

**Series: AWM95**  
**Australian Army commanders' diaries**  
**[Vietnam]**

**Signals units**

**Item number: 6/2/6**

**Item: 104 Signal Squadron**

**Narrative**

**Annex**

**[1-30 Sep 1967]**



## COVERING LETTER

Reference No. R707-1-1

To: OIC, Military History Section, AHQ.

1. I enclose Commanders Diary (AF C 2118) (Adapted) as indicated at Part 2.

2. Please return receipt below.

(Signature)

Capt.

2 IC 104 Sig Sqn

Appointment

(OC Unit or senior staff officer)

**SECRET**ORIGINAL  
~~DUPLICATE~~Strike out where  
not applicable**COMMANDERS DIARY**

OF

Unit or Formation 104 Sig Sqn

From 1 Sep 67 To 30 Sep 67

**INDEX**

Narrative (AF C 2118)

## ANNEXES

- \* A Duty officer's log
- \* B Messages connected with log
- C Operation orders and instructions issued
- D Operation orders and instructions received
- \* E Sitreps issued
- F Orders of battle and location reports issued
- G Intelligence reports and summaries issued; appreciations made
- H Administrative orders and instructions issued
- I Administrative orders and instructions received
- J Administrative reports and bulletins; ammunition returns; field strength returns
- \* K Standing orders issued
- L Commander's policy and demi-official letters
- M Action reports (if required)
- N Other papers, eg, maps and diagrams, air photos, reports from sub units
- O Periodical summaries of operations
- Z Top Secret Supplementary Diary

\* Only to be included during operations.  
† Cross out whichever is not applicable.

## Enclosure Numbers

N/A	to	.....
N/A	to	.....
1	to	.....
N/A	to	.....
N/A	to	.....
N/A	to	.....
N/A	to	.....
N/A	to	.....
N/A	to	.....
N/A	to	.....
N/A	to	.....
2	to	.....
N/A	to	.....
3	to	4
N/A	to	.....

† NIK  
† RETAINED  
† Despatched to

on N/A



## PART 3

# COMMANDERS DIARIES INSTRUCTIONS

### AIM

1. The aim of a Commanders Diary is to provide data on which to base future improvements in Army training, equipment, organization and administration, and to furnish historians with a record of the activities of units and formations in operational and non-operational periods in peace and in war.

### GENERAL

2. Entries are to be made daily on AF C 2118 (Adapted) each entry being initialled by the officer detailed to keep it.
3. Commanders Diaries will conform with the rules for drafting orders given in "Staff Duties (Australia)", Chapter 2, Section 12.

### RESPONSIBILITY

#### During Non-operational Periods

4. A Commanders Diary is to be compiled by commanders of all formations.

#### During Operational Periods (1)

5. A Commanders Diary is to be compiled in duplicate by:
  - a. Commanders of all formations.
  - b. Each branch of the staff at formation headquarters commanded by a brigadier or above.
  - c. Heads of services not below the rank of lieutenant colonel.
  - d. Personal staffs and officers holding special appointments.
  - e. Unit commanders.
  - f. Commanders of a detachment of a unit when so ordered.

### COMPILATION

6. Both original and duplicate copies are to consist of:
  - a. Cover (AF C 2119) (Adapted).
  - b. Index as printed on cover.
  - c. Narrative (AF C 2118) (Adapted).
  - d. Annexes as shown in the Index.
7. All details of the unit or formation (if a detachment is concerned, the name of the parent unit), period covered and enclosure numbers of the annexes are to be shown on the cover. If there has been a change of command since the last report, the date of assumption by the new commanding officer is to be included.
8. The annexes are to be assembled in the groups shown on the cover. If there are no enclosures for an annex NIL will be entered on the cover. If additional annexes are convenient for a particular headquarters, starting at B.

g for operations form Annex "Z", "TOP SECRET"; the document. It is to be prepared and disposed of as

### INTENTS

nes as well as map references), establishment, equipment and orders given. the day's fighting, including company movements. mmander with regard to equipment, tactics, organization

potential importance. o officers, men and equipment. pment captured. employed in the time not accounted for. The type of

and to save work as much information as possible is to uments issued and received, routine returns, etc. All and the time of receipt or despatch is to be given.

he annexes, but need not give a precis of any of them.

