

**Series: AWM95**  
Australian Army commanders' diaries

Royal Australian Infantry

**Item number: 7/4/48**

**Item: 4 Battalion Royal Australian  
Regiment**

Annexes

1-31 August 1971



C1

AUSTRALIAN ARMY

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4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn  
NUI DAT

R569/1/84

22 Aug 71

Ops 9

FRAGO 2/71 (Continuation of Op NORTH WARD)

Reference: A. 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn R810/5/1 dated 13 Aug 71 - Bn Forecast of Activities.

1. Situation. GVN Lower House elections are to be held 29 Aug 71. /  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn (-) has additional tasks of securing some access routes to DUC THANH and BARIA. Intelligence information issued separately.

2. Execution.

a. V Coy.

- (1) No change from Reference A.
- (2) Replaces Sp Coy (-) at Courtenay 29 Aug 71.
- (3) Tasks:
  - (a) Defence of Courtenay.
  - (b) Ambushing in the Courtenay area.

b. B Coy. Search Area P 23 Aug - 3 Sep 71 incl.

c. C Coy.

- (1) Search NUI DINHS with emphasis on eastern portion of Area S.  
25 Aug - 3 Sep incl.
- (2) Air insertion am 25 Aug from Eagle Farm to LZ vic YS 346645 or YS 363657 subject to RAAF confirmation.
  - (a) PZ time 0955 hrs.
  - (b) H hr 1000 hrs.
  - (c) PZ callsign 95B.

/(d)

SECRET



SECRET

2 -

- (d) LZ callsign 3.
- (e) Frequency Admin Air.
- (f) LZ prep:
  - i. H - 15 to H - 5 Arty.
  - ii. H - 5 to H hr Bushrangers.

d. D Coy.

- (1) Search Area Q from 28 Aug 71 until at least 3 Sep 71.
- (2) Air insertion 28 Aug 71 from Eagle Farm to LZ vic YS 346710 subject to RAAF confirmation.
  - (a) PZ time 1455 hrs.
  - (b) L hr 1500 hrs.
  - (c) PZ callsign 95B.
  - (d) LZ callsign 4.
  - (e) Frequency Admin Air.
  - (f) LZ prep:
    - i. L - 15 to L - 5 Arty.
    - ii. L - 5 to L hr Bushrangers.
- (3) Direction of search: SOUTH to NORTH.
- (4) Endeavour to operate within gun range. If forced to operate outside gun range, only fire support available will be from Bushrangers.

e. Sp Coy (-).

- (1) No change from Reference A.
- (2) Hands over responsibility for defence of Courtenay to V Coy 29 Aug 71.
- (3) Returns Courtenay 4 Sep 71.

f. Mor Pl.

- (1) FSB DEBBIE one Sect.
- (2) FSB ROBIN one Sect mounted in AMC wef 23 Aug 71.
- (3) Remainder NLI DAT. /g. Arty.

SECRET



SECRET

- 3 -

g. Artv.

(1) 104 Fd Bty.

(a) FSB ROBIN YS 438765 in action 23 Aug 71 - UFN.

(b) FSB DEBBIE remains in action.

(2) A Bty. In sp to C Coy.

h. 2 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt. No change.

i. Tp 1 Fd Sqn (-). No change.

j. Co-ord.

(1) Timings.

(a) H hr C Coy 251000H.

(b) L hr D Coy 281500H.

(2) Boundaries.

(a) As per trace.

(b) Bdry between Areas P and Q **incl** to D Coy.


(3) Sequence of Events. Annex A.

3. Administration and Logistics. No change.

4. Command and Signal. No change. HQ 4 RAR/NZ remains Courtenay.

Ack Instrs: ACK

(J.C. HUGHES)  
Lt Col  
CO



(E.H. STEVENSON)  
Maj  
Ops Offr

Authentication:

Annex: A. Sequence of Events.

/Distribution:

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Distribution:

Copy Nos

<u>Distribution:</u>	<u>Copy Nos</u>
List D plus	As per List D
C Sqn 1 Armd Regt	76 - 77
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt	78 - 79
12 Fd Regt RAA	80 - 83
C Bty 5/42 Arty Bn (US)	84 - 86
1 Fd Sqn RAE	87 - 90
104 Sig Sqn	91 - 92
161 Indep Recce Flt	93 - 95
9 Sqn RAAF	96 - 98



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ANNEX A TO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN  
FRAGO 2/71  
DATED 22 AUG 71

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Serial	Time From	Time To	Event
1	23 TBA		FSB ROBIN in action
2	250945	250955	Arty LZ prep C Coy
3	250955	251000	Bushranger LZ prep C Coy
4	250955		PZ time C Coy
5	251000		H hr C Coy
6	25 TBA		Complete time C Coy
7	281445	281455	Arty LZ prep D Coy
8	281455	281500	Bushranger LZ prep D Coy
9	281455		PZ time D Coy
10	281500		L hr D Coy
11	28 TBA		Complete time D Coy

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45  
83

80  
30





# ARAR INZ ANZAC WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW



Reference

718/34

Period Ending

4 AUG 71.

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4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn

INTDEX 718/34

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

NORTH VIETNAM

1. STAR returns of truck activity have shown a marked increase over the past four months. The daily average tonnage of supplies being shipped SOUTH has totalled 143 tons. However due to rain there has been a fall-off over the past 30 days to 95 tons per day. #2

LAOS

2. Truck movement throughout the PANHANDLE lines of communication, as indicated by sensor activations, increased slightly during the week. There were 102 activations recorded as compared with 95 the previous week. Visual reconnaissance continued to reflect the effects of the heavy rainfall. High water on rivers, flooded fords, standing water, mud slides, as well as interdiction by air strikes continue to hamper the enemy's attempt to use effectively the lines of communication through LAOS. There was little activity of note in LAOS during the week as the enemy made little effort to regain his recent losses in the PLAIN OF JARS area. #2

CAMBODIA

3. Enemy initiated activity remained at a low level. On 27 JUL ARVN forces on a search operation near NEAK LUONG (WT392307) contacted an unknown size enemy force. The ARVN were supported by VNAF tactical air. Results were 8 friendlies killed and 26 wounded and 1 APC damaged to 79 enemy killed. On 29 JUL ARVN troops also managed to trap a large group of enemy in the open with a flood waterway at their back, 18km NORTH of SVAY RIENG (WT771401). US helicopter gunships and ARVN artillery were used in support. Enemy losses were a confirmed 79 killed and 50 detained to one friendly wounded. #2

SVN MR 1, 2 and 4

4. Activity remained at a low level as the enemy conducted logistical activity and made preparations for possible increased tactical activity during the GVN elections. ARVN elements operating in the vicinity of FSB FULLER discovered two large caches during the period. The caches consisted of a total of 180 82mm mortar rounds, 310 60mm mortar rounds, 180 B40 and B41 rounds, 400 small arms rounds and 700 grenades. #2

5. Activity in MR 2 remained at a reduced level, and was characterised by limited attacks by fire and ground probes in VC MR 5.

6. In PLEIKU Province on 29 JUL ARVN elements conducting search operations 40km SOUTH of PLEIKU City (AR7708) engaged an enemy force in three contacts which resulted in 13 enemy killed and 5 detained. #2

7. In QUI NHON (CR100244) Harbour on 25 JUL enemy sappers sank 3 ammunition barges. There were no casualties, and the barges were reported to be loaded with scrap lumber only. #2



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-2-

8. The 15 day operation conducted in the vicinity of Base Area 252 (BP232) by ROKA units ended on 26 JUL. Cumulative results were friendlies 1 killed and 3 wounded to enemy 245 killed and 1 detained. #2

9. Activity continued at a low level in MR 4 with a daily average of two attacks by fire. Five OPs were overrun, two in the AN XUYEN (VQ805986 VQ867887), two in VINH LONG Province (XS295080 XS168080) and one in VINH BINH Province. Cumulative results friendlies 32 killed (5 civilians killed) 31 wounded (4 US and 11 civilians wounded) and 10 missing. #2

10. On 23 JUL in KIEN GIANG Province (VR40500) RF elements discovered a cache containing 100 60mm mortar rounds, 100 2.75 inch rocket warheads and misc booby traps and ammunition. #2

SVN : MR 3

11. During the week activity continued at a low level. Activity was generally characterised by light attacks by fire and probes primarily against RF/PF and PSDF elements. There were no reported terrorist activities in SAIGON. #2

12. In TAY MINH Province on 24 JUL ARVN forces captured 2 ton cache of rice NORTH of TAY NINH City (XT283561) in the same area as that in which a 1 ton cache was discovered last week. #2

13. On 27 JUL the LAI KHE base camp (XT785385) received a sapper attack which resulted in 3 friendly casualties (2 US) and 4 helicopters destroyed and 1 damaged. #2

Assessment for MR 3

14. As the election date draws closer an increase in the number of attacks against lightly defended posts is forecast.

15. Attempts will be made to step up the pressure against PSDF stationed in hamlets/villages throughout the MR.

4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn Area of Interest

16. NVA/VC Units, Identification and Locations.

See Annex A.

17. 3 Bn 33 NVA Regt

a. It is possible that this Bn has been recovering caches not located by allied troops during Operation OVERLORD in the area to the EAST of CAM MY/NUI NHAC.

b. Elements from the Bn were probably responsible for the attack on a hamlet near BAO BINH (YT487055) on 30 JUL when 4 PF were killed and 6 wounded 5 VC were killed and one was captured.

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18. 274 VC Main Force Regt

- a. In a series of contacts along the line of the SOUI CA during the last week 1 Bn has been driven out of his bunker bases losing a number of men and an amount of equipment during his withdrawal most likely to the SOUTH and the WEST.
- b. On 29 JUL C Coy contacted about 20 VC in a 3 bunker base at YS395914. 3 VC were engaged by 7 Pl at a distance of less than 5 metres and were seen to fall and were possibly killed during the action. Next morning the system was found to have been hastily evacuated.
- c. Also on 29 JUL 9 Pl located 13 bunkers that had received an air strike some time before at YS 401917 - YS402916.
- d. On 30 JUL at YS401914 8 Pl located 3 large bunkers, which had been recently evacuated.
- e. To the SOUTH at YS403909 also on 30 JUL 5 Pl contacted 2 VC who were carrying packs and weapons.
- f. On the afternoon of 30 JUL D Coy and tanks of C Sqn 1 Armd Regt assaulted a 23 bunker complex, killing a total of 12 VC by body count, and capturing the system by night fall. The VC returned fire with heavy fire including RPG's, M60's and AK's. Artillery fire was used to support the assaulting troops. Documents captured in the system identified 1 Bn 274 Regt and reference was made to the signals platoon that would normally be co-located with HQ 1 Bn. Equipment CIA included 1xM60, 4xAK47's, 2xB40 a number of documents and ammunition for all weapons CIA. A large quantity of personal gear/equip was also captured. The system itself was well camouflaged and the bunkers were from 1-3 months old in good condition, with few tracks in the area but with electrical wires running between the larger bunkers and vines tied to trees within the system. Recently cut (sawn) trees were located adjacent to the complex but as with others in the area mud had been placed over the top of the cut stumps to camouflage them from the air and ground observation.
- g. On 31 JUL a platoon from B Coy 3 RAR was engaged by 2 VC at YS411908 as the VC approached from the NORTH WEST. Thought to be elements from 274 Regt probably 1 Bn.
- h. Regt HQ is thought to be operating in the general area SOUTH of Route 320 near the LONG KHANH/BIEN HOA Province Border.
- i. 3 Bn were probably involved in one incident with a LONG THANH Special Forces patrol on 27 JUL at YS269831, although the majority of the Bn is reported to be in the NORTH in the area of BINH SON Plantation.

19. D445 LF Bn

- a. A 1 ATF patrol located and directed an air strike on to a bunker system occupied by C3 Coy D445 at YS775883 on 29 JUL.



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- b. A report has been received that NGUYEN VAN BE (ORBATS hold BE as a cadre of AN NHUT Party Chapter and a second NGUYEN VAN BE as APO HQ SR4) has replaced SAU THU as Bn Comd D445. BE was last seen in the area approx 2 years ago.
- c. Indications are that an important element of D445 has joined C1 Coy in the NUI TRUONG PHI area (YS4748) which may be a preparatory move prior to increased offensive activity in the Route 23 and 44 area.
- d. D2 Coy of D445 reported to be in the MINH DAM Secret Zone on the 2/3 AUG have an 82mm mortar however D445 are not known to possess an 82mm mortar but may have on loan from K8 Coy Combat and sp Coy of BA LONG. Attachments from K8 are usually effected for a planned operation.

20. Sub Region 4

- a. No identification was made, nor evidence to support the reports that SR 4 elements were located in the vicinity of the SOU CA/SOC as 1 ATF troops during Operation IRON FOX completed their area search.
- b. D2 En was probably involved in an incident with a LONG THANH Special Forces patrol at YS325855 just WEST of the FIRESTONE Trail in which gunships received ground fire. Strength of D2 is approx 65.
- c. Reports continue to be received that D10 Sapper Bn elements have been operating in the area of THAI THIEN - PHU MY.

21. CHAU DUC District Forces

- a. Elements of CHAU DUC are still widely spread - the most likely areas being the CHAU PAV Valley, NORTH and WEST of the CU BI Plantation and small groups near HOA LONG, NUI DINH's, LONG PHUOC HAI and PHU MY.
- b. There have been reports of small groups of VC reported by villagers as being in the Plantation area vicinity YS4983, which could be either a CHAU DUC band or members of the NGAI GIAO guerillas.

22. BARIA City Unit

- a. Consistent reports indicate that there is a considerable increase in VC activity in the mangrove area of the RUNG SAT WEST and SOUTH of Route 15 from THAI THIEN to BARIA, over the last month.
- b. Instances of VC stopping fishermen from entering areas or demanding tax or kind, have occurred recently at YS235673, YS243695, YS323589 and at NGON LANG (WEST of ONG TRINH).
- c. There is no doubt that the RUNG SAT area of PHUOC TUY is becoming an increasingly important sanctuary base area for the smaller guerilla units and units from SR 4, though to date no definite attempt to increase interdiction of Route 15.

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23. Assessment

- a. 3 Bn 33 NVA Regt is certain to be allocated an offensive task for this month, in either Southern LONG KHANH or Northern PHUOC TUY Province, no further indication is able to be ascertained on current information.
- b. HQ 274 Regt also certain to have been allocated similar tasks but further to the WEST, and as far NORTH as Route 1. Currently the 1st Bn and Regt HQ have overcome the problems of re-organisation and re-location of their HQ elements as a result of 1 ATF operations in the SOUI QUIT/CA area. Though there is little doubt that with their recently received NVN reinforcements they are capable of effecting this, and attempting offensive tasks. Recently estimated strengths are shown as Annex B.
- c. SR 4 units are likely to operate along Route 15 area from PHU MY NORTH to LONG THANH.
- d. D445 LF Bn remains a threat to Route 23/44 population centres. They have a detailed knowledge of the area and should be capable of carrying out limited co-ordinated offensive tasks.
- e. CHAU DUC units should have relocated their offensive elements, though whilst thought to be small in number are capable of minor attacks and interdiction along Route 2.
- f. Further restrictions on an interception of fishermen in the SOUTH Eastern Area of the RUNG SAT are most probable over the remainder of the month.

24. Battalion Statistics

	(22 - 28 JUL) (Last Week)	(29 JUL - 4 AUG) (This Week)
a. Contacts	7	4
b. Wpns CIA and Recovered	4	1
c. PWs and HOI CHANHs	-	-
d. VC/NVA KIA	4	12
e. Instls and Caches	13	6
f. Mine Incidents	-	-
g. Sightings and Agent Reports	37	83

25. Additional Statistics

Totals shown are for the 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn Operational Group, which includes C Sqn (-) Armd Regt and 1 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt. The figures are for all operations to 31 JUL 71.

1. VC/NVA KIA (BC)	49
2. VC/NVA PW (CIA)	5
3. HOI CHANH	1



NUI DAT

*R. L. Sayce*  
 (R.L. SAYCE)  
 Capt  
 IO  
 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn

- Annexes:-
- a. VC/NVA Strengths, Locations and Identification.
  - b. 274 VC MF Regt and 33 NVA Regt Recent Strength Increases.
  - c. Current VC Ration Scale.
  - d. Mining Incidents in Area COURTENAY HILL over period SEP 70 - FEB 71.
- Sources:-
- #1 1 ATF INTSUM No 216/71.
  - #2 SUPINTREP 31/71.
  - #3 1 ATF INTSUM No 215/71.
  - #4 1 ATF INTSUM 54/71.

ANNEX A TO  
 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn  
 WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW  
 718/34  
 DATED 4 AUG 71

## VC/NVA STRENGTHS, LOCATIONS AND IDENTIFICATION.

UNIT	ESTIMATED STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION
HQ MR7/SVNLA	2330	SE of GIA BAY approx YT6800
MR7 Rear Services	1860	NUI BE approx YS8891
33 NVA Regt/MR 7	1245	
HQ elm & Sp units	333	SONG LA NGA approx YT6123
1 Bn	300	"
2 Bn	265	NORTH of NUI CHUA CHAN approx 7 YT5915
3 Bn (D2/BARIA)	230	BAO BINH 3 area approx YS5396
274 VC MF Regt	590	
HQ elm & sp units	345	SOUTH WEST ONG QUE Rubber area vic Route 320
1 Bn	115	SOUTH WEST of ONG QUE Rubber
2 Bn	80	SOUTH of HUNG NGHAI approx YT3004
3 Bn	70	SOUTH of BINH SON approx YT2288
BA LONG (P) HQ MR7	450	Vic NUI TRANO approx YT6000
D445 LF Bn/BA LONG	158	

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/Bn HQ



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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ESTIMATED STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>
Bn HQ & C5 Coy	68	Flms in LONG HAI Mountains
C1 Coy	24	"
C2 Coy	22	Eastern Province Border area
C3 Coy	27	"
C4 Coy	17	"
K8 Combat Sp Coy/BA LONG	65	Probably Southern LONG KHANH
C36 Sapper Recce Coy/BA LONG	50	Probably Southern LONG KHANH
XUAN LOC (D)/BA LONG	160	SW of XUAN LOC
CAO SU (D)/BA LONG	155	YT3903
CHAU DUC (D)/BA LONG	60	CHAU PHA Valley approx YS3477
C41 Conc Coy	18	"
LONG DAT (D)/BA LONG	70	YS4851
C25 Conc Coy	24	YS4851
XUYEN MOC (D)/BA LONG	38	YS6669
incl C70 Conc Coy		
BARIA Special Zone/BA LONG	36	YS3261
incl C610 Special Action		
VUNG TAU Special Zone/MR7	20	YS2558
A31 Eastern Special Action Unit	23	LONG HAI Mountains YS4851
A32 Western Sapper Unit	22	YS2558
SR4 HQ/MR 7	550	HAT DICH area
D10 Sapper Bn/SR4	230	Dispersed in Northern RUNG SAT Special Zone

ANNEX B TO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn  
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW  
718/34

274 VC MF Regt and 33 NVA Regt Recent Strengths  
Increase

1. TRAC have confirmed that 274 Regt and 33 NVA Regt have recently received substantial reinforcements. This information has been taken from detailed information of infiltration reports and PW interrogation.
2. The new estimates of strength for 274 Regt are:
  - a. 1 Bn 274 Regt; 240 men approx.
  - b. 2 Bn 274 Regt; 250 men approx
  - c. 3 Bn 274 Regt; 250 men approx
  - d. HQ 274 Regt and support coys; 300 men approx
  - e. Total strength; 1040 men approx
3. These figures are based on TRAC ORBAT studies which have indicated that two infiltration groups of 200 men each have recently reinforced 274 Regt. The figures are also based upon PW interrogations, including that of PHAM VAN CHIEN, who was captured by A Sqn 3 Cav Regt at YS429872 on 1 JUL 71, a member of 2 Bn 274 Regt.
4. Based on infiltration rates from TRAC ORBAT, estimates of 33 NVA Regt strengths have been amended as follows:

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-B2-

- a. HQ and Support units; 333 men approx.
- b. 1 Bn; 300 men approx.
- c. 2 Bn; 265 men approx.
- d. 3 Bn; 300 men approx.
- e. Total strength; 1245 men approx.

#1

ANNEX C TO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn  
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW  
718/34  
DATED 4 AUG 71

CURRENT VC RATION SCALE

1. Documents captured by 3 Bde on 25 JUL 71 at YT269568 give indications of some increases in the food supply for enemy personnel.

2. The docs state that in compliance with present supply capabilities, HQ SVNLA has decided to increase the food supply criteria for personnel as follows:

Category I: 700 grams (1,538 lbs) of husked rice daily and 700 grams of salt monthly for members of transportation units, production units, maintenance units and combat units.

Category II: 650 grams (1,318 lbs) of husked rice daily and 700 grams (1,538 lbs) of salt monthly for members of other units and agencies.

Special Category for Children : Each child between 1 and 5 years old is to be issued 12 litres (23.75 lbs) of husked rice per month. Those aged between 6 and 9 are to receive 16 litres (31.75 lbs); those between 10 and 14 20 litres (39.5 lbs); and those aged 15 and above, 23 litres (45.5 lbs).

3. 1 ATF COMMENT: The fact that transportation, production and maintenance units should now draw equivalent rations to those drawn by combat units is interesting, and constitutes a change from the previous custom of rationing larger quantities of rice for the combat soldiers. #3

ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn  
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW  
718/34  
DATED 4 AUG 71

MINING INCIDENTS IN AREA COURTFENAY HILL OVER  
PERIOD SEP 70 - FEB 71

1. Over the past six months FWMAF have been involved in 33 mine incidents in the area. The following types of explosives have so far been identified:-

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/a.



- a. CHICOM
- b. Chippings from aerial bombs and UXB's.
- c. RPG's.
- d. C4 (Plastic Explosive).
- e. 105 HE rds.
- f. US Claymores.

Types of Switches and Mines

2. The following are the types of switches which have been identified:-
  - a. Tilt switches (4, one of the mines probably encased in bakelite).
  - b. Bamboo offset switch (approx 3-6 ft).
  - c. Bamboo switch.
  - d. AP mines.

Size of charges

3. The mines have consisted of AP mines of up to 5 lbs, anti vehicular mines with between 10-15 lbs explosive, and one anti helicopter mine.

Mine markers

4. There have been four separate markers found in the area. They are:-
  - a. Skull and crossbones (SW
  - b. Sign "MIN".
  - c. A leaf with a stick pushed through it (area YS470890).
  - d. Sharpened sticks lying on the ground and pointing towards the mines.

Pattern of Enemy Minelaying

5. Prior to mid-December 1970, the majority of the mine incidents occurred either WEST of Route 2 or on Route 2 itself. These mines had in most cases been emplaced for a long period, some of them for three years, with the switches being placed in position approx 24 hrs before the required time for detonation.

6. Since mid-December of the 17 mine incidents which have occurred, 11 have taken place EAST of Route 2 in the general area of YS471896. In mid-December a number of incidents occurred on Route 2 itself at YS457887, the switches had been placed in position shortly before the required time for detonation. However these mines laid



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EAST of Route 2, together with the mines laid at YS457887, had been implanted within the last three or four months only, in contrast to the mines laid WEST of the road.

Enemy Units in the Area

7. SR4. This organisation has the capability to implant mines. The group from SR4 which uses the VIET CUONG regularly is the Rear Services Group, and the mines to the WEST of the road may possibly have been laid by SR4 sappers in an effort to deter the allied operations.

8. 274 Regt. This unit has the capability for implanting and also uses the VIET CUONG for resupply. 274 Regt may also possibly have contributed to minelaying WEST of Route 2.

9. CHAU DUC. CHAU DUC did not move NORTH from their normal AO until DEC 70 and therefore the mining to the WEST of the road is possibly not of their doing. It is felt that the mining to the EAST of the road is too sophisticated for CHAU DUC resources.

10. C36. C36 was formed in about SEP 70 as a sapper recce unit. Present indications are that the unit is intended for attacks against isolated GVN outposts rather than for mining.

11. CAM MY Village Unit. The mining to the WEST of the road may have been conducted by CAM MY Village Unit, but this is thought unlikely as such a task is probably outside the units resources.

12. D65 Engr Bn (Disbanded). In approx AUG 70, D65 withdrew from their AO in the MANGROVES. From various sources it has been ascertained that the Bn has since been disbanded and the coys redeployed to different Provinces within MR7. In approx NOV 70, it was reported that elms of D65 were with BA LONG Province and were being used to train personnel to the NORTH of the MAY TAOS. Later it was reported that a coy of D65 was with BA LONG. On 10 NOV at YS497878 a Pl Comd from A6/D65 was killed by US forces. Documents carried on his body made reference to mining in the area LANG LON Hamlet (YS465859) and to the laying of 20 mines to the EAST of Route 2. The type of mines found to the EAST of the road are basically of the same design as those found off the firetrail in the MANGO area several months ago while D65 were operating in that area. It is believed probable that the mining to the EAST of the road has been conducted by elms of the Coy of D65 which was sent to BA LONG, possibly with the support of A32, BA LONG Engr Sect.

#4

Conclusion

13. It is likely that two or more of the enemy organisations have contributed to the mining. The mining to the WEST of the road has probably been carried out by elements of 274 Regt and SR4. The mining to the EAST of the road, probably the work of former D65 members assisted by BA LONG Province Engrs, is likely to be maintained at its present level of activity.


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# ARAR INZ ANZAC BN WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW



Reference

718/35

Period Ending

11 AUG 71.

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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEWNORTH VIETNAM

1. The daily average tonnage of supplies trucked SOUTH on routes 101C and 1AC, as indicated by SLAR, was 124 tons per day during the past week, as compared with 104 tons per day for the last 30 days. #2

LAOS

2. Truck movement throughout the PANHANDLE lines of communication as indicated by sensor string activations, increased during the week. There were 154 activations recorded as compared with 102 during the previous week. The enemy is continuing his attempt to maintain a high level of logistical activity during the current rainy season. Standing water on roads, flooded fords, cratering and mud slides continue to hamper his efforts. #2

3. In the MUONG PHALENE area (WD6041) irregular forces have reported strong enemy resistance. In several company size contacts during the week, irregulars failed to dislodge the enemy from well-prepared defensive positions on both sides of the SANG SOY river. These contacts resulted in 3 irregulars killed and 14 wounded. On 3 AUG 2 irregular battalions operating near MUONG PHALENE received an attack by fire consisting of 40 82mm mortar rounds. Results were 13 friendly wounded. #2

4. Increased enemy resistance is also being encountered around PAKSONG (XB429794) and SARAVANE (XB195825). This stepping up of enemy activity is probably indicative of the enemy's intention to prevent further friendly gains as well as an attempt to protect caches. #2

5. The enemy has shown concern at the advances being made by General VANG PAO's forces in the PLAIN OF JARS area. Several heavy attacks have been launched in this area, some of them using PT-76 amphibious tanks. Two enemy tanks were destroyed by airstrikes during the week.

CAMBODIA

6. Activity remained at a low level. There have been no significant contacts initiated by enemy forces in CAMBODIA since early JUN. Indications are that the food and ammunition situation in some places is critical and some evidence of possible low enemy morale is provided by the fact that government forces reported that a group of 70 Cambodian communists rallied to government forces in the KAMPONG TRABEK area (WT5331) during the week. #2

7. On 2 and 3 AUG ARVN forces operating near SVAY RIENG had several contacts with small groups of enemy, resulting in two friendly killed and 24 wounded to a large number of enemy reported killed and 12 detained. On 6 AUG ARVN forces reported that tactical air engaged two NVA companies. Results were 10 friendly killed and 25 wounded to a reported 60 enemy killed. On 2 AUG a VNAF tactical airstrike near NEAK LUONG killed some 30 enemy and destroyed 10 structures. #2

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8. On 3 AUG US aircraft escorting a convoy along the MEKONG River, 21km SOUTH of NEAK LUONG (WT149319), struck a known enemy location. Results were 14 enemy killed by air, one secondary explosion and 3 structures and 7 sampans destroyed. #2

SVN : MR 1, 2 and 4

9. Enemy initiated activity continued at a low level as enemy units apparently prepare for increased activity in late AUG. #2

10. ARVN forces operating near FSB FULLER received an attack by fire of 200 rounds of mixed 82mm and 60mm mortar rounds. Interrogation of a PW and agent report indicate that allied installations at CHU LAI (BT5505) will be subjected to a sapper attack in the near future. The PW stated that the enemy were using detailed models of the base to prepare for the attack. #2

11. Activity remained at the same reduced level as the same past month in MR 2. On 2 and 3 AUG RF elements discovered two caches near KONTUM City (AS876043). One contained 15 tons of misc ammunition which was evacuated, while the other contained 4 tons of rice which was destroyed. According to previous reports elements of the KONTUM Provincial units have been experiencing supply shortages due to the priorities of major B-3 front elements in the TRI-BORDER area. The capture of these caches should further contribute to the present low level of activity in KONTUM Province. #2

12. A reliable agent report from VC MR 5 indicates that the enemy intend staging kidnappings of VC supporters so that they can be given indoctrination courses in disrupting the GVN elections. #2

13. On 2 AUG 9km NE of SONG MAO (BN340500) ARVN elements on a search operation engaged an estimated enemy battalion killing 15 enemy. #2

14. Enemy initiated activity in MR 4 remained at a low level as of previous weeks, with an average of one attack by fire per day. There are no indications that the enemy plans to initiate tactical activity in the coming week. #2

15. Interrogation of several PWs and ralliers reveals that many enemy units in the Delta have been forced to operate in groups no larger than a company size. Thus situation has been bought about by the aggressiveness of ARVN operations as well as by the need to avoid offering lucrative targets for tactical airstrikes. #2

16. Enemy initiated activity in MR3 remained at a low level. There were no terrorist activity in SAIGON. However, dissident students were involved in two firebomb incidents against US vehicles and in one incident students stoned an Australian vehicle. According to a National Police report some extremist students have commenced an anti-US campaign calling for US withdrawal. #2

17. In TAY NINH Province on 2 AUG RF elements discovered a two ton cache (XT292605) The cache was in good condition and was the third discovered in this area in the past two weeks. Three caches were discovered by US forces on 3 and 5 AUG near DINH QUAN (YT685525, YT678518, YT671522). The caches contained 14 ton of flour and oneton of salt. The flour had been manufactured in the US. #2.



18. Assessment for MR 3.

Enemy initiated activity is likely to increase on or about 19 AUG, a period of low lunar illumination. 19 AUG commemorates General Revolution Day of 1945 when the VIET MINH claimed power in HANOI. This date is close enough to the Lower House elections for a significant upsurge in activity to embarrass the GVN. The enemy will try to make his influence known prior to the elections by using propaganda to discredit the elections, by calling for a "peace coalition", and by targetting installations of political value using terror tactics, sappers and attacks by fire. We anticipate targetting of US airfields, fuel and ammo storage areas and GVN officials and offices during the pre-election period. #4

4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn Area of Interest

19. VC/NVA Identification, Units and Locations.

See Annex A.

20. 3 Bn 33 NVA Regt

- a. The Bn has not been identified in recent contact, and is thought to be located to the EAST of the NUI NHAC in Southern LONG KHANH Province.

21. 274 VC MF Regt.

- a. On 2 AUG A Coy 3 RAR located 16 bunkers at YS352905 which had been used until 24 hrs prior to occupation as a hospital complete with operating theatre, medical equipment and documents located identified C24 Conv Coy. The last record of treatment patients was on 27 JUL 71. Items of ammunition were also located in the system.
- b. Other documents also identified C24 Coy when located on a body at YS352910 on 2 AUG 71.
- c. Documents located on 2 AUG at YS401891 in an old bunker system also identify 274 Regt (probably elements from 1 Bn) and elements from SR4.
- d. On 4 AUG 2 ammunition caches vicinity YS374902 were located which would have belonged to elements from 274 Regt.
- e. SR4 and 274 Regt have used the same system - or perhaps the same courier system to MR 7.

22. MR 7 Rear Services

- a. On 6 AUG C Coy 4 RAR/NZ at YS434865 saw two VC in an overnight camp and killed one VC, identified from captured documents as a member from C5 Requisitioning and Purchasing Coy of ex 84 RSG (now intergrated as part of 814 RSG of MR 7). Reciepts carried indicated that he had provided food and money to 274 Regt elements, in the past, which is substantiated by the number of contacts with re-supply parties from 274 Regt in the general area over the past six months.



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- b. An agent report on 6 AUG stated that a party of 10 VC who split into groups of 2 and 3 were seen at YS442852 which is a VC supply point. It was also mentioned that groups would return in about 48hrs time, or later.

23. CHAU DUC.

- a. On 10 AUG 3 Pl V Coy engaged 2 VC, armed and dressed in green at YS476864. One VC was KIA and 1 AK47 and a quantity of gear and documents were CIA. A notebook which had a list of pyrotechnics and rationing records of a group of 3 persons with B1 and B2 sub units suggested association with C2 Engr Coy of BA LONG. 18 metres of plastic, 36 D or C cell batteries and a compass with the words CONG BINH - 14-6-71(Engineers) scratched on the lid suggested that the group was a sapper/engr element.
- b. On 11 AUG 3 Pl V Coy further to the SOUTH at YS475859 contacted 2-3 VC in a staging camp of 3 bunkers, with 20 nootchie spaces and exit/entry points to the NE, S and W. Equipment captured included an SKS rifle, 5xRPG rockets, a roll of electric cable and a packet of electric detonators with a pair of pliers, again sapper type stores. Documents identified the system as having been from the Engr Cell of CHAU DUC (D) Unit.
- c. There is a possibility that C2 Engr Coy of BA LONG and the Engr Cell of CHAU DUC are both composed of ex members of ex D67 later D65 MF Engr Bn. Elements could also be co located and may also be responsible for the mine incident on Route 2 at S458899 on 4 AUG 71 when a US vehicle triggered a pressure electric detonated 2015 CHICOM mine. It is also probable that the group is receiving the majority of its re-supply from the hamlet XA BANG just to the WEST. The system has been built for some months and is one of a number of small bunker systems/staging area in the vicinity.
- d. C2's task is to mine Route 2, but they may have delegated the area of Route 2 in PHUOC TUY Province to this group. C2 itself is believed to be further NORTH as 2 members of the unit were CIA at YT471008, WEST of BAO BINH on 3 AUG by ARVN troops.

24. D445 LF Bn

- a. B Coy 3 RAR engaged VC on 10 AUG in a 6 bunker system/camp at YS655713. The system was in good condition and amongst equipment CIA were batteries a quantity of electrical wire and 1400 rounds of 7.62mm ling (M60) ammo. It is certain that the group occupying the system were from D445.

25. Assessment

- a. The reinforced 3 Bn 33 NVA Regt has given no indication of future offensive tasks that it is likely to attempt in the future probably in Southern LONG KHANH Province.
- b. 1 Bn and HQ 274 Regt is currently remaining to the WEST of BLACKHORSE SOUTH of Route 320, and is likely to remain in the area in the immediate future.

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- c. CHAU DUC Units still remain capable of small interdictory tasks along Route 2.
- d. D445 LF Bn - remains a threat to population hamlets/outposts along Route 23/44.
- e. A report by a HOI CHANH to 3 RAR at FSB CENTENARY states that C25 Conc Coy of LONG DAT District and C70 Conc Coy from XUYEN MOC have combined, raises the potential of that group, which normally supports D445, and they as well pose a threat to population centres on Routes 23 and 44 if they realise their new capability.


26. Battalion Statistics

	(29 JUL - 4 AUG) (Last Week)	(5 - 7 AUG) (This Week)
a. Contacts	4	4
b. Wpns CIA and Recovered	1	2
c. PWs and HOI CHANHs	-	-
d. VC/NVA KIA	12	2
e. Instls and Caches	6	1
f. Mine Incidents	-	-
g. Sightings and Agent Reports	83	73

27. Sub Region 4.

- a. An old letter, written by an MR7 Political artist (who had been killed by V Coy 2 RAR/NZ on 10 MAR 71 2000 metres to the SOUTH) was located at YS401891 in an old bunker system by 3 RAR on 2 AUG. Also located were a number of sketches of VC personnel. The letter revealed that the artist would be delayed in returning to MR7 Political Staff (as directed) and was attached Political Section SR4 at the time of writing, (20 NOV 70).
- b. There is a possibility that elements from SR 4 and 274 Regt have used the same system or perhaps the same courier system to MR7.

NUI DAT

  
 (R.L. SAYCE)  
 Capt  
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 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn



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- Annexes: a. VC/NVA Strengths, Locations and Identification.  
 b. VC Sapper Activity in MR 3.  
 c. Improved Model Soviet 122mm Rocket.  
 d. Details of Evaluation of Strength Figures for 274 Regt.

- Sources: #1 1 ATF INTSUM 28/71.  
 #2 SUPINTREP 32/71.  
 #3 1 ATF INTSUM 28/71.  
 #4 TRAC PERINTREP 11/71.  
 #5 TRAC PERINTREP 11/71.

ANNEX A TO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn  
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

VC/NVA STRENGTHS, LOCATIONS AND IDENTIFICATION

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ESTIMATED STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>
HQ MR7/SVNLA	2330	SE of GIA RAY approx YT6888.
MR7 Rear Services	1860	NUI BE approx YS8891.
33 NVA Regt/MR7	1245	
HQ elm & Sp units	333	SONG LA NGA approx YT6123.
1 Bn	300	"
2 Bn	265	NORTH of NUI CHUA CHAN approx YT5915
3 Bn (D2/BARIA)	230	BAO BINH 3 area approx YS5396
274 VC MF Regt	590	
HQ elms & Sp units	345	SOUTH WEST ONG QUE Rubber area vic Route 320.
1 Bn	115	SOUTH WEST of ONG QUE Rubber.
2 Bn	80	SOUTH of HUNG NGHAI approx YT3004
3 Bn	70	SOUTH of BINH SON approx YT2288.
BA LONG (P) HQ MR7	450	Vic NUI TRANO approx YT6000.
D445 LF Bn/BA LONG	158	
Bn HQ & C5 Coy	68	Elms in LONG HAI Mountains.
C1 Coy	24	"
C2 Coy	22	Eastern Province Border area.
C3 Coy	27	"
C4 Coy	17	"
K8 Combat Sp Coy/BA LONG	65	Probably Southern LONG KHANH
C36 Sapper Recce Coy/BA LONG	50	Probably Southern LONG KHANH.
XUAN LOC (D)/BA LONG	160	SW of XUAN LOC.
CAO SU (D)/BA LONG	155	YT3903.
CHAU DUC (D)/BA LONG	60	CHAU PA Valley approx YS3477.
C41 Conc Coy	18	"
LONG DAT (D)/BA LONG	70	YS4851.
C25 Conc Coy	24	"
XUYEN MOC (D)/BA LONG & C70 Conc	38	YS6669
BARIA Special Zone/BA LONG	36	YS3261.
VUNG TAU Special Zone/MR7	20	YS2558.
SR4 HQ/MR7	550	HAT DICH area.
D10 Sapper Bn/SR 4	230	Dispersed in Northern RUNG SAT area.



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ANNEX B TO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn  
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW  
718/35  
DATED 11 AUG 71

VC SAPPER ACTIVITY IN MR 3

General

1. In recent months the number of enemy sapper attacks in MR 3 has increased sharply. The following study has been produced by HQ TRAC and includes information received during the last six months concerning sapper units and activities in and near MR 3.
2. Sapper organization, disposition, training, tactics, weapons and equipment are discussed, as well as recent and projected activities and possible vulnerabilities and countermeasures.

Recent Activity

3. Since the first of the year, there has been a steadily increasing number of sapper attacks in MR 3, primarily in the Western portion of the region. This increase has culminated in seven major sapper attacks in BINH DUONG and TAY NINH Provinces during JUNE and JULY, resulting in friendly casualties of 17 KIA and 57 WIA versus only 9 enemy KIA. In addition 4 helicopters were destroyed and 2 helicopters and 2 trucks were damaged.
4. These attacks are the result of the enemy's increased emphasis on sapper attacks by fire as the primary form of opposition within MR 3. Although the enemy has always employed sappers in conjunction with more conventional military operations, his activities in recent months have shown significant increased reliance on the sapper as an essential part of his military operations.
5. This emphasis began as early as the Spring of 1970, when the first of several infiltration packets arrived to form the nucleus of the greatly expanded Sapper High Command. Many of these replacements had received formal sapper training in NVN, and were used to form new sapper Battalions and provide instruction on sapper tactics and techniques to older units.
6. Specific units can only be identified on 3 of the last 7 attacks, two being from the Sapper High Command (2 Sapper Coy at TAY NINH and 10 Sapper Bn at DAU TIENG), and one a sapper company of Sub Region 5 (PHU LOI attack). The majority of sapper attacks since the first of the year have been the initial combat operations of newly formed units and, as such, it can be anticipated that future attacks will be even more effective.

Training and Tactics

7. Training. NVA personnel normally receive pre-infiltration sapper training in courses that last from 3 months to 9 months. After arriving in SOUTH VIETNAM or CAMBODIA, all cadre, officers, and as many soldiers as possible attend sapper schools conducted by the Sapper High Command. This second portion of their training refreshes previous training and provide information on local conditions that

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may vary from those in NORTH VIETNAM. SVN personnel often receive their first sapper training at district or provincial schools, learning only rudimentary tactics and techniques. Once they have progressed to a cadre position, they are normally sent to a more formal training course conducted by the Sapper High Command. During the past year, the enemy has also used a mobile training team concept that involves sending an instruction team to various areas to train entire units in sapper tactics. This has occurred in Sug Region 5 and TAY NINH (P).

8 The training itself places a strong emphasis on small unit actions, and is almost exclusively limited to tactics of 2 or 3 men sapper cells. Subjects which receive the most attention are (1), methods of crawling (low crawl within 100m of an objective, high crawl 100m or over), (2), crossing ditches and walls or fences, (3), wire cutting, (4), avoiding or deactivating mines, grenades and trip flares, and (5), the characteristics of mines, claymores, C-4 and TNT. Relatively little time is spent in tactics to be employed once a penetration has been made or in the actual use of demolitions. The sapper training courses are normally geared to undetected approach and penetration of the objective. Surprise is considered the essential ingredient for any sapper operation.

9. Training site and facilities are normally quite limited, with a great reliance on experienced instructors. The Sapper High Command School had several mock-ups of compounds, surrounded by wire barriers for practice penetrations by students. Training aids were generally dummy mines, claymores, and small amounts of TNT and C-4. An interesting aspect of the training is that student personnel rarely had any training in the actual handling or detonation of explosives. Their first experience with live explosives generally came during the first sapper attack. As a general rule of thumb, it was taught that a half kilogram of TNT was used against bunkers and one kilogram for artillery emplacements. Often the first sapper attack of a new unit was considered the final training phase of the unit.

10. Tactics. The basic tactical doctrine presently in use is thorough recon followed by short quick attacks by small sapper teams. The tactical doctrine of the 10 Sapper Bn of the Sapper High Command (one of the newly formed units) points out the four standard steps for a sapper attack:

- a. Complete reconnaissance of the objective by unit commanders and ranking cadre.
- b. Sandtable mockup constructed with wire positions, weapon emplacements, Tactical Operations Centres (TOCs) and CPs highlighted. Personnel who will actually conduct the attack usually study the model several days prior to the attack.
- c. Approach march on the day of the attack, normally to within 500m of the objective.
- d. Surprise: 10-15 min attack by several 3-5 man cells.

11. The initial recon of the target is considered essential for a successful attack. The recon is normally carried out by experienced commanders and cadre who do not take part in the attack itself. Their responsibility is that of carefully briefing the attacking force, and coordinating the action when more than one sapper element, or supporting or diversionary fires are to be used. Since cadre personnel



seldom take part in the attack, personnel killed or captured normally do not represent an important loss to the unit.

12. The recce itself normally takes place anywhere from 3-10 days prior to the attack. It is during this portion of the operation that the mission is most likely to be postponed or cancelled if an adequate recce cannot be carried out. In a number of instances, friendly patrols and ambush points have intercepted these recce teams killing or capturing key sapper personnel. In addition to locating bunkers, weapons and CPs, the recce teams pay particular attention to any security pattern or laxness. This pre-attack recce often involves actual penetration of the objective.

13. The standard sandtable mock-up is used to brief the attack personnel, normally a day or two prior to the attack. The attack personnel often use their objective for the first time on the night of the attack.

14. The approach marches are generally divided into two phases; an initial move from the unit's base area to a forward base area, usually within a 5-10 hour walk from the objective; and a second phase, the approach to the objective, generally attempting to arrive early in the evening at a distance of approx 500 metres from the perimeter wire.

