

Series: AWM95
Australian Army commanders' diaries

Royal Australian Infantry

Item number: 7/3/83

**Item: 3 Battalion Royal Australian
Regiment**

Annexes

1-31 August 1971

Comd Diary

MEDICAL IN CONFIDENCE
3 RAR HOSPITAL STATE
AS AT 1700 HRS 22 AUG 71

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DIAGNOSIS</u>	<u>CONDITION</u>	<u>COY</u>	<u>ADMITTED</u>
1200251	Lcpl	G.W. KELLY	1 AUST FD	HAEMORRHOID/ECTOMY	SATISFACTORY	SP	11 AUG 71
365503	Pte	M.L. DICKSON	"	ACID BURNS LEFT SHIN	"	B	11 AUG 71
3790475	Cpl	R.L. PETTY	"	SHRAP LOWER JAW & R LEG	"	C	12 AUG 71 MEDEVAC 23/8
45626	Pte	D.R. HILL	"	SHRAP R THIGH	"	C	12 AUG 71 MEDEVAC 23/8
2412469	Pte	S.P. WILSON	"	SHRAP R THIGH & BUTTOCK	"	C	12 AUG 71 MEDEVAC 23/8
1736773	Pte	M.J. POPP	"	ABCESS L FOOT	"	A	14 AUG 71
218720	Pte	R.A. SWANSTON	"	HAEMORRHOID/ECTOMY	"	SP	18 AUG 71
1731438	Sgt	D ELLIOT	"	INT BLEEDING	"	ADM	19 AUG 71
2798700	Pte	J. MELLEMA	"	THER LEAVE	"	C	MEDEVAC 23/8
218967	Lcpl	D.N. JOHNSTON	"	PUO	"	D	20 AUG 71
2795565	Pte	R.C. APPO	"	TICK GRANULARTA	"	A	21 AUG 71 MEDEVAC 23/8

Distribution:

- CC
- 2IC
- BC
- Adjt
- All Coy OCs
- Asst Adjt
- RAP
- HVO
- Everyman
- Chaplain
- Movts
- Records
- List F (Serials 2-7)
- CP
- Comd Diary
- UPR
- Postal
- Float & File

(Handwritten signature)
 (A.J. RALPH)
 2lt
 Asst Adjt

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R553/1/8
R654/1/4 (TT)

CONFIDENTIAL

Command diary
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See Distribution List

3rd Battalion
The Royal Australian Regiment
AP AN PHU

22 Aug 71

RTA PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE 22 AUG 71

Reference: 3RAR R553/1/8 of 21 Aug 71.

General

1. RTA will be in three possibly four parties depending upon the number of personnel cross posted in the theatre. See Annexes A and B.
 - a. Adv Party by air - D-21 (to be confirmed).
 - b. Main Body by HMAS Sydney - D Day plus balance by air on date to be advised.
 - c. Rear Party by air - D + 4 (to be confirmed).
2. Operations will continue except for designated periods required in Nui Dat for Administrative purposes and final packing and RTA procedures.

G MATTERS

3. See Annex C for "Forecast of Operations" which is issued for execution unless otherwise ordered.
4. Weapons will be stripped of all paint ASAP.
5. Security is paramount and all ranks must be alert at all times. Rifle Coys will be required to do ptls in AO OTAGO when in Nui Dat and not on TF RR. No reference to the withdrawal is to be made over the radio.

A MATTERS

6. Offr Postings. With immediate effect.

Adjt-	Capt Jones (To conc on RTA procedures).
Mor Offr & Asst Ops Offr -	Capt Clarke (Also OC Adv Party).
2IC A -	Capt O'Dea after OCs return from R & R Until then Offr appt by OC.
2IC B -	Offr appt by OC.
2IC C -	Offr appt by OC.
2IC D -	Capt Herlihy - as well as CMC Admin CP.
Admin Offr Sp -	Lt Abigail
2IC Admin -	Capt Bray (as well as CP Duty Offr).
OC Mor Pl -	2Lt Shillabeer (unpaid).
OC Ships tps -	Maj Arnison.
Baggage Offr -	Lt Crawford.
OC Rear Party -	Maj Trevarthen.

/ 7. No

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7. No other changes are contemplated unless unforeseen incidents occur. It can be expected that Capts Andrews and Jackson will remain as IO's.
8. Postings on RTA
- a. Officers already posted will be advised of their new reporting date or change of posting in due course.
 - b. Posting of OR's will be advised.
 - c. Posting of those members whose families were removed prior to departure will be advised in due course.
 - d. OR's will be advised of postings once the policy is known.
 - e. My policy is to get the unit home first and then worry about repostings.
9. R & R
- a. Adv Party. Ceases now.
 - b. Main Body & Rear Party. Ceases last flt Aug except for those reposted in theatre.
10. R & C. Current cycle will be the last. It may be curtailed. No soldier is to go on leave outside R & C facilities with less than 3 weeks to go.
11. Farewell Activities:-
- a. A Coy barbeque (along previous lines).
 - b. An Offrs mess function.
 - c. A Sgts mess function.
 - d. Farewell parade . (incl Commemorative Service).
12. Pipes & Drums. Required for Rehearsals etc D- 14.
13. Attachments and Detachments. Cooks, Sigs, Dvrs, MFCs, Med Cpls, SB etc except for Pipers and Drummers and some cooks for rear party will remain with present attached company for RTA.
14. Accounts. Details issued later.
15. PX. Next allocation early Sep last sold in unit PX. Later sales through TF PX. No more credit.
16. Offr Confd Reports. Drafts for Lts to be submitted as for Capts (details issued by A/Adjt) required by 15 Sep 71.
17. Recommendations for Awards. Detailed notes to CO by 15 Sep 71.

/ 18. Subject

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18. Subject B for Promotion to Cpl & Sgt. See current instructions but recommendations to Ops Offr by 30 Sep. Applications will not be accepted once unit RTA's.
19. King Scotts Whisper. Temporarily suspended.
20. Book. Will be produced in Australia on RTA. Method of payment now requires review in view of reduced PX profit.
21. Cross Postings. Will be advised as soon as requirement advised to unit.
22. Discipline. When not on RR each coy is to appoint Duty Offr and NCO with specific duties to supervise coy areas particularly at night.
23. Ceremonial. Final parade and march through Adelaide are to be anticipated. Dress will be Greens Ceremonial with Hats KFF.
24. Tape Room. No more orders can be accepted.
25. Change in Allotments. No action to be taken until details received from 1 ATF.


Q MATTERS

26. All items including torches etc are to be returned. What we take back we use in Australia. They are not personal property.
27. Unit stocktake will be conducted at time of packing. All stores (less 7.62 rifles incl CES, bayonet frog, pistols and holsters for Main Body only, and hair clippers) to be returned, cleared and uncased, as directed by QM.
28. All F12s cleared except for personnel wpns required by Main Body.
29. Policy on amenities equipment to be advised. Remember, amenities items are unit property.
30. All wpns to be completely refurbished ASAP, eg carrying handles, sling swivels replaced.
31. Orderly room stores WOV treated as for fwd journey.
32. Regt property packed and stocktaked by W02 Archer.
33. Offrs and Sgts mess property packed and stocktaked as directed by 2IC and RSM.
34. Refer to Admin Instr 24/71 re withdrawal of clothing and equipment.
35. Minimum marking requirement as follows:-
 - a. Trunks - name, coy, 3RAR
 - b. Cases - sub a/c name, 3RAR
 - c. QM - QM 3RAR

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~~(F.P. SCOTT)
Lt Col
CO~~

- Annexes:
- A. Advance Party
 - B. Rear Party
 - C. Forecast of Activities. (to be issued separately)

Distribution:

List G
HQ C Comd (3)

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Annex A To 3 RAR
R654/1/4(11) dated
22 Aug 71

ADVANCE PARTY

Comd Gp

OC	Capt Clarke
CSM	WO Moyle
G Clerk	Pte Pye
Orderly	To be nominated
Typiste	(Civilian)

A Staff

2lt Lewis	
Sgt Clerk	(Aust?)
Clerk	Pte Boundey
Pay Clerk	Pte Fowles

Q Staff

QM	Aust?
RQMS	WO Twigg
Ledger Clerk	To be nominated
Storeman	L cpl O'Brien
Tpt NCO	Cpl Jamieson
4 x dvrs	Ptes Gill, Barber + 2
1 x veh mech	Cpl Mulley

GD Staff

<u>Pl Comd</u>	Sgt Powell
	One Cpl from A B & C Coys
	Five Ptes each from A, B, C, D, Sp Coys

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ANNEX B TO
3RAR R654/1/4 (11)
DATED 22 AUG 71

REAR PARTY

2IC
QM and some staff
Asst Adjt
WO2 Archer
Pte Bowd
Sgt Newman and Lcpl Cocknam
Lcpl Keevers plus one R & F Sgts mess
Sgt McIntosh
Sgt Dabinett
2 Drivers
GD Group - 15 R & F (3 per coy)
Sgt Godden
Asst QM
Caterer plus 12 cooks.

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Comd Dairy

MEDICAL IN CONFIDENCE
3 RAR HOSPITAL STATE
AS AT 1700 HRS 23 AUG 71

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DIAGNOSIS</u>	<u>CONDITION</u>	<u>COY</u>	<u>ADMITTED</u>
1200251	Lcpl	G.W. KELLY	THER LEAVE	HAEMORRHOD/ECTOMY	SATISFACTORY	SP	11 Aug 71
365503	Pte	M.L. DICKSON	1 AUST FD	ACID BURNS LEFT SHIN	"	B	11 Aug 71
1736773	Pte	M.J. POPP	"	ABCESS L FOOT	"	A	14 Aug 71
218720	Pte	R.A. SWANSTON	"	HAEMORRHOD/ECTOMY	"	SP	18 Aug 71
1731438	Sgt	D. ELLIOT	"	INT BLEEDING	"	ADM	19 Aug 71
218967	Lcpl	I.H. JOHNSTON	"	PUO	"	D	20 Aug 71
235402	Lt	D.K. SHEA	8FD AMB	PUO	"	A	23 Aug 71
3798914	Lcpl	B.J. WILLIAMS	1 AUST FD	HOOKWORM	"	A	23 Aug 71

- | | |
|---------------------|----------------------|
| <u>Distribution</u> | Chaplain |
| CO | Movements |
| 2IC | Records |
| Base Comd | List F (Serials 2-7) |
| Adjt | CP |
| All Coy OCs | Comd dairy |
| Asst Adjt | UPR |
| RAP | Postal |
| HVO | Float and File |
| Everyman | |

(Signature)
 (A.J. RALPH)
 2LT
 Asst Adjt

Handwritten notes in the top left corner.

REPUBLICAN CHAIRMAN
OF THE NATIONAL BOARD
OF THE YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION

Table with multiple columns containing names and dates, possibly a roster or record. The text is faint and partially obscured by bleed-through from the reverse side.

Handwritten signature or initials in the center of the page.

Additional handwritten notes and possibly a date in the bottom right corner.

R66/3/3.

3rd Battalion
The Royal Australian Regiment
AP AN PHU

31 Aug 71

Distribution:

List F
HQ Coy 1 ATF
2lt Philips
WO2 Archer

VISIT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CONCERT
PARTY 30 AUG 71

General

1. A South Australian concert party will be playing at 3 RAR on 30 Aug 71.

2. Members of the party are:

a. Escort Officer: Capt R.C. Haines

b. Sound Technician: To be nominated

c. Artists

(1) Johnny Mac Compere/Vocalist

(2) Joan McInnes Vocalist

(3) Anna Allwood Vocalist

(4) Maria Kay Martin Vocalist/Dancer

(5) Billy Ross Drummer

(6) John Newlyn Bass Guitar/Comedian

(7) Stuart Woolham Organist

Totals - Artists 3 Females 4 Males = 7

Escort Officer & Technician = 2

Unit Escort Officers = 2

Total = 11

Timings

3. a. 29 Aug 71 1200 Uplift eqpt from stage and move from Luscombe Bowl to 3 RAR. To be held in a dry secure area.

/2....b.

2.

3. b. 30 Aug
- | | |
|-----------|--|
| 0730 | Uplift Party from Luscombe Field. Move to 3 RAR Area for breakfast. |
| 0900 | Stage to be set up and power to be connected by this time. Party moves to stage, eqpt set up and tested. |
| 1000 | Morning tea, Admin Coy. |
| 1030 | Visit PX etc. |
| 1200-1300 | Drinks Sgts Mess. |
| 1300 | Lunch. |
| 1330 | Party moves to stage. Electrical eqpt in dressing rooms to be working by this time. |
| 1400 | Show commences. |
| 1530 | Show ends. |
| 1600 | Eqpt loaded on 3 RAR Veh. Veh stands by for move to Luscombe Field with part. |
| 1645 | Party and eqpt move to Luscombe Field. |
| 1715 | Depart. |

Attendance

4. 3 RAR (-) will be able to attend the concert in the area of 3 RAR Mor Base Plate Position.

- a. B Coy will view the concert at Luscombe on 29 Aug 71.

Show commences 1000

Show ends 1130

- b. D Coy will view the concert at HQ Coy 1 ATF on 1 Sep 71.

Show commences 1400

Show ends 1530

Responsibilities

5. 3 RAR Escort Officer is 2lt Philips assisted by WO2 Archer. They are to:

- a. Collect party from Luscombe and escort to Officers Mess for breakfast.

- b. Escort party to stage area 0900.

- c. Escort party to Admin Coy for morning tea at 1000.

- d. Lunch in Sgts Mess at 1200.

- e. Escort to stage area 1330.

- f. Supervise loading of eqpt at 1600 and move with party to Luscombe.

/3....6.


3.

6. Tpt Offr is responsible to provide tpt as follows:
- a. 29 Aug 71 - TCV: is to move B Coy to Luscombe Bowl.
 - (1) Report to B Coy 0930.
 - (2) 1 x ¾ ton and 1 x 5 ton to uplift stage and eqpt from Luscombe Bowl. Report Luscombe 1200.

Note. Mobile stage is only to be towed by ¾ ton veh.

30 Aug 71 - 2 x ¾ ton and 1 x 5 ton required all day.

1 Sep 71 - TCV's to mov D Coy to HQ Coy 1 ATF. Report D Coy lines 1330.
7. Admin Coy is responsible for:
- a. Liaison with Pte Manton (Mor Storeman) for setting up of separate male and female dressing rooms and toilets behind the stage. Room/tent are to be equipped with fans, lights, mirrors, tables, chairs, water, basins, soap, towels, coat hangers and racks.
 - b. Provision for morning tea in the area of Admin Coy kitchen.
8. In addition WO2 Archer is responsible for:
- a. Provision of cold drinks, glasses and can opener for performers - Regimental Funds to pay.
 - b. Selling of cold drinks to audience.
9. WORD is responsible for:
- a. Provision of 6 chairs on stage.
 - b. Provision of 30 chairs for Officers and WO's.
 - c. Cleanliness of site after the concert.
 - d. Provision of work party of 5 men to:
 - (1) Cutting of grass in area of concert.
 - (2) Set up area.
 - (3) Unload and load luggage.
 - (4) Clean up area.


(F.P. SCOTT)
Lt Col
CO

Comd Dairy

MEDICAL IN CONFIDENCE
3 RAR HOSPITAL STATE
AS AT 1700 HRS 24 AUG 71

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DIAGNOSIS</u>	<u>CONDITION</u>	<u>COY</u>	<u>ADMITTED</u>
1200251	Lcpl	G.W. KELLY	THEIR LEAVE	HAEMORRHOID/ECTOMY	SATISFACTORY	SP	11 Aug 71
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1731438	Sgt	D. ELLIOT	"	INTERNAL BLEEDING	"	ADM	19 Aug 71
218967	Lcpl	I.N. JOHNSTON	"	PUO	"	D	20 Aug 71
235402	Lt	D.K. SHEA	"	PUO	"	A	23 Aug 71
3798914	Lcpl	B.J. WILLIAMS	"	HOOKWORM	"	A	23 Aug 71
	BUSHMAN SCOUT	NGUYEN VAN BE	"	APPENDICITIS	"	F	24 Aug 71

DISTRIBUTION

- CO
- 2IC
- Base Comd
- Adjt
- All Coy OCs
- Asst Adjt
- RAP
- HVO
- rynan
- Chaplain
- Movements
- Records
- List F (Serial 2-7)
- CP
- Comd Dairy
- UPR
- Postal
- Float and File

(Signature)
(A.J. RALPH)
2 Lt
Asst Adjt

(cont. from)

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UNITED STATES ARMY
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT
1918-1919

DATE	RANK	NAME	REGIMENT	COMPANY	LOCATION
11 Aug 11	1st Lt	G. V. KELLY	1st	1st	BATHING
11 Aug 11	2nd Lt	H. L. DICKSON	1st	1st	"
14 Aug 11	2nd Lt	H. L. DICKSON	1st	1st	"
16 Aug 11	2nd Lt	H. L. DICKSON	1st	1st	"
19 Aug 11	2nd Lt	H. L. DICKSON	1st	1st	"
20 Aug 11	2nd Lt	H. L. DICKSON	1st	1st	"
23 Aug 11	2nd Lt	H. L. DICKSON	1st	1st	"
23 Aug 11	2nd Lt	H. L. DICKSON	1st	1st	"
24 Aug 11	2nd Lt	H. L. DICKSON	1st	1st	"

(A. J. ...)
S. H.
Last ...

Chaplain
Lieutenant
Lieutenant
List 7 (Serial 2-7)
C
Company
Company
Company
Company

UNITED STATES ARMY
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT
1918-1919


Cond Dairy

MEDICAL IN CONFIDENCE
3 RAR HOSPITAL STATE
AS AT 1700 ERS 25 AUG 71

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DIAGNOSIS</u>	<u>CONDITION</u>	<u>COY</u>	<u>ADMITTED</u>
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3798914	Lcpl	B.J. WILLIAMS	"	HOOKWORM	"	A	23 Aug 71
		BUSHMAN SCOUT					
		NUGYEN VAN BE	"	APPENDICITIS	"	B	24 Aug 71
3798787	Pte	I.S. PRICE	"	TONCILLITIS	"	C	24 Aug 71
1736788	Pte	L.G. ANDERSON	"	OBSERVATION	"	B	25 Aug 71
2276670	Pte	B.L. PENNY	"	OBSERVATION	"	B	25 Aug 71
3797050	Pte	R.W. BLEAKLEY	"	PHYSIOTHERAPY	"	SP	25 Aug 71

DISTRIBUTION

- CO
- 2IC
- Base Comd
- Adjt
- All Coys OCs
- RAP
- HVO
- Everyman
- Asst Adjt
- Chaplain
- Movements
- Records
- List F (Serial 2-7)
- CP
- Comd Dairy
- UPR
- Postal
- Float and File


 (A.J. RALPH)
 2Lt
 Asst Adjt

Conf. Priv.

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RECORD OF SERVICE
FOR THE
UNIT

NAME	DATE	POST	LOCATION	REMARKS	INITIALS
G.W. KELLY	1943	1st Lt	THE LEAVE		
M.J. LUTHER	1943	2nd Lt	THE LEAVE		
M.A. KYLE	1943	1st Lt	THE LEAVE		
E.A. HANCOCK	1943	2nd Lt			
D. KELLY	1943	2nd Lt			
I.M. JOHNSON	1943	2nd Lt			
D.L. BIRD	1943	1st Lt			
D.A. WILLIAMS	1943	1st Lt			
WALTER VAN DE					
A.M. BRICE	1943	2nd Lt			
L.C. ANDERSON	1943	2nd Lt			
B.L. DRYE	1943	2nd Lt			
A.V. WHEATLEY	1943	2nd Lt			


 Captain
 1943

1st Lt
 2nd Lt
 1st Lt (Detach 2-7)
 2nd Lt
 1st Lt
 2nd Lt
 1st Lt
 2nd Lt
 1st Lt
 2nd Lt

MESSAGE FORM

Precedence Action
PRIORITY

Date - Time Group
251600H AUG 71

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL

Originators Number
OPS049

From 3 RAR
To A, B, C, D, SP, ADMIN COY, MOR FSB (80A)
info CO, 2IC, OPS, BC, BASE COMD, IO, COMD DAIRY (3)

SECURITY MEASURES SVN ELECTION DAY 29 AUG 71 .

