

Series: AWM95
Australian Army commanders' diaries
[Vietnam]

Infantry units

Item number: 7/1/29

**Item: 1 Battalion Royal Australian
Regiment**

Additional Annex material

[1-31 Jul 1965]

PRIORITY Action

JUL 65
DATE TIME GROUP

04 1705 H

SECRET

FROM :- IRAR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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TO :- A Coy, B Coy, C Coy, D Coy
Adm Bay, OC Mor Pl,
ASST Pmr Pl, A/Tk Pl,
SIGS Pl.

ORIGINATORS NUMBER

OPS 2.

NFO: PWHH, CP, INT, ZIC, FAC
FCC, RSM

WARNING ORDER @ Bde of 17/65 @ Bn will
participate in a hde search and destroy @
Bn is at 2 hrs notice to move as at 060800 @
Recce for coy comes at Bn tel had 050900 @
Orders GP at CP at 051100H @ Bn expected to
be out 72 hrs @ Further details plus traces will
fol @ ACK //

 CAPT

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WARNING ORDER

WARNING ORDER (.) OP 2/65 (.) Search and destroy op (.)
'O' Group timings to follow (.) A Coy on one hour ~~XXXXXX~~ NOTICE
to ^{move} from 280730 hrs (.) Coys in order, B, BnHQ, C,D. on one
hrs notice to move from departure time from this location of the
preceding Coy (.) Cbt rats res to be replenished by 1700hrs today
Jun 26 (.)

Distribution A Coy
B Coy
C Coy
D Coy
Adm Coy
OC Mor pl
Aslt pnr
A/tank
Sigs
Sp 2I/C
BWLH
CF
INT
RSM
FAC
FCC.

SECRET

Copy No. 14

1RAR

BIEN HOA

5 Jul 65.

OpO 2/65

Map: TAN UYEN 1:50,000

Confirmatory Notes to Verbal Orders by CO 1RAR
at 1100 hrs 5 Jul 651. SITUATIONa. En Forces (~~Annex 'A' Intelligence~~ ^{not all})b. Friendly Forces

- (1) 1730 Abn Bde (Sep) is conducting a search and destroy op in TAOR as per ANNEX 'P'.
- (2) 48th ARVN Regt conducts search and destroy op on WEST flank of Bde TAOR from D Day to D+3 and outposts and fills SONG DONG NAI River from TAN-UYEN (9622) to XA THAI HUNG (1022) from D Day to 0800 hrs D+3
- (3) US AIR FORCE provides tactical air sh.
- (4) 3/319 provides direct fire sh.
- (5) Flank firms as per ANNEX 'P'.

c. Atts and Dets(1) Remaining Under Comd.

(a) FAC Team

(b) LO and FOS 3/319 Arty Bn

→

(2) Under Comd:

(a) RRU Team

(b) 2 VIETNAMESE POLICE

(c) 3 IPW

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0.2/ (3) dmv sh

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(3) Am Sp. TF 3/319

(4) Det to TF 3/319 from 0530 hrs D Day until completion of op - Tp PWLT.

2 Mission. 1 RAR is to execute a search and destroy op, within bn belogs, to find, fire and destroy en forces, sups and eqpt.

3 Execution

a Gen Outline

(1) Op Overlay ANNEX 'P'

(2) Op will be conducted in five phases.

(a) Phase 1. Air mobile alt into Obj 16.

(b) Phase 2. The mov of coys into Northern Sectors of the TAOR from D Day to D+2.

(c) Phase 3. The mov of Coys into Southern Sectors of TAOR on D+3.

(d) Phase 4. Link up with TF 1/503 in obj 3.

(e) Phase 5. Extraction of bn by hel from obj 3 with TF 1/503 providing security of the LZ.

(3) Arty sp is avail throughout the op from posn 33.

(4) Air Sp avail on call

... 3/ A Coy

SECRET

SECRETb A Coy

(1) Grouping ANNEX 'B'

(2) Tasks

(a) Third Coy to move.

(b) On arrival on obj 16 to move to sector 3 forthwith and commence patrolling.

(c) NOT before 0700 hrs D+3 and on receipt of Nickname HARD HOOF to move into sector 6 and continue patrolling.

(d) At 1200 hrs D+3 to estb ground contact with 1/503 and move into obj 3 for extraction. Second coy out on extraction.

c B Coy

(1) Grouping ANNEX 'B'

(2) Tasks

(a) Second Coy to move

(b) On arrival obj 16 to move into sector 1 forthwith and commence patrolling.

(c) NOT before 0700 hrs D+3 and on receipt of Nickname HARD HOOF move into sector 5 and continue patrolling.

(d) At 1230 hrs D+3 to estb ground contact with 1/503 and move into obj 3 for extraction. Last coy out on extraction.

d C Coy

(1) Grouping ANNEX 'B'

(2) Tasks

(a) Fourth Coy to move

(b) On arrival obj 16 to move into sector 4 forthwith and commence patrolling.

(c) NOT before 0700 hrs D+3 and on receipt of Nickname HARD HOOF move into sector 7 and continue patrolling.

(d) At 1100 hrs D+3 estb ground contact with 1/503 and move into obj 3 for extraction. First coy out on extraction.

4/ D Coy

SECRET

e D Coy

(1) Grouping ANNEX B

(2) Tasks

(a) First coy to move

(b) On arrival obj 16 to secure for the arrival of the bn and provide guides to assist coys moving through their loss.

(c) Ptl into sector 2 on receipt of Nickname STILL POT.

(d) Re-estb ground contact with Bn HQ on D+1/D+2 prior to mov to Southern Sector. Contact on Nickname NOISE BOX.

(e) Move with Bn HQ to Obj 3 NOT before 0700 hrs D+3 on receipt of Nickname HARD HOOE.

(f) Estb ground contact with 1/503 and move into obj 3 at 1130 hrs D+3.

(g) Third Coy out on extraction.

f Mors

(1) Grouping ANNEX 'B'

(2) Tasks

(a) To move with one sect of mors and 60 rds HE.

(b) To remain loc of Bn HQ for period of op.

g Anti Tk/Aslt Pwr To remain with and be responsible for the protection of the Bn HQ Cp.j Arty

(1) Five tasks ANNEX 'Q'

(2) LO to co-ord all arty.

k Air FAE Team to move with Bn HQ.l Co-ord Instrs

(1) Coy Strs

(a) A Coy - 110

(b) B Coy - 110

(c) C Coy - 110

(d) D Coy - 110

(e) Bn HQ Cp - 110

(1) Affkwhl - 25

(1) Aslt Pwr Pl. - 25

- (iii) Bn Tac HQ - 45
- (iv) Mor Pl - 26
- (v) ATts - 9

(f) Total

- (i) 570 pers
- (ii) 2x81 mm mors
- (iii) 60x81 mm mor rds,
to BIEN HOA and LZ

- (2) Order of mov, D Coy, B Coy, Bn HQ Gp, A Coy, C Coy.
- (3) Mov to BIEN HOA by MT.
 - (a) Embussing pt. On the lateral road opposite Sp Coy kitchen.
 - (b) Allotment of pers to TEV. TO to coord.
 - (c) TC to be org by TO.
 - (d) Debussing pt. BIEN HOA hel pad.
 - (e) Con at debussing pt by Bn 2IC.
- (4) Emplaning. Bn 2IC to co-ord with sub unit emplaning offs.
- (5) Guiding on LZ at obj 16 to be controlled by D Coy.
- (6) Smoke grenades and red panels to be carried to indicate LZ's. Colour of smoke to be announced only after the grenade has been activated.
- (7) Sp fire (DF) lift or shift on comd. Emergency sig for lifting fire is VIOLET smoke from UGA.
- (8) LZ's
 - (a) Landing - obj 16
 - (b) Extraction - obj 3
 - (c) Coy resup LZ's will be indicated by NICKNAMES from the Coy block list in comd and Sig. A Nickname followed by a Grid Reference will indicate an LZ.
- (9) Rules of Engagement. As normal.
- (10) Suppressive Fires Obj 16
 - (a) 1045 hrs - 1100 hrs - Arty
 - (b) 1100 hrs - 1120 hrs - USAF
 - (c) 1120 hrs - 1125 hrs - Armd helo.

- (11) Locstats will be submitted by Coys every 2 hrs, 15 mins before the even hrs, commencing 1145 hrs D Day.
- (12) Boundaries. ANNEX 'P'
- (13) Report Lines. ANNEX 'P'
- (14) Coys when reorg after arrival at obj 16 are to send Nickname 'POTENT JUICE'. On receipt of Nickname SILENT PACKET coys are to move into their assigned sectors.
- (15) Extraction order of mov. C Coy, A Coy Bn HQ Coy, D Coy, B Coy. Adjt to coord lift out.
- (16) Five Plan ANNEX 'Q'
- (17) D Day. 6 Jul 65 submitted by Coys
- (18) H Hr. 0850 hrs. before the even commencing 1145 hrs D Day
- (19) Timings.
- (a) Coys at embussing pt.
- (i) D Coy - 0930 hrs
- (ii) B Coy - 0930 hrs arrival at obj
- (iii) Mors and Bn HQ Resce Party - 0930 hrs
- (iv) A Coy - 1000 hrs SILENT PACKET
- (v) Bn HQ Main Body - 1000 hrs
- (vi) C Coy - 1015 hrs
- (b) First Slicks ready for emplaning BIEN HOA - 1050 hrs
- (c) First Slicks into obj 16 - 1125 hrs.
- (d) First Slicks lift off from obj 3 on extraction - 11430 hrs D+3

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7/ Admin and
log.

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4. ADMI and WOG

3. Resupp of water and rat

- (1) Water in afternoon of D Day
- (2) Water and rat at first light D+1.
- (3) Water on afternoon of D+1.
- (4) Water and rat at first light D+2
- (5) Water on afternoon of D+2
- (6) Water and rat at first light D+3.

(7) Coys are to request resupp to pts when they are stationary. If terrain or weather prevents heli landing, resupp will be carried out by air drop. Two marker balloons for coy will be carried for this purpose.

b. Rat: One 24 hr rat pack combat to be carried.

c. Water: Two full water bottles to be carried.

d. Extraction of Jerricans: Jerricans will be extracted by resupp hel. Every effort will be made to recover jerricans.

e. Resupp pt at Beke: A resupp pt will be estab at the Beke resupp hel pads by 060800 hrs and will remain until completion of op.

f. Med:-

(1) Casualty by DUST OFF hel as required.

(2) RAP remains this bc.