(continued on back cover)



# COMMA DISPOSAL DIARIES

13. **Original Commander's Diary.** This is to be forwarded monthly, unless otherwise ordered by the seventh day of the succeeding month direct to AHQ.

14. **Duplicate Commander's Diary.** This must be clearly marked as a duplicate. It is to be sent separately from the original to AHQ one month after the original has been despatched but not before the former has been acknowledged.

15. When overseas, both copies of diaries are to be sent through the Army Records organization in the overseas theatre but at different times.

16. **TOP SECRET Supplementary Diaries.**

a. The documents referred to in Paragraph 9 together with a list of them made out on AF C 2118 (Adapted) must be placed in separate cover (AF C 2119) (Adapted). All details must be filled in and the cover clearly marked in red: "ANNEX Z — OFFICER ONLY". It may be convenient to group the papers by appendices.

b. Supplementary diaries must be forwarded under the normal rules for TOP SECRET correspondence, to AHQ. The inner envelope must be plainly marked:

TOP SECRET

ANNEX Z to

Commanders Diary of.....(Formation or Unit)

From.....to..... (Dates)

c. The duplicate supplementary diaries must be despatched as shown in Paragraph 14 as soon as receipt of the original has been acknowledged.

## COMPILATION

Both original and duplicate copies are to consist of:

- Cover (AF C 2119) (Adapted).
- Index as printed on cover.
- Narrative (AF C 2118) (Adapted).
- Annexes as shown in the index.

7. All details of the unit or formation (if a detachment is concerned, the name of the parent unit), period covered and enclosure numbers of the annexes are to be shown on the cover. If there has been a change of command since the last report, the date of assumption by the new commanding officer is to be included.

8. The annexes are to be assembled in the groups shown on the cover. If there are no annexes for an annex NIL will be entered on the cover. If additional annexes are convenient for a particular headquarters, starting at B.

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## VENTS

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all orders given.

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mental importance.

o officers, men and equipment

present captured.

employed in the line not mentioned for. The type of

and to save work as much information as possible is to be entered and received, routine returns, etc. All and the time of receipt or despatch is to be given.

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(continued on back cover)



SECRETAUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

Quote in Reply

R707/1/1ADDRESS HQ 104 Sig Sqn  
AFPO 4  
GPO SYDNEY NSW

1 Oct 67

OIC  
Military History Section  
AHQ  
CANBERRA, ACTCOMMANDER'S DIARY

1. Enclosed are:-

- a. 104 Sig Sqn Commander's Diary (Duplicate) including annexures L and N, for Aug 67.
- b. 104 Sig Sqn Commander's Diary (Original) for Sep 67.
- c. Annexures C {enclosure 1}  
L {enclosure 2}  
N {enclosure 3 and 4}  
to Commander's Diary for Sep 67.

*for* *Shinton Capt*  
(G.J. Lawrence)  
Major  
Officer Commanding

SECRET



COMMANDERS DIARY NARRATIVE

UNIT/FORMATION 104 Sig Sqn

MONTH AND YEAR Sep 67

REFERENCE MAP Vietnam 1:50000 sheets 6442 ItoIV COMMANDING OFFICER Maj. LAWRENCE

Place and grid reference	Date	Time	Event or information	Annex letter and enclosure number
Nui Dat	1 Sep		Construction began on Nui Dat hill bunker.	
YS 4367	2 Sep		NTR	
	3 Sep		LOs det deployed with 1/11 ACR for Op AINSLIE.	
	4 Sep		NTR	
	5 Sep		Pole route construction began from canteen area PX to Nui Dat hill.	
	6 Sep		NTR	
	7 Sep		VC/NVA electronic warfare capability report issued.	Anx N Enclosure 3
	8 Sep		110 Sig Sqn assumed responsibility from 104 Sig Sqn for HF Voice link between Saigon and Nui Dat. Comsec Monitoring Report issued.	Anx N Enclosure 4
	9 Sep		New switchboard TC 10 arrived in unit.	
	10 Sep		NTR	
	11 Sep		Installation of new switchboard began.	
	12 Sep		NTR	
	13 Sep		Instruction on basic communication given to Garrison Military Police.	
	14 Sep		NTR	
	15 Sep		NTR	
	16 Sep		NTR	
	17 Sep		NTR	