- ONE . 1 ATF BASE IS A CLOSED CAMP 281800H TO 300600H AUG 71 . 1 ATF GATES WILL BE LOCKED . C COY IS TO ENSURE NORTH GATE IS LOCKED AND NOT OPENED .
- TWO . NO MOV ON ANY ROAD IN PHUOC TUY IN PERIOD 281800 TO 300600 AUG .
- THREE . NO RANGE PRACTICES OR TEST FIRING TO BE CONDUCTED FROM 281800 TO 300600
- FOUR . BUSHMEN SCOUTS AND INTERPRETERS ATTACHED TO BNHQ AND SUBUNITS LOC IN NUI DAT OVER THIS PERIOD ARE TO BE RELEASED TO VOTE . IO TO BRIEF VN PERSONNEL OF RESTRICTIONS ABOVE . VN PERSONNEL MUST DEPART BEFORE 281860H AND RETURN AFTER 301600H .
- FIVE . CAV TP WILL BE LOC IN XUYEN MOC AO AT NIGHT AND IN AO GLENELG BY DAY - AN AO FOR THIS PURPOSE WILL BE ADVISED SEPARATELY .
- SIX . 3TP ADVISED OF RESTRICTIONS BY CRYPTO

page 1 of 1

Drafters Name	Office	Tele No
KERR	OPS OFFR	EMP

File No 569/71/9

Releasing Officers Sig and Rank
<i>[Signature]</i>
MAJ

R553/1/8

3 RAR
Ap An Phu

25 Aug 71


43

Distribution: See Below

COMPOSITION OF 3 RAR ADVANCE PARTY

1. Comd Gp
(7)
- | | | | | |
|-------------|---------|-------|--------------|------------|
| OC | 217621 | Capt | C.J. Clarke | (Mor) |
| 2IC | 4719949 | 2lt | R.B. Lewis | (C Coy) |
| CSM | 54762 | Sgt | R.M. Powell | (Bn HQ) |
| Clerk 'A' | 45266 | Pte | C.J. Boundey | (Bn HQ) |
| Clerk 'G' | 45372 | Pte | D.T. Pye | (Int Sect) |
| Clerk (Pay) | 56126 | L cpl | G.R. Fowles | (D Coy) |
| Batman | 255443 | Pte | N.E. Aldred | (Sp Coy) |
2. 'Q' Gp - Admin Coy
(8)
- | | | | |
|-----------|---------|-------|---------------|
| RQMS | 310236 | WO2 | R.J. Twigg |
| Ledger | 4410478 | L cpl | J.A. O'Brien |
| 'Q' Clerk | 3798547 | Pte | J.H. Andrews |
| Tpt NCO | 1200900 | Cpl | R.J. Jamieson |
| Dvr | 4721114 | Pte | D.J. Barber |
| " | 1411340 | Pte | B.R. Jones |
| " | 43996 | Pte | R. Gill |
| " | 38699 | Pte | W.L. Osborn |
3. Coy Reprs
- | <u>A Coy (6)</u> | | | <u>C Coy (6)</u> | | |
|------------------|-----|---------------|------------------|-----|----------------|
| 313652 | Cpl | I.R. Scanlan | 61721 | Cpl | W.H. Meech |
| 45373 | Pte | J. Gwynn | 56266 | Pte | R.C. Larsen |
| 4721846 | Pte | L.A. Hancock | 219946 | Pte | P.B. Stenchion |
| 296103 | Pte | G.D. Phillips | 220431 | Pte | V.J. Marangoni |
| 2798782 | Pte | S.C. Rout | 62161 | Pte | G.W. Johnson |
| 2795825 | Pte | S. Pannarello | 3799052 | Pte | W.R. Eaton |
- | <u>B Coy (6)</u> | | | <u>D Coy (5)</u> | | |
|------------------|-----|----------------|------------------|-----|--------------|
| 4720799 | Cpl | G.J. Maynard | 4721795 | Pte | P.T. Barbour |
| 4721855 | Pte | P. Hankell | 44727 | Pte | T.P. Collins |
| 411653 | Pte | R.L. Brown | 219833 | Pte | D.A. Russell |
| 4721879 | Pte | P.J. McDonough | 313717 | Pte | R.J. Thomas |
| 2795694 | Pte | J.R. Barrett | 4721583 | Pte | B. Bateman |
| 62127 | Pte | S.L. Sinnitt | | | |
- Sp Coy (4)
- | | | | | | |
|---------|-----|----------------|--------|-----|-------------|
| 1202378 | Pte | B.J. Eames | 448443 | Pte | G. Bruno |
| 45180 | Pte | B.F. Applekamp | 219395 | Pte | L.J. Norman |

2. No changes are to be made without prior approval of HQ 3 RAR.


(J.A. Jones)
Capt
Adjt

Distribution CO 2IC Adj (5) OC Advance Party (5) RSM
Bn HQ (5) Pay (5) Postal (2) RMO (2) QM (3) Coys (5)

MESSAGE FORM

Comd Diary
44.

Precedence
PRIORITY

Date, - Time Group
25020Z AUG 71

Security Classification
RESTRICTED

From 3 RAR
To List F

Originator's Number
A1231

REF 1 ATF OPS 1461 OF 240530Z AUG 71 . RESTRICTIONS R AND C CMM STANDOWN CMM
LOCAL LEAVE VUNG TAU . WITH EFFECT FROM 25 AUG 71 AND UNTIL AT LEAST 30 AUG 71
CMM FOL RESTRICTIONS APPLY TO PERS IN VUNG TAU SPECIAL ZONE CLN
ONE . NO OFFR IS TO STAY AT THE GRAND HOTEL ANNEX .
TWO . PERS STAYING AT R AND C CENTRE MAY PROCEED BY 1 ALSG BUS TO 1 ALSG
DURING DAYLIGHT OTHERWISE TO REMAIN R AND C CENTRE .
THREE . PERS STAYING PETER BADCOE CLUB TO REMAIN 1 ALSG AREA OR MAY USE BUS TO
R AND C CENTRE DURING DAYLIGHT .
FOUR . NO LOCAL LEAVE TO BE GRANTED FOR PERS TO MOV OUTSIDE 1 ALSG OR
R AND C CENTRE

Page 1 of 1 pages

Drafters Name & Appt Tele NO Date
RALPH A/ADJT EMP 25 AUG 71

Releasing Officers Sig and Rank

Ralph 2LT

Comd Diary 45.

MESSAGE FORM

Precedence - Action
PRIORITY

Date - Time Group
26 1000Z AUG 71

Security Classification
UNCLAS

Originators Number
A1243

From 3 RAR

To List F

CONCESSIONAIRE AND GIFT SHOP TRADING .

ONE . DUE TO ELECTIONS THE FOLLOWING TIMINGS AND CHANGES TO TRADING HOURS
WILL TAKE PLACE WITH THE HONG KONG CONCESSIONAIRE, KOREAN SNACK BAR
CMM BARBER ETC CLN

ALFA . FROM 26 AUG UNTIL 30 AUG CLOSING TIME WILL BE 1600HRS .

BRAVO . ALL OF THE ABOVE FACILITIES WILL BE CLOSED SUNDAY 29 AUG .

TWO . UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE THERE WILL BE FREE TRADING AT THE PX GIFT SHOP

page 1 of 1

Drafter's Name & Appointment Tele NO
RALPH A/ADJT EMP

Releasing Officers Sig and Rank
Ralph .2LT

Comd Dairy 46.

MESSAGE FORM

Precedence--Action
PRIORITY

Date - Time Group
2604Z AUG 71

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL

Originators Number
G1240

From 3 RAR
To MILCOMD ADELAIDE

INFO FILE, COMD DAIRY (3)


- 3 RAR TRAINING IN 1971 FOL RTA FROM VN . FOR PRELIMINARY PLANNING REQUEST
YOUR ADVICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE PREFERABLY BY SIGNAL ON FOLLOWING INF CLN
- ONE . COURSES SCHEDULED AT C COMD TRADE TRG CENTRE IN PERIOD 1 NOV TO
20 DEC 71 .
 - TWO . DETAILS ON ANY EDUCATION COURSES SCHEDULED IN C COMD IN PERIOD
NOV - DEC 71 .
 - THREE . DETAILS OF ANY OTHER COURSES CONDUCTED WITHIN COMD IN SAME PERIOD
THAT MAY BE OF VALUE TO 3 RAR .

FOR INFORMATION 3 RAR WILL REQUIRE VACANCIES ON COURSES FOR CLERKS CMM
DRIVERS AND PAY AT EARLIEST DATE AFTER 1 NOV . THIS REQUIREMENT ARISES FROM
ARA/NS MANNING PROBLEMS DUE TO EARLY NS MARCH OUT CMM POSTINGS CMM DISCHARGES

page 1 of 1

Drafters Name	Office	Tele No
KERR	OPS OFFR	EMP

Releasing Officers Sig and Rank



File No 850/71/2

Cond Diary

MEDICAL IN CONFIDENCE
3 RAR HOSPITAL STATE
AS AT 1700 HRS 26 AUG 71

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DIAGNOSIS</u>	<u>CONDITION</u>	<u>COY</u>	<u>ADMITTED</u>
1200251	Lcpl	G.W. KELLY	THER LEAVE	HAEMORROID/ECTOMY	SATISFACTORY	SP	11 AUG 71
365503	Pte	M.L. DICKINSON	" "	ACID BURNS LEFT SHIN	"	B	11 AUG 71
1736773	Pte	M.J. POPP	1 AUST FD	ABSCESS LEFT FOOT	"	A	14 AUG 71
218720	Pte	R.A. SWANSTON	"	HAEMORRHOID/ECTOMY	"	SP	18 AUG 71
1731438	Sgt	D. ELLIOT	"	INTERNAL BLEEDING	"	ADM	19 AUG 71
218967	Lcpl	I.N. JOHNSTON	"	PUO	"	D	20 AUG 71
235402	Lt	D.K. SHEA	"	PUO	"	A	23 AUG 71
3798914	Lcpl	B.J. WILLIAMS	"	HOOKWORM	"	A	23 AUG 71
		BUSHMAN SCOUT NUGYEN VAN BE	"	APPENDICITIS	"	B	24 AUG 71
3798787	Pte	I.S. PRICE	"	TONCILECTOMY	"	C	24 AUG 71
3797050	Pte	R.W. BLEAKLEY	"	PHYSIOTHERAPY	"	SP	25 AUG 71
5411585	Cpl	D.R. DILLON	"	SUSPECTED FRAC NOSE	"	B	26 AUG 71

Distribution:-

CO	MOVEMENTS
2IC	RECORDS
BASE COMD	LIST F (Serials 2 - 7)
ADJT	CP
ALL COY OCs	COMD DIARY
RAP	UPR
HVO	POSTAL
EVERYMAN	FLOAT
ASST ADJT	FILE
CHAPLAIN	

A.J. Ralph
(A.J. RALPH)
for 2LT
ASST ADJT

Handwritten notes and number 47 in blue ink.

MEMORIAL IN CONNECTION
WITH THE
1914-15 CAMPAIGN

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>REGIMENT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
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Handwritten signature or name in the lower left quadrant.

Additional printed text or a second table fragment in the lower right quadrant.

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

ROUTINE ORDERS PART 1

by

LT COL F.P. SCOTT

COMMANDING OFFICER

3RD BATTALION

THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT

Serial SVN 20

26 Aug 71

Numbers 250 - 258

- 250 Duties
- 251 Cheques - Converting to cash or credit to pay book
- 252 Fire Hazards
- 253 Wearing of the Infantry Combat Badge
- 254 Training Publications
- 255 Swimming Pool
- 256 Outstanding Asco Pay Plans
- 257 Diseases - Conjunctivitis
- 258 Results of 5/71 Promotion Course

NOTICE

- 1. Call Australia Telephone Service.

250.

Duties1. 3 RAR Base Duty Officer

The following personnel are to mount duty on the date indicated:

<u>Duty Officer</u>	<u>Date</u>
Sgt J. Godden	29 Aug 71
WO2 R.J. Twigg	30 Aug 71
WO2 F. Plummer	31 Aug 71
Sgt A. Norman	1 Sep 71
Sgt K. Burgess	2 Sep 71
WO2 G. Archer	3 Sep 71
Sgt J. Broome	4 Sep 71
Sgt P. Golden	5 Sep 71
Sgt K. Van-Kruyssen	6 Sep 71
Sgt D. Elliot	7 Sep 71
Sgt K. Battersby	8 Sep 71
Sgt R. Newman	9 Sep 71
Sgt J. Godden	10 Sep 71

2. Bn HQ Duty Clerk

<u>Duty Clerk</u>	<u>Date</u>
Cpl T.C. Seekamp	24 Aug 71
Pte P.R. Crees	25 Aug 71
Cpl M.E. Daly	26 Aug 71
Lcpl K.J. Bennett	27 Aug 71
Pte C.J. Boundey	28 Aug 71
Pte J.C. Munckton	29 Aug 71
Pte H.C. Egan	30 Aug 71
Pte R.S. Fallon	31 Aug 71
Lcpl I.T. Botfield	1 Sep 71
Cpl T.C. Seekamp	2 Sep 71
Pte P.R. Crees	3 Sep 71
Cpl M.E. Daly	4 Sep 71
Lcpl W.B. Watt	5 Sep 71
Lcpl K.J. Bennett	6 Sep 71
Pte C.J. Boundey	7 Sep 71
Pte J.C. Munckton	8 Sep 71
Pte R.S. Fallon	9 Sep 71

3. Bn HQ Hygiene Duties

Pte R.J. Bastock	26 Aug 71	Pte J.J. Fisher	3 Sep 71
Pte M.W. Hardy	27 Aug 71	Pte M.D. Hindson	4 Sep 71
Pte J.R. Grant	28 Aug 71	Pte B.W. Dennis	5 Sep 71
Pte R.D. Thomas	29 Aug 71	Pte P.J. Morton	6 Sep 71
Pte D.W. Pye	30 Aug 71	Pte R.S. Fallon	7 Sep 71
Pte C.E. Turner	31 Aug 71	Pte C.J. Boundey	8 Sep 71
Pte D.W. Pobje	1 Sep 71	Pte R.M. Bowd	9 Sep 71
Pte T. Poutakidis	2 Sep 71		

/2....4.

2.

250. 4. Sp Coy Mess Duties

Pte B.W. Dennis	
Pte N.W. Hardy	1 Sep 71
Pte R.S. Fallon	
Pte J.R. Grant	3 Sep 71
Pte R.D. Thomas	
Pte C.E. Turner	5 Sep 71
Pte J.J. Fisher	
Pte R.M. Bowd	7 Sep 71

5. Duty Projectionist

The following personnel are rostered to show the movies in the Battalion Picture Theatre on the dates indicated. If for any reason any member is unable to perform his duty he is to inform the Asst Adjt 24 hours beforehand.

WO2 R.A. Moyle	29 Aug 71
Cpl T.C. Seekamp	30 Aug 71
Pte F. Poczyhajlo	31 Aug 71
Pte R.S. Fallon	1 Sep 71
Sgt A. Norman	2 Sep 71
WO2 R.A. Moyle	3 Sep 71
Cpl T.C. Seekamp	4 Sep 71
Pte F. Poczyhajlo	5 Sep 71
Pte R.S. Fallon	6 Sep 71
WO2 R.A. Moyle	7 Sep 71
Pte R.S. Fallon	8 Sep 71
Pte F. Poczyhajlo	9 Sep 71
Cpl T.C. Seekamp	10 Sep 71
Sgt A.R. Norman	11 Sep 71

6. Admin OP Duty Officer

Shown at Annex A

251. Cheques - Converting to cash or credit to pay book

1. Reserve Bank cheques are the only ones which will be accepted by the Cash Office in Vietnam for converting to cash or credit to pay book.

252. Fire Hazards

1. It is thought that at least one fire in tentage accomodation has been caused by electric light bulbs being too close to the tent inner. In future, the light globe in tentage accomodation fitted with the electricity, is to be at least 6 inches from the inner canvas.

253. Wearing of the Infantry Combat Badge

1. The badge is to be worn on the left breast, 1/8 of an inch above, and centrally placed immediately above the medal ribbons or medals with all orders of dress, except mess dress, in which medal ribbons/medal are worn. The point of the bayonet must be uppermost.

/3....2.

253. 2. Members entitled to wear this badge and another Army badge in the same position may wear only one; the choice being made by the member.
3. It should also be noted that a small piece of talc or similar material placed behind the shirt material and over the pins will secure the badge in a stable and upright position.

254. Training Publications

Reference: 3 RAR G1233.

1. All members are reminded that all training publications are to be returned to WORD by 30 Aug 71. Companies returning from operations after that date have 72 hours in which to return their publications.

255. Swimming Pool

1. The Battalion swimming pool is now open for general use. The hours of operation are between 0700 and 1800 hrs daily. Use of the pool outside these hours is an offence.

General Safety

2. Personnel are not to run around the edge of the pool nor to push any person into the pool.
3. No liquor is to be consumed in the pool or its immediate vicinity.
4. No objects are permitted in the pool except water polo equipment at specified times.
5. Diving is not permitted at any time.
6. No person is to swim alone and there is to be at least one competent swimmer in the party.

Behaviour

7. No butts or litter are to be thrown into the pool.
8. No food is to be consumed in or beside the pool.
9. Appropriate swim wear is to be worn in and around the pool.

Hygiene

10. There is to be no spitting or voiding of body wastes into the pool.
11. Every effort is to be made to avoid letting sand get into the pool.
12. Before using the pool all personnel are to shower thoroughly, including the hair.

General

13. Appropriate swimming attire is defined as follows:-
- a. Board Shorts.

/4....b.

- b. Boxer swim shorts.
- c. Speed Racing costumes or like item.

Cut down Jeans, Trousers JG, Jockettes or any Army Issue shorts are not considered an appropriate swimming attire.

256. Outstanding ASCO Pay Plans

1. The following is a list of members who have outstanding ASCO Pay Plans. This matter is to be attended to as soon as possible. Remittance and enquiries are made at the 1 ATF Gift Store.

3797962	P.J. Kennedy	1736288	L.G. Anderson
5717044	J. Lewis	4721580	C.A. Bailey
5717219	G.J. King	62104	T.G. Alexander
2794008	G.R. Voycey	219041	M.A. Doran
216703	C.V. Sinclair	313687	A. Christopoulos
219833	D.A. Russell	1202378	B.J. Eames
423921	B.L. Porter	45567	M.W. Clarke
1736316	T.S. Post	219767	J.E. Coughlin
219018	P.W. O'Brien	62116	M.R. Auwe
62029	T.J. Swanton	130427	D.R. Geary
4721269	S.R. Rose	56126	G.R. Fowles
217364	J.A. Parlett	5717181	B.C. Haberley
56291	J.B. Murray	43964	K. Gillies
313540	R.T. Wagstaff	1202240	G.G. Forster
3798914	B.J. Williams	219964	R.W. Hodge
1202988	G.W. Wiseman	219784	D.O. Grinoroo
314042	R.L. Beer	312973	A.R. French
1202791	B.G. Atkinson		
3797069	S.J. Black		

257. Diseases - Conjunctivitis

1. Outbreaks of the disease among Vietnamese in the Delta Region now appears to be spreading to military personnel. Conjunctivitis lasts from 7 to 10 days and subsides without consequence. To inhibit the spread of the disease units are to advise all members to observe strict personal hygiene measures and in particular, avoid contact with clothing, towelling or other articles of already infected persons.

2. The wearing of sunglasses by infected personnel will reduce aggravation of conjunctivitis symptoms. The RMO is to authorise wearing of sunglasses by infected personnel as necessary. Sunglasses will not be supplied at public expense.

258. Results of 5/71 Promotion Course

1. Attached are results of 3 RAR Promotion Examination to Corporel held at AP AN PHU 22 Aug 71.

258.

P: Pass
N: Fail

Number	Rank	Name	A	B	C
219051	Cpl	D.K. Lansley	P	P	-
3798914	Lcpl	B.J. Williams	P	P	P
1410804	Lcpl	P.E. Norcott	P	-	N
2798782	Pte	S.C. Rout	P	P	P
2184195	Cpl	G.K. Marheine	P	-	-
5411586	Lcpl	D.R. Dillon	P	-	-
220377	Pte	J.G. Dykyj	P	P	N
1202836	Pte	C.I. Burns	P	P	P
2795584	Lcpl	J.P. Insull	P	P	P
2795617	Pte	T.T. Ellemes	P	P	P
56336	Pte	G.V. Dawson	P	P	N
3798603	Pte	N.T. Kennedy	P	N	N
313717	Pte	R.J. Thomas	P	P	P
3131762	Pte	R.K. Reynolds	P	P	P
1202988	Pte	G.W. Wiseman	P	P	P
219762	Pte	J.V. Meorin	P	P	P
39757	Pte	D.J. Jeffries	P	-	-
1202578	Pte	D.W. Ellison	P	P	N
4721698	Pte	S.W. Riley	-	P	P
56285	Pte	R.J. Frawley	-	P	P
41163	Pte	R.L. Brown	-	P	P
1203018	Pte	T.S. Mellick	-	P	P
1202191	Cpl	H.A. Chrust	-	P	P
56045	Pte	K.G. Manton	-	-	P
1200900	Cpl	R.J. Jamieson	-	-	P
215222	Cpl	J.A. Welsh	-	-	N
423219	Pte	R.J. Devine	-	P	-
44219	Sgt	J. McKenna	-	-	P

(A.J. RALPH)

2lt

Asst Adjt

NOTICE

1. Call Australia Phone Service

1. Commencing 24 Aug 71 this phone service will be available to members of 1 ATF from 1500-1600 hrs daily. All calls are to be booked with the Amenities Officer (Ebony 77) at the Pearson Centre by 1430. This service is in addition to the early morning calls now in operation. Early morning calls are to be booked by 1600 hrs daily for calls the following day between 0800 hrs - 0900 hrs.