15. In the conduct of the attack itself, normally 2-3 man sapper cells cut the wire and penetrate the objective, generally between the hours of 0100 and 0330. Often two teams, composed of one or more cells, are employed from different directions. However, 12-15 personnel are normally the maximum in the actual penetration. An additional sapper element is usually stationed outside the wire to provide diversionary action/or fire support, as well as a command and control centre. Normally the entry and exit routes are the same. Once penetration has been made, time delay satchel charges are placed at predesignated targets. The delay, generally less than one hour, is to allow for exfiltration of the attack personnel. The detonation of a satchel charge usually means the attacking force has already left the objective area and is relatively safe.

16. Mortar and rocket attacks have been used in conjunction with sapper attacks, although this is more the exception than the rule. A recent example is the JUN sapper attack on PHU LOI Base Camp that was followed several hours later by a rocket attack. Subsequently, captured documents indicated that the attacking force had coordinated with an artillery company for the joint attack. In addition, documents and a recent HOI CHANH have indicated that the 9 Sapper Bn of the Sapper High Command has an artillery element from 69 Artillery Command under its control. Despite these exceptions, the majority of sapper units seldom employ fire support larger than B40 and B41 RLs.

17. The 5 Sapper Coy of Sub Region 1, the 8 and 10 Sapper Bn of Sub Region 4, and the 15 Sapper Bn of the Sapper High Command, all have water sapper capabilities. The Sub Region 4 units normally are employed against shipping in the RUNG SAT area, with their attack often coming from staggered positions on both sides of the river using B40 and B41 fire. The Sub Region 1 unit has employed both RL fire and command detonated mines against river patrols. In a recent example, the third patrol craft in line was hit by a mine, and the first two craft were engaged with RL fire when they turned to assist the mined boat. Mining and B41 activity has also shown an increase in the LONG AN Sub Region.



18. The majority of the information discussed above refers to the enemy's forces (main) sapper units. The local district and village level sapper units employ basically the same tactics, although on a much smaller scale. The primary difference in the main and local forces is the latter's familiarity with the terrain, people and customs, and their reliance on inside help. Many of the recent minor raids on hamlets and PSDF posts have been through the use of information or personnel that will actually open gates or signal the sapper unit when it is safe to approach.

19. Weapons. Although the NVN Tables of Organisation and Equipment (TO & E) for a sapper battalion include heavy weapons, the majority of sapper units operating within MR3 have modified their organisation to exclude heavy mortars, recoilless rifles and rockets, and rely primarily on district, provincial and main force artillery units for support. Occasionally, 60mm and 82mm mortars are in a sapper unit's inventory but they seem to be employed more for defence or diversion than as an integral part of the attack. Reports of mortar fire during a sapper attack are often erroneous, and are actually the exploding satchel charges.

20. The standard weapons inventory includes B40 and B41 RLs, AK47s, K54s and satchel charges. A typical sapper team will have 2 B40 RLs with 4-5 rounds each, 2 AK47s with 60 rounds each, and 5-10 satchel charges per man. The weapons employed outside the perimeter of an objective with the men who actually penetrate the defences carrying only the satchel charges. The explosives used includes TNT, C4 grenades, and bangalore torpedoes. One-pound charges are normally used, and are considered adequate for destruction of weapons positions or helicopters. The JUL attack on LAI KHE Base Camp involved the exclusive charges, while the JUN attack at PHJ LOI employed a heat delay fuze designed to go off when warned by the sun.

21. While there have been recent indications of an ammunition shortage in some sapper units, ammunition and weapons resupply is not considered significant problem. Many of the explosive charges are manufactured from recovered allied duds.

22. Equipment. Equipment in a sapper unit is kept to an absolute minimum and normally consists of wire cutters, steel pins for deactivating mines, clips for holding the wire apart, compasses, binoculars and daggers. The sapper who penetrates the objective generally has only a pair of shorts, some metal rods, pins and his satchel charges.

23. Training. The almost complete lack of training with live explosives hinders the effective employment of satchel charges. Numerous instances have occurred where a successful penetration is made but the charges failed to detonate, or, when detonated, caused negligible damage.

24. Reconnaissance. A thorough prior recce of the objective is mandatory for a sapper attack. Any measures that hinder or stop the recce will normally cause the attack to be cancelled or at least postponed. Effective physical barriers, dogs, constant night patrols, and ambushes have all been documented as preventing adequate recce.

25. Pre-attack Positions. The enemy's normal procedure calls for positioning of his sapper teams in the early evening as close as possible to the objective, generally about 500m from the perimeter. The enemy force generally stay in these positions until the penetration is attempted, usually 0100 and 0330 hours. Effective night patrols and ambush points can prevent this positioning. #1



26. Counter-measures. The measures suggested here are identical to those which have been recommended since the sapper threat first became serious. The sapper threat has not basically changed in recent years, only the scope, intensity and targetting of the unit varies.

- a. Preventing an Attack. Constant night patrols, ambush points and employment of dogs and ground radar are effective in hindering or preventing the pre-attack recce and positioning of forces. Ensuring that set patterns are not established in patrolling, guard changing, and weapons positions will greatly hinder the enemy in obtaining an accurate assessment of the friendly situation. During periods of increased alert posture, increased use of flares and searchlights has proven effective, both in revealing sapper personnel and throwing their time schedule off.
- b. During an Attack. The one essential ingredient of a successful sapper attack is surprise and the sapper team must depend on laxness by guard personnel. Once the sappers are in the wire, the guard personnel are usually the only barriers between the sapper and his objective. As always alert guards are the last and most effective defence against a sapper penetration.

27. Projected Activities. Based upon the formation of new sapper units, sapper training of district and provincial forces, recent activity and PW and HC reports, sapper attacks can be expected to increase. During the first four months of 1971, the sapper attacks were directed primarily against border fire support bases and the specific targets included ammunition, POL and supplies. This was an attempt to hinder ARVN forces in CAMBODIA and to force their return to MR3. With the majority of ARVN units now within MR3, the enemy has shifted his priorities to targetting helicopters and personnel. Such targets create a much greater impression on the local populace, as well as providing favourable propaganda for the enemy in his efforts to dis-credit the Vietnamisation programme and keep American casualties in the news. We can expect a continuation of this programme with US and ARVN base camps, particularly those with a high aircraft density, being prime targets. The enemy will employ his main force sapper units against these targets, while the lower level forces will target the GVN pacification programme. Appearance of new main force sapper units does not appear likely in the near future, as the enemy presently has adequate forces for an intensive campaign. The great majority of sapper activity will continue to occur in the BINH DUONG and TAY NINH Provinces. While sapper training has taken place in MR7 (both the 33 NVA Regt and D445 Bn have received sapper training in the last six months), the enemy in this area appears to be preoccupied with food shortages and the current reorganisation of the Region.

28. It should be noted that the JUN and JUL sapper attacks occurred during the period of least illumination, (normal enemy procedures), and that the period of lowest illumination for AUG is the 17th to the 25th.

1 ATF COMMENT: The 10 VC Sapper Bn referred to in paras 10 and 16 is D10 Sapper Bn, of which elements are at present thought to be in the RUNG SAT NORTH WEST of THAI THIEN. Both D445 and 3/55 have received sapper training and 274 Regt possesses a Sapper Coy which may have carried out the attack on CAM TAN (YS578995) on 27 JUL 71.

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ANNEX CTO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn  
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW  
718/35  
DATED 11 AUG 71

IMPROVED MODEL SOVIET 122mm ROCKET

1. 122mm Rocket. Recently there has been some misunderstanding concerning the capabilities of the Soviet 122mm Fin-Stabilised HE Rocket. Provided below are significant facts derived from exploitation of the rocket at ABERDEEN Proving Ground during the period MAR 69 to MAR 70.
  - a. The Soviet model DKZ-B fuse, used with the 122mm rocket is a point detonating fuse. It has a built in screw type selector which gives the following optional settings with average delay times as indicated: Superquick - 0.52 milliseconds; Short Delay - 8.93 milliseconds; Long Delay - 19.03 milliseconds
  - b. Effectiveness tests proved that minimum material capable of defeating optional delay settings of the fuse, by causing functioning with reduced delay time, was 1/2 inch thick rolled homogeneous armour plate or 5/8 inch thick mild steel plate. When fired against material of lesser thickness, the rocket penetrated the target and exploded inside the log barricade backing.
  - c. The 122mm rocket is a highly accurate, barrage type weapon. A well trained crew, using the Soviet tube launcher, firing at an optional range of 8,500 metres can place 95% of all rounds fired into an area 70,650 sq metres or, in other words, a circular area having a radius of 150 metres. When field expedients, such as crossed sticks or earthen mounds, are employed instead of the tube launcher, the circular error probable (CEP) is not significantly increased because the rocket is fin-stabilised and the same fire control instruments are normally used.
2. There is no evidence of any new model 122mm rocket or fuse being used within RVN. #3



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ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn  
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW  
718/35  
DATED 11 AUG 71

DETAILS OF EVALUATION OF STRENGTH  
FIGURES FOR 274 MF Regt ( REF ANNEX B to  
4 RAR/NZ WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW  
718/34)

1. General

The purpose of this Annex is to evaluate the strength figures of the 274 MF Inf Regt, in view of past and current information, and provide a basis for a revised strength estimate.

2. Composition

- a. Regt HQ. The Regt HQ is divided into three sections; The Military Staff B1; The political Staff B2; and the Rear Services Staff, B3. Although the strength of each staff section is not known, the current combined strength is held at 60 personnel, which includes Security/Signal elements
- b. Battalion Organisation: Three Infantry Battalions designated D1, D2 and D3 comprise the main infantry units of the 274 Regt. Each of these battalions has three infantry companies, and a headquarters company. In the 1 Bn, these are designated C1, C2 and C3 plus C4 (Hvy Wpns Coy), and C5 (HQ Coy). In the 2 Bn, company designations are C6, C7, C8, C9 (Hvy Wpns), and C10 (HQ Coy). In the 3 Bn, company designations follow in the order of the other two battalions and are designated C11, C12, C13, C14 (Hvy Wpns), and C15 (HQ Coy).
- c. Battalion Strengths:  
(1) The battalion is carried at a strength of 240 personnel. Each of the three infantry companies and the heavy weapons company is carried at 50 personnel with the headquarters company held at 40 personnel.  
(2) The 2 Bn and 3 Bn are carried at a strength of 250 personnel each. Each company, heavy weapons company, and headquarters company is held at 50 personnel.
- d. Regt Support Companies: The Regt support companies are designated C16 through C24. An estimate of the unit strengths is listed below:

C16 Mortar Coy	30
C17 Recoilless Rifle Coy	25
C18 Antiaircraft/Heavy Wpns Coy	20
C19 Engineer Coy	25
C20 Signal Coy	24
C21A Sapper Coy	24
C21B Recon Coy	12
C22 Trans Coy	40
C23 Surgical Coy	20
C24 Convalescent Coy	20

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3. Strength Evaluations: This current strength evaluation is based on three indicators. First, previous estimates, which were admittedly outdated, were viewed in light of known infiltration of personnel detained for the 274 Regt during 1971. Secondly, a PW, PHAM VAN CHIEN, Pl Leader, 6 Coy D2, 274 Regt captured vic YS428-877, on 1 JUL 71 by elements of the 3 Bde, 1 ACD has revealed extensive information concerning the 274 Regt. CHIEN's statements concerning 1) the time frame of his infiltration group number (2238), 2) the organizational structure of the 274 Regt and 3) many of the personalities identified, all agreed with OB holdings, but his strength figures appeared excessive. Strength for the D1 and D2 Bn was given as 400 men each. CHIEN's information cannot be proven as erroneous. The third indicator which prompted this re-evaluation is URS reports. URS confirmed the arrival of CHIEN's group, an additional group of 200 within the past month and another group within the past week, the latter two designated for the 274 Regt. Since CHIEN's group was stated as 200 and the former URS group was stated at 200, it can be assumed the recent arrivals may also number 200 personnel. Therefore, since JAN 1971, 400 replacements have probably arrived for the 274 Regt and possibly as many as 600. Of further consideration is the fact that 1 ATF ORBAT reports an obvious increase in the number of enemy personnel encountered during contacts; an increase in the volume of fire encountered; and an overall willingness to stand and fight. In light of past history, these tactical facets are viewed as further evidence of increased strength.


4. Conclusion: It is the consideration of TRAC OB and 1 ATF ORBAT that the 274 Regt has a total strength figure of approx 1,040 personnel. Liaison with III Corps OB and the 3rd Bde 1 ACD indicates that they also accept higher strengths than are previously recorded by TRAC OB. Research back in mid 1969 has provided some insight into the probable distribution of this strength. The TRAC PERINTREP will reflect the strength as follows: Regt HQ and Support companies 300; 1 Bn 240; 2 Bn 250; and 3 Bn 250.

5. Comment: Recent contacts with 274 Regt and documents CIA by 4 RAR/NZ have provided the basis for and substantiated the research conducted by TRAC OB and 1 ATF ORBAT into these evaluated strengths. #5

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# ARARINZ ANZAC BN WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW



Reference

718/36

Period Ending

18 AUG 71.

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4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn

INDEX 718/36

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NORTH VIETNAM

1. Aerial photography of the ports of DING HOI and QUANG KHE revealed normal activity. Truck activity South on Routes 101C and 1AC as revealed by STAR showed a slight decrease over the last week. An average of 117 tons of supplies per day were shipped South from DONG HOI, compared with 111 tons a day for the past 30 days.

LAOS

2. Truck movement through the PANHANDLE lines of communication, as indicated by sensor string activations, decreased slightly during the week. There were 127 activations recorded, as compared with 154 the previous week. This level of activity is well below the corresponding period last year in which there were 641 activations. This is probably due to the unusually heavy rains experienced this year as well as to allied air interdiction.

3. On 7 Aug an irregular company contacted an enemy company near SARAVANE. Tactical air strikes forced the enemy to withdraw leaving behind one killed. A cache was located in the area containing three rice storage warehouses, one destroyed ammunition bunker, 34 cases of B-40 rocket launcher rounds, one case of 60mm mortar rounds and 60 bales of clothing and blankets.

4. RLA forces have reported heavy resistance in the vicinity of PAKSONG (XB276795). The enemy were supported by B-40 and mortar fire. On 12 Aug, two friendly battalions operating in the same area received an attack by fire of more than 400 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. There were no casualties reported.

CAMBODIA

5. Enemy initiated activity continued at an extremely low level. The enemy is apparently continuing to concentrate on logistical activity, training and repositioning of forces. The fact that some enemy units may be preparing to move back into SOUTH VIETNAM, in preparation for attempts to disrupt the forthcoming elections, is probably a contributing factor to the low level of activity.

SOUTH VIETNAM

6. Enemy activity increased. A recent agent report has revealed the presence of 38 NVA Artillery Regt in the South-Central DMZ near CON THIEN (YD037713). The estimated strength of the unit is 200 men equipped with eight 105mm howitzers.

7. There have been several contacts with enemy troops and attacks by fire late in the reporting period. On 14 and 15 Aug, the Fire Support Bases facing the DMZ were subjected to heavy attacks by fire including barrages laid down by 130mm guns positioned north of the DMZ. One ARVN Fire Support Base was reported overrun on 15 Aug, in what was the first full scale daylight attack by North Vietnamese troops for some considerable time. The FSB was reportedly taken after hand to destroyed ammunition bunker, 34 cases of B-40 rocket launcher rounds, one case of 60mm mortar rounds and 60 bales of clothing and blankets.

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hand fighting. However, it was only held by the enemy for a few hours. B-52 strikes and US Artillery was used to drive out the enemy. Further detail is still to come on these reports.

MR2

8. Activity remained at a reduced level as many enemy units possibly prepare for the upcoming Autumn campaign.

9. In the B-3 Front major enemy elements have continued to avoid contact during the past week. An agent has stated that two enemy companies intend to **conduct attacks by fire** against PLEIKU City between 15 and 20 Aug, and they also plan to conduct ambushes along Route 14 between KONTUM City and PLEI KHOL (ZA199675) from 20 to 25 Aug. This is one of several reports received which state that PLEIKU City is one of the prime targets during the forthcoming Autumn campaign.

MR4

10. During the week enemy initiated activity remained at a low level, with a daily average of one attack by fire. Region-wide DONG KHOI operations probably contributed to the decline in enemy activity.

11. Debriefing of a Hoi Chanh has provided further indication of a decline in enemy morale in the Delta. The rallier is a former company commander and he stated that his unit's combat capabilities has deteriorated seriously in the past year because of morale problems. Some of the factors contributing to these problems were shortages of food, friction between NVA and VC, lack of popular support and depletion of the ranks due to personnel rallying. This statement corroborates those of other ralliers, **indicating** growing dissatisfaction and resultant deterioration of combat effectiveness. If these reports are accurate, morale may be a factor in the current lull in activity in the U MINH Forest.

MR3

12. Enemy initiated activity continued at a low level during the week. There were no reported terrorist incidents in SAIGON.

13. On 8 Aug RF elements killed seven enemy while on search operations west of CHON THANH (XT547647). The enemy were possibly elements of 101 NVA Regt. Friendly losses were one killed and three wounded/ Also on 8 Aug VNN and RF/PF elements returning from an amphibious operation near BEN LUC were ambushed by an enemy force using B-40 and small arms fire. One VNN patrol boat was hit by two B-40 rounds, two friendlies were killed, 20 were wounded and two are missing. Enemy losses are unknown.

14. A usually reliable agent reports that the enemy intend to conduct ambushes against ARVN convoys in SR5. The ambushes are to occur along Highway 1A between PHU GIAO (XT9649) and BINH MY (XT9129). In probably related activity, on 6 Aug, ARVN forces were ambushed near PHU GIAO (XT964483) by an enemy force using claymores, B-40s and small arms fire. Results were eight friendlies killed, six wounded, one civilian wounded, 25 weapons lost and one 1½ ton truck destroyed.

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These reports tend to substantiate current reports of increased enemy emphasis on interdiction of lines of communication in GVN MR3.

15. Assessment for MR 3

Attacks against GVN Officials, and officers are certain to continue, and a general increase in enemy offensive activity is likely to take place to cover the election period.

4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN AREA OF INTEREST

16. NVA/VC Identification, Units and Locations.

See Annex A.

17 3 Bn 33 NVA Regt

a. The unit is believed to remain to the South East of BAO BINH in LONG KHANH Province.

18. 274 VC MF Regt

a. Regt HQ probably remains near the SUOI QUIT area to the West of the BILMSTONE TRAIL.

b. 1 Bn is thought to be located near the tri - Province area of BIEN HOA, LONG KHANH and PHUOC TUY Provinces.

c. On 13 Aug a 1 ATF patrol engaged a party of at least ten enemy near the SUOI QUIT (at YS341918), killing five and wounding at least another three. The enemy were identified from documents as members of 3 Bn 274 Regt and the KIA probably included the Assistant Political Officer of the Battalion. When contacted the party was moving in what is believed to have been the general direction of elements of HQ 274 Regt. A document indicated that there was to be a meeting of representatives of all units of 274 Regt to commence on 14 or 15 Aug and it is therefore thought that the party may possibly have been moving to attend this meeting. One of the KIA was carrying \$VN 30,000. He was possibly a member of the Rear Services Staff of 3 Bn. The main element of 3 Bn is usually located in the South-Eastern portion of BIEN HOA Province.

19. D445 LF BN

a. On 12 August 8 Pl C Coy 3 RAR were engaged from a small bunker position at YS662652. The enemy group were aggressive and directed heavy fire at supporting gunships. The VC are probably from D445 or XUAN MOC/LONG DAT Guerillas.

b. Previously, reports that elements of D445 were located in the XUAN MOC area were received, indicating that C2 Coy was to the North and C3 Coy to the South. 3 RAR operations may have forced these forces away from the population centre, but the VC most likely will remain in the general vicinity together with elements from BHQ. It is probable that C1 Coy remains in the LONG HAI and information indicated that still other elements are located in the MAY TAO area.

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20. MR7 - BA LONG Forces.

- a. On Aug 15 1 Pl V Coy contacted a group of VC on the North Eastern foothills of NUI LE (YS504877). A camp consisting of 23 sleeping places with some bunkers under construction was found in the area and documents located identified C5 Purchasing and Requisitioning Coy of J85 Transportation Bn. The number of receipts and supply notes captured indicated that they were establishing a possible staging area in the vicinity of the " Re-supply" rubber plantations.
- b. The last contact with members of C5 was on 6 Aug at YS434865 and there is a definite connection between the two groups.
- c. Further evidence was provided from documents captured from 2 VC who were wounded and later DOW at YS438862 on 16 Aug; after being ambushed by 10 Pl D Coy as they approached a cache which contained 650 lbs of rice and a small quantity of other food/tobacco supplies.
- d. These documents referred to the BA LONG Rubber Plantation Peoples Revolutionary Committee and also made mention of senior cadre of BA LONG (P) HQ and members of CAO SU and CHAU DUC (D).
- e. The 2 VC DOW have been tentatively identified as PHAN VAN CUONG aka VU HIEN (the ex PCS BINH BA (V)) and member Comd Committee CHAU DUC and NGUYEN VAN HAI (2IC Propaganda and Trg Sect BA LONG ). The reason for their being in the area of Route 2 Plantation is not fully understood, but it is known that in Jul a large qty (6,000 lbs) of rice and at least \$VN50,000 had been collected from that area.
- f. It is also thought that their presence is linked with the re-organisation of MR7 - Provincial HQ currently reported to be in action.
- g. Several warnings were also issued which involved the security of persons in the plantation area, as a result of the document readout.
- h. The VC are certainly aware of what allied action has taken place, and have established a reliable reporting system covering the area. However these reports take time to reach the HQ (probably the Current Affairs Committee of Province HQ) and any plans the VC may make to avoid our operations are often nullified by changes in deployment.

21. Sub Region 4

- a. On 9 Aug, THAI forces killed a member of the Medical Services near the FIRESTONE TRAIL (YS286824).

22. ASSESSMENT

- a. 3 Bn 33 NVA Regt is likely to be carrying out reconnaissance for future offensive tasks in the BAO BINH area and Southern LONG KHANH Province.
- b. 27<sup>th</sup> VC Regt have undoubtedly received orders concerning the re-organisation of MR7 and given directions concerning offensive operations for the near future. Whether the Regt will concentrate for attacks or remain as Bn groups cannot as yet be determined. Mention of a meeting to be held on 1<sup>st</sup>/15 Aug attended by representatives from each unit would most certainly have discussed the Regt's role during the election period.

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- c. Most likely targets for an attack would be outposts along Northern/Central Routes 2, and 15, as well as BEARCAT, BLACKHORSE and population centres such as CAM TAM, BAM MY and BIN SON.
- d. CHAU DUC (D) and C2 Coy BA LONG Engineers remain capable of mining and interdicting Route 2.
- e. D445 remains a threat to population centres/outposts along Routes 23 and 44; with LONG DAT Conc Coys C25 (and C21 Coy?) threatening LONG DIEN. The attack on a PF compound 14/15 Aug in LONG DIEN, may have been launched by C25.
- f. BARIA/LONG HUONG. After an ABF on an RF Coy on 9 Aug of 2 x B40 rounds in BARIA, and the repeated reports of a concentration of VC forces around LONG HUONG the area is certain to have further incidents in the near future.
- g. Two assassination attempts have occurred recently. An RCD Cadre member was killed on 9 Aug on Route 23 near XUAN MOC, and the District Chief and 3 body guards were killed in an ambush near BARIA on 15/16 August. The DSA (from HOA LONG) was also wounded in this second incident. Further attempts against GVN officials and road traffic can be expected as the elections draw closer.
- h. An increase in the amount of VC activity in the Plantation area of Route 2 near the Province Border is expected; to obtain supplies for units participating in future offensive activity, as large food caches intended for use by the VC/NVA forces in MR7 have been destroyed in the NUI MAO TAO, NUI BE area over the last 5 months, and reserve stocks must be running low. #

23. Battalion Statistics

	(5 - 11 AUG) (Last week)	(12 - 18 AUG ) (This week)
a. Contacts	4	2
b. Wpns CIA and Recovered	2	-
c. PWs and HOI CHANHS	-	-
d. VC/NVA KIA	2	2
e. Instls and Caches	1	7
f. Mine Incidents	-	1
g. Sightings and Agent Reports	73	68

NUI DAT

  
(R.L. SAYCE) *RLS*  
Capt  
IO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn



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Annexes: **A.** VC/NVA Strengths, Locations and Identifications.  
**B.** Information received from TRAC.  
**C.** New Enemy Weapons and Tactics.

Sources: 1 ATF INTSUM 229/71  
1 ATF SUPINTREP 33/71

ANNEX A TO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN  
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

VC/NVA STRENGTHS, LOCATIONS AND IDENTIFICATION

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ESTIMATED STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>
HQ MR7/SVNLA	2330	SE of GIA RAY approx YT6888.
MR7 Rear Services	1860	NUI BE approx YF3891.
33 NVA Regt/MR7	1245	
HQ Elm & Sp Units	333	SONG LA NGA approx YT6123.
1 Bn	300	" " " " "
2 Bn	265	NORTH of NUI CHUA CHAN approx YT5915
3 Bn (D2/BARIA)	300	BAO BINH 3 area approx YS5396.
274 VC MF Regt	1040	
HQ Elms & Sp Units	300	SOUTH WEST ONG QUE Rubber area vic Route 320.
1 Bn	240	SOUTH WEST of ONG QUE Rubber.
2 Bn	250	SOUTH of HUNG NGHIA approx YT3004
3 Bn	250	SOUTH of BINH SON approx YT2288.
BA LONG (P) HQ MR7	450	Vic NUI TRANO approx YT6000.
D445 LF Bn/BA LONG	158	
Bn HQ & C5 Coy	68	Elms in LONG HAI Mountains.
C1 Coy	24	" " " " "
C2 Coy	22	Eastern Province Border/XUAN MOC Area
C3 Coy	27	" " " " "
C4 Coy	17	" " " " "
K8 Combat Sp Coy/BA LONG	65	Probably Southern LONG KHANH.
C36 Sapper Recce Coy/BA LONG	50	" " " "
XUAN LOC (D)/BA LONG	160	SW of XUAN LOC.
CAO SU (D)/BA LONG	155	YT3903.
CHAU DUC (D)/BA LONG	60	CHAU PA Valley approx YS3477.
C41 Conc Coy	18	" " " " "
LONG DAT (D)/BA LONG	70	YS4851.
C25 Conc Coy	24	"
XUYEN MOC (D)/BA LONG & C70 Conc	38	YS6669
BARIA Special Zone/BA LONG	36	YS3261
VUNG TAU Special Zone/MR7	20	YS2558
SR4 HQ/MR7	550	HAT DICH area.
D10 Sapper Bn/SR 4	230	Dispersed in Northern RUNG SAT area.

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ANNEX B TO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN  
WEEKLY REVIEW NO 718/36  
DATED 18 AUG 71

1. The following has been received from TRAC:

- a. The translation of 12 cassette tapes captured by Cambodian forces 18 May 71 at approx YT4635 which were probably recorded by a cadre of SR6, has provided information on a possible enemy plan for mass uprisings in SAIGON. The VC are reported to believe that a Government favouring peace in SAIGON would greatly increase their chances of an overthrow of the present VN Govt. Therefore, by fomenting mass demonstrations, the VC planned to discredit and possibly overturn the THIEU regime. They expected to replace the present Govt with at least one that favoured peace. SAIGON was to be the centre of this activity because the narrator believed that the revolution could only be successfully ended here. The enemy pers also stated that this action could take as long as five years to complete.
- b. Docus captured from an ambush 5 Aug 71, NE of DINH QUAN (YT6461) by a 3 Bde (Sep) 1st (US) Cav Div (AM) Ranger Team have ident elms of 814 RSG. The docus indicate continuous mov of en pers into the DINH QUAN area of War Zone D.
- c. Since 2 Aug 71, 3 Bde has uncovered four food caches in War Zone D in vicinity of YT6752. A total of 11 tons of flour and one ton of salt have been captured. Contacts, ground to airfiring incidents and the incident of C4 Purchasing and Requisitioning Coy indicate that the area is a major entry/exit point along Route 20 for J95 Rear Services Bn of MR7 RSG.
- d. Docus captured on 6 Aug 71 near DINH QUAN (YT6462) which ident elms of 814 RSG, contained entries dated early Apr 71 discussing the mov of 30 tons of supplies from DA NANG to the SAIGON area. The docus indicate that a meeting held on 6 Apr 71, dealt with a forthcoming long term supply transportation mission. Minutes of another meeting recorded the shipment of supplies to DA LAT and it would appear from these docus that 814 RSG may have responsibilities other than supporting units in MR7, and possibly that supplies are being shipped to MR7 by sea.

Comment: Reference comments to Annex D to REVIEW 718/33 dated 28 Jul 71; DINH QUAN (YT6462) area is known to ~~some members~~ of 5VC Div as they passed through the vicinity during TET 1969. #



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4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn  
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

NEW ENEMY WEAPONS AND TACTICS


Ex'racted from PHUOC TUY Province INTSUM 223/71, dated 11 Aug 71. The VC in VINH BINH Province MR 3 have ~~been~~ found to use kites as a signal device to warn of friendly operations in an area. Personnel on an operation in VINH BINH (P) observed two red kites rise into the air on the commencement of an allied operation. Immediately following the sighting, a buzzing sound was heard in the operational area. Examination of the anchor points of the unattended kites revealed that each kite had a reed attachment to it, which created the buzzing sound when spun by the wind. The sound produced was audible at a range of 1 to 1½ kilometres, and was thought to be intended as a warning for VC.

Comment. It is unlikely that this method will be employed in the 4 RAR/NZ AO.



G4

# ARAR/INZ ANZAC BN WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW



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4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN

INTDEX 718/37

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

LAOS

1. On 18 Aug four Laotian Battalions preparing for an attack on PAKSONG were attacked by an enemy force 3½ kilms West of that location (XG 2978). The enemy were supported by recoilless rifles, mortars and probably tanks. The friendly units retreated with one killed and 32 wounded. An APC and a jeep were also destroyed. On 19 Aug irregular forces at BAN PHAKKOUT (XB2280) received an attack by fire of 100 mortar and artillery rounds which killed one friendly and wounded two.

2. Interrogation of two PWs from 6 Bn 148 Regt 316 NVA Div has provided information which indicates the concern that the enemy has for his caches in the Plain of Jars and his determination to prevent, as far as possible, any further inroads into the Plain of Jars by General VANG PAO's forces. The PWs stated that air strikes and desertions had reduced the Bn's strength to only 30%. The PWs had been part of a 300 strong group that had been infiltrated by truck to reinforce 6 Bn with the express intention of recapturing the Plain of Jars. The fact that the enemy reinforcements arrived following VANG PAO's move into the Plain, and the fact these reinforcements were rushed into Northern LAOS by truck, indicates the importance which the enemy attaches to holding the Plain.

CAMBODIA

3. On 17 Aug an ARVN Bn engaged an enemy force 13 km South of NEAK LUONG (WT283320). Results were 9 enemy killed and 15 weapons captured. Also on 17 Aug CAMBODIAN forces engaged a large enemy force near KAMPONG TRABEK (WT604195) resulting in five friendlies killed and five wounded to 42 enemy killed and eight detained.

4. On 18 Aug an enemy Sapper force attacked a bridge on Route 16 near KAMPOT (VS1562) which was being guarded by Cambodian elements. The enemy succeeded in dropping a 50m span of the bridge and killing four of the defending force.

SOUTH VIETNAM

MR 1

5. Activity continued at a moderate level in Northern QUANG TRI Province while remaining at a low level elsewhere in the Region.

6. In the B - 5 Front 84 NVA Artillery Regt has been conducting attacks by fire in both the central and Eastern DMZ areas. In the central area attacks were launched against Fire Support Base (FSB) FULLER (YD019593), FSB KHE GIO (YD024564) and CAMP CAPROL (YD063544). These attacks were heaviest on 15 Aug and were probably timed to support the enemy ground assault on NUI BA HO (YD0151). Below the Eastern DMZ, the enemy's plans to strike A - 4 (CON THIEN, YD115703), C - 2 (YD135645), and C - 1 (YD215675) were executed with a series of attacks that

/began on

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began on 12 Aug.

7. Between 14 and 17 Aug allied elements located in FSB SARGE (YDO29478) and operating in the vicinity of NUI BA HO received numerous attacks by fire and ground attacks. On 15 Aug allied elements located 3 km NNW of FSB SARGE received a ground attack from a large enemy force. Results were 31 friendlies killed or missing to an estimated 200 enemy killed. It was reported that allied forces withdrew from NUI BA HO under heavy enemy pressure. On 17 Aug allied elements operating 3.5 km NW of NUI BA HO engaged an enemy force resulting in 22 friendlies killed and 51 wounded to 142 enemy killed by body count.

MR 2

8. During the past week activity remained at a reduced level, although there was a slight increase in attacks by fire in the coastal provinces.

9. Reports of an intended attack against PLEIKU continue to be received and therefore it seems likely that PLEIKU may be subjected to some kind of attack in late Aug.

10. In MR 5 activity remained at a reduced level as major enemy elements continued to avoid contact. In BINH DINH Province, on 17 Aug, in QUI NHON Harbour (CR100244), a US freighter was sunk by an estimated 500 to 600 lbs of explosive placed externally on the hull. The ship was carrying military cargo. Four pers were wounded.

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MR 4

11. During the week activity continued at a low level, with a daily average of two attacks by fire. The continued lull may be due to final preparations and planning for election - orientated activity during the coming week. There have been numerous indications that an increase in activity is planned.

12. Translation of a directive from COSVN in a captured document gives an indication of enemy intentions regarding both the lower house and Presidential elections. The directive calls for intensification of political activities. Major missions assigned are propaganda activities and the exploitation of student organizations and other social groups in urban areas. Other reports suggest encouragement or guidance of the people to vote for candidates whom the VC consider favourable to their cause; while in some cases the people are to be called upon either to void their ballots or not to vote at all.

MR 3

13. During the past week activity remained at a low level. There was one terrorist incident reported in SAIGON during the week. This incident, which was the first this month, occurred when 6 lbs of explosive was placed against the gate of an ARVN installation. Results were one ARVN soldier wounded and the gate lightly damaged.

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14. In TAY NINH Province on 14 Aug, US and ARVN forces conducting land clearing operations 8 km East of KHIEN HANH (XT512356) discovered a very large enemy tunnel system containing 60 to 80 tunnels. Although the complex was in excellent condition, it had been abandoned.

15. On 17 Aug elements of the LONG AN PRU on search operations near CAN GIOUC (XS925712), with VNAF tactical air and gunship support, engaged probable elms of 508 VC Bn. The contact lasted 2 hours and resulted in 4 friendlies wounded to 6 enemy killed and a quantity of ammunition captured.

16. On 16 Aug, BIEN HOA airbase received an attack by fire of 4 rounds of 75mm RR fire. The rounds impacted near the runway and resulted in no casualties and only slight damage to the runway, which was closed for 12 hours.

17. Further large caches of US manufactured flour have been discovered in the vicinity of DINH QUAN. These latest discoveries mean that 6 caches totalling 24.4 tons of flour and salt have been found within a 2 mile radius (of YT680530) recently.

18. On 11 Aug documents were captured North West of SAIGON which identified an element of 174 Regt of 5 VC Div. Other documents captured on 7 Aug in TAY NINH Province indicated that Rear Service planning has been taking place for a likely move of the Sapper Command HQ SVNLA from CAMBODIA into GVN MR 3 to take place in late Sept or early Oct. These documents support earlier assessments that some enemy units are preparing to move back into SOUTH VIETNAM.

19. Assessment for MR3

Indications of an increase in enemy initiated activity throughout MR3 during the period late Aug - ~~early~~ Sep are supported by an increase in the number of agent reports, and slight increase in the number of contacts local GVN forces are currently experiencing. The VC are also maintaining an intensive propaganda campaign against the elections, and their aim is to create tension and unrest amongst the population (including GVN forces), as well as a general feeling of insecurity both in cities and hamlets.

4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN AREA OF INTEREST

20.a. NVA/VC Identifications; Units and Locations.  
See Annex A.

21. 3 Bn 33 NVA Regt

a. Remains in the area to the SOUTH EAST of BAO BINH.

b. The unit is currently feeling the effects of 3 Bde (Sep) 1 t (US) Cav Div (AM)'s operations to the East of their last known location and indications are that some groups have moved to the SOUTH and probably WEST to evade the search.

22. 274 VC Main Force Regiment

a. Regt HQ remains in the area of Route 320 to the WEST of BLACKHORSE near the SUOI QUIT.

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/b. One



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b. One VC of a substantial force located in bunkers at YS356901 on 20 Aug by a 1 ATF patrol was killed in an ambush. Although the VC could not be identified it is almost certain that his group were members of 274 Regt. The area was engaged by air and artillery strikes.

c. The fifth body from the contact on 13 Aug in the same general area has been identified as being that of the Assistant Chief of Staff of 274 Regt. He was carrying \$VN120,000 and some valuable documents (Ref 728/336/17/ 4734).

d. 1 Bn 274 Regt, like the other sub units of the Regt is probably deployed on a task designed to discredit the coming elections. The most recent indication is that the unit is located in NORTH WESTERN PHUOC TUY Province.

23. 74 NVA ROCKET REGT

a. On 18 Aug in WESTERN LONG KHANH Province, a THAI Ranger patrol killed 6 NVA at YT287057. They were members of 74 NVA ROCKET REGT, the artillery group which normally supports 274 VC Main Force Regt.

24. D445 Local Force Bn

a. No further reports have been substantiated concerning the Coys of the Bn. Though C1 is thought to have been reinforced by other members from the Bn recently.

b. It is possible that the 1 - 2 VC engaged by 3 RAR at YS531678 on 25 Aug, may have been from D445.

25. HQ Military Region 7

a. A camp consisting of 75 bunkers and 4 lecture rooms probably belonging to HQ MR7 was located by US forces at YT816071 on 17 Aug.

26. Local Guerilla Forces

a. On 20 Aug RF troops killed two VC in a contact EAST of PHU MY (YS261752). One guerilla KIA was identified as Finance and Economy Chief of the PHU MY Party Chapter.

b. A large number of agent reports recently received indicates that the LCNG HUONG guerillas are working with the BARIA City Unit and have repeatedly sought information and food from the villagers.

c. Other local units reportedly<sup>active</sup> are the HOI MY, PHUOC HAI, PHUOC HOA and HOA LONG guerillas, who are all engaged in attempts to discredit the approaching elections.

27. Rear Services Group

a. On 22 Aug at YS490836 a VC was killed by 1 Pl V Coy 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn. Documents captured mentioned K7 Group Chapter.

b. Although K7 may be a unit designator for 2 Bn 274 Regt, ex D440 LF Bn, it is most likely to be one for a sub-unit of a Rear Services Group - probably 814 RSG. Mention is made of new members and the names recorded are characteristic of

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the Central Highlands, and Laotian border area.

c. It is also possible that the VC KIA and the second who was WIA (blood trail) were from the group contacted previously by 1 Pl in the NUI LE area on 15 Aug from C5 Purchasing and Requisitioning Coy.

28. ASSESSMENT

a. 3 Bn NVA Regt are located in a convenient position to launch an attack against the villages of BAO BINH and CAM MY, however US operations may force the unit to reassess the situation.

b. 1 Bn 274 Regt is also in a position to launch an attack against outposts and population centres near Route 2 in Northern PHUOC TUY Province.

c. The Coys of 145 LF Bn remain a threat to the outposts and population centres along Routes 23 and 44.

d. The BARIA City Unit and LONG DAT, XUAN MOC local forces offer a possible threat to the hamlets in their respective areas of operations.

e. CHAU DUC District units have been reported to be infiltrating members into AP BAC (H) of HOA LONG (V) recently for re - supply, and information gathering purposes.

f. There are concerted attempts throughout the Province to re - establish the VCI (infrastructure) within the centres of population. It is an ideal time to commence such activity as there is obvious public discord concerning the coming elections, particularly for President, and the Allied withdrawal, certain to place stress upon the economic stability of the Province.

g. Enemy activity is certain to increase in the coming month but will be spread into three fields; propogandizing, terrorism and military action. Until now, emphasis has been placed upon the spreading of propoganda verbally amongst the people of the outlying centres of population. There is a likelihood of the latter methods being planned and resorted to should the first fail to create the desired effect.

29. Battalion Statistics

	(12 - 18 AUG) (Last week)	(19 - 25 AUG) (This week)
a. Contacts	2	1
b. Wpns CIA and Recovered	-	1
c. PWs and HOI CHANHs	-	-
d. VC/NVA KIA	2	1
e. Instls and Caches	7	-
f. Mine Incidents	1	-
g. Sightings and Agent Reports	68	75

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NUI DAT

*P. J. Siver*  
(R.L. SAYCE)

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4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn

Annexes: A. VC/NVA Strengths, Locations and Identifications.  
B. Captured Document Readouts - Numbers 1,2,3.

Sources: 1 ATF INTSUMS 232/71, 233/71, 254/71.  
1 ATF SUPINTREP 34/71.

ANNEX A TO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN  
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

VC/NVA STRENGTHS, LOCATIONS AND IDENTIFICATIONS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ESTIMATED STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>
HQ MR7/SVNLA	2330	SE of GIA RAY approx YT6888.
MR7 Rear Services	1860	NUI BE approx YS8891.
33 NVA Regt/MR7	1245	
HQ Elm & Sp Units	333	SONG LA NGA approx YT6123
1 Bn	300	" " " " "
2 Bn	265	NORTH of NUI CHUA CHAN approx YT5915
3 Bn (D2/BARIA)	300	BAC BINH 3 area approx YS5396.
274 VC MF Regt	1040	
HQ Elms & Sp Units	300	SW ONG QUE Rubber area vic Route 320.
1 Bn	240	SW of ONG QUE Rubber.
2 Bn	250	S of HUNG NGHIA approx YT3004.
3 Bn	250	S of BINH SON approx YT2288.
BA LONG (P) HQ MR7	450	Vic NUI TRANO approx YT6000.
D445 LF Bn/BA LONG	158	
Bn HQ & C5 Coy	68	Elms in LONG HAI Mountains.
C1 Coy	24	" " " " "
C2 Coy	22	Eastern Province Border/XUAN MOC Area.
C3 Coy	27	" " " "
C4 Coy	17	" " " "
K8 Combat Sp Coy/ BA LONG	65	Probably Southern LONG KHANH.
C36 Sapper Recce Coy/BA LONG	50	" " " "
XUAN LOC (D) / BA LONG	160	SW of XUAN LOC.
CAO SU (D)/BA LONG	155	YT3903.
CHAU DUC (D)/BA LONG	60	CHAU PA Valley approx YS3477.
C41 Conc Coy	18	" " " " "
LONG DAT (D)/BA LONG	70	YS4851.
C25 Conc Coy	24	" " /XUYEN MOC

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XUYEN MOC (D)/BA LONG & C70 Conc  
BARIA Special Zone/ BA LONG  
VUNG TAU Special Zone/MR7  
SR4 HQ/MR7  
D10 Sapper Bn/SR 4

38  
35  
20  
530  
230

YS6669  
YS3261  
YS2558  
HAT DICH area.  
Dispersed in Northern RUNG  
SAT area.

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ANNEX B TO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN  
WEEKLY REVIEW NO 718/37  
DATED 20 AUG 71

NO 1 CAPTURED DOCUMENTS READOUT

1. A further report on the documents captured by a 1 ATF patrol at 130745H at YS341918 (refer to INTSUM NO 728/324/1/4497) has been received from CDEC. The documents contained the following information additional to that previously reported:-

a. A letter written on 7 Aug 71 by HUYNH THANH TAO (possibly Chief of Rear Service Sect, 274 Regt) to BAY PHUOC (Chief Civil Proselyting 274 Regt), TAM QUAN (unk) and LUU NGUYEN (Asst Chief Rear Service Sect, 274 Regt) discussing the problems of procuring food from C5, C11 and C12 (probably elements of 814 RSG MR 7). The author also mentions problems in exchanging US currency for piastre in the area; the exchange rate is only \$1 (US) = 360 \$ VN although **this well under the rate prescribed by higher echelon**. He also mentions that C12 has fresh stocks of clothing and that allied ops in the area are severely restricting the supply of rice.

b. A letter written by HAI QUANG (member of Staff Sect HQ 274 Regt) to BA NGAN (Coy Comd, 3/274) requesting a new uniform, advising the recipient that many attacks are to take place in the future and ordering him to buy 20 US shovels.

c. A letter from HAI QUAN (Staff Sect HQ 274 Regt) dated 12 Aug 71, to HUE and HOA (unk) discussing the future missions of 274 Regt and a meeting to be held at Regt HQ at 131400H. The "Artillery Sect" (presumably C17 RR Coy) and C16 (Mor Coy) were to move to the HQ to receive their mission and were to be prepared to move out from there. The author advised the recipients to take enough rice for use until 20 Aug 71 "during your new mission", and were also cautioned not to be late for the meeting.

