air/artillery strikes, Rangers).
- (2) Suitable terrain (avoiding tracks, civilians and near jungle areas).
- (3) Sometimes areas which have just been vacated by the enemy could be chosen for base camps. Every base camp must have at least one bunker system.

Infantry. Must remain close to the enemy therefore, they must choose locations which do not attract attention. (Taking advantage of the surprise element). The positions are usually located near ARVN posts, but not near AUSTRALIANS.

eg, The ARVN posts located at approx YS455840, YS445746 and Duc Thanh (Sub-Sector). The VC would position themselves at approx YS437847, YS416765 and YS482826.

/Question 2 (c)

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Question 2 (c). Are there Engineers and Sappers to help select the sites and construct the bunkers?

Answer 2 (c). The agencies construct the bunkers themselves.

Question 2 (d). Why are bunkers normally situated on straight tracks and trails?

Answer 2 (d). All bunkers are situated in line in order to avoid arty/airstrikes, especially B52 strikes. VC and NVA base camps have to be located well away from any track or trail. If there are tracks in the area caused by VC/NVA traffic, they must be camouflaged.

Question 2 (e). What is the average distance between bunkers?

Answer 2 (e). The average distance between bunkers is 60 metres.

Question 2 (f). What is the bunker system normally used?
eg, A system of 4-6 bunkers, 100 metres apart, in a circle, a U shape, a Y Shape or some other formation?

Answer 2 (f). The bunkers of agencies are usually laid out in an "I" formation (eg, the Rear Services Agency of the Province Unit).

Question 2 (g). What happens when a bunker system is attacked?

Answer 2 (g). Agencies. The commander of the agency will give the order to withdraw without any counter-fire (in case the enemy is very close), or everyone runs for his life (if they are attacked).

Question 2 (h). Who gives the command to withdraw if they are defeated?

Not answered.

Question 2 (i). Who is the last to leave?

Not answered.

Question 2 (j). How many persons (percentage or fraction) must stay in the bunkers to delay enemy attacks?

Not answered.

Question 2 (k). After leaving the bunkers how far must they go?

Answer 2 (k). If anybody becomes lost after running away from the base camp, he should ask commo-liaison about the location of the Province Unit. (Only the commander knows the location of the reserve base camp).

Question 2 (l). When does the Recce team return to the bunkers?

Answer 2 (l). The Recce team returns to the base the day after an attack to investigate the condition of the camp and situation.

/Question 2 (n).

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Question 2 (n). How do they set up sentries? Where are they placed?

Answer 2 (n). Agencies. If they receive information about Ranger (SAS) raids, or if they see helicopters flying in the area or landing near the base camp, or even just hearing the sound of aircraft, they will set up sentries that night. The recce team patrols around the camp during the day.

If the enemy is in the area, the agency will establish a watch tower (lookout) facing the probable direction of enemy approach. The watch tower team consists of two persons and is located about 50 metres from the camp.

Question 2 (o). What type of fire control do the VC and NVA have?

Not answered.

Question 2 (p). What type of fire control do the VC and NVA have?

Not answered.

Question 2 (p).

Not answered.

Question 2 (q). When the enemy leave the bunkers:

(1) For how far do the NVA and VC need to keep in contact with the enemy?

(2) Do they have scouts to watch the movement of the enemy?

(3) How much material is salvaged from old bunkers to construct new ones?

Answer 2 (q).

(1) They do not leave any recce group near the old camp after being attacked.

(2) Not answered.

(3) If possible every man carries 40kg of goods from the old base. They hide it in a cache approx 7 to 8 hours walking distance away. Other material is hidden about 700 to 800 metres from the base.

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ANNEX B TO
7RAR R569-1-9
DATED 16 DEC 69

ANSWERS BY TRAN VAN KINH
EX-BATTLEFIELD REPORTERS CELL LEADER OF D445

Question 1 (a). What are the criteria for the construction of individual or groups of bunkers?

Answer 1 (a). Any VC combat unit must always have bunkers; that is the order from its HQ and it is also a decision and direction from COSVN. Bunkers are built:

(1) To protect them against artillery and airstrikes by ARVN or Allied forces.

(2) In order to have conditions for countering raids and sweep operations by ARVN and Allied Forces.

Question 1 (b). Who decides on the positioning of bunkers?

Answer 1 (b). The direct commander of the unit.
eg, D445 is Commanded by SAU THU. He positions the Companies. The Company Commander then deploys his Company and the position of the bunkers.

The type of bunkers are decided by the Command Section of the Province Unit. (This includes the directions as to length, width, depth and the techniques for digging them).

Question 1 (c). Is any unusual system used for positioning bunkers?

Answer 1 (c). Nil.

Question 1 (d). What is the best method for destroying bunkers?

Answer 1 (d). Only use Air/Arty strikes and surprise attacks against VC communication trenches.
eg, Use assault forces, carrying explosives and grenades, in secret and continuous attacks on VC bunkers or communication trenches. (Use Arty and assault tactics).

Question 2 (a). Why do NVA and VC have bunkers?

Answer 2 (a). See Answer 1 (a).

Question 2 (b). What type of locality is selected for a bunker system?

Answer 2 (b). In jungle areas which offer secrecy, on high hills, near water (in the dry season, along suitable streams).
There are many areas which the AUSTRALIANS have been in, but where they did not destroy the bunkers, or where Artillery or bombs have not affected the base camp. (Meaning the base still provides secrecy or can be repaired).
eg, The base camp of D445 at TA LUNG Stream, YS558708 to YS569706, which had just been completed at the end of Aug 69. The base camp on both sides of the TAM BO Stream YS557809.

/Question 2 (c)

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Question 2 (c). Is any Engineer or Sapper assistance given in selecting the site or in the construction of the bunkers?

