

Series: AWM95
Australian Army commanders' diaries

Royal Australian Infantry

Item number: 7/2/76

**Item: 2 Battalion Royal Australian
Regiment**

Annexes

1-28 February 1971

C1

CONFIDENTIAL

2 RAR/NZ SOI

FEB 71

GENERAL INFORMATION

EMERGENCY AIR TO GROUND ASSISTANCE

GROUND UNITS. Ground units requiring emergency assistance (radio relay, casualty evacuation when DUSTOFF is not available, Artillery or Gunship support) must first signal the aircraft with flares, lights, panels or some other means.

AIRCRAFT. All aircraft observing unusual activity or signalling by ground units or convoys will immediately attempt to establish contact using the emergency frequency of 38.90MHz and offer assistance.

ARTILLERY NETS

107 FD BTY				
	1-7	8-14	15-21	22-28
PRI	55.90	55.60	55.40	52.85
SIG	21W	74B	47B	29J
NCS	KE	HB	MT	ET
ALT	36.70	39.95	35.95	41.25
DESIG	29Q	98A	92M	61C
NCS	GM	JW	CR	BC
106 FD BTY				
PRI	58.65	57.40	59.60	56.60
DESIG	34N	24X	87X	22X
NCS	LE	WL	AF	WH
ALT	46.10	45.85	45.20	45.60
DESIG	99W	80P	20S	76D
NCS	VM	NJ	TM	VP
161 FD BTY				
PRI	49.95	52.70	48.85	50.55
DESIG	51Z	31R	41E	71E
NCS	MW	DZ	QU	YD
ALT	34.80	33.50	30.50	33.85
DESIG	74S	32H	85U	79X
NCS	IQ	CW	EJ	FI

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2 RAR/NZ SOI

FEB 71

GENERAL INFORMATION

READY REACTION FORCE FREQUENCY

56.70 is the Ready Re-action Force Internal Frequency.

This frequency is compatible with Armoured Corps radio equipments. NCS will change every seven (7) days.

	1-7	8-14	15-21	22-28
NCS	FJ	CE	KT	AK
DESIG	29U	22A	81N	93U
C/S	11	11	11	11

HAWKFLIGHT

The Hawkflight platoon is to have a separate callsign on the Task Force Comd net. The callsign and frequency shown.

	1-7	8-14	15-21	22-28
FREQ	69.75	67.10	47.75	61.95
DESIG	60H	87G	74U	99Z
CON	29	23	44	40
C/S				
OWN				
e/s	45	21	65	11

OPERATING FREQUENCY	ANTENNA 292 VERTICAL SECTIONS				GROUND PLANE SECTIONS			
	21	22	23	24	21	22	23	24
30-36.95	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1
37-50.95	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
51-75.95	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1

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2 RAR/NZ SOI

Feb 71

ADDRESS GROUPS

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2 RAR/NZ SOI

Feb 71

ADDRESS GROUPS

SERIAL	UNIT	SERIAL	UNIT
1	HQ 1 ATF	21	DET 1 DIV INT UNIT
2	HQ 1 ATF (MAIN)	22	HQ 26 COY RAASC
3	C SQN 1 ARMD REGT	23	POST OFFICE AFPO 4
4	A SQN 3 CAV REGT	24	DET 2 AFCU
5	4 FD REGT	25	8 FD AMT
6	106 FD BTY	26	1 OFP
7	107 FD BTY	27	106 FD WKSPS
8	161 FD BTY RNZA	28	B SQN 3 CAV WKSPS
9	DET 131 DIV LOC BTY	29	1 FD SQN WKSPS
10	1 FD SQN	30	1 ATF LAD
11	17 CONST SQN	31	C SQN 1 ARMD WKSPS
12	11 MO GP 1 ATF	32	4 FD REGT LAD
13	A SECT 1 TOPO SVY TP	33	DET 131 DIV LOC LAD
14	104 SIG SQN	34	DET AFV PROV UNIT
15	110 SIG SQN	35	No 1 DET AFV CASH OFFICE
16	2 RAR	36	ATOC NUI DAT (RAAF)
17	7 RAR	37	HQ AFV
18	1 SAS SQN	38	HQ 1 ALSG
19	1 ARU	39	1 AUST CA UNIT
20	161 RECCE FLT	40	PSY OPS

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2 RAR/NZ SOI

Feb 71

ADDRESS GROUPS

2 RAR/NZ SOI

Feb 71

ADDRESS GROUPS

SERIAL	WK 1 1-7	WK2 8-14	WK3 15-21	WK4 22-31	SERIAL	WK 1 1-7	WK2 8-14	WK3 15-21	WK4 22-31
1	AET	HPI	FTO	CYN	21	MUX	GVY	DOI	XQA
2	GDO	ZWE	YTS	GXD	22	UCT	HYW	OSW	PHG
3	XIV	JVZ	BIC	OKZ	23	AOY	DSK	CTL	FYM
4	BZK	AZW	EJH	DOA	24	UEH	OWH	ZRJ	DYC
5	FUQ	QAD	WMC	KBY	25	KLS	HUZ	XDL	WDQ
6	TYS	ZLE	SNB	BMF	26	DNG	DKT	CBO	ZXG
7	NIQ	XCA	PAG	XND	27	URL	YTR	KSD	MWQ
8	SNX	CML	VZB	NSK	28	VHG	FVL	MSO	JSO
9	FZR	EIA	JLC	WKN	29	KWY	XEW	LAK	XWB
10	NLY	LNF	NHJ	UMP	30	WMC	BJM	BRN	DXP
11	MES	MDZ	TRV	OUL	31	HTF	EUZ	YTU	NIU
12	MIY	ZQM	GLI	CGB	32	FVA	UWV	IFE	CVP
13	SPL	PKF	IMR	TVQ	33	DMB	XQE	OUM	GBQ
14	QNT	JHE	FGA	EXU	34	WXE	JCF	VHL	YAO
15	MJX	SIV	VFH	JLR	35	LFK	IHX	ZWP	HTQ
16	EYZ	YKG	IYQ	XJG	36	HRC	WTA	EYI	VCP
17	KAU	IKU	MGZ	GYS	37	VXJ	JPN	NBM	SZK
18	FJW	SQX	HQS	TNP	38	IZB	UTW	ARF	MER
19	HJV	REZ	GFW	FIT	39	KOL	EBD	TDN	ZCT
20	QDC	KQY	LBT	PDI	40	OAO	MGY	BGS	NUV

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CONFIDENTIAL					CONFIDENTIAL				
2 RAR/NZ SOI					2RAR/NZ SOI				
JAN FEB 71					FEB 71				
PURPOSE	FREQUENCIES 1-7	DESIGNATORS 8-14	NGS 15-21	22-28	PURPOSE	FREQUENCIES 1-7	DESIGNATORS 8-14	NGS 15-21	22-28
Bn Pri	51.35	61.95	43.60	58.90	Sp Coy	45.85	45.60	43.90	44.35
	67K	13R	4CH	27M		88U	72M	19K	77G
	CY	ID	GL	KI		ZF	HW	FV	RO
Bn Alt	61.50	61.85	62.60	61.90	Mors 1	57.60	55.90	57.40	56.60
	63Q	80D	36J	14K		62K	72F	54M	86Z
	3 XR	MF	BC	WD		LT	OZ	NF	ED
A/Air Pri	42.50	41.35	43.10	41.40	Mors 2	56.55	55.30	56.85	55.60
	52F	27B	91D	99V		41M	54E	67C	16P
	KL	WY	VB	FV		SI	QR	IC	ZX
A/Air Alt.	63.30	64.55	63.65	63.50	Boat Pti	44.90	44.60	43.30	44.20
	57T	37M	27Z	12A		13G	14F	95X	69J
	JY	FB	BH	UR		JS	4F TL	XQ	MR
Tac A ir	56.10	51.65	55.00	52.70	Re tra ns	52.50	50.40	52.85	50.75
	91 T	52 C	63E	81H		85G	40Z	43G	97J
	NZ	IG	HN	CD		A Y	BU	WV	VC
Base Def	49.35	48.70	46.10	49.95	Pnr Pl	58.60	57.90	58.65	59.60
	45P	16F	70J	80C		28S	67G	92 R	42Z
	DT	LM	DQ	LT		RB	LU	ZO	TH
A Coy	39.95	41.25	41.20	40.25	Atk Pl	33.85	34.80	33.05	30.50
	44Y	37S	16D	41K		98X	14 T	79J	64N
	ZV	JV	NU	AC		XJ	KA	OD	WJ
B Coy	34.95	36.55	35.55	34.30	RF	59.75	61.35	61.40	61.65
	2 4K	55F	52S	43M		74X	20N	19F	60K
	SN	HA	RH	GC		SL	A J	IB	LD
C Coy	37.00	37.15	37.45	36.70	Spare 1	65.20	65.70	70.65	71.90
	33U	39M	37G	66W		49J	58L	96G	51W
	EI	FW	TS	YX		FQ	VE	UM	LC
V Coy	35.85	37.05	36.45	35.05	Spare 2	71.35	72.50	74.95	75.20
	42J	33S	50N	89F		14E	56N	76N	52K
	ZS	CU	FP	VH		WM	KC	PM	IY

Tac A ir	56.10	51.65	55.00	52.70	Re tra ns	52.50	50.40	52.85	50.75
	91 T	52 C	63E	81H		85G	40Z	43G	97J
	NZ	IG	HN	CD		A Y	BU	WV	VC
Base Def	49.35	48.70	46.10	49.95	Pnr Pl	58.60	57.90	58.65	59.60
	45P	16F	70J	80C		28S	67G	92 R	42Z
	DT	LM	DQ	LT		RB	LU	ZO	TH
A Coy	39.95	41.25	41.20	40.25	Atk Pl	33.85	34.80	33.05	30.50
	44Y	37S	16D	41K		98X	14 T	79J	64N
	ZV	JV	NU	AC		XJ	KA	OD	WJ

C2

2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn
Nui Dat
/ Feb 71

See Distribution List

AMENDMENT TO 2 RAR/NZ SOI C7/71

1. Following is amendment to 2 RAR/NZ for Feb 71:
 - a. Weeks 1 to 4. V Coy - delete freqs 42J(35.85) 33S(37.05) 50N(36.45) and 89F(35.05) and insert freqs 28S(58.60) 67G(57.90) 92R(58.65) and 42Z(59.60).
 - b. Weeks 1 to 4. Pnr Pl - delete freqs 28S(58.60) 67G(57.90) 92R(58.65) and 42Z(59.60) and insert freqs 42J(35.85) 33S(37.05) 50N(36.45) and 89F(35.05).

Authorised by *M Taylor cpl*

for Capt

Signal Officer

See Distribution List

C3

2 R.R/NZ (ANZAC) Bn
Nui Dat
/ Feb 71

See Distribution List

AMENDMENT NUMBER 08/71 2 RAR/NZ SOI

1. Following is amendment to 2 RAR/NZ SOI for Feb 71:
 - a. Week 1. B Coy - delete freq 24K (34.95) and insert freq 13G (44.90).
 - b. Week 1. Boat Pt1 - delete freq 13G (44.90) and insert freq 24K (34.95).

Authorised by

A Taylor
Capt

Signal Officer

Distribution as for SOI

C4

2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn.
NUI D.T
5 FEB 71

See Distribution List

AMENDMENT NUMBER 09/71

1. Following is amendment to 2RAR/NZ SOI for Feb 71
 - a. A Coy - Week 1. Delete freq 44Y(39.95) and insert freq 41M(56.55)
 - b. Mor 2 - Week 1. Delete freq 41M(56.55) and insert freq 44Y(39.95)

Authorised by *G Taylor*
for Capt

Signals Officer

Distribution
As for SOI

CS

2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Ln

Nui Dat

16 Feb 71

See Distribution List

AMENDMENT NUMBER 10/71 2 RAR/NZ SOI

1. Following is amendment to 2 RAR/NZ SOI;
 - a. Week 3. B Coy - delete freq 52S (35.55) and insert freq 54M (57.40).
 - b. Week 3. Mor 1 - delete freq 54M (57.40) and insert freq 52S (35.55).
 - c. Week 3. Retrans - delete freq 43G (52.85) and insert freq 36J (62.60).
 - d. Week 3. Bn Alt - delete freq 36J (62.60) and insert freq 43G (52.85).

Authorised by *M Taylor*

M Taylor
Capt

Signal Officer

Distribution as for SOI

MESSAGE FORM

cb

FOR COMM CONVENTIONAL USE

R 569/21/1

PRECEDENCE - ACTION PRIORITY	PRECEDENCE - INFO ROUTINE	DATE-TIME GROUP Q2Q23QZ FEB 71	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS FEB 71
FROM: 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC)			CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
TO: LISTC plus V COY C SQN 1 ARMY REGT A SQN 3 CAV REGT 1 FD SQN 1 ATF LO DUC THANH(2) 1 ATF LO XUAN LOC			ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER G 212
INFO: HQ 1 ATF(4)			

OP PHOI HOP (.) REF OUR OP INSTR 4/71 DATED 31 JAN 71 (.) COY RECCE AND AMBUSH TASKS WILL BE CONDUCTED AS FOLLOWS (.) B COY (.) CONTINUING TO 6 FEB INCL WITH REDEPLOYMENT COY, LESS 5 PL REMAINING AREA YS 4981, TO AO RECOVERY (ANNEX B) ON 3 FEB BY APL/AIR (.) V COY (.) DEPLOY 5 FEB BY AIR TO AO RIDGWAY, RTND 18 FEB (.) SP COY (.) DEPLOY BY ROAD TPT 3 FEB TO AO ROVER (ANNEX A) (.) SP COY BE PREP TO REDEPLOY ONE DOG/VISUAL TRACKER TEAM FROM AO TO IN SP RIFLE COYS IF REQUIRED (.)

VERBAL ORDERS ISSUED TO ALL OLS (.) BN HQ WILL ADVISE LO DUC THANH OF ALL FRIENDLY MOV WITHIN 2000M OF DISTRICT AO BDRY (.) B, V AND SP COYS ARE TO ESTB LIAISON WITH LO DUC THANH (C/S 96 BN COMD NET) FOR ANY DETAILED QUERIES ON THEIR AREA INCL CIV MOVEMENT (.) ALL MOV IN THE DUC THANH DISTRICT AO REQUIRES FORMAL AO EXTN OR BDRY CLEARANCE OR TRANSIT REQUEST TO LO DUC THANH WITH INFO TO BN HQ (.)

PAC <u>1, 2</u> PAGES	REFERS TO MESSAGE	DRAFTER'S NAME	OFFICE	TEL NO.
	CLASSIFIED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO			
FOR OPERATOR'S USE				RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR

FORM 52

MESSAGE FORM

FOR COMM COMMUNICATIONS USE


PRECEDENCE - ACTION	PRECEDENCE - R. O.	DATE-TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
FROM:			CLASS
TO:			SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
			CONFIDENTIAL
INFO:			CLASSIFICATION
			G212

ALTN Comms THROUGH C/S G16 ON ARTY BTY NET WITH APPROVAL C/S G19 (.)

CIVILIAN ACCESS (.) DUC THANH DISTRICT AO IS CIVILIAN ACCESS AREA 0600 TO 1900 HRS (.) OTHER AREAS AS SHOWN ON CURRENT CIVILIAN ACCESS OVERPRINT 1:50,000 MAP (.)

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (.) ATTENTION IS DIRECTED TO RULES IN UNIT FD SOPs PAGES 1-1A (REVISED JUL 70) (.) AOs RECOVERY AND ROVER MAY CONTAIN CIVILIANS OUT OF AUTHORISED CIVILIAN ACCESS AREAS (.) AO RIDGWAY EAST OF 52 EASTING IS AN "ENEMY CONTACT" AREA (.)

BDRY CLEARANCES (.) ANNEXES A, B AND C INDICATE BDRY CLEARANCES ALREADY AUTHORIZED (.) FURTHER CLEARANCES ARE TO BE REQUESTED FROM ADJOINING COY/DUC THANH AS REQUIRED, INFO BN CP (.) B COY, V COY, SP COY ACK ERUDITE CP

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES	REFERS TO MESSAGE	DRAFTER'S NAME	OFFICE	TEL. NO.					
CLASSIFIED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		Roberto	Ops. ERUDITE						
FOR OPERATOR'S USE			RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE						
DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	 RANK Maj	


FORM 10-64

CONFIDENTIAL

MAP: SERIES L7014
SHEETS 6430II
6430III
1:50,000.

ANNEX A TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC)
G 212
OF Q2Q230Z FEB 71

AO ROVER



NOTES:

1. BDRY CLEARANCE BETWEEN A COY AND SP COY TO BE REQUESTED AS REQUIRED
2. 5 PL B COY HAS BDRY CLEARANCE ALONG SOUTHERN BDRY OF AO.
3. SP COY HAS BDRY CLEARANCE ALONG EASTERN BDRY WITH V COY, UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE

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
5130112
CONFIDENTIAL

MAP: SERIES L7014
SHEETS 6430(I)
6430(II)
1:50,000

ANNEX B TO
2RAR/NZ(ANZAC)BN
G212
OF 020230Z FEB

AO RECOVERY

212



NOTES:


1. BDRY CLEARANCE SHOWN XXX GRANTED TO B COY FROM A COY.
2. B COY HAS BDRY CLEARANCE ALONG DISTRICT AO BDRY

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ANNEX C TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
G 212
OF Q20230Z Feb

AO RIDGWAY



NOTES:

1. BDRY CLEARANCE BETWEEN V COY AND A COY OR SP COY IS TO BE ARRANGED AS REQUIRED. 5 PL B COY HAS BDRY CLEARANCE IN SW CORNER OF AO RIDGWAY WHILE DEPLOYED

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MESSAGE FORM

FOR COMMUNICATIONS USE

C7

R562/21/1

PRECEDENCE - ACTION ROUTINE	PRECEDENCE - INFO ROUTINE	DATE-TIME GROUP 040750Z	MESSAGE PRIORITY Feb 71
--------------------------------	------------------------------	----------------------------	----------------------------

FROM: 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC)	TO: LISTC plus VCoy IO Sig@ Cust Adj6 TO 1 ATF LO HOA LONG 1 ATF LO DUC THANH	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
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INFO: HQ 1 ATF (3) MATT 7 ONG TRINH Det AFV Pro Deb NUI DAT	OPERATOR'S NUMBER G224
--	---------------------------

OP PHOI HOP(.) MOBILE CHECK PT PROGRAMME
FOR THE PERIOD 8 FEB TO 17 Feb 71 IS ATTACHED
AS ANNEX A

PAC 1 c 2 PAGES	REFS TO MESSAGES	DRAFTER'S NAME ROBERTS	OFFICE OPS	TEL NO. ERUDITE
CLASSIFIED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO				

FOR OPERATOR'S USE								RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	
DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	<i>Al Roberts</i> maj	
								RANK	

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ANNEX A TO
2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC)
G 224
OF Q40750Z FEB

MOBILE CHECK POINT PROGRAMME FEB 71

FEBRUARY

Serial	Item	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1	Operating Days			*		* *			*		*
2	Turnings (period)			2		1	3		4		2
3	Police Supplied By			D T		D T	D T		H L		D T
4	Patrol Area			B		B			A		B
5	Frequency Designator										
6	Call Sign										

Notes:

1. Period timings are : 0830-1230 Period 1
1120-1500 Period 2
1300-1700 Period 3
1630-1830 Period 4

CS

MESSAGE FORM

FOR COMM. ONLY, SIGRMS USE

R569/21/1

PRECEDENCE - ACTION PRIORITY	PRECEDENCE - INFO PRIORITY	DATE - TIME GROUP 080730Z	MESSAGE NUMBER FEB 71
---------------------------------	-------------------------------	------------------------------	--------------------------

FROM: 2RAR/NZ(CANZAC) BN
 TO: LISTC PLUS VCOY IO SIG PL
 ASST ADJT TO IATF HO HOA LONG
 IATF HO DUC THANH

CLASSIFICATION
 CONFIDENTIAL

INFO: HQ IATF (3) MATI 7 ONG TRINH
 DET AFV PRO DET NUI DAT
 OP PHOI HOP () MOBILE CHECK POINT PROGRAMME ()
 OUR G224 OF 040750Z FEB 71 CMM SERIAL 6 ()
 AMMEND C/S TO READ 98

COMMUNICATIONS NUMBER
 G 247

In Konting

PAGE 1 OF 1 YES KONDRATOWICZ OPS ERUDITE
 CAPT

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Page 1 of 5

Copy 51 of 67
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn
NUI DAT
12 Feb 71

OPS 27
Op Instr 5/71

References: A. Series L7014, VIETNAM, Sheets 6430 I
and 6430 II, Edition 3, 1:50,000.

Time Zone used throughout the instruction: HOTEL

1. Situation

a. Int. No change to Weekly Intelligence Review
Intdes 718/9 and daily summaries.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) 7 RAR. Elements of sp coy and A Coy, with
APCs, interdict en route from the MAY TAO
area into PHUOC TUY Province. These elements
are deployed in the area centre of map
YS 640920. There are no 7 RAR troops
west of the 62 easting.

(2) US Forces. Elements of 1/5 Bn (US) and 2/12
Bn (US), in pl strength, are deployed in
the area centre of map YS 560960. There
are no US troops south of the 95 northing
in this area.

(3) GVN Forces. To be advised.

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2. Mission. To eliminate HQ CHAU DUC District and C 36 Coy.

3. Execution

a. Gen Outline. Op in three phases:

(1) Phase 1. V Coy move to block positions in AO RIDGWAY.

(2) Phase 2. C Coy air insertion into AO REMBRANDT.

(3) Phase 3. C Coy conduct sweep from NE to SW.

b. A Coy. Remain NUI DAT for maintenance and retraining.

c. B Coy. Continue ops in AO QUIVER.

d. C Coy.

(1) Grouping. Normal op atts, with one engr sapper team per rifle platoon.

(2) Tasks

(a) Phase 1. Nil.

(b) Phase 2. Air insertion.

(c) Phase 3. Sweep AO from NE to SW.

e. V Coy

(1) Grouping. No change

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- 3 -

(2) Tasks

a. Phase 1.

- i. Move to block posns along 90 northing.
- ii. Search area NUI SAO - NUI LE.

b. Phase 2. No change.

c. Phase 3

- i. Ambush tracks crossing 90 northing.
- ii. Continue search of area NUI SAO - NUI LE.

f. Coord Instrs

(1) AO and Boundaries. Annex A. AO REMBRANDT.

(2) Timing

(a) Phase 1. Commence 120800H Feb 71.

(b) Phase 2. H hr 151100H Feb 71.

(c) Phase 3. On completion Phase 2.

(3) Air Planning Table. Issued separately.

(4) PZ. CAM MY (airstrip) YS 451911.

(5) LZs

(a) LZ 1 Fly-in LZ YS 585929

(b) LZ 2 Dummy LZ YS 560932

(c) LZ 3 Dummy LZ YS 542925.

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-4-

(6) LZ Prep

(a) LZ 1.

- i. Arty. H-25 to H-5 mins
- ii. LFT H-5 to Hhr

(b) LZ 2. Arty H+20 to H+40 mins.

(c) LZ 3 Arty H+40 to H+60 mins

(7) Planning Conference. Air planning/co-ord conference 131400H ab 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn Briefing Room. Air recce of PZ/LZs 131500H from Eagle Farm.

4. Admin and log. C Coy to deploy with five days ratio.

5. Comd and Sig. SOP and SOL.

Ack instrs: B, C, V Coys acknowledge.

A Robert
(A R ROBERTS)
Maj
for CO

Annex: A. AO and Bdrys.

Distribution list attached.

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-5-




DISTRIBUTION LIST

	<u>Copy No:</u>
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B Coy	2
C Coy	3
V Coy	4-5
Sp Coy	6
Admin Coy	7
C Sqw 1 Armd Regt	8
A Sqw 3 Cav Regt	9
107 Fd Bty	10
1 Fd Sqw	11
HQ 1 ATF	12 - 36
LO Long Le District	37
LO Duc Thuan District	38
CO	39
2ic	40
BC	41
Ops Offr	42
Adj't	43
IO	44
Sig Offr	45
oc mor Pl	46
RMO	47
QM	48
Eagle Farm	49
Comd's Diary	50 - 54
FSB GARTH (for CP)	55
CP (Ops file)	56
File	57
Spare	58 - 67

CONFIDENTIAL

Map: Sheet 6430 I
6430 II
1:50,000

AO REMBRANDT



2/25 (US)

(11) FSB
BASS

AO QUIVER

BDRY CLEAR TO
C COY 150800 UFN

BDRY CLEAR TO V COY
120800H UFN



B X V


V

CONFIDENTIAL


87

L-N

H A. TIMINGS



B. AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT



CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No of 67 ⁵⁴
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn ^{C10}
NUI DAT
13 Feb 71

Distribution list as
for Op Instr 5/71

OP INSTR 5/71

AMDT No 1.

Reference: A. Op Instr 5/71 dated 13 Feb 71.

1. Annex A to Reference A is amended by deleting Page 2 and inserting new Page 2 attached (amdt to fly-in and arty prep arrangements).


A Roberts
(A. R. ROBERTS)
Maj
for CO

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
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-2-

A. TIMINGS



B. AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT



FROM NUI DAT TO START SERIAL 2

BASS

ARTY PREP LZ 2 AND 3

CONFIDENTIAL

TASMAN

(AMDT. No 1, 13 Feb)

ANNEX A TO
OP INSTR 5/71
DATED 12 FEB 71

CONFIDENTIAL

C11

2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC)BN
NUI DAT
17 Feb 71

R569/21/1

See Distribution list

MOBILE COMBINED
CHECK POINT

Reference: A. 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC)BN R569/21/1 dated 4 Feb 71

1. Check point programme for the period 18 Feb to 28 Feb 71 is attached as Annex A.

Albert
(A. R. ROBERTS)
Major
for CO

Annex A: Check Point Programme

Distribution: List C plus V Coy

IO

1 ATF LO

Sig Offr

HOA LONG

Asst Adjt

DUC THANH

Tpt

CONFIDENTIAL

For info:

HQ 1 ATF (3)

MATT 7 ONG TRINH

Det AFV Pro Unit

NUI DAT

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX A TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC)
R 569/21/1
DATED 17 Feb 71

MOBILE CHECK POINT
PROGRAMME FEB 71

Serial (a)	Item (b)	FEBRUARY 71											
		18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	
1.	Operating Days		*		*		*	*		*	*		
2.	Timings. 1. 0830-1230 2. 1100-1500 3. 1300-1700 4. 1630-1830		1		3		2	4		1	2		
3	Police Supplied By		D T		D T		D T	D T		H L	D T		
4	Patrol Area		B		B		B	B		A	B		
5.	Frequency Designators.		40 H		40 H		27 m	27 m		27 m	27 m		
6.	Callsigns		←————— 98 —————→										

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MESSAGE FORM

FOR COMA CEN, SIGNALS USE

R 569/21/1

PRIORITY	ROUTINE	190030Z	MESSAGE NUMBER
FROM: 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC)			FEB 71
TO: LIST C plus V Coy			CLASS
C Sqn 1 Armd Regt A Sqn 3 Cav Regt			SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
1 Fd Sqn 1 ATF LO DUC THANH (2)			CONFIDENTIAL
			ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER
			G322
INFO: HQ 1 ATF (4)			

OP PHOI HOP (.) RECCO AND AMBUSH TASK A COY
 20 FEB TO 5 MAR 71 (.) VERBAL ORDERS
 ISSUED TO OC A COY (.) COY DEPLOYS BY
 ROAD ~~200000H~~ FEB TO DROP-OFF POINT
 (TO BE SELECTED) FOR MOVE ON FOOT TO
 AO PICASSO (ANNEX A) (.) TRANSIT CLEARANCE
 OF DUC THANH DISTRICT AO WILL BE OBTAINED (.)
 AO AND BDRYS INCL NECESSARY BDRY
 CLEARANCES AS IN ANNEX A (.) V COY
 VACATES AO RIDGWAY BY ~~201800H~~ FEB (.)
 A B COYS AND LO DUC THANH ACK TO CP


Page 1 of 1	Classified NO	ROBERTS OPS ERUDITE
		<i>Allobergs Maj</i>

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ANNEX A TO G2
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
G 322
OF 190 030 Z Feb

Map: Sheet
6430 11
1:50,000

AO AND BDRY



CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE FORM 569/24/1

CP13

PRECEDENCE - ACTION PRIORITY	PRECEDENCE - INFO ROUTINE	DATE-TIME GROUP 200820Z FEB 71	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS FEB 71
FROM: 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC)		E.O. 11652 CR	
TO: LIST C plus V COY		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	
1 ATF LO HOA LONG		COORDINATOR'S NUMBER 6335	
C SQN 1 ARMD REGT			
SP COY (3 ADDL COPIES)			
SIG OFFR EAGLE FARM			
INFO: HQ 1 ATF (Ops) 1 ARU			

OP PHOI HOP (1) BD/HL TASK (1) THE FOLLOWING ARRANGEMENTS ARE TO APPLY IN THE PERIOD 21 TO 27 FEB 71:

- A. 21 AND 22 FEB. SP COY (USING ONE PL SP COY AND TWO PLS ARU)
- B. 230800H FEB TWO PLS ARU UNDER
TO 260800H FEB. OP CON BN HQ. LIAISON WITH HOA LONG BY ADJT. COMMS WITH PLS ON BN COMD NET C/S 65 (2 PL 1 ARU) AND 66 (3 PL 1 ARU)
- C. From 260800H FEB SP COY (USING
TO 040800H MAR. TWO PLS ARU DURING COY RTR PERIOD).
- D. From 040800H MAR. SP COY USING ONE PL ARU. COY (-) DEPLOYED ON R/A

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES	REFERS TO MESSAGE	DRAFTER'S NAME ROBERTS	OFFICE OPS	TEL. NO. ERUDITE				
CANCELLED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		FOR OPERATOR'S USE						
DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE <i>AR Roberts</i>
								RANK <i>MAJ</i>

C14

MESSAGE FORM R 569/21/1

PRECEDENCE - ACTION	PRECEDENCE - INFO	DAYS - TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
PRIORITY	ROUTINE	200815Z	FEB 71
FROM:	2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC)		INDEX
TO:	LIST C plus V Coy CP C SQN 1 ARMD REGT A SQN 3 CAV REGT 1 FO SQN SIG OFFR EAGLE FARM		CLASSIFICATION
INFO:	1 ARU HQ 1 ATF (Ops) and (air) (2)		CONFIDENTIAL
			ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER
			G 336

READY REACTION PL (.) ARRANGEMENTS FOR PERIOD 21 FEB TO 26 FEB 71 AS FOLLOWS (.)

200800H FEB TO 230800H FEB	SP COY (2)
230800H FEB TO 250800H FEB	V COY
250800H FEB TO 260800H FEB	B COY (1)
260800H FEB	UFN
	SP COY (2)

NOTES:

1. PL TO BE IN GARTH ON 15 MIN NOTICE TO MOVE. MAX STR. FOR AIR LIFT, 28 PAX.
2. SP COY PLS ONLY. 1 ARU PLS ARE NOT TO BE EMPLOYED ON RR TASKS.

REVISED FORECAST OF OPS FOLLOWS (.)
B, V, SP COYS ACK TO CP

PAC	1	PAGES	REFERS TO MESSAGE	DRAFTER'S NAME	OFFICE	TEL NO.
			CLASSIFIED	ROBERTS	Ops	ERUDITE
			<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO			CP

Distribution (Cont)

Sp Coy (6)
Admin Coy (3)
FSB GARTH (2)
C Sqn 1 Armd Regt (3)
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt (3)
107 Fd Bty (2)
1 Fd Sqn (2)
17 Const Sqn (2)
104 Sig Sqn
161(Indep)Recce Flt
TFMA
1 ARU (2)
No 9 Sqn RAAF
HQ 1 ATF (6)
4 RAR TOWNSVILLE
7 RAR
9 RAR ENOGERRA
LO LONG LE District
LO DUC THANH District
MATT 7, ONG TRINH
CO
2IC
BC
Ops Offr
Adjt
IO
Sig Offr
OC Mor Pl
OC Aslt Pnr Pl
RMO
QM
TO
RSM
Eagle Farm
NZ Component
Asst Adjt
Chief Clerk
Movts Clerk
Comm Centre
Chaplains (2)
WO Asst Admin
Caterer
Postal Orderly
Unit Canteen
Offrs Mess
Sgts Mess
Comds Diary (5)
Spare (5)
File

CONFIDENTIAL

FORECAST OF OPERATIONS FEB - APR 71

ANNEX A TO
2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN
R569/21/1
OP PHOI HOP
 DATED FEB 71

	FEBRUARY											MARCH																							
	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20						
A	DEPLOY					R/A							→	RTND	VT	VT	RTND	DEPLOY	←																
B	GARTH					*		→	REDEPLOY	←			R/A					→	RTND	VT	VT	RTND	M	M			R	T	R	→					
C	RTND						Op con 3 RAR to 072400H Mar														→	RTND	M	M	←	R	T	R		→	VT	VT	RTND	DEPLOY	←
V	RTND	←	R	T	R				→	VT	VT	RTND	DEPLOY	←																					
	BL/HL	*	*							*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*					
		M	M	V	V	RTND				←	R	T	R	and	BD/	→																			
				(6)	(6)	(6)							(3) DEPLOY *																						

	MARCH											APRIL																				
	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19		
A				R/A												RTND	VT (1)	VT (1)	RTND	* DEPLOY	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
B	DEPLOY								R/A											RTND	VT (1)	VT (1)	RTND	DEPLOY					R/A			
C				GARTH						REDEPLOY					R/A										RTND	VT (1)	VT (1)	RTND	DEPLOY	R/A		
V		R/A				RTND	VT	VT	RTND	* DEPLOY	*	*				GARTH				REDEPLOY				R/A								
SP with 3 & 4 Pls ARU	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
		BD/HL							RTND	VT (4)	VT (4)	RTND (4)	DEPLOY								R/A			RTND	BD/HL (5)		DEPLOY	R/A				

.. / Notes:

- Notes:
1. Members nominated for Advance Party may accompany sub-units to VT but are not permitted leave outside 1 ALSG area.
 2. Ready Reaction Pl to be in GARTH on 15 mins notice to move from 241800 to 260800H Feb.
 3. Sp Coy is to operate as follows wef 4 Mar 71:
 - a. Deployed. Coy HQ (-) with one pl Sp Coy and one pl ARU.
 - b. Nui Dat. Elm Coy HQ with under comd:
 - (1) RR Pl. Pl of Sp Coy.
 - (2) BD/HL. One pl ARU.
 4. Sp Coy VT period includes one pl ARU. Other ARU pl remains BD/HL under op con BnHQ.
 5. One pl ARU to VT with C Coy. Remainder of Sp Coy provide RR pl and BD/HL task.
 6. Two ARU pls provide BD/HL under op con BnHQ.
 7. V Coy assumes RR pl task 230800H from Sp Coy and relinquishes 241800H Feb to B Coy.

Legend:

RTND	Return to NUI DAT
VT	VUNG TAU
ND	NUI DAT
R/A	Reconnaissance and Ambush Operations
RTR	Retraining Period
BD/HL	Base Defence/HOA LONG Area
*	Coy marked provides one pl as TF Ready Reaction Force <u>in NUI DAT</u> on 15 minutes notice to move.
M	Period allotted to base defence works as directed by Base Def Comd

CONFIDENTIAL

R 617/1/1A C16

MESSAGE FORM

PRECEDENCE - ACTION ROUTINE	PRECEDENCE - INFO ROUTINE	DATE - TIME GROUP 2300030Z	MESSAGE INDICATOR Feb 71
FROM: 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC)			CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
TO: List C plus V Coy 1 ATF(2) HQ COY 1 ATF 104 Sig Sqn(2) 8 Fd Amb 106 Fd Wksp (2)			OPERATOR'S ID NO G 347
INFO: File R 569/21/1			

OP PHOI HOP (.) BASE PATROLS BY MINOR
UNITS (.) OUR G 203 OF 310100Z JAN 71 (.)
PTL FORECAST FOR PERIOD 28 FEB TO 31 MAR 71:

Serial	Item	P+1	P+1	P+1
1	Ptl Serial	26/71	27/71	28/71
2	Unit	106 Fd Wksp	104 Sig Sqn	HQ COY 1 ATF
3	Controlled By	Sp Coy	Sp Coy	Sp Coy
4	Task	Fighting	Fighting	Fighting.
5	Strength (min)	1 NCO/14 OR	1 NCO/14 OR	1 NCO/14 OR
6	DTG OUT	151700H	231700H	When tps
7	DTG IN	171700H	251700H	aval.
8	Remarks	MAR 71	MAR 71	Between 15 and 31 Mar*

OCs OF MINOR UNITS ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE
DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS WITH OC SP COY (.)

* HQ COY to advise suitable dates.

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES	REPORT TO ADDRESS	DRAFTER'S NAME ROBERTS	OFFICE OPS	TEL NO. ERUDITE CP
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		FOR OPERATOR'S USE DATE TIME SYSTEM OPERATOR DATE TIME SYSTEM OPERATOR		
RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE Allbert maj			DATE	

C17

R 569/21/1

PRECEDENCE - ACTION ROUTINE	PRECEDENCE - INFO ROUTINE	DATE - TIME GROUP 220620Z	MESSAGE NUMBER FEB 71
FROM: 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN			CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
TO: Distribution list as for Op Forecast dated 22 Feb 71			CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
INFO:			CLASSIFICATION G 346

OP PHOI HOP (.) FORECAST OF OPERATION
 FEB - APR 71 (.) REF OUR R569/21/1 DATED
 22 FEB 71 (.) AMEND ANNEX A TO REF
 AS FOLLOWS:

Page 2. A Coy. Dates 9 to 19 Apr incl
 - delete "*" in each column (Sp
 Coy to supply RR pl.
Sp Coy. Dates 30, 31 MAR and
 1 Apr. Delete "*" in these
 three columns (V Coy TO
 SUPPLY RR pl).

PAGES		REFERS TO MESSAGE	DRAFTER'S NAME	OFFICE	TEL NO.
		CLASSIFIED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	ROBERTS	Ops	ERUDITE CP
FOR OPERATOR'S USE				RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	
DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	DATE	TIME
				Allobert Maj.	

REF FORM 52

C18

2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn
NUI DAT

R541/1/17

24 Feb 71

List A

GENERAL INSTRUCTION
EXERCISE LIFESAVER
AMENDMENT NO 1


Reference: A, 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn R841/1/17 dated 26 Jan 71.

1. The General Instruction for Exercise LIFESAVER issued with Reference A is amended as follows:

a. In the following places:

Appendix 1 to Annex B Page 2 para 11 line 2,
Appendix 1 to Annex B Page 2 para 13 line 2,
Appendix 1 to Annex B Page 2 para 15 line 2,
Appendix 2 to Annex B Page 2 para 6.b.,
Appendix 2 to Annex B Page 2 para 6.c.,
Appendix 2 to Annex B Page 2 para 6.d.,
Appendix 4 to Annex C Page 2 para 3.f.(4)(b),
Appendix 4 to Annex C Page 2 para 3.f.(4)(c), and
Appendix 4 to Annex C Page 2 para 3.f.(4)(d),

delete "are obviously not friendly"
insert "are not obviously friendly".