Comment: The letter indicates that it was intended that C16 and C17 were to be assigned a task to be completed by 20 Aug 71. C17 are armed with 75mm RRs which have a range of 6675metres. C16 has possibly 82mm and 60mm mortars.

d. An activity plan signed by LUU NGUYEN (Asst Chief Rear Services Group 274 Regt) detailing the Rear Services missions to be carried out by the Group in support of 274 Regt during Aug 71. They were to provide 19,000 litres (1 litre = 1.7 lbs) of rice for use until the end of Aug and a further 16,000 litres as reserve. Apart from rations, subordinate units would be required to purchase 3,745 litres for their own use. There was a reminder that medical equipment was to be properly stored; the Regt medical station was to hold enough medicine for two months and enough malaria tablets for use until Sep 71. They were also to be prepared to supply spontaneous combat missions with ordnance items and to purchase enough saws and shovels, and also cleaning equipment for weapons to last until Aug 71.

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Comment: This possibly indicates that the Chief of RSG (sub para a above) is obtaining supplies from Rear Services MR 7 to be distributed by LUU NGUYEN and suggests an extensive logistic programme on the part of the RSG in support of possible future operations of 274 Regt. 19,000 litres of rice will feed approximately 720 men for one month. The reserve of 16,000 litres coupled with the unit purchases of 3,700 litres would probably suffice for the Regt for at least one further month.

e. A report dated 16 Jul from LY CHON TU (unk) to HQ 3 Bn, 274 Regt, stating that the Bn had a total strength of 92; 40 members in the two Infantry Coys, 25 in the Combat Sp Coy and 27 in Bn HQ. It also mentioned the weapons held by the Bn and the return of elements to the Bn's location in the near future. A later document, dated Aug 71, stated that the Bn's strength was now 83.

Comment: This throws some doubt on the recent reports of 274 Regt receiving a large number of reinforcements. However, 3 Bn is not known to have moved recently to the Regt HQ area and the recruits may not yet have moved to their respective Bns.

1. (1) A notebook belonging to DAO MINH TAM of 3 Bn 274 Regt (Asst Pol Offr of 3/274, probably KIA in the contact). The notebook mentions a meeting which was held on 1 Aug 71 to discuss the missions to be carried out in August. These include intensified training, especially for recruits, consolidation of party organizations, attacks on FVMAF/RVNAF units and positions and the destruction of aircraft and vehicles. Emphasis was placed on capturing weapons. Sufficient rice supply was to be available until October. Specific 3 Bn missions were:

- (a) The conduct of a 15 day training course.
- (b) The conduct of 2 or 3 attacks in the area of Route 15.
- (c) The destruction of enemy units, three or four vehicles and one aircraft.
- (d) The preparation of two or three objectives for a Bn size attack.
- (e) The provision of 274 Regt HQ with 500 kilograms of rice.

(2) The author mentions that, during the first six months of the year, his unit fought two battles, supposedly destroying a THAI Pl, a vehicle and capturing two automatic weapons. However, several members displayed a **cautious** attitude and the unit was plagued with sickness during the rainy season.

Comment: This document indicates that 3 Bn was planning to begin operational training in the area of Route 15 and to launch some attacks in Aug in the Route 15 area. 3 Bn have not been aggressive in the recent past but were probably responsible for the abortive attempt to ambush an RAAF convoy on Route 15 South of LONG BINH on 17 May.

g. Two reports prepared by the armourer of 274 Regt, dated 7 and 9 Aug 71, give the detailed holdings of three ammunition depots at HUNG NGHIA (YT311070), DOI (YS298973) and at SONG NHAN (YS275013). The depots contain a large number of 60mm mortar rounds, C4 explosive and detonation equipment and a number of spare weapons (see INTSUM 728/324 Captured Document Readout Para 6).

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the Regt appears to have in its depots a total of 34 x 75mm RR rounds; 196 x 60mm mortar rounds; and 80 x 82mm rounds.

h. An undated letter from HAI QUAN (Asst Chief of Staff, 274 Regt) to NAM THANH (Chief of Military Personnel, 274 Regt) and TAM THU instructing them to prepare for the Regt meeting in an area near the SUCI QUIET (North West of PHUOC TUY border) after 15 Aug 71. It states that AN (possibly Asst Pol Offr, 274 Regt) has the responsibility for preparing the site and administering the meeting. Nearly all the subordinate units and agencies of 274 Regt are mentioned as attending and the author stresses the importance of security.

Comment: At this meeting it was possibly intended to plan ops for the period Aug - Oct (election period) for Regt elms.

i. A letter dated 12 Aug 71 from HAI QUAN to CHINH (possibly Comd C19 Engr Coy 274 Regt) and NHUAN (unk) to have BA NGAN (Coy Comd, 3 Bn, 274 Regt) expedite the disposal of two dud bombs so that the explosive may be used to help accomplish missions on 19 Aug 71. Addressees were to assist 3 Bn 274 Regt in military training and CHINH specifically was to train the Recce unit of 3 Bn to enable them to reconnoitre the objectives.

Comment: This document provides a further indication (see above) that 3 Bn, 274 Regt intends to attack certain objectives in Aug, and specifically on or about 19 Aug 71.

j. General Comment: The documents indicate that 274 Regt was conducting an important meeting of all elms of the Regt commencing on or about 15 Aug. It seems likely that this meeting was to plan activities including ops, for the election period Aug - Oct 71. 3 Bn is obviously meant to carry out certain attacks in the Route 15 area on or about 19 Aug, and C16 Mor Coy and C17 RR Coy were to be given objectives for about 19 or 20 of Aug. An intensive logistic programme was prepared to assist the Aug - Oct plans. Although the attacks appear to be scheduled for 19 - 20 Aug, past experience shows that VC attacks often occur some days after the originally planned date. There is no mention in these documents of targets for 1 Bn or 2 Bn. However, it is thought that 1 Bn may regard a target in DUC THANH District as a possibility.

Redeployment of Units from CAMBODIA

2. Documents captured by an RF Coy in BINH DUONG (P) NW of SAIGON on 11 Aug 71 identify an element of 174 Regt, 5 VC Division.

3. The Combined Documents Exploitation Centre (CDEC) SAIGON has commented that the presence of an element of this Regt is very significant. It suggests that at least one element of 5 VC Division has possibly been redeployed from CAMBODIA to RVN MR3 to increase the capability for offensive operations in the coming RVN Presidential election period.

4. Other documents captured on 7 Aug in TAY NINH (P) by RVNAF Rangers also mention a planned redeployment of the Sapper Comd, HQ SVNLA from CAMBODIA to MR 3. One

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letter dated 2 Aug 71 read in part:

" The Commanders (possibly of Sapper Comd) informed us that in late Sept or early Oct 71, the main command post (and Sappers) will move down here (possibly meaning the command post and its Sapper Battalions will be redeployed to RVN MR3)..... preparations must be made immediately ..... this redeployment will make our Rear Service (logistic) task more difficult. We should open all the (VC) entry/exit points in TAY NINH (P) ..... It is imperative for us to purchase one third of the required quantity of rice from local resources. The remaining two thirds will be channelled (to SVN territory) from the (Cambodian) frontier..... In short, everybody will be down here by late Sept or early Oct 71. Therefore we must be prepared to support them'.

CDEC has commented that there is urgent tone in the documents concerning Rear Service support. The author appears to be positive that a large part of Sapper Comd, HQ SVNLA, will be redeployed from their present areas of operations in CAMBODIA to GVN MR3 in late Sept or early Oct 71. CDEC comment that such a move is possibly to increase enemy offensive operations during the forthcoming RVN Presidential elections.

1 ATF Comment: These documents tend to support assessments that some enemy units are preparing to move back into SOUTH VIETNAM. See WEEKLY REVIEW 718/36/5 dated 18 Aug 71.

COMMENT: CICV has confirmed that elements of 174 Regt and other units thought to be from 5 VC Division are moving from CAMBODIA to the general area of WAR ZONE D. US forces operating in the vicinity of DINH QUAN have located nearly 25 tons of cached flour and salt. Movement of Sapper Command HQ SVNLA is also scheduled for the near future. (Ref Para 17 and 18 of this Review.)

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NO 2 CAPTURED DOCUMENTS READOUT

SR 4 Combat Plan for 1970 - 71.

1. A report on documents captured by B/2/5th Cav 3 Bde (sep) 1st (US) Cav Div (AM) has been received from CDEC. The documents contain the following information:

a. An activity plan undated and possibly prepared by a staff agency of MR 7 detailing tasks to be performed by SR 4 and other subordinate units in 1970 - 71. SR 4 was to work out a combat plan with the emphasis on counter pacification, and a command committee was to be formed to co-ordinate combat matters. 274 Regt, LONG THANH (D) and SR 4 were to be represented on the committee which would degelate areas of responsibility to subordinate units and encourage the development of local guerilla forces.

Comment: Recent reports suggest that HQ SR 4 is to be disbanded, if this has not already happened. It is not known how the above plan may be affected by the current enemy reorganization.

Allied Ambushing of "BA LONG Corridor"

2. A report on documents, captured by C/1/12 Cav, 3 Bde (Sep) 1st (US) Cav Div (AM) has been received from CDEC and contains the following information:

a. A directive, signed by DANG QUANG (Co-ordination and Operation Committee of MR 7) stating that communications between the various agencies of MR 7 had been poor in 1970. A number of personnel operating along the "BARIA - LONG KHANH corridor" had left their posts when difficulties were encountered and this hampered the transmissions of documents considerably. The liaison corridors had been cut several times by allied forces and this resulted in a breakdown of courier services. To remedy this the committee gave the following directions:

(1) Military postal sections in the liaison - communication corridor were to be strengthened and reorganized and were to follow the postal schedule laid down by MR 7.

(2) Personnel of BARIA liaison station at VIET CUONG (area YS4488) were to observe operating procedures and to stop delaying couriers.

b. A report signed by MAI VAN BEN (Postal Transportation and Communications Section MR 7) dated Nov 70, describing the communications activities of the year. Generally, the operations were considered to be successful in spite of allied attacks on liaison corridors. However, personnel in BARIA VC (P) displayed irresponsibility and poor fighting spirit, leaving their posts for five months.

c. A report signed by TRINH VAN PHONG (Postal, Transportation and Communications Sect, BA LONG KHANH (P)), dated Dec 70 describing operations for the past nine months. The documents stated that, in Dec 70, the section had 75 members. During the past nine months, the section had lost 17 KIA, 3 MIA, "3 deserters and 3 defectors". However, during that period, it had delivered approximately 7,000 letters, 45 kilograms of parcels and had guided 1,155 transient personnel.

Comment: The exact location of the "BARIA -LONG KHANH Corridor" referred to cannot be stated. However, it may well refer to the general routes used by couriers

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travelling from the area of HQ MR 7 North of the MAY TAO and West through HQ BA LONG (P), and thence South West through the COURTENAY and VIET CUONG rubber plantations West towards Sub Region 4. In the COURTENAY area 1 ATF troops have had successes in ambushing, notably 8 RAR and 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC), resulting in many couriers killed, no doubt in part causing some of the enemy morale problems referred to in these documents.

Ambush by 1 ATF ptl near SUOI QUIT

3. Further to INTSUM 728/324/1/4497, which reported an ambush by a 1 ATF ptl on 13 Aug at YS 41918 in which four members of 27<sup>th</sup> Regt were killed, on 18 Aug a fifth body was found. He was identified from documents as HAI QUAN, Asst Chief of Staff 274 Regt. The docs included:

a. A statement of the personnel and weapons in the subordinate units of the Regt as at Jul 71:

(1) 1 Bn 274 Regt - 137 members	2 x B41
1 x colt .45	2 x RPD
9 x K54	1 x MMG
51 x AK47	2 x 60mm mortars
1 x M16	1 x 82mm mortar
10 x B40	
(2) 2 Bn 274 Regt - 80 members	2 x RPD
8 x K54	1 x MMG
40 x AK47	2 x 60mm mortars
1 x M16	1 x M79
6 x B40	
(3) 3 Bn 274 Regt - 82 members	3 x B40
4 x colt .45	1 x B41
10 x K54	1 x RPD
32 x AK47	2 x 60mm mortars
4 x M16	1 x M79
(4) C 16 (Mortar Coy) - 27 members	5 x SKS
3 x K54	2 x B40
11 x AK47	4 x 82mm mortars
(5) C 17 (RR Coy) 23 members	1 x SKS
2 x K54	1 x B40
8 x AK47	2 x 75mm RR
(6) C 18 (AA/HMG Coy) - 26 members	3 x SKS
3 x K54	1 x B40
12 x AK47	3 x 12.7 HMG
(7) C 19 (Engr Coy) - 26 members	2 x SKS
1 x colt .45	3 x B40
13 x AK47	1 x B41
(8) C 20 (Sig Coy) - 66 members	20 x AK47
2 x K54	1 x B40

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(9) C 21 A (Recce Coy) - 37 members 2 x K54	20 x AK47 1 x B40
(10) C 21 B (Sapper Recce Coy) - 41 members 1 x colt .45 3 x K54	14 x AK47 3 x B40
(11) C 22 (Transportation Coy) - 24 members 2 x K54	5 x AK47 4 x SKS
(12) C 23 (Surgical Coy) - 52 members 3 x K54 16 x AK47	1 x M16 1 x B40 1 x M79
(13) C 24 (Dispensary) - 29 members 1 x K54 4 x AK47 4 x SKS	1 x Carbine 2 x M16 2 x B40
(14) B1 (Military Staff Regt HQ) - 100 members 1 x colt .45 25 x K54 35 x AK47	1 x Carbine 2 x M16 4 x B40 2 x M79
(15) B 2 (Pol Staff, Regt HQ) - 29 members 16 x K54 6 x AK47	1 x Carbine 2 x M16
(16) B 3 (Rear Services Staff, Regt HQ) - 49 members 9 x K54 13 x AK47	1 x Carbine 1 x M16 1 x B40

Comment: Other documents found following this contact ( see INTSUM 728/325 Captured Document Readout Para 5) suggest that reinforcements arrived in the Regt in Jul - Aug, significantly increasing the strength of the Regt.

b. A report from 3 Bn to 274 Regt HQ on the situation in 3 Bn's AO and mentioning the areas of LONG THANH, LOC AN, and LONG AN; the report also mentioned that the Bn had been engaged in Engr and "guerilla tactics" training from 26 - 31 Jul 71.

Comment: A letter from HAI QUAN to NHAN (see WEEKLY REVIEW 718/37 ANNEX B Para 1.c.) mentioned that the addressee's unit would be required to assist 3 Bn in Engr training. Although this letter was dated 12 Aug 71, it further indicates 3 Bn's interest in Engr training.

c. A receipt book for money issued; the receipts were signed by HAI QUAN.

Comment: The subject was carrying VN\$100,000 when his body was found.

d. A communique from the Current Affairs Committee mentioning the Paris Peace talks and the Student Moratorium Demonstrations in the US in 1969.

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e. A letter from NGUYEN QUANG (Pol Offr 274 Regt) to BON BE (unk) saying that he agrees that the "Signals" should go back to HUNG NGHIA (vicinity YT311070) to resupply.

Comment: HUNG NGHIA was the location of one of the three armouries mentioned in (WEEKLY REVIEW 718/37 ANNEX B No 1 Document Readout Para 1.g.). Other logistic elements of the Regt are possibly also at this location. The "Signals" presumably refers to C20 Sig Coy of 274 Regt.

f. A letter from LE VAN PHUNG ( Comd 2 Bn 274 Regt) to the Staff Section of Regt HQ, undated, mentioning that his group had returned safely "with the reinforcements". The group took two months to return and arrived 26 Jul 71. No mention was made of the reinforcements.

Comment: This is further evidence that 274 Regt have recently received reinforcements. See comment to para 3.a. above.

g. A sitrep from NGUYEN VAN NHOI of 2IC (Sapper Recce Coy) dated 9 May 71 to HAI QUAN, stating that half of the unit was engaged in political training. The unit was co-located with C 19 (Engr Coy).

h. A number of maps of BIEN HOA, LONG KHANH and PHUOC TUY ( P ) with some markings on them. These do not have any apparent significance at this stage.

i. A number of personal letters and receipts belonging to HAI QUAN.

Comment: The loss of HAI QUAN at this stage would have effected morale of the ranking members of 274 Regt assembled for the scheduled conference. No doubt the meeting would have been held - although probably delayed initially by his (and his companions) absence. The loss of approx \$VN150,000 would also have a restrictive effect upon re-supply by local purchase in the immediate future.

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NO 3 CAPTURED DOCUMENTS. READOUT.

1. Further to 718/37 ANNEX B NO 1 DOCUMENT READOUT, a further report on docs captured by a 1 ATF patrol at YS341918 on 13 Aug 71 has been received from CDEC. The documents contain the following information:

a. A letter from LE SY HUE (Bn 2IC D6 Arty Bn) to an unspecified unit, dated 25 Mar 71, asking if there was any change in the situation and whether they had any trouble in obtaining supplies. He regretted that he could not send any B41 rounds as the member who had concealed the grenades in the DOI DA (unk) was absent at the time. He also stated that a VC unit had lost 8 KIA and all their equipment in a battle in the "F LAI" area (unk).

Comment: D6 (Arty Bn, SR4) was believed to have been disbanded approx Jun 70 and very little is known about the subsequent deployment of its members. The DOI DA supply area may be the same as the DOI 102 area (YS298973) mentioned as an ammunition cache in the armourer's report to HQ 274 Regt. 718/37 ANNEX B NO 1 Document Readout, Para 1.g.

b. A letter from TPAN VAN QUANG (Asst Political Offr, 274 Regt) to UT TAM (Asst Political Offr, 3 Bn, 274 Regt) mentioning that the author was busy securing the base area to enable "his friends to move out for activities". QUANG recently learnt that TAM's unit had received "a number of new men" and warned him of allied sweep operations. The letter was dated 31 Jul 71.

c. A letter dated 13 Aug 71 from HOANG SANH (possibly Exec Offr 3 Bn, 274 Regt) to brother CHINH (possibly Comd C 19 Engr Coy) asking about the progress of training in 3 Bn and suggesting that the addressee report on future training requirements to the staff section of Regt HQ. He states that "at home" everybody has moved out on combat missions and the author himself is about to depart on a "TDY" mission.

Comment: This letter further confirms earlier indications of 3 Bn's involvement in Engr Trg (718/37 ANNEX B, NO 2 Document Readout Para 3. b.)

d. A notebook containing entries dated Jun - Jul 71 evidently maintained by a member of the Rear Services Section of 274 Regt. One entry gave the financial state of the three Bns combined to be \$VN 949,837. The strengths of the Bns are also mentioned and are almost identical to those given in 718/37 ANNEX B No 2 Document Readout Para. 3.a.

e. Two notebooks maintained by HOANG THANH PHAN (Adjt 3 Bn 274 Regt) dated from Mar 70 to Aug 71 giving past strength reports of the Bn and mentions that from Nov 70 to Jul 71 the unit lost 37 KIA. The Bn strength fell from 104 in Nov 70 to 43 in Jun 71 and then increased to 83 by 25 Jul 71.

Comment: These figures agree with those held by HAI QUAN (718/37 ANNEX B, NO 2 Document Readout, Para 4. a.) However it is not known whether these figures include the group of reinforcements who arrived at the Bn on 26 Jul 71.

f. Two financial reports by LOU NGUYEN (2IC Rear Services Section, 274 Regt), dated 5 Jun 71, stating that the total messing allowances spent for 37 recruits

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/of 3 Bn



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of 3 Bn and the 67 recruits of 1 Bn for Jun and Jul amounted to 14,700 Riels (approx \$US 290). In addition, the monthly salary of each member was 84 Riels (\$US 1.54) and would be paid after being exchanged (presumably into SVN piastre).

Comment: The fact that the messing allowance and pay for the recruits was paid in Riels (Cambodian currency) indicates that the finance element of MR7 handle both Cambodian and SVN currency. The payment of allowances in Riels to 274 Regt, a unit with no connections to CAMBODIA, possibly suggests a surplus of Cambodian currency in VC MR7.

g. Report signed by DUONG HOA (Political Offr C 17 RP Coy, 274 Regt) dated 9 Aug 71, mentioned that the Coy spent one and a half days carrying Arty supplies from E (HQ 274 Regt) to H (one of the Regt's En locations). It was also stated that members of the Coy were attending a professional course and would return to H (presumably the same as above) after receiving a supply of rice.

Comment: DUONG HOA was possibly one of the addressees of the directive to C16 and C17 dated 12 Aug 71 (718/37 ANNEX B, NO 1 Document Readout, Para 1. c.). No mention is made of the meeting on 13 Aug 71 in the above letter but this letter provides an indication that C17 was preparing for an operation with one of the Bns.

h. A circular, dated 21 Mar 71, signed by TRAN CONG CHANH (Rear Services Sect, 274 Regt), outlining the policy for crop cultivation in 1971. A resolution by the Party Committee of MR7 stated that units must increase their efforts in agricultural production for 1971 and responsible cadre should be appointed to supervise the programme. C18 (Anti Aircraft Coy) and C22 (Transportation Coy) were ordered to carry out their production missions within their present areas.

Comment: The directive by MR7 possibly indicates that the Rear Services Group may not be able consistently to meet the supply requirements of the Main Force units during 1971. Therefore, these units have been directed to start their own cultivation programme in order to become partially self supporting.

i. A directive dated 14 Jul 71, signed by TRANG VAN QUANG (Deputy Chief Pol Sect, 274 Regt) outlining political training to be conducted during the wet season. The document states that, in the past, 1 and 2 Bns have achieved significant victories against allied forces. The Regt's aim is to break allied control of the villages and hamlets and to gain control of the population. To do this, the political and technical knowledge of members should be increased and all subordinate units were to conduct training courses during the wet season to improve military skills and motivation.

j. A letter from HAI QUAN, dated 12 Aug 71 to BA AN (unk) asking for a report on the state of underground shelters in his location. This reply was to be sent to NAM THANH's location (Chief of Military Personnel, 274 Regt). NAM THANH had been instructed to prepare shelters for subordinate units of the Regt who would arrive in his location on 14 or 15 Aug 71. He was also advised to construct a conference room and cover it with plastic sheeting.

Comment: This letter refers to the Regt conference mentioned in 718/37 ANNEX B NO 1 Document Readout Para 1.h.

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/ 2. Further



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they contained the following additional information:

a. A letter from PHUC (Possibly Exec Offr, Group 30, BA LONG Province) of FK (possibly Group 30) to 274 Regt discussing the collection of supplies by the Regt. He states that a Coy of Group 30 met HAI LONG (unk) and another person, name unknown, of B3 (possibly Rear Services Cell, 274 Regt). They had the following supplies for the Regt:

- (1) 1 x B40 and 30 rounds.
- (2) 10,000 x K63 rounds (possibly CLICOM 7.62mm).
- (3) 50 x 60mm mortar rounds.
- (4) 55 x DKZ rounds (122mm rockets or 75mm RR rounds).
- (5) 27 x AT rounds (unk).

Comment: DKZ generally designates a heavy rocket and is used for both 75mm rounds and 122mm rockets. It is considered unlikely that 274 MF Regt would be supplied with 122mm rockets, especially such a large number. C17 (RR Coy) has two 75mm RRs and the reference is probably to fifty five 75mm rounds intended for these weapons.

b. The markings on the maps may symbolize the following information:

- (1) A Bn HQ located at YS210930.
- (2) An observation post at YT410065.
- (3) An unknown HQ at YS440370. (The proximity of this location to BLACKHORSE implies that it is not a permanent location).
- (4) Movement both East and West, possibly an infiltration - supply route in the area YT4201.
- (5) Movement North across the PHUOC TUY/LONG KHANH Province border in the area YS4389 with 10/8 written alongside (possibly 10 Aug 71).
- (6) Movement in a Westerly direction along the Province border in the area YS4189 with 8/8 written alongside (8 Aug 71).
- (7) Easterly movement in the area YS2893 to a HQ or installation at YS290933 of unknown size or type.
- (8) A series of dots marked at the following locations (meaning unknown).

(a) YS328808	(b) YS322802	(c) YS318802	(d) YS315802
(e) YS313802	(f) YS310801	(g) YS307795	(h) YS303794
(i) YS303788	(j) YS304784		

Comment: During Jul and Aug 71 at least five apparently separate agent reports have been received of an enemy group located in YS3079. (Ref. 728/336/17/1734 dated 26 Aug 71.

(9) The boundaries of the RTAVF AO are marked accurately with the AO names marked in English. This indicates that the maps are almost certainly from a US or Australian source.

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LIGHT DATA FOR BIEN HOA

SEPTEMBER 1971

DATE	BMNT	SR	SS	EENT	MP	MS	% ILLUM	PHASE
1.	0557	0644	1903	1950	1548	0234	78	
2.	-	-	1902	1949	1641	0335	87	
3.	-	-	1901	1948	1731	0434	93	
4.	-	-	1901	1948	1819	0533	98	
5.	-	-	1901	1948	1906	0630	100	Full Moon
6.	-	-	1900	1947	1951	0728	99	
7.	-	-	1859	1946	2039	0826	95	
8.	-	-	1858	1945	2127	0926	88	
9.	-	-	1858	1945	2220	1026	79	
10.	-	-	1857	1944	2315	1127	69	
11.	-	-	1857	1944	XXXX	1229	58	
12.	-	-	1856	1943	0012	1328	47	Last Half
13.	-	-	1856	1943	0110	1424	37	
14.	-	-	1855	1942	0208	1514	27	
15.	-	-	1854	1940	0303	1601	19	
16.	-	-	1853	1939	0395	1643	12	
17.	-	-	1853	1939	0443	1722	6	
18.	-	-	1852	1938	0529	1759	2	
19.	-	-	1851	1937	0613	1834	0	New Moon
20.	-	-	1850	1936	0657	1909	0	New Moon
21.	-	-	1850	1936	0741	1945	2	
22.	-	-	1850	1936	0827	2023	5	
23.	-	-	1849	1935	0914	2104	10	
24.	-	-	1848	1934	1003	2148	17	
25.	-	-	1847	1933	1055	2235	24	
26.	-	-	1847	1933	1149	2327	33	
27.	-	-	1846	1932	1243	XXXX	43	
28.	-	-	1845	1931	1336	0022	53	First Half
29.	-	-	1844	1930	1428	0120	63	
30.	-	-	1844	1930	1518	0217	73	

BMNT and SR remain the same throughout the month.

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
MESSAGE FORM

ROUTINE 020845 Z AUG 71  
 FROM ARAR/NZ  
 TO LIST A. HQ IATF UNCLAS.  
 INFO. G461

ARAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN. FORECAST OF ACTIVITIES NO. 2/71  
 PERIOD 25 JUL 71 - 16 AUG 71 (w AMENDMENT NO ONE (o))  
 ARAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN FORECAST OF ACTIVITIES NO 2/71 IS  
 AMENDED AS FOLLOWS PLAN

ALFA (o) B Coy CMM TFRRF UNTIL 9 AUG (INCL)  
 THEN ND CMM ND 10-11 AUG (o)

BRAVO (o) C Coy RTND 9 AUG CMM TFRRF 10-15 AUG (INCL)  
 CMM OPS 16 AUG. - 19 OCT (o)

DRAFTER'S NAME AND APPOINTMENT	DATE
HEFFERNAN EC	2 AUG 71
RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND RANK	
	LT



H 2

RESTRICTED

AUSTRALIAN ARMY

R850/70/6

4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Pn  
NUI DAT

See Distribution Below

5 Aug 71

TRAINING INSTRUCTIONS 3/71  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN QUAL COURSES  
FOR 1ST PROMOTION  
SUBJECT 'C' AUG 71

Reference: A. Army Promotion Manual

Introduction

1. The 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn Subject 'C' Courses for 1st promotion will be conducted on the following dates in Aug: 14-17 Aug, 19-20 Aug, 24-27 Aug and 29 Aug-01 Sep.

Aim

2. The aim of the course is to coach, examine and qualify students in Subject C for 1st promotion.

Attendance

3. The course is based on the attendance of 24 students.

- a. Students as per annex 'C'.
- b. Students attending are required to return to Nui Dat on the morning of the day prior to the start of their course and will return to parent coys ASP on completion of course.
- c. Allocation per coy.

B Coy	4
C Coy	4
D Coy	4
Sp Coy	4
Admin Coy	4
Other Units	4

/Quarters



Quarters

4. Students will remain in their own company lines and be administered by parent company.

Instructional Staff

5. The following personnel are responsible for the conduct of the course:

- a. Senior instructor/Co Ord - Capt C.H. Babington.
- b. Assistant Co Ord - Capt J. Taia.
- c. Course CSM - W02 L.W. Wilmen.
- d. The instructing staff are nominated in Annex 'D'. They are to be made available to instruct on all 4 courses.

Co - Ord

6. A course Co - Ord Conference will be held in the Bn briefing room at 1815 hrs on the 9 Aug 71.

Lesson Plans

7. Each instructor is to prepare a lesson plan for each lesson to be taught and is to be shown to the SI three days prior to date of lesson.

Course Syllabus

8. The Block and Detailed Syllabus is attached at Annex 'A'. The Daily Programme at Annex 'B'.

Lecture Room

9. Building to rear of Sp Coy Q Store.

Publications and Reference Books

10. These will be issued Day One of the course or they will be available for precourse study when required.

Course Duties

11. A Course Duty Instructor will be rostered on a daily basis and will be briefed by the SI/CSM at 1600 hrs the prior to mounting duty.

/12. A




12. A course Duty Student will be rostered on a daily basis. Attached as Annex 'E' is the Duties of the Duty Student.

Dress

13. The dress to be worn - JG's long, boots GP, bush hat, pistol belt and personal weapon.

Note. Mugs required for morning tea.



(J.C. HUGHES)  
Lt Col  
CO

- ANNEXES.
- A. Block and Detailed Syllabus.
  - B. Daily Programme.
  - C. Students to Attend.
  - D. Instructional Staff.
  - E. Duties of Duty Student.

Distribution:

List A  
HQ 1 ATF. (3)  
One Per Instructor  
One Per Student  
SI (Capt C.H. Babington)



ANNEX A TO  
 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN  
 R850-70-6  
 DATED \* AUG 71

BLOCK & DETAILED SYLLABUS  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn SUBJECT C FOR CPL

Reference: A. Promotion Manual.

Training Time

1.	Number of training days		4	
	Number of periods per day		8	
			<u>32</u>	
	Number of night periods		6	
	TOTAL		<u>38</u>	
2.	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>NIGHT PERIOD</u>	<u>DAY PERIOD</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
	Military Law	4	15	19
	Administration	2	8	10
	Examination		3	3
	Miscellaneous			<u>6</u>
				38
3.	<u>Military Law - ML</u>			

L/CODE	SUBJECT	LEC DEMO	SQUAD PRACT	TOTAL
ML 1	Intro to mil law	1		1
ML 2	Preface to AMR&O		1	1
ML 3	How to answer Mil Law questions		1	1
ML 4	Offences	1	1	2
ML 5	Arrest and suspension	1	1	2
ML 6	Punishments - WO's & NCO's	1	1	2
ML 7	Redress of Wrongs	1	1	2
ML 8	Drunkenness	1	1	2
ML 9	Coy conduct sheet		1	1
ML 10	Framing of A4 - Charge Reports	1	1	2
ML 11	Punishments	1	1	2
ML 12	Standing Orders/RO's	1		<u>1</u>
				19

/4. Peace



4. Peace Administration - PA

---

L/CODE	SUBJECT	TOTAL
PA 1	Man Management	1
PA 2	Morale	1
PA 3	Duties of Orderly Cpl	1
PA 4	Health and Hygiene	1
PA 5	Marking of Pl Roll Book/Rationing	2
PA 6	Appointments and Promotion - WO's and NCO's	2
PA 7	Unit Stores Accounting	<u>2</u>
		10

---

5. Examination - Ex

---

	TOTAL
Trial Ex (Misc)	<u>2</u>
Final Ex	<u>3</u>
	5

---

6. Miscellaneous - Misc

---

L/CODE	SUBJECT	TOTAL
Misc 1	Trial Test	1
Misc 2	Trial Test	1
Misc 3	Leave	1
Misc 4	Pay and Allowances	1
Misc 5	Mark Trial Paper	1
Misc 6	Open/Closing Address - ADM	<u>1</u>
		6

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ANNEX B TO

4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn R850-70-6(1)

DATED AUG 71

SERIAL	DATE	TIME	CODE	SUBJECT	AREA	INSTRUCTOR	METHOD	REMARKS
1		0745-0800	-	Course Pde	Trg Area 2	WO2 Wilmen		
1		0800-0815	Misc 6	Opening Address/Admin	Lec Room 1	Capt Babington		
2		0835-0915	ML 1	Intro to M.L. Law	Lec Room 1	QM		
3		0920-1000	ML 2	Preface to AMK & O	Lec Room 1	QM		
		1000-1015		Morning Tea				
4		1015-1055	ML 3	How to Answer ML Question	Lec Room 1	QM		
5		1105-1145	ML 4	Offences	Lec Room 1	WO2 Wilmen		
		1145-1315		Lunch				
6		1315-1355	ML 4	Offences	Lec Room 1	WO2 Wilmen		
7		1405-1445	M 10	Framing a Charge Report	Lec Room 1	RSM		
8		1455-1535	ML 10	Framing a Charge Report	Lec Room 1	RSM		
9		1900-1945	PA 7	Unit Stores Accounting	Lec Room 1	QM		
10		1950-2030	PA 7	Unit Stores Accounting	Lec Room 1	QM		
		0745-0800		Course Pde	Trg Area 2	D/Student		
11		0800-0840	ML 5	Arrest and Suspension	Lec Room 1	SSgt Lawrence		
12		0850-0930	ML 5	Arrest and Suspension	Lec Room 1	SSgt Lawrence		
13		0940-1020	ML 9	Coy Conduct Sheets	Lec Room 1	RSM		
		1020-1030		Morning Tea				
14		1030-1110	ML 6	Punishments WO2 & NCO's	Lec Room 1	WO2 O'Brien		



SERIAL	DATE	TIME	CODE	SUBJECT	AREA	INSTRUCTOR	METHOD	REMARKS
15		11.20-1200	ML 6	Punishments WO's & NCO's	Lec Room 1	WO2 O'Brien		
		1200-1330		Lunch				
16		1330-1410	PA 4	Health and Hygiene	Lec Room 1	Sgt Chapman		
17		1420-1500	ML 7	Redress of Wrongs	Lec Room 1	SSgt Lawrence		
18		1510-1550	ML 7	Redress of Wrongs	Lec Room 1	SSgt Lawrence		
19		1900-1940	PA 1	Man Management	Lec Room 1	Lt Martin		
20		1950-2030	PA 2	Morale	Lec Room 1	Lt Martin		
		0745-0800		Course Pde	Trg Area 2	D/Student		
21		0800-0840	ML 8	Drunkeness	Lec Room 1	WO2 Cook		
22		0850-0930	ML 8	Drunkeness	Lec Room 1	WO2 Cook		
23		0940-1020	PA 5	Marking Pl Roll Books	Lec Room 1	Cpl Garner		
		1020-1030		Morning Tea				
24		1030-1110	PA 5	Rationing	Lec Room 1	WO2 Ploenges		
25		1120-1200	ML 11	Summary of Minor Punishments	Lec Room 1	WO2 O'Brien		
		1200-1330		Lunch				
26		1330-1410	ML 11	Summary of Minor Punishments	Lec Room 1	WO2 O'Brien		
27		1420-1500	PA 6	Appointments & Promotion WO's & NCO's	Lec Room 1	SSgt Heffernan		
28		1510-1550	PA 6	Appointments & Promotion WO's & NCO's	Lec Room 1	SSgt Heffernan		



SERIAL	DATE	TIME	CODE	SUBJECT	AREA	INSTRUCTOR	METHOD	REMARKS
29		1900-1940	Misc 1	Trial Test	Lec Room 1	WO2 Wilmen		
30		1950-2030	Misc 2	Trial Test	Lec Room 1	WO2 Wilmen		
		0745-0800		Course Pde	Trg Area 2			
31		0800-0840	PA 3	Duties of Orderly Cpl	Lec Room 1	WO2 Wilmen		
32		0850-0930	ML 12	Standing Orders/POs	Lec Room 1	RSM		
33		0940-1020	Misc 3	Leave	Lec Room 1	Sgt Culling		
		1020-1030		Morning Tea				14-13
34		1030-1110	Misc 4	Pay and Allowances	Lec Room 1	Sgt Warnes		19-22 WO2 Cook
35		1120-1200	Misc 5	Mark Trial Paper	Lec Room 1	RSM		24-27 WO2
		1200-1330		Lunch				O'Brien
36		1330-						29-01 RSM
37		-		FINAL EXAMINATION	Lec Room 1	WO2 Wilmen		
38		-1545						
		1545-1600	Misc 6	Closing Address/Admin	Lec Room 1	Capt Babington		



ANNEX C TO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn  
R850-70-6  
DATED 8 AUG 71

STUDENTS

To be advised



ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn.  
R850-70-6  
DATED 8 AUG 71

INSTRUCTIONAL STAFF

36114	Lt	Catton
2192240	Lt	Martin
28609	WO1	Thompson
28671	WO2	Wilmen
2411544	WO2	O'Brien
53298	WO2	Cook
43024	WO2	Ploenges
13647	Ssgt	Lawrence
36793	Ssgt	Heffernan
15578	Sgt	Chapman
41797	Sgt	Warnes
54227	Sgt	Culling
55347	Cpl	Garner



ANNEX E TO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn  
R850-70-6  
DATED 8 AUG 71

DUTIES OF DUTY STUDENT

1. The Course Duty Student will be rostered on a daily basis by the course CSM and will mount for a 24 hour period commencing at 1630 hours.
2. Course Duty Students will not alter their tour of duty without approval from course CSM.
3. Duties - The duty student is responsible for:
  - a. Ensure course is on pde as detailed in Daily Programme at 0745 hrs each day - correctly dressed.
  - b. Give a detailed pde state when handing over to instructors at commencement of periods.
  - c. Detail students to clean lec room on completion of days training.
  - d. For night periods draw 4 fuses and 8 large globes from Sp Coy Q Store. These items are to be returned to Sp Coy Duty NCO on completion of night training.



H 3

AUSTRALIAN ARMY

R54-1-1 (a)

4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn.  
NUI DAT

// Aug 71

Distribution: See Below

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION 11/71  
MARCH IN/MARCH OUT PROCEDURES

General

1. The purpose of this administrative instruction is to detail the normal march in and march out procedures to be followed by 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn. Any requirement to vary these procedures for individual drafts will be notified by signal to all personnel involved.

March In Procedures

2. Attached as Annex A are the March In procedures for reinforcements both from Australia and from 1 ARU. These procedures cover four days. Prior to arrival of reinforcements, Bn HQ will notify all addressees by signal the following details:

- a. Date of march in ie Day 1 of Annex A.
- b. Number of reinforcements.
- c. Time sub units are to uplift rfts from Bn HQ, and where possible sub units who will be allotted rfts from the draft.
- d. The sub unit nominated to conduct Exercise Lifesaver and weapon familiarisation.
- e. Any variations to the procedures shown in Annex A.

March Out Procedures

3. General. Attached as Annex B are the March Out procedures to be followed for all pers returning to Australia as part of a draft (Medevacs, Welfare RTA's will be marched out individually as required). The procedures cover a period of 8 days. Prior to Day 1 Bn HQ will notify all addressees by signal the following details:

- a. Latest date by which pers involved must be released from ops and available for commencement of march out procedures.
- b. Names of pers involved.
- c. Any variations required to procedures shown in Annex B.

4. Dress. On the day of departure the dress is to be:

Shirts Polyester  
Trousers Polyester  
Hat KFF  
Shoes Black  
Lanyard  
Medal Ribbons  
Ties to be carried

..../5.



5. Movement on Arrival in Australia. Movement will be arranged by 10 MC Gp Sydney. It is anticipated that the drafts will be despatched to their commands of discharge prior to going on leave.

*for* *Walter James May*  
(J.C. HUGHES)  
Lt Col  
CO (AOD)

Distribution:

List A

For Info:

HQ 1 ATF



ANNEX A TO  
 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN  
 R54-1-1 (a)  
 DATED : AUG 71

REINFORCEMENT DRAFTS  
MARCH IN PROCEDURES

Serial	Day	Time	Event	Actioned by
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1	1	TBA	Uplift and report to unit.	Asst Adjt/TO
2		1 hr	Report to Bn Briefing Room for: a. Welcoming address b. 'A' documentation check to incl: (1) AAB 83 check (2) Personal particulars cards (3) Married/Single Registration forms (4) Pay and allotments (5) R & R requirements	CO or 2IC/ RSM Asst Adjt Chief Clerk Pay Sgt
3		1 hr	Interviews/allocation to sub units	Asst Adjt
4		Remainder of day	March into sub units, to incl: a. Allocation of accn b. Issue wpns/ammo	Coy 2IC/CSM (Coy veh to be avail to move pers to sub units)
5	2	0800-1000	Sub unit admin procedures (1)	2IC/CSM
6		1000-1200	Briefing in Bn briefing room to incl: a. Bn History b. Bn Org c. SO's and SOP's d. Discipline etc	RSM/WORD
7		1330-1430	QM Issues/documentation check	QM/TO (1 x TCV to be avail)
8		1435-1630	Tour 1 ATF/4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn area	TO (TCV req)
9	3	0800-1000	Ex "Lifesaver" (2)	RSM/WORD
10		1000-1200	Test fire weapons/wpn familiarization	RSM/WORD (range bookings req)
11		1300-1500	Dental/Medical Inspections	RAP
12		1500-	Coy Op procedures	

.../Day 4



(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
13	4	0800- 1200 1330-	Coy op procedures  Available for ops	

Notes: 1. If draft arrives late day 1, unit documentation check may extend into day 2 serial 5.

2. Ex Lifesaver to be conducted centrally by sub-unit nominated by RSM/WORD.



ANNEX B TO  
 4 RAR/1NZ (ANZAC) BN  
 R54-1-1 (a)  
 DATED // AUG 71

MARCH OUT PROCEDURES

Serial	Day	Time	Event	Actioned by
1	1	0830	Med exam and blood test	PMO
2			Dental Check	Dental Offr
3			Draw Pay	Pay Sgt
4			RTA briefing	Asst Adjt/Chief Clerk
5			Clean equpt and clo	Coys
6			A26A handed to Asst Adjt (MBI 171-1 refers)	Coys/Asst Adjt
7	2		Final Q clearance	CQMS/QM
8	3		MFO procedure	CQMS/QM
9	4	TBA	Leave Audit, pay documentation, IHC and ID card check	E Comd Rep processing takes 20 mins per person
10			All documents to Bn HQ	Coy Clerks/Mov Clerk
11	5	TBA	As for event one in serial 4	"
12	6	TBA	"	"
13	7	AM	"	"
14		PM	Farewell briefing etc	CO or 2IC/RSM
15	8	TBA	RTA	Mov Clerk



RESTRICTED

AUSTRALIAN ARMY

4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn  
NUI DAT

R810/5/1

13 Aug 71

4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN FORECAST OF ACTIVITIES NO 3/71  
PERIOD 17 - 31 AUG 71

1. The Forecast of Activities for the period 17 - 31 Aug 71 is subtended and is to be used for planning and execution. Sub-units are reminded that the Forecast could be subject to change.

Coy	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31			
V Coy	←						Ops						←	CH	→			
B Coy	←						Ops											
C Coy	←	Ops	→	RTND	ND	←	VT	→	RTND	ND	←	Ops	→					
D Coy	←			Ops				→	RTND	ND	←	VT	→	RTND	ND	←	Ops	→
Sp Coy HQ	←					Ops							→	RTND	ND	VT		
Mor Pl																		
a. 1 Sect	←						Ops											
b. 2 Sect	←						Ops											
c. 3 Sect	←	Ops	→	RTND	ND	←	VT	→	RTND	ND	←	Ops	→					
d. 4 Sect	←			Ops				→	RTND	ND	←	VT	→	RTND	ND	←	Ops	→
Aslt Pnr Pl	←						Ops							→	RTND	VT		
Tracker Pl	←						Ops							→	RTND	VT		

RESTRICTED

HF



RESTRICTED

- 2 -

Legend: RTND Return to Nui Dat  
ND Nui Dat  
VT Vung Tau  
Ops Operations as ordered  
CH Courtenay Hill security

- Notes: 1. Continuation of Forecast.
- a. V Coy. CH until 5 Sep; RTND 6 Sep;  
VT 7 - 8 Sep; RTND 9 Sep; Ops 11 Sep;  
TFRRF 15 - 23 Sep.
  - b. B Coy. RTND 14 Sep; VT 16 - 17 Sep;  
RTND 18 Sep; Ops 20 Sep; TFRRF 23 - 31 Sep.
  - c. C Coy. R & I 25 - 27 Sep; TFRRF 31 Sep -  
8 Oct.
  - d. D Coy. R & I 30 Sep - 2 Oct; TFRRF 8 - 15  
Oct.
2. TFRRF will mount at 1800 hrs on day specified.
3. 2IC, CSM V Coy to report to Courtenay Hill 28 Aug  
for briefing and take-over duties.