(3) Now purified water to be used only in an emergency and when sterilized by boiling

g. Ammo: Sealings as per amdt to SOPs. Mors to carry 30 rounds per barrel

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h. Desert and Egypt: PHL order less steel helmet;
replace by bush hat or beret.

i. PW: PW was ASD. Info Bw HQ immediately



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5. MD and SIG

- a. Bn HQ
- (1) Bn HQ moves after B Coy into Obj 16 and estab N of LZ.
 - (2) On D+2 / D+3 moves with D Coy on to report line NEW CAR.
 - (3) On D+3 moves with D Coy through sector # 7 to RV.

b. Sigs : Sig Instr issued separately.

c. NICKNAMES

(1) Phases of Op

Serial	Nickname	Meaning	Issued by
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	POTENT JUICE	Coys reorganized & ready to move	COYS
2.	SILENT PACKET	Order for Coys to move	Bn HQ
3.	HARD HOOF	Coys to move into SOUTHERN sector across RL NEW CAR	Bn HQ
4.	STILL POT	D Coy released to PH into sector 2	Bn HQ
5.	NOISE BOX	D Coy to re-estab ground contact with Bn HQ	Bn HQ
6.	DIRTY DOME	RL - S bdy sector 1 & 2	COYS
7.	NEW CAR	RL - S bdy sector 3 & 4	COYS
8.	HOME RUN	RL - N and W of RV (See Annex 'P')	COYS
9.	BLIND DATE	RV at 017 225	COYS

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... (2) BLOCK

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(2) Block Nicknames

<u>A Coy</u>	<u>B Coy</u>	<u>C Coy</u>	<u>D Coy</u>
FAST HORSE	INDIAN INK	GOLF BALL	SILVER BULLET
AUSTIN LAMCKE	LEAVE PASS	CAPE DENT	PAINT BRUSH
TRUE FORM	ECHO POINT	BUCK JUMP	KING SIZE
SOFT PATCH	SWIMMING POOL	WOODEN BOAT	FILTER TIP
SMALL BOOK	CLOUDY SKY	WALK TALL	RAZOR BLADE
SOUR MUSIC	GHOST RIDER	MOTOR LORRY	CRYSTAL BALL
PLOUGHED FIELD	DUDE RANCH	BULL RUSH	GLEN MIST
QUICK TEMPER	CUP CRUISE	SUMMER STORM	HALF BACK
BUSH WALK	YOUNG MAN	TIN TRUNK	RING LOST
BATH ROOM	FOAM RUBBER	LEAD PENCIL	CHINA WALL

Bw HQ

DUST CAP	TOBY JUG
SEA GULL	ABSENT FATHER
BRANDY BOY BOY	ROUGH TIRE
SNOW DROP	MILKY WAY
CHARLIE BOY	PAPER BACK
ROWING BOAT	NOTE BOOK
GOLF COURSE	CARD GAME
TENNIS COURT	HOT TEA
LEAVES DROP	FAST CAR

d. Phs

6 July	1400 hrs
7 July	1000 hrs
8 July	0800 hrs
9 July	1500 hrs

e. Points of origin

FRUIT	0024
FLOWER	0121
COUNTRY	9927

f. Hot relay : O&F for radio relay will be provided from 061900H to 090700H on bde comd net. The relay will be operating from 1900 hrs till 0700 hrs daily

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g. Passwords

<u>Time</u>	<u>Challenge</u>	<u>Password</u>
060600H - 071200H	COUNTRIES	Use name of any country
071200H - 081200H	FRUIT	Use name of any fruit grown in USA
081200H - 091200H	CITIES	Use name of any well known US city
091200H - 101200H	FLOWERS	Use name of any flower
101200H - 111200H	BOYS	Use any boys first name
111200H - 121200H	CARS	Use name of any US car.

h. Synchronization: Synchronization will be from the Sig Cen at 060800H.

TRN BRUMFIELD
Commanding TRN.

Authentication

Revere Capt

HCK

Amuseuses A Cramping
P Overlay
Q Party

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Plan 'H' 15
00 3/65.
Confirmatory Notes
15 Verbal Orders
CO 12 AR.

GROUPING

<u>A Coy</u>	VC from 0800 hrs D Day	MFC Med ord (1) SBs (4)
<u>B Coy</u>	VC from 0800 hrs D Day	FO party Med ord (1) SBs (4) Int dutymen (1) Policeman (1)
<u>C Coy</u>	VC from 0800 hrs D Day	MFC Med Ord (1) SBs (4)
<u>D Coy</u>	VC from 0800 hrs D Day	FO party Med ord (1) SBs (4)
<u>Holton Coy</u>	Det to each of four rifle coys	SBs (4)
<u>Bn HQ Co</u>	VC for Op	RRU team IPW (2) Policeman (1)
<u>Med Pl</u>	Det to A Coy and C Coy	MFC


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OVERLAY = SECTORS, BOUNDARIES, REPORT LINES


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ANNEX A TO IRRAR OPO 3/65
dated 5 JUL 65



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AIR / FIRE SUPPORT GRID SYSTEM.



DISTRIBUTION

UNIT	OPO 2/65 Copy Number	UNIT	OPO 2/65 Copy Number
A Coy - 1	1	173 Abn Bde (Sep) - 1	27
B Coy - 1	2	AAFV - 1	28
C Coy - 1	3	1/503 - 1	29
D Coy - 1	4	2/503 - 1	30
Adm Coy - 3	5-7	3/319 - 1	31
Mor Pl - 2	8-9		
Aslt Pwr Pl - 1	10		
Anti Tk Pl - 1	11		
Sig Pl - 1	12		
Tk PWH - 1	13		
CO - 1	14		
2IC - 1	15		
OC Sp Coy - 1	16		
AdjT - 1	17		
IO - 2	18-19		
RSM - 1	20		
Comd Diary - 2	21-22		
Fce - 1	23		
FAc - 1	24		
RRU Team - 1	25		
CP - 1	26		
Spave - 2	32-33		

SECRET

1 RAR
/ Jul 65

COMPANY PATROLLING - TAOR

1. The new system of patrolling is effective on 2 Jul 65. Two Companies are to be patrolling the TAOR for one week at a time. The remaining 2 rifle coys will share the responsibilities for a Standby and Duty coy. Details are at Annex A.
2. The allocation of sectors to coys is.
 - a. A and D Coys : Sectors A, C, F, G, H and K.
 - b. B and C Coys : Sectors B, D, E and J.
3. Coys are to patrol their sectors with at least one platoon, one platoon from each coy is to be in the perimeter base at 10 minutes notice to move.
4. Coys are to inform the Int Section of the following basic details by 0900 hrs on the day before the patrol departs.
 - a. Platoon
 - b. Callsign
 - c. Sectors to be patrolled.
 - d. Time out and time in.
 - e. Any special tasks given.
 - f. DF requirement
5. Coy and Pl locstats to the CP every 2 hrs on the even hour while in TAOR.
6. If the Bn is called for operations, patrolling will resume, as per Annex A on the return of the patrol coys. Bn HQ will give time out.
7. Standby coy. This coy is at one hours notice to move. It is to effect liasion with PWLH as the move will probably be by APC. It is confined to its Coy area. This coy should be at rest.
8. Duty Coy. This coy is at two hours notice to move. It should be prepared to supply all perimeter base duties.

*John Paul
ocp Coy.*

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Copy No _____
HQ 173d Abn Bde (Sen)
Bien Hoa, RVN
041200H Jul 65
RBM

FRAG ORDER #7

1. MISSION: 173d Abn Bde conducts aggressive patrolling in the C3 area on 4 and 5 July 1965.

2. EXECUTION:

a. Concept: On 4 July E/17 Cav conducts recon patrols into southern portion of C3 area while 2/503 and 1/RAR intensify patrolling in their assigned areas. On 5 July 1/503 with D/16 attached moves two rifle companies & D/16 to Check Point #3 where one company will move out to patrol area while one company remains with D/16 and the troop transport. Transport then moves to check point 5 where TF (-) will await the arrival of the rifle co from Check Point #3, reform and return to present locations. (Annex A Operation Overlay)

b. 1/503

Attached: D/16 effective 041300H Jul 65

(1) Cross SP 050600H Jul 65

(2) Close NMF 051830H Jul 65

c. 2/503: Conduct aggressive patrolling in C3 area from 041200H Jul to 050700H Jul and from 051800 to 070600H Jul.

d. 1/RAR: Continue to conduct aggressive patrolling in assigned TAOR.

e. E/17: Conduct recon patrols in C3 area until 041830H Jul 65.

f. D/16: Attached 1/503 effective 041300 Jul, detached upon return base camp on 5 July.

g. Bde (-) continues present mission.

H. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) FO and FAC airborne 5 July 65

(2) Armed choppers over area 4 and 5 July

(3) Points of origin (Annex A)

(4) Minimum number of $\frac{1}{2}$ T vehicles will move with 1/503 TF.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: SOP

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Signal:

(1) 1/503 TF will operate on Bn Comd Freq (FM) but will maintain an entry into the Bde Comd Net (FM) (42.8)

1

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(2) FO and FAC will operate on 1/503 Bn Comd Net
(43.2) call sign of Ground Force Commander Violent Hermit 3.
Call sign of FAC is Python 3,4 or 5. Call sign of Air FO is
Un paid Beaver 18.

b. Command: No Change

Acknowledge

WILLIAMSON
Brig Gen

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- 1 III Corps
- 2 MACV
- 1 Bde S1
- 1 Bde S2
- 2 Bde S3
- 1 Bde S4
- 1 Bde Avn Officer
- 2 E/16th Armor
- 2 E/17th Cav
- 2 3/519th Arty
- 2 2/503d Inf
- 2 Engr Co
- 1 Psy War Det
- 2 1/503d Inf
- 2 R/R
- 1 Spt Bn
- 1 HHC
- 5 Historical File

ANNEX A - Operations Overlay

OFFICIAL:

Tyler
TYLER
S3

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
ANNEX A FRAG ORD # 7

19 00

~~MAP~~
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Copy No. _____
No. 1730 Abn Bde (Se
Bish Hqs, RVN
061200H July 1965
NSL

Annex A (Operation Overlay) to FRAG ORDER Number 7



References: ASame as Frag Order 6
Acknowledge

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
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1/RAR

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2ND BN (ABN) 503d INF



OP ORD 26-65

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Copy No 20
2d Bn (Abn), 503d Inf
Bien Hoa, RVN
050900H July 1965
PQ 44

Operation Order 26-65

Reference: Mapsheet Vietnam, Series L701, Sheet No 6344II; 1:50000.

1. SITUATION:

- a. Enemy forces: Annex A, Intelligence.
- b. Friendly forces:
 - (1) U.S. Air Force: provides TAC air support to TF 2/503d. Annex C (Fire Support Plan).
 - (2) 145th Avn Bn provides direct support aircraft. Annex B (Army Aviation).
 - (3) TF 3/319th provides direct fire support to 173d Abn Bde (Sep) from D-Day, H-Hour-2 hours 50 minutes.
 - (4) TF 1/503d operates west (right) of TF 2/503d.
 - (5) TF 1/RAR operates west (right) of TF 1/503d.
 - (6) TF Rear organizes for defense of rear areas.
- c. Attachments and detachments:
 - (1) 2 men (IPW), 172d MI Det.
 - (2) E Troop, 17th Cav.
 - (3) 1 squad, 173d Engr Co
 - (4) 2 RVN Police.
 - (5) 2 scout dog teams (5 men, 2 dogs).
 - (6) 1 RRU Team (4 men).

(All attachments effective 060600H July 1965 until return to Bien Hoa.)

2. MISSION: TF 2/503d conducts airmobile assault, landing Objective 27 commencing D-Day, H-Hour (060850H Jul 65) to seize and secure Objective 27, conducts search and destroy operations in sector from D-Day to D+3 to find and destroy VC forces, supplies and equipment, secure Obj 27 and prepare for extraction commencing 1630H hrs, H+3 (091630H July 65).