(A.R. ROBERTS)
Maj
for CO

R569/18/1

24 Feb 71

See Distribution List

2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN/384 RF COY
COMBINED OPERATION 2 - 5 FEB 71
AFTER ACTION REPORT

Reference: A. Series L7014, VIETNAM, BINH BA, Sheet 6430 III, Edition 3,
1:50,000.

Type of Operation

1. This was a five-day reconnaissance and search operation by 384 RF Coy advised by Mobile Advisory and Training Team (MATT) 6 AATTV, with additional liaison and artillery support by 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn and MATT 11.

Dates of Operation

2. 2 to 5 Feb 71.

Location

3. The operations was conducted in an AO allotted by 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn in the southern portion of the NUI DINH hills, centre of mass YS 335655.

Control Headquarters

4. The operation was controlled jointly by Sub-Sector HQ at HOA LONG and HQ 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn at NUI DAT.

Task Organization

5. a. 384 RF Coy (-), strength 70. A security element remained at the Coy base YS 424648.
b. Liaison party, strength 15.

Intelligence

6. Current intelligence on the area was supplied by 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn Intelligence Section.

7. There were no significant intelligence results.

Mission and Concept of Operations

8. A satisfactory operational plan for the search of the AO was produced by the company commander in that the First and Second Platoons were used for reconnaissance and search with the Coy HQ controlling operations from a patrol base supported by the heavy weapons platoon.

../ Execution

Execution9. Sequence of Events.

- a. 010845H Feb 71. Planning and co-ordination conference at NUI DAT. Air recce of AO by company commander and platoon commanders with advisers and liaison staff.
- b. 011600H Feb 71. Liaison party joined 384 RF Coy at HOA LONG.
- c. 020800H Feb 71. Coy HQ and heavy weapons platoon deployed in AO by air. Two rifle platoons deployed on foot in the southern area of the AO from road transport.
- d. 2 to 5 Feb 71. Reconnaissance and search in AO.
- e. 051230H Feb 71. Coy and liaison party departed AO by road transport to coy base at HOA LONG.

Results

10.
 - a. 021600H Feb 71. A lying-up area for five to seven persons located at YS 351638. The camp was approximately one week old.
 - b. 022030H Feb 71. Lights on spur line in the area of YS 348638 were observed moving north.
 - c. 030900H Feb 71. Cotton wool and medical instructional lesson plans were found in area YS 348640. The stores had been abandoned not more than 24 hours earlier.
 - d. 031945H Feb 71. Movement approached western sentry of an ambush position at YS 340641. Movement ceased when noise was made by troops standing-to. A sweep at 040800H showed four to five enemy had withdrawn SW.
 - e. 041430H Feb 71. Old tin shed showing signs of recent use within two to four days located at YS326658. Shed destroyed.
 - f. 051000H Feb 71. Large cave system located in area YS 326646 with very old satchel charge placed on entrance to one of the caves.
 - g. 051030H Feb 71. Three VC sighted at temple/pagoda YS 325639 during extraction of coy. Enemy withdrew east.

Lessons Learned

11. Reporting Information. Platoon commanders did not always report progress and information regularly. The incident in para 10 g., was not reported until the company was on Route 15 at the RV. It was then too late to follow-up.
12. Navigation. More training and practice in map reading, including compass work, is necessary. LOCSTATS were rarely accurate enough for safe and effective fire support to have been provided if contacts had occurred.

13. Noise. Noise when on the move should be reduced.

14. Obstacle Crossing. Leading elements crossing an obstacle such as a stream must provide security until all troops have crossed. Flank protection must also be ensured.


Administration and Logistics

15. Water Resupply. Each RF soldier had only one water canteen, though a redistribution provided those moving on foot with two before deployment. Time available for patrolling was reduced because of the need for frequent resupply from local water. Some security was lost when resupply of water by air was necessary. An increase in the RF personal scale to three canteens should be made a high priority requirement if RF coys are to be fully effective in reconnaissance and ambush tasks.

16. Cooking. Wood fires were used, with consequent loss of security. Solid fuel should be made available for field operations.

Comment

17. This coy is fit and its morale is high. Basic tactical drills are well understood and the coy moved well over difficult country. The value and result of continuous liaison, advice and example by a MATT at coy level was obvious.


Lt Col
CO

Distribution:

Copy No

DSA LONG LE District	1 - 5 (incl copies for MATTs 6 and 11)
A Coy	6
B Coy	7
C Coy	8
V Coy	9
OIC Liaison Party (Capt A.J. BOOTH)	10 - 12
107 Fd Bty	13
HQ 1 ATF	14 - 16
1 ATF LO LONG LE District	17
1 ATF LO BARIA	18
AATTV C/- Sector HQ BARIA	19
CO	20
2IC	21
BC	22
Ops Offr	23
IO	24
Comd's Diary	25 - 29
Spare	30 - 34
File	35

MESSAGE FORM

R 569/21/1

C70

PRECEDENCE - ACTION ROUTINE	PRECEDENCE - INFO ROUTINE	DATE-TIME GROUP 250030Z	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS FEB 71
FROM: 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC)			CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
TO: List C plus V Coy 107 Fd Bty BC LO LONG LE DISTRICT LO DUC THANH DISTRICT			ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER G 362
INFO: EAGLE FARM HQ 1 ATF (Ops and Air Cell) (2)			

OP PHOI HOP (.) FORECAST OF OPS FEB/MAR 71 (.)
 THE FOLLOWING ADDL ACTIVITIES ARE PROPOSED (.)
 ALFA (.) COMBINED OP B COY/945 RF COY 28 FEB TO
 3 MAR IN AREA CENTRE OF MASS YS 3886 (.)
 B COY REMAINS IN AREA TO APPROX 10 MAR (.) OP
 INSTR FOLLOWS (.) PROPOSE DEPLOY 945 RF COY BY
 AIR 28 FEB (.) AIR PLANNING CONFERENCE 27 FEB (.)
 BRAVO (.) C COY NOW FROM OPCON 3 RAR 3 MAR (.)
 INTEND RTND 4 MAR, DEPLOY PM 4 MAR TO AREA
 YS 3882 RTND 8 MAR (.) CHARLIE (.) OPS BY
 386 RF COY WITH LIAISON 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) IN
 AREA YS 3274 2 MAR TO 5 MAR AND IN
 AREA YS 3071 11 MAR TO 16 MAR (.) OP
 INSTRS TO FOLLOW (.) AIR PLANNING CONFERENCE
 FOR OP 2 TO 5 MAR ON 1 MAR 71 (.) LO FOR
 BOTH 386 RF COY OPS CAPT P. R. RADCLIFFE
 A COY (.) DELTA (.) FOR AIR CELL 1 ATF (.) EXPECT
 AIR INSERTIONS AM 28 FEB AND AM 2 MAR
 FOR RF COYS AND PM 4 MAR FOR C COY

PAC Lc PAGES	REFERS TO MESSAGE	DRAFTER'S NAME ROBERTS	OFFICE OPS	TEL NO. ERUDITE
CLASSIFIED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		FOR OPERATOR'S USE		
DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE <i>Al Roberts</i> RANK Major.
12			3	

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 1 of 3

Copy No 41 of 50

2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn
NUI DAT

25/6/71 H Feb 71

R569/21/1

OPS 27

OpO 5/71 (Op PALUMA)

1. Sit
 - a. En forces. Intelligence; Annex A.
 - b. Friendly forces
 - (1) V Coy. Cont ops in AO QUIVER.
 - (2) US. 1/5 (Mech) Bn cont ops in area YT3300.
 - (3) RTAVF. 2/2 Bn RTAVF cont ops in area YS3287.
2. Msn. To eliminate HQ SR4.
3. Execution. Combined op with DUC THANH District RF.
 - a. Gen outline. In three phases:
 - (1) Phase 1. RF Coy deploys by air to block posn.
 - (2) Phase 2. One coy deploys by APC and foot to search area.
 - (3) Phase 3. Search op.
 - b. B Coy
 - (1) Grouping. Normal op atts plus in sp for Phase 2:
3 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt (less one sect).
 - (2) Tasks
 - (a) Phase 1. Nil.
 - (b) Phase 2. Move by APC and on foot from NDP GARTH to AO SEANA.
 - (c) Phase 3. Search AO SEANA. Be prep to cont op until 081000H (Mar 71) orders separately.
 - c. 626 RF Coy
 - (1) Grouping. Normal op atts plus in sp: Arty LO party.
One ARVN interpreter.
 - (2) Tasks

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(2) Tasks

- (a) Phase 1. Deploy by air from DUC THANH to AO BETH commencing at 280850H (Feb 71).
 - (b) Phase 2. Move to block posns along inter-coy bdry.
 - (c) Phase 3. Remain in block posns until extraction commencing 031100H (Feb 71).
- d. 3 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt. Tp less one sect in sp B Coy for mov from NDP GARTH to AO SEANA.
- e. 107 Fd Bty. Sect loc FSB LINDY in sp all phases. One LO party in sp 626 RF Coy from 280800H (Feb 71).
- f. Co-ord Instrs
- (1) AOs and Bdrys. Annex B.
 - (2) Timings
 - (a) Phase 1. H hr 280900H (Feb 71).
 - (b) Phase 2. B Coy move commences NOT before 281100H (Feb 71). 626 RF Coy move to block posns on completion Phase 1.
 - (c) Phase 3. On completion Phase 2.
 - (3) Air
 - (a) Air Planning Conference. 271400H (Feb 71) at HQ 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn.
 - (b) PZ. Airstrip YS463780.
 - (c) IZ. YS367867.
 - (d) LZ Prep
 - (i) Arty. 280835 - 280855H (Feb 71).
 - (ii) LFT. 280855 - 280900H (Feb 71).
 - (4) Bdry Clearance
 - (a) AO BETH. 626 RF Coy have bdry clearance for all bdrys from 280900H (Feb 71) - 031100H (Mar 71).
 - (b) AO SEANA. B Coy have bdry clearance for northern bdry from 280900H (Feb 71) to 081000H (Mar 71).

4. Admin and Log

a. Rat

- (1) B Coy carry 5 days rat.

/(2) 626 RF Coy

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- 3 -

(2) 625 RF Coy carry 3 days rat.

b. Water. Water resup by air if req.

5. Comd and Sig

a. HQ 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn NUI DAT ex overall con. Reports and LOCSTATS from:

(1) B Coy dir.

(2) 626 RF Coy via Arty LO party.

b. Liaison. Arty LO party 626 RF Coy maint liaison with B Coy via arty net.

Ack Instrs: ACK to ERUDITE CP (Serials marked * only).

Al Robert Maj
for Lt Col
CO

Annexes: A. Intelligence.

B. AOs and Bdrys (trace).

<u>Distribution:</u>	<u>*Ack</u>	<u>Copy No</u>
A Coy		1
B Coy	*	2
C Coy		3
V Coy		4
Sp Coy		5
Admin Coy		6
C Sqn 1 Armd Regt		7 - 8
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt	*	9 - 10
107 Fd Bty		11
1 Fd Sqn	*	12
HQ 1 ATF		13 - 18
District Chief DUC THANH		19 - 20
LO DUC THANH District	*	21
CO		22
2IC		23
BC		24 - 25
Ops Offr		26
Adjt		27
IO		28
Sig Offr		29
OC Mor Pl		30
RMO		31
QM		32
TO		33
RSM		34
Eagle Farm		35
NZ Component		36
Comds Diary		37 - 41
Spare (held by G Clerk)		42 - 46
FSB GARTH (for CP)		47
CP Ops file		48
File (incl combined ops file)		49 - 50

*ACK required to ERUDITE CP (radio or telephone).

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ANNEX A TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
OP INSTR 5/71
DATED 25 FEB 71

INTELLIGENCE

1. General The jungle area along the SONG CA, SUOI CA and SUOI SOC, has long been used by various VC units as a base area, and, as it lies on the important communications-liaison route linking the NUI MAY TAO/NUI BE Base area, the VIET CUONG area, the BINH SON resupply area and BIEN HOA and the RUNG SAT SECRET ZONE in the West there is at all times some level of VC activity in the area.

2. Units in the Area

- a. HQ SR 4 Little is known of HQ SR 4 which is located along the SUOI SOC in vicinity of YS3788. Strength of the HQ element, including protection elements is approximately 30 persons. Morale is fairly low.
- b. K10 aka H10 HOSPITAL Unit K10 is subordinate to SR 4 and cares for all minor wounds suffered by SR 4 units. The strength of K10 is approximately 13 persons, with, in early February reportedly 3-4 patients. K10 is believed to be in the vicinity of YS385882.
- c. 274 Regt Although 274 Regt is not located in the area small groups of subordinate Rear Service elements move through en route to the VIET CUONG/CHAU LAC area.
- d. Being a major communications-liaison route couriers of almost any MR 7 unit at times pass through the area.

3. The southern part of the area appeared to be devoid of any major enemy activity for a period of some months. It has in the past been used by CHAU DUC and the now disbanded D440. Contacts by elements of 2nd Bde 25 Inf Division (US) also indicate that the greater part of enemy activity is confined to the area close to the Province border.

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AOs AND BDRYS

ANNEX B TO
2RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN
OP INSTR 5/71
DATED 25 FEB 71

MAP: SERIES L7014
Sheet's 6430 III
6430 N




V

B-V

B-V

B-



B COY
BDRY
CLEARANCE

2/25(US)

AO SEANA
280900H
TO
081000H
MAR

626 RF COY
BDRY
CLEARANCE

AO QUIVER

626
RF
COY

AO BETH
280800H FEB
TO 031100H MAR

626

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2/25(US)

RTAVF

RTAVF



AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

C22


R572/1/18

HQ 1 ATF
NUI DAT

25 Feb 71

1 ATF STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES
FOR OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM (REVISED JAN 71)

1. The above publication is amended as follows:
 - a. By cancelling the existing index to Chapter 4, Part 1 and inserting the attached new index.
 - b. By adding to Chapter 4, Part 1, the attached Sections 1 to 4.
 - c. In Part 1, (General Staff Branch) Annex C to Chapter 6, Serial 8,
 - (1) Delete "HQ Coy Admin Respons"
 - d. In the Preface, page VI, below signature block insert "10 Feb 71".
 - e. In Chapter 2, Part 1, Section 2, page 2-7, paras 222b; 222c,
 - (1) Delete "obviously not friendly",
 - (2) Insert "not obviously friendly".



(I.M. SIMPSON)
Capt
For Comd

Distribution

As for SOP.

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VII

CHAPTER 4 - TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES

INDEX

<u>Section</u>	<u>Contents</u>	<u>Para Nos</u>	<u>Page Nos</u>
1	<u>RANGES AND SAFETY</u>		
	General	401	
	1 ATF Range Safety board	402-404	
	Ranges	405-407	
	Bookings and clearance procedure	408-	
	Range Orders	409	
	Types of Weapons to be used	410	
	Demolition - Blinds	411	
	Explosive Weapons	412	
	Hand grenades	414	
	Blinds	415	
	Medical	416	
	Range Maintenance and Supervision	418	
	Safety	419	
	Danger Areas	420-424	
	Range Overlay	425	
	Horseshoe Range	426-427	
	Types of Weapons allowed to be fired	428-430	
2	<u>TEST FIRING OF WEAPONS IN 1 ATF BASE</u>		
	General	431-434	
	AFV Function Pits	435	
	Clearance for Test Firing	436	
	AFV MG Function Tests	437	
	Safety Criteria	438	
		.../3	

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3	<u>1 ATF COURES AND TRAINING</u>	
	General	439
	Theatre Introduction	440
	Subject A and C for first promotion and promotion to Sergeant	441
	Subject A for Warrant Rank	442
	Subject C for Warrant Rank	443
	Specialist Courses run under MACV direction	444
	Unit Courses	445
	Education and Projectionist Courses	446
4	<u>TRAINING ASSISTANCE TO TERRITORIAL FORCES</u>	
	General	447-448
	Assistance to the VAN KIEP National Training Centre	449
	Reserved paragraphs	450-460
5	<u>STAFF DUTIES (SD)</u>	
	General	461-462
6	<u>VISITORS</u>	
	General	463-464
	Itineraries and Sponsoring	465-466
	Briefing	467-468
	Use of Aircraft	469
	<u>ANNEXES TO CHAPTER 4</u>	
	A. Small Arms Function Test Pit (Remaining Annexes to be issued at a later date).	

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4-1

CHAPTER 4

TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES
SECTION 1 - RANGES AND SAFETY

General

401. The provisions of the following references are to be observed during the conduct of range practices on 1 ATF Ranges unless other instructions are issued by HQ 1 ATF:

- a. Infantry Training Volume 3, Ranges and Courses, Phamphlet 33, 1967.
- b. Manual of Army Safety "Provisional".
- c. Field Engineering and Mine Warfare. Phamphlet 10 (Aust), Mine Anti-Personnel "Claymore".

1 ATF Range Safety Board

402. The 1 ATF Range Safety Board, presided over by DAQMG HQ 1 ATF is to issue instructions for practices other than those listed in the above reference. These will be occasioned by the introduction of new weapons, by special or unusual training, or by existing weapons required to meet operational tasks.

403. The 1 ATF Range Safety Board is composed of:

- a. DAQMG 1 ATF - President
- b. DCRE 198 Works Section - Member
- c. GSO3 (SD) 1 ATF - Member
- d. Officer from Arty Tac - Member
- e. Other co-opted members as required.

404. The tasks of the Range Safety Board are:

- a. To inspect for safety all new or re-constructed ranges and function test pits prior to use.
- b. To issue formal Board proceeding related to such inspections.
- c. To promulgate instructions relating to matters of Range Safety in 1 ATF Base and on training.
- d. To comment on the application of safety instructions on investigations involving injury to personnel or damage to Commonwealth property in training.
-/e. To ensure

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4-2

e. To ensure, by a system of regular visits, that units are complying with relevant safety publications and instructions and furthermore, are being updated on current safety doctrine.

Ranges

405. a. The table below lists the authorized ranges in the 1 ATF Base area. It should be noted that the following old ranges are now out of use:

(1) Range 7.

(2) Firing of 20 Pdr HE from Range 5B.

406. Three new Small Arms ranges 2A, 2B and 2C have been added to the existing facilities.

407.

RANGE NUMBER TITLE	GRID REFERENCE OF FIRING MOUND	RANGE OWNER UNIT	AXIS OF FIRE CENTRE OF ARC (MILS)
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1A	YS44326875	1/3/7 RAR	1000
1B	YS44446895	1/3/7 RAR	0600
1C	YS44416885	1/3/7 RAR	1600
2A	YS44856836	1/3/7 RAR	1000
2B	YS44936818	1/3/7 RAR	1000
2C	YS44946785	1/3/7 RAR	1000
3	YS44906740	2/4/6 RAR	1300
4	YS44906714	2/4/6 RAR	1300
5A (SA)	YS44896680	A/B/C SQN 1 Armd Regt	1300
5B (.30, .50 Cal) (20 Pdr APC, BC)	YS45006685	A/B/C SQN 1 Armd Regt	1300
6A	YS45136644	1 ARU	1300
6B	YS45366654	1 ARU	0720
8 (25 metre)	YS44186570	1 ARU	3200
9A	YS49006710	A/B/C Sqn 3 Cav Regt	5800
9B	YS48926716	A/B/C Sqn 3 Cav Regt	6300
9C	YS48786716	A/B/C Sqn 3 Cav Regt	6150
9D	YS48706716	A/B/C Sqn 3 Cav Regt	5500
9E	YS48616722	A/B/C Sqn 3 Cav Regt	0200
9F	YS48486730	A/B/C Sqn 3 Cav Regt	6400
10	YS43966658	1 ATF Gun Club	2100

Note: 1. Firing for .30, .50 cal and 20 Pdr APC, BC is to take place down range at Grid Reference shown as Range 5B. 20Pdr APC, BC is to be fired for Zeroing purposes only on a fixed line of 1200 mils

.... /408.

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4-3

Bookings and Clearance Procedure.

408. a. Range bookings are to be made through G Branch 1 ATF (EBONY 25) at least 48 hours in advance. G Branch is to co-ordinate bookings and ~~to give~~ tentative confirmation or otherwise to requesting unit.
- b. The following procedure is to be followed by G Branch 1 ATF on receipt of a request for use of a range.
- (1) Check availability of range (other booking).
 - (2) Check Base Patrol locations and movements for day and time required.
 - (3) By 1700 hours on day prior to range practice notify 1 ATF CP of next days range programme.
- c. Before proceeding to the range, user units are to join the Task Force Command Net (VHF) and verify that the ranges are cleared for use. User units are to use call sign "HERMITAGE HOUSE" followed by the range number e.g. "HERMITAGE HOUSE ONE CHARLIE" identifies the user unit for Range 1C.
- d. User unit are to maintain communications on the Task Force Command Net (VHF).
- e. On arrival at the Range, user units are to request ground and air clearance from Arty Tac through Duty Officer 1 ATF CP.
- f. 1 ATF Duty Officer is to obtain normal ground clearance from unit controlling the ground in which the respective range danger area lies.
- g. Prior to granting clearance Arty Tac is to contact flanking unit and users of flanking ranges where safety may be affected.
- h. Under no circumstances is firing to take place before ground and air clearances are confirmed.
- i. Communications are to be maintained for the duration of the practice. Should communications fail, firing is to stop until communications are re-established.

.... /j. User

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4-4

j. User units are to inform 1 ATF CP:

(1) When practice is completed and

(2) When the user has left the range. At this time permission is to be sought to leave the net.

k. G Branch (EBONY 25) is to be informed immediately of any alterations to original bookings.

Range Orders.

409. "Range Orders and Safety Instructions" for all ranges are to be issued as a separate 1 ATF instruction. All proposed amendments are to be passed to 1 ATF Safety Officer for vetting and final clearance by G Branch HQ 1 ATF before publication.

Types of Weapons to be Used.

410. The following types of weapons may only be fired on the ranges designated below:

- a. Ranges 1A, 2A, 2B, 2C, 4, 5A, and 6A: GPMG M60, M16, AR(LMG), MMG and SLR (Pistol).
- b. Range 1B : M72, Rifle grenade.
- c. Range 1C : M79, Claymore.
- d. Range 6B : M72, M79, Claymore, Rifle grenade, Hand grenades M26, M61, M67.
- e. Range 8 : M16, SLR(L1A1), AR(L2A1), Pistol, SMG, GPMG M60.
- f. Range 9 : .30 cal MG only.
- g. Range 10.: 12 guage shotgun using size 6 or 7 shot only.

Demolition/Blinds.

411. The destruction of blinds or the blowing of engineer demolitions during reinforcement training is only to be conducted after a suitable AO has been granted by EBONY CP. Normal clearance procedures are to apply for both air and ground clearance.

Explosive Weapons.

412. Particular attention is to be paid to paragraph 410 above and units are to ensure that only weapons designated are fired on the ranges listed.

413. SAS Sqn is permitted to conduct special LRRP training using M79 and WP grenades in the open. For these exercises Range 6A is to be used for manouvre and Range 6B impact area for targets. (1 ATF Q0360 of 240600Z Feb 70 refers).

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.../Hand Grenades.

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4-5-

Hand Grenades.

414. Range 6B is the only authorized grenade throwing facility in 1 ATF Base.

Blinds.

415. The following procedures are to be observed regarding locations and destruction of blinds:

a. Blind location charts are to be maintained at the firing points on the following ranges:

(1) Range 1B,

(2) Range 1C,

(3) Range 5 and

(4) Range 6B.

b. Officers/WOs in charge of explosive weapon practices are to mark the locations of all blinds using a prismatic compass. Details of bearing, range and type of blind are to be shown on the blind location chart.

c. Every effort must be made to accurately locate and mark all blinds before quitting the range. If practicable the 1 ATF ATO is to be contacted through TFMA CP (EBONY 97) and blinds will be destroyed before the party leaves the range. Unqualified personnel are not to attempt to move or destroy any blind located on the ranges.

d. Any blind occurrence is to be reported to the owner unit CP at the conclusion of the practice, irrespective of whether it has been destroyed or not. In the case of undestroyed blinds, the unit responsible for the practice is to ensure that the final destruction of the blind is carried out without delay.

Medical.

416. During all firing practices a first aid kit is to be in position at the range site. Ear protection is to be used by all members on the range during firing.

417. Reserved.

Range Maintenance and Supervision.

418. a. The owner unit is to ensure that its ranges are kept in a tidy and safe condition at all times. User units are to remove all produce and range stores at the conclusion of practices.

.../b. Owner

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4-6

- b. Owner units are to make regular inspections of the ranges and facilities. Damaged items such as target holders and arc markers are to be replaced as necessary.
- c. The practice of using steel pickets or sheeting for target stands is prohibited.
- d. OC 1 ARU and his staff are responsible for overall inspection of ranges and supervision of range procedures on behalf of HQ 1 ATF. All breaches are to be reported to Duty Officer EBONY CP.

Safety.

419. General Safety Precautions for Small Arms and Field Firing Ranges are contained in Chapter 1 of Infantry Training, Volume 3, Ranges and Courses, Pamphlet 33, 1967. The following additional safety measures are to be implemented:

- a. Warning Signs. Permanent warning signs are erected at likely entry points to the danger areas, and on tracks in the range area.
- b. Red Flags. Red flags are to be raised by user units, adjacent to the warning signs referred to in sub para a. above, to indicate that range practices are being held. In addition, a red flag is to be located on the mound at the range in use.
- c. Axes of Fire. Axes of fire are laid down in column (d) of paragraph 407. Posts are to be erected along each side of the range with a distinguishing letter L or R as applicable on the top. These indicate Left or Right of arc to clearly delineate the bounds of the target area and fire lanes.
- d. Sentries. Prior to firing the Claymore mine or M72 Grenade Launcher, not less than two sentries are to be posted to give warning to anyone approaching the target area along the tracks.
- e. Minimum Ranges. Other than for pistols, no targets may be engaged at less than 25 metres.

Danger Areas.

420. The tables below show the maximum safety distances forward of the firing point on a particular range in relation to other ranges. Weapons are grouped in accordance with their danger areas. It is to be noted that Range 8 and Range 10 are excluded from the tables as their use does not affect the use of other ranges.

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4-7

421. Groupings are as follows:

- a. Group 1 - GPMG M60, LMG, MMG, M16, SLR.
- b. Group 2 - M79 and Claymore.
- c. Group 3 - M72 and Rifle Grenade.
- d. Group 4 - Hand Grenades M26, M61, M67.
- e. Group 5 - .30, .50 cal.
- f. Group 6 - 20 Pdr.

RANGE IN USE	SAFETY DISTANCE FORWARD OF FIRING POINT (METRES)												
	1A	1B	1C	2A	2B	2C	3	4	5A	5B	6A	6B	9A-F
1A	-	US	US	200	400	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL
1B	US	-	US	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL
1C	US	US	-	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL
2A	NL	NL	NL	-	100	400	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL
2B	NL	NL	NL	100	-	250	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL
2C	NL	NL	NL	200	50	-	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL
3	NL	NL	NL	NL	400	200	-	100	400	400	NL	200	NL
4	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	400	100	-	300	200	200	200	NL
5A	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	300	100	-	US	500	US	NL
5B	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	400	400	300	US	-	200	US	NL
6A	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	400	400	200	-	US	NL
6B	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	400	300	200	100	US	-	NL
9A-F	NL	NL	NL	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	-

NOTE: When Ranges 3, 4, 5A and/or 6A are in use access to Range 9A-F from Route TL 52 is to be East of Easting 48.

LEGEND: US - Unsafe
NL - No Limit

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4-8

422. Ranges 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A, 2B, 2C, 4, 6A and 6B may all operate freely in relation to Range 9 as long as the restrictions in the above table are observed.
423. When Range 9 is in use care **must** be taken to see that firing ceases before F target is reached.
424. Due to the possibility of finding blinds down range, Safety Officers are directed to exercise strict **control** over movement beyond the firing point eg.
- a. Use the cut tracks to target areas on Ranges 1B, 1C, and 6B.
 - b. On Ranges 1A, 2A, 2B, 2C, 3, 4, 5B and 6A foot movement should not be in excess of 400 metres forward of the firing point at any time.
 - c. "RUN DOWN" practices are not to be conducted on small arms ranges until the unit Safety Officer has personally inspected the area over which the practice is to be held.

Range Overlay.

425. Units are to be issued with a revised range overlay on maps BINH BA/XUYEN MOC 1:25,000.

Horseshoe Range.

426. Range located at FSB HORSESHOE and known as HORSESHOE 25 Metre Small Arms Range has been opened for use.
427. The range is located on the western side of the HORSESHOE HILL at grid reference YS48956220 with an axis of fire 2060 mils.

Types of Weapons Allowed to be Fired.

- 428.
- a. Rifle 7,62mm SLR L1A1 and L2A1.
 - b. Rifle Automatic 5.56mm M16.
 - c. GPMG M60 7.62mm.
 - d. Sub Machine Gun 9mm F1.
 - e. Pistols 9mm.
429. Practices are to be conducted in accordance with instructions issued.
430. 3 RAR CP is responsible for range bookings, ground and air clearances.

.../431.

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4-9

SECTION 2 - TEST FIRING OF WEAPONS IN 1 ATF BASE

General

431. Test firing consists of two tests:
- a. Accuracy test.
 - b. Function test.
432. Test firing is not to be used for expending old or surplus ammunition, familiarization range practices should be conducted for this purpose.
433. Accuracy tests should only take place on an authorized range.
434. Test firing for function may take place on an authorized range or in a Function Pit. These pits are to be constructed and used in accordance with Annex A to this chapter. Before a pit may be used it is to be inspected and approved by 1 ATF Safety Board.

AFV Function Pits

435. The armoured and cavalry squadrons may have function pits of a design approved by 1 ATF Safety Board for testing MGs mounted on AFV.

Clearance and Test Firing

436. Test firing of weapons is normally to take place between 0730 and 1730 daily. With the exception of AFV MGs, no clearance is necessary for test firing in an approved function pit between those times. Outside those times the approval of HQ 1 ATF CP (Operations) must be obtained.

AFV MG Function Tests

437. Before AFV MGs are tested into an approved function pit an air clearance must be obtained from Arty Tac. The approval of HQ 1 ATF CP (Operations) must also be sought for test firing outside the period 0730-1730 daily.

Safety Criteria

438. The function test pit is to be constructed and used as follows:
- a. It is to be sited on the perimeter where possible so that direction of fire is to the outside of the perimeter.

.../ b. It

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4-10

- b. It is to be constructed in accordance with the sketch plans as shown in Annex A and inspected and approved by the 1 ATF Safety Board before use.
- c. The impact area must consist of loose sand or laterite which is free of rocks, shale or any material likely to cause ricochets.
- d. The firer must stand in the pit to test fire the weapon.
- e. When getting into or out of the pit the weapon must be in the clear condition. The weapon may only be brought to readiness to fire in the pit with the muzzle pointing towards the impact area.
- f. The person test firing is to be supervised by another person to ensure that safety precautions are observed. The supervisor ~~isto~~ check weapons and clear before allowing them to be laid aside in the pit or removed from the pit.
- g. Where a series of weapons are to be tested only sufficient ammunition for each weapon is to be located in the test pit.

SECTION 3 - 1 ATF COURSES AND TRAINING

General

439. Members of 1 ATF may be required to attend the following courses/training in SVN.

- a. Theatre introduction.
- b. Subjects A and C for first promotion and promotion to **Sergeant**.
- c. Subject A for Warrant Rank.
- d. Subject C for Warrant Rank.
- e. Specialist courses run under MACV direction.
- f. Unit courses run to introduce new weapons/techniques.
- g. Education and Projectionist Courses.

.../Theatre

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4-11

Theatre Introduction

440. This course is run by units newly arrived in theatre and by ARU to introduce troops to local weapons, conditions and techniques. ARU are responsible for covering these subjects with infantry reinforcements.

Subjects A and C for First Promotion and Promotion to Sergeant

441. Units are to apply to HQ 1 ATF for approval to run the course. The application is to include a copy of the detailed programme. On completion of the course the unit is to submit to HQ 1 ATF an AAF A2 (Proceedings of Board) together with a nominal roll showing results.

Subject A for Warrant Rank

442. The same procedure as for para 428, except that HQ 1 ATF must seek approval from and pass proceedings to HQ AFV.

Subject C for Warrant Rank

443. Examinations for Subject C for Warrant Rank are held on the second Monday in March and the second Monday in September each year. Nominations will be submitted to HQ 1 ATF on 7 January and 7 July. A unit will be nominated to conduct coaching courses. As soon as the panel of examinees is known, HQ 1 ATF is to notify HQ AFV who will obtain the necessary papers from AHQ. Results of the examination are to be forwarded to HQ AFV.

Specialist Courses run under MACV Direction

444. On occasions members of 1 ATF will be required to attend such courses e.g. Intelligent Staff, Civil Affairs Staff. HQ 1 ATF will issue separate instructions for each course.

Unit Courses

445. Units may conduct as required to introduce new weapons/techniques.

Education and Projectionist Courses

446. These are normally run at 1 ALSG. Nominations will be called for and instructions issued for those attending by HQ 1 ATF.

.../ SECTION 4

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4-12

SECTION 4 - TRAINING ASSISTANCE TO TERRITORIAL FORCES

General

447. 1 ATF may be required to assist in training of Territorial Forces. This training is carried out under directives used by II FFV. Other training assistance may be a result of liaison between 1 ATF and province authorities.

448. The assistance may take the following forms:

- a. Specialist Assistance to the AATTV MATT.
- b. Assistance to the VAN KIEP National Training Centre.

Assistance to VAN KIEP National Training Centre

449. The Australian contribution to this school is provided by AATTV. Assistance as required may be provided on request of the Commandant VAN KIEP National Training Centre.

450 - 460 Reserved.

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Page 1 of 3

Copy No 43 of 58

2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn
NUI DAT

26 Feb 71

R569/70/3

See Distribution List

2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATION CUNG CHUNG 111
1 JAN TO 31 JAN 71

- References:
- A. Series L7014 VIETNAM, BINH BA, Sheet 6430 111, Edition 3, 1:50,000.
 - B. 1 ATF Op Instr 36/70 dated 27 Aug 70.
 - C. 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn Op Instr 14/70 dated 18 Sep 70.
 - D. 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn Op Instr 17/70 dated 30 Oct 70.
 - E. 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn Op Instr 18/70 dated 31 Oct 70.
 - F. 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn After Action Report for period 1 Dec to 31 Dec 70 dated 16 Jan 71.

Name and Type of Operation and Reporting Period

- 1. Operation CUNG CHUNG 111 continued during the reporting period 1 to 31 Jan 71.

Locations

- 2. The battalion continued to operate in AO JUDY, with an AO extension in the north along the PHUOC TUY/LONG KHANH Province boundary to allow the rifle company based at NDP GARTH YS 4590 to protect the NDP and engineer road reconstruction operations on Route 2.

Control Headquarters

- 3. Battalion headquarters remained at NUI DAT.

Intelligence

- 4. Annex A.

Mission and Tasks

- 5. During this month, land clearing operations in the area east of PHU MY YS2574 were completed. There was no further enemy activity in the area, which will now be opened up to access by local civilians.

Concept of Operations

- 6. A further operation was conducted in the RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE (RSSZ) using one rifle company with support from 1 FD SQN and 26 BOAT COY (VN).
- 7. The focus of attention in reconnaissance and ambush operations followed the pattern of enemy movement and activity to the eastern side of Route 2 and north of BINH GIA village YS 4977.
- 8. Operation CUNG CHUNG III ended on 31 Jan 71. Changes in AOs and certain tasks will be described in the Feb 71 report.

Execution

- 9. Sequence of Events. Annex B.

/Contacts and Incidents

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- 2 -

10. Contacts and Incidents. A summary of contacts and incidents during the reporting period, with an individual report on each contact, is attached as Annex
11. Installations and Caches. A summary of installations and caches located during Jan 71 is attached as Annex D.
12. Artillery. BC 107 Fd Bty's report on artillery activity during Jan 71 is attached as Annex E.

Results

13. Summary of Major Casualties

a. Enemy

(1) KIA (Body Count)	17
(2) KIA (Credited)	Nil
(3) PW	1
(4) Hoi Chanh	3


b. Own Troops

	<u>Aust</u>	<u>NZ</u>	<u>Total</u>
(1) KIA	Nil	Nil	Nil
(2) WIA	1	Nil	1

14. Enemy Casualties and Captured Weapons. Appendix 1 to Annex A.
15. Captured and Destroyed Equipment, Munitions and Food. Appendix 2 to Annex A.

Lessons Learned

16. Base Maintenance. Repairs and maintenance to NUI DAT base defence works including wire obstacles and bunkers assumed a high priority during this period. It is necessary to allot each company with a sector perimeter responsibility about 3 to 4 days to bring these defences to a reasonable standard of repair. This period should be separate from any retraining time allotted and must be allowed for in the operations programme.


Lt Col
CO

- Annexes:
- A. Intelligence.
 - B. Sequence of Events.
 - C. Summary of Contacts and Incidents.
 - D. Summary of Installations and Caches.
 - E. Artillery After Action Report.

Distribution:

	<u>Copy No (incl Annexes A to E)</u>
A Coy	1
B Coy	2
C Coy	3
V Coy	4
Sp Coy	5
Admin Coy	6

/C Sqn 1 Armd Regt

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

C Sqn 1 Armd Regt	7
B Sqn 3 Cav Regt	8
107 Fd Bty	9
1 Fd Sqn	10
HQ 1 ATF	11 - 25
NZ Component	26
CO	27
2IC	28
BC	29
Ops Offr	30 - 31
Adjt	32
IO	33
Sig Offr	34
Mor Pl	35
Atk Pl	36
Aslt Pnr Pl	37
RMO	38
QM	39
Chaplain	40
RSM	41
Comds Diary	42 - 46
Spare	47 - 53
File	54

For Information:

4 RAR TOWNSVILLE	55
3 RAR	56
9 RAR ENOGGERA	57
D Inf AHQ CANBERRA	58

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Page 1 of 1

ANNEX A TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
AFTER ACTION REPORT
OP CUNG CHUNG III
PERIOD 01 - 31 JAN 71

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

General Situation

1. No contact with CHAU DUC district HQ's had been made for a considerable period and infiltrations into HOA LONG had ceased.
2. PHU MY guerillas remained active in their village area and to the east of Route 2 at the northern base of the NUI THI VAI's.
3. Rear service elements of SR4 and MR7 continued to use the VIET CUONG - CHAU LAC COURTENAY area, centre mass YS4588, as a communication - liaison and resupply area although the frequency of use appeared to have decreased.
4. BA LONG Province HQ's and 3 Bn 33 NVA Regt were believed located north of the PHUOC TUY Province boundary in the head waters of the SONG RAI.
5. Infiltrations of LONG HUONG by BA RIA CITY UNIT groups continued regularly.

Events of Intelligence Interest

6. On 3 Jan, 37 PF Platoon captured three members of NGAI GIAO Guerilla Unit. During interrogation mention was made of a reorganization within CHAU DUC and of liaison with CAU SU (VC) District.
7. Indications of reorganization and a probable future rise in VC activity continued to be recorded. A CHAU DUC document captured early in the month gave evidence that CHAU DUC had been re-indoctrinated at a course while colocated with BA LONG Province and that the (VC) authorities were concerned about the lack of CHAU DUC's success. The documents also stated that attacks against pacification targets (eg PSDF, PF posts and government agencies) were to be increased.
8. On 5 Jan, CHAU DUC with BA LONG elements in support conducted a successful small-scale sapper attack on the PSDF posts at LA VAN Hamlet DUC THAHN Village YS 4677.
9. On 14 Jan, PF contacted elements of CHAU DUC east of HOA LONG at YS 457638, and it became quite apparent that CHAU DUC had left their normal AO in the SOU CHAU PHA - HAT DICH and had moved east of Route 2 into NUI SAO - BINH GIA - CU MY - SONG RAI area and were, for a period in December and early January, co-located with BA LONG Province HQ's in the NUI LE (YS 5088) - BA CHINH (YS 4882) area.
10. A Coy killed an ex-platoon commander of K6 Coy D440 Bn on 21 Jan in the BAO CHINH area confirming that BA LONG elements, other than just CHAU DUC, were loc there. Maps of hamlets on Route 2, the VAN KIEP TRAINING CENTRE, the BARIA CHIEU HOI Centre and a hamlet on Route 1 (at YS 4905) were found in the VC's pack. Sapper attack routes were marked on some of the maps. It was believed at the time that the mapped attacks indicated VC targets for the projected TET offensive. Up to the end of January however, no significant increase in VC activity was noted and no other ground attacks were launched.
11. CHAU DUC and other unidentified BA LONG elements remained in the area between Route 2 and the SONG RAI, mainly NORTH of BINH GIA. No further contact was made with them during the rest of the month.
12. In other areas, except for continued small group infiltrations of LONG HUONG and some movement in the RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE WEST of PHU MY, no significant VC activity was recorded for the month.

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Page 1 of 1

APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX A TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
AFTER ACTION REPORT
OP CUNG CHUNG III
PERIOD 01 - 31 JAN 71

SUMMARY ENEMY CASUALTIES/CAPTURED WEAPONS

ENEMY CASUALTIES

a. KIA (BC) 17
b. PW 1
c. Hoi Chanh. 3

CAPTURED WEAPONS

a. AK47 5
b. M1 Carbine 1
c. SKS. 1
d. K54 Pistols. 4
e. .45 cal Pistols. . 2

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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX A TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
AFTER ACTION REPORT
OP CUNG CHUNG III
PERIOD 01 - 31 JAN 71

SUMMARY ENEMY MUNITIONS/EQUIPMENT AND FOODSTUFFS

CAPTURED MUNITIONS

a. AK47 magazines	8	b. K54 magazines	6
c. .45 magazines	4	d. AK47 rounds	200
e. K54 rounds	54	f. .45 rounds	30
g. 7.62 link rounds	200	h. C4 explosive	1 lb
i. M26 grenade	1	j. Smoke grenades	1 box

CAPTURED EQUIPMENT

a. Clothing	qty	b. Cloth bag	4
c. Shirts	11	d. Trousers	5
e. Shorts	3	f. Womens skirt	1
g. Scarf	3	h. Bush hats	2
i. Singlet	1	j. Underpants	4
k. Handkerchiefs	3	l. Medical phials	63
m. Bandages	8	n. Inhalers	2
o. Cotton wool	qty	p. Cortidasmyl tablets	183
q. White powder	small qty	r. Thermometer	1
s. Pill tin	1	t. Syringes and needles	qty
u. Surgical tong	1	v. Cough mixture	qty
w. Sweet pills (unidentified)	qty	x. White substance	2 lb
y. Grey powder (unidentified)	1 pkt	z. NA Glutamate	1 pkt
A. Streptomycine	1	B. Penicillin	qty
C. Packs	9	D. Nylon straps	3
E. Web belts	6	F. Sandbags	2
G. Plastic pouches	3	H. Holsters	3
I. Magazine holders	4	J. US Camouflage jacket	1
K. Claymore bags	2	L. Aust Patt Camouflage raincoat	1
M. Plastic Water bag	1	N. Water bottle	1
O. Chopsticks	1 set	P. Rice bowls	6
Q. Spoon	1	R. Cooking Pot	1
S. Scrap metal	qty	T. Bottle	1
U. Plastic sheeting	10	V. Batteries	23
W. Silk	lge qty	X. Plastic bags	3
Y. Tin	1	Z. Needle and thread	qty
aa. Toothbrushes	5	bb. Toothpaste	5 tubes
cc. Soap	3 cakes	dd. Wallet	1
ee. Mirrors	3	ff. Torches	8
gg. Hair clippers	6	hh. Transistors	3

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. . ./ii. Medal

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- 2 -

ii. Medal	1	jj. Insect repellent.	2 bottles
kk. Cigarette lighters.	2	ll. Combs	3
mm. Spoons.	3	nn. Razor blades.	6
oo. US can openers.	2	pp. Whisker plucker	1
qq. Canteen	1	rr. Brief case.	1
ss. Hand towel.	1	tt. Cleaning rod for .45 cal.	1
uu. Money wallets	4	vv. Biro's	3
ww. Adhesive tape 1/2".	2 rolls	xx. Perfume	1 bottle
yy. Fountain pen.	1	zz. Hammocks.	3
AA. Part radio aerial	1	BB. "Stars and Stripes" 17 Jan 71 . . .	1
CC. Fishing lines	qty	DD. Cut throat razor.	1
EE. Gold ring	1	FF. Spirit lamp	1
GG. APC track	1	HH. Hoes	2
II. Shovel blade and screw driver	1.	JJ. Tablets (unidentified).	qty

CAPTURED FOODSTUFFS

a. Roots	lbs 200	b. Salt	lbs 7
c. Rice.	lbs 8	d. Noodles.	lbs 25
e. Tea	pkts 6	f. "C" ration cans.	6
g. Shrimps.	pkts 1	h. Cooking crystals	3 1/2
i. "C" ration salt pkts.	17	j. Brown sugar.	pkts 2
k. Bananas	lbs 14	l. Green vegetables	qty
m. Drink mixture	pkts 2	n. Tobacco.	lbs 7
o. Cigarettes.	460.		

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Page 1 of 5

ANNEX B TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATION CUNG CHUNG III
PERIOD 1 - 31 JAN 71
DATED FEB 71

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
OPERATION CUNG CHUNG III

<u>Date/Time</u> (a)	<u>Activity</u> (b)	<u>Serial of</u> <u>Event in</u> <u>Annex C/</u> <u>Annex D</u> (c)
<u>1 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 1</u>	
	There were no occurrences of tactical significance and no changes in Battalion deployments.	N/A
<u>2 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 2</u>	
0345 hrs	A troop of tanks from C Sqn 1 Armd Regt engaged a light at YS362763. The lights were extinguished and the sweep conducted at first light revealed negative results.	N/A
<u>3 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 3</u>	
0625 hrs	Sp Coy at NDP LORRAINE heard movement at YS256766. The movement was engaged with mortars but the sweep conducted at first light revealed nothing.	N/A
0900 hrs	A Coy returned to NUI DAT from reconnaissance and ambush tasks in preparation for re-deployment to the RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE (RSSZ).	N/A
1000 hrs	37 PF Pl operating in AO MICE on intelligence information from DUC THANH located four VC in a hollow tree at YS449887. One VC was killed while attempting to escape and the remaining three were taken prisoner. Two kilos of rice and 12,000 Piastre were confiscated. V Coy provided cut-off ambush patrols in co-ordination with the PF's initial search of the area.	N/A
<u>4 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 4</u>	
0810 hrs	A Coy deployed from NUI DAT to establish FSB PENNY at YS2568, in preparation for operations in the RSSZ, area centre of mass YS2167. The operation was supported by small craft from 1 Fd Sqn RAE and boats from 26 Boat Coy (RF).	N/A
1610 hrs	2 Pl A Coy located fresh tracks of two persons moving east at YS211676.	N/A
1743 hrs	A patrol from 1 Pl V Coy detained a suspect whilst moving into night ambush position at YS469891. Detainee previously observed in area from 1730 to 1845 hrs watching friendly forces closely.	N/A
<u>5 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 5</u>	
1100 hrs	A patrol from the Aslt Pnr Pl located a camp.	D1
1515 hrs	2 Pl A Coy found tracks of 10 - 15 persons in an old installation at YS222688. Nearby a sampan was located with tracks of four persons leading to the installation estimated to be seven days old.	N/A
1701 hrs	2 Pl A Coy sighted a man running north and followed up. The follow up led to several installations being found.	C1, D2 and D3
	/1830 hrs	

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

(a)	(b)	(c)
1830 hrs	Lights were sighted by V Coy HQ at YS451904 in the vicinity of road construction plant at the quarry near NDP GARTH. Illumination was fired and there were no further sightings.	N/A
2156 hrs	A patrol from 3 Pl V Coy sighted a light moving west to east and then south towards their ambush position.	C2
<u>6 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 6</u>	
0930 hrs	A Combat Engineer Team from 1 Fd Sqn RAE was deployed to 2 Pl A Coy location to destroy installations found the previous day.	N/A
1100 hrs	A tracking team from Sp Coy was deployed under op con DUC THANH to follow up blood trail found resulting from the attack on LA VAN Hamlet YS465772 the previous night.	N/A
1200 hrs	1 Pl V Coy located a camp.	D4
1245 hrs	A SIOUX aircraft conducting a Visual Reconnaissance sighted sampan launch points at YS228695. It is believed that some of the persons 2 Pl A Coy were following escaped during the previous night.	N/A
1330 hrs	A patrol from Aslt Pnr Pl located a camp.	D5
1600 hrs	Tracking team deployed with DUC THANH returned to NDP LORRAINE. The track was unsuccessful.	N/A
<u>7 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 7</u>	
1100 hrs	A Coy commenced return to NUI DAT from FSB PENNY and the RSSZ in preparation for redeployment.	N/A
1200 hrs	B Coy relieved C Coy of HOA LONG/Base Defence tasks.	N/A
<u>8 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 8</u>	
1015 hrs	A patrol from Atk Pl located a staging camp.	D6
1100 hrs	A Coy commenced deployment from NUI DAT to area, centre of mass YS4378, to conduct reconnaissance and ambush operations.	N/A
1845 hrs	An APC from 2 Tp B Sqn 3 Cav Regt detonated a 10 - 15 lb mine at YS455880. Moderate damage was sustained by the APC and three Aust WIA.	N/A
<u>9 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 9</u>	
0815 hrs	1 Pl A Coy located a tunnel system.	D7
1120 hrs	1 Pl A Coy located a booby trap.	C3
<u>10 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 10</u>	
1000 hrs	3 Pl A Coy located a camp.	D8
1455 hrs	2 RAR/NZ liaison team departed NUI DAT for PHUOC HOA in preparation for combined operation to be conducted with 385 RF Coy.	N/A
<u>11 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 11</u>	
0840 hrs	C Coy deployed from NUI DAT on APCs to secure area for new FSB CATHERINE YS3571, and subsequently to conduct reconnaissance and ambush tasks in that area.	N/A
1300 hrs	385 RF Coy and 2 RAR/NZ liaison team deployed from PHUOC HOA by air to area centre of mass YS3365, to conduct reconnaissance and ambush operations.	N/A

/12 JAN 71

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- 3 -

(a)	(b)	(c)
<u>12 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 12</u>	
0800 hrs	A patrol from 2 Pl V Coy located a bunker.	D9
1012 hrs	3 Pl V Coy detained one person who was returned to NUI DAT as a PW.	N/A
1200 hrs	1 Pl A Coy located and destroyed a camp.	D10
1946 hrs	1 Sect 2 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt contacted one enemy.	C4
<u>13 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 13</u>	
1220 hrs	Elms C Coy HQ located a very old, decayed bunker system at YS341736. An east-west track through the system was used in the last week by 1 - 2 persons.	D11
<u>14 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 14</u>	
0830 hrs	2 Pl A Coy located a previously destroyed camp showing signs of recent movement.	D12
1510 hrs	A checkpoint consisting of elms of 1 Pl V Coy and National Police, at YS450911, detained a Vietnamese male who had documents of possible VC nature in his possession. The detainee was sent to DUC THANH for interrogation.	N/A
2005 hrs	Elms Sp Coy at NDP LORRAINE sighted a light 300 - 400 metres east of their location. The light was engaged by M60 and M79 fire and was extinguished. At 2015 hrs, another light was sighted at YS265765. This light was also engaged and extinguished. A sweep of the area revealed negative results.	N/A
2030 hrs	HQ 385 RF Coy with liaison party 2 RAR/NZ engaged one enemy.	C5
<u>15 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 15</u>	
0920 hrs	A Coy less 3 Pl relieved Sp Coy of land-clearing team protection tasks at NDP LORRAINE. 3 Pl A Coy were placed under op con B Coy for HOA LONG/Base Defence tasks. Sp Coy returned to NUI DAT.	N/A
1400 hrs	385 RF Coy were extracted from the NUI DINHS and returned to PHUOC HOA. 2 RAR/NZ liaison party returned to NUI DAT.	N/A
<u>16 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 16</u>	
1115 hrs	C Coy located a previously destroyed camp at YS330737. There was no sign of recent movement in the area.	N/A
1840 hrs	2 Pl V Coy sighted two VC at YS466875. The VC were moving from east to west 500 metres from the ambush position.	N/A
<u>17 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 17</u>	
1000 hrs	A patrol from 7 Pl C Coy located a camp.	D13
1200 hrs	8 Pl C Coy located a camp.	D14
1310 hrs	An APC from 1 Sect 2 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt detonated a 25 - 30 lb Chicom explosive mine at YS479882, there were no casualties and the vehicle sustained only moderate damage.	N/A
<u>18 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 18</u>	
0815 hrs	C Coy commenced relief of V Coy at NDP GARTH to take over road construction protection tasks and to conduct /reconnaissance	N/A

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- 4 -

(a)	(b)	(c)
	reconnaissance and ambush operations in AO MICE. V Coy returned to NUI DAT.	
0815 hrs	1 Pl A Coy visually located a booby trapped 155mm shell at YS297750 which had been in position for 6 - 12 months and was in good condition. There was no sign of recent occupation in the many old camp sites in the area.	N/A
1620 hrs	A road checkpoint comprising elms 9 Pl C Coy and National Police detained one Vietnamese male. Detainee was sent to DUC THANH for interrogation.	C6
1820 hrs	A patrol from 9 Pl C Coy detained one Vietnamese male without an Identification Card and carrying an excess of food. The detainee was sent to NUI DAT for interrogation.	N/A
<u>19 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 19</u>	
0830 hrs	Sp Coy commenced redeployment from NUI DAT to relieve A Coy at NDP LORRAINE and to take over land clearing team protection tasks. A Coy returned to NUI DAT in preparation for redeployment to reconnaissance and ambush tasks.	N/A
0945 hrs	3 Pl A Coy released from op con of B Coy and returned to under command A Coy.	N/A
1215 hrs	9 Pl C Coy located a previously destroyed camp at YS440895 D15 showing signs of use within the last four months.	
1430 hrs	9 Pl C Coy located a camp.	D16
<u>20 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 20</u>	
0830 hrs	A Coy commenced redeployment from NUI DAT into AO ZARA centre of mass YS4883, to conduct reconnaissance and ambush operations.	N/A
1100 hrs	NDP LORRAINE closed and new NDP for the land clearing team was established. NDP AMANDA at YS265747.	N/A
2245 hrs	A patrol from 9 Pl C Coy contacted one VC.	C7
<u>21 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 21</u>	
0711 hrs	2 Pl A Coy ambushed one VC.	C8
1145 hrs	1 Fd Sqn RAE land clearing team and elms A Sqn 3 Cav Regt located a bunker system.	D17
<u>22 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 22</u>	
0300 - 0500 hrs	Elms C Coy at NDP GARTH engaged lights seen at YS454906 with small arms. The lights were extinguished and a sweep conducted at first light revealed nothing.	N/A
1200 hrs	V Coy relieved B Coy on HOA LONG/Base defence tasks. B Coy began preparation for redeployment to reconnaissance and ambush operations.	N/A
1230 hrs	9 Pl C Coy observed a woman drop a bag into bushes at YS453888. Later a man and a woman approached the area and picked up the bag and were then detained. The detainees were sent to DUC THANH for interrogation.	N/A
1846 hrs	A patrol from 9 Pl C Coy and APCs from A Sqn 3 Cav Regt contacted five VC.	C9
<u>23 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 23</u>	
0540 hrs	A patrol from 9 Pl C Coy engaged one enemy who approached the rear of their ambush position.	C10

/0800 hrs

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- 5 -

(a)	(b)	(c)
0800 hrs	B Coy redeployed from NUI DAT to area, centre of mass YS4378, to conduct reconnaissance and ambush tasks.	N/A
0850 hrs	Elms C Coy and A Sqn 3 Cav Regt reacted to support CAM MY Village after learning of the VC attack directed against the PSDF in that location on night 22/23 Jan 71.	N/A
2012 hrs	A patrol from 3 Pl V Coy fired illumination over YS407641 after detecting suspected enemy movement. Illumination revealed negative results.	N/A
<u>24 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 24</u>	
1942 hrs	A patrol of 9 Pl C Coy engaged two VC who approached their ambush position from the west.	C11
<u>25 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 25</u>	
2050 hrs	2 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt contacted an estimated four VC.	C12
<u>26 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 26</u>	
1938 hrs	A patrol from 7 Pl C Coy located an apparent VC RV point.	C13
2230 hrs	A patrol from 9 Pl C Coy contacted two VC who approached their ambush position from the south.	C14
<u>27 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 27</u>	
2120 hrs	A patrol from 8 Pl C Coy engaged an estimated four VC.	C15
2145 hrs	2 Tp B Sqn 3 Cav Regt engaged at least two VC.	C16
2215 hrs	Sp Coy HQ at NDP AMANDA sighted a light at YS270742 and engaged with mortars. Sweep conducted at first light revealed negative results.	N/A
<u>28 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 28</u>	
0845 hrs	A patrol from 2 Pl V Coy located a sleeping platform.	D18
<u>29 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 29</u>	
0900 hrs	As a result of information supplied by the District Chief of DUC THANH, a patrol from 7 Pl C Coy located a bunker.	D19
1400 hrs	A Coy commenced air extraction from AO ZARA and returned to NUI DAT for rest.	N/A
<u>30 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 30</u>	
2215 hrs	Elms C Coy and APCs from A Sqn 3 Cav Regt conducted a sweep to the south of CAM MY Village, after what appeared to be a contact with RF or PF in that vicinity, was heard. Nothing was found.	N/A
<u>31 JAN 71</u>	<u>DAY 31</u>	
0347 hrs	A patrol from 7 Pl C Coy engaged one VC.	C17
1100 hrs	NDP AMANDA closed and the land clearing operation concluded. Sp Coy was extracted from NDP AMANDA and returned to NUI DAT.	N/A
1200 hrs	Operation CUNG CHUNG III ended. Operation PHOI HOP commenced (details of the changes in dispositions and tasks will be contained in the Feb 71 report).	N/A
2020 hrs	A patrol from 8 Pl C Coy engaged approximately eight VC.	C18
2025 hrs	Another patrol from 8 Pl C Coy engaged approximately two VC.	C19

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Page 1 of 4

ANNEX C TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATION CUNG CHUNG III
PERIOD 1 - 31 JAN 71
DATED FEB 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACTS/INCIDENTS
OPERATION CUNG CHUNG III

<u>Serial</u> (a)	<u>Date/Time</u> (b)	<u>Location</u> (c)	<u>Unit/ Sub Unit</u> (d)	<u>Activity</u> (e)	<u>Reference</u> (f)
1	051701H	YS229693	2/A Coy	Elms 2 Pl A Coy sighted a man running north and followed up his tracks. The tracks led to three camp areas, each containing bunkers 12 x 6' with 3' OHP, sleeping platforms and cooking areas, and sentry platforms 3' square and 15" above the ground. Paths made from cut timber inter-connected the three camps which were 3 - 6 months old and last used two hours prior to discovery. One camp contained three bunkers was in good condition, the other two containing two and five bunkers respectively, were in a poor but liveable condition. As the follow up progressed through the camps, the tracks being followed indicated successively larger groups being chased.	N/A
2	052156H	YS420883	3/V Coy	A patrol from 3 Pl V Coy sighted a light moving west to east and then south towards their ambush. The area was engaged with small arms but the sweep conducted at first light revealed negative results.	Appendix 1 to Annex C
3	091120H	YS400801	1/A Coy	In the tunnel system found in the same location the platoon visually detected a Chicom fragmentation stick grenade, set for detonation by trip wire as an early warning device.	N/A
4	121946H	YS458883	1 Sect 2 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt	The section contacted one enemy who approached their location from the east after seemingly receiving light signals from a house at YS YS458888. The contact was initiated with .30 cal MG and claymores. A sweep conducted at first light revealed nil results.	Appendix 2 to Annex C
5	142030H	YS334653	HQ 385 RF Coy and 2 RAR/NZ liaison team	The group engaged movement believed to be that of one enemy approaching the location via a re-entrant. 155mm illumination was fired and no further movement was heard or sighted. A Sweep conducted at first light revealed tracks.	Appendix 3 to Annex C

/6 181620H

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- 2 -

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
6	181620H	YS442892	9/C Coy	The patrol detained one male suspect of military age who had no Identification Card and was carrying more than 10lb rice, 1/2lb salt, tobacco, quantity of clothing, mosquito net and a hammock. At the location where person was detained a sandbag was found containing a US pack and water bottle. The detainee claimed the bag belonged to his friend and that they were both from TAY NINH Province.	N/A
7	202245H	YS460891	9/C Coy	APCs from A Sqn 3 Cav Regt reported seeing three large bags of rice being carried into a house at YS459891. This house had been previously searched and a tunnel located. An elm 9 Pl mounted an ambush to keep the house under surveillance. One person in black clothing approached the ambush from the south-east and was engaged. A sweep was then conducted assisted by mortar illumination and one VC was found KIA and one .30 cal M1 carbine was captured.	Appendix 4 to Annex C
8	210711H	YS489825	2/A Coy	The platoon ambushed one VC who approached their location from the south-west. The enemy was engaged by M60 MG fire and he returned one burst from an AK47. The sweep revealed 1 VC KIA, 1 AK47, 1 K54 pistol and one pack captured in action.	Appendix 5 to Annex C
9	221846H	YS438888	9/C Coy and APCs from A Sqn 3 Cav Regt	The patrol was resting prior to moving into an ambush position when three enemy were sighted moving north at a range of 80 metres. The enemy then began to move north-west and were engaged by small arms. APCs which had been reacted to cut-off the enemy withdrawal route engaged two VC lying in the grass. The APCs recovered two VC KIA and one WIA. A further sweep conducted at first light revealed a further two VC KIA. Equipment captured was one AK47, one .45 cal pistol, one K54 pistol and one compass. The VC WIA later died of wounds,	Appendix 6 to Annex C
10	230540H	YS454886	9/C Coy	The patrol engaged movement indicating one enemy moving towards the rear of their ambush position. Illumination was fired and a sweep was conducted with negative results.	Appendix 7 to Annex C

/11 241942H

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
11	241942H	YS442892	9/C Coy	The patrol engaged two VC who approached their ambush from the west. The contact was initiated with claymores and M60 MG fire. One VC withdrew to the west and the area was illuminated by mortars. The sweep revealed 1 VC KIA.	Appendix 8 to Annex C
12	252050H	YS462914	2 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt	A section of APCs were in ambush when an estimated one VC was moving north past their position. The APCs engaged at 70 metres with .30 cal MG fire and the enemy withdrew to the east. A sweep was conducted revealing nil results.	Appendix 9 to Annex C
13	261938H	YS463916	7/C Coy	The patrol saw three enemy double across a track and adjusted their ambush accordingly. This location was apparently used as an RV point. Five VC were observed who signaled by light to the patrol. The contact at grid YS451883 was heard at 2230H. The VC movement ceased and the enemy then moved off.	N/A
14	262230H	YS451883	9/C Coy	The patrol were in ambush near two houses when two enemy approached the rear of the ambush from the south. The claymores covering that approach failed to detonate and contact was initiated by M16 fire. The patrol was then engaged by fire from the houses. Illumination was fired and suppressive fire was directed towards the houses. Four VC were seen to run from one house and they were engaged. The sweep conducted at first light revealed three VC KIA. Later, in the same area, the apprehension of a Datsun light vehicle with a wounded VC in the back led to three VC rallying as Hoi Chanhs.	Appendix 10 to Annex C
15	272120H	YS460889	8/C Coy	The platoon contacted an estimated four VC moving north to south approximately 50 metres from their ambush position. The contact was initiated by claymores and illumination was fired. The sweep conducted produced negative results.	Appendix 11 to Annex C
16	272145H	YS461914	2 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt	The section of APCs were in ambush when a burst of small arms was fired at their location. Movement to the rear of the ambush was engaged with claymores and a sweep was conducted with negative results. On returning to the contact area the APCs were again engaged by small arms.	Appendix 12 to Annex C

/17 310348H

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- 4 -

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
17	310348H	YS460889	7/C Coy	One enemy approached the ambush from the east approximately 40 metres to the north, walking through rubber. The enemy was engaged with claymores and M60 MG fire. The area was illuminated by mortars and a sweep was conducted which revealed negative results.	Appendix 13 to Annex C
18	312020H	YS444877	8/C Coy	The patrol initiated contact with approximately eight VC with claymores and M60 MG fire. The enemy had approached from the south and withdrew to the east and then circled south into another 8 Pl ambush location. The sweep revealed five VC KIA and four packs captured in action.	Appendix 14 to Annex C
19	312025H	YS440873	8/C Coy	After the first 8 Pl contact a second ambush patrol engaged approximately two enemy who approached from the east. Illumination was fired and the sweep revealed one VC KIA and one AK47 captured in action.	Appendix 15 to Annex C

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX C TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
AFTER ACTION REPORT
DATED 26 FEB 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT/INCIDENT

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Pl</u>	<u>Coy</u>
5 Jan 71	2156 hrs	YS420883	3	V
<u>Strength</u>	<u>Commander of troops in contact</u>		<u>Platoon Commander</u>	
12	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>
	Cpl	NOTTON	Lt	MICKENZIE
<u>Initiated by</u>	<u>Enemy Strength</u>	<u>Enemy Identification and Weapons</u>		
Sentry	1	Unknown		
<u>Terrain Description:</u> Light vegetation, visibility about 20 metres.				
<u>Narrative:</u> Whilst manning an ambush position a sentry saw a light approach the ambush from the rear. Light was observed for three minutes and then engaged with small arms fire. A sweep in the morning produced negative results.				
<u>Sketch:</u> Nil.				
<u>Enemy Casualties</u>		<u>Friendly Casualties</u>		
Nil		Nil		
<u>Supporting Fire Employed:</u> Nil.				
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned:</u>				
a. <u>Local Commander:</u> Nil.				
b. <u>Platoon Comments:</u> Nil.				
c. <u>Company Comments:</u> Nil.				
d. <u>Unit Comments:</u> Nil.				
e. <u>Lessons Learned:</u> Nil.				

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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX C TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
AFTER ACTION REPORT
DATED 20 FEB 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT/INCIDENT

<u>Date</u> 12 Jan 71	<u>Time</u> 1950 Hrs	<u>Location</u> YS458883	<u>Pl</u> 2 Tp A Sqn	<u>Coy</u> 3 Cav Regt
<u>Strength</u> 9	<u>Commander of troops in contact</u> <u>Rank</u> Capt <u>Name</u> LEVENS		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> Capt <u>Name</u> LEVENS	
<u>Initiated by</u> Own Troops	<u>Enemy Strength</u> Possibly 2 - 3	<u>Enemy Identification and Weapons</u> Unknown		
<u>Terrain Description:</u> Terrain was flat, there was a full rubber plantation canopy causing very poor visibility.				
<u>Narrative:</u> Section was in ambush when 1 VC was sighted approaching from the east moving through the rubber. As the VC neared the ambush he apparently detected the ambush and withdrew rapidly. The area was engaged with .30 cal MG and claymores with negative results. A sweep later revealed a blood trail.				
<u>Sketch:</u> Nil				
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> Nil			<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil	
<u>Supporting Fire Employed:</u> Nil				
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned:</u> a. <u>Local Commander:</u> Contact was initiated with a .30 cal MG, rather than claymores because it was thought enemy was between APCs and claymores. b. <u>Platoon Comments:</u> If contact was initiated by claymores it is possible that results would have been at least 1 VC KIA. c. <u>Company Comments:</u> Nil. d. <u>Unit Comments:</u> Nil. e. <u>Lessons Learned:</u> Nil				

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APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX C TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
AFTER ACTION REPORT
DATED 25 FEB 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT/INCIDENT


<u>Date</u> 14 Jan 71	<u>Time</u> 2030 Hrs	<u>Location</u> YS334653	<u>Pl</u> Coy HQ	<u>Coy</u> 385 RF Coy & elms 2 RAR/NZ
<u>Strength</u> 14	<u>Commander of troops in contact</u> <u>Rank</u> Capt <u>Name</u> B.P. GREEN		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> N/A <u>Name</u>	
<u>Initiated by</u> Batman	<u>Enemy Strength</u> Possibly 1	<u>Enemy Identification and Weapons</u> Unknown		
<u>Terrain Description:</u> Peak of NUI DINH, rocky ground large boulders and scattered scrub. Visibility about 15 metres.				
<u>Narrative:</u> Liaison team HQ was in ambush with 384 RF Coy HQ on NUI DINH peak. The signaller on the Liaison team perimeter heard movement up a re-entrant toward his position. The ambush was alerted. Batman with signaller saw movement and opened fire with SLR. Signaller fired M16 and RF Coy HQ fired M60 and M79. 155mm illumination was fired with no obvious results. Sweep at first light revealed tracks but whether they were animal or human was not able to be determined.				
<u>Sketch:</u> Nil.				
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> Nil			<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil	
<u>Supporting Fire Employed:</u> 155mm Illum.				
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned:</u> a. <u>Local Commander:</u> Positive identification was not made. It is possible that the movement was a deer or some other animal, but the batman and signaller were certain that it was human. A better reaction would have been for the two persons concerned to fire the claymore covering the re-entrant. b. <u>Platoon Comments:</u> Nil. c. <u>Company Comments:</u> Nil. d. <u>Unit Comments:</u> Nil. e. <u>Lessons Learned:</u> Nil.				

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APPENDIX 4 TO
ANNEX C TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
AFTER ACTION REPORT
DATED 26 FEB 77

SUMMARY OF CONTACT/INCIDENT


<u>Date</u> 20 Jan 71	<u>Time</u> 2245 Hrs	<u>Location</u> YS460891	<u>Pl</u> 9	<u>Coy</u> C
<u>Strength</u> 13	<u>Commander of troops in contact</u> <u>Rank</u> 2Lt <u>Name</u> I.M. RAFFERTY		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> 2Lt <u>Name</u> I.M. RAFFERTY	
<u>Initiated by</u> Own troops	<u>Enemy Strength</u> 1	<u>Enemy Identification and Weapons</u> Black clothing and 1 x US M1 carbine		
<u>Terrain Description:</u> Five foot high sword grass to within 10 metres of houses.				
<u>Narrative:</u> The patrol was in ambush when at approximately 2200 hrs the western snetry group heard noises from about 60 metres moving from NW to SE, South of ambush position. The voices were not engaged. A four man group was sent to locate and observe a track believed to be in that area. At 2245 hrs, one enemy approached from the SE and was engaged with small arms at 5 metres. Mortar Illumination was called for and the body was recovered. Area search conducted at first light produced 40 lbs rice in a US Aid calico bag prepared to carry as a knapsack.				
<u>Sketch:</u> 				
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 1 VC KIA		<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil		
<u>Supporting Fire Employed:</u> Mortar Illumination (16 rounds).				
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned:</u> a. <u>Local Commander:</u> In some instances it could prove successful to move own troops during hours of darkness. An effort was made to set up ambush position as close as possible to occupied houses. Personal discipline on part of soldiers was major contributing factor in success of ambush. b. <u>Platoon Comments:</u> On 20 Jan, APCs sighted vehicle carrying approximately 400 lbs rice going into houses. Both east and west approaches were ambushed. This kind of information must be acted upon and we must maintain security in doing so. c. <u>Company Comments:</u> Care must be taken in ambushing close to houses; however, experience has shown that civilians prepared or expecting an enemy food or money pick up will stay indoors. In the current stage of the conflict, movement or adjustment of an ambush position at night is quite feasible in most terrain during all but very dark nights. d. <u>Unit Comments:</u> Nil. e. <u>Lessons Learned:</u> Nil.				

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APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX C TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
AFTER ACTION REPORT
DATED 26 Feb 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT/INCIDENT

<u>Date</u> 21 Jan 71	<u>Time</u> 0715 Hrs	<u>Location</u> YS489825	<u>Pl</u> 2	<u>Coy</u> A
<u>Strength</u> 30	<u>Commander of troops in contact</u> <u>Rank</u> 2Lt <u>Name</u> O'NEIL		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> 2Lt <u>Name</u> O'NEIL	
<u>Initiated by</u> MG No 1	<u>Enemy Strength</u> 1	<u>Enemy Identification and Weapons</u> Main AK47		
<u>Terrain Description:</u> The area in front of the platoon position had been cleared for a radius of about 30 metres by woodcutters. There was secondary growth along the edge of the track. The platoon was positioned inside a tree line.				
<u>Narrative:</u> The platoon was conducting morning administration when an enemy approached our position along a track from the south. He was seen by the MG No1. When the enemy drew level with our position he was engaged by MG fire from the southern flank. The enemy returned fire but was eventually killed. A sweep was conducted immediately and the enemy had withdrawn about 30 metres before he died.				
<u>Sketch:</u> 				
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 1 VC KIA			<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil	
<u>Supporting Fire Employed:</u> Nil.				
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned:</u> a. <u>Local Commander:</u> The platoon position was well off the track, therefore enemy did not detect our presence until too late. b. <u>Platoon Comments:</u> Nil. c. <u>Company Comments:</u> Nil. d. <u>Unit Comments:</u> Nil. e. <u>Lessons Learned:</u> Nil.				

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APPENDIX 6 TO
ANNEX C TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
AFTER ACTION REPORT
DATED 28 FEB 71


SUMMARY OF CONTACT/INCIDENT

<u>Date</u> 22 Jan 71	<u>Time</u> 1845 Hrs	<u>Location</u> YS438888	<u>Pl</u> 9	<u>Coy</u> C
<u>Strength</u> 13	<u>Commander of troops in contact</u> <u>Rank</u> 2Lt <u>Name</u> I.M. RAFFERTY		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> 2Lt <u>Name</u> I.M. RAFFERTY	
<u>Initiated by</u> Own troops	<u>Enemy Strength</u> Unknown	<u>Enemy Identification and Weapons</u> Mixed Dress, 1 AK47		

Terrain Description: Rubber plantation.

Narrative: At 1845 hrs, the patrol was resting prior to moving into an ambush position when three enemy were sighted at approximately 8 metres moving north. The enemy then changed direction to NW and were engaged with small arms fire. APCs were reacted to cut off enemy withdrawal route. APCs engaged two enemy lying in grass. Enemy did not return fire. APCs swept north and recovered two enemy bodies, one enemy WIA. Illumination was called for further sweep with negative results. WIA DUSTED OFF at approximately 2030 hrs. Sweep conducted at 230700H produced two further enemy bodies.

Sketch:



Enemy Casualties

4 KIA, 1 WIA (DOW)

Friendly Casualties

Nil

Supporting Fire Employed: 81mm Mor Illum (25 rds), 105mm(US) arty Illum (80 rds)

Comments and Lessons Learned:


- Local Commander: Enemy appeared to be moving towards occupied houses close to last light and were possibly looking for any friendly ambush positions. They could then have skirted these and reached their objective during the hours of darkness. Enemy were difficult to recognise as only one had an AK47 and this was difficult to see. Familiarity with area and inhabitants in all hamlets assisted in own troops identifying enemy. Deception plan also assisted greatly as normally when civilians sighted own troops they would sing loudly or bang tins. The patrol had moved 2000 metres west since 221700H and had not been observed. Self discipline and silence on the part of own troops was also a contributing factor in success.
- Platoon Comments: Nil.
- Company Comments: It was found that more effective results were obtained if the occupation of ambush positions was left until almost darkness and deception plans were used extensively to deceive the civilian inhabitants of the actual ambush position.
- Unit Comments: Nil.
- Lessons Learned: Nil.

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APPENDIX 7 TO
ANNEX C TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
AFTER ACTION REPORT
DATED 20 FEB 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT/INCIDENT

<u>Date</u> 23 Jan 71	<u>Time</u> 0540 Hrs	<u>Location</u> YS454886	<u>Pl</u> 9	<u>Coy</u> C
<u>Strength</u> 15	<u>Commander of troops in contact</u> <u>Rank</u> Sgt <u>Name</u> ALEXANDER		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> 2Lt <u>Name</u> I.M. RAFFERTY	
<u>Initiated by</u> Own troops	<u>Enemy Strength</u> Unknown	<u>Enemy Identification and Weapons</u> Unseen		
<u>Terrain Description:</u> Clean rubber to the southern side of the ambush position. Thick bush to the north and west along a creek.				
<u>Narrative:</u> A noise, which sounded like a person moving slowly and carefully along the bank of the creek, approached the western side of the ambush position. Visibility was about 5 metres because of the lack of moon. When it was estimated the noise was about 15 metres from the ambush position, the claymores and M60 MG were fired. A sweep found no sign of body.				
<u>Sketch:</u> 				
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> Nil		<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil		
<u>Supporting Fire Employed:</u> Mortars and artillery illumination.				
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned:</u> a. <u>Local Commander:</u> It is believed the VC may have escaped down into the creek which was used by civilians as a water point. The sentries, one of whom was the patrol commander, could have waited until the person was close enough to be clearly seen. b. <u>Platoon Comments:</u> Nil. c. <u>Company Comments:</u> It is difficult on a moonless night to know if the enemy is in the killing ground and trip flares are rarely used if the ambush group move into position after dark. d. <u>Unit Comments:</u> Nil. e. <u>Lessons Learned:</u> Nil.				

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APPENDIX 8 TO
ANNEX C TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
AFTER ACTION REPORT
DATED 26 FEB 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT/INCIDENT

<u>Date</u> 24 Jan 71	<u>Time</u> 1942 Hrs	<u>Location</u> YS442892	<u>Pl</u> 9	<u>Coy</u> C
<u>Strength</u> 15	<u>Commander of troops in contact</u> <u>Rank</u> Sgt <u>Name</u> ALEXANDER		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> 2Lt I.M. <u>Name</u> RAFFERTY	
<u>Initiated by</u> Sentry	<u>Enemy Strength</u> 2	<u>Enemy Identification and Weapons</u> Unknown		
<u>Terrain Description:</u> Clear rubber, the ground was fairly flat but dropped away to a creek to the north. Visibility approximately 50 metres in a fading light. The silhouette of enemy only could be seen.				
<u>Narrative:</u> The half platoon task was to ambush in a position which would deny the use of a small hamlet at YS442891 as a resupply point to the enemy. The ambush was set up in fading light. At 1940 hrs, the last bank of claymore mines had been set up and while the member who had set them up was reentering the perimeter, the first VC was seen approaching from the west. This person was approximately 20 metres away and passing the position on the southern side when a second VC was seen 50 metres to our west and north of the first VC. The ambush was sprung when the first VC was approximately one pace from a claymore mine. The second VC, still approximately 40 metres to the west was lost in shadow but it is believed he withdrew west and then north across the creek. A sweep was conducted under the light of flares and one enemy body was found in the position where the first VC was seen to fall after firing the claymore mines.				
<u>Sketch:</u> <p>En No 1 →</p> <p>1st group to see En → gun →</p> <p>sentry</p> <p>claymores</p> <p>En No 2 →</p> <p>houses</p> <p>N</p>				
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 1 KIA		<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil		
<u>Supporting Fire Employed:</u> Mortar illumination for the search only.				
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned:</u> a. <u>Local Commander:</u> Nil. b. <u>Platoon Comments:</u> Nil. c. <u>Company Comments:</u> Extreme care must be taken if ambush positions are sited close to civilian habitation, however, experience showed that civilians generally remained well indoors during expected food pick-ups and taxing visits. d. <u>Unit Comments:</u> Nil. e. <u>Lessons Learned:</u> The enemy were obviously approaching the group of houses, however, they were not using any established tracks. Therefore the closer the ambush to the houses, the more chance there is of channeling the enemy into the ambush position.				

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APPENDIX 9 TO
ANNEX C TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
AFTER ACTION REPORT
DATED 16 FEB 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT/INCIDENT

<u>Date</u> 25 Jan 71	<u>Time</u> 2100 Hrs	<u>Location</u> YS462914	<u>Pl</u> 2 Tp A Sqn	<u>Coy</u> 3 Cav Regt
<u>Strength</u> 9	<u>Commander of troops in contact</u> <u>Rank</u> Capt <u>Name</u> LEVENS		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> N/A <u>Name</u>	
<u>Initiated by</u> Friendly	<u>Enemy Strength</u> 1	<u>Enemy Identification and Weapons</u> Unknown		
<u>Terrain Description:</u> Terrain was flat, there was a rubber plantation canopy and visibility was poor.				
<u>Narrative:</u> While in ambush, 6 platoon heard the sounds of one person crossing the front of the ambush at a range of about 70 metres. The movement was engaged and the area swept with nil results.				
<u>Sketch:</u> Nil.				
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> Nil			<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil	
<u>Supporting Fire Employed:</u> Nil.				
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned:</u> a. <u>Local Commander:</u> The enemy was engaged at 70 metres because it was thought that he would not come closer. b. <u>Platoon Comments:</u> Nil. c. <u>Company Comments:</u> Considering the poor light and the range, it was a waste of time engaging the enemy. d. <u>Unit Comments:</u> Nil. e. <u>Lessons Learned:</u> Nil.				

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APPENDIX 11 TO
ANNEX C TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
AFTER ACTION REPORT
DATED 22 FEB 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT/INCIDENT

<u>Date</u> 27 Jan 71	<u>Time</u> 2120 Hrs	<u>Location</u> YS460889	<u>Pl</u> 8	<u>Coy</u> C
<u>Strength</u> 14	<u>Commander of troops in contact</u> <u>Rank</u> Cpl <u>Name</u> J.J. BRANDER		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> Lt <u>Name</u> C.J. PURCELL	
<u>Initiated by</u> Sentry	<u>Enemy Strength</u> 4	<u>Enemy Identification and Weapons</u> Unknown		
<u>Terrain Description:</u> Rubber plantation four feet high grass. Visibility approximately 20 - 30 metres.				
<u>Narrative:</u> The ambush moved into position at approximately 271900H and the sentry heard movement at 272120H at a range of approximately 30 metres. He fired claymores and a sweep was conducted resulting in only scuff marks being found. After claymores were fired, movement was heard withdrawing to the north.				
<u>Sketch:</u>				
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> Nil		<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil		
<u>Supporting Fire Employed:</u> Mortar Illumination.				
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned:</u> a. <u>Local Commander:</u> Nil. b. <u>Platoon Comments:</u> Nil. c. <u>Company Comments:</u> It is my opinion that the claymore mines were probably poorly sited, aimed and/or fired prematurely. d. <u>Unit Comments:</u> Nil. e. <u>Lessons Learned:</u> Contact was initiated too early to ensure a positive kill.				

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APPENDIX 12 TO
ANNEX C TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
AFTER ACTION REPORT
DATED 26 FEB 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT/INCIDENT

<u>Date</u> 27 Jan 71	<u>Time</u> 2145 Hrs	<u>Location</u> YS461914	<u>Pl</u> 2 Tp A Sqn	<u>Coy</u> 3 Cav Regt
<u>Strength</u> 10	<u>Commander of troops in contact</u> <u>Rank</u> Capt <u>Name</u> LEVENS		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> Capt <u>Name</u> LEVENS	
<u>Initiated by</u> Enemy	<u>Enemy Strength</u> 2 - 3	<u>Enemy Identification and Weapons</u> Unknown		
<u>Terrain Description:</u> Flat ground, rubber plantation with canopy. Poor visibility.				
<u>Narrative:</u> While 6 platoon was in ambush position, a burst of small arms was fired past their position and several enemy flares were fired. Movement close to the ambush position was engaged with claymores and during a sweep further small arms fire was directed at 6 platoon. The sweep revealed nothing.				
<u>Sketch:</u> Nil.				
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> Nil.			<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil.	
<u>Supporting Fire Employed:</u> Nil.				
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned:</u> a. <u>Local Commander:</u> It is probable that the enemy were trying to recce the ambush position by drawing fire from the ambush position. b. <u>Platoon Comments:</u> The contact was probably an attempt to recce the ambush position on a diversion for an attack on Cam My. c. <u>Company Comments:</u> Nil. d. <u>Unit Comments:</u> Nil. e. <u>Lessons Learned:</u> Nil.				

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APPENDIX 13 TO
ANNEX C TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
AFTER ACTION REPORT
DATED 16 FEB 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT/INCIDENT


<u>Date</u> 31 Jan 71	<u>Time</u> 0348 Hrs	<u>Location</u> YS460889	<u>Pl</u> 7	<u>Coy</u> C
<u>Strength</u> 16	<u>Commander of troops in contact</u> <u>Rank</u> N/A <u>Name</u>		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> Lt <u>Name</u> BRADD	
<u>Initiated by</u> Sentry	<u>Enemy Strength</u> 1	<u>Enemy Identification and Weapons</u> Regional or local		
<u>Terrain Description:</u> Flat ground in rubber with sparse canopy. Visibility 50 metres.				
<u>Narrative:</u> One enemy approached ambush from the east approximately 40 metres north of the ambush. He was walking through the rubber until he came to a north-south track where he stopped to observe and then ran across the track in a crouched position to a factory. The ambush initiated with a bank of two claymores followed by MG fire.				
<u>Sketch:</u> <p>The sketch depicts a tactical layout. On the left is a square labeled 'Factory Complex'. To its right is a vertical line. Further right is a horizontal track. Above and below the track are areas labeled 'RUBBER'. An arrow points from the right towards the track, labeled 'Direction of enemy movement'. A north arrow is on the right side. A vertical line is marked '40m' from the track. An 'X' is marked on the track, with an arrow pointing to it from the text 'Engaged by Western most gun'.</p>				
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> Nil.		<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil.		
<u>Supporting Fire Employed:</u> Mortar Illumination and HE.				
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned:</u> a. <u>Local Commander:</u> Nil. b. <u>Platoon Comments:</u> Nil. c. <u>Company Comments:</u> It is my opinion that the claymore mines were probably poorly sited, aimed and/or fired prematurely. d. <u>Unit Comments:</u> Nil. e. <u>Lessons Learned:</u> Initiation of ambush too late because sentry did not expect enemy to run across track.				

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APPENDIX 14 TO
ANNEX C TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
AFTER ACTION REPORT
DATED 16 FEB 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT/INCIDENT

<u>Date</u> 31 Jan 71	<u>Time</u> 2020 Hrs	<u>Location</u> YS444877	<u>Pl</u> 8	<u>Coy</u> C
<u>Strength</u> 14	<u>Commander of troops in contact</u> <u>Rank</u> Cpl <u>Name</u> J. BRANDER		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> Lt <u>Name</u> C.J. PURCELL	
<u>Initiated by</u> Sentry	<u>Enemy Strength</u> 8	<u>Enemy Identification and Weapons</u> Regional SR4		
<u>Terrain Description:</u> Edge of clean rubber, visibility approximately 40 metres.				
<u>Narrative:</u> The patrol was in ambush on a track between two houses. Approximately one hour after establishing the ambush position, the sentries heard movement and talking and saw torch lights moving along the track towards the ambush position. The ambush was initiated by claymores once the enemy were in the killing area. An initial sweep was conducted with the aid of artillery illumination and a further detailed sweep was conducted at first light.				
<u>Sketch:</u> 				
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 5 KIA		<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil		
<u>Supporting Fire Employed:</u> Artillery, Mortar Illumination.				
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned:</u> a. <u>Local Commander:</u> Nil. b. <u>Platoon Comments:</u> Nil. c. <u>Company Comments:</u> Well positioned and sited claymores as well as restraint in triggering the ambush until the right moment produced excellent results. d. <u>Unit Comments:</u> Nil. e. <u>Lessons Learned:</u> Nil.				

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APPENDIX 15 TO
ANNEX C TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
AFTER ACTION REPORT
DATED 26 FEB 71


SUMMARY OF CONTACT/INCIDENT

<u>Date</u> 31 Jan 71	<u>Time</u> 2025 Hrs	<u>Location</u> YS440873	<u>Pl</u> 8	<u>Coy</u> C
<u>Strength</u> 14	<u>Commander of troops in contact</u> <u>Rank</u> Lt <u>Name</u> PURCELL		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> Lt <u>Name</u> PURCELL	
<u>Initiated by</u> Rear protection party	<u>Enemy Strength</u> 2	<u>Enemy Identification and Weapons</u> Regional		

Terrain Description: Clean rubber plantation, small folds of ground giving a range/visibility of approximately 50 - 60 metres.

Narrative: At approximately 311915H, the enemy were observed moving east towards the village. I reported this to my other ambush patrol and then at approximately 11200H, moved into an ambush position across the route the enemy had taken. After the other ambush was triggered, movement was heard to the NE of the ambush position. One enemy was observed at about 40 metres SW north of the ambush position and was engaged. The enemy withdrew west and then SW after contact.

Sketch:



<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 1 KIA	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
----------------------------------	-----------------------------------

Supporting Fire Employed: Artillery Illumination.

Comments and Lessons Learned:

- a. Local Commander: Nil.
- b. Platoon Comments: Nil.
- c. Company Comments: There was a considerable delay in the ambush commander calling for illumination.
- d. Unit Comments: Nil.
- e. Lessons Learned: If enemy are not contacted on their way into a village, they will tend to come out the same way. Even if contacted in the village, they will tend to flee on the old trail.

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Page 1 of 3

ANNEX D TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
AFTER ACTION REPORT FOR
OP CUNG CHUNG III FOR
PERIOD 01 - 31 JAN 71
DATED 16 FEB 71

SUMMARY OF INSTALLATIONS AND CACHES
OPERATION CUNG CHUNG III

<u>Ser-</u> <u>ial</u> (a)	<u>Date/Time</u> (b)	<u>Location</u> (c)	<u>Unit/ Sub Unit</u> (d)	<u>Activity</u> (e)
1	051100H	YS268744	Aslt Pnr Sp Coy	Located a base camp in an area 50 metres triangular consisting of 6 x 'L' shaped weapon pits, 1 bunker with 3ft OHP and 2 x cache positions. The camp was in very poor condition, over 12 months old and not used for over 12 months. Entry/exit tracks to NORTH, EAST and SOUTH. Assorted scrap metal and qty of bottles were found.
2	0517 H	YS223691 YS224691 YS224692	2/A Coy	Located 3 camp areas, each containing bunkers 12 x 6ft with 3ft igloo-shaped OHP, sleeping platforms and cooking areas, each camp had sentry platforms 3ft square and 15 ins off the ground. Tracks made of cut timber inter-connected the 3 camp areas which were 3-6 months old and last used 2 hours prior to being found. Area at first grid contained 3 bunkers in good condition. Area second grid contained 2 bunkers and area at third grid contained 5 bunkers. Bunkers in second and third area were in poor but liveable condition. Used med stores and misc assorted stores were located.
3	051700H	YS226697	2/A Coy	Located a camp in an area 20 x 30 metres, consisting of 1 bunker with 2ft 6 ins OHP and 3 fighting pits. Camp was six months old in good condition and vacated only minutes prior to discovery. Clothing, food, fishing nets, cooking utensils and a boat were located.
4	061200H	YS476880	1/V Coy	Located a camp 10 x 10 metres containing 3 sleeping areas. Entry/exit routes NORTH and WEST. Last used 4-5 hours previous by 3-4 persons and was in a dirty condition. Loc was 1 x US mug, 2 plastic water containers, and 1 home made kerosene lantern.
5	061330H	YS264744	Aslt Pnr Sp Coy	Located a camp consisting of 11 bunkers, 1 well and 15 sleeping positions. Bunkers had 4-5ft OHP. Entry/exit NW and SE. Camp 6-12 months old, used 1-2 months ago, and was in good condition. Loc were cooking utensils, qty of bottles, clothing and evidence of med supplies. Camp destroyed.
6	081015H	YS264747	Atk Pl/ Sp Coy	Located staging camp 10 metres square with 2 cooking fires. Est 2 months old and used 2 months ago by 3-5 persons. Used med supplies located.
7	090815H	YS400801	1/A Coy	Located a tunnel system approx 300 metres in diameter. Tunnel in many directions with 12 poss entrances, but unable to check fully due to CS gas in system. The tunnels have 3ft OHP, entry/exit points, north, south and east, and is 2 years old and used 12 months ago although there has been movement in the area in last 2-3 days. Destruction not required due to CS gas in

.../the system

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- 2 -

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
				the system. 091130H Pl loc a stick. gren frag anti pers type of $\frac{1}{4}$ lb explosive CHICOM manufacture set up as an early warning device for the system. Set for det by trip wire.
8	101000H	YS446806	3/A Coy	Located and destroyed 2 bunkers 15 x 10ft "Z" shaped in area 30 x 10 metres. 18 ins of OHP of timber and 12 ins of earth. Entry/exit SW and NW. System 3 months old, last used 3 months ago and in fair condition.
9	120800H	YS474882	2/V Coy	Located and destroyed 1 bunker 10 x 10ft with 12-18 ins OHP and a water point 20 metres away. The bunker was 4-8 weeks old and used 7 days ago and in very good condition.
10	121200H	YS395790	1/A Coy	Located and destroyed a base camp 30 metres diameter with 1 large bunker and several bed spaces. Bunker at southern end of the camp on creek bank and has 2ft OHP. Entry/exit from north and west. Camp 3 years old, last used 1 year ago and in poor condition. Loc were 100 x 7.92 rds.
11	131220H	YS341736	C Coy	Located a very old decayed bunker system. An east - west track through the system was used in the last week by 1-2 persons.
12	140830H	YS388758	2/A Coy	Located previously destroyed camp in an area 75 x 20 metres, crescent shaped area consisting of 16 bunkers, 6 x 15 x 6ft and 10 x 6 x 4ft with 24ins OHP. Camp was 3 years old and used within last 3 years old and used within last 3 months by a small group of pers. Entry/exit tracks to east and west.
13	171000H	YS343761	7/C Coy	Located 4 uncompleted and deteriorated bunkers, OHP incomplete, est to be 3 months old and not used since that time. Bunkers not destroyed. 1 x Thompson SMG and UXB of 500lbs loc.
14	171200H	YS325735	8/C Coy	Located a camp comprising 14 bunkers with no OHP, one . 35ft deep well and 2 large fire places. Entry/exit to all 4 cardinal points and to the NE. Camp was est to be 1-2 years old, not used for 8-12 months and had been destroyed on an earlier occasion.
15	191215H	YS440895	9/C Coy	Located previously destroyed bunker system 30 x 30 metres square with 4 bunkers est 12 months old last used 4 months ago. Loc 4 x U/I mags, 3 x M16 mags, 80 rds SA ammo and 1 (electric) fire extinguisher.
16	191430H	YS439896	9/C Coy	Located and destroyed a bunker system 30 x 20 metres "T" shaped consisting of 2 bunkers and 1 pit with 1ft OHP. Entry/exit all directions. System 6 months old and 1 bunker used 3 weeks ago and in fair condition, 1 in good condition. Loc were 200 x 7.62mm rds link (badly rusted).
17	211145H	YS269755	Engr LCT/ A Sqn 3 Cav Regt	Located a bunker system consisting of one well and three bunkers with 2ft OHP, and 5 open pits. System was overgrown and in disrepair. Last used 9 months ago. Recovered from the system 1000 rds 5.56mm SA ammo. System was destroyed.

.../18.

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
18	280845H	YS4406239	2/V Coy	Located a platform type installation built against a large tree. Believed to be a sleeping position and in a swampy area. Position was in very good condition, 3 months old and last used 10-14 days ago. Entry/exit tracks north, south and east. Platform destroyed.
19	290900H	YS451883	7/C Coy	As a result of information supplied by District Chief, DUC THANH, a ptl of 7 Pl located a bunker with 2 x 2ft hidden trapdoor. Bunker was 12 x 2 x 3ft with 3ft OHP, 6 months old, in very good condition and used within the last month. Entry/exit track to SW lead to a pack containing 5lbs rice and other food. Blood stains loc were believed attributable to a VC WIA in 9 Pl contact at YS451883 on 262230H. Qty med sups and a water bottle found in bunker.

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Page 1 of 1

ANNEX E TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn
AFTER ACTION REPORT
PERIOD 1 - 31 JAN 71
DATED 15 FEB 71

ARTILLERY AFTER ACTION REPORT
DIRECT SUPPORT BATTERY COMMANDER'S REPORT

1. The ammunition expended by 107 Fd Bty in support of 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn during the reporting period was as follows:

a.	Contact Missions	-	71 Illum.
b.	Adjustment of DF's	-	87 HE 6 WP
c.	H and I targets	-	2364
d.	Training	-	157 HE 9 Illum 10 WP 7 Splintex
e.	Curfew warnings	-	4 Illum
f.	Others (incl Intelligence targets, and in support of other units)	-	766 HE 108 Illum 1 WP
g.	LZ preparations	-	1 WP
	<u>Total</u>	-	<u>3591</u>

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MESSAGE FORM R 569/21/1

C24

PRECEDENCE - ACTION	PRECEDENCE - INFO	DATE - TIME GROUP	MESSAGE NO. (OPTIONAL)
ROUTINE	ROUTINE	262330Z	
FROM:	2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC)		FILE NO.
TO:	LIST C plus V COY IO Sig Offr Tpt 1 ATF LO JUE THANH		CLASSIFICATION
			RESTRICTED
			CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
			G377
INFO:	1 ATF LO HOA LONG		

MOBILE COMBINED CHECK POINT (-) 2 RAR/NZ
(ANZAC) BN R.569/21/1 DATED 24 FEB 71 (-)
WEF 1 MAR 71 AND UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE
SP COY IS RELIEVED OF RESPONSIBILITY
FOR CHECK POINT EXCEPT PROVISION
OF ONE RADIO OP (-) CHECK POINT IS
ADMIN COY RESPONSIBILITY WEF 1
MAR 71 (-) SP COY TO HANDOVER CHECK
POINT REPORT FORMS TO ADMIN COY

PAGE	NO. OF PAGES	REFERS TO MESSAGE	DRAFTER'S NAME	OFFICE	TEL. NO.
1	1	CLASSIFIED	ROBERTS	OPS	ERUDITE CP
		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO			
FOR OPERATOR'S USE					RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	<i>A. Roberts</i>
					<i>Maj</i>

BLT FORM 52

C25

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Page 1 of 4 pages

Copy No 36 of 50
2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn
NUI DAT

R569/18/1

261700H Feb 71

OPS 28

Op Instr 6/71

1. Sit.

a. En Forces. PHU MY guerillas, estimated strength 9 to 11, are located in the area north of the NUI THI VAIs YS 2971. They maintain liaison and communications with the PHU MY Party Chapter in PHU MY village YS 2574. The group has mixed weapons without IMGs or B 40s. An element of CHAU DUC District HQ may be co-located.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) RTAVF. 2/2 Bn RTAVF continues operations in the area centre of mass YS 2682.

2. Msn. To locate and destroy PHU MY guerillas in AO BACH TUONG.

3. Execution.

a. Gen Outline. Reconnaissance and ambush op in three phases:

(1) Phase 1. 386 RF Coy (-) deploys by air.

(2) Phase 2. Coy searches astride east-west fire trail, west of 32 easting.

(3) Phase 3. Coy moves by road tpt from RV in vicinity YS 2573 to coy base.

b. 386 RF Coy.

(1) Grouping.

In sp from 011500H Mar

Liaison Party 2 RAR/NZ
(ANZAC) Bn
Elm MATT 7 as allocated
by WOIC

In gen sp from 020800H Mar

Pl C/5/42 Arty (US) (155mm)

(2) Tasks.

(a) Phase 1. Deploy by air from CAY DIEP YS 2571 to AO BACH TUONG commencing 020855H Mar.

(b) Phase 2. Search and ambush astride the fire trail in accordance with the concept of ops by Comd 3/15 RF Gp and OC 386 RF Coy.

../(c) Phase 3.

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-2-

(c) Phase 3. Extraction by road tpt commencing 041600H Mar.

c. Liaison Party.

(1) <u>Grouping.</u>	OC, Capt P.R. RADCLIFFE	A Coy
	Radio Op (fwd)	A Coy
	Radio Op (rear link)	Sig Pl
	Orderly	A Coy
	FO Party	107 Fd Bty
	Platoon LNCOs (2)	A Coy
	Platoon radio ops (2)	A Coy
	Interpreters (3)	Int Sect
	MATT advisers (2)	MATT 7

(2) Tasks.

- (a) Maintain liaison and communications at Coy HQ and platoon level between HQ 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn and 386 RF Coy.
- (b) Co-ord arty and offensive air sp to 386 RF Coy, as required.
- (c) Co-ord air movement and emergency resupply by air if requested.
- (d) Provide advice and assistance.

d. Co-ord Instrs.

(1) AO and Bdry. Annex A. AO BACH TUONG.

(2) Timings.

- (a) Phase 1. H hr 020900H Mar 71.
- (b) Phase 2. 021000H to 041600H Mar 71.
- (c) Phase 3. On completion of Phase 2.

(3) Air.

- (a) Air Planning Conference. 010830H Mar 71, at HQ 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn.
- (b) PZ. YS 252713.
- (c) LZ. YS 330740 (to be confirmed)
- (d) LZ Prep. Arty (FSB DORA YS 272663) and gunships. Details to be confirmed.

4. Admin and Log.

a. Rat.

../(1) 386 RF

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-3-

- (1) 386 RF Coy carry 2&1/3 days rations on deployment from base.
- (2) Liaison Party carry 3 days rations on deployment from NUI DAT.

b. Water. Water resup by air if required.

5. Comd and Sig.

a. Command.

(1) HQ 3/15 RF Gp at YS 261681.

(2) HQ 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn at NUI DAT.

b. Op con. 386 RF Coy under op con HQ 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn in co-ordination with HQ 3/15 RF Gp.

c. Sig.

(1) Radio Diagram. Annex B ~~(to be issued)~~.


d. Rules of Engagement. Much of the AO is a civilian access area and civilians are to be found throughout the area by day. Rules of engagement are to be applied by 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn members.

e. Liaison. LO HQ 3/15 RF Gp will be located at HQ 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn 011500H to 041600H Mar 71.

f. Nicknames.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Meaning</u>	<u>Issued By</u>
(1) <u>Locations</u>		
(a) SOUTHERN CROSS	ONG TRINH RF Compound (HQ 3/15 RF Gp)	-
(b) HOSE CLIP	CAY DIEP RF Compound YS 252713	-
(c) RING STAND	PHU MY YS 2574	-
(2) <u>Activities.</u>		
(a) SOLID PIPE	Joined 386 RF Coy	Liaison Party
(b) OPEN CIRCLE	PZ Secure	Liaison Party
(c) ROMAN RINGS	Air insertion completed	Liaison Party

Ack Instrs: ACK (to CP ERUDITE)



(A.R. ROBERTS)

Maj
for CO

../Annex:

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-4-

- Annex: A. AO and Bdrys.
B. Radio Diagram (~~to be issued~~).

Distribution:


	<u>Copy No</u> (incl Annexes A and B)
HQ 3/15 RF Gp	1 - 5
District Chief LONG LE District	6
A Coy	7
B Coy	8
C Coy	9
V Coy	10
Sp Coy	11
Admin Coy	12
Liaison Party (Capt RADCLIFFE)	13 - 17
107 Fd Bty	18
1 Tp 1 Fd Sqn	19
HQ 1 ATF	20 - 22
1 ATF LO HOA LONG	23
DSA, LONG LE District	24
1 ATF LO Sector HQ BARIA	25 - 26
AATTV C/- Sector HQ BARIA	27
MATT 7 ONG TRINH	28
CO	29
2IC	30
BC	31
Ops Offr	32
IO	33
CP	34
Comds Diary	35 - 39
Spare (G Clerk)	40 - 49
File	50

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AO AND BDRYS

ANNEX A TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
OP INSTR. 6/71
DATED 26 FEB 71




Map: Series L7014
Sheet 6430 III
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RADIO DIAGRAM

ANNEX B TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
OP INSTR 6/71
DATED 26 FEB 71



SECURITY CLASSIFICATION:

UNCLASSIFIED


DRAWN BY:

AUTH BY:

} *Ad Roberts*
Major

ADMIN/AIR:

Frequency 43.10
Designator 95J
(IF REQUIRED)



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C26

RESTRICTED

Page 1 of 2

2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn
NUI DAT

R696/4/1

27 Feb 71

2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN FD SOPS
(REVISED JUL 70)

AMENDMENT No 3

Reference: A. 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn R696/1/1 dated 19 Jul 70.

1. Amendment No 3 to 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn Fd SOPs (Revised Jul 70) is enclosed.
2. The amendment is to the Aeromedical Evacuation (DUSTOFF) procedures and is related to Section 4 of Part 2 (AG Branch) of 1 ATF SOPs (Revised Jan 71). The following changes in procedure are significant but have not been included in the Fd SOP amendment because of lack of space:
 - a. One helicopter (DUSTOFF 1) of No 9 Sqn RAAF is permanently stationed at 8 Fd Amb. It is backed by another (DUSTOFF 2) on 15 mins stand-by (night) at VUNG TAU.
 - b. RAAF is responsible for DUSTOFF only within the 1 ATF TAOR and VUNG TAU Special Zone unless a special request is made by US DUSTOFF control at LONG BINH.
 - c. RAAF DUSTOFF is to be used for the following patients in order of priority:
 - (1) Australian troops;
 - (2) FWMAF or RVNAF troops (but not dependants);
 - (3) RF/PF troops (but not dependants);
 - (4) Detainee or PW patients; and
 - (5) VN Civilian battle casualties.
 - d. Vietnamese civilian non-battle illness and pregnancy cases are not eligible for DUSTOFF.
 - e. Evacuation precedence is:
 - (1) URGENT. Evacuation is essential within two hours to save life or limb. Examples are:

	NO	YES
URGENT	MALARIA PSYCHIATRIC FEVER OF UNKNOWN ORIGIN (FUO) VN CIV NON-BATTLE ILLNESS OR PREGNANCY	GSW OR FRAG WOUNDS OF CHEST, HEAD, NECK, ABDOMEN OR THIGH; FRACTURE OF THIGH, BROKEN NECK OR BACK; HEAT INJURY IF PASSING OUT OR BREATHING STOPS; BURNS COVERING 20% OR MORE OF THE BODY; CRUSHING INJURY OF BODY OR MAJOR EXTREMITIES.

/(2) PRIORITY

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

- 2 -

- (2) PRIORITY. Evacuation is essential within four hours or the patient will become URGENT. Examples are:


	NO	YES
PRIORITY	MALARIA PSYCHIATRIC MOST FWO FRACTURES OF FINGERS OR TOES VN CIV NON-BATTLE ILLNESS OR PREGNANCY	GSW OR FRAGMENTATION OR FRACTURES OF THE EXTREMITIES; HEAT CASUALTIES WITH CRAMPS AND DIZZINESS; CRUSHING INJURIES TO FINGERS OR TOES; BURNS COVERING 10% - 20% OF THE BODY.

- (3) ROUTINE. Evacuation is required within 24 hours. Examples are:

	NO	YES
ROUTINE	VN CIV NON BATTLE ILLNESS OR PREGNANCY	MALARIA; PSYCHIATRIC; MONOR FRACTURES OF THE FINGERS AND TOES; MOST FWO.

- (4) Tactical Precedence. A minor injury may cause a soldier to hinder operations. Such a case may be graded "Medically ROUTINE, tactically URGENT", but the tactical situation must require immediate evacuation and DUSTOFF should not be used merely for convenience.
- (5) Dead. DUSTOFF aircraft are only to be used to evacuate bodies in conjunction with patient evacuation. The aircraft commander is the sole authority for the acceptance or otherwise of bodies. Any available aircraft may be asked to lift Australian dead from the area or a separate air task submitted. Immediate identification of Australian/NZ dead by two separate members is necessary. Particulars of the members making the identification should be included in the NOTICAS report. Subsequent identification at 1 Aust Fd Hosp by two members is also necessary.

- f. Hoist. If no suitable site can be found and the case is URGENT or Tactically URGENT, request hoist extraction.



(A.R. ROBERTS)

Maj
Ops Offr

Enclosure: 1. Amdt No 3 to 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn Fd SOPs.

Distribution:

A Coy	30
B Coy	30
C Coy	30
V Coy	30
Sp Coy	50
Admin Coy	30
Bn HQ	30
Spare (Ops Clerk)	75

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn
FD SOPs (REVISED JUL 70)
AMENDMENT NO 3

1. Page 18 and 18A. Delete pages 18 and 18A and insert new pages 18, 18A and 18B attached.
2. Amendment Page. Record insertion of Amendment No 3.
3. Record of Amendments. The current issue of Fd SOPs is that revised in Jul 70 (pages 1 to 26) and including amendments:
 - a. Amendment No 1, 16 Sep 70.
 - b. Amendment No 2, 29 Oct 70.

RESTRICTED

FORMAT

EXAMPLE/REMARKS

Offer message to warn CP. "Standby DUSTOFF" is of no value unless a long delay is expected before the full request is available

Serial

- 1. DUSTOFF C/S... Of requesting sub-unit.
- 2. Location of PZ. Grid reference in numeral code.

3A. Patient priority:

URGENT

Evacuation is essential within two hours to save life or limb.

PRIORITY

Evacuation is essential within four hours or the patient will become URGENT.

ROUTINE

Evacuation is required within 24 hours.

3B. Number of patients:

-lying (in aircraft)
-sitting (in aircraft).

3C. Type of illness or injury.

Brief description/diagnosis.

3D. Nationality

AUST; US; VN MILITARY; PW/DETAINEE; VN CIV BATTLE CAS.

4A. Frequency and C/S. Sub-unit manning PZ.

.....4B. LZ

4B. LZ identification. LZ name (if any) or any permanent marker.

4C. Terrain and Weather. Only if other than clear and level pad and good visibility.

4D. Tactical Security. "PZ is secure". DUSTOFF will not be sent fwd until this is advised. If recently in contact, give direction of contact from PZ.

4E. Hoist requirement/Special Eqpt:

Is winch required?

If so, estimated tree height?

Litter needed?

If a night mission, may ac use lights?

4F. English speaking personnel at PZ? Yes/No - interpreter available?

4G. How will LZ be marked? Smoke? Strobe? Light? Flares? Vehicle lights?

Notes:

1. Report "DUSTOFF complete (and destination if known)" on Bn Comd Net.

2. ASP after completion (and within 60 minutes) send NOTICAS report on Admin/Air Net. /Ensure

Ensure patient's details are obtained before he is evacuated.

3. Destinations are:

- a. 8 Fd Amb ND: RED EARTH.
- b. 1 Aust Fd Hosp VT: VAMPIRE.
- c. 68 Med Gp LONG BINH: WIDE MINNOW/
QUEEN TONIC.
- d. ROK Hospital VT: ROK PAD (VN military).
- e. BARIA Hosp: VAN KHIEP (VN civilians).

(Amdt No 3 27 Feb 71)

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

Period Ending 3 Feb 71

General

1. In MR 3 during the week, enemy initiated activity continued at a low level. The most significant contacts were four widely dispersed friendly initiated actions with enemy platoon sized forces which were possibly resupply parties. The larger regimental sized units continued to avoid contact and are thought to be engaged primarily in the procurement of supplies. The heaviest enemy initiated attack in MR3 occurred SW of PHUOC VINH (XT 9242) on 24th January when 30 rounds of 82 mm mortar fire were received by a government post.
2. Elsewhere in VIETNAM a significant increase in mortar and rocket attacks was reported in the post-TET period. At a 23 (US) Infantry Division (AMERICAL) base near CHU LAI, the mortar fire was followed by a VC ground attack.
3. In Saigon on 29th January two pieces of TNT were thrown into an asphalt store in a public works building 2km from MACV HQ. There were no casualties but the building was extensively damaged by fire.
4. Food Resupply.
 - a. Further large caches of rice have been captured. An MR 7 Rear Services Group cache of 1 ton was captured by US Forces on 23rd January NW of TAN LINH (XT 8829), while another cache of two tons was found on 27th January in PHUOC LONG Province. Further large food supplies have recently been captured by 3 Bde 1 (US Air Cav Div (Airmobile) in the NUI MAY TAO area (see para 6.a. of this Review).
 - b. A HOI CHANH in the has stated that 1st Bn 274 VC MF Regt has been living entirely on bananas and sweet potato for the last 5 months. To celebrate TET, each man was presented with a can of rice.
 - c. During the period 10-27 Jan 71, approximately 500 HOI CHANHS were received in PHUOC LONG Province. Of the ralliers, 324 were from VC K29 District VC MR 10, 164 were from K17 District. The reasons most often given for rallying were lack of food supplies and air and artillery strikes. Most of the ralliers were workers in the VC villages of K17 and K 29 Districts tasked with food production for VC units.
5. Assessment for MR 3. II FFV have estimated that the enemy may attempt an increase in activity during the coming week. Several low level agent reports and the reported movement of munitions by 81 Rear Services Group during early January all point to a planned surge in enemy activity soon after the TET cease-fire. The enemy will concentrate his attacks upon the pacification programme and upon the government's influence in the countryside while some ground probes against isolated government posts could occur. Terrorism in major population centres and possible rocketing of allied bases may also take place. 33 NVA Regiment and 274 VC Main Force Regiment have not been committed to offensive operations for a considerable period of time. These formations may therefore play an important role should a military region - wide high point be ordered.

SOURCES: Paras 1, 3, 4a - 1 ATF SUPINTREP 5/71.
 Para 4b - 2nd Bde 25th (US) Inf Div INTSUM 028-71.
 Para 4c - II FFV PERINTREP 5-71.

Area of Interest

6. NUI MAY TAO - NUI BE.

- a. It was reported a fortnight ago that reconnaissance pilots had observed heavy recent track activity leading into NUI BE from the NORTH (YS 816962 - YS 815930 - SE to YS 824923 - YS 830922 - YS 833915), suggesting that other enemy troops in addition to D445, possibly elements of Headquarters Military Region 7, may have moved into NUI BE. 1st Air Cav Div troops have now observed signs of enemy movement at ten locations in the NUI BEs (YS 814922, YS 819922, YS 820912, YS 817923, YS 849904, YS 862911, YS 796893, YS 837943, YS 829939, YS 836935) and at one location in the MAY TAOs (YS746915). US forces have killed one enemy soldier (at YS 829939) and wounded two (YS 849904) and have located a major cache (YS 836935 and YS 837938) and one smaller one, containing a total of 18 tons of flour (39,550 lbs 2½ tons of sugar, 500 lbs of unpolished rice and 200 lbs of corn. The flour was probably not intended for use by field units as it does not form a part of the staple diet. It may have been intended for making bread, cakes and soup for MR 7 hospital patients. The quantity of flour concerned would probably suffice for all the patients in the NUI BE base area for over a year. The present US activity in NUI BE, combined with these losses of supplies, will cause temporary administrative problems for the enemy.
- b. Following the location of BA LONG Province Armoury section workshop, 1 ATF patrols have found some further enemy ammunition material (YS 679881) and 16 x 66mm aircraft rockets (YS 639920) WEST of NUI MAY TAO. US troops have located a weapons cache in the Eastern border area (YS 791723).
- c. D445 LF Bn is probably still in the area of NUI BE although no confirmed contact has been made with the unit. C1 remains in the LONG HAI.

7.

GARTH - COURTENAY

- a. All seven 1 ATF contacts during the week occurred in the area of NDP GARTH (YS4590). US Troops had contacts in the same area. Most of the enemy dead are believed to have been members of Rear Services Sub Region 4, including the Assistant Political Officer of J 600 Transportation Group.
- b. HOI CHANHs and PW have commented on the effects 1 ATF and US operations are having in the VIET CUONG and adjacent areas on VC resupply and tax collection efforts, particularly of CAU SU District.
- c. On 25th January South of GARTH US troops located a cache of 14 x 100mm mortar rounds (YS 440870). These rounds may have been intended for use by the BA LONG Province Unit.

8.

CHAU DUC.

- a. Reconnaissance pilots have continued to observe foot-tracks in the NUI LE (YS 5087) and CU MY (YS 5787) areas which may indicate the present location of CHAU DUC Dist HQ elms.
- b. On 25th January, Sector forces killed the Deputy Chief of the Youth Organisation Section of CHAU DUC in a bunker in HOA LONG.

9. On 31st January, five VC from the PHU MY guerilla unit and an enemy group from THAI THIEN entered a hamlet of PHU MY (YS 2574) and stole eleven weapons from the PSDF. The primary aim of the enemy is to attack the pacification programme, and this incident demonstrates the enemy's capability to discredit the PSDF when the opportunity presents itself. The THAI THIEN gp mentioned may be in fact the HAT DICH guerillas (Montagnards originating from the THAI THIEN area but sub-ordinate to CHAU DUC).

10. A report has been received that on 22nd and on 29th January small groups of VC were seen in the area of LONG HOA in the RUNG SAT (YS 334586) carrying mines by sampan. The enemy groups concerned may be water sappers planning to carry out mining or terrorist attacks at LONG SON, on Route 15 or in the VUNG TAU harbour. The report is unconfirmed and the manner in which it was reported has made it difficult to assess.

11. PWs have stated that the strength of BINH BA guerilla and Party Chapter is between five and eight persons, who are usually located along SUOI SON (YS425735 to YS415724). The unit is very short of food and maintains no contact with other District Forces.

SOURCE. Paras 6 - 11 (excl para 7b) - 1 ATF SUPINTREP 5/71.

(R.J.K. HOSKIN)
Capt
IO
2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn

- Annex:
- A. VC/NVA Strengths, Locations and Identifications.
 - B. Part 2 - VC/NVA Sapper Tactics, Organisation, Armament, Training and Effectiveness.
 - C. VC/NVA Rockets.

VC/NVA STRENGTHS, LOCATIONS AND IDENTIFICATIONS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Est Str</u>	<u>Last Ident</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Est Current Loc</u>
<u>HQ MR 7</u>	540	09 Jan YF720088	402/A/024	East GIA RAY
<u>3/33 NVA</u>	195	27 Jan YS620950	502/14/1	Vic Area YS 6393
<u>274 MF Regt</u>	765		402/A/024	
HQ/Sp elms	420	16 Jan YS322898	402/A/024	West of ONG QUE Plant
1st Inf Bn	135	17 Jan YF363101	402/A/024	YS 3594
2nd Inf Bn	110	19 Jan YT311072	402/A/024	South HUNG LOC
3rd Inf Bn	90	07 Jan YS260905	402/A/024	SOUT CA Stream
<u>HQ SR 4 +</u>	580	31 Jan YS444887	502/13/2	VIET CUONG
2 VC MF Bn	100	23 Dec YF 295084	402/A/024	SOUT CA YS 2899 South of NHON TRACH
4 VC MF Bn	50	20 Dec YS049928	402/A/024	Dispersed NW NHON TRACH
<u>74 Arty Regt</u>	560			
HQ Sp Elms	90	20 Dec YF 295084	402/A/024	SW HUNG NGHIA
2 Arty Bn	165	30 Nov YS2495	402/A/024	Near BINH SON
3 Arty Bn	170	17 Jan YT290084	402/A/024	SW HUNG NGHIA
<u>6 VC MF Sapper Bn(D6)</u>	80	10 Jan YT423101	402/A/024	NW XUAN LOC
<u>8 VC MF Water Sapper Bn</u>	70	31 Jan elms YS334586	403	THU DUC
<u>10 MF Sapper Bn (D10)</u>	260	02 Dec YS 209799	402/A/024	RSSZ/E NHON TRACH
<u>BA LONG PROVINCE HQ</u>	440	31 Jan YS690940	434/45	YS 690940
D445 LF Bn	150	19 Jan YS 710704	402/A/024	NUI BE
CHAU DUC Dist HQ	50	18 Jan YS 426605	PW 502/1	YS 5485
Elms CHAU DUC	5	31 Jan PHU MY		
XUAN LOC Dist HQ	21		402/A/024	Sparrow's Wing
LONG DAT Dist HQ	55	16 Jan YS 456542	403	LONG HAI
CAO SU Dist HQ	12	27 Jan YS 446883	511	NUI SUOI RAM
VUNG TAU City Unit	19	03 Feb YS 316592	434/47	South LONG HUONG
BARIA City Unit	10	08 Jan YS 455824	507/A/2	South NUI DINHs
BINH BA Guerillas	8		403	SJOI SON

PART 2
VC/NVA SAPPER TACTICS, ORGANISATION, ARMAMENT, TRAINING AND
EFFECTIVENESS

General Discussion of Sapper Tactics as Employed by Sappers Without Infantry

- 11.
- a. Sapper techniques are specifically designed to eliminate the need for fire superiority in the attack and to thwart massive Allied defensive fire. Stealth and secrecy are substituted for fire superiority in the attack. The sapper will seek to counteract massive Allied defensive fire by thrusting deeply into Allied defensive positions from different directions, and hitting several targets simultaneously, causing confusion and greatly limiting the effective use of Allied firepower.
 - b. The main objectives are usually the installations' command post, signal centre, and those other areas where maximum damage can be inflicted in the shortest period of time, such as supply areas, vehicle parks, flight lines etc.
 - c. Enemy documents indicate that the VC/NVA sapper places special emphasis on choosing a main avenue of approach which leads directly to the objective.
 - d. Sappers employed without infantry often attempt to disguise their attack as an attack-by-fire or ground infantry assault by careful employment of the fire support element and reserve element. This causes the friendly forces to deploy to their bunkers or to the perimeter, leaving the centre of the installation relatively free of troops and at the mercy of the sapper assault teams. This particular tactic has proven very effective, and it appears that many friendly units have not realized that they were in fact the victims of a sapper assault rather than an attack-by-fire or ground infantry assault.
 - e. Upon completion of the mission all elements withdraw through the perimeter, usually at the same point they entered, while the reserve and fire support elements provide cover. The elements of the unit withdraw to a rallying point, normally the same location as the assembly point, where a muster is conducted. The sapper unit normally remains at this point until the following night before returning to its base camp.
 - f. Conclusion. The sapper thus seeks:
 - (1) to penetrate the perimeter secretly, thereby eliminating the need to achieve fire superiority in the attack;
 - (2) to rapidly close with the enemy to blunt his defensive fire once his presence is known;
 - (3) to penetrate and close from many different directions using several assault teams to cause confusion and divide the defence;
 - (4) to attack many targets at once, adding to the confusion and further splitting the defence;
 - (5) to employ the fire support element, and the reserve element to

- (6) to disguise his attack as an attack-by-fire or ground infantry assault so as to cause friendly forces to deploy to their bunkers or the perimeter and away from the centre of the installation.

Sappers With Infantry in the Attack

12. Employment of Sappers with Infantry. Sappers, when employed with infantry in the assault, will assume either a supporting role with infantry units assuming the primary role, or a primary role with infantry assuming a support role.

13. Sappers in Support.

- a. This is evidently a role that sappers consider to be a misemployment of their tactical abilities, and there is evidence that authorities at Region and COSVN concur. Nevertheless, recent intelligence reports reveal that sappers continue to be employed in this role by infantry commanders as a substitute for adequate fire support.
- b. Support rendered by sappers to infantry units in the attack consists largely of reconnaissance and penetration of the perimeter for the infantry units. Reconnaissance tactics employed in this support role are generally as described in Para 8 of Annex B, Weekly Int Review, INTDEX 718/7, period ending 28 Jan 71.
- c. Sapper object to penetrating perimeters for infantry ground assaults because, when operating with large infantry units, sappers tend to lose the secrecy and surprise essential to their success.
- d. Despite these objections, there seems to be no decrease in the use of sappers in support of infantry as described above. Indeed the VC/NVA appear to have used sappers in a support role in many of the recent ground assaults in III CTZ against allied fire support bases along the Cambodian border. So long as VC/NVA forces lack adequate fire support, the infantry will probably continue to use sappers in support.

14. Sappers in the Primary Role with Infantry in Support.

- a. Available information indicates that when infantry is employed in support of sappers, it is employed as a reserve element, a security element, or a secondary assault element.
- b. When employment as the reserve or security element, the infantry assumes essentially the same mission as its corresponding sapper element. In the organizational example cited previously (Figure 1), the reserve element used was an infantry squad. Both the reserve and security roles assigned to infantry in support of sappers is quite common.
- c. The greatest threat is posed when the infantry is employed as a secondary assault element with the sapper force. This tactic essentially consists of a large diversionary attack from one direction while sappers secretly penetrate and assault the centre of the objective from another, using the techniques and tactics already discussed. The attack against Plain Rang, Ninh Thuan Province, on 26 January 1969 and the attack against a field position of the B/3/8 US Infantry (ZA 122722), Pleik. Province, on 9 May 1969, were of this type.

Special Action

15. Definition. Special action groups are covert units designed specifically to fight in a hostile urban environment. These units are trained to engage in terrorist and sabotage activities, to disseminate propaganda, proselyte the population, and

They are units designed and trained for actions of a unique and special nature that are unsuited to conventional units. They are not new to modern warfare and the organization and techniques they employ are similar to those employed by the Irgun (the Jewish 'special action' unit employed in Jaffa, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem) against the Arabs and British up to 1948.

16. Mission. The mission of special action units is:

- a. to maintain constant military pressure on the enemy in his secure areas eg., his urban areas, through acts of sabotage and terrorism.
- b. To co-ordinate with and assist larger tactical units attacking the towns and cities by attacking objectives from within and causing confusion in the objectives area. Implied in both missions is the political task of winning the support of the population in the urban areas.

17. Organization. City special action groups have no standard organization and differ from city to city. Their internal structure appears to be a composite of various elements. For example, the SR 6 Special Action Group (Saigon) is composed of eight units: four special action, one infantry, one artillery, one sapper-reconnaissance and one tactical sapper:

- a. Special action units use the three-man cell concept. The grouping of these cells into larger special action teams appears to be contingent upon given circumstances.
- b. The infantry, artillery, sapper and sapper-reconnaissance units of Special Action Group appear to be organized in the same manner as VC/NVA Local and Main Force units of comparable type and size.

18. Tactics and Armament.

- a. The tactics employed by special action groups are also contingent upon the given situation. The basic tactic utilized by these groups is the raid, the basic unit is the three-man cell, and the basic weapons are the explosive charge, the AK-47 and the concealed side arm.
- b. Special action tactics are defined by the VC/NVA as follows:
The special action tactic as employed in urban areas consists of disguising the attack forces throughout the attack phase or for a limited length of time, launching surprise attacks against the enemy with explosive charges and fire power, inflicting casualties on him or destroying his war material and then withdrawing quickly.
- c. Targets and missions will determine which unit or units will be used at any given time by the special action group. Sapper units will usually be employed against 'hard' targets, eg, urban airfields, military installations, etc. Special action units will usually be targeted against 'soft' targets, eg, personnel, theatres, restaurants, BOQs, BEQs etc.
- d. Evidence indicates that the three-man cell of the special action unit is employed in terrorist attacks and assassinations. Vehicles are often used to approach and withdraw from the target area. One member will scout the area and if necessary provide covering fire, the second will operate the vehicle and the third will hit the target.

19. Targets. Targets may include but are not limited to:

- a. enemy personnel.
- b. military bases and depots.

- c. administrative buildings.
- d. BOQs.
- e. BEQs.
- f. guard stations.
- g. restaurants, and
- h. theatres.

20. Bases. The special action units of special action groups usually live and operate entirely within urban areas, relying heavily on the use of legal or forced documents to conceal their identity. The sapper, infantry and artillery units are normally based outside the city and enter it only to conduct operations.

Naval Sapper Units

21. Study of VC/NVA naval sapper units is beyond the scope of this study. A comprehensive study, 'Operational Handbook for Swimmer Defence', on this subject was published recently by the Naval Advisory Group, MACV. Also available is a study on 'NVA Underwater Sapper Techniques' prepared by II FFORCEV. These studies examine in depth the naval sapper threat, capabilities, tactics, organisation, explosive devices, and defences which can be employed against him.

This article is a continuation of extracts from Training Information Letter 7/70 of May 1970 and will be continued in next week's Review.

VC/NVA ROCKETS

1. Since the first reported use of rockets by enemy forces in SVN - the attack on DA NANG airbase, 27 Feb 1967 - VC/NVA forces have placed increasing emphasis on the use of rockets.
2. Rockets primarily used by enemy forces are the 122mm and 140mm SOVIET ROCKETS. They can be employed in hastily constructed positions and can be fired from areas inaccessible to other artillery pieces. Using rockets the enemy can place a maximum amount of fire into an area in a minimum amount of time and withdraw from the launching area before the arrival of reaction forces.
3. Techniques and Tactics of Employment.
 - a. Past attacks have indicated that the 140mm rocket will be fired from distances of 8,000 to 10,000 metres. The 122mm rocket units will probably emplace their launch system in a site 9,000 to 11,000 metres from the target. The position for both systems have always been in open terrain with a minimum of masking to their front.
 - b. The 140mm attacks have shown no consistency in the number of launchers which they have employed against any given target. There have been as many as 134 launchers (27 February 1967, Da Nang attack) employed in one position. In many cases there will be as few as two or three launchers emplaced and fired.
 - c. The 122mm rocket attacks have all exhibited a consistent employment pattern. Either one battalion (18 launchers) or two battalions (36 launchers) have been utilized in these attacks. A battalion has three companies, each company having six launchers. The six launchers of a company will all be deployed on line with 15 metres distance between launchers. The distance between the three companies varies from 150 to 800 metres. The battalion is normally not deployed with all three companies on line; they are usually staggered. Normally, 12.7mm heavy machine guns will be placed on the flanks of an employed battalion.
 - d. There is no site preparation, except for surveying in the launch positions, prior to the night of the attack. Equipment and personnel are moved into the site under cover of darkness. Preparations can be completed and the rockets fired within a maximum of two to three hours. In some instances it is possible that the rockets are cached near the launch site some time prior to the night of the attack. This technique would reduce the number of personnel infiltrating to the launch site on the night of the attack.
 - e. Simple tools for preparing the firing sites consist of scoops or shovels and perhaps picks. In the case of 140mm rockets, past procedures have been to survey the area in advance and to lay out the positions with stakes placed one behind the other, six feet apart. A rope is tied between the two stakes to facilitate the tube emplacement at night. In order to emplace the tripod mounts for the 122mm rockets, holes six inches in diameter must be dug. Some of the 122mm positions have extensive networks of trenches and control pits. Consideration must also be given to electrical wiring used for ignition.

3. The 140mm rockets are launched in one volley, and the launcher is not reloaded. The crews will evacuate the launch area minutes after firing the rockets. There are at least two, and as many as five, 122mm rockets fired from each launcher during an attack. It requires from three to five minutes to reload the launcher. Attacks using the 122mm rocket last from 10 to 15 minutes. This is adequate time to place effective counter-battery fire on the launch positions, provided the sites can be accurately and quickly located.

4. Characteristics of the Soviet 122mm Rocket.

- a. Launcher and Mount
Caliber - 122mm
Length - 8.1 ft.
Height (at maximum elevation - 8.1 ft
Weight - 121 lb (emplaced)
Tube - 55 lb
Mount - 57.2 lb
Remote firing device - 8.8 lb
Emplacement time - 2.5 min
Displacement time - 2 min.
- b. Rocket, Fin-Stabilized
Length - 6.2 ft
Weight w/fuze - 102 lb
Range - 11,000 m
- c. Fuze, Point-Detonating, Model DKZ-B
Type of action - instantaneous, short delay, long delay
Weight - 21b
- d. Technical Data
Minimum elevation - plus 10 degrees
Maximum elevation - plus 42 degrees
Deflection - 7 degrees from centre; 14 degrees total
- e. Sighting Device
Type - optical panoramic and mechanical open
Visual angle - 9 degrees
magnification - 2 x 5 power
- f. Warhead
Weight w/o fuze - 41 lb
Filler weight - 14.5 lb
Filler type - 86% TNT; 14% AL
Length - 24 in

5. Characteristics of the Soviet 140mm Rocket.

- a. Launcher Tube and Wooden Plank (Mounting Board)
Length, overall - 45 in
Weight, single tube - 22 lb
Weight, double tube - 45 lb
- b. Rocket, Spin-Stabilized
Length, overall w/fuze - 42.35 in
Length, overall w/o fuze - 40.0 in
Weight w/fuze - 83 lb
Range - 10,000 m (est)
- c. Fuze, Point Detonating, Model V-25
Type of action - instantaneous, short delay, long delay
Weight - 1.4 lb


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a. Warhead
Weight w/o fuze - 41 lb
Filler weight - 9.26 lb
Filler type - TNT
Length - 15.5 in


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2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW



1915



Reference

INTDEX 718/g

Period Ending

10 FEB 71

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2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN

INTDEX 718/9

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

Period Ending 10 Feb 71

General

1. As forecast by II FFV, the level of enemy initiated activity increased during the week in (US) MR 3, with a slight high point toward the end of the week. In (VC) MR 7 however, enemy initiated activity remained low with widely scattered attacks by fire. Two of the attacks were probably mounted by elements of 33 NVA Regt and 274 VC MF Regt.
2. Representative incidents of interest were:
 - a. At YS281934 on 1 Feb, RTAVF elements received three 82mm mortar rounds, wounding 8 Thais and destroying two 2½ ton vehicles and a jeep.
 - b. DINH QUAN PF/PSDF compound at YT558355 received fifteen B40 rounds on 2 Feb at 0210 hours. The subsequent ground attack by an unidentified force with an estimated strength of 30-40 persons resulted in four PSDF KIA, four PSDF WIA with two VC KIA and two VC CIA (PW). It is possible that the attack was mounted to screen the large-scale movement of supplies across Highway 20.
 - c. 812 RF Coy were ambushed on 2 Feb at YT4525 while picking up their mechanical ambush. Three RF were KIA and seven WIA.
3. Although the intensity of attacks by fire remained low, the dispersion and use of a variety of weapons suggests that the attacks involved both local and main force artillery or mortar units.
4. Assessment. Enemy activity is expected to remain at a low level in MI during the coming week with the most common form of activity being attacks upon hamlet defence forces. These attacks will be designed to raise the interior enemy threat in an attempt to diminish the commitment of ARVN forces to CAMBODIA.

Activity Capabilities and Intentions

5. Mine activity. There have been a further three mine incidents in the GARTH area:
 - a. At YS473895 a patrol of 2 P1 detonated a 3lb mine with a bamboo pressure/electric firing device. A command detonated US CLAYMORE mine was fired immediately afterwards. The incident resulted in one Australian DOW and one WIA.
 - b. An APC disturbed an anti-tank mine at YS442888. The mine consisted of a 105mm shell and a RPG 2 round.

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- c. At YS484907 a Landrover was destroyed and 4 Australians WIA by a 30 lb CHICOM mine.

There have been several other mine incidents reported by other units in the Province. It is expected that mine incidents will increase.

6. According to an agent report plans have been made for a possible attack by fire upon BARIA or VUNG TAU prior to 14 February. In addition, explosive charges were to be placed at US agencies in both cities. Reports have been received in the past of the possible movement of sappers into VUNG TAU and of the presence on LONG SON Island of enemy artillery reconnaissance personnel. In addition, small groups of VC were reported in late January in the RUNG SAT, carrying mines by sampan (YS334586).
7. Several unconfirmed reports were received during January that the enemy might attempt a high point in PHUOC TUY prior to 14th February. Should a high point be attempted, 1 ATF assess that the most likely enemy action would be a probe by C1 and LONG DAT in the LONG DIEN or DAT DO area, or possibly attacks in BARIA or VUNG TAU as mentioned earlier. An attack in the Route 2 area in the NORTHERN part of the Province by C36 is possible, but any such plans may have been pre-empted by ANZAC Bn operations in the area.
8. Troops of 3rd Brigade 1st Air Cavalry Division operating in NORTHERN NUI BE and NUI MAY TAO have killed at least two and wounded at least two further enemy. One HOI CHANH has been received. The Americans have found further food caches bringing the total amount of flour found to over 19½ tons, with large quantities of sugar, rice and salt also found. An enemy soldier killed in the area (YS836935) carried documents identifying him as a member of C10 Requisitioning and Purchasing Company, J85 Transportation Battalion of MR 7 Rear Services. The task of C10 Company is to supply K76A Hospital, 33 NVA Regiment and other MR 7 units. The location of the largest cache so far found conforms very closely with that of Entry Exit Point 63 (YS832937). A rallier has described how D445 drew rations from this point between July and December 1970, bringing them to a D445 camp in WESTERN NUI BE (YS7990).
9. On 6th February, troops of 3rd Bde 1st Air Cav Div entered this known D445 camp. On 7th February, the Americans became involved in contacts with an enemy force in the area of the camp and further up the slopes of NUI BE (to YS807906). The enemy initiated contact by means of booby-trapped mines and well controlled small arms fire including the use of snipers. Six Americans were killed and ten wounded, DUSTOFF aircraft receiving heavy ground fire. Enemy losses were unknown, and the enemy force which is probably D445, is believed still to be in the area (between Eastings 80-82 and Northings 89-91.) The seizure by the Americans of food caches in NORTHERN NUI BE may have partially disrupted D445's preparations to return to PHUOC TUY Province.
10. On 7th February Bn found a large enemy camp in very good condition to the WEST of CU MY (at YS545880). The camp comprised of 20 bunkers, one of which included a class room. The camp would be capable of accommodating over 100 troops and was last used only a few days previously. Documents found in the camp are still being interpreted but the initial impression is that they do not indicate CHAU DUC. Mention is made of C36

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11. A member of the BINH BA Party Chapter was killed by Sector forces EAST of BINH BA on 6th February (YS491719).

12. On 4th February the Deputy Party Chapter Secretary LONG SON was killed in a contact with Popular Forces near LONG SON Village (YS298558).

Order of Battle and Locations

13. VC/NVA formation and unit strengths, locations and identifications are given in Annex A.

14. While prognostications concerning the ORBAT of military region and province level formations and units are beyond the scope of the Review, the effect of their changes is reflected in the pattern of activity and enemy capabilities within the Battalion's AO. Changes in ORBAT of MR 7 are therefore, of interest. A examination of the pattern of changes at MR level may also provide indications of the current ORBAT pattern in BA LONG Province where the basic function and designation of many units is in question.

15. The basic ORBAT of MR 7 is given in Annex B. Probable changes and disbandments are noted. The recorded ORBAT of BA LONG Province is given in Appendix 2. Details of possible changes are given also. It is clear that the changes cannot be taken in isolation and that they are closely related. Annex C suggests that 84 RSG has been resubordinated directly to MR 7.

16. BA LONG Province Unit, CHAU DUC Dist and C36

a. On 4 Feb a 1 ATF patrol contacted approximately fifteen VC in the CU MY area (YS573877) killing two. The enemy KIA were identified as TRAN VAN BE aka TU BE and BE GIO, Commander of the CHAU DUC District Unit, and NGUYEN VAN DANG aka NAM DANG, Commander of C41 CHAU DUC Concentrated Company. (The District unit consists of C41 Coy, the District Unit Command Committee and its associated military section).

(1) TRAN VAN BE aka TU BE aka BE GIO
TU BE's mother NAM THIET is a VC supplier living in NGAI GIAO. His brother TUONG is Assistant Political Cadre in BA LONG Province Forward Supply Council. His sister, SAU PHUONG is a medical specialist in BA LONG Province Med Sect.

BE GIO enlisted in NLF on 9 Jan 61. His early military history is unknown. On 21 Jul 68 he was promoted from Coy 2IC to Coy Comd in D440 LF Bn. BE was transferred to D445 on an unk date and was promoted to Bn 2IC of that unit on 4 Nov 69. On 16 Aug 70 he was transferred to CHAU DUC as Dist Unit Commander.

(2) NGUYEN VAN DANG

DANG was the Comd of C41 Conc Coy. From commendation certificates it would appear that NGUYEN VAN DANG joined C41 before 1966 (First commendation certificate dated 13 Jan 66) to Dec 70 DANG was Comd C41 but his appointment at time of death is unknown.

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- b. Docs CIA include a report from UT MUOI MOT (PCS NGAI GIAO, female, age approx 25 yrs) which mentions a contact with Australian forces on morning of 21 Jan. 2 Pl A Coy contacted a group of VC (at YS489825 on 210715H Jan) on that day which resulted in 4 VC KIA, including TRAN VAN THOAI, an ex Pl 2IC of K6 D440. This may indicate that:
- (1) elms of the disbanded D440 LF Bn have reinforced CHAU DUC or,
 - (2) that there have been elms of BA LONG (ex D440) working with NGAI GIAO elms of CHAU DUC or
 - (3) that elms of BA LONG Province HQ have been working in the area of NGAI GIAO/Slope 30.
- c. These alternatives are possibly related to an agent report (728/112) which stated the VC have already recce'd the SUOI NGHE PF Post (YS4271), the PF posts BINH BA Hamlet (YS4474), DUC TRUNG (YS4574) NGAI GIAO (YS4679), the DUC THANH NP station (YS462780) and DUC THANH Sub secotr HQ. At present they are waiting for the higher unit (unk) to carry out the attack. The source also disclosed that the attack on LA VAN hamlet YS465774 at 050300H was supposed to be against 4 posts. The attacking unit comprised 4 sapper cells of CHAU DUC District unit and a unit of BA LONG Province HQ led by DUNG. Wpns used were 1 x B40, 1 x AK47, 1 x K54 and grenades.
- d. A document carried by THOAI, Directive 003/CT, dated 28 Jul 70, states that armed units subordinate to BA LONG were trained in sapper techniques and tactics during 15 day courses.
- e. PHAM MINH NGUYET aka PHAM LE NGUYET (511/98) stated that BINH BA Village Unit has had no contact with CHAU DUC or any other unit since Aug 70. It is possible that the unit reportedly led by DUNG may have actually been led by DANG (The Comd of C41 Conc Coy).
- f. This is supported by a document captured in the contact in which DANG was killed, a letter of commendation from PHAN THANH HA, Chief of Staff BA LONG Province HQ to C36 for their victorious attack on the RDC/Pacification units on 5 Jan 71.
- g. It is therefore reasonable to assume a link between the attack on LA VAN, DANG, BE GIO, CHAU DUC (from the agent report) elms of XK6 D440 (BA LONG Sp force) and tentatively, personnel from C1 and C3 D445 (from a nominal roll of "3 Company" carried by THOAI) although the latter correlation is very vague.
- h. A PW DANG VAN CHUNG (511/84), Commander of CHAU DUC Dist Rear Services and Adj of the Dist Unit Comd Committee stated that CHAU DUC went to XUAN LOC district where they were to be reorganised, they were receive reinforcements and become a new unit with a different name. The letter from PHAN THANH HA (para f above) further states that he hopes for a brighter future for C36 as a sapper unit thus indicating that an unknown unit with an unsatisfactory record had been designated C36 and had received sapper training.

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- i. TRUNG VAN KHOI, (511/103) A PW previously a member of CHAU DUC stated that C41 was to be reinforced by ex members of D65 Engr Pn to bring it up to its full strength of approx 100.
- j. It now seems possible that at least C41 (CHAU DUC Dist Comd Coy) has been reinforced by members of XD440 and D65 and may now be designated C36, a (sapper) coy subordinate to either BA LONG Province or CHAU DUC.
- k. Another document, an unsigned letter to Uncle BA (unk) and NAM THANG (Comd Security Sect CHAU DUC, Security member Dist Committee) states that SAU NGUYEN went to Province for a conference on 05 Jan 71. SAU NGUYEN was transferred to CHAU DUC to replace NAM KIEM (PCS, CHAU DUC Dist) but with a general reorganisation within (VC) MR 7 it is thought that NAM KIEM may again be placed in comd of CHAU DUC District. The conference to which SAU NGUYEN was to attend may have been in relation to this.
- l. The letter from PHAN THANH HA (paras f and h, above) described C36 as "the punch of the Province", indicating that it is a Provincial rather than a district unit.
- m. Bunkers loc by V Coy in area South of CAM MY contained docus which ident elms of BA LONG Province, among them C36, which was mentioned in a report with date 12 Dec 70.
- n. From docus recovered the possible identification of 3 ex-members of K6 D440 can be established as possible members of C36.
 - (1) VU NGOC BON aka NGOC BON - medic ex D440
 - (2) TRAN VAN BOT - Pl 2IC ex D440
 - (3) VU VAN MIEU Sect Comd ex D440.
- o. Conclusion From the evidence above it is considered that elms of C41, K6 D440 and possibly D65 have been reorganized into a unit with a sapper capability. The unit is designated C36 and is under provincial control.

17. Assessment BA LONG HQs and subordinate units are at present disrupted by allied operations:

- a. 3 Bde 1st (US) Air Cav Div elms are located in NUI MAY TAO-NUI BE area where D445 LF Bn is also located. The destruction of large quantities of stockpiled food and the continued presence of this large Allied force in what was considered a secure (VC) area cannot but influence the offensive capability of both D445 and BA LONG Province.
- b. 1 ATF Operations are currently forcing BA LONG Province HQ northwards. This is causing BA LONG units such as CHAU DUC and C36 to either follow and maintain contact or be separated from their controlling HQs. Having recently reorganised it is considered that separation is unacceptable.

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c. BA LONG and its subordinate units have four main alternatives:

- (1) Remain in their present locations and risk contact,
- (2) continue to move northwards,
- (3) attempt to "sidestep" and exfiltrate allied units in detail, reestablishing themselves in areas previously searched,
- (4) Cause diversionary attacks designed to focus attention away from their secure areas.

d. It is assessed that if the present pattern of allied activity is maintained BA LONG will not risk heavy contact nor move much further NORTH. To undertake either of these courses would result in further disruption and destruction of already distorted forces. It is believed that BA LONG will continue to attempt to avoid contact and may attempt to mount diversionary activities. The attacks, as forecast elsewhere are most likely to be in the Route 2 area.

A. B. H. H.
Cpl
for (R.J.K. HOSKIN)

Capt
IO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn


- Annex:
- A. VC/NVA Strengths, Locations and Identifications
 - B. ORBAT MR-7
 - C. Resubordination of the 84 Rear Service Group to MR-7 and its subsequent reorganization.
 - D. Part 3 - VC/NVA Sapper Tactics, Organization, Armament, Training and effectiveness.
 - E. VC/NVA Rockets and RPGs
 - F. The Hoi Chanh

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Est Str</u>	<u>Last Ident</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Est Current Loc</u>
LONG DAT Dist HQ	21	16 Jan YS456542	403	LONG HAIS
CAO SU Dist HQ	12	27 Jan YS446883	511	NUI SUOI RAM
VUNG TAU CITY Unit	19	05 Feb YS302604	502/5	South LANG CAT
BARIA CITY Unit	17	14 Jan YS365609	507/A/2	NUI DINHS

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


Previous organisation of (VC) MR-7.

* Dotted line signifies Operational Control .

ANNEX F. TO 2 RAE/IZ (ANZAC) BN
 VISUAL INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
 INDEX REF 718SERIAL 9
 DATED 12 FEB 71

MR-7



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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO
 2 TAP/NZ(ANZAC) EP
 WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
 INDEX REF 718 SERIAL 9
 DATED 12 FEB 71

Units in broken lines are believed to have been disbanded.

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ANNEX C TO 2 RAP, NZ (ANZAC) BN
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
INDEX REF 718 SERIAL 9
DATED 12 FEB 71

RESUBORDINATION OF THE 84 REAR SERVICE GROUP TO MR-7 AND ITS
SUBSEQUENT REORGANIZATION

Purpose

1. The purpose of this Annex is to collate the information available on the resubordination of the 84 Rear Svc Gp and its subsequent reorganization as provided by Hoi Chanh and captured documents.

History

2. The 84 Rear Svc Gp came into existence when a rear service element was activated in the latter half of 1964 for the purpose of supporting the BINH GIA, aka BA RIA Campaign. It was designated Group 60 in April 1965 and in August 1965 merged with Transportation Unit K-10 to form the 84 Rear Service Gp.

3. The 84 Rear Service Gp had the mission of supplying equipment, food, munitions and medical care to units operating in southern BINH TUY Province, southern LONG KHANH Province, southern BIEN HOA Province and PHUOC TUY Province. Until September 68, the 84 Rear Svc Gp effectively accomplished its mission.

4. Near the end of 1968, the 84 Rear Svc Gp experienced some changes in its command structure. This was at least partially due to the inability of the unit to successfully accomplish its mission as a result of allied operations in the area. It was during that time HUYNH CU became the CO of 84 Rear Svc Gp.

5. In December, 1968, HUYNH CU attended a meeting with the members of the MR-7 Rear Svc Staff and the MR-7 Finance and Economy Staff in order to create the MR-7 Forward Supply Council. The purpose of establishing the council was to coordinate with the 84 Rear Svc Gp the administration of entry and exit points and the procurement of food. While the system may have aided in increasing the logistical input of the 84 Rear Svc Gp for awhile, by the fall of 1969 the majority of the unit's supply system was ineffective.

6. Allied interdiction of the SONG BE Corridor and the ADAMS and JOLLEY Roads through which the 84 Rear Svc Gp received supplies from the 70 and 85 Rear Svc Gp, compounded the problem. Documents captured during the period revealed severe supply shortages at the 84 Rear Svc Gp. The situation continued until March 1970. At that time, the MR-7 Rear Svc Staff apparently decided to resubordinate and reorganise the 84 Rear Svc Gp. This was probably done in an effort to try and regain some semblance of an effective logistical system in supplying the combat and support units of MR-7. Documents dated shortly thereafter began identifying units that had been subordinate to the 84 Rear Svc Gp as subordinate to the MR-7 Rear Svc Staff.

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7. At present, it is clearly evident that the elements of the 84 Rear Svc Gp have been either resubordinated to the MR-7 Rear Svc Staff, disbanded, or transferred to other support units. The new organization indicates that the emphasis is on supply from in or near the MR-7 area and not a dependence on supply routes from CAMBODIA.

Mission of the MR-7 Rear Svc Gp

8. The mission of the MR-7 Rear Svc Gp is to provide all the logistical material for MR-7 and BINH TUY Province and their subordinate units. It also provides medical care for units operating in and around MR-7 and BINH TUY Province.

Organization of the MR-7 Rear Svc Gp

9. An indication of the resubordination of the 84 Rear Svc Gp to MR-7 appeared in documents captured on 25 August 70 by the 199th US Inf Bde in BINH TUY Province. A report stated that as of 1 May 70, 201 personnel of the 84 Rear Svc Gp were resubordinated to the MR-7 Rear Svc Staff. The 201 personnel included 28 for the 2 Requisitioning and Purchasing Coy, 21 from Tailor Shop 502, 58 from Unit 301 and 94 from the K76A Hospital.

- a. Material turned over to the MR-7 Rear Svc Staff besides weapons included 7112 litres of rice and 4292 litres of salt. The MR-7 Rear Svc Staff assumed the responsibility for all materials belonging to the ordnance shop and the equipment of other units including clothing items, medicine and medical instruments valued at 3,682,130\$VN. The MR-7 Rear Svc Staff also assumed the liability of 4,726,144\$VN in funds issued to the abovementioned units.
- b. In the same set of documents, a notebook contained entries as current as 27 July 70. Contained in the notebook was the breakdown of the resubordination of units from the 84 Rear Svc Gp to MR-7. According to the notebook, R85 contains units, C2, C5, C11, C12, Z302, K76A, T301 and T300, while R95 contains units C3, C4, C10, C13, Doi 5, K76E, Doi 400 and Z302. Medical treatment units under the reorganization are DT9, 15, 17, 18 and 76, while the medical section includes 16, B5A and B5E. Also mentioned was the C119 Transportation Company and 11 agencies designated B1 through B11.

10. Documents dated 30 Aug 70 referred to HUYNH CU, former CO of the 84 Rear Svc Gp, as the new CO of the MR-7 Rear Svc Gp.

11. On 20 November 70 TRANH THI HUE and TRONG THI NGA rallied and identified the 13 Transportation Coy. The Hoi Chanh stated that the company with a strength of 40 personnel, was subordinate to MR-7 and was orgznised into four platoons. The mission of the unit was to supply food for units subordinate to MR-7; however, occasionally it also transported ammunition.

12. On 29 December 70, NGUYEN DUY BINH, a warrant officer in the administration section of J95 Transportation Battalion, MR-7 Rear Svc Gp, rallied and provided information on the organization, disposition, strength, logistics and area of operations of the units subordinate to the battalion.

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13. The J95 Headquarters and staff section, with a strength of 72 personnel, has operational and administrative control over the affairs of the J95 Transportation Battalion. The battalion has four staff sections designated B1 through B-4.

- a. B-1, the admin section, has the mission of keeping accurate records of the strength, weapons, replacements, training, losses and logistical materials of all units subordinate to J95. All subordinate units of J95 are responsible for submitting a period situation report to B-1.
- b. B-2, the quartermaster section specializing in rations, keeps accurate records of all the supply activities and routes of the battalion.
- c. B-3, another quartermaster section specializing in finance and clothing, has a mission similar to B-2.
- d. B-4, the communication section, is responsible for comms between MR-7 and J95, and also with the 33 NVA Inf Regt and the 10 Requisitioning and Purchasing Company. The Communication Section has a 15 watt radio capable of reaching NVN. Also working with the section is a female who can translate English to Vietnamese. B-4 also has a telegraph set by which they receive orders from MR-7 HQ.
- e. J95 is responsible for all supply and logistical material from northern LONGKHANH Province to BINH THUAN Province. The headquarters and staff elements, located vic YT701629, receives its logistical supplies from the 3, 4 and 13 Requisitioning and purchasing companies, and weapons and ammunition from the 736 Ordnance Depot. J95 receives almost all of its replacements from the D440 Convalescent Gp. It does not receive new personnel from Cambodia as they are needed in combat units. The replacements obtained from the convalescent unit are no longer able to perform a satisfactory combat mission.

14. The 3, 4 and 13 Requisitioning and purchasing companies are able to obtain approximately three to five tons of food from all sources daily. The companies pick up supplies at pick up points that are always located in the jungle and transport the supplies to a base area where units subordinate to the MR-7 pick them up. The food never remains at the base area for more than two days. The current locations of the companies are hard to determine as they regularly change base areas due to the mobility required to cover their large AO and because of the fear of compromise.

- a. The C3 requisitioning and purchasing company with a strength of 43 personnel has the mission of collecting supplies, particularly food, from woodcutters and the local populace in their area of operations. Vehicles available to the company includes one heavy truck which is equivalent to a US 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton, two motorized sampans and one sampan without a motor. The company operates in the area south of the SONG LA NGA in BINH TUY Province, and is the main supplier of the 33 NVA Inf Regt. The sampans are used to carry weapons, supplies, and personnel across the SONG LA NGA. The company also uses the area around DA KAI, vic YT7644, for river crossings utilizing the motorized sampans.

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The company never receives any food supplies from J95, but receives weapons, ammunition, clothing, and other logistical materials from the battalions quartermaster section.

- b. The C4 requisitioning and purchasing company has a strength of 35 personnel with the mission of collecting and transporting supplies for J95 that are collected from woodcutters and the local populace in the company's area of operations. The company supplies all elements of J95 except the C3 and C13 requisitioning companies. Supplies acquired by the company are taken to its base area, vic YT705618, where the units of J95 come for distribution. Vehicles available to the company include three heavy trucks. The company operates in an area East of Highway QL-20, West of the SONG DONG NAI and South of the DA HOAI River. There is also a pickup located vic YT772619. All supplies except food are received from J95.
- c. The 13 Requisitioning and purchasing company, with a strength of 35 personnel, has the mission of supplying the 33 NVA Inf Regt. It took over the area of the C10 requisitioning and purchasing company as that company is now subordinate to the J85 Transportation Battalion and operates in BINH TUY Province. The 13 Coy utilizes Montagnards for the transportation of food and supplies. The company operates in the area West of Highway QL-20, south of the LAM DONG Province, BINH TUY Province border, and North of the SOU LA NGA in HOA DUC District. The company receives all of its supplies, except food, from J95.

15. The C6 Detention Camp, with a strength of 12 personnel and located vic YT770670, has the mission of detaining the personnel of J95 who want to rally or who the cadre feel are not adequately performing their assigned mission. The camp receives all of its logistical support from J95.

16. The Doi 5 clothing manufacturing and repair section, with 31 personnel, has the mission of manufacturing and/or repairing uniforms and clothing for units subordinate to J95. The unit is equipped with six sewing machines to perform its mission. It also has a security section for protection and a production section to grow food. The unit is located in close proximity to J95 HQ, vic YT701627. The material for making and repairing uniforms is received from the B-3 Quartermaster Section. Additional information about Doi 5 was provided by TRANH THI TRINH who rallied on 14 Jan 71. She stated that she had worked for Doi 5 as a seamstress and that the unit had a strength of 30 personnel, 22 females. TRINH stated that Doi 5 had 14 sewing machines. The brand names of the machines used by Doi 5 are SINGER, SINGCO, and MISHIWA. TRINH confirmed BINH's statement as to the mission of Doi 5. TRINH further states that in December 1970, Doi 5 was disbanded as there was insufficient material to manufacture and repair uniforms. She revealed that the members of Doi 5 were assigned to other units of the J-95 Transportation Battalion.

17. The K76 Hospital was formed on 15 Dec 70 after that the consolidation and reorganization of the K76E and K76F Hospitals and the Doi 9 Convalescent unit. After the consolidation and reorganization, two-thirds of the personnel were sent to the 70 Rear Svc Gp in Cambodia. The remaining one-third formed the K76 Hospital which has the mission of providing complete medical facilities for all units subordinate to J95, MR-7 and the 33 NVA Inf Regt. The hospital

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has a capacity for treating 100 to 130 patients and has surgical facilities and an operating room. Most of its personnel were trained in NVN. The hospital, located vic YT779684, is supplied by J95. It also receives medical supplies from the B5E Pharmaceutical Section about once a month. The hospital also utilizes American manufactured medicine and equipment.

18. The DT18 Aid Station with a strength of 42 personnel, has the mission of providing medical treatment for civilians and units of J95. It has the facilities for treating both internal and external illnesses. All supplies come from J95, except medical supplies which come from the B5E pharmacy.

19. The B5E Pharmaceutical Section, with a strength of 62 personnel, has the mission of providing pharmaceutical products for all units subordinate to MR-7 and of training personnel as qualified pharmacists. The unit also trains personnel from the K76 Hospital and the DT18 Aid Station, as well as its own laboratories. The two laboratories for B5E are capable of producing medicine under the supervision of a senior pharmacist from NVN. The unit also includes an Oriental Medical Section which makes medicine from roots and herbs found in the jungle. All supplies for the unit, except food, come from J95.

20. The B5A Medical Specialist Training Unit, with a strength of 73 personnel has the mission of training medical specialists for MR-7 and the 33 NVA Inf Regt. The trainees from the 33 NVA Inf Regt form the 1 Platoon, while the trainees from MR-7 form the 2 Platoon. The training lasts for six months and all courses are taught by two doctors from HANOI. The unit is located vic YT701628.

21. The 400 Convalescent Group, located vic YT787696, with a strength of 418 personnel, has the mission of providing a secure area where the sick and wounded of the 33 NVA Inf Regt, Q-5 (NFI) and all subordinate units of J95 can recuperate. The unit has two medical specialists and 26 nurses. The two companies of the unit, with an authorized strength of 200 personnel, are each composed of convalescents. Personnel who are well enough to work in the unit's garden plots and provide the unit with food four months per year. J95 provides all other logistic support.

22. The Z302 Ordnance Workshop, with a strength of 107 personnel, has the mission of manufacturing, repairing, transporting, and supplying MR-7 and the 33 NVA Inf Regt with weapons. The workshop contains chemistry, weapons, repair, machine, motor repair, tailor and ferry boat sections. The chemistry section makes gun powder and explosives, especially C4. The weapons repair section has the capability of repairing any type of weapon. The machine section has the facilities to make parts for weapons and do general machine shop work. All the machinists are technicians from NVN and are under the supervision of two engineers from NVN. The motor repair section is responsible for the maintenance and repair of all the unit's electric motors. The tailor shop makes covers for all weapons that are made or repaired by the workshop. The ferryboat section transports troops, weapons, and food across the SONG DONG NAI. The Z302 Workshop receives its logistical support from J95 and the T36 Ordnance Depot. J95 supplies the unit with food and clothing and T36 supplies weapons and tools. All orders for weapons repair must first be approved by J95 Admin Section. The base area of the Z302 Ordnance Workshop is believed to be 2½km walk from CAU CHAP Hamlet, vic YT473732, on the DAP LOU HA Stream and is possibly located vic YT480780.

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Operational Techniques

30. The MR-7 Rear Svc Gp procures the bulk of its supplies within its AO through the requisitioning and purchasing companies. Food money is raised through taxation or extortion, and the money is then used purchase supplies in SAIGON, PHAN THIET or DA LAI. If the latter method is used, the supplies are trucked down Highway 1 and 20 to pickup points in the MR-7 Rear Svc Gp AO. From the pickup points, the supplies are taken to a cache site and the unit requesting supplies sends its own transportation element to pick them up. At present, the basic method used by the MR-7 Rear Svc Gp for resupply is the Shadow Supply System (SSS). The SSS consists of civilian purchasing and liaison agents and independent truck operators. The agents receive money from the requisitioning and purchasing companies to buy food and supplies on the open market. The supplies are then transported by civilian trucks to a pre-designated pickup point along a highway where they are met by someone from the MR-7 Rear Svc Gp. The trucks are equipped with legal and false documentation. An example of the workings of the SSS is revealed by an incident which occurred on 3 Jan 71 in LONG KHANH Province. On that date, elements of the ACR captured captured two SSS truckers south of GIA RAY Village on Highway 1. Interrogation of the two PW revealed that they had been hired by the MR-7 Rear Svc Gp to purchase supplies on the SAIGON Black Market. They purchase 500,000\$VN worth of rice and beer. When stopped, the truck contained 9.6 tons of rice and 40 cases of beer which was used to conceal the true cargo of rice. From SAIGON, they drove along Highway 1 to XUAN LOC Village passing through twelve National Police checkpoints. At XUAN LOC Village they changed license plates and met a VC contact. Upon leaving XUAN LOC Village, they continued down Highway 1 to a prearranged location where a contact met them. While the two PW were waiting for the contact man to bring aid to offload the truck, they were detained by 11 ACR.

Summary

31. The 84 Rear Svc Gp was activated in late 1964 to provide logistical support to southern BINH TUY Province, southern LONG KHANH Province, southern IEN HOA Province and PHUOC TUY Province. It accomplished its mission with some degree of success until the fall of 1968 when it began experiencing considerable difficulties. At that time it experienced changes in its command structure and eventually HUYNH CU became its CO. The change helped for a while, but by the fall of 1969 the 84 Rear Svc Gp was ineffective, partly due to allied interdiction of the SONG BE Corridor and ADAMS and JOLLEY Roads. Conditions worsened, and by March 1970, it was apparently decided to consolidate and reorganize the 84 Rear Svc Gp and resubordinate it to MR-7.

32. At present it is clearly evident that all elements of 84 Rear Svc Gp have either been resubordinated to the MR-7 Rear Svc Staff, MR-7 Rear Svc Gp, disbanded or transferred to other support units. The MR-7 Rear Svc Gp has assumed the mission of the 84 Rear Svc Gp and now has the mission of providing the logistical support to MR-7 and BINH TUY Province and their subordinate units. The MR-7 Rear Svc Gp also provides medical care for units operating in and near BINH TUY Province.

33. The information on the J-95 Trans Bn as provided by HOI CHANH NGUYEN CUY BINH basically conforms to the organization for the battalion given in captured documents. BINH gave the strength of the J-95 Trans Bn as 1211 personnel.

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
34. Little is known about the J-85 Transportation Battalion. The basic organization submitted in this study comes from captured documents.
35. The basic supply system used by the MR-7 Rear Svc Gp is the Shadow Supply System (SSS) and taxation of the local population payable in both food and money. The SSS has replaced the dependence on logistical support from Cambodia via the SCNG BE Corridor or the ADAMS and JOLLEY Roads.
36. Based on the statements of BINH, the J-95 Trans Bn will be carried at a strength of 1211, while the J-85 will be assigned a strength of 400 based on the strength of its known subordinate units, and the MR-7 Rear Svc Gp will be carried at a strength of 2000 personnel.

Source: II FFORCEV PERINTREP 6-71 ANNEX F.

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
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO
2 PAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
INDEX REF 718 SERIAL 9
DATED 12 FEB 71



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
APPENDIX II TO ANNEX C TO
2 RAR/12 (ANZAC) BN
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
INDEX REF 718 SERIAL 9
DATED 12 FEB 71



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2 RAR/WZ (ANZAC) HQ
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
INDEX REF 716 SERIAL 9
DATED 12 FEB 71**



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ANNEX D TO 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
INTDEX REF 718 SERIAL 9
DATED 12 FEB 71

PART 3

VC/NVA SAPPER TACTICS, ORGANIZATION, ARMAMENT, TRAINING
AND EFFECTIVENESS

SAPPER TRAINING

General

As in any other form of warfare, proficiency depends upon the training experience, and determination of the individual sapper and his leaders. The VC/NVA Leadership fully appreciates these factors, and it strives to make both cadre and soldier aware that serving in this special combat arm is a great honour, and although the arm is new, it has already achieved a victorious background.

Development of the Individual Sapper

2. The sapper is expected to be highly motivated and fully conversant with the tactical requirements of the sapper assault and with the personal and collective expertise required to successfully accomplish a perilous mission. The trained sapper is a raider, an individual who relies on secrecy and stealth, has a thorough knowledge of his objective and its avenues of approach, is familiar with the techniques to surmount natural and man-made obstacles, is an expert in the use of conventional weaponry, and is fully knowledgeable in the use of the explosive charge.

3. Reconnaissance Training. As a basic step towards successfully completing reconnaissance missions, the VC/NVA sapper is taught how to negotiate the terrain and man-made obstacles that hinder his approach to an entrance into the objective.

a. Captured enemy documents and their sources indicate that, ideally, the sapper's training in overcoming terrain obstacles enables him to:

- (1) covertly cross, either by crouching or crawling on hands and knees, areas which are strewn with dry branches and dead leaves;
- (2) pass through muddy fields and flooded terrain;
- (3) safely move over terrain covered with grass and grass mingled with poisonous plants.
- (4) cross rivers without compromising the mission or causing damage to weapons, ammunition, and explosives, and

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(5) cross swamps without being detected or without undue expenditure of energy.

b. The sapper's training in overcoming man-made obstacles includes:

(1) methods of crossing spiked ditches by the use of wooden ladders, rope, or bare hands;

(2) methods of crossing various types of barbed wire fences by propping them up, cutting the wire, or climbing over them;

(3) methods of avoiding detection when crossing permanently illuminated areas or areas in which illumination is used intermittently.

(4) methods of avoiding detection when crossing or approaching areas where dogs or other domesticated animals (ducks, geese, etc) are employed for sentinel purpose; and

(5) methods of manually or mechanically detecting, removing, and neutralizing mines and alarm devices.

4. Observation Training. Once the sapper has learned to negotiate obstacles and to penetrate the objective, he is then taught to note all weaknesses in the defensive position for possible exploitation and to carefully record the following:

a. position of perimeter guard bunkers;

b. location of interior defensive positions;

c. position of flat trajectory and indirect fire weapons, if possible, their fields of fire;

d. position of static guards and areas of responsibility for mobile sentinels;

e. position of the guardhouse;

f. location of listening posts

g. routine of the guard detail;

h. position of the command and communication centres;

i. position of administrative structures (barracks, mess halls, etc);

j. position of POL resources;

k. position of wheeled and tracked vehicles;

l. position of aircraft;

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- m. location of ready alert elements;
- n. habitual and peculiar troop movements within the compound;
- o. entrances for pedestrian and vehicle traffic and the roads leading to them;
- p. detailed recording of detected mines and alarm devices; and
- q. avenues of approach which will facilitate penetration and withdrawal.

5. Penetration and Withdrawal Training. Penetration and withdrawal training consists of the practical application of the lessons learned during the reconnaissance phase of training. 1Lt NGUYEN MINH MAN, a returnee (13 April 1969) and a sapper instructor in the BIEN HOA Province Staff Headquarters subordinate to "R" (COSVN) said:

"When perimeter penetration was required, a cell composed of three men, was utilized. Each man was equipped with a K-54 pistol, two grenades, a flashlight, note paper and one pencil. One of the men took along a few nails, short pieces of wire and a pair of wire cutters. The nails and pieces of wire were used to neutralize mines and trip flares. Rifles were never taken along on reconnaissance missions because they were cumbersome when moving in tight quarters. Prior to leaving the base camp area, each man drew a sketch of what he believed the base looked like. This sketch was drawn by referencing past reconnaissance sketches and other intelligence that had been gathered on the base. After they had drawn this sketch, they would check their equipment and depart. No time limit existed for the penetration of a base, just as there was no pre-set time for the initiation of such a mission, other than during the hours of darkness. Upon reaching the base, the first defence usually encountered was either concertina or a straight barbed wire fence. Prior to cutting the wire, to allow entrance, it was always carefully checked for trip flares. Trip flares were equally spaced on the fence and source said locating them was easy. After locating the trip flares, the men put a small nail through the "Safe" hole of the flares, thereby rendering them harmless. If the wire they encountered was concertina, it was cut by one man, while another held it taut with a hook-shaped piece of wire. If the wire was strung on fence posts, a forked stick was used to prop up the bottom strand of wire, thus allowing the three men to go underneath it. They did not cut this type of wire. After getting past the first defence, they usually encountered a minefield. Source said that the US and its allies generally placed their mines in a zigzag pattern, and the majority of the time the mines were only half buried. After getting past the first wire obstacle they would go straight forward, keeping a sharp eye out for the mines. When a mine was located, they gently dug it up and placed a small nail or piece of wire through its "safety hole". Just one route was used to enter the installation. The last defence usually encountered was a final row of wire. The process of getting through it was the same as previously described. The men had the objective of trying to get within 10 metres of the nearest observation tower, using natural cover to keep

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hidden. All three men were to enter the base. After observing all differences (with the sketch). The three-men cell would be ready for departure. Departure was made using the same route as entering. On the way out, the broken fences were repaired, and mines replaced. When the mines were replaced, the nail or piece of wire making them safe were left in place, making the mines useless, and giving them a pre prepared entrance through the perimeter defences for their next operation."

6. Assault Training. The sapper trainee usually has received prior training in basic infantry tactics and the employment of the three-man cell technique. The VC/NVA training doctrine emphasizes the value of this concept and stresses its application as indicated in the following quote from a captured enemy document:

"Because of its close organization and its close inner command and control structure, the capabilities of the cell for night attacks and combat at close quarters are unique. The cell is not seriously affected by loss of communications with the other elements for the attacking force. Because of its inner strength, the cell can perform and accomplish its mission as an independent entity. During combat, disorder is more harmful than dispersion. When cells are employed there is dispersion but not disorder. The cell is capable of engaging the enemy in the open field or at close quarters, during broad daylight or at night. Because of these reasons, the cell can be used successfully in the offensive or in the defence, and is a valuable fighting force in the most complex situations. Inasmuch as special action forces and sapper forces specialize in attacks by surprise and in attacks at close quarters, it is imperative that the three-man cell technique be studied and broadly employed. Also important is the examination of the capabilities and qualities of each cell in relation to the other cells. Disparity in performance could affect the combat effectiveness of the overall organization. It must be remembered that the organization of cells is different from the organization of squads, platoons, and companies as employed in infantry."

7. Demolition Training.

- a. The explosive charge is the key to the effectiveness of the sapper, and the success of his mission and frequently his own survival depends on his effective use of his weapon. The sapper is expected to be able to reorganise, arm, and disarm conventional explosives as well as those of "home" manufacture. The sapper is taught the characteristics of detonators and their various uses, the technical characteristics, properties, maintenance, and destructive force of all available explosive compounds. He is trained to know the quantity of explosive required to destroy fences, buildings, defence bunkers, perimeter lights, POL and ammunition storage, artillery pieces, etc. He is expected to become an expert in the employment of the explosive charge.
- b. The sapper receives instruction on Allied mines, trip flares, and other explosive material, and is taught to detect, and employ these weapons for his own purposes. He is expected to become knowledgeable on booby trap design and employment.

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8. Available information indicates that the sapper, in addition to normal basic training, receives specialised sapper training for two or more months.

9. Sappers are not necessarily volunteers. They are hand-picked individuals and are usually chosen from the honour graduates of the basic training classes. Officers may volunteer for sapper training, and, if selected, are stripped of their rank for the duration of the training course. To be chosen for sapper training is evidently considered a great honour. Enlisted men selected for sapper training are usually promoted one grade upon commencement of the training.

10. Morale is usually high, and the sapper is expected to have confidence in himself, his unit, his tactics, and armament. He has become a formidable foe.

Conclusion

11. The sapper is a highly trained combat engineer. He is not a guerilla and, although frequently used as a terrorist, he is not one per se. He is a member of the standing VC/NVA Armed Forces, and his units enjoy equal status with the infantry and artillery as a combat arm. He employs the raid as a principal tactic. His basic unit is the three-man cell, and his basic armament is the explosive charge.

12. The effectiveness of sapper raids in 1969 increased threefold when measured in terms of monetary value of Allied material damaged or destroyed. There has been a 10% increase in the number of significant enemy-initiated sapper contacts resulting in relatively large numbers of Allied KIA and material damage. The frequency of sapper attacks throughout South Vietnam has not increased. This is an excellent indication that recent stress on better training and employment of sappers has paid large dividends to the VC/NVA. The success achieved by Allied forces in 1 CTZ when dealing with sappers indicates that the sapper can be effectively thwarted and his assaults blunted.

This article is the conclusion of extracts from Training Information Letter 7/70 of May 1970.

CONCLUSION

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ANNEX E TO 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
INTDEX REF 718 SERIAL 9
DATED 12 FEB 71

VC/NVA ROCKETS AND RPGs

(A Summary of the articles of Weekly Intelligence Reviews 2 and 8)

The following is a summary of the characteristics of all known types of rockets and RPGs in use in SVN by VC/NVA forces.

SOVIET 122mm ROCKET DKZ

1. This is a fin-stabilized barrage rocket possessing a high-explosive fragmentation warhead of 43lbs. It is an indirect fire weapon employed effectively against point and area targets. The 122mm rocket consists of 4 major components:

- a. point detonating fuze,
- b. high explosive fragmentation warhead,
- c. rocket motor, and
- d. folding fin-stabilizer unit.

2. The 122mm rocket can be fired electrically from a tube-type launcher or any of several field expedient launchers including crossed sticks and mounds of dirt. The rocket weighs 101.85lbs and has a range of 11,000 metres.

SOVIET 140mm ROCKET

3. The rocket is a spin-stabilized barrage type rocket designed for use with a 16 round vehicular mounted launcher. For employment in SVN, the original launcher has been dismantled and the tubes mounted on wooden planks singly or in pairs. The 140mm rocket has 3 major components:

- a. A point detonating fuze,
- b. high explosive fragmentation warhead, and
- c. rocket motor.

4. The rocket is fired electrically from its tube launcher or from anyone of several field expedient launchers. It weighs 88lbs and has a range of 10,000 metres.

CHICOM 107mm ROCKET

5. This rocket is a spin stabilized, barrage rocket possessing a high explosive fragmentation warhead. It is employed in SVN as an artillery barrage rocket against point and area targets. The 107mm is basically an improved version of the CHICOM 102mm rocket. The rocket consists of five

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major components:

- a. A point detonating fuze,
- b. high explosive fragmentation warhead,
- c. warhead - to - motor adaptor,
- d. rocket motor, and
- e. a Venturi motor plate with 6 canted nozzles which produce a clockwise spin.

6. The rocket is launched electrically from a manufactured launcher or any one of several improvised launchers, ie., mounds of dirt and cross sticks.

SOVIET 122mm ROCKET - TWO STAGE VERSION

7. During June and July 1970 Soviet made booster stages, with adaptors, for use with the widely employed standard 122mm rocket, were captured both in Cambodia and SVN. The basic rocket using the booster, can be converted into a 2 stage electrically-fired version with an estimated increase in range from 11,000 to 13,000 metres. The booster motor is a standard 122mm rocket motor with modifications to fit it to the first stage standard rocket.

8. Although the accuracy of the rocket is undoubtedly reduced, the probable reason for this somewhat complicated innovation is to retain the man-portability facet while increasing the flexibility of employment of the weapon against area targets.

9. The complete 2 stage extended range rocket weighs 174.7lbs and is 127" long.

OVER-CALIBRE 122mm ROCKETS

10. There have been two types of over-calibre rockets, based on the standard Soviet 122mm rocket captured in SVN. They are the 400mm and 260mm variants. It has been established that these weapons are probably only effective against area targets or used at short range against fortified positions or large targets.

a. This weapon has an estimated effective range of 1000 metres and damage effect is estimated comparable to that of a 250lb bomb. The 400mm variant consists of 3 major components:

- (1) A Soviet 122mm rocket motor,
- (2) A 400mm shaped charge warhead, weighing 216lbs and containing 170lbs TNT,
- (3) A 400mm stroud type tail fin mounted over the folding fins.

b. The 260mm variant has a maximum range of 4000 metres. The weapon consists of 3 major components:

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- (1) A Soviet 122mm rocket motor,
- (2) A 260mm shaped charge warhead, weighing 115lbs and containing 82lbs of TNT.
- (3) A 260mm shroud type fin stabilizer.

OVER CALIBRE 107mm ROCKETS

11. There have been 3 types of over-calibre rockets based on the standard CHICOM 107mm rocket captured in SVN. Complete details on effectiveness are unknown but they are probably only effective against area targets.

a. Model I 200mm variant is composed of:

- (1) A complete standard production CHICOM 107mm rocket without fuze,
- (2) A 200 mm homemade warhead containing 27.75lbs of PE, clamped to rocket motor,
- (3) A PG2 warhead in a shaped charge configuration.
- (4) A 200mm aerodynamic drogue.

The weapon has a maximum range of 3000 metres.

b. Model II 200mm variant is composed of:

- (1) Standard CHICOM 107mm rocket complete,
- (2) A 200mm warhead containing 31.5lbs of explosive, welded to rocket motor,
- (3) A PG2 warhead in a shaped charge configuration,
- (4) A 207mm shroud type tailfin.

This weapon has a range similar to model I.

c. Model III 180mm Variant is composed of:

- (1) Standard CHICOM 107mm ROCKET complete,
- (2) A 180mm warhead containing 27lbs of explosive,
- (3) A 180mm fin stabilizer shroud type. The weapon has a maximum range of 2600 to 3000 metres.

ROCKET PROPELLED GRENADES

12. RPG 2/B40 is a smooth bore, recoilless anti tank grenade launcher and is widely used throughout SVN by the VC/NVA. The PG2 round is of 80mm calibre weighs 3.3lbs and the weapon has a maximum range of 600 metres.

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13. RPG 7/R4. is a smooth bore, recoilless Soviet design and greatly improved weapon of the shoulder fired anti-tank type. It is used throughout SVN but usually limited to MF and LF units. The PG 7 round is of 85mm calibre and weighs 5.5lbs. The weapon has a maximum range of 900 metres.

Sources for VC/NVA Rockets and RPG's Summary

- a. II FFV Rocket Study Sept 1968
- b. CICV (US ARMY) ST 67-082 VC/NVA Rocket Artillery
- c. CMEC T.I.B. 1-68

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ANNEX F TO 2 IAF/Z (ANZAC) BN
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
INDEX REF 718 SERIAL 9
DATED 12 FEB 71

THE HOI CHANH

REVIEW NOTE: The following article was extracted from the 4th (US) PSYOP Group Magazine CREDIBILIS Vol 3, No 5 dated May 1969. It is an essay by R.G. JONES, their Director of COORDS CHIEU HOI Division.

1. There are two prevalent misconceptions about the Chieu Hoi Programme and about the returnees known as "Hoi Chanh". These are the ralliers that are "traitors" or "defectors" who can only be considered with contempt and that, once the military operation is underway, the enemy who surrender - with or without safe conduct pass - must necessarily be considered a prisoner of war and not a true rallier.
2. Both of these misconceptions need to be examined. In the first place, according to cherished (western) masculine values, changing one's mind is a woman's prerogative. Similarly, along the same lines, not the psychology inherent in the popular cigarette advertisement, "I'd rather fight than switch". So before his case has been assessed on the basis of situational events the rallier has a strike against him. According to some students of Eastern culture, "The grass which bends with the prevailing wind is more to be admired than the oak which stands unyielding", the latter being a symbol more meaningful to the west.
3. Too few of us appreciate that many Vietnamese become Viet Cong like many of us in the United States inherit a political philosophy. They may be either energetic or complacent about it, depending upon whether or not they are politically sensitive individuals, or whether or not they are the "joiner" type. They will probably follow the local party line because this is what they will have been exposed to.
4. The party will contain heavy dosages of freedom, democracy, anti-imperialism and above all nationalism, none of which any one of us would probably have any quarrel with. Particularly significant is the fact that there would be no high level Marxist-Leninist political philosophy. This is reversed for those few who become deeply committed to the cause and normally is presented by skilled teachers in special seminars or at the party universities in Hanoi or Moscow.
5. There are other individuals who developed organisational associations from a practical rather than a ideological viewpoint. Better jobs, advancement, higher pay, status and other benefits of enlightened social nobility have been characteristic of the NLF appeal to youth. Unfortunately, they have not been equally visible on the GVN side. There is a great amount of similarity in the basic appeal of both sides. A "soft-sell" approach is taken by propaganda cadre with emphasis on those points which have nationalist rather than a communist impact. The point to be made at this juncture is that individuals whom we would list under "active enemy" could well have qualified for such status in the course of an understandable and completely normal progression within their own environment.

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6. Many other thousands of Vietnamese have been drafted into the Viet Cong without ever having knowingly "joined". While obliged to serve, they look forward to an opportunity to escape. This is often difficult and dangerous for many reasons:

- a. VC propaganda portrays the GVN's Chieu Hoi Programme as a hoax and attests to the inevitability of torture, prison, or worse.
- b. The close control of the "three-man-cell" system make it well-nigh impossible to escape.
- c. VC pronouncements indicate that ralliers become choice targets for assassination.
- d. There is the problem of earning a living and supporting a family in an entirely different environment.
- e. After breaking away from the enemy's control system, there is a problem of finding a rally point and not getting shot or taken as a PW in the process.
- f. Decision to rally are not easy. Most of them require courage, ingenuity and decision - characteristics which are considered most favourable in an, culture.

7. A discussion dealing with motivation to rally would be complex and extend well beyond the issues at hand here. Suffice it to say that they run the full spectrum from ideological disillusionment to other very pragmatic reasons. Just plain survival is often a fundamental cause. Thus, in view of the background and factors involved, there does not appear to be anything which would indicate a sinister or habitually traitorous character in the act of "returning to the just cause".

8. Other Viet Cong, or NVA for that matter-particularly at NCO, company and field grade levels are proud, professional soldiers. Perhaps they have served many years as insurgents. Then a time comes, for example, when orders from Hanoi oblige them to sacrifice their men in fruitless operations against overwhelming allied firepower. In such circumstances, the Viet Cong officer may become disaffected with Hanoi and with the whole Communist movement. For many years he has successfully evaded capture by GVN or allied forces, and he does not feel inferior to them even now in terms of his professional skills and capabilities. He is thus unwilling to surrender as a prisoner, as this would not be consistent with his pride, but when Government of Vietnam offers him free and honourable return to the GVN side, he is prepared to accept that offer and come in as a free agent.

9. Even Viet Cong of lower levels who join the VC movement voluntarily have the right to become disillusioned with it. When a patriotic German officer, who had lost one hand and one eye in battle in North Africa, decided that his country's welfare required him to assassinate Hitler, we did not call such a man a traitor. Even if one commits himself to a cause, the time may come when he must in good conscience abandon that cause. Since we believe that the Free World's cause is basically right, a man who wishes to quit communism should not be considered a traitor by the great mass of the Vietnamese population who recognize that in his confused situation a man may change his mind about which side he should be on.

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10. One must also not forget that "Defection" is a political action. The rallier is not defecting from his status as a Vietnamese. In a sense, he is changing political sides, perhaps not exactly in a Republican to Democrat type of switch but still the change is entirely different from that in which, for instance, a Free World National disappears behind the iron curtain, leaving one country to join another.

11. Thus there are many reasons why it is unnecessary and unjust to consider every returnee a traitor worthy of our contempt. It is also extremely unwise to indulge in this point of view, because its practical effect would be to keep the enemy in the field firing at our people and to deny us the best source of tactical intelligence available. Thus, the policy of demeaning or degrading Hoi Chanh is neither just nor good common sense.

12. In other wars our PSYOPS campaigns have used "hates" to build up sentiment against an enemy, both on the home front and among the fighting men. One of the anomalies of our present situation is that programmes which involve reconciliation are the direct antithesis of "hate" and "enemy" sentiment. Expecting troops to make this rather dramatic psychological adjustment is indeed asking a great deal. In fact, it is a tribute to troop leadership that the Chieu Hoi Programme has been so well accepted in almost every quarter.

13. The second basic theme is the prevalent opinion that any man who rallies under battlefield conditions must be considered a POW. This is not valid because, in fact, we have learned from many returnees that most of them had planned rallying as much as six months before the date they actually came in, but were only able to do so when the confusion of battle forced a relaxation of the Viet Cong control system. As many of our military officers and men already know, the Viet Cong and NVA exercise the most stringent controls over the movements of their people.

14. Typically, the Viet Cong are organised into three-man cells, with each member responsible for the whereabouts of the other. The Viet Cong are not allowed to leave the campsite without the most categorical authorisations. In one unit, the Viet Cong were even obliged to sleep without their trousers so as to make it inconvenient to escape during the night. Thus, an engagement becomes, for some Viet Cong, the best and only place to rally under the Chieu Hoi programme. Our forces should not, in effect, cooperate with the Viet Cong control system by preventing these people from rallying. When the would be rallier is received and treated like a prisoner of war, the word gets back to the enemy forces and other ralliers do not come in. In too many cases they have been given POW treatment, and this is one of the reasons why approximately 90% of all Chieu Hoi ralliers come to the GVN civil authorities instead of to military forces.

15. How is the local unit to know whether a man voluntarily surrendering on the battlefield with or without a Chieu Hoi safe conduct pass should be considered as a rallier or as a prisoner? There is no 100% sure or automatic method of classification. If the man claims to be a rallier and wants rallier status he should at least be given the benefit of the doubt. Did he come in when he still had the means to resist? Above all is he cooperative and willing to assist our side? Since our forces are in a position to decide, at least initially, as to the man's classification as a prisoner of war or as a returnee, we should consider which classification is in our best interests.

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If the circumstances are not clear but the man is obviously cooperative, it probably makes more sense to give him the benefit of the doubt and call him a returnee. In any case, what our commander and troops should avoid at all costs is a basic, flat assumption that no man can be a rallier under battlefield conditions. It is hardly wise to prevent the enemy who is attempting to profit by battlefield conditions to rally as he wanted to do for a long time - and it is also highly impractical, as it may prevent people from coming into our side who would otherwise want to do so. Such people, unwilling to be taken prisoner, will then have to remain in the enemy's ranks, shooting at our people and withholding from us the valuable intelligence they would have provided.


16. One should keep in mind that this programme is not based on humiliation or altruistic aspects, but on hard-headed selfishness. An understanding of the Hoi Chanh and an appreciation of Chieu Hoi objectives are essential to the programme's prosperity which is manifest by larger and more serious enemy losses in the form of returnees. Initially, such losses are negative, like KIA or POW's but in the Chieu Hoi process the unique characteristic is that the Hoi Chanh become positive assets as they provide intelligence, serve in the Bushman Scout organisation, become an armed propaganda team member or perhaps even an ARVN soldier, as is often the case.

REVIEW NOTE: Paragraph 15 of the above article gives the impression that the decision regarding classification is made by the individual or sub-unit detaining the subject. This is not so. 1 ATF Standing Operating Procedures state that the classification of detainees as Hoi Chanh, PWs, civil defendants or innocent civilians is made by HQ 1 ATF after interrogation and investigation of the detainee.


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2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW



1915



Reference

INTDEX 718/10

Period Ending

17 Feb 71

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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

Period Ending 17 Feb. 71

General

1. Enemy initiated activity remained at a low level within (US) MR 3 during the past week and consisted primarily of light scattered attacks by fire. In (VC) MR 7, the most significant incidents occurred in response to allied operations in the NUI BE area, a known Shadow Supply terminal (Enclosure 1 refers, it is also a known base area for MR 7 and BA LONG Province Units)(*1).
2. NORTH of (ROUTE) QL-1 there were several significant contacts. On 6 Feb in the vicinity of YT378124, reconnaissance elements of 1/27 (US) Inf Bn engaged three VC killing two of them. Documents CIA identified D440 LF Bn and CAU SU District Force. (K5 Coy D440 was assigned to CAU SU District in Oct 70 when D440 was disbanded). On 7 Feb at YT273164 a mechanical ambush detonated killing three VC. Two 75mm recoilless rifle rounds and six 60mm mortar rounds were recovered. Documents identified C18 Anti Aircraft Coy 274 VC MF Regt (*2).
3. 274 VC MF Regt continued to avoid contact. Elms of Regt HQs were identified on 8 and 10 Feb at YT353026 and YT325013 and on 11 Feb at YT340016. On 8 Feb in the vicinity of YT293096 documents CIA identified 1 Bn 274 Regt. There had been no identification of 2 Bn for some weeks and 3 Bn, according to RTAVF sources, is dispersed throughout southeastern BIEN HOA Province (*2). Captured documents have confirmed reports of shortages of personnel in 3 Bn. During 1969 the battalion suffered 219 losses but received 134 replacements. By January 1971 further losses had reduced the battalion strength to only 70 men (*3)
4. 33 NVA Regt also continued to avoid contact except for an attack by fire NE of VO DAT (YT7233) on 10 Feb which was probably conducted by one of its elements. (*1). The 3 Bn (33 NVA Regt) is still located EAST of the SPARROW'S WING (vic YS6494)(*2).
5. Assessment for MR-3 II FFV estimate that enemy activity will remain at a low level during the coming week. It is assessed that the enemy does not currently have the ability in MR-3 to sustain increased activity for any period of time. However an increase in route interdiction along roads supporting ARVN Cambodian operations can be expected (*3).

Identifications and Locations

6. D445 LF Bn

- a. The main elements of D445 remain in the NUI BE/MAY TAO area. On 8 Feb in a bunker complex in western NUI BE (YS801896) troops of 3rd Bde 1st Air Cavalry Division found recent documents which identified C4 D445. This further substantiates that the enemy force which was contacted to the NORTH on 7 Feb, resulting in sixteen US casualties was in fact D445.

- b. Documents found by 7 RAR in a camp south-east of Lake BAU-HAM (at YS692823) suggest that C4 and C5 had used the camp in January, possibly while en route to NUI BE.
- c. C1 with the Battalion Commander, SAU THU, are believed still to be in the LONG HAI (*3).

7. CHAU DUC Dist HQ and C36

- a. V Coy located four bunker systems in the NUI LE area. All these systems provided indications of very recent occupation.
 - (1) Documents located in bunkers at YS514866 indicate that the system was occupied from Dec 70 to Jan 71 by elms of CHAU DUC District.
 - (2) Documents located in bunkers at YS545880 and YS530865 on 7 Feb, indicated that they were occupied by C36 or elms in liaison with C36.
- b. On 16 Feb, C Coy loc a bunker at YS577921 which contained mention of 24 and C36 and the date 13 Jan 71.
- c. At YS518882 V Coy located a further bunker system which was occupied up to 17 Feb by an unidentified VC element.
- d. An agent report of 12 Feb stated that sapper and recce elements of a BA LONG unit were located at YS498818. Later similar reports mentioned NGAI GIAO Guerillas and CHAU DUC. As this is the type of combination that is known to have been responsible for the LA VAN attack on 5 Jan, it is probable that elements including C36, C41 and the NGAI GIAO Guerillas are preparing for an attack on BINH BA or another hamlet in the DUC THANH area.
- e. Chau Duc Dist HQ and C41 elements have been reported WEST of Route 2. These reports remain unsubstantiated but it is conceivable that cadre elements may be located with the PHU MY Guerillas or that CHAU DUC may attempt to return to its usual area of operation.
- f. A circular letter signed for the Command Committee XUAN LOC Dist instructing sub units to be careful in mine attacks was captured by 2/25 (US) Bde at YT565016 on 12 Jan. The letter mentions that on 15 Sep 70 one VC was killed and one wounded when elements of (XUAN LOC) City Special Action platoon and C36 were attacked by guerillas. If the C36 referred to is the C36 identified recently and recorded as a BA LONG Sapper Recce unit, many assumptions made about its composition may be invalid.


ORBAT and Organization

8. No substantive conclusions concerning the ORBAT of C36 or other BA LONG units can be made from the documents CIA by V Coy.

9. From Aug 70, the following subunits were allocated to BA LONG Province:

- a. C3 Coy D445 LF Bn,
- b. K6 Coy D440 LF Bn (now disbanded),
- c. K8 Hy Weapons Coy D440 Bn (disbanded), and
- d. A2 Coy D65 NVA Engr Bn (now disbanded).

Personnel from these subunits presumably make up a BA LONG Province military unit with a support weapons and sapper recce capability. The detailed ORBAT remains obscure.


(R.J.K. HOSKIN)
Capt
IO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn

Annex: A. VC/NVA Strengths, Locations and Identifications

Enclosure:

1. The Shadow Supply System in PHOUC TUY Province
2. VIET CONG Infrastructure

Sources: (Sources are noted in the text by an asterisk * and a number in brackets at the end of that part of the text to which they refer)

- *1. II FFV PERINTREP 7-71.
- *2. 2/25 (US) Inf Bde INTSUM 045-71.
- *3. 1 ATF SUPINTREP 7/71.

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ANNEX A TO 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
INDEX REF 718 SERIAL 10
DATED 17 FEB 71

VC/NVA STRENGTHS, LOCATIONS AND IDENTIFICATIONS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Est Str</u>	<u>Last Ident</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Est Current Loc</u>
<u>MR-7 RSG</u>				
J85 Trans Bn	70	09 Feb YT326014	402/A/45	Southern LONG KHANH
<u>274 MF Regt</u>	765			
Hq/Sp Units	420	12 Feb YT335018	402/A/45	North West ONG QUE
<u>BA LONG Prov HQ</u>	474	12 Feb YS543883	docus 502/3	SOUI SAP (YS6296)
BA LONG Prov Recce Gp	unk	11 Feb YS498898	502/3	
CHAU DUC Dist HQ	46	16 Feb YS643883	502/1	NUI BE Area
Elms CHAU DUC	10	16 Feb YS451783	502/1	
VUNG TAU City Unit	19	07 Feb YS296607	502/5	South LANG CAT

Other units no change from Weekly Intelligence Review 718/9.

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ENCLOSURE 1 TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
718/10
DATED 17 FEB 71

THE SHADOW SUPPLY SYSTEM IN PHUOC TUY PROVINCE

Introduction

1. The VC organization which provides for the procurement, transportation, storage and distribution of supplies and equipment using the legal commercial system as a "front" is referred to as the Shadow Supply System (SSS). The infiltration of villages, which does not employ any aspect of the normal system of commerce is not considered part of the SSS.
2. The SSS in PHUOC TUY differs from the normal national SSS in that it is mainly concerned with supplying Local Force VC units. The main force units depend on 84 RSG. The local force supply system hence relied greatly on a close relationship with the VCI and the local populace.

Procurement of Funds

3. The Finance and Economy sections at all levels are responsible for the provision of funds for the purchase of equipment. These sections receive:
 - a. an allowance from the next higher command, and
 - b. taxation from the people.
4. The percentage received from each source is an indication of the strength of VC in the area, since as the taxation of the people decreases so the proportion from the higher headquarters must increase.
5. VC district headquarters receive their annual allowance from Province Headquarters. Examples of grants are given below:
 - a. VN \$500,000 received by HQ of 2 and 4 Coys D445 when they returned to the DAT DO area having completed 6 weeks indoctrination. This money was used to purchase goods before the rest of the Bn returned between Oct - Dec 70.
 - b. VN\$370,000, subsistence allowance for an unspecified time to VUNG TAU City Unit.
 - c. A HOI CHANH from DAT DO District HQ related that prior to 1970 they had received grants up to VN\$1,000,000, but since 1970 the grant had decreased considerably, the latest grant up until mid 1970 being VN \$100,000 (thus indicating that Province HQ acting in the role of a financial assistant had been curtailed.)
6. The taxation of the local population is the responsibility of the finance and economy sections; particularly those of the village party chapters. Taxation falls generally into 3 broad categories:

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A. Small scale taxation of peasants within the villages or out in the field.

b. Taxation of various commercial enterprises such as:-

(1) Timber cutters in enemy controlled areas. Where the VC have instigated a fee for the privilege of cutting timber as well as taxing the timber removed,

(2) truck, cycles and Lambretta drivers,

(3) salt manufacturers,

(4) charcoal producers, and

(5) fishermen.

c. Large scale taxation of rubber plantations.

7. Individual lump-sum taxation payments as high as \$10,000 VN - \$15,000 VN have been made to the VC by fishermen and woodcutters. \$40,000 VN - \$50,000 VN payments are not uncommon for plantations.

8. From a document captured in 1970, the following taxation goals for 1970 were forecast for LONG DAT District:

a. from villages in the district, VN\$15,900,000,

b. the fishing trade, VN\$10,000,000,

c. the salt industry, VN\$300,000 and

d. merchants, transport and communication agencies VN\$700,000.

9. Evidence suggests that taxation has not reached its goal. District HQs have received little money from their villages.

10. The lack of funds due to the difficulty in taxation, is a result of increased security in the Province and the fear of VC being recognised and comprising their own security.

Procurement of Supplies

11. All types of supplies required by the VC, food, medical supplies, luxury items and clothing, may be provided by the SSS.

12. The major rice producing centres for the Province are

a. BA RIA,

b. DAT DO,

c. LONG DIEN, and

d. HOA LONG.

These centres have a complex of merchants whose dealings come under the jurisdiction of the GVN resource control programme, who attempt to police purchasing.

13. In the village it is the responsibility of the Finance and Economy element to organise the purchasing of supplies through these merchants. In order to avoid drawing attention to themselves by purchasing large quantities of food, members and relatives of local VC are utilised. The extent of collaboration between the merchants and VC is uncertain, however it can be assumed they do provide considerable quantities of supplies, either as a result of pressure or for monetary gain.

14. The smaller hamlet forces do not have the large requirement of district units and therefore are supplied through families.

15. Arms and ammunition are usually provided through the Rear Service Group with equipment from NVN. To supplement the NVN supplies corrupt GVN agents are utilized to provide US arms and ammunition, through GVN sources. This is organized by the SSS' organization. Local manufacture or adaption of weapons is not a function of the SSS.

Transportation

16. The major lines of communication for the SSS in PHUOC TUY Province are:

- a. Route 15 - SAIGON, BARIA, VUNG TAU.
- b. Route 2 - XUAN LOC - BARIA.
- c. Route 23 - BARIA, DAT DO, XUYEN MOC.

17. The VC uses commercial transport to move supplies from the purchase point to areas close to the VC bases and Pro-VC villages.

18. The VC transport goods from BARIA and HOA LONG to BINH BA, NGAI GIAO and from DAT DO to XUYEN MOC. Should a route be affected by allied activity an alternative distribution point is opened.

19. The establishment of road blocks or check points on major transport routes caused a reduction in 30% of traffic using these roads, however, it cannot be assumed that this percentage was all illegal traffic. Although there is little evidence of dumping supplies on the roadside in remote areas for later pick-up by the VC, it is considered probable that this sort of activity does occur.

20. Captured documents have referred to the intentions of the VC obtaining vehicles for their exclusive use. The vehicles referred to being mainly Lambrettas.

21. The large scale fishing industry based in the LANG PHUOC HAI and LONG HAI areas is probably used to a limited extent to transport goods to the EAST of the SONG RAI. Although boats are not allowed to beach, enforcing of the rule is difficult without injuring innocent civilians.

Storage

22. Storage of supplies procured by the SSS is the most sensitive link in the supply chain. Supplies are stored in the homes of VCI while awaiting their distribution. For most of the year the storage of large quantities of food is impossible and the fear of discovery of large caches has resulted in the VC splitting bulk supplies into many houses.

23. To ensure supplies are not held at distribution points for a prolonged period the VC have to carefully plan the purchase, pick-up and transportation of supplies. This must decrease his flexibility considerably.

Distribution

24. The SSS accounts for very little of the distribution of supplies compared with the VC requirements. Most of the distribution is accounted for by infiltration of villages. A small amount is distributed by workers carrying small amounts of supplies, caching them in the fields for later collection by the VC. Woodcutters are also reported to supply VC elements in the XUYEN MOC area.

Repressive Action Against the SSS

25. Resource denial is the responsibility of the GVN. The present control methods are sometimes effective, but the supply of food cannot be completely eliminated. The resources employed utilize the National Police and Military Security Service (MSS), the agencies which control the purchasing of goods by the civilian population. When a family appears to be over purchasing they are liable to investigation by the authorities. A GVN agency network has provided information leading to the discovery of many VCI supply operations.

26. Static and mobile checkpoints on all communications routes are the only means of controlling the commercial transport system. All movement of supplies requires a permit from the GVN. This procedure coupled with checkpoints has severely restricted the means of distribution and has made it more vulnerable to ambush operations.

27. Random cordon and search operations in villages are mounted where houses are suspected of containing VC supplies.

Summary

28. Current VC difficulties in obtaining supplies indicate the present preventive methods are fairly effective. Improvement would mean more frequent checks which may effect the innocent civilian population adversely and this would be unadvisable.

29. While the SSS can be restricted it cannot be eliminated. The counter-activities applied to the SSS have taken the initiative from the VC forcing him into vulnerable situations.

(Extracted from IIFV PERINTREP 46-70)

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ENCLOSURE 2 TO
2 R R/NZ (ANZAC) BN
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
INTDEX REF 718 SERIAL 10
DATED 19 FEB 71

VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE

General

1. The VC Infrastructure (VCI) is the term used to describe that group of hard core political cadre who manage a complex of organizations supporting the insurgency. This organizational complex consists of three main parts (military, party control structure and front) and is controlled by the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) in the name of the Peoples Revolutionary Party (PRP). The PRP is the southern branch of North Vietnam's Communist LAO DONG (Workers) Party in Hanoi and although COSVN exercises de facto control the PRP, which is represented at each echelon through the organization, provides the face of respectability in its declared control through the agency of the NLFSVN.
2. This infrastructure exists at all levels, but it is those members at the hamlet, village, district and province levels who constitute the major threat to the South Vietnamese Government's Pacification Programme. It is these people who can best fulfil the two main missions of the VCI which are:
 - a. To provide an administration and government structure prepared to assume control of the country in the event of a communist victory or in a coalition government. These preparations include winning (or gaining by force) support of the people while at the same time eroding the GVN administration and authority from within.
 - b. To provide support (food, recruits, intelligence, refuge, money, guides, etc) to VC military units, without which, they could not survive.
3. Because this is the basis for successful insurgency, the PRP is continually striving to **bolster** and expand its infrastructure at the lower levels and makes the most of every opportunity to establish new cells and re-establish those which have been eliminated by the Government authorities and security forces.

Method of Establishing a Village Infrastructure

4. At first a core of two or three cadre are sent from District or Province who together collect intelligence, spread propoganda, and proselytize the people. The three cadre form associations for social and community purposes which are not, at this stage, overtly connected with the insurgency (See figure 1). The Farmer's Association markets crops cooperatively and improves farming techniques. The Womens' Association upholds women's rights and doubles as a social club.

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


Figure 1

5. Concurrently, the VCI cadre slip in propaganda at association meetings, pass around copies of Party Newspapers, and start discussions for "political education". Sympathizers are singled out and cultivated carefully. Several of these sympathizers join the Party and, together with the original three VCI cadre, they form the village Party Chapter of five or six people (see figure 2).




Figure 2

6. The association leaders meanwhile continue to weave propaganda into the regular meetings. For example; they encourage the Women's Association to get mothers to proselytise their sons. Soon a squad of youths is organised as a village self-defence force commanded by one of the original three hard core cadre, who is now known as Chief of Military Affairs. At the same time the members of the Party Chapter take responsibility for specific functions. One becomes responsible for finance and economy, one for security, one for military proselytizing, and one for civilian proselytizing. (See figure 3).






Figure 3

7. As the associations become more and more indoctrinated with VC ideology they elect representatives (usually the chief or deputy chief of each association) to form an NLF Committee for the village. This draws the various associations together under a coordinator; a broad-based popular front with common goals, which are the traditional "Front" goals of ending corruption, replacing the Government (or forming a coalition government), driving out foreigners, and reuniting the country. The chairman or deputy chairman of the NLF Committee will be a Party member, as will some of the associations chiefs (see figure 4).



(Figure 4)

8. As soon as there are nine members in the village Party Chapter, a village Party Executive Committee is elected and at this point the VC infrastructure organization is complete (see figure 5). It is important to realize that it is only the leaders who have been mentioned that are VC. The guerilla squad and the members of the various sections and Front associations are not necessarily VCI. However, if they are party members, they could well be considered in the same light as the VCI cadre.



(Figure 5.)

9. In spite of efforts made by the Government and Free World Military Assistance Forces to eliminate the infrastructure, the VCI still flourish in most areas of South Vietnam. It is interesting to note that in 1969 well over half of the food used to feed the VC/NVA mainforce in South Vietnam, was provided by the VCI.

Source: Training Information Letter No 24/70 November 1970.

2RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

94



Reference
INTDEX 718/11

Period Ending
24 Feb 71

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2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn

INTDEX 718/11

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

Period Ending 24 Feb 71

LAOS and CAMBODIA

1. A brief article on ARVN operations in LAOS and CAMBODIA is enclosed. It is stressed that the article is written for the information of Bn personnel and is in no way an official assessment.

MILITARY REGION 3

2. There was a slight increase in the number of attacks by fire during the week. Three attacks by fire, including the use of 60mm and 82mm mortars and 122mm rockets, took place against targets in the area of NUI CHUA CHAN (YT6010) and XUAN LOC. (Para 9 refers) (#3)

3. In TAY NINH Province on 14th February two PF platoons engaged an enemy force north of GO DAU HA (XT388305) killing 18 enemy for the loss of five killed and two wounded.

4. Six caches were found during the week, totalling 7.5 tons of munitions and 11.5 tons of foodstuffs. Most of these caches were found in TAY NINH, War Zone D and PHUOC LONG. On 18th February US forces captured an estimated one ton weapons cache SE of PHUOC VINH (YT129394). (#3)

5. Unit Identifications, Locations and Strengths. Annex A. (Paras 13-16 refer).

6. A document captured by elms of 2/25 Bde marked TOP SECRET to be sent to all units subordinate to (BA LONG) Province force contained an order from the Command HQs of the People's Army of Vietnam that if the units hear that US/FWMAF units have struck NORTH VIETNAM they are immediately to begin a "general uprising". (#1)

7. "DEEP THRUST" Sapper Unit

A document captured on 11th February 15 km ENE of TAN UYEN (YT100299) contains an enemy TOP SECRET plan of attacks to be conducted in the vicinity of BIEN HOA, by a recently formed sapper unit of 11 men. The planned time for these attacks generally coincides with the enemy offensive phase reportedly scheduled to begin between March and May. The targets are to be warehouses, fuel points, aircraft revetments, restaurants, billets, ships, barges and decking facilities and BIEN HOA airfield. The unit is to be designated "DEEP THRUST" and was to consist of water and ground sappers. (#2) and (#3).

8. Subversion and Terrorism

a. Documents captured near BLACK HORSE on 24th January provide information concerning the enemy use of penetration agents in friendly units in the XUAN LOC District. The documents claimed that agents had penetrated RF and PSDF units and one document

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

reported that propaganda activities during December 1970 had resulted in desertions from units of 18 ARVN Inf Div. Although they enemy's overall success in the use of agents in MR-3 is unknown, the possible use of penetration agents to facilitate attacks on territorial force compounds in VC BA LONG Province suggests an emphasis by the enemy on the use of these persons. (#3)

- b. In SAIGON there were seven fire-bombings of US vehicles and a fire bombing attack against the US Embassy. It is believed that these were carried out by dissident students protesting about CAMBODIAN Operations. (#3)
- c. According to a source in BINH DUONG Province, the NLF has issued orders to their cadre to accept recruitment as National Police recruits. This move is made possible by the National Police policy of turning to draft dodgers in an attempt to recruit police personnel. The source foresees no difficulty in getting these individuals into the police as most VC are also draft dodgers. The covert assignment of the infiltrated VC will be to cause the greatest amount of confusion within the police ranks and any other GVN organizations accessible to them. (#2)

9. Rocket and Mortar Attacks In addition to the attack at FSB HEIDI (para 13 refers), three other attacks by fire were reported.

- a. On 15 Feb HUNG LOC PSDF post at YT3208 received 6 x B40 rounds and SA fire.
- b. On 16 Feb GIA RAY (YT6312) received 2 x 122mm rockets believed fired from YT613315.
- c. On 18 Feb DAN HIEU Village (YT417034) received 30 x 60mm mortar rounds. One and a half hours earlier, C Coy 3/22 (US) Inf were mortared at YT414026 probably by the same VC unit.

(#1)

10. New Tactics and Weapons

It is assessed that the VC/NVA function within the area of interest has been modified to the extent that Provincial and Main Force units, having failed to achieve reasonable success, have largely been reorganised to provide support for Local (District) Force Actions. Emphasis is being placed on small-scale actions which emphasise the provision of maximum effect with minimum risk and effort. In addition to the increase in terrorism, sabotage and indirect fire attacks reported elsewhere in this review, there are other indications that the VC are returning to (modified) "Phase 1" type activity. These are:

- a. Improvised Indirect Fire Methods Annex B

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

- b. Sapper attacks VC units of MR 3 including BA LONG, C36, D445 and other LF units have received sapper training and have been directed to employ their sapper attack techniques. (Details of these techniques have been published in a 3 part series in recent Reviews).
- c. Mines and Booby Traps Annex C.
- d. Avoidance of Contact MF units continue to attempt to avoid contacts.
- e. Reinforcement of LF Units Provincial LF units have been used to support District LF forces (C36 and CHAU DUC at LA VAN). Provincial Units (D440) and some MF units (D65, 1 and 3 Bns 274 Regt) have been broken up to provide additional (district level) local support, cadres and reinforcements. It is possible that some guerilla groups have been reinforced by LF personnel (CAO SU, NGAI GIAO, CAM MY and PHU MY).
- f. Anti-Pacification Directive VC units have been directed to concentrate their efforts against "low risk" targets of the GVN Pacification programme.

11. Assessment

II FFV estimate that enemy-initiated activity within the military region will remain at a low level during the coming week. Despite the commitment of ARVN forces to Cambodia and the evident enemy desire to impede the friendly offensive thrusts in the border areas, the recent cache finds and the low personnel strengths of the enemy units remaining in the interior of the military region will tend to preclude any activity other than an increase in the low level of attacks by fire and terrorism. The booby-trap remains the most potent weapon in the enemy's arsenal and he can be expected to continue to emplace these devices in areas patrolled by territorial forces. In addition, the enemy may attempt to foster unrest in populated areas, citing ARVN out-of-country operations as propaganda themes. Such action may be exemplified by recent fire-bombing of US vehicles. (#2)

Unit Activity and Identifications

12. 274 VC MF Regt

- a. Docus CIA by 2/25 Bde at YT325013 on 10 Feb identified 274 Regt and some of its subordinates. The documents revealed some intentions and capabilities of the Regt. One letter indicated that the Regt's Engr Coy (C19) was to relocate to an area South of the ONG QUE rubber plantation (YS3396) where the Recce Unit of HQ 274 was also located. Another letter dated 1 Feb 71 revealed that the Engr Coy had been ordered to attack a 2/25 Bde US Div Command Post near an airfield, possibly LEOPARD MAIN (YS399995), on 5 Feb. However, LEOPARD MAIN was not attacked until 21 Feb. (#3) (Annex B includes details of the CS projectiles used in this attack)(Para 10 a refers).

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- b. The letter also stated that the unit was to be tasked to plant mines in a village (CAM DUONG vic YS355949) on Route 25, and on the roads near the ONG QUE Plantation. Additionally, certain cadre were to go to BINH SON to supervise the manufacture of mines. Other documents revealed that all subordinate units of 274 Regt were to undergo political reorientation in an effort to improve Regimental "ideology", which the docs suggested was very low. These docs that indicated 274 Regt intends to rely on the use of mines and booby traps to harass Allied forces as the Regimental major reorganisation and consolidation effort continues. (#3)
- c. Recently captured documents have confirmed that the strengths of 274 Regt has been depleted to the reported extent that 1 and 3 Bns have been reorganised as company-size elements. The low strength of 3 Bn was confirmed by that unit's political officer who rallied on 14 Feb and stated that the Bn's strength was 65 persons. (#1)

13. 3 Bn 33 NVA Regt and XUAN LOC District HQs On 15 Feb, FSB HEIDI (YT515056) received 10-15 x 60mm and 80mm mortar rounds and SA fire. The attack was believed to have been made by XUAN LOC District forces with support by elements of 3 Bn 33 NVA Regiment. On 16 Feb at YT512044, documents were located which identified elements of XUAN LOC District HQs and 3 Bn 33 NVA Regiment. (#1)

14. D445 LF Bn

- a. The main elements of D445 remain in the NUI BE area. A rallier who was a Platoon leader with C1 states that the present location of C1 in the LONG HAI is on the western slope of NUI CHAU VIEN (YS469504). On 16 Feb Sector forces killed a member of C1 East of NUI DA DUNG (YS471561). SAU THU, the Battalion Commander, remains with C1.
- b. The rallier further stated that the Bn had intended to attack DAT DO in late Feb or Mar but that the attack had been cancelled. Elms of BA LONG Province HQ including the Province Unit were to assist and provide (sapper) advice. An AN/PRC 25 set was to be used to monitor allied (ENGLISH language) transmissions. It is considered that the heavy casualties suffered by D445 in Dec may have influenced the decision not to attack. The rallier stated that the Bn was to concentrate with C1 Coy in the MINH DAM Secret Zone (LONG HAI) to be "close to the people". (#3)

15. CHAU DUC District HQ

- a. Information from captured documents indicates that a group from CHAU DUC were occupying a camp south east of NUI LE on 14 Feb (YS514866). The persons occupying the camp may have been a caretaker group only but it is clear from the documents that this was an important CHAU DUC camp. Three smaller camps found

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

in the area of NUI LE (YS518882), YS518881 and YS497875) and several contacts with small groups in this area may also have indicated the presence of CHAU DUC caretaker groups. (#3)

- b. The present loc of CHAU DUC Dist HQs remains obscure. It is assessed that the unit had six reasonable alternatives following V Coys movement into their then current location.
- (1) remain in the NUI LE (YS5087) area, probably in dispersed groups, resupply from the CHAU LAC and NGAI GIAO areas.
 - (2) move SE to the NUI SAO (YS5184) area
 - (3) move SOUTH down the SONG RAI to vic YS5781
 - (4) remain in the BAO CHINH (YS4882)
 - (5) establish either side of Route 2 in the CU BI - NUI NHAN - BINH BA area crossing Route 2 at SLOPE 30 (YS4682) and also in BAO CHINH - SOUI TAM BO area, resupply mainly from NGAI GIAO
 - (6) move west of Route 2 returning to their more normal AO, either to:
 - (a) South HAT DICH
 - (b) SOUI CHAU PHA, or
 - (c) NUI DINH.
- c. Indication at present available appear contradictory but it is assessed that CHAU DUC remain within the NGAI GIAO - DUC THANH area.

16. C36 Sapper Unit

- a. A rallier has confirmed that this unit is a BA LONG Province Sapper Reconnaissance Unit former C3 and K6 companies, with a strength of approximately 50. A marking found in a camp near the SUOI LUC (YS577921) suggests that an element of C36 may have used this camp recently.
- b. The present loc of C36 is not known. SNIFFER reports in the SONG RAI - TAM BO junction (YS5781) may indicate their general area. However it is possible that C36 is located near or with CHAU DUC elements in the DUC THANH area or that it has moved North via BA LONG Province HQs.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

Other Areas and Units

17. SR4, 274 VC Regt and MR 7 Rear Service elements appear to have diverted their resupply movement in the GARTH area. Either the axis of the routes has been shifted South of AO QUIVER or supplies are being collected elsewhere.

18. Further evidence of supply collection and coordination between CAO SU (VC) District and the NGAI GIAO area (CHAU DUC District) has been recorded. BA LONG Rear Service elements, NGAI GIAO Guerillas and CAO SU elements including Hamlet 4 and CAM MY personal are believed to be involved in the logistic (SSS) activities in the CHAU LAC - NGAI GIAO - COURTENAY areas.

Battalion Statistics

	(1)	(2)
	(10 - 17 Feb)	(18 - 24 Feb)
19. a. Contacts	8	4
b. Wpns CIA & Rec	3	1
c. PW & Hoi Chanhs	1	-
d. VC/NVA KIA	-	-
e. Instls & Caches loc	12	7
f. Mine incidents	2	2
g. Sightings and Reports	2	20

R.J.K. Hoskin
(R.J.K. HOSKIN)

Capt

IO

2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn

Annexes: A VC/NVA Strengths, Locations and Identifications
B VC/NVA Improvised Indirect Fire Methods
C Mining Incidents in area of NDP GARTH in past 6 months
(Appendix 1 The Tilt Rod Firing Device
2 The Tilt Rod Firing Device (Diagram)

Enclosures: 1 Calendar of Important Vietnamese Hol days and Dates
2 VC/NVA Communication and Liaison System
3 ARVN Operations in CAMBODIA and LAOS

Sources: #1 2nd Bde 25 (US) Inf Div INTSUM 050-71, 052-71
#2 II FFV PERINTREP 8-71
#3 1 ATF SUPINTREP 8/71

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ANNEX A TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
718/11
DATED 26 FEB 71

VC/NVA STRENGTHS, LOCATIONS AND IDENTIFICATIONS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Est Str</u>	<u>Last Ident</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Est Current Loc</u>
<u>33 NVA Regt</u>				
3 Bn	105	20 Feb YT512160	502/14/1	EAST of SPARROWS WING
elm 3 Bn		YT596009	502/14/3	
<u>74 Arty Regt</u>				
3rd Arty Bn	170	16 Feb YT289094	402/A/52	SW HUNG NGHIA
<u>BA LONG Prov HQ</u>	475	25 Feb YT664001	434/59	EAST of SPARROWS WING
CHAU DUC Dist	46	16 Feb YS643883	502/1	SOUI TAM BO - NUI LE
NGAI GIAO Guerillas	6	20 Feb YS457810	728/154	NGAI GIAO Area
VUNG TAU City Unit	19	26 Feb YS264594	502/5/A	SW LANG CAT

CORRECTION: CHAU DUC District location in Weekly Intelligence Review 718/10 should read NUI LE and not NUI BE.

Other units no known change from Weekly Intelligence Review 718/9

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ANNEX B TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
718/11
DATED 25 FEB 71

VC/NVA IMPROVISED INDIRECT FIRE METHODS

Attack on FSB FONTAINE -- Case/cannister fired artillery blind.

1. On 082350H Feb FSB FONTAINE (YS803953) received three HE type indirect fire rounds inside the perimeter, two of which were air bursts and the third, a 105mm artillery blind. The blind 105mm round had been previously fired as evidenced by rusty lands and grooves on the rotating band. In addition, the fuzing on the projectile had been tampered with. Again on 102236H Feb, the fire base received three rounds, two of which were air bursts and one blind 155mm round. The 155mm blind, like the 105mm blind received on the evening of 8 Feb, had previously been fired and its fuze tampered with. Although the 105mm projectile had been destroyed before a thorough analysis could be made of its modifications, a team from 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery (ACD) and Combined Materials Exploitation Centre (CMEC), Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), examined the 155 mm projectile recovered from the 10 February attack.
2. Figure 1 portrays the fusing method used to detonate the 155mm projectile. A redundant system was used to insure detonation and employed two blasting caps (A) sunk into the 155mm projectile explosive charge; two lengths of time fuse (B), the length based on the desired time to flight; and two electrical igniters (C). The fusing system was wedged into the projectile fuse well to prevent its separation from the projectile while in flight or at impact. In 155 mm blind projectile, based on the length of time fuse, it was estimated that the round was launched approximately 200 metres from the fire support base perimeter.
3. Figure 2 indicates a probable means of launching the projectiles fired at FSB FONTAINE. A hole two to four feet deep is dug in the ground having the approximate diameter of the projectile to be launched. In the case illustrated, a canister (A) for the 175mm powder bag is used to hold the propellant charge (B), piston (C) and 155mm projectile (D). The canister is positioned at a predetermined angle, partially packed with a propellant charge, a piston device (C) which also serves to seal in the expanding gasses of the burning propellant, and the 155mm projectile (D) to be launched. In the case of the 105mm projectile, a 155mm powder bag canister may be used to ensure that the projectile fits snugly. The propellant charge (B) is detonated and the electrical fusing (E) ignited simultaneously. The range obtained using this technique varies from zero to 1600 meters depending on the ingenuity and experience of the cannoneer. That this method of indirect fire has been used successfully points to the continuing requirement for all friendly forces meticulously to police the battlefield to deny to the enemy the use of such commonly cast off items as PRC 25 batteries, communications wire, artillery canisters, etc.

CONFIDENTIAL

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B - 2

Attack on FSB LEOPARD MAIN - Satchel charge projected CS/Arty blind.

4. On 210345H Feb 71 a loud explosion and blast was noted north of FSB LEOPARD MAIN (YS399995). Following this 3 rounds of 105 (US) landed near the bund - two rounds outside the bund. The last round landed inside the bund. A patrol left the FSB at 0710 hrs to investigate the area where the blast occurred. At approximately 0800 hrs the patrol reported finding a large crater and a satchel charge containing CS, approximately 300 metres North of LEOPARD MAIN. Later investigation found that the satchel charge was resting on top of a charge of C4. The C4 charge was buried in a trench which would give a directional blast of 160 degrees. This was in direct line with LEOPARD MAIN. To cushion the satchel charge, fill dirt had been placed over the C4 charge. The fusing device on the satchel charge was attached to a tripwire. The tripwire was attached to a pin stake to the rear of the satchel charge. The C4 charge had a 5 minute time fuse attached to it.

5. The fuse igniters on the time fuse had been pulled but failed to ignite. Had the fuse ignited approximately 5 minutes later, the C4 would have detonated and catapulted the satchel charge toward LEOPARD MAIN. As the satchel charge was heaved forward by the blast, the trip attached to the fuse igniters on the satchel charge would have ignited the time fuse. Once the charge landed in LEOPARD MAIN it would explode. The 10lb of CS contained therein would have caused blindness and confusion within the camp.

6. The three 105mm rds had 2 pressure type blasting caps and a chemical cap seated in the fuse well with the C4. The 105mm rds were catapulted from the crater by a similar charge as described above. They were set to go off a short time after landing.

7. Had the 105mm rds and satchel charge detonated inside LEOPARD MAIN a sapper attack may have followed from the rubber plantation south of the FSB. Several sets of footprints were found in the rubber south of LEOPARD MAIN by a patrol at approximately 0900 hrs.

8. Figure 3 shows the set up of the CS satchel charge and the method of launching. The satchel charge was 16" x 9" x 6" and weighed 20lbs consisting of 5lbs TNT, 3lbs NITRO, 10lbs CS and 4 pressure type blasting caps. The cylinder shaped charge consisted of 5lbs of C4 and was wrapped in a VC poncho with nylon cord.

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


FIGURE 1





FIGURE 2

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FIGURE 3

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APPENDIX C TO
2RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
718/11
DATED 24 FEB 71

MINING INCIDENTS IN AREA OF NDP GARTH DURING PAST SIX MONTHS (*3)

1. Over the past six months FWMAF have been involved in 33 mine incidents in the area of NDP GARTH (YS453906). The following types of explosives have so far been identified:

- a. CHICOM
- b. Chippings from aerial bombs and UXBs
- c. RPGs
- d. C4 (Plastic explosive)
- e. 105 HE rds
- f. US Claymores

2. Types of Switches and Mines The following are the types of switches which have been identified:-

- a. Tilt switches (4, one of the mines probably encased in bakelite). (Appendix 1)
- b. Bamboo offset switch (approx 3-6 ft).
- c. Bamboo switch
- d. AP mines.

3. Size of Charges The mines have consisted of AP mines of up to 5lbs anti vehicular mines with between 10-15lbs explosive, and one anti helicopter mine.

4. Mine Markers There have been four separate markers found in the area. They are:

- a. Skull and crossbones (SW and South of NDP GARTH)
- b. Sign "MIN" (SW and South of NDP GARTH)
- c. A leaf with a stick pushed through it (area YS470890)
- d. Sharpened sticks lying on the ground and pointing towards the mines (YS484907).

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Pattern of Enemy Minelaying

5. Prior to mid-December 1970, the majority of the mine incidents occurred either West of Route 2 or on Route 2 itself. These mines had in most cases been emplaced for a long period, some of them for three years, with the switches being placed in position approx 24 hours before the required time for detonation.

6. Since mid-December, of the 17 mine incidents which have occurred, 11 have taken place east of Route 2, in the general area of YS471896 to YS472887. In mid-Dec a number of incidents occurred on Route 2 itself at YS457887. Again, the switches had been placed in position shortly before the required time for detonation. However these mines laid east of Route 2, together with the mines laid at YS457887, had been implanted within the last three or four months only, in contrast to the mines laid west of the road.

Enemy Units in the Area

7. SR-4 This organisation has the capability to implant mines. The groups from SR 4 which used the VIET CUONG regularly is the Rear Service Group, and mines to the west of the road may possibly have been laid by SR 4 sappers in an effort to deter the allied operations around GARTH.

8. 274 Regt This unit has the capability for implanting mines and also uses the VIET CUONG for resupply. 274 Regt may also possibly have contributed to minelaying west of Route 2.

9. CHAU DUC CHAU DUC did not move north from their normal AO until Dec 70 and therefore the mining to the west of the road is probably not of their doing. It is felt that the mining to the east of the road is too sophisticated for CHAU DUC resources.

10. C36 C36 was formed in about Sep 70 as a sapper recce unit. Present indications are that the unit is intended for attacks against isolated GVN outposts rather than for mining in the NDP GARTH area.

11. CAM MY Village Unit The mining to the west of the road may have been conducted by CAM MY Village Unit, but this is thought unlikely as such a task is probably outside the units resources.

12. D65 Engr Bn (Disbanded) In approx Aug 70, D65 withdrew from their AO in the MANGO. From various sources it has been ascertained that the Bn has since been disbanded and the coys redeployed to different Provinces within MR 7. In approx Nov 70, it was reported that elms of D65 were with BA LONG Province and were being used to train personnel to the north of the MAY TAOs. Later it was reported that a coy of D65 was with BA LONG. On 10 Nov at YS497878 a Pl Comd from A6/D65 was killed by US forces. Documents carried on his body made reference to mining in the area of LANG LON Hamlet (YS465859) and to the laying of 20 mines to the east of Route 2. The type of mines found to the east of the road are basically of the same design as those found of the firetrail in the MANGO area several months ago

CONFIDENTIAL

C - 3

while D65 were operating in that area. It is therefore probable that the mining to the east of the road has been conducted by elms of the Coy of D65 which was sent to BA LONG, possibly with the support of A32, BA LONG Engr Sect.

Conclusion

13. It is likely that two or more enemy organizations have contributed to the mining in the NDP GARTH area. The mining to the west of the road has probably been carried out by elements of 274 Regt and SR4. The mining to the east of the road has probably been carried out by elements of 274 Regt and SR4. The mining to the east of the road, probably the work of former D65 members assisted by BA LONG Province Engineers, is likely to be maintained at its present level of activity.

COMMENT: The docu referred to in para 12 above, identifying a Pl Comd of A6/D65 were CIA after a contact with a VC force which was identified as CAM MY Village Unit. The docu indicated that elms D65 and CAM MY Village Unit were co-located. CAM MY Village unit was probably one of the units subordinate to BA LONG Province which received Sapper/Engr training, and possibly cadres from D65 when the Engr Bn was disbanded.

It is therefore considered likely that the mines on the eastern side of Route 2 were laid by CAM MY Village Unit with assistance from elms D65 Engr Bn.

An agent report dated 20 Feb 71 stated the intentions of Village units of (VC) CAO SU District are to place mines in night ambush positions used by ARVN and FVMAF units.

The mines on the western side of Route 2 are believed by locals to be, in many cases, old mines laid by 274 Regt when they were located in the area.

CONFIDENTIAL

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX C TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
718/11
DATED 24 FEB 71


THE TILT ROD FIRING DEVICE

1. The tilt rod firing device can be employed with anti-personnel, anti-vehicular or anti-helicopter mines. It is a well constructed, simple, locally made device which is very effective.
2. The components are usually limited to a spring loaded striker, a small arms cartridge case and a threaded base. The cartridge case is modified by removal of the primer cap and base slotted to receive the springloaded striker. A primer detonator is positioned on the threaded base, and a length of bamboo, tree branch or steel rod is inserted in the other end of the cartridge case. This end may also be equipped with a pin to which a trip wire can be attached. There may be a hole in the threaded base for insertion of a safety pin to prevent the striker from impacting on the primer during fuze installation.
3. When the assembly is screwed into the mine the safety pin is removed. It is believed that the sensitivity of the fuze can be increased by spreading the claws which retain the striker until they are barely holding the head of the striker.
4. When the tilt rod is moved 8 - 10 degrees out of vertical, the holding claws release their grip on the striker head. The striker spring drives the striker into the primer which in turn initiates the primer detonator explosive train.
5. This device is employed on paths, trails and on helicopter landing zones where a palm frond or similar item is employed as a tilt rod, the downdraft from the helicopter being sufficient to move the rod out of the vertical plane so activating the fuze.

CONFIDENTIAL

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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX C TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
718/11
DATED 24 FEB 71



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ENCLOSURE 1 TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
718/11
DATED 24 FEB 71

CALENDAR OF IMPORTANT VIETNAMESE HOLIDAYS AND DATES

<u>GREGORIAN</u>	<u>SIGNIFICANT EVENT</u>	<u>LUNAR</u>
March		Thang Hai
2	TRUNG Sisters Birthday (Two VN instrumental in the defeat of the Chinese) (Historical)	6
3	Organization of the Vietnam Workers Party (1951) (The Vietnam LAO DONG, headed by TRUONG CHINH, was formed as the successor to the Indo-Chinese Communist Party, disbanded in 1945) (NVN).	7
5	Establishment of the 3rd Internation (COMINTERN) (1919) (USSR)	9
8	International Women's Day (1961) (VC)	12
9	Overthrow of the French Government by the Japanese (1945) (Nominally under the BAO DAI, the coup was staged by the Japanese)	13
11	BA TO Uprising (Viet Minh attacked French in QUANG NGAI Province Central Vietnam (1945) (NVN)	15
14	Death of KARL MARX (1883)	18
18	Activation of Paris Commune (1871)	22
19	All People's Anti-American (1950) (VC)	23
26	Formation of the Indo-Chinese Communist Youth (1931) (NVN)	30
		Thang Ba
28	Birthday of MAC XIN GOOD KI (1868)	2

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ENCLOSURE 2 TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
718/11
DATED 24 FEB 71

THE NVA/VC COMMUNICATION AND LIAISON SYSTEM

Introduction

1. Reference is often made to the NVA/VC Communications - Liaison System (often seen abbreviated as "commo-liaison"). This system is responsible for the movement of supplies and personnel SOUTH from NORTH VIETNAM into SOUTH VIETNAM where it is supplemented locally by the VC Shadow Supply System (SSS) described in last week's Review (Enclosure 1 to 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn, Weekly Intelligence Review 718/10). The content of this enclosure is taken from II FFV PERINTREP 7-71 and briefly describes the function of the system.
2. Since 1960, the responsibility for the movement of personnel and supplies SOUTH from NORTH VIETNAM has belonged to the NVA/VC Commo-Liaison system. Personnel and materials destined for the southernmost regions of RVN were routed to COSVN and then to MR 3 and MR 4. The Commo-Liaison Line, also referred to as the Unification Line (SUONG DAY THONG NHAT) under HANOI control, extended from QUANG BINH Province, NVN, through the southern provinces of LAOS, and down the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border to the COSVN area of operations. This infiltration route has remained relatively unchanged over the years. Smaller Commo-Liaison Lines branched off the Unification Line into the northern and central provinces of South Vietnam as far south as BINH LONG Province in GVN MR 3. In addition, a sub-network of commo-lines linked COSVN, the terminus, with the major VC subdivisions in GVN MR 3 and MR 4.
3. Prior to 1967, the extensive complex of Commo-liaison Stations and secondary lines throughout RVN and the border area were under the operational control of the Communications and Postal Section, COSVN. The Communications and Postal Section of COSVN maintained limited operational control over remotely located Commo-liaison Stations by means of Mobile Cadre Advisory Groups which travelled nine months of the year to the various commo-liaison stations and provided guidance, direction of effort, and settle problems and training from COSVN. The system functioned well within COSVN until late 1966 when significant increases in infiltration of personnel and material overloaded the system and caused a deterioration of command and control over subordinate activities. Consequently COSVN undertook a revision of the over all system.
4. In early 1967 the Communication and Postal Section was redesignated J-14 (estimated strength 500 - 600) and placed under the operational control of the SVNLA Military Staff Department. The commo-liaison route from BINH LONG Province to SVAY RIENG Province, Cambodia and TAY NINH Province, RVN, was designated the Communications and Postal Transportation Line (DUONG DAY GIAO BUU-VAN). Branches of this line ran east, southeast, and south, linking COSVN with the major VC subdivisions.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. Four battalion-size Commo-Liaison Groups designated Groups 43, 45, 47 and 49 were established with the mission of receiving infiltrators from the Recovery and Replacement Regiments, carrying, documents, carrying official and personal correspondence, and escorting high level cadre and visitors to and from the military regions and subregions. Concurrently, HANOI transferred control of the commo-liaison lines branching off from the Unification Line to those VC military regions in South Vietnam in which the branch line terminated. In addition, the Unification Line was divided into two parts; the northern segment extending from North Vietnam to the Laos-Cambodian border, and the southern segment extending from the Laos-Cambodia border to BINH LONG Province. The southern portion was redesignated the Military Postal Line (DUONG DAY QUAN-BUU) and was placed under COSVN control.

6. Prior to the reorganization of the Commo-Liaison System, the VC/NVA lost approximately 33% of the infiltration troop strength due to drownings, disease and air attacks. After the reorganization, the Military Staff Department formed three new regimental size Commo-Liaison Groups designated 90, 91 and 92. These groups were responsible for the Military Postal line in Cambodia and were assigned as follows:

- a. the 90th Group controlled the line from BINH LONG Province to QUANG DUC Province,
- b. the 91st Group from QUANG DUC Province to QUANG TIN Province,
- c. the 92nd Group from QUANG TIN Province to the Laotian border.

7. These groups were all subordinate to the Military Staff Department, SVNLA, and exercised the same authority as J-14. Four battalion size intermediate stations were organized within each group to control the operations of from five to ten company size Commo-Liaison Stations. Each group built at least one hospital or dispensary to care for its own staff personnel and infiltrators.

8. A convalescent station was created by each group to care for patients too weak to continue infiltration. Combat experience cadre served as Commo-Liaison guides between stations. Combat engineering elements were also assigned to the 90, 91 and 92 Groups with a mission of building bridges over narrow streams and rivers, and keeping the routes clear of physical obstructions. Motorized sampans were provided to the 90, 91 and 92 Groups to carry infiltrators over portions of the routes intersected by wide rivers and streams.

9. Security of commo-liaison lines and stations was (and is) the responsibility of the commo-liaison station personnel. However, due to the lack of a security force, little actual effort was made to keep the line secure and only the stations were secured. Further, no real need for security existed until LON NOL deposed SIHANOUK. The group headquarters and intermediate stations had guard elements assigned for protection. In addition, the commo-liaison stations were responsible for

effort in both Cambodia and South Vietnam. Consequently appropriate resources will probably be directed towards insuring the smooth functioning and security of this system in the coming months.

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE 3 TO
2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
718/11
DATED 25 FEB 71

ARVN OPERATIONS IN
CAMBODIA AND LAOS.

1. Operation LAM SON 719, the South Vietnamese advance into LAOS previously called Operation DEWEY CANYON II began on 08 Feb. The primary objective of LAM SON 719 is TCHEPONE, a small town on Route 9, approximately 25 miles inside LAOS. It is a known staging area and at a point where the various infiltration routes of the HO CHI MINH trail converge before fanning out again into SOUTH VIETNAM and CAMBODIA. Air photos have revealed base camps in the TCHEPONE area with trucks, gasoline and other supplies. An oil pipeline runs from NVN into the area.
2. The advance of the 13,000 ARVN troops (AIRBORNE, RANGERS, INFANTRY and ARMOURED) into the LAOTION "panhandle" has been slow because of bad weather, the difficult terrain and the caution of the ARVN Commanders. There are believed to be 20,000 NVA troops in Southern LAOS. The ARVN are relying on mobility, armour and air support to outweigh superior numbers.
3. However intense anti-aircraft fire is seriously restricting helicopter support and gun-ship operations and some NVA armour, including PT-76 and T034 tanks have been noted in the area. Conservative figures estimate enemy losses at about 700 killed and friendly casualties to be about 750 killed and wounded and in excess of 80 aircraft damaged or destroyed.
4. The aims of operation LAM SON 719 are twofold:
 - a. to prevent an offensive during 1971 designed to upset THIEU's chances in the Presidential elections this year, and
 - b. to prevent a TET type offensive in 1972 when SVN will not be able to call on US ground troops for aid.
5. The possible reactions of the North Vietnamese have been assessed by US analysts as:
 - a. INFILTRATE. Small guerillas units that could create havoc behind the ARVN advance. Last week an ARVN Marine unit was pulled back from the Route 9 advance and reassigned to security duty along the wide-open border.
 - b. SIT BACK AND WAIT, for weak points to develop. Some of the Communist troops on the trail seemed to be drawing back from Route 9 with just that in mind.


CONFIDENTIAL

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3 - 2


- c. CROSS THE DMZ into South Vietnam. To discourage the three North Vietnamese divisions above the demilitarized zone from trying a counterinvasion, a U.S. Navy Task Force carrying 1,500 Marines was despatched to the waters off the DMZ, and two ARVN divisions were rushed to DONG HA.
- d. HARASS CAMBODIA to create a diversion. The Communists never followed up their raid on PHNOM-PENH'S airport, however, which suggests that they may be short of supplies. Though hard working Premier LON NOL suffered a mild stroke last week and was flown to HAWAII for what may be a long recuperation, his idealistic 'government of salvation' has achieved a strong following.
- e. SQUEEZE LAOS in its more populous western provinces. Communist forces mounted an offensive on the Plain of Jars more than two weeks ago, began to surround LUANGPRABANG, the royal capital, and maintained pressure on SAM THONG and LONG CHENG, headquarters of the US backed army of MEO tribesman.

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ROUTINE ORDERS PART ONE

by

LIEUTENANT COLONEL J.M. CHURCH

COMMANDING OFFICER

2ND BATTALION

THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT

NUI DAT

9 FEB 71

Serial 6/71

Routine Order Nos V31 - V47/71

Comdo Dairy
(5) 41

ROUTINE ORDERS

- V31/71. COURSE RESULTS FOR SUBJECT 'A' FOR PROMOTION TO SERGEANT
- V32/71. SAFETY - HELICOPTER PADS
- V33/71. ILLEGAL USE OF C4 EXPLOSIVE
- V34/71. IMPORTATION OF EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DEVICES AND FIREARMS INTO R & R LOCATIONS
- V35/71. CESSATION OF ADMINISTRATION OF DAPSONE ANTI-MALARIAL TABLETS
- V36/71. CURRENCY - MPC - PIASTRE - US DOLLARS - RESTRICTIONS ON USE AND CONVERSION - PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES
- V37/71. PROHIBITED IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
- V38/71. OFFICER CADET SCHOOL, PORTSEA - JULY 1971 INTAKE
- V39/71. ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL OFFICER QUALIFYING COURSES 1971
- V40/71. RETURN OF ILLEGAL ITEMS
- V41/71. FIXED LIMITS
- V42/71. LOCAL LEAVE IN VUNG TAU
- V43/71. ADMINISTRATION OF COMMAND
- V44/71. MAIL CLEARANCE TIMINGS
- V45/71. PORNOGRAPHY
- V46/71. DRUNKENESS - R AND R AND RTA FLIGHTS
- V47/71. M60 - MACHINE GUN

NOTICES

1. GENERAL MESS MEETING - SERGEANTS MESS
2. DELIVERY OF TET GIFTS

ROUTINE ORDERS

V31/70.

COURSE RESULTS FOR SUBJECT 'A' FOR PROMOTION TO SERGEANT

The above course was held at Nui Dat from the 11 Jan 71 to 22 Jan 71. Results appear as Annex A.

V32/70.

SAFETY - HELICOPTER PADS

1. A helicopter, landing recently at a fire-base pad, sustained damage costing \$5,000.00 because a shelters individual was blown into its main rotor.
2. Any member of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn who is at any time responsible for the preparation, maintenance and control of helicopter pads is to ensure that daily, or more frequent checks for loose objects are made of pad areas.

V33/71.

ILLEGAL USE OF C4 EXPLOSIVE

1. It would appear that soldiers in 1 ATF are using C4 explosive as a substitute for Hexamine solid fuel tablets.
2. All ranks of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn are warned that such a use is an offence and highly dangerous.
3. C4 is a highly explosive substance which has nitro-glycerine as one of its basic ingredients and will detonate if subjected to heat. The intense heat generated by C4 in the process of heating a can of rations is quite sufficient to cause it to detonate with subsequent injury or possible death to persons in the immediate vicinity.

V34/71.

IMPORTATION OF EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DEVICES AND FIREARMS INTO R & R LOCATIONS

1. Several incidents have occurred involving the illegal importation into R&R locations, of small arms, ammunition, trip flares etc by personnel on leave and/or on temporary duty. Many of the personnel involved arrive by military and civil aircraft and transport the ordnance to local hotels - normally to ensure its safe keeping for the duration of their visit.
2. A continuance of such incidents could result in a deterioration of the presently relaxed and outstanding relationships between airport personnel and visiting military personnel and generate a stringent enforcement of debarkation procedures.
3. It is an offence to import explosive ordnance devices, firearms and weapons of any nature into an R & R location.

V35/71.

CESSATION OF ADMINISTRATION OF DAPSONE ANTI-MALARIAL TABLETS

Reference: MBI 142-10.

1. This order applies to all members of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn.
2. The administration of Dapsone anti-malarial tablets will cease on 28 Feb 71.

.. / 3. Members

3. Members arriving in theatre after 1 Feb 71 will NOT commence taking Dapsone anti-malarial tablets.
4. All members who RTA permanently, are to cease Dapsone treatment fourteen (14) days before their date of arrival in Australia and immediately commence the standard fourteen day Chloroquine/Primaquine anti-malarial course. Dapsone is NOT to be taken concurrently with Chloroquine/Primaquine.
5. All members are to continue to take two (2) Paludrine tablets daily throughout their tour in Vietnam including the period of the final Chloroquine/Primaquine anti-malarial course before RTA, and during any period of temporary absence from Vietnam, eg, R&R.
6. Strict adherence to the administration of Paludrine is essential at all times particularly so after Dapsone is discontinued.
7. Dapsone may be reintroduced by HQ AFV if warranted by future prevailing conditions.

V36/71.

CURRENCY - MPC - PIASTRE - US DOLLARS - RESTRICTIONS ON USE AND
CONVERSION - PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES

Reference: A. MACV Directive 37-6 of 17 Apr 68

1. Military Payment Certificates (MPC) are not to be obtained from any source other than an AFV Cash Office or US Service facility authorized for that purpose.
2. Military Payment Certificates (MPC) in excess of US\$ 200 are not to be held except where required for the purchase of a specific item or items and such excess is not to be held in excess of one full pay period.
3. Piastre are not to be obtained from any source other than an AFV Cash office or US service facility authorized for that purpose. A single exception is made in the case of piastre obtained by way of change as the result of an authorized transaction in that form of currency.
4. The following persons and groups are authorized to acquire, use or possess Military Payment Certificates (MPC) within RVN.
 - a. Active and retired US Military Personnel.
 - b. Military personnel of Free World Military Assistance Forces on duty in RVN.
 - c. US Civilian employees, including DOD contractor personnel of the US Government in RVN.
 - d. Individuals, agencies and organizations authorized specifically by a competent authority to acquire, use or possess Military Payment Certificates (MPC) or patronise US Military facilities which exclusively use Military Payment Certificates (MPC) in RVN.

.. /5. The following

5. The following means of identification will be satisfactory evidence of authority to acquire, use and possess Military Payment Certificates (MPC):
 - a. Service personnel and Retired US Military personnel - the Military identification card for the United States, Australia, Korea, New Zealand, Phillipines, Republic of China or Thailand.
 - b. Other personnel - MACV FORM 333 or MACV FORM 334 or USAHAC FORM 46 or AFV FORM 1 or other official identification bearing a photograph of the individual.
6. Members of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn are not to deal in any manner in Military Payment Certificates (MPC) with any person save as authorized in paragraph 4 above.
7. Upon arrival in 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn all currency held by members of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn is to be immediately declared and converted at the ATF Cash Office cashier at Nui Dat into Military Payment Certificates (MPC) or piastre. Any currency obtained by mail whilst in country is to be converted at an AFV Cash Office.
8. Members of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn proceeding to an R & R centre other than Australia, are to convert Military Payment Certificates (MPC) into US dollars prior to departure. Maximum conversion of Military Payment Certificates (MPC) to US dollars is \$500 and will be effected at the AFV Cash Office cashier located at Tan Son Nhut.
9. Members of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn are required to be in possession of a minimum of US\$200 when proceeding to an R&R centre other than Australia.
10. Members of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn requiring to convert Military Payment Certificates (MPC) into US dollars, in excess of US\$200 are required to be in possession of a properly completed adapted form F-WF 226 to enable the currency change to be effected. This does not restrict members from drawing pay in US dollars for use outside RVN but only limits the conversion of Military Payment Certificates (MPC) into US dollars. Payment of Paybook credits must be authorized by the CO on the adapted form F-WF 226. The form is available from the UPR.
11. All members of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn on return to RVN are to convert US dollars into Military Payment Certificates (MPC) at the AFV Cash Office at Tan Son Nhut.
12. All members of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn proceeding on R & R to Australia or on RTA are to have no more Military Payment Certificates (MPC) than the equivalent of A\$10 prior to departure from RVN and such Military Payment Certificates (MPC) are to be converted into Australian dollars immediately prior to departure for Australia.

V37/71.

PROHIBITED IMPORTS AND EXPORTS

Reference: A. MACV Directive 643-1 of 11 Jun 67.

1. The private import into RVN or export from RVN by members of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn of any of the following articles is prohibited:

.../a. Narcotics

- a. Narcotics.
- b. Marihuana.
- c. Explosives.
- d. Alcoholic beverages in excess of any limit authorized at the time.
- e. Privately owned or captured firearms, save as authorized.
- f. Vietnamese currency in excess of 500 piastre.
- g. Gold or silver bullion.
- h. Articles manufactured or produced in Communist China, North Vietnam or North Korea.
- i. Obscene or pornographic articles, literature or material.
- j. Printed matter advocating treason or insurrection against the Commonwealth of Australia or against any country with which the Commonwealth of Australia has entered into or is serving with in a mutual defence or assistance agreement.
- k. Items in excess of demonstrable personal needs.

2. The introduction of the items listed in paragraph 1 above onto any aircraft or ship operated by or for the Australian Government whether on the person, in hand or stowed baggage, or through military postal facilities, or otherwise, except when listed on a government shipping document or when authorized by competent is prohibited.

V38/71.

OFFICER CADET SCHOOL, PORTSEA - JULY 1971 INTAKE

1. The closing date for applications for the above intake is 12 Mar 71. It is anticipated that the AFV Selection Board will convene in the week 20-27 Mar 71.

2. Any person who wishes to apply is to request through his chain of command as soon as practicable.

3. Applicants who have previously have been interviewed by an AHQ Selection Board and not selected will not be considered by the AFV Selection Board unless:

- a. They were invited to re-apply; or
- b. In this case, full particulars are to be submitted with the application.

4. The following documents are required by the AFV Selection Board:

- a. AAF A140 (latest reprint).

..b. AAF A140

- b. AAF A140 III (latest reprint).
- c. Approval for surgical operations, if applicable.
- d. Four (4) photographs; in accordance with MBI 212-6 Annex A, Serial 7.

V39/71.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL OFFICER QUALIFYING COURSE, 1971

Reference: A. ARO 33/69.
B. ARO 147/69 Part 4.

1. There are to be two courses conducted at JTC Canungra during 1971. The timings for each course - the latter being subject to confirmation - are:

4/71 Course - 5 Jun 71 to 29 Jul 71; and
5/71 Course - 11 Sep 71 to 4 Nov 71.

2. The closing date for applications to attend the courses is 10 Mar 71. It is anticipated that the AFV Selection Board will convene in the week 20 Mar to 27 Mar 71.

3. Persons who are eligible and wish to apply are to request through their chain of command as soon as practicable.

4. Applicants who have previously been interviewed by a Command Selection Board or considered by an AHQ Selection Board will not be considered by the AFV Selection Board unless:

- a. They were invited to re-apply; or
- b. In this case full particulars are to be submitted with the application.

5. The following documents are required by the AFV Selection Board:

- a. AAF A28 (latest reprint).
- b. AAF A28 Part II (latest reprint).
- c. Two (2) photographs in accordance with MBI 212-6, Annex A, Serial 5.

V40/71.

RETURN OF ILLEGAL ITEMS

1. Any member of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn who has in his possession unauthorized weapons, drugs or pornographic material which he is unwilling to declare in his sub-unit, may hand such articles to a chaplain without prejudice.

2. Members are reminded that the carriage of the above items into Australia can attract severe penalties.

3. The chaplain will treat such a transaction in confidence and is authorized to dispose of such items as advised by the Commanding Officer.

..V41/71. FIXED

V41/71.

FIXED LIMITS

Amendments: Delete paras 1 (a), 1 (b) of V132/70 dated 4 Aug, with cross reference to this order.

1. When in the 1 ALSG Area or Vung Tau, no member of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn is to be outside the following fixed limits between 2300 hrs and 0600 hrs on the following day unless on an authorized duty:

- a. Within the 1 ALSG area perimeter - the perimeter wire.
- b. Within the R & C centre compound - the compound fence;
- c. In the case of officers only, Rooms 815, 816, 817 and 818 of the Grand Hotel Annex.

2. When in the 1 ALSG area or Vung Tau no member of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn is to be outside the following fixed limits between 0600 hrs and 2300 hrs on the same day unless the member is on authorized duty or is in possession of a pass or written leave from the Commanding Officer.

- a. Within the 1 ALSG area perimeter - the perimeter wire.
- b. Within the R & C centre compound - the compound fence.
- c. In the case of officers only, Rooms 815, 816, 817 and 818 of the Grand Hotel Annex.

V42/71.

LOCAL LEAVE IN VUNG TAU

1. Members of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn may be granted local leave in Vung Tau when they are:

- a. on R & C at the R & C Centre;
- b. staying at the Beach Annex as part of an authorized group; or
- c. required to stay overnight at an Australian service establishment in Vung Tau as a result of duty.

2. No member of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn is to proceed on local leave in Vung Tau unless he is dressed in civilian clothes and is carrying his identification card and current leave pass.

V43/71.

ADMINISTRATION OF COMMAND

1. Capt I.W. KORTLANG is to administer discipline for Admin Coy 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn for the period from 1300 hours 9 Feb 71 until the return of Admin Coy commander from duty in Vung Tau.

2. Capt A.J. BOOTH is to administer command of Admin Coy 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn for the period from 1300 hrs 9 Feb 71 until the return of Admin Coy commander from duty in Vung Tau.

, V44/71. MAIL

V44/71.

MAIL CLEARANCE TIMINGS

1. 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn RO Part 1, No V141/70 is hereby cancelled.
2. Notification of mail clearance timings will be implemented by signal until further notice.

V45/71.

PORNOGRAPHY

1. No member of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn or a member attached to or visiting 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn is to possess, distribute, employ, show, screen or view any obscene or pornographic article, literature or material.
2. For the purposes of this order, the word 'article' includes any cinefilm, film slide or photograph.
3. Any obscene article, literature or material found in the possession of the member or lawfully seized is to be destroyed on the order of the Commanding Officer.
4. 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn RO Part 1 No V21/71 dated 26 Jan 71 is hereby cancelled.

V46/71.

DRUNKENESS - R & R AND RTA FLIGHTS


1. Consumption of alcoholic beverages at TAN SON NHUT air-port is forbidden.
2. No member of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn, destined for an R & R, RTA, or similar flight is to arrive at Camp Alfa or RAAF Movements, Tan Son Nhut in an intoxicated condition.
3. 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn RO Part 1, No V22/71 dated 26 Jan 71 is hereby cancelled.

V47/71.

M60 - MACHINE GUN

1. Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Instructions (EMEI's) for the M60 Machine Gun state: "Change barrels after firing the rapid rate (200 rpm) for 2 minutes, or the sustained rate (100 rpm) for 10 minutes. Barrels should be changed frequently even when these limits are not reached in order to maintain equal use on barrels....."
2. As a direct result of this EMEI not being complied with the weapon may sustain a complicated stoppage known as "cook-off".
3. The "cook-off" has been responsible for a number of casualties. All members of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn are advised of the dangers involved in not complying with standard operating procedures of the gun and should a machine gunner have a "cook-off" in the M60 it shows obvious neglect.
4. 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn RO Part 1 No V29/71 dated 31 Jan 71 is hereby cancelled.

../Annex:


(R.A. DE MAAS)
Lt
Asst Adjt

Annex: A. Promotion Course Results Subject 'A' - Sergeant 11 Jan 71 to 22 Jan 71.

NOTICES

1. GENERAL MEETING -- SERGEANTS MESS

1. Members of the 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn Sergeants Mess are reminded of the General Mess Meeting to be held at 1500 hrs on 26 Feb 71 in the 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn Sergeants Mess.

2. All members not required on duty are to attend.

2. DELIVERY OF TET GIFTS

On behalf of the children of PHUOC TUY, I would like to thank your unit for its assistance in supplying the cakes that were recently delivered to the schools of the Province. I can assure you they were much appreciated by the children.

K.P. OUTRIDGE
Lt Col
CO 1 Aust CA Unit

ANNEX A TO
2 RA (NEW ZEALAND) BN
ROUTINE ORDERS PART ONE
SERIAL 6/71
DATED FEB 71

PROMOTION COURSE RESULTS
SUBJECT 'A' - SERGEANT
11 JAN 71 TO 22 JAN 71

<u>Number</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Corps</u>	<u>Pass</u>	<u>Fail</u>
18396	Sgt	K.K. ANDERSON	RAEME	P	
5410692	Cpl	J.J. BRANDER	RA INF		N
214742	Sgt	A.J. COLEMAN	RA INF	P	
14725	Sgt	R. CRONIN	RA INF	P	
1734251	Cpl	D.B. CUMNER	RA INF	P	
38314	Cpl	W.J. DAVIDSON	RA INF	P	
215737	Cpl	R.J. HART	RA INF	P	
1200877	Cpl	A.R. HARRISON	RA INF	P	
1200993	Cpl	P.J. HEALY	RA INF	P	
1200705	Cpl	D.T. KISSICK	RA INF	P	
1200818	Cpl	U.D. LIEBICH	RA INF	P	
54937	Cpl	D.C. MANSFIELD	RA INF	P	
39943	Cpl	G. MIALKOWSKI	RA INF	P	
2782524	Cpl	P.D. SPICER	RA INF	P	
216214	Cpl	G.J. TAYLOR	RA INF	P	

ROUTINE ORDERS PART ONE

by

LIEUTENANT COLONEL J.M. CHURCH

COMMANDING OFFICER

2ND BATTALION

THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT

NUI DAT

16 FEB 71

Serial 7/71
Routine Orders No V48 - V52/71

ROUTINE ORDERS

- V48/71. CANTEEN TIMINGS - 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN
- V49/71. BULK STOPE TRADING
- V50/71. OUT OF BOUNDS AREA - MORTAR COMPOUND
- V51/71. COURSE RESULTS FOR SUBJECT 'B' FOR PROMOTION TO CORPORAL
- V52/71. ADMINISTRATION OF DISCIPLINE

ROUTINE ORDERS

V48/71.

CANTEEN TIMINGS - 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN

1. All canteens of sub-units of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn may be open for the sale of wet items from 1830 hours to 1930 hours daily.
2. Any extension of timings for particular functions, eg, post-operational barbeques, must have prior authorization from the Commanding Officer.
3. The following 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn ROs Part 1 are hereby cancelled:
 - a. RO V151/70 dated 8 Sep 70.
 - b. RO V131/70 dated 4 Aug 70.
 - c. RO V100/70 dated 21 Jul 70.
 - d. RO V116/70, para 2 and para 3, dated 9 Jun 70.
 - e. RO V118/70 dated 16 Jun 70.

V49/71.

BULK STORE TRADING

1. 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn Bulk Store will operate for personnel at the following times:
 - a. Normal Trading. 0800 hours to 1200 hours Monday to Friday. This covers sale of normal canteen items.
 - b. Luxury Goods. 1400 hours to 1600 hours Monday to Friday.
 - c. No trading at all on Saturdays.

V50/71.

OUT OF BOUNDS AREA - MORTAR COMPOUND

The 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn Mortar Compound is out of bounds to all ranks except those on authorized duty.

V51/71.


COURSE RESULTS FOR SUBJECT 'B' FOR PROMOTION TO CORPORAL

1. The above course was held at NUI DAT from the 25th Jan 71 to 2nd Feb 71.
2. Results appear as Annex A to this order.

V52/71.

ADMINISTRATION OF DISCIPLINE

Capt P.J. HAYDEN was authorized to administer discipline for C Coy, 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn from 0800 hours 13 Feb 71 to 1800 hours 13 Feb 71.


(R.A. TE HAAS)
Lt
Ass. Adjt

Annex: A. Course Results Subject B for Promotion to Corporal.

ANNEX A TO
2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN
ROUTINE ORDERS PART ONE
SERIAL 7/71
DATED 16 FEB 71

COURSE RESULTS FOR SUBJECT 'B' FOR
PROMOTION TO CORPORAL
25 JAN 71 - 2 FEB 71

	<u>CANDIDATE</u>		<u>CORPS</u>	<u>PASS</u>	<u>FAIL</u>
216791	Cpl	W.J. BARRIE	RA INF	P	
2239141	Lcpl	P.R. BAXTER	RA INF	P	
36002	Cpl	C.R. BRODIE	RA INF	P	
1202858	Pte	B.J. GRAHAM	RA INF	P	
61713	Lcpl	R.C. GREEN	RA INF	P	
3179825	Lcpl	P.J. HEENEY	RA INF	P	
1200074	Cpl	J.T. HUET	RA INF	P	
5411659	Cpl	R.P. JOHNSON	RA INF	P	
312570	Cpl	C.P. KONDRATOWICZ	RA INF	P	
37281	Lcpl	D.J. MILLER	RA INF	P	
44949	Pte	N.A. MORGAN	AACC	P	
5411619	Cpl	A.W. PARKER	RA INF	P	
312606	Lcpl	L. PAVICH	RA INF	P	
1735407	Lcpl	S.W. PURDIE	RA INF	P	
219035	Lcpl	D.J. RILEY	RA INF	P	
123195	Pte	P.T. ROEBIG	RA INF	P	
55757	Cpl	P.J. STANSFIELD	RA INF	P	
1202663	Pte	K. STECKLEBRUCK	AACC	P	
1200153	Cpl	J.G. SULLIVAN	RA INF	P	
17783	Cpl	J.M. WOODWARD	RA INF	P	

Any member who sat for the examination and whose name does not appear on this page did not pass Subject B for promotion to Corporal.

MESSAGE FORM

H3

R 569/21/1

PRECEDENCE - ACTION ROUTINE	PRECEDENCE - INFO ROUTINE	DATE - TIME GROUP 170230Z	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS Feb 71
FROM: 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN			PREFIX CR
TO: List C plus V Coy, EAGLE FARM,			SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
INFO: BC HQ I ATF (for PR offn) (2)			ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER G 311

PR (.) ARMY PR TEAM OF TWO NCOs (ONE PHOTOGRAPHER AND ONE REPORTER) WILL BE ATT TO COYS AS FOLLOWS FOR PRODUCTION OF GENERAL PR PHOTOGRAPHY/STORIES (.)

B COY 19 TO 21 FEB. MOV TO AND FROM GARTH BY PIECART AC 19 AND 21 FEB (.)

C COY 23 TO 25 FEB. MOV TO AND FROM HORSESHOE TO BE ADVISED (.)

A COY 27 FEB TO 1 MAR. MOV TO BE ADVISED. ATTACHMENT DEPENDS UPON OP SITUATION (.)

NUI DAT 22 FEB, 26 FEB, 2 MAR FOR SP/ADMIN COY PHOTOS/STORIES AND FOR FILM PROCESSING

TEAM MAY BE ABLE TO TAKE PHOTOGRAPHS FOR COY SEGMENTS OF BN BOOK IF REQUESTED (.) FILM WILL BE SUPPLIED TO TEAM BY BN HQ (OPS OFFR) (.)

THIS OUTLINE PROGRAMME MAY BE VARIED AS REQUIRED BY OPS/COYS/PR

PAGE <u>1</u> OF <u>1</u> PAGES	REFERS TO MESSAGE	DRAFTER'S NAME ROBERTS	OFFICE OPS	TEL. NO. ERUDITE			
CLASSIFIED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE <i>Al Roberts</i> RANK Maj					
FOR OPERATOR'S USE							
DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR

R861/1/1A

2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn
NUI DAT


21 Feb 71

List B (One copy each Coy only)

MOVEMENT OF VEHICLES OUTSIDE 1 ATF AREA

HQ 1 ATF have drawn attention to what appears to be excessive movement of 1 ATF vehicles outside the Nui Dat base. To counter this increasing use of vehicles, the following will apply:

- a. Vehicles to Vung Tau. Vehicles will travel in convoy at the times notified at the 1 ATF daily briefing. Exceptions to this will be limited to essential and urgent tasks. Convoy timings are such that there should rarely be a need for 'free running passes' to be issued. When necessary, authority for individual movement will be given by Q Branch HQ 1 ATF.
- b. Vehicles to Other Places Outside of Phuoc Tuy Province. These vehicles will always require a pass issued by Q Branch HQ 1 ATF.
- c. Vehicles Moving Within Phuoc Tuy Province. This is the area of greatest abuse as no special authority is required for vehicles to move outside of Nui Dat base. Those officers and NCOs of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn responsible for the control of vehicles are to ensure that vehicle and personnel movement (particularly to Baria) is restricted to essential tasks only.



(R.T.V. TAYLOR)
Maj
for CO

HS

ROUTINE ORDERS PART ONE

by

LIEUTENANT COLONEL J.M. CHURCH

COMMANDING OFFICER

2ND BATTALION

THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT

NUI DAT

22 FEB 71

Serial 8/71
Routine Order Nos V53 - V59/71.

ROUTINE ORDERS

- V53/71. DISCHARGE OF NATIONAL SERVICEMEN
- V54/71. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION TAGS
- V55/71. CHANGE IN BN APPOINTMENT
- V56/71. APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER TO AATTV
- V57/71. SAFETY - CLAYMORE MINES
- V58/71. R AND I RESTRICTIONS - VUNG TAU
- V59/71. CANTEEN TIMINGS - 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN

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ROUTINE ORDERS

V53/71.

DISCHARGE OF NATIONAL SERVICEMEN

Reference: A. MBI 154-4.
B. AFV (Army Component) SOPs.
C. AFV File No R270/1/10.

Obligation

1. National Servicemen (NSM) are enlisted in the ARAS(NS) for two years full time service. The following conditions apply:
 - a. Periods of non-effective service do not count towards this obligation, and where applicable, the date of discharge is deferred accordingly.
 - b. There is no provision for NSM to be discharged at their own request before completing a total of two years full time effective service.
 - c. In exceptional circumstances of a compassionate or hardship nature, leave without pay (LWOP) for a minimum period of 22 days can be approved by AHQ. This LWOP constitutes non-effective service and does not count towards the two years obligation.
 - d. In cases where LWOP is approved for a period totalling at least two years and the compassionate or hardship grounds still exist, the remainder of the period of obligatory service may be waived by AHQ with the concurrence of Department of Labour and National Service.
2. Applications by NSM for discharge before completion of two years full time effective service, no matter how short the reduction requested, cannot be approved and will not be forwarded by 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn.

Discharge

3. NSM are to RTA at a date no later than four weeks prior to due date of discharge.
4. Leave may be granted on RTA however the member will be required to report to the Command Discharge Cell, three weeks prior to discharge.
5. Uniform is to be worn when reporting to the discharge centre.

V54/71.

PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION TAGS

Reference: A. ARO 86/69.

1. Some members arrive in Vietnam without identity discs or with discs bearing illegible markings or errors. Errors have also been found on discs issued to personnel in SVN to replace those lost.

../2. 2 RAR/NZ

2. 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn HQ will check individual identity discs for accuracy as part of the march in procedure on arrival in the unit. Sub units are to counter check as members march in.

3. Sub units are to hold a stock of blank discs. When discs are lost the following actions will take place:

- a. The loss will be reported to BnHQ with all relevant details so that a new set of authorised discs may be obtained from 1 RTB, E Comd.
- b. Sub units will provide a temporary set from unit resources or by local contract. It is essential that all information on these discs be carefully checked to ensure that marking complies with the provisions of the reference.
- c. When the authorised set from 1 RTB, E Comd is available, the temporary set of discs is then to be destroyed.

V55/71. CHANGE IN BN APPOINTMENT

Lt R.C. BEATTIE is appointed 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn ELECTRICAL and FIRE OFFICER from date of Lt SMITH's RTA (11 Feb 71).

V56/71. APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER TO AATTV

1. To be eligible for posting to AATTV, qualification at one of the following courses is required:

- a. Tropical Warfare Advisors Course, JTC, Canungra.
- b. MATT Course, Infantry Centre, Ingleburn.

2. Members who have not qualified at one of the courses will not be considered for posting to AATTV and should not apply for transfer to that unit.

V57/71. SAFETY - CLAYMORE MINES

1. Induced current from radio frequency waves may be responsible for premature detonations of claymore mines.

2. In addition to the usual precautions of ensuring that the dust cover/shorting plug is kept closed at all times except when the M57 firing device is hooked into the circuit and of ensuring that the firing device has been tested through both 'clicks' of the handle before attaching it to the circuit, users should be aware that the following additional precautions are desirable:

- a. Proper Shielding. This can reduce radio frequency hazards a great deal. Plastic and rubber are not good shielding materials. Metal containers would be more suitable.

..b. Folding

- b. Folding of wire and blasting caps. When transporting claymores which may come into close proximity to radio transmitters (eg, as in helicopters), the package of wire and blasting caps should be folded (not coiled) and placed in a metal container, eg, ammunition box.

V58/71.


R AND I RESTRICTIONS - VUNG TAU

1. Members of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn who are returning to Australia, or New Zealand/Singapore, as part of the unit ADVANCE PARTY may be able to take R and I with their respective sub-units at the Peter Badcoe Club, Vung Tau, but are not to proceed beyond the limits fixed of 1 ALSG area. This is to take effect from 31 Mar 71.
2. Members of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn who are returning to Australia, or New Zealand/Singapore, as part of the unit MAIN BODY may be able to take R and I with their respective sub-units at the Peter Badcoe Club, Vung Tau, but are not to proceed beyond the limits fixed of 1 ALSG area. This is to take effect from 18 Apr 71.
3. Members of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn who are returning to Australia, or New Zealand/Singapore, as part of the unit REAR PARTY may be able to take R and I at the Peter Badcoe Club, Vung Tau, but are not to proceed beyond the limits fixed of 1 ALSG area. This is to take effect from 4 May 71.

V59/71.

CANTEEN TIMINGS - 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN

1. All canteens of sub units of 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn may be open for the sale of wet items from 1830 hours to 1930 hours daily.
2. When rifle companies and Support Company are on base maintenance/rest and retraining, their canteens may extend timings for one (1) hour, ie timings 1830 to 2030 hours daily.
3. Any extension of timings for particular functions, eg, post operational barbeques, must have the prior authorization from the Commanding Officer.
4. The following 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn ROs Part 1 are hereby cancelled:
 - a. RO V48/71 dated 16 Feb 71.
 - b. RO V151/70 dated 8 Sep 70.
 - c. RO V131/70 dated 4 Aug 70.
 - d. RO V130/70 dated 21 Jul 70.
 - e. RO V116/71, para 2 and 3, dated 9 Jun 70.
 - f. Ro V118/70 dated 9 Jun 70.



(R.A. DE HAAS)
Lt
for CO

COM Policy

2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn 46
NUI DAT

R553/1/2

22 Feb 71

List D plus serial 22,23,26,35,39
less serials 47 to 51

RETURN TO AUSTRALIA

Reference: A. 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn R553/1/2 dated 25 Jan 71, and Coy replies.

1. Since the Reference was published, there have been a number of decisions, and planning has reached the stage where the Advance Party and Rear Party can be named.

2. The following is the general outline of the RTA:

a. Advance Party. The Advance Party of 45 members commanded by Major C.J. MAYHEW will depart Saigon by air on 30 Apr 71. It will have the following tasks:

- (1) Reception and processing of the Main Body.
- (2) The takeover of barracks.
- (3) The takeover of unit stores, equipment and regimental property.
- (4) The commencement of unit administration.

All of the Advance Party will proceed on leave on arrival in Townsville. Those concerned with the reception of the Main Body and with the takeover of barracks will return to duty on 24 May, and proceed on leave again on 2 Jun 71. All others will return to duty by 7 Jun 71 having completed up to 30 days leave. The RQMS will organise a course of instruction on F7 Accounting, commencing 14 June, and the takeover of unit stores etc, will commence 21 June 71.

b. Main Body. The Main Body will embark on HMAS SYDNEY on a planned date of 22 May 71 (Confirmation of the date will not be available until April). It is expected the Main Body will arrive in Townsville on 1 Jun 71, march through the city and then after reception procedures at Lavarack Barracks, proceed on leave. All ranks will take up to 30 days leave, and therefore the Main Body should return to duty from 7 July 71 (due allowance being made for travelling time). Personnel will proceed on leave by normal travel means, ie, rail, unless they are prepared to pay the difference for air fare.


c. Rear Party. The Rear Party will leave Saigon by air on 27 May 71. the task of the Rear Party will be:

- (1) Finalizing of Q accounts.
- (2) Assistance in the move out of 2 RAR Main Body.
- (3) Assistance to 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn.

../3. Attached

3. Attached as Annex A is the composition of the Advance and Rear Parties. Coys are to check this list, and advise BnHQ of their nominations to fill vacancies by 1 March 1971.

4. In Reference A it was thought that the Advance Party would be some 100 strong. Approval is now being sought to reduce this to about 45. If approval is not obtained, Coys will be required to nominate additional personnel. Meanwhile the Advance and Rear Party can be finalized to the extent that essential personnel can be nominated and BnHQ will publish the finalized list soon after 1 Mar 71.



(R.T.V. TAYLOR)
Maj
for CO

Annex: A. Composition of Advance and Rear Parties.

ANNEX A TO
 2 PAR BATT (ANZAC) BN
 R553/1/2
 RETURN TO AUSTRALIA
 DATED 22 FEB 71

COMPOSITION OF ADVANCE PARTY AND REAR PARTY
RETURN TO AUSTRALIA

1. The following are the planned composition of the Advance and Rear Parties for RTA:

a. Advance Party.

<u>A Coy.</u>	SSgt Cochrane Pte/Lcpl Pte/Lcpl Pte/Lcpl	-	CQMS
<u>B Coy.</u>	SSgt Sheehy Pte/Lcpl Pte/Lcpl Pte/Lcpl	-	CQMS
<u>C Coy.</u>	SSgt Cocker Pte/Lcpl Pte/Lcpl Pte/Lcpl	-	CQMS
<u>Sp Coy HQ.</u>	Maj Mayhew SSgt Catsacos Pte	- -	Commands Advance Party CQMS
<u>Atk Pl.</u>	Lcpl		
<u>Aslt Pnr Pl.</u>	Sgt Dennert Pte	- -	Pl Sgt Storeman
<u>Mor Pl.</u>	Sgt McDonald		
<u>Sig Pl.</u>	Sgt Mullings Lcpl Trewern	- -	Pl Sgt Asst Storeman
<u>BnHQ.</u>	Maj Roberts 2Lt De Haas WO2 Giffin Sgt Sellke Cpl Mialkowski Lcpl Fox Lcpl Dixson Pte Thompson	- - - - - - - -	Asst Adjt WO Admin Movments Clerk Pay RP
<u>Admin Coy HQ.</u>	SSgt O'Doherty	-	Int Sect CQMS
<u>QM Pl.</u>	WO2 Hoare Pte	- -	RQMS Q Clerk

.. /Tpt.

<u>Tpt.</u>	Cpl Brocmfield	-	Despatch Clerk
	Lcpl Greene		
	Pte	-	Driver
	Pte	-	Driver
	Pte	-	Driver
	Pte	-	Driver
<u>Caterer.</u>	Pte Lyall	-	Storeman
<u>Med Pl.</u>	Pte		
<u>Offrs/Sgts Mess.</u>	Sgt Sojan	-	Mess Supervisor
	Pte	-	Barman/Storeman
	Pte	-	Barman/Storeman
b. <u>Rear Party.</u>			
<u>A, B, C, Sp Coys.</u>		-	NIL
<u>BnHQ.</u>	Major Taylor		
	SSgt Jackson	-	Chief Clerk
	Cpl Kondratowicz		
<u>Admin Coy.</u>			
<u>Coy HQ.</u>	Major Lloyd	-	OC
	Lcpl	-	Storeman
<u>QM Pl.</u>	Lt Beattie	-	AQM
	Sgt Harrison		
	Pte	-	Clerk
<u>Tpt Pl.</u>	Cpl Pratt	-	Driver
	Pte		
	Pte		
	Pte		
	Pte		
	Pte		
	Pte		
	Pte		
	Pte		
	Pte		
<u>Med Pl.</u>	Sgt Farrar		
	Cpl Pierce		
<u>Offrs/Sgts Mess.</u>	Cpl Barrie		