Answer 2 (c). No. Units build the bunkers themselves, without outside help.

Question 2 (d). Why are bunkers normally placed on straight tracks or trails?


Answer 2 (d). When the VC choose a site for the building of a new base, there are no tracks. But after a while tracks will start to be evident. (This will be faster in the rainy season than it is in the dry season). The VC know this and will open tracks into the camp but in such a manner as to give protection against discovery by aircraft.

Question 2 (e). What is the average distance between bunkers?

Answer 2 (e). The average distance between two bunkers is from 50 to 60 metres. They are this far apart to avoid damage from artillery or aerial bombardment, especially B52. In case of B52 strikes on the base, if one bomb hits one bunker, the next bunker escapes being hit.

Question 2 (f). What is the normal lay-out of a bunker system?

Answer 2 (f). The bunker system is built in a triangular formation. Each bunker is 2.6 metres long; 1.5 metres wide; if there are no rocks it will be 1.2 metres, 1.4 metres or 1.6 metres deep. If there are rocks then the depth will only be 0.8 metres to 1.0 metres deep. At Company level, each platoon digs and deploys in one side of the triangle.



/Question 2 (g).

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3.

Question 2 (g). What is done when the bunker system is attacked.

Answer 2 (g). Only the side which is attacked has the right to counter fire. Other sides stay in their positions and only reinforce when needed. When the base is caught in a surprise attack, the VC do not use 61mm or 82mm Mortars. They mostly use B40 or B41 to fire into the machine gun position of the attackers. AK's fire short bursts. Other companies could come to reinforce the company which is under attack by routes through the jungle which have been previously prepared, in accordance to an established plan for defense. Platoons which go to reinforce another platoon (in the same company, in the same bunker system) do so via the communication trenches.

Question 2 (h). Who gives the command to withdraw, if they are defeated?

Answer 2 (h). The highest, direct commander of the unit.
eg, An independent platoon has a company 2IC to give the order.
A Company has a battalion 2 IC to give the order.
In a battalion the decisions are reached in discussion between the Battalion Commander and the Battalion Political Officer, with the final decision resting with the Political Officer.

Question 2 (i). Who is the first to leave?

Answer 2 (i). Depends on the orders given by direct commander.
eg, The Battalion Commander orders 1 Company to withdraw, then 2 Company, then 3 Company, then 4 Company under fire support by 1 Company. 1 Company withdraws about 100 metres, then they must deploy to guard (support) the withdrawal of 2 Company. (The withdrawal is along prepared or previously agreed routes). When the base is attacked and the order of withdrawal is given, they usually leave a section of Infantry-Recce behind, or if there is a lack of these Recce-Sappers, to keep an eye on the situation (they do not fire any weapons). In special circumstances D445 usually leaves 3 Company behind, as 3 Company consists totally of Infantry-Recce and Sappers. Withdrawal from each bunker is in accordance with orders by the direct commander (bunker commander).
eg, Bunker 1 receives orders to withdraw. The assault soldiers of cell 1 go first, followed by cell 2 (machine gun section), then the bunker-commander followed by cell 3 (B40 or B41 cell - there is only one launcher).

Question 2 (j). How many people (percentage or fraction) are left in the bunkers to delay the advance of the enemy?

Answer 2 (j). The VC usually leave behind one cell or one section (Infantry-Recce or Sapper-Recce). If terrain is favourable, they could leave a company. D445 usually leaves C3 behind to keep an eye on the situation and for sniping, as C3 consists entirely of Sappers.

/Question 2 (k).

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4.

Question 2 (k). After leaving the bunkers, how far must they go?

Answer 2 (k). They usually leave the attacked camp about 8 hours walking behind them.

Question 2 (l). When does the Recce team return?

Answer 2 (l). As soon as the enemy forces leave, the Recce team is back in the old camp.

Question 2 (m). What type of attack is the most successful?

Answer 2 (m). The AUSTRALIAN tactics are the best, namely to take advantage of opportunity - rainy weather, rest periods such as lunch (12 noon) or evening meal (8 at night). From 2130 hours (Hanoi time) until 1000 hours (Hanoi time), the VC post sentries and send out many patrols around the base, up to 2km away from the camp. If they hear observer aircraft, then they establish 2 beats for the patrols, one at least 8km away from the camp and the nearest about 200 to 300 metres away. Surprise attacks, ambushes, claymores cause the VC the most casualties and these are the things the VC fear most.

Question 2 (n). How are sentries posted? Where are they placed?

Answer 2 (n). Each company organises two or three guardposts, that is each side has a lookout post. These are 150 metres to 200 metres from the camp. They take advantage of a termites nest or the trunk of a tree to sit behind at a distance of about 5 metres from a track.

Question 2 (o). What type of fire control do the VC have?

Answer 2 (o). The VC usually employ their machine guns to support the infantry - B40 and B41 to destroy the enemy's firing position - AK's for sniping (short bursts) and handgrenades to break up enemy assaults.

Question 2 (p). Are snipers specifically trained for this task?

Answer 2 (p). No. Nobody is trained as a sniper. In D445 there is only a man named QUANG, who is a "Hero of the Liberation Front" because he knocked-out a tank with a B40.

Question 2 (q). When the enemy leave the bunkers:

(1) For how far do the VC need to keep contact with the enemy?

(2) Do they have sentries to watch the movements of the enemy?

(3) How much material is salvaged from the old bunker system to build new bunkers?

/Answer 2 (q).

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5.

Answer 2 (q).

They leave observers behind to follow the enemy wherever they go, so that when the enemy leaves the VC know immediately.

These observers are at times as close as 5 or 10 metres from the enemy. Other times the enemy is observed through binoculars.

Materials usually are hidden about 10 minutes to $\frac{1}{2}$ an hour's walk away from the base (about 1000 metres).