ComD Diary

MEDICAL IN CONFIDENCE
3 RAR HOSPITAL STATE
AS AT 1700 HRS 27 AUG 71

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DIAGNOSIS</u>	<u>CONDITION</u>	<u>COY</u>	<u>ADMITTED</u>
1200251	Lcpl	G.W. KELLY	Ther Leave	HAEMORROID/ECTOMY	Satisfactory	SP	11 Aug 71
365503	Pte	M.L. DICKINSON	" "	ACID BURNS LEFT SHIN	"	B	11 Aug 71
1736773	Pte	M.J. POPP	1 Aust Fd	ABSCESS LEFT FOOT	"	A	14 Aug 71
218720	Pte	R.A. SWANSTON	"	HAEMORROID/ECTOMY	"	SP	18 Aug 71
1731438	Sgt	D. ELLIOT	"	INTERNAL BLEEDING	"	ADM	19 Aug 71
218967	Lcpl	L.N. JOHNSTON	"	PUO	"	D	20 Aug 71
233402	Lt	D.K. SHEA	"	PUO	"	A	23 Aug 71
3798914	Lcpl	B.J. WILLIAMS	"	HOOKWORM	"	A	23 Aug 71
BUSHMAN SCOUT		NUGYEN VAN BE	"	APPENDECTOMY	"	B	24 Aug 71
3798787	Pte	I.S. PRICE	"	TONCILECTOMY	"	C	24 Aug 71
3797050	Pte	R.W. BLEAKLEY	"	PHYSIOTHERAPY	"	SP	25 Aug 71
5411585	Cpl	D.R. DILLON	"	FRAC NOSE	"	B	26 Aug 71
4721635	Pte	J.F. HANCOCK	8 Fd Amb	GASTRITIS	"	D	27 Aug 71

Distribution:

CO	CHAPLAIN
2IC	MOVEMENTS
BASE COMD	RECORDS
ADJT	LIST F (Serials 2 - 7)
ALL COY CCs	CP
RAP	COMD DIARY
HVO	UPR
EVERYMAN	POSTAL
ASST ADJT	FLOAT & FILE

Ralph Woz
(A.J. RALPH)
for 2LT
ASST ADJT

49.

Comd Diary 50

MESSAGE FORM

Precedence- Action
PRIORITY

Date - Time Group
280733 AUG 71

Security Classification
UNCLAS

Originators Number
A1250

From 3 RAR
To LIST F

RESTRICTIONS OF R&C . THE FOLLOWING IS NOW IN EFFECT CLN NO SPIRITS
WILL BE SERVED IN THE R & C CENTRE BARS .
AMENDED BAR HOURS ARE AS FOLLOWS CLN
1000 - 1200
1330 - 1700
1830 - 2100
PERSONNEL ARE REMINDED THAT THE TOWN OF VUNG TAU IS CLOSED CMM AND
PERSONNEL WILL BE RESTRICTED TO THE R & C CENTRE CMM ALTHOUGH A BUS WILL
RUN FROM ALSG TO THE R & C CENTRE EACH HOUR

PAGE ONE OF ONE PAGES

Drafters Name and Appointment Tele No
RALPH A/ADJT EMP

Releasing offr Sig and Rank :

Ralph

Int Sect 51

MESSAGE FORM

Precedence - Action
ROUTINE

Date - Time Group
280³⁰Z AUG 71

Security Classification
UNCLAS

Originators Number
A1252


From 3 RAR
To LIST F

SAIGON GUARD . OUR R397/1/2 DATED 13 MAR CMM ADMIN INSTR NO 12/71 .
D COY TO PROVIDE PERIOD 25 SEPT - 2 OCT 71 . GREENS AND BOOTS GP
CHANGED ONE FOR ONE IF NECESSARY . OTHER ITEMS REQUIRING REPLACEMENT
AT MEMBERS EXPENSE OR L AND D

PAGE ONE OF ONE

Drafters Name and Appointment Tele No
MOYLE WORD EMP

Releasing Offr Signature and Rank



W02

Cond Diary

MEDICAL IN CONFIDENCE
3 RAR HOSPITAL STATE
AS AT 1700 HRS 29 AUG 71

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DIAGNOSIS</u>	<u>CONDITION</u>	<u>COY</u>	<u>ADMITTED</u>
1200251	Lcpl	G.W. KELLY	THER LEAVE	HAEMORROID/ECTOMY	SATISFACTORY	SP	11 AUG 71
365503	Pte	M.L. DICKINSON	" "	ACID BURNS LEFT SHIN	"	B	11 AUG 71
1736773	Pte	M.J. POPP	" "	ABCESS LEFT FOOT	"	A	14 AUG 71
218720	Pte	R.A. SWANSTON	" "	HAEMORROID/ECTOMY	"	SP	18 AUG 71
1731438	Sgt	D. ELLIOT	1 AUST FD	INTERNAL BLEEDING	"	ADM	19 AUG 71
218967	Lcpl	L.N. JOHNSTON	"	PUO	"	D	20 AUG 71
233402	Lt	D.K. SHEA	"	PUO	"	A	23 AUG 71
BUSHMAN SCOUT		NGUYEN VAN BE	"	APPENDECTOMY	"	B	24 AUG 71
3798787	Pte	I.S. PRICE	"	TONSILECTOMY	"	C	24 AUG 71
3797050	Pte	R.W. BLEAKLEY	"	PHYSIOTHERAPY	"	SP	25 AUG 71
5411585	Cpl	D.R. DILLON	"	CONCUSSION	"	B	26 AUG 71
4721635	Pte	J.F. HANCOCK	8 FD AMB	GASTRITIS	"	D	27 AUG 71

Distribution:

CO	Movt's
2IC	Records
Base Comd	List F (Serials 2-7)
Adjt	CP
All Coy OC's	Comd Diary
RAP	UPR
HVO	Postal
Everyman	Float & File
Asst Adjt	
Chaplain	

A. J. Ralph
(A.J. RALPH)
for 2lt
Asst Adjt

52

MEDICAL IN CHARGE
 3 WAR HOSPITAL GROUP
 AS AT 15th FEB 52

NUMBER	RANK	NAME	LOCATION	DIAGNOSIS	ADMITTED
120001	Capt	R.W. KELLY	3RD LEAVE	HAMMORRHOIDAL DYSPLASIA	17 AUG 51
200002	Pvt	M.L. DICKINSON	"	ACID BURNS LEFT EAR	17 AUG 51
170003	Pvt	M.L. POPE	"	ACID BURNS LEFT FOOT	16 AUG 51
270004	Pvt	M.A. HANCOCK	"	HAMMORRHOIDAL DYSPLASIA	16 AUG 51
200005	Cpl	D. WILTON	1 PORT CO	INTERNAL BLEEDING	15 AUG 51
270006	Capt	L.M. JENNISON	"	PTD	20 AUG 51
270007	Pvt	D.L. SHAW	"	PTD	23 AUG 51
100008	Private	WALTER VAN DE	"	APPENDICITIS	24 AUG 51
270009	Pvt	J.S. WHITE	"	TUMOUR	24 AUG 51
270010	Pvt	R.W. BARKER	"	PHYSICIAN	25 AUG 51
270011	Cpl	C.E. BILSON	"	CONJUNCTIVITIS	25 AUG 51
270012	Pvt	J.A. HANCOCK	5 TO 6	CONJUNCTIVITIS	25 AUG 51

2nd Lt

1st Lt

1st Lt
 2nd Lt
 3rd Lt (Special 5-7)
 Capt
 1st Coy 2nd Bn
 2nd Coy
 3rd Coy
 4th Coy
 5th Coy
 6th Coy
 7th Coy
 8th Coy
 9th Coy
 10th Coy

Comd Diary
53

MESSAGE FORM

Precedence - Action
ROUTINE

Date - Time Group
291000Z AUG 71

Security Classification
UNCLAS

Originators Number
A1255

From 3 RAR

To LIST F (ONE COPY PER CHECKER)


INFO: CO, 2IC

INTERNAL CHECKING . 3 RAR R54-1-3 DATED 4 MAY 71 . REMIND ALL INTERNAL CHECKERS THAT RETURNS ARE DUE TO OC ADMIN COY BY 31 AUG 71 . FOLLOWING ARE STILL DUE FOR JUL AND ARE TO BE INCLUDED IN AUG CHECK . SGT STEPHENS AFW 3809 AND RATION ACCOUNT CMM SGT THOMPSON AAF202 CMM SGT BROOME 61045 CMM LT CAMPBELL TRANSPORT ! DOCUMENTATION

PAGE ONE OF ONE

Drafters Name	Office	Tele No
ARNISON	ADMIN	EMP

Releasing Officers Signature and Rank


MAJ

Comd Diary
54

MESSAGE FORM

Precedence - Action

ROUTINE

Date - Time Group

290100Z AUG71

Security Classification

UNCLAS

Originators Number

A1258

From 3 RAR
To List F

UNIT Q CONFERENCE TO BE HELD TUESDAY 31 AUG COMMENCING 1330 HOURS IN CONFERENCE ROOM . FOLLOWING TO ATTEND CMM 2IC CMM QM CMM AQM CMM RQMS CMM TECH SGT CMM CLOTHING STOREMAN CMM LEDGER CLERKSCMM ALL SUB UNIT ADMIN OFFICERS AND CQMS CMM SIG SGT CMM PNR STOREMAN CMM MORTAR STOREMAN CMM A/TANK STOREMAN CMM RAP SGT CMM DPRI CMM TPT OFFICER C. SGT CMM RAEME DET REP CMM RP SGT CMM BN HQ REP CMM SGTS MESS REP CMM SGT GODDEN . CONFERENCE ROOM TO BE PREPARED BY RQMS . ALL SUB A/C REPS TO BRING LEDGERS

PAGE ONE OF ONE

DRAFTERS NAME	OFFICE	TELE NO
TREVARTHEN	2IC	EMP

RELEASING OFFICERS SIGNATURE AND RANK

Trevarthen Maj

Cond Diary

55.

3 RAR
Ap An Phu

30 Aug 71

R980/300/1

Distribution: List F

EQUIPMENT INSPECTION REPORT

1. The unit has received the report for the EIS carried out from 5 - 14 Aug 71.
2. The overall grading was GOOD.
3. General recommendations included the following:


Action By

- | | |
|--|--|
| a. All equipment not available at time of inspection be presented for inspection to 1 ATF as soon as possible. | <u>QM</u> |
| b. Action be taken, as soon as practical, to have all equipment repaired/replaced for which AAF F114/406's were issued. | <u>QM</u> |
| c. Rifles, L1A1 be cleaned and lubricated in accordance with ARTI WPN A251-1/ | <u>All</u> |
| d. Rifles, M16A1, receiver extensions be lubricated by unit armourer as per ARTI WPN D296. After firing barrels should be cleaned with Solvent Cleaning Compound to prevent sweating/fouling. | <u>RAEME Det</u>
&
<u>Comds</u> |
| e. M60 spare barrels remain with parent weapons and be used alternately and serviced with same. | <u>All Coys</u> |
| f. Plant Record Books (AAB 3) be maintained for engine driven equipments as listed in Equipment Instructions, Part 5, Annex C and that entries in Sections 7 and 8 be kept up to date. These should be checked during monthly NTI's. | <u>QM/</u>
<u>Internal</u>
<u>Checkers</u> |
| g. Typewriters be cleaned daily in accordance with ARTI Inst F0009 and covers be used when machines are not in use. | <u>QM/Chief</u>
<u>Clerk</u> |
| h. NTI's be carried out on miscellaneous and Instrument Equipments as per AFV RO 47/70 and minor equipments be maintained in accordance with AFV RO 217/69. | <u>OC Admin Coy</u> |

4. The above recommendations are to be implemented forthwith.

...../2 5.

5. Detailed comments and action required is in Annex A. Those responsible are to take action to effect faults immediately, so that all action is completed by 30 Sep 71.
6. Each addressee mentioned in the "Action By" column is to submit a report to Bn HQ by 6 Sep, stating what action has been, or is being taken, and include the estimated time of completion.
7. Verbal and written instructions have been issued to all sub units to refurbish all weapons before RTA.


(A.R. Trevarthen)
Maj
2IC

DETAILED COMMENTS

Action By

General

1. Preparation and presentation of equipment, including documentation, for inspection was GOOD and every assistance given the inspectors.
2. Due to operational requirements approximately 25% of weapons and 37% of compasses were unavailable for inspection. As this was the final inspection prior to withdrawal of unit, all items not available for inspection should be presented for same as soon as practicable.

QM

WEAPONS

Pistol, 9mm L9A1

3. Repairs Required. One only of the 48 pistols inspected required minor repair to lanyard loop.
4. Condition. Overall condition GOOD.

Nil

Rifle, 7.62mm L1A1

5. Repairs Required. Of the 390 weapons available for inspection 299 were fully serviceable with 80 requiring minor repairs, which were effected by the unit tradesmen, and 11 requiring workshop repair which were sentenced "BLR" and MF F406 issued.
6. Condition. Unit maintenance was GOOD, except for 9 cases of seized regulators or rusted return springs. Apart from the minor repairs above, technical condition was GOOD.

QM

Rifle, 5.56mm M16A1

7. Repairs Required. 180 weapons were serviceable and 18 required unit repairs, which were carried out during inspection by the unit armourers.
8. Condition. Unit maintenance was GOOD, with the exception of a few fouled barrels and rusted receiver extensions. Technical condition was GOOD.

GPMG, M60

9. Repairs Required. Of the 62 inspected 28 only were fully serviceable, 25 required unit repairs and 9 workshop repair. Unit repairs were effected by unit tradesmen and consisted mainly of rectifying incorrect head space, seized pistons (including spare barrels) and loose flash eliminators.

M60 - Continued

8 of the 9 workshop repairs required were due to loose receiver rivets and were sentenced "BLR" whilst the other was sentenced "NFW" due to the unauthorised modification of removing the Magazine Bracket Assembly. AAF F406's were issued for these 9 weapons.

QM

10. Condition. Due to above faults the overall condition of these weapons was graded FAIR.

Grenade Launchers

11. Repairs Required. 33 of the 39 available were serviceable with 6 requiring minor unit repairs.

Nil

12. Condition. Unit maintenance and technical condition GOOD.

Flamethrowers

13. Repairs Required. All 6 required unit action to service, as they had apparently been stored after use without cleaning.

OC Sp Coy
Aslt Pnrs

14. Condition. Due to above unit maintenance was graded POOR and technical condition (by visual inspection only) as GOOD.

Summary of Weapons

15. The following figures summarise the general repair requirement at the time of inspection:

- a. No of weapons on charge - 1114
- b. No of weapons inspected - 743 (67%) OPS - 283/U/A 88
- c. No of weapons serviceable - 587 (79%)
- d. No OTS - fit for use - 136 (18%)
- e. No OTS - unfit for use - 20 (3%) BLR - 20

16. The majority of unit repairs, indicated at 15(d) above, were carried out by unit tradesmen during the inspection.

17. Condition. The overall equipment condition was graded GOOD.

MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT

18. All items were well maintained and in GOOD technical condition, with the following exceptions and repairs required:

a. Chain Saws & Paving Breakers. Unit maintenance was graded FAIR as no servicing entries had been made in the Plant Record Books (AAB 3) since 10 Feb and 15 Jan 71 respectively.

OC Sp Coy
Aslt Pnrs

b. Food Containers & Multipots. Five "hot boxes" required minor repair and two were sentenced "UR". Two multipots were also "UR" for Board of Survey action and AAF F114's issued.

Caterer

...../3 c. Air

Action By

- c. Air Compressors. No entries of hours run had been made in AAB 3 since May 71. QM
- d. Heaters, Immersion. 30 of these equipment were welded into 44 gallon drums so could not be inspected. Nil
- e. Pulling & Lifting Gear. One trolley jack required minor attention to "top-up" oil reservoir. Nil
- f. Range Outfits M39 & 59. One burner unit and one cabinet required minor repair. Nil

19. Summary of Miscellaneous Equipment

- a. No of items on charge - 195
- b. No of items inspected - 142 (73%) Ops - 15: U/A - 8
- c. No of items serviceable - 130 (92%) Not Insp - 30
- d. No OTS - fit for use - 8
- e. No OTS - unfit for use - 4 UR - 4

20. Condition. The overall equipment condition was GOOD. See also para 18(d).

INSTRUMENT EQUIPMENT

21. Repairs Required. All items were well maintained and in GOOD technical condition except for the following:

- a. Duplicating Machines. Technical condition was only FAIR as 2 of the 5 machines required a general overhaul. Chief Clerk
- b. Adding & Subtracting Machines. One machine was sentenced "UR" due to broken and distorted mechanism. Nil
- c. Typewriters. Unit maintenance was graded FAIR due to the general cleanliness of these machines. One of the 14 inspected required several workshop repairs. QM Chief Clerk
- d. Compasses. 26 of the 109 inspected required various field workshop repairs. Nil
- e. Binoculars. 5 equipments also required workshop repairs to eyepieces and for optical cleaning. Nil
- f. Cameras. Two of the six inspected required repairs to the shutter mechanisms. Nil
- g. Watches. One stop watch required workshop attention to clean and replace broken sweep hand. Nil
- h. Starlightsopes. Technical condition was graded FAIR on these items as 4 of the 10 required field repairs, mainly to the illuminating mechanism. Nil

...../4 j Sights

	<u>Action By</u>
j. <u>Sights.</u> One aiming circle required an optical clean.	<u>Nil</u>
22. AAF F114's were issued for all above items requiring workshop repair.	<u>QM</u>
23. <u>Summary of Instrument Equipment</u>	
a. No of items on charge - 316	
b. No of items inspected - 207 (66%) Ops 88 U/A - 21	
c. No of items serviceable - 164 (79%)	
d. No OTS - fit for use - Nil	
e. No OTS - unfit for use - 43 UR - 1	
24. The low figure of items inspected was due, in the main, to approximately 38% of compasses not being available owing to operational requirements. Of the 43 items requiring workshop repairs, 26 were also compasses.	
25. <u>Condition.</u> The overall condition of this group of equipment was GOOD.	
<u>OBSERVATIONS</u>	
26. The siezed gas regulators and rusted return springs in Rifle, L1A1 indicate that the weapons may have been cleaned in petrol and that periodic lubrication of spring had not been carried out.	<u>All OCs</u>
27. It would appear that periodic cleaning and lubrication of M16A1 receiver extensions and cleaning out of butt screw drain hole had not been carried out.	<u>All OCs</u>
28. Spare barrels for M60 had not been carried with parent weapon and stored in "Q" stores with the result that they were lacking in lubrication causing a number of siezed pistons. The number of main barrels with excessive headspace would be attributable to the lack of alternate use of spare barrels.	<u>All OCs</u>
29. Plant Record Books (AAB 3) were not up to date with "hours run" or servicing entries for most equipments since early 1971.	<u>QM</u>
30. Daily maintenance was somewhat lacking on Typewriters and covers were not being used when the machines were not in use.	<u>Chief Clerk</u>
31. NTI's had not been carried out on miscellaneous and Instrument Equipment.	<u>OC Admin Coy</u>

Comd Wing
36.

R66/3/3

3rd Battalion
The Royal Australian Regiment
AP AN PHU

30 Aug 71

Distribution:

List F
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC)
HQ 1 ATF
2lt PHILIPS
WO2 ARCHER

VISIT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CONCERT
PARTY 1 SEP 71

General

1. 3 RAR R66/3/3 of 24 Aug 71 is cancelled.
2. A South Australian concert party will be playing at 3 RAR on 1 Sep 71.
3. Members of the party are:

- a. Escort Officer: Capt R.C. Haines
- b. Sound Technician: To be nominated
- c. Artists
 - (1) Johnny Mac Compere/Vocalist
 - (2) Joan McInnes Vocalist
 - (3) Anna Allwood Vocalist
 - (4) Maria Kay Martin Vocalist/Dancer
 - (5) Billy Ross Drummer
 - (6) John Newlyn Bass Guitar/Comedian
 - (7) Stuart Woolham Organist

Totals - Artists 3 Females 4 Males = 7
 Escort Officer & Technician = 2
 Unit Escort Officers = 2
 Total = 11

a.

Timings

4. 1 Sep 0730 Uplift Party from Luscombe Field. Move to 3 RAR area for breakfast.
- 0900 Stage to be set up at Luscombe Bowl and power to be connected by this time. Party moves to stage eqpt set up and tested.
- 1000 Show commences Luscombe Bowl.
- 1130 Show ends. Uplift party and eqpt to 3 RAR area. Stage to be set up in vic of Mor Base Plate position.
- 1200-1300 Drinks Sgts Mess.
- 1300 Lunch.
- 1330 Party moves to stage. Electrical eqpt in dressing rooms to be working by this time.
- 1400 Show commences.
- 1530 Show ends.
- 1600 Eqpt loaded on 4 RAR Veh and moved to 4 RAR area.
- 1645 Party and eqpt move to Luscombe Field.
- 1715 Depart.


Attendance

5. 3 RAR will be able to attend the concert in the area of 3 RAR Mor Base Plate position.

Responsibilities

6. 3 RAR Escort Officer is 2lt Philips assisted by WO2 Archer. They are to:
- a. Collect party from Luscombe and escort to Officers Mess for breakfast.
 - b. Escort party to stage at Luscombe Bowl 0900.
 - c. Lunch in Sgts Mess 1200.
 - d. Escort to 3 RAR stage area 1330.
 - e. Supervise loading of eqpt at 1600 and move with party to Luscombe.
7. Tpt Offr is responsible to provide tpt as follows:
- a. 1 Sep 71 - 2 x $\frac{3}{4}$ and 1 x 5 ton required all day.
 - b. 1 x $\frac{3}{4}$ ton to tow stage from HQ Coy 1 ATF to 3 RAR. Stage to be in position by 1200.
 - c. 2 x TCV's to ferry D Coy to concert site. Liaise with D Coy for requirement and timings.

8. Admin Coy is responsible for:
 - a. Liaison with Pte Manton (Mor Storeman) for setting up of separate male and female dressing rooms and toilets behind the stage. Room/tent are to be equipped with fans, lights, mirrors, tables, chairs, water, basins, soap, towels, coat hangers and racks.
9. In addition WO2 Archer is responsible for:
 - a. Provision of cold drinks, glasses and can opener for performers - Regimental Funds to pay.
 - b. Selling of cold drinks to audience.
10. RP Sgt is responsible for:
 - a. Provision of 6 chairs on stage.
 - b. Provision of 30 chairs for officers and WO's.
11. D Coy is responsible for: Cleanlines of Luscombe Bowl after the concert.
12. A Coy is responsible for the provision of a work party of 1 NCO and 10 men to:
 - a. Cutting of grass in area of 3 RAR concert site.
 - b. Set up area. (Liaise with Cpl Jamieson (tpt).)
 - c. Unload and load luggage.
 - d. Clean up area.