3. EXECUTION:

- a. Concept of operation: The operation will be conducted in 3 phases commencing on D-Day.
 - (1) Phase I - TF 2/503d conducts airmobile assault, landing on Objective 27, D-Day, H-Hour, seizes objectives A, B, C and D, establishes patrol and logistical bases and prepares to continue search and destroy mission.
 - (2) Phase II - TF 2/503d conducts search and destroy operations in assigned sector from D-Day to D+3,
 - (3) Phase III - TF 2/503d is extracted by helicopter from Objective 29 commencing D+3, 1630 hours.
- b. Concept of Phase I and II - TF 2/503d departs Bien Hoa by helicopter, order of march B, Cmd Gp 1, HHC, A, Cmd Gp 2, E/17th and C; conducts airmobile assault on Objective 27 commencing D-Day, H-Hour, with B Company seizing north portion of Objective 27, HHC seizing south portion of Objective 27, A Company seizing Objective A, E Troop/17th Cav screening area north and east of Objective 27, and C Company seizing Objective C. Upon entry of all TF 2/503d elements; A, B, and C Companies deploy to seize their respective objectives (A, B, and C), HHC seizes Objective D and E Troop/17th Cav screens in zone to close Objective D. Companies A, B, C, HHC and E Troop/17th Cav then establish patrol/log. Bases and clear in zone using Objectives A, B, C and D for control. HHC remains in vic Objective D initially and prepares to assume mission of TF 2/503d reserve on order, or upon closure of E Troop to Objective D. Companies remain on, v objectives A, B, C, and D for the night. Each unit sends out ambush patrols during hours of darkness.
- c. A Company:
 - (1) Attached:
 - (a) 4 EM 173d Engr Co
 - (b) 3 EM Scout Dog Team.
 - (2) Seize and secure Objective A.
 - (3) After seizure of Objective, establish patrol/log base and conduct search and destroy operations in zone to northern boundary.
 - (4) Exercise extreme caution in contact with east flank of 1/503D
 - (5) Place ambush patrols vic objective during night.

Document Number
21F/2/503/Jul 65

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2d Bn (Abn), 503d Inf OPORD 26-65 (Cont)

d. B Company:

- (1) Attached:
 - (a) 3 EM 173d Engr Co.
 - (b) 1 RVN Policeman.
- (2) Seize and secure north portion Objective 27 (Objectives B and C.)
- (3) Be prepared to displace entire company to Objective B upon closure of all elements TF 2/503d or on order.
- (4) After seizure of objective, establish patrol/log. base and conduct search and destroy operations in zone to northern boundary.
- (5) Place ambush patrols vic objective during night.

e. C Company:

- (1) Attachments:
 - (a) 3 EM 173d Engr Co.
 - (b) 2 EM Scout Dog Team.
- (2) Relieve B Company on Objective C.
- (3) After relief on objective, establish patrol/log. base and conduct search and destroy operations in zone to northern boundary.
- (4) Place ambush patrols vic objective during night.

f. Headquarters Company:

- (1) Attachments: None.
- (2) Seize and secure south portion Objective 27 (Objective D).
- (3) Be prepared to assume mission as TF 2/503d reserve on order or upon closure of E Troop/17th Cav to Objective D. Provide guides to assist closure of E Troop/17th Cav to Objective D.
- (4) After seizure of objective, establish patrol/log base and conduct search and destroy operations vicinity objective.

g. E Troop/17th Cavalry:

- (1) Attachments: 1 RVN Policeman.
- (2) Screen in zone to boundary east of Objective 27 within limits of 2A sector (ref Annex D - Operation Overlay).
- (3) Screen in zone to close objective D NLT 1600H D-Day.
- (4) Establish patrol/log base and conduct search and destroy operations vicinity Objective D.
- (5) Place ambush patrols vicinity objective during night.

h. Medical Platoon:

- (1) Attach 2 additional medics to each rifle company.
- (2) Continue normal operations in base camp.
- (3) Bn Surgeon will augment Bde Clearing Station.

i. Communications Platoon:

- (1) Provide two RC-292's to each command group.
- (2) Continue normal operations in base camp.
- (3) Provide rear area security.

j. Mortar Platoon:

- (1) Leave sufficient personnel to remain operational (4 tubes) in rear area.
- (2) Provide rear area security.

k. Coordinating instructions:

- (1) Rear area commander, Capt Westmoreland.
- (2) Sequence of events - Annex E.
- (3) Report location every hour, 15 minutes prior to the hour using points of origin (Annex D - Operations Overlay).
- (4) Rules of engagement - SOP.
- (5) All attachments terminated upon return to Bien Hoa.
- (6) Each rifle company and E Troop/17th Cav carry one (1) 81mm mortar.
- (7) Alternate Plan: None.
- (8) Recon by fire: SOP.
- (9) Use of smoke and panels: SOP.
- (10) Exercise extreme caution in moving dead and wounded, and abandoned equipment. VC frequently will boobytrap any of the above.
- (11) Bde prepared to provide a team to assist in destruction of large supplies of food, on call.
- (12) D-Day, H-Hour - 060850H July 1965.
- (13) Thoroughness of search and destroy operations will have precedence over speed of execution.
- (14) Time Code:
 - (a) D-Day and D+2:

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2d Bn (Abn), 503d Inf OPORD 26-65 (Cont)

- 1. H - 0850
 - 2. B - 1330
 - 3. C - 1600
 - 4. D - 1915
- (b) D+1 and D+3:
- 1. W - 0700
 - 2. X - 0915
 - 3. Y - 1430
 - 4. Z - 1730

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: Annex F.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Signal:

- (1) Radio sets 22-6 and OPS CODE KAC HE-734 in effect.
- (2) Supporting fires lift or shift on verbal command of airborne fire control team.
- (3) Emergency signal for lifting supporting fires violet smoke from U6-A aircraft.

b. Command:

- (1) Assembly area for CP: TBA.
- (2) Both command groups vicinity Objective 27 initially.

Acknowledge:

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Annexes:

- A - Intelligence
- B - Army Aviation
- C - Fire Support Plan
- D - Operations Overlay
- E - Sequence of Events
- F - Administration and Logistics
- G-Y - Omitted
- Z - Distribution

Distribution: Annex Z

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2d Bn (Abn), 503d Inf OPORD 26-65 (Contd)

ADDED:

k. Coordination instructions:

(15) The following challenge and passwords will be used in the operational area during the execution of OPORD 26-65 only:

CHALLENGE	PASSWORD
060600H Jul to 071200H Jul 65 COUNTRIES	Use the name of any country
071200H Jul to 081200H Jul 65 FRUIT	Use the name of any fruit grown in the U.S.
081200H Jul to 091200H Jul 65 CITIES	Use the name of any well known U.S. City
091200H Jul to 101200H Jul 65 FLOWERS	Use the name of any flower
101200H Jul to 111200H Jul 65 BOY'S	Use any boy's first name
111200H Jul to 121200H Jul 65 CAR	Use the name of any U.S. made car

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Annex A (Intelligence) to OPCODE 26-65

Reference: Maps: Vietnam Series I701 Sheet No. 6214 II, 1:50,000

1. Summary of Enemy Operation. War Zone D is a Viet Cong Base and forces of squad to regimental size are normally in or within short reinforcing distance of our area within the zone to include the current area of operation. The area of operation will be well tunneled and entrenched. Mines and booby traps will be utilized by the enemy to protect landing zones, fortified areas, caches and along trails. Caches will normally be found 50-100 meters off subsidiary trails.
2. Intelligence Requirements:
 - a. EEI:
 - (1) What is the location, identification and strength of enemy units in our operational area?
 - (2) Does the enemy plan any organized offensive action against brigade units? If so when, where, and in what strength?
 - b. Other Intelligence Requirements:
 - (1) With what type weapons are the enemy armed? What is their condition and ammunition status?
 - (2) What is the nature and extent of enemy logistics operations, and where are their locations?
 - (3) What is the nature and extent of enemy fortifications, buildings and communications?
 - (4) What indications can be found of enemy organization; identification and morale?
3. Orders and Request for Information: Omitted.
4. Miscellaneous:
 - a. PW's will be evacuated to Brigade Collection Point vicinity Brigade Logistics Helicopter Pad. Resupply helicopters returning to the Brigade Logistics Base (rear) should be used with proper security provided when possible. PW's may be briefly interrogated by capturing unit if a language capability exists. PW's will not be taken in CP areas. The "Five S's", Search, Segregate, Silence, Speed and Safeguard, will be applied in handling PW's.
 - b. Captured documents and material will be reported immediately and evacuated through intelligence (PW) channels. Documents and material found on PW's will be evacuated with them. Documents and PW's will be tagged with appropriate information on time, location and circumstances of capture.
 - c. Extreme caution will be exercised in searching of enemy installations, personnel and handling of material. The discovery and elimination of possible booby traps must be a consideration prior to any search.
 - d. Intelligence reports indicate that mines and booby traps are abundant in the operational area. Caution will be emphasized.
 - e. The probability exists that the VC's have been using charcoal burners as a cover for arms and munitions caches. Such structures should be carefully examined to determine if they contain material.
 - f. Counterintelligence: Compromise of call signs countersigns or any classified operational item will be reported to the Bn S2 immediately.
 - g. Escape and Evasion: Personnel separated from their unit should remain generally stationary in the area where contact is lost for 24 hours if security permits. Streams in the operational area generally tend to flow Southerly toward the Dong Nai River where directions should be asked to the friendly hamlet, THAI HUNG. Extreme caution should be exercised in orienting movement along streams or trails. Units are encouraged to adopt special buddy systems, SCP's and signals to maintain personnel accountability and prevent individual separation.

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Appendix 1 (TBP)

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Annex B (Army Aviation) to OPORD 26-65

1. GENERAL:

- a. Aircraft for helicopter assault will be organized in 3 lifts. Elements TBA
- b. Units will use type loads for UH-1Bs for planning purposes. Aircraft used will consist of UH-1B and UH-1D. Actual type aircraft per chalk TBA D-1.
- c. Staging area will be runway 15-33, Bien Hoa Air Base.
- d. DACO is Capt Java. DACO will meet aviation battalion pathfinder at 145th Bn CP Forward, Bien Hoa Air Base twenty (20) minutes prior to loading time of first lift.
- e. S4 is responsible for movement of troops from base camp to departure airfield.

2. LOADING PLAN:

a. Chalk Designation:

CHALK	UNIT
1-37	Co B
38-41	Cmd Loads 1-4
42-60	HHC
61-100	Co A
101-102	Cmd Loads 5-6
103-128	E/17 Cav
129-166	Co C

3. EXTRACTION:

- a. Extraction will be by 50 chawks in 3 lifts. Units will plan the following numbers of chawks at 5 personnel each:
 - (1) A Co - 40
 - (2) B Co - 37
 - (3) C Co - 38
 - (4) HHC - 19
 - (5) E/17 - 26
 - (6) Cmd Gp 1 - 4
 - (7) Cmd Gp 2 - 2
- b. Order of extraction TBA. Each unit will appoint an extraction officer. This officer will meet extraction DACO (S3 Air) at LZ NLT 2 hours prior to extraction.