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Copy No. .... 87

1 ATF  
NUI DAT

251530H Sep 67

SIGS 379

SIG INSTR 2/67 (OP KENMORE)

Time Zone used throughout this instr: HOTEL

General

1. All communication facilities currently provided in the Nui Dat base area will continue unchanged. This instruction details additional facilities to be provided for the op.
2. 1 ATF SOIs for Oct 67 apply except when noted. SOIs for Oct are to become effective 290800H Sep.

Radio

3. TF Comd Net.

- a. As units and sub-units depart Nui Dat D-1 and D Day their rear elms are to use the unit callsign with an "A" suffix.
- b. With the arrival of the Fwd HQ recce party at the new loc, a HQ step-up sta will join the net using control's callsign with an "A" suffix.
- c. When Comd 1ATF arrives at the Fwd HQ, con will change from Nui Dat to Fwd HQ. At this time, the sta at HQ 1ATF Rear will use the "A" suffix while the new con sta uses the callsign for 1ATF.
- d. At 1700H D Day the TF Comd Net Rear is to open and all stas not concerned with ops in the fwd area will leave the TF Comd Net and join the TF Comd Net Rear. (See Para 4.)
- e. Stas op on the TF Comd Net from 1700H D Day are shown in Annex A. The LO at XUYEN MOC will join the net on arrival in loc.
- f. Rear area sub stas of the TF Comd Net are to minimise tfc from 0600H to 1700H D Day.

4. TF Comd Net Rear.

- a. This net is to open at 1700H D Day. Stas to op on this net are given in Annex B.
- b. This net is to be effective for the duration of OP KENMORE only. Arrangements for closing down will be advised later.

5. Fwd HQ Def Net. A Fwd HQ def net is to be estb at 1700H D Day. Note that all units and sub-units op on this net are to provide their own radios and ops. See Annex C.

6. TF Comd Net Altn. This net will op only if VHF comms are lost to inf bn. See Annex D.

7. Air Task Net. Two stas will be provided for comms to ac. One will be loc at the Fwd HQ and one at the Rear HQs. See Annex D.

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8. Arty Rear Comd Net. See Annex D for call words and freqs. Fixed callsigns are to be used. This net is effective only for the duration of the op. Opening and closing times are the responsibility of 4 Fd Regt.

9. HF Link. A HF link will be estb between fwd and rear HQs. This will op as a radio teletype circuit in the event of failure of the RR bearer (see para 12). This link is also avail as an altn voice link between fwd and rear HQs. See Annex D.

10. VHF Monitor. A VHF monitor radio will be provided at the Fwd HQ.

11. VHF Retransmission

a. A ground VHF retransmission sta will be positioned at the Fwd HQ. It will be avail from that site to assist units with their internal comms if requested.

b. Eqpt for aerial VHF retransmission will be held at Nui Dat. It will be avail to units.

RR

12. RR tele and tg circuits will be provided between HQ 1ATF Fwd and HQ 1 ATF Rear. See Annex E for channel allocations.

13. This facility will enable all subscribers to Ebony Fwd swbd (including Enterprise Fwd and Evergreen Fwd) to comm by tele to any subscriber, local swbd or trunk circuits connected to Ebony at Nui Dat.

14. The four exclusive circuits do not go through any swbd and so provide direct tele comms between the two parties on each circuit.

15. All RR tele circuits are unclassified.

Swbd and Line

16. Exts of the Ebony Fwd swbds are given in Annex F. Additional copies of this annex are issued as the Ebony Fwd tele directory.