Question 2 (r).

How far away from an old bunker system is a new bunker system built?

Answer 2 (r).

Very far. Sometimes it takes a day and a night to walk from the old camp to the new one. At least 10 hours and the most 24 hours walking.

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7th Battalion
Royal Australian Regiment
Finschhafen Lines
HOLSWORTHY NSW 2173

3 Dec 69

41

Distribution: List D.

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION 17/69
MOVEMENT FOR PERSONNEL PROCEEDING ON LEAVE

Reference: A. 7RAR Admin Instr 11/69.
B. AAF Mob 3's (Adapted) submitted by coys.

PART A
AIR MOVEMENTS

1. Outlined below are the movement details for members proceeding on leave by air, in all cases, transport will leave Bn HQ at the designated time. It will be the members own responsibility to ensure that he is at Bn HQ in adequate time to embus.

Serial	Date	Time Depart 7RAR	No of Pers	Veh Requirement	Aircraft Depart- ure Times
1.	12 Dec	1530	1	Duty Vehicle	1800 hrs
2.	15 Dec	1645	1	Duty Vehicle	1915 hrs
3.	16 Dec	0715	1	Tpt pl to provide 1x $\frac{3}{4}$ ton Veh	0940 hrs
4.	17 Dec	0500	4	As above	0700 and 0855
5.		1115	5	As above	1345 and 1450
6.		1430	5	Same vehicle as ser 5	1700 and 1800
7.		1600	69	5x2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton RAASC	1945
8.	18 Dec	0500	2	As for ser 3	0700
9.		0715	2	As above	0940 and 1100
10.		1315	6	As above	1540-1800-1915
11.	19 Dec	0700	1	As above	0855
12.		1430	4	As above	1635-1915
13.	20 Dec	0700	1	As above	0855
14.	21 Dec	1000	2	As above	1200-1450
15.		1600	11	1x2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton CL (Unit)	1800-1915
16.	23 Dec	1400	2	Duty Vehicle	1635-1915
17.	24 Dec	1300	2	As above	1540-1915

/2.

2. All personnel are reminded of restrictions in personal luggage allowed by civil airlines. One piece of hand luggage regardless of weight is allowed, plus a small overnight bag. Trunks cabin metal will not be accepted by the airlines.

3. All tickets will be issued by Bn HQ at a date and time to be specified.

PART B RAIL MOVEMENTS

1. Accurate rail departure times are not yet known, however, it is anticipated that final details will be known prior to the units return from ROCKHAMPTON. Any great changes from those outlined below will be notified by signal.

Serial	Date	Depart 7RAR	No of Persons	Vehicle Requirement	Train Time
1.	17 Dec	1600	122	8x2½ ton TCV	Not Before 1830 in all cases
2.	18 Dec	1600	8	1x¾ ton Unit tpt with tlr	
3.	19 Dec	1600	3	As above	
4.	20 Dec	1600	1	As above	
5.	21 Dec	1600	12	1x2½ ton GL(Unit)	
6.	22 Dec	1600	34	3x2½ ton TCV	
7.	23 Dec	1600	1	As for Serial 2	
8.	24 Dec	1600	1	As above	

2. There is no restriction on luggage carried, however, it should be kept to a minimum.

3. Tickets will be issued from Bn HQ at a date and time to be specified.

GENERAL

1. Coys are to ensure that all members are briefed on transport timings. Bn HQ will issue each individual member a list of all his relevant movement details.

2. Any unused tickets are to be returned to Bn HQ upon the completion of leave.

3. Timings, aircraft bookings and rail bookings are to be taken from the photostat copies of Reference B and NOT the coy originals. Due to availability of seats and connecting flights, 10 MC Group has been forced to change some of the dates submitted.

Recall from Leave

4. All members are to be aware of requirements if recalled from leave. A member recalled from leave has a definite responsibility to obey any "recall" announcement or order. A member who proceeded on leave:


a. Under Departmental arrangements will report to the nearest RTO.

/b.

3.

b. Under individual arrangements will return to 7RAR direct.

If for any reason a member is unable to obey a recall order, he will advise 7RAR by telegram of the circumstances and will contact the Comd HQ in which he is taking leave.


(R.A. GREY)
Lt Col
CO

CD

N1

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

ROUTINE ORDERS PART 1

BY

LT COL R.A. GREY
COMMANDING OFFICER

7th BATTALION
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT

Serial 46

10 Dec 69

Numbers 445 - 451

-
- 445. 7 RAR DUTY OFFICER ROSTER
 - 446. ROAD SAFETY
 - 447. CIVIL DEBTS
 - 448. OPENING OF TELEGRAMS
 - 449. DOGS ON HOLSWORTHY AIRFIELD
 - 450. SIR JOHN NORTHCOTT SWIMMING POOL
 - 451. APPROVAL TO LIVE IN/LIVE OUT

NOTICE

- 1. INFLUENZA EPIDEMIC - PNG
- 2. WAR VETERANS' CHRISTMAS GIFT LOTTERY
- 3. CHRISTMAS CARDS' HEADED PAPER - ENVELOPES
- 4. DISCOUNT CARDS

445.

7 RAR DUTY OFFICER ROSTER15 - 22 DEC 69

15 Dec 69	2Lt K.	METCALF	(Mount 1700 hrs)
16 Dec 69	2Lt D.	CHITTY	
17 Dec 69	2Lt L.	WILSON	
18 Dec 69	2Lt I.	PAUZA	
19 Dec 69	Lt O.N.	CAIRNS	
20 Dec 69	2Lt L.	WILSON	
21 Dec 69	Lt M.O'	BRIEN	

446.