*J.C. Hughes*  
(J.C. HUGHES)  
Lt Col  
CO (AOD)

Distribution:

List A  
HQ 1 ATF (10)

RESTRICTED



145

AUSTRALIAN ARMY

ROUTINE ORDERS PART 1

by

LIEUTENANT COLONEL J.C. HUGHES, MC

COMMANDING OFFICER

4TH BATTALION, THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT

NUI DAT

13 AUG 71

SERIAL V12/71  
NOS V173 - V181

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- |      |   |
|------|---|
| V173 | USE OF AFV CANTEENS AND FACILITIES  |
| V174 | DRESS   |
| V175 | PROMOTION QUALIFICATION FOR PROMOTION TO SGT  |
| V176 | COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF PERSONAL EFFECTS   |
| V177 | COMMUNICATIONS -- USE OF PRIVATELY OWNED LOW POWER RADIO SETS WITHIN AUSTRALIA AND TPNG |
| V178 | POSTAL -- ADDRESSING LETTERS  |
| V179 | USE OF RATION CARDS IN 1 ATF CANTEEN FACILITIES   |
| V180 | CONTROL AND ISSUE OF RATION CARDS   |
| V181 | POWERS OF DISCIPLINE  |
- 

NOTICES

CALL HOME TELEPHONE SERVICE -- NONEFFECTIVE CALLS  
COLONEL COMMANDANT THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT  
CUSTOMS -- MAILING OF LIQUOR TO AUSTRALIA  
HOURS OF TRADING CONCESSIONAIRES - PEARSON CENTRE  
SERGEANTS MESS - GENERAL MESS MEETING



V173

USE OF AFV CANTEEN FACILITIES

1. AFV Canteen facilities are:
  - a. All ASCO retail outlets.
  - b. All concessionaire retail outlets located in AFV area and under contract to ASCO. These are:
    - (1) Concession shop in FWMAO Compound, SAIGON.
    - (2) Concession shop in 1 ATF area, NUI DAT.
    - (3) Concession shops in 1 ALSG area, VUNG TAU.
2. The following are entitled to use AFV Canteen facilities located in 1 ATF area:
  - a. Members of the Australian Armed Services.
  - b. Members of philanthropic organizations accredited to AFV.
  - c. Official Australian Concert parties.
  - d. Australian journalists accredited to AFV.
  - e. Australian Embassy staff and surgical teams.
  - f. Members of NZ V Force.
  - g. NZ Embassy staff.
  - h. US service personnel attached to units of 1 ATF, or members of US units located in 1 ATF area.
3. Purchases by entitled personnel, as listed in paragraph 2, of items from Canteen facilities are to be by the production of a MACV Ration Card. US personnel are also to produce their identity card.
4. The sale of rationed items is to be in accordance with 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn Routine Order No V179/71 dated 13 Aug 71.
5. Members of 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn are not to:
  - a. Transfer by sale, gift, exchange or rental any merchandise, articles or items purchased or otherwise obtained from any US or Free World (other than Australian) wholesale or retail canteen, mess, exchange or similar outlet to any individual in Vietnam not entitled to use those outlets.

.../b.



- b. Transfer by sale, gift, exchange or rental any merchandise, articles or items purchased or otherwise obtained from any AFV canteen, or Concessionaire licensed by ASCO to any other individual not entitled to the use of the outlets.
- c. Transfer by sale, gift, loan, exchange or rental, any item, on issue or otherwise, which is property of any Free World Government or its members to any person not authorized to receive such items.
- d. Possess, have in their possession, obtain or acquire by any means any quantity of unrationed canteen, exchange or mess items in excess of their own immediate personal needs.
- e. Possess, have in their possession, obtain or acquire by any means any quantity of rationed canteen, exchange or mess items in excess of the limits of the entitlements specified on the Ration Card on issue to them.

6. A single exception is made to the limitations in paragraph 5 in the case of bona fide non-rationed gift items under a retail value of US\$10. Each gift is to be accompanied by a note containing:

- a. Full name of recipient.
- b. Each item of gift listed and valued.
- c. The signature and full name of the donor together with unit and duty phone number.

7. Members of 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn are not entitled to use American PX outlets unless serving with American forces in a locality in which they do not have access to ASCO facilities.

8. Goods stocked by US PXs may be purchased by members of 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn by placing orders through ASCO. However, supply is dependent on availability at the time the order is placed.

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V174

DRESS

General

1. This Routine Order details the requirements for dress in 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn.
2. All items of uniform are to be maintained in a neat and clean condition, in good repair and are to be replaced when un-serviceable.



3. Only authorised items of dress are to be worn; unauthorised embellishments are not to be worn.

#### Orders of Dress

4. Only three orders of dress are to be worn by members of 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn; these are:

- a. Summer Dress.
- b. Jungle Green Dress, Ceremonial.
- c. Field Dress.

5. The orders of dress applicable to 1 ATF are detailed in Annex A.

6. Field Dress will be the dress of the day.

#### Wearing of Orders of Dress

7. The various orders of dress applicable to 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn will be worn on the following occasions:

- a. Summer Dress. When proceeding on R and R or RTA.
- b. Jungle Green Dress, Ceremonial.
  - (1) Ceremonial parades or guards of honour.
  - (2) Visits to Allied Headquarters as appropriate.
- c. Field Dress. All other occasions.

#### Headdress

8. Headdress is to be worn at all times except when customarily removed indoors, when removal is specifically ordered, or when travelling in a vehicle not fitted with a roof or canopy.

9. Personal headdress approved by OC's for specialists, may be worn only during the performance of specialised and operational tasks.

#### Shirts

10. Shirts which are designed to be worn inside the trousers are to be tucked in at the waist; these shirts are not to be modified and worn outside trousers. Shirts are to be buttoned on the front except that the neck button is to be left undone.

11. Shirt sleeves may be rolled in accordance with the Dress Manual 1963, paragraph 370 between 0630 and 1830 hours daily.

12. Woven or stencilled name tags may be worn on shirts above the right breast pocket.



13. Laundry marks are not to be placed on the outside of shirts, they are to be marked inside the neckband or the double thickness across the back of the shirt. (Note: Shirts with laundry marks on the outside now may continue to be worn rather than replaced, but new issues are to be marked in accordance with this paragraph.)

#### Trousers

14. Laundry marks on trousers are to be placed inside the waistband. (Note: Trousers with laundry marks on the outside now may continue to be worn rather than replaced, but new issues are to be marked in accordance with this paragraph.)

#### Badges of Rank

15. Badges of rank are to be worn at all times.

16. For warrant officers and NCOs, badges of rank are to be sewn on all shirts except the combat shirt worn outside the trousers. When the combat shirt is worn, badges of rank are to be worn on a brassard on the right arm or on a strap on the right wrist.

17. Brassards are to be worn fastened by a loop from the shirt epaulette and to extend down the arm to the centre of the fold when shirt sleeves are rolled. The brassard is to encircle the arm at the latter point.

18. Badges of rank for officers are detailed in Annex A.

#### Identity Discs and Cards

19. Identity discs are to be worn by members of 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn at all times.

20. Identity cards are to be carried by Australian members of 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn when in the Vung Tau Special Zone, when visiting Saigon, Allied establishments and when proceeding on R & R or RTA.

21. Identity cards are to be carried by New Zealand members of 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn at all times.

#### Flying Suits

22. Flying suits are issued for specific duties within certain units. No member of 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn is to wear a flying suit unless it is an authorised issue to him and he is engaged in or warned for the specific duty for which the flying suit is issued.

#### Boots

23. Boots are not to be worn with polyester uniform unless specifically ordered.

24. When boots are worn with jungle trousers, socktops are to be concealed, socktops may be rolled over boots when wearing shorts.

.../Sunglasses



### Sunglasses

25. Sunglasses are not to be worn by members of 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn in uniform when on parade, within a building or after sunset, unless the member is required to wear medically prescribed sunglasses or tinted lenses.

### Wearing of Rings

26. The wearing of wedding or other rings creates a hazard, in particular when:

- a. Repairing equipment.
- b. Driving, loading or unloading vehicles.
- c. Mounting or dismounting vehicles.
- d. Operating plant or equipment.
- e. packing or unpacking stores.
- f. handling weapons.

27. Although there is no complete prohibition on wearing of rings, sub-unit commanders should order that rings be removed whenever operational or employment requirements justify it.

### Shoulder Titles and Embellishments

28. The only metal title to be worn by members of 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn is the metal shoulder title "Australia". Metal branch or service titles are not to be worn. Embroidered titles "Australia" are not to be worn.

29. Metal titles are to be fitted in one of the following methods:

- a. To a shoulder board with badges of rank (officers only)
- b. To the epaulette on the shirt.
- c. To a cloth band slipped on the epaulette; the cloth band to be the same colour as the shirt on which it is worn.

30. Woven AMF shoulder signs (gold badge on green background) may be worn on shirts sewn on the left sleeve only.

.../Haircuts



Haircuts and Moustaches

31. A member of 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn may grow a neat moustache, otherwise his face is to be clean shaven daily. Sideburns are **not** to be longer than a line drawn horizontally through the centre of the ear canal, must be tapered, not thick and bushy, and must not increase in width throughout their length.

32. Hair is to be neatly cut. The hair down to the neckline is to be tapered and not square cut and the taper is to commence not less than one half inch above the shirt collar when buttoned.

Carrying of Weapons

33. Members of 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn carrying long barrellled weapons in the 1 ATF Base Area and not moving as part of a formed body of troops are to carry the weapon at either the "Trail" or "Shoulder" position.

Medical Restrictions on Dress

34. Certain temporary restrictions on dress may be imposed for medical reasons. These restrictions will be notified in 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn Routine Orders and will over-ride the provisions of this order for such time as they are imposed.

ANNEX: A. Orders of Dress

V175 PROMOTION QUALIFICATIONS FOR PROMOTION TO SGT

1. The results of a course for qualification for Promotion to Sergeant held at 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn from 15 Jul 71 to 31 Jul 71 are attached as Annex 'B'.

2. Sub-units are to ensure that where a member **has now** qualified in all subjects for promotion to Sergeant, a Confidential Report (AAF A26A) is submitted within one week of receipt of this order.

V176. COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF PERSONAL EFFECTS

1. Claims for compensation for loss of personal property are to be prepared in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10 of MBI 113-1.

2. Claims are to be accompanied by a Statutory Declaration listing the items which were lost.

3. Claims are to be fully checked for correct compilation before submission to Asst Adjt.

4. It is emphasised that the authority for the payment of claims rests with HQ AFV after consideration of each individual item.



V177. COMMUNICATIONS - USE OF PRIVATELY OWNED LOW POWER RADIO SETS  
WITHIN AUSTRALIA AND TPNG

1. Outside Australia and TPNG it is possible to purchase low powered "walkie-talkie" type radio sets for private communications. Such equipments are generally manufactured to meet regulations in force in the USA. They are often sold at a low price in comparison with equivalent items available in Australia, and hence could be purchased by members for use on RTA.
2. Members intending to purchase low powered radio sets for use in Australia, or TPNG, should be aware that the Postmaster General's Department requires that:
  - a. The radio set must be of an approved type and be adjusted to operate on an approved frequency. (Normally in the band 27230 to 27280 KHZ. However in practice, frequencies normally assigned are 27240 KHZ primary and 27270 secondary).
  - b. The person operating the radio set must be in possession of a licence issued by the PMG. Licences will only be issued where the radio set is to be used for a useful purpose, such as for industrial, business or pastoral activities, the conduct of sporting or other group events or emergency services. The licence fee is currently \$2.00 for each station per annum.
3. The PMG Brochure RB 191 "Conditions Governing the Licencing and Operation of Hand Phone Mobile Radio Services", which contains an application form for a licence, is available from the following address:

Superintendent,  
Radio Branch,  
PMG's Department  
in the Capital City of the State in which the radio set is to be used.

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V178.

POSTAL - ADDRESSING LETTERS

1. AFPOs are equipped with letter franking machines for post marking letters.
  2. To avoid obliterating the address, the first line of writing is to be at least  $1\frac{1}{2}$  inches from the top of the envelope.
  3. The word "FREE" is to be printed in the top right hand corner of the envelope of personal mail or voice tapes addressed to and from Australia.
-



V179

USE OF RATION CARDS IN 1 ATF CANTEEN FACILITIES

1. The following canteen and concessionaire goods are to be rationed to each authorised customer:

- a. Cameras (still and movie).
- b. Projectors (slide and movie).
- c. Radios.
- d. Record players.
- e. Tuner/amplifiers.
- f. Tape recorders.
- g. Watches.
- h. Typewriters.
- i. Electric fans.
- j. TV.
- k. Refrigerators.
- l. Air conditioners.

2. The sale of these goods is to be in accordance with the entitlement specified in the MACV Ration Card (MACV Form 333 of 1 Apr 68), with the following exceptions:

- a. An entitled customer (Reference A) may purchase up to six watches.
- b. TV sets, refrigerators and air conditioners (not shown on the card) can not be purchased unless the authorised customer has written approval of his CO. In the case of a civilian, approval of his senior officer in country is required.

3. The sale of rationed items by canteens and concessionaires within 1 ATF area to members of 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn is not to be recorded on the MACV Ration Card. The section of each ration card listing rationed items is to be cancelled for all 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn personnel resident in NUI DAT.

4. Members of 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn are only to purchase rationed items from the canteen and concessionaires in NUI DAT. If a member of 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn wishes to purchase a particular rationed item from one of the other AFV canteens or concessionaires, he may ask for the item to be sent to NUI DAT and be reserved for his purchase at NUI DAT.



5. Members of 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn authorised to use an American PX are to abide by the American Directive applicable to the use of ration cards and the purchase of rationed items. The local PX manager will advise on these regulations.

V180

CONTROL AND ISSUE OF RATION CARDS

1. MACV Ration Card (MACV Form 333 of 1 Apr 68) is to be issued to each member of 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn.

2. MACV Form 333 is an accountable document and its issue is to be controlled as follows:

a. The Asst Adjt is the 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn Ration Card Control Officer and is responsible for:

- (1) Demanding bulk supplies, by signal, from the 1 ATF Ration Card Control Officer.
- (2) Receipt, secure storage and issue in bulk to sub units.
- (3) Maintaining records on issue and receipts of cards.

b. Sub units are to appoint Unit Ration Card Control Officers who are to be responsible for:

- (1) Obtaining bulk supply from Asst Adjt as required.
- (2) Receipt, secure storage and issue to authorised personnel.

3. The Asst Adjt is to be notified of any change of Sub-Units Ration Card Control Officers. Where there is a change of incumbents, a handover of accountable documents is to be carried out in accordance with Equipment Instructions, Paragraph 1270.

4. Members of 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn issued with a MACV Ration Card are not to:

- a. Transfer that card to any other person by gift, loan, sale, exchange or by any other means.
- b. Use, obtain or have in their possession a MACV Ration Card Form 333 not issued by a person authorised to issue the same.
- c. Possess or have in their possession more than one Ration Card (Form 333).
- d. Alter, erase, deface or in any way interfere with any MACV Ration Card save in a manner authorised.

.../e.



- e. Retain any Ration Card (MACV Form 333) after the completion of their tour of duty in RVN. Ration cards are to be returned to the officer or person responsible for the issue of Ration Cards.

5. All ration card accounts are to be subject to Army Audit examination at regular intervals.

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V181

POWERS OF DISCIPLINE

1. 235240 Maj J.H. Robbins is appointed Officer Commanding for disciplinary purposes of 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn Rear Details whilst the Battalion is on operations.
2. 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn Routine Order Part 1 number V171/71 dated 30 Jul 71 is cancelled.

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*R.L.J. Martin*  
(R.L.J. MARTIN)  
Lt  
Asst Adjt



ORDERS OF DRESS

1. Summer Dress.

- a. Hat Felt khaki, cap khaki, or beret appropriate to rank and Corps.
- b. Shirt khaki polyester (1) (2).
- c. Lanyard as appropriate to Corps or Regiment.
- d. Necktie khaki (1) (2).
- e. Trousers khaki polyester.
- f. Trouser belt.
- g. Socks khaki.
- h. Black shoes.
- i. Ribbons of orders, decorations and medals. See Appendix 1.
- j. Titles metal "AUSTRALIA".
- k. Insignia rank officers anodized on khaki shoulder boards.

- Note:
1. Sleeves to be worn buttoned at wrist and ties worn on arrival in Sydney.
  2. Ties are not required and sleeves may be rolled when proceeding on R & R to places other than Australia.

2. Jungle Green Dress, Ceremonial.

- a. Hat Felt khaki, cap khaki or beret appropriate to rank and Corps, (as ordered).
- b. Shirt Green (to be tucked into trousers).
- c. Trousers Green.
- d. Lanyard as appropriate to Corps or Regiment.
- e. Socks khaki.
- f. Boots GP.
- g. Black web belt.
- h. Ribbons of orders, decorations and medals. See Appendix 1.



- i. Titles metal "AUSTRALIA",
- j. Insignia rank officers anodized on green shoulder boards.

3. Field Dress.

- a. Hat utility green or beret appropriate to Corps or Regiment.
- b. Shirt green.
- c. Trousers green.
- d. Socks khaki.
- e. Boots GP (1).
- f. Pistol belt.
- g. Insignia rank officers FS woven (1) (2).

Note:

- 1. Shoes and insignia rank officers anodized on green shoulder boards may be worn as alternative items between 1630 and 0630 hours daily.
- 2. Insignia rank officers anodized on green shoulder boards may be worn as alternative when visiting HQ AFV.

Appendix: 1. Notes on Wearing of Medal Ribbons.



APPENDIX 1 TO  
ANNEX A TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
ROUTINE ORDER PART 1  
SERIAL NO V12/71  
DATED 13 AUG 71

WEARING OF MEDAL RIBBONS

1. Attention is drawn to MBIs 102-2, 3, 4 and 5 concerning the correct sequence for the wearing of medal ribbons. The following is the order in which they are to be worn:

- a. British Commonwealth honours and awards in order of seniority,
- b. British Commonwealth campaign stars and medals in order of receipt,
- c. Medals for long service and good conduct, for example, MSM, LS and GCM, ED, and
- d. Foreign awards.

2. The United Nations Medal for Korea is not classified as a foreign award but all other UN medals are. The Vietnamese Campaign Medal is a foreign award.

3. An example of the above would be a soldier who had served in Korea and Vietnam and who had been awarded the LS and GCM. He would wear his ribbons in the following order:

Korea Medal,  
United Nations Medal - Korea,  
Vietnam Medal,  
Long Service and Good Conduct Medal,  
Vietnamese Campaign Medal.



ANNEX B TO  
 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
 ROUTINE ORDER PART 1  
 SERIAL V12/71  
 DATED 13 AUG 71

RESULTS - 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN QUALIFICATION COURSE  
 SUBJECTS A, B, C FOR PROMOTION TO SERGEANT  
 15 - 31 AUG 71

No	Rank	Name	15-20			21-27			28-31			Corps
			A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	
15578	T/Sgt	E.A. Chapman	P								RAAMC	
54227	T/Sgt	B.J. Culling		P							RA Inf	
1200691	T/Sgt	L.G. Clem	P								RAEME	
37004	T/Sgt	J.C. Hall		P							AACC	
441053	T/Sgt	D.A. Jenkin		P							RA Inf	
217394	T/Sgt	J.C. Jensen						P			RA Inf	
38794	T/Sgt	J.C. Ryan		P							AACC	
216472	T/Sgt	R.P. Wikuckis		P							RA Inf	
39338	Cpl	J.A. Boniface	P	P		P					RA Inf	
16983	Cpl	J.R. Darlington		P		P					RA Inf	
54342	Cpl	B. Howieson	P			P					RA Inf	
54696	Cpl	W.D. Maumill	P			P					RA Inf	
217395	Cpl	C.R. McKenzie	P			P					RA Inf	
1200179	Cpl	R. McGregor	P	P		P					RA Inf	
1731469	Cpl	R.V. McGahan	P	P		P					RA Inf	
16200	Cpl	W.J. Porter	P	P		P					RA Inf	
120090	Cpl	L.R. Raisin		P							RA Inf	
47738	Cpl	B.J. Rush	P	P		P					RA Inf	
217423	Cpl	H.R. Soelberg	P	P		P					RA Inf	
1732535	Cpl	G.A. Spiers	P	P		P					RA Inf	
5713990	Cpl	J.M. Williams	P	P								
5713892	Cpl	W.J. Mathews		P		P					RA Inf	
2192218	Cpl	T.J. Willoughby	P	P		P					RA Inf	
215079	Cpl	A.L. Wilkes	P			P					RA Inf	
214148	Cpl	J.E. McKinley	P	P		P					RA Inf	
1202914	WO2	D.A. Thoresen		P							RA Inf	



NOTICES

CALL HOME TELEPHONE SERVICE  
NON-EFFECTIVE CALLS

1. Occasionally there are faults in the circuit between Saigon and Sydney which cause poor reception.
2. The PMG operator in the Sydney exchange, monitors calls each minute. At the end of three minutes, or if a fault occurs, the Sydney operator challenges. It is at this point that members should advise if the call is not effective.
3. The PMG will then take appropriate action regarding the charge for the call.

COLONEL COMMANDANT THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT

1. Lt Gen Sir Reginald Pollard KCVO, KBE, CB, DSO retired as Colonel Commandant of the Royal Australian Regiment on 9 Jul 71. He is succeeded by Lt Gen Sir Thomas Daly KBE, CB, DSO.
2. Lt Gen Sir Reginald Pollard was presented with a Statuette of an Australian Infantryman as a farewell gift by the Regiment. A photograph of the statuette is displayed in the briefing room.

CUSTOMS - MAILING OF LIQUOR TO AUSTRALIA

1. The Department of Customs has reported that they are receiving a considerable number of complaints from recipients of liquor parcels sent from this theatre.
2. Briefly, rules covering gift parcels of liquor are as follows:
  - a. There is no provision for the duty free entry of liquor sent through the post. If liquor is not accompanied by the member, it is subject to duty.
  - b. Liquor should only be sent through the post if it has a flash point of less than 80 degrees Fahrenheit. Customs have laboratories in Sydney, Melbourne and Canberra and problems could occur if they decide to test some brands being mailed.
  - c. Liquids must be packed properly in accordance with Part 3, Section 9, paragraph 1266 of HQ AFV(Army Component) SOP. Some bottles are being sent wrapped in clothing only.

.../3



3. It is understood that duty is sometimes not collected and sometimes charged at a reduced rate. Members should treat this as a bonus and not a change in the rules.
4. Any member who intends sending bottles of liquor through the post is asked to inform the recipient of the information contained in paragraphs 2 and 3.

HOURS OF TRADING CONCESSIONNAIRES - PEARSON CENTRE

1. Barber Shop, with effect 14 Aug 71. Hours of trading over weekends will be as follows:
  - a. Saturdays - 0900hrs to 1200hrs and 1300hrs to 1500hrs.
  - b. Sundays - 0900hrs to 1200hrs.
2. CFC Hong Kong Shop will be closed all day Sunday 29 Aug 71. Other hours of trading not affected.

SERGEANTS MESS - GENERAL MESS MEETING

1. A general mess meeting is to be held in the Sergeants Mess at 1600 hours 23 Aug 71. All members available are to attend.
2. Members who are required for operational duties or essential duties are to notify the RSM 24 hours prior to the meeting of their reason for non-attendance.



MESSAGE FORM

H6

PRIORITY 200700 Z AUG 71

FROM ARRR/NZ

TO LIST A.

RESTRICTED

A 570

INFO.

FOU IS TEXT OF IATF SIG AAC01 DATED 200012 AUST/0

QUOTE (.) WITHDRAWAL OF AFV (.)

TO AVOID POSSIBLE DISAPPOINTMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLICATIONS CMM EACH SOLDIER SHOULD BE MADE AWARE NOW CMM THAT BECAUSE A UNIT IS RETURNING TO AUSTRALIA ALL MEMBERS OF THAT UNIT WILL NOT NECESSARILY RETURN AT THE SAME TIME (.) TO MINIMISE REPLACEMENT MOVEMENTS FROM AUSTRALIA CMM SOLDIERS WITH RESIDUAL SERVICE MAY BE CROSS POSTED TO FILL A NEED IN ANOTHER UNIT OR ALTERNATIVELY SOME SOLDIERS MAY BE OFFERED AN EXTENSION TO FILL A SERVICE NEED (.) UNQUOTE (.)

DRAFTER'S NAME AND APPOINTMENT

HEFFERNAN

CC

DATE

20 AUG 71

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND RANK.

ATT M.  LT



MESSAGE FORM

H7

ROUTINE 200700 Z AUG 71

FROM ARARINZ

TO LIST A (LESS SERIAL 41, 47 TO 50) RESTRICTED  
INFO A 571

FOL IS TEXT OF AFV SIG PA 12280 DATED 19 JUL 71 PHM  
WITHDRAWAL OF AFV IN IT SHOULD BE PROMULGATED TO ALL  
RANKS IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARARINZ. RESTRICTED  
A 570 DATED 200700 Z AUG 71 (U) QUOTE (U)

REFERENCE GOVERNMENT DECISIONS ANNOUNCED 18 AUG 61  
REDUCTION IN PERIOD OF NATIONAL SERVICE (U)

ONE (U) CONDITIONS (U) REQUIREMENT NOW 18 MONTHS  
FULL TIME SERVICE WITH ARA (NS) PLUS THREE  
AND ONE HALF YEARS RESERVE OR PMF SERVICE (U)  
ALTERNATIVE SERVICE IN PMF IS FIVE YEARS OR  
CMH IN CASE OF THOSE WITH TWELVE MONTH EFFICIENT  
SERVICE PRIOR TO REGISTRATION PHM FOUR YEARS (U)

TWO (U) IMPLEMENTATION (U) INTAKE 4/69 WILL BE DISCHARGED  
AS SCHEDULED ON 30 SEP 71 HAVING COMPLETED TWO  
YEARS SERVICE (U) TENTATIVE DISCHARGE DATES FOR  
INTAKES 1/70 AND 2/70 ARE NOT LATER THAN  
22 NOV 71 AND 9 DEC 71 RESPECTIVELY BUT THESE ARE  
SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION (U) INTAKE 3/70 WILL BE  
DISCHARGED ON 7 JAN 71 ON COMPLETION OF 18  
MONTHS SERVICE (U) LATE REPORTERS FOR INTAKE  
3/70 WILL BE DISCHARGED AFTER 15 MONTHS SERVICE (U)  
FOR INTAKES 4/69 PHM 1/70 CMH 2/70 THEY WILL BE  
DISCHARGED WITH THAT INTAKE (U) RESERVE OBLIGATION  
FOR THESE INTAKES WILL BE THAT NECESSARY TO  
MAKE TOTAL SERVICE EQUAL FIVE YEARS (U)

THREE (U) TRANSITIONAL PERIOD (U) CERTAIN CONDITIONS WILL  
APPLY FOR A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD (U) DURATION WILL  
BE PERIOD OF SERVICE OF CURRENT NSM (U) DETAILS  
LATER (U)

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

FOUR /



-2-  
0700

- FOUR (a) VOLUNTARY EXTENSION OF SERVICE (a) DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD RE-ESTABLISHMENT BENEFITS WILL BE GRANTED IN RESPECT OF SERVICE NOT EXCEEDING TWENTY SEVEN MONTHS (a). ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS OF UNY ACTION IN RESPECT TO VOLUNTARY EXTENSION OF SERVICE WILL BE ADVISED IN DUE COURSE (a)
- FIVE (a) RTA OF NSM SERVING OVERSEAS (a) MEMBERS ARE TO ARRIVE IN AUSTRALIA NOT LATER THAN FOUR WEEKS PRIOR TO DISCHARGE DATE (a)
- SIX (a) GRATUITY (a) WILL REMAIN AT DOLLARS FORTY PER COMPLETED YEAR (a) UNQUOTE .

DRAFTER'S NAME AND APPOINTMENT DATE

HEFFERNAN

EC

20 AUG 71

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES.

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND RANK

 LT



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H8

4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn  
NUI DAT

20 Aug 71

See Distribution Below

MAINTENANCE - COURTENAY HILL

1. Subject to operational requirements the following is to be the daily method of maintenance to Courtenay Hill.

Sat 21 Aug	Air	(1)
Sun 22 Aug	Air	
Mon 23 Aug	Road 1000 hrs	(2)
Tue 24 Aug	Air	
Wed 25 Aug	Air	
Thu 26 Aug	Road 1500 hrs	
Fri 27 Aug	Air	
Sat 28 Aug	Air	
Sun 29 Aug	Road 1030 hrs	(3)
Mon 30 Aug	Air	
Tue 31 Aug	Air	
Wed 1 Sep	Road 1530 hrs	
Thu 2 Sep	Air	(4)
Fri 3 Sep	Air	
Sat 4 Sep	Road 1530 hrs	
Sun 5 Sep	Air	
Mon 6 Sep	Road 1030 hrs	(3)
Tue 7 Sep	Air	
Wed 8 Sep	Air	
Thu 9 Sep	Road 1400 hrs	
Fri 10 Sep	Air	
Sat 11 Sep	Air	
Sun 12 Sep	Road 1030 hrs	
Mon 13 Sep	Air	
Tue 14 Sep	Air	
Wed 15 Sep	Road 1500 hrs	
Thu 16 Sep	Air	
Fri 17 Sep	Air	
Sat 18 Sep	Road 1530 hrs	
Sun 19 Sep	Air	
Mon 20 Sep	Air	
Tue 21 Sep	Road 1030 hrs	
Wed 22 Sep	Air	
Thu 23 Sep	Air	
Fri 24 Sep	Road 1430 hrs	
Sat 25 Sep	Air	
Sun 26 Sep	Air	
Mon 27 Sep	Road 1500 hrs	
Tue 28 Sep	Air	
Wed 29 Sep	Air	
Thu 30 Sep	Road 1000 hrs	

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..../Notes



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- 2 -

- Notes: (1) Air resup to dep Eagle Farm 1630 hrs.
- (2) Timing is the departure time from Nui Dat. APC escort to be at Duc Thanh at the same time.
- (3) Changeover V and Sp Coys.
- (4) South Australian Concert Party to Courtenay Hill. No CH47 resup.

2. The following is to be the planned holding capacities for major (Dardem) items.

- |    |             |                     |
|----|-------------|---------------------|
| a. | Water       | 2250 gals           |
| b. | Dieso       | 18 x 44gal drums    |
| c. | Avgas       | 4 x 44 gal drums    |
| d. | Mogas       | 1 x 44 gal drum     |
| e. | JP4 (AVTUR) | 1 x 500 gal bladder |

*D.S. McIver*

(D.S. MCIVER)  
Maj  
2IC

Distribution:

Admin Coy (3) (OC, Tpt Offr, QM)  
Sp Coy (5) (OC, 2IC, CSM, CQMS, AQ Cell)  
V Coy (3)

For Info:

C Sqn 1 Armd Regt  
A Sqn 3 Cav  
Det 5 Coy RAASC  
SC 'S&T' 1 ATF

Internal:

CO  
2IC  
Ops Offr  
BC  
Adjt  
Asst Adjt

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MESSAGE FORM

H9

ROUTINE

240630Z (AUG 71)

UNCLAS

A587

FROM : 4RAR/NZ

TO : LIST A LESS SER 1, 40, 41,  
46 to 50.

INFO:

THE FOL IS THE TEXT OF 1 ATF @ 2011 OF 210035Z  
AUG 71 @ QUOTE LLN PERSONAL BAGGAGE ALLOWANCE  
ON RTA BY DEFENCE CHARTER AL @ PERS ARE TO  
BE REMINDED THAT THIS ALLOWANCE IS 88 LBS @  
RETURNING MEMBERS CONSISTENTLY HAVE EXCESS  
BAGGAGE @ IN FUTURE EXCESS BAGGAGE WILL  
NOT BE CARRIED BY THE CHARTER AIRLINE @  
SUB UNITS ARE TO EXERCISE CONTROL OF BAGGAGE  
AND ENSURE MEMBERS FWD SURPLUS EQPT BY MFD  
AS PER AFV SOP PART 3 CHAPTER 2 SECTION 5  
UNQUOTE @ SUB UNITS ARE ALSO REMINDED OF MFD  
PROCEDURE AS LAID DOWN IN 4RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN  
ADMIN INSTR 4/71 ANNEX C DATED 5 JUN 71

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGE

PULLING BN HQ ERUDITE

MTML LT



H10

AUSTRALIAN ARMY

4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn  
NUI DAT

R810-5-1

26 Aug '71

See Distribution List

4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN FORECAST OF ACTIVITIES NO 4/71  
PERIOD 25 AUG - 30 SEP 71

1. The Forecast of Activities No 3/71 is cancelled and is replaced by Forecast of Activities No 4/71 for the period 25 Aug to 30 Sep 71.

2. Sub units are reminded that while the Forecast is to be used for planning and execution, the forecast could be subject to change.

- 3.
  - a. V Coy - 25 - 28 Aug Operations  
 28 Aug 2IC. CSM to report to Courtenay Hill for briefing and takeover duties  
 29 Aug - 4 Sep Defence of Courtenay Hill  
 4 - 8 Sep Operations  
 9 Sep Return to Nui Dat  
 10 Sep Nui Dat  
 11 - 12 Sep Vung Tau  
 13 Sep Return to Nui Dat  
 14 Sep Nui Dat  
 15 - 21 Sep Task Force Ready Reaction Force  
 21 Sep - ? Operations
  - b. B Coy - 25 Aug - 13 Sep Operations  
 14 Sep Return to Nui Dat  
 15 Sep Nui Dat  
 16 - 17 Sep Vung Tau  
 18 Sep Return to Nui Dat  
 19 - 20 Sep Nui Dat  
 21 - 29 Sep Task Force Ready Reaction Force  
 30 Sep - ? Operations
  - c. C Coy - 24 Aug - 22 Sep Operations  
 23 Sep Return to Nui Dat  
 24 Sep Nui Dat  
 25 - 26 Sep Vung Tau  
 27 Sep Return to Nui Dat  
 28 Sep Nui Dat  
 29 Sep - 5 Oct Task Force Ready Reaction Force
  - d. D Coy - 24 Aug - 27 Sep Operations  
 28 Sep Return to Nui Dat  
 29 Sep Nui Dat  
 30 Sep - 1 Oct Vung Tau  
 2 Oct Return to Nui Dat  
 3 - 4 Oct Nui Dat  
 5 - 15 Oct Task Force Ready Reaction Force

...../Sp Coy



e. Sp Coy Mor Pl - 25 - 28 Aug Operations  
29 Aug Return to Nui Dat  
30 Aug Nui Dat  
31 Aug - 1 Sep Vung Tau  
2 Sep Return to Nui Dat  
3 Sep Nui Dat  
4 Sep - ? Operations

f. Mor Pl. A section of Mor Pl to Vung Tau with each rifle company

3. Ready Reaction Company assumes responsibility at 1800 hrs on the day of mounting. OC Coy to be briefed by 1 ATF prior to this time

*R. J. Hughes Capt*

(J.C. HUGHES)

Lt Col

CO

Distribution:

List A  
HQ 1 ATF (10)



IN CONFIDENCE

L1

4 RAR/MZ (ANZAC) Bn  
NUI DAT

8 Aug 71

5510/173

OC V Coy  
OC B Coy  
OC C Coy  
OC D Coy  
OC Sp Coy  
OC Admin Coy

Copy to: CO  
2IC  
Ops Offr  
Adjt  
QM  
RSC  
IO  
Asst Adjt  
RSM  
File

CO'S NEWSLETTER 2/71

Reference: A. Newsletter 1/71 dated 8 Jul 71.

G ASPECTS

Ready Reaction Force

1. It may be anticipated that we will be allotted this task each alternative month; the next dates being 15 Sep to 15 Oct. Rifle coys will be rostered through the task in sequence.
2. A week as TF RRF has several side effects apart from the primary role viz:
  - a. A week of fresh rations.
  - b. A re-training opportunity.
3. As most coys are doing, the CSM should return Nui Dat one maintden prior to the coy and organize ranges, trg areas and trg aids.
4. I require each OC to give me an outline brief of the points he intends to stress during re-training. Ex "Lifesaver" is obligatory.

/Meal and Brew Halts

IN CONFIDENCE



Deal and Brew Halts

5. A V Coy practice is commended to you viz each halt is planned as an ambush (including claymores), in the same manner that we treat NDP's.

Incidents

6. Two recent incidents in our AO suggest that the mines were old - but detonators were recently installed. Mine awareness must be stressed.

LOH Pad

7. The tail of the "Kiowa" is much lower than the Sioux. In preparing a pad for the LOH a 6 ft square must be cut at ground level. Flattened grass is unacceptable. The cut grass should be carried well away from the pad site.

Ambushes

8. For reasons unknown 4 RAR Trg Precis 5/71 was delayed. The issue is to all offrs and enr NCO's. OC's are to examine the contents and discuss within their coy gp.

9. Coys are to re-examine their techniques for physically searching a killing area after a contact - both day and night.

Artillery and Bushrangers

10. In contact it is normally impossible to have troops on all likely enemy reinforcement or withdrawal routes. Additionally, the depth of a position is generally unknown. Fire support must be brought in ASP with adjustments to follow.

Coy Rear Link Set

11. The OC's primary set is obviously his forward control. In contact it is essential that someone with authority man the rear link; in order of priority 2IC, CSM then Sig Cpl.

After Action Reports

12. Probably considered a bind but must be done. The maximum delay acceptable is in one maintdem, out the next, addressed to Ops Offr.

PR

13. Publicity for 4 RAR/NE has in my opinion been negligible. Our Unit Correspondent (IO) has taken the matter up with PRO 1 ATF.

A ASPECTSManning

14. The pressures in certain areas and sections can be alleviated if the problem is known to the Adjt. Recently attention was drawn to a problem area and investigation proved that we had a SIW. One coy had misused particular men and the work capacity of the group concerned - at the expense of the entire unit. When the 2IC is again mobile he will examine the duties of all personnel not performing their DCM.

/s/ [Signature]



A Records

15. The unit has lost one AAB 83 and the fact came to light accidentally. This proves that the coy concerned is not making regular A checks, nor recording correctly the movement and location of all records. Coy 2IC's and Ord Room Cpls to take note.

Malaria Precautions

16. I do not intend to repeat the various orders and instructions which should be well known but I will repeat certain facts in case anyone has forgotten viz:

- a. I hold pl comds personally responsible for supervising daily issues.
- b. Issues will not be made by anyone less than a pl sgt.
- c. Self issue is only allowed on R & I (and in the case of V Coy R & C) but provision for bulk issue must be made prior to the event. On completion of either R & I or R & C a % follow-up check is to be made by pl comds.

17. For your information every case of malaria is investigated and patients are questioned. Never again do I want patient's statements such as:

"The section cmd gave me a strip for the week but I forgot to take them."

"Didn't have any whilst on R & I."

"Our coy doesn't worry about sleeves down and spraying when at Nui Dat," etc.

Q ASPECTS

L & D Reports

18. To sign a write-off in August for a loss in June is not efficient. Post Op Procedures are incomplete unless L & Ds are raised and processed.

Barrack Damages Townsville

19. Nothing further to report at present.

Alleged Maintenance Shortage

20. Nothing is impossible. We are not adverse to borrowing from other units, or, withdrawing items from people at Nui Dat. The QM has spoken to all CQMS's.

*J. C. Hughes*  
(J. C. HUGHES)  
Lt Col  
CO  
4 RAR, NZ (ANZAC) Bn



M1

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AUSTRALIAN ARMY

Page 1 of 4 Pages

Copy No 44 of 61 Copies

4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn  
NUI DAT

16 Sep 71

R569/1/82

See Distribution List

4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
14 JUN TO 27 JUL 71

- References:
- A. Map L7014.
  - B. 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn Ops 5 dated 16 Jun 71.
  - C. 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn Op Instr 225 dated 20 Jun 71.
  - D. 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn OpO 4/71 dated 18 Jul 71.

Name and Type of Operation

1. Operation HERMIT PARK was a locate and destroy; search and ambush operation.

Location

2. The operation was conducted in AO PICTON which included all the northern sector of AO BIRDSVILLE on both sides of Route 2 from the 80 Northing NORTH to the PHUOC TUY/LONG KHANH Province boundary. The area of operations and AO extensions is at Annex A.

Controlling Headquarters

3. The operation was controlled by HQ 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn located at COURTENAY HILL YS 4590.

Task Organisation

4. 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn group consisted of:
- a. Under comd Det 104 Sig Sqn.
  - b. Under op con
    - C Sqn (-) 1 Arm'd Regt 23 - 30 Jun 71.
    - 5 Tp C Sqn 1 Arm'd Regt 18 - 27 Jul 71.
    - 3 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt 14 - 21 Jun 71.
    - 1 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt 21 Jun - 27 Jul 71.
    - Indep Mortar Carrier Sect 20 Jun - 27 Jul 71.
    - Armoured Comd Vehicle 14 Jun - 27 Jul 71.
    - D & E Pl HQ 1 ATF 14 - 16 Jun 71.

Name and Type of Operation

1. Operation HERMIT PARK was a locate and destroy; search and ambush operation.

Location

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Page 2 of 4 Pages

- c. In DS 104 Fd Bty less one sect 14 Jun - 27 Jul 71.  
One Sioux 161 (Indep) Recce Flt 14 Jun -  
27 Jul 71.
- d. In sp 1 Tp (-) 1 Fd Sqn RAE 14 Jun - 27 Jul 71.
- e. In gen sp and at pri call C Bty (-) 5/42 Arty Bn (US).

Intelligence

5. Shown as Annex B.

Mission

6. To destroy NVA/VC in AO PICTON.

Concept of Operation

7. From 14 to 20 Jun 71 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn maintained continuous surveillance and ambush positions to the WEST of Route 2 above the 84 Northing to interdict known resupply routes from the SOUTHWEST and NORTHWEST of Courtenay Rubber Plantation used by SR4 and 274 Regt.

8. On 21 Jun 71 C and D Companies were tasked against Chau Duc Coy and conducted search and ambush operations to the 80 and 73 Northing respectively, whilst V, B and Sp Companies maintained search and ambush operations above the 85 Northing.

9. The battalion was tasked against HQ 274 Regt from the 19 to 27 Jul 71. Three companies (V, B and C) conducted a search from the 405 Easting SOUTHWEST to the 36 Easting. 1 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt maintained a block to the NORTH and WEST of the search area as required.

Execution

10. Sequence of Events. Annex C.

11. Contacts and Incidents. A summary of contacts and incidents during the operation is attached as Annex D. After Action Reports are attached as Appendices to Annex D.

12. Installations and Caches. A summary of installations and caches located during the reporting period is attached as Annex E.

13. Artillery. The report by BC 104 Fd Bty 12 Fd Regt on artillery used during the operation is attached as Annex F. US artillery (155 MM) supported operations in AO PICTON from 18 - 27 Jul 71.

/Results

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Page 3 of 4 Pages

Results

14. Summary of Major Casualties.

a. Enemy.

(1) KIA (Body Count)	35	
(2) KIA (Credited)	2	
(3) PW	5	
(4) Hoi Chanh	1	<u>Total 43</u>

b. Own Troops.

	<u>Aust</u>	<u>NZ</u>	<u>Total</u>
(1) KIA	-	1	1
(2) WIA	4 (C Sqn 1 Armd Regt)	4	8

15. Enemy Casualties and Captured Weapons. Appendix 1 to Annex B.

16. Captured and Destroyed Equipment, Munitions and Food. Appendix 2 to Annex B.

Lessons Learnt and/or Relearnt

17. Night Dustoff Requests should include:

- a. Type of illumination available.
- b. Method ground troops will use to indicate LZ or winch point to the aircraft.

18. In tall grass, the standing aimed shot increases the chances of a kill.

19. The value of using tanks, supported by infantry, to attack and destroy occupied bunker systems was again proven. Close co-ordination between armour and infantry is essential.

20. Ambushes should be maintained at 100% alertness during known enemy movement times eg 274 Regt movement into the Courtenay Area is normally between 1900 and 2200 hours and occasionally between 0500 and 0800 hours.

21. Sentries must be sited carefully, so that, maximum protection is afforded the section without inhibiting the effectiveness of the section's firepower.