4. Turn-around time is 15 minutes.

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Annex C (Fire Support) to OPORD 26-65
Reference: Maps 1/50000 Sheets 6343 I and 6343 II
Time Zone: Hotel

1. Situation: OPORD 26-65
2. Mission: OPORD 26-65
3. Execution:
 - a. Concept of Operation:
 - (1) General: OPORD 26-65
 - (2) Maneuver: OPORD 26-65
 - (3) Fire Support:
 - (a) D-Day TF 3/319th Arty moves to position 33 (060600H July) and conducts registration in center of sector. Arty and TAC Air provide preparatory fires on Objective 27 and fires in support of 173d Abn Bde (Sep) in TAOR.
 - (b) D+1 - D+3 Artillery and TAC Air provide fires in support of 173d Abn Bde (Sep) in TAOR.
 - b. Air Support:
 - (1) D-Day
 - (a) Provide 20 minute period of preparatory fires on Objective 27 (070825H-070845H)
 - (b) Maintain Air CAP 070600H-071150H over TAOR (completion of air assault).
 - (2) 071150 H D-Day - 101430H D+3:
 - (a) Maintain Aircraft on ground alert.
 - (b) Flare Ship on call 1900-0600.
 - (3) 100430H - D+3:
 - (a) Maintain Air CAP 100430H - 101800H.
 - (4) Light Fire Team is on call through Bde Command Net.
 - c. Artillery Support:
 - (1) TF 3/319 (3/319th Arty; D 16th Armor move to position 33 at 0600 D-Day and conduct registration MIT 0800 D-Day. Fire 15 minute preparation on LZ 27.
 - (2) TF 3/319 DS of Inf TF NLT D-Day H-Hour.
 - d. Coordinating Instructions
 - (1) All fire missions will be approved by Bde FSCC.
 - (2) All firing units maintain air guards for lookout of friendly air prior to firing.
 - (3) Emergency signal for lifting fires is a violet smoke grenade dropped from U6A.
 - (4) TF 3/319th provide air observers to conduct fire missions and act as relay for arty. Observers will be airborne from 0600 to 1800 hrs during operation.
 - (5) One FAC team will be attached to 2/503d for duration of operation.
4. Administration and Logistics: OPORD 26-65
5. Command and Signal: OPORD 26-65

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Annex E (Sequence of Events) to OPORD 26-65

References: Same as 26-65 (D-Day H-Hour = 060850H Jul 65)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>DAY</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>ACTIVITY</u>
1	D-Day	060810-060825	Arty preparatory fires on Obj 27
2	D-Day	060825-060845	AF prepares Obj 27
3	D-Day	060845-060850	Armed choppers pre-strike Obj 27
4	D-Day	060850	1st lift TF 2/503d lands Obj 27
5	D-Day	060920	Last lift TF 2/503d lands Obj 27
6	D-Day	060935-060950	Arty prepares Obj 5
7	D-Day	060950-061010	AF prepares Obj 5
8	D-Day	061010-061015	Armed choppers pre-strike Obj 5
9	D-Day	061015	1st lift TF 1/503d lands Obj 5
10	D-Day	061040	Last lift TF 1/503d lands Obj 5
11	D-Day	061045-061100	Arty prepares Obj 16
12	D-Day	061100-061120	AF prepares Obj 16
13	D-Day	061120-061125	Armed chopper pre-strike Obj 16
14	D-Day	061125	1st Lift TF 1/RAR lands obj 16
15	D-Day	061155	Last Lift TF 1/RAR lands Obj 16
16	D-Day	060850-072400	TF 1/503, 2/503, and 1/RAR conducts search and destroy in areas 1A, 2A, and RA
17	D+1	070001-082400	Bde continues mission in same areas
18	D+2	080001-090700	Bde continues mission in same areas
19	D+2	080700-092400	TF 1/503, 2/503 and 1/RAR conduct search and destroy in areas 1B, 2B and RA
20	D+3	090001-100700	Bde continues mission in same areas
21	D+3	090700-101200	TF 1/503 conducts search and destroy in area 1C and secures obj 3
22	D+3	090700-101300	TF 1/RAR conducts search and destroy in area RB and prepares for link-up with TF 1/503
23	D+3	090700-101630	TF 2/503 conducts search and destroy in area 2C
24	D+3	091430	TF 1/RAR extracts by air from Obj 3
25	D+3	091530	TF 1/503 extracts by air from Obj 3
26	D+3	091630	TF 2/503 extracts by air from Obj 29

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ANNEX F (Administrative & logistics) to OPORD 26-65
Reference: Same as OPORD NO 26-65
Time Zone: Hotel

1. General:

- a. This annex outlines the logistical and administrative responsibilities and procedures for support of the 2d Bn (Abn), 503d Inf during the current operation.
- b. Unit distribution by helicopter will be utilized for all resupply during the conduct of this operation.
- c. 2/503d resupply point will be established VIC 012145 NLT 060800H July 1965.
- d. All request for resupply will be forwarded to the Bn forward CP on the logistical net.
- e. Log net will be opened at 060800H July 1965.
- f. All units coordinate with the Bn S-4 concerning daily rations, water, and battery resupply requirements NLT 051500H July 1965.

2. Material and Services:

a. Supply:

(1) Class I:

(a) Feeding schedule for the 2/503d:

	B	D	S
D-Day	A	C	C
D+1	C	C	C
D+2	C	C	C
D+3	C	C	C

- (b) All personnel will carry 1 meal to be consumed noon 6 July.
- (c) Each unit will submit strength figures for rations in the forward and rear area NLT 051500H July 1965.

(2) Class II & IV

- (a) Units will carry only the equipment necessary to accomplish the mission.
- (b) All units and sections will insure that a switchboard operator and a supply representative is left with the rear detachment.
- (c) Recovery of water cans and cargo nets will be accomplished in openarea. The following guidelines must be followed:

- 1. The helicopters must approach into the wind or within 45° of that direction.
- 2. A cleared area must be selected that allows an approach of 300 feet and a minimum of 100 feet wide. The pilots will not attempt to extract a load from a smaller area.

(3) Class III: Any requirements for Class III may be forwarded to the Bn CP by the log net.

(4) Class V:

- (a) Units will carry a double basic load of Class V as specified by the unit commander.
- (b) Units will carry a double basic load of smoke grenades.
- (c) Units will carry an increased load of blasting caps and detonating cords. A 50 pound package of C-4 explosives will be prepared for delivery to each unit on call.
- (d) ASR as follows (based on rounds per weapon per day)

1.	81mm HE W/PD	15.50 rds
2.	81mm w/o fuze	.76 rds
3.	81mm Illum	.47 rds
4.	81mm WP	.90 rds
5.	4.2 HE w/PD	13.00 rds
6.	4.2 Illum	8.61 rds
7.	4.2 WP	7.77 rds

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ANNEX F (Administrative & Logistical) to OPORD 26-65 (Cont'd)

8. Ctg 40mm HE 4.01 rds

- (5) Water:
 - (a) All personnel will carry 2 full canteens.
 - (b) Each unit will turn in all water cans, excess to mess hall requirements, to the Bn S4 NLT 051500H July 65. These cans will be returned upon completion of this operation.
 - (c) HHC will provide 1 water trailer to the Bn S4 060800 July 65.
 - (d) Unit XO's will insure that all water cans are prepared for recovery as outlined in paragraph 2(b).
- (6) Salvage Equipment:
 - (a) Salvage equipment will be tagged by the unit and evacuated with the water cans.
 - (b) Requirements for equipment beyond this capability will be forwarded to the Bn CP on the log net.
- (7) Captured material and/or supplies as prescribed in the field SOP.

b. Transportation:

- (1) Motor:
 - (a) 6 PC and 8 2 1/2 ton trucks will arrive at the RJ east of Co C at 060700H July 65.
 - (b) Movement of chalks will be as follows:

Chalk	Trans Arrive Bn Area	Depart	Arrive Air Base
1 - 100	0700	0725	0745
101 - 150	0815	0825	0845

- (c) MP escort will be provided by the Bde PMO.

3. Medical Evacuation and Hospitalization: a. Evacuation:

- (1) All medical evacuation will be by air evacuation (helicopter).
- (2) All patients will be evacuated to the Brigade Clearing Station located at grid coordinates YTO06146.
- (3) 57th Med Det "Dust Off" will provide medical coverage to accompany heliborne operations and one for standby at Brigade Clearing Station during remainder of operation.
- (4) Requests for medical evacuation will be transmitted through the Bn Command Net.
- (5) Medical evacuation call sign is "Dust Off":
 - (a) Essential information when requesting medical evacuation:
 - 1. Unit's call sign.
 - 2. Location.
 - 3. Nature of casualty - type of casualty. (eg litter or walking)
 - 4. Special equipment required.
 - 5. Replacement medical supplies required.
 - 6. Doctor required.

b. Hospitalization:

- (1) Battalion surgeon will be located at Brigade Clearing Station.
- (2) There will be two (2) additional medical aidmen attached to each lettered company for the exercise.
- (3) Casualties will remain in so far as possible at the Brigade Clearing Station. Serious casualties will be evacuated from the Brigade Clearing Station to (1) 3rd Field Hospital and (2) Saigon Naval Hospital, in that order of priority.
- (4) Equipment of hospitalized personnel will be tagged by the Brigade Clearing Station, and returned to the Bn S4 (Rear)

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1/RAR

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503rd Infantry

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OPORD 13-65

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(3) VASANTYA BITH (MAT)

(7) BOUNDINGS OF BATHUR (MAT)

(1) COORDINATE INFORMATION:

(2) Be labeled as per map to the west of position of Co A B of U

OPORD 13-65

(7) ON BATHUR POSITION CO C

References: Maps, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L701, Sheets 6343 I. 6344 II

(3) BATHUR POSITION CO B

TASK ORGANIZATION:

Co A:

Arty FO Tm
Engr Demo Tm
RVN Policeman
Scout Dog Tm

Co B:

Arty FO Tm
Engr Demo Tm
RVN Policeman
Scout Dog Tm

Co C:

Arty FO Tm
Engr Demo Tm

TF MOSSBURG:

Mort Plat (-)
Recon Plat (+)
Composite Plat

1. SITUATION:

a. Enemy (Annex A, Intelligence).

b. Friendly:

(1) 173d Abn Bde conducts search and destroy operations in TAOR 17-65 commencing D-Day; H-Hour to find, fix and destroy Viet Cong Forces, Supplies and Equipment.

(2) TF 2/503 conducts airmobile assault on Obj 27 commencing D-Day, H-hour; clears area 2A D-Day thru D+1; 2B on D+2; 2C on D+3; extracts from Obj 29 commencing 1630 hrs D+3.

(3) TF 1/RAR conducts airmobile assault on Obj 16 commencing D-Day H+2½ hrs; clears area RA D-Day thru D+2; RB on D+3; extracts from Obj 29 commencing 1430 hrs D+3.

(4) TF 3/319 DS Bde from psn 33 NLT D-Day, H-Hour.

(5) 145th Avn Bn provides direct support aircraft (Annex B, Army Aviation).

(6) 48th ARVN Regt outposts and patrols SONG DONG NAI River from D-Day to 0800 hrs D+3.

c. Attachments and Detachments: See Task Organization

2. MISSION: TF 1/503 conducts airmobile assault on Obj 5 commencing 061015H Jul 65; conducts search and destroy operation in zone; secures Obj 3 and covers extraction of 1/RAR.

3. EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operation:

(1) Phase I - TF 1/503 conducts airmobile assault on Obj 5 (Appendix 1 to Annex B, Army Avn) and assembles at position C1 (Annex F, Assembly Plan).

(2) Phase II - TF 1/503 conducts search and destroy operation in zone with Co A on the west; Co B on the east and Co C in the center; TF MOSSBURG: TF 1/503 res.