ROAD SAFETY

1. The number of traffic accidents involving both Military and Civilian vehicles is disturbing.
2. All members of 7 RAR are to be addressed on "Road Safety" before proceeding on ARL. This may be done at sub unit or Platoon level. Various aspects of road safety, including the implication of speed and alcohol will be stressed.

447.

CIVIL DEBTS

1. The terms relating to AMR & O are to be promulgated to all ranks.
2. The incidence of correspondence relevant to civil debts received by 7 RAR is alarming. All members must realise that they are personally obliged to honour the requirements of any financial contract into which they enter. Embarrassment and possible hardships could be avoided if members would not overcommit themselves financially.
3. Business firms have indicated that they are refusing credit to members of the armed forces because some members are not satisfying their accounts - this displays lack of confidence in the army and its members.

448.

OPENING OF TELEGRAMS

1. No member of 7 RAR is permitted, under any circumstances, to open a telegram which is not personally addressed to him. Any person found doing this is liable to a maximum fine of \$400 under the 1901-1966 Posts & Telegraphs Act. All undelivered telegrams are to be returned direct to the postal orderly.

449.

DOGS ON HOLSWORTHY AIRFIELD

1. Dogs are creating a hazard on the Holsworthy Airfield, particularly when air traffic is heavy.
2. Residents in nearby married quarters are warned that pet dogs must be restrained from entering the airfield. If the hazard persists, 171 Air Cav Flt will have no alternative but to have stray animals destroyed.

450. SIR JOHN NORTHCOTT SWIMMING POOL

1. Members using the Sir John Northcott Swimming Pool are required to shower before entering the water.
2. Body or Suntan lotions and creams are not to be worn when members are swimming.

451. APPROVAL TO LIVE IN/LIVE OUT

1. The following have approval to live in on dates shown:

235109	Maj	F.K.COLE	from 20 Nov 69	to 20 Feb 70
311591	Maj	C.F.THOMSON	20 Nov 69	to 20 Feb 70
218834	Pte	V.E.BARTLEY	10 Nov 69	to 10 Feb 70
472055	Pte	R.C.VANDERVEEN	2 Dec 69	to 2 Mar 70
2. 2790650 Pte J.S.HARRIS (5RAR Aust Comp) has approval to live out from 5 Dec 69 to 28 Feb 70 inclusive.

(R.A.GREY)

Lt Col
CO

NOTICES1. INFLUENZA EPIDEMIC - PNG

Below is text of a signal from the GOC E Comd.

"From GOC for Unit Comds. The following message has been received from the CGS. Quote. Operation Enza. Control of Influenza Epidemic in TPNG. One. Epidemic is now under control and support troops are being returned to normal duty. Army assistance has resulted in a major reduction in the effects of the epidemic. Two. The energy and efficiency with which the operation was mounted and the way in which the task was performed has been the subject of very favourable comment. Three. It is noteworthy that troops from Australia worked well under their changed conditions and no cases of accident or failure to complete tasks were reported. Four. Please pass to all ranks concerned my congratulations on a job well done. Unquote. To the CGS's congratulations I add my own and am pleased that the splendid response to this sudden call for medical assistance has enhanced the Army's reputation for service to the community."

2. WAR VETERANS' CHRISTMAS GIFT LOTTERY

FIRST PRIZE VALUE \$30,500

1. War Veterans' Christmas Gift Lottery Tickets are now on sale in ASCO Canteens in NSW.
2. Each ticket costs \$2.00 and only 100,000 tickets are to be sold. There are 1,000 prizes to be awarded. The major prizes are:

First Prize - A large brick veneer family home at Lot 6 Stroud Place, Belrose, Sydney, plus a Ford Falcon Automatic car. Total value \$30,500.

Second Prize - Triumph 2.5 litre, Petrol Injection, Car.
Value \$3,950.

Third Prize - Morris Mini (k) Sedan. Value \$1,869.

3. As this lottery will be drawn on Friday, 19th December, 1969, every ticket holder has one chance in less than one hundred of winning a wonderful prize for Christmas.

4. ASCO Canteens are holding only limited stocks of tickets at the moment so it is recommended that you place early orders so that you will not miss out.

Where will your \$2.00 go?

5. The money gained from each \$2.00 ticket sold in ASCO Canteens will earn a 20 cent commission per ticket to help build our holiday home at Terrigal.

6. The remaining profits support the War Veterans' Home at Narrabeen which now accommodates 634 Ex-Servicemen and Women in both hostel type and cottage accommodation. This is a Service charity which every serviceman and servicewoman should support!

Will there be future Lotteries?

7. By an agreement between HQ E Comd, ASCO and the Chairman of the War Veterans' Lottery, ASCO will continue to sell tickets in NSW Canteens! The agreement that each ticket sold by us will earn a 20 cent commission for our Terrigal holiday home is a permanent arrangement! For further details and for tickets, see your ASCO Canteen, and do remember that you have to be in it to win it!


3. CHRISTMAS CARDS, HEADED PAPER AND ENVELOPES

1. All members are reminded that 7 RMR Christmas Cards, Headed Paper and Envelopes are available at coy orderly rooms. Prices, Christmas Cards, 10c ea, envelopes 10c packet, headed paper 25c a pad.

4. DISCOUNT CARDS

Any member requiring Discount Cards for purchasing christmas gifts etc, are advised these are obtainable from the DPRI Sgt.