(F.P. SCOTT)
Lt Col
CO

MEDICAL IN CONFIDENCE
3 RAR HOSPITAL STATE
AS AT 1700 HRS 30 AUG 71

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DIAGNOSIS</u>	<u>CONDITION</u>	<u>COY</u>	<u>ADMITTED</u>
365503	Pte	M.L. DICKINSON	THER LEAVE	ACID BURNS LEFT SHIN	SATISFACTORY	B	11 AUG 71
176773	Pte	M.J. POPP	" "	ABCESS LEFT FOOT	"	A	14 AUG 71
233402	Lt	D.K. SHEA		PUO	"	A	23 AUG 71
BUSHMEN SCOUT		NGUYEN VAN BE	1 Aust Fd	APPENDECTOMY	"	B	24 AUG 71
3798787	Pte	I.S. PRICE	"	TONSILECTOMY	"	C	24 AUG 71
3797050	Pte	R.W. BLEAKLEY	"	PHYSIOTHERAPY	"	SP	25 AUG 71
5411585	Cpl	D.R. DILLION	"	CONCUSSION	"	B	26 AUG 71
3798638	Pte	V.V. LOVISON	8 FD AMB	PUO	"	A	27 AUG 71

Distribution

CO	Movements
2IC	Admin CP
Base Comd	UPR
Adjt	Postal
All Coy OC'S	RAP
A/Adjt	HVO
Everyman	List F (Serials 2-7)
Chaplain	Float and File
Comd Dairy	
Records	

(Signature)
 (A.J. RALPH)
 2LT
 Asst Adjt


Cand diary

MEDICAL IN CONFIDENCE
3 RAR HOSPITAL STATE
AS AT 1700 HRS 31 AUG 71

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DIAGNOSIS</u>	<u>CONDITION</u>	<u>COY</u>	<u>ADMITTED</u>
176773	Pte	M.J. POPP	THIR LEAVE	ABCESS LEFT FOOT	SATISFACTORY	A	14 AUG 71
BUSHMAN	SCOUT	NGUYEN VAN BE	1 AUST FD	APPENDECTOMY	"	B	24 AUG 71
3798787	Pte	I.S. PRICE	"	TONSILECTOMY	"	C	24 AUG 71
5411585	Cpl	D.R. DILLON	"	CONCUSSION	"	B	26 AUG 71
3798638	Pte	V.V. LOVISON	8 FD AMB	PUC	"	A	27 AUG 71
134341	Pte	K.P. JONES	1 AUST FD	IDK (L)	"	B	31 AUG 71

Distribution:

CC	MOVEMENTS
2IC	ADMIN CP
BASE COMD	UPR
ADJT	POSTAL
ALL COY OC'S	RAP
A/ADJT	HVO
EVERYMAN	LIST F (Serials 2-7)
CHAPLAIN	FLOAT
COMD DIARY	FILE
RECORDS	


(A.J. RALPH)
2Lt
Asst Adjt

58.

CONFIDENTIAL

R1315/40/1

HQ 3 RAR
Nui Dat

24 Aug 71

DEFICIENCIES OF THE 81MM MORTAR PLATOON

- Reference: A. AHQ Letter Inf 1015/33/1 dated 10 May 71.
B. 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC)Bn letter R1315/1/1 dated 22 May 71.

INTRODUCTION

1. Reference A refers to some deficiencies of the Mortar Platoon in terms of equipments. This unit agrees that there are serious deficiencies in equipment, but also in many other aspects of the mortar platoon as a weapons system: in manning, organisation, training and technical doctrine there are weaknesses which result in problems of safety and effectiveness, once the platoon is committed to operational service conditions.
2. Whilst there may have been a failure on the part of units to report equipment deficiencies, many of the deficiencies inherent in the mortar platoon are inter-related and only manifest themselves as severe problems under operational service conditions.

AIM

3. The aim of this paper is to examine the weaknesses of the 81mm mortar platoon as revealed by employment in a current operational setting.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

4. As with many other parts of the Army the role of the mortar platoon has not changed in the environment of counter insurgency warfare. To provide close fire support to the rifle companies is still the task of the mortar platoon. However, the method of employment must be varied to meet the different situation encountered in this environment.

Mobility of Operations

5. No longer does the battalion form part of an advancing or withdrawing force with fronts and flanks which can easily be defined. Rather the battalion now moves in rapidly changing areas of operation with companies often spread over a large area. Furthermore the platoons of the companies often operate appreciable distances removed from the company headquarters and in all directions.

Observation and Control of Fire Support

6. In such a situation there is a need for each element moving independently to have an observer of fire support with it. Almost every infantry battalion which has served in South Vietnam has accepted this premise and utilised it by splitting the forward observer's party. In this way the company headquarters and one platoon retain the services of the forward observer himself while the observer's assistant and the mobile fire controller can be allotted to the two other platoons. This has become an accepted practise and has the following advantages:

/2...a.

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2.

6.
 - a. All elements of the company have an observer to call and direct fire support when needed, thus allowing the platoon commander greater freedom to command his force.
 - b. The company command net is left free for the company commander to control his platoons when in contact and not bogged down with the passage of fire orders for artillery or mortars.
 - c. When not actually involved with the mission being fired, other platoons still have the capacity to monitor the mission. This allows them to immediately prevent an adjacent platoon or company ordering corrections which would be unsafe to them, a situation which can occur due to the difficulties of navigation in thick jungle. Additionally the platoon can utilise fire missions fired by other subunits as mark missions to assist with their navigation.
7. There are several provisions attached to this practice which must be considered:
 - a. In order that the fire support for the company can still be co-ordinated at company level and controlled by the artillery forward observer there is a requirement for all observers within the company to be on the same net. This necessitates the mortar fire controller leaving the mortar net and joining the direct support battery net.
 - b. The company commander loses the direct access of the fire controller provided by the mortar platoon.
8. Due to these reasons, within 3 RAR the mortar net has been integrated with the direct support battery net. This provides almost every individual platoon in the battalion with an observer who has direct access to direct support artillery and the battalion's mortars, thus facilitating the speedy employment of the most suitable type of indirect fire support in any given situation.

Limitations

9. There is one potential problem caused by this integrated net system. Because of the mobile nature of operations it is accepted practise to have the artillery battery split into two section fire units. This, with up to three mortar fire units and a minimum of twelve observers produces a very full net which requires close supervision and control and places a great load on the fire co-ordination centre. This is especially true when heavy contact is made and several fire units may be required to fire simultaneously.

Indeed the greatest limiting factor when heavy contact is made is the ability of the fire co-ordination centre and the communications to cope with the volume of traffic. Five fire units cannot be simultaneously employed and controlled.

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3.

10. Partly for this reason 3 RAR has reorganised its mortar platoon into two fire units each of three mortars. This has not reduced the flexibility of the platoon, since the limitation on the number of armoured mortar carriers available to the battalion has already limited this. Rarely has the opportunity or requirement for three separate baseplates arisen during this unit's experience in 1971.

11. The need for good communications is self-evident. For the mortar platoon the requirement to be equally efficient in voice procedure and fire discipline as their artillery counter-parts is equally obvious. Mortar trained observers must also be experienced in the employment of artillery fire support.

Mobility of the Mortars

12. In order to keep pace with the rifle companies the mortar platoon must be equally mobile lest it be defeated by the very mobility of the operation it is designed to support.

13. This requirement can and has been met with the advent of the armoured mortar carrier (M125A1). The AMC section provides for the rapid redeployment of a mortar section complete with a quantity of ammunition thereby enabling the mortars to remain within range of the operations of the rifle companies.

SAFETY AND EFFICIENCY

14. This demand for mobility does however present the mortar platoon with several problems.

Accurate Location of Baseplates

15. Navigation in thick country is difficult at any time. In armoured vehicles it is made much more difficult. This is especially significant for the mounted mortar section, since the accuracy of their position when going into action is a factor of paramount importance in the safe and effective employment of the weapons. Obviously if the baseplate grid is wrong then any round fired from that baseplate will have a similar error. This increases the danger of rounds accidentally falling among our own troops.

16. The possibility of error in the baseplate grid can be reduced by the provision of an aerial mapspot or the firing of a mark mission using artillery as soon as the baseplate is established, and one or both of these methods is used as standard practice for mobile baseplates. Obviously this problem does not arise when the mortars are co-located with guns since the surveyed grid reference is then readily available.

17. The problems associated with navigation have led to the introduction of a safety distance within which no initial round of any fire mission can be directed to fall. This is provided to allow a margin for error in the navigation of the troops on the ground. It does not specifically include a margin for the baseplate commander's possible error. Thus it is implied that the baseplate commander is required to be as accurate as the survey troop which provides the field battery with the grid reference of its gun position.

/4....Technical

CONFIDENTIAL

Technical Problems

18. The possibility of a round falling at a grid reference other than ordered is further aggravated by the almost total lack of application of technical factors within the mortar platoon.

19. No consideration is given to the effects of meteorological conditions on the flight of the bomb. The artillery receive regular meteorological reports and corresponding compensation factors are computed into the firing of each round. There seems no reason to believe that the mortar bomb with its slower muzzle velocity and long time of flight is not affected at least as much as the artillery round. This is a far more serious problem with the 81mm mortar than it was with the 3 inch mortar because of longer range and trajectory. This unit believes that discrepancies of up to 400 metres may occur in the fall of shot due to meteorological variations.

20. Similarly no allowances is made for variations in muzzle velocity of mortar barrels or other non standard conditions. Again these are compensated for in artillery units further improving the degree of precision acquired by artillery and unattainable for mortars. Calibration of mortars does not appear to be a technical impossibility.

Equipment Deficiencies

21. The contents of reference B are all agreed with and also the following additions to the Equipment Table are suggested:

a. At least one spare sight unit and bipod be immediately available to replace damaged equipments as soon as the damage occurs. In 6 months of operations some 20 instances of sights requiring repair and replacement in the field have occurred. All of these had to be backloaded outside the unit.

b. A director as used by artillery units for parallelling guns be issued to each mortar section. This would provide much greater accuracy than the methods currently available for parallelling mortars.

c. Firing tables Ft81-A1-2 (US) be issued to each fire unit. These tables provide much greater flexibility than the tables now in issue. In addition they also provide correction components for meteorological and other conditions. Although this information could not currently be utilised, it may be able to be used in the future, (paras 19 and 20 refer)

Manning and Organisation

22. In order for the technical problems discussed above to be overcome and the suggested additional equipment to be utilised a more highly skilled, better trained mortarman is required. Obviously longer and more specialised training is necessary if the mortar plotter is to be able to calculate correction factors for meteorological effects and varying muzzle velocities in addition to his present tasks.

/5....23.

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23. Even without these advances there is a requirement for longer and more concentrated training for students at the basic mortar courses. To teach mortar drills, command post operating and signalling in the space of four weeks to the standard required for operational employment is impossible.

Responsibility

24. The responsibilities of a mortar section commander are far greater than a corporal is fitted for in terms of rank, experience or pay. Yet the current manning establishment gives this requirement to a corporal as being responsible for detailed supervision of every task of a fire unit.

25. In addition to the problems of navigation which is so vital, the section commander is also required to directly supervise the function of his command post (including a check of the plotter) as well as the fire unit itself including the laying of each individual weapon. Since the senior man on each mortar is only a private soldier and the senior man in the command post, the plotter, is only a lance corporal, the degree to which the section commander can delegate his responsibility is minimal. If as he must, he personally checks every action, the time taken to provide each round on the ground is unacceptable. There is a need for an officer or senior NCO to command each mortar fire unit and also to have highly trained, responsible NCO's to allow delegation of some responsibilities, thus enhancing speedy response without sacrificing safety considerations. Irrespective of the argument over rank level visavis artillery it is very strongly submitted that one man, of any rank, cannot supervise in detail a fire unit in action.

CONCLUSIONS

26. The fact that the 3 inch mortar was employed effectively under current doctrine in World War II and Korea is often heard as an argument against change or progress. The introduction of a more sophisticated, longer range weapon and radical changes in the operational environment have not been matched by an updating of doctrine. This unit believes that the mortar platoon is under trained, undermanned and lacks the technical support necessary for it to produce rapid, effective fire on the battlefield.

RECOMMENDATIONS

27. The greater degree of precision now demanded of the mortar platoon requires the adoption of more advanced procedures and equipments, long used by artillery, if the mortar is to be safely and effectively employed in its designed role.

28. Such innovations will necessitate fuller and more specialised training for the mortarman.

29. The rank structure of the mortar platoon should be upgraded so as to be commensurate with the responsibilities involved. This need will be further accentuated should these new equipments and procedures be accepted but even without new technical considerations, a greater degree of experience and responsibility at all levels is required.

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CONFIDENTIAL

30. The training of fire controllers of the mortar platoon should include the direction of artillery fire, since more often than not, this will be his task as long as the practise of allotting an observer to each platoon remains.

31. Similarly the voice procedure and fire discipline of the mortar platoon should be standardised to that of the artillery so as to facilitate the employment of mortars by an artillery observer and vice versa.



(E.P. SCOTT)

Lt Col

CO

Distribution:

AHQ
CO
Ops Offr
OC Mor Pl
Comd Diary (3)
File
Spare (3)

DEMOLITION REPORT
BUNKER SYSTEM AT YS 3590

Operation: IRON FOX

By : Capt J. E. TICK, 2 Tp Comd.

Map : XA XUAN LOC

For : OC 1 Fd Sqn Gp

Date: 8 Aug 71

General

1. 2 Troop Combat Engineer Team (CET) was given the task of destroying a group of fifteen bunkers at YS 3590. The system had been occupied by C24 Convalescent Company.
2. At 1600 hrs on 2 Aug the CET left FSB KATE by UH1H Albatross. They were dropped at an LZ 300 metres from the bunker system.
3. The search of the bunker system was completed prior to the arrival of the CET by the splinter team attached to A Coy 3 RAR. This simplified the CET's task to a demolition task only.
4. Protection was provided by A Coy 3 RAR with two platoons occupying positions on entry/exit tracks to the bunker system. A third platoon was provided as close protection for the CET.
5. Demolition was completed by 1350 hrs on 3 Aug 71 and aerial confirmation of the effectiveness of the demolition was made by 031600 hrs.

Bunker Design

6. All bunkers located were of the "T" shaped variety with dimensions 10' x 8' x 5' with about 2' OHP. Each bunker was fitted with three sets of interior hammock poles and five bunkers had exterior modifications in the form of bamboo tables, seats and tie down rails for ponchos.
7. Age. The bunkers were estimated to be from one to two years old. Some exterior modifications had been made in the previous three months.
8. Sites. The area was well drained and sloped gently to the south and south-west. Vegetation was rain forest with thick clumps of bamboo forming a secondary canopy. The bunkers were generally sited in bamboo and under large trees to provide maximum camouflage against aerial observation.

Problems Encountered

9. No major problems were encountered.
10. One minor problem was the search of bunkers by the infantry - a sapper task.

Results


11. The following installations were destroyed:

- a. Bunkers 15
- b. Sentry pits 1
- c. Trees 25

12. For details of documents and equipment recovered refer to Appendix 1 to Annex B "Notes on Bunker Clearance".

Troop Commander's Comments

13. The demolition task was a simple one and no difficulties were encountered. Co-operation from the infantry was good and the security of the area sound. One VC was killed by 2 Pl A Coy on an entry/exit track to the system.



(J. E. TICK)
Capt
2 Tp Comd.


- Annexes:
- A. Daily Narrative
 - B. Map of Bunker Systems

DAILY NARRATIVE

Serial	Date/Time	Troops to Task	Details
a.	b.	c.	d.
1.	021200H Aug 71	Tp Comd	Received Wng-0 from CO 3 RAR.
	1400		SAPDEM submitted to 1 Fd Sqn.
	1450		Tp Comd recce of bunker system.
	1600	CET	Fly by UH1H Albatross to LZ. Diverted to TØB location.
	1700		CET lands at LZ with SAPDEM.
	1800		2 Pl A Coy ambush.
2.	030700H Aug 71	CET	Wrapping of charges.
	0800	Inf Sect	Digging of charge holes.
	0900	CET	Placing of charges.
	1300	CET	Check of circuit and charges.
	1330	CET, A Coy, HQ, 3 Pl	Move by APC to TØB.
	1350		Demolition complete.
	1600		Visual recce and confirmation of demolition.

annex B to
demolition report
dated 8 aug 71

map of bunker system
grid 3590




map
xã xuân lộc 1:50,000

scale
0 5 10 20 30 40 50 PACES

NOTES ON BUNKER SEARCH

1. Bunker sentry pit - T shape, 6' x 3' x 3', 18" OHP located E side of track.
2. Latrine - Deep trench latrine filled to within 6" of top, infested with maggots and cockroaches. Appeared to be main latrine used.
3. Bunker 10' x 8' x 5', 3' OHP fitted with 3 sets of interior hammock holes, walls lined with plastic. Found inside were: a bamboo battery case containing 6 "D" cells; 800' claymore lead; 50 rounds of 7.62 short ammunition.
4. Bunker 10' x 8' x 5', 3' OHP; cooking area on W side dug in with thatched hut 6' x 6' x 4'. Bunker fitted externally with bamboo table and benches and tent rails. One pair of black trousers, cotton and patching material were also found. Cooking area contained a quantity of cooking utensils and about 5 lb bush mangoes. A 2.75" rocket had impacted 10 m due east in bamboo.
5. Bunker normal size - caved in, probably caused by rocket impactions in general area.
6. Bunker 10' x 8' x 5', 3' OHP. Found inside were: wallet; books of medical notes; womens underclothing. A stick grenade was found 10 metres away at the base of a tree.
7. Bunker normal size fitted with hammock poles, tables and seats. One pair of sandals found inside,
8. Bunker collapsed.
9. Bunker 10' x 8' x 5', 18" OHP fitted with table and chairs and hammock poles.
10. Galvanised iron roofed operating/treatment theatre, containing two 6' x 2½' benches and a shelf. Three drip bottles with drip tubing were left hanging, the bottles were ½ full. Bandages were hanging to dry and an untouched prawn and rice meal was left over a fire at one end of the hut. The floor was built up and 18" drains had been dug on all sides. From the wrappings, used phials and other debris the hut had been used for medical treatment for some time.
11. Bunker 10' x 8' x 6', 2' OHP. Bunker was lined with plastic and inside were found a surgical mask and batteries.
12. Bunker 10' x 8' x 5', 3' OHP fitted with bamboo table and seats also tent tie down rails. A cooking area was dug in on the E side of the bunker. A fire had been made inside the bunker. The bunker appeared to be the most lived in of all the bunkers. The interior was lined with plastic and the uphill side was drained. This could possibly have been the HQ bunker.

13. Bunker 11' x 8' x 5', 2' OHP fitted with 3 sets of hammock poles, tables and tent rails. Cooking area on S side containing freshly cut firewood, bread fruit, bamboo shoots, rice and 2 gallons of kerosene. In a 2 gallon cooking urn was found a stew of yams and bamboo shoots. An unhygienic cess pit was 3 metres away.
14. Bunker normal size containing only two sets of hammock poles. It was fitted externally with a table and tent rails. A track led NW to a water point, another track led W to a new latrine.
15. Bunker - normal size, fitted with 3 sets of hammock poles covered in dead fall.
16. Bunker - normal size, modified externally with tables, benches etc. Inside were found 2 plastic squeeze bottles of grease. A cooking area was located on the north side. In this were: a couple of red plastic bowls; a water bottle of kerosene; a tin of sewing gear. Some clothing was located (old), 7-8 lb of salt in plastic bags.
17. Cache - 49 stick grenades with friction igniters. They were in bad condition and most of the handles containing the igniters were affected by water. The grenades were manufactured from 2" diameter food tins 3" long, the igniters were the normal wood lathe production types. Shrapnel was incorporated in the cast TNT charge.
18. Bunker - normal size, 3 hammock spaces, inside was a quantity of clothing and 4 sandals.
19. Bunker - collapsed.
20. Grave - not touched.
21. Latrine - newly built.
22. Water point.
23. Bridge.



OP IRON FOX - PHASE 1

ANNEX A
3RAR AFTER ACTION REPORT
OP IRON FOX
DATED 7 AUGUST 71

PTL 13
27 Jul

CSqñ 1 ARMD

PTL 21 Ấp Suối Cả
27-28 Jul

4RAR/NZ

A Sqñ 3 CAV(-)

C 3
(29-30 Jul)

1/274

PTL 32
30 Jul

A 3

QUẬN XUÂN LỘC
QUẬN ĐỨC CỎ
QUẬN ĐỨC THÀNH

TỈNH LONG KHÁNH
TỈNH PHƯỚC TUYÊN

A Sqñ 3 CAV(-)

FSB CHERIE

PTL 24
28 Jul


TỈNH LONG KHÁNH
TỈNH PHƯỚC TUYÊN

3RAR

FSB KATE

QUẬN XUÂN LỘC
QUẬN ĐỨC THÀNH

FSB DEBBIE





OP INVERBRACKIE DEPLOYMENT

ref map 1:50000
6430 II


Annex B to
3RAR OPO 14/71
Dated 9 Aug 71

xuyen moc

XUYEN MOC AO



OP INVERBRAC



DEPLOYMENT OP INVERBRACKIE

AO GLENELG

XUYEN MOC

AO

D

B

RF


PL C

RF

3 A/B

SP

A



Aug 95
7/2/83

3.