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(3) Phase III - TF 1/503 links up with 1/RAR NLT 1300 hrs D+3; secures Obj 3 during extraction of 1/RAR commencing at 1430 hrs D+3; and extracts from Obj 3 commencing 1530 hrs D+3. (Annex G, Extraction Plan).

b. Co A:

(1) Land and assemble in position C1.
(2) Conduct search and destroy operations in zone in following sequence:

(a) D-Day - positions A1, A2, and A3.

(b) D+1 - positions A4, A5, and A6.

(c) D+2 - positions A7, A8, and A9.

(d) D+3 - position A10.

(3) Link up with 1/RAR at GC YT 015227 NLT 1300 hrs D+3 and assist passage to Obj 3.

c. Co B:

(1) Land and assemble in position C1.

(2) Conduct search and destroy operation in zone in following sequence:

(a) D-Day - position B1.

(b) D+1 - positions B2 and B3.

(c) D+2 - positions B4, B5, and B6.

(d) D+3 - positions B7, B8, B9, and B10.

d. Co C:

(1) Land and assemble in position C1.

(2) Conduct search and destroy operation in zone in following sequence:

(a) D-Day - positions C1 and C2.

(b) D+1 - position C3.

(c) D+2 - positions C4, C5, and C6.

(d) D+3 - positions C7 and C8.

e. TF Res, TF MOSSBURG:

(1) Land and assemble position C1.

(2) Screen southern portion of Obj 5 with Recon Plat (+).

(3) Provide security to TF Hos.

(4) On order follow Co C.

(5) Be prepared to assist in any assigned mission of Cos A, B or C.

f. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Sequence of Events (Annex E).

(2) Assembly Plan (Annex F).

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- (3) Extraction Plan (Annex G).
- (4) Report locations every hour using assigned positions as reference point.
- (5) Order of movement from present loc to DAF: Co C; Recon Plat (+); Co A; Bn Cmd Gp #1; TF MOSSBURG (-); Bn Cmd Gp #2; Co B.
- (6) Rifle companies will employ one 81mm mortar. (Bn FSC will be notified of intent to fire any 81mm mortar).
- (7) Rear area security under control of Bn S1 (Mortar Plat will leave sufficient personnel to service all four tubes in present location.)
- (8) D-Day, H-Hour: 060850H Jul 65.

<u>Challenge</u>	<u>Password</u>
060600H Jul to 071200H Jul 65 COUNTRIES	Use the name of any country
071200H Jul to 081200H Jul 65 FRUIT	Use the name of any fruit grown in the U. S.
081200H Jul to 091200H Jul 65 CITIES	Use the name of any well known U. S. City
091200H Jul to 101200H Jul 65 FLOWERS	Use the name of any flower
101200H Jul to 111200H Jul 65 BOYS	Use a boys first name
111200H Jul to 121200H Jul 65 CARS	Use the name of any U. S. made car

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

- a. Class I - units will carry in three meals.
- b. Class V - units will carry in basic load of small arms and at least 40 rounds of assorted 81mm.
- c. Medical unit aidmen will accompany all platoon sized units; all med evac as per DUST-OFF SOP; identify number and type of casualties.
- d. All resupply by helicopter to be on call as follows:

<u>Day</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Position</u>
D+1	1000-1200	Co C & TF MOSSBURG	C1
	1000-1200	Co B	B2
	1200-1400	Co A	A4
D+2	1000-1200	Co C & TF MOSSBURG	C8
	1000-1200	Co A	A8
	1200-1400	Co B	B5

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5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Signal:

(1) During hours of darkness wire will be utilized by those units in immediate vicinity of Bn CP only.

(2) All units will carry one TA 312.

(3) SOI Item 20-6 in effect.

b. Command:

(1) Bn Cmd Gp #1 initially with TF MOSSBURG.

(2) TF CP tentatively located as follows:

(a) D-Day - position C1

(b) D+1 - position C3

(c) D+2 - position C6

(3) Units report CP locations when established.

Acknowledge.

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Annexes:

- A - Intelligence
- B - Army Aviation
- C - Point of Origin Code
- D - Operations Overlay
- E - Sequence of Events
- F - Assembly Plan
- G - Extraction Plan
- H-Y-Not Used
- Z-Distribution

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Annex A (Intelligence) to OPOD 13-65

Reference: Maps: VietNam, 1:50,000, Series L701, Sheet No. 6344 II

1. Summary of Enemy Operation

War Zone D is a Viet Cong Base and forces of from squad to regimental size are normally in or within short reinforcing distance of our area within the zone to include the current area of operation. The area of operation will be well tunneled and entrenched. Mines and booby traps will be utilized by the enemy to protect landing zones, fortified areas, caches and along trails. Caches will normally be found 50-100 meters off subsidiary trails. VC Regiment Q762 is a Main Force Unit; strength approximately 2,000. This area is also home base for many units within this sector and training sites, R&R centers and storage facilities can be expected to be found.

2. EEI and other Intelligence Requirements

a. EEI

- (1) What is the location, identification and strength of enemy units in the area?
- (2) Does the enemy plan an attack on Bde units? If so, when, where and in what strength?

b. Other Intelligence Requirements

- (1) With what type weapons is the enemy armed?
- (2) What is the enemy's resupply status?
- (3) Does the enemy have supply and storage areas in the area of operations? If so, what type and where?

3. Orders and Requests for Information: Omitted

4. Miscellaneous

- a. PWs will be evacuated to Brigade Collection Point by most expeditious means. PWs may be briefly interrogated by the attached IPW team. PWs will not be taken to unit CP's. PWs will be thoroughly searched prior to evacuation.
- b. Captured documents and material will be reported immediately and evacuated through intelligence channels. Documents and material found on PWs will be tagged and evacuated with them.
- c. Extreme caution will be exercised in handling of enemy material. A search will be conducted for booby traps prior to removing equipment.
- d. Counterintelligence. Compromise of call signs and countersigns will be reported to Bde S2 immediately.

Acknowledge.

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Appendix 1 Situation Overlay

Distribution: Annex Z

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Holland
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S2


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A-1

MAT

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Bien Hoa, RVN
051200H JULY 65
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Appendix 1 (Situation Overlay) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPORD 13-65



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S2 Sgt

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REH

Annex B, (Army Aviation) to OPORD 13-65

References: Same as OPORD 13-65

1. SITUATION: Same as OPORD 13-65

2. MISSION: Same as OPORD 13-65

3. EXECUTION:

a. Concept of air operation:

(1) Phase I - TF 1/503d conducts airmobile assault on LZ FIVE commencing 061015H Jul 65. See Appendix I (Assault Airloading Table).

(2) Phase III - TF 1/503d conducts extraction from LZ THREE to BIEN HOA AB commencing at approximately 091530H Jul 65. See Annex G, (Extraction Plan) to OPORD 13-65

b. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Aircraft loading: All rotary wing aircraft, regardless of type, carry 5 troops or 1,000 lbs.

(2) Light fire team on-call through Bn Comd Net.

(3) One Ol-F airborne from 1900 until 0700 hours daily for aerial relay.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

a. 173d Avn Plat (-) (+) available at Bde LOC for resupply from D-Day 1500 hrs to D+3 1500 hrs.

b. See Para 4d OPORD 13-65 for aerial resupply schedule.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: OPORD 13-65

Acknowledge.

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Appendices:

- 1 - Assault Airloading Table
- 2 - Departure Airfield Diagram (TBP)

Distribution: Annex Z, Distribution

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Appendix 1 (Assault Air Loading Table) to Annex D (Army Aviation) to OPORD 13-65

LIFT	ELEMENT	AIRCRAFT NO	UNIT	LOAD
1	1	1-10	C	50 pax
	2	11-20	C	50 pax
	3	21-30	C	50 pax
	4	31-36	C	30 pax
		37-40	Recon	20 pax
	5	41-47	Recon	35 pax
		48-50	TF MOSSBURG	15 pax
2	1	51-60	TF MOSSBURG	50 pax
	2	61-63	Comd Gp #1	15 pax
	3	64-70	A	35 pax
	4	71-80	A	50 pax
	5	81-90	A	50 pax
	6	91-100	A	50 pax
3	1	101-110	B	50 pax
	2	111-116	B	30 pax
		117-120	Comd Gp #2	20 pax
	3	121-130	B	50 pax
	4	131-140	B	50 pax
	5	141-143	B	15 pax

NOTE 1:

<u>COMMAND GROUP #1</u>		<u>COMMAND GROUP #2</u>	
Acft #61	CO Opns Sgt RTO - PRC-25 (Bde) RTO - PRC-25 (Bn) CO's Messenger	Acft #117	S3 Asst Opns Sgt RTO - (PRC-10) Press RTO - (PRC-10)
Acft #62	FSC Asst DVR RTO - (spare) RTO - (292)	Acft #118	Commo Chief Wireman Wireman RTO - (292) Wireman
Acft #63	S3 Air FAC FAC RTO FAC RTO		

MAT

COMMAND GROUP #2

Acft S4
#119 S4 Asst
Press
RTD (Spare)

Acft S2 Sgt
#120 IPW
IPW
Press

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
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Annex D (Operations Overlay) to CPORD 13-65

Reference: Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000, Series L701, Sheets 694 II, 693 I



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Blairfield, NSW
051008 July 1965
R22

Annex C (Point of Origin Code) to GPOSD 13-65

Reference: Map of Viet Nam, 1:50,000, Series L701, Sheet 694 II, 6940.

COUNTY

03

FRUIT

99

18

Asker ledge.

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Annex 2

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
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Nien-Hoa, RVN
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Annex F (Assembly Plan) to OPRD 13-65



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Bien Hoa, RVN
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Annex G (Extraction Plan) to OPORD 13-65

1. SITUATION: Same as OPORD 13-65
2. MISSION: Same as OPORD 13-65
3. EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operation: TF 1/503 secures Obj 3 while 1/RAR conducts extraction commencing 091430H Jul 65. (See Appendix 2 (LZ Schematic) this annex) and conducts extraction operation from Obj 3 to Bien Hoa AB commencing 091530H Jul 65. (See Appendix 1 (Extraction Air Loading Table) this annex).

b. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Organization of elements dependent on available aircraft. Shifting of loads may be required in order to make maximum use of available aircraft.

(2) Loads will be moved from unit positions to LZ only on order from Bn S3.

(3) Upon departure of 2d lift all units will consolidate remaining personnel on position to minimize loading for 3d lift while maintaining maximum security of LZ. Technique of units left in contact during night withdrawal operation will be used.

(4) Panels will be spotted on LZ approximately 30 meters apart to mark pick up point for each chalk; smoke will mark touchdown point of lead A/C.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: Same as OPORD 13-65
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: Same as OPORD 13-65

Acknowledge.