N2



7 RAR

UNIT HISTORY PHOTO

DATE *Dec 69*

DETAILS *Long Hoa Village*




7 BAR

UNIT HISTORY PHOTO

DATE *Dec 69*

DETAILS *Long Ha Valley*
Shochuato By



7 RAR

UNIT HISTORY PHOTO

DATE Dec 69

Long Hoa Village
DETAILS Shoalwater Bay

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ARMY/RAF JOINT
EXERCISE COLD STEEL

EXERCISE REPORT BY
MAJ GEN C.M.I. PEARSON, DSO, OBE, MC
COMD 1 DIV

RESTRICTED

17 Dec 69

AHQ (24)
HQ Operational Command (6)

JOINT EXERCISE COLD STEEL
EXERCISE REPORT

- References:
- A. AHQ CS Instruction 107/68 Annex C.
 - B. HQ 1 Div/HQ OC General Instruction Exercise COLD STEEL dated 21 Oct 69.
 - C. Maps: SHOALWATER BAY Special 1: 100,000, 1-AAS.

Introduction

1. Exercise COLD STEEL was a one sided exercise for 7 RAR employing a controlled enemy and was conducted in the eastern sector of the SHOALWATER BAY Training Area from 2 to 11 Dec. This was preceded by a five day preliminary exercise in the SAMUEL HILL- FRESHWATER area which practised 7 RAR in operating with various support elements. Prior to this Exercise, 7 RAR spent three days in unit training on conjunction with various supporting elements, including RAAF.

Exercise Aim

2. The aim was to train 7 RAR and elements of 4 Fd Regt for operational service in SOUTH VIETNAM by exercising the battalion group within a task force setting, with supporting arms and services and RAAF participation, in a counter-insurgency situation as currently exists in SOUTH VIETNAM.

Exercise Setting

3. The setting depicted the Training Area as being analogous to PHOUIC TUY Province in SOUTH VIETNAM. The units at SAMUEL HILL were depicted as representing a task force base similar to NUI DAT, including a task force headquarters and a maintenance area. As far as was possible all the procedures used within the exercise were based on 1 ATF SOPs.

.../Conduct of the Exercise

Conduct of the Exercise

4. Preliminary Training. The three days training conducted by the CO 7 RAR prior to exercise CLARION CALL proved to be of considerable value to the battalion and its supporting elements. The programme included training with helicopters, (both Army and RAAF), forward air controllers, armoured personnel carriers, combat engineer teams and forward observer parties. This training enabled operational procedures to be clarified and practised and formed an excellent basis for the development of teamwork in the later exercises.
5. Exercise CLARION CALL. This was a "shakedown" exercise designed to enable the Battalion Group to operate as a cohesive force and to further practise operational procedures. The exercise was conducted in the DISMAL Sector from 27 Nov to 1 Dec, and involved the establishment of a Fire Support Base to support "reconnaissance in force (RIF)" operations in the western half of the DISMAL Sector, the location and attack on an enemy base camp and cordon and search of a village constructed at FRESHWATER.
6. Exercise GOLD STEEL. This exercise was designed to practise 7 RAR in various types of operations, including those listed by HQ in Reference A. The exercise took place in the CORRIDOR, MT HUMMOCK and RAZORBACK Sectors between 2 and 11 Dec beginning with a six day RIF operation in the CORRIDOR, MT HUMMOCK and RAZORBACK Sectors and the establishment of a fully developed Fire Support Base in the CORRIDOR SECTOR. The RIF operation culminated in the deployment of the battalion as a blocking force to repel a Main Force threat which developed in the vicinity of MT HUMMOCK. On completion of the RIF phase the battalion was required to locate and attack a major bunker system in the RAZORBACK Sector. The exercise ended with the redeployment of 7 RAR Cp by air and APC to a concentration area and subsequently a cordon and search of a village near SAMUEL HILL.
7. Air Operations. The considerable effort provided by both the RAAF and Army Aviation was one of the major factors contributing to the success of the exercise. The exercise was conducted on a semi airmobile basis, the main limitation being the M2A2 towed 105mm howitzer which could be moved only by APC or gun tractor. 7 RAR and 4 Pd Regt gained valuable experience in using the various types of support made available by RAAF and Army Aviation.
8. There is a need for Iroquois helicopters to simulate light fire teams so that the infantry can be practised in the procedures of controlling and employing gunships. There is also a requirement for a UH1B to be fitted with the proper communications for it to be employed as a Command and Control aircraft.
9. A report on air operations is at Annex A.

.../10.

10. Control. Control was exercised by a Joint Control Centre (JCC), staffed by RAAF and Army, established at SAMUEL HILL. The JCC worked efficiently and opportunity was taken to further refine joint operating procedures. A very high degree of co-operation and harmony was achieved between the staffs of the two Services in the JCC. On exercise COLD STEEL a separate Artillery Control was established to provide both higher and lower control to exercise fully the FSCC. A lower control on the Task Force command net was also established to increase the volume of traffic on the net and to help develop the overall battle picture.

11. Umpire Organization. The umpire organization worked well. It is hoped that further reductions in the umpire organization can be made without significantly reducing its efficiency and a suggested amendment to Reference A will be forwarded to AHQ later. The umpires submitted detailed reports on each sub unit of 7 RAR and copies of these were passed to the CO.

12. Enemy Force. One rifle company supplemented by a flight of Airfield Defence Guards, RAAF provided the enemy force. More flexibility could be gained by the inclusion of additional officers and senior NCOs in the rifle company so that each enemy group could be commanded by an officer or senior NCO. B Coy 3 RAR and the ADG Flt from RAAF Base WILLIAMTOWN worked well and successfully completed all their tasks.

Administration

13. Logistics Concept. Administrative support for the Exercise again was provided by the ROCKHAMPTON Logistics Group (RLG), commanded by N Comd who operated forward to the TFMA at SAMUEL HILL. The JCC was maintained by a joint Army/RAAF HQ Coy. Units in the exercise dealt with the TFMA through their echelons and all administrative procedures were based on 1 ATF SOP's. This concept worked well and provided the troops being exercised with realistic administrative training.

14. The organization and strength of the TFMA is adequate. Minor amendments to the organization of RAAOC and RAASC elements will be submitted to AHQ separately.