22. In deploying other sub-units to support a contact care must be taken to ensure that artillery/mortar fire is not masked resulting in a "check fire".

/23.

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Page 4 of 4 Pages

23. Once a killing area is selected detailed planning is required to fill the area with lead from all weapons available to the platoon, remembering the characteristics, strengths and weaknesses of the weapons concerned. To rely on one type of weapon alone invites failure.

*J.C. Hughes*  
(J.C. HUGHES)  
Lt Col  
CO

- Annexes:
- A. AO PICTON and Extensions.
  - B. Intelligence.
  - C. Sequence of Events.
  - D. Summary of Contacts and Incidents.
  - E. Summary of Installations and Caches.
  - F. Artillery After Action report.

<u>Distribution:</u>	<u>Copy No:</u> (Incl Annexes A to F)	<u>Distribution:</u>	<u>Copy No:</u> (Incl Annexes A to F)
V Coy	1	Chaplain	41 - 42
B Coy	2	RSM	43
C Coy	3	Comds Diary	44 - 48
D Coy	4	Spare	49 - 56
Sp Coy	5	File	57
Admin Coy	6		
C Sqn 1 Armd Regt	7	<u>For Information:</u>	
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt	8	1 RAR Townsville	58
104 Fd Bty RAA	9	3 RAR	59
12 Fd Regt	10	9 RAR Enoggera	60
1 Fd Sqn	11	D Inf AHQ Canberra	61
161 (Indep) Recce Flt	12		
HQ 1 ATF	13 - 27		
NZ Component	28		
CO	29		
2IC	30		
Ops Offr	31 - 32		
Adjt	33		
IO	34		
RSO	35		
Mor Pl	36		
Tracker Pl	37		
Aslt Pnr Pl	38		
RMO	39		
QM	40		


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Ref Map 6430  
Scale 1:100,000  
Series L607

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**OPERATION HERMIT PARK**

ANNEX <sup>A</sup> TO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC)  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71



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


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# OPERATION HERMIT PARK

REDEPLOYMENT 19 JULY 1971

APPENDIX 1 TO  
ANNEX <sup>A</sup> to  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OP HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71



FSB DEBBIE

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Page 1 of 7 Pages

ANNEX B TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 15 SEP 71

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

General

1. The effects of Operation HERMIT PARK on VC/NVA in the operational area were as follows:
  - a. The VC/NVA units were forced to abandon constructed base camps and caches in the North West of PHUOC TUY Province and relocate bases outside the Province.
  - b. Increased pressure was placed on the local resupply system by denying the VC/NVA access to civilian population along Route 2.
  - c. Preventing interdiction to Route 2 and preventing attacks against local forces posts along Route 2.
2. Known Enemy Disposition at the Commencement of Operation HERMIT PARK.
  - a. Main Forces.
    - (1) 274 VC Main Force Regiment.
      - (a) Contact with a number of VC who employed above average tactics near the re-supply area of the VIET CUONG plantation at the conclusion of Operation OVERLORD, indicated that at least a small force from the Regt was operating within PHUOC TUY's North Western boundary.
      - (b) Regt HQ. Reported to be South of ONG QUE Plantation (vic YS 3698).
      - (c) 1 Bn. Based in the area of the SOUI CA (vic YS 3991) and known to be operating South across the Province border, and replenishing its supplies from the VIET CUONG, NGUYEN HIEP and CHAU IAC Plantations. Strength approx 100 men.
      - (d) 2 Bn. Operating to the North, based near feature at YT 4101, strength up to 80.
      - (e) 3 Bn. Further West, operating in the area of the BINH SON Plantation (YS 2392). Strength about 70.
    - (2) Sub Region 4. Elements from the HQ and its supporting services group had operated in the area to the North of COURTENAY Plantation, and could be expected to take advantage of the sanctuary area offered by the inter-provincial boundary, to the West of Route 2. Estimated strength in the area not exceeding 100.
  - b. Local Forces.

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Page 2 of 7 Pages

b. Local Forces.

- (1) Chau Duc District HQ. Reported to be back in the area of the CU BI Rubber (YS 4282) and reported to be conducting liaison with both the NGAI GIAO and BINH BA Guerillas. Strength was up to 60, but usually the number based in any one group does not exceed 30.
- (2) C41 Chau Duc LF Coy. Thought to be based further to the West in the CHAU PHA valley and probably in an older base near YS 3472. Also thought to have been resupplied recently when a group from CHAU DUC was located to the North East near HQ BA LONG Province. Strength not more than 35.
- (3) NGAI GIAO Guerillas. Located to the South of CU BI plantation (YS 4481), the force suffered a series of setbacks in early June as two of their strength were killed and one captured by RF troops. Strength not more than 20.
- (4) BINH BA Guerillas. Based in the vic YS 4173, the band resupplies from Binh Ba and Duc My. Strength, including the Duc My guerillas, about 13.

3. The Threat. The Main Force and Local units were known to have received resupply and possibly reinforcements during the period May - June. This enabled them to plan ahead, and gave them the capability to undertake offensive tasks in the area of Route 2 in Northern PHUOC TUY Province. The most likely targets being local military outposts and outlying hamlets in DUC THANH District. The Main Force units could also be expected to operate in Southern LONG KHANH Province on a similar basis.

4. Enemy Losses. A record of enemy casualties and captured weapons is summarized in Appendix 1.

5. Installations and Caches. A list of installations and caches located is contained in Annex E.

6. Captured Munitions, Equipment and Foodstuffs. A summary of captured munitions, equipment and foodstuffs is contained in Appendix 2.

7. Summary of Enemy Activities and Reactions.

a. Main Force.

(1) 274 VC Main Force Regiment.

- (a) During the period 13 - 24 June a number of individuals, small groups from C24 Convalescence Coy and elements from 1 Bn were engaged during resupply tasks to and from the VIET CUONG/CHAU LAC plantations.

/(b)

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Page 3 of 7 Pages

- (b) On 25/26 June an assault on a tenaciously defended 10 bunker system at YS 420855 by tanks, infantry and APC's supported by artillery fire, resulted in the killing of 7 VC and the probable wounding of more. Documents in the hastily evacuated system identified C2 Coy 1 Bn. The system had been renovated, and occupied by C2 within the three weeks prior to the attack. Captured documents also indicated that they were aware of the proximity of our coys well before the attack, and had deliberately remained static and endeavoured to avoid contact. The fact that the coy had managed to move undetected from the North is probably due to the emphasis on allied operations to the East of Route 2 early in the month, driving 3 Bn 33 NVA Regt and D445 LF Bn out of their base areas. C2 was well equipped with RPG 2's and employed them aggressively against the assaulting forces. Withdrawal routes were to the South then East, and to the North.
- (c) A further engagement with a resupply squad from 1 Bn, who were moving North West, near the VIET CUONG Plantation on 1 July resulted in 2 VC being killed and 1 VC taken prisoner.
- (d) Reports received, and the area from which these resupply parties originated indicated that a main force unit - probably 1 Bn - were based in the vicinity of the SOUI CA and SOUI SOC.
- (e) Over the period 20 - 22 July a search was conducted from the East along the general line of the SOUI QUIT and its southern tributary. In a number of separate incidents generally close to a series of bunker systems in area YS 3794 - YS 3894, 8 members from the Sp Coys C20 Signals and C23 Surgical Coys of Regt HQ were killed. Bunker systems of 4, 8, 8 and 13 bunkers were located and destroyed along the SOUI QUIT as were a number of food caches totalling approx 700 lbs rice. An equipment cache containing 3 x K63 Chicom man pack radios was also found, together with a hand generator and field telephone. A large number of C and D cell batteries were also captured from members of the Signals Coy after a contact. Documents located in the systems identified other Sp Coys from Regt HQ - C17 Recoilless Rifle, C19 Engineer, C21 Recce Coy and H13 Rear Services Group, clearly indicating a HQ element was based in and operating from the area.
- (f) The 2 Bn or Sp Coys of 274 Regt are suspected as having been involved in a contact SOUTH-WEST of CAM TAM on 26 July, the mortar/sapper attack on the village on 27 July and the ambush of RF on 28 Jul 71. All of which indicate that HQ 274 Regt may have still been capable of co-ordinating activities to relieve the pressure from the HQ area.

(g)

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(g) Total number of VC eradicated from the Regt was 19 for the operation.

(2) Sub Region 4.

- (a) Documents CIA, interrogations from 4 PW and a Hoi Chanh identified a group of approx 25 VC who were ambushed by 1 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt at YS 441940 as being from H10 Hospital Unit, the Commo Liaison Section, D10 Water Sapper Bn and SR4.
- (b) The group, reportedly based in the SOUI SOC/CA area to the West of Route 2, were moving to BAO LIET (H) of BAO BUNH (V) in LONG KHANH Province.
- (c) A total of 13 VC were killed and 23 packs containing over 750 lbs rice, a typewriter and a quantity of documents were captured.
- (d) Most of the PW's stated that resupply for their units originated from one or more of the following locations:
- i. BINH SON (P) YS 2392.
  - ii. THAI THIEN (V) YS 2279.
  - iii. VIET CUONG (P) YS 4489.
  - iv. CHAU LAC (P) YS 4487.
  - v. BAO LIET (H) vic BAO BINH (V).

These areas are also known to contribute to the maintenance of 274 Regt as well as their own local guerilla forces.

- (e) One PW from this group maintained, although others did not substantiate the statement, that H10 was to be disbanded in June 1971. This may have been a part reference to the reported re-organization of MR7, thought to be currently taking place.
- (f) On 13 July in a series of contacts near the SOUI CA (vic YS 4292) two members of SR4 were KIA. One from C205 Recce Coy, the other from the MILPO Section of HQ SR4. Both were well equipped, and were obviously not on a resupply mission, but almost certainly carrying out recce/liaison tasks to the North East.
- (g) The VC from the MILPO Section was dressed in a blue uniform which had a green insignia on the upper left arm. Amongst documents found in his pack was a marked map of an unidentified village or military outpost.

/(h)

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- (h) In all cases contacts with members from SR4 occurred near the line of the SOUI CA in the vicinity of Route 2. The numerous small bunker systems in the area have possibly been used as staging areas. The SOUI CA/SOC merging to form the SONG CA is assessed as having been a navigation aid with the SOUI LE to form the basis of a communication route between SR4 HQ and its units based in the North Western area of the RUNG SAT near Route 15. This route connects the resupply areas from THAI THIEN to the Courtenay area and further to the East.
- (i) 20 VC from SR4 units were eradicated during the course of the operation.

b. Local Forces.

(1) Chau Duc District Forces.

- (a) One member of the Medical Protection Cell was killed when travelling as part of a resupply party North of the CU BI Rubber at YS 437844 in mid June.
- (b) A bunker system with 12 bunkers and 9 small weapon pits - all with OHP, up to two months old was located at YS 418808 in early July. There were signs of recent evacuation, and documents found in the system identified Chau Duc District Unit. There was reference to members from the Finance and Economy Sections being in the villages of PHU MY and PHUOC HOA on Route 15. The location of this system was consistent with a number of small skirmishes, reports and tracks located in the area in late June.
- (c) In the CHAU PHA Valley at YS 356811 during a follow up search of a contact in which 1 VC was killed, a large tunnel system over 1200 ft in length, averaging 5' 4" in height and 2' 6" in width with up to 12 ft of earth on top of the tunnel, was located. There were also 6 bunkers, 2 of which were recently completed, in close proximity to exit/entry points to the system. There was an underground well in the tunnel. A caretaker group of 10 VC were thought to be in system when the contact occurred.
- (d) Documents found identified elements of Chau Duc as having occupied the system. Mention was made of members of the Finance and Economy Section being in the village of PHUOC HOA in late June.

/(e)

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- (e) Although the tunnel system was occupied by Chau Duc forces, it was about 3 years old and similar in size and construction to one located on 3 Oct 70 at YS 334825 which housed a considerable ammunition cache and apparently was built by elements of 274 Regt or ex D65 Engr Bn. This is consistent with the characteristics of CHAU DUC forces who have been known to reoccupy old bunker systems originally constructed by other VC units operating in the area.
  - (f) The complex was ideally situated near the SOUI CHAU PHA and the border of the civil access area from PHU MY/THAI THIEN, and would have been ideal for establishing a cache/resupply centre. With the systems located at YS 356811 and YS 418808 Chau Duc forces would have had two suitably sited staging centres, enabling them to operate freely between Route 15 and Route 2.
  - (g) There was no further contact with elements from Chau Duc during the following period. 2 Chau Duc VC were eliminated during the operation.
- (2) NGAI GIAO Guerillas. No contact was made with this group, but it would be reasonable to assume that they worked as guides and liaised with CHAU DUC forces when in the area of the CU BI Rubber.
  - (3) BINH BA Guerillas. No contact was made with the guerillas during the operation.

8. Assessment.

- a. Any offensive task that C2 Coy 1 Bn 274 Regt had planned for the DUC THANH District was certainly disrupted when their base was located and destroyed on 25 - 26 Jun 71.
- b. Regt HQ was forced to withdraw to the NORTH and then WEST from its base area on the SOUI QUIT. Valuable communication equipment and 700 lb rice was captured as a result of the search conducted along the creek line from the EAST.
- c. That the Regt had received NORTH VIETNAMESE reinforcements recently was confirmed from identification of bodies, equipment and documents recovered from the Regt's HQ base.
- d. Sub Region 4 suffered a substantial loss of its hospital unit personnel together with necessary HQ elements in an ambush during a resupply task to the sanctuary areas in the NORTH EAST near BAO BINH in LONG KHANH Province. The capture of a marked map from a member of the unit may not seriously affect future plans of the HQ; possibly the loss of the map may inhibit the execution of an attack.

/e.

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- e. Chau Duc elements were forced to withdraw from two important systems. One near the CU BI Plantation/Slope 30 on Route 2, near the population centre of DUC THANH District. The second in the CHAU PAU Valley near the civil access area of PHU MY/THAI THIEN on Route 15. Both instances have compelled Chau Duc to relocate their base and re-establish vital links with the local population.
- f. This may not be simply achieved, as the inactivity of this unit over the past 6 months surely questions their credibility in the eyes of the people.
- g. Chau Duc sub-units are thought to be spread widely as a result of this forced movement with elements located near the population centres of HOA LONG (YS 4164), PHUOC HOA (YS 2862), PHU MY (YS 2574), THAI THIEN (YS 2279) and small mobile groups in the NUI DINHS and CHAU PAU Valley.

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APPENDIX 1 TO  
ANNEX B TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF ENEMY CASUALTIES AND WEAPONS CAPTURED  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK

Enemy Casualties

a.	VC/NVA KIA (BC)	35
b.	VC/NVA KIA (Poss)	2
c.	VC/NVA PW	5
d.	Hoi Chanh	1

Captured Weapons

a.	AK47	14
b.	K54	5
c.	B40 (RPG2)	1
d.	PPS(H)	1
e.	M79	1

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APPENDIX 2 TO  
ANNEX B TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY CAPTURED ENEMY MUNITIONS, EQUIPMENT AND FOODSTUFFS  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK

Captured Munitions

a.	7.62 MM (short) rds	596
b.	7.62 MM Link	4
c.	M79 HE	6
d.	M79 Canister	4
e.	B40 rds	1

Captured Equipment

a.	US sandbags	6
b.	Cooking pots	3
c.	Metal spoon	5
d.	Plastic water carrier	1
e.	US water bottle	1
f.	Metal bowl	1
g.	Machete	1
h.	Machete sheath	1
i.	Bandages	Qty
j.	Medical supplies	Qty
k.	Anti Malaria tablets	Qty
l.	Iodine	1 Bottle
m.	Wire	Qty
n.	String	Qty
o.	Toilet gear	Qty
p.	Kerosene lamp (homemade)	1
q.	VC poncho	2
r.	Plastic sheeting	Qty
s.	Plastic bags	Qty
t.	Aerial flare parachute	1
u.	Packs	13
v.	Rubber strips	Qty
w.	Shirts	14
x.	Shorts	10
y.	Trousers (pr)	9
z.	Vest	1
aa.	Socks (pr)	1
ab.	Plastic wallet	2
ac.	Gold ring	1
ad.	Cigarette lighter	3
ae.	Woman's watch	1
af.	Chop sticks (sets)	3
ag.	Torch	5
ah.	Magazine carriers	1
ai.	US compass	3
aj.	Hat	2
ak.	Eating bowl	3

/al,

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- 2 -

al.	Batteries (D Cell)	67
am.	Kerosene (bottles)	2
an.	Hoe	1
ao.	Acid (small bottle)	1
ap.	Hammock	2
aq.	Cam silk (sheet)	1
ar.	Silk (sheet)	3
as.	US webb belt	4
at.	Thongs (pr)	1
au.	US compass pouch	1
av.	Pouches (assorted)	7
aw.	Belt (NVA)	3
ax.	Oil (bottle)	1
ay.	Sewing material	Qty
az.	Sandals	1
ba.	Chicom radio sets	3
bb.	Chicom field telephone	1
bc.	Chicom generator	1
bd.	Handset (25 set)	2
be.	Whip aerials (25 set)	2
bf.	NVA shirt	1
bg.	NVA trousers	1
bh.	NVA water bottle	1
bi.	NVA water bottle carrier	1
bj.	NVA bush hat	1
bk.	Morse key set with jack	1
bl.	Medal	1
bm.	Medal bar	1
bn.	Ribbon	1
bo.	VN \$9049	
bp.	Documents	Qty

Captured Foodstuffs

a.	Rice (uncooked)	278½ lb
b.	Rice (cooked)	3 lb
c.	Brown sugar	3 lb
d.	Salt	2 lb
e.	Food flavouring	9 lb
f.	Seafood	5 lb
g.	Beverage powder	1 lb
h.	Honey (bottle)	1
i.	Bananas	2 lb
j.	Condensed milk (tin)	8 oz
k.	Chilis	1 lb
l.	Tobacco	1 lb
m.	Sauce (bottle)	9

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ANNEX C TO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED: 6 SEP 71

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK

<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Activity</u>	<u>Serial of Event</u> <u>in Annex D/</u> <u>Annex E</u>
(a)	(b)	(c)
At 140600H Jun 71 when Operation OVERLORD concluded and Operation HERMIT PARK commenced the sub-unit locstats and tasks were:		
a. V Coy	YS 398875	Search and ambush in areas YS 3887, 3987, 3888 and 3889 in AO X.
b. B Coy	CHQ/Aslt Pnr Pl YS 415889 4 Pl YS 421887 5 Pl YS 417884 6 Pl YS 411879	Search and ambush west of Courtenay Hill AO T.
c. C Coy	CHQ/9 Pl YS 424857 7 Pl YS 430860 8 Pl YS 417857	Search and ambush below 88 Northing in AO Z.
d. D Coy	CHQ, 11, 12 Pls YS 557922 10 Pl YS 560923	(1) Destroy previously located bunker system YS 5691. (2) Search and ambush in AO X. after V Coy depart the area.
e. Adv CP/D & E Pl HQ 1 ATF	Courtenay Hill YS 4590	
f. Main CP/Sp Coy(-)	FSB TRISH YS 5288	

14 Jun

Day 1

0930 11 Pl D Coy located three bunkers at YS 567921 1/E .

/1406

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(a)	(b)	(c)
1406	4 Pl B Coy at YS 428892 found suspected mine marker and destroyed bunker at same vicinity. 6 Pl located similar markers at YS 440905.	N/A
1650	C Coy reported finding a crashed aircraft at YS 426854 estimated 1 - 2 years old, burnt out and exploded. Aircraft number 62D12262 and wreckage was spread over 100 metres by 200 metres with evidence of bullet holes in the fuselage.	N/A
1955	B Coy completed BDA for an airstrike in the area of D & E Pl ambush 12 Jun 71 YS 420891. Bomb strike not effective.	N/A.
<u>15 Jun</u>	<u>Day 2</u>	
0802	At YS 424853 7 Pl C Coy discovered 2 x 44 gal containers of CS gas. Containers were buried.	N/A
0825	At YS 426853 C Coy HQ contacted 3 or 4 en with unknown results.	1/D
1110	C Coy was advised that 2 VC pls had been sighted at YS 4385. (Agent report).	N/A.
<u>16 Jun</u>	<u>Day 3</u>	
0845	V Coy ordered to RV at YS 398864 by 171200H for extraction by APC (3 Tp) for R & I.	N/A.
1419	D Coy redeployment from the bunker system YS 569925 to YS 398864 by 9 Sqn RAAF for search and ambush tasks.	N/A.
1400	4 Pl B Coy at YS 401887 found one bunker in very poor condition.	2/E
1540	Tracker Pl complete at Courtenay Hill after completing destruction of FSB TRISH. Movement by 9 Sqn RAAF aircraft.	N/A.
1600	D & E Pl HQ 1 ATF ceased to be under operational control and returned to Nui Dat by TCV.	N/A.
<u>17 Jun</u>	<u>Day 4</u>	
0845	8 Pl C Coy contacted 6 enemy at YS 437344 moving from E to W. Enemy were dressed in greens and khaki. Results: 1 en KIA.	2/D
0912	6 Pl B Coy located an aerial illumination shell at YS 411897. Destroyed.	N/A.

/0950

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(a)	(b)	(c)
0950	8 Pl C Coy contacted an unknown number of enemy. Nil results.	3/D
1215	V Coy extracted from YS 395867 by 3 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt for movement to Courtenay Hill.	N/A
1235	A patrol from Sp Coy located a mine marker, a 105 MM blind and a small shrine at YS 447907. Blind buried.	N/A
1505	V Coy departed Courtenay Hill by TCVs for Nui Dat. (R & I).	N/A
1735	9 Pl C Coy sighted a person at YS 424844 moving from W to E at a distance of 150 metres. No action taken because of distance and nature of terrain.	4/D
1855	CHQ B Coy at YS 418894 contacted two enemy moving from S to N. Results: 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA (poss), qty of eqpt CIA.	5/D
1859	6 Pl B Coy at YS 413893 contacted estimated 5 to 10 enemy moving from E to W. Results: 1 en KIA (poss), wpn, qty food, eqpt and AK47 CIA.	6/D
<u>18 Jun</u>	<u>Day 5</u>	
0820	9 Pl C Coy found two CBU at YS 424844. Buried.	N/A
0845	11 Pl D Coy found a VC body, approx 1 week old, at YS 378885. (KIA by V Coy 2 Jun 71).	N/A
0855	9 Pl C Coy contacted est 4 - 6 enemy at YS 424844 who withdrew S to N after contact. Nil results.	7/D
1140	8 Pl C Coy contacted 3 enemy in a camp at YS 433842. Nil results, blood trail located - 1 en WIA (poss). The camp was 20 metres square and had been in use 2 - 3 days. A qty of docs and eqpt were located.	8/D 3/E
1500	10 Pl D Coy located a bunker system at YS 396887, 'L' shaped 150 metres wide. There were 8 bunkers, and last used 5 - 7 days ago.	4/E
<u>19 Jun</u>	<u>Day 6</u>	
0730	12 Pl D Coy located a tunnel at YS 362879. The tunnel was 15 ft deep and had a number of branch tunnels. Tunnel length over 1000 metres.	5/E
1115	8 Pl C Coy located a camp at YS 435842, 10 metres square. Entry/exits S and W. Last used 2 - 3 days ago.	6/E

/20 Jun

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(a)	(b)	(c)
<u>20 Jun</u>	<u>Day 7</u>	
1120	D Coy ordered to concentrate at YS 381878 for redeployment by 9 Sqr RAAF to YS 345712 on 210730 Jun. Tasked against Chau Duc LF unit.	N/A
1715	8 Pl C Coy contacted one enemy at YS 436843. Enemy armed with unidentified weapon and approached from the N. Withdrew W. Nil results.	9/D
1902	TA32 found one grave at YS 483905 estimated two weeks old with a HO CHI MINH sandle on top.	N/A
<u>21 Jun</u>	<u>Day 8</u>	
0959	D Coy complete at YS 345712 following redeployment by air from YS 381878. Search Chau Pau Valley and K Base YS 4176.	N/A
1426	TA3 replaced by TA1 as under op con 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn.	N/A
1835	8 Pl C Coy contacted 3 enemy in black dress armed with AK 47s and 1 RPG at YS 436823. Enemy withdrew S. Nil results.	10/D
2210	TA11 contacted an unknown force of enemy at YS 442941. Results: 12 en KIA (BC), 1 x AK 47 and 2 x K54 CIA.	11/D
<u>22 Jun</u>	<u>Day 9</u>	
0230	TA11 contacted unknown number of enemy at YS 442941. Results: 3 VC PW (1 WIA), 2 x K54, 1 x AK 47, 22 packs CIA.	12/D
0459	Dustoff for one wounded VC from TA11. Contact complete.	N/A
0650	Tracker Pl to TA1 loc to assist in the search for en from TA11 contact.	N/A
0835	Tracker Pl following a blood trail from the contact area found a track of 4 persons moving NW. Recovered a pack in this area.	N/A
1054	TA12 and Tracker Pl captured one VC with a pack at YS 445938 after following a track from the contact area.	13/D
<u>23 Jun</u>	<u>Day 10</u>	
0831	V Coy deployed from Nui Dat (ex R & I) to YS 408875 by TCV and APC (1 Tp). Search and ambush tasks to South. /1030	N/A

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(a)	(b)	(c)
1030	Previous agent reports of Chau Duc Coy being located vic YS 4080 appeared to be confirmed following the location of tracks leading to west; sounds of digging vic YS 409808 by 7 Pl C Coy and the report by 8 Pl C Coy of the sounds of chopping vic YS 408810. The camp was assessed as in vic YS 404805 (ground, Chau Duc habits, bearings of sounds).	N/A
1115	11 Pl D Coy at YS 353782 loc fresh cut bunches of bamboo tied with cord.	N/A
1235	CO advised C Coy of his intention to deploy mortars in AMC's as fire support. Tanks and APC's were to be deployed in direct support of C Coy. D Coy 3 RAR would be deployed as a blocking force SOUTH of the objective.	N/A
1635	11 Pl D Coy at YS 347786 sighted 1 VC and suspected others loc in camp. They kept the camp under surveillance. 12 Pl D Coy followed 3 heavily laden carts moving in direction of camp. Carts later headed West into civil access area.	D/14 E/7
1715	8 Pl C Coy at YS 418808 loc a track with pits and overhead protection. They saw one person and heard a lot of talking. They avoided the area in order to proceed on primary task of rejoining the coy.	D/15
1815	C Coy advised H hr delayed by 1 hr till 0900 hrs. Elements of A Sqn 3 Cav Regt to block from YS 398820 to YS 400825. To be in position by 0800 hrs.	N/A
1845	12 Pl D Coy at YS 331769 loc a letterbox.	E/8
1933	TA11 captured a wounded PW at YS 436938 who had been wounded in TA11 contact 21 Jun 71.	D/16
2005	Base Defence fired M79s at movement on its western perimeter and heard retreating footsteps.	N/A
2012	Dustoff TA11 complete.	N/A
<u>24 Jun</u>	<u>Day 11</u>	
0600	C Coy attack, H hour 0900 hrs, direction N to S. Artillery on target 0845 hrs. D Coy 3 RAR blocking YS 397797 to YS 415800. 5 Tp to join C Coy for attack. Sect 1 Tp 3 Cav and Sect AMC at YS 22824. A Sqn 3 Cav (-) blocking from YS 457840 to YS 397817. Sect 104 Fd Bty to move to FSB Jane by 0600 hrs to sp attack protected by 3 Tp C Sqn.	N/A

/0845

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(a)	(b)	(c)
0645	TA1 located a 2.75 inch rocket pod at YS 436938.	N/A
0800	C Coy advised H hour to be delayed 30 mins (now 0930 hrs).	N/A
0907	C Coy advised H hour delayed a further 45 mins (now 1015 hrs).	N/A
1040	4 RAR (Rear) reported that V Coy's magazine had blown up. One engineer slightly injured, another shocked.	N/A
1300	B Coy departed Courtenay Hill by TCVs for Nui Dat and R & I.	N/A
1520	CHQ V Coy contacted an unknown number of enemy at YS 425854. Results: 1 NZ WIA, later DOW.	D/17
<u>25 Jun</u>	<u>Day 12</u>	
1117	2 Pl V Coy contacted an unknown number of en at YS 421855 in a bunker system. Results: 4 NZ WIA.	D/18
1200	11 Pl D Coy located a bunker system at YS 350793. There were 6 bunkers and two fighting pits. System had been vacated hastily.	E/9
1203	HQ 1 ATF ordered T1, T5, TA1 to RV east of the contact area at YS 453858. Tango 9 was to command the assault on the bunker system with C Sqn (-), 1 Pl V Coy, 1 Tp A Sqn.	N/A
1205	Bushranger on station.	N/A
1343	Dustoff complete with 3 NZ casualties. One remained in location.	N/A
1350	V Coy reported that 2 Pl V Coy were directing Cobras and Bushrangers in the contact area. A number of enemy were in a camp armed with RPGs and using automatic fire.	N/A
1402	T9 reported in position to search.	N/A
1406	T9 reported that the form of the assault will be T5 on the right, T3 on the left, 1 Pl V Coy on left to cover left flank. TA1 to follow up in the rear.	N/A
1425	Assault commenced.	D/19

/1500

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(a)	(b)	(c)
1500	TØA reported bunkers 150 metres from the line of departure and the presence of CS gas to their right flank. Some elements were slightly affected by the gas.	N/A
1517	TØA reported finding the top of a 44 gallon CS drum but could not locate the drum.	N/A
1519	TØA reported sighting a bamboo construction in the bunker system.	N/A
1545	V Coy reported having sighted the western limit of the system. Reported that the system appeared to be 70 metres by 120 metres and marked by large trees.	E/10
1622	Possum AØ4 reported receiving fire in the contact area. There were still enemy between the tanks and 2 Pl V Coy.	N/A
1630	TØA reported finding what they believed to be a grave for eight persons. Search revealed rubbish dump.	N/A
1631	V Coy again in contact at YS 421855.	N/A
<u>26 Jun</u>	<u>Day 13</u>	
0745	T9 advised H hour for assault into bunker system to be 1000 hrs.	N/A
0935	TØA located a grave at YS 425825 containing a body in a coffin. (Possibly KBA on 12 Jun 71).	N/A
1140	TØA reported that the tanks had entered the bunker system and had encountered numerous bunkers but no opposition.	N/A
1142	C Coy ordered to concentrate at YS 404805 for redeployment by air to LZ to be notified and secured by 3 Pl V Coy. Follow-up search and ambush tasks.	N/A
1216	TØA reported that the tanks were 60 metres plus of the bunker system and were beginning to push South.	N/A
1255	Tanks and 1 Pl V Coy at southern edge of bunker system and located three tracks which had been used as withdrawal routes to the South. Result: 5 VC KIA, 1 RPG CIA.	N/A
1255	3 Pl V Coy reported tracks of heavily laden troops at YS 400875 heading north. Marks of stretchers sighted.	N/A

/27 Jun

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(a)	(b)	(c)
<u>27 Jun</u>	<u>Day 14</u>	
0040	Movement heard in front of TA11 position. M79s fired. Nil results.	D/20
1105	Tracker Pl located transit camp at YS 443902.	E/11
1142	3 Tp C Sqn 1 Armd Regt returned to FSB MARY. Sqn HQ (-), 1 Tp, 5 Tp moved to NDP at YS 453863. TØE, T8B returned to Nui Dat for repairs.	N/A
1352	Tracker Pl located a rifle (PPSH) jammed in a tree 6 - 8 ft above ground YS 438903.	E/12
1400	V Coy located VC body and AK 47 at YS 428854 (vicinity of CHQ V Coy contact 24 Jun 71). Credited to V Coy.	E/13
<u>28 Jun</u>	<u>Day 15</u>	
1011	Tracker Pl sighted possible 8 enemy wearing packs 600 metres away at YS 434889. Group split and moved west and east.	D/21
1145	C Coy located UXB 250 lb bomb at YS 414814. Destroyed.	N/A
1400	V Coy located a grave at YS 427853. Buried last 2 days. Dressed in black shirt and trousers. KIA 25 Jun 71.	N/A
<u>29 Jun</u>	<u>Day 16</u>	
0100	6 Pl B Coy in contact at YS 438853. Approximately 5 or 6 enemy moving east to west. Nil results.	D/22
1620	10 Pl D Coy contacted one VC moving south-west to north-east at YS 350793. Nil results.	D/23
1950	CHQ C Coy contacted unknown number of VC at YS 420827. Nil results.	D/24
2120	CHQ C Coy engaged movement on perimeter. Nil results.	N/A
2128	CHQ and 3 Pl V Coy contacted 5 or 6 VC at YS 438853. Nil results.	D/25
<u>30 Jun</u>	<u>Day 17</u>	
0508	Aslt Pnr Pl in contact with small party ( 2 - 3 ) at YS 437872. Nil results.	D/26

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(a)	(b)	(c)
0955	Aslt Pnr Pl located VC pack at YS 436887 containing personal items and 90 AK47 rounds.	E/14
1145	At YS 426840 2 Pl V Coy engaged sounds of movement while a Standing Patrol was re-adjusting its position. Results: 1 VN woman killed.	D/27
1645	B Coy redeployed from Nui Dat by TCVs and APCs to vic YS 429921 after R & I to conduct ambush tasks.	N/A
<u>01 Jul</u>	<u>Day 18</u>	
1230	8 Pl C Coy at YS 418808 loc a recently evac bunker system consisting of 12 large bunkers and 9 weapon pits.	E/15
1900	TA11 at YS 428877 contacted 10 VC. Results: 2 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA (PW), 2 x AK47 and 1 x K54 captured.	D/28
<u>02 Jul</u>	<u>Day 19</u>	
0900	10 Pl D Coy at YS 356810 contacted 4 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 x AK47 captured.	D/29
0930	10 Pl D Coy at YS 356811 located an old bunker system with 2 new bunkers.	E/16
1530	10 Pl D Coy at YS 356811 located a tunnel system.	E/17
1745	12 Pl D Coy at YS 354814 located a base camp.	E/18
<u>03 Jul</u>	<u>Day 20</u>	
1930	Sapdem submitted for explosives to demolish bunkers and tunnel system searched throughout the day by D Coy.	N/A
<u>04 Jul</u>	<u>Day 21</u>	
1203	TA12 at YS 442941 loc 1 x AK47 resulting from TA11's contact 22 Jun 71.	N/A
1545	12 Pl D Coy at YS 367814 loc one sleeping space.	N/A
1805	Tracker Pl at YS 472858 had a trip flare activated. Search revealed fresh footprints and a VN type poncho.	D/30
<u>05 Jul</u>	<u>Day 22</u>	
	There were no occurrences of tactical significance and no changes in Battalion deployments.	N/A
<u>06 Jul</u>	<u>Day 23</u>	
1630	C Coy complete at Eagle Farm following extraction from YS 378800 by 9 Sqn RAAF. (For R & I).	N/A

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(a)	(b)	(c)
<u>07 Jul</u>	<u>Day 24</u>	
	There were no occurrences of tactical significance and no change in Battalion deployments.	N/A
<u>08 Jul</u>	<u>Day 25</u>	
	There were no occurrences of tactical significance and no changes in Battalion deployments.	N/A
<u>09 Jul</u>	<u>Day 26</u>	
1906	2 Pl V Coy contacted 2 VC at YS 434869. Results: 1 VC KIA and 1 AK 47 recovered.	D/31
<u>10 Jul</u>	<u>Day 27</u>	
	There were no occurrences of tactical significance and no changes in Battalion deployments.	N/A
<u>11 Jul</u>	<u>Day 28</u>	
1245	D Coy extracted by 1 Tp 3 Cav Regt from YS 396864 to Courtenay Hill in preparation for R & I.	N/A
1415	D Coy returned to Nui Dat by TCVs for R & I.	N/A
<u>12 Jul</u>	<u>Day 29</u>	
1042	C Coy (-) deployed by TCV to FSB CHERIE ex R & I. 8 Pl 1 ATF Ready Reaction Force. C Coy (-) released from RRF task.	N/A
1235	C Coy (-) deployed to centre of mass YS 402872 by APC. (1 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt).	N/A
1430	7 Pl C Coy located a staging camp at YS 403876.	E/19
<u>13 Jul</u>	<u>Day 30</u>	
1455	At YS 434885 TA12 loc a shallow grave containing 2 bodies. (KIA 2 RAR Mar 71).	N/A
1650	At 428928 B Coy HQ contacted 2 VC dressed in black and armed with AK 47s. Results: 1 VC KIA and 1 AK 47 CIA. 1 VC WIA (BT).	D/32
1843	At YS 414926 6 Pl B Coy contacted 5 - 6 VC. Results: 1 VC KIA, 1 x AK 47 and assorted equipment including 2 maps CIA.	D/33
1854	At YS 442940 TA12 loc a further body resulting from TA11's contact on 22 Jun 71.	N/A

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(a)	(b)	(c)
<u>14 Jul</u>	<u>Day 31</u>	
0840	Pnr Pl at YS 446900 loc a Honda motorscooter which had been hidden in thick jungle. The scooter was recovered to Courtenay Hill.	N/A
1543	At YS 417935 TA10B loc 2 sleeping areas used by possibly 5 persons.	N/A
<u>15 Jul</u>	<u>Day 32</u>	
0145	6 Pl B Coy at YS 414926 engaged mov on their perimeter. A search at first light revealed no sign.	D/34
2100	At YS 433885 the Tracker Pl in an ambush position sighted one person carrying a torch. Person was not engaged due to range (200 metres).	N/A
<u>16 Jul</u>	<u>Day 33</u>	
	There were no occurrences of tactical significance and no changes to Battalion deployment.	N/A
<u>17 Jul</u>	<u>Day 34</u>	
0750	CO ordered redistribution of B Coy. 4 and 6 Pls directed to move SW from YS 424921 and YS 414926 respectively and continue ambush tasks.	N/A
1240	6 Pl B Coy at YS 410920 loc a new bunker system consisting of 5 bunkers used in previous 24 hrs. System ambushed.	E/20
1445	CO issued a Wng O for the Battalion to attack HQ 274 Regt in vicinity of YS 3894 on 20 Jul.	N/A
1745	LO at Xuan Loc advised an agent reported approx 100 VC loc at YT 3800 and armed with 82 mm mors, AA MGs, B40 and SA. Reported intentions were to attack an Australian base.	N/A
<u>18 Jul</u>	<u>Day 35</u>	
0920	FSB DEBBIE in action YS 443892.	N/A
1105	At YS 417917 4 Pl B Coy loc an old campsite for approx 20 persons.	E/21
1230	Wng O's sent to coys for op against HQ 274 Regt.	N/A
1455	FSB MARY closed. Sect 104 Fd Bty to Nui Dat.	N/A

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(a)	(b)	(c)
<u>19 Jul</u>	<u>Day 36</u>	
1000	C Gp held at Courtenay Hill for op against HQ 274 Regt to commence 20 Jul 71.	N/A
<u>20 Jul</u>	<u>Day 37</u>	
1230	At YS 388929 V Coy HQ and 1 Pl contacted 8 - 9 VC dressed in black and green. Results: 1 VC KIA (BC), qty rice and docus CIA.	D/35
1300	At YS 390945 C Coy HQ struck by lightning. One member evacuated by APC then air.	N/A
<u>21 Jul</u>	<u>Day 38</u>	
0959	T5 moved from Courtenay Hill to YS 419940 in anticipation of bunker system attack.	N/A
1420	6 Pl B Coy at YS 380943 contacted an estimated 4 en dressed in civilian clothing and armed with AK 47. Results: 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC WIA (poss) (BT).	D/36
1653	5 Pl B Coy at YS 380941 loc a cache wrapped in plastic and suspended from a tree. Cache ambushed.	N/A
2005	2 Pl V Coy heard voices at YS 371931 and engaged with claymores. Nil results.	D/37
<u>22 Jul</u>	<u>Day 39</u>	
0820	5 Pl B Coy at YS 380941 investigated the cache and discovered it to be empty. It had previously been a food cache.	N/A
0827	6 Pl B Coy loc a cache containing 3 Chinese military radios and a qty of ancillary eqpt. YS 380943.	E/22
1216	4 Pl B Coy at YS 378942 contacted an unknown sized force while entering a bunker system. Results of this contact are unknown.	D/38
1615	7 Pl C Coy at YS 369946 ambushed 3 VC. Results: 3 VC KIA (BC), 3 x AK 47 captured.	D/39
1620	CHQ B Coy/4 Pl B Coy at YS 378942 contacted approximately 4 VC who withdrew West.	D/40
1624	6 Pl B Coy at YS 379942 contacted approx 4 V who were withdrawing from previous contact. Results: 1 VC KIA and 1 x M79 captured.	D/41

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(a)	(b)	(c)
<u>23 Jul</u>	<u>Day 40</u>	
1840	6 Pl B Coy at YS 372934 saw 1 man mov past their perimeter. Clearing ptl failed to loc him.	D/42
<u>24 Jul</u>	<u>Day 41</u>	
0045	8 Pl C Coy at YS 366949 engaged sounds of mov on perimeter with unknown results.	D/43
0745	12 Pl D Coy at YS 369923 located small bunker system.	E/23
1300	4 Pl B Coy at YS 378943 located a 15 bunker system.	E/24
1430	6 Pl B Coy at YS 375942 located a circular 8 bunker system and 300 lb rice.	E/25
1620	4 Pl B Coy at YS 375942 loc a cache containing 160 lbs rice.	E/26
2030	TA11 at YS 357924 engaged an estimated 4 en with claymores and small arms. Results unknown.	D/44
<u>25 Jul</u>	<u>Day 42</u>	
0140	TØA at YS 405941 heard mov and engaged area with canister. Results unknown.	D/45
0404	TØA at YS 405941 heard mov and fired illumination but detected nothing.	N/A
0901	C Coy at YS 376949 evacuated 2 NBC using 1 Tp 3 Cav Regt.	N/A
1055	9 Pl C Coy at YS 373942 loc a cache containing 200 lbs rice.	N/A
1833	TA11 at YS 353927 found an unoccupied tunnel. Destroyed.	N/A
1923	TA1ØB at YS 358950 hit a mine but suffered no damage.	N/A
2035	8 Pl C Coy at YS 373946 contacted 3 - 5 en with unknown results.	D/46
2125	9 Pl C Coy at YS 381950 engaged sounds of rapid mov approaching their loc with unknown results.	D/47
<u>26 Jul</u>	<u>Day 43</u>	
0016	8 Pl C Coy at YS 373946 engaged mov on their perimeter with unknown results.	D/48
1335	10 Pl D Coy at YS 380933 found a VC body. Credited to 6 Pl B Coy contact on 21 Jul 71.	

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(a)	(b)	(c)
<u>27 Jul</u>	<u>Day 44</u>	
1300	At Courtenay Hill verbal orders for Cp IRON FOX to commence 28 Jul 71.	
	During the afternoon 27 Jul 71 administration and redeployment for Operation IRON FOX conducted.	
	Locstats:	
a. V Coy	Nui Dat	
b. B Coy	YS 412942	
c. C Coy	CHQ/9 Pl YS 420943 7 Pl YS 420942 8 Pl YS 419941	
d. D Coy	YS 408934	
e. Sp Coy(-), BHQ CHQ/Aslt Pnr Pl/ Tracker Pl	Courtenay Hill Vung Tau	
f. 104 Bty (-) Sect 104 Fd Bty	FSB DEBBIE Nui Dat	
g. C Sqn (-) 1 Armd Regt	YS 406939	
h. 1 Tp (-) A Sqn 3 Cav Regt TA12	YS 450905 Nui Dat	
2359	Op HERMIT PARK concluded.	