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Appendices:

- 1 - LZ Security Schematic
- 2 - Extraction Air Loading Table

Distribution: Annex Z, Distribution

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
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BIEN HOA, RVN
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APPENDIX I (LZ SECURITY SCHEMATIC) TO ANNEX G
(EXTRACTION PLAN) TO OPOD 13-65



ACKNOWLEDGE

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Appendix 2 (Extraction Air Loading Table) to Annex G (Extraction Plan) to OPORD
13-65

LIFT	ELEMENT	AIRCRAFT NO.	UNIT	LOAD
1	1	1- 10	C	50 pax
	2	11- 20	B	50 pax
	3	21- 30	A	50 pax
	4	31- 40	C	50 pax
	5	41- 50	B	50 pax
2	1	51- 60	TF MOSSBURG	50 pax
	2	61- 63	TF MOSSBURG	15 pax
		64- 66	Comd Gp #1	15 pax
		67- 70	Recon	20 pax
	3	71- 80	A	50 pax
	4	81- 90	C	50 pax
	5	91-100	B	50 pax
3	1	101-106	A	30 pax
		107-110	Recon	20 pax
	2	111-120	A	50 pax
	3	121-126	C	30 pax
		127-130	B	20 pax
	4	131-136	B	25 pax
		137-140	Comd Gp #2	20 pax
	5	141-143	Recon	15 pax

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Bien Hoa, RVN
051200H Jul 65
REH

Annex Z, (Distribution) to OPOD 13-65

<u>Copy No</u>	<u>Unit/Organization</u>
1	1/503
2	CO
3	S1
4-5	S2
6-7	S3
8-9	S4
10-11	HHC
12-13	A Co
14-15	B Co
16-17	C Co
18	TF MOSSBURG
19	Rcn Plat
20	4.2" Mort Plat
21	Medic Plat
22-23	Commo Off
24	FAC
25-26	FSC
27	173d Abn Bde (Sep) (S3)
28	173d Engr Co
29-30	2nd Bn (Abn), 503d Inf
31	3rd Bn (Abn), 31st Arty
32	MI Det (IPW Team)
33	E/17 Cav
34	1/RAR
35-36	Scout Dog Tm
	Spares

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Wax

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation No.....
2. Report by No. 6280 ~~Ref~~ SEC Name J.W. CARNEY
3. ~~.....~~ Sec 12 Pl 1 Coy
4. a. Time of Action 1115 hrs
- b. Duration 1 1/2 hrs
- c. Date 7-2-66
- d. Location WAR ZONE 1 ^{NAM} HAP. PHAN CR. 984 357

5. Unit / Sub-unit tasks
SEARCH - DESTROY

6. Was it?
 - a. Contact FRONT
 - b. Incident -----

7. Summary of action in chronological sequence

- 1/ APPROX 100 METRES PREVIOUS TO CONTACT - EARLY WARNING SYSTEM IN FORM OF (A) SCRUB CUT FROM WAIST TO KNEE HEIGHT AND FACING OUT FROM DEFENSIVE POSITION
- (B) ONE BUNKER IN SCRUB - LISTENING POST PRESUMABLY
- 2/ (1) ONE HURCHIE, BUNKER AND TRENCHING SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED.
- 3/ (1) ONE SECTION TO THE LEFT - (1) SECTION TO THE RIGHT WERE DEPLOYED FOR SUPPORT FIRE - WHILE PL COMD TOOK REMAINDER SECTION IN TO CLEAR.
- 4/ V.C. OPENED FIRE INFLECTING (1) ONE CASUALTY ON FORWARD SECTION
- 5/ SECTION PINNED DOWN - V.C. STRENGTH AND POSITION TOO STRONG THEREFORE CALLED IN ANOTHER PL TO SWEEP AND CLEAR OUR FRONT, ENCOUNTERING LARGER FORTIFIED POSITION TO OUR FRONT. DURING SWEEP.
- 6/ BUNKERS CLEARED IN AREA - NO VC BODIES FOUND.

8. VC
 - a. Strength APPROX. 10 MEN.
 - b. Type of VC (Guerrilla, RF or Main Force) R. Force
 - c. VC cas
 - i KIA
 - ii WIA UNKNOWN.
 - iii VCC

8. d Were VC cas disposed of by Nil
 i Mol evac.....Time.....
 ii Buried.....Location.....
 iii Other means.....

e. Summary of docus and kit recovered Nil

f. Type and number of wps: ~~recovered~~ (2) TWO AUTOMATIC WEAPONS
 (1) ONE 30 CAL.
 6-8 - RIFLES
 GRENADES - (FRENCH?)

g. Wps identified on action

h. VC dress UNKNOWN

j. Summary of VC actions FIRING FROM TRENCHES ALSO THROWING GRENADES - ESCAPE ROUTE UNKNOWN.

9. Own cas

KIA Nil

MIA (1) ONE

10. Lessons learned

USE MORTAR OR ARTY PREVIOUS TO CLEARING LIKELY VC POSITION.

11. Comments by Coy Comd/ Emphasises importance of fully cordoning off en position prior to clearing. In this case a partial cordon was done but the rear was not covered nor the side cordon deep enough.

Comd. [Signature]

Coy Comd. [Signature]

~~SI FILE~~
RAR

Extract of Restricted Document

I-T-I-N-E-R-A-R-Y

For Visit by Hon. A. J. Forbes, M. C. M. P.

Saturday 10 July 1965

1200 - Arrives 173d Abn Bde Heliport (HULB)
1200 - 1220 Briefing by Bde S-3
1220 - 1230 Aerial Tour of Bde Area (HULB)
1230 - 1525 Lunch with 1st RAR and Inspection Tour
1525 - 1530 Travel to ALSG
1530 - 1645 Visit ALSG
1645 - Depart 173d Abn Bde Area

NOTE: Accompanying Mr. Forbes will be COMAAPV, Mr. B. White, CBE
and Lt Col CHA East MBE, psc and AMA.

Extract of Restricted Document

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

1 RAR
BIEN HOA
10 Jul 65

30/1/1(G)

VISIT OF THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR THE ARMY

THE HON. A J FORBES, MC, MP, ON 9 Jul 65

1. The Minister of State for the Army the Hon. A J FORBES, MC, MP, accompanied by COMAAFV Mr. B WHITE CBE and Lt Col C.H.A. EAST MBE will visit 1 RAR at BIEN HOA on 10 Jul 65.
2. The itinerary for the visit is as follows:-

Serial	Time	Event	Remarks
1.	1230 hrs	Arrival at 1 RAR hel pad	
2.	1245 hrs-- 1315 hrs	Lunch in Comd's Mess	To attend-2IC, OCs B Coy, C Coy, D Coy, Sp Coy, Adm Coy, Adjt.
3.	1315 hrs-- 1515 hrs	Inspection of 1 RAR posn in order of Adm Coy, PWLH, B Coy, C Coy, D Coy	
4.	1530 hrs	Departs 1 RAR Car Park for ALSC.	

NOTE:

- (a) Coy Comds are to meet the visitors at the entrance to their position.
- (b) All areas are to be clean and tidy; particular attention will be paid to the tents *and hygiene*
- (c) Only persons on official 'rest' will be inside pl tentage.

Distribution

A Coy
B Coy
C Coy
D Coy
Sp Coy
Adm Coy
PWLH
Det 709 Sig Tp
FAC
LO
CO
2IC
Adjt
CP

Comd's

R. Quire Capt
for Lt Col
CO 1 RAR

Intelligence Section
1RAR
BIEN HOA
SOUTH VIETNAM
11 Jul 65

SUMMARY OF
DOCU NO 1282/BTM/QD111/2/1/K

Subject: Result of Exploitation of Docus seized by 173 Abn Bde during the operation in the area SOUTH of D Battle Zone from 6 - 10 Jul 65.

1. G-2 III Corps Comments

Almost all docus belonged to VC DONG NAI District Committee and consisted of Political Mil Trg propaganda finance and Rear Svc docus. The capture of these docus indicated that the US forces had made a direct hit against a VC base area and destroyed DONG NAI District Committee org.

2. At YF 067273 docus seized belonged to PHU GIAO District Committee and subordinate orgs. The VC force in that area was a 33 man unit subordinate to PHUOC THANH province.

3. Up to 27 Dec 64 VC main force units in NAM BO consisted of fol combat units:

- a. D800 Bn
- b. C4 Seperate Coy
- c. C6 Seperate Coy
- d. Sp and tech units such as C435 Coy.

Conclusion: In Zone D we may expect to encounter the max resistance of the fol units NOT counting main force.

- a. 1 Inf Bn and 2 Seperate Coys (Zone level)
- b. C303 Territorial Coy of PHUOC THANH Province.

IO 1RAR's comment: This is more commonly termed regional force rather than territorial, though the word in VIETNAMESE is the same.

- c. 3 territorial coys of district level at DONG NAI, TAN UYEN and PHU GIAO districts.
- d. A number of base protection units of unknown str and composition.

4. Among captured docus was a note book which made the fol observations:

" On 11/5/65Previously the SOVIET UNION led the liberation mov against Imperialism - But the USSR is still administering the Revisionism. Today, RED CHINA has replaced the USSR in the mission of ldg the liberation mov against the Imperialists".

Subject: Report on the interrogation of suspected VC captured by the US op forces in TAN UYEN within 3 days 7,8,9 Jul 65.

5. Recapitulation

- a. 1 forced labourer, member of DONG NAI district committee.
- b. 1 liaison member MY LOC Village C13.
- c. 34 VC Suspects (including 15 children).

6. Exploited Info

- a. MY LOC Village chapter
 - Chapter Sec NAMLUN
 - Guerrilla: 3 persons
- b. TAN TICH V illage Chapter
 - (1) Chapter secretary NAM BUN
 - (2) Assistant TUAN
 - (3) Guerrilla (4 men) NGHIA, ANH, BINH, BANH
 - (4) Wpns 3 rifles
 - (5) Hiding Area YT 023210
- c. DONG NAI District Committee
 - (1) Cadre unknown
 - (2) Str 53 persons (many female youths)
 - (3) Hiding Area YT075276
- d. DONG NAI District Forces
 - (1) Unit often reported in this area
 - (a) Str 70
 - (b) Org Unknown
 - (2) BN 0800 (APO)
 - (a) Str approx 400
 - (b) Org 4 coys
 - (c) Hiding loc Along DAT CUOC Rd.

Subject: Personnel roster and wpns of 2nd Pl 1/248 Coy.

7. This chart gives 19 names with aliases, wpns and serial numbers of wpns.

a.	AR	1
b.	SMG	2
c.	US SMG	1.
d.	Automatic	1.
e.	Carbine	2.
f.	US Rifle	5.
g.	Russian Rifle	7.

8.

VC DONG NAI District is composed of 7 villages.

	<u>Name</u>	<u>Code Name</u>
a.	THUONG LANG	HT A/50K
b.	TAN TICH	HT B/50K
c.	MY LOC	HT C/50K
d.	TAN HOA	HT D/50K
e.	BINH MY	HT E/50K
f.	TAM LAP	HT F/50K
g.	LAC AN	HT I/50K

9. Org Elm and Str of VC DONG NAI District Committee


- a. Mil Sector Code No C365 - HT 623514 - HT 75/90 B (New)
5 members.
- b. Finance Section 3 members
- c. Security preservation 6 members
- d. Comms and Postal Sec 5 members
- e. Rear Svcs Sec
 - (1) Production 3 members
 - (2) Manager 4 members
- f. Battle fd sec 13 members
- g. Summary of PHUOC THANH District Committee and guard section,
with code names.