15. Exercise Staffing. 3 RAR were able to provide nearly all of the personnel required from a Support Battalion. It was noted, however, that where personnel were required to be provided from Commands some individuals received as little as 36 hours notice. This matter is being investigated and details will be forwarded to AHQ.

16. In general the administration of the Exercise was good and the logistic support provided by N Comd was of a high order. However, the late delivery of engineer stores caused considerable inconvenience during the Exercise.

.../Comments on 4 Fd Regt

Comments on 4 Fd Regt

17. The Exercise served to cement the good relationship which was already existing between 7 RAR and 106 Fd Bty. The battery operated well both technically and tactically and appears to be well prepared for its impending service overseas. Deployments were planned and effected with purpose and local defence was well organized.

18. At regimental level the FSCC was well tested by the operation of an artillery control which endeavoured to simulate the type and tempo of operations in SVN. Opportunity was also taken to exercise the Regimental Echelon which was able to gain some useful experience in the field.

Comment on 7 RAR

19. 7 RAR is a fit, well trained and confident battalion with good leaders at all levels. The unit worked hard and well throughout the Exercise and was quick to learn from the lessons which evolved. Morale remained at a high level and the health of the battalion was good.

20. All elements of 7 RAR are well versed in 1 ATF SOPs and their own SOPs are sound. Communications security was of an unusually high standard.

21. Umpires submitted reports on each sub-unit down to platoon level and these have been passed to 7 RAR. The umpires praised highly the efficiency of the battalion and its standard of training, but drew attention to the following points:

a. Although the passage of information upwards was good, the information passed downwards through platoons to the troops sometimes was scanty.

b. Initially, the combat engineer teams and the engineer troop headquarters were not properly and fully employed by the Bn HQ or the companies. A significant improvement was noticeable by the end of the Exercise.

c. Although the standard of navigation generally was satisfactory, further practice, especially in navigation by night, would be worthwhile.

d. Initially, some company and platoon commanders tended to do too much themselves and did not fully employ their headquarters. In most cases this had been remedied by the end of the Exercise.

.../22.

22. On 12 Dec, the Comd 1 Div visited 7 RAR at HOLSWORTHY and conducted a critique on the lessons learnt from the Exercise.

C.M.I. Pearson

(C.M.I. Pearson)

Maj Gen

Comd

AIR OPERATIONS

1. Helicopter Operations. Request procedures were good and 7 RAR liaised closely with the TFASC, thereby enabling benefit to be derived from resources available. Pilots reported that the rear echelon pad control was good.
2. It should be stressed to 7 RAR prior to deployment to SWI that they will not necessarily receive priority for air effort in a similar fashion to Exercise COLD STEEL. They will be operating in an environment where available resources must be shared and air planning therefore must remain very flexible in relation to timings.
3. Offensive Air Support. This was utilised where practicable but it would be desirable to introduce more fortified enemy positions in future exercises to force more use of strike aircraft.
4. Air Effort. Details of air activity in support of Exercise COLD STEEL are listed hereunder:

<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Hours</u>
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Winjeel	49	52.20
Sabre	63	54.10
Canberra	39	106.40
Sioux	412	240.05
Porter/Cessna	163	114.10
Total	3411	926.85

5. Army Aviation. The support provided by 163 Recce Flight was satisfactory, and the Battalion utilised aircraft allotted to them to the maximum. An innovation introduced into the exercise was the use of a Porter aircraft in the role of a flare ship for battlefield illumination. This worked well from the point of view

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N3

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ARMY/RAAF JOINT
EXERCISE COLD STEEL

EXERCISE REPORT BY
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17 Dec 69

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COMOS DIARY

R810-5-4

HQ 10 TF (2)
35 Dental Unit7th Battalion
Royal Australian Regiment
Finschhafen Lines
HOLSWORTHY NSW 2173

7 RAR WEEKLY TRAINING PROGRAMME WEEK ENDING 11 Jan 70

Dec 69

Serial	Day/Date	Time	Sub-Unit	Activity	Remarks
1	Mon 15 Dec - Wed 17 Dec	- -	All	Unit administration	
2	Thu 18 Dec - Sun 11 Jan 70	- -	All	Annual leave	
					(R.A. GREY) Lt Col CO

NB

CD
R810-5-8

N 45
7th Battalion
Royal Australian Regiment
Finschhafen Lines
HOLSWORTHY NSW 2173

16 Dec 69

Distribution: List B.

1970 TRG PROGRAMME

References: A. 7 RAR R490-1-3 of 21 Oct 69. Legal Lectures.
B. 7 RAR R850-20-2 of 21 Oct 69. Security/Int Brief.

1. Attached at annex A is the programme of events for the period January - February 1970. This incorporates the details of references A and B.

2. Annex B shows the allocation of specific ranges within the Holsworthy small arms complex by days and supplements Annex A.

3. Annex C contains brief details of a series of lectures which are to be given by companies during the period Jan-Feb. To assist companies the Int Offr will prepare prior to 11 Jan 70 the lesson plans and training aids required for each lecture.

R. A. Grey
(R.A. GREY)

Lt Col
CO

Annexes: A. Programme of Events.
B. Allocation of Specific Ranges within the Small Arms Complex.
C. Lecture Details.