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ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACTS/INCIDENTS  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK

<u>Serial</u> (a)	<u>Date/Time</u> (b)	<u>Location</u> (c)	<u>Unit/Sub-Unit</u> (d)	<u>Activity</u> (e)	<u>Reference</u> (f)
	Jun 71				
1	150825H	YS 426853	CHQ/C Coy	Clearing patrol was moving clockwise around a clearing to the west of CHQ when the enemy were contacted. One VC was seen to fall after being fired at by the patrol commander. Search revealed tracks to South.	Appendix 1 to Annex D
2	170845H	YS 437844	8 Pl/C Coy	Platoon sighted 6 enemy dressed in greens and moving East to West. After contact the VC withdrew North leaving 1 VC KIA.	Appendix 2 to Annex D
3	170950H	YS 436844	8 Pl/C Coy	Platoon sighted and engaged one person moving near the perimeter of the platoon in the area of a previous contact. Movement was from North to South. Nil result.	Appendix 3 to Annex D
4	171735H	YS 424844	9 Pl/C Coy	Platoon had a very brief sighting of a man moving through sparsely covered ground at a range of 150 metres. Not engaged due to range and terrain.	N/A
5	171855H	YS 418894	CHQ/B Coy	A sentry, who was located in high grass, stood up when he heard sounds of movement and sighted two VC. The sentry fired two aimed shots at one VC and then fired the remainder of the magazine in the direction taken by the second VC. A search of the area located one VC KIA.	Appendix 4 to Annex D
6	171859H	YS 413893	6 Pl/B Coy	One VC who was sighted on the NE of the pl perimeter was engaged with claymores which failed to fire. Small arms HE and illum were fired. Search the following morning located one AK47 and pack.	Appendix 5 to Annex D

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
7	180855H	YS 424844	9 Pl/C Coy	The rear man of the platoon and one VC sighted each other at a range of 10 metres. One soldier fired 3 quick unaimed shots and the VC disappeared. A search was conducted without results.	Appendix 6 to Annex D
8	181140H	YS 433842	8 Pl/C Coy	Platoon moved within 20 metres of a camp containing 3 VC after hearing chopping. When the M60 group were heard moving, the VC moved behind a large tree and could not be forced out by small arms firing. While the platoon was deploying through thick jungle the VC escaped South and to the East.	Appendix 7 to Annex D
9	201715H	YS 436845	8 Pl/C Coy	One VC armed with an AK47 was sighted briefly by a soldier at a range of 40 metres who engaged with his M16. The M16 did not penetrate the heavy undergrowth.	Appendix 8 to Annex D
10	211835H	YS 436823	8 Pl/C Coy	The platoon was establishing an ambush position when the enemy group appeared among the rubber trees. The claymore party who were outside the position engaged the VC using small arms without results.	Appendix 9 to Annex D
11	212210H	YS 442941	TA11/1 Tp A Sqn	Ambush was initiated at 20 metres range when voices heard in front of APC. Claymores and illumination fired. 2310 hrs search revealed 6 VC KIA. 2319 hrs TA1 joined TA11 in contact area; search revealed one additional VC KIA. Further movement was heard and claymores and MGs fired. 220320H search revealed 12 VC KIA in area. Drag marks to east sighted. 1 AK47, 2 K54 CIA.	Appendix 10 to Annex D
12	220230H	YS 442941	TA11/1 Tp A Sqn	Sound of voices to south of ambush caused claymores and MGs to be fired. Search revealed two VC PW (one WIA). Dusted off. 1 AK47, 2 K54, 22 packs CIA.	Appendix 11 to Annex D
13	221054H	YS 445938	TA12/1 Tp A Sqn/Tracker Pl	APCs with G/S 6 on board were following blood trail/footprints after TA1 contact and captured one PW with a pack.	Appendix 12 to Annex D

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
14	231635H	YS 347786	11 Pl/D Coy	Platoon sighted one VC and suspected others to be located in a camp. The camp was kept under surveillance for two days. The VC, a very old woman, was permitted to leave the camp as she had apparently prepared the camp for others to occupy. The ambush was maintained without results.	N/A
15	231715H	YS 418808	8 Pl/C Coy	The platoon was moving to rejoin the company prior to the attack on the suspected location of Chau Duc Coy when the platoon located fresh cuttings and heard voices. A recce located one VC and one bunker. Not engaged as the position was suspected to be an outpost to the main camp.	Appendix 13 to Annex D
16	231933H	YS 436938	TA11/1 Tp A Sqn	TA11 was moving to an ambush position in the area of the ambush on 21 Jun 71 when one VC was sighted and captured. He had a bad wound to the left arm from the ambush on 21 Jun 71. Movement in undergrowth indicated there may have been others but were not found in the following search of the area.	Appendix 14 to Annex D
17	241520H	YS 425854	Sp Sect/V Coy	Sp Sect were checking a track which showed new VC sign when Sect Comd saw and engaged one VC. Two other VC returned fire using RPG and small arms. One VC KIA and one NZ WIA later DOW.	Appendix 15 to Annex D
18	251112H	YS 421854	2 Pl/V Coy	Pl found signs of possible bunker posn and established a 'pack base'. On moving forward one VC was observed moving towards the Pl to either draw fire or clear the area. The VC was engaged at 15 metres and heavy RPG and small arms fire was received. Under cover of Bushranger and by using fire and movement the pl withdrew with two WIA. A third NZ was later WIA; all extracted by Dustoff. One VC KIA. 4 NZ WIA.	

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
19	251620H	YS 421855	1 Pl/V Coy	1 Pl assisted 1 Tp, 5 Tp C Sqn and 1 Tp A Sqn to assault bunker posn located by 2 Pl. The infantry/armoured attack ceased at 1630 hrs to extract WIA from C Sqn and permit the resupply of the tanks. The search of system was not conducted until 26 Jul 71.	Appendix 17 to Annex D
20	270040H	YS 450902	TA11/1 Tp A Sqn	Movement was heard and engaged with M79 fire. Search revealed nil results. (Courtenay Hill).	N/A
21	281011H	YS 434889	Tracker Pl/Sp Coy	Pl sighted a group of people in a civil access area 600 metres from pl posn. The eight people were wearing packs and dispersed west and east. Group were not engaged as identity as VC could not be determined.	N/A
22	290100H	YS 438853	3 Pl/V Coy	Movement was heard near the pl perimeter but claymores failed to detonate. Enemy moved away from the perimeter and when they moved back towards the perimeter they were engaged with M60, M16, 81 MM Mor HE fired on escape route direction with nil results.	Appendix 18 to Annex D
23	291620H	YS 350793	10 Pl/D Coy	One VC approached platoon position and was fired on. Nil results.	Nil
24	291950H	YS 420827	CHQ/C Coy	Sentry sighted one VC approaching from the north; fired M60 with nil results. VC withdrew towards the west. Sounds of scuffling were heard at intervals during the night and M60, claymores and artillery illumination were fired. Search on 30 Jun 71 showed nil results.	Appendix 19 to Annex D
25	292128H	YS 438853	3 Pl/V Coy	Two groups of VC approached arbush from northeast and northwest and were engaged simultaneously with claymore, M79 and M60. Search produced nil results.	Appendix 20 to Annex D
26	300508H	YS 437872	Aslt Pnr Pl/Sp Coy	VC approached the ambush position from the northwest and were moving at a tangent away from the killing area. Claymores, M60, SLR and M16 were fired with nil results.	Appendix 21 to Annex D

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
27	301145H	YS 426840	2 Pl/V Coy	Small Standing Patrol was returning to 2 Pl location when movement was heard and a person was sighted carrying what appeared to be a weapon. An M16 was fired and resulted in one civilian KIA.	Appendix 22 to Annex D
<u>Jul 71</u>					
28	011900H	YS 428877	TA11/1 Tp A Sqn	TA11 was moving to night ambush when 10 VC wearing packs were sighted moving from Southeast to Northwest across open ground. MGs fired and 2 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA (PW); 2 AK47s, 1 x K54 CIA. Remainder moved west after contact.	Appendix 23 to Annex D
29	020900H	YS 356810	10 Pl/D Coy	After finding fresh timber cutting the forward scout sighted and fired on one VC. An estimated two or three VC were heard leaving the area which contained a bunker position. One VC KIA.	Appendix 24 to Annex D
30	041805H	YS 472858	Tracker Pl/Sp Coy	Trip flare activated and as sentry did not observe movement the flare was thought to have been set off by deadfall. Search 5 Jul 71 revealed footprints of three-four people and one VN style poncho.	Appendix 25 to Annex D
31	091906H	YS 434869	2 Pl/V Coy	Two VC were sighted by a sentry moving west to east. Ambush was sited in civilian access area and as the light was fading the sentry could not positively identify first man as VC. Second man confirmed as VC by AK47; sentry fired aimed shots, man dropped and crawled away. AK47 recovered during quick search; body located next morning 10 Jul 71.	Appendix 26 to Annex D
32	131650H	YS 428928	CHQ/B Coy	After hearing noises approaching from Southwest, the sentry sighted one VC carrying an AK47 and fired his AR. A search located one VC KIA, one AK47 and a blood trail and drag marks.	Appendix 27 to Annex D

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
33	131843	YS 414926	6 Pl/B Coy	One VC was sighted and an estimated four more were heard. Claymores and M60 were fired and the following search revealed one VC WIA who later died of wounds. Difficulty was experienced with DUSTOFF as the VC also switched on a strobe light when aircraft was heard. The VC light and difficulty in locating the winch point caused a time lapse and the VC died. AK47 CIA.	Appendix 28 to Annex D
34	150145H	YS 414926	6 Pl/B Coy	Sentry heard movement and engaged with claymore and M60. Search conducted on 16 Jul 71 revealed nil results.	Appendix 29 to Annex D
35	201230H	YS 388929	1 Pl/V Coy	Platoon was in a triangular harbour when a sentry fired one shot which was followed by a burst of automatic fire from the enemy. Sounds of moaning were heard from the north-eastern sector and enemy were sighted at the western corner, southern side and eastern side of the harbour. A heavy fire fight followed involving the use of an airstrike with guns and 2.75 MM rockets, and artillery which resulted in one VC KIA with possible VC WIA	Appendix 30 to Annex D
36	211420H	YS 380943	6 Pl/B Coy	Platoon had been following an enemy track which turned into another track. The last man observed four VC approaching the rear of the platoon as he neared the track bend. He fired two aimed shots and 16 rounds in bursts. Search revealed one VC KIA and two blood trails. A second body was located at YS 380943 on 26 Jul 71 by D Coy.	Appendix 31 to Annex D
37	212005H	YS 371931	2 Pl/V Coy	Sentry heard sound of voices and engaged with claymores and small arms. Search on 22 Jul 71 proved to be negative.	N/A

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
38	221216H	YS 378943	4 Pl/B Coy	Platoon was following a track from a bunker system at YS 380941 when a small group of VC (estimated 4) fired on the platoon. Platoon returned fire and 6 Pl deployed to move through contact area. The force appeared to be a delaying or caretaker group as the group withdrew when both 4 and 6 Pls deployed. A 13 bunker system was located during the search for the VC. Nil results.	Appendix 32 to Annex D
39	221615H	YS 369946	7 Pl/C Coy	Small party of 3 VC moving South along a track were ambushed by the platoon. Two claymores and M60 were fired resulting in 3 VC KIA and 2 AK47s and 1 AK50 CIA.	Appendix 33 to Annex D
40	221620H	YS 378942	4 Pl/B Coy	B Coy (-) were occupying a defensive position in a bunker system when a sentry from 4 Pl sighted four VC who were initially identified as friendlies as they were dressed in greens and carried M16, M79. There were no casualties in an exchange fire of M60 and M79.	Appendix 34 to Annex D
41	221624H	YS 379942	6 Pl/B Coy	Platoon had halted to check a bunker system when one VC was seen moving in the same direction as and parallel with the track the platoon was following. The VC was shot and additional movement was heard and fired at without results. Movement was also heard and seen within the bunker system during the contact. (M79 CIA). 1 VC KIA.	Appendix 35 to Annex D
42	231840H	YS 375942	6 Pl/B Coy	Sentry thought he sighted one man move across his line of vision in thick jungle. A clearing patrol found no trace of movement.	N/A
43	240005H	YS 366949	8 Pl/C Coy	Sentry heard the sound of movement and fired claymores and M60 before establishing whether the movement was human or animal. Search the following day did not reveal tracks.	Appendix 36 to Annex D

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
44	242030H	YS 357924	TA11/1 Tp A Sqn	Estimated four VC approached TA11 location from South and after the contact moved West. VC detected by seismic detectors and later talking. Flareshape used to provide illumination. No result.	Appendix 37 to Annex D
45	250140H	YS 405941	TØA/C Sqn 1 Armd Regt	Movement on western perimeter heard - metallic sounds - canister fired. No result.	N/A
46	252035H	YS 373946	8 Pl/C Coy	An enemy party of 3 to 5 sighted by their movement and by the light from a torch. Claymores and small arms were fired without results. A search was conducted the following morning and it was evident that the opening range was too great.	Appendix 38 to Annex D
47	252125H	YS 381950	9 Pl/C Coy	A sentry engaged the sound of very rapid movement towards the ambush site without results.	N/A
48	260016H	YS 373946	8 Pl C Coy	Movement was heard near the perimeter of the ambush and from the same direction as enemy movement earlier the same night. No result.	Appendix 39 to Annex D


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APPENDIX 1 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71


SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 15 Jun 71	<u>Time</u> 0825	<u>Location</u> 426853	<u>Pl</u> Coy HQ	<u>Coy</u> C
<u>Strength</u> 20	<u>Task</u> Clearing ptl from Coy HQ	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u> Sgt            O'Brien		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u>
<u>Initiated By</u> Coy HQ	<u>Wpns</u> M16, SLR, M60, M79	<u>En Strength</u> 3 - 4	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> West then South	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 30 Metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> <u>Max</u> 30            100	<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> <u>Mins</u> -            10	<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Moving away from ptl	
<u>Terrain Description</u> Thick jungle and bamboo				
<u>Narrative</u> Coy HQ contacted 3 - 4 enemy moving West then South. Search revealed track heading SW. Sect Comd opened fire at one enemy moving away from him. En fell to ground and other en returned fire. Area was swept by fire and movement. A detailed search revealed only signs of movement toward the South.				
<u>Sketch</u> 				

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> M16, SLR, M60, M79	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 5 x M79, 25 x M16, 100 x M60, 20 x SLR
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Nil	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 1 WIA (possible)	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u> Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> Nil	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> Nil	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> Nil	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u> An aggressive follow up and detailed search is required immediately.	





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APPENDIX 2 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 17 Jun 71		<u>Time</u> 0845		<u>Location</u> 437844		<u>Pl</u> 8		<u>Coy</u> C	
<u>Strength</u> 34		<u>Task</u> Ambushing		<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> Rank Name Cpl J. Pollard			<u>Platoon Commander</u> Rank Name Lt P. O'Brien		
<u>Initiated By</u> 8 Pl		<u>Wpns</u> M16, M79, SLR		<u>En Strength</u> 6		<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Moving E - W			
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 30 Metres		<u>Range of Engagement</u> Min Max 30 30		<u>Length of Engagement</u> Hrs Mins - 10		<u>How Was En Noticed</u> En movement			
<u>Terrain Description</u> Light bamboo									
<u>Narrative</u> 8 Pl sighted 6 enemy dressed in greens moving E to W. En withdraw N after contact. Results: 1 enemy KIA.									
<u>Sketch</u> <p>CLAYMORE PARTY ←</p> <p>BAMBOO BAMBOO</p> <p>← EN MOVEMENT</p> <p>CLEARING</p>									

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> M16, SLR, M79, M60	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 20 x M16, 5 x SLR, 5 x M79, 200 x M60
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Nil	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 1 KIA	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
<p>a. <u>Local Commander.</u> Nil</p>	
<p>b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> On initiating the contact the claymore party withdrew within the platoon perimeter to enable M60 to engage the area. During the time it took to return to the platoon the remainder of the enemy withdrew. Lesson: Too much time wasted in returning to the perimeter.</p>	
<p>c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> The platoon was unlucky in that the claymore party had been sent out to check the claymores which had been in position for some time, when the enemy approached.</p>	
<p>d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> Nil</p>	
<p>e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u> Don't check claymores during periods when en are likely to move i.e. early morning or late afternoon.</p>	



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APPENDIX 3 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 17 Jun 71	<u>Time</u> 0950	<u>Location</u> 436844	<u>Pl</u> 8	<u>Coy</u> C	
<u>Strength</u> 34	<u>Task</u> Ambushing	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> Cpl <u>Name</u> J. McKinley		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> Lt <u>Name</u> P.O'Brien	
<u>Initiated By</u> 8 Pl	<u>Wpns</u> SA	<u>En Strength</u> 1	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Movt on perimeter		
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 40 Metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> 40	<u>Max</u> -	<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> -	<u>Mins</u> 5	<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Fleeting en movement
<u>Terrain Description</u> Light Bamboo					
<u>Narrative</u> 8 Pl engaged 1 person moving on perimeter in area of previous contact. Movt was N to S. Nil results.					
<u>Sketch</u> <p>EN MOVEMENT</p> <p>BAMBOO</p> <p>ENGAGING GUN</p> <p>BAMBOO</p> <p>CLEARING</p>					

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> M60, SLR, M16	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 100 x M60, 20 x M16, 20 x SLR
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Nil	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> Nil	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u> Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> Nil	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> Nil	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> Nil	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u> Nil	

*[Faint signature and illegible text]*



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APPENDIX 4 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 17 Jun 71	<u>Time</u> 1855	<u>Location</u> 418894	<u>Pl</u> Coy HQ	<u>Coy</u> B
<u>Strength</u> 23	<u>Task</u>	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u>		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u>
				WO2                      T. Barnes
<u>Initiated By</u> Coy HQ B Coy	<u>Wpns</u> SLR, M16	<u>En Strength</u> 2	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> 1 Bn 274 Regt      1 x AK47	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 10 Metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> <u>Max</u>	<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> <u>Mins</u>	<u>How Was En Noticed</u>	
	10                      60	-                      3	Sentry sighted	
<u>Terrain Description</u> Coy HQ located in bamboo thicket with tall grass and low scrub surrounding thicket.				
<u>Narrative</u> Pte MARUM who was on sentry at the SW corner of the position heard noises in the high grass. He stood up and sighted two VC approaching between himself and the HQ position. Pte MARUM fired two aimed shots and then fired the remainder of magazine in area where second VC dived into the long grass. Cpl CRAPP fired three magazines from M16 into area and a short burst of AK47 fire was returned. It was wide and high. A sweep of the area revealed one KIA and pack. One nylon hat was located several metres from the body. The body was buried and pack returned to OA.				
<u>Sketch</u> HIGH GRASS LOW SCRUB <p>DIRECTION OF APPROACH</p> <p>1 SENTRY 25M</p> <p>2 SENTRY 15M</p> <p>BODY</p> <p>GUN</p> <p>THICK BAMBOO</p> <p>X CP</p> <p>PIT</p> <p>S E ← → W N</p>				

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> SLR, M16	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 23 x SLR, 60 x M16
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Nil	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 1 KIA	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil

Comments and Lessons Learned

a. Local Commander.

Silence in a position and the sentry in a position where he can observe over the long grass and low scrub. The position preferred would be up a tree.

b. Platoon Comments.

Nil

c. Coy Comments.


The value of aimed shots is emphasised.

d. Unit Comments.

Nil

e. Lessons Learned.

Nil





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APPENDIX 5 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Pl</u>	<u>Coy</u>
17 Jun 71	Approx 1859	YS 413893	6	B
<u>Strength</u>	<u>Task</u>	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u>		<u>Platoon Commander</u>
1 & 33	NDP Track Squat	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u>
		2lt	McDaniel	2lt McDaniel
<u>Initiated By</u>	<u>Wpns</u>	<u>En Strength</u>	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u>	
Friendly	Claymore, M60	5 - 10	1 seen in jungle greens carrying plastic pack and AK47	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u>	<u>Range of Engagement</u>	<u>Length of Engagement</u>		<u>How Was En Noticed</u>
	<u>Min</u> <u>Max</u>	<u>Hrs</u>	<u>Mins</u>	
20 Metres	20 50	-	5	Movement heard through bamboo
<u>Terrain Description</u>				
Jungle with vine, bamboo.				
<u>Narrative</u>				
Movement heard East, North and South of perimeter - platoon stood to. 1 en sighted NE of perimeter and engaged with claymore (which failed to detonate) then M60 and SLR. Movement then heard E of perimeter in bamboo and engaged with claymore and M60. Artillery HE fired to N on probable en withdrawal route. Sweep conducted from SE to NE under M79 then artillery illumination; en eqpt recovered and claymores replaced. Sweep not completed due to vegetation and light - completed at first light.				
<u>Sketch</u>				

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APPENDIX 5

<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> Claymore, SLR, M60, M16, M79	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Claymore: 3; SLR: 40; M60: 250; M16: 40; M79: 6(illum)
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> 105 MM How	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 13 x illum, 12 x HE
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 1 WIA (poss)	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
<p>a. <u>Local Commander.</u></p> <p>The party was a resupply group moving rapidly to the West. The enemy seen was travelling approx 15 metres in front of the main body. The en withdrew rapidly and without firing a shot when engaged, dropping the AK47 and packs.</p>	
<p>b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u></p> <p>Great care needs to be taken when setting up command detonated claymores, as a fault was evident on the claymore that failed to detonate. Dets and det cord should be changed regularly. It is felt that (from the posns of the capt CIA) 4 casualties would have been inflicted had the weapon detonated. Gunners need to employ searching fire when engaging movement in an area.</p>	
<p>c. <u>Coy Comments.</u></p> <p>Aimed shots are preferred to claymores.</p>	
<p>d. <u>Unit Comments.</u></p> <p>Claymores should be used with another weapon to initiate an ambush.</p>	
<p>e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u></p> <p>Above.</p>	
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
<p>a. <u>Local Commander.</u></p> <p>The party was a resupply group moving rapidly to the West. The enemy seen was travelling approx 15 metres in front of the main body. The en withdrew rapidly and without firing a shot when engaged, dropping the AK47 and packs.</p>	
<p>b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u></p> <p>Great care needs to be taken when setting up command detonated claymores, as a fault was evident on the claymore that failed to detonate. Dets and det cord should be changed regularly. It is felt that (from the posns of the capt CIA) 4 casualties would have been inflicted had the weapon detonated. Gunners need to employ searching fire when engaging movement in an area.</p>	
<p>c. <u>Coy Comments.</u></p> <p>Aimed shots are preferred to claymores.</p>	
<p>d. <u>Unit Comments.</u></p> <p>Claymores should be used with another weapon to initiate an ambush.</p>	

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APPENDIX 6 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 18 Jun 71		<u>Time</u> 0855		<u>Location</u> YS 424844		<u>Pl</u> 9		<u>Coy</u> C	
<u>Strength</u> 33		<u>Task</u> Search and clear		<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> Rank Lt Name A.C. Grecian			<u>Platoon Commander</u> Rank Lt Name A.C. Grecian		
<u>Initiated By</u> 9 Pl		<u>Wpns</u> SLR, M60, M79		<u>En Strength</u> Est 4 - 6		<u>En Identification and Weapons</u>			
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 10 metres		<u>Range of Engagement</u> Min 10 Max 50		<u>Length of Engagement</u> Hrs - Mins 10		<u>How Was En Noticed</u> En moved towards pl through undergrowth			


Terrain Description

Typical bamboo and jungle with heavy secondary growth.

Narrative

As 9 Pl and Coy HQ were departing their NDP voices were heard to the North and simultaneously one enemy appeared coming through the undergrowth. The last man of 9 Pl opened fire instinctively without aiming and the enemy withdrew North. The area was swept with M60 and M79 fire. The subsequent search revealed negative results.

Sketch



Friendly Movement

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
SLR, M60, M79	200 x 7.62 link, 10 x M79 HE, 40 x 7.62 ball
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
Nil	Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u>	<u>Friendly Casualties</u>
Nil	Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u>	
Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u>	
Nil	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u>	
The last man of 9 Pl acted in haste and commenced erratic fire from the hip. During the ensuing period while people went to ground and adopted fire positions the enemy escaped.	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u>	
Nil	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u>	
Aimed shots only must be employed to engage enemy who have been seen.	



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APPENDIX 7 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) LN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 18 Jun 71	<u>Time</u> 1140	<u>Location</u> YS 433842	<u>Pl</u> 8	<u>Coy</u> C
<u>Strength</u>	<u>Task</u> Patrolling	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> Rank Name Cpl R.M. Templeman		<u>Platoon Commander</u> Rank Name Lt O'Brien
<u>Initiated By</u> 8 Pl	<u>Wpns</u> M16, SLR, M60	<u>En Strength</u> 3	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Dressed in black wearing webbing carrying AK47's	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 20 Metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> Min Max 20 -		<u>Length of Engagement</u> Hrs Mins - 10	<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Pl heard chopping coming from en camp
<u>Terrain Description</u> Thick jungle				
<u>Narrative</u> Pl heard chopping sounds and crept up to within 20 metres from enemy camp. While moving M60 into position en heard movement and withdrew behind a large tree which could not be penetrated accurately by M60 or SLR. Withdrawal routes to east and south.				
<u>Sketch</u>				

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> M60, SLR, M16	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 300 x M60, 50 x SLR, 100 x M16
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Artillery HE	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 20
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> Nil	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u> Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> Nil	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> The platoon initially had considerable difficulty in getting close enough to correctly apply rules of engagement. In doing so they were detected and an opened fire and fled.	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> Nil	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u> Rules of engagement, although necessary, are difficult to apply in thick jungle.	



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APPENDIX 8 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 20 Jun 71	<u>Time</u> 1715	<u>Location</u> YS 436843	<u>Pl</u> 8	<u>Coy</u> C
<u>Strength</u> 31	<u>Task</u> NDP	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> Cpl <u>Name</u> J. Pollard		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> Lt <u>Name</u> P. O'Brien
<u>Initiated By</u> 8 Pl	<u>Wpns</u> M16, M60	<u>En Strength</u> 1	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> AK47	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 40 Metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> 40 <u>Max</u> -		<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> - <u>Mins</u> 5	<u>How was En Noticed</u> Saw movement then saw man with AK47
<u>Terrain Description</u> Thick bamboo				
<u>Narrative</u> Soldier on perimeter glimpsed a man 40 metres away and caught sight of a weapon believed to be an AK47. He opened up with his M16 but by that time the enemy had disappeared.				
<u>Sketch</u> <p>BAMBOO</p> <p>CLEARING</p> <p>EN SIGHTED HERE</p> <p>M16</p>				

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
<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> M16, M60	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 100 x M60, 20 x M16
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Nil	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> Nil	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u> Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> Nil	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> Nil	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> Nil	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u> The M16 is not a good weapon for engaging enemy through thick undergrowth.	



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APPENDIX 9 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 PAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71


SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 21 Jun 71	<u>Time</u> 1835	<u>Location</u> YS 436823	<u>Pl</u> 8	<u>Coy</u> C
<u>Strength</u> 32	<u>Task</u> Ambushing	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> Rank Name Cpl R.H. Templeman		<u>Platoon Commander</u> Rank Name Lt P. O'Brien
<u>Initiated By</u> 8 Pl	<u>Wpns</u> M60, SLR, M16	<u>En Strength</u> 3	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Carrying AK47's and RPG	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 40 Metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> Min Max 40 -		<u>Length of Engagement</u> Hrs Mins - 5	<u>How Was En Noticed</u> En seen by claymore party
<u>Terrain Description</u> Rubber with thick undergrowth.				
<u>Narrative</u> The platoon was just moving into an ambush position when the enemy approached through the rubber. They were engaged by the claymore party who immediately withdrew back into the perimeter. The en withdrew south.				
<u>Sketch</u> 				

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> M60, M16, SLR	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 200 x M60, 100 x M16, 50 x SLR
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Nil	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> Nil	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u> Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> Nil	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> Nil	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> AP should have been completed earlier.	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u> En movement in this area took place mainly between 1600 hrs and 1900 hrs and ambushes should be in position prior to 1600 hrs.	





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APPENDIX 10 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RATA NZ (ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 21 Jun 71		<u>Time</u> 2210		<u>Location</u> YS 442941		<u>Pl</u> TA1, 11, 12		<u>Coy</u> A Sqn 3 Cav	
<u>Strength</u> Tp (-)		<u>Task</u> AP		<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> Rank Name Capt Earle		<u>Platoon Commander</u> Rank Name			
<u>Initiated By</u> Friendlies		<u>Wpns</u> .50, .30, M79, Claymore		<u>En Strength</u> Approx 30		<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> SR4, AK47, K54, Grenades			
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 3 metres		<u>Range of Engagement</u> Min Max 3 100		<u>Length of Engagement</u> Hrs Mins 4 50		<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Voices			
<u>Terrain Description</u> Edge of rubber and cleared rubber. Dark night. Heavy rain. Nil visibility.									
<u>Narrative</u> 11 Sect initiated a contact at 2210 hrs. Tp HQ and 12 Sect reacted to the area to clear the area for 11 Sect and to relieve the pressure. Contact continued spasmodically until 220300 hrs. After clearing the area we occupied a ni def posn to "protect" the bodies, having recovered them (12) to the one location. 220800 approx an infantry elm cleared the area and the area was searched by vehs, resulting in a further 1 x VC (PW). A further body was located 150 metres West of contact grid on 13 Jul by Tp HQ.									
<u>Sketch</u>									
<u>Legend</u> 1. Main Group 7 bodies 2. 2 x KIA. 3. 2 x KIA. 4. 1 x KIA. 5. 1 x WIA (PW)(12 Sect)									

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APPENDIX 10

<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> .50, .30, M79, M16, Claymores	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Approx 10,000
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Artillery HE and Illumination	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Unknown
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 13 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC WIA (PW), 2 PW	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u>  The number of WIA and PW include those captured by 12 Sect and Tp HQ on 22 and 23 Jun 71.	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u>  Nil	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u>  VC apparently approached the killing ground on old AFU track and there were engaged by 11 Sect. Edge of rubber appeared to be RV point.	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u>  A very well executed and conducted ambush. Search of killing ground prevented the loss of enemy bodies and weapons and resulted in additional enemy being killed or wounded.	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u>  Nil	

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APPENDIX 11 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RA<sup>F</sup>/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 22 Jun 71	<u>Time</u> 0230	<u>Location</u> YS 442941	<u>Pl</u> 1 Tp	<u>Coy</u> A Sqn 3 Cav
<u>Strength</u> Tp (-)	<u>Task</u> AP	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u> Sgt          R.J. Veall		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u>
<u>Initiated By</u> Friendlies	<u>Wpns</u>	<u>En Strength</u> Unknown	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> SR4.    AK50	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u>	<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> <u>Max</u>	<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> <u>Mins</u>	<u>How Was En Noticed</u>	
	25	-	15	Movement/Noise
<u>Terrain Description</u> Spaced rubber with medium to heavy growth ranging from approx 3 ft to carrier height.				
<u>Narrative</u> C/S 11 initiated a contact while in AP. C/S 1 and 12 went to location. At approx 0230 hrs C/S 12A heard movement and fired. A sweep revealed 1 VC WIA with pack. In a further sweep to West C/S 12 apprehended 1 VC (PW). A further sweep in daylight resulted in 1 pack and 1 AK50 CIA.				
<u>Sketch</u> See Appendix 10				

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 1 x VC WIA (PW), 1 x VC PW	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u> Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> VC casualty was dusted off.	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> Nil	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> See Appendix 10.	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u> Nil	



CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX 12 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RA NZ (ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 22 Jun 71	<u>Time</u> 1054	<u>Location</u> YC 445038	<u>Pl</u> EA12 & Sect Aslt Per Pl	<u>Coy</u> A Sqn 3 Cav
<u>Strength</u> 1 Sect	<u>Task</u> Search area of contact 212210 hrs	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> Rank Name Sgt Veall		<u>Platoon Commander</u> Rank Name Capt Earle
<u>Initiated By</u> Friendlies	<u>Wpns</u> Nil	<u>En Strength</u> 1	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u>	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 5 metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> Min Max - -		<u>Length of Engagement</u> Hrs Mins - -	<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Vehicle almost ran over him
<u>Terrain Description</u> Thick secondary growth to 30 feet high with high grass.				
<u>Narrative</u> 12 Sect was sent to search for escape routes. Located a fresh track leading West to East. Followed the track and located 1 x VC, who was CIA.				
<u>Sketch</u> <p>N ↑</p> <p>X 1 x VC (PW)</p> <p>Rubber</p> <p>Secondary Growth</p>				

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
Nil	Nil
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
Nil	Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u>	<u>Friendly Casualties</u>
1 VC (PW)	Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u>	
Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u>	
Nil	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u>	
PW was involved in ambush on 212210 hrs.	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u>	
Nil	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u>	
Nil	



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APPENDIX 13 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 15 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 23 Jun 71	<u>Time</u> 1715	<u>Location</u> YS 418808	<u>Pl</u> 8	<u>Coy</u> C
<u>Strength</u>	<u>Task</u> Patrolling	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> Rank Name Cpl J. Pollard		<u>Platoon Commander</u> Rank Name Lt P. O'Brien
<u>Initiated By</u> -	<u>Wpns</u> -	<u>En Strength</u> Unknown	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> En were in bunker system	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 20 Metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> Min Max - -		<u>Length of Engagement</u> Hrs Mins - -	<u>Hcw Was En Noticed</u> Cuttings lead up to bunker system
<u>Terrain Description</u> Thick jungle				
<u>Narrative</u> The platoon was moving to join CHQ prior to an attack on a suspected en position. Pl found a fresh track with cuttings and followed it up to a small bunker system in which 3 pits with OHP and 2 en were seen. Talking was also heard. Pl ordered to avoid contact in order not to jeopardize main attack. System was later re-entered by 8 Pl (no en present) and destroyed.				
<u>Sketch</u> <p style="text-align: center;">EN SEEN</p> <p style="text-align: center;">BUNKERS</p> <p style="text-align: center;">BAMBOO</p> <p style="text-align: center;">BAMBOO</p> <p style="text-align: center;">EN TRACK</p> <p style="text-align: center;">PL APPROACH</p>				

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> Nil	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Nil
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Nil	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> Nil	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u> Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> Nil	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> It is demoralising for a platoon to be ordered to let go enemy who are in their sights after the outstanding effort of entering an occupied en camp undetected!	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> The unit aim should not be confused with intermediate aims.	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u> Nil	



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APPENDIX 14 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RPT NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 23 Jun 71		<u>Time</u> 1920		<u>Location</u> YS 436938		<u>Pl</u> TA1 and 11		<u>Coy</u> A Sqn 3 Cav	
<u>Strength</u> 11 Sect plus Tp HQ		<u>Task</u> AP		<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u> Capt      Earle			<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u>		
<u>Initiated By</u> Friendlies		<u>Wpns</u> Nil		<u>En Strength</u> 1		<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> SR4. Nil			
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 1 metre		<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> <u>Max</u> -      -		<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> <u>Mins</u> -      -		<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Observed as different to surrounding area.			
<u>Terrain Description</u> Cleared rubber. Just on last light.									
<u>Narrative</u> Tp HQ and 11 Sect moving to AP vic 442940. 19J crew sighted person lying in grass. He indicated that there were two more ahead which seemed to confirm 11 Sect report of movement in vic of AP loc. The en was wounded in the AP of 212210 hrs and had been hiding in the area since then. He was sent out on Dustoff.									
<u>Sketch</u> 									

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
Nil	Nil
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
Nil	Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u>	<u>Friendly Casualties</u>
1 VC WIA (PW)	Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
<p>a. <u>Local Commander.</u></p> <p>Further 2 persons were in area. Sweep failed to locate them. Probably all three were from contact on 212210 with 11 and 19J. PW indicated presence of 2 others.</p>	
<p>b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u></p> <p>Nil</p>	
<p>c. <u>Coy Comments.</u></p> <p>Nil</p>	
<p>d. <u>Unit Comments.</u></p> <p>Nil</p>	
<p>e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u></p> <p>Nil</p>	



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APPENDIX 15 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 24 Jun '71	<u>Time</u> 1520	<u>Location</u> YS 425854	<u>Pl</u> Coy HQ Sp Sect	<u>Coy</u> V
<u>Strength</u> 8	<u>Task</u> Recce	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> Rank Name Cpl A.M. Lee		<u>Platoon Commander</u> Rank Name
<u>Initiated By</u> Friendly	<u>Wpns</u> M16	<u>En Strength</u> 3	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Main Force C2 Coy 1 Bn 274 Regt Black Dress, AK47 and RPG	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 30 Metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> Min Max 30 30		<u>Length of Engagement</u> Hrs Mins - 15	<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Movement


Terrain Description

Heavy bamboo with scattered thick scrub with fresh enemy sign in area.

Narrative

Moving SW along a track, possibly used by VC, when we came upon a well used VC track running N - S. On investigating it was found to have been recently used as sign (footprints) showed movement was N to S. On further investigation it was found that the track then swung W. At this point it was noted that logs were across the track and light trees were bent over the track and tied down; to the left of this were 2 diversion tracks which ran parallel for 15 - 20 metres then swung out. The 2 scouts were checking the north track when I noticed movement to my front about 30 metres away. I identified it as VC and fired. I then saw 2 other VC who fired at the scouts hitting the lead man. Contact drills were carried out. During contact drill 1 x RPG was fired from VC but was non effective. It went approx 200 metres to our N.

Sketch



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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> M16, SLR, M60	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 140 x M16, 120 x SLR, 400 x M60
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Nil	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 1 KIA	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> 1 DOW
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
<p>a. <u>Local Commander.</u></p> <p>Nil</p>	
<p>b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u></p> <p>Coy HQ had halted and formed a limited ambush along an East-West track that showed fresh sign. The support section was sent further West to recce the approaches and confirm the enemy sign in the area. The contact was initiated approx 60 metres from Coy HQ as the Sp Sect was investigating a north-south track.</p>	
<p>c. <u>Coy Comments.</u></p> <p>(1) The enemy standing patrol was not aware of the approach of the friendly patrol. They fired only a few small arms rounds and withdrew leaving their casualty under the cover of RPG fire.</p> <p>(2) Following the contact a Possum confirmed that there were "clearings just to the north". The extraction of the casualty was attempted in an unsatisfactory clearing - the Stokes litter snagging in nearby trees. It was then indicated that there was a better clearing some 50 metres away where the Dustoff aircraft could land.</p>	
<p>d. <u>Unit Comments.</u></p> <p>Nil</p>	
<p>e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u></p> <p>Nil</p>	



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APPENDIX 16 TC  
ANNEX D TO  
4 R P/NZ (ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 25 Jun 71	<u>Time</u> 1117	<u>Location</u> 412854	<u>Pl</u> 2	<u>Coy</u> V
<u>Strength</u> 34	<u>Task</u> Recce	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> Lt <u>Name</u> G.F.S. Campbell		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> Lt <u>Name</u> Campbell
<u>Initiated By</u> Friendly	<u>Wpns</u> AR16	<u>En Strength</u> 30+ ?	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> MF VC. RPG, MG, AK, AR, Directional mines.	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 20 Metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> 15 <u>Max</u> 50		<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> 3 (approx)	<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Movement
<u>Terrain Description</u> Moderately clear jungle with patches of thick undergrowth.				
<u>Narrative</u> Pl discovered bunker sign, established pack base, then probed forward on broad front. After deployment to edge of suspected area one VC wandered towards pl to clear/draw fire? Member forced to drop him at 15 metres range. MGs then opened up at en voices of 6 - 10 en. Pl immediately drew heavy RPG, MG, rifle and claymore fire from wide frontage (50 metres). Withdrew under cover of Bushranger to pack base to evacuate 2 WIA. En followed and continued to harass with heavy fire. 1 WIA more received. Bushranger used to clear perimeter and provide suppressive fire during Dustoff. After Dustoff complete Pl withdrew further West to allow assault from East.				
<u>Sketch</u> 				

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APPENDIX 16

<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> MG, SLR, AR16, M79	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 3500 SA
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Artillery, Bushranger	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 10 ? artillery, several sorties
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 1 KIA	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> 3 WIA
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u>  En very aggressive in both defence and counter. En came well forward of bunkers and attempted a flanking movement. Considered that en was forewarned by contact day before. M60s drew considerably more fire than other weapons. Had to stop using them.	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u>  Although artillery laid on and pl comd requested fire through clearances, there was unacceptable delay before fire started. Bushranger seemed to be the best neutralizing weapon but one must repeatedly insist that they bring their suppressive fire closer to friendlies in order to get best effect.	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u>  The following prior considerations were confirmed:  (1) Wide front desirable when investigating a suspected bunker area.  (2) The main enemy killing area was fairly obvious and therefore avoided.  (3) The importance of mutually supporting machine guns is stressed because of the amount of enemy fire they attack.  (4) The value of internal station comms to co-ordinate movement particularly during the recce phase,  (5) The importance of having a contingency plan for a possible defensive/extraction phase in the operation.	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u>  (1) The presence of an en bunker system must be reported to the Bn CP ASAP so that all necessary resources can be alerted.  (2) Artillery was available immediately, however its effectiveness was reduced by the number of "check fires" originating from many sources. The difference between live and dead shrap must be appreciated. When ordered to dig in and take cover - that's what you do - in a hurry.	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u>  Above	

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SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 25 Jun 71		<u>Time</u> 1425		<u>Location</u> 421855		<u>Pl</u> 1		<u>Coy</u> V	
<u>Strength</u> 32	<u>Task</u> Assault on bunker system		<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> Rank Name Lt N.J. Fry			<u>Platoon Commander</u> Rank Name Lt N.J. Fry			
<u>Initiated By</u> Enemy		<u>Wpns</u> RPG		<u>En Strength</u> Unknown		<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> RPG, AK47			
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 20 Metres		<u>Range of Engagement</u> Min Max 15 35		<u>Length of Engagement</u> Hrs Mins - 45		<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Movement, noise and fire			


Terrain Description

Thick bush. Visibility good up to 15 metres, poor after that.

Narrative

On the 25 June we were under command of the Armoured Squadron. We were advancing towards the suspected bunker area at 420855, when the forward left flank tank received an RPG round. My platoon moved forward, as we were behind the forward tanks. We removed the wounded crewman and organized their backloading. After the tanks reorganized themselves again they pushed on. We followed as before. We had only moved forward 20 metres and again an RPG opened fire. This time we saw the RPG firer and a few others. Then almost simultaneously to my forward section firing at the seen en, we received heavy fire (automatic and some RPG) from the south. The en was moving from east to west, and then they seemed to turn and move away from the bunker area in an easterly direction. The whole C/S 11 was laid out along the left hand tank's tracks, and we fired into the area of where the en had been seen. There was a break of a few seconds and then the en returned a great amount of small arms fire (automatic and RPG). This lasted about 15 mins. The tanks and APC then swung into line with us, and fired canister, 50 and 30 cal into the area. We did not sweep the area until the following afternoon - after we had taken out the bunker area. So results were unknown.