DEPLOYMENT OP INVERBRACKIE

AO GLENELG

XUYEN

AO





OP INVERBRACKIE PHASE I

10 AUG 71

A/3CAV

C/3

3A/3CAV

FSB CENTENARY

B/3

RF

D/3

RF


Sp/3

3A/3CAV

3C/3 (11-14 AUG)

A/3

4.



PLOI

KI

PLOI

GLEI

YEN

AO

TO

NEW

X

BD

PLOI

- ROAD
- RAILROAD

ENTRANCE

QUAN HANG


Op INVERBRACKIE Phase 2



5

Op INVERBRACKIE Phase 2

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569/71/7

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HQ 3 RAR
NUI DAT

See Distribution List

7 Aug 71

3RAR COMBAT OPERATIONS
AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATION IRON FOX
280001 JUL 71 - 052400 AUG 71

- Reference: A. HQ 1ATF OpO 7/71 dated 26 Jul 71.
B. HQ 1ATF OpO 8/71 dated 31 Jul 71.
C. Map L7014, SVN, Sheet 6430- IV, XA XUAN LOC, 1: 50,000
D. Map L7014, SVN, Sheet 6430- III, XA BINH BA, 1: 50,000

Name and Type of Operation

1. Operation IRON FOX was a two phase Task Force 'search and clear' operation; 3RAR group provided a blocking force in Phase I and a searching force in Phase 2.

Location.

2. The operation was conducted in the SUOI CA/ SUOI SOC area, on the LONG KHANH/ PHUOC TUY Province border, WEST of Route 2 and DE COURTENAY Rubber. The operational area for Phase 1 and 2 is shown at Annex A.

Controlling Headquarters

3. The operation was controlled by HQ 1 ATF at NUI DAT. HQ 3RAR deployed from FSB ZIGGIE to FSB KATE on 28 July 71 and returned to NUI DAT on 5 Aug 71.

Task Organization.

4. 3RAR Group consisted of:
- a. 3RAR (less C Coy 28 Jul and 1- 5 Aug and Pnr Pl 28 Jul- 5 Aug)
 - b. C Sqn (-) 1 Armd Regt 1- 5 Aug
 - c. Indep AMC Sect A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
 - d. Two ACVs A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
 - e. BC and FO Parties A Fd Bty
 - f. Sect 104 Fd Bty
 - g. 2 Tp (-) 1 Fd Sqn
 - h. Det 104 Sig Sqn
 - i. one ac 161 Recce Flt.

/Intelligence

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Intelligence.

5. Intelligence available before the operation indicated the presence of 1 Bn/ 274 (VC) Regt (MF) in the area targetted for blocking and search (centre of mass YS4091). 4RAR contacted C1 Coy 1Bn/ 274 Regt at YS3991. An SAS ptl also located C24 Convalescent Coy of 274 Regt at YS3590. This bunker system was searched and destroyed by A Coy 3RAR.

6. An intelligence summary for the operation showing intelligence available before the operation and enemy identified during the operation is at Annex B.

Mission.

7. 1 ATF mission was to destroy elements of HQ 274 (VC) Regt and 1 Bn/ 274 VC Regt in the SUOI CA/ SUOI SOC area. 3RAR mission in Phase 1 was to block for 4RAR sweep and in Phase 2, to sweep SOUTH WEST down the SUOI CA/ SUOI SOC to locate any elements of 1 Bn/ 274 (VC) Regt in the area.

Concept of Operations

8. Phase 1. It was not possible to use stealth to move the battalion into the general area of operations. Commencing at first light 28 Jul 71 two coys were inserted into the AO by air assault and one coy by APC. HQ 3RAR moved to the FSB by air; the guns and defence stores by road. Deployment was complete by 0830. However, on arrival in the AO, coys then moved on foot up to 2000 metres into their blocking positions.

9. Phase 2. 3RAR search of the SUOI SOC/ SUOI CA was carried out by three coys with A Sqn (-) of tanks held in reserve.

Execution.

10. The sequence of events is at Annex C and After Action Reports at Annex E.

Results.

11. Results are summarized in Annex D.

Lessons Learnt

12. There is no doubt that the wet season is a pervasive factor in operations and must always be considered and allowed for, be it, for example, in the employment of armour or air, in the replacement rate of radios and hand-sets, or construction of field defences. However, although pervasive, it is not over-riding and there is a very real danger of grossly overcompensating for the wet. Allowing for the fact that Australian forces now rarely have cause to enter the rice growing areas of the Province, the employment of tanks and APCs has not been unduly restricted by the wet season and they still operate effectively away from obviously wet and soft ground. The flow of intelligence in to the unit from airborne sensors seems largely unaffected, although army aviation VR flights are curtailed by weather from time to time. In the first three months of the wet season, resupply has been flown by UH1H and CH47 daily to the FSB and/ or rifle companies; although there are occasional delays, no mission has yet been aborted due to weather in that period. The effects of the wet season can very easily be over emphasised in training doctrine and publications.

/ FSB's

FSB's constructed in the NORTH of the Province have been built below ground without drastic effects and one constructed especially for the wet has more than proved its effectiveness. The main effect of the wet so far has to make the patrolling infantryman more uncomfortable through more suffering of prickly heat.

13. The effectiveness of the infantry battalion's ^{operations} in the Task Force are very dependent of the timely and accurate intelligence which is now being provided by Task Force HQs. The intelligence process is aided by, not only the Task Force retaining a permanent area of interest (ie. Phuoc Tuy), but also by the allocation of permanent AOs within the Province to battalions. Although battalions can quickly be deployed outside of their "permanent" AOs (as in this operation), they become very familiar with the intelligence history of "their AO", installations, topography and the orbit, tactics and habits of the VC units that traditionally operate within them. It would be idle to pretend that an infantry battalion could operate in any future theatre of war as efficiently as they do in Phuoc Tuy if the intelligence assets available to 1ATF are not available within, or available to, Australian services in the future.

14. On this and other recent operations the battalion has been working outside the economic range for resupply of the UH1H from NUI DAT. An efficient system of resupply employing a combination of the CH47 with UH1H and APCs has been established without deploying a permanent echelon out of NUI DAT. The subunit Q staff flies forward with the resupply in CH47 to a secure LZ (eg the FSB or an LZ secured by armour) and establishes a "temporary echelon" under control of the AQ cell. The resupply, already broken down to individual platoon, etc, lots is delivered forward by UH1H and APCs. The advantages of such a system are efficient use of aircraft; the subunit being resupplied receives its resupply quickly because of the short turnaround; and the distance that the battalion group can work out of base on aerial resupply without establishing an echelon is very greatly increased beyond the 20 kilometre generally considered the absolute economical maximum for UH1H resupply. Using a mix of CH47/ UH1H or CH47/ APC a battalion group could probably work up to 90km out of base.

15. The provision of Squadron Headquarters with reserve tanks and repair facilities to support one or more troops of tanks, all under the operational control of the infantry battalion has had its effectiveness confirmed in this operation. The infantry battalion is not worried by the maintenance or repair problems and can always be assured of tank troops always being available and up to strength. In the attack or advance to contact in jungle, the positioning of the armoured element about 300 metres behind the assaulting company and guided by the reserve platoon has proved a very successful method of control and positioning armour.

16. The provision of an APC LO at the battalion FSB ensured the close co-operation of 3RAR with APC elements on both our flanks.

17. In preliminary orders it is preferable to give orders direct to the person who is going to do the task rather than through a representative. Although the APC representative passed on the correct orders for the securing of the LZ for FSB KATE, the actual element responsible could not be contacted and when eventually found was at a distance which prevented them from doing their task on time. As a result the FSB Recce Party landed into an insecure area and this was only acceptable because it was in a Civilian Access Area.

18. In a recent MACV paper, a report was given on a HOI CHANH demonstration of VC sapper tactics in penetrating standard wire obstacles. The ease and speed with which VC sappers are able to penetrate without detection wire obstacles much thicker than those normally used to protect FSBs is a major source of concern given the enemy's current emphasis on this form of attack. The ex-VC themselves recommended a mesh-type fence that requires actual cutting or breaching to improve security. This unit usually constructs two single catwire fences around FSBs: a balance of economy to security related to the current threat. In the last two FSBs constructed by 3 RAR, the inner single wire fence has had an 8ft RPG wire fence incorporated in it in place of the inner cattle fence of the catwire. The idea has proved practical and economical. There has been a relatively small increase in the total FSB defence stores list. The fence has the advantages of greater protection against sapper attack; of inhibiting the enemy's use of RPGs into the perimeter; and greater protection to the forward pits against grenades and satchel charges. Whilst the standard wire obstacles remain effective against massed infantry in other environments, they are less effective against sapper type attack penetration by stealth. They also offer no protection against RPGs, satchels or grenades. It is felt that a review of our wire obstacles, and the provision of RPG wire as standard defence stores is required.

19. It has been the experience of this unit, operating away from civil access areas, that there have been almost no contacts at night apart from a very few incidents of suspected movement. This is reflected in artillery and mortar ammunition expenditure: supporting indirect fire is virtually exclusively HE, very little illumination being fired.

F.P. Scott
(F.P. SCOTT)

Lt Col
CO

- Annexes:
- A. OP IRON FOX PHASE 1 and 2 Boundaries.
 - B. Intelligence Summary
 - C. OP IRON FOX Sequence of Events.
 - D. OP IRON FOX Contact After Action Reports.

Distribution:

Copy No

A Coy	1	CO	29
B Coy	2	Ops Offr	30
C Coy	3	BC	31
D Coy	4	Comds Diary	32 - 34
Sp Coy	5	Spare	35 - 39
Admin Coy	6	File	40
HQ 1 ATF	7 - 20		
C Sqn 1 Armd Regt	21		
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt	22		
12 Fd Regt	23		
1 Fd Sqn	24		
4RAR	25		
9RAR	26		
HQ C COMD	27		
D Inf CANBERRA	28		

OPERATION IRON FOX
PHASE II


ANNEX A

REFERENCE MAPS 1:25000

- 6430 I SW
- 6430 II NW
- 6430 III NE
- 6430 IV SE

PTL 13

PTL 21



PTL 14
2 Aug 1600 hrs

Junct Pt

1 ATF

3RAR

A 3

PTL 34

A 3
[1-3 Aug]

4 RAR/NZ [ANZAC]

D 3

B 3

FSB DEBBIE

A 3

PTL 24

D 4



3 RAR

C 4

FSB
KATE

3 RAR

4 RAR



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ANNEX B TO
3RAR AFTER ACTION REPORT
OP IRON FOX
DATED 7 AUG 71

OPERATION IRON FOX
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
PART 1

INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE BEFORE THE OPERATION

1. During June 1971 HQ 274 VC Main Force Regt and 1 Bn 274 VC Main Force Regt moved SOUTH into the SUOI CA area in the vicinity of the PHUOC TUY, LONG KHANH border. The reason may have been to be located close to the supply area of the COURTENAY Rubber; or may have been in preparation for an offensive task.
2. 1 Bn 274 Regt had been based in the SOUI CA area since June and on one occasion had sent elements into PHUOC TUY probably on the resupply tasks. Elements of 1 Bn 274 Regt were contacted at YS420855 on 25 June.
3. The complete Intelligence picture as at the beginning of OP IRON FOX is given at Appendix 1.

PART II

VC LOCATED AND CONTACTED DURING THE OPERATION

1 Bn 274 VC Main Force Regt

4. Elements of this unit were contacted in a bunker system by 4RAR/ at YS398913 on 29 J ly 71. The following day D Coy 4RAR contacted C1 Coy 1 Bn 274 Regt in another bunker system at YS394911. It is thought that, whilst not all of the battalions estimated strength of 115 were in the bunkers at the time of contact the system had been used as a base for the battalion.

5. At 4190 6 Pl B Coy 3RAR found tracks of 2- 3 people heading SOUTH. At 4190 2 VC engaged 6 Pl B Coy 3RAR wounding a member of 6Pl. These were the only signs of exfiltration from the contact area mentioned in para 4.

C24 Convalescence Coy, 274 Regt.

6. At YS351906 a SAS Plt contacted one VC resulting in 1 VC WIA. The Plt followed a blood trail to a partly occupied bunker system. A Coy 3RAR were reacted to exploit this information. A Coy found that the system had been evacuated by C24 Convalescence Coy.

7. The system consisted of 16 bunkers. Details are at Appendix 2.

8. 3 Pl A Coy contacted 1 VC (KIA) at YS355910. No identification could be made however it is believed that he was probably making his way to the system that A Coy had just entered.

Rear Services MR7

9. Two small caches were found by A Coy at YS3790. These had probably been set up by the Rear Services of MR7 who are known to operate in that area.

/Part III

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2

ANNEX B

PART III

CONCLUSIONS

ARRESMENT OF OP IRON FOX

10. 1 ATF operations on OP IRON FOX disrupted two base camps used by 274 VC Main Force Regt. 1 Bn has been forced to relocate, it is also believed that the HQ of 274 Regt and associated coys were forced to move further WEST.

11. The intelligence which OP IRON FOX was based on again proved to be accurate and timely.

- Appendices
1. Summary of Intelligence Available prior to OP IRON FOX.
 2. Demolition Report Bunker System at YS3590.

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX B TO
3RAR AFTER ACTION REPORT
OP IRON FOX
DATED 7 AUG 71

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE PRIOR TO OP IRON FOX

Ref: A. 1ATF OpO 7/71 Annex A dated 26 Jul 71.

General

1. During June 1971 1 Bn of 274 VC Main Force Regt is believed to have moved SOUTH into the SUOI CA area of the PHUOC TUY/LONG KHANH border from its former area of operations WEST of XUAN LOC. The reason for the move is not clear but may have been in order to be located closer to the supply area of the COURTENAY Rubber; or may have been in preparation for an offensive task as suggested from a study of documents captured by SAS Patrol on 3 Jun. These documents indicated that 1 Bn was to receive an issue of 40 60mm mortar rounds and 10 B40 rounds.

Recent Activity

2. The battalion appears to have been based in the SUOI CA area since June, and to have sent elements into PHUOC TUY, some no doubt on resupply tasks. On 25 Jun elements of C Sqn 1 Armd Regt supported by V Coy 4RAR/NZ (ANZAC) and A Sqn 3 Cav Regt engaged a company of 1 Bn in a bunker system WEST of XA BANG (at YS420855), killing at least five.

Current Location.

3. Recent reports suggest that 1 Bn is currently located in the SUOI CA area, **centre of mass YS4091.**

Strength

4. The battalion is believed to have a strength of approximately 115. There are three rifle companies (C1, C2 and C3) each with a strength of approximately 20, and each having a 60mm mortar. A Heavy Weapons Company (C4), also of roughly 20 men, is believed to have one 82mm mortar. In addition there is a Headquarters group (C5), of approximately 35 men, which includes a Signals Platoon and a Reconnaissance Platoon.

5. As far as is known, the battalion possesses no 12.7 Heavy Machine Guns. However it is quite possible that a 12.7 HMG may have been allotted to the battalion from C18 HMG Coy of the Regiment. Other elements of the **Regimental Support Companies could also have been allotted to 1 Bn.**

6. There have been some reports this year that 274 Regt has been allotting small elements to help in up grading local force units, and elements of 1 Bn have been reported recently in areas of LONG KHANH other than the SUOI CA. It is therefore possible that all of 1 Bn's estimated strength of 115 may not be located with the battalion at present.

7. Events of the past two months suggest that 274 Regt units have improved in morale and combat effectiveness.

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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX B TO
3RAR AFTER ACTION REPORT
OP IRON FOX
DATED 7 AUG 71

DEMOLITION REPORT
BUNKER SYSTEM AT YS3590

Operation: IRON FOX

By: Capt J.E. TICK 2 Tp Comd

For: OC 1 Fd Sqn

Map: XA XUAN LOC

Date: 8 Aug 71

General

1. 2 Troop Combat Engineer Team (CET) was given the task of destroying a group of fifteen bunkers at grid YS3590. The system had been occupied by C24 Convalescent Company.
2. At 1600hrs on 2 Aug the CET left FSPB KATE by UH1H Albatross. They were dropped at an LZ 300 metres from the bunker system.
3. The search of the bunker system was completed by the splinter team attached to A Coy 3RAR prior to the arrival of the CET. This limited the CET task to a demolition task only.
4. Protection was provided by A Coy 3RAR with two platoons occupying ambush positions on entry/ exit tracks to the bunker system. A third platoon was provided as close protection for the CET.
5. Demolition was completed by 1330hrs on 3 Aug 71 and aerial confirmation of the effectiveness of the demolition was made at 031600hrs.

Bunker Design and Construction.

6. Design. All bunkers located were of the "T" shaped variety with dimensions 10'x 8'x 5' with about 2' OHP. Each bunker was fitted with three sets of interior hammock poles and five bunkers had exterior modification in the form of bamboo tables, and tie down rails for ponchos.
7. Age. The bunkers were estimated to be from one to two years old, some exterior modification had been made in the previous three months.
8. Sites. The area was well drained and sloped gently to the South and South West, Vegetation was rain forest with thick clumps of bamboo forming a secondary canopy. The bunkers were generally sited in bamboo and under large trees to provide maximum camouflage against aerial observation.

Problems Encountered.

9. No major problems were encountered.
10. One minor problem was the search of bunkers of the infantry - a sapper task.

/ Results

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Results.

11. The following installations were destroyed:-
 - a. Bunkers 15
 - b. Sentry pits 1
 - c. Trees 25
12. Details of documents and equipment recovered are given in Annex D to this After Action Report.
13. The demolition task was simple and no difficulties were encountered. Co-operation from the infantry was good and the security of the area sound, one VC was killed by 3 Pl A Coy on an entry/ exit track to the system.

(J.E. TICK)
Capt
2 Tp Comd

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(D.N. KERR)
Maj
Ops Offr

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ANNEX C TO
3RAR AFTER ACTION REPORT
OP IRON FOX
DATED 7 AUG 71

OPERATION IRON FOX
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Serial	Date/Time	Event
(a)	(b)	(c)
1	280001	<u>OP IRON FOX Commenced. Grouping:</u> a. <u>3RAR Gp</u> Remaining under comd Det 104 Sig Sqn Under op con Indep AMC Sect A Sqn 3 Cav Regt Two ACVs A Sqn 3 Cav Regt Remaining in DS one RW ac 161 Recce Flt Reverting from in DS to gen sp 1 ATF A Fd Bty (less BC, FO parties) Remaining in support 2 Tp (-) 1 Fd Sqn In support and at priority call and under comd for local defence from time of arrival FSB KATE Sect 104 Fd Bty (FSB KATE) In support Sect 104 Fd Bty (FSB DEBBIE) Pl (3 tubes) C Bty (-) 5/42 (US) Arty (FSB CHERIE) Detached to under op con 1 ATF C Coy 3RAR Detached to under op con LCT 1 Fd Sqn (NDP JUDITH) Pnr Pl 3RAR b. <u>3RAR Rear.</u> Composite force at FSB ZIGGIE for local defence: Under comd Composite Pl Admin Coy 3RAR Under op con Composite Pl provide by HQ 1 ATF In DS Sect Mor Pl 3RAR (80)
2	280500	<u>3RAR Deployed:</u> a. <u>0500.</u> B Coy mounted in 3 Tp A Sqn, Sect Mor Pl mounted in AMCs and two ACVs departed NUI DAT with elements A Sqn 3 Cav. B Coy dismounted YS4089 and moved on foot to blocking positions. Sp Tp A Sqn (FSVs) escorted the AMC mounted Mortar Section and ACVs to secure FSB KATE (YS 422884) by 0645.