	MON 12JAN	TUE 13	WED 14	THUR 15	FRI 16	MON 19	TUE 20	WED 21	THUR 22	FRI 23	MON 26	TUE 27	WED 28	THUR 29	FRI 30
A		AM: Small Arms Complex	FFR"E"	FFI Med docu Check	Q Issues			ANZAC	AM: Small Arms Complex	S W I M M I N G	A U S T R A L I A			DRILL	FFR"E"
B	K I T			ANZAC	Security Lect. Legal Lect.	PM: Small Arms Complex			Pack pers eqpt for sea movt			ANZAC	DRILL		
C	C H E C K S				Security Lect. Legal Lect.	AM: Small Arms Complex			ANZAC			UNIT 25METRE	AM: Small Arms Complex	DRILL	
D	A N D	PM: Small Arms complex	ANZAC		QISSUES	FFI MED DOCU CHECK		ANZAC	Pack pers eqpt for sea movt				DRILL	ANZAC	PM: Small Arms Complex
		UNIT 25 METRE	ANZAC	AM: Small Arms Complex	Security Q Lect	ISSUES	Legal Lect.	FFR"E"	Pack pers eqpt for sea movt			AM: Small Arms Complex		DRILL	ANZAC
				FFI Med Docu Check		ANZAC			PM: Small Arms Complex				DRILL	PM: Small Arms Complex	
		ANZAC	AM: Small Arms Complex	Q ISSUES	Security Lect	ANZAC			Pack pers eqpt for sea movt			ANZAC	UNIT 25METRE	DRILL	
				PM: Small Arms Complex		FFI MED DOCU CHECK	Legal Lect.	PM: Small Arms Complex	FFR"E"				DRILL		ANZAC
SP	A D M I N			ANZAC	FFI MED DOCU CHECK	UNIT 25 METRE	Q ISSUES	AM: Small Arms Complex	Pack pers eqpt for sea movt	C A R N I V A L	D A Y	MOR PL SHOOT "E" ANZAC	FFR	DRILL	AM: Small Arms complex
		ANZAC	PM: Small Arms Complex		Security Lect.	Legal Lect.			ANZAC			PM: Small Arms complex	DRILL		
					Legal Lect		FFI		Pack pers eqpt for sea movt						
					Security Lect	Q Issues	LED DOCU CHECK								

FFI'S CO-ORDINATED BY RMO

	MON 2 FEB	TUE 3	WED 4	THUR 5	FRI 6	MON 9	TUE 10	WED 11	THU 12	FRI 13
A	DRILL			ANZAC	UNIT 25METRE	CONDUCT				
		ANZAC				REFRESH- ER				
B	DRILL		P	AM: Small Arms Complex	ANZAC		Con- duct			
		PM: Small Arms com- plex	A				Refresh- er			
C	DRILL		R		AM: Small Arms com- plex			Conduct		
		FFR"E"	A	ANZAC				Refresh- er		
D	DRILL	ANZAC	E						Conduct	
	PM: Small Arms Complex			PM: Small Arms Complex	ANZAC				Refresh- er	
SP	DRILL	AM: Small Arms Complex		FFR"E"						Conduct
	ANZAC				PM: Small Arms Com- plex					Refresher
A D M I N						% each day				

ANNEX B TO
7RAR R810-5-8
DATED 16 DEC 69

ALLOCATION OF SPECIFIC RANGES WITHIN
HOLSWORTHY SMALL ARMS COMPLEX

SERIAL	DATE	SMR	25METRE OPEN	INF WPNS ANTI TK	ASSLT GREN	DART SNEAKER 1	DART SNEAKER 2	SECTION DEFENCE	
1	13 Jan	X	X	X	—	X		X	
2	14 Jan	X	X	X	X	X		X	
3	15 Jan	X	X	X	X	X		X	
4	19 Jan	X	X	X	X	—		X	
5	21 Jan	X	X	X	X	X			
6	22 Jan	X	X	X	X	X			
7	27 Jan	X	X		X	X	X	X	
8	28 Jan	X	X		X	X	X	X	
9	29 Jan	X	X		X	X	X	X	
10	30 Jan	X	X		X	X	X	X	
11	2 Feb	X (PM only)	—	—	X	X	X	X	
12	3 Feb	X (PM only)	—	—	X	X	X	X	
13	5 Feb	X (PM only)	—	—	X	X	X	X	
14	6 Feb	X (PM only)	—	—	X	X	X	X	

Legend: X allocated

— Not avail

Blank - not allocated but available if wanted.

ANNEX C TO

7 RAR R810-5-8

DATED 16 DEC69

LECTURE DETAILS

Serial	Lecture	Periods Required
1.	<u>VC BUNKER SYSTEMS</u> a. Indicators b. Layouts c. Methods of defending	2
2	<u>VCI</u> Dealing with structure from hamlet/village level through to Military District	1 1
3.	<u>VC EQPTS</u> a. Eqpt in common use b. Method of employment	1
4.	<u>NC/NVA TACTICS</u> a. Immediate action drills b. Techniques of employment of small arms fire.	1
5.	<u>PHUOC TUY PROVINCE</u> Geography / demography	2
6.	<u>SVN FORCES IN PHUOC TUY PROVINCE</u> a. RF/PF/PRU etc b. Chain of command within Province including division of responsibilities	1

GD Room

N6

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

ROUTINE ORDERS PART 1

BY

LT COL R.A. GREY
COMMANDING OFFICER

7TH BATTALION
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT

Serial 47

22 Dec 69

Number 452

452. POWERS OF DETACHMENT COMMAND

1.

452.

POWERS OF DETACHMENT COMMAND

1. 235252 Lt M.P. O'BRIEN has been granted powers of Detachment Commander from 22 Dec 69 to 29 Dec 69.
2. 57089 Lt P.D. GIBBONS has been granted powers of Detachment Commander from 30 Dec 69 to 12 Jan 70.