Sketch





<p align="center"><u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u></p> <p>M60, M16, SLR, M79</p>	<p align="center"><u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u></p>
<p align="center"><u>Supporting Fire Employed</u></p> <p>Tanks, APCs, Artillery</p>	<p align="center"><u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u></p>
<p align="center"><u>Enemy Casualties</u></p> <p>Unknown</p>	<p align="center"><u>Friendly Casualties</u></p> <p>Nil</p>
<p><u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u></p> <p>a. <u>Local Commander.</u></p> <p>Under the conditions, and under command of the Armoured Squadron, we had very little opportunity to move freely and push into the area. The forward section worked extremely well to get the wounded tankies out.</p> <p>b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u></p> <p>Above.</p> <p>c. <u>Coy Comments.</u></p> <p>This was a subsequent phase of the contact initiated by C/S 12. At this stage C/S 11 had come under command of C Sqn 1 Armd Regt, with additional APCs in support. Co-ordination was subsequently required for:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) The completion of C/S 12 dustoff and extraction from their western approach to the bunker system before armoured/infantry element moved so that the dustoff aircraft were not in line of fire from the tanks and APCs.</li> <li>(2) The complete extraction of C/S 12 to a blocking position to the west that would not compromise armoured or supporting fire.</li> <li>(3) Overcoming the lack of effective communications between HQ V Coy and HQ C Sqn, requiring information on the bunker system from 2 Pl V Coy to be relayed through 1 Pl and thence to the armoured commander.</li> </ol> <p>d. <u>Unit Comments.</u></p> <p>Brought about through the lack of 25 sets held by C Sqn and could have been achieved on the Battalion Command Net easier and more quickly.</p> <p>e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u></p>	



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APPENDIX 17A TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 25 Jun 71		<u>Time</u> 1200		<u>Location</u> YS 421855		<u>Pl</u> 1 Tp		<u>Coy</u> A Sqn 3 Cav	
<u>Strength</u>	<u>Task</u> Sp C Sqn 1 Armd		<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> Rank Name Maj Bourke			<u>Platoon Commander</u> Rank Name Capt Earle			
<u>Initiated By</u> Enemy		<u>Wpns</u> AK47		<u>En Strength</u> Unknown		<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> 1 Bn 27 <sup>4</sup> Regt. RPG2, AK47			
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 15 metres		<u>Range of Engagement</u> Min Max 10 15		<u>Length of Engagement</u> Hrs Mins		<u>How Was En Noticed</u> En fired RPG2			
<u>Terrain Description</u> Thick jungle and bamboo									
<u>Narrative</u> 1 Tp reacted to assist V Coy 4 RAR/NZ in contact. Then supported Tank aslt on bunkers: Secured start line; protected flanks and rear; evacuated casualties; resupplied tanks in contact with ammo. In addition at approx 1700 hrs ØA, 19J and 13 engaged enemy withdrawal to East along South side of lane cut by tanks. Nil result. En engaged with AK47. 1 x RPG was seen but not used, probably due to thick scrub.									
<u>Sketch</u>									

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> .30, .50, MG	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 2000
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Nil	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> Unknown	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u> Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> APC's could have been employed to protect flanks of tanks by being directly behind them and employing continuous suppressive fire. Tanks received several RPG's from flanks.	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> Nil	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> Nil	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u> Nil	



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APPENDIX 18 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 29 Jun 71		<u>Time</u> 0100		<u>Location</u> 438853		<u>Pl</u> 3		<u>Coy</u> V	
<u>Strength</u> 33		<u>Task</u> Ambush		<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u>			<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u>		
<u>Initiated By</u> 3 Pl		<u>Wpns</u> M60, M79		<u>En Strength</u> 5 - 6		<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Unknown			
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> Not seen		<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> <u>Max</u> 25		<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> <u>Mins</u>		<u>How Was En Noticed</u> En approached position from E, heard by sentry			
<u>Terrain Description</u> Thick grass and bush									
<u>Narrative</u> The en were heard approaching from the east. A sentry attempted to engage the en with a claymore which malfunctioned (the forward en was 25 ft from sentry). The lead en stopped and moved back toward the others. They then started to move forward again. Friendlies engaged with MG and M79 fire and fired mortars to cut off the en. A daylight search revealed signs of a hasty withdrawal of 5 - 6 en moving East. Nil results.									
<u>Sketch</u>									

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
M60, M79	250 x M60, 15 x M79
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
Mortars	30
<u>Enemy Casualties</u>	<u>Friendly Casualties</u>
Unknown	Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u>	
Hard to judge distance of en by sound because of long grass so senior sentry held fire of claymores until last moment. Claymores malfunctioned. En may have suspected or heard something and seemed to move away. Junior sentry therefore held M60 fire until en movement heard once more.	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u>	
Claymore "clacker" had been tested but still malfunctioned. En appears to have heard either the sentry re-trying claymores or noise of someone sleeping in the ambush. Tall grass main reason for nil results. But this was only suitable loc in track area for siting the ambush.	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u>	
Although the ambush covered a possible enemy route, the actual area chosen was unsatisfactory; even though the best use was made of the ground available.	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u>	
Nil	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u>	
Nil	



CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX 19 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 PAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 29 Jun 71	<u>Time</u> 1950	<u>Location</u> 420827	<u>Pl</u> Coy HQ	<u>Coy</u> C
<u>Strength</u> 20	<u>Task</u> Search and Ambush	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> Rank - Name Maj R.E. Boxall		<u>Platoon Commander</u> Rank Name
<u>Initiated By</u> M60; Claymore		<u>En Strength</u> 004 (poss 4)	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Unknown	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 15 Metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> Min 15	<u>Max</u>	<u>Length of Engagement</u> Hrs -	<u>Mins</u> 10
<u>Hw Was En Noticed</u> En noticed ponchos in Coy HQ posn				
<u>Terrain Description</u> Edge of bamboo jungle adjacent to rubber plantation.				
<u>Narrative</u> Gun picquet saw 1 enemy approach from the North. He apparently saw Coy HQ hootchies and ran West. M60 fired and claymores detonated. Rapid scuffling heard in area and engaged with SA. Search conducted AM 30 Jun 71. Scuffling continued some time after initial contact and was engaged several times subsequently. M79 and artillery illumination was used as was a ground flare.				
<u>Sketch</u>				

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> Claymores and M60	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 400 link 7.62, 1 trip flare, 3 claymores
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Artillery Illumination	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 6
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> Unknown	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u> <p>a. <u>Local Commander.</u> It is debatable whether the sentry saw en movement. There was scuffling in the bamboo thicket but it may have been animal movement. It continued for some time and was engaged with SA fire several times subsequently.</p> <p>b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> Nil</p> <p>c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> There is no conclusive evidence to establish the presence of enemy.</p> <p>d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> Nil</p> <p>e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u> Artillery illumination is of little use in jungle or bamboo.</p>	



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APPENDIX 20 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 29 Jun 71		<u>Time</u> 2128		<u>Location</u> 438053		<u>Pl</u> 3		<u>Coy</u> V	
<u>Strength</u> 33		<u>Task</u> Ambush		<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u>			<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u>		
<u>Initiated By</u> 3 Pl		<u>Wpns</u> Claymores, M79, M60		<u>En Strength</u> 6		<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Unknown			
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> Not seen		<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> <u>Max</u>		<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> <u>Mins</u>		<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Both groups of en noticed by noise			
<u>Terrain Description</u> See diagram									
<u>Narrative</u> Two enemy groups approached AP. One from North East on northern approach, which withdrew back along axis, the other group on southern approach from E - W, which withdrew South. Both groups were engaged virtually simultaneously.									
<u>Sketch</u>									

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
Claymores, M60, M79, SLR, M16	2 x Claymores, 500 x M60, 25 x M79, 200 x SLR, 150 x M16
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
Nil	Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u>	<u>Friendly Casualties</u>
Unknown	Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
<p>a. <u>Local Commander.</u></p> <p>Sentry (1) heard movement to North and was waiting for it to come closer, when sentry (3) initiated claymores against movement to SE which had been coming closer for several minutes. Sentry (1) thought he had had RPG fired at him which had landed in area of sentry (3). Thus sentry (1) loathe to fire until position clarified.</p>	
<p>b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u></p> <p>En suspected to be two separate groups - perhaps making for an RV? Main problem was again the difficulty of judging distance correctly by sound in the tall, thick grass, and daylight search revealed sign much further out than anticipated. Hence permission gained to move to a new area because of lack of satisfactory AP anywhere on track within AO.</p>	
<p>c. <u>Coy Comments.</u></p> <p>Although the ambush covered a possible enemy site the actual area chosen was unsatisfactory, even though the best use was made of the ground available.</p>	
<p>d. <u>Unit Comments.</u></p> <p>Nil</p>	
<p>e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u></p> <p>Nil</p>	



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APPENDIX 21 TO  
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OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
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SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 30 Jun 71	<u>Time</u> 0508	<u>Location</u> 437872	<u>Pl</u> Aslt Pnr Pl	<u>Coy</u> Sp
<u>Strength</u> 1 & 31	<u>Task</u> Ambush	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> Rank Name 2lt R. Swarbrick		<u>Platoon Commander</u> Rank Name 2lt R. Swarbrick
<u>Initiated By</u> Aslt Pnr Pl	<u>Wpns</u> M60, M16, SLR, Claymore	<u>En Strength</u> Unknown	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Unknown	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> Not seen	<u>Range of Engagement</u> Min Max 20 30	<u>Length of Engagement</u> Hrs Mins - 3	<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Movement heard on perimeter	


Terrain Description

Ambush was set in long savannah, with no cover from fire for troops. 1 N-S track, 2 E-W tracks approx 15 metres apart, heavy use however only old sign. Several old wpn pits on edge of bamboo N side of creek.

Narrative

1. Pl set standard triangular ambush at approx 1915 hours at above grid.
2. Due to ground claymores were controlled by sect commanders.
3. Set using claymores in banks of 2 and 3 with flares set only for trip.
4. Posn selected due to number of approaches junctioning in vicinity of creek.
5. At 0508 mov was heard on N-S track about 20 - 30 metres in front of 3 sect gun - apparently sound of 2 to 3 people.
6. Engaged with claymore, SA and M60 fire.
7. 2 Sect heard further mov in creek bed near ford. Engaged with claymore, M60, SA.
8. Sweep first light revealed fresh small track E-W into creek line.

Sketch



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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> M60, SLR, M16, Claymores	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 60 x M60, 47 x SLR, 90 x M16
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Nil	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> Unknown	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
<p>a. <u>Local Commander.</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Difficulty of setting ambush in fading light and in open country i.e. no cover from fire.</li> <li>2. Difficulty in covering more than 2 possible killing grounds.</li> <li>3. Difficulty of moving to AP late afternoon without time for complete recce.</li> </ol>	
<p>b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Fire control resting with section proved workable; no waste of ammunition occurred.</li> <li>2. A difficult ambush as not only were there 3 killing grounds, but the main killing ground had dead ground immediately behind it i.e. creek line.</li> </ol>	
<p>c. <u>Coy Comments.</u></p> <p>The platoon was deployed in the late afternoon which prevented thorough recce prior to occupation of the AP. Also the line of approach of the en was tangent to the killing ground. More a case of bad luck than bad management.</p>	
<p>d. <u>Unit Comments.</u></p> <p>More time should be allowed in planning activities.</p>	
<p>e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u></p> <p>Nil</p>	



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OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
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SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 30 Jun 71	<u>Time</u> 1135	<u>Location</u> 426840	<u>Pl</u> 2	<u>Coy</u> V	
<u>Strength</u> 12	<u>Task</u> Standing Patrol	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u> Sgt          G.G. King		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u> Lt          Campbell	
<u>Initiated By</u> 2 Pl	<u>Wpns</u> M16	<u>En Strength</u>	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u>		
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 15 Metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> <u>Max</u> 15		<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> <u>Mins</u> -          2		<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Movement
<u>Terrain Description</u> Bamboo - visibility 20 metres					
<u>Narrative</u> Small standing patrol - 200 metres from 2 Pl - while returning to their 2 Pl loc, saw movement 10 - 15 metres away and engaged - 1 dead civilian. They were crossing an area where they were vulnerable. Light was tricky and civilian (suspect) looked as though she was threatening exposed flank.					
<u>Sketch</u> Not Applicable					

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
M16	30
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
Nil	Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u>	<u>Friendly Casualties</u>
Nil	Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
<p>a. <u>Local Commander.</u></p> <p>Civilian was carrying a digging implement by her side as one would carry a rifle. Engaged because situation looked like threatening the life of one of the friendly C/S.</p>	
<p>b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u></p> <p>Unfortunately just outside civilian access area and tricky light. Pl Sgt opened up on silhouette which looked threatening towards exposed flank.</p>	
<p>c. <u>Coy Comments.</u></p> <p>This incident has been the subject of a separate report.</p>	
<p>d. <u>Unit Comments.</u></p> <p>Nil</p>	
<p>e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u></p> <p>Nil</p>	



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APPENDIX 23 TO  
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AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 1 Jul 71		<u>Time</u> 1900		<u>Location</u> YS 428877		<u>Pl</u> TA11		<u>Coy</u> A Sqn 3 Cav	
<u>Strength</u> 1 Tp (- 13 Sect)		<u>Task</u> Moving to AP		<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> Rank Name Capt R.M. Earle		<u>Plat on Commander</u> Rank Name			
<u>Initiated By</u> Friendlies		<u>Wpns</u>		<u>En Strength</u> Approx 10		<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Main Force. AK47, K54			
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 600 metres		<u>Range of Engagement</u> Min Max 250 250		<u>Length of Engagement</u> Hrs Mins - 10		<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Movement			
<u>Terrain Description</u> Open ground with grass 3 - 4 ft high. Rubber 200 metres to East. Patches of low scrub 100 metres to West.									
<u>Narrative</u> 11 Sect with 10B were moving to an AP vic 431872. Approx 600 metres NE of that loc while in the rubber, 11A sighted 2 persons moving East to West. The Sect moved to investigate and sighted approx 10 persons in black with weapons, running away across the open to the West. A warning burst was fired and the persons failed to stop. They were then engaged. They split into groups of 1 - 2 and headed SW, NW, N and NE. A sweep revealed 2 VC WIA (1 DOW) and 1 VC KIA. Dustoff later called by C/S 1 evacuated the WIA and KIA.									
<u>Sketch</u> To Route 2 - 3 KM N 1300 metres Track Thick Scrub Light Scrub Creekline Thick Scrub 2 x KIA 1 x WIA									

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Nil	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 2 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA (PW); 2 AK47s, 1 K54 CIA.	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u>  VC appeared to be using one of the main roads through the rubber.	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u>  Appear to have been a porter party. They did not appear to be armed with RPGs. It seems that the VC are openly using the time around last light at the start of the curfew to move. APCs and others, it seems, should move into their AP locs about ½ to 1 hour before last light. The role of the .50 Cal MG is again positively shown in the use of the weapon to "scrub bash".	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u>  When 11 Section contacted the VC, I moved the Tp HQ and 12 Sect to support 11 Sect. We arrived in the area at approx 1925 hrs. I then conducted a thorough sweep of the area using all vehicles in fire and movement employing spot lights and speculative fire. I then called the Dustoff in, having previously alerted it through 4 RAR, secured a pad and evacuated the dead and wounded. Whilst the Dustoff was on the ground, it, or 11A, was engaged by VC from apparently two different directions. The rounds in fact struck 11A. One small calibre (possibly K54) hit on the tail light (apparently fired from the SW), and one AK47 (or similar) round hit on the ammo liner on the flexible .30 MG. 12 Sect, on the SW side of the contact grid, heard someone yelling and the area was engaged. Silence. After the Dustoff departed, the area was again thoroughly swept, looking for the persons who had been shooting, without success. The Tp (-) then occupied a circular leaguer in the vicinity of the contact. In the morning a thorough sweep of the area revealed two major escape routes, to the NW and to the SW, plus one pack containing food (bamboo roots).	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u>  Nil	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u>  Nil	

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APPENDIX 24 TO  
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AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 2 Jul 71	<u>Time</u> 0900	<u>Location</u> 356810	<u>Pl</u> 10	<u>Coy</u> D
<u>Strength</u> 32	<u>Task</u> RIF	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> Rank Name Cpl Menner		<u>Platoon Commander</u> Rank Name 2lt Byrne
<u>Initiated By</u> 10 Pl	<u>Wpns</u> M16, SLR, M60	<u>En Strength</u> 4	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Chau Duc AK47	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 10 Metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> Min Max 5 10		<u>Length of Engagement</u> Hrs Mins - 5	
<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Moving towards forward scout				


Terrain Description

Low bushy entanglement. Close bamboo

Narrative

10 Pl found new cuttings. Fwd scout sighted 1 enemy and engaged, others fled N and NE. Bushrangers employed from 0925 - 0945. Artillery employed. Pl exploited in 3 directions by stages. En were heard withdrawing N and NE. 10 Pl estimate of strength 2 to 4. One section on initial move located camp/sleeping/eating area for 6 - 10 people. Pl pulled back to contact point and employed Bushranger and artillery. C/S 43 later joined for co-ordinated exploitation and search.

Sketch



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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> M16, M60	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Exploitation 50 link, 40 M16 Initial burst 20 rds M16
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Busranger/Artillery	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 60 (capacity cut-off)
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 1 KIA (BC)	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
<p>a. <u>Local Commander.</u></p> <p>Fwd scout heard voices, went fwd, sighted a partly constructed shelter. At the same time enemy approached and he engaged. Immediately section was deployed and contact area was engaged with fire. <u>Comment:</u> Gunner had difficulties in terrain on initial deployment.</p>	
<p>b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u></p> <p>Pl moved through thick bamboo. Fwd scout believed he heard movement towards him and also sighted a hut under construction. Pl Comd and Sect Comd moved forward. Contact was initiated by scout. Visibility was bad through the undergrowth.</p>	
<p>c. <u>Coy Comments.</u></p> <p>Above comments accurate to my knowledge. No further comments.</p>	
<p>d. <u>Unit Comments.</u></p> <p>Nil</p>	
<p>e. <u>Lessons Learnt.</u></p> <p>People must move quietly and reaction must be quick to maintain the initiative - only one person was sighted - KIA.</p>	



SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 4 Jul 71		<u>Time</u> 1805		<u>Location</u> YS 472858		<u>Pl</u> Tracker Pl		<u>Coy</u> Sp	
<u>Strength</u> 28		<u>Task</u> Ambush		<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> Cpl <u>Name</u> J.R. Robinson			<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> 2lt <u>Name</u> M. Murphy		
<u>Initiated By</u> En tripped flare		<u>Wpns</u> Unknown		<u>En Strength</u> 3 - 4		<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Unknown			
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> Not sighted		<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> 15 <u>Max</u> 15		<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> <u>Mins</u>		<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Trip flare set off			
<u>Terrain Description</u> Thick rain forest									
<u>Narrative</u> A trip flare was ignited in front of Cpl Robinson's section. The sentry <b>did</b> not see anything (heavy rain and fading light). Cpl Robinson could not fire because of his sentry. The first report was that deadfall had set the flare off. However, on searching, a VN poncho was found and foot prints indicating 3 to 4 persons had approached from the East, set the flare off, then withdrew to the East.									
<u>Sketch</u>									




<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
Nil	Nil
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
Nil	Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u>	<u>Friendly Casualties</u>
Nil	Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
<p>a. <u>Local Commander.</u></p> <p>Greater care in sighting of sentry and his weapons to cover his arc. The reaction of the Pl to the ignition of the flare was too slow.</p>	
<p>b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u></p> <p>Nil</p>	
<p>c. <u>Coy Comments.</u></p> <p>Pl Comd reminded that when siting a track squat ambush, it is imperative to have sentries who are alert and sited in such a way as to be able to bring a heavy volume of fire to bear on likely approaches, particularly those covered with early warning devices that alert the en the same time as they alert us.</p>	
<p>d. <u>Unit Comments.</u></p> <p>Nil</p>	
<p>e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u></p> <p>Sentries must always be sighted to provide the greatest protection to their sub-units and to provide the earliest possible warning.</p>	



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APPENDIX 26 TO  
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AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 9 Jul 71	<u>Time</u> 1906	<u>Location</u> 434869	<u>Pl</u> 2	<u>Coy</u> V
<u>Strength</u> 27	<u>Task</u> Ambush	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> Lt <u>Name</u> G.F.S. Campbell		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> Lt <u>Name</u> Campbell
<u>Initiated By</u> Friendlies	<u>Wpns</u> AR16, M60, SLR	<u>En Strength</u> 2	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> MF ? VC, AK47	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 35 Metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> 35 <u>Max</u> 35		<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> - <u>Mins</u> 30	<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Movement
<u>Terrain Description</u> Pl in bush edge in bamboo. Looking along fire lane to track in 4' high grass				
<u>Narrative</u> Pl in ambush in civilian access area. 2 en moved quickly W - E across frontage of ambush point. Sentry let first one go because could not identify as en (NB time). Second en was seen to have AK47 so sentry initiated with SA. Limited sweep only possible because of poor light and tricky terrain. AK47 recovered at point where en seen to drop and crawl away. Further search in morning recovered body 20 metres West.				
<u>Sketch</u> 				

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> MG, AR16, SLR	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 800 (mostly clearing fire)
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Nil	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 1 KIA	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil

Comments and Lessons Learneda. Local Commander.

Sentry did well to identify weapon. Track was regarded as likely approach and thus had only protective claymore/offensive claymores.

b. Platoon Comments.

Nil

c. Coy Comments.

A well executed ambush illustrating the importance of fire control and rules of engagement.

d. Unit Comments.

Nil

e. Lessons Learned.

Nil



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APPENDIX 27 TO  
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AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 13 Jul 71	<u>Time</u> 1650	<u>Location</u> 428928	<u>Pl</u> CHQ	<u>Coy</u> B
<u>Strength</u> 23	<u>Task</u> Ambush	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> Rank Name Maj Hogarth		<u>Platoon Commander</u> Rank Name WO2 Barnes
<u>Initiated By</u> B Coy Sentry	<u>Wpns</u> AR 7.62 mm	<u>En Strength</u> 1 - 3	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Recce Coy AK47	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 10 Metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> Min Max 10 10		<u>Length of Engagement</u> Hrs Mins - 3	<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Noise
<u>Terrain Description</u> Edge of jungle and disused rubber				
<u>Narrative</u> Pte Brown, the southern sentry, heard noises approaching from the SW. Sighted an armed VC and fired thirty rounds from his AR. One KIA, drag marks and a blood trail were found. A sweep of the area by foot and APC failed to reveal anything further.				
<u>Sketch</u> <p>1 KIA APC Track 10 metres Sentry Disused Rubber 3 to 4 feet undergrowth Thick Jungle Gun CP Gun N</p>				

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> AR 7.62 mm	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 30
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Nil	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA (BT), 1 AK47 (CIA)	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u> Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> Nil	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> Good action by member. Shorts bursts held till last minute produce results. Unexpected en approach direction precluded better results.	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> Nil	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u> Nil	



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APPENDIX 28 TO  
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OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 15 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 13 Jul 71		<u>Time</u> 1843		<u>Location</u> YS 414926		<u>Pl</u> 6		<u>Coy</u> B	
<u>Strength</u> 30		<u>Task</u> Track squat		<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u>			<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u>		
<u>Initiated By</u> 6 Pl		<u>Wpns</u> Claymore, GPMG		<u>En Strength</u> 1 seen, poss 4 - 5			<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Dark shirt with 1 1/2" square green patch on left upper arm, dark trousers, Ho Chi Minh sandals, AK47.		
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 20 Metres		<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> <u>Max</u> 10      50		<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> <u>Mins</u> -      10		<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Moving slowly on track, searching, in crouched posture.			
<u>Terrain Description</u> Four way track junction in primary jungle									
<u>Narrative</u> En approached position along track. Was allowed to approach as close to claymore as possible before engaged with claymore and M60. Sweep revealed 1 VC (WIA) who was carried inside perimeter. Movement in creek to east engaged with claymores. Clearing patrol next morning revealed drag marks on track. Night dustoff was attempted for the VC CIA. However difficulties with terrain and enemy showing stroce to north made it impossible. VC CIA later DOW. Area to north engaged with artillery with unknown results.									
<u>Sketch</u>									

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> Claymore, M60, SA	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 4 x Claymore, 200 x M60, 60 x SA
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Artillery	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 15
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 1 VC KIA (DOW), 1 VC WIA (Poss) (Drag marks), AK47 CIA	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u> N/A	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> Gun firing too high, however gunner in first contact. Track not well covered with claymores, since tracks from West and North were considered higher priority. The VC CIA, although he had extensive shrapnel wounds to both legs and lower abdomen, bled very little. Possibly under influence of blood coagulant.	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> Nil	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> Nil	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u> Nil	
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u> N/A	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> Gun firing too high, however gunner in first contact. Track not well covered with claymores, since tracks from West and North were considered higher priority. The VC CIA, although he had extensive shrapnel wounds to both legs and lower abdomen, bled very little. Possibly under influence of blood coagulant.	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> Nil	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> Nil	

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APPENDIX 29 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
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AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 15 Jul 71	<u>Time</u> 0145	<u>Location</u> 414926	<u>Pl</u> 6	<u>Coy</u> B
<u>Strength</u> 30	<u>Task</u> Ambush	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u>		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u> 2lt      McDaniel
<u>Initiated By</u> 6 Pl	<u>Wpns</u> Claymore, M16	<u>En Strength</u> Unknown	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Unknown	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> N/A	<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> <u>Max</u> 15      30		<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> <u>Mins</u> -      1	
<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Torch believed seen on track				
<u>Terrain Description</u> Track in primary jungle.				
<u>Narrative</u> Gun picquet heard suspected en movement and saw what appeared to be a torch light. Engaged with claymore and M16. Search at first light revealed nil results.				
<u>Sketch</u> Nil				

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
Claymore, M16	1 x Claymore, 20 x M16
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
Nil	Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u>	<u>Friendly Casualties</u>
Nil	Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u>	
Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u>	
Possibly glow worm, not torch.	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u>	
Should not have been engaged.	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u>	
Nil	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u>	
Fire must be withheld at night until a definite target is seen even if this is at as short a range as 5 metres.	



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APPENDIX 30 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71


SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 20 Jul 71	<u>Time</u> 1230	<u>Location</u> 388929	<u>Pl</u> 1	<u>Coy</u> V
<u>Strength</u> 42	<u>Task</u> RIF	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> Lt <u>Name</u> N.J. Fry		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> Lt <u>Name</u> N.J. Fry
<u>Initiated By</u> Friendlies	<u>Wpns</u> SLR	<u>En Strength</u> 8 - 9	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> C23 Coy 274 Regt.      AK47	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 10 Metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> 10 <u>Max</u> 30		<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> 2 <u>Mins</u> -	<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Movement
<u>Terrain Description</u> Scrub and scattered bush, good visibility 30 metres.				
<u>Narrative</u> My Platoon had been moving through an area clearing and seeking en sign. At 1200 hrs on 20 Jul 71 we halted and formed a defensive harbour. At 1230 hrs a shot was fired by the sentry followed by a burst of fire from the enemy. The sentry moved back into the harbour and the gun posn returned fire to the north eastern corner. We then heard moaning at the north eastern corner about 15 metres out. Simultaneously en were seen on the western corner, southern side and the eastern side of the harbour. After a long period of fire fight there was a lull. I mounted a sweep and moved out through the eastern side. We received heavy fire from about 15 - 20 metres and had to withdraw back to the perimeter. (We tried to move forward but there were approx 5 en with automatic wpns. One VC stood up and one of my scouts shot him at about 10 ft distance. He spun around with the shock of the SLR hitting him. (But we did not find a body in this area). After pulling back, we again received periodic fire from around the perimeter. Artillery and air sp were brought in. We swept the area twice at different distances and in different directions but only found the one body. The en tried to remove our sentry's claymore. The Platoon fired 2300 M60 (4 guns), 210 SLR and 200 M16. All fire was controlled by section comds.				
<u>Sketch</u> See Page 2				

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Sketch



Moaning and movement from this area. (Tracks found later by sweep. En moving NW).

3 en seen by sentry. One def hit by sentry

Tracks leading out N

○ Body found here by sweep (15 metres out)

Track P1 made on the way into harbour

C/S 11 & 10 in Harbour

X En seen and dropped by SLR here (10 ft from firer)

X En seen and dropped by SLR fire (15 metres)

Tracks leading into the area

Tracks leading away

Four en seen moving SW. Were fired at. but nothing found in sweep. A lot of tracks heading SW.

Air Support and Arty dropped in this SE area. Nil results




<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> M60, M16, SLR	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 2300 x M60, 200 x M16, 210 x SLR
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Artillery, Air Support	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 60 x Artillery, ½ - ¾ hr of Air Support
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 1 KIA	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
<p>a. <u>Local Commander.</u></p> <p>I consider the en strength to total approx 10. We definitely saw 3 separate groups of 3, 4 and 3 plus the odd VC around the perimeter. In 2 cases VC were fired at within a range of 10 feet and were definitely hit.</p>	
<p>b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u></p> <p>Quick action by sentry was good and the immediate action of Platoon and Coy HQ was due to good control by junior NCO's.</p>	
<p>c. <u>Coy Comments.</u></p> <p>The contact confirmed the value of forming an ambush whenever halted. In this case no fresh enemy sign had been located but the halt was in a "potential track area". The enemy approached the ambush area at right angles to the track made by the friendly troops. Subsequent to the contact enemy tracks indicated three squad sized groups had moved from North to South with their right flank group moving near the friendly ambush. Upon contact the enemy groups not in contact appeared to support by fire that which had come under fire. It is considered that these groups were used to assist in the extraction of the further casualties that were caused to the enemy. There were some difficulties on the Battalion Command Net concerning the establishment of communications with the FAC who was out of range. However on his arrival in the general area there were no problems. The co-ordination of artillery and air support presented no difficulties and was available when and where required. A further communications limitation which was not specific to this contact was the mutual interference between the fire control and the Battalion Command Nets. This could only be remedied by keeping the sets approximately 20 - 25 feet apart.</p>	
<p>d. <u>Unit Comments.</u></p> <p>Nil</p>	
<p>e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u></p> <p>Nil</p>	



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APPENDIX 31 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RAP/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 21 Jul 71	<u>Time</u> 1420	<u>Location</u> 380943	<u>Pl</u> 6	<u>Coy</u> B
<u>Strength</u> 30	<u>Task</u> Following en track	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u>		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u> 2lt      Mc Daniel
<u>Initiated By</u> 6 Pl	<u>Wpns</u> SA	<u>En Strength</u> 4	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> JG shirt, dark trousers, AK47	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 20 Metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> <u>Max</u> 10      20		<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> <u>Mins</u> -      1	<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Moving in group along track
<u>Terrain Description</u> Well worn track in primary jungle.				
<u>Narrative</u> 6 Pl following an en track north when enemy approached from the rear. Rear most man observed and engaged with SLA. Sweep back up the track revealed 1 en KIA and 2 blood trails. En withdrew south.				
<u>Sketch</u> 				

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> SLR	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 18
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Nil	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 1 KIA (BC), 2 WIA (BT)	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u> Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> Pte KIPKE acted calmly in firing two aimed shots at the enemy group then firing 16 rounds into the area that the en had withdrawn through. Sweep should have been carried further, since apparently a body was subsequently discovered in the area.	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> Good action by member and by platoon. Probably 3 en were KIA from this contact. Had the en not have approached the platoon stood a good chance of surprising the en in a bunker system.	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> Nil	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u> When following a track as 6 Pl did, due attention should be paid to en approaches from the rear of the force.	

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APPENDIX 32 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RA7/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 22 Jul 71	<u>Time</u> 1216	<u>Location</u> YS 378942	<u>Pl</u> 4	<u>Coy</u> B
<u>Strength</u> 30	<u>Task</u> Recce in Force	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> Rank Name Lt Ballantyne		<u>Platoon Commander</u> Rank Name Lt Ballantyne
<u>Initiated By</u> 4 Pl	<u>Wpns</u> SA	<u>En Strength</u> 4	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Jungle greens, AK47s	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 15 Metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> Min Max 15 15	<u>Length of Engagement</u> Hrs Mins 1 -	<u>How Was En Noticed</u>	


Terrain Description

Thick, scrubby bamboo and secondary jungle.

Narrative

Platoon following track from Bunker System at 380941. Smell noticed about 50 metres from system. Pl had been deployed when en sighted. Contact initiated and fire returned almost simultaneously. Pl received fire from bunker to direct front. 6 Pl following up were deployed. En disengaged and sweep through bunker system carried out. 13 bunkers located.

Sketch



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<u>Cwn Type of Weapons Used</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
M60, M16, SLR	150
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
Artillery fired to West of area	2
<u>Enemy Casualties</u>	<u>Friendly Casualties</u>
Unknown	Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u>	
Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Commander.</u>	
Contact initiated at close range with auto fire - M16. Single shot possibly more efficient and effective. En only "caretaker" force and broke contact after short engagement.	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u>	
The en strength was probably fairly small and I believe were encouraged to withdraw only on seeing a large force (2 pls) assembled and slow fire and movement commenced.	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u>	
Concur.	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u>	
Nil	



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APPENDIX 33 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RA/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 22 Jul 71	<u>Task</u> 1615	<u>Location</u> 369946	<u>Pl</u> 7	<u>Coy</u> C
<u>Strength</u> 32	<u>Task</u> Search and Ambush	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> Lt <u>Name</u> Andrews		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> Lt <u>Name</u> Andrews
<u>Initiated By</u> 7 Pl	<u>Wpns</u> Claymore	<u>En Strength</u> 3	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Dressed in green and black and armed with AK47s.	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 25 Metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> 10 <u>Max</u> 10		<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> - <u>Mins</u> 5	<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Seen moving along track


Terrain Description

Low scrub with grass about 5 ft tall covered the area. Scattered clumps of bamboo and remains of an old rubber plantation.

Narrative

3 enemy moved SOUTH along a track. They were engaged and killed. 2 x AK47, 1 x AK50, 8 mags, 7 packs (4 empty inside others), qty docus, 4 doz torch batteries, spare greens, civilian clothing, 3 mosquito nets, 3 torches and qty fresh fruit and rice CIA.

Sketch



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<u>Own Type Of Weapons Used</u> Claymore, M60	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 2 x Claymores, 100 x M60
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Nil	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 3 KIA	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u> Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> Although the enemy appeared to be alert and watching their arcs, they were moving quickly and did not see any sign of the ambush killer group. The centre bank of claymores was fired killing all three enemy.	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> This ambush was particularly commendable from the viewpoint that only the required amount of firepower was used to kill the enemy and to support the search. The ambush comd was certain that there were only 3 enemy present and exercised good fire control.	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> A successfully executed ambush.	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u> Nil	



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APPENDIX 34 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Pl</u>	<u>Coy</u>	
22 Jul 71	1620	YS 378942	4	B	
<u>Strength</u>	<u>Task</u>	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u>		<u>Platoon Commander</u>	
30		<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u>	
				Lt Ballantyne	
<u>Initiated By</u>	<u>Wpns</u>	<u>En Strength</u>	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u>		
Enemy	M79	4	Pistol, M79, M16, Greens, Aust Bush Hat		
<u>Distance En Sighted</u>	<u>Range of Engagement</u>		<u>Length of Engagement</u>	<u>How Was En Noticed</u>	
20 Metres	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	<u>Hrs</u> <u>Mins</u>	En sighted by sentry. Mistaken for friendly	
	20	25	-	2	
<u>Terrain Description</u>					
Thick secondary jungle					
<u>Narrative</u>					
CHQ, 4 Pl, 5 Pl harboured in bunker system. En sighted on track running out of system to West. Initially mistaken for friendly troops because of Greens, M16, M79. En fired M79 into position. Area engaged by M60 and sweep carried out. En withdrew to West.					
<u>Sketch</u>					

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
M60	100
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u>	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
Nil	Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u>	<u>Friendly Casualties</u>
Unknown	1 WIA
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u>	
Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u>	
En dressed in greens with US wpns. Hesitation by sentry to establish identity allowed en to fire M79 and withdraw before effective return fire was employed.	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u>	
Little can be done to combat enemy wearing our uniforms. I believe the soldiers concerned were correctly applying the rules of engagement.	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u>	
Nil	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u>	
Troops must be aware that VC do wear Australian pattern clothing and carry similar weapons to the ones issued to friendly forces.	



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APPENDIX 35 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 PAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 22 Jul 71		<u>Time</u> 1624		<u>Location</u> YS 379942		<u>P1</u> 6		<u>Coy</u> B	
<u>Strength</u> 30		<u>Task</u> Following en track		<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> Rank Name				<u>Platoon Commander</u> Rank Name	
6 P1		SLR, M16		Possible 4		JG Shirt, Black Trousers, M79 (US origin)			
<u>Initiated By</u>		<u>Wpns</u>		<u>En Strength</u>		<u>En Identification and Weapons</u>			
20 Metres		5		30		-		5	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u>		<u>Range of Engagement</u> Min Max		<u>Length of Engagement</u> Hrs Mins		<u>How Was En Noticed</u>			
Track on steep-banked creek in primary jungle/bamboo.		5 30		- 5		Moving on track paralleling P1 mov			
<u>Terrain Description</u>									
<u>Narrative</u>									
P1 had halted due to sighting of bunker system by leading sub-unit. Rear man of central section and medic sighted 1 en moving in the same direction as the pl on a track paralleling the one being followed. They ambushed and killed the enemy. Subsequent movement in the creekline was engaged but a sweep produced nil result. Movement was observed in the suspected bunker system during contact.									
<u>Sketch</u>									

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> M60, SA	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 50 x M60, 50 x SA
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Nil	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 1 KIA (BC)	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
<p>a. <u>Local Commander.</u> Nil</p> <p>b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> Members concerned acted quickly and <b>decisively</b>, alerting other members before engaging en.</p> <p>c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> A contact which may have precluded catching enemy in a nearby bunker system. The system was occupied before the contact and the pl was deploying to attack it. It was vacated on contact.</p> <p>d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> Nil</p> <p>e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u> Forces must always pay due regard, as was done, to rear protection.</p>	



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APPENDIX 36 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 PAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 24 Jul 71	<u>Time</u> 0005	<u>Location</u> 366949	<u>Pl</u> 8	<u>Coy</u> C
<u>Strength</u> 31	<u>Task</u> Ambushing	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> Rank Name Cpl J. Pollard		<u>Platoon Commander</u> Rank Name Lt P.O'Brien
<u>Initiated By</u> 8 Pl	<u>Wpns</u> Claymores, M60s	<u>En Strength</u> Unknown	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Not seen	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u>	<u>Range of Engagement</u> Min 10	<u>Length of Engagement</u> Hrs 5	<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Sound of movement	
<u>Terrain Description</u> Light vegetation and long grass				
<u>Narrative</u> Sentry heard movement which he thought was enemy and engaged with claymore and M60.				
<u>Sketch</u>				

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> Claymore, M60	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 2 x Claymores, 200 x M60
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Artillery Illumination	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 20
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> Nil	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u> Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> Nil	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> It appears that one group comd in the ambush prematurely opened fire. Corrective action has now been taken.	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> Nil	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u> At night fire must not be opened at movement. Point blank range is the only possibility of reasonable success.	

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APPENDIX 37 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 PAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 24 Jul 71	<u>Time</u> 2030	<u>Location</u> YS 357924	<u>Pl</u> TA11	<u>Coy</u> A Sqn 3 Cav
<u>Strength</u>	<u>Task</u> Ambush and block	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u> Sgt          McLeay		<u>Troop Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u> Capt      Earle
<u>Initiated By</u> TA11A	<u>Wpns</u> Claymores, .50, .30 Cal	<u>En Strength</u> Est 4	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Voices and movement	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> Initially est 50 M but probably 100 - 200 metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> <u>Max</u> Est 50 M              200		<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> <u>Mins</u> 1 (Approx)	<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Voices and movement
<u>Terrain Description</u> The Section was deployed in open ground on a spur line, covering the approach to a creek crossing.				
<u>Narrative</u> En approached from S and were engaged with claymores at range approx 50 metres. En withdrew S on contact and movement later was heard to the West. The area was swept with fire and illuminated within TA11 resources. A physical search was conducted by two moving C/S.				
<u>Sketch</u> <p>Rubber and Bamboo</p> <p>Rubber</p> <p>Track on spur</p> <p>Suoi Gia Trao</p> <p>N</p>				

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
<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> .30, .50, Claymore, M16	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 1000 total
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Nil	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> Unknown	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u> Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> Nil	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> It was a very still night. The voices were heard at a greater range than was thought by the picquet. Consequently the contact was initiated too early.	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> Nil	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u> Nil	



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APPENDIX 38 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 P/B/NZ (ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71.

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 25 Jul 71	<u>Time</u> 2035	<u>Location</u> YS 373946	<u>Pl</u> 8	<u>Coy</u> C
<u>Strength</u> 31	<u>Task</u> Occupying NDP	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> Cpl <u>Name</u> R.H. Templeman		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> Lt <u>Name</u> P.A. O'Brien
<u>Initiated By</u> 8 Pl	<u>Wpns</u> Claymore	<u>En Strength</u> 3 - 5	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> En using a torch at night	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> Approx 20 metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> 20	<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> -	<u>Mins</u> 10	<u>How Was En Noticed</u> As above
<u>Terrain Description</u> Thick Bamboo				
<u>Narrative</u> En approached from SE - moved north after engagement. Enemy spotted by movement and suspected torch. Initiated by claymores then followed by SA fire. Search conducted in morning. Nil results.				
<u>Sketch</u> 				

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> M16, Claymores, M60, SLR, M79	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 4 x Claymores, 50 x SLR, 3 x M79, 50 x M16 300 x M60
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Artillery HE and Illumination	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 30
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> Nil	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u> Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> There was no sign of en movement on the search. Although section commander and 3 members of his section are sure there were enemy, they may have withdrawn back along the track.	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> This is another instance of firing at too great a range at night at noises. Noises are not grounds for opening fire at night. Corrective action has been taken.	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> Nil	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u> Only open fire at night when enemy are at point blank range of either claymores or SA.	




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APPENDIX 39 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 PAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 26 Jul 71	<u>Time</u> 0016	<u>Location</u> YS 373946	<u>Pl</u> 8	<u>Coy</u> C
<u>Strength</u> 31	<u>Task</u> Occupying NDP	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> Cpl <u>Name</u> R.H. Templeman		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> Lt <u>Name</u> P. O'Brien
<u>Initiated By</u> 8 Pl	<u>Wpns</u> M60	<u>En Strength</u> Unknown	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Suspected enemy movement	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 30 metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> 30 <u>Max</u>		<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> - <u>Mins</u> 5	<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Movement
<u>Terrain Description</u> Thick Bamboo				
<u>Narrative</u> Following previous contact enemy movement heard. Engaged with M60.				

Sketch



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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> M60, M79	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 100 x M60, 3 x M79
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Nil	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> Nil	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u> Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> Nil	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> As for previous contact at same location at 252035H Jul 71.	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> Nil	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u> Nil	



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ANNEX E TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF INSTALLATIONS AND CACHES  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK

<u>Serial</u> (a)	<u>Date/Time</u> (b)	<u>Location</u> (c)	<u>Unit/Sub Unit</u> (d)	<u>Activity</u> (e)
1	140930 Jun	YS 567921	11 Pl D Coy	Located a 20 m x 50 m bunker system consisting of 3 bunkers, 2 to 3 months old. Major exit tracks went East, South-West and North. Destroyed.
2	161400 Jun	YS 401887	4 Pl B Coy	Located a 20 m x 20 m bunker system consisting of a large bunker and several small sleeping spaces. Estimated 6 months old and last used 2 months ago. Exit routes South and North along creek.
3	181140 Jun	YS 433842	8 Pl C Coy	Located a 20 m x 20 m rest camp with exit tracks running East and South. Last used 2 to 3 days previously by 3 men.
4	181500 Jun	YS 396887	10 Pl D Coy	Located an 'L' shaped bunker system of 8 bunkers with 2 to 3 feet of OHP. 5 bunkers had recently been renovated and had been occupied 5 to 7 days previously. Exit/entry tracks to North, North-West and North-East.
5	190805 Jun	YS 362887	12 Pl D Coy	Located a tunnel complex over 1000 ft in length with an average height 5 ft 6 ins. Width varied from 2 ft 6 ins to 3 ft and up to 12 ft OHP. There were several small branch tunnels and a well located in the tunnel.
6	191115 Jun	YS 435842	8 Pl C Coy	Located a 10 m square camp with entry/exit tracks to South and West. The camp was made and used approximately 2 days previously. There were 3 bed spaces and 2 fire places.
7	231535 Jun	YS 347786	11 Pl D Coy	Located a 7.5 m x 10 m camp with 10 bed spaces, several fire places and 2 wash points. Approximately 6 months old and used 12 hours previously. Entry/exit tracks to North, South and West.

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- | (a) | (b)        | (c)       | (d)                                 | (e)   |
|-----|------------|-----------|-------------------------------------|---|
| 8   | 231845 Jun | YS 331769 | 12 Pl D Coy                         | Located a possible letter box which was a 9 in x 6 in hole in the ground covered by bamboo. A cord from the hole at 45 degrees was tied to nearby scrub. Had been visited that day and was empty.   |
| 9   | 251200 Jun | YS 350793 | 11 Pl D Coy                         | Located a very old bunker system with 6 bunkers and 2 fighting pits. The system was 50 m x 50 m in a box formation straddling a creek. Bunkers had 30 ins OHP and were used by 8 or 9 men the previous day. Entry/exit tracks to the South.   |
| 10  | 251545 Jun | YS 421855 | 2 Pl V Coy/<br>C Sqn 1 Armd<br>Regt | Located a 'Z' shaped bunker system 120 m x 70 m with 10 bunkers 5 ft x 8 ft x 5 ft with 30 ins OHP. Exit/entry tracks to North, South, South-East and East. System was approximately 6 to 12 months old and had been renovated about 10 days ago. Last occupied the previous night. Quantity of equipment and documents were located in the system. |
| 11  | 271105 Jun | YS 443902 | Tracker Pl/<br>Sp Coy               | Located a triangular shaped camp 20 m x 15 m in size. 5 to 7 sleeping spaces and a bunker with 18 ins OHP. Camp approximately 6 months old and used within that time by a possible 4 persons. Entry/exit tracks to the East and West. 2 empty explosives boxes and an RPG container were located and destroyed with the system.                     |
| 12  | 271352 Jun | YS 438903 | Tracker Pl/<br>Sp Coy               | Located a PPSH rifle jammed between the trunks of 2 trees 6 to 8 feet above the ground. In position approximately 6 to 12 months.   |
| 13  | 271400 Jun | YS 428854 | V Coy                               | Located a body and weapon (AK47) in the vicinity of a contact which occurred on 24 Jun 71. Body was badly decomposed; no documents or equipment. Dressed in black clothing with home made webbing. Credited to V Coy as body/dress recognised by soldier who shot him.  |
| 14  | 300955 Jun | YS 436887 | Aslt Pnr Pl/<br>Sp Coy              | Found a VC type pack containing plastic sheeting, a hammock, camouflaged cloth, some old fish and 90 AK47 rounds. No identification could be made from the pack.  |

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
15	011230 Jul	YS 418808	8 Pl C Coy	Found a "Y" shaped base camp 200 metres square consisting of 12 large bunkers and 9 small weapon pits with 2 ft OHP. Pits were of varied age with some up to 2 months old and some very new. They are estimated to have been used on the night of 30 Jun 71. Entry/exit points were in all directions but a fresh track led South. A qty of clothing, 1 M16 magazine with an M16 round, eating utensils and a qty of docus and med eqpt were located. Docus ident Chau Duc.
16	020930 Jul	YS 356811	10 Pl D Coy	Found an old bunker system with 2 large new bunkers. There were numerous collapsed bunkers approx 12 months old in the system. Recovered were: 1 set ARVN greens, pistol belt, a qty of docus and a qty of cooking utensils. Docus ident Chau Duc.
17	021530 Jul	YS 356811	12 Pl D Coy	Found a tunnel system in an area 100 metres and 50 metres. There were 3 new bunkers, a well and a cooking place within the system. Tracks led W to SW, S and NE. The system had been constantly used during the last week and vacated 6 hrs previously. Cooking utensils, 2 prs US boots and 5 lb of salt were located in the area.
18	021745 Jul	YS 354814	12 Pl D Coy	Located a base camp covering an area 150 x 40 metres with one bunker. Entry/exit tracks were located to North-East and North-West. 8 x 7.62 MM rounds and a quantity of cooking utensils were found and destroyed.
19	121430 Jul	YS 403876	7 Pl C Coy	Located a staging camp consisting of one fighting pit, one uncompleted well and platform for stores.
20	171240 Jul	YS 410920	6 Pl B Coy	Located an unoccupied bunker system of 5 bunkers in an area 75 x 75 metres with 3 entry/exit tracks. Constructed within last 4 weeks and used within last 24 hrs.
21	181105 Jul	YS 417917	4 Pl B Coy	Located a 60 x 30 metre camp site capable of accommodating 20 persons. Site approximately 6 months old and not used in that time. An NVA helmet, 3 enamel plates and empty ration tins were found.