CD

29

MAT
CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS



ALL
THE
WAY

173RD

AIRBORNE BDES



OP ORD

10

18-65

MAT
CLASSIFICATION

MAT

Copy No 29
Hq 173d Abn Bde (Sep)
Bien Hoa, RVN
171200H July 1965
RMN

OPERATION ORDER 18-65

References: Same as OPORD 17-65

TASK ORGANIZATION:

TF 1/503:

1/503d Inf
One (1) Squad, 173d Engr Co
2 Vietnamese Police
2 Scout Dog Teams (3 men, 2 dogs)
One (1) Detachment, 3d RRU
One (1) Detachment, 172d MI

TF 2/503:

2/503d Inf
One (1) Squad, 173d Engr Co
2 Vietnamese Police
2 Scout Dog Teams (3 men, 2 dogs)
One (1) Detachment, 3d RRU
One (1) Detachment, 172d MI

TF 3/319:

3/319th Arty
One (1) Section, Mortar Plat, 1/503d Inf
Composite Plat, 173d Spt Bn (40 men) (Effective 230600H Jul 65)
One (1) Detachment, 3d RRU

TF 1/RAR: (Bde Reserve)

1/RAR

TF D/16th Armor (Captain Jordan, Commanding)

D/16th Armor
E/17th Cav
Engr Det, 173d Engr Co
One (1) Detachment, 3d RRU
One (1) Detachment, 172d MI

TF Rear (Lt Col Staigers, Commanding)

173d Spt Bn
HHC
173d Engr Co (-)
1/503 (Rear)
2/503 (Rear)
E/17 (Rear)
D/16 (Rear)

MAT is a Vietnamese classification equivalent to SECRET and will be handled accordingly.

This document is regraded CONFIDENTIAL upon termination of operation and may be destroyed. No certificates of destruction required by this headquarters.

184F/173/3/JUL'65 MAT

1. SITUATION:

MAT

a. Enemy (Annex A, Intelligence)

b. Friendly:

(1) U.S. Air Force provides tactical air support to 173d Abn Bde.

(2) 145th Avn Bn provides direct support aircraft to 173d Abn Bde.

2. MISSION: 173d Abn Bde conducts search and destroy operations in TAOR 18-65 commencing 220300H Jul 65 to find, fix and destroy Viet Cong forces, supplies and equipment (Annex F, Operation Overlay).

3. EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operations: 173d Abn Bde conducts search and destroy operations in five (5) phases.

Phase I -- TF 1/503, 2/503 and D/16 move by convoy to Assembly Area Position QUEEN (vic coord XT 9724) commencing D-Day H-Hour (211400H July 65)

Phase II -- TF 1/503, 2/503 and D/16 cross LP 0800 hours D+1 (220800 Jul 65) and conduct search and destroy operation through D+5 (26 Jul 65).

Phase III -- TF 3/319 displaces to Position KING by echelon on D+2 (23 Jul 65)

Phase IV -- TF 1/503 and 2/503 are extracted by airlift and TF D/16 conducts river crossing on D+5 (26 July 1965).

Phase V -- TF 3/319 returns to Base Camp on completion of extraction.

b. TF 1/503:

(1) Secure Position ACE NLT 1200 hrs D+5 (261200H Jul 65)

(2) Link up with TF 2/503 at Check Point (YT 091226) NLT 1300 hrs D+5 (261300H Jul 65) and assist passage of TF 2/503.

(3) Cover extraction of TF 2/503 which commences 1430 hrs D+5 (261430H Jul 65).

(4) Prepare for your extraction from Position ACE to commence immediately after extraction of TF 2/503

c. TF 2/503:

(1) Link up with TF 1/503 at Check Point (YT 091226) NLT 1300 hrs D+5 (261300H Jul 65)

(2) Extract by airlift from secured Position ACE commencing 1430 hrs D+5 (261430H Jul 65)

d. TF 3/319:

(1) Provide direct support fires to TF initially from present positions.

(2) Move by echelon to Position KING on D+2 (23 Jul 65)

(3) Be prepared to release attached security force to parent-unit control on Bde order.

MAT

MAT

- (4) Return to present position by convoy upon completion of extraction of TF 1/503 on D+5.
 - (5) Annex C, Fire Support.
- e. TF D/16:
- (1) Initially attached to TF REAR for convoy security to Position QUEEN, released on Bde order.
 - (2) Screen Bde South (right) flank from D+1 to D+5.
 - (3) Select crossing sites vic YT 0719.
 - (4) Conduct river crossing NLT 1200 hrs D+5 (261200H Jul 65) and return to Base Camp.
- f. TF Rear:
- (1) TF D/16 attached D-Day (21 Jul 65) for convoy security, detached on Bde order.
 - (2) Move TF 1/503 and 2/503 to Position QUEEN commencing D-Day H-Hour (211400H Jul 65). Close vehicles back to Base Camp NLT 1900 hrs D-Day (211900H Jul 65).
 - (3) Provide composite platoon (40 men) to TF 3/319 for security NLT 0600 hrs D+2 (230600H Jul 65). Platoon will revert to your control on Bde order.
 - (4) Provide special demolition teams to assist in destruction of fortified positions on call.
 - (5) Be prepared to assume responsibility for rear area security upon commitment of Bde reserve.
- g. TF 1/RAR:
- (1) Bde Reserve
 - (2) Outpost C3 and C4 area of Base Camp until committed.
 - (3) Be prepared to provide a company-size Ready Reaction force on one hour notice and a Battalion-size Ready Reaction force on a six hour notice. Be prepared for commitment in following priority:
 - (a) Block to the North-East of the TAOR vic Position TRUMP.
 - (b) Assume the mission of either TF 1/503 or 2/503.
- f. Coordinating Instructions:
- (1) Sequence of Events (Annex E).
 - (2) Move to Position QUEEN by convoy under control of TF REAR.
 - (3) Occupy assigned sectors of Psn QUEEN.
 - (4) Cross LD 0800 hrs D+1 (220800H Jul 65).
 - (5) Conduct search and destroy operations in sector as follows:
D+1: to PL DOG
D+2: to PL RAT
D+3: to PL DEER

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D+4: to PL MOOSE

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D+5: to Psn ACE

- (6) Report locations every hour using Points of Origin (Annex D, Operation Overlay).
- (7) TF 1/503 and 2/503 will employ one (1) 81mm Mortar per rifle company. 4.2 Mortars, with sufficient personnel to service all tubes will remain in present (rear) locations except one section, complete, from 1/503 attached to TF 3/319.
- (8) Viet Cong Captive Collection Point (VCCCP) vic YT 020150.
- (9) The following challenge and passwords will be used in the operational area during the execution of OPORD 18-65 only:

CHALLENGE

PASSWORD

211200 to 221200 = BIRD	Use the name of any bird found in U.S.
221200 to 231200 = GIRL	Use any Girl's first name
231200 to 241200 = TREE	Use the name of any tree
241200 to 251200 = CIGARETTE	Use the name of any U.S. brand
251200 to 261200 = DANCE	Use the name of any popular dance
261200 to 271200 = CLOTHING	Use the name of any item of clothing
271200 to 281200 = SPORT	Use the name of any popular sport

ALTERNATES

Color = Any color

Weather = Weather condition (i.e., sunshine, rain, snow, etc.)

- (10) Attachments effective 0800 hrs D-Day D-Day (210800H Jul 65) unless otherwise stated.
- (11) Information concerning extraction will be furnished on D+4. Plan on 50 slicks.
- (12) D-Day H-Hour = 211400H Jul 65. D-Day is subject to change on short notice.
- (13) Use Operations Code KAC-HE 734/TSEC for reporting casualties and requesting evacuation helicopters. Spare groups of the Operations Code are assigned the following meaning; Spare Number 1 - LITTER, Spare Number 2 - WALKING

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: Annex F

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5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Signal:

- (1) SOI item 20-6 (Radio Nets)
- (2) Operations Code KAC HE-734 in effect.
- (3) Admin Log Net operational 0600-2200 hours D+1 thru D+5.

b. Command:

- (1) Bde main CP - present location
- (2) Bde TAG CP airborne
- (3) TF report CP locations when established.

Acknowledge


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Annexes:

- A - Intelligence
- B - Not Used
- C - Fire Support
- D - Operations Overlay
- E - Sequence of Events
- F - Admin and Log
- G - Y = Not Used
- Z - Distribution

Distribution: Annex Z, Distribution

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Bien Hoa, RVN
171200 July 65
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Annex A (Intelligence) to OPORD 18-65

Reference: Maps: Vietnam Series L701, sheet 6344 II OPORD:

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION. War Zone "D" is a known VC base with forces of from squad to regimental size operating therein or within short reinforcing distance. The area north of the Dong Nai River and west of the Song Be River is a known VC storage and supply area. The following VC company size units permanently operate in the area:

C300 (Phouc Thanh) Regional Co
C303 (Dong Nai) Regional Co
C9 (D Zone Security Co
C1 Logistical Security Co East Zone
C2 Logistical Security Co East Zone

The following Main Force units temporarily encamp in the area:

C4 Company - Eastern Zone
C6 Company - Eastern Zone
D800 Battalion
Q 762 Regiment

Any or all of these units may be encountered, however, it is thought that only C4 and C6 are currently in the area of operation.

2. EEI and other Intelligence Requirements

a. EEI

(1) What is the location, disposition and strength of enemy forces in the area?

(2) What is the identity of enemy forces in the area?

(3) What are the enemies intentions?

b. Other Intelligence Requirements.

(1) Where are the enemies caches?

(2) What is the enemies morale?

(3) How many casualties has the enemy suffered?

(4) What is the nationality of foreign troops with the Viet Cong?

(5) Where are the enemies withdrawal routes?

3. ORDERS AND REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION. All units will report immediately all enemy contact.

4. MISCELLANEOUS. Viet Cong captives will be evacuated to the Viet Cong Captives Collection Point (VCCCP) by the most expeditious means.

a. Viet Cong Captive tags will indicate any hostile action taken against friendly forces by that VCC and whether the VCC was armed when captured.

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Annex A (Intelligence) to OPORD 18-65

b. (1) All captured documents, or groups of documents captured in one general location, will be tagged to include date/time, place, place of capture and capturing unit.

(2) Documents captured with VCC will be evacuated by the guard evacuating the VCC. The tag with the document will bear the name or VCC number so as to relate the document with the VCC.

(3) Documents taken from VC KIA will be so indicated on the tag.

c. The following enemy material is of specific interest:

(1) 7.62 mm Assault carbines and sub machine guns

(2) Medicine of other than RVN manufacture

(3) Communications equipment

(4) Steel helmets

(5) Enemy uniforms bearing insignia

(6) All automatic weapons, mortars, and recoilless weapons.

(7) Artillery

(8) Military vehicles (Civilian vehicle license numbers will be photographed or noted.)

(9) All munitions of a caliber larger than 30 caliber will be photographed and destroyed.

d. Requests for maps and air photos may be submitted verbally to Brigade S2.

e. Only authorized signs and countersigns and authorized codes will be used. Friendly casualty information will not be transmitted in the clear. Compromise of signs, countersigns or codes will be reported to Brigade S2 immediately.

f. An ISUM for the entire operation will be submitted by participating units with 48 hours after completion of the operation. Participating units will not submit ISUMS during the operation. Non participating units will continue to submit daily ISUMS.

g. (1) Det 1 3d RRU will attach teams to each participating infantry battalion and artillery battalion.

(2) 172d MI will attach 3 man MI teams to each participating infantry battalion and an operational team to the screening force.

(3) Extreme caution will be taken in the recovery of enemy material and equipment to avoid ambushes and booby traps.