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2

(a)	(b)	(c)
2		<p>b. <u>0515.</u> A Coy departed NUI DAT by TCV, secured PZ YS4584 and air assaulted LZ YS3790. A Coy then moved on foot to their blocking position.</p> <p>c. <u>0530.</u> D Coy departed NUI DAT by TCV and air assaulted LZ3888 from PZ YS4584. D Coy then moved on foot to blocking positions.</p> <p>d. <u>0645.</u> FSB recce party moved by UH1H from FSB ZIGGIE to FSB KATE. The main body followed by UH1H at 0835.</p> <p>e. <u>0730.</u> Sect 104 Fd Bty and 3RAR stores convoy arrived by road with cavalry.</p> <p>f. <u>0830.</u> Composite Pls from Admin Coy 3RAR and HQ 1 ATF flew by CH47 to ZIGGIE. Sect A Fd Bty at ZIGGIE returned to NUI DAT by CH47.</p> <p>g. <u>1200.</u> Bn HQ stores, special equipment and fuel fly in by CH47 to KATE commenced.</p>

3	282100	<p>3RAR coys moved into position quickly on deployment and 4RAR commenced sweeping towards 3RAR blocking positions. No recent sign of the enemy was found by 3RAR or 4RAR during the day. 3RAR final dispositions were:</p> <p>a. FSB KATE - HQ 3RAR, HQ Sp Coy, A TK Pl, AMC mtd mortars section, two ACVs, A Sqn 3 Cav LO, Sect 104 Fd Bty, elms 2 Tp (-) 1 Fd Sqn, elm TFMA.</p> <p>b. A Coy - HQ, 1Pl- 391911; 2 Pl- 390913; 3Pl- 392908.</p> <p>c. B Coy - HQ, 4Pl- 403895; 5Pl- 406895; 6Pl- 400898.</p> <p>d. D Coy - HQ, 12Pl- 395904; 10Pl- 394906; 11Pl- 397901.</p>
---	--------	--

DAY 2- 29 JUL

4.	290700	<p>3RAR coys searched between pl localities for signs of enemy movement and deployed half platoon ambushes between platoon localities. By 1320 4RAR had searched to within 500- 1000 metres of 3RAR block. 3RAR companies called in their half platoon ambushes and prepared to move. As they did so, however, 7Pl C Coy 4RAR came into heavy contact at YS398913 and 3RAR coys reoccupied their blocking position. 4RAR contact continued throughout the afternoon.</p>
5	291655	<p>C Coy 3RAR was moved by 1ATF by air from vicinity NUI LA, YS6166 to an LZ secured by A Sqn 3 Cav at YS3891. On arrival C Coy reverted to under comd 3RAR and moved by APC to extend 3RAR blocking positions: HQ, 7Pl- 388916; 8Pl- 390914; 9Pl- 388919.</p>
6	292009	<p>7Pl C Coy engaged movement WEST of their location with no observed result.</p>

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(a)	(b)	(c)
7	292332	HQ C Coy engaged movement on their EAST flank with no observed result.
<u>DAY 3- 30 JUL</u>		
8	300630	4RAR and C Sqn continued clearing the bunker system at YS3891. 3RAR remained in blocking positions and coys checked between localities for sign of enemy exfiltration.
9	301200	3RAR coys in blocking position were pulled back to allow 4RAR search to continue: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. A Coy to ambush between YS384905- YS386901. b. B Coy to ambush between YS400903- YS406907. c. C Coy - 8Pl withdrawn to YS385916. d. D Coy moved to ambush between YS390900- YS393900.
10	301442	D Coy 4RAR made heavy contact with C1 Coy 1/274 (NVA) Regt in a bunker system at 394911. B Coy, C Coys 4RAR and C Sqn 1 Armd Regt supported D Coy 4RAR (This bunker system was 250 metres from A Coy 3RAR original blocking position). Contact continued until last light. Results: 12VC KIA; CIA 1M60, 4 AK47s, 2 RPGs qty ammunition rice and equipment; 1 Aust KIA, 4WIA.
11	301500	C Coy was extracted to NUI DAT by UH1H from a PZ at YS 3992 secured by A Sqn 3 Cav. Elements of A Sqn 3 Cav were moved to thicken up the blocking position vacated by C Coy and along the firetrail from YS3790 to YS3992.
12	301935	<u>Dispositions 3RAR gp.</u> 3RAR blocking positions were re-established as follows: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>FSB KATE</u> - HQ 3RAR, Sp Coy (-), AMC mtd Mor Sect (80A), Sect 104 Fd Bty, elms TFMA, 2Tp (-) 1 Fd Sqn. b. <u>A Coy</u> - HQ, 1P1- 385903; 2P1- 384905; 3P1 386901. c. <u>B Coy</u> - HQ, 4P1- 403905; 5P1- 400905; 6P1- 405907. d. <u>D Coy</u> - HQ, 12P1- 392900; 10P1- 390900; 11P1- 397901.
13	302105	11 Pl D Coy engaged movement on their perimeter with claymores, M79s and artillery with no observed result.

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4

ANNEX C

(a)	(b)	(c)
-----	-----	-----

DAY 4- 31 JUL

- | | | |
|----|--------|--|
| 14 | 310800 | 3RAR patrolled and ambushed between blocking positions. |
| 15 | 310903 | A patrol of 6Pl patrolling to link up with elements of A Sqn 3 Cav on the right flank of 3RAR found two small tracks used by 1- 2 pers, estimated within last 15 hours, heading SOUTH. |
| 16 | 311135 | 6Pls patrol had just married up with TA84, an indep APC Sect of A Sqn, at YS4190 when 2VC wearing greens approached the position. Before the sentry could alert the patrol, the VC fired a 3- 5 rd burst wounding a member of 6Pl in the arm. TA84 and elements Tp HQ 1 Tp swept the area but heavy jungle and bamboo and proximity of 4RAR prevented further follow up. |
| 17 | 311249 | The tracks found by 6Pl were the only sign of exfiltration from 4RAR contacts 29/30 Jul. B Coy was ordered to search SOUTH to the area bounded by YS 400903- 411908- 417905- 417894- 400894 and search three known bunker systems in 4090 and 4089. |

DAY 5- 1 AUG

- | | | |
|----|--------|--|
| 18 | 011020 | At YS 351906, SAS ptl 34 engaged one VC suspected to be a sentry. The ptl followed a bloodtrail 100 metres NNW to an old bunker system with enemy in part of it. The bunkers were engaged with gunships and artillery. |
| 19 | 011000 | A Coy and D Coy resupplied by UH1H out of KATE. B Coy continued search. D Coy secured an LZ at YS3990 for insertion of B Coy/into a PZ at YS423892. 4RAR |
| 21 | 011327 | A Coy was ordered by CO3RAR to remain at their LZ to facilitate their employment in support of SAS if required. |
| 20 | 011200 | Phase 2 of OP IRON FOX commenced (See Annex A). 1 ATF to continue search SOUTH WEST against elements 1/274 (NVA) Regt; and possibly HQ SR 4:
<ol style="list-style-type: none">Gen Cutline. 3RAR (-) and C Coy 4RAR to search SOUTH WEST astride the SUOI CA and SUOI SOC against a blocking force on the BRIMSTONE TRAIL consisting of A Sqn 3 Cav Regt with D Coy of 4RAR under op con.A Coy to search the NORTH side of the SUOI CA.D Coy to search the SOUTH side of the SUOI CA. |

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- | (a) | (b) | (c) |
|-----|-----|--|
| | | d. <u>B Coy</u> to complete search of assigned area and then to search the NORTH side of the SUOI CA. B Coy to resupply 2 Aug. |
| | | e. <u>C Coy 4RAR</u> to search the SOUTH side of the SUOI SOC after extraction of B Coy 4RAR to NUI DAT as 1 ATF RRF. |
| | | f. <u>Co-ord.</u> Assy areas, SL and co-ord of sweeping elms to be co-ord by HQ 3RAR. |

22 011330

Dispositions at commencement Phase 2:

- a. HQ 3RAR - FSB KATE - no change
- b. A Coy - complete at YS377907 after maintdem.
- c. B Coy - HQ, 4P1 YS407902; 5P1- YS405902; 6P1- YS406900
- d. C Coy - NUI DAT
- e. D Coy - complete at YS392900
- f. C Sqn (-) - HQ, 1Tp, 5Tp- YS405941

22 011715

A Coy was inserted to LZ at YS358918 secured by 2 Tp A Sqn. 2 Tp moved A Coy to a night harbour at YS357903. A guide from SAS ptl 34 married up with A Coy to guide them into the bunkers and the remainder of the ptl was extracted. C Sqn (-) was ordered to move ASAP 2 Aug. (A Coy task to search NORTH side of SUOI CA was postponed).

011930

Dispositions 3RAR group at last light:

- a. A Coy - complete at 357903.
- b. B Coy - HQ, 4P1- 405901; 5P1- 400898; 6P1- 406895.
- c. C Coy - NUI DAT
- d. D Coy - HQ, 12P1- 388897; 10P1- 386898; 11P1- 390896.
- e. FSB KATE - Bn HQ, Sp Coy HQ, A TK P1, Mor Sect (80A), AMC Sect, ACV sect, A Sqn LO, Sect 104 Fd Bty.
- f. C Sqn (-) - HQ, 1Tp, 5Tp- 406940.

(a)	(b)	(c)
-----	-----	-----

DAY 6 - 2 AUG

24 020756 C Sqn (-) married up with A Coy at YS358914. At 080600 A Coy found a quantity of CBUs. The CBUs was marked for later destruction. A Coy, supported by C Sqn and guided by an SAS guide, advanced towards the bunker system found by SAS at YS351906. The bunker system was found to have been recently abandoned by C24 Convalescence Coy of 274. The system contained 16 bunkers including an operating theatre. A CET was inserted by air and the bunkers were blown 3 Aug.

25 021250 10Pl located a track at YS3789 used by 2- 3 persons moving SW- NE in past 3 days. 12 Pl found yam diggings, estimated 7 days old, in the same vicinity.

26 021700 5 Pl located an old destroyed bunker system at YS4089. Documents were found in the system indentifying an element of 274 (NVA) Regt. The documents were, however, old.

27 021720 At YS3591, 3Pl shot one VC (KIA) moving SOUTH along an established track. The VC was thought to have been alone, was very well dressed but carried no papers or ident at all. Captured 1 AK47, mag, 30 rds, 5 M79 rds and pers equipment, 25lbs rice.

28 022050 5Pl heard movement 250 metres from their perimeter moving past their position at YS401892 and engaged with an M60. Enemy approached from NORTH, was engaged with SA, and withdrew NW. Artillery engaged the area.

DAY 7 - 3 AUG

29 030945 10Pl located a well used track at YS372881 with prints of two pers moving WEST in last 36 hours. The track was followed to a water point at YS370887.

30 031030 A patrol out of NDP ZIGGIE at YS6080 heard a burst of automatic fire and chopping. A track of two people was located. NFI.

31 031130 Orders for final tasks OP IRON FOX issued:

- a. A Coy. To return by APC to vic YS3790 and continue search NORTH of SUOI CA. A Coy moved at 1343 after destruction of bunkers.
- b. B Coy. Search NORTH of SUOI SOC to non- perennial stream YS3788.

(a)	(b)	(c)
		<p>c. <u>D Coy.</u> Complete search SUOI CA/ SUOI SOC from YS3688 between SOC in SOUTH, 89 N in NORTH and BRIMSTONE TRAIL in WEST.</p> <p>d. <u>C Sqn (-).</u> Reposition in reserve YS3790.</p>
32	031935	<p><u>Dispositions 3RAR gp:</u></p> <p>a. <u>HQ 3RAR -FSB KATE-</u> HQ 3RAR, HQ Sp Coy, A TK Pl, Mor Sect (80A) Indep AMC Sect, ACVs, Sect 104 Fd Bty, 2 Tp (-) 1 Fd Sqn, elm TFMA.</p> <p>b. <u>A Coy</u> - complete at YS377903.</p> <p>c. <u>B Coy</u> - HQ, 4Pl- YS391885; 5Pl -YS393882; 6Pl- YS376884</p> <p>d. <u>C Coy</u> - NUI DAT</p> <p>e. <u>D Coy</u> - HQ, 11Pl, 12Pl- YS351884; 10Pl- YS353888.</p> <p>f. <u>C Sqn (-)</u> - complete at YS377908.</p>

DAY 8 - 4 AUG

33	040842	A patrol out of NDP ZIGGIE located a hootchie and tracks, small footprints at YS606803 and were ordered to ambush the area.
34	041000	D Coy was extracted from a PZ at YS3589 secured by A Sqn to an LZ at YS4584 and returned to NUI DAT by TCV down Route 2.
	041055	1Pl located two caches at YS3790, 60 metres from an old bunker system. The following were destroyed: 3x 60mm rds; 1x 82mm Mor rds; 640 AK47 rds; 6x 82mm mor fuses; 8x RPG 7 boosters; 2x RPG7 fins; 1x RPG warhead.
36	041430	An ATO was flown forward to A Sqn 3 Cav to destroy the CBUs located near the bunker system destroyed by A Coy 3 Aug. Total material destroyed: 48 CBUs; 49 stick grenades; 1 US trip flare; 1 9mm pistol mag and 10 rds; 52 7.62mm short rds; 1 section 292 aerial; 1x 2.75 rocket.

DAY 9 - 5 AUG

37	050800	B Coy was extracted by UH1H from an LZ at YS3888 to an LZ on Route 2 at YS4584 and returned to NUI DAT by TCV.
38	050900	C Coy deployed to ZIGGIE relieving the composite pls from Admin Coy and 1 ATF. One pl C Coy flew to NDP JUDITH to come under op con of the LCT. The Pnr Pl returned to NUI DAT.

<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>
38	050913	3 Tp moved from C Sqn HQ location to move behind and support A Coy sweep (now approaching the BRIMSTONE TRAIL). 5Tp- YS369899, A Coy HQ, 3P1- 365896; 1P1- 360898; 2P1- 362892. 1 Tp C Sqn replaced 5 Tp at 1312.
39	051420	A Coy married up with 3 Tp A Sqn and moved by APC to NUI DAT.
40	051425	A tank of 1 Tp detonated a large mine at 358904. Nil casualties but left hand centre suspension station and 4 road wheels destroyed. The mine is believed to have been in place for a long time, but the pressure device may have been recently installed.
41	051615	3RAR CP closed at FSB KATE to return to NUI DAT. C Sqn (-) reverted to under comd of 1ATF. 3RAR (Rear) assumed command of FSB KATE, NDP ZIGGIE and AO GLENELG. Sp Coy HQ, A TK P1, AMC mtd mor sect and sect 104 Fd Bty remained at J KATE for extraction 6 Aug.
42	052400	OP IRON FOX concluded.

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ANNEX D TO
3RAR AFTER ACTION REPORT
OP IRON FOX
DATED 7 AUG 71

1. The operation resulted in 1 VC KIA (BC). The following equipment was captured:
2. Weapons
 - 1 x AK47
 - 1 x AK 47 Mag
 - 1 x K54 Pistol Mag
3. Explosives and Ammo
 - 50 x Butterfly Bombs (CBUs)
 - 5 x 79 Rounds
 - Qty homemade Stick Grenades
 - 2 x bags explosives.
 - 1 x RPG Warhead
 - 3 x 60mm Mor rounds
 - 1 x 82mm Mor round
 - 6 x 82mm Mor fuzes
 - 7 x RPG7 Boosters
 - 2 x RPG7 fins
 - 680x AK47 rounds
4. Med Supplies
 - Plasama Bottles
 - Drugs Phials
 - Bandages
 - Surgical Mask
 - 1 Pair Scissors
 - 1 x plastic bag containing 3x ex books containing Med data.
5. Food/ Cooking Utensils
 - Large Qty of cooking utensils
 - 25lbs of Rice
 - Small qty of Aust and US rations.
 - 5 x bottles of pepper
 - 6 x water bottles (US pattern)
 - 1 x sandbag Breadfruit and Mangos.
6. Miscellaneous Clothing and Utensils
 - 1 wallet with photograph
 - 5 ex books
 - 1 x US compass
 - 1 x 'L' shaped torch with batteries
 - 1 web belt
 - 1 x pack plastic drawnstring
 - 1 x set of civilian clothing
 - 2 x Shirts mil green
 - 1 x black shirt
 - 2 x trousers mil green

/ 1x

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Miscellaneous Clothing and Utensils (contd)

1 x hammock
Toilet gear
1 x tin Aust foot powder
25 set Bty dry cell
Nylon cord
1 x Pair Boots (US) pattern
3 x Prs Sandals
1 x pr Sand Shoes
6x US Pattern Hootchies
Small qty Plastic sheeting
4 x Memmade Rucksacks
Assorted Webbing Straps (US pattern)
2 Handwritten letters
Plastic Bag containing photos, certificates.
Small qty of money
Sewing Kit
Personal Hygiene Items: nail clippers.
4 x 'D' cell batteries
1 x Homemade Torch
Qty Soap, Combs, scrubbing brushes.

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ANNEX E TO
3RAR AFTER ACTION REPORT
OP IRON FOX
DATED 7 AUG 71

OP IRON FOX

Attached are Contact After Action Reports for OP IRON FOX as follows:

- a. Appendix 1: 6 Pl. Contact 31 Jul.
- b. Appendix 2: 3 Pl Contact 2 Aug.

APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX E TO
3RAR AFTER ACTION REPORT
DATED 7 AUG 71

CONTACT/INCIDENT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Report by: No 4719424 Rank Lt Name J.O'Connell 3RAR B Coy 6Pl
2. Date/Time of contact: 311120H AUG 71 Grid Loc: YS412909
3. Duration of (i) Firefight: 3 mins (ii) Total 120 mins
4. Description of contact, including task and events prior to contact and friendly/ enemy reaction. Include sketch:
Half pl ptl had just married up with an APC Section when two enemy approached the position and opened fire before the sentry could engage and warn the patrol. The area was engaged and swept by APCs.
5. Description of terrain and canopy, including Estimated ranges of visibility.
Lantana with undergrowth to 10' high tall grass 4- 5'
6. Who first saw enemy (Names no required; insert fwd scout, sentry etc.
Section 2IC/ Sentry
7. Distance enemy first sighted: 10 - 15 metres
8. What caused enemy to be noticed: Movement
9. Strengths: Enemy Tps: 2 Friendly Tps: 14
10. Enemy type: Unknown
11. Who fired first: Enemy
12. Range of first engagement: 10 metres
13. Maximum range of engagement: 10 metres
14. Weapons fired: Friendly: M60; M16; M79; M26. Enemy: M16 or M1/M2
15. Approx no of friendly rds fired: M60-25, M16- 60, SLR- 60, M26- 4
16. Total enemy casualties: Nil
17. Friendly casualties: 1 WIA
18. Other points and Lessons Learnt: One initiation of contact APCs commenced moving and APC Comd failed to man radio on coy net and co-ordination was difficult until comms were established.

PART II

19. Platoons actions and commanders comments: Nil
20. Support fire: Nil
21. Support fire ammunition expended: Nil

PART III

22. Company Cpmmander's Comments: Nil

(J.O'Connell)
Lt
Pl Comd

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J.O'Connell

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
APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX E TO
OP IRON FOX
AFTER ACTION REPORT
DATED 7 AUG 71

CONTACT/ INCIDENT AFTER ACTION REPORT

PART I

1. Report by: 17161 Lt N.R. MURRAY 3P1 A Coy 3RAR
2. Date, Time of contact: 021720H Aug 71. Grid: 352910
3. Duration of (1) Firefight: 20mins (2) Total time: 45 mins
4. Description: The platoon had been given the task of following a well used track, running NORTH from a bunker system (352904) found by 2P1. At the contact grid the platoon was in the process of setting up a night ambush position, with the aim of ambushing any enemy moving NORTH or SOUTH along the track. During a sentry change on the northern end of the ambush, an enemy was seen moving along the track. The gun position was warned, and the enemy engaged at approximately 10 metres. The enemy fell, wounded, and several persons reported movement to his rear. This area was engaged with SA and grenades (projected). A sweep was then conducted, by which time the enemy was dead. The sweep did not reveal any information as to whether or not any other enemy had been present.

- Enemy
- × Original position of sentry
- ↘ Direction of En movt



5. Terrain: Undulating, with numerous small creeklines.
Canopy: Thick undergrowth (approx 10- 20ft) mixed with some trees, and numerous patches of bamboo.
Visibility: Approx 10- 15m
6. Who first saw enemy: Sentry
7. Distance Enemy first sighted: Approx 20m
8. What caused Enemy to be noticed: Movement
9. Strengths: Enemy: 1 (may have been more, however not seen definitely)
Own Troops: 27

/10. Enemy

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- 10. Enemy Type: Not positively identified. Possibly C24 Convalescent Coy 274 Regt.
- 11. Who Fired First: MG No 2
- 12. Range of first Engagement: Approx 10 metres
- 13. Maximum Range of Engagement: 10 metres.
- 14. Weapons Fired: Friendly: M60 -1, SLR- 1, M16- 3, Gren- 3
- 15. Approx No of Friendly Rounds Fired: M60- 200, SLR -80, M16- 100.
- 16. Total Enemy Casualties: 1 KIA
- 17. Friendly Casualties: Nil
- 18. Other Points and Lessons Learnt:
 - a. Fire lanes cut low to the ground allowed the gun group to engage the en at close range, without being seen by the enemy.
 - b. Grenades projected out to various ranges along the track could have caused further en casualties if (i) More en had been present (unknown)
(ii) If it had been thought of immediately

PART II

- 19. No further comments.
- 20. Nil
- 21. Nil

PART III

- 22. Coy Commander's Comments.
 - a. The ambush was planned and conducted with attention to detail - concealed fire lanes.
 - b. Reporting during their contact was excellent. The signaller reported 'Contact wait out' to CHQ virtually simultaneous with its first shots and progressively related what he saw without hindering the Pl comd.
 - c. The platoon was well briefed and knew exactly what to do.
 - d. The platoon comd followed up quickly and aggressively, but retained intimate control of static and moving elements all the time.

.....Pt1 Comd N. MURRAY Lt Pl Comd J DOYLE Maj
(Coy Comd)

Comds Diary
2.

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569/71/5

HQ 3RAR
NUI DAT

13 Aug 71

HQ 1ATF (14)
Comds Diary (3)
File (1)

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT
OP HAWKER

Reference: A, 3RAR After Action Reports OP HAWKER 28 Jul 71.

Enclosed are Contact After Action Reports for OP HAWKER as follows:

- a. Pnr Pl Contact 19 Jul at YS624676
- b. 2Pl Contact 20 Jul at YS624667
- c. 9Pl Contact 20 Jul at YS585654.