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
22	220827 Jul	YS 380943	6 Pl B Coy	Cache located containing signal equipment: 3 aerials (one rod, 2 whip); 1 aerial tuner; 1 adapter, 3 CHICOM 251-A radios (one bullet damaged), 2 handsets (H189), 1 CHICOM field telephone, 1 generator, 3 wire aerials, 3 headsets and microphone complete, 1 CHICOM gooseneck, quantity of PRC25 components, 1 log book. (Sig Pl HQ 274 Regt).
23	240745 Jul	YS 369923	12 Pl D Coy	Located a 2 to 3 month old bunker system with sleeping spaces for 20 to 30 persons. System in good condition and contained digging tools, cooking utensils, clothing and a fishing net. System and contents destroyed.
24	241300 Jul	YS 378943	4 Pl B Coy	Located a 15 bunker system 100 x 150 metres in area. Bunkers 15 x 5 x 5 ft with 3 ft OHP. In good condition and vacated within last 24 hours. Entry/exit tracks to North-East and West. Captured: 2 RPG rounds and boosters, 2 x 105 MM shell fuses, quantity 7.62 ammunition, one morse key, clothing and equipment.
25	241430 Jul	YS 375942	6 Pl B Coy	Located and destroyed a circular 8 bunker system used within last 24 hours. 300 lb polished rice located in two caches.
26	241620 Jul	YS 375942	4 Pl B Coy	Located 160 lb polished rice.

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ANNEX F TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION HERMIT PARK  
DATED 16 SEP 71

ARTILLERY ROUNDS FIRED BY 104 FD BTY RAA  
IN SUPPORT OF 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
PERIOD 14 JUN - 27 JUL 71

	<u>HE</u>	<u>Illum</u>
Contact Missions	1733	114
Fire Plans	306	
Mark Missions	25	
Adjustment of DFs	61	
AI Missions	632	
Trg Missions	89	
Total	<u>2846 HE</u>	<u>114 Illum</u>



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NUI DAT

R569/1/83

29 Sep 71

See Distribution List

4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION IRON FOX  
280001 JUL 71 - 052400 AUG 71.

- References:
- A. Map L7014, SVN, Sheet 6430 -IV, XA XUAN LOC, 1:50,000.
  - B. Map L7014, SVN, Sheet 6430 - III, XA BINH BA, 1:50,000.
  - C. 1 ATF OpO 7/71 dated 26 Jul 71.
  - D. 4 RAR OpO 6/71 dated 27 Jul 71.
  - E. 1 ATF OpO 8/71 dated 31 Jul 71.

Name and Type of Operation and Reporting Period

1. Operation IRON FOX was a two phase Task Force 'locate and destroy' operation; 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn providing the searching force on Phase 1 and searching and blocking forces on Phase 2.

Locations

2. The operation was conducted in the SUOI CA/SUOI SOC area, in the North West of AO BIRDSVILLE and the West of the TRAC Special Zone, West of Route 2 on the LONG KHANH/PHOUC TUY Province border. The operational area for Phases 1 and 2 are shown at Annex A.

Control Headquarters

3. HQ 1 ATF controlled the operation from NUI DAT. HQ 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn remained at COURTENAY HILL during Operation IRON FOX.

Task Organisation

4. 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Group consisted of:
  - a. 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn less V Coy 28 Jul-5 Aug, Sp Coy 28 Jul-2 Aug, B Coy 2-5 Aug and D Coy 2-5 Aug 71.

/b.

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- b. Under command Det 104 Sig Sqn.
- c. In DS 104 Fd Bty, 12 Fd Regt (less one sect)  
1 RW ac of 161 Recce Flt.
- d. In support One sect 104 Fd Bty, 12 Fd Regt  
1 Tp(-) 1 Fd Sqn.
- e. Under operational control C Sqn(-) 1 Armd Regt.
- f. In general support and at priority call for (28 Jul-1 Aug 71) P1 (3 tubes) C Bty(-) 5/42 US Arty.
- g. Detached to operational control HQ 1 ATF for Ready Reaction at NUI DAT V Coy

Intelligence

- 5. Annex B.

Mission

6. 1ATF mission was to destroy elements of HQ 274 (VC) Regt and 1st Bn 274 (VC) Regt in the SUOI CA/SUOI SOC area. 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn mission was to destroy enemy in SUOI SOC/SUOI CA areas.

7. For Phase 1 3 RAR (-) and A Sqn (-) 3 Cav Regt provided blocks to the South, North West and East whilst 4 RAR/NZ (-) Gp advanced South West along the line of the SUOI CA to destroy the enemy.

8. In Phase 2 both Battalion Gps provided blocks and search coys. In particular 4 RAR/NZ (-) searched South of the SUOI SOC and detached D Coy to A Sqn (-) for a West block force.

Concept of Operations

9. Only three rifle coys 4 RAR/NZ were available for the operation. An examination of intelligence and terrain suggested that the enemy base would be on the North side of the SUOI CA, on rising ground and within 500m of the river. Consequently the search commenced with B Coy South of the river and C Coy North, whilst the reserve company (D Coy) and C Sqn (-) were also positioned North of the river shadowing the advance at a depth of 1000m. Additionally, FSVs were earmarked for the East block force should the South coy (B Coy) require support.

10. When C Coy made contact on 29 Jul 71, D Coy and C Sqn (-) were directed to move to the contact and be prepared to attack from the North. As the rate of movement was made slow by thick undergrowth and numerous deep, steep side re-entrants, the supporting force did not arrive at the contact until dusk. C Coy, by last light had extracted the leading platoon and its casualties from the contact area and had engaged the area with very effective artillery fire. D Coy and C Sqn (-) assaulted the bunker system on morning of 30 Jul 71 to find the bunker system abandoned.

/C Coy



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C Coy remained to destroy the bunker system while B and D Coy continued to search to the West. C Sqn (-) moved North to replenish.

11. When D Coy made contact with a large force, C Sqn (-) rejoined the company. C Coy were ordered to move to a position to the North and West of the contact to assist D Coy. After a prolonged firefight, D Coy and C Sqn (-) supported by C Coy, captured the bunker system. 1 Tp C Sqn 3 Cav Regt conducted the Dustoff of D Coy casualties from an LZ secured by the troop. Fire support was provided by 104 Fd Bty, 12 Fd Regt while gunship helicopters from No 9 Sqn RAAF were not employed but remained on station during the afternoon. B Coy, which remained adjacent to the two contact areas, searched the South bank of the SUOI CA, secured the left flanks of the assaulting companies while remaining ready to assist if required.

12. Blocking forces were provided to the West by 3 RAR and to the North, East and South by A Sqn (-) 3 Cav Regt.

13. Phase 2. The search of the South bank of the SUOI SOC was conducted by B Coy on 1 Aug 71 and C Coy from 2 - 5 Aug 71. D Coy, under operational control of A Sqn (-) provided blocking positions to the West from 1 - 5 Aug 71 with A Sqn (-). 3 RAR conducted the search North of the SUOI SOC with two companies. A third company searched an old bunker position West of the blocking force located by 2 SAS Sqn.

Execution

14. Sequence of Events. Annex C.

15. Contacts and Incidents. A summary of contacts and incidents during the operation is attached as Annex D.

16. Installations and Caches. A summary of installations and caches located during the operation is attached as Annex E.

17. Artillery. BC 104 Fd Bty, 12 Fd Regt report on artillery during the operation is attached as Annex F.

Results

18. Summary of Major Casualties.

a. Enemy.

(1) KIA (Body Count)	12
(2) KIA (Possible)	3

b. Own Troops.

	<u>Aust</u>	<u>NZ</u>	<u>Total</u>
(1) KIA	1	Nil	1
(2) WIA	7	Nil	7

19. Enemy Casualties and Captured Weapons. Appendix 1 to Annex B.

20. Captured and Destroyed Equipment, Munitions and Food. Appendix 2 to Annex B.

/Lessons

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Lessons Learned and Relearnt

21. The locations of the major bunker systems again showed the tendency of the VC/NVA to build base camps on rising ground, above a reliable water course, reasonably close to the civilian population and within the "sanctuary" of the province border.

22. The 1st Bn 274 Regt tactics of fighting a determined rear guard action, at least until last light, to permit the extraction of stores, equipment and key personnel was again demonstrated during the operation.

23. If an occupied bunker system cannot be captured before last light, the attacking and cordoning troops should be so positioned that effective artillery fire can be maintained on the bunker area to prevent the enemy escaping through and around the cordon during darkness.

*J. C. Hughes*  
(J.C. HUGHES)  
Lt Col  
CO

- Annexes:
- A. Area of Operations. *(No boundaries)*
  - B. Intelligence.
  - C. Sequence of Events.
  - D. Summary of Contacts and Incidents.
  - E. Summary of Installations and Caches.
  - F. Artillery After Action Report.

<u>Distribution:</u>	<u>Copy No:</u>	<u>Distribution:</u>	<u>Copy No:</u>
V Coy	1	Mor Pl	36
B Coy	2	Tracker Pl	37
C Coy	3	Aslt Pnr Pl	38
D Coy	4	RMO	39
Sp Coy	5	QM	40
Admin Coy	6	Chaplains	41 - 42
C Sqn 1 Armd Regt	7	RSM	43
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt	8	Comds Diary	44 - 48
104 Fd Bty	9	Spare	49 - 56
12 Fd Regt	10	File	57
1 Fd Sqn	11		
HQ 1 ATF	12 - 26	<u>For Information:</u>	
NZ Component	27	1 RAR Townsville	58
CO	28	3 RAR	59
2IC	29	9 RAR Enoggera	60
BC	30	D Inf AHQ Canberra	61
Ops Offr	31 - 32		
Adjt	33		
IO	34		
RSO	35		


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
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OPERATION IRON FOX  
PHASE 1

Ref Maps: A. L7014 sheet 6430-I Ed 2TPC 150,000  
B. L7014 " 6430-II " 3TPC "  
C. L7014 " 6430-III " 3TPC "  
D. L7014 " 6430-IV " 2TPC "

A  
ANNEX TO  
4RAR/NZ (ANZAC)  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OP IRON FOX  
DATE 29 SEP 71



PHASE 2



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ANNEX B TO  
4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION IRON FOX  
DATED 29 SEP 71

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

- References:
- A. 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn Weekly Intelligence Review 718/34 dated 4 AUG 71.
  - B. 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn Weekly Intelligence Review 718/35 dated 11 AUG 71.

General

- 1. Consistent reports indicated that elements of 1 Bn 274 VC Regt were located in the vicinity of the SUOI CA (YS 4091) during the month of Jul 71.
- 2. Elements of Sub Region 4 were also believed to operate along the line of the SUOI CA.

Base Areas

- 3. The SUOI CA provides good water throughout the year, the canopy and undergrowth thick, and provides excellent cover from aerial observation.

The Threat

- 4. The estimated strength of 1 Bn 274 Regt was approx 115, however it was not known exactly how many NORTH VIETNAMESE reinforcements had joined 1 Bn prior to the commencement of the operation.

Enemy Losses

- 5. A list of enemy casualties and captured weapons is attached as Appendix 1.

Installations and Caches

- 6. Installations and caches located by the unit are summarised as Annex E.

Captured Equipment

- 7. A summary of equipment including munitions, is attached as Appendix 2.

Enemy Activities

- 8. During a series of contacts, and attacks on occupied bunker positions at YS 395914 and YS 393911, along the line of the SUOI CA; a number of VC/NVA identified from captured documents as being from 1 Bn 274 Regt, were killed.

/9.



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9. Documents specifically identified C1 Coy of 1 Bn which had an approx strength of 29 prior to 29 Jul 71. The Signal Pl of HQ 1 Bn was also identified. Some old caches were located.
10. A marked map of an unidentified village was found and a document listing a number of senior cadre including the former Comd 1 Bn as having been killed on 19 Apr 71. RTAVF advised that on 19 Apr 71 at YS 288997 13 VC were KIA and documents CIA identified elements of HQ, 1 and 3 Bns 274 Regt.
11. In both cases the defenders of the occupied bunkers fought aggressively and employed RPG and automatic SA fire to cover withdrawal to the WEST under cover of darkness.
12. Although the VC fire control was well co-ordinated, the majority of their fire being directed at movement and commanders passing orders, the fire in most cases was from bunkers and was high 18 inches-2 foot above ground level. RPG fire was also high; directed towards the canopy of the trees and turrets of the tanks - probably to cause shrapnel to splash on the troops below. This is similar to the tactics employed by C2 Coy whilst defending a bunker system on 25 Jun.
13. Further to the West, a contact by a 1 ATF patrol, and resultant search of the area vic YS 352905 by 3 RAR, on 2 Aug, located a bunker hospital system, recently evacuated by C24 Conv Coy 274 Regt.
14. There were no contacts with identified elements from Sub Region 4.

Assessment

15. As a direct result of Op IRON FOX the HQ and some coy elements of 1 Bn 274 Regt were forced to withdraw from their base area on the SUOI CA to an area WEST of the BRIMSTONE Trail.
16. With the 1 Bn sanctuary area destroyed, the VC will have to secure and re-construct further systems, probably in the tri-border area of BIEN HOA, LONG KHANH and PHUOC TUY PROVINCE.
17. Basic training scheduled for recent reinforcements to the unit would have been disrupted.
18. Any planned offensive action for the unit, or its coys is certain to have been adversely affected by Op IRON FOX.

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APPENDIX 1 TO  
ANNEX B TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION IRON FOX  
DATED 29 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF ENEMY CASUALTIES  
AND WEAPONS CAPTURED

Enemy Casualties

1.	NVA/VC KIA (BC)	12
2.	NVA/VC KIA (Poss)	3

Captured Weapons

1.	GPMG M60	1
2.	B40	2
3.	AK47	4

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APPENDIX 2 TO  
ANNEX B TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION IRON FOX  
DATED 29 SEP 71

SUMMARY CAPTURED WEAPONS, MUNITIONS, EQUIPMENT AND FOODSTUFFS  
OPERATION IRON FOX

Captured Weapons

a.	AK47	4
b.	M60	1
c.	B40 (RPG2)	2

Captured Foodstuffs

a.	Salt	7 lbs
b.	Rice	145 lbs
c.	Chili	Qty

Captured Munitions

a.	7.62 MM SA (rds)	562
b.	RPG rounds	11
c.	Chicom grenade	1
d.	7.62 MM Link (approx)	460

Misc Captured

Small quantity med supplies

Captured Equipment

a.	Entrenching tools	6
b.	Shovels GS (Aust)	1
c.	Shovels misc	1
d.	Shovels, head, misc	1
e.	Machetes (Aust)	1
f.	Band Saw	1
g.	Plastic Poncho	10
h.	Hootchies	3
i.	Magazines AK47	8
j.	Magazine carrier AK47	1
k.	Water bottle carrier	1
l.	NVA water bottles	9
m.	Water bottles misc	4
n.	NVA pack	1
o.	Packs misc	3
p.	Web belts (US)	2
q.	Chicom belt	1
r.	Gas mask	1
s.	Torches	2
t.	Fountain pens	2
u.	Mouth organ	1
v.	NVA pith helmet	1
w.	Transistor radio	1
x.	Eating bowls and utensils	6
y.	Copper wire (yards)	120
z.	Claymore wire	Qty
aa.	Cooking utensils	Qty
ab.	Canteen cup	1
ac.	Nuts and bolts	Qty

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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS  
OPERATION IRON FOX

<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Activity</u>	<u>Serial of event</u> <u>in Annex D/Annex E</u>
(a)	(b)	(c)
<u>28 Jul 71</u>	<u>Day 1</u>	
0001	<u>Locstats</u> V Coy NUI DAT B Coy Centre of mass YS412942 C Coy Centre of mass YS420942 D Coy Centre of mass YS408934 Sp Coy VUNG TAU Bn HQ <del>COURENAY HILL</del> C Sqn(-) 1 Armd Regt Centre of mass YS405901	N/A
0001	1 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt changed from under operational command 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn. to under command A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.	N/A
0730	B Coy commenced moving South East from night position.	Timings staggered to prevent a friendly clash while companies moved to Line of Departure <b>vic 413 East</b> ing either side of SUOI CA.
0831	C Coy commenced moving South from night position.	N/A
0930	D Coy commenced moving South from night position.	N/A
0930	6Pl B Coy located at YS417928, an old track on a bearing of 400 mils.	N/A
1035	C Coy located at YS412927 a track running North East/South West. Had been heavily used in past but no recent sign.	N/A
1125	7Pl C Coy at YS412920 located four partially completed bunkers used about six months previously.	E/1
1203	D Coy medevac by 1 Tp 3 Cav Regt completed at YS409933.	N/A
1231	D Coy at YS408927 located an East/West track used by 15-20 persons three weeks previously.	N/A



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(a)	(b)	(c)
1355	B Coy at YS413937 located a number of tunnels three foot high made in long grass. System ran South-West/North- East.	N/A
1400	B and C Coys crossed Line of Departure (approximately 413 Easting - parallel with creek).	N/A
1435	D Coy at YS 410928 located a North-East/South West track used by 20 persons.	N/A
1450	7Pl C Coy at YS412918 located a number of L shaped weapon pits approximately 12 months old. Condition poor.	N/A
1615	5Pl B Coy at YS411918 located tree stumps camouflaged with mud.	N/A
<u>29 Jul 71</u>	<u>Day 2</u>	
0740	C Coy at YS 404920 located a 155mm shell which had been fired with a shipping plug and had been removed from it's impact hole. Buried.	N/A
0855	7Pl C Coy at YS 409919 located five bunkers which had been occupied about five weeks previously.	E/2
1010	5Pl B Coy completed a search of the camouflaged tree stump area without locating bunkers.	N/A
1105	9Pl C Coy at YS 401917 found cut logs ranging in diameter from three inches to ten inches.	N/A
1126	9Pl C Coy at YS 401917 located 13 bunkers and 403 X 7.62mm rounds.	E/3
1130	Sp Coy (-) to NUI DAT by TCVs for R and I.	N/A
1345	C Coy completed search of bunker system.	N/A
1440	7Pl C Coy at YS 398913 contacted an unknown size enemy force in a bunker system. 3 VC/NVA KIA (Poss) 3 Aust WIA.	D/1
1443	C Sqn (-) ordered to join D Coy at YS 399925 and then to move with D Coy and to be prepared to attack the bunker system if required.	N/A
1550	Contact broken between C Coy and VC/NVA.	N/A
1615	D Coy/C Sqn (-) moving to contact area.	N/A
1705	D Coy/C Coy commenced marrying up procedure.	N/A

/1715

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(a)	(b)	(c)
1715	C Sqn (-) too far West - moving North to cross a re-entrant, then South-East to rejoin D Coy. Airborne Tank LO experienced problems navigating C Sqn (-).	N/A
1800	B Coy located a bunker system at YS 403911 after following a track.	E/4
1810	D Coy/C Sqn (-) 200 metres North from contact area. <u>Attack Formation:</u> 10Pl left flank, 11Pl right flank, C Sqn (-) in centre; with 12Pl and CHQ in rear.	N/A
1840	D Coy/C Sqn (-) moving into attack now.	
1907	4Pl B Coy at YS 399911 located a North-East track used recently by 6-8 people. Sandal marks and evidence of people sitting in the grass.	N/A
1930	D Coy/C Sqn (-) halted short of bunker system because of fading light. D Coy YS 394916, C Sqn (-) YS 397916.	N/A
2140	D Coy gave 0700 hrs as H hour for attack on 30 Jul 71.	N/A
2345	D Coy reported movement on perimeter from South to North. Nil results.	D/2
<u>30 Jul 71</u>	<u>Day 3</u>	
0001	5 Tp C Sqn (-) reported movement sounds on perimeter engaged. Nil result.	D/3
0710	D Coy/C Sqn (-) moved to bunker area.	N/A
0820	10, 11Pls D Coy at YS 395914 located three bunkers. C Sqn (-) remained at edge of system on call. System unoccupied.	E/5
0830	Tanks destroyed four bunkers.	N/A
0910	8Pl C Coy located three bunkers at YS 401914 unoccupied.	E/6
1330	5Pl B Coy contacted 2 VC dressed in greens and carrying weapons at YS 403909. Nil results.	D/4
1345	D Coy completed demolition of bunker system.	N/A
1400	C Sqn (-) departed bunker system for T/A location YS 401938 to refuel and reposition as Reserve.	N/A

/1422

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(a)	(b)	(c)
1422	B and D Coys ordered to continue search with C Coy reserve Coy.	N/A
1423	10Pl D Coy sighted possible movement of VC.	N/A
1442	10Pl D Coy at YS 394911 contacted a large enemy element in a bunker system armed with M60s, AK 47s and RPGs.	D/5 E/7
1445	C Sqn (-) ordered to rejoin D Coy.	D/5
1510	Bushrangers 71/72 on station.	
1515	C Sqn (-) joined D Coy.	
1525	D Coy reported taking casualties.	
1540	C Sqn (-) receiving RPG fire.	
1547	C Sqn (-) reported 3 VC KIA in bunker.	
1550	C Coy moved 300 metres West into a position to assist D Coy from right flank if required.	
1610	D Coy again receiving RPG fire.	
1624	10Pl D Coy extracted one WIA from bunker area; one WIA still in contact area.	
1627	Bushranger 73 on station.	
1634	1 Tp 3 Cav Regt provided ammunition resupply to 10Pl.	
1643	C Coy in position to North of contact area and redeploying to assault if required.	
1648	D Coy had one occupied bunker preventing the extraction of WIA, tanks moving to engage.	
1655	C Coy moving South through very thick undergrowth.	
1656	12Pl engaged in heavy fire fight.	
1716	C Coy sighted 12Pl D Coy.	
1725	1 Tp 3 Cav Regt collected D Coy casualties. 1 KIA, 4 WIA.	
1730	Dustoff request: 1 Tp 3 Cav Regt to control extraction.	D/5

/1740

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(a)	(b)	(c)
1740	C Coy to move 150 metres West covered by D Coy; D Coy to search West 100 metres through bunker system covered by C Coy; D Coy then cover C Coy as C Coy make search of Western extremity of the system.	D/5
1755	Dustoff complete.	D/5
1840	D Coy moving West to support C Coy.	D/5
1930	Ground movement ceased with C Coy on Western end of the bunker system, D Coy in centre and South of system with C Sqn (-) elements in locations co-ordinated with C and D Coy	D/5
2030	<u>D Coy/C Sqn (-)</u> ordered to refuel tanks; destroy system using tanks; D Coy to re-water; construct a LZ using tanks. <u>B Coy</u> to continue present task searching to West on South bank of SUOI CA.  <u>C Coy</u> to lead search to West on North bank of SUOI CA.  <u>Sp Coy (-)</u> one platoon at 15 minutes notice to move, the other at one hour.	N/A

31 Jul 71

Day 4

0145	<del>TOP</del> (C Sqn (-)) reported one VC moving 300 metres to the East. Sentry cocked 30 cal MG when the VC changed direction from moving North East to North. VC withdrew South East into rubber line Nil results.	N/A
0720	11Pl D Coy located 3 VC KIA in bunker system.	D/5
0821	11Pl D Coy located 1 VC KIA.	D/5
1204	4Pl B Coy at YS 395909, following a light blood trail, located four new AK47 rounds.	N/A
1400	C Sqn (-) completed resupply, 1 Tp ordered to follow C Coy to the West breaking new trail, Tank IO airborne.	N/A
1730	1 Tp C Sqn (-) ordered to rejoin C Sqn (-) before last light.	N/A
1930	<u>Tasks for 1 Aug.</u>  <u>B Coy:</u> Move to LZ in YS 4189 and receive orders. Rations to last four more meals.	

/C Coy

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(a)	(b)	(c)
	<u>C Coy</u> ; Move to D Coy location and receive maintenance and orders. Air lift to YS 4187 later 1 Aug 71.	
	<u>D Coy/C Sqn (-)</u> : Complete present task, verbal orders 1 Aug 71.	N/A
1955	C Coy to take maintenance at YS 4187.	N/A
2008	A Sqn 3 Cav Regt ordered to secure LZ at YS 422893 for transland B and C Coy. 1 Tp to carry out task.	N/A
2252	Sqn HQ C Sqn (-) fired claymores at suspected enemy movement, nil results. YS 395911.	D/6
<u>1 Aug 71</u>	<u>Day 5</u>	
0855	D Coy reported a total of 19 bunkers in system.	D/5
0900	B Coy reported PZ secure for transland to YS 422893. PZ time 0910 hrs, LZ secured by 1 Tp A Sqn. Transland by No 9 Sqn RAAF. Task to search to West of South bank of SUOI SOC. To be prepared for extraction by air on 2 Aug 71 for R and I.	N/A
0915	1 Tp A Sqn destroyed 500lb UXB at YS 400918.	N/A
0936	B Coy transland complete.	N/A
0941	D Coy search of bunker system complete - 23 bunkers in system. 12 VC KIA (BC).	D/5
0946	C Coy transland by No 9 Sqn RAAF to YS 422893 commenced. Tasks: to receive maintenance and then move West to take over search along SUOI SOC from B Coy. No movement West of 37 Easting until cleared by 3 RAR.	N/A
1016	C Coy transland complete.	N/A
1040	D Coy demolition of 23 bunker system completed.	E/7
1040	HQ 1 ATF advised L hour for search along SUOI SOC to be 011200 hrs.	N/A
1430	B Coy commenced search South of SUOI SOC, movement co-ordinated with 3 RAR.	N/A
1444	D Coy under operational control A Sqn 3 Cav Regt to assist with block positions along BRIMSTONE TRAIL YS 3691 - YS 3586.	N/A
1730	C Coy maintenance/back load complete. Remain at LZ overnight.	N/A

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/2 Aug 71



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(a)	(b)	(c)
<u>2 Aug 71</u>	<u>Day 6</u>	
0900	B Coy at YS 3986 for extraction by No 9 Sqn RAAF for return to NUI DAT for R and I.	N/A
1020	B Coy transland complete.	N/A
1130	D Coy located eight bunkers at YS 395886 last used two/three days ago.	E/8
1450	8Pl C Coy at YS 387877 located heavily used North to South track with no recent use.	N/A
N/A	D Coy adjusted APC/infantry ambush positions during the day. CHQ YS 361902; 10Pl YS 351887; 11Pl YS 354870; 12Pl YS 356894.	N/A
<u>3 Aug 71</u>	<u>Day 7</u>	
0845	7Pl C Coy at YS 383873 located a South to North track used by 1 to 2 persons. Saw movement to the left flank of the platoon. Nil result of search.	N/A
0938	CHQ C Coy at YS 384873 located two UXB CBU. Disarmed by Engineer Splinter Team.	N/A
1120	8Pl C Coy at YS372879 located well used South-East track. No sign recent used except for VN cigarette packet. Track had been previously reported by 3 RAR.	N/A
1210	A26 completed Dustoff of two NBC for C Coy at YS 376875	N/A
1537	C Coy halted at YS 371872, the Western limit of search permitted by 3 RAR.	N/A
1750	C Coy to search GS 3687 on 4 Aug 71 and then to move to NDP YS 3686 to receive maintenance by APC.	N/A
	D Coy to search from East to West GS 3587 and to be aware of 3 RAR sub-units.	N/A
<u>4 Aug 71</u>	<u>Day 8</u>	
0716	3 RAR advised that C and D Coys were clear to commence search tasks.	N/A
0937	Mine incident at YS 458898 destroyed a vehicle in a US Army convoy. Nil casualties. Tracker Pl and Mini Team to search YS 4589. Pie Cart to be by No 9 Sqn RAAF and not by road.	D/7

/1040/1200

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(a)	(b)	(c)
1040/1200	Tracker Pl reported mine was prepared East of Route 2 and they had followed up a small track to the West. The mine was a pressure switch type of approximately 20 lb explosives. Had been placed 6 to 10 feet from the Eastern edge of the road before the last heavy rain.	N/A
1805	C Coy ordered to RV with 1 Tp A Sqn at 050800 hrs and move to YS 435860 in preparation for Operation NORTH WARD.	N/A
	D Coy ordered to move by APC from A Sqn to YS 407868 not later than 060930 hrs for Operation NORTH WARD. Resupply at new location on 6 Aug 71.	N/A
<u>5 Aug 71</u>	<u>Day 9</u>	
0716	1 Tp A Sqn at RV with C Coy for move to YS 435860.	N/A
0847	Tracker Pl moving out for tracker dog training.	N/A
0946	Aslt Pnr Pl returned to COURTENAY HILL.	N/A
0950	1 Tp A Sqn completed task and positioned C Coy to YS 435860.	N/A
1110	C Coy maintden complete.	N/A
1400	Section Tracker Pl returned to COURTENAY HILL.	N/A
1430	Tank from 1 Tp C Sqn (-) hit mine at YS 358904 Nil casualties, mine approx 50 lb - limited damage to vehicle.	N/A
1600	D Coy ordered to ambush YS358904 with one platoon and section 1 Tp A Sqn for night 5/6 Aug 71. Remainder move as planned.	N/A
1608	Tracker Pl complete at COURTENAY HILL.	N/A
1724	HQ C Coy located a grave at YS 434852 approx six weeks old.	D/8
1930	OC V Coy briefed at COURTENAY HILL for Operation NORTH WARD. To search and ambush East of Route 2 and West of 50 Easting. Insertion by APC.	N/A
2400	Operation IRON FOX concluded.	N/A

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ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION IRON FOX  
DATED 29 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACTS/INCIDENTS  
OPERATION IRON FOX

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Unit</u> <u>Sub unit</u>	<u>Activity</u>	<u>Reference</u>
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1.	291440 Jul	YS398913	7Pl C Coy	Platoon was following a track through an occupied bunker system when movement was seen by forward section. Across a re-entrant another system was sighted as the platoon moved forward. One VC came out of a bunker and was shot. Two more VC came from the same bunker and were also shot. The VC fired RPGs, MGs and also claymores which were located in the trees. Contact was maintained for one hour before the platoon could be extracted from the contact area. D Coy/C Sqn (-) could not join C Coy in time to assist. The VC appeared not to be commanded for the first 15 minutes of the contact. Result: 3 VC/NVC KIA (Poss); 3 Aust WIA.	Appendix 1
2.	292345 Jul	YS394916	D Coy	Sounds of movement on West of company perimeter moving from South to North were engaged. Nil result from a search conducted the following morning.	N/A
3.	300001 Jul	YS397916	5 Tp C Sqn(-)	Canister was fired at sounds of movement on the troop perimeter. White light was used without result.	N/A
4.	301330 Jul	YS403909	5 Pl B Coy	2 VC were noticed moving on a track parallel to the path of the platoon. VC were engaged by one man using single shots. Nil result.	Appendix 2

/5.

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
5.	301442 Jul	YS394911	10 Pl D Coy	The company was moving West in a two up formation through an unoccupied bunker system when RPG fire was received from an other bunker system to their front. C Sqn(-) was ordered to rejoin D Coy and after a heavy firefight assisted D Coy to extract D Coy casualties. C Coy were moved to the West and to the North of the contact area and then South to join D Coy. A combined fire and movement operation by C, D Coys and C Sqn(-) overran the system by last light. 1 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt who joined C Sqn conducted the Dustoff of D Coy casualties. Results; 12 VC KIA (BC) ; 1 Aust KIA, 3 Aust WIA.	Appendix 3
6.	312252 Jul	YS395911	Sqn HQ C Sqn(-)	Sounds of movement were heard and claymores were fired. Nil results from search.	N/A
7.	040919 Aug	YS438899	US Army	Third last truck in convoy ran over a 20 lb locally manufactured mine which was suspected as having been detonated by a pressure electric device. The mine had been dug into the gravel surface, 3 metres from the Eastern side of the road at a turn off to a track to the West. Evidence of a possible preparation area on East side of road was made by possible four persons. There were numerous tracks in the area, all used prior to rain on 3 Aug 71. Nil casualties; truck extensively damaged.	N/A
8.	051724 Aug	YS434852	HQ C Coy	Located a grave approximately six weeks old containing body with small arms wounds credited to contact on 25 Jun 71 of 2Pl V Coy. Also buried were documents and ammunition.	N/A

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APPENDIX 1 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION IRON FOX  
DATED 29 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 29 Jul 71	<u>Time</u> 1440	<u>Location</u> YS 398913	<u>P1</u> 7	<u>Coy</u> C
<u>Strength</u> 32	<u>Task</u> Search and destroy	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> Lt <u>Name</u> Andrews		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> Lt <u>Name</u> Andrews
<u>Initiated By</u> 7 P1	<u>Wpns</u> M60, M16, SLR, M79	<u>En Strength</u> 20 plus	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Dressed in black. Wpns: Claymores, RPGs, AK47s.	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 5 - 10 metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> 10 <u>Max</u> 50	<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> 1 <u>Mins</u> 30		<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Seen


Terrain Description

Thick jungle with good overhead canopy. Re-entrants in the area were steep banked.

Narrative

The platoon was following a track which led from an unoccupied bunker system found by C/S 33. The track crossed a steep re-entrant - the forward section crossed the re-entrant and a bunker was seen. As the section commander went to investigate, an enemy came out of the bunker and contact was initiated. Small arms fire was received from within the bunker system and claymores in trees were fired. RPGs were used by the enemy after about 15 mins from the start of the contact. After about 1 hr the platoon withdrew by fire and movement. During the contact at least 3 en were heard to cry from wounds and a commander was heard to take charge early in the contact from within the system.

Sketch



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
<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> M60, M16, SLR, M79	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> M60: 1300; SLR: 300; M16: 500; M79: 40
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Artillery	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 417
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 3 KIA (Probable) (Engaged at 5 - 15 metres range)	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> 3 WIA
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u> Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> During the contact approx half the M79 rounds failed to detonate. 2 x M60s had mechanical failures - including a broken extractor of the gun of the fwd section. Spare parts for the M60 are essential and proved their worth. M72s were not available and would have been ideal in this situation. Maximum use was made of WP and HE grenades fired from the SLR - they proved reasonably effective but do not destroy bunkers.	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> A well conducted extraction of the platoon's fwd element in fire and movement in the face of heavy en fire. The HE and WP grenades fired from the SLR were invaluable and far more effective than M79.	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> Many rounds of artillery failed to detonate because the fuze was delay and the ground too soft. The quick fuze was eventually used and proved satisfactory to enable the platoon to withdraw using artillery as cover and fire and movement by sections. Artillery fire was found to have effectively covered the entire bunker system and during the time the fire was placed on the system, VC movement would have resulted in injury.	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u> Nil	



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APPENDIX 2 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION IRON FOX  
DATED 29 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 30 Jul 71	<u>Time</u> 1330	<u>Location</u> YS 403909	<u>P1</u> 5	<u>Coy</u> B
<u>Strength</u> 31	<u>Task</u> Search and destroy	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> Cpl <u>Name</u> C.J. Harrington		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> Lt <u>Name</u> S.V.L. Willis
<u>Initiated By</u> 5 P1	<u>Wpns</u> SLR	<u>En Strength</u> 2	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> Dressed in greens, wearing packs	
<u>Distance En Sighted</u> 25 metres	<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> 25 <u>Max</u> 25		<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> - <u>Mins</u> 15 seconds	<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Rifleman noticed their movt to his flank
<u>Terrain Description</u> Thick bamboo and sparse primary jungle				
<u>Narrative</u> Enemy engaged with single shots abreast of 5 P1 after a fleeting glimpse.				
<u>Sketch</u> 				

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<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> SLR	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> 3
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> Nil	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u> Nil
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> Nil	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> Nil
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u>	
a. <u>Local Commander.</u> Nil	
b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> The pl was in single file and was moving around a thick clump of bamboo. A rifleman in the lead section noticed the movt and engaged the en. The en withdrew North East.	
c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> Nil	
d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> The initiating soldier did not alert the section or platoon of his reasons for firing until far too late thus making follow up and effective fire impossible in the situation.	
e. <u>Lessons Learned.</u> Nil	



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APPENDIX 3 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
DATED 29 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF CONTACT

<u>Date</u> 30 Jul 71	<u>Time</u> 1442	<u>Location</u> YS 394911	<u>Pl</u>	<u>Coy</u> D Coy, C Sqn (-) 1 Armd Regt	
<u>Strength</u>	<u>Task</u> Search and destroy elms 1 Bn 274 Regt	<u>Commander of Troops in Contact</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u> Maj          J.H. Taylor		<u>Platoon Commander</u> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u>	
<u>Initiated By</u> Enemy	<u>Wpns</u> RPG	<u>En Strength</u>	<u>En Identification and Weapons</u> 1 Bn 274 Regt. RPG, M60, AK47		
<u>Distance En Sighted</u>	<u>Range of Engagement</u> <u>Min</u> <u>Max</u>		<u>Length of Engagement</u> <u>Hrs</u> <u>Mins</u>		<u>How Was En Noticed</u> Fired RPG from bunker
<u>Terrain Description</u>					
<u>Narrative</u> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. At approx 301340 hrs C/S 4 moved from a small bunker system at Grid 397914 in a SW direction.</li><li>2. C/S 41 was moving parallel to the river and about 200 metres N of it, whilst C/S 43 paralleled C/S 41's movement on the right flank; the Tank element had departed in a northerly direction at about 1330 hrs.</li><li>3. At approx 301400 the leading section of C/S 41 came under RPG fire from a bunker in the area of Grid 394911. The section went to ground and returned fire, whilst OC C/S 41 went forward to make an assessment of the situation.</li><li>4. C/S 43 with C/S 40 to their left and C/S 42 in rear moved toward the contact area and were joined by a troop of tanks.</li><li>5. By the time that C/S 40, 43 and the tanks had closed up parallel to rear C/S 41, the fire from the bunker system was becoming intense, and consisted of RPG, M60 and AK47 ordnance. Casualties were taken by C/S 41, who reported that they were now pinned by <del>accurate fire from their</del> LEFT, CENTRE and RIGHT, and were totally unable to move either forward or back. Artillery was fired to the W + 400 of the contact.</li><li>6. At about this time C/S 43 reported that they too were taking automatic fire from a bunker to their immediate front. A section of C/S 43 moved forward and engaged this bunker, which was seen to contain 3 enemy.</li><li>7. The disposition of the company was now C/S 41 pinned and in heavy contact, C/S 40 parallel to C/S 41 with the leading section of C/S 43 level with C/S 40. The leading tanks were 5 - 10 yards in front of C/S 40. C/S 42 was immediately behind C/S 40 and 75 metres in rear.</li><li>8. At this stage intense fire from RPGs and automatic weapons was received by C/S 41 and C/S 40.</li><li>9. The tanks moved forward to try to locate the bunkers from which this fire was coming. Their progress was necessarily slow, because of the thickness of the vegetation, the size of the trees and the difficulty in identifying own troops.</li><li>10. Smoke was thrown by the inside flanks of C/S 41 and C/S 43 and the outside (left) flank of C/S 41. The tanks moved forward again, still receiving RPG fire, though only one tank was hit (on the LR basket).</li></ol>					


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Narrative (cont)

11. The tanks were now 40 metres forward of C/S 40, but still some 10 metres behind the leading section of C/S 41. For this reason they had limited use of their main armament, and relied mainly on 30 and 50 cal weapons.
12. Eventually the tanks were able to draw level with C/S 41's leading section, though 1 soldier was killed by M60 from the centre bunker.
13. Once level with C/S 41 leading section the tanks made good practice with their main armament, and used canister with excellent effect. Their movement forward became quicker, and they exploited forward some 100 metres.
14. C/S 41 casualties were evacuated, and C/S 41 replaced by C/S 42. C/S 43 fired on the 3 enemy in the bunker to their front as they attempted to escape. They were seen to fall.
15. As soon as the casualties were evacuated and the coy reformed, C/S 42, 40, 43 moved forward to join the tanks.
16. The bunker system was occupied and cleared. It was secured at 301830 hrs.

Sketch





<u>Own Type of Weapons Used</u> SLR, M60, .30 cal, .50 cal, M16, M79, Grenades	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
<u>Supporting Fire Employed</u> 105 MM How, 20 pdr HE, APDS, Canister	<u>No of Rounds Fired (Approx)</u>
<u>Enemy Casualties</u> 12 VC/NVA KIA	<u>Friendly Casualties</u> 1 Aust KIA, 5 Aust WIA
<u>Comments and Lessons Learned</u> a. <u>Local Commander.</u> Nil b. <u>Platoon Comments.</u> Nil c. <u>Coy Comments.</u> Nil d. <u>Unit Comments.</u> Nil e. <u>Unit Comments.</u> Nil	



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ANNEX E TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION IRON FOX  
DATED 29 SEP 71

SUMMARY OF INSTALLATIONS AND CACHES  
OPERATION IRON FOX

<u>Serial</u> (a)	<u>Date/Time</u> (b)	<u>Location</u> (c)	<u>Unit/Sub Unit</u> (d)	<u>Activity</u> (e)
1	281125 Jul	YS 412920	7/C Coy	Found 4 "Y" shaped bunkers in a "Y" shaped system and one sentry pit which had been completed. Entry/Exit tracks ran East and West. Further "T" shaped system facing West with fighting and sleeping bays estimated to be 6 months old and badly weathered.
2	290855 Jul	YS 409919	7/C Coy	Located diamond shaped bunker system (75 M x 75 M) with five bunkers and one command bunker. Each had 2 feet OHP and were in good condition. Last used 3 weeks ago. North West track from the system.
3	291123 Jul	YS 401917	9/C Coy	Found 13 bunkers on a ridge line, which had been struck by napalm. Bunkers were "H" shaped and each had two firing bays and two entrances with 3 ft OHP. The system is estimated to be six months old and last used one month ago. System could be easily renovated. Entrance/exit tracks ran to the North, South and West. Located in the system were 403 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition.
4	291800 Jul	YS 403911	B Coy	Found 2 partially completed bunkers with approach from the NW. Last used in previous 24 hrs.
5	300820 Jul	YS 395914	10, 11/D Coy	Found 3 bunkers 6' x 4½' x 5½' with 1½' OHP. The system was estimated to be 12 months old and last used in the preceding 24 hrs. Recovered were one damaged RPG round, one NVA pack, qty cooking utensils, one NVA water bottle, one canteen cup and qty of nuts and bolts. Destroyed.
6	300910 Jul	YS 401914	8/C Coy	Found 3 triangular bunkers 10' x 10' x 6' with 3' OHP. The complex was 50 metres square, approx 6 months old and last used in the preceding 12 - 24 hrs. Destroyed.

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
7	301442 Jul	YS 394911	D Coy	Found 23 bunkers 6' x 7' and 4½' x 6' x 5' with 1½' to 2½' OHP. The bunkers varied in age from 1 - 3 months and had been occupied at the time of contact. Tanks from C Sqn 1 Armd Regt destroyed the bunkers by flattening them. Further docus found in the system confirm the ident of 1/274 Regt.
8	021130 Aug	YS 395886	D Coy	Found 8 bunkers that had been used in the past 2 - 3 days. Destroyed.

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ANNEX F TO  
4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION IRON FOX  
DATED 29 SEP 71

ARTILLERY ROUNDS FIRED BY 104 FD BTY RAA  
IN SUPPORT OF 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) BN  
PERIOD 28 JUL - 5 AUG 71

Contact Missions	518	HE
Fire Plans	569	HE
AI Missions	258	HE
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Total	1345	HE
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