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Annex A (Intelligence) to OPORD 18-65

h. Natural E & E routes exist to the South, personnel becoming lost or separated should attempt to move South to the Dong Nai River. Search will be concentrated in that area.

i. Village locations in the area are attached as Appendix 1 and 2.

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Appendix 1 (Villages and Fortifications) to ANNEX A to OPORD 18-65

Following are descriptions of villages and fortifications found in area of operation. Locations are shown on Appendix 2 (Overlay).

1. Two old "U" shaped bunkers w/overhead cover
2. Abandoned village w/ten huts
3. Abandoned village w/thirteen huts
4. VC village w/twenty-five huts est. to accomodate 800 VC
5. VC village w/fifteen huts
6. VC village w/ten huts
7. Four new bunkers w/overhead cover
8. VC village w/ten huts (huts were booby trapped w/home made mines)
9. VC village w/sharp bamboo stakes driven in ground for an est. 150 meters around village.
10. Village w/six huts in groups of twos. Area consisted of tunnels and pits. Each hut had an underground chamber w/tunnels leading away. Considered a possible staging camp for VC.
11. VC village w/eight huts (numerous trenches and bunkers were located in area)
12. VC camp surrounded by extensive trench system. Tunnels and pits were inter-connecting inside the perimeter with tunnels leading outside perimeter.
13. Bunker/pit complex est. to accomodate 200-300 VC. Pits were facing to the west. Area considered to be used for an ambush site.
14. VC camp w/approx twenty huts. Camp was surrounded by extensive trench and bunker system.
15. VC village w/seven huts
16. Small hamlet w/four huts. Pits were in area and appeared to be used for bomb protection.
17. Long single line of wpn pits (two men positions)
18. Layout of wpn pits covering approx 10,000 sq yards.
19. Area contained several semi-permanent huts (protective positions had been dug in area)
20. Hamlet consisting of four huts. Extensive inter-connecting defensive type tunnels were located in the area.
21. VC hamlet w/six huts
22. VC hamlet w/seven huts
23. An organized VC encampment w/four huts in area.
24. A forge and smith shop capable of fashioning crude implements.

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Appendix 1 (Villages and Fortifications) to ANNEX A to OPORD 18-65

25. VC cadre Training Camp w/well constructed inter-connecting bunkers and tunnels.

26. Several small huts which had recently been occupied.

27. VC village w/twelve huts. Numerous inter-connecting tunnels were located in the area.

28. VC hamlet w/three huts


29. Extensive tunnel network w/inter-connecting tunnels running through ridge.

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Annex 2 (Villages and Fortifications) to Annex A
(Intelligence) to OPR 18-65

Reference: Map, V. Area, 1:50,000
SP 16, 4 II

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
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
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Appendix 2 (Villages and Fortifications) to Annex A
(Intelligence) to OPOD 18-65

References: Maps, V. Area, 1:50,000
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Appendix 2 (Villages and Fortifications) to Annex A (Intelligence) to
OPORD 18-65

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Bien Hoa, RVN
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RMN

Annex C (Fire Support) to OPO RD 18-65

References: Maps 1:50,000, 6344 II & 6343 I

Time Zone: Hotel.

1. SITUATION: OPO RD 18-65.

2. MISSION: 173d Abn Bde (Sep) conducts search and destroy operations in TAOR 18-65, commencing 220300 H July 1965, to find, fix, and destroy Viet Cong forces, supplies and equipment; and conduct extraction from LZ ACE on D+5 (Annex D OPO RD 18-65).

3. EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operations:

(1) General: OPO RD 18-65.

(2) Maneuver: OPO RD 18-65.

(3) Fire Support:

(a) TF 3/319th provides continuous fire in support of OPERATION 18-65.

(b) TAC AIR available on request through Bde Command Net. Pre-planned strikes requested 24 hours in advance.

(c) Bde Light Fire Team on request through Bde Command Net.

(d) Target List dated 4 June 65 (as amended) will be used.

(e) AGS (Area Grid System) Appendix I to annex C (Fire Support) to OPO RD 18-65 will be used to clear areas of fire. Tick Marks in effect for OPO RD 18-65 upper right corner 13-38, lower left 97-14.

(4) Air Support: TBA

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS: Annex F.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: OPO RD 18-65.

Acknowledge:

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APPENDIX:

I - Area Grid System

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 HEADQUARTERS 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE)
 APO SAN FRANCISCO 96250

12 Copies

RIABN

27 July 1965

CRITIQUE OF OPORD 17-65

The following is a critique of OPORD 17-65 conducted on Sunday, 11 July 1965 at the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), Bien Hoa Base Camp.

This has been reproduced for study purposes. Through this approach it is hoped that we can improve future operations.

file

Ellis Williamson

ELLIS W. WILLIAMSON
 Brig Gen, U.S. Army
 Commanding

spares to Sgt O'Shea to detail
C.O. has copy

CRITIQUE NOTES

General Williamson - Brigade Commanding General

Gentlemen we will conduct this critique in a manner similar to the others. The orders have been issued and duly executed. You are now completely free and expected to speak your piece even to the point of saying that you think I was nuts in issuing such orders. We are here to learn from the experience of the past few days. We must perfect and repeat those things that went well. We must replace or materially modify those things that did not go as well as they should have.

In all candor I must admit that I did not expect us to find as many enemy in that area as we did. The maneuver was set this way; by helicopter to jump across the river behind the enemy and force him towards the river. We moved the artillery down to the river bank. The artillery, as you recall, was protected by strong attachments so that it could concentrate on shooting, rather than on local security. At our request the 48th RVN Regiment moved in on our west flank into blocking positions. I thought that was a real smart move. As it turned out, I could have been a lot smarter. The RVN went in the right place, they did a good job. I'll tell you later on why I think we should have gone a bit further.

We put battalion size task forces in three different landing zones. The first landing zone was prepared by artillery fires and air strikes. Immediately after the armed chopper strafing runs and recon, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry went in on the eastern most LZ. Just as quickly as we could shift our artillery and air support the 1st Battalion, 503d

Infantry and the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment landed in succession in two separate zones west of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry.

The operation went very nicely. As you all know we found more than we expected. When the enemy finally started breaking and trying to get out he initially tried to move towards some of our other formations that were in blocking positions to the west. We later got indications that he was moving towards the east and was pointed towards our open flank. That night I requested the III Corps Commander, General Vien, to give me another RVN Battalion. I was afraid that the enemy would escape through the open flank or would try to mix with the civilians who lived in the town at the river bank and use that tactic as a safe haven. He knew very well that our troops were not prepared to tell friend from foe in village fighting. General Vien reacted much quicker and better than I had requested. I thought maybe he would have duplicated the existing policy of coordinated but separate forces. The RVN force on the west was not under my command, it was a cooperative affair. At eight o'clock at night when I asked for the Battalion, General Vien gave it to me, lock stock and barrel with no strings at all with respect to command structure. He said it's yours, use it as you see fit. The Battalion was moved from some 50 kilometers away and arrived here in this area between one and two o'clock at night. At seven o'clock the next morning, we helicopter lifted it over the river and put it in position with the mission of insuring that the enemy could not get in among the civilian populace. The operation continued, we moved on to the river. Apparently we mauled and pretty well beat up the D 800 enemy battalion.

As the battalion commanders talk about it, I hope we will learn just how it worked. From all indications we did a good job. We did a lot of things well, a lot of things that we could not even have considered six weeks ago. As you recall when we first arrived in Vietnam we started off doing one thing at a time. On this operation, at the extraction time, we took right at three thousand troops out of three different landing zones in three hours and ten minutes. We couldn't have moved troops that fast or afford to bring our troops that close together at one time unless we had a lot going on at one time. One of the things that helped the lift out helicopters to rapidly get to the right spot in the landing zones was the colored helmets and fluorescent vests that were being worn by the guide individuals in the LZ. Other activities protected our position. I say this particularly for the company level people that probably didn't know all that was going on. As I looked at it from above, it was a sight to see. We were withdrawing from the center LZ while some friendly troops were still in the western LZ. We had a helicopter strike going in a circle around the center LZ. The machine gun and rocket firing helicopters kept making their circle smaller and smaller as we withdrew our landing zone security. Just to the west side we had another helicopter strike running north to south. We also had something else that was just a little hairy but it worked without any question, the artillery was firing high angle fire to screen the northern side of the landing zone. The personnel lift helicopters were coming from the east, going under the artillery fire, sitting down in the LZ to pick up troops and leaving by way of the southwest. In addition to that we had an air strike going to the northeast. All of these activities were going on at the same time. We could not have done that a few weeks ago. The only reason we can do this now is that you people in this tent know how to tell exactly where our troops are and the FSCC can coordinate fire and other activities. I've talked too long already, next victim.

Lieutenant Colonel Dexter - Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion (Airborne),
503d Infantry

The mission of the 2d Battalion was to land at D-Day at H-hour on objective 27, to conduct search and destroy missions on D-Day and D+1 in area 2A, D+2 in 2B, D+3 in 2C, and then to extract from objective 29 at 1630 D+3. The Battalion was organized in the normal three rifle companies which ran for this exercise at approximately 182 with attachments, which is lower than we normally have because of the shortage of aircraft. We had attached to us the Cavalry Troop, 129 people; and as I did in my last operation, I had my Headquarters Company organized into a small rifle company of two platoons, the Reconnaissance Platoon and Mortar Platoon, for a total of 94 people. The Battalion Command group with attachments ran another 43 people for a total of 812 people within the battalion.

My plan for securing the LZ was for B Company to land first, push to the north of the LZ and seize two objectives. They were followed immediately by Headquarters Company with their two small platoons which moved south and seized an objective there (pointing). Then we pushed A Company in to the northwest, C Company to the northeast, and Cavalry Troop to the east screening. That day was spent with the three rifle companies pushing to the northern boundary, and closing back that night around objective 27. We encountered no opposition except a couple snipers. We did, however, uncover in the immediate vicinity of the landing zone numerous newly prepared positions which could have given us a hot time, had they been occupied by the Viet Cong at the time of our landing. We found numerous camps with new storage bunkers. Captain Hall in his area, for instance, found some storage buildings that were dug into the ground with new tin roofs and which contained stored rice. The storage bins were lined with green leaves, so obviously very recently the Viet Cong were in there building up supplies. That night, as I mentioned, we closed in around the LZ and had a quiet night.

On D+1 we fought two major engagements and one minor engagement, and I will spend most of my time discussing this particular day. My plan was to sweep south with four companies abreast, A Company on the west, then Companies B and C and the Cavalry troop on the east, all sweeping to the southern boundary of area 2A. Headquarters Company was to follow C Company. We had asked for an air strike for eight o'clock that morning, up on our final objectives for the day. The request went in the night before but was turned down just before 0800 that morning. Later on we heard that it was turned down because of a higher priority mission, but that it was re-scheduled for nine o'clock, but we never got the word. Communication was never established with our forward air control people for the nine o'clock strike, so it too was cancelled. I believe that if that strike had gone in, it might have had some effect on the VC decision to stay and fight us that day.

We started our sweep south. At about ten o'clock, B Company ran into a fortified village. I would like to sketch this briefly for you. This village had a system of trenches all around it. It also had covered tunnels throughout the area and several sheds above ground--just roofs, no sides. There were at least two automatic weapons in bunