

**Series: AWM95**  
Australian Army commanders' diaries

Royal Australian Infantry

**Item number: 7/5/27**

**Item: 5 Battalion Royal Australian  
Regiment**

Annexes

1-30 June 1969

Comd Diary

R723-1-1

5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SVN

Jul 69

5 RAR COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT 2/69  
OPERATION FEDERAL/OVERLANDER

Reference: A. 5 RAR R723-1-1 of 5 Jun 69.

1. The final traces to Annex A of this After Action Report are attached.
2. The report is now complete.

(C.N. KHAN)  
Lt Col  
CO

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Copy no 34 of 52 copies

5 RAR  
AP AN PHU

See Distr List:

31 May 69

5 RAR COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT 3/69  
OPERATION SURFSIDE

- References:
- A. HQ 1 ATF Op O 31/69 dated 131400Z Apr 69
  - B. 5 RAR Op O 8/69 dated 21 Apr 69
  - C. Map VIETNAM Sheet 6430-11, XUYEN MOC, 1:50,000
  - D. Map VIETNAM DAT DO 6429-1, 1:50,000
  - E. Frag O 2 to 1 ATF Op O 31/69 dated 131400Z Apr 69.

Name and type of operation

- 1. Operation SURFSIDE - Recce in force ops in AO COOGEE centre of mass YS 6662 and in later extension to AO COOGEE to WEST to the "Long Green" centre of mass YS 5660.

Dates of operation

- 2. 22 Apr - 2 May 69.

Locations

- 3. a. AO COOGEE - Centre of mass YS 6662.
- b. Ext to AO COOGEE to WEST to the LONG GREEN centre of mass YS 5660.
- c. Both AOs were loc in SE PHUOC TUY Province.

Control Headquarters

- 4. HQ 5 RAR, under comd HQ 1 ATF based at NUI DAT.

Task Organization

- 5. Under op con from 220630H Apr one tp B Sqn 1 Armd Regt  
one sect mor APCs, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt  
Tp HQ and four combat engr teams,  
1 Fd Sqn
- Under op con from arrival  
FSPB BRUISER until rel one TD15 dozer  
one D4 dozer  
one backhoe
- Under op con from arrival  
FSPB BRUISER approx 221700H  
to 231700H Apr one tp B Sqn 3 Cav Regt
- Under op con from 231700H one sect B Sqn 3 Cav Regt
- Remaining in DS 105 Fd Bty
- In DS from 220630H one H13, 161 (Indep) Recce Flt
- In gen sp rft from 220630H one sect B/2/35 Arty (US)

Intelligence

- 6. Annex A.

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Mission

7. To deploy into AO COOGEE by rd, air and sea on 22/23 Apr 69 to conduct the fol ops:
- a. Loc and destroy HQ D445 Bn and other elms within the AO.
  - b. Loc and destroy VC instls, bunkers and gardens.

Concept of Operations

8. A three phase op was planned:
- a. Phase 1 - Deployment
    - (1) Insertion of FSPB securing coy with APC's tks, engr plant, Bn HQ recee parties, Asit Pnr pl and two sects mor pl by rd AM 22 Apr. Remainder Bn HQ, sect med bty, fd bty deploy by rd to FSPB BRUISER PM 22 Apr 69.
    - (2) Beach landing of two rifle coys by LCM in SE part of AO COOGEE at first lt 23 Apr 69.
    - (3) Fly in of one rifle coy to FSPB BRUISER AM 23 Apr 69.
  - b. Phase 2 - Bn attack against HQ D445 Bn. On 23 Apr bn op involving three rifle coys, tk tp, tp APC's in blocking role and one rifle coy search towards suspected loc HQ D445 Bn.
  - c. Phase 3 - Coy search of AO's. From 24 - 30 Apr (approx). Deployment of coys into search AO's throughout AO COOGEE.

9. This op was aimed at denying D445 bn any further use of the area. To the WEST and adjacent to AO COOGEE, 9 RAR were conducting simultaneous ops in AO GLENELEG, HQ D445 bn were believed to have been in the area of square YS 6562. A quick surprise encirclement and sweep were to be achieved by the initial deployment. Unfortunately the sea landing was cancelled at the last moment and the two coys were inserted by rd tpt on 23 Apr.

Execution

10. Annex B - Sequence of Events

Results

11. a. VC - 4 KIA (BG)  
3 WIA (Possible)
- b. Aust - 8 WIA

Lessons Learned

12. Prior to this op liaison was made with the XUYEN MOC District Post with a view to obtaining local RF guides up to the bn. Four were provided and the local knowledge provided by two of them was most valuable. It is intended to repeat this practice in future ops.

13. The concept of RIF ops against a local force geurilla unit needs careful consideration. On intelligence provided for this op, it was thought that D445 bn could be loc in up to coy sized bunker systems. This proved to be incorrect and whilst it is estimated there may have been up to two coys of D445 bn in the area it became obvious during the op, that the en was both living and moving in small gps of 3 - 6 and therefore conventional RIF type ops stood little chance of success against such small packets of en who could easily evade searching tps. It is therefore intended, on future ops against an en of this nature, to concentrate on ambush along the tracks which he consistently uses.

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- 3 -

This will involve spending three or more days at the commencement of the op, searching for en signs i.e. water pts, tracks, courier routes etc. and then ambushing at these sites. Once this phase is over, rifle coys could then start the more conventional search ops for bunker systems. It is also considered that more success would be obtained by the silent insertion of coys into AOs on ft and avoiding whenever possible a noisy insertion by heli.

14. In areas that are suspected or known to contain mines, as was in this case, the deployment of engr/aslt pnr elms carrying detectors down to pl level is desirable. It is not satisfactory to keep engr resources centralized either at Bn HQ or coy, as rarely can they be deployed to rifle pl in time to give assistance.


15. The rotation of pl protecting the FSPB proved to be successful.

16. Old bunker systems, especially those which have been bombed, need to be rechecked, as the en had in several cases, reoccupied two or three bunkers in an old complex whilst living in small scattered gps.

17. Tks again proved to be invaluable both in clearing and escorting AFC borne troops over suspected mine areas.

18. During ops in the AO ext by A Coy, the successful contacts that occurred in the area which had been recently vacated by 9 RAR, again shows how quickly the enemy move back into an area as soon as friendly troops depart.

(C.N. KHAN)  
Lt Col  
CO



(A.B. PERRIMAN)  
Maj  
Ops Offr

Authentication:

Annexes: A. Intelligence Summary  
B. Sequence of Events

Distr: HQ 1 ATF (12)

For Info: B Sqn 1 Armd Regt  
B Sqn 3 Cav Regt  
105 Fd Bty, 1 Fd Regt  
1 Fd Sqn  
161 (Indsp) Recce Flt  
6 RAR  
7 RAR  
8 RAR  
9 RAR  
D Inf (2)

Internal

CO  
2IC  
Ops Offr  
IC  
A Coy (2)  
B Coy (2)  
C Coy (2)  
D Coy (2)  
Sp Coy (2)  
Admin Coy (2)  
CP  
File (2)  
War Diary (5)  
Spare (5)

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ANNEX A TO  
5 RAR COMBAT AFTER ACTION  
REPORT 3/69  
DATED 31 MAY 69

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

General

1. During the period of the op 5 RAR sought to loc and destroy HQ D445 Bn, any other VC elms, instls, bunkers and gardens within the area concerned.

2. Enemy Contacted

Numerous track activity, sightings and caches were loc dispersed throughout area. En activity consisted mainly of small gps, largest gp being approximate str of 25 pers.

3. Enemy Identification

a. Local force XUYEN MOC Geurillas.

b. TRAN VAN KIA (AKA TRAN VAN LOI) acting coy comd of C2/D445 LF Bn (Ambush at YS 556589 on 30 Apr 69).

4. Bunkers

Numerous old and several new partly const bunker systems with indications of recent use. Majority of usable systems loc were either blown, or seeded with CS crystals.

Conclusions

5. Elms D445 Bn loc SOUTH of XUYEN MOC in dispersed gps trying to avoid contact.

6. Beaches along Southern coast of AO COOGEE used for landing of sups and pers possibly from SOUTH, EAST and SOUTH-EAST coast of CHINA. (See Appendix 2)

Appendixes

Appendix 1 - Summary of Contacts and Incidents  
Appendix 2 - Summary of En Cas, wpns and eqpt

Traces

Trace 1 - Areas of Op SURFSIDE  
Trace 2 - Coy Routes Op SURFSIDE  
Trace 3 - Contacts, Incidents, Instls Op SURFSIDE

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SUMMARY OF CONTACTS AND INCIDENTS  
OP SURFSIDE

SERIAL	DATE/TIME	LOCATION	C/S	ACTIVITY
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
	APRIL			
1	221225H	YS 645639	4	Loc 23 bunkers and 3 huts, all were in poor condition.
2	221959H	YS 644649	21	Heard mov to their front
3	230245H	YS 615619	3	Heard primary 2000 metres to NORTH
4	230714H	YS 656646	2	Loc 7 bunkers with 1 ft OHC
5	230840H	YS 639613	3	Loc a bunker system - not used recently
6	230843H	YS 650640	TA81	Loc one old bunker
7	231040H	YS 645632	42	Loc a very old bunker system
8	231040H	YS 644633	4	Found an ammo box containing docus
9	231130H	YS 642618	TA	Loc an OP and old bunker system, with cache
10	231244H	YS 667604	32	Contacted 2-5 en dressed in black 1 VC KIA (BC)
11	231345H	YS 667604	32	Contacted 6 en - 2 WIA (Possible)
12	231325H	YS 674619	2	Loc 2 huts and large tunnel, also a part of a crashed F100 ac
13	231500H	YS 673622	2	Loc a large camp which was very old
14	231620H	YS 656604	63	Found sandal tracks - one day old
15	240125H	YS 646630	42	Contacted 3-25 en - unknown results
16	240907H	YS 676609	2	Found footprints - 3 hrs old
17	240920H	YS 677622	2	Loc well used tracks and heard voices to EAST
18	241325H	YS 677622	22	Found hut and 5 CBU's
19	241410H	YS 648636	41	Sighted 1 en, who withdrew NE
20	241521H	YS 660650	21	Loc 4 bunkers 2 were under const
21	241523H	YS 657607	11	Found a cache containing 50 lbs rice, 30 lbs barley
22	<del>241523H</del>	YS 661608	13	Loc small bunker system, food and ammo cache
23	242130H	YS 693603	32	Heard a motor running in direction of river, suspect motor boat
24	250955H	YS 658611	13	Loc 10 bunkers fishing gear, ammo(7.62)
25	251005H	YS 665633	41	Loc bunker system
26	251030H	YS 659611	13	Found a cache containing ammo and fishing gear
27	251125H	YS 663612	11	Detonated a mine on a track - one AUST WIA
28	251200H	YS 657610	13	Loc bunker system 6 months old
29	251237H	YS 644624	21	Loc 18 bunkers - 25 years old; (VIET MINH ERA)

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- 2 -

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
	APRIL			
30	251237H	YS 644624	21	Loc rock and tin hut - very old
31	251231H	YS 668639	43	Loc large bunker system - very new
32	251505H	YS 663611	11	Loc 3 X M16 mines
33	251605H	YS 647624	9	Fired on hut from possum - unknown results
34	251633H	YS 705614	31A	Found 1 bunker no recent use
35	251812H	YS 678579	12	Loc sanpan docking area, US and British maps
36	260110H	YS 678579	12	Reported vessel dropped suspected 20 en
37	261103H	YS 647693	62	Found 2 tin huts and 1 bush hut used 6 months ago
38	261523H	YS 642613	62	Loc a cache containing 220 lbs rice - loc footprints of one man and a dog
39	261811H	YS 685643	4	Contacted 5 en who fired RPG's and withdrew - unknown results
40	261812H	YS 650635	49	Heard voices and mov 15-20 on, en withdrew when they heard 49 approaching
41	261820H	YS 683637	4	Heard 3-5 en heading SOUTH
42	270815H	YS 685643	4	Received 1 RPG round - nil cas
43	271040H	YS 643603	23	Found large fish farm
44	271051H	YS 690593	12	Found containers for RPG 7 rounds
45	271110H	YS 689641	42	Loc en camp - not used for some time
46	271255H	YS 643603	23	Loc 1 hut - not recently used
47	271358H	YS 686633	42	Loc bunker system had fresh cam
48	271515H	YS 687630	42	Contacted 3 en moving along a track they were carrying MG - results unknown
49	281014H	YS 679635	43	Found fresh tracks heading NORTH to YS 679635 to YS 680638 and back again
50	281117H	YS 682634	43	Loc bunker systems docus and 44 gal drum $\frac{3}{4}$ full of rice
51	281340H	YS 685645	4	Contacted 1 en, en fired back and withdrew - unknown results
52	281400H	YS 699650	3	Loc 6 bunkers, 6 months old
53	281755	YS 715646	3	Found tracks leading SE - 13 people used in last 24 hrs
54	281921	YS 686646	4	Contacted 2 en carrying AK 47's - results 1 en WIA possible
55	282100H	YS 688644	41	Contacted 2 en results unknown
56	291035H	YS 686646	41	Loc 1 atk grenade
57	291131H	YS 699655	23	Loc 5 bunkers 6 months old
58	291432H	YS 679635	43	Found a small food cache

/59

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- 3 -

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
59	291530H	YS 699650	22	Loc small bunker system 3 months old
60	291655H	YS 655640	21	Loc 10 bunkers not recently used
61	291700H	YS 648610	9	Loc several spider holes during recce
62	291827H	YS 623604	31	Loc 2 graves 3 weeks old
63	301135H	YS 555591	1	Found a wdg sign
64	301147H	YS 619603	3	Found signs on trees 2 days old and some docus
65	301147H	YS 618610	3	Found a prepared ambush posn consisting of 20 bunkers - several weeks old
66	301215H	YS 619602	3	Found blood and bandages 2 days old in an old camp, also loc mine marker and docus
67	301436H	YS 698656	61	Loc 12 bunkers in good condition
68	301550H	YS 556589	11	Contacted 3 en - results 3 en KIA (BC)
69	301638H	YS 686632	41	Loc 20 bunkers used 5 days prior by one person
70	301812H	YS 697666	2	Found 5 fish ponds, the fish were not big enough to eat
71	301905H	YS 612610	3	Loc a wpn and ammo cache
	<u>MAY</u>			
72	010720H	YS 554587	11	Contacted 2 en - results en cas unknown, captured quant of eqpt
73	010735H	YS 6257	3	Found a cache
74	010930H	YS 681667	2	Detained 3 old women
75	011011H	YS 697651	43	Found 6 old graves
76	011155H	YS 554586	12	Loc cache containing 500 lbs rice
77	011457H	YS 655646	62B	Contacted 1 en in bunker system - results unknown
78	011540H	YS 555581	13	Contacted 4 en with RPG's and auto wpns
79	020710H	YS 708652	43	Contacted 2 en with RPG - unknown results

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APPENDIX 2 TO  
ANNEX A TO  
5 YEAR COMBAT AFTER  
ACTION REPORT 3/69  
DATED MAY 69

SUMMARY OF ENEMY CASUALTIES, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT CAPTURED  
OP SURFSIDE

1. Enemy Casualties
  - 4 KIA (BC)
  - 3 WIA (Possible)
2. Captured Weapons
  - 1 AK47
  - 1 MAT 49
  - 1 Chicom pistol
  - 1 SKS
  - 1 Springfield
  - 1 Enfield
  - 2 Mauser 95K
3. Captured Ammunition
  - 300 x 7.62 mm (short) rounds
  - 75 x 9 mm rounds
  - 20 x .45 pistol rounds
  - 31 lbs Chicom explosives
  - 4 x Chicom grenades
  - 1 x Green a tk grenade
  - 1 x Anti pers mine
  - 3 x M16 mine
  - 6 x Mk II US Hand grenade
  - 8 x M26 US Hand grenade
  - 12 x Partly const Chicom claymores
  - 6 x CBU's
  - 1 x 175 mm UXB
  - 1 x 500 lb UXB
  - 2 x Mor bombs (approx 40 mm)
  - 2 x 105 mm priming devices
  - Qty mor and arty charges

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4. Equipment

1 x Bicycle

1 x SONY Transistor Radio Case

1 x Loud hailer

1 x 3.5 Practise Rkt

34 x British and USA Nautical maps of South East and South East Coast of China and South China Sea

2 x Torches

1 x Tin carpenter tools

2 x 7.62 mm Pistol Mags

2 x SMG mags

1 x AK 47 mag

5. Miscellaneous Equipment

1 x wallet

1 x photo frame

Qty docus and papers

1 x fishing net & qty fishing eqpt

15 x fishing lines

24 x sinkers

Qty personal clothing

1 x US hat

1 x US water bottle

1 x flag

1 x helmet

2 x 44 gal drums

1 x web belt with holster and ammo pouches for pistol

1 x pack

1 x set webbing

1 x plastic bag

1 x china bowl

1 x animal trap

1 x cigarette lighter

1 lb tobacco

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-- 3 --

6 x Large tin leaves with switches for booby traps

Qty Detonators and fuzes

1 x pair spectacles

Qty sand paper

1 x power drill

1 x mechanical drill

1 x metal press

1 x bench vice

1 x 6 ft length of plastic

6. Medical Equipment and Supplies

18 x Capsules glucose

1 x Syringe

Small qty med sups

7. Food Stuffs

Qty salt water eels

100 lbs live fish

4300 lbs rice

20 lbs cooked rice

30 lbs barley

20 lbs plus one bag salt.

3 lbs plus one tin sugar

8. Bunkers

a. Loc 331 approx

b. Seeded or destroyed 267 approx

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ANNEX B TO 5 RAR  
COMBAT AFTER ACTION  
REPORT 3/69 DATED  
MAY 69

OPERATION SURFSIDE  
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Day 1

22 Apr 69

0730 hrs D Coy moved by TCV to AO COOGEE with Bn HQ recce party. FSPB secured by B Coy.  
1150 hrs 12 pl loc bunkers in area YS 642650.  
1605 hrs C Coy departed NUI DAT by TCV for 9 RAR FSPB MARDI. A Coy remained in NUI DAT.

Ni Locs

A Coy NUI DAT  
B Coy YS 656645  
C Coy YS 615619  
D Coy YS 644637  
Bn HQ, Mor pl(-), Tp B Sqn, Tp A Sqn, 105 Fd Bty, sect B/2/35 Arty (US), Aslt pnr pl, 4 pl - FSPB BRUISER

Day 2

23 Apr 69

AM

Coys moved from ni ambush locs to insert blocking posns. A Coy moved by air from NUI DAT (KANGA PL) to FSPB BRUISER. Move completed at 0805 hrs. Coy then moved to, aslt posn in sq 6662 to commence search to SOUTH WEST. B Coy moved from ambush posn to block posn from YS 673608 to YS 674619. C Coy moved by APC's (3 Tp) from ni ambush posns to insert block from YS 644630 to YS 655630 3 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and 1 Tp B Sqn 1 Armd Regt inserted block from YS 637626 to YS 643608.

0714 hrs 5 pl loc en camp at YS 656646 7 bunkers with OHC 1 ft depth in sandy area, not heavily timbered  
0845 hrs C Coy low bunker system at YS 639613 not used for long period. Track leading SE had been used recently.  
1040 hrs 11 pl loc very old bunker system with ammo box and docus at YS 644633. Docus not current  
1231 hrs 3 Tp loc 500 lbs rice, 1 bicycle, 4 gals kero and med sups on OP at YS 642618  
1244 hrs 8 pl contacted 2 - 5 en at YS 667604. En were dressed in black with black sandals and US type hat. 1 en KIA (BC), 1 SKS, 30 rounds and tobacco captured. En moved from SOUTH to NORTH.  
1315 hrs 8 pl contacted 2 en, one without shirt and black trousers and one in greens at YS 667604, en withdrew NORTH  
1345 hrs 8 pl contacted 6 en local force at YS 667604 2 en WIA (possible) En withdrew NORTH  
1557 hrs B Coy loc 2 huts and tunnel, front part of crashed F100 ac at YS 673622. One hut had parts of CBU inside. Huts and CBU dml.  
2000 hrs D Coy reported finding 25 - 30 bunkers covering 1875 sq yds at YS 647631 2 - 3 years old 50% destroyed. 16 bunkers at YS 646633 in poor state 50% destroyed. 3 wpns pits in poor state at YS 654633.

Ni locs

A Coy HQ & 1 pl YS 659616, 2 pl YS 657621, 3 pl YS 675612  
B Coy HQ & 6 pl YS 679614, Tracker pl YS 675612, 5 pl YS 677619  
C Coy HQ & 7 pl YS 657603, 8 pl YS 667606, 9 pl YS 649601  
D Coy HQ YS 650631, 10 pl YS 654630, 11 pl YS 644629, 12 pl YS 648630 - Bn HQ, Aslt Aslt pnr pl, 4 pl, 4 Tp B Sqn, 105 Fd Bty, sect B/2/35 Arty (US), Mor PL (-) FSPB BRUISER GRID SQ YS 6464  
3 Tp A Sqn, 1 Tp B Sqn YS 638615 and YS 642610

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- 2 -

Day 3

24 Apr 69

0125 hrs 11 pl contacted an en force of up to 25 pers at YS 646630  
En approached from NORTH and stopped 20 yds from ambush for  
20 - 30 mins. En withdrew NORTH to NORTH WEST. Search next  
morning revealed nothing

0907 hrs B Coy reported one set of footprints found 1 - 3 hrs old  
heading EAST

0920 hrs 5 pl found suspect camp at YS 677622. Voices heard well to  
NORTH. Noises also heard to NORTH some WEST. . . No results  
on check out

1000 hrs Large heaps of timber loc by VR at YS 646618. A pile of wire  
coils 4 ft high and some chains loc at YS 643615

1332 hrs 5 pl loc one small hut with galvanised iron roof and 5 CBU's  
Smell of cooking at YS 677622 NTR

1500 hrs D Coy loc fresh tracks running NORTH to SOUTH at YS 650637

1521 hrs 4 pl loc very old bunkers at YS 660650 NTR

1523 hrs 1 pl loc 50 lbs rice; 30 lbs barley on EAST-WEST track at  
YS 655608. 3 pl found 300 lbs rice and 25 lbs CHICHOM  
explosives

1543 hrs C Coy loc 4 old bunkers at YS 661601. The area was  
1 - 2 days old

1410 hrs D Coy sighted one en dressed in greens at YS 648636. En was  
moving NE. D Coy fol up and came across trails of 4 - 5  
en who had moved in the area up to 1 hr ago. D Coy HQ and  
11 pl stopped SOUTH of the creek at YS 654638 and 10 pl swept  
NORTH of creek about 30 metres from creek. Engrs att to D Coy  
were sitting on creek bank, 11 pl sighted movon creek and fired  
1 engr was wounded under LEFT arm with one round. Dustoff  
completed 1620 hrs

2123 hrs At YS 668599. C Coy saw signs of mov on track system mainly  
NORTH to SOUTH. Loc bamboo carrying pole and fishtraps

2130 hrs 8 pl reported sounds of a vessel with motor running 1500 metre s  
away

Ni Locs A Coy HQ, 1 pl YS 659605, 2 pl YS 656607, 3 pl YS 661608  
B Coy HQ & Tracker pl YS 678616, 5 pl YS 677621, 6 pl YS 677608  
C Coy HQ & 7 pl & 9 pl YS 674599, 8 pl YS 693603  
D Coy HQ & 11 pl YS 658637, 10 pl YS 659635, 12 pl YS 663640  
Bn HQ, Aslt Pnr pl, Mcr pl (-), 4 pl, 4 Tp B Sqn, Sect A Sqn,  
105 Fd Bty, Sect B/2/35 Arty (US) FSPB BRUISER

Day 4

25 Apr 69

0415 hrs 8 pl heard motor boat 4000 metres out to sea.

0955 hrs 3 pl loc large bunker system at YS 658611 recently used.  
10 bunkers, fishing gear letters and small qty 7.62 rounds.  
20 X .45 mm ROUNDS, 40 X 9mm rounds, 1 flag, docus, 1 helmet,

1005 hrs D Coy loc tracks running from NORTH to SOUTH EAST in area of  
YS 661638. 12 pl found signs of fresh chopping and tables at  
area of YS 667640. 10 pl loc bunkers at YS 662633

1020 hrs Boomerang type object found on track by D Coy

0955 hrs REF ABOVE: C/S 13 also loc, fishing net, 6 salt water eels,  
30 X AK47 rounds and cover for SONY radio

1045 hrs C Coy reported sounds of MG fire 300 metres from his loc.  
Investigating revealed that US gun-ship was testing his guns  
on coastline

1125 hrs 1 pl reported mine incident at YS 660612. Pressure mine.  
3 WIA. 1 dustoff. 2 remained on duty

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- 3 -

1237 hrs 4 pl loc 18 very old bunkers at YS 644624  
1246 hrs D Coy loc 8 bunkers at YS 668639  
1435 hrs 10 pl loc & reported mine incident at YS 675634, fwd elms tripped wire detonating mine. 2 WIA DUSTOFF 2 WIA remained on duty  
1505 hrs 1 pl loc 1 X M16 mine at YS 663611  
1559 hrs 1 pl loc further M16 mine at YS 663611  
1611 hrs Another M16 mine loc by 1 pl  
1812 hrs 2 pl came across drag marks on beach. Fol up and saw more drags on shore in area of YS 678577 4 sanpans sighted 1000 metres to SOUTH  
1853 hrs 30 sanpans now 50 metres off shore of 2 pl. Large junk observed out to sea signalling to sanpans  
1930 hrs 2 pl reported only 2 sanpans remained. Others moved EAST  
2015 hrs 1 pl spotted 3 craft showing lts to SW of this loc  
2115 hrs C Coy sighted 1 vessel 300 metres out to sea. Vessel moved parallel to shore then sailed out to sea  
2145 hrs 2 pl reported boat drifting in front of their loc  
Ni locs A Coy HQ, 3 pl YS 660609, 1 pl YS 660612, 2 pl YS 678579  
B Coy HQ, 6 pl YS 654583, 5 pl YS 642582 Tracker Pl YS 654581  
C Coy HQ, 8 pl YS 699608, 7 pl YS 710613, 9 pl YS 697606  
D Coy HQ, 12 pl YS 671647, 10 pl YS 660643, 11 pl YS 661647  
Bn HQ, Mor Pl (-), Aslt Pnr Pl, 4 Pl, sect A Sqn 3 Cav Regt  
4 Tp B Sqn 1 Armd Regt, 105 Fd Bty, sect B/2/35 Arty (US)  
FSPB BRUISER.

Day 5

26 Apr 69

0110 hrs Illumination fired by arty in area of beaches. All sanpans turned and moved out to sea 15 mins after first round fired.  
0748 hrs 2 pl reported that craft had beached during ni and dropped off pers 200 metres from their loc  
1103 hrs Aslt pnr pl loc 2 galvanised huts and 1 bush hat which appeared to have been occupied within last 4 days  
1106 hrs A Coy loc 1 bunker, fishing gear and 100 lb live fish at YS 668594. Appears used in last 4 days.  
1115 hrs 2 pl loc qty British and US nautical maps of SOUTH CHINA SEA at YS 678579  
1501 hrs Gunships reported firing in SW corner of AO without clearance  
1523 hrs Aslt pnr pl loc 30 gal tin of rice at YS 646613  
1810 hrs D Coy reported contact with est en party of 5 at YS 685643, En appeared to be early warning gp who lay in hiding when coy moved into ni locs and evaded clearing ptls. En fired 3 RPG'S at individuals when discovered and withdrew SOUTH. RPG'S penetrated 25 metres thick scrub. 1 Aust WIA.  
1745 hrs HQ D Coy heard voices of en party of 15 - 20 en at YS 680635. Voices and noise stopped when D Coy mov detected.  
1820 hrs D Coy HQ loc 3 - 5 en who were believed to have been involved in earlier contact at YS 682637. En withdrew SOUTH.  
Ni Locs A Coy HQ, 3 pl YS 680580, 1 pl YS 678579, 2 pl YS 681581  
B Coy HQ, 5 pl, 6 pl YS 644590, Tracker pl YS 625593  
C Coy HQ, 8 pl, 9 pl YS 696618, 7 pl YS 698629  
D Coy HQ, YS 684646, 10 pl YS 685643, 11 pl YS 682642, 12 pl YS 686644.  
Bn HQ, Mor Pl (-), Aslt pnr pl, 4 pl, sect A Sqn 3 Cav Regt,  
tp B Sqn 1 Armd Regt, 105 Fd bty, sect B/2/35 Arty (US) FSPB.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

27 Apr 69

Day 6

- 0815 hrs 1 RPG round was fired at 10 pl as they prepared to depart from ni loc at YS 685643 . Nil cas
- 0929 hrs Airstrike delivered in area of creek junc 681635 on suspected en camp
- 1040 hrs 6 pl loc extensive fish farm at YS 643603
- 1057 hrs 2 pl loc RPG 7 containers and CHICOM grenade containers at YS 690593
- 1110 hrs 11 pl loc camp at YS 689641 contained logs, tin and shelter with baskets inside, not used for some time. Bunkers loc with fresh cam
- 1255 hrs Tracker pl loc thatched hut at YS 660652
- 1300 hrs C coy loc a track for 5 VC at YS 701637
- 1515 hrs 11 pl contacted 3 en dressed in black at YS 687630. En ran WEST into scrub when fired at by MG
- 2037 hrs C coy reported fol finds: (1) Old ox cart truck with tracks for 10 men heading NE at YS 701635. (2) At YS 702640 loc tracks for 4 heading SOUTH within past 12 hrs. (3) At YS 713638 loc 2 yr old VC camp with 6 huts.

Ni locs

A Coy HQ & 3 pl YS 643612, 1 pl YS 651608, 2 pl YS 677612  
B Coy HQ & Tracker pl YS 670667, 5pl YS 668668, 6 pl YS 672666  
C Coy HQ & 7 pl YS 701638, 8 pl YS 701635, 9 pl YS 702640  
D Coy HQ & 11 pl YS 686646, 10 pl YS 688642, 12 pl YS 683641  
Bn HQ Mor pl (-), Aslt pnr pl, 4 pl, sect A Sqn 3 Cav Regt, Tp B Sqn 1 Armd Regt, 105 Fd Bty, sect B/2/35 Arty (US) FSPB BRUISER.

Day 7

28 Apr 69

- 0210 hrs LO XUYEN MOC reported receiving 2 incoming rounds into his gen area . no results
- 1014 hrs 12 pl loc fresh tracks of one man leading from his loc to D Coy HQ and back.
- 1117 hrs 12 pl found docus in bunker at YS 679635 . 11 pl loc at YS 682634 2 X 44 gal drums for storing rice. One drum was  $\frac{3}{4}$  full.
- 1335 hrs D Coy HQ contacted 1 en dressed in black carrying AK at YS 685645 En came from SW through scrub and approached sentry who engaged with unknown results
- 1400 hrs C Coy found 6 bunkers, 6 months old at YS 669650
- 1755 hrs C Coy loc track made by 13 pers heading NW & SE made in last 24 hrs
- 1920 hrs D Coy HQ contacted 2 en at YS 686646 . En dressed in black carrying AK 47 and appeared to come from SE . They were moving 100 yds apart apparently trying to move around posn . 1 en WIA (possible)
- 2100 hrs 10 pl contacted 2 en at YS 683644 . En appeared through thick scrub No results

Ni locs

A Coy HQ & 3 pl YS 642619, 1 pl YS 641611, 2 pl YS 678579  
B Coy HQ & Tracker pl, 5 pl YS 694657, 3 pl YS 694655  
C Coy HQ, 8pl YS 712643, 7 pl YS 715646, 9 pl YS 711640  
D Coy HQ YS 686646, 10 pl YS 688644, 11 pl YS 683630, 12 pl YS 679635  
Bn HQ , Mor pl (-), Aslt pnr pl, sect A Sqn 3 Cav Regt, 4 Tp B Sqn 1 Armd Regt, 105 Fd Bty, Sect B/2/35 Arty (US) FSPB BRUISER  
4 Pl YS 655641

Day 8

29 Apr 69

- 1507 hrs 6 pl loc what appears to be a main exit route at YS 707652
- PM A & C coys redeployed into ambushes to WEST of AO into area of AO GLENELG
- 1520 hrs 5 pl loc small bunker system at YS 699650 2 - 3 months old extending to SE
- 1655 hrs 4 pl loc 10 bunkers at YS 652656 . Bunkers not used often and appeared to be a stop over pt and water resupply area.



CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

2228 hrs B Coy in ni loc heard chapping 700 metres to NE and engaged with Arty.