17. TF Sigs will lay lines from Ebony Fwd to other swbds in the area of the Fwd HQ.

Sigcen

18. A small sigcen will be estb at the Fwd HQs. It will incl a teletype terminal with on-line encryption to provide quick and secure formal comms between Fwd and Rear HQ.

19. TF time may be obtained by tele from the fwd sigcen or by radio on the TF Comd Net. The master clock will be loc in the rear sigcen.

DR

20. Starting D+1 there will be a daily aerial SDS between Fwd and Rear HQs. It will depart Kangaroo Pad at 1000H. Closing times for despatches are:

a. At HQ 1ATF Rear - 0940H.

b. At HQ 1ATF Fwd - 1000H.

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21. At the Fwd HQ there will be three DR deliveries a day from incl D+1. All unit and sub-unit HQs in the area of the Fwd HQs, CP and Arty Tac will be visited. Timings are for the DR to depart the sigcen at 1030, 1300, and 1600 hrs.

22. All LOs and visitors going from and to any fm, unit or sub-unit HQs are reminded of their responsibility to visit sigcen or orderly rooms and collect any despatches addressed to the destination of their journey.

*R. J. H. H. H.*  
(Major)  
1ATT Sig O

- Annexes.
- A. TF Comd Net.
  - B. TF Comd Net Rear.
  - C. Fwd HQ Def Net.
  - D. Misc Radio Facilities.
  - E. RR Channel Allocations.
  - F. Ebony Fwd Swbd Exts.

Distribution

List Z

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ANNEX A TO  
1 ATF SIG INSTR 2/67

TF COMD NET


The net shows those stas op after 1700H D Day.

CALLWORD

CP  
XO

FREQ

56.35  
65.50



SPARE CALLSIGNS

SPARE 2	21
SPARE 3	39
SPARE 4	41

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ANNEX B TO

1 ATF SIG INSTR 2/67

TF COMD NET REAR

This net opens on freq VW at 1700H D Day and is effective only for the duration of the op.

CALLWORD

FREQ

~~VW~~ UW  
UV

75.95  
61.40

STA

CALLSIGN

HQ 1 ATF Rear  
2 RAR Rear  
7 RAR Rear  
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt Rear  
1 Fd Sqn  
161 Rescue Flt  
D Comd's Rover  
1 ARU  
1 SAS Sqn  
Standby Coy  
Horseshoe Coy  
HQ Coy 1 ATF Rear  
CA (Hamlet 3)  
MILO  
Spare No 1  
Spare No 2

43  
63  
65  
25  
23  
35  
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45  
56  
36  
46  
75  
26  
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76

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ANNEX C TO

1 ATF SIG INSTR 2/67

FWD HQ DEF NET


This net opens on freq VX at 1700H D Day and is effective only for the duration of the op. Units and sub-units on the net are to provide their own radios and ops except HQ 1 ATF Fwd sta.

CALLWORD

VX  
CK

FREQ

59.70  
35.90



SPARE CALLSIGNS

SPARE 1 36  
SPARE 2 26

- NOTES:
1. Only the short whip antenna is to be used with radios on this net.
  2. AN/VRC-46 radios are to op on LOW POWER on this net.

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ANNEX D TO

1 ATF SIG INSTR 2/67

MISC RADIO FREQUENCIES

General

1. All facilities given below are effective for Op KENMORE only.

TF Comd Net Altn (Voice/Tg)

2. This net will be activated only if VHF comms to one or both inf bns are unsatisfactory.
3. Frequencies, callwords and callsigns are:

<u>CALLWORD</u>	<u>FREQ</u>
AB	3269 (opening freq)
CD	3288
KA	5185
<u>STA</u>	<u>CALLSIGN</u>
1 ATF	26
2 RAR	41
7 RAR	46

Air Task Net (Voice)

4. Frequency, callwords and callsigns are:

<u>CALLWORD</u>	<u>FREQ</u>
NU	32.30
<u>STA</u>	<u>CALLSIGN</u>
HQ 1 ATF Fwd	3
HQ 1 ATF Rear	3A

Arty Rear Comd Net (Voice)

5. Frequencies and callwords are:

<u>CALLWORD</u>	<u>FREQ</u>
PR	36.10
RV	37.30

6. Fixed callsigns are to be assigned by 4 Fd Regt.

HF Link (Voice/Tg)

7. Frequencies, callwords and callsigns are:

<u>CALLWORD</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>STA</u>	<u>CALLSIGN</u>
AY	2324 (opening freq)	HQ 1 ATF Fwd	7
CB	3244	HQ 1 ATF Rear	9
TD	5045		

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ANNEX E TO

1 ATF SIG INSTR 2/67

RR CHANNEL ALLOCATIONS

CHANNEL No

CIRCUIT

1.	EBONY FWD	to EBONY
2.	EBONY FWD	to EBONY
3.	EBONY FWD	to EBONY
4.	Fwd HQ CP	to REAR HQ CP
5.	Fwd HQ Q Rep	to DAQMG (log in ST Office)
6.	Fwd HQ GS02 Air	to RAAF Ops
7.	Arty Tac	to Arty Rear
8.	Fwd HQ Sigcen Teletype	to Rear HQ Sigcen Teletype
9.		SPARE

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ANNEX F TO

1 ATF SIG INSTR 2/67

EBONY FWD SWBD EXTS

<u>MAIN SWBD</u>		<u>EMERGENCY SWBD</u>	
<u>Ext No</u>	<u>Subscriber</u>	<u>Ext No</u>	<u>Subscriber</u>
1.	Spare	1.	Spare
2.	ENTERPRISE Fwd	2.	ENTERPRISE Fwd
3.	Arty Tac	3.	Arty Tac
4.	CP	4.	CP
5.	GS02 Air	5.	GS02 Air
6.	HQ Coy	6.	HQ Coy
7.	ATF D & E Pl	7.	1 ATF D & E Pl
8.	1 ALSG D & E Pl	8.	1 ALSG D & E Pl
9.	Sigcen	9.	Sigcen
10.	Sigs Sector	10.	Sigs Sector
11.	Radio Ops	11.	Radio Ops
12.	EBONY	12.	EBONY
13.	EBONY		
14.	EBONY		
15.	Int Cell		
16.	Q Rep		
17.	Sig O/OC Sigs Det		
18.	RR Det		
19.	OC A Sqn 3 Cav Regt )		
20.	EVERGREEN Fwd )		
21.	Fwd HQ Clerks		
22.	Public Telephone (Sigcen area)		
23.	GS02 Ops		
24.	)		
25.	)		
26.	) SPARE		
27.	)		
28.	)		
29.	)		
30.	)		

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104 Sig Sqn  
NUI DAT

30 Sep 67

R723-1-4

SO Sigs AFV (4)

MONTHLY REPORT - SEPTEMBER 67

Equipment

1. TC - 10 Switchboard. This switchboard arrived early in the month. A new switchboard room was built and the TC 10 installed. The frame, power supply and ringer have been installed in the old switchboard room which adjoins the new. The equipment has been completely tested. The only serious fault was that transistors in two of the ringers were defective. Cut-over to the new switchboard has now been delayed because operations have required the technical resources of the squadron to be employed on other tasks. It is anticipated that the changeover will start about 12 Oct.
2. Intruder Alarms. The R and D Team Bangkok brought three seismic intruder alarm sets to 1 ATF for trial. Each set consists of two detector/transmitters and two citizens band transceivers. The output of the transmitters is an RF signal modulated by a tone burst of short duration. One detector of the set has a high tone and one a low tone. The interval between the tone bursts is decreased as the vibration of the ground increases; the maximum rate is about four tone bursts per second. The equipment is intended for use in ambushes. The detector/transmitter has no controls (plugging in the geophone switches on the equipment) making installation and operation extremely simple. Interpretation of the tones is also simple. The equipment has now been returned and trial reports are being written. Further information should be sought from the R & D Team Bangkok.
3. B70 Radio Relay Equipment. There have been several opportunities to use this type of equipment in 1 ATF and at present it could be used to advantage in two situations: to the Horseshoe company position and to the new hamlet under construction by 1 ATF. Use of the B70 would enable better communication facilities to be provided within 1 ATF and would reduce traffic on the 1 ATF Comd Net Voice. There has been no advice on the availability of serviceable equipment.

Operations

4. AINSLIE. This is the largest operation which 1 ATF has independantly undertaken since 104 Sig Sqn has been in SVN. The TF HQ was not moved although inf bn HQs were up to 18 KM away. Except for the first two days when units were often moving and in thick country, communications were good.
5. KENMORE. This operation involves the two inf bns, the fd regt and the cav sqn deploying in very thick country some 20 KM ESE of Nui Dat. It was decided that the TF HQ should move to ensure good communications. Two MRC-69 shelters and crews from 110 Sig Sqn have been placed under command of 104 Sig Sqn to provide communications between forward and rear HQs of 1 ATF. The signal instruction relating to this operation is attached. As the operation has just started, comments will be left till the next report. At this stage the following points can be made:
  - a. An ad hoc troop of 32 all ranks has been formed to cope with the requirements of the forward HQ. This is

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2.

just slightly less than were required the last time the TF HQ was deployed.


b. To move all men and stores the following were required:

(1) Three APCs. Each carried only 1000 pounds of stores as swimming a river was involved in the approach. The six men in the recce party moved in these APCs.

(2) Three CH-47 Chinook helicopters. One was for the forward MRC-69 shelter, one for miscellaneous stores and one for the men.

Individual Relief

6. In the absence of advice, 104 Sig Sqn will plan on being placed completely on individual relief in accordance with the submission made to 1 ATF (which was forwarded to AHQ). Replacement forecasts now being submitted are based on the proposed individual relief plan. Matters such as R & R and R & C are also being based on this plan. Early advice on the relief proposals will greatly assist unit planning.



(G.J. Lawrence)  
Major  
Officer Commanding

Copy to:

139 Sig Sqn

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DIARY

ANNEX N ENCLOSURE 3  
TO COMMANDER'S DIARY  
SEP 67

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HQ 104 Sig Sqn  
NUI DAT  
7 Sep 67

See Distribution List

VC/NVA ELECTRONIC WARFARE CAPABILITY

The contents of this paper relating to enemy action and capabilities have been extracted from a Combined Intelligence Centre Vietnam report ST 67-061 dated 1 Jul 67.

Introduction

1. The VC/NVA have been concerned with electronic warfare throughout the Vietnam conflict, but recently they have intensified their efforts. By taking advantage of breaches in Allied communication security they have been able to gain valuable intelligence data. The VC/NVA have effectively jammed friendly radio transmissions and have developed the ability to enter friendly nets and transmit false information.

2. Recent examples of VC/NVA electronic warfare attempts are:

a. Jamming. On 25 Feb 67, 4 Inf Div on Operation SAM HOUSTON had their command net jammed by Russian and oriental voices and march type music. Jamming using music has been reported in recent months by units of 1 ATF.

b. Imitative Deception.

(1) In Jan 67, III MAF reported six attempts in one week when VC/NVA entered aircraft nets and, speaking English, attempted to misroute strike aircraft.

(2) In Feb 67, members of an MACV Advising Team whilst in contact with the enemy requested artillery support from the fire direction centre. As the FDC was preparing the request, they received another call in clear and distinct English for the fire to be shifted. The MACV Team heard this request and on checking found that the new coordinates were their own position.

c. Intercept. A platoon leader of a VC anti-aircraft platoon reported that his signal platoon was composed entirely of English speaking personnel who monitored FAC nets daily. When the FAC aircraft called for strike aircraft, VC battalion commanders would be notified.

Equipment

3. As at 10 May 67, it was known that the VC/NVA had the following VHF FM radios in the III Corps area:

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- |   |     |
|---|-----|
| a. <u>AN/PRC - 9 (27 - 38.9 Mc/s)</u>   | 3   |
| b. <u>AN/PRC - 10 (38 - 54.9 Mc/s)</u>  | 133 |
| c. <u>AN/PRC - 25 (30 - 75.95 Mc/s)</u> | 11  |
| d. <u>AN/PRC - 6 (47 - 55.4 Mc/s)</u>   | 13  |

4. Since the VC/NVA do not rely on VHF radio for communications within regiments and units, it must be assumed that a considerable proportion of the VHF FM radios which they have captured are used for electronic warfare.

Jamming

5. An FM radio has a property known as "capture effect". The strongest signal at the receiver is "captured" and all the weaker signals on that frequency are ignored. Therefore, for jamming to be effective with an FM radio, the jamming signal must be stronger at the receiver than the desired signal.

6. The AN/PRC - 9 and AN/PRC - 10 radios have an output power of 1 watt while an AN/PRC - 25 set has an output power of 1.5 to 2 watts. Other things being equal (such as antennas used, suitability of transmitting sites), an enemy jamming station must be closer to the receiving station than the desired station. Within an infantry battalion or within the Task Force it could be expected that the enemy can achieve this situation without difficulty.

Imitative Deception

7. Imitative deception is a most difficult form of EW. The enemy operator must speak fluently the language used on the net and with an accent appropriate to the station being imitated. He must know the communication procedures used on the net he has entered and he must know the form in which instructions are given.

8. Although the VC/NVA has tried imitative deception on English speaking nets, no examples of success have been reported.

Intercept

9. It is virtually impossible to detect that a radio net is being intercepted. Of all EW techniques, intercept is the most widely used by the VC/NVA.

10. Inadequate knowledge of English is the biggest single factor likely to reduce the VC/NVA effectiveness of their intercept of our radio transmissions. However, the enemy has got English speaking operators some of whom are sufficiently skilled to attempt imitative deception. It must be assumed that there are at all times in our TAOR enemy operators who understand English sufficiently well to enable information extracted from our nets to be exploited.

11. Intercept exploits breaches of communication security. Most radio users are aware of the need to avoid obvious security breaches such as giving overnight locations in clear or discussing movements for the next day in clear. However it is interesting to note that a VC returnee said that intercept had exploited the following:

- a. Conversations between officers of different units.
- b. Discussions in clear about a preceeding message which resulted in a decrypting difficulty.

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
- 3 -

- c. Answering questions about information previously encrypted.
- d. The use of plain text mixed with encrypted text.

Conclusion

12. Various sources indicate that VC/NVA have increased their EW against the Allied forces. They are thoroughly familiar with our communication procedures and equipment. Some of their intercept units have English speaking personnel. They realise that EW, especially intercept, is a subtle yet highly effective means of gathering intelligence and causing confusion.

13. It is not known how much EW has aided the enemy but it must be concluded that if the VC/NVA are able to monitor our communications they have the potential to exploit any compromised information.



(G. J. LAWRENCE)  
Major  
Officer Commanding

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HQ 1 ATF (12)

67 GL Sect

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ANNEX N ENCLOSURE 4  
TO COMMANDER'S DIARY  
SEP 67

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File No  
R723/1/2

HQ 104 Sig Sqn  
NUI DAT  
8 Sep 67

List C  
HQ 1 ATF (12)  
SO Sigs 2 AFV (4)

COMSEC MONITORING REPORT - AUG 67

1. Attached is the Aug 67 comsec monitoring report.
2. The report draws attention to HQ 1 ATF Troops Information Sheet No 58. A paper giving more details of the VC/NVA radio intercept capability has now been distributed by 104 Sig Sqn. Please ensure all users of radio read this paper.



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Comsec Det  
532 Sig Tp  
NUI DAT  
7 Sep 67

OC 104 Sig Sqn

COMSEC MONITORING REPORT AUGUST 1967

1. The following circuits were monitored during the reporting period:

- a. RR Channels            1 - 5 Aug  
                             11 - 15 Aug  
                             18 - 21 Aug  
                             29 - 31 Aug
- b. 1 ATF Command Net            5 Aug  
                             23 - 26 Aug
- c. 2 RAR Command Net        1 Aug
- d. 7 RAR Command Net    6-7 Aug        (Op BALLARAT)
- e. 7 RAR Company Nets    6-12Aug        "        "
- f. CA Unit (Line)        30-31Aug

2. A monitoring detachment was deployed with 7 RAR during Operation BALLARAT with the aim of assessing company nets. Due to range, terrain and the use of short antennae by the companies this task was unsuccessful and very little information was recorded. Two security breaches detected are shown in Annex A.

3. 7 RAR Comd Net    One minor breach detected.    See Annex A.

4. 2 RAR Comd Net    No significant information recorded. However on two occasions helicopter inter-communication conversations were transmitted over this net by callsign 90.

5. Radio Relay Channels    This system continues to be a security hazard. Both operations BALLARAT and AINSLIE were compromised several days before they commenced.    See Annex A.

6. CA Unit    Telephone calls to and from this unit were monitored during the period 30 - 31 August. From the information recorded it was obvious that a major operation (AINSLIE) was pending and involved the construction of housing facilities and probably resettlement of a large number of civilians. See Annex A.

7. The use of indecent language is still prevalent on RR channels. No examples are given in this report. Circuit time is being used for unnecessary or unauthorised purposes such as idle chatter or the placing of race bets. Many conversations are for too long. These practices tend to deny the use of these circuits to legitimate users and in some instances reveal information of a confidential nature such as results of courts martial or medical disabilities.



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8. Attention is directed to section three of the HQ 1 ATF Troops Information Sheet No 58. The information given in this document is sufficient to emphasize the importance of communication security during radio and telephone conversations.

*A. G. Poulton*

(A. G. POULTON)

WO1

IC Comsec Det

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ANNEX A TO  
COMSEC REPORT  
DATED      SEP 67

DATE/TIME	CALLS		TRANSMISSION	COMMENTS
	TO	FM		
			<u>D COY 7 RAR</u>	
121559	OA	42	Say again <u>direction</u> of <u>recce patrol</u>	Could be useful to enemy
		OA	<u>South East</u>	
121618	43	OA	Give us a call when you get to your <u>ambush position</u>	Could be useful to enemy OA could have said "---- to your position".
			<u>7 RAR COMD NET</u>	
071135	1	OA	Are all your <u>callsigns</u> in one location or are they spread slightly	May be of some use to the enemy to know all platoons of A Coy are concentrated
		1	No. They are all <u>concentrated</u>	
			<u>RR CHANNELS</u>	
031144			(Det 5 Coy - 25 Supply) <u>7 RAR</u> are picking up some ration packs for an <u>operation</u> they're getting-----picking them up this afternoon.	Indicates operation about to start
151435			(Maj BROWN - Cpl WHEELER) Is Capt BROWN there? No. I'm afraid he is not. Well find him then! OK wait - He's with <u>General WESTMORELAND</u>	VIP locations
30 Aug			-----I think that the reason is that half the witnesses have to go <u>out on operation</u>	This info is significant when linked with other conversations
30 Aug			I say that because of my own <u>planning conference</u> ----- I'll make a point of popping down to see you to tie up a few loose ends on <u>this business</u> you know <u>in</u> <u>the next few days.</u>	



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31 Aug

(CA HQ 1 ALSG - CA 1 ATF)

Got parcels up here for your people at HQ ALSG. They consist of clothing, medicine, napkins and all other stuff. Could you get a vehicle down today or tomorrow to pick this stuff up----- etc -----

I have spoken to Colonel McDONNA. We have a conference on at 1400 to discuss movement of building material.

- have problem preparing stores for air movement. All these marquees of ours ---- thought he would have finished today with his timber

Have a conference on with the Brigadier at 1400 hours today on the method of census that we're going to go on with --- to put me in the portrait as to what the Task Force requirement will be over and above what we will do from the point of view of locals --etc---

---- we got caught up in this bloody tentage for this operation

--- he was going to ring me back about some poles upright tops and bottoms. Are they coming? ---yes they're going up this afternoon. We ordered four trucks but it was not enough to get it all on ---- etc ----

- - - I wasn't worried about that but there's an operation coming up and I've gotta get the stuff packed and ready by tomorrow afternoon.

.  
These conversations clearly indicate the type of operation about to start.

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