F.P. Scott
for (F.P. SCOTT)
Lt Col
CO

Enclosures:

1. Pnr Pl Contact After Action Report
2. 2Pl Contact After Action Report
3. 9Pl Contact After Action Report

For Information:

A Coy
C Coy
Sp Coy

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CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Report By: 47054 Lt P.J. Abigail 3RAR Sp Coy Aslt Pnr PJ
2. Date/Time of Contact: 191610 Jul 71 Grid Location: YS624676
3. Duration of (i) Firefight: 5 mins (ii) Total: 5 mins
4. Description of Contact: P1 was in harbour position to allow CHQ to control C/S61 contact. The pl harbour was just to the north of an old overgrown woodcutters track. The contact took place in the area of the track, with the VC on our side of it and the P1 on the other. The VC approached from the NW and were fired upon by the P1 perimeter. The VC then withdrew to the West and NW, leaving behind an M16 and other items of clothing and equipment. Sketch attached at Annex A.
5. Description of terrain: Area was fairly flat with some small gullies. Canopy: About 50' Undergrowth: Thick Visibility: 20-25m
6. Who first saw enemy: Forward scout.
7. Distance enemy first sighted: 15 metres
8. What caused enemy to be noticed: Movement
9. Strengths: Friendly: 35 Enemy Tps: 4- 5
10. Enemy Type: Local
11. Who fired First: Forward Scout
12. Range of First Engagement: 15 metres
13. Maximum range of engagement: 25- 30 metres
14. Weapons fired: Friendly:- M60, M16, SLR, Rifle Grenades
Enemy: Nil
15. Approx No of rds fired: M60- 150; M16- 60; SLR- 60; Grenades- 2.
16. Total Enemy casualties: 1 WIA (poss)
17. Friendly casualties: Nil
18. Other points and Lessons Learnt: Captured in this contact were:- 1x M16, 3x M16 mags, 1x M61 grenade, 1x pack, qty rice 50lb, Med supplies, qty clothing and hammocks. All items were in spotless condition, the clothing being new. Documents: 2 Diaries

PART II

19. The reaction of the perimeter once contact was made was good, however, if the perimeter in the area of the contact had been more alert, it is probable that the result would have been 1 VC KIA instead of 1VC WIA (poss).
20. Sp fire: Arty fired to NORTH and NORTH WEST.
21. Sp fire ammunition expended: Arty 20 rounds of HE.

/PART III

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2

PART III

22. Company Commander's Comments: The degree of alertness and in-
experience caused this action to develop prematurely.
23. Other Comments. Agent report later confirmed 1 VC WIA in this
contact.

(P.J. Abigail)

Lt

Pl Comd

(G.L. Morgan)

Maj

Coy Comd

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D.N. Kerr

(D.N. KERR)


Maj

Ops Offr

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ANNEX A TO
CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT
DATED 13 AUG 71



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CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Report By: 147735 2Lt R. Donkin, 2Pl, A Coy, 3RAR
2. Date/Time of Contact: 0625hrs 20 Jul 71 Grid Location: YS624667
3. Duration of (i) Firefight: 1 minute Total: 1 Minute
4. Description of Contact: Platoon was in an ambush position to the north of well impacted footpad that showed no signs of very recent movement. During stand to, the right flank gun group heard some bushes moving a good 30- 40 metres from their position at 0615. At 0625 No2 on the gun saw movement, alerted the No1 who saw a mans hand through the bushes just in front of the claymores. It appeared the man was crouching as if to push under the bushes. It is believed the enemy may have heard the platoon signaller answering radio checks and could not decide exactly what he heard or where it came from. The MG No1 initiated the claymore. He heard no noise after initiation and saw no movement so did not fire. A sweep revealed the enemy had died instantly but no sign of anyone else. A detailed search of the track in the direction from which he had come revealed a few slight marks in 100 metres, indicating that while he had used the track, he had been extremely careful to have a very minimum of sign. He had skillfully avoided any mud patches on the track.
5. Description of Terrain: Terrain and canopy was very thick secondary growth visibility was about 10- 15 metres.
6. Who first saw enemy: MG No 2 on right flank of the killer group
7. Distance enemy first sighted: 10 metres.
8. What caused the enemy to be noticed: Movement
9. Strengths: Enemy: 1 Friendly Troops: 30
10. Enemy Type: Local VC, barefooted, carrying M16, dressed in greens with only basic webbing.
11. Who Fired first: MG No 1 initiated claymore to initiate contact
12. Range of first engagement: 10 Metres
13. Maximum range of engagement: 10 metres
14. Weapons Fired: Friendly: 2x M18A1 Claymore mines Enemy: Nil
15. Nil
16. Total enemy casualties: 1 KIA (BC)
17. Total Friendly casualties: Nil
18. Other points and Lessons Learnt: Possibly the enemy had slept fairly close to the platoon position without either of us knowing. At the time of contact (0625) he had only had at the most about twenty minutes of light sufficient to enable him to move as carefully as he had done along the track. The platoon subsequently followed the track where he had come from for four hundred metres and did not see any obvious signs of his movement at any stage.

/Lessons Learnt

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Lessons Learnt. Impacted footpads, such as these, although showing little sign of recent movement, could be regularly used by small groups who ensure that they do not leave any sign.

PART III

- 19. N/A
- 20. Support Fire Nil
- 21. N/A


PART III

- 22. Coy Commander's Comments: An economical action by a well briefed and disciplined platoon.

(R.J. Donkin)
2Lt
Pl Comd

(J.Doyle)
Maj
OC A Coy

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(D.N.KERR)
Maj
Ops Offr

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CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Report by: 4719949 2Lt R.B. Lewis 3RAR C Coy 9P1
2. Date/Time of contact: 201830H Jul 71 Grid Location: 585654
3. Duration of (i) Firefight: 30 mins (ii) Total: 60mins
4. Description of Contact: 9P1 was ordered to move into an AP in vic of contact area. At 1830 as P1 saddle up to move from RV into AP, three persons were observed approaching from NE. At first sight they appeared to be civilians carrying working tools, but at 25m range were confirmed as enemy as they were carrying weapons. Contact was initiated with M60 killing the first enemy. The second retaliated by firing an RPG into the perimeter slightly wounding 3 members of 9P1. The 2 remaining enemy split up and withdrew leaving their wpns and packs. The RPG was dropped in a Paddi and could not be located after later searching. Two sects were sent out (one in Northerly direction, one in North Easterly) to follow up. The enemy were still under fire from SA, grenades and M79s but managed to escape in both directions into the Jungle. C/S consolidated area and called in Dustoff for two members slightly wounded. Enemy KIA was dusted off next day.
5. Decription of Terrain: Terrain was open paddi surrounded by Bamboo and jungle. Visibility 100m in places. Low scrub provided limited cover. Paddi bunds also provided cover.
6. Who ~~first~~ saw enemy: Machine Gunner
7. Distance enemy first sighted: 60 metres
8. What caused enemy to be noticed: Movement and splashing
9. Strenghts: Enemy: 3 Own Troops: 29
10. Enemy Type: VC (1 Guerilla 2 D445)
11. Who fired first: Machine Gunner
12. Range of first engagement: 25 metres
13. Maximum range of engagement: 100 metres
14. Weapons Fired: Friendly: M60, M16, SLR, M79, Rifle Grenades.
Enemy: AK47, RPG2
15. Approx no of friendly rounds fired: M60- 200; M16- 200; SLR- 60; M79- 18; Grenades- 10.
16. Total enemy casualties: 1 KIA (BC)
17. Total friendly casualties: WIA - 3 (1 Remained on duty) (all minor frag wounds).
18. Other Points and Lessons Learnt: P1 was pulled into false sense of security by the presence of civilians and our contact with them throughout the day. No doubt en were taking advantage of this by moving into civ access at the same time as civilians were leaving paddi.

/ Part II

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2

PART II

19. NTF

20. Nil


21. Nil

PART III

22. Nil

(R. LEWIS)
2Lt
Pl Comd

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(D.N. KERR)
Maj
Ops Offr

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R569/71/8

HQ 3 RAR
Nui Dat
24 Aug 71

See Distribution List

3 RAR COMBAT OPERATIONS
AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATION INVERBRACKIE
060001 AUG 71 - 222400 AUG 71

- References: A. Map Series L8015, Sheet 6430-11-NW Xuyen Moc 1:50,000
B. Map Series L8015, Sheet 6430-11-NE Xuyen Moc 1:50,000
C. Map Series L8015, Sheet 6430-11-SE Xuyen Moc 1:50,000
D. Map Series L8015, Sheet 6430-11-SW Xuyen Moc 1:50,000

Name and Type of Operation

1. Operation INVERBRACKIE was a two phase battalion search and clear operation.

Location

2. The operation was conducted in the Xuyen Moc district AO for Phase 1 and then in AO GLENELG to the NORTH, EAST and SOUTH of XUYEN MOC for Phase 2. Patrolling from FSB ZIGGIE to the EAST was also carried out during Phase 1 of the Operation.

3. The operational area for phase 1 and 2 is shown at Annex A.

Controlling Headquarters

4. HQ 3 RAR deployed from NUI DAT to FSB ZIGGIE on 10 Aug 71 and returned to NUI DAT 22 Aug 71.

Task Organization

5. 3 RAR Group consisted of:
- a. 3 RAR (-)
 - b. HQ and 1 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt (9-11 Aug 71)
 - c. 3 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
 - d. Indep AMC Sect A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
 - e. One ACV A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
 - f. Sect A Fd Bty (FSB CENTENARY)
 - g. Sect A Fd Bty 15-23 Aug 71 (FSB ZIGGIE)
 - h. 2 Tp (-) 1 Fd Sqn
 - i. One ac 161 Recce Flt

...../2 Intelligence

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-2-

Intelligence

6. The operation was targeted primarily against the XUYEN MOC Guerilla units who were thought to be operating or preparing to operate close to XUYEN MOC village to cause maximum disruption to the Government agencies during the August and October elections.
7. It was also considered likely that elements of D445 could be preparing for operations in the area. Quite coincidentally, an agent report received on the eve of the operation suggested the presence of elements of D445 in the NORTH EASTERN area of the XUYEN MOC AO.
8. An intelligence summary for the operation is at Annex B.

Mission

9. The 3 RAR group mission in Phase 1 was to search the XUYEN MOC AO in co-ordination with XUYEN MOC District RF/PF and destroy elements of D445 and the XUYEN MOC Guerillas in the XUYEN MOC AO.
10. Phase 2 was to follow up with search and clear operations in depth to the NORTH, EAST, and SOUTH of XUYEN MOC.

Concept of Operations

11. Phase 1 In conjunction with the XUYEN MOC RF/PF, 3 RAR deployed forces around the entire XUYEN MOC AO on 10 Aug 71.
12. Four companies deployed from NUI DAT by APC and TCV into areas shown at Annex A. RF/PF deployed into an AO allotted them immediately NORTH EAST of XUYEN MOC. All companies (less C Company (-) at Ziggy) were in position by 1200 hrs 10 Aug. A Sqn escorted the A Bty convoy to establish FSB CENTENARY vic 6569 and moved to occupy a blocking position along Route 329 to the NORTH EAST of XUYEN MOC. All companies commenced sweep as shown at Annex A.
13. HQ 3 RAR redeployed by air to FSB ZIGGY AM 10 Aug 71.
14. Phase 2 Companies continued to search to the NORTH and NORTH EAST of XUYEN MOC AO with 3 Tp and C Company (-) remaining along Route 329 to the EAST in a blocking role.
15. Upon reaching the Northern limit of 79 Northing, two companies were extracted by air to NUI DAT, the remaining companies deploying, one EAST of XUYEN MOC searching SOUTH, and the other on the coast line SOUTH of XUYEN MOC searching to the NORTH EAST. 3 Tp occupied ambush positions EAST of XUYEN MOC.

Execution

16. The sequence of events is at Annex C and After Action Reports at Annex D.

Results

17. Results are summarized in Annex E.

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
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Lessons Learnt

18. In a combined Aust/RF/PF operation, security can be maintained providing the co-operation of the SVN Commander is obtained and orders to his troops given at the last moment. In this case the outline plan was arranged between CO 3 RAR and District Chief XUYEN MOC on D-2 and although an order for operations was given to the RF/PF forces the actual plan was not issued until the night before. The two contacts made during the operation showed security had been maintained.

19. Even though a Rebroadcast Set was established within the AO concerned, communications were difficult to the Bn CP at ZIGGIE. Rebroadcast should only be used as a last resort. In this case the FSB at ZIGGIE was still required for general operations in that part of the Province but its location was a hinderance to Phase 1 of the operation.

20. Surprise was achieved by the rapid deployment of the Battalion in APCs and TCVs. This may not have been so had helicopters been used.


(F.P. SCOTT)
Lt Col
CO


- Annexes:
- A. Trace OP INVERBRACKIE Phase 1 and 2.
 - B. Intelligence Summary.
 - C. OP INVERBRACKIE Sequence of Events.
 - D. Contact After Action Reports.
 - E. OP INVERBRACKIE Results.

<u>Distribution:</u>	<u>Copy No</u>
A Coy	1
B Coy	2
C Coy	3
D Coy	4
Sp Coy	5
Admin Coy	6
HQ 1 ATF	7-20
C Sqn 1 Armd Regt	21
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt	22
12 Fd Regt	23
1 Fd Sqn	24
4 RAR	25
9 RAR	26
HQ C Comd	27
D Inf CANBERRA	28
CO	29
Ops Offr	30
BC	31
Comds Diary	32-34
Spare	35-39
File	40

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
OP INVERBRACKIE PHASE I

Ref Map 1:50000
6430 II XUYEN MOC



A 3Cav
8 C/3
1H 3 A/3Cav

10 Aug 71



56

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ANNEX B TO
3 RAR AFTER ACTION REPORT
OP INVERBRACKIE
DATED 24 AUG 71

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

General

1. The operation was conducted in conjunction with the XUYEN MOC RF/PF Troops to clear the XUYEN MOC AO of elements of the XUYEN MOC Guerillas.
2. The presence of the XUYEN MOC Guerillas in the SOUTH WEST of the XUYEN MOC AO was confirmed by the contacts Sp Coy 3 RAR had in late July.
3. It was also believed that the XUYEN MOC Guerillas were responsible for ambushing of RDC members on 9 Aug 71.

Intelligence available prior to the Operation

4. There was very little hard intelligence available. The following National Police reports had been received.
 - a. A base camp used by the XUYEN MOC Guerillas was located in the vicinity of YS650638.
 - b. Movement of small groups from SOUTH to NORTH had taken place to the WEST of XUYEN MOC.
 - c. A tax collection point had been operating on Route 329 to the NORTH of XUYEN MOC.
5. There was also a reliable report that elements of D445 were in the NORTH EASTERN corner of the XUYEN MOC AO.

Enemy Units Contacted

D445 Bn (LF)

6. Elements of D445 were contacted of YS655713 by B Coy 3 RAR on 10 Aug 71. The enemy was occupying a small bunker system only a couple of hundred metres from areas normally cultivated by civilians.
7. The reason for their presence is not clear, however it is probably tied in with the coming elections. The XUYEN MOC area is also the easiest area for D445 to receive supplies.
8. It is believed that the group contacted was C3 D445 but no conclusive identification could be made.
9. A Hoi Chanh who surrendered to FSB CENTENARY on 10 Aug stated that C2 and C3 of D445 were in the XUYEN MOC area.
10. No further contact was made with D445, however a reliable source placed elements of D445 in the vicinity of YS6777. A thorough search of that area was conducted with negative results.

/2....11.

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Xuyen Moc District Guerillas

11. At YS 662652 on 12 Aug 71 8 Pl C Coy contacted a group of enemy in a small bunker system. No initial identification could be made but a National Police report received later stated that the F & E Section of XUYEN MOC plus the PHUOC BUU Guerillas were involved. The report also stated that 3 of the group were WIA.

12. Anti-tank Pl contacted 1VC at YS628800 on 18 Aug. No identification could be made although it is possible he was a member of some part of XUYEN MOC guerillas it is most likely that he was an illegal resident.

Conclusion

13. There has been evidence that most sub-units of D445 have been operating around XUYEN MOC over the past month. The reason for this presence is not clear and it can only be assumed that their intentions are to disrupt the coming elections.

14. It may be that XUYEN MOC Guerillas and the XUYEN MOC area are now a major source of resupply for D445 rather than its traditional resupply areas in LONG DAT District. This fact plus the fact the F & E section and PHUOC BUU Guerillas were armed with B 40's tends to substantiate the Hoi Chanh's claim that LONG DAT District and the XUYEN MOC District have combined.

OP INVERBRACKIE

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Event</u>
<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>
1	100001	<p><u>OP INVERBRACKIE commenced. 3RAR Gp consisted of:</u></p> <p>a. Remaining under comd Det 104 Sig Sqn</p> <p>b. Under op con A Sqn (-) gp 3 Cav Regt Indep AMC Sect (3 M125A1) one ACV</p> <p>c. In DS Sect A Fd Bty</p> <p>d. In sp 2 Tp (-) 1 Fd Sqn</p>
2	100600	<p>3RAR Gp deployed to the XUYEN MOC AO as shown in ANNEX A. Tasks on arrival at XUYEN MOC also shown in ANNEX A.</p> <p>a. HQ 3RAR opened at FSB ZIGGIE at 100600H.</p> <p>b. B Coy mtd in 3 Tp A Sqn departed NUI DAT at 0630 escorting Sect A Fd Bty to FSB CENTENARY, then deployed to YS6670.</p> <p>c. Sect A Fd Bty with 3RAR AMC mtd mortar sect deployed to FSB CENTENARY by road YS6569 leaving NUI DAT at 0630.</p> <p>d. D Coy mtd in 1 Tp A Sqn in 1 Tp A Sqn departed NUI DAT at 0645 and deployed to YS6169.</p> <p>e. A Coy mtd in TCVs deployed at 0700 to YS6164.</p> <p>f. Sp Coy (-) mtd in TCVs deployed at 0745 to YS6365.</p> <p>g. A Sqn HQ deployed to vic YS6168. 8Pl C Coy flew from ZIGGIE and came under op con A Sqn. A Sqn with 1 Tp and 8Pl commenced deployment by Routes 328/23/329 to an area NORTH of the XUYEN MOC AO.</p> <p>h. Bn HQ Pl deployed by air from NUI DAT to ZIGGIE at 0900.</p> <p>i. 3 Tp A Sqn deployed EAST of XUYEN MOC after dropping B Coy.</p> <p>j. HQ C Coy and 7Pl remained at ZIGGIE, 9Pl remained under op con of the LCT.</p>
3	101055	<p>At YS6571 a scout of 6Pl B Coy engaged a group of 6 enemy on a track. A heavy fire fight developed, the enemy returning fire with AK47s, M79, grenades and machine guns. The remainder of B Coy moved to support 6Pl and gunships, artillery and mortars supported the contact. HQ A Sqn and 1 Tp were recalled down Route 329 and moving in from the SOUTH swept the contact area. 6 bunkers were found and some live and expended ammunition. Produce and equipment indicated approx 10 men equipped with an M60, M16s, AK47s, RPG 7s, M79s claymores an ANPRC 25 set. Although no positive identification could be made it was strongly suspected that the enemy was D445 rather than local guerillas. A Sqn HQ, 8Pl and 1 Tp moved to night locations vic YS6977 - 7076.</p>

(a)	(b)	(c)
4	101230	3Tp located an E - W track used by 2- 3 pers within the last hour at YS7170.
5	101400	11Pl D Coy found 3 bunkers in a triangluar pattern at YS6370. System had been renovated and used about one week ago.
6	101830	One VC local guerilla surrendered to FSB CENTENARY at 1830 and was evacuated to 1ATF. Later at 2134, movement was reported, a claymore was reported to be interfered with on the perimeter.

DAY 2 - 11 AUG

7	110600	Detailed search of XUYEN MOC AO continued.
8	111120	A Coy ordered not to search EAST of the 645E in their allotted AO and to search the NUI KHO area 64- 66E and 61- 64N. Sqn HQ A Sqn and 1 Tp A Sqn were released to return to NUI DAT. 8Pl C Coy moved by A Sqn to search A Coys original AO EAST of the 645E commencing 1340.

DAY 3 - 12 AUG

9	120700	B Coy ordered to move to search area bounded by 6173- 6073- 6679- 6877- 6473. D Coy order to move to search 6776- 7176- 7173- 6473. 3 Tp continued mobile role EAST of XUYEN MOC.
10	1215000	8 Pl C Coy contacted 6- 8 VC at YS662652. Contact was enemy initiated from 15 metres with AK47, RPG and possibly M60. 3 Aust were wounded and one 3PMG knocked out. Gunships and artillery supported the platoon and 3 Tp A Sqn was reacted to their assistance via XUYEN MOC. Contact was broken at 1640 and casualties evacuated at 1800. On arrival 3 Tp A Sqn took 8Pl under op con. A search of the area revealed two T shaped pits, 150 lbs com, food prepared for cooking, 6 smoke grenades and a firing device and lead.

11	122213	<p><u>Dispositions 3RAR Gp</u></p> <p>a. <u>FSB ZIGGIE</u> - HQ 3RAR, HQ C Coy, 7Pl, Sect Mor Pl</p> <p>b. <u>FSB CENTENARY</u>- Sect A Fd Bty, AMC Mtd Mor Sect, 3RAR retrans ACV, Sect APCs op con to A Bty.</p> <p>c. <u>A Coy</u> - HQ, 2Pl- 6562; 1Pl- 6561; 3Pl- 6461.</p> <p>d. <u>B Coy</u> - HQ, 4Pl- 6572; 5Pl- 6674; 6Pl- 6473.</p> <p>e. <u>D Coy</u> - HQ, 11Pl- 6274; 10Pl- 6373; 12Pl- 6274.</p> <p>f. <u>Sp Coy</u> - HQ, A TK Pl- 6268; Pnr Pl- 6269.</p> <p>g. <u>3 Tp</u> - HQ 3Tp, 1 Sect, 2Sect, 8Pl C Coy-6665; 3Sect 3 Tp- 7065.</p>
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DAY 4 - 13 AUG

12	131100	Sp Coy was extracted by UH1H to NUI DAT on completion of its search of its AO.
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(a)	(b)	(c)
13	131930	During the day A Coy searched NORTH EAST from the NUI KHOs along the line of the SONG HOA towards 8 Pls contact. 3Tp returned to APs SOUTH EAST of XUYEN MOC.
<u>DAY 5 - 14 AUG</u>		
14	140700	<p>Following indications of elements of D445 vicinity YS6777 3RAR gp redeployed:</p> <p>a. <u>0700.</u> D Coy received resupply and commenced searching NORTH-EAST from vicinity YS6475.</p> <p>b. <u>0830.</u> A Coy commenced moving by UH1H from PZ vic YS6564 to an LZ YS7079 to search SOUTH WEST.</p> <p>c. <u>0900.</u> B Coy resupplied and moved to block from SOUTH-EAST.</p> <p>d. <u>1200.</u> 3 Tp A Sqn and 8 Pl concentrated at FSB CENTENARY.</p> <p>e. <u>1300.</u> HQ C Coy and 7Pl moved by UH1H to CENTENARY to join 8Pl and 3 Tp. C Coy with 3 Tp under op con moved to blocking positions along Route 329. AMC mor sect deployed from CENTENARY with C Coy.</p> <p>f. <u>1430.</u> On departure C Coy, RSM assumed comd of FSB for local def. D & E Pl moved by air to the FSB with elms of Admin Coy.</p>
<u>DAY 6 - 15 AUG</u>		
15	150700	B Coy commenced sweep to the NORTH WEST with A Coy in a blocking role to the NORTH EAST and D Coy blocking to the SOUTH WEST.
<u>DAY 7 - 16 AUG</u>		
16	160700	B Coy continued sweep to the NORTH WEST finding no sign of recent movement. A Coy and D Coy moved closer to the search company to tighten the blocking positions. C Coy remained deployed in ambush position along route 329.
17	161300	Warning Orders were given to A and D Coy to prepare to search NORTH WEST along the axis of the Suoi Day and Suoi Lao respectively on completion of B Coy search of initial target area.
18	161700	A and D Coys were both advised that they would be extracted AM 18 Aug 71.

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ANNEX C

(a)	(b)	(c)
<u>DAY 8 - 17 AUG</u>		
19	171200	Warning Order sent to all callsigns for activities on 18 Aug detailing A and D Coys extractions, B and C Coy, and Sect Mors maintdems, and redeployment to the south for B and C Coy by TA3.
20	171700	Search of target area completed with no enemy sign being located. 3 Tp married up with D Coy 650787. A Coy at LZ 654797. B Coy centre of mass 660790. C Coy remained along Route 329 in AP.
<u>DAY 9 - 18 AUG</u>		
21	180800	A Coy extracted by UHIH to FSB Ziggie.
22	180900	D Coy extracted by UHIH to FSB Ziggie.
23	180900	Sp Coy arrived Ziggie by CH 47 after standdown.
24	180920- 1100	A Coy, D Coy, D & E Pl and Admin elms returned from Ziggie to Nui Dat by CH 47.
25	181000	3 Tp married up with B Coy vic 655776 and returned to 80A loc.
26	181200	B Coy, C Coy, 3 Tp, Sect Mors concentrated at 686762 to receive maintdem by CH 47
27	181200	Atk Pl departed Ziggie on patrol task to East. Expected duration 2 days.
28	181330	Sect Mors, AMCs commenced mov independently from 6876 via Xuyen Moc and Route 327 to Ziggie. On arrival AMCs to be on ready reaction task with Aslt Pnr Pl to support Atk Pl if necessary.
29	181520	At 628800 Atk Pl engaged one enemy dressed in black. Enemy was in small rest camp and fled SE. Nil results. Enemy thought to be yam digging. Not seen to be armed.
30	181630	3 Tp redeployed B Coy to vic 6873. B Coy to commence sweep to SSE on 19 Aug.

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(a)	(b)	(c)
31	181700	3 Tp commenced return journey to vic C Coy loc. APC threw track 900 metres west of B Coy drop off point.
32	181730- 2200	3 Tp carried out sufficient repairs to enable recovery of APC to 6670 where 3 Tp established NDP. (US vehicle to be recovered to FSB Centenary at first lt 19 Aug).
33	181900	3 RAR group were deployed as follows: A Coy Nui Dat B Coy vic 6873 C Coy (-) Vic 6876 9 Pl NDP Vivian D Coy Nui Dat Sp Coy(-) Ziggie Atk Pl 6279 3 Tp 6670 (as at 2200 hrs)
34	181900	
<u>DAY 10 - 19 AUG</u>		
35	190800 -1800	B Coy commenced sweep South and East along axis Suoi Soc and Suoi Da.
	190800	C Coy with 3 Tp deployed from 6876 via Xuyen Moc, Route 23 and 7163 to vic Sandy Point vic 6758. 3 sect 3 Tp secured an LZ on the beach vic 6959, for fly in or 9 Pl C Coy.
37	191130	9 Pl C Coy reverted from under op con LCT to fly by UHIH from NDP Vivian to LZ at 6959. On arrival married up with remainder C Coy.
38	191200	C Coy commenced search of area centre of mass 6660 with 7 Pl to the West, 8 Pl to the East and 9 Pl with CHQ.
39	191200 -2000	3 Tp despatched one callsign to Centenary to complete repairs. (One APC left at that location 18 Aug.) Further mechanical trouble prevented 3 Tp (-) from returning to allotted AO until 2000 hrs when 3 Tp (-) formed an NDP vic 7066.

(a) (b)

(c)

DAY 11 - 20 AUG

40 200800
-1800 B Coy continued search to East of Xuyen Moc in a Southerly direction. C Coy continued to search North East vic 6761. 3 Tp remained in APs with sections vic 7061 and 7065. A and D Coy remained at Nui Dat.

41 201400 7 Pl C Coy found old cache at YS666616 containing large fishing net, 2 doz sandbags and some plastic sheeting.

42 201600 B and C Coy and Bn HQ warned that extraction to Nui Dat would be 24 hrs earlier commencing about 220800 Aug 71.

DAY 12 - 21 AUG

43 210800
-1800 B Coy continued sweep South with no contact. C Coy continued sweep changing axis to South East. 3 Tp continued in AP.

44 211600 Details advised to Coys of extraction 22 Aug. C Coy to extract by UHIH from vic 6960 at 220900. B Coy to extract by APC ASAP 22 Aug (to be West of Song Rai by 220830). 3 Tp return to Nui Dat with B Coy. Sect AMCs at Ziggy to mov to Nui Dat commencing 220700 with Pnr Sect as protection.

DAY 13 - 22 AUG

45. 220700
-1000 B Coy extracted by 3 Tp via Route 23/Dat Do.

46. 220900
1000 C Coy extracted by UHIH to Nui Dat.

47. 221300 Bn HQ Pl extracted from Ziggy by CH 47

48. 221430 RTA Conference held at HQ 3 RAR Nui Dat.

49. 221600 All Coys less Sp Coy at Nui Dat. Sp Coy HQ, Pnr Pl, Atk Pl remain at Ziggy demolishing area.

50. 222400 OP INVERBRACKIE concluded.

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ANNEX D TO
3 RAR AFTER ACTION REPORT
OP INVERBRACKIE
DATED 24 AUG 71

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORTS

Contact After Action Reports for Op INVERBRACKIE are attached as follows:

- a. B Coy contact 10 Aug 71 - Appendix 1
- b. 8 Pl contact 12 Aug 71 - Appendix 2
- c. Atk Pl contact 18 Aug 71 - Appendix 3

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX D TO
3 RAR AFTER ACTION REPORT
OP INVERBRACKIE
DATED 24 AUG 71

B COY 3 RAR
CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATION INVERBRACKIE
10 AUG 71

PART 1

1. Report by 335151 Maj I.J. Cahill.
B Coy 3 RAR
2. 101100H Aug 71 Grid YS 655713
3. Firefight 195 mins
Total 235 mins
4. a. 6 Pl B Coy had moved approximately 420 metres from an APC drop off point into the platoon area. The leading element of 6 Pl was approximately 120 metres from a small creek (unmarked on map) when the scout located a foot pad running in the general direction of the platoon movement. The scout passed this information to his Section Commander who in turn called his Pl Comd forward. The scout and Section Comd moved cautiously along the track as the Pl Comd moved forward.

b. The scout sighted 2 en 40 metres to his front and this information was passed to the Pl Comd who gave the order to halt. The scout and Section Comd continued to move forward to cover. However, the scout was seen by another group of en who were not initially detected. The scout and Sect Comd were forced to initiate contact with long bursts from their M16's. They then reported the sighting of up to 12 en in 2 groups; one of 4 on the left and one of 7 on the right.

c. Once the Pl had initiated contact the en returned the fire from at least 5 different locations. The Pl Comd considered the heavy en fire prevented further movement forward and he spread the Pl front enabling him to bring a heavy weight of fire to bear on the enemy. Arty was called for and mortars employed in depth.

d. As the firefight continued the en employed RPG 2 and RPG 7, AK 47, M 1 Carbine, grenades and M 79 firing high trajectory. Few of the grenades or M 79 rounds detonated. The en continued to fight aggressively and Aust Bushranger aircraft were called to suppress the area. A marker balloon had been erected 40 metres to the rear of the Pl position and the gunsnips began live passes a short time after arriving. Arty and gunships support was co-ordinated and both continued simultaneously. Gunship support was facilitated by the balloon marker and by the artillery indicating fall of shot when required by using one gun WP.

/2....e.

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2.

4. e. The platoon had consolidated its position and continued to return the en fire however at a reduced rate as ammunition was running short. Whilst the fight was developing CHQ and 4 Pl were moving rapidly to the contact area. When they arrived they quickly linked in with 6 Pl on the SW and NE flanks and began passing ammunition forward. A gun was required and this was taken forward to 6 Pl HQ for redistribution.
- f. During this time the Pl Comd was informed that 2 members of the lead section were caught away from the Pl and were under fire. The rear section was moved up on the left and the Pl front broadened once again. The 2 members were told that on the next pass of the Bushranger aircraft the platoon would engage the enemy position with maximum fire and they were to return to the Pl position. This was completed with no injuries and without incident.
- g. Shortly after 4 Pl and CHQ arrived a small group of enemy made an abortive attempt to outflank 6 Pl on the WESTERN side. The en were sighted and fire directed upon them forcing them to return to the bunker complex.
- h. CO 3 RAR was airborne and was directing 1 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and Sqn HQ A Sqn 3 Cav Regt to the contact area. They moved from the SOUTH around the western flank of 6 Pl and swept EAST into the bunker system under direction of B Coy. They did not sight any enemy and could have destroyed sign of enemy withdrawal routes. At this time 5 Pl was deployed in a blocking position further to the EAST and was not brought in because it would have masked air/arty sp fire.
- i. Once the Cavalry had secured the area of the bunkers and CHQ/4 Pl moved forward and conducted the sweep. Once they were in position around the bunker complex 6 Pl moved in and the area was secured.

5. Terrain and Canopy

Canopy approx 60-70' not really thick in contact area but much thicker over the bunker system. Undergrowth 6-8 ft high with few large trees mainly saplings 4-6" diam. Area was approx 140m from creek which was flowing strongly but was not marked on map.

6. Who First Saw Enemy

Scout and Section Commander.

7. Distance Enemy First Sighted

40 metres

8. What Caused Enemy to be Noticed

Movement

9. Strength Enemy - 13-15
Our Troops - 25

/3....10

3.

10. Enemy Type - unknown probably D445 LF Bn.
11. Who Fired First
Scout and Section Commander.
12. Range of Engagement
30 metres
13. Maximum Range of Engagement
30 metres
14. Weapons Fired
Friendly - M60, SLR, M16, M79, M26.
Enemy - AK 47, M1, M16, M60 or RPD, RPG 2/7 M79 Grenades (Concussion)
15. Approx No of Friendly Rounds Fired
M60 2400 M16 1300 SLR 800, M79 50, M26 24, Smoke Grenades 24.
16. Total Enemy Casualties
Unknown
17. Friendly Casualties
Nil
18. Other Points & Lessons Learnt
The enemy fought aggressively particularly after the gunship had made their pass and were returning to their start point.

PART II

19. N/A
20. Sp Fire Arty
 Mortar
 Gunships
21. Sp Fire Ammunition Expended Arty: 375 HE; 15 WP
 Mortar: 50 HE
 Gunship: Minigun 38,200; M60 12,350;
 2.75 HE Rockets 56

/4....Part III

4.

PART III

22. Coy Comd's Comments

a. The quick assessment of the situation, and swift deployment of the platoon to meet it, undoubtedly ensured that no casualties were taken by our troops and allowed maximum weight of fire power to be brought immediately onto the enemy position. Lt O'Connell's initial actions set the scene for the company battle which subsequently developed and played a major part in ensuring that the enemy were forced out of their bunker system leaving behind the equipment found.

b. Initial clearances for artillery took longer than normal as the action took place in civil access close to populated areas. However, the requirements of the Rules of Engagement were met and effective co-ordinated and continuous fire support was employed against the enemy without danger to civil populace.

(I.J. CAHILL)
Maj
OC B Coy

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY



(D.N. KERR)
Maj
Ops Offr

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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX D TO
3 RAR AFTER ACTION REPORT
OP INVERBRACKIE
DATED 24 AUG 71

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT
8 PL C COY 12 JUL 71

1. Report by: 235345 Lt P.E. Green
3 RAR C Coy 8 Pl.
2. Date/Time of Contact 121500H Aug 71.
Grid YS661652
3. Duration of (1) Firefight 150 Mins
(2) Total 225 Mins
4.
 - a. 8 Pl's task was to clear along the SONG HOA from 673671 100 metres from the river then move to 650664 on Route 23.
 - b. At 121430 Aug 71 believing 8 Pl had completed the distance along the SONG HOA the Pl turned onto a bearing of 6000 mils.
 - c. 8 Pl crossed a clearing (200m x 75m) and entered thick secondary jungle.
 - d. Approx 50m into the jungle the enemy opened up with a long (20-30rd) burst of light automatic fire directed at the fwd scout.
 - e. The fwd section immediately carried out a contact drill and the remainder of the Pl closed up in all round defence.
 - f. During the contact drill the enemy opened fire with a heavier machine gun (2-3 bursts of 100 rds) and threw what appeared to be a grenade.
 - g. The Pl then began fire and movement forward when the left hand machine gun was hit with an RPG 2.
 - h. At this time the right hand machine sighted the bunker from which the RPG had been fired, and engaged with SA & MG fire.
 - i. Sect Comd, fwd scout and machine gunner all wounded by first RPG - two (Sect Comd & fwd scout) both unconscious and 10m in front of Pl.
 - j. En bunker engaged with M79.
 - k. En then appeared to move around both flanks of Pl and Pl received fire from SE and SW including RPG from SW.
 - l. Fire also continued to come from bunker position including one further RPG fired towards area where the balloon was being inflated to mark the Platoon's position.
 - m. Pl continued to fire on en position and en position also engaged with arty and bushranger.

/2....n.

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- 4. n. Pl continued to receive sporadic SA fire from bunker position until 121730 when the en fired a long (100 rd) burst from MMG and then no more fire was received.
- o. Pl then pulled back to clearing and joined up with TA3.
- 5. a. Terrain in area of bunkers was flat with the SONG HOA 100m E and a large track running N-S 50m W of system.
- b. Vegetation consisted of very thick undergrowth (mainly thorn bushes) with only a few tall trees.
- c. Canopy was thick and 20-30 ft high.
- d. Visibility in the contact was 5-10m.
- 6. Machine gunner first saw enemy.
- 7. Enemy sighted at 15m distance.
- 8. Enemy fired burst automatic fire.
- 9. Strengths: En - 5-6 plus
 Own - 27
- 10. Enemy type: Local guerillas
- 11. Enemy fired first - fire returned by fwd scout.
- 12. Range of first engagement - 10-15m.
- 13. Max range of engagement - 20m.
- 14. Wpns fired: Friendly M60, SLR, M16, M79.
 Enemy AK47 (at least 3) Machine (possibly M60 - similar sound) RPG 2, Grenade.
- 15. Rounds fired M60: 800
 M16: 400
 SLR: 360
 M79 5 (HE)
 3 (Cannister)
- 16. Unknown
- 17. Friendly casualties WIA 3
Weapon causing casualties: RPG 2.
- 18. Nil

/3.... Part II 19.

PART II

19. a. Pl experienced trouble with M60's. During contact one machine gun would not feed at all and second MG ceased to feed after approx 600 rds. Both MGs worked prior to ops.
- b. The majority of en SA fire was about 2-4 ft above ground level and often appeared even higher.
- c. The en appeared to fire on Bushranger several times.
- d. En tended to direct majority of SA fire in direction of voices.
20. Support fire employed: a. Artillery.
b. Gunships.
21. Sp fire ammo expended: Arty 150 rds
Gunships: M60 - 1650; Mini Gun 6100;
2.75 Rocket HE 42

(P.E. GREEN)
Lt
Pl Comd

Other Comment

Subsequent VN agent reports identified F & E Section XUYEN MOC Guerillas and PHUCC BUU Guerillas. 3 enemy were reported wounded by agent report.

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APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX D TO
3 PAR AFTER ACTION REPORT
OF INVERBRACKIE
DATED 24 AUG 71

CONTACT AFTER ACTION REPORT

PART 1

1. Report by: 175012 2lt P.J. Challands Atk Pl Sp Coy 3 RAR.
2. Date/Time and Location of Contact 1515 hrs 18 Aug 71, at YS 628800.
3. Duration of firefight: 15 seconds
Duration of contact activity: 10 minutes

4. Description of Contact

The platoon was following the bank of a creek, on the southern side. The lead scout and Section Commander started to move up an embankment away from the creek, when the scout spotted a bush table and sleeping space at the top of the embankment. He turned to indicate the table and bed space to the Sect Comd. The Sect Comd looked in the direction indicated, and saw one enemy who dropped into a crouch and began to move rapidly away. The person was engaged by the scout, Sect Comd and MG and a sweep was conducted with nil results.

5. Description of Terrain

The platoon was moving East, on its left (Northern) flank, in heavy rain. Visability was good to about 40 metres across the creek. On the right (Southern) flank was an embankment about 10 feet high, rising at the point of contact to about 20 feet. The vegetation on the embankment and beyond permitted visability to about 20 metres. About 50 metres to the East of the contact side was a large clearing.

6. The first person to see the enemy was the Section Commander.
7. The range of sighting was about 30 metres.
8. The enemy's movement drew the patrols' attention to him.
9. There was only one enemy seen. The patrol strength was 24.
10. The enemy's identification was unknown.
11. The first person to engage was the Section Commander.
12. The range of initial engagement was about 30 metres.
13. The maximum range of engagement was about 35 metres.
14. Two M16's and one M60 were fired.
15. The two M16's fired 40 rounds and the gun fired 20 rounds.
16. Enemy casualties were nil.
17. Friendly casualties were nil.

/2....18.

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18. Lessons Learnt

There was some initial confusion as to the accurate location of the enemy, as the leading elements of the platoon had changed direction to some extent to negotiate the embankment, and their indication of direction, which was relative to direction of movement was confusing to the Commander.

The confusion inhibited the initial reaction of the platoon and it is apparent that in the absence of returned fire, the first priority for a commander in a contact is to accurately locate the direction of the enemy.

19. Nil.

20. Mortars were employed on the withdrawal route.

21. Mor 24 x 81mm HE.

22. Nil.

P. J. Challands

(P.J. CHALLANDS)

21t

Pl Comd

G. L. Morgan

(G.L. MORGAN)

Maj

Coy Comd

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ANNEX E TO
3 RAR AFTER ACTION REPORT
OP INVERBRACKIE
DATED 24 AUG 71

OP INVERBRACKIE RESULTS

1. Ammunition and Explosives

RPG 7 rounds	3
AK 47 rounds	100
7.62mm rounds (long)	40
7.62mm link	20
Grenades (smoke)	6
Claymore and firing device	1

2. Equipment
 - a. Magazines

AK 47	1
-------	---

 - b. Web Equipment

Webbing (miscellaneous) Qty

 - c. Military Items

25 set aerial	1
25 set batteries	25
Sandbags	36
Water bottles	2

 - d. Clothing Items

Clothing (assorted)	Qty
Ho Chi Minh Sandals (pr)	4
Shirts (green)	3
Trousers	2

 - e. Miscellaneous

Scissors	1
Bottoms D Cell Batteries	20
Game of Chinese Checkers	1
Electrical Wire	30 ft
D Cell Batteries (1.5V)	10
Bottle of petrol	1
Bicycle frame	1
Fishing net	1

3. Food

Rice (lbs)	10
Fish (lbs)	10
Edible roots	5
Corn (lbs)	150
Monkeys (prepared for cooking)	2
Fish	1

/2....3-

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4.

Medical Supplies

ANNEX E


Assorted drugs (phials)	30
Syringes	2
Plaster of Paris (lbs)	3
Elastoplast (roll)	1
Bandages	2



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Annex A


OP INVERBRACKIE PHASE II


Ref Maps 1:50000
6430 II XUYEN MOC
6429 I DAT DO

A  3
14 Aug 71


3  A/3Cav
C  3 } 14 Aug 71


D  3
14 Aug 71

B  3
14 Aug 7

B  3
18 Aug 71


FSB CENTENARY

3  A/3Cav
20 Aug 71

C  3
19 Aug 71