Ni locs  
A Coy HQ & 3 pl YS 554604, 1 pl YS 560603, 2 pl YS 558599  
B Coy HQ & Tracker pl YS 696656, 5 pl YS 694659, 6 pl YS 706649  
C Coy HQ & 8 pl YS 616599, 7 pl YS 621605, 9 pl YS 614594  
D Coy HQ YS 686644, 10 pl 685636, 11 pl YS 685645, 12 pl YS 679635  
Bn HQ, Mor pl (-), aslt pnr pl, sect A Sqn, 105 Fd Bty, sect of B/2/35 Arty (US), tp B Sqn FSPB BRUISER. 4 pl YS 658642

Day 9

30 Apr 69

1135 hrs At YS 555591 A coy loc a tree sign with marking KHU TU DIA below a skull and cross-bones and grenade shape below that

1147 hrs C coy found a prep ambush posn at YS 618610 - 20 pits on high ground several weeks old. Also loc signs on trees and some docus of no immediate value

1158 hrs Several markings of trees and what appears to be mine field marker found by C Coy at YS 619602

1215 hrs At YS 619602 C Coy loc bandages and blood about 2 days old and med sups old en instl used in past 2 - 3 days by small gp of en Also loc 1 docu written by a female nurse.

1436 hrs Tracker pl loc 12 bunkers at YS 698656 in good condition

1540 hrs 5 pl loc bunker system at YS 696652

1550 hrs 1 pl contacted 3 en Regional Force at YS 556589. Front man was carrying a pistol 15 - 20 metres in front of next man who was carrying AK47. When fired on the second man returned fire and ran back to the SOUTH. 3 en KIA (BC) one AK47, one 7.62 mm pistol and 2 chicom grenades recovered.

1638 hrs 10 pl found 20 bunkers at YS 686632 used within 5 days by 1 person

1807 hrs 6 pl, loc 3 fish ponds each 8'x8'x1' full of small fish at YS697666

1905 hrs C Coy at YS 612610 loc cache containing 3 greased rifles, 1 SMG, 1 doz partly completed claymores, 1 mor bomb, 1 electric drill, 1 press & bench vice, qty of SA ammo C coy have not yet had time to look thoroughly or check for booby traps.

Ni locs

A Coy HQ & 1 pl, 3 pl YS 556589, 2 pl YS 545584  
B Coy HQ, 5 pl, Tracker pl YS 696656, 6 pl 693665  
C Coy HQ, 7 pl YS 612610, 8 pl YS 610610, 9 pl YS 614611  
D Coy HQ, YS 686644, 10 pl YS 685636, 11 pl YS 679635, 12 pl YS 685645.  
Bn HQ, Mor pl, (-), sect A Sqn, 105 Fd Bty FSPB BRUISER  
Aslt pnr pl YS 658642 4 pl YS 681582

Day 30

0715 hrs 1 Pl A Coy made lt contact with 2 en at YS 554587. En appeared to be Regional force dressed in black shirt. En approached from West and when fired upon withdrew South dropping 40 lbs of rice, 1lb Tabasco, 1 shirt, 1 pair shorts, 1 pair green mil trousers, 20 lbs sugar, Qty of food, 2 SMG mags full, 7.62 short, 1 set of webbing, 6 ft plastic sheeting, 1 pair thongs.

1011 hrs 12 pl D coy loc 6 old graves at YS 697651.

1145 hrs Elm of aslt Pnr pl made contact with 1 en at YS 654640. En appeared to be local force and when fired upon withdrew to the South-East. Nil results. Area of contact was a bunker system in which some clothing was found, also it appeared the area has been occupied by Aust troops approx 2 days before.

1152 hrs 3 pl A coy was fired upon from its flank initiating a contact at YS 555581, with approx 3 to 4 en. The pl returned fire with all wps at a distance of approx 150 metres. The en replied with automatic wps and RPG's which started a bushfire causing the pl to retire. The pl used LPT in sn. then searched area resulting in wps

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

1603 hrs B coy complete move back to NUI DAT in readiness for move out as securing party for FSPB SUSAN on 2 May 69

Ni locs A Coy HQ, 1 pl YS 556589, 2 pl YS 544585, 3 pl YS 551579, B Coy complete, NUI DAT, C Coy HQ, 9 pl YS 604614, 7 pl YS 604613, 8 pl YS 599614, D Coy HQ, YS 686644, 10 pl YS 681635, 11 pl YS 675630, 12 pl YS 708652. Bn HQ, Mor pl YS 643648, Aslt Pnr pl (-) YS 642648. Elm of Aslt Pnr pl YS 658642, Tracker pl YS 678579, 105 Fd Bty YS 643647, Elm B Sqn 3 Cav Regt YS 642647.

Day 11

2 May 69

0710 hrs 12 pl D Coy made contact with an est 2 en at YS 708652. En dressed in black, returned fire with one RPG and SA fire. Appears 1 Russian SKS used. En withdrew to North East along track on which they had approached. Nil results.

0950 hrs B Coy complete plus Recce Party secured FSPB SUSAN. YS 280651.

1530 hrs Bn (-) B Coy and recce party at NUI DAT.

CONFIDENTIAL

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 1733741 2Lt R.A. Hutchison.
2. Report on bunker system at GR 655646 at 1800 hrs on 22 Apr 60.
3. Area covered by instl: 3500 square metres.
4. Def Layout
  - a. Wpn pits and tunnels
    - (1) 7 wpn pits with overhead protection, 4 wpn pits .
    - (2) Not applicable.
    - (3) Not applicable.
  - b. Not applicable.
  - c. Not applicable.
  - d. Const
    - (1) Not applicable.
    - (2) Wpn pits were covered with logs and 1 foot of earth.
  - e. There was a total of 11 pits.
  - f. Instl was for approx Pl str.
  - g. Pits were facing in all round def.
  - h. All pits were two man. There were no crew served pits.
  - i. Pits were 6 - 12 months old.
  - j. The def layout was 75 metres from a dry creek bed.
  - k. There were no booby traps in the area.
  - l. Not applicable.
  - m. No destruction action was taken.

(R.A. Hutchison)  
2Lt  
Pl Comd


CONFIDENTIAL

D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM

May 69

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by. 235268 Capt TJ Britten.
2. Report on. Camp at YS 645639 found at 1700 hrs 22 Apr 69.
3. Area covered by installation. 250 sq yds.
4. Defensive layout. See sketch
  - a. Installation contained wpn pits and bunkers.
  - b. Not applicable.
  - c. Bunkers and pits were not interconnecting.
  - d. Construction of timber frame, earth filled.
  - e. Number of bunkers: 19. Number of wpn pits: 3.
  - f. Estimate a pl str to occupy posn.
  - g. Pits and bunkers were in all round def.
  - h. Bunkers and pits were individual.
  - i. Installation was 24 months plus old.
  - j. Located near a creek.
  - k. Early warning posts were used, see sketch. Only on immediate approach to posn. No other early warning devices.
  - l. There were no booby traps in the area.
  - m. No destructive action was taken as bunkers had crumbled and fallen in.

  
(T. J. Britten)  
Capt  
2IC D Coy 5 RAR

VC INSTALLATION REPORT  
(C/S 43)


1. Report by 4719038 2Lt R.A. FENWICK.
2. Report on bunker system at Grid 647631 at 230915H Apr 69.
3. Area covered by instl was 1875 sq yds.
4. Defensive layout:
  - a. (1) Wpn pits.
  - b. Not applicable.
  - c. Not applicable.
  - d. 5 ft long, 3 in wide - 3 ft to 4 ft deep with 6 in to 12 in OHP.
  - e. There were 25 to 30 pits in this area.
  - f. Approx pl plus size.
  - g. All round def.
  - h. (1) Some individual.  
(2) A few 2-3 man pits.
  - i. The system was 3 to 4 yrs old.
  - j. Near a dried out creek bed. 350 metres from perenial stream.  
There was also a footpad through the system.
  - k. Not applicable.
  - l. Not applicable.
  - m. Nil.

D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM

12 May 69

INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by. 38811 2Lt TE Stannus.
2. Report on. 3 wpn pits at 654633 at 231000 Apr 69.
3. Area covered by instl was 3600 sq yds
4. Defensive layout.
  - a.
    - (1) Wpn pits.
  - b. Not applicable.
  - c. Not applicable.
  - d. (1) Not applicable  
(2) The pits were interconnecting.
  - e. Instl contained 3 wpn pits.
  - f. Not applicable
  - g. Not applicable
  - h. Individual wpn pits.
  - i. Approx 12 months old
  - j. Instl loc 400 metres from a creek.
  - k. There were no early warning devices.
  - l. There were no booby traps.
  - m. No destructive action was taken.

  
(T. E. Stannus)  
2Lt  
Pl Comd 10 Pl

Jun 69

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. SURFSIDE.
2. 215832 Lt B. THRIPP.
3. 8 Pl, C Coy, 5 RAR.
4. 25.
5. 23 Apr, 1 hour.
6. 667604.
7. Ambush.
8. Ambush was laid between clearing and track. Rear protection covering track. 1 enemy approached from SOUTH to NORTH, wpn over shoulder along track. Rear protection fired, recovered body and wpn. Def was regrouped and moved in closer. Then posn was hit from a flank by 2 men. They withdrew without loss. Posn was then hit from flank by 4-6 men who withdrew when claymores were fired.
9. Primary jungle, well-worn pad.
10. 6 feet.
11. Sect Comd.
12. Rear protection of ambush.
13. Mov.
14. 1-2 initially then up to 8.
15. Friendlies.
16. Armalite.
17. Dropped dead.
18. Remained in posn.
19. 1 KIA.
20. Armalite.
21. Nil.
22. N/A.
23. 20 rounds.
24. 1 SKS.
25. VC travel on tracks.
26. Nil.
27. N/A.
28. Moved to new posn soon after.
29. 20 rounds Armalite, 5 rounds SLR, 1 Claymore.
30. Confirms the need for all round protection of ambush party.

(B. THRIPP)  
Lt  
OC 8 Pl C Coy

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 54761 2Lt B.J. Ryan.
2. Report on fortified camp at GR YS672619 at 1430 hrs on 23 Apr 69.
3. Area covered by instl: 1600 square metres.
4. Defensive Layout
  - a. There were wpn pits only.
  - b. Not applicable.
  - c. Not applicable.
  - d. Const
    - (1) Not applicable.
    - (2) Timber of approx 4 in diameter.
  - e. There was a total of 30 wpn pits.
  - f. The instl was for a force of approx Coy size.
  - g. Pits were facing in all round def.
  - h. All pits were two man or three man.
  - i. Pits were between one and two years old, and were in poor condition.
  - j. The def layout was near tracks.
  - k. There were no booby traps or early wng devices in the area.
  - l. Nil.
  - m. Condition of pits did not warrant destructive action being taken.

Signed

.....2Lt  
Pl Comd



VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 54761 2Lt B.J. Ryan.
2. Report on dug-in camp/bunker system at GR 672620 at 1430 hrs on 23 Apr 69.
3. Area of instl was 80 metres x 80 metres.
4. Def Layout
  - a. There were 2 wpn pits and an open trench.
  - b. Depth: 1-2 feet.
  - c. Trench and wpn pits were interconnecting, about 80%.
  - d. Const
    - (1) Wood and earth walls.
    - (2) Earth walls.
    - (3) Bunkers - wood and earth.
    - (4) Comm trench - earth.
  - e. 30 pits and bunkers; 150 metre open trench.
  - f. Str required to occupy instl: Company.
  - g. Pits were facing north, south and east.
  - h. Pits were 2 and 3 man, some possibly more. There was no indication of crew served pits.
  - i. All pits were very old. There was two old thatched huts still standing.
  - j. Def layout was near a track.
  - k. No booby traps were in the area.
  - l. Nil.
  - m. Destruction action taken

One bunker which contained a number of unexploded cluster bombs was blown and the 2 huts were burned down.
  - n. There was also an old, dry well in the area, about 25 feet deep.

(B.J. Ryan)  
2Lt  
Pl Comd

D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM

17 May 69

INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by. 5715939 2Lt J Russell.
2. Report on a bunker system at YS 646633 at 231745H Apr 69.
3. Area covered by instl 2500 sq yds.
4. Defensive layout.
  - a. Wpn pits
  - b. Not applicable.
  - c. Not applicable.
  - d. Dugouts.
  - e. No of wpn pits was 16.
  - f. Est pl str to occupy posn.
  - g. Pits were facing north and south.
  - h. (1) Pits were individual and two man.
  - i. Instl approx 2 yrs old.
  - h. Situated near a small creek.
  - k. Early wng device in 4th pit.
  - l. There were no booby traps.
  - m. No destructive action was taken.

*J. Russell*  
(J. Russell)  
2Lt  
Pl Comd 11 Pl

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 1733741 2Lt R.A. Hutchison.
2. Report on rice storage bin at GR 681617 at 1145 hrs on 24 Apr 69.
3. Area of instl: 50 square metres.
4. a-c Not applicable.  
d. Const
  - (1) Not applicable.
  - (2) Not applicable.
  - (3) Bin was 8' x 5' x 4' deep and was built 1' off the ground. Sides were const of 1" x 8" sawn planks. Probably a tent half-shelter or something similar was used for a roof.

e-h Not applicable.

  - i. The bin was 6-12 months old.
  - j-l Not applicable.
  - m. No destruction action was taken.

(R.A. Hutchison)  
2Lt  
Pl Comd

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 1733741 2Lt R.A. Hutchison.
2. Report on bunker system and water point at GR 682618 at 1200 hrs on 24 Apr 69.
3. Area of instl: 900 square metres.
4. Def Layout
  - a. There were wpn pits only.
  - b. Not applicable.
  - c. Not applicable.
  - d. Const
    - (1) Not applicable.
    - (2) Wpn pits were const of logs, with 1 foot of overhead cover.
  - e. There were 3 wpn pits.
  - f. Instl was for 6-8 men.
  - g. Pits were facing east-west.
  - h. Pits were all two man.
  - i. (1) Pits were 12 - 18 months old.  
(2) Not applicable.  
(3) A const water point was in the area, approx same age as pits, but had been used 2 weeks previously.
  - j. Def layout was on high ground overlooking a const dam across a sharp reentrant.
  - k. There were no booby traps in the area.
  - l. Not applicable.
  - m. No destruction action was taken.

(R.A. Hutchison)  
2Lt  
Pl Comd

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 1733741 2Lt R.A. Hutchison.
2. Report on rice storage point at GR 682619 at 1230 hrs on 24 Apr 69.
3. Area covered by instl: 1000 square metres.
4. Def layout
  - a. (1) Not applicable.  
(2) Not applicable.  
(3) One tunnel, 4' deep x 8' long - probable cache hole.
  - b. 4'.
  - c. No.
  - d. Const
    - (1) One tunnel was dug at an angle under an ant hill.
    - (2) Not applicable.
  - e. There was 1 tunnel - no wpn pits.
  - f. Unknown.
  - g-h Not applicable.
  - i. (1) Not applicable.  
(2) Tunnel was 6-12 months old.  
(3) There was a collapsed shelter which had been used as a rice bin. Also in the immediate area were 2 ox carts, one in good condition and one with a wheel off, and 2 bicycles, both with perished tyres - one with a wheel missing.
  - j. A track ran north for 200 metres, where it joined a water point, 8' x 10' x 5' deep, with a natural spring which was dammed up by an earth wall.
  - k. No booby traps were found in the area.
  - l. Not applicable.
  - m. No destruction action was taken.

(R.A. Hutchison)  
2Lt  
Pl Comd

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 1733741 2Lt R.A. Hutchison.
2. Report on rice storage cache at GR 679622 at 1300 hrs on 24 Apr 69.
3. Area: 100 square metres.
4. Def layout
  - a-c Not applicable.
  - d. Const
    - (1) Not applicable.
    - (2) Not applicable.
    - (3) Hut was 10' x 15', log floor 2' off ground. The inside bin was 4' deep, const with beer can tin plate. The roof was thatched, but had collapsed.
  - e-h Not applicable.
  - i.
    - (1) Not applicable.
    - (2) Not applicable.
    - (3) The instl was 6 - 12 months old.
  - j. A track ran south for 100 metres to a well used ox cart track.
  - k-m Not applicable.

(R.A. Hutchison)  
2Lt  
Pl Comd

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 1200424 Lt G.J. Dunlop.
2. Report on bunkers at GR 660650 at 1521 hrs on 24  
Apr 69.
3. Area covered by instl: 750 square metres.
4. Defensive Layout
  - a. There were four bunkers only, two of which were under const.
  - b-c Not applicable.
  - d. Bunkers were const of bush materials.
  - e. Not applicable.
  - f. Instl was for occupation by approx squad size force.
  - g. Bunkers were facing in all round def.
  - h. Pits were three man.
  - i. Instl was approx 12 months old, and had not been used for over six months.
  - j. Def layout was 250 metres from a non-perennial stream.
  - k. There were no booby traps in the area.
  - l. Nil
  - m. No destructive action was taken - bunkers were in poor state of repair.

.....Lt  
Pl Comd


VC INSTALLATION REPORT  
..... (C/S 13)

1. Report by 55092 2Lt J.R. JAMES.
2. Report on Bunker System at Grid 661608 at 241530H Apr 69.
3. Area covered by instl was 625 sq yds.
4. Defensive layout:
  - a. (1) wpn pit & bunker.
  - b. Not applicable.
  - c. Not applicable.
  - d. Type of const used was local timber and dirt.
  - e. Four wpn pits and bunkers.
  - f. Sect str.
  - g. The system was used to cover tracks NW to SE.
  - h. 2 to 3 men pits.
  - i. The system was 9 to 12 mths old.
  - j. Sited on well used track.
  - k. Nil, however found the instl could be used for early wng for larger instl.
  - l. Nil.
  - m. No destructive action taken at this stage.



VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 1200424 Lt G.J. Dunlop.
2. Report on en camp at GR 656643 at 1231 hrs on 24 Apr 69.
3. Area covered by instl: 320 square metres.
4. Defensive Layout
  - a. There were 3 wpn pits only.
  - b-e Not applicable.
  - f. Instl was squad size.
  - g. Pits were facing in all round def, with sentry posts on the track.



- h. Not applicable.
- i. System was at least 12 months old, and had not been used recently.
- j. Def layout was near a non-perennial stream.
- k. There were two sentry posts. No booby traps in area.
- l. Not applicable.
- m. Instl had previously been seeded with CS crystals.

.....Lt  
Pl Comd

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. 55092 2Lt J.R. JAMES.
2. Enemy system at YS657610 at 251200H Apr 69.
3. Area covered by system was 2250 sq yds,
4. Defensive Layout.
  - a. There were 11 wpn pits.
  - b. Not applicable.
  - c. The pits were not interconnecting.
  - d. Wpn pits were const . . . from local timber and earth.
  - e. There were 11 wpn pits.
  - f. Pl strength.
  - g. All round def . . . no specific dir.
  - h. (1) 3 Man  
(2) CP type.
  - i. The system was 3 to 6 months old.
  - j. The def. layout was 200 metres north of a creek.
  - k. There was no booby traps.
  - m. No destruction carried out yet.

3 May 69

.....  
(J.R. JAMES)  
2Lt  
OC 3Pl A Coy

*R.F. Sutton*  
.....  
(R.F. SUTTON)  
Maj  
CO ACoy 5 RAR

CONFIDENTIAL

D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM


16 May 69

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by. 235268 Capt T. J. Britten.
2. Report on. Camp at YS 668639 found at 1200 hrs 25 Apr 69.
3. Area covered by installation. 250 sq yds.
4. Defensive layout. See sketch
  - a. Installation contained wpn pits and bunkers.
  - b. Not applicable.
  - c. Wpn pits and bunkers were not interconnecting.
  - d. Construction consisted of timber frame and earth filled pits.
  - e. Installation contained 8 bunkers, 2 not roofed.
  - f. Estimate platoon plus to occupy posn (30 - 40 pers).
  - g. Dir wpn pits were facing : E and W.
  - h. Bunkers could have been a combination of two and three man served.
  - i. Installation was 3 - 4 months old.
  - j. Defensive layout was near a river.
  - k. There were no early warning devices or posts in the area.
  - l. There were no booby traps in the area.
  - m. Destructive action taken included, bunkers pulled down, tables and huts burned.

*T. J. Britten*  
(T. J. Britten)  
Capt  
2IC D Coy 5 RAR

UL Installation 456639



VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 1200424 Lt G.J. Dunlop.
2. Report on bunker system at GR 644624 at 1237 hrs on 25 Apr 69.
3. Area covered by instl: 4000 square metres.
4. Def Layout
  - a. The instl consisted of 2 wpn pits, 18 bunkers and some comm trenches. There were no tunnels.
  - b. Not applicable.
  - c. Not applicable.
  - d. All instl were constructed of bush material.
  - e. Refer para 4a.
  - f. Est Coy required to occupy posn.
  - g. Pits were facing in all round def.
  - h. Pits were 2 and 3 man, with no crew served wpn pits.
  - i. System was 18 months old.
  - j. The instl was near a track and well.
  - k. There were no booby traps in the area.
  - l. Not applicable.
  - m. The system was very old and run down. No destruction action was taken.

(G.J. Dunlop)  
Lt  
Pl Comd

D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM

17 May 69

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by. 4719038 2Lt RA Fenwick.
2. Report on. Bunker system at YS 663643. at 261300H Apr 69.
3. Area covered by instl. 3000 sq yds.
4. Defensive layout.
  - a. (1) There were 12 wpn pits.
    - (2) Not applicable.
    - (3) Not applicable.
    - (4) Kitchen and comd type bunker.
    - (5) Qty of galvanized iron.
  - b. Not applicable.
  - c. The excavations were not connecting
  - d. (1) Not applicable  
(2) Wpn pits had diagonal entrances and 2 ft of overhead cover made up of logs and dirt.
  - e. There were 12 wpn pits, one comd bunker, one kitchen, 4 pits under construction.
  - f. Unit able to occupy them. Pl and/or rear services.
  - g. Wpn pits were facing in the dir of 6400 mils.
  - h. The pits were two man only.
  - i. The wpn pits were brand new.
  - j. Loc near a creek, on the bank with foot pads in 4 dirs.
  - k. There were no early wng posts or devices under const.
  - l. There were no booby traps.
  - m. Minor destruction to area but nil destruction to bunkers.

*R. A. Fenwick*  
(R. A. Fenwick)  
2Lt  
Pl Comd 12 Pl

D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM

12 May 69

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op. Op ~~SIDESIDE~~
2. Report by. 53652 WO2 GA SMITH MM
3. Unit in contact. CHQ, D Coy, 5 RAR.
4. Str of unit in contact. 14 men.
5. Date/time/duration of action. 261310H, 5 minutes duration.
6. Loc. 685643
7. Tasks. CHQ part of perimeter with 10 Pl to secure LZ.
8. Description of action. CHQ and 10 Pl had moved into an area bordering a clearing which was to be used for an LZ. Shell scrapes had been dug and the perimeter was quiet. The quietness was broken by what was first thought to be an RPG, but it was then decided that it was Garrand anti tank grenades. Approx three more were fired from a distance of 75 - 80 metres. Only retaliation was 20 rds 7.62mm ball, 50 rds 7.62 link belt and a sweep by 2 sects of 10 Pl.
9. Description of terrain. Clearing bordered by sparse timber and low scrub.
10. Distance to en when first sighted. Not seen.
11. Which soldier first saw en. Not applicable.
12. What was soldier doing. Not applicable.
13. What caused en to be noticed. The en fired.
14. VC str 3 - 4 men, dress not known, type of VC not known.
15. Who fired first. The enemy fired first from a range of 75 - 80 metres.
16. What sect wpns fired. 1x GPMG M60, 1 x SLR.
17. What was en's immediate reaction. To leave.
18. What was sect/ptl's immediate reaction. Take cover.
19. En cas. Unknown.
20. Caused by. Not applicable.
21. Friendly cas. 1 WIA.
22. Caused by. Garrand anti tank grenade.
23. Approx ammo expenditure. 50 rds 7.62 link, 20 rds 7.62mm ball.
24. Docus/wpns captured. Nil.
25. Lessons learnt. Sentries must be well out, even in previously cleared areas and an accurate report by member/s who clear the area as to what is in the area, ie tracks etc.
26. Other points. Retaliation not quick enough.  
Members not firing unless they sight a tgt.  
Initiative was lacking in that soldiers waited to be told to fire into the tgt area.

Part 2 - Pl Conds Comments

- 27 Related sect reports. Not applicable.
28. Describe pl actions. Not applicable.
29. Estimate of all ammo fired. See para 23.

Part 3 - Coy Comd's Comments

30. Comments. This contact occurred due to a map inaccuracy as the coy was deployed around a clearing which did not match the area shown on a map. The result was a gap in the perimeter which remained undetected due to the OC being absent on a recce ptl.

*G. A. Smith*  
(G. A. Smith MM)

WO2

CSM D Coy 5 RAR

*M. P. Blake*  
(M. P. Blake)

Maj

OC D Coy 5 RAR



VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. 235192 Maj R.F. SUTTON.
2. Old VC camp at YS651606 at 271430H Apr 69.
3. Area covered by Installation was, 5000 sq yds.
4. Defensive layout.
  - a. There were 18 wpn pits and 45 feet of comm tunnel.
  - b. Depth of tunnels underground was 18 ins.
  - c. Three pits facing the creek were connected.
  - d. Types of const used were, open tunnel pits 2'x2'x2' with 9" of flimsy overhead covering.
  - e. There were 18 wpn pits and tunnels.
  - f. Est str required to occupy them would be a Pl.
  - g. Wpn pits faced EW from creek
  - h. The pits were individual.
  - i. The pits and tunnels were approx 2 yrs of age or older.
  - j. The def layout was astride a creek.
  - k. There were no early wng posts or devices.
  - l. There were no booby traps.
  - m. Caches were burnt.
5. West of the creek there were 8 pits containing, 3x4 gallon drums of rice, two flare containers, one seringe, fifteen fishing lines, portable animal trap 25 feet long, 24 sinkers, one torch and bulbs, one tin of carpenters tools.

East of the creek there were eight to ten pits approx two years old, one m72 case, 2x.75 rocket heads, one VC hat, one well, one cooking hut with table also a comm trench.

30 Apr 69

*R.F. Sutton*  
.....  
(R.F. SUTTON)  
Maj  
CO A Coy 5 RAR

D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM

17 May 69

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op. Op COOGEE.
2. Report by. 5715939 2Lt J Russell.
3. Unit. 11 Pl D Coy, 5 RAR.
4. Str of Pl in contact. 20 men.
5. Date/Time/Duration of action. 271515H, 10 seconds duration.
6. Loc 685630.
7. Pl Task. Find a track to South of en camp to provide a blocking force.
8. Description of action. The platoon was harboured on a track running South East from en camp at 679635 when 3 en came towards us along the track. Pte Weber fired at them with the M60. The en withdrew to the East.
9. Description of terrain. Open, defoliated.
10. Distance to en when first sighted. 25 metres.
11. Which soldier first saw en. Pte Weber.
12. What was soldier doing. Picquet on M60.
13. What caused en to be noticed. Movement.
14. VC Str/Type and Dress. Three regional dressed in black pyjamas.
15. Who fired first. Pte Weber from a range of 25 metres.
16. What sect wps fired. M60 and M16.
17. What was en's immediate reaction. Ran
18. What was Pls immediate reaction. Swept the area.
19. En cas. Nil
20. Caused by. Not applicable.
21. Friendly cas. Nil
22. Caused by. Not applicable
23. Approx ammo expenditure. 20 x M60, 18 x M16.
24. Docus/wps captured. 1 AK 47 magazine.
25. Lessons learnt. Be more alert.
26. Other points. The gunner was a replacement for the usual gunner who was on R & R.

Part 2 Pl Comd's Comments

27. Related sect reports. Nil.

28. Describe Pl actions. We conducted a sweep from the right flank immediately.

29. Estimate ammo expenditure. See para 23.

Part 3 Coy Comd's Comments

30. Comments. Poor shooting.

*J. Russell*  
(J. Russell)  
2Lt  
Pl Comd 11 Pl

*M. P. Blake*  
(M. P. Blake)  
Maj  
OC D Coy 5 RAR

D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM

17 May 69

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op. Op SIDESIDE .
2. Report by. 217950 Pte KR Holden.
3. Unit. CHQ, D Coy, 5 RAR.
4. Str in contact. One man.
5. Date of action. 281335H. Duration of action. 5 minutes.
6. Loc. 685645.
7. Tasks. Sentry duty.
8. Description of action. While on sentry duty approximately 70 metres from CHQ perimeter I heard noises of leaves being trodden on. I peered around the tree to see if there were friendly troops approaching, as I did this I spotted an enemy the same time as he spotted me. I opened fire from the hip the same time as did the enemy. I then withdrew 10 metres to a different position and sprayed the area where I had seen the enemy withdrawing. I then called Sp Sect down to do a sweep.
9. Description of terrain. Great amounts of trees with sparse undergrowth.
10. Distance to en when first sighted. 25 metres.
11. Which soldier first saw en. Sentry Pte KR Holden.
12. What was soldier doing. Sentry duty.
13. What caused en to be noticed. Noise.
14. VC Str/type and dress. One Local dressed in black pyjamas.
15. Who fired first. Both en and myself fired at approx the same time from a range of 25 metres.
16. What wpn was fired. SLR.
17. What was en's immediate reaction. After returning fire - ran.
18. What was sentry's immediate reaction. Fired at en, withdrew to better fire posn.
19. En Cas. Nil.
20. Caused by. Not applicable.
21. Friendly cas. Nil.
22. Caused by. Not applicable.
23. Approx ammo expenditure. 20 rds 7.62mm ball.
- 24-29. Not applicable.
30. Coy comd's comments. Poor shooting.

*K. R. Holden*  
(K. R. Holden)

Pte  
Sentry

*M. P. Blake*  
(M. P. Blake)

Maj  
OC D Coy 5 RAR

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 235326 Lt I.R. Hosie.
2. Report on huts at GR YS633606 at 1400 hrs on 28  
Apr 69.
3. Area covered by instl: 30 metres x 40 metres.
4. Defensive Layout.
  - a. Wpn pits only.
  - b-c Not applicable.
  - d. Const
    - (1) Not applicable.
    - (2) Pits: Wood and earth.
    - (3) Huts were const of paper bark and wood.
  - e. There was one wpn pit.
  - f. Posn was for occupation by two to three pers.
  - g. Pit was facing east - west.
  - h. The pit was two man.
  - i. Wpn pit and huts were approx 10 months old.
  - j. The def layout was near a rice pad and clearing.
  - k. Nil.
  - l. Nil.
  - m. Huts were burnt down.

.....Lt  
Tracker Pl Comd

D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM

12 May 69

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op. Op SURFSIDE .
2. Report by. 39377 Lcpl MG Massie.
3. Unit in contact. Sp Sect, CHQ, D Coy 5 RAR.
4. Str of sect in contact. 4 men.
5. Date/Time/Duration of action. 281925H. Five minutes duration.
6. Loc. 686646.
7. Sect task. Clearing ptl.
8. Description of action. The sect were moving anticlockwise around the clearing when the fwd scout noticed a sudden movement to his half right. He then went to ground and commenced firing. The MG which was manned by the Sp Sect gunner was back in the CHQ loc commenced firing immediately the fwd scout opened up. I then called one of the riflemen up to me and we fired into the approx area of the en movement.
9. Description of terrain. The contact was in a clearing.
10. Distance to en when first sighted. 70 - 75 metres.
11. Which soldier first saw en. The fwd scout.
12. What was soldier doing. Member a a clearing ptl.
13. What caused en to be noticed. Sudden movement.
14. VC Str/Type/Dress. 1 Local dressed in black pyjamas.
15. Who fired first. The fwd scout at a range of 70 - 75 metres.
16. What sect wps fired. Two M16s, 1 SLR, 1 GPMG M60.
17. What was en's immediate reaction. Withdrew.
18. What was sect's immediate reaction. Went to ground and commenced fire.
19. En cas. Nil
20. Caused by. Not applicable.
21. Friendly cas. Nil
22. Caused by. Not applicable.
23. Approx ammo expenditure. 60 rds.
24. Docus/wps captured. Nil.
25. Lessons learnt. Nil
26. Other points. The MG was placed in the CHQ loc to give us covering fire to our front as we proceeded around the edge of the clearing.

- 27-29. Omitted.
- 30. Coy Comd's Comments. Poor shooting.

*M. G. Massie*  
 (M. G. Massie)  
 Lcpl  
 Sp Sect Comd

*M. P. Blake*  
 (M. P. Blake)  
 Lt Col  
 OG D Coy 5 RAR

- 27-29. Omitted.
- 30. Coy Comd's Comments. Poor shooting.

*M. G. Massie*  
 (M. G. Massie)  
 Lcpl  
 Sp Sect Comd

*M. P. Blake*  
 (M. P. Blake)  
 Lt Col  
 OG D Coy 5 RAR

- 27-29. Omitted.
- 30. Coy Comd's Comments. Poor shooting.

*M. G. Massie*  
 (M. G. Massie)  
 Lcpl  
 Sp Sect Comd

*M. P. Blake*  
 (M. P. Blake)  
 Lt Col  
 OG D Coy 5 RAR

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 1733741 2Lt R.A. Hutchison.
2. Report on bunker system at GR 698656 at 1130 hrs on 29 Apr 69.
3. Area of instl: 6000 square metres.
4. Defensive Layout
  - a. There were wpn pits only.
  - b-c Not applicable.
  - d. Const
    - (1) Not applicable.
    - (2) Pits were "L" shaped with logs and  $\frac{1}{2}$  metre of earth overhead protection. Exit holes were loc at each end of pits.
  - e. There were five pits.
  - f. Instl was squad size.
  - g. Pits were facing north-east, south-west.
  - h. Pits were all two man, with no crew served wpn pits.
  - i. Pits were one to two months old.
  - j. The def layout was 15 metres from the edge of a dry creek which ran north-west. Bunkers had not been used, but had drains built around them in prep for the wet season. A high level wash pt was const in the creek bed.
  - k. No booby traps were in the area.
  - l. Nil.
  - m. Instl was blown with explosives.

.....2Lt  
Pl Comd

- (2) Pits were "L" shaped with logs and  $\frac{1}{2}$  metre of earth overhead protection. Exit holes were loc at each end of pits.
- e. There were five pits.
- f. Instl was squad size.
- g. Pits were facing north-east, south-west.
- h. Pits were all two man, with no crew served wpn pits.
- i. Pits were one to two months old.
- j. The def layout was 15 metres from the edge of a dry creek which ran north-west. Bunkers had not been used, but had drains built around them in prep for the wet season. A high level wash pt was const in the creek bed.
- k. No booby traps were in the area.
- l. Nil.



VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 54761 2Lt B.J. Ryan.
2. Report on bunker system at GR 700649 at 1430 hrs on 29 Apr 69.
3. Area covered by instl: 300 metres x 30 metres.
4. DEFENSIVE LAYOUT
  - a. There were wpn pits only.
  - b-c Not applicable.
  - d. Const
    - (1) Not applicable.
    - (2) Pits were const of logs and earth.
  - e. There were 15 pits.
  - f. Posn was for occupation by Pl/Coy size force of 30 - 40 pers.
  - g. Pits were facing basically east-west, with end pits facing north-south.
  - h. All pits were individual or two man.
  - i. (1) Pits were new - two to three months old.  
(2) Not applicable.  
(3) Area contained several small tables and racks.
  - j. The posn was 500 metres from a creek. Posn extended for approx 300 metres and fol a large clearing. Bunkers were 50 metres in from the edge of the clearing and were not visible at over 20 metres.
  - k. No booby traps were found.
  - l. Nil.
  - m. System was blown with explosives.

.....2Lt  
Pl Comd

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 1733741 2Lt R.A. Hutchison.
2. Report on bunker system at GR 700655 at 0730 hrs on 30 Apr 69.
3. Area covered by instl: 1000 square metres.
4. DEFENSIVE LAYOUT
  - a. There were wpn pits only.
  - b-c Not applicable.
  - d. Const
    - (1) Not applicable.
    - (2) Pits were L shaped with  $\frac{1}{2}$  metre of log and earth overhead protection over the centre portion of each pit. Pits had an opening at each end.
  - e. There were three completed bunkers and four partially completed.
  - f. A squad size force would be required to occupy the posn.
  - g. Pits were facing north-south.
  - h. Pits were all two man.
  - i. Age of pits: two weeks -  $1\frac{1}{2}$  months .
  - j. Bunkers were situated along the northern bank of a dry creek which ran to the north-west. There was a clearing 20 - 50 metres north of the posn. The system had not been used, but appeared to be under const for the wet season.
  - k. Nil
  - l. Nil.
  - m. Bunkers were blown.

.....2Lt  
Pl Comd

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 235326 Lt I.R. Hosie.
2. Report on bunker system at GR YS69756550 at 1300 hrs on 30 Apr 69.
3. Area covered by instl: 120 metres x 40 metres.
4. Defensive Layout
  - a. There were wpn pits only.
  - b-c Not applicable.
  - d. Const
    - (1) Not applicable.
    - (2) Pits were const of wood and earth.
  - e. There were 22 pits, no tunnels.
  - f. Posn would hold approx 40 pers.
  - g. Pits were facing west.
  - h. There were 5 individual pits and 17 two man pits, with no three man or crew served wpn pits.
  - i. (1) Pits were a month to six weeks old.
    - (2) Not applicable.
    - (3) A number of tables, chairs, fireplaces and poles for shelters were also in the area.
  - j. A clearing was situated 30 metres to the west and a creek 30 metres to the east.
  - k. A two man pit was used as a sentry post.
  - l. Nil
  - m. Pits were blown.
  - n. Bunkers were laid out to cover the clearing, possibly against hot onsertion.

.....Lt  
Pl Comd  
Tracker Pl

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op SURFSIDE.
2. 235328 Lt E.J. LEE.
3. 1Pl A Coy 5 RAR.
4. Pl str 23.
5. 30 Apr 69, 1550 hrs, 20 mins.
6. YS556589
7. The Pl was part of a two Pl and CHQ ambush, we were to ambush the track running in front of the 'posn.'
8. At approx 1549 hrs 3 en were sighted moving North along the track at a distance of approx 150m. The ambush was alerted. The first man was carrying a pistol on his shoulder and was moving approx 10 - 15m in front of the other two. The second man was unarmed. The last man was carrying an AK47 over his shoulder. The three of them was allowed to move past the left flank right into the killing ground. The ambush was sprung by the gunner on the right flank, he hit the lead man and dropped him on the track, the other two doubled back towards the bridge and were killed when the left flank opened fire. A claymore mine facing South on the track was ignited in case someone was lying up further down the track. A sweep of the area from E - W revealed nothing else. The dead were grappled and then buried. The ambush then stood to in case of follow up action, none eventuated.
9. The foot pad was raised up above the marshy ground on each side. Visibility was good to a range of approx 250m to the South and 500 - 600m to the West. The ambush was sited on a 'finger' of growth which extended out into the clearing thus accounting for the good visibility. This good view also affected the siting of the mGs.
10. 150 - 175m.
11. Pte MOSTERD (Pl SB).
12. Pte Mosterd was part of the sentry gp of three men on the left flank.
13. Move along the track.
14. Three en, Dress lead man black shorts, no shirt, carrying 7.65mm pistol on US pat belt. Second man was wearing all black, no wpn, carrying docu which stated that he was a member of D445. Third man had a sweat band around head, coloured shirt/black trousers, carrying 2 grenades (french pat) AK47 with one mag.
15. Pte B.J. LEWIS an Lcpl F. WILLIAMS, range 15m.
16. Wpns fired were M60, M16. The M79 was fired later during the sweep on a suspected hide, the search revealed nothing.
17. The first man was knocked off the track by the gun. The second man and third doubled back along the track. 2 x AK47 rds were fired back.
18. Nominated men fired as detailed in para 8.
19. En cas, 3 KIA

20. Caused by the M60 and M16.
21. Nil.
22. Not applicable.
23. Ammo expenditure: 400 x M60, 100 x 5.56, 20 x 7.62.  
6 x M79. 1 x Claymore mine.
24. Docu captured, diary type book. Wpns AK47, 7.65mm pistol.  
2 x grenades (frech pat).
25. Sect radios would have been handy.. As it was we had to  
use the MFCs set and our admin net set for early wng. These are  
obviously not always aval
26. Nil.
27. As above.
28. As above.
29. No Mor or Arty tgts were fired so figures are the same as  
para 23.

6oy Comds Comments.


30. A good ambush with complete success. The left flank gp  
did well in allowing the en to pass within 10m of them into the  
killing ground.

.....  
(E.J. LEE)  
Lt  
OC 121 A Coy 5 RAR

May 69.

.....  
(R.F. SUTTON)  
Maj  
CO A Coy 5 RAR

TRACE 'P' TO  
 CONTACT AFTER ACTION  
 VS 556389  
 30 APR 69



LEGEND

- X SUN PIT
- L RPN (2)
- ▶ CLAYMORE
- ⊕ EN DEAD
- CREEK
- TRACK

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 54761 2Lt B.J. Ryan.
2. Report on bunker system at GR 696652 at 1600 hrs on 30 Apr 69.
3. Area covered by instl: 100 metres x 60 metres. The central portion of the instl had been destroyed by air strike.
4. Defensive Layout
  - a. There were wpn pits only.
  - b-c Not applicable.
  - d. Const
    - (1) Not applicable.
    - (2) Pits were const of wood and earth, some were burrowed under ant hills.
  - e. There were 10 bunkers, 2 open L-shaped pits and 1 square pit.
  - f. Instl was approx 25 man to Pl size. The system was obviously part of a larger system, as part had already been hit by air strike. It appeared likely there would be more bunkers in the near vicinity.
  - g. Pits were facing in all round def.
  - h. Pits were all individual or two man.
  - i. Pits were 3 to 4 months old.
  - j. There was a track, creek and a clearing all within 150 metres.
  - k. Nil
  - l. Not applicable.
  - m. Instl was blown.
5. Due to lack of light and avail destruction material, no further check was made in the area for further systems. A fire msn was called in on areas of other suspected bunkers.

.....2Lt  
Pl Comd

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op SURFSIDE.
2. 235328 Lt E.J. LEE.
3. 1Pl A Coy 5 RAR.
4. Pl Str 23.
5. 1 May 69, 0715 hrs, 15 mins.
6. YS 554587 (Pl at YS556589).
7. To ambush the track crossing our front S-N, as part of a two pl ambush.
8. The pl had just started its morning routine, all guns were still manned by two men. Two en carrying large packs were seen approaching the right flank across the wet padi. They were let come to a distance of approx 150m, when they started to turn south, they were not moving on a well worn foot pad. As their new course would have taken them out of sight to the ambush the gunner fired. The en dropped their packs and ran into dead ground in the creek bed. Initially because of wrong info on the posn that the en went to ground, our fire was directed at the wrong copse of trees, This was corrected and M72 and M79 fire was directed at the right copse. I took a sect out with my radio to sweep the area. Initially we found one heavy pack in the area of the contact. We followed numerous small paths into the wet padi and found a rubber dinky toy type sandal. The tracks lead us to nothing so we turned back after a pursuit of approx 200m. On returning to the scene of the contact a more thorough search revealed a second bundle and some webbing.(see att diagram).
9. The terrain was very open for approx 5-600m across padi.
10. 250 - 275m at least.
11. Pte R.L. LE GUIER, Lcpl F. WILLIAMS.
13. Moved across padi.
14. 2 en, dressed in shorts and coloured shirts carrying packs of food. One appeared to be armed with an SMG of 7.65mm cal(from ammo captured). Regional force.
15. Lcpl F. WILLIAMS and Pte R.L. LE GUIER, 150m.
16. M60, SLR, M16, M79, M72.
17. Both dropped their packs. The first man ran south crossed the creek and then turned west, crossed the creek again and joined his companion (from footprints). The second man ran off west.
18. All wpns engaged the area of contact.
- 19.-22. Nil
23. 1000 x M60, 3 x M72, 40 x 5.56, 12 x M79.
24. 2 x mag of 7,65mm ammo, US webb belt with pouch, small qty of tea and food, 40lbs rice and 20lbs salt, 1pr mil trousers and assorted civi clothes and 1lb tobacco.
- 25-26. Nil
- 27-28. As above.
29. Same as para 23.

2/ Coy Comd Comments.




Coy Comds Comments.

30. Because the en turned south away from the ambush the MG was faced to open up in the hope it would obtain a kill. The range was too great for results. The sweep was conducted very quickly and good con was exercised throughout the contact.

.....  
( E.J. LEE )  
Lt  
OC 1Pl A Coy

.....  
( R.F. SUTTON )  
Maj  
CO A Coy 5 RAR

TRAIL 'F' TO  
CONTACT WITH ACTION  
YS 556587  
1 MAY 69.



Sp Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU

May 69

R569-1-19

5 RAR AFTER ACTION REPORT

Part 1

1. Operation SURFSIDE
2. 54309 Cpl J. HALLIDAY
3. 2 Section Aslt Pnr Pl Sp Coy 5 RAR
4. 13
5. 011450 May 69
6. GR 654640
7. To destroy en bunker complex.
8. On return of my recce party, which I sent out to find the main creek I was heading for, I was informed by my 2IC of an en bunker system of unknown size, 100 metres on the same bearing I was marching on. We moved into the area with caution, after putting out flank protection.
9. Fairly flat and heavily jungled with gradual slope to creek line.
10. 20 to 25 metres approximately.
11. 134368 Pte E. KIME (Fwd scout)
12. Searching bunker complex.
13. En sudden movement when fleeing.
14. One Local
15. 134368 Pte E. KIME
16. M16 Armalite
17. Withdrew SE
18. The fwd scout yelled "contact front" and the normal contact drill was carried out but at this stage the en had withdrawn. OA was notified when the first shots were fired then a detailed search was carried out.
19. Nil
20. N/A
21. Nil
22. N/A
23. 4 to 6 bursts from an M16.
24. Nil

25. The contact drill could have been put through a lot quicker if we did not go straight to ground on the initial contact with everyone yelling at once. A contact drill must be carried out fast so I feel going to ground can be avoided to a certain extent.

26. Nil

Part 2

27. N/A

28. N/A

29. N/A

Part 3

30. N/A

.....Ptl Comd

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op "SURFSIDE"
2. Report by 55092 2Lt J.R. JAMES.
3. 3Pl A Coy 5 RAR.
4. Pl str 1 + 25, Att-1 engr mini team, 1 tracker team, MFC and sig. Total 1 + 31.
5. 1 May 69 at 1500hrs duration 2 hrs.
6. YS 555532.
7. Search area for tracks with a view to ambush.
8. The Pl was moving in single file south along an old semi destroyed road through a marshy area. The fwd sect moved through a thin band of light scrub and propped at another clearing. Pl comd moved fwd with sect comd and two scouts to adjust navigation data. The pl was signalled to move by the pl comd. At this stage the fwd elms were fired on by automatic wpns sounded like 2 AK 47s. The fwd sect deployed to cover their front and flanks. At this stage their GPMG failed after firing one burst. The remainder of the Pl closed up to cover flanks and rear and returned fire into en posn. En fired 1 RPG round at fwd sect and this revealed his posn to all guns. M72, M79 and small arms were directed at the en who were still returning fire. Arty was called in and a li fire team req. Pl Sgt A.B. McNULTY exposed himself and came under direct SA fire whilst placing marker panels on each flank in anticipation of the arrival of li fire team. A fire had been started by the M72 M79 and RPG, and was moving in on the left (southern) flank of the Pl. This was a great hindrance as it meant leap frogging sects through the Pl to keep them from being burnt. By this time arty rounds were landing right on tgt (YS553581). Due to proximity of tgt the Pl remained in dead ground behind old road with live shrapnel flying overhead. The fire team arrived (3 gun ships) and put a strike right on tgt. Under the covering fire of the fire teams MGs two sects of the pl moved across the 200m of open ground and assaulted the objective. The fire sp sect was called fwd and the pl consolidated. A search of the area found a large qty of AK 47 cartridges and a small qty of .306 (gerand) cartridges. It was noted that even when the arty was falling 200m from them the en were still engaging the pl with automatic fire.
9. Flat and open. En in timber line.
10. 200m.
11. Gunner second sect, Pte L.B. HOLMAN.
12. Looking in dir from which hostile fire was coming.
13. Flash of RPG.
14. En, unknown, probably four. Unknown probably local.
15. En 200m.
16. All.
17. Remained and returned fire.
18. Deployed and returned fire.
19. Unknown, one seen to fall out of tree.

21. Nil.
22. Not applicable.
23. 1400 x GPMG, 800 x M16, 400 x SLR, 3 x M72, 30 x M79.
24. Nil.
25. En will initiate contact at extreme range if he has good view. It take a long time (clearance etc) to bring Arty fire in close.
26. Only because spare barrels were carried was it possible to keep fwd GPMG firing. Some form of robust, small radio should be issued for sect - Pl comms when in a contact comms can become easily confused. The Pl was restd. to mov along the old semi destroyed road because of marshy ground. The fact that they were well spread out probably resulted in no casualties being taken by the Pl. The fire team did an excellent job. The conditions were ideal and they were well on tgt during the aslt. All members of the aslt gp felt extremely confident when moving over the open paddy.
27. As above.
28. As above.
29. 3.000 x GPMG. 60 x 105mm. 800 x M16, 400 x SLR, 3 x M72, 30 x M79.


Coy Comd Comments.

30. It is my opinion the en were moving from the South, sighted 3Pl, and then deployed to the West. It was at about the same time as 1Pl contacted 3 en mov in the same direction the day before. The fire in 3Pl loc prevented full manouvre and deployment and this caused a delay in fol up. It was a copybook action to watch once the Pl began to move in on the en from the East under cover of a L. Fire Team.

.....  
(J.R. JAMES)  
2Lt  
OC 3Pl

.....  
(R.F. SUTTON)  
Maj  
CO A Coy 5 RAR

TRACE "P" TO  
CONTACT AFTER ACTION  
YS 555587  
1 MAY 69



D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM

12 May 69

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op. Op SURFSIDE
2. Report by 4719038 2Lt RA Fenwick.
3. Unit in contact. 12 Pl <sup>U</sup> Coy 5 RAR.
4. Str of unit in contact. 22 men.
5. Date/Time/Duration of action. 020710H May 69, 5 minutes duration.
6. Loc. 708652
7. Pl Tasks. Morning harbour and admin.
8. Description of action. Two en came along a track from NE, Cpl Heron saw the en as they heard the pl. 8 Sect applied fire, en went to ground moved then returned fire with RPG 2 and SKS rifle fire and withdrew along the track to NE.
9. Description of terrain. Trees 60', thick underbrush, visability 70 metres, 5 tracks into junction, visability 200 metres to 20 metres.
10. Distance to en when first sighted. 40 metres.
11. Which soldier first saw en. 18353 Cpl BD Heron.
12. What was soldier doing. Watching track.
13. What caused en to be noticed. Movement
14. VC Str/type and dress. Two local ~~en~~ dressed in black clothing.
15. Who fired first. Cpl Heron from a range of 40 metres.
16. What sect wps fired. All.
17. What was en's immediate reaction. Went to ground, moved and returned fire.
18. What was Pl's immediate reaction. Fired into area and swept through.
19. En Cas. Nil
20. Caused by. Not applicable.
21. Friendly cas. Nil
22. Caused by. Not applicable.
23. Ammo expenditure. 200 M60, 100 SLR, 140 M16, 2 M79HE, 1 M79CAN, 1 M26 Gren.
24. Docus/wps captured. Nil.
25. Lessons learnt. Always check sentries, stay in ambush till 0800 hrs.
- 26.-29. Omitted.
30. Coy Comd's comments. Pl had to administer early to complete another task prior to leaving the area. Unfortunately time and space restricted.

*R. A. Fenwick*  
2Lt

*M. P. Blake*  
Capt



Comms Diary

955\_1\_29

SRAR  
AF AM PHU  
11 JUN 69

SRAR COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION ROADSIDE 5/69.

1. Enclosed are copy (copies) of the above report less traces  
These will be forwarded when processed by Det 1 Topo Svy Unit.
2. Some delay can be expected before traces are processed.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
 (A B Ferriman)  
 Maj  
 Ops Offr.

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Copy no 35 of 52 copies

R569-1-23

5 RAR  
AP AN PHU

Jun 69

See Distr List:

5 RAR COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT 5/69

OPERATION ROADSIDE

- References:
- A. 1 ATF Op Instr 43/69 dated 130130Z May 69.
  - B. Map VIETNAM, TAN UYEN, 6331-11, 1 : 50,000.
  - C. Map VIETNAM, XA GIA KIEM, 6431-111, 1:50,000.
  - D. Map VIETNAM, BIEN HOA, 6330-1, 1 : 50,000.
  - E. Map VIETNAM, XUAN LOC, 6430-IV, 1 : 50,000.

Name and Type of Operation

1. Op ROADSIDE - RIF ops in AO KANGAROO.

Dates of Operation

2. 13 - 22 May 69.

Location

3. AO KANGAROO - central NORTH of BIEN HOA Province, centre of mass YT 1614.

Control Headquarters

4. HQ 5 RAR under comd Tac HQ 1 ATF.

Task Organization

5. Remaining in DS 105 Fd Bty, 1 Fd Regt, one H13, 161 (Indep) Recce Flt
- From under op con to under comd 5 RAR from 130630H May 69 one tp B Sqn, 1 Armd Regt, one sect B Sqn, 3 Cav Regt, one tp HQ, one combat engr team, 1 Fd Sqn
- Under comd from 130630H May 69 one tp HQ and one sect B Sqn 3 Cav Regt, three combat engr teams 1 Fd Sqn, one D4 dozer, one backhoe, one kettle
- Under comd from 140630H May 69 two mor carriers B Sqn 3 Cav Regt
- In gen op rft arrival AO KANGAROO 13 May Arty LONG BINH/BIEN HOA complex
- In op from arrival AO KANGAROO 13 May one UH-1, No 9 Sqn RAAF

Intelligence

6. Annex A.

Mission

7. To occupy and conduct ops in AO KANGAROO from 13 May as dir by CO BIEN HOA TAC.

/Concept of operations

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- 2 -

Concept of Operations

8. The threat to BIEN HOA/LONG BINH complex from VC/NVA ground and rkt attacks had increased to a significant level and at 111915 hrs, 5 RAR were placed on 24 hrs notice to move as Ready Reaction force in sp of BIEN HOA TAC.
9. Rifle coys were extracted by air from AO ILLAWARRA centre of mass YS 3067. AM 13 May into LZ YT 175109. FSPB NICK was estb at YT 175109 at 131500H May.
10. Rifle coys then deployed on ft into AO KANGAROO.
11. Reconnaissance in force (RIF) ops were then conducted throughout AO KANGAROO and preps were made to react to an en thrust towards LONG BINH from the EAST or NE.
12. On 17 May AO KANGAROO was extended to the EAST as far as the 32 EASTING until 181800H May. Two rifle coys and APC tp were deployed into this ext to conduct RIF ops.
13. CO 5 RAR design for battle is att as Annex C.

Execution

14. Annex B - Sequence of events.

Results

15. Casualties

- a. VC - 1 KIA (BC)
- b. AUST - 7 WIA

16. Installations and Equipment - Annex A

Lessons Learned

17. Staff shortages did not permit deployment of liaison offrs to flanking bns, or to RF Posts loc within the AO. Despite this very effective liaison was estb by daily visits to and from units and regular interchange of info obtained by flicking on to other unit nets regularly.
18. No problem was encountered in the rapid redeployment of the complete bn and its ech with negligible wng time from one op to another. Air mov orders were dropped by H13 to coys who at that time were op in inaccessible mountain areas. Coys, one of which was involved in the middle of a coy attack, quickly moved to secure PZ's suitable for extraction to LONG BINH. The only minor problem encountered in the mov of the bn, was the inability to close up the old FSPB as completely as is normal practice.
19. Def stores were again handed over to local RF/PF forces and this is considered to be the best disposal of these items.
20. From the CO's point of view, it was invaluable to have the Deputy Comd acting as the Senior Australian representative at BIEN HOA TAC.
21. When op with the US forces, in particular in temp AO exts early reps should be made to the Senior HQ to ensure that all friendly ac are warned of the temp presence of our tps to avoid the possibility of friendly ac firing into our area.
22. It should be appreciated by Australian Unit Comds that when given a search task in conjunction with US search ops, that the time frame allowed is not sufficient to enable a normal Australian type search to be conducted and, if the area allocated is to be covered, a more mobile approach may be necessary or only certain areas concentrated upon.

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/23.

23. Again considerable difficulties were encountered in the con of civ wood cutters in the AO. Although the District Chief had agreed that civs would be warned to stay out of the area. They cont to op in all parts of the AO, in particular the EASTERN and NORTHERN sectors.

24. With the coming of the wet season, every effort is being made to use local water resources. Local water is also being used as a matter of policy within 5 RAR, in an endeavour to keep as many hells out of the area as possible and hence avoid prejudicing our ops. There are health risks involved in this policy, and pl comds are required to make careful checks on the employment of MILLBANK filters and sterilization tablets. It should also be realized that the use of MILLBANK filters is normally only practicable on an overni stop - it can take several hrs to fill one water bottle using a filter.

(C.N. KHAN)  
Lt Col  
CO

*9951-1*

(A.B. FERRIMAN)  
Maj  
Ops Offr

Authentication:

Annexes: A. Intelligence Summary  
B. Sequence of Events  
C. CO 5 RAR Design for Battle

Distr: HQ 1 ATF (12) Internal  
CO  
2IC  
Ops Offr  
IO  
A Coy (2)  
B Coy (2)  
C Coy (2)  
D Coy (2)  
Sp Coy (2)  
Admin Coy (2)  
CP  
File (2)  
War Diary (5)  
Spare (5)

For Info: B Sqn 1 Armd Regt  
B Sqn 3 Cav Regt  
105 Fd Bty, 1 Fd Regt  
1 Fd Sqn  
161 (Indep) Recce Flt  
6 RAR  
7 RAR  
8 RAR  
9 RAR  
D Inf (2)

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ANNEX A TO  
5 RAR COMBAT AFTER ACTION  
REPORT 5/69  
DATED JUN 69

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

General

1. Apart from the initial A Coy contact with ten en at YT 185125, no other evidence of en presence in AO KANGAROO was found. There was evidence of limited recent en mov in the area of the AO ext.

Enemy Contacted

2. The en contacted were probably in the village of HO NAI YT 087117. The squad leader was killed and identified.

Base Camps

3. The tracks found by B and C coys in the area of B2 and C1, indicates that the V-1 base area is still being used.

Conclusion

4. The presence of 5 RAR in AO KANGAROO probably prevented en mov in that area.

Appendixes:

Appendix 1 - Summary of Contacts and Incidents  
Appendix 2 - Summary of En cas, wpns and eqpt

Traces:

Trace 1 - Areas of Op ROADSIDE  
Trace 2 - Coy routes of Op ROADSIDE  
Trace 3 - Contacts, Incidents, Instls Op SURFSIDE

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APPENDIX 1 TO  
ANNEX A TO  
COMBAT AFTER ACTION  
REPORT 5/69  
DATED JUN 69

SUMMARY OF CONTACTS AND INCIDENTS

SERIAL	DATE/TIME	LOCATION	C/S	ACTIVITY
1	131850H	YT 185125	13	Contacted est 10 en, who appeared from WEST. 1 KIA (BG), 1 AK47 capyured
2	141825H	YT 184159	PCSSUM22	Sighted 2 bunkers in good condition whilst conducting VR
3	150530H	YT 166128	22	Incident - A flare was set off on 5 pl perimeter - The area was engaged by MG. NTR after sweep of area
4	151506H	YT 175122	POSSUM 22	Sighted a new bunker, a truck and a square type hole whilst on VR
5	170938H	YT 177142	12	Loc well used ft and ox cart tracks that were used recently
6	171232H	YT 261126	9	Sighted a large number of pits and a few old bunkers - also ox cart tracks, whilst on VR
7	171300H	YT 150173	9	Sighted a well equipped truck with a lot of young men- looked too good to have been wood cutters
8	180930H	YT 264114	TA3	Loc an old house with med sups & pans stacks which appear to have been cut in last week. Also a pole which could have been used as a dye pole
9	181427H	YT 236131	2	Loc a bunker system which had not been used for some time-also a ft pad which had been used in last 24 hrs
10	181440H	YT 140182	9	Sighted a camp which had cooking gear and racks of webbing about area
11	1 H	YT 185114	62A	Incident - A person on a bike stopped short of NICK turned around and drove off. He repeated this a few times
12	181936H	YT 186103	6	Clearing ptlsighted two men obsn 3 locs - Men withdrew after sighting clearance ptl
13	200840H	YT 177119	TA33	Hit a mine of 251b CHICOM TNT. APC moderately damaged.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A  
TO COMBAT AFTER ACTION  
REPORT 5/69  
DATED JUN 69

SUMMARY OF ENEMY CASUALTIES, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT CAPTURED  
OP ROADSIDE

1. Enemy Casualties  
1 KIA (BC)
2. Captured Weapons  
1 X AK47
3. Captured Ammunition  
120 X 7.62 Short(AK Rounds)
4. Captured Equipment  
1 X Entrenching Tool  
1 X Set of Webbing  
1 X VC Flag  
1 X Transistor Radio  
Large qty PROPAGANDA  
Qty docus personal and official  
1 X Carrying bag  
\$VN100 - \$20 CAMBODIAN
5. Medical Equipment and Supplies  
30 X Vitamin B Phials.

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OP ROADSIDE - SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Day 1

13 May 69

AM 5 RAR extracted by air and rd from AO ILLAWARRA and inserted into AO KANGAROO centre of mass YT 1614. Coys deployed on ft from FSPB NICK YT 175109.

1850 hrs 3 pl contacted est 10 en at YT 185125. En came from WEST. Sentry saw them and fired from 25 metres so MG could be used. En withdrew when MG opened up. 1 en DOW (BG) 1 AK47 1 grenade

Ni locs

A Coy HQ, 2 pl, 3 pl YT 185125, 1 pl YT 185121  
B Coy HQ, 4 pl YT 173114, 5 pl, 6 pl YT 170121  
C Coy HQ, 7 pl YT 183104, 8 pl YT 180102, 9 pl YT 185106  
D Coy HQ, 12 pl YT 163120, 10 pl YT 163118, 11 pl YT 161123  
Bn HQ, Mor pl (-), Tracker pl, Aslt Pnr pl, 3 Tp A Sqn (-)  
Tp B Sqn, 105 Fd Bty - FSPB NICK

Day 2

14 May 69

0610 hrs 5 pl heard now at YT 170121 from WEST. Sentry engaged. No results

0855 hrs H13 VR sighted 2 bunkers at YT 185149. Not used but in good condition.

Ni Locs

A Coy HQ, 2 pl YT 189125, 1 pl YT 185121, 3 pl YT 182125  
B Coy HQ, 6 pl YT 170121, 4 pl YT 167126, 5 pl YT 166128  
C Coy HQ, 7 pl YT 183104, 8 pl YT 180103, 9 pl YT 185106  
D Coy HQ, 12 pl YT 154130, 10 pl YT 150135, 11 pl YT 156132  
Bn HQ, Sp coy, 3 Tp A Sqn, 1 Tp B Sqn, 105 Fd Bty FSPB NICK

Day 3

15 May 69

0652 hrs 5 pl engaged area of YT 166128 with MG when flare ignited. Search revealed nothing

1432 hrs 3 Tp A Sqn (-) detained 2 people in square 1820 and task then to TRANG BOM

Ni Locs

A Coy 2 pl & HQ YT 186132, 1 pl YT 189132, 3 pl YT 184134  
B Coy HQ, 4 pl YT 167135, 5 pl YT 167135, 6 pl YT 168139  
C Coy HQ, 9 pl YT 187128, 7 pl YT 190125, 8 pl YT 182104  
D Coy HQ, 11 pl YT 148170, 10 pl YT 152176, 12 pl YT 144171  
Bn HQ, Sp Coy, Sect mors, APC's, Tp B Sqn, 3 Tp A Sqn,  
105 Fd Bty - FSPB NICK

Day 4

16 May 69

A COY Searched in area A1 -- B COY Searched in area B1  
C COY Searched in area C1 -- D COY Searched in area D1  
3 Tp B Sqn (Cav) conducted RIF cps in area CAV1 -- over 150 civs loc  
5 detainees held and taken to TRANG BOM

Ni Locs

HQ, 3 pl YT 184137, 1 pl YT 190140, 2 pl YT 180140 (A COY)  
B COY HQ, 4 pl, 5 pl, 6 pl YT 168138  
C COY HQ, 7 pl YT 187128, 8 pl YT 177103, 9 pl YT 198123  
D COY HQ YT 156178, 10 pl YT 159174, 11 pl YT 153181, 12 pl YT 145183  
Bn HQ, Sp Coy, Tp B Sqn (tks), 3 Tp B Sqn (Cav), 105 Fd Bty, FSPB NICK



Day 5

17 May 69

- Ext to AO KANGAROO granted to 181800H to NORTH along SONG RET to province bdry to SOU DAU GIAY to 30 Easting. EAST to 30 Easting SOUTH along line WEST present bdry. B & C Coys, 3 tp B Sqn (Cav) 1 tp B Sqn (tks), Aslt Pnr pl, sect mors deployed by APC's and TCV into AO ext. Cav/tk/nor gp returned to FSPB NICK for ni.
- 0840 hrs 2 pl at YT 179141 loc old cache
- 0938 hrs 2 pl found well used oxcart tracks used recently within past 12 hrs
- 1300 hrs At YT 155173, CO on VR loc truck with pers
- 1440 hrs Camp loc at YT 140182 by D coy with variety of cooking gear, wpns pits and pieces of webbing
- PM B & C coy redeployed EM 18 May into AO KANGAROO. All coys occupied coy def posns by 1700 hrs.
- 1936 hrs C coy clearing ptl moving to EAST of ni loc. sighted 2 en 50 metres away. En withdrew to EAST. Nil results as poor lt and distance restricted shooting

Ni locs YT 180157 (A COY COMPLETE)  
B COY HQ, 4 pl, 5 pl YT 168138  
C COY YT 186103  
D COY HQ, 11 pl, 12 pl YT 156178, 10 pl YT 157182  
Bn HQ, Sp Coy, 1 Tp B Sqn (tks), 3 tp B Sqn (Cav), 105 Fd Bty at FSPB NICK -- Sect Aslt Pnr pl YT 185114, 6 pl YT 185125

Day 6

18 May 69

- RIF ops cont in AO Ext with B coy searching Area B1, B2 and coy searching C1.
- 0926 hrs 3 Tp B Sqn (Cav) loc old house at YT 264114. House deserted but contained old surgical mask and other med capsules, old clothes, sharped bamboo sticks cut recently and aerial.
- 1012 hrs 3 Tp B Sqn (Cav) while crossing a clear area sighted boy and man who began to run. After telling them to stop they fired over heads and detained the man
- 1427 hrs At area YT 230135, <sup>B</sup> coy loc large coy bunker system used recently
- 1428 hrs 7 bunkers loc at YT 175151 with 18 ins of OHC const 12 months ago and used 3 months ago. Each pit had bamboo cam screen in front ab YT 174123

Ni Locs A COY YT 177143 (Complete)  
B COY HQ & 4 pl YT 229139, 5 pl YT 226124, 6 pl YT 223134  
C COY HQ YT 262131, 7 pl YT 259135, 8 pl YT 264133, 9 pl YT 262133  
D COY HQ, 10 pl YT 172167, 11 pl YT 182165, 12 pl YT 161169  
Bn HQ, Sp Coy, 1 Tp B Sqn (tks), 3 Tp B Sqn (Cav) 105 Fd Bty FSPB NICK Sect Tracker pl YT 185115

Day 7

19 May 69

- 0921 hrs 8 ox carts and truck with timber sighted by VR moving SOUTH to the SOUTH of D coy
- 2000 hrs At YT 186103 one man hit by explosion of either RPG or mor. Dir of primary not known

Ni locs A COY YT 182151 (Complete)  
B COY HQ, 4 pl, 5 pl YT 168138  
C COY YT 186103 (Complete)  
D COY HQ, 10 pl, 11 pl YT 155178, 12 pl YT 153183  
Bn HQ, Sp Coy, Tp B Sqn (tks), sect B Sqn (Cav), 105 Fd Bty FSPB NICK 6 pl YT 158126

Day 8

20 May 69

AM Rifle coys redeployed from ni locs to a posn closer to FSPB NICK. Fol mov occurred. A Coy - Extracted by hel at 1100 hrs from PZ YT 182151 to LZ YT 185124 secured by 6 pl B Coy moved on ft and APC's from YT 168138 to YT 172117 C Coy Remained at YT 186103 D Coy - Extracted by hel at 1000 hrs from YT 155178 to LZ YT 163118 Sect B Sqn (Cav) and Tp B Sqn (tks) assisted with move

0840 hrs APC hit mine at YT 177119. Mine was pressure type made of bamboo and wire. Nil cas. Moderate damage to APC

Ni locs

A Coy YT 185124 (Complete)  
B Coy HQ, 4 pl, 5 pl YT 172117  
C Coy YT 186103  
D Coy HQ, 11 pl YT 168116, 10 pl YT 165117, 12 pl YT 163120  
Bn HQ, Sp Coy, tp B Sqn (tks), Sect B Sqn (Cav), 105 Fd Bty  
FSPB NICK, 6 pl YT 186115

Day 9

21 May 69

Coys remained in static def posns during day.

Ni locs

A COY YT 185124 (Complete)  
B COY HQ, 4 pl, 5 pl, YT 172117, 6 pl YT 186115  
C COY YT 186103 (Complete)  
D COY HQ, 11 pl YT 168116, 10 pl YT 165117, 12 pl Y T 163120  
Bn HQ, Sp Coy, sect B Sqn (Cav), tp B Sqn (tks), sect mors APC's,  
105 Fd Bty - FSPB NICK

Day 10

22 May 69

5 RAR redeployed by air and rd from AO KANGAROO into AB ILLAWARRA

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ANNEX C TO  
COMBAT AFTER ACTION  
REPORT 5/69  
DATED JUN 69

CO's DESIGN FOR BATTLE - OPERATION ROADSIDE

1. Enemy

a. 5 VC Div is posing a threat to the defences of LONG BINH-BIEN HOA, this threat is likely to develop as fols:

(1) Phase 1 (Up to 19 May) Recce Phase

(a) The appearance of recce parties and small gps of main force elms with local guides to recce attack routes and friendly def locs.

(b) The posn and use of caches.

(c) The preliminary moves of larger en units/posns outside the AO.

(2) Phase 2 (19-20 May) Infiltration Phase Mov of en units up to bn str to attack posns within or just outside the AO.

(3) Phase 3 - Main Attack Phase By up to Regt str towards area of FSPB NICK - ROUTE 1 from NE astride SUOI DIA and from EAST astride ROUTE 1 - TRANG BOM Rubber Estate - railway line.

2. 5 RAR Concept of Ops

a. I intend to conduct this op in three phases as fols:

(1) Phase 1 - Recce/Ambush Phase. The amoush and search of four rifle coy AO's and a Cav AO to loc sign of en Phase 1 ops in particular, recce parties and cache areas. During this phase coys will be op widely dispersed throughout the bn AO in pl, gps, ambushing likely en tracks, water pts and camp sites. Coys must retain, during the phase, the capability of conc as coys, within two hrs.

(2) Phase 2 - Coy Def Battle On my orders, coys will conc at designated areas within coy AO's covering likely en approach routes and be prep to conduct coy def battles against en op up to bn str. It may be anticipated that this phase will be conducted fwd: ie. to the NORTH of coy AO's.

(3) Phase 3 - Bn Def Battle

(a) Sect Op Instr 11/69 dated 16 May 69.

(b) On my orders, coys are to be prep to move in accordance with the above instr to occupy coy def locs as a part of the bn def layout, to defeat up to an en Regt attack from NE and EAST in gen area of FSPB NICK.

3. Ready Reaction

a. 5 RAR will retain the capacity to provide a ready reaction force into the village of TRANG BOM and to other areas in the BIEN HOA def area, if approved by Comd 1 ATF.

b. Composition

(1) 3 Tp A Sqn 1 Cav Regt less one sect

(2) 1 Tp B Sqn 1 Armd Regt

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- 2 -

- c. Comd: OC 3 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
- d. C Coy is also warned to be prep for ready reaction against TRANG BOM. In this case, comd of the force reverts to OC C coy. Aslt Pnr pl will remain at FSPB NICK.
- e. Recce Armd recce into TRANG BOM has been completed. The route to TRANG BOM is to be from the SOUTH unless other loc circumstances dictate an approach from the NORTH or EAST. The WEST approach from FSPB NICK will not be used. OC C coy is to complete his recce ASP. Ready reaction will not be implemented during hrs of darkness and will only be launched on dir orders of CO 5 RAR.

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INCIDENT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op "ROADSIDE"
2. Report by 45761 2Lt B.J. Ryan.
3. 5 Pl B Coy 5 RAR
4. Str: 24.
5. 4 May 69 at 2140 hrs. Duration: 2 mins.
6. GR 300691.
7. Pl Task: ni ambush.
8. MG sentry heard mov to flank from east to west, but could not see anything. Mov stopped and then started to go back; sentry then detonated claymore and MG and M79(buckshot) fire was engaged onto area. There was considerable noise in the area of suspected en and a voice was heard by some members.
9. Terrain: Dense secondary growth, undulating. Visibility at time was nil.
10. En were not sighted.
11. Not applicable.
12. Not applicable.
13. En were noticed by noise and mov.
14. Not known.
15. First shot was fired by the sentry.
16. Wpns fired: Claymore, M79, M60.
17. En withdrew.
18. Sect fired into area of mov and noise.
19. Nil.
- 20-22 Not applicable.
23. Approx ammo expenditure: 2 x M79, 40 x M60, 1 x Claymore,
24. Nil.
25. Fire was not effective due to difficulty in pinpointing source of noise and total lack of visibility.
26. Nil.
27. Refer para 25.
28. A sweep was conducted at first light - nil results.
29. Refer para 23.
30. Coy Comd's Comments

Lack of visibility restricts Pls to rely on noise only as indication of en mov. Majority have adequate experience not to mistake animal noises for en.

.....Pl Comd

.....Coy Comd

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op 'ROADSIDE'.
2. Report by 55159 Cpl M.A. DENCH.
3. 7 Sect, 3Pl, A Coy, 5 RAR.
4. Str 8 + 2 att.
5. 13 May 69 at 1935 hrs, duration 25 min.
6. YS185125.
7. Defending N-W of Coy, 2Pl harbour posn.
8. Both MGs and sentry saw a gp of 2 or 3 en approaching from the West, the sentry fired first, dropping one en. The remainder of the en turned and fled as both MGs fired after the sentries shot. Result from the MG fire Nil. An elm of C/S 12 fired Mg and 1 x M79 HE, results Nil. 7 Sect then conducted a sweep of the area finding one wpn AK47 and a wounded en, the wounded man was taken into the perimeter for first aid. (See att annex P for diagram of contact).
9. Rubber and very low brush on our side of the rd. Dead ground and very thick scrub on w and NW side of rd, visibility 70 metres on rd.
10. 40 metres.
11. Sentry and MG No ( Pte Collins).
12. Watching front.
13. Mov.
14. 3 sighted by 7 Sect, possibly 10 or more sighted by C/S 12 elm. Main Force, Possible NVA, Dress green ARVN shirt, khaki slacks, Ho Chi Minh type sandals.
15. Sntry, 25 metres (Pte J.F. Collins).
16. M16, 2 x MG 7 Sect. MG and M79 from C/S 12.
17. First man fell, remainder retreated into dead ground.
18. Sweep of area.
19. 1 KIA (DOW).
20. 1 x M16.
21. Nil.
22. N/A.
23. 1 x 5.56, approx 60 x M60.
24. 1 x AK47.
25. En used most unlikely route and was totally unexpected, vigilance of sentry and gunners paid of.
26. Spare M60 could have been situated in sentries posn for better results, this was done after this contact.
27. As above.
28. Pl Comd org and con the sweep and loc en on side of rd.

..2/29. Para 23 refers

29. Para 23 refers, Mors then began 'bedding in' to the West of the contact and this was employed as cut off fire.

Coy Comds Comments.

30. It was unfortunate that the Coy moved into the ambush posn late in the afternoon and was still in the process of digging in and making final adjustments. The terrain, vegetation taken with the above factors necessitated sentries being posted - unusual and unfortunate in the long run. If the sentries had not been posted and 'stand too' been slightly earlier a bigger result would have been possible. Ambushes in rubber by day is feasible provided time is allowed for complete occupation and siting.


.....  
(M.A. DENCH)  
Sect Comd. 7 Sect.

.....  
(J.R. JAMES)  
2Lt  
OC 3P1

May 69

.....  
(R.F. SUTTON)  
Maj  
CO A Coy 5 RAR

TRACE "P" TO  
CONTACT AFTER ACTION  
VS 185125  
13 MAY 69





INCIDENT AFTER ACTION REPORT

- 1z Op "ROADSIDE".
2. Report by 54761 2Lt B.J. Ryan.
3. 5 Pl B Coy 5 RAR
4. Str of Pl: 24
5. 15 May 69.
6. Loc: GR 166128
7. Pl task: ambush
8. The ambush was set to cover portion of a track running through bamboo. A trip flare was placed out on trip with wire from waist to knee height. Flare was detonated and area of trip covered by fire.
9. Terrain: Flat country, bamboo thickets and secondary growth. Visibility at time of incident was 10 to 15 metres.
- 10-15 Not applicable.
16. Claymore mine and M60.
- 17-18 Not applicable.
19. Nil.
- 20-22 Not applicable.
23. Approx ammo expenditure: 2 Claymores, 80 rounds M60.
24. Nil.
25. Flare was not suitable on trip. It was probably set off by an animal, or falling foliage.
26. Nil.
27. Nil.
28. Pl conducted a sweep of the area at first light - nil results.
29. Refer para 23.

Coy Comd's Comments

30. The flare was tried in an attempt to avoid firing purely at noise. They are too unreliable, and from initial detonation to adequate light are too slow to be of use.

*[Signature]*  
.....Pl Comd  
*[Signature]*  
.....Coy Comd

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 235192 Maj R.F. SUTTON.
2. Report on bunker system at YS180146 at 1430 hrs on 18 May 69.
3. Area covered by instl was approx 10,000 sq yds.
4. Defensive layout.
  - a. Bunkers only.
  - b. N/A.
  - c. N/A
  - d. (2) Timber and earth.
  - e. approx 27 bunkers.
  - f. Approx Coy size.
  - g. All round def.
  - h. 2 man pits.
  - i. Ranging from 3 - 18 months.
  - j. Dried up creek next to the system, a well had been dug.
  - k. Sighted in posts.
  - l. N/A.
  - m. Nil.

May 69

.....  
(R.F. SUTTON)  
Maj  
CO A Coy 5 RAR

C Coy 5 RAR  
AP AN PHU

10 Jun 69

5 RAR

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. ROADSIDE.
  2. 215832 Lt B. THRIPP
  3. 8 pl C Coy 5 RAR
  4. 4
  5. 19 May 69 1735 hrs 3 seconds
  6. 187104
  7. Clearing ptl
  8. The evening clearing ptl briefly sighted 2 figures about 50 yards from them. In the half light they could distinguish nothing of dress or eqpt. The figures disappeared instantly.
  9. Secondary growth.
  10. 50 yards
  11. Fwd scout
  12. Clearing ptl.
  13. Mov
  14. 2, probably NVA
  - 15 to 16. N/A
  17. Ran away
  18. Reported incident
  - 19 to 24. N/A
  25. Clearing ptls are essential, and a good chance to pick up an odd kill.
  26. Nil
- PART 2
27. N/A
  28. Already stood to.
  29. N/A
- PART 3
30. Confirmed the value of listening posts and clearing ptls as used.

*B. Thrupp*  
(B. Thrupp)  
Lt  
Pl Comd



Concept of operations

9. At 0900 hrs 6 Jun 69, OC D coy was called to HQ 1 ATF for briefing on a ready reaction task at BINH BA. At 1000 hrs 6 Jun 69, D coy group departed from NUI DAT and stopped level with AP SUOI NGHE. At this stage D coy were under comd 6 RAR.

Execution

10. At 1030 hrs 6 Jun 69, D coy group moved to SE of village BINH BA and awaited clearance to move into the village from CO 6 RAR. In that area they were engaged with RPG fire from the SOUTH of village BINH BA. Fire was returned using tanks and APCs. At 1120 hrs clearance was granted to enter the village from the EAST. Tanks were in the centre with a section of APCs on either side with Tp HQ and one APC section at the rear of the tanks. There was no opposition until they reached the centre of the village when heavy RPG and small arms fire was received from the SOUTH of the village.
11. During the next two hours D coy group manoeuvred to contain heavy enemy RPG and SA fire from the SOUTH and SOUTH WEST of the village. In this period all three tanks were hit with RPGs and one was disabled and five crewmen were wounded. D coy consolidated in the centre of the village and used a light fire team on the SOUTH part of the village on to Route 2 where the District Chief organised further evacuation.
12. At 1150 hrs, B coy were despatched to assist D coy in BINH BA. On arrival they initially blocked to the SOUTH. At this stage control of operations reverted to CO 5 RAR.
13. The light fire team effectively neutralized the enemy to the extent that D coy broke out of the village to the SOUTH.
14. D coy then moved to the WEST of the village and lined up for an assault. A rocket cache was located in the rubber WEST of the village. B coy moved to block from the EAST and covered the NORTH and SOUTH approaches by fire.
15. PF troops remained in a block to the NORTH throughout the operation and, before D coys second assault, PF troops cleared the church in the NORTH of the village.
16. At approx 1420 hrs, D coy commenced to sweep towards the EAST. Heavy contacts occurred immediately. There were underground tunnels, which appeared to have been built by local civs. These tunnels were not inter-connecting between houses and had obviously been built as civ refuge in time of attack. The en were firing from the houses and then withdrawing into the tunnels. During this sweep, D coy sustained 1 KIA and 2 WIA. At 1830 hrs, D coy completed this sweep and to the EAST of Route 2 opposite BINH BA. PF troops remained in blocks to the NORTH and NW of BINH BA.
17. At approx 1500 hrs B coy despatched one platoon to the NE of BINH BA to control and screen civs withdrawing NORTH. Two VC were detained at this point. One CHIEU HOI with a head wound also reported in. One VC was also captured attempting to escape to the EAST.
18. At 0320 hrs on 7 Jun 69, 4 pl contacted 2 en attempting to escape SOUTH from the village. A sweep at daylight revealed 2 en KIA (BC). At 0600 hrs 6 pl and B coy HQ contacted an unknown size en moving from SOUTH with no results.
19. At 0700 hrs on 7 Jun 69, D coy moved to link up with B coy. At 0700 hrs an en coy was observed moving towards the village at about 300 metres to the SW. The en were engaged by tank and SA fire. A sweep of the area after the contact by B coy revealed 1 en KIA (BC) and 6 en WIA (blood trails).

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- 3 -

20. D coy, with a pl B coy and two combat engineer teams, then positioned itself to sweep through the village again from WEST to EAST to flush out en who may have been missed from the day before and to ensure that en had not re-entered the village during the night. B coy blocked to the SOUTH and SW. PF troops continued blocking to the NORTH. D coy maintained a block to EAST with a section of APCs and an elm of D coy. The sweep commenced at 0950 hrs. The WESTERN half of the village was swept by midday with no opposition. 3 en PW (WIA) were located and evacuated. D coy then stopped and waited for PF troops to take over and complete the search of the EASTERN half of the village.

21. At 0800 hrs, 7 Jun 69, a section of APCs moving from the NORTH along Route 2 was engaged by RPG fire from buildings in the NORTHERN part of DUC TRUNG (XA NGAI GIAO). VR observed between 50 - 80 en troops moving between houses in this sector after the contact. The PF pl in DUC TRUNG at this stage held its ground. Aslt pnr pl was flown to BINH BA with a view to ready reaction into DUC TRUNG. When the strength of the en was more accurately assessed, it was decided to use an RF Reaction Coy in this task. This coy was provided by Province authorities. The RF coy swept the village but the en had departed.

22. At approx 1300 hrs heavy firing broke out again in DUC TRUNG and it was reported by the District Chief that the PF pl had been overrun by an estimated 100 en resulting in 4 PF KIA and 7 WIA. En were again observed in occupation of the NORTHERN building. VR also located at least one HMG. Artillery was brought down on the NORTHERN fringe of the village within 20 metres of the houses and observed to fall amid the en. A light fire team (LFT) was also effectively employed on the NORTHERN and WESTERN sides of the village. B coy and a troop of tanks were ordered to sweep the village. This force formed up on its start line within 20 mins of receiving its orders and movement into the village was commenced during the artillery and LFT preparation. When the SOUTHERN part of the village had been swept by B coy group CO 5 RAR received information from the District Chief that there were still a large number of civs intermingled with the en in the NORTH part of the village. It was agreed that in order to avoid civ casualties, the remainder of the sweep should be completed by PF troops. Accordingly B coy was withdrawn back to its start point and PF troops immediately took over the sweep of the village. 6 NVA bodies and numerous blood trails were located by PF. The remainder of the en force withdrew to the NW. Artillery and LFT continued to be used on his suspected withdrawal.

23. At 1500 hrs, CO 5 RAR ordered D coy to sweep the EASTERN end of BINH BA. The sweep was completed at 1715 hrs.

24. B & D coys were located overnight 7/8 Jun in blocking positions, B coy to the NW of DUC TRUNG, D coy to SW of BINH BA. There was no activity.

25. At 0800 hrs 8 Jun 69, D coy conducted a further sweep of houses in BINH BA near Route 2. At 1100 hrs D coy returned to NUI DAT. B coy returned to NUI DAT at 1540 hrs.

26. On the morning of 8 Jun, 1 Aust CA Unit despatched a MEDCAP team to BINH BA to assist in resettlement of villagers.

Results

27. a. VC - 43 KIA (BC)  
6 WIA (BT)  
8 PW  
1 HOI CHANH  
28 Detainees.

b. Aust - 1 KIA  
2 WIA

...../a.

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- c. In addition PF tps killed 8 en (BC), a further 21 en KIA (BC) have just now been loc (10 Jun) making a total for the op of 7.2 KIA/BC
- a 28. Tank sp was outstanding and there is no doubt their activities were a battle winning factor. They moved with inf, covered the mov close up to houses assisting inf to get into the houses to deal with the en inside bunkers and tunnels.
- b 29. Comms with tanks needs improvement. Tank freqs were not compatible with inf PRC 25 freqs. Tank telephones did not function and attracting the attention of tanks was a problem.
- c 30. In an op of this nature certain pts of coord are worth noting:
- 1 a. Immediate and continuous liaison with the District Chief is necessary. This may have to be done over the radio through the US Senior Advisor who is normally always with the District Chief.
  - 2 b. Where civs are still in the town it is necessary to initially determine the locs and str of the VC. On three occasions this was effectively done by the local PF tps under the District Chief.
  - 3 c. Civs must then be moved out of the VC occupied area by all means possible - PF tps, Aust tps and broadcast. They are collected at a RV and moved to a safe area by the District Chief. The majority but not all, were moved out of both villages fairly smoothly and little evidence exists that the VC/NVA stopped them. Those who remained were collected during the sweep. Some NVA did mix with civs and there is a requirement for screening.
  - 4 d. The District Chief must give the Aust Comd authority to use force to destroy the VC and property if necessary, before Aust tps move in. This was readily forthcoming on this op.
  - 5 e. If it appears too many cas may be done by Aust tps to civs left in the area, it may be preferable to get PF/RF tps to complete the task. This occurred in DUC TRUONG when B coy and tanks were stopped half through the askt because the District Chief received late notice that many civs still remained.
- d 31. The inf battle developed into normal street and house clearing op in which M72's, MG fire and rifle fire was used to gain entry to a house by one or two men and then use grenades and M16 fire against tunnels into which the en withdrew. D coy used approx 300 M26 grenades. The en used doorways as fire lines and when the inf closed, threw grenades against our tps.
- e 32. The raw leadership of pte soldiers was outstanding. Of the 21 rifle sects involved, 12 were lead by pte soldiers. Two pl's were comd by Sgt's and one by a Cpl.
- f 33. Individual soldiers in D coy showed remarkable restraint when sweeping through BINH BA. Some civs were still in the village and were unable to escape. On several occasions soldiers exposed themselves before engaging on to determine identity.
- g 34. Both Arty and lt fire teams proved most effective, in some cases, within and on the outskirts of the village.

(C.N. KHAN)  
Lt Col  
CO

.....Authentication:

(A.B. PERRIMAN)  
Maj  
Ops Offr

Authentication:

Attachments. Trace 1. AG Arvil.

Annexes: A. Intelligence Summary

Distr: HQ 1 ATF (12)

For Info:

B Sqn 1 Armd Regt  
B Sqn 3 Cav Regt  
105 Fd Bty, 1 Fd Regt  
1 Fd Sqn  
161 (Indep) Recce Flt  
6 RAR  
7 RAR  
8 RAR  
9 RAR  
D Inf (2)

Internal

CO  
2IC  
Ops Offr  
IO  
A Coy (2)  
B Coy (2)  
C Coy (2)  
D Coy (2)  
Sp Coy (2)  
Admin Coy (2)  
CP  
File (2)  
War Diary (5)  
Spare (5)



INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

General

1. B and D Coy's 5 RAR were reacted in response to a request from DUC THANH District HQ. A Tac HQ was consequently deployed at District HQ. The en force was reported as two pls holed up in XA BINH BA.

Enemy Encountered

2. Captured docus and PW's revealed that the en in fact was the 1st 33rd Regt NVA. Docus also stated that one coy was targeted against HOA LONG. This was NOT cfm.

3. The NVA were guided by the local BINH BA guerilla unit. The probable str of this unit is 26.

Enemy Locations and Routes

4. When contact was opened the probable en dispositions were:
- a. A Coy (plus) in BINH BA.
  - b. A Coy (possibly heavy wpns coy) in vicinity of YS 440740 with the task of keeping withdrawal route to SOUTH WEST open.
  - c. A coy in square YS 4476 with the task of occupying DUC TRUNG and ambushing route 2.
  - d. Bn HQ with protection elms in the vicinity of YS 425750.

5. The en moved from an assembly area in the BINH BA guerilla base camp (possibly in square YS 4076) at 051500H to a forward assembly area (probably area of YS 425750). At 060300H a force left there to occupy BINH BA from the SOUTH WEST.

Conclusion

6. The en operation was probably mounted with one or both of the following aims:
- a. As part of a country wide offensive designed to influence current peace negotiations.
  - b. Relieve pressure to the NORTH where 6 RAR was blocking HQ 33rd Regt NVA from moving EAST to the base areas.

- Attachments:
1. Appendix 1 - Summary of contacts and incidents.
  2. Appendix 2 - Summary of Enemy Casualties, Captured wpns, Ammunition, Eqpt, Med & foodstuffs.

SUMMARY OF EN CASUALTIES, CAPTURED WEAPONS  
AMMUNITION, EQUIPMENT, MEDICAL STORES, FOODSTUFFS

1. En Casualties

43 KIA (BC)  
6 WIA (Blood Trail)  
8 POW  
1 HOI CHANH  
28 Male Detainees.

2. Captured Weapons

1 x 75mm RCR (Chicom Type 56)  
1 x 60mm Mor Tube  
2 x RPG7  
1 x RPG2  
1 x RPD MMG  
1 x Base Plate 82mm Mor  
1 x Bipod 82mm Mor  
6 x AK47  
3 x SKS  
1 x Garrand  
1 x Mossin Nagent  
3 x K54 Pistols.

3. Captured Ammunition

9 x RPG7 rounds  
12 x RPG2 rounds  
2 x Claymore Mine (Chicom)  
18 x Grenades  
1174 x AK47 (7.62mm short) rounds  
18 x 30 cal rounds  
11 x 82mm mor rounds  
5 x 62mm mor rounds  
3 x 60mm mor rounds  
1 x anti-tank grenade  
5 x Primers  
14 x Fuzes  
250 x 7.62mm rimmed link rounds.

4. Captured Equipment

1 x Transmitter & Receiver  
1 x Morse Key  
2 x Headsets & Leads  
1 x Transistor Radio (on fixed freq)  
5 x AK47 Mag Carrying cases  
30 x AK47 Mags  
12 x Water Bottles  
12 x Sets Webbing  
6 x NVA Packs  
8 x Carrying Bags  
1 x Cut Throat Razor  
7 x Sets toilet gear  
1 x Pair scissors  
6 x Gas masks  
10 x China Bowls  
5 x Entrenching Tool  
4 x Shovels  
7 x Wallets  
10 x VC Type Rifle Cleaning Rolls  
3 x VC Type lamps  
Large qty of assorted clothing  
Large qty of plastic sheeting  
Qty of assorted footwear  
Qty docus

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5. Medical Stores

4 x Tubes Buam  
7 bottles Telmin  
2 x Tins BCK  
5 x Bottles Vitamen E  
2 x Tubes Nazal Drops  
8 x Tubes Penicillen  
6 x Bottles Penicillen  
2 x Packets Pep Pills  
11 x PHOSPALUGE  
5 x Packets Anti-Worm powder  
2 x Laxettes  
9 x Bottles CITROSODINE  
7 x Tubes CHLOROQUIN Tablets  
7 x packets pills of unknown type  
2 x Syringes  
10 x Phials Vit D12  
11 x Phials HEPAMINE B12  
16 x Phials Coromine  
13 x Phials Glucoages  
20 x Phials Novocaine  
14 x Phials Vit B1  
20 x Phials Quinine  
6 x Phials Vit K  
8 x Phials Vit C  
14 Bandages  
2 Surgical Masks

6. Foodstuffs

8 x tins Foremost Milk  
5 x tins Fish  
16 lbs Sugar  
6 x packets Soup  
Qty Rice  
1 x packets Shrimp  
Qty Salt


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Trace I to 5RAR  
Combat after action  
Report 6 /69.  
Date Jun 69.

AO ANVIL.

REF Maps:

XA BINH BA 6430 III  
XUYEN MOC 6430 II  
I:50,000.



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CONFIDENTIALC Coy 5 RAR  
AP AN PHU

// Jun 69

HQ 1 ATF

C COY GP 5 RAR LATE READY REACTION COY  
COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION TONG

Reference: A. Map VIETNAM Sheet 6430-111 SE, XA BINH BA (SE), 1:25,000.

TO: Comd 1 ATF.

Name and Type of Operation

1. Operation TONG - Ready Reaction against an enemy force of unknown size reported to be entrenched in HOA LONG.

Dates of Operation

2. 7/8 Jun 69.

Location

3. NW segment of HOA LONG village and area to the west in map squares 40 64 and 41 64.

Control Headquarters

4. Deputy Commander 1 ATF located at sub-sector HQ, HOA LONG.

Task Organisation

5. Under op con C Coy 5 RAR from 081345H.
 

<p>one tp B Sqn 1 Armd Regt one tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt one Combat Engr team</p> <p>Remaining in DS</p> <p>In DS (as required)</p> <p>Attached for Liason Duties</p>	<p>105 Fd Bty, 1 Fd Regt one Mor sect 5 RAR</p> <p>one H13, 161 (Indep) Recce Flt. one Light Fire team</p> <p>S3 from HOA LONG Sub-Sector.</p>
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Supporting Forces

6. The following supporting elements were used:
  - a. Tp B Sqn 1 Armd Regt (and 2Lt D. RITCHIE)
    - (1) The tanks were used on several occasions to great effectiveness against enemy fire from concealed enemy positions. On each occasion the enemy fire was silenced.
    - (2) The tanks moved forward close to the leading two platoons which were moving dismounted (two sections up). Individual tanks were requested by the platoon commanders to deal with enemy fire using normal Inf Tk Co-op procedures.

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/b.

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- 2 -

b. Trp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt (Comd Capt R. de VERE)

- (1) After conveying C Coy to the SL, the APC's moved with the dismounted rifle platoons. They gave additional fire support in rear of the tanks and to the flanks. This proved valuable, particularly when fire opened up from enemy not located by the leading troops, including what appeared to be one or two snipers.
- (2) When not moving in close country (during part of 8 Jun), the complete Coy moved in APC's.

c. Combat Engr Team

- (1) The team was divided into Splinter Teams moving with each platoon.
- (2) Apart from one Chicom claymore (see para 23), no mines or booby traps were located. The team was used to demolish ammunition which was captured.

d. Arty and Mor Fire SP

- (1) After the arrival of C Coy there was no opportunity to use close indirect fire SP due to proximity of friendly troops and the availability of tanks.
- (2) Fire tasks were planned at all times.

e. H13, 161 (Indep) Recce Flt

Circled overhead in order to pass on any information about enemy movement. Later a second H13 arrived.

f. Light Fire Team

Available to hit enemy withdrawing to the west. At one stage fired on a likely enemy withdrawal position WEST of AP BAC. Results unknown but no bodies counted in a sweep of the area (see Annex A) on 8 Jun.

Intelligence

7. a. On 7 Jun RF reports indicated that an enemy force was firmly entrenched in the approximate vicinity of 416645 and the enemy had successfully resisted RF and Arty efforts to dislodge them.
- b. Two PW captured by the RF in HOA LONG claimed there were up to 200 enemy in the village.
- c. On 8 Jun, the District Chief of LONG LE received reports of enemy in the following areas:

NW of AP BAC 4164  
WEST of by pass road 4064 (enemy HQ)

Mission

8. To destroy the enemy force in NW HOA LONG.

Concept of Operations

9. See Annex A.

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/10

7 Jun 69

10. C Coy was to sweep from EAST to WEST with SL the road between 421645 and 420641. The close country and houses required C Coy to move dismounted two platoons up, with the tank troop (3 tanks), the APC troop giving intimate fire support. The whole Coy group was to move on the same axis, allowing a free fire zone to the WEST.

11. 236 RF Coy was to cordon the SOUTH flank. 577 RF Coy, 578 RF Coy and a platoon from 609 RF Coy were to cordon the NW, NORTH and NE exits of AP BAC village.

12. A Light Fire Team and Artillery and Mortars (directed by H13) were to deal with any enemy escaping over open ground to the WEST.

8 Jun 69

13. On subsequent orders from Deputy Comd 1 ATF, the sweep was to continue in three phases (see Annex A) to locate enemy in other areas (see Para 7c).

Execution

14. At approximately 1200 hours 7 Jun OC C Coy and his respective sp arms Comds were called to 1 ATF CP to be briefed on a probable future operation against enemy in HOA LONG village. C Coy was already on 30 minutes notice to react.

15. Whilst at HQ 1 ATF, further information was received about enemy in other areas, and there was some delay before the TF Ready Reaction Force could be committed. OC C Coy remained at 1 ATF during this time.

16. At approximately 1300 hours OC C Coy was ordered to have his Coy Gp at an assy area (428658) by 071500H. The Coy Comd and SP arms Comds were to move to HOA LONG Sub-Sector for briefing by the Deputy Commander 1 ATF.

17. Subsequent deployment timings were as follows:

1320 hours - OC C Coy left 1 ATF to return to 5 RAR to issue preliminary orders and collect 7 pl in APC's (these had been ordered for protection) and other members of the R Gp who were to meet him there at C Coy lines.

1400 hours - R Gp and 7 pl departed for HOA LONG.

1420 hours - R Gp and 7 pl arrived at Sub-sector HQ, OC C Coy briefed by Deputy Comd 1 ATF and flew over enemy area (H13 fired upon).

1430 hours - C Coy departed in APC's for RV with tanks (these were deployed).

1510 hours - C Coy Gp main body arrived at assembly area.

1525 hours - OC C Coy orders in assembly area.

1630 hours - C Coy Gp crossed SL in HOA LONG (this was delayed by break down of two tanks).

8. On arrival at SL, it became obvious that many of the villagers (mainly women and children) had remained in the area.
19. Soon after crossing the SL, the left forward platoon (moving NORTH of LEFT boundary - mill at 419641) moved into a large proportion of 236 RF Coy which were supposed to form the cordon further to the SOUTH.
20. At approximately 1700 hours the right forward platoon and APC's moving with them came under RPG and small arms fire in vicinity 417644. Opening range was approximately 50 yards.
21. Subsequently both leading platoons and their supporting AFVs, were involved in several contacts. Ranges were very close and it was difficult to locate the source of fire due to the thick vegetation. Fire came from at least three houses (most of the houses had bunkers underneath).
22. Several parts of the Reaction Force came under sniper fire which at one stage came from a large tree. Both the Comd tank and the Coy Comd's group with the Comd APC were conscious of aimed sniper fire. The sustained fire of the APC's moving in rear of the tanks were particularly effective against the snipers.
23. Enemy fire was small arms and RPG's (on at least six occasions). Pl Comds called for tank fire on several occasions when their sub-units came under fire. One occasion when 7 pl faced a Chicom claymore at 415645, tank fire was used to render the mine useless. Target indication was difficult and the more effective method of an infantryman to climb up to the tank turret was used.
24. The main enemy position evacuated was in the area 415644 to 416645. There was little time to stop and mop up after the firing, despite the reserve platoon (8 pl), moving 70 metres behind Coy HQ, killed and located one body, but fire from AFV's could have killed or wounded several more enemy particularly in three destroyed houses. It was not until 8 Jun that the 23 enemy pits in the area could be counted:
- |    |                |   |          |
|----|----------------|---|----------|
| 3  | three man pits | = | 9        |
| 15 | two man pits   | = | 30       |
| 5  | one man pits   | = | <u>5</u> |
|    |                |   | 44       |
25. A further six enemy pits were found at 414644 and three packs were located nearby including one belonging to a Commander. (8 Jun 69)
26. On reaching the bund on the Western extremity of AP BAC at approximately 1810 hours, the Reaction Force proceeded 100 metres north and then swept EAST to get the NORTH flank of the enemy from the rear.
27. At 1830 hours, the Coy Comd received orders to stay in HOA LONG for the night 7/8 Jun because the enemy were expected to return to the area to collect weapons they had discarded during contacts before fleeing as "civilians".
28. The Coy Comd ordered the force to harbour in the main area of enemy opposition (416645) to prevent enemy returning. At this stage (about 1840 hours) a further enemy armed with an RPG 7 and three rounds was located and killed by 9 platoon 200 metres to the NORTH.
29. During the night 7/8 Jun torches were seen shining about 200 yards outside the perimeter on two occasions. They could have been civilians returning to collect bodies or weapons. However the enemy did not collect the body of the enemy killed at last light.



CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

30. During the night 7/8 Jun the RF ambushed at the following locations:

414638  
417638  
414624  
423629  
420640  
424637

31. On 8 Jun, until 0900 hours, C Coy searched the immediate area of the main contact. A quantity of RPG rounds and small arms ammunition was recovered. Houses in the immediate area had tunnels which could only be searched superficially, for example, after C Coy continued their sweep 4 unarmed VC (including 3 women) were captured by RF in a well hidden tunnel inside the C Coy perimeter where they had spent the night.

32. At 080800H the body of a friendly Vietnamese soldier (found the previous day by 9 platoon) was recovered and sent back to Sub-sector. OC C Coy was informed that another Vietnamese soldier was present when the VC killed him.

33. After the search of the immediate area, C Coy continued their sweep in three phases (see Annex A). Most of the sweep was done with rifle platoons dismounted in a similar formation to 7 Jun as visibility was limited and enemy were to be expected. The only fresh signs of enemy found were as follows:

415648 3 freshly dug weapon pits and some AK 47 rounds.

414644 Six enemy pits and three packs (containing documents, civilian clothes and ammunition). These were in an area subjected to fire the previous day.

34. At 081600H when the Reaction Force had completed their allotted sweep, the force was ordered to form a mounted block WEST of AP BAC, and be prepared to assist RF operations against a small VC group in the village. At 081620H the Reaction Force was released.

Results

35. Enemy casualties in HOA LONG area were difficult to estimate. C Coy had only two hours of daylight to deal with the enemy on 7 Jun and had to move as quickly as the thick country and houses would allow without bothering about locating bodies. During the night the enemy had an opportunity to remove dead or wounded.

36. The following were certain enemy casualties:

KIA 6 VC (two bodies seen by C Coy during contacts, two fresh bodies found by villagers at 419661, covered by leaves, two killed by RF).

PW 2 VC (captured by RF)

4 VCI (captured by RF in tunnel when C Coy vacated harbour).

/37

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37. It is fairly certain that several other enemy casualties were inflicted by heavy AFV fire during the sweep 7 Jun.

38. Aust Casualties: Nil.

Lessons Learnt and Relearnt


39. The need for sufficient time for Infantry and tanks to marry up in the assembly area. Two of the three tanks became unserviceable and their replacements arrived as C Coy was about to leave without them. The "ad hoc" troop (due to tank casualties on previous day) performed extremely well. However, for a while the platoon commanders were confused by tanks using different callsigns to their markings. This was subsequently rectified.

40. The continuing need for certain riflemen to have the specific task to look for snipers in trees.

41. Ready Reaction time can be saved by the force Commander having the opportunity to carry out an air recce of a likely task when it appears probable that the force will be committed enabling him to give preliminary orders. In this case the Reaction Force Commander had never had the opportunity to recce HOA LONG before 7 Jun. (1440 hours).

Estimate of Enemy Force

42. Fresh weapon pits sufficient for 56 enemy were located in areas 415644 - 416645 - 414644 (the main area of contact). It is not certain how many of these pits were occupied during contact, probably some enemy were fighting a delaying action to enable others to melt into the population. Captured documents examined at the contact site indicated at least three groups of enemy belonging to C41, giving names and weapons. The three groups had 8, 11, and 16 men respectively. This total of 35 was closer to the mark than the 200 reported by the VC PW.





(C.H. Ducker)  
Maj  
OC C Coy 5 RAR


- Annexes:
- A. Outline of Operation TONG
  - B. List of items captured by C Coy 5 RAR.

ANNEX 'A' TO CCOY 5RAR  
AFTER ACTION REPORT

GENERAL OUTLINE  
OPERATION TONG



ASSY Area  
071510H



PITS FOR 12 EN  
PITS FOR 44 EN

KEY (DIRECTION OF SWEEPS)

- | <u>7 JUNE</u>  | <u>8 JUNE</u>                  |
|----------------|--------------------------------|
| ① 1645-1810hrs | ② PHASE I                      |
| ② 1810-1830hrs | ④ PHASE II                     |
|                | ⑤ PHASE III                    |
|                | ⑥ BLOCK FOR RF CONTACT 1600hrs |

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ANNEX B TO  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION TONG

LIST OF ITEMS CAPTURED  
BY C COY 5 RAR

1 RPG 7  
4 RPG 7 rounds  
5 RPG 7 boosters  
2 RPG secondary charges  
3 RPG 2 rounds  
200 .3006 rounds (in black bag)  
60 7.62 short rounds (in green bag)  
4 AK 47 rounds  
1 Chicom Claymore  
1 M26 grenade  
2 US pattern 56 web belts  
1 magazine carrier (VC type)  
1 US water bottle carrier  
1 sling (VC type)  
2 ponchos (VC type)  
1 cup canteen  
1 first field dressing  
1 compass pouch  
1 improvised lamp in bottle (VC type)  
2 large packs  
1 US type 1956 Fd pack  
1 ~~Diary~~ containing ammunition states for sub-unit of C41  
(Chau Duc) Coy.  
1 Road map of Saigon  
1 VC movement order  
Other documents  
1 pr Sandals (VC type)  
1 pr Green shorts  
1 Blue shirt  
1 pr Dark blue trousers  
1 Entrenching tool.

12 Jun 69

R569-1-22

See Distr List:

5 RAR COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT 4/69  
OPERATION TWICKENHAM 1 AND 2

- References:
- A. 5 RAR Op O 9/69 dated 29 Apr 69.
  - B. HQ 1 ATF Op Instr 38/69 of 292330Z Apr 69.
  - C. 1 ATF Op Instr 47/69 of May 69.
  - D. Map VIETNAM, BINH BA, 6430-111, 1 : 50,000.
  - E. Map VIETNAM, VUNG TAU, 6429-1V, 1 : 50,000.

Name and type of Operation

1. Op TWICKENHAM -- Recce in Force (RIF) op in AO ILLAWARRA.

Dates of Operation

2. a. Op TWICKENHAM 1 -- 2-13 May 69.  
b. Op TWICKENHAM 2 -- 13 May-1 Jun 69.

Location

3. AO ILLAWARRA, centre of mass YS 3057 in SW PHUOC TUY province.

Control Headquarters

4. HQ 5 RAR, under comd HQ 1 ATF based at NUI DAT.

Task Organization

5. a. Op TWICKENHAM 1

Under op con from 020630H May 69

one tp B Sqn 1 Armd Regt  
two mor carriers B Sqn 3 Cav Regt  
one TD 15 dozer  
one D 4 dozer  
one backhoe  
one 100 gal tar truck  
one RF coy

Remaining under op con

one sect B Sqn 3 Cav Regt  
HQ 2 Tp and one combat engr team  
1 Fd Sqn

Under op com from 020630H May  
until rel same day

two sects B Sqn 3 Cav Regt

Under op con from 030630H May  
until rel approx 031100H May

one tp B Sqn 3 Cav Regt

Remaining in DS

105 Fd Bty, 1 Fd Regt  
one H13, 161 (Indep) Recce Flt

- b. Op TWICKENHAM 2

Remaining under comd

one combat engr team

Remaining under op con

one tp B Sqn 1 Armd Regt  
one sect B Sqn 3 Cav Regt

Remaining in DS

105 Fd Bty, 1 Fd Regt  
one H13, 161 (Indep) Recce Flt  
two mor carriers, B Sqn 3 Cav  
Regt

Under op con from 220830H until  
rel 22 May 69

Remaining in op

one tp B Sqn 3 Cav Regt

one D4 Dozer  
one backhoe  
one ACV B Sqn 3 Cav Regt

Intelligence

6. Annex A

Mission

7. To conduct RIF ops in AO ILLAWARRA with a view to locating and destroying VC and VC instls in AO.

Concept of Operations

8. Ops TWICKENHAM 1 and 2 were designed to disrupt the activity of VC elms in the NUI THI VAI, NUI DINH areas which have long been a haven for VC and NVA elms op against ROUTE 15. This area also was known to harbour village guerilla units and VC infrastructure.

9. 5 RAR were inserted by ft and APC's with the initial task of moving to and ambushing approaches to the NUI THI VAI and NUI TOC TIEN area. On completion of this task which was expected to take at least four days, coys then searched in the sub AO's to loc and destroy en camp instls. Once this search was completed, coys were to redeploy and conduct similar ops in the area of NUI DINH - NUI BAO QUAN.

10. Op TWICKENHAM 1 proceeded as planned but prior to redeployment to area of NUI DINH - NUI BAO QUAN 5 RAR were committed to Op ROADSIDE in BIEN HOA.

11. For Op TWICKENHAM 2, two coys moved back into the area of NUI THI VAI - NUI TOC TIEN, while the other two coys op in the area of NUI DINH - NUI BAO QUAN. Eventually all coys were redeployed into the latter area.

Execution

12. Annex B - Sequence of Events

Results

13. Casualties

a. Op TWICKENHAM 1

(1) VC	-	11 KIA (BC)
	-	1 WIA
(2) Aust	-	1 KIA
	-	6 WIA

b. Op TWICKENHAM 2

(1) VC	-	11 KIA (BC)
	-	5 WIA
(2) Aust	-	1 KIA
	-	2 WIA

14. Installations and Equipment - Annex A

...../Lessons Learned

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
- 3 -

Lessons Learned

15. Ambushing of en tracks, waterholes in the initial phase (ie. 4-5 days) of an RIF op is very profitable.
16. Max insertion of rifle coys by ft should be employed if any form of surprise is required.
17. The VC will continue to use the same tracks no matter how many contacts may have taken place on them. Eleven VC were killed at the same pt over three weeks in nine different contacts.
18. This op has reconfirmed that the VC will remain hidden in base camp areas, avoiding all contact until he is physically walked upon by our searching tps. There were several examples of areas being searched with no result but the next day different tps in the same area finding en. The VC stand a better chance of survival by remaining hidden rather than them continually moving to new areas.
19. Again, as in op SURFSIDE, local guides were of considerable value.
20. A local RF rifle coy from PHUOC HOI came under op con for day 1t hrs during the first phase of this op. This was an experiment and in getting local tps into the bush showed promise. Australian LO's (MAT teams) must move with the South Vietnamese coy and the coy should not be given much ground to search. It is considered that two map squares is the max they can search in one day. The RF coy liked the sp of tks and APC's but was reluctant to use arty. Of a ni time one pl remained in ambush over 3,000 metres from the Highway '15' and appeared to be gaining confidence in 'deeper' ops.
21. On contact the en broke from the area quickly moving through the jungle then coming back on the track when he considered he was clear of the contact area.
22. The use of flame throwers during A Coys contact in the caves proved to be of considerable value in neutralizing en fire.
23. Although the use of arty in the mountains was watched carefully, no major problems were encountered in the use of high angle fire and it proved most effective.

(C.N. KHAN)  
Lt Col  
CO

Authenticated:

  
(A.B. FERRIMAN)  
Maj  
Ops Offr

Annexes: Annex A. Intelligence Summary  
Annex B. Sequence of Events

Appendixes:

- Appendix 1 - Summary of Contacts and Incidents  
Appendix 2 - Summary of en cas, wpons and eqpt

Traces:

- Trace 1 and 1A - Areas of Ops TWICKENHAM I and II  
Trace 2 and 2A - Coy routes of Ops TWICKENHAM I and II  
Trace 3 and 3A - Contacts, Incidents, Instls Ops TWICKENHAM I and II

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- 4 -

Distr: H Q 1ATF (12)

Internal

CO  
2IC  
Ops Offr  
IO  
A Coy (2)  
B Coy (2)  
C Coy (2)  
D Coy (2)  
Sp Coy (2)  
Admin Coy (2)  
C P  
File (2)  
War Diary (5)  
Spare (5)

For Info:

B Sqn 1 Armd Regt  
B Sqn 3 Cav Regt  
105 Fd Bty  
1 Fd Regt  
161 (Indep) Recce Flt  
6 RAR  
7 RAR  
8 RAR  
9 RAR  
D Inf (2)

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ANNEX A TO 5 RAR  
COMBAT AFTER ACTION  
REPORT 4/69  
DATED JUN 69

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

General

1. Reports that en forces, both local guerilla and main force, were using this area in sizeable numbers was verified. However the expected presence of a coy of D445 was not proven.

Enemy Controlled  
D67 Engineer/Recce Battalion

2. Posn ident was made of HQ D67 Engr/Recce Bn at YS 312699. The sub-units of this bn ident were G22, the Bn HQ pl and the Bn Med sect. The presence of NVA regulars in this unit was also confirmed. This unit fought consistently well. It was well armed with AW's, RPG's and directional AP mines.

3. Phuoc Thai Village Unit (Thai Thien)

This unit was ident by contact with 10 plus at YS 288772 on 27 May 69. Their permanent camp was not loc. Also ident in this contact was a member of G5, the Rear Services coy of D445. This suggests that maybe more of D445 Bn was in that area.

4. Documentary evidence suggests that the fol units were occupying the base camp found at YS 328671:

- a. Chau Duc District Civil Health Sect
- b. Long Son Party Chapter
- c. Baria Province Military Sect

This is also suggested by there being women and children in this camp.

5. The **Pl Comd** of the Provincial Int sub sect was contacted and killed at YS 311722 on 7 May 69.

Base Camps

6. Three major base camps were found. These were at:

- a. YS 314698
- b. YS 303708
- c. YS 328671

In all instances maximum use was made of the natural caves and crevices to afford protection and shelter from the weather and allied fire power

Conclusion

7. The en obviously regards this area as a safe storage, transit and **trg** area. Because of the rocky nature of the terrain it is impossible to destroy all the posns he can use to his advantage, both for storage and def. Therefore it is most likely he will continue to use this area as before.

8. It is recommended that cont pressure be exerted in this area by F

Appendixes: Appendix 1 - Contacts and Incidents  
Appendix 2 - Summary of En cas, Wpns/Eqpt captured.

Traces: Trace 1 & 1A - Areas of op OP TWICKENHAM  
Trace 2 & 2A - Coy routes of op OP TWICKENHAM  
Trace 3 & 3A - Contacts, Incidents, Instls, OP TWICKENHAM

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO  
5 RAR COMBAT AFTER ACTION  
REPORT 4/69  
DATED MAY 69

SUMMARY OF CONTACTS AND INCIDENTS

SERIAL	DATE/TIME	LOCATION	C/S	ACTIVITY
1	MAY 041940H	YS 300691	22	Contacted unknown no of en - en withdrew NORTH with unknown results
2	042115H	YS 300691	22	Contacted unknown no of en - Possible same gp as previous contact - unknown results
3	050625H	YS 314725	11	Contacted 3 en moving NORTH to SOUTH 2 en KIA (BC)
4	050830H	YS 314725	11	Contacted 10 en moving SOUTH to NORTH 3 en KIA (BC)
5	050950H	YS 318705	61	Contacted 5 en who withdrew SOUTH 2 en KIA (BC)
6	051146H	YS 291627	71	Loc 15lb of CHICOM explosives and a electric detonator switch (Route 15)
7	051527H	YS 313724	11	Contacted 2 en in black 2 en KIA (BC)
8	061335H	YS 313724	11C	Contacted 2 en moving NORTH to SOUTH 1 en KIA (BC)
9	061900H	YS 332708	4	Sighted 1 en moving on fire trail 200 metres away
10	061941H	YS 312721	12	Received en fire in their loc - no friendly cas
11	062050H	YS 322706	41	Contacted 1 en who approached their trail - nil results
12	<del>070925H</del>	YS 311722	12	Contacted 1 en on track 1 en KIA (BC)
13	071030H	YS 291716	3	Loc a cache of sleeping and digging eqpt also found an old camp
14	071106H	YS 291716	3	Found a set of TNT detonators in cave
15	071413H	YS 321636	T21	Sighted a stone dwelling under a rock
16	071436H	YS 321636	T21	Found a claymore mine-found rice cache in rocks
17	071600H	YS 322695	4	Loc a bunker system of 30 bunkers and food & rice cache
18	071900H	YS 283739	3	Sighted 2 pers req arty unknown results
19	072150H	YS 318707	61	Contacted 1 en who came EAST unknown results
20	081100H	YS 355696	43B	Contacted 3 en in bunkers 1 Aust WIA
21	081225H	YS 315696	43	Found ammo and med, food cache
22	081415H	YS 309699	22	Contacted 1 en who withdrew with nil results
23	081509H	YS 286667	42	Loc 7 bunkers in good condition
24	091510H	YS 292714	3	Found a cave with 2 bags CS crystals and a booby trap
25	090950H	YSN304712	12A	Loc a rest area
26	091020H	YS 297710	32	Loc cave
27	091120H	YS 30 3710	12A	Found a fresh grave
28	091325H	YS 288712	32	Loc 5 bunkers - not used 12 months
29	091338H	YS 306 701	2	Loc a series of caves. Not used
30	091545H	YS 287704	33	Loc a bunker system - with booby traps both 8 months old
31	091545H	YS 318686	4	Sighted 3 persons in black
32	091900H	YS 287704	3	Sighted 2 pers in black
33	100814H	YS 315699	61	Loc 2 new graves
34	10 0840H	YS 304704	22	Loc an old camp and 303 rifle
35	100845H	YS 313697	61	Found a cache of ammo, food and med sups
36	100959H	YS 315655	T21	Ran over mine pressure switch-the charge had been taken out of mine
37	101010H	YD 307702	23	Loc a squad sized rest area
38	101205H	YS 309699	2	Found signs of 4 persons, 1 wounded
39	101223H	YS 313698	61	Loc a camp and ammo, food med & clothing cache
40	101325H	YS 310698	21	Found a en cache with 2 RPG rounds, food and clothing in it

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- 2 -

SERIAL	DATE/TIME	LOCATION	C/S	ACTIVITY
41	101437H	YS 314657	71A	Loc 2 very old bunkers
42	101440H	YS 317712	42	Loc 32 bunkers -- not used for 6 weeks
43	102048H	YS 286716	31A	Contacted 5 en with unknown results
44	110900H	YS 303708	11	Loc a large camp area
45	111200H	YS 304713	1	Loc 2 camp areas with blacksmiths eqpt
46	111215H	YS 304709	11	Contacted 10 en in a well prep post the fire fight cont for seven hrs 1 Aust KIA 2 Aust WIA
47	111400H	YS 309699	2	Loc 50 bunkers and ammo, food, med cache
48	120847H	YS 280735	T21	Hit a mine -- 1 APC damaged -- no cas
49	130725H	YS 304709	4	Found en camp and ammo cache
50	221135H	YS 312727	TA1	Detonated a pressure type mine of 50 lbs
51	221732H	YS 302701	23	Heard voices then saw 1 person 300 metres to the NW
52	230741H	YS 302708	23	Sighted one en dressed in black
53	231105H	YS 312721	12	Contacted one en on a track-- 1 en KIA (BC)
54	231500H	YS 308698	4	Loc unknown lecture rooms & cover containing explosives
55	231611H	YS 310670	29	Loc a base camp with old bunkers, also trees with markings meaning instl
56	231625H	YS 333652	31	Contacted 6 en with possible RPD--1 en KIA (BC) 1 en KIA (Possible)
57	240935H	YS 312721	12	Sighted 2 en in black and carrying wpns
58	241100H	YS 331647	33	Contacted 1 en who came from the NE 1 en KIA (BC)
59	241455H	YS 330650	3	Loc a camp & caves which accomodate 15 en
	241930H	YS 304708	4	Loc an en camp with wpn & ammo cache
61	251720H	YS 338660	32	Found one old bunker & ft prints 1 hr old
62	260900H	YS 315667	23	Contacted 3 en who approached from EAST 1 en WIA
63	261530H	YS 312633	4 & 42	Contacted 10 en with RPG 2--2 en KIA (BC)
64	270745H	YS 325675	21	Contacted 1 en with AK47--unknown results
65	271530H	YS 305760	11	Detained 4 pers who said they were woodcutters
66	271516H	YS 288772	12	Contacted 15 en who came from NNW--3 en KIA (BC) 2 en WIA
67	281545H	YS 333671	3	Loc a rest area, had been used recently
68	281702H	YS 327671	32	Contacted 1 en with AK47--1 en WIA
69	290732H	YS 339671	3	Loc en camp and food, med cache
70	290900H	YS 288772	12	Contacted 3 en with RPG-- 1 en KIA (BC) 1 en WIA
71	291309H	YS 332679	23	Loc recently used en base camp
72	291355H	YS 339689	42	Contacted 1 en dressed in black--1 en KIA (BC)
73	291835H	YS 332671	34	Contacted 1 en who approached from WEST 1 en KIA (BC)
74	291915H	YS 327672	3	Loc 9 bunkers in good condition
75	301125H	YS 325666	3	Loc a fresh grave 4-7 days old
76	301413H	YS 325672	3	Loc an old bunker system
77	301705H	YS 337683	4	Found a rest area used in last 48 hrs
78	301819H	YS 287771	1	Loc en camp, possibly used in last 6 hrs
79	311000H	YS 328672	33	Loc a wpn and ammo cache

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A TO  
5 RAR COMBAT AFTER ACTION  
REPORT 4/69  
DATED JUN 69

SUMMARY OF ENEMY CASUALTIES, CAPTURED WEAPONS  
AMMUNITION, EQUIPMENT, MEDICAL SUPPLIES, FOODSTUFFS & BUNKERS

1. EN CASUALTIES

22 KIA (BC)  
1 KIA (Possible)  
5 WIA (Blood Trail)

2. CAPTURED WEAPONS

8 AK47 Assault Rifle  
2 RPG 2 Rkt Launcher  
1 M16 Rifle  
1 M1 Carbine  
1 Springfield Rifle  
2 CHICOM SMG  
1 Homemade Rifle  
1 K54 Pistol  
1 M3 SMG

3. CAPTURED AMMUNITION

3570 7.62mm Short (AK47) Rounds  
14 B40 Rounds  
6 B41 Rounds  
19 B40 Boosters  
5 60mm Mor Rounds  
20 Hand Grenades  
8 A tk Grenades  
50 Grenades Head atts  
50 Grenade springs  
1800 Detonators  
350 ft of safety fuze  
158 lbs CHICOM explosive  
12 Bangalore torpedoes  
7 Flares  
40 30 cal rounds  
4 45 cal rounds  
300 7.92mm rounds  
1000 5.56mm rounds  
2 Bags CS crystals

4. CAPTURED EQUIPMENT

18 Sets webbing  
1 Typewriter  
2 Boxes  $4\frac{1}{2}$  volt batteries  
4 Vices  
2 Grinding wheels  
1 watch  
1 Blacksmiths furnace  
11 Saws  
1 Hand drill  
3 Hammers  
3 Chisels  
8 Hoes  
1 Torch  
7 Shovels  
Large qty of cable  
1 Pistol belt & holster  
1 Offrs carrying case  
32 AK47 mags

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Large qty of civ clothing  
Qty of NVA uniforms  
Qty of Plastic sheeting  
Qty of tentage  
Large qty of cooking utensils  
6 6' canvas squares  
Large qty of docus  
14 packs

5. MEDICAL SUPPLIES

1 Gal of Blood Plasma  
10 Bottles Anti Biotics  
30 Phials Vitamin E  
20 Phials Vitamin K  
19 Phials Novocaine  
11 Phials Morphine  
14 Phials Quinine  
8 Phials Penicillin  
1 Litre Glucose  
Large qty of assorted drugs  
Qty of bandages  
Qty of Med instruments

6. FOODSTUFFS

3011 lbs Rice  
350 lbs Salt  
Qty of tinned food  
Qty of Sugar

7. BUNKERS, PITS AND CAVES

159 Bunkers  
20 Pits  
7 Caves

OP TWICKENHAM - SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Day 1

2 May 69

- 0800 hrs - B coy deployed into AO ILLAWARRA by rd from NUI DAT with sect A Sqn, tp B Sqn, Engr plant and stores and one sect mors.
- 0900 hrs - Bn HQ recce party fly in from FSPB BRUISER to LZ SUSAN.
- 1000 hrs - A, C coys returned to NUI DAT by rd.
- 1500 hrs - D coy extracted by air to NUI DAT.
- 1600 hrs - Bn HQ, 105 Fd Bty cleared FSPB BRUISER for NUI DAT.

Ni locs - 5 RAR (-) NUI DAT, B coy FSPB SUSAN

Day 2

3 May 69

- AM - A, C coys, Bn HQ and 105 Fd Bty moved by rd convoy from NUI DAT into FSPB SUSAN YS 2865. A & C coys moved to debussing pt in YS 2571
- 0700 hrs - D coy departed from NUI DAT in APC's to approach AO from EAST.
- 1900 hrs - Party of 5 en sighted at a distance by C coy moving from SOUTH to NORTH at YS 292712, due to future tasks en were not engaged by arty.

Ni locs - A coy HQ, 2 pl YS 276726, 1 pl YS 274727, 3 pl YS 279727  
B coy HQ, 4 pl YS 289670, 5 pl YS 296673, 6 pl YS 286673  
C coy HQ, 8 pl YS 279717, 7 pl YS 285716, 9 pl YS 279722  
ptl of 7 pl YS 283716  
D coy HQ YS 339714, 10 pl YS 337714, Tracker pl YS 329710  
12 pl YS 331698  
Bn HQ, Mor pl (-), 11 pl, Ech pl, 1 Tp B Sqn, 3 sect 3 Tp A Sqn,  
105 Fd Bty FSPB SUSAN

Day 3

4 May 69

- Coys deployed into ambush posns in fol locs surrounding NUI THI VAI - A Coy NORTH B Coy SE C Coy NW D Coy EAST
- 1959 hrs - 5 pl contcted at least 1 en at YS 300691, no results
- Ni Locs - A Coy HQ & 2 pl YS 305724, 1 pl YS 314725, 3 pl YS 294725  
B Coy HQ & 4 pl YS 294686, 5 pl YS 300691, 6 pl YS 286688  
C Coy HQ YS 285716, 7 pl YS 286717, 8 pl YS 285715, 9 pl YS 278724  
D Coy HQ YS 337710, 10 pl YS 335708, 12 pl YS 326697 Tracker pl YS 320706  
Bn HQ, Mor pl (-), 11 pl (-), ech pl, sect A Sqn, tp B Sqn,  
sect Mor APC's - FSPB SUSAN sect 11 pl YS 281654

Day 4

5 May 69

- 0625 hrs - 1 pl contacted 3 local en wearing black clothes with webbing fol dressing and water bottles. En were carrying 75 lbs rice, 6 candles, several docus and 2500 Dong. En approached ambush from NORTH and stopped and rested 25 metres from ambush. At 0620 hrs en started SOUTH singing and well spread out. 2 en KIA (BC) 1 AK47 captured.
- 0730 hrs - 6 pl loc 2 ox carts with 2 old men, women and children at YS 287686 ID cards were checked then people fled SOUTH. Apprehended by APC's and taken to ONG TRINH Post

- 0830 hrs - 1 pl contacted 10 plus en at YS 314725. En were local wearing black uniforms and moved from SOUTH to NORTH. 3 en KIA (BC) 1 en WIA 1 XMI rifle and fwd stock of M1 rifle.
- 0930 hrs - Tracker pl contacted 4-5 en at YS 301726. While moving from ni loc to WEST Tracker pl heard noises on right flank. Fwd scout opened up on en, 2 en KIA (BC). En withdrew SOUTH.
- 1200 hrs - MAT team loc mines and CHICOM explosives in area of AP LONG CAT YS 2962. Combat Engr Team from NUI DAT called fwd to clear area.
- 1527 hrs - 1 pl contacted 2 local en wearing black at YS 313724. En were moving SW to WEST. 2 en KIA (BC) 1 AK47, 1 RPG with 3 warheads and 4 boosters

Ni Locs

A Coy HQ, 2pl YS 305724, 1 pl YS 313724, 3 pl YS 309717  
B Coy HQ YS 292685, 4 pl Y S 299684, 5 pl YS 294686, 6 pl YS 287690  
C Coy HQ 9 pl YS 285716, 7 pl YS 294686, 8 pl YS 285715  
D Coy HQ YS 329707, 10 pl YS 322706, 12 pl YS 320696 Tracker pl YS318708  
Bn HQ, Mor pl (-), tp B Sqn 1 Armd Regt, 11 pl FSPB SUSAN  
sect A Sqn YS 275671

Day 5

6 May 69

- 0944 hrs 1 pl while moving along track at YS 311719 clashed with 3 pl in ambush. 3 Aust WIA
- 1335 hrs While moving NORTH along track sect 1 pl contacted 2 en at YS313724. En came from NORTH 1 en KIA (BC) 1 AK47 and 4 mags
- 1559 hrs 10 pl reported metallic banging noises in possible en camp at YS303699
- 1900 hrs D coy reported 1 en seen by sentry at YS 332708. Tapping noises indicated others in party
- 1941 hrs 2 pl reported en loc 100 metres NW of his posn at YS 312721. En fired some rounds into 2 pl posn. 2 pl did not return fire but heard sounds of mov
- 2050 hrs 10 pl heard 1 en moving at YS 322706. En approached from EAST and withdrew EAST

Ni Locs

A Coy HQ & 1 pl YS 311720, 2 pl YS 312721, 3 pl YS 309717  
B Coy HQ YS 292687, 4 pl YS 300685, 5 pl YS 295686, 6 pl YS 287691  
C Coy HQ & 9 pl YS 285716, 7 pl YS 294715, 8 pl YS 279714  
D Coy HQ YS329707, 10 pl YS322706, 12 pl YS320696, Tracker pl YS318708  
Bn HQ, Mor pl (-), tp B Sqn, 105 Fd Bty, Ech pl, 11 pl(-) FSPB SUSAN  
sect A Sqn, sect 11pl YS 276672 RF pl YS 312644

Day 6

7 May 69

- 0925 hrs 2 pl while sweeping area of YS 311722 contacted one en wearing black pyjamas, pistol, food and docs. En had been wounded by sect 1 pl contact at 061335H. 1 en KIA (BC), 1 K54 chichom pistol
- 1030 hrs C Coy loc cache at YS 291716 containing 6' x 3' canvas stretchers 7'x6'x6' canvas square, pots cooking utensils, plates and cups hand drill, hammers, chisels spade & hoe. Old cave room with space for 30-40 pers. Not used for at least 12 months, explosives with detonators also loc at rear of cave.
- 1342 hrs Tp tks loc temple at YS 321636. Further check revealed a VC claymore in building and qty of rice.
- 1600 hrs D coy found a bunker system of 25-30 bunkers at YS 322695 used recently by 4-5 pers, containing a qty of food and eqpt and med sups

1900 hrs G coy sighted 2 people moving EAST at YS 283729. En were engaged with arty.

2150 hrs Tracker pl contacted 1 en at YS 318707. En came from EAST and moved off to WEST.

Ni locs  
A Coy HQ, 1 pl YS311721, 2 pl YS312721, 3 pl YS 309717  
B Coy HQ, 5 pl YS 307695, 4 pl YS 307691, 6 pl YS 305699  
C Coy HQ, 8 pl YS 285716, 7 pl YS 294715, 9 pl YS 288717  
D Coy HQ, YS 326704, 10 pl YS322706, Tracker pl YS318695 12pl YS318695  
Bn HQ, Mor pl(-), sect A Sqn, tp B Sqn, Ech pl, 11 pl, 105 Fd Bty  
FSPB SUSAN RF Pl YS 302633

Day 7

8 May 69

1100 hrs 12 pl contacted 2-3 en local en at YS 315696 moving EAST. Fwd scout loc then and turned around to give fd sig. He was shot in back. 1 AUST WIA

1225 hrs In area of YS 314698, 12 pl found 12 bangalore torpedoes 5'6" long 4 X 15lb blocks and 11½ X ½lb blocks of chicom explosives, 6 X RPG 7rounds and 4 boosters, 4 electric pressure devices for anti veh mines, 40 lbs rice and 15 lbs of other food, qty clothing and 200-300 assorted med sups.

1415 hrs 5 pl whilst const LZ at YS 309699 were fired on by 1 en who approached from EAST and withdrew SOUTH

1500 hrs 11 pl loc 7 bunkers in good condition at YS 286667 used in the last month.

1510 hrs G coy found cave at YS 292714 30 ft deep containing 2 bags CS crystals, det cord and body about 9-12 months old

Ni Locs  
A Coy HQ, 1pl YS311720, 2 pl YS304714, 3 pl YS313714  
B Coy HQ, 5pl YS309699, 4 pl YS307697, 6pl YS307703  
C Coy HQ, 8pl YS294711, 7 pl 294714, 9 pl YS 288717  
D Coy HQ YS326704, 10 pl YS322706, Tracker pl YS326706  
12 pl YS 327695 Bn HQ, Mor pl (-), Ech pl, Sect A Sqn, tp B Sqn,  
105 Fd Bty FSPB SUSAN RF Pl YS 326634

Day 8

9 May 69

0950 hrs Sect 2 pl at YS 304712 loc a rest area containing metal objects, tin sheets, old tin cans picquets and fire irons.

1545 hrs 9 pl found a bunker system at YS 287704. 3 Chicom grenades also found. Two of them were set up as booby traps. Bunkers unused for past 8 months

1745 hrs C Coy loc remains of Iroquois at YS 281704. Proved to be AUST crashed - 2 yrs old. Sect 11 Pl YS 281654.

Ni Locs  
A Coy HQ, 2 pl YS 304713, 1 pl YS 303710, 3 pl YS 305716  
B Coy HQ, 5 pl YS 309699, 4 pl YS 294714, 6 pl YS 309699  
C Coy HQ, 8 pl YS 294711, 7 pl YS 294714, 9 pl YS 289703  
D Coy HQ, YS 326704, 10 pl YS 319711, Tracker pl YS 315699,  
12 pl YS 318692  
Bn HQ, Mor pl (-), Ech pl, Sect A Sqn, Tp B Sqn, 105 Fd Bty  
FSPB SUSAN.

Day 9

10 May 69

0814 hrs At YS 313697 Tracker pl loc 2 graves 2-3 days old, 100 lbs salt and 13 cwt rice, 40 dets with switches and det cord, 1 bottle anti-biotics.

0845 hrs At YS 313697 elms 5 pl loc old en camp with .303 rifle and pack with docus and food, 2 RPG, 2 rounds and a booster.



- 1002 hrs At US 253732, tk B Sqn ran over a mine pressure switch. Charge apparently had been lifted.
- 1223 hrs Tracker pl found camp at YS 313698 with 7 x RPG 2 rounds, 1 booster, 1 atk grenades, 1 home made grenade, 7 flares, 2500 x AK47 rounds, 300 dets, instant fuse, soap, med sups, tinned food, docus, plastic sandals, 200 lbs rice, 100 lbs salt, 3 anti-biotic pills, 1 typewriter, large qty clothes and hutchies.
- 2048 hrs Sect 7 pl contacted 5 en at YS 286716. En believed to withdraw to EAST - nil results.

Ni Locs A Coy HQ, 2 pl YS 304713, 1 pl YS 303710, 3 pl YS 302712  
B Coy HQ, 5 pl, 6 pl YS 309699, 4 pl YS 314698  
C Coy HQ, 9 pl YS 294711, 7 pl YS 280722, 8 pl YS 295706  
D Coy HQ, 10 pl YS 326704, Tracker pl YS 324696, 12 pl YS 318692  
Bn HQ, Mor pl (-), 11 pl, Ech pl, Sect A Sqn, Tp B Sqn, 105 Fd  
Bty FSPB SUSAN.

Day 10

11 May 69

- 0854 hrs 1 pl moved 200 metres SOUTH of ni loc and found empty fish tins and hutchie spares.
- 0930 hrs 1 pl found old caves in area YS 303708 with old rats lying around - large system with tables and chairs.
- 1200 hrs A Coy loc two living areas with 2 water pipes at YS 304713.
- 1207 hrs 1 pl found vices, grinding wheels and blacksmiths furnace.
- 1215 hrs 1 pl initially contacted at least 10 en entrenched in bunkers and caves at YS 304709. En armed with RPGs, Claymores, grenades and Garand type rifles. En remained and fought. Two sects 1 pl initially swept from low to high ground and suffered cas. En remained and fought and were still in posn at last lt. Own cas: 1 KIA, 2 WIA. En cas not known.

Ni Locs A Coy HQ, 2 pl YS 304713, 1 pl, 3 pl YS 303710  
B Coy HQ YS 314698, 4 pl YS 314699, 5 pl YS 313698, 6 pl YS 314697  
C Coy HQ, 7 pl, 9 pl YS 285716, 8 pl YS 301700  
D Coy HQ, 12 pl, Tracker pl YS 309704, 10 pl YS 326704  
Bn HQ, Mor pl (-), Ech pl, 11 pl, Sect A Sqn, Tp B Sqn, 105 Fd  
Bty FSPB SUSAN.

- 1415 hrs Albatross sustained lt damage from area of contact.
- 1915 hrs 5 RAR nominated as ready reaction force for Bien Hoa Tac on 24 hrs notice.
- 2010 hrs In area of YS 309704, B Coy loc large instl with 2 lecture rooms and approx 50 bunkers. Instl widely scattered. Found blood stained bandages, 300 x AK47 rounds, docus, 200 red files, 1 gal blood plasma, 3 shovels, 4 mattocks, 40 lbs rice, large forceps, 3 saws and bamboo pipeline down hill. Instl no tac sited.

Day 11

12 May 69

- 0137 hrs B40 rkt fired into village of PHUOC HOA. Mor fire msn fired in cutt-off.
- 0640 hrs Rd block reported to SOUTH of PHUOC HOA. Cleared by RF coy.
- 0847 hrs Tk hit mine at area of YS 280734 - slight damage only.
- AM A Coy moved NE out of contact area to clear area for airstrike. On completion of airstrike, D Coy swept down ridge from EAST. Temp FSPB estb in area YS 280734 to sp D Coy activities. C Coy moved back to SUSAN in prep for activities in Area W.

1539 hrs A Coy collected by APC and returned to SUSAN.

Ni Locs A Coy HQ, 1 pl, 3 pl FSPB SUSAN, 2 pl YS 311721  
B Coy HQ, 5 pl, 6 pl YS 319613, 4 pl YS 314692  
C Coy HQ, 7 pl, 8 pl YS 316644, 8 pl YS 321636  
D Coy HQ, 12 pl YS 307715, 10 pl YS 326704, Tracker pl YS 304112  
Bn HQ, Mgr pl (-), Ech pl, 11 pl, Sect A Sqn, Tp B Sqn, 105 Fd  
Bty (-) FSPB SUSAN.

Day 12

22 May 69

AM

1. Four rifle coys deployed from for PZ:  
A, B, C, Coys - PZ NICK YT 175110  
D Coy - PZ YT 163118
2. Coys deployed to:
  - a. A, D Coys - LZ YS 241773
  - b. B, C Coys - LZ SUSAN
3. On arrival at LZ, A & D Coys moved by APC to drop off pt in area of YS 303734.
4. Tp tks, Bn HQ Recce Party and Mor sect in APCs departed FSPB NICK at 0630 hrs and married up with D Coy at LZ YS 241773.
5. Tks and mor sect moved fwd and estb mor fire base at YS 303734.
6. Recce parties moved by rd to FSPB SUSAN, which was secured by Ech pl.
7. C Coy moved from SUSAN by APC into Area W.
8. B Coy deployed from SUSAN by APC to area of YS 310668.

1135 hrs Whilst moving on fire trail one tk of 1 Tp B Sqn (tk) hit a mine at YS 314726. No cas. Minor damage to one tk.

Ni Locs A Coy HQ, 3 pl YS 305722, 1 pl YS 286716, 2 pl YS 312721  
B Coy HQ, 4 pl YS 309671, 5 pl YS 309705, 6 pl YS 302701  
C Coy HQ, 7 pl, 8 pl YS 321644, 9 pl YS 320636  
D Coy YS 309705  
Bn HQ, Sp Coy, Tp B Sqn (Tks), Sect B Sqn (Cav), 105 Fd Bty  
FSPB SUSAN YS 281650.

Day 13

23 May 69

0753 hrs 6 pl sighted one man dressed in black heading NORTH.

AM D Coy moved from ni loc to WEST to clear out area on side of hills and in valley. A Coy blocked to NORTH and WEST, 6 pl bl blocked to SOUTH.

1109 hrs 2 pl contacted 1 en wearing black trousers, khaki shirt and webbing approaching from EAST - 1 en KIA (BC), 1 AK47 captured.

1409 hrs B Coy found an old bunker system at YS 310670. Not used for quite some time.

1625 hrs 7 pl contacted 4 en initially at YS 333652 moving to SW in 2 gps of 2. 1 en KIA (BC), 1 x AK47 captured. On sweep after contact, 7 pl were pinned down by en RPD firing from YS 333654. 7 pl withdrew under cover of arty.

Ni Locs A Coy HQ, 3 pl YS 305722, 1 pl YS 286716, 2 pl YS 312721  
B Coy HQ, 4 pl YS 312672, 5 pl YS 303710, 6 pl YS 301700  
C Coy HQ, 7 pl, 8 pl YS 326652, 9 pl YS 337646  
D Coy HQ YS 303710, 10 pl YS 304707, 11 pl YS 303704, 12 pl YS 304714

Ni Locs BnHQ, Sp Coy (-), Tp B Sqn (Tks), Sect B Sqn (Cav), 105 Fd Bty  
Cont FSPB SUSAN

Day 14

24 May 69

AM Sect Mors in APCs, Sect APCs, Sect inf, Tp tks moved at 1000 hrs to area YS 305656.

0944 hrs 2 pl sighted two en moving from EAST. En withdrew when they possibly sighted gun sentry.

1100 hrs 9 pl contacted 1 en at YS 331647. Heavy blood trail indicated one en WIA. Trail fol up to unoccupied camp at YS 330648. En loc dead. 1 en KIA (BC).

1930 hrs Summary of en eqpt found by D Coy in caves at YS 304708 - Wms are old, bolt action rifle, 1 old rifle barrel, 1 grease gun - Ammo 5 x 60mm mor rounds, 4 x 45 cal rounds, 4 local type grenades, 50 grenade springs, 50 grenade head atts, 85 lbs chicom explosive, 500 dets, 50 ft safety fuse, 1 litre glucose, 1 grindstone, 1 vice, large amount of assorted tools and docus.

Ni Locs A Coy HQ, 3 pl YS 305722, 1 pl YS 286716, 2 pl YS 312721  
B Coy HQ, 4 pl YS 312649, 5 pl YS 303711, 6 pl YS 301700  
C Coy HQ, 7 pl, 8 pl, YS 336654, 9 pl YS 335653  
D Coy HQ, YS 303713, 10 pl YS 313712, 11 pl YS 304705, 12 pl YS 306715  
Bn HQ, Sp Coy (-), Tp B Sqn (Tks), Sect B Sqn (Cav), 105 Fd Bty  
FSPB SUSAN

Day 15

25 May 69

AM A Coy moved to RV with Tp APCs at YS 303714 for move to new posn of AO. Tp Tks, Sect mors in APCs and sect inf estb temp fire base in area of YS 310736. 5 pl & 6 pl were extracted by air and APC to FSPB SUSAN and were deployed PM to rejoin B Coy. C Coy cont search in area W and mov NORTH. D Coy cont search in valley area.

1324 hrs 6 pl reported finding Atk mine at YS 273658. Locals reported that at least 5 mines were laid by en on previous ni at distance of 1 metre from bitumen to EAST.

2100 hrs B Coy reported sighting of two torches on bearing of 2100 mils from ni loc.

Ni Locs A Coy HQ, 1 pl YS 321760, 2 pl YS 315760, 3 pl 318749  
B Coy HQ, 4 pl YS 318644, 5 pl YS 315656, 6 pl YS 316665  
C Coy HQ, 7 pl, 9 pl YS 337661, 8 pl YS 338659  
D Coy HQ, 11 pl YS 302705, 10 pl YS 325705, 12 pl YS 313722  
Bn HQ, Sp Coy (-), Tp B Sqn (Tks), Sect B Sqn (Cav), 105 Fd Bty  
FSPB SUSAN

Day 16

26 May 69

0856 hrs 6 pl sighted 3 en in black and blue clothing carrying 2 rifles and AK47 at YS 315667. En were seen at 80 metres crossing fire trail from EAST. 1 en WIA.

1530 hrs HQ D Coy and 11 pl contacted 7-10 en at YS 312699. En were local wearing black and grey civ clothing. 2 en KIA (BC), 1 RPG2, 2 RPG rounds, 2 grenades, 1 pack and docus. En withdrew under cover of 1 man who stayed in cave and fought until killed. 2 AUST WIA.

Ni Locs A Coy HQ, 1 pl YS 311760, 2 pl YS 304766, 3 pl YS 308754  
B Coy HQ, 4 pl YS 325675, 5 pl YS 322668, 6 pl YS 316678

Ni Locs C Coy YS 338666  
Cont D Coy HQ, 11 pl YS 309699, 10 pl YS 321695, 12 pl YS 323703  
 Bn HQ, Sp Coy (-), Tp B Sqn (Tks), Sect B Sqn (Cav), 105 Fd Bty  
 FSPB SUSAN.

Day 17 27 May 69

- 0745 hrs 4 pl contacted one en at YS 325675. En fired AK47 burst at ambush party when it was changing reliefs and then withdrew SOUTH.
- 1334 hrs D Coy found assorted docus, qty med sups incl 50 phails of drugs, and instruments, 400 x 7.62mm short, 1000 x 5.56mm rounds, 90 lbs rice, 3 x Atk grenades, 5 RPG boosters, cooking utensils, 20 lbs salt, 1 x AK47, 2 packs from area YS 312699.
- 1503 hrs 1 pl picked up 4 woodcutters in restricted area. They were classified as detainees and evac by hel to NUI DAT. 4 detainees were interrogated and are believed to be:  
 a. Deputy Security Chief CHAU DUC Committee.  
 b. VC Supplier.  
 c. 2 draft dodgers.
- 1516 hrs 2 pl contacted a party of 15 en at YS 288772. Lead en sighted MG at 50 metres and 2 pl opened fire. En approacher from NNW and broke to WEST and SOUTH on contact. En wearing black pants, green shirts, US webbing ARVN type boots. 3 en KIA (BC), 2 en WIA (Blood trail) 1 armalite.
- 1750 hrs 7 pl after extensive recce loc en camp at YS 329671. Cooking smells cfm en occupation.

Ni Locs A Coy HQ, 1 pl, 3 pl YS 307759, 2 pl YS 288722  
 B Coy HQ, 4 pl YS 325675, 5 pl YS 322667, 6 pl YS 319677  
 C Coy HQ, 9 pl YS 336668, 7 pl YS 330670, 8 pl YS 338666  
 D Coy HQ, 11 pl YS 309699, 10 pl YS 317696, 12 pl YS 314699  
 Bn HQ, Sp Coy (-), Tp B Sqn (tks), Sect B Sqn (Cav), 105 Fd Bty  
 FSPB SUSAN  
 Sect 105 Fd Bty ONG TRINH YS 260682  
 Tracker pl (-) YS 313723

Day 18 28 May 69

- 1138 hrs B Coy loc fresh cuttings on a track at YS 327676
- 1545 hrs C Coy loc resting place for pl at YS 333671, hurriedly vacated 24 hrs ago. En appeared to move NORTH.
- 1630 hrs 2 pl left ambush area for 2 hrs to collect resup. Bodies killed in earlier contact had been left above ground as a decoy. When pl returned bodies had been buried.
- 1703 hrs 8 pl contacted 1 en at YS 327671 dressed in black with AK47. 1 en WIA (blood trail).

Ni Locs A Coy HQ, 1 pl, 3 pl YS 307759, 2 pl YS 288722  
 B Coy HQ YS 325675, 4 pl YS 327677, 5 pl YS 325672, 6 pl YS 328684  
 C Coy HQ, 9 pl YS 329669, 7 pl YS 330671, 8 pl YS 330692  
 D Coy HQ, 12 pl, YS 337698, 10 pl YS 340690, 11 pl YS 330692  
 Bn HQ, Sp Coy (-), Sect B Sqn (Cav), Tp B Sqn (tks), 105 Fd Bty  
 (-) FSPB SUSAN  
 Tracker pl (-) YS 314712, elms Tracker pl YS 279653, Sect 105 Fd  
 Bty YS 260682

Day 19 29 May 69

- AM C Coy cleared en base camp in area YS 329671. No en loc which had been hurriedly vacated. Est camp was staying area for 90-100 pers incl women and children. Coy found docus and large qty of sugar and rice (900 lbs) and salt. Camp contained tunnels and possible first aid station with operating tables.

- 0900 hrs 2 pl contacted 3 en at YS 288722. En were possibly regional wearing blue shirts, black trousers, AK webbing AK47, AK50, RPG. One man believed to be VC prisoner dressed in loin cloth and with hands tied behind back. 1 en KIA (BC), 1 en WIA (blood trail), 1 AK 50.
  - 1355 hrs 11 pl contacted 1 en at YS 339689. En was loc dressed in black. 1 en KIA (BC) 1 SKS.
  - 1835 hrs C Coy HQ (C/S 34) contacted 1 en at YS 329671. En believed to be med orderly carrying claymore and extensive med sups incl surgical kit, wearing black trousers, brown shirt, sandals, satchel type pack, pistol belt with pouches & KILT & BAGPIPES. 1 en KIA (BC), 1 SMG 7.62mm.
- Ni Locs A Coy HQ, 1 pl YS 290765, 2 pl YS 289770, 3 pl YS 287765  
 B Coy HQ, 5 pl YS 329680, 4 pl YS 331695, 6 pl YS 332678  
 C Coy HQ, 9 pl YS 325675, 7 pl YS 330670, 8 pl YS 329671  
 D Coy HQ, 12 pl YS 337687, 10 pl YS 334686, 11 pl YS 339689  
 Bn HQ, Sp Coy (-), Tp B Sqn (Tks), Sect B Sqn (Cav), 105 Fd Bty (-) FSPB SUSAN  
 Elms 105 Fd Bty YS 260682, Tracker pl (-) YS 308717.

Day 20 30 May 69

- 1010 hrs Whilst moving to clear area of suspected en near their pl loc using suppressive fire, a soldier of 4 pl tripped over an object. As his weapon hit the ground, it discharged and fired. 1 AUST KIA.
- 1125 hrs C Coy loc 6 old bunkers last used 36 hrs ago.
- 1819 hrs 2 pl loc en camp at YS 287771.
- 1910 hrs C Coy found a stopover hutchie area for 30 - 40 pers recently used at YS 326666.
- 1921 hrs C Coy loc more docus, 1 x RPG2 round, 8 tail sects for RPG rounds, 4 detonators, 2 ballistite rounds.

- Ni Locs A Coy YS 287771  
 B Coy HQ, 5 pl YS 329680, 4 pl YS 334674, 6 pl YS 326672  
 C Coy HQ, 7 pl YS 326674, 8 pl YS 326673, 9 pl YS 326672  
 D Coy HQ, 12 pl YS 337683, 10 pl YS 334684, 11 pl YS 341691  
 Bn HQ, Sp Coy (-), Tp B Sqn (tks), Tp B Sqn (Cav), 105 Fd Bty (-) FSPB SUSAN  
 Sect 105 Fd Bty YS 260682  
 Tracker pl (-) YS 313722, Elms Tracker pl YS 279653.

Day 21 31 May 69

- 1000 hrs C Coy found fol eqpt in camp in area YS 329671. 1 SMG Chicom, 300 rounds 7.92 ammo, 2 hand grenades, 1 Atk grenade and further docus.
- 1755 hrs Tracks of at least 30 people were sighted by D Coy and fol NORTH to YS 340707. Tracks then headed EAST.
- 1500 hrs C Coy moved by APC/Tks/TCV to NUI DAT.

- Ni Locs A Coy YS 267759  
 B Coy HQ, 4 pl YS 326683, 5 pl YS 321688, 6 pl YS 325674  
 C Coy NUI DAT  
 D Coy HQ, 10 pl YS 329702, 11 pl YS 341691, 12 pl YS 321702  
 Bn HQ, Sp Coy (-), Tp B Sqn (Tks), Sect B Sqn (Cav), 105 Fd Bty (-) FSPB SUSAN  
 Tracker pl (-) YS 313723  
 Sect Mor pl YS 237772

Day 22

1 Jun 69

AM 5 RAR returned to NUI DAT

- a. A Coy by APC
- b. B & D Coys by hel
- c. Bn HQ by TCV.

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. OP 'TWICKENHAM'.
2. Report by 235328 Lt E.J. LEE.
3. 1Pl A Coy 5 RAR.
4. 1+19 + 4 att, Total 24.
5. 5 May 69 at 0625 hrs duration 15 min.
6. YS 314725.
7. Pl to ambush track.
8. At approx 0530 hrs my right flank heard en voices down the track from them as if they had stopped to rest or eat. At approx 0620 hrs they moved into the ambush. The first man was allowed to walk into the ambush posn, the second man also had entered the ambush posn, the right flank (Lcpl Williams) then initiated the ambush by firing the mine and the gun. The mine hit the first man at point blank range. The mines on the right flank plus the gun were fired at the same time as the mine on the left flank went off, the second man was hit by the mine next to him also. A sweep down the track to our North found the rice pack of a third man who hadnt entered the ambush. It was approx 50 metres down the track. Both en were buried and the ambush posn cam and restored again. (See att diagram for the layout of the ambush posn)
9. The area in the killing zone was reasonably open. The area of the mabush itself provided cover from view at a distance of 10 metres from the track.
10. En sighted at a range of approx 10 metres - heard at a distance of approx 30 metres.
11. Pte M.D. Buchanam.
12. Manning the GPMG M60 on the right flank.
13. Noise indicated their presence first - movson the track indicated their presence in the ambush.
14. 3 (last man not seen) however, local - mixture of black clothing, Ho Chi Minh type rubber sandals.
15. Lcpl F. Williams - Claymore mine 5 metres, gun 15 metres.
16. Claymore mines and MG.
17. Death.
18. MG on right flank opened up as soon as the contact was initiated from the left flank.
19. 2 KIA.
20. Claymore mines.
- 21-22. Nil.
23. 3 x Claymores, 300 x M60, 20 x M16.
24. AK47, 1 x Grenade (Frech), 4 x AK47 mags, 2 sets webbing, 3 bags of rice(45lbs each), small amount of personal docus.
- 25-26. Nil.
- 27-28. As above.
29. As for serial 23, no Arty fire was used.

...2/ Coy Comds Comments.

Coy Comds Comments.

30. A good and successful ambush 'WE' have learnt our lesson at last - allow the en to come into the killing ground before initiating fire.



May 69

.....  
(E.J. LEE)  
Lt  
OC 1 Pl

.....  
(R.F. SUTTON)  
Maj  
CO A Coy 5 RAR





TRACE 'P' TO  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
YS 314 725  
5 MAY 69



LEGEND

- ~~~~ TRACK
- △ CLAYMORE
- X GPMG M60
- WPN PIT
- ⊕ EN

TRACE 'P' TO  
CONTACT AFTER ACTION  
VS 314725  
5 MAY 69



LEGEND

- TRACK
- △ CLAYMORE
- X MG
- ⊘ EN POSN WHEN AMBUSH SPRUNG
- └ PITS
- ⊗ POSN RESEVE GUN FIRED FROM.

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. OP 'TWICKENHAM'.
2. Report by 235328 Lt E.J. LEE.
3. 1Pl A Coy 5 RAR.
4. 1 + 19 + atts.
5. 5 May 69, at 0830 hrs, duration 15 min.
6. YS 314725.
7. Ambush the track.
8. The ambush had just been readjusted after the contact at 0625 hrs. Cam had been readjusted and the sentries had been posted. The sentry on the southern flank reported mov towards him down the track. He returned to the posn which was alerted. The first en mov to a posn in front of the flank claymore and stopped to look at pieces of flesh in the trees from the contact before. As he did not appear to be going to come any closer the mine was ignited, it threw backwards, the second man was hit in the back by two M16 wpns at a range of 25 ft. The MG was fired up the track. A lot of en voices were heard up the track so a second MG was brought up to engage the area. Arty fire was brought in to 600 metres, when this lifted a li fire team was used to saturate the area to our south. Two sects then moved out of the posn to fol up down the track. An M1 carbine was found on the edge of the track when the first man had been hit by the mine. Two yellow rubber thongs were also found on the track in the same posn. A little further down the track the fore stock off an M1 carbine was found. We fol a good blood trail down the track where we found a web belt with a plastic pouch of rice on it, both articles were heavily blood stained. The blood trail cont on til we came to a log across the track (approx 150 metres from the ambush) there was a large blood stain on this. The trail cont on the other side, we fol the trail for a distance of approx 300 metres till we came to the junction of three tracks. At this stage I stopped the pursuit because we were not to go too far into the valley as ambush was our prime aim. I carried out a recce for an ambush task in this area and then returned to my ambush posn. (See att diagram for layout of ambush).
9. The killing zone was relatively open. The area of the ambush itself provided cover from view to a range of 10 metres from the track.
10. 25 metres from the ambush.
11. Pte P.K. O'CONNOR.
12. Sentry on the track to our south.
13. Mov on the track.
14. Possibly about 10 en (from the sound of voices after contact) Local force, dressed largely in black clothing.
15. Lcpl F. WILLIAMS detonated the claymore. Pte ELLICE-FLINT the MG. Mine 5 Ft, MG 10 metres.
16. All.

....2/17

17. Doubled back down the track. The first three received full sect fire at a range of approx 10 - 15 metres.
18. Fired down the track.
19. 2 KIA, 1 WIA.
20. Claymore - sect wpns.
21. Nil.
22. N/A.
23. 1 x claymore, 700 x M60, 150 x 5,56, 40 x 7.62mm.
24. M1 carbine, M1 stock, 2 thongs, webb belt.
- 25-26. Nil.
27. Above.
28. The rear protection gun was brought to the left flank to help engage the track area.
29. As for serial 23 plus Arty rounds - 19 rounds HE, plus gun ship fire.

Coy Comds Comments.

30. Possibly fire was opened to early in their ambush, however, the initiator thought the en would not enter the killing area. Results were again good, there is no doubt the claymore is an excellent ambush wpn.

.....  
(E.J. LEE)  
Lt  
OC 1Pl

May 69

.....  
(R.F. SUTTON)  
Maj  
CO A Coy 5 RAR


VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 1201164 2Lt D.J. MEAD
2. Report on caves and hutchie area at 291718 at 0900 hrs on 5 May 69.
3. 50 x 50 yards.
4. a to c. Not applicable (N/A)
  - d. Area consisted of two low tin huts which had been demolished, and a large open cave under a rock. A concrete OP had been built next to the rock.
  - e. N/A
  - f. 20, or large squad.
  - g. Area looked out to W, NW and SW.
  - h. N/A
  - i. Area had not been used for at least 6 months
  - j. 250 metres from water (spring)
  - k. The OP acted as an early warning device.
  - l. Nil
  - m. Nil

*D.J. Mead*  
for  
(D.J. Mead)  
2Lt  
Pl Comd

Annex: A. Sketch of area.

FRONT VIEW



CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. OP 'TWICKENHAM'.
2. Report by 235328 Lt E.J. LEE.
3. 1Pl A Coy 5 RAR.
4. 1 + 19 + 4 att Total 24.
5. 5 May 69, at 1545 hrs, duration 15 min.
6. YS 314723.
7. Pl to ambush track junction.
8. At approx 1450 hrs the MG on the left flank of the ambush saw an en dressed in greens moved down the track, about 20 metres from him, stop, and then run off south again. No more mov was seen till approx 1540 hrs when the same gunner saw mov on the track again. This time he fired, at the same time an en moved in front the SW fired an AK47 into the ambush posn. The left flank detonated their mine which killed the en with the AK47. A loud moaning was heard from the track about 25 metres to our front. We suspected that this was a trap so moved the depth MG fwd to saturate the area with fire. A sweep found the en, as he was making an attempt to fire his RPG, he was killed. The area around the tracks was searched for signs of any more mov, none was found. Both en were searched and buried. The man carrying the RPG was found to be a regular soldier.
9. The killing was fairly open again. The area of the ambush itself provided cover from view for 5 - 10 metres off the track.
10. 15 - 20 metres.
11. Pte G.R. ELLICE - FLINT.
12. Manning the GFMG M60 on the left flank.
13. Mov on the track.
14. 2 en - local, both men dressed in mixture of black and green clothes. Footwear was black Ho Chi Minh sandals for both men.
15. Pte G.R. Ellice-Flint - 15 - 20 metres.
16. MG - M16s.
17. The lead man fired his AK47 back into the ambush, one round grazed the head of Pte D.F. Woolford on the left flank. Approx 20 rounds were fired.
18. Fire their claymore and return fire.
19. 2 KIA.
20. Claymore, M16, M60,
21. Nil.
22. N/A.
23. 2 x claymore, 600 x M60, 150 x 5.56.
24. AK47 and 4 mags - small amount of webbing. RPG launcher + 4 rkts, 4 boosters, small amount of webbing and personal docu.
- 25-26. Nil.
27. Nil.

...2/ 28 Right hand

28. Right hand sect (N flank) fired their centre mine which faced south on the track. The reserve gun was brought fwd to help engage the track junction.

29. As for serial 23, no Arty fire was used.

Coy Comd Comments.

30. Another successful ambush 1Pl has certainly maintained a very aggressive attitude in this role. Their fire discipline is excellent and every soldier is to be congratulated.


.....  
(E.J. LEE)  
Lt  
OC 1Pl

May 69

.....  
(R.F. SUTTON)  
Maj  
CO A Coy 5 RAR



TRACE 'P' TO  
 AFTER ACTION REPORT  
 YS 314723  
 5 MAY 69



- LEGEND
- TRACK
  - - - CREEK BED
  - X MG
  - A CLAYMORE
  - J PIT
  - ⊙ EN
  - X RESERVE GUN FIRED FROM HERE

Jun 69

5 RAR

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. OP TWICKENHAM
2. Report by 235326 Lt I.R. HOSIE
3. Tracker Pl Sp Coy 5 RAR
4. 1 Offr 22 ORS.
5. 5 May 69 Duration 5 mins
6. YS 318705
7. Pl task ambush tracks in area 3170.
8. Pl was moving from previous nights ambush spot, further west, to pick up any tracks which the en may have been using. Voices were heard to our south approx 40 metres away. The enemy were moving parallel to us on at track. The forward sect was moving into a firm fire base when the en heard us. The sect then engaged the en over a distance of 20 metres. The en returned fire and ran off up the track.
9. Lower slopes of NUI TOC TIEN. Thick vegetation.
10. En heard at 40 metres.
11. Pl HQ heard en first.
12. Moving.
13. Voices were heard.
14. 4 - 5 Lf en were engaged.
15. Scout and fwd sect comd fired first at 20 metres.
16. All sect wprns engaged.
17. En reaction slow, ran into dead ground and returned fire.
18. Sects immediate reaction was firm fire base drill and engaged en.
19. En Cas unknown.
20. N/A
21. NIL
22. N/A
23. Ammo expenditure: 150 rds link, 200 rds 5.56, 40 rds 7.62.
24. Nil
25. Rear sects should bring packs when closing up and drop them when down in pl fire base.
26. Nil

.. /Part 2

Part 2

27. N/A

28. Pl action was fwd sect, gave good fire. Pl closed up very quickly Sect comds maintained good control and individual reactions were very aggressive. The sweep was very slow because of the thickness of the scrub.

29. See serial 23.

.....Pl Comd

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. OP 'TWICKENHAM'.
2. Report by 3411685 Lcpl F. WILLIAMS.
3. 3 Sect 1Pl A Coy 5 RAR.
4. 5 + 3 Att.
5. 6 May 69 at 1340 hrs, duration 15 - 20 min.
6. YS 314723.
7. Sect was to return to old ambush posn to destroy 4 x RPG2 warheads which we had buried there when left for resupply.
8. When we arrived at the posn I deployed my gun facing north down the track, a sentry was placed to cover the tracks that led into the junction. Myself, my scout and the two aslt pnr went fwd to the spot where the warheads were buried. As we began to dig up the warheads the gun opened fire down the track, myself and the sig moved fwd to the gun where I was informed that an en was lying badly wounded on the track. I saturated the area with fire using the MG, M79 and M16, this was to deal with anyone further down the track. I then moved fwd by fire and mov to secure the area where the en was lying. He was searched and wpn cleared. I was then told by the Pl comd to move fwd for 20 metres down the track to see if there was any sign of mov. I was to go no further because of my str. I then returned to the dead en and adjusted Arty fire into 600 metres via the Pl comd and the MFC, who was with him. I then recovered the en wpn and returned to the Pl posn for resup.
9. Area was reasonably open, visibility was good along the track for a distance of about 20 metres.
10. Approx 15 metres.
11. Pte B.J. LEWIS.
12. Manning MG.
13. Mov on the track.
14. 2 en (second man found the next day by 2Pl). Loacl, dress was a mixture, dark green trousers and black shirt, Dinky toy plastic sandals.
15. Pte Lewis, 25 ft.
16. MG, M16, M79.
17. Death.
18. Saturated area with sect fire.
19. 1 KIA, found at that stage. 1WIA (this man was found next day by 2 Pl as a KIA). See 2Pl Contact After Action Report 7 May 69.
20. M60, M16.
21. Nil
22. N/A.
23. 200 x M60, 60 x 5.56. 8 x M79.

.....2/ 24. AK47

24. AK47, 4 Mags.

25-26. Nil

27. Lcpl Williams handled the situation very well. He adjusted the Arty fire with little help from me at all. Good fire discipline was evident.

28. Pl stood to. I listened out on my spare set and relayed all fire orders.

29. See serial 23 - plus 8 rounds HE (Arty).

Coy Comd Comments.


30. Lcpl Williams is a very aggressive comd and I feel sure it was his experience that made the contact a success.

.....  
(E.J. LEE)  
Lt 1 L  
OC 1Pl

May 69

.....  
(R.F. SUTTON)  
Maj  
CO A Coy 5 RAR

TRACE 'P' TO  
CONTACT AFTER ACTION  
VS 314723  
6 MAY 69



LEGEND

- TRACK
- - - CREEK BED
- ⊗ EN
- ⊙ SENTRY
- X MG
- ⌈ RFM
- ⊕ SECT COMD & ASLT PWR

CONFIDENTIAL

D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM

7 Jun 69

INCIDENT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op. OpTWICKENHAM II.
2. Report By. 57055 Maj M. P. Blake.
3. D Coy 5 RAR.
4. Str of Sect/Pl in incident. 27.
5. Date/Time of Incident. 061900 H May 69.
6. Loc. 332708.
7. Sect/Ptl task. Coy HQ securing LZ.
8. Description of action. Sentry observed 1 man dressed in black crawling across open ground. Sentry was posted 200 m from perimeter and man observed was 100 m from sentry. Sentry also heard distinct tapping noises indicating the presence of other en. A sweep of the area next day with the tracker team revealed no evidence of en move.
9. Description of Terrain. Open with mounds of dead fall.
10. Distance to en when first sighted. 100m.
11. Which soldier first saw en. Sentry.
12. What was soldier doing. Sentry duty.
13. What caused en to be noticed. Movement.
14. VC str/type/dress. One local dressed in black.
- 15-30. Omitted.

*M. P. Blake*  
(M. P. Blake)  
Maj  
OC D Coy 5 RAR


CONFIDENTIAL

D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM

12 Jun 69

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op. Op TWICKENHAM II.
2. Report By. 53652 WO2 GA Smith.
3. Unit. 1 Sect, 10 Pl, D Coy, 5 RAR.
4. Str of Sect in Contact. 4.\*
5. Date/Time/Duration of Action. 062055 May 69. 10 minutes duration.
6. Location. 322706.
7. Sect Task. Ambush.
8. Description of Action. 10 Pl was in an ambush position when 1 en approached from the rear of the position. The M60 of the sect in the rear protection engaged him with negative results, mainly due to it being a very dark night and they could only engage by firing at the noise the en was making.
9. Description of Terrain. Medium scrub.
10. Distance to en when First Sighted. 15 metres.
11. Which soldier first saw en. The M60 team.
12. What was soldier doing. Rear protection in ambush position.
13. What caused en to be noticed. He stumbled in a tree root.
14. VC Str/type/dress. One local, dress unknown.
15. Who fired first. M60 group at a range of 15 metres.
16. What sect wps fired. M60 and M16.
17. What was en's immediate reaction. Went to ground then fled.
18. What was sect's immediate reaction. Being in ambush, they stayed in position.
19. En cas. Nil.
20. Caused by. Not applicable.
21. Friendly cas. Nil
22. Caused by. Not applicable.
23. Ammo expenditure. 100 rds 7.62 mm link, 20 rds 5.56 mm.
24. Docus/wps captured. Nil.
25. Lessons learnt. Other members in rear protection did not fire at enemy when he fled. They were waiting for orders
- 26-29. Omitted.
30. Coy Comd's comments. Nil.

  
(G. A. Smith Maj)  
WO2  
N/Pl Comd 10 Pl

  
(M. F. Blake)  
Maj  
OC D Coy 5 RAR



VC INSTALLATION REPORT


1. Report by 1201164 2Lt D.J. MEAD
2. Caves and stone hutchie system at Grid 290716 between 0900 hrs and 1500 hrs 7 May 69.
3. 250 x 200 yards.
4.
  - a. Not applicable (N/A)
  - b. Depth of caves up to 30' below ground.
  - c. Only natural connections between close caves.
  - d. N/A
  - e. 3 caves, 6 rock hutchie areas (under overhanging rocks).
  - f. Coy strength.
  - g. No direction, except all had possible OP's looking towards the west and north west.
  - h. Largest cave could hold up to 25 people, and sizes ranged down from that.
  - i. Installations were very old and well established. Extra concrete works having been done in some areas. Large concrete water tanks had been built. They all showed no recent use, and were probably last used over 6 months ago.
  - j. 200 - 250 metres to large constructed dam.
  - k. Yes, but only in the form of OP's outside the caves and hutchies.
  - l. 10lbs of TNT was set up in one cave as a booby trap. It was deloused. It had been there at least 12 months.
  - m. Caves to be treated with CS gas.

*D.J. Mead*

(D.J. MEAD)  
2Lt  
Pl Comd

Annex: A. Sketch showing area of caves.

CAMP AREA  
AT 290 716  
7 MAY 69



CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. OP 'TWICKENHAM'.
2. Report by 217210 2Lt R.A. BRETT.
3. 4 and 5 Sect 2Pl A Coy 5 RAR.
4. 13 (two sects).
5. 7 May 69 at 0925 - 0926 hrs.
6. YS 311722.
7. Lo and capture if possible, suspected wounded en outside ambush posn.
8. On the previous ni (6 May 69) the Pl moved into an ambush posn at YS311721. At approx 1925 hrs a voice was heard moaning and sometimes yelling, this was from an area approx 50 metres to the right of the ambush. At 1932 hrs three shots were fired into the ambush posn. No further incidents occurred that ni. At 0830 hrs this morning I took approx half of my Pl and conducted a sweep on the bearing I had taken on the voice and shots. After sweeping 150 metres, with no results I pivoted on my right man and swept back towards my posn this time straddling the track. Approx 70 metres from the ambush posn a shot was fired at the same instant Pte Waldock saw the en and returned fire with his M16, killing the en. It was found that he had previously been hit in a contact as both his legs were broken and shot about. He had bandaged them himself, at this stage of our contact with him he was already near death. Diagram att .
9. Very close rain forrest. On track - visibility 10 ft.
10. 8 ft.
11. 5 Sects scout Pte Waldock.
12. Looking for en.
13. He fired a shot.
14. 1 VC, Regional force - black pyjamas.
15. En - 8ft (bullet) went no where near soldier.
16. Fwd scouts M16 (Pte Waldock).
17. Dropped dead.
18. Moved fwd into fire posn.
19. 1 KIA.
20. M16.
21. Nil
22. N/A.
23. 5 x 5.56.
24. Numerous letters and assorted docs+ map. 1 x Chicom 9mm pistol.
- 25.26. Nil.
27. As per serial 8.
28. Nil
29. 5 x 5.56.

...2/30 Coy Comd Comments.

Coy Comds Comments.

30. The en was definetely wounded in a contact with 11A the previous day. Sweeps must take time as the jungle is very thick and offers concealment even at a few ft.

.....  
(R.A. BRETT)  
2Lt  
OC 2Pl

May 69

.....  
(R.F. SUTTON)  
Maj  
CO A Coy 5 RAR


CONFIDENTIAL

D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM

7 May 69

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by. 4719038 2Lt RA Fenwick.
2. Report on. Bunker system at 318696 found at 1530 hrs 7 May 69.
3. Area covered approx 150 m x 50 m.
4. Defensive layout.
  - a. Wpn pits only.
  - b. Not applicable.
  - c. Not applicable.
  - d. Wpn pits 8' x 3' x 4' deep. 2' OHP made of logs 4" to 8" in diameter with diagonal entrances.
  - e. No of pits approx 20 completed.
  - f. Est unit to be 2 Pls plus (40 - 50 pers).
  - g. Pits facing 620 m.
  - h. 2 man pits.
  - i. Pits were approx 6 - 12 months old.
  - j. Posn was 460 metres from a creek and there were tracks throughout.
  - k. There were no early warning devices or posts.
  - l. There were no booby traps.
  - m. Destructive action. Nil as yet, but signs of recent occupation by 4 - 5 pers.

  
(R. A. Fenwick)  
2Lt  
OC 12 Pl D Coy 5 RAR

CONFIDENTIAL

D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM

16 May 69

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by. 4719038 2Lt RA Fenwick.
2. Report on bunker system at YS 318696 found at 1530 hrs 7 May 69.
3. Area covered by installation. 750 sq yds.
4. Defensive layout.
  - a. Installation contained wpn pits only.
  - b. Not applicable.
  - c. Wpn pits were interconnecting by foot tracks only.
  - d. Types of construction used. Wpn pits were 8' x 3' and 4' deep, 2' of overhead cover consisting of logs 4" to 8" in diameter. Entrances were diagonal.
  - e. Installation contained 20 completed pits.
  - f. Estimate 40 - 50 pers to occupy the posn.
  - g. Wpn pits were facing in the dir of 6200 mils.
  - h. Pits were 2 man.
  - i. The installation was 6 - 12 months old.
  - j. Located 60 metres from a creek.
  - k. There were no early warning posts or devices.
  - l. There were no booby traps.
  - m. Destructive action as yet, has not been taken.
5. Signs of recent occupation within 48 hrs by 4 - 5 pers. Considerable tracks were in the system.
6. 12 bangalore torpedoes and 1 RPG round were found in the system. Bangalores were locally made 3 - 5 ft long, filled with Chicom explosive.

(R. A. Fenwick)  
2Lt  
OC 12 Pl D Coy 5 RAR

RESTRICTED

Sp Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU

Jun 69

5 RAR

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op TWICKENHAM
2. Report by 235326 Lt I.R. HOSIE
3. Tkr Pl Sp Coy 5 RAR
4. Pl Strength 1 and 21.
5. 7 May 69 Duration 2 mins.
6. YS 318707
7. Pl was ambushing en track system.
8. En moved up onto rear protection. A member of the ambush coughed and en called out. Rear protection fired high and en crawled away in dead ground.
9. Ground sloped away to EAST. Large re-entrant to NORTH. Vegetation was thick secondary type.
10. En not sighted.
11. Picquet on rear protection sighted en.
12. On picquet.
13. En noticed by noise.
14. One En possibly courier.
15. Picquet fired first at 8 - 10 metres.
16. M60 and M16 were fired.
17. En went to ground and crawled away.
18. Rear protection was woken and wpns fired at en. Fire was high.
19. En cas nil.
20. N/A
21. Friendly cas nil.
22. N/A
23. Ammo expenditure: 70 rds 7.62 link, 40 rds 5.56.
24. N/A
25. Soldier must have a clear target before opening fire at night.
26. Nil

.../Part 2

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

- 2 -

Part 2

27. N/A.
28. Fire control was good as only those wpns which could directly engage tgt were in use i.e. M60 and one M16.
29. See serial 23.

.....Pl Comd




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
D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM

7 Jun 69

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op. Op TWICKENHAM II.
2. Report by. 37593 Sgt R. L. Lees.
3. Unit. 12 Pl, D Coy, 5 RAR.
4. Str of Pl in contact. 10 men.
5. Date/time/duration of action. 081100 H May 69. 10 minutes duration.
6. Loc. 315696.
7. Pl task. Search re - entrant for en sign.
8. Description of action. Fwd scout heard a metallic noise and signalled a halt and listen sign to the sect comd. As scout was moving to a fire posn 2 en fired at scout and sect comd with automatic wps. Sect comd returned fire and sect carried out contact drill. A sweep was conducted but the en had withdrawn after the initial firing.
9. Description of Terrain. Visability 80 m, large trees, vines, moderate undergrowth.
10. Distance to en when first sighted. 15 m.
11. Which soldier first saw en. Fwd scout.
12. What was soldier doing. Moving.
13. What caused en to be noticed. Noise.
14. VC Str/type dress. 2 local dressed in black.
15. Who fired first. En at a range of 15 m.
16. What sect wps fired. GPMG, SLR, M16, M79.
17. What was en's immediate reaction. Withdrew in dead ground.
18. What was sect's immediate reaction. Return fire, contact drill.
19. En Cas. Nil.
20. Caused by. Not applicable.
21. Friendly cas. 1 WIA.
22. Caused by. M16.
23. Approx ammo expenditure. 150 x 7.62 link, 20 x 7.62 ball, 120 5.56, 1 x M79 cannister.
24. Docus Wpns captured. 20 lbs rice, 3 RPG boosters, clothing.
- 25-29. Omitted.
30. Coy Comd's Comments. The en posn was a bunker and situated in dead ground covering any approach towards the position. Later events revealed that this post was a enrly warning post for a cave complex 150 m further up the re-entrant.

  
(R. L. Lees)  
Sgt, Ptl Comd

  
(M. P. Blake)  
Maj, OC D Coy.

CONFIDENTIAL

D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM

16 May 69

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by. 214650 Sgt B. K. London.
2. Report on. Bunkers at YS 317706 found at 081300 H May 69.
3. Area covered by installation. 100 sq yds.
4. Defensive layout.
  - a. Installation contained wpn pits and bunkers.
  - b. Not applicable.
  - c. Pits and bunkers were not interconnecting.
  - d. Types of construction used. Bunkers and trenches with 2 openings, 6' x 2'6" overhead protection of 1' constructed with small saplings and dirt.
  - e. There were 3 pits and 3 bunkers.
  - f. Estimate a squad could occupy the installation.
  - g. Pits were facing in the dir NS; bunkers in the dir of EW.
  - h. Pits were 2 man.
  - i. Installation was constructed in the last 2 months.
  - j. Located near an old ox cart track.
  - k. There were no early warning posts or devices.
  - l. There were no booby traps.
  - m. Destructive action as yet has not been taken


*B. K. London*  
(B. K. London)  
Sgt  
A/OC 10 Pl D Coy 5 RAR

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 1201164 2Lt D.J. MEAD.
2. Cave and rock hutchie area at 293714 at 1500 - 1630 hrs on 8 May 69.
3. 150 x 150 yards.
4.
  - a. Not Applicable (N/A)
  - b. Caves extended in places to 30' underground.
  - c. 2 caves were natural interconnecting ones.
  - d. The rock hutchie caves had been well constructed with concrete beds and walls in some cases. Some of the caves in the area had been improved upon from their natural state.
  - e. 3 caves, 3 hutchie areas.
  - f. Up to a VC Coy.
  - g. OP's facing west.
  - h. Largest cave capable of taking 15 men.
  - i. Area not used more recently than at least 6 months.
  - j. 250 metres from well constructed large dam.
  - k. Most areas could have been used as OP's.
  - l. Nil
  - m. CS to be used on caves.

*D.J. Mead*  
for  
(D.J. MEAD)  
2Lt  
Pl Comd

Annex: A. Sketch of area of caves.



There were a string  
of caves down the re-  
entrant, but they could  
have only been used in  
the dry season

CONFIDENTIAL

D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM

16 May 69

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by. 5715939 2Lt J Russell.
2. Report on. Bunkers at YS 286667 found at 1515 hrs 8 May 69.
3. Area covered by installation. 250 sq yds.
4. Defensive layout.
  - a. Wpn pits only.
  - b. Not applicable.
  - c. Not applicable.
  - d. Not applicable.
  - e. Number of pits. 7.
  - f. Estimate 10 men to occupy posn.
  - g. Installation was covering a creek.
  - h. Pits were individual.
  - i. Approximately one month old.
  - j. Installation was near a river, 5 pits on west side, 2 on east side.
  - k.-
  - m. Not applicable.

*J. Russell*  
(J. Russell)  
2Lt  
OC 11 Pl D Coy 5 RAR

CONFIDENTIAL

D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM

16 May 69


VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by. 57055 Maj M. P. Blake.
2. Report on bunker system at 317712 found at 0900 hrs 10 May 69
3. Area covered by installation. 200 x 100 m.
4. Defensive layout. Installation contained bunkers only.
  - a. Installation contained bunkers only.
  - b. Not applicable.
  - c. Bunkers were not interconnecting.
  - d. Construction consisted of solid bunkers others not.
  - e. Installation contained 32 bunkers
  - f. Estimate coy would be required to occupy the posn.
  - g. Bunkers sited to give all round def.
  - h. Bunkers were two and three man.
  - i. Installation was up to six months old, occupied 6 weeks ago.
  - j. Def layout was near a dried out creek with an ox cart track along the E side.
  - k. Extent of booby traps. nil sighted.
  - l. There were no early warning devices or posts.
  - m. Destructive action taken.
    - (1) To be seeded.
    - (2) System had been bombed.
    - (3) New bunkers built around craters.
    - (4) Approx 6 - 8 kitchen areas.

*M. P. Blake*  
(M. P. Blake)  
Maj  
OC D Coy 5 RAR


VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. 215832 Lt B. THRIPP.
2. Caves at 295706 at 1000 hrs on 10 May 69
3. 750 sq yards.
4. a. No
  - (1) Nil
  - (2) Nil
  - (3) Nil
  - (4) 4 caves.
- b to e. N/A
- f. Squad
- g. Sighted to overlook SW/SE, but with all round def.
- h. 1 cave: 1 man  
1 cave: 5 Man  
1 cave: 2 man  
1 cave: 3 man
- i. At least 2 years
- j. Near spring.
- k. No
- l. Nil
- m. C/S gas.

  
(B. Thripp)  
Lt  
Pl Ccmd

Annexes: A. Sketch of area of caves.

ANNEX A TO  
INSTALLATION REPORT  
AT 295706







24. Nil

25. Not to rely on movement by night alone for springing an ambush in the dark.

26. Nil

PART 2

(A.J. KILBY)  
Sgt  
Pl Sgt

27. As per complete report.

28. At this stage the pl was broken up into two halves, and the pl comd was not with the half involved in the contact.

29. 100 x 7.62 link, 30 x 7.62, 50 x 5.56, 2 claymores, 1 flare, 3 x 40 mm grenades.


PART 3

30. I visited the ambush site on 11 May 69 and made the fol observations on the ambush technique used:

a. The two claymores were well sited, but appeared to have been fired at the wrong time, probably too late. Evidence of spilt water was found nearby, indicating they may have moved away.

b. Machine gun fire should have been used instantaneously with claymores in direction of where noise was heard.

c. Better means of night lighting was <sup>required</sup> req in this ambush.



.....Maj  
C.H. DUCKER



CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. OP 'TWICKENHAM'.
2. Report by 3411264 Sgt A.B. McNULTY.
3. 3Pl A Coy 5 RAR.
4. Str 9 men.
5. 11 May 69 at 1145 hrs, duration 6 $\frac{3}{4}$  hrs.
6. YS 306707.
7. Original task was to provide fire sp for 2 sects of 1Pl.

8. At 1145 hrs on the 11 May 69, I was told by the OC of 3Pl A Coy 5 RAR, to go up and join 1Pl A Coy, and to give them fire sp.

I then took 3 sect cmd by Lcpl K.C. Bell and myself and then proceeded up to join 1Pl, after I had gone 50 metres I came across 2 members of 1Pl, it was obvious that these members had lost contact with their Pl. I informed the Coy cmd I was taking these 2 members up with me to join 1Pl. After I had gone another 50 metres the firing up ahead intensified, I did not know if it was aimed at me or 1Pl, however, grenades were thrown at us. We proceeded up the hill slowly taking advantage of all avail cover, at this stage we were approx 150 yds up the hill, it was here that we came across a sect of 1Pl cmd by Lcpl F. Willimas, he was 40 metres ahead of me and pinned down to such an extent, that he could not reply to any of my questions where the Pl cmd was. I informed the OC of his posn. It was obvious that the en were in a solid posn and the only way to help anyone was to press on. I moved around them up the hill, where I saw the acting Pl Sgt of 1Pl Cpl J.M. Logan, who informed me that his Pl Comd was wounded and was lying "Somewhere up there". I did a quick appreciation taking notice of where present forces were deployed, I decided that by doing a right hook I could both out flank the en, and then search for the Pl cmd.

I informed the Coy Comd of my intentions and told Cpl Logan who was carrying a radio, to info the remainder of his callsign (whom I had passed earlier) of my plan so that they would not mistake me for the en. I moved fwd using fire and mov, taking advantage of the cover so that I was level with the en left flank.

I then advanced on the en, coming under intense SA fire (AK47s). After I had gone 50 yds I came across Pte D.F. Woolford, who was pinned down himself on top of a ledge, he told me he was with the Pl Comd when he was hit. I obtained dir where the Pl Comd was, however my task now became to extract Pte Woolford using intense M69 fire in the dir of the en he was able to dash back to my posn. I then obtained dir to where the Pl Comd was, I then moved my force in his dir. We advanced changing dir several times to comply with Pte Woolford instr, after about 1 hr of this the member had become confused and did not know the exact spot of the Pl Comd. At this stage the en had fired 3 claymores and 1 x RPG at my force, then we were wholly committed to the fight. I knew that the Pl Comd could not be behind me, as we had already searched the area. So I, realizing I had a small force, I maint pressure on the en, adv slowly the whole time, I refused an offer of more troops, as I considered a larger force in the area, would cause confusion, due to the terrain. My fwd 3 members Lcpl K.C. Bell, Pte T.J. Donnelly and Pte K.W. Williams thought they saw the Pl Comd ahead, Lcpl Bell without telling me, dashed across a known fire lane, in an effort to get near the Pl Comd, he was shot once in the cheek, once in the neck for his efforts. He indicated he was alright by commenting on the lack of the en ability to shoot straight. His comrades info me of what had happened, and once

....2/ again I was

again I was faced with the problem of extracting a person from under en fire. However I now knew exactly where the Pl Comd was.

Using intense M60 fire Pte Donnelly and Pte Leahy moved fwd and carried Lcpl Bell to a safe posn. My Coy Comd info me that flame throwers were aval if I could use them, I info him that I could use them, and he said that they would be brought fwd. Lcpl Bell was extracted back to the Coy firm base, and the flame throwers were brought fwd this took approx 2 hrs. We were coming under intense en fire including 3 claymores and 2 RPGs. The flame throwers arrived on the scene and Cpl W. Ward sect comd 3 sect aslt pnr pl, proceeded on a recce to see where he could employ his flame throwers with max effect. Cpl Ward told me how he intended to use the flame thrower. I deployed my force in such a way to give him max fire sp, while he got into posn. Then Cpl Ward fired his flame thrower into the en, the en replied by firing an RPG dir at him, it hit the rock in front of which he was standing, however he kept pouring flame into the en posn. Under cover of the flame thrower Pte Williams, Pte Donnelly and Pte Leahy dashed across the open ground, and reached the Pl Comd who was lying in the shelter of a rock ledge. At this stage a claymore was fired knocking Pte Williams off his feet, fully realizing they were exposed to en fire, these three soldiers dragged the PL Comd back over 20 metres of open ground. Where then I got the medic to examine him, and was told he was dead. The time was now approx 1840 hrs, so we started back to the Coy firm base. Once again the en fired RPGs and intense SA fire at us. This was probably the most difficult part of the whole op, as it was getting dark. My men were exhausted and the Pl Comd was a heavy burden. We eventually reached the rest of 3Pl and proceeded back to 1Pl posn in the dark.

9. Very steep with large rocks forming natural caves, with thick low scrub.
10. 30 metres.
11. Pte M.F. Leahy.
12. Providing fire sp for others.
13. Firing.
14. At least six, possibly more.
15. En 150 metres.
16. M60, M16, SLR, M26, and 1 flame thrower M2A1-7.
17. Return fire with SA, claymores and RPGs.
18. Take cover and return fire when possible.
19. Unknown.
20. See Serial 16.
21. 1 WIA.
22. SA.
23. 2000 x M60, 400 x M16, 100 x SLR, 2 x M26.
24. Nil.

...3/25 En will

25. En will fight tenaciously when cornered, en will cover our injured by fire, in an attempt to thwart any rescue attempt. He will not reveal his posn unless he has a clear shot at you. When given time to estb himself will make max use of claymores. It is easier to con a small force than a large one, when in close contact in mountainous country, however it is necessary to have a force large enough to carry out aggressive action. Whilst protecting flanks and rear.

26. When the sect comd Lcpl Bell was wounded, I was the only NCO left in the gp. It became difficult to both con the gp, and remain in comms with my Comd. The flame thrower was extremely effective and should be utilised where ever possible.

27-28. N/A.

29. Para 23 refers.

Coy Comds Comments.

30. This is by far the biggest action the Coy has been involved in. The en were well sighted and prep to fight to the last.

31. The fact that a wounded was near the en and the closeness of contact, prevented gunships, arty and flame being used. Flame was finally used, however, only when the wounded was finally loc late in the afternoon.

32. There were many heroic acts during the 7 hrs of contact and it seems a miracle that only one other soldier was wounded.

33. Sgt McNulty and his gp deserves the highest praise for the patience, courage and determination they all showed in 7 hrs of continual battle.

.....  
(A.B. McNULTY)  
Sgt  
Pl Sgt 3Pl

May 69

.....  
(R.F. SUTTON)  
Maj  
CO A Coy 5 RAR

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op TWICKENHAM 2.
2. Report by 217210 2Lt R.A. BRETT.
3. 2Pl A Coy 5 RAR.
4. Pl Str 26 + 2 aslt Pnr + 2 FO party.
5. 1516 hrs 27 May 69, Duration 20 mins incl fol up.
6. YS 288772.
7. Find en footpads and sup routes.
8. The pl had fol up a well used oxcart track from the north and at approx 1450hrs came across a well used footpad at YS288772. The OC gave me permission to remain there over ni and at 1510hrs I started to move off on a recce, as I started to move south the MG gunner covering the track in that dir opened fire. Arriving in his posn as he finished firing the first belt I saw 6-7 figures race into the bush on the west of the track. The area was immediatly engaged with MG, SA, M72 and M79 fire. The gunner Pte R.R.COOPER reported that approx 12-15 en were on the track, he had them covered but they became alerted approx 50 metres from him. This was possibly caused by the mov of the recce ptl. The en were already racing from the track when Pte Cooper opened fire. I then moved fwd with the recce ptl plus the gun to the contact sight were two bodies and three blood trails were found. On one trail a hat covered in blood and with two bullet holes in it was found.
9. Thick low scrub, vis 20 metres.
10. 70 metres.
11. 6 Sect MG No1, Pte Cooper.
12. Laying behind MG.
13. Moving towards him.
14. 12 - 15 Regional Force, Dress black pants, green shirts, some all green, some in cam suits, US type webbing and eqpt.
15. MG No1 Pte Cooper.
16. M60, M16, M72, M79.
17. Broke into the bush on both sides of the track returned fire.
18. Kept up fire.
19. 3 en KIA, 2 en WIA and blood trails.
20. M60, M79.
21. Nil.
22. Not applicable.
23. 300 x 7.62.link, 20 x 5.56, 20 x M79, 1 x M72.
24. 1 x M16 plus small qty of docus.
25. Possibility of getting more en loss when gunners first belt ran out. On all stops ensure at least 2 belts are linked together.


..2/26. Nil

- 26. Nil.
- 27. It was only because of good control and fire by Pte Cooper that he was able to get as many en as he did when they broke.
- 28. Nil.
- 29. As for serial 23 plus 30 rounds of Arty.

Coy Comds Comments.

30. A good ambush even though the MG No was forced to open fire at 50 metres, the en in fact went to ground and aimed his wpn at the MG No before any rounds were fired. M79s were used in a mor type roll at high angle and proved very eff. It is good to see at last that M72s are being used.

.....  
(R.A. BRETT)  
2Lt  
OC 2Pl A Coy

  
.....  
(R.F. SUTTON)  
Maj  
CO A Coy 5 RAR



CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op 'TWICKENHAM 2'
2. Report by 217210 2Lt R.A. BRETT.
3. 2Pl A Coy 5 RAR.
4. Pl str 26 + 2 Arty + 2 Aslt pnrns.
5. 23 May 69, 1105 to 1106 hrs.
6. YS302721.
7. Ambush track system.
8. The Pl had gone into ambush on the previous day at YS302721 at 231050 hrs a heavy rain storm started and vis was cut to approx 5 metres, At 231104hrs Pte PJJ. DRUMMOND the 4 Sect MG No1 saw a figure moving down the track from the east with a plastic cape over his head. At first Pte Drummond thought it was the Sect Comd coming back from checking the claymores, the figure was approx 10ft away when he realized it was an en. As ordered he let the NO2 Pte Simes cover the first man and he tried to distinguish if there were any more fol. The en approached within 3ft of the gun then swung north on a different track. At this stage he tripped a flare and ran straight back into the gunner who killed him with a short burst. The gunner then trained the gun back up the track and fired the remainder of the belt in the hope of getting anyone fol. At this stage I had reached the gun pit and proceeded to fire the M79 up the track. I then called another gun to the posn and leap frogging the guns on either side of the track moved fwd. One en dead carrying an AK47 was found and there were no signs of other personalfol.
9. Thick rain forrest, vis up to 15 metres.
10. 10 metres.
11. Mg No1 Pte Drummond.
12. Laying behind M60.
13. Mov towards him.
14. 1 VC, regional forces, Dress black pants, grey mil shirt, sandals, webbing.
15. M60 Pte Drummond, 4ft.
16. M69, M79.
17. Death.
18. Stand to, as no prior wng of en had been given.
19. 1 en KIA.
20. M60.
21. Nil.
22. Not Applicable.
23. 200 x 7.62 link, 10 x M79.
24. 1 AK47 + 3 mags.
25. Nil.
26. Nil.

../2. 27.

- 27. As per serial 8.
- 28. Stood to.
- 29. 200 x 7.62 link. 10 x M79. 23 rounds Arty.

Coy Comds Comments.


- 30. A good ambush in that the en was allowed to enter the killing ground. The MG No did an excellent job in allowing the en to pass within 3ft of the posn.


.....  
(R.A. BRETTON)  
OC 2Pl A

*R.F. Sutton*  
.....  
(R.F. SUTTON)  
Maj  
CO A Coy 5 RAR

TRACE "P" TO  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
YS302721  
23 MAY 69.



GRAVE  




CONFIDENTIAL

D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM

7 Jun 69

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by. 57055 Maj M. P. Blake.
2. Report on. Cave system at 304703, found at 231200 H May 69.
3. Area covered by installation. 1000 sq yds.
4. Defensive Layout. Linear running from a creek bed up to caves in a steep rocky hill.
  - a. Installation contained caves only.
  - b. Caves were 50 to 70 ft in depth.
  - c. Caves were not interconnecting.
  - d. Types of construction used. Rock caves with bamboo beds.
  - e. Installation contained 35 caves.
  - f. Estimate 50 pers required to occupy posn.
  - g. Def layout facing west, down hill.
  - h. Caves were of various size.
  - i. Age of system not known, estimate in use for at least 6 mths.
  - j. Defensive layout located near a river.
  - k. Early warning devices consisted of a sentry post in creek bed.
  - l. Installation contained no booby traps.
  - m. Destructive action consisted of blowing of trees around main cave system to enable easier air recce.

*M. P. Blake*  
(M. P. Blake)  
Maj  
03 D Coy 5 RAR

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 29466 Maj R.E. HARRING.
2. Report on Base Camp at GR 310670 at 1530 hrs on  
23 May 69.
3. Area covered by instl: 200 square metres.
4. Defensive Layout
  - a. There were wpn pits only.
  - b. Not applicable.
  - c. Not applicable.
  - d. Const
    - (1) Not applicable.
    - (2) Wpn pits were dirt only.
  - e. There were 24 pits.
  - f. Est unit or sub-unit required to occupy posn: Coy.
  - g. Pits were facing in all round def.
  - h. Pits were one and two man only.
  - i. Wpn pits were three years old.
  - j. The def layout was near a creek and track.
  - k. There were no booby traps in the posn.
  - l. Nil.
  - m. No destruction action was taken - pits were already collapsed.

*R. Harring*  
.....Maj  
Coy Comd

CO 5 RAR

Jun 69

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op "TWICKENHAM 2"
2. Report by 1201164 2Lt D.J. MEAD
3. 7 Pl C Coy 5 RAR
4. 10.
5. 23 May 69. 1625 hrs. 10 mins.
6. 333654
7. Lead Pl of Coy (less 9 Pl)
8. The Pl had halted for locstats just to the west of a pad which they were paralleling. The scout and sect comd of the fwd sect heard two en moving along the pad 10 - 15 metres from them. They both saw the first man and shot and killed him. The second en returned fire and withdrew in cover down a re-entrant to the west. As the Pl blocked up, the MFC's sig saw another 2 en further along the pad to the south. He fired at one of them, no fire was returned, and he only had a glimpse of the en.
9. An open and rocky area, all en were on a pad.
10. 15 metres to the first two en. 100 metres to the second two seen.
11. 167125 Lcpl W.B. MALTBY.
12. Crouched - waiting for the sig to move.
13. They were heard talking.
14. 4 local VC. Dress of man killed: Green shorts, black shirt, plastic sandals, US web belt with a water bottle carrier, and a magazine carrier.
15. We did - 15 metres. 100 metres for second case.
16. M16's only.
17. First en was dead, the second returned fire, and withdrew behind cover.
18. The sect closed up, the gun moved fwd.
19. 1 KIA
20. M16
21. Nil
22. N/A
23. 50 rounds 5.56mm.
24. 2 personal letters, 1 AK47.

26. N/A

PART 2

27. As per this report.

28. Pl closed up, other actions as previously described.

29. 50 rounds 5.56mm  
1 M26 Grenade

PART 3

30. The actions of 7 Pl were correct. Their immediate sweep led up to another contact (see later report).


*D.J. Mead*

(D.J. MEAD)  
2Lt  
Pl Comd 7 Pl

*C.H. Ducker*

(C.H. Ducker)  
Maj  
OC C Coy

CONTACT AT 333654  
23 MAY 69





CO 5 RAR

Jun 69

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op "TWICKENHAM 2"
2. Report by 1201164 2Lt D.J. MEAD.
3. 7 Pl C Coy 5 RAR
4. 10.
5. 23 May 69. 1715 hrs. 40 mins.
6. 333653.
7. Section doing a sweep after a previous contact.
8. After a previous contact, 2 sect commenced a sweep N-S looking for an en we thought could have been wounded. The sect was sp by Pl comd and the sig, and the other gun gp on the high ground to the East. Just on the completion of the sweep, an en MG and at least one AK 47 opened up on the gp in the sweep. The gp went to ground and the MG was quietened by the sp gp. The sect then withdrew under cover of our sp fire. The en did not fire again, and later after we were more estb on the high ground we fired M79's into the area to try and move the en out towards the rest of the Coy. At this stage we were running short of light, and it was raining heavily. The en had an escape route. It was decided to withdraw West so that arty could be used on the area.
9. Two high rocky features to the East overlooking reasonably clear ground in the area of the contact. Very thick to the south in the area of the en MG.
10. En not sighted.
11. N/A
12. N/A
13. N/A
14. 2-4 en not sighted, (from previous contact local force).
15. The en MG.
16. GPMG, M16, M79.
17. He fired at the sect sweep, and then stopped when we brought heavy fire on him.
18. The sect went to ground, their sp gun opened up on the area of the en gun.
19. Unknown.
20. N/A
21. Nil
22. N/A
23. 100 7.62 link, 300 5.56mm, 50 7.62, 10 M79's.
24. Nil
25. Nil

26. M79 excellent weapon for sp, the round did not explode on hitting leaves, but only on contact with heavy objects.

PART 2

27. As per this report.

28. As per this report, mainly a contact within one sect, although the others were in a posn to give sp.

29. 100 7.62 link  
300 5.56mm  
50 7.62mm  
10 M79's  
68 Arty rounds spread over 12 hrs were fired.

PART 3


30. The actions of 7 Pl were correct. Their immediate reporting to Coy HQ of en sightings (see previous contact) enabled the OC to deploy 8Pl and 9 Pl in immediate ambush to cut the en off. Darkness prevented further action, except arty fire was used.

*D.J. Mead 2Lt*

(D.J. Mead)  
2Lt  
Pl Comd 7 Pl

*C.H. Ducker*

(C.H. Ducker)  
Maj  
OC C Coy



CONTACT AT  
YS 333653  
23 MAY 69

INCIDENT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op 'TWICKENHAM 2'
2. Report by 217210 2Lt R.A. BRETT.
3. 2Pl A Coy 5 RAR.
4. Str 23.
5. 24 May 69 at 0930 hrs.
6. YS302721.
7. Ambush track system.
8. The Pl had been in ambush since the previous day. Approx 15 mins earlier the gunner and his No2 had been relieved at their posn in order that they could move into the centre of the ambush and carry out their morning routine. At 0927 hrs the en signal was passed and the Pl stood to, after approx 10 mins I moved to the gun covering the Eastern track to see what was going on. This was the gun that had just been relieved. My batman and an aslt pnr were manning it and said that they had seen a figure move off the track approx 40 metres from them. Behind the figure it appeared there was another person. The figures were not noticed until they moved into the bush and the relief gunner did not fire. They did not know if they had been seen or not and did not want to fire in case they had not been seen and the en come closer. The figures were not seen again.
9. Thick rain forrest, vis 10 - 15 metres.
10. 30 metres moving into scrub.
11. Pte Heenan (manning the claymore switches).
12. Relieving MG No2 in manning claymore switches.
13. Quick mov into bush from track.
14. 1 possibly 2, Type unknown. Black.
- 15.-18. Not applicable.
19. Nil.
20. Not applicable.
21. Nil.
22. Not applicable.
- 23-24. Nil.
25. Not to put my batman or that pnr on an important gun again.
- 26-27. Nil.
28. Stood to, I checked with the Coy Comd as to the possibility of dropping Arty but was advised against it in case we wasnt seen.
29. Nil.



Coy Comds Comments.

30. Mov in an ambush is a must during a 3 day task. It is unfortunate the en saw his mov or noticed some wng sign in the area. A miss but not a bad one.

.....2Lt  
(R.A. BRETT)  
OC 2Pl A Coy

*R.F. Sutton* Maj  
.....  
(R.F. SUTTON)  
CO A Coy 5 RAR

TRACE 'P' TO  
INCIDENT AFTER ACTION  
YS 302721  
24 MAY 69



/0 Jun 69

5 RAR


CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. TWICKENHAM II
2. 2784009 2Lt R.A. LAMBERT
3. 9 pl C Coy 5 RAR
4. 1 and 24
5. 24 May 69 1100 hrs 1 hr, incl fol up.
6. YS 331647
7. Recce to loc LZ for Coy
8. Pl was deployed in all round protection whilst a navigation check was being carried out. The sentry of 7 sect who was 30 metres fwd of the posn saw 1 en approaching and shot him. En went to ground dropping his pack. Two elms immediately swept through the area, and a large blood trail was found. This trail led to a camp 250 metres away (YS 320649) where the en had been hastily bandaged and helped to withdraw. Evidence was found in the camp that there were at least two people occupying it at the time. At this stage the fol up was abandoned and the camp was searched. Some docus and civ clothes were recovered, and the fol up elms returned to the pl posn. The pack dropped on contact was also recovered, and proved to contain several changes of clothing, med sups and food.
9. Primary jungle, vis restr<sup>d</sup> to 30 - 40 metres.
10. 25 metres
11. Sentry of 7 sect, namely Pte H KALLERGIS.
12. Sentry
13. Noise factor as he approached the posn.
14. One local VC dressed in grey-green clothing.
15. Sentry. 15 metres
16. Sentry fired M16 and was extracted under covering fire of M60.
17. Dropped to ground.
18. Sentry was extracted and fol up commenced.
19. 1 WIA, substantiated by heavy blood trail.
20. M16 (5.56)
21. Nil
22. Not applicable.
23. 100 rounds M60, 40 rounds M16, 20 rounds SLR.
24. Pers and med docus recovered from pack.
25. Fol up action must be immediate and aggressive in case of possible WIA in order to retain the initiative and cfm kill.

26. Not applicable.

PART 2


27 to 29. As per above report.



(R.A. Lambert)  
2Lt  
Pl Comd

PART 3.

- 30.
- a. Follow up must be immediate in such a sit.
  - b. Judging by hvy blood trail found later, the en is unlikely to have survived.
  - c. They must be very confident in this area to walk around singly.



(C.H. Ducker)  
Maj  
OC C Coy

CONFIDENTIAL

D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM

7 Jun 69

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by. 57055 Maj M. P. Blake.
2. Report on. Cave system at 312699 found at 261400 H May 69.
3. Area covered by installation. 1000 sq yds.
4. Defensive Layout. Linear along natural caves in a rocky and steep re-entrant.
  - a. Not applicable.
  - b. Not applicable.
  - c. Tunnels and wpn pits were interconnecting.
  - d. Types of construction used. Caves - bamboo beds and bamboo water pipe.
  - e. Number of wpn pits and tunnels, 20 caves.
  - f. Estimate 30 pers required to occupy posn.
  - g. Caves facing all round.
  - h. Caves were of various size from 1 - 10 man.
  - i. System was 2 days old.
  - j. Defensive layout contained a spring in one of the caves.
  - k. Claymore mines and sentry positions were used as early warning devices.
  - l. There were no booby traps in the area..
  - n. No destructive action was taken.

*M. P. Blake*  
(M. P. Blake)

Maj  
OC D Coy 5 RAR



CONFIDENTIAL

D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM

7 Jun 69

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op. Op TWICKENHAM.
2. Report by. 5715939 2Lt J. Russell.
3. Unit. 11 Pl, D Coy, 5 RAR.
4. Str of Pl on contact. 22 men.
5. Date/time/duration of action. 261500 H May 69. 2½ hrs duration.
6. Location. 313699.
7. Pl task. Sweep.
8. Description of action. 11 Pl was sweeping down the side of a very steep feature when CH<sub>1</sub> contacted 1 en at the bottom of the hill in the re-entrant. We continued sweep when en fired an RPG at us wounding Pte Mitken and Cpl Letford, whose section was lead in the sweep. I ordered 4 sect to give covering fire from left flank while I took 5 sect plus two from 6 sect and assaulted en from right. We killed the en with the RPG and secured the area. During contact en fired number of RPG rounds and a Claymore and possibly small arms.
9. Description of Terrain. Very steep, rocky, hard going.
10. Distance to en when first sighted. 20 metres.
11. Which soldier first sighted en. Pte Gage.
12. What was soldier doing. No 2 MG during assault.
13. What caused en to be noticed. Movement.
14. VC str/type/dress. Regional dressed in shorts, shirt, Ho Chi Minh sandals.
15. Who fired first. Sweep sect & myself and some of flank sect at a range of 25 - 35 metres.
16. What sect wps fired. All.
17. What was en's immediate reaction. Kept firing.
18. What was pl's immediate reaction. Went to ground engaged en.
19. En Cas. 1 KIA.
20. Caused by. M60, M16, M26, M79.
21. Friendly cas. 2 WIA.
22. Caused by. RPG, Claymore.
23. Approx ammo expenditure. 700 rds link belt, 600 M16, 8 M26, 6 M79.
24. Docs/wps captured. RPG 2, RPG rounds boosters, qty docs.
25. Lessons Learnt. Watch ammo in assault.
- 26-29. Omitted.

30. Coy Comd's Comments. This action was a pl attack conducted over particularly difficult ground. Area fire sp from a sect proved most effective as did the use of grenades in the assault. Fire and movement in the assault group was of a high standard indicating that at last individuals appreciate the use of this technique.

*J. Russell*  
(J. Russell)

2Lt

Pl Cond 11 Pl.

*M. P. Blake*  
(M. P. Blake)

Maj

OC D Coy 5 RAR

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 213825 WO2 J.W. LAKE.
2. RAP type dispensaries and base camp at grid 332671 at 1400 hours on 27 May 69.
3. 20,000 sq yards.
4.
  - a. 4 caves.
  - b. N/A
  - c. No.
  - d. N/A
  - e. N/A
  - f. pl +
  - g. N/A
  - h. N/A
  - i.
    - (1) N/A
    - (2) N/A
    - (3) At least one year, and up to 24 hours prior to discovering.
  - j. Stream.
  - k. N/A
  - m. Nil.

.....WO2  
J.W. LAKE

B coy 5RAR  
AP AN PHU

Jun 69

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation TWICKENHAM II
2. Report by 1200424 Lt G Dunlop
3. 4 Pl B coy 5 RAR
4. Strength of Pl - 22
5. Date of action 280730 hrs May 69 Duration 5 minutes
6. Location YS 325676
7. Task RIF ambushing
8.
  - a. 4 Pl plus CHQ were deployed in a ambush position
  - b. The ambush consisted of 9 claymore mines and 2 M60
  - c. The position was occupied by 1 section by day and 2 by night.
  - d. The resting sections and CHQ were 30 meters in the rear of the ambush position.
  - e. At 0730 hrs the ambush comd was contacted by radio and told that his relief section would move down individually and replace his section.
  - f. The first man moved down to the ambush position and when he was 5 meters short of the left flank gun he was fired on by the enemy from the south.
  - g. The fire was returned with 2 M60's and the enemy fled south.
9. The terrain was thick secondary growth, visibility 20 Metres
10. The enemy was not seen.
11. Strength not known suspect 2-3
12. Enemy fired first Range 25 metres.
13. Section weapons fired M16 M60's
14. Enemy reaction - run
15. Enemy casualties- Nil
16. Own casualties - Nil
17. Ammo expenditure - M60 - 500 M16 -5
18. Lessons learnt.
  - a. Sentries must be posted for relief in place
  - b. Enemy must have been moving very cautiously  
I think he suspected some one would be to the north

(G DUNLOP)  
LT  
OC 4 Pl B Coy

B coy 5 RAR  
AP AN PHU

Jun 69

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 1200424 Lt G Dunlop
2. Report on VC Bunker System at 327676 at 1130 hrs on  
28 May 69.
3. Area covered by installation 3000 square yards
4. Defensive Layout:
  - a. The system was not complete.
  - b. It consisted of 7 bunkers each about 6' x 10'  
x 4'6"
  - c. The system was built outside a track with  
bunkers covering the two main approaches.
  - d. The overhead protection was bush material
  - e. There were 7 bunkers
  - f. Estimated strength 40. Occupy system - Squad T.
  - g. The system was 6 - 8 months old.
  - h. The system was near a track.
  - i. Restriction action taken. - Nil.

(G DUNLOP)  
LT  
OC 4 Pl. B Coy

Jun 69

5 RAR

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. TWICKENHAM II
2. 218006 Cpl H.E. SUTTON
3. 5 Sect 8 pl C Coy 5 RAR
4. 4 man recce
5. 28 May 69 3 mins
6. 327671
7. Recce party for stop gp loc for 8 pl, as part of Coy attack on camp.
8. Contact occurred when a VC was sighted by recce party of 4 men above a bunker system. En was mov cautiously in partial cover along a track. Both VC and recce party sighted each other simultaneously. Recce party fired 3 armalites and one SLR. 2 Members had positive aim, and third had obscured vision. En fell back into gully. Recce fell back into cover on hearing loud crashing noise, then silence. Not knowing what was ahead in bunkers, recce party returned to pl har.
9. Hilly, close timbered scrub.
10. 20 yards
11. Scout
12. Covering withdrawal.
13. Mov through bush
14. 1 VC, black pyjamas.
15. Recce scout, 15 yards.
16. 3 armalites, 1 SLR
17. Dropped weapon and fell backwards.
18. Immediate withdrawal to complete cover, then back to pl.
19. 1 probable KIA. Heavy blood trail, fresh grave found at YS 325669.
20. 3 of recce party.
21. Nil
22. N/A
23. 60 rounds AR15.

../2


- 24. 1 AK47.
- 25. En often travel on tracks.
- 26. En very alert.


PART 2

- 27. N/A
- 28. On hearing the firing, a relief force was organised, and had just moved out of the har when the recce party returned.
- 29. 30 rounds armalite, 3 rounds SLR.

PART 3

- 30. Fol up must be quick if man loses weapon. Because of close proximity of bunkers (later proved unoccupied), it is understood why fol up not carried out by recce ptl.

  
(H.E. Suttor)  
Cpl  
Sect Comd.

  
(C.H. Ducker)  
Maj  
OC C Coy

VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 3411359 Sgt P.J. KNIGHT.
2. Base camp at YS 328671 at 0700 hours on 29 May 69.
3. 300 metres X 300 metres.
4.
  - a. Numerous caves used for living and storage purposes. Caves and rocks offered natural cover, and a few sentry posns were noted.
  - b. Average cave depth 30 - 50 metres.
  - c. Some caves inter-connecting.
  - d. Construction limited to furniture such as beds, seats and tables.
  - e. 5 caves - several small bunker complexes in proximity - see Annex A.
  - f. Living accn for 40-50 (incl children)
  - g. The western or down hill approach was covered more thoroughly than the others.
  - h. Average cave could accomodate squad if nec.
  - i. (3) Furniture 12-18 months old, probably not used continuously.
  - j. Camp loc adjacent to non-perennial stream. Excellent water through a pipeline, and could only be drawn from inside the largest cave.
  - k. N/A
  - l. N/A
  - m. Furniture destroyed, cooking utensils rendered unservicable.
5. The proximity of this camp should be noted to the resting place at 333671 (Separate installation report) and bunkers found at 325673 in excellent condition, destroyed 31 May (see separate installation report).
6. A list of documents, weapons, ammo, food, etc is detailed at Annex A.

*P.J. Knight*  
.....Sgt  
P.J. KNIGHT

Annexes:

- A. Items found in camp.
- B. Enlargement showing camps near YS 328671.
- C. Enlargement showing camps and their track systems.



LIST OF DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS CAPTURED AT GRID 328671 ON 29 MAY 69

DESTROYED	1100 lbs	rice
"	30 lbs	salt
"	12 lbs	flour
"	2 lbs	peanuts and peas
"	1 pkt	pepper
"	8	M51A5 delay fuses
"	1	smoke grenade
"	1	rifle grenade
"	2	home-made A/Pers grenades
"	1	RP2 rocket
"	8	tail section RPG2 rounds
"	4	detonators
"	2	balastite rounds
"	8	RPG2 fuses
"	1	RPG2 booster fuse.
"	1	Gal of oil
"	3	Gal of kero
"	5 doz	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ volt batteries
"	1	American web belt
"	1	aluminium oil bottle
"	1	aluminium water bottle
"	1	metal cup
"	1	Aust Entrenching tool.
"	1	shovel top
"	1	blackboard
"	1	large mirror
"		various eating utensils
"		various cooking utensils
"	2	plastic water bottles
"	2	bottles liniment
"		various items of black clothing (numerous)
"	3	black jungle boots
"	1	bush hat
"	1	JG shirt
"	1 pr	Op blue shorts
"	1	sarong
"	2	bras
"	1	table cloth
"	1	set olive green metal dixies
RETAINED	300 rounds	7.62
"	1	SKS (less butt) very rusty
"	1	sub machine gun CHICOM
RETAINED	1	green and maroon duffle bag containing:
	5 pkts	potassium permanganate
	1 pkt	copper sulphate
	1	bottle olive oil
	1	jar antiseptic
	1 roll	elastic tape
	1	complete bandage
	5	incomplete bandages
	1	bottle perfume
	3	odd socks
	2	small clothes bags
	1	plastic bag (improvised gas mask)
	1 roll	black material


CAPTURED DOCUS (con't)

RETAINED	1	large clothes bag containing: Physics exercise books various educational notes various docus including part of an accounting ledger
	1	personal letter
	1	plastic water bottle top on which was scratched the words NGAEM and CHHYHN
	1	Aust water sterilization tin containing 3 dong and a receipt.
	9	bundles of propaganda material Numerous docus.

ANNEX "B"

- Bunker (or denotes 2 to 3 bunkers)
- X Rock Hutches or cave
- Grave
- ▤ Bamboo Pipeline
- Pad
- Water Point or water hole

45 328 671  
29 MAY 69



32

33

10 15 20 30 40

34

69

67


66

65

32

33

34



CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. OP ' TWICKENHAM '
2. Report by 217210 2Lt R.A BRETT.
3. 2Pl A Coy 5 RAR.
4. Pl str 26 + 2Aslt Pnrs + 2 Arty acc party.
5. 0900hrs 29 May 69, duration 15mins including sweep.
6. YS288772.
7. Ambush area.
8. The Pl had dug in ambush at YS288772 after a contact on the track at that loc the previous day. At 0900hrs the Pl was alerted by the en signal from the gun covering the southern track. The en were picked up approx 70 metres out and the gunner had them covered from this distance. Three en were seen, the middle one was naked except for a lion cloth and it looked as though his hands were tied. At approx 40 metres out something alerted the en, it may have been the smell and blood from the previous contact. Im definite the ambush itself was not seen or heard. At 30 metres out the en made a sudden break from the track, immediatly the claymore in that area was fired but failed to fire, it was only 5ft from the en and would have hit the first two at least. The gunner lead his gun off and let the en run into his fire. This paid off as in the sweep one body and one blood trail was found. During this contact an RPG2 was fired into the posn.
9. Thick low scrub, vis 20 metres, along track vis 70 metres.
10. 70 metres.
11. Pte Cooper MG No1.
12. Sentry duty on gun.
13. Movement
14. 3 Regional Black pants blue shirts.
15. MG No1 Pte Cooper
16. MG, M16, SLR, Claymore, M72, M79.
17. Moving into bush before contact and after returned fire with RPG.
18. Continued to fire.
19. 1 En KIA(BC) 1 En WIA(Blood trail)
20. MG
21. Nil
22. N/A
23. 200x7.62 link 20x5.56, 15 M79, 1 M72, 15x7.62  
1 Claymore (1 failed to fire)
24. 1 AK-50.
25. =
26. -

27 As per prior contact it was only because of intelligent use of the gun by Pte Cooper that caused the en cas when they broke.


28 As for serial 8.

29 As for serial 23 +20 rounds Arty.


Coy Comds Comments.

30 An ambush site once estb is well worth occupying for some time (even after previous contact) provided it covers a well worn track or foot pad- this has been tried time&time again.

.....  
(RA Brett)  
OC 2 Pl A Coy.

  
.....  
(R F Sutton)  
Maj.  
C O A Coy 5 RAR

TRACE "P" TO  
AFTER ACTION RPT  
YS 288772  
29 MAY 69.



CONFIDENTIAL

D Coy  
5 RAR  
AP AN PHU  
SOUTH VIETNAM

7 Jun 69

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op. Op TWICKENHAM II.
2. Report by. 5715939 2Lt J. Russell.
3. Unit. 11 Pl, D Coy, 5 RAR.
4. Str of Pl in contact. 12 men.
5. Date/time/duration of action. 291400 H May 69. 12 minutes duration.
6. Location. 339639.
7. Pl Task. Ambush.
8. Description of Action. 6 sect plus 2 men of and pl HQ were ambushing a track while rest of pl were in admin posn 50 m NW. 1 en approached from SW through bush (not on the track). Pte Sturla engaged him with MG and Pte Weymouth with M16. I conducted a sweep and found the dead VC.
9. Description of Terrain. Flat, normal vegetation.
10. Distance to en when first sighted. 14 metres.
11. Which soldier first saw en. Pte Weymouth.
12. What was soldier doing. No 2 MG in ambush.
13. What caused en to be noticed. Movement.
14. VC Str/type/dress. 1 Local dressed in black pyjamas.
15. Who fired first. Pte Sturla at a range of 14 metres.
16. What sect wps fired. M60, M16, SLR.
17. What was en's immediate reaction. Died.
18. What was pl's immediate reaction. Swept area.
19. En Cas. 1 KIA.
20. Caused by. M60, M16.
21. Friendly cas. Nil
22. Caused by. Not applicable.
23. Approx ammo expenditure. 50 rds link belt, 18 M16, 3 SLR.
24. Docus/wps captured. 1 SKS, 40 rds 7.62 short.
25. Lessons learnt. Nil.
26. Other points. The No 2 MG directed the fire of the MG from a kneeling posn.
- 27.29. Omitted.



CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

30. Coy Cond's Comments. Good fire control by the MG team.

*J. Russell*  
(J. Russell)

2Lt

Pl Cond 11 Pl.

*M. P. Blake*  
(M. P. Blake)

Maj

OC D Coy 5 RAR

C Coy 5 RAR  
AP AN PHU

// Jun 69

5 RAR

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. TWICKENHAM II
2. 213825 WO2 J.W. LAKE
3. Sp sect and sect of 8 pl C Coy 5 RAR
4. 17
5. 29 May 69 1835 hrs 45 mins
6. 332671
7. Ambush track / Cut off party for camp at 328671.
8. At approx 1835 hrs, the western fwd pit sighted 1 en mov along the track towards the posn. The sect cmd waited until the en was approx 2 yards from the claymore, and then pressed the firing device. It malfunctioned, so he threw the prep M16 grenade at the en who was at this stage directly below the sect cmd who was posn on a large rock. The grenade did not appear to harm the en, but blew him off his feet. The en then disappeared back along the track. The sect cmd and two men searched the area of the grenade blast and found one SMG PPS type 43 lying on the track. Myself and three others fol up after sighting the en 3 or 4 times and firing at him at intervals over 300 yards. He was killed by a member with an M16 as he was trying to throw a chicom anti tank grenade at us. He also carried a French frag type grenade. The only reason we were able to track the en was that he had been hit through the rice bag early in the action, and when he left the made track, he left a slight trail of white rice.
9. Thick secondary growth, mountainous terrain.
10. Approx 10 metres.
11. Rfn on sentry.
12. On sentry.
13. Removing branches from ~~across~~ track, which had been placed across for this purpose by us.
14. 1 man main force.
15. Us. Grenade at approx 10 metres.
16. Individual wpns.
17. Run.
18. Fol up.
19. 1 en KIA
20. M16
21. Nil

22. Not applicable  
23. 1 M26 grenade - 60 rounds M16 - 50 rounds SLR  
24. Med docus - 1 PPS type 43.7.62 mm short SMG Chicom type.  
25. Nil  
26. Nil

PART 2

27. As above  
28. Quick and well prep.  
29. As above.

*J.W. Lake*  
(J.W. Lake)  
WO2  
Ptl Comd


PART 3

30. a. A well conducted ambush, which was maintained for two days.  
b. Showed value of quick fol up whilst en was off balance.  
c. Confirmed need for thorough checking of claymore devices, one of which failed to operate in this case.

*C.H. Ducker*  
(C.H. Ducker)  
Maj  
OC C Coy

Annex: A. Diagram of contact.

ANNEX A TO  
CONTACT REPORT  
AT 332671




VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 1201164 2Lt D.J. MEAD.
2. Report on bunker system and rock and cave camp area at grid 324669 (centre) at 1130 hours on 31 May 69.
3. 350 metres X 80 metres.
4.
  - a. Bunkers and natural rock hutchie areas.
  - b. N/A.
  - c. No.
  - d. (2) Bunkers were quite well built, 8' X 6' with about 18" overhead protection, but in many cases were very old, and may have been partially demolished by own troops previously.
  - e. 15 bunkers, 3 small cave hutchies.
  - f. At least en Coy, more in temporary areas.
  - g. In one area, a long line connected by a crawl trench. The other bunkers were in a type of all round def layout.
  - h. Bunkers at least 4 man.
  - i. All bunkers at least 18 months - 2 years old, but in some cases had been used recently.
  - j. Layout near a water point which had constant running water.
  - k. No.
  - m. Nil

*D.J. Mead*  
.....2Lt  
D.J. MEAD

- PAD
- BUNKER
- WATER POINT
- x ROCK HUTCHIE
- == CRAWL TRENCH

BUNKER SYSTEM  
 AT 324664  
 31 MAY 69



VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 1201164 2Lt D.J. MEAD.
2. Bunker installation at grid 325673 at 1330 hours on 30 May 69.
3. 300 yards X 100 yards.
4.
  - a. (1) Bunkers and crawl trenches.
  - b. N/A
  - c. Bunkers on the high ground were connected by a single crawl trench, 2' deep.
  - d. (2) Bunkers were large, 8' X 6' with 18" to 2' overhead protection.
  - e. 16 bunkers, some without overhead protection.
  - f. En Coy at least.
  - g. One group in all round def, another long group along the edge of some high ground, overlooking lower ground.
  - h. (3) 3 to 4 man bunkers.
  - i. The smaller system was up to 12 months old, but had had recent repair work carried out. The larger group was at least 2-3 years old, and had not been used for a long time.
  - j. Layout near a water point dug in a river bed.
  - k. No.
  - l. Nil
  - m. Six of the best bunkers with overhead protection were destroyed using explosives on 31 May 69.

*D.J. Mead*  
.....2Lt  
D.J. MEAD

DRINKER SYSTEM  
AT 325 673  
30 MAY 69



- Bucket
- Water point
- Crawl Trench



VC INSTALLATION REPORT

1. Report by 217210 2Lt R.A. BRETT.
2. VC bunker system/camp at YS286773.
3. 1400 sq yds, 70 x 20.
4. There were two small systems approx 40 metres apart
  - a. System 1 approaching from the East.
    - (1) 5 bunkers, four of which were small fighting bunkers connected by a crawl trench.
    - (2) 2 sentry pits.
    - (3) 1 smoke hut.System 2.
    - (1) 5 separate bunkers.
  - b. All bunkers were of timber and earth const.
  - c. Both systems could take at least a squad each.
  - d. System 1 covered the Eastern approach along the entry track. System 2 covered all dir.
  - e. There were 4 one man fighting bunkers and 6 main bunkers two man.
  - f. System 1 was approx 2 weeks old(since used last). System 2 was used that day.
  - g. 1 sentry post was found on the Eastern approach.
  - h. No docs or eqpt were found.
5. Diagram att.

.....  
(R.A. BRETT)  
2Lt  
OC 2Pl A Coy

TRACE 'P' TO  
VC INSTALLATION REPORT  
YS 286773  
31 MAY 69