W.A.S. - 14/3/70
R (R.A.GREY)
Lt Col
CO

CONTACT SUMMARY

091930.
101930

01

SERIAL	DATE/TIME	LOCATION	CALLSIGN	OWN TPS			EN TPS		
				KIA	WIA	WIA Remaining on Duty	KIA	WIA	PW
90	091040	206750	41				1		
91	091230	181742	22						
92	091625	226760	T20A				4		
93	091635	226761	T20A		2AP	MINES			
94	091710	264791	95D						
95	092325	234768	62	—	—	—	—	—	—
96	092320	234768	6	—	—	2xCLAYMORTS	DET	—	—
97	100800	261816	61	—	1	—	4	—	—
98	101100	347973	42	—	—	—	—	—	—
99	101300	317832	32	—	—	—	—	—	—
100	101315	359975	41	—	—	—	6	—	—
101	101305	LONG HOP	33	—	4	—	9	—	—

CONTACT SUMMARY

SERIAL	DATE/TIME	LOCATION	CALLSIGN	OWN TPS			EN TPS		
				KIA	WIA	WIA Remaining on Duty	KIA	WIA	PW
73	080940	141776	13	-	-	-	-	-	-
74	080945	156774	12	-	-	-	-	-	-
75	081028	173760	JADE	-	-	-	5KBA	-	-
76	081028	164763	JADE	-	-	-	1KBA	-	-
77	081028	185745	JADE	-	-	-	10KBA	-	-
78	081150	157761	11	-	-	-	11KIA	-	-
79	081205	192749	21	-	1	(MORTARS)	-	-	-
80	081405	191740	2 and 23	-	2	-	2KIA 2POSS	-	-
81	081428	164762	12 13	-	-	-	-	-	-
82	081513	301880	42, 43	2	4	-	-	-	-
83	081530	182744	23	2	-	-	-	-	-
84	090740	182746	1	3	6	-	18	-	-
85	090850		2		5	-	6	7	-
86	091140	200745	43	UMPIRES?			-	-	-
87	091135	183744	2	-	1	-	-	-	-
88	091145	178740	2	5	9	-	23	-	-
89	091155	206750							

5 DEC 69

CONTACT SUMMARY

SERIAL	DATE/TIME	LOCATION	CALLSIGN	OWN TPS			EN TPS		
				KIA	WIA	WIA Remaining on Duty	KIA	WIA	PW
55	051134	159817	T14B	-	-	-	-	-	-
56	051058		3						
57	051325	162820	32C				5	-	-
58	051300	163816	31	-	-	-	-	1	-
59	051500	162817	32A	-	-	-	3	4	-
60	051625	200762	62	-	-	-	1	1 (poss.)	
61	051931	160818	31	-	-				
62	060230	160818	31	5		CLAYMORE FIRE AT ENON NICE INCOMING MOR (ORDS)			-
63	060537	165818	31	-	-	-	-	-	5
64	061055	193832	21	-	-	-	2	-	-
65	061406	237764	6						2
66	070205K	160817	3	-	-	MORTARING AND PERIMETER PROBES			-
67	070334K	160817	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
68	070804K	199746	6	-	-	-	7	-	-
69	070902K	187778	6	-	-	-	8	-	-
70	071135K	184867	2	-	-	-	1	1	-
71	072134K	213847	23	2	3	-	7	BLOOD TRAILS 8-10 PERS	
72	07242K	160818	6	-	3	-	12 (30) 24 (poss)	50	-
73									

04-05 DEC 62

CONTACT SUMMARY

SERIAL	DATE/TIME	LOCATION	CALLSIGN	OWN TPS			EN TPS		
				KIA	WIA	WIA Remaining on Duty	KIA	WIA	PW
34	041012	238 810	41	-	-	-	3	-	-
35	041100	197 807	13	-	3	-	-	-	-
36	041330	213 847	2, 23	-	-	-	-	-	-
37	041430	203 797	13	-	-	-	1	2	-
38	041453	238 813	43	-	-	-	-	-	-
39	041515	206 850	22/234	-	2	-	2	-	-
40	041547	157 817	3	-	2	1	7	-	1
41	041745 041940	157 817 160 818	33	-	-	-	1	-	-
42	041945	226 811	41	-	-	-	4	-	-
43	042007	242 77	C/S 6	MORTREP 6 RDS			-	-	-
44	050210	160 818	31	-	-	-	-	-	-
45	050523	223 814	41	-	-	-	4	-	-
46	050600	220 807	43	-	-	-	4	-	-
47	050622	224 817	42	-	-	-	-	-	-
48	050811	222 817	42	-	-	-	3	-	-
49	050910	178 812	12	1	1	-	1	-	1
50	050910	159 809	33	-	-	-	3	1	-
51	050925	211 833	21	-	-	-	1	-	-
52	050924	164 807	720A	-	-	-	-	-	-
53	050940	162 815	32A	-	-	-	2	-	-
54	051040	167 811	11	SIGHTED 6 EN NEAR POSN			-	-	-

03 DEC 69
04 DEC 69

CONTACT SUMMARY

SERIAL	DATE/TIME	LOCATION	CALLSIGN	OWN TPS			EN TPS		
				KIA	WIA	WIA Remaining on Duty	KIA	WIA	PW
17	030115	220825	22				3	—	—
18	030510	228800	11				9	—	—
19	030855	224813	41				6	—	—
20	031250	217828	23	1	1		5	—	—
21	031327	217823	21		1		—	—	—
22	031405	213881	2				5	—	—
23	031505	220815	22				1	—	—
24	031530	174832	31 32				3	—	—
25	031640	191195	124				7	—	—
26	032303	INCOMING MOR 239768	6	—	—	—	—	—	—
27	040330	155817	33	—	—	—	7	—	—
28	040630	308883	62				1	1	
29	040840	237810	41	—	—	—	—	—	—
30	040700 040700	237810	41 B	1*	1	—	—	1 (Pass)	—
31	040912	194806	13	—	—	—	—	—	—
32	040959	238810	41	—	—	—	1	—	—
33	040925	195808	13	—	—	—	2	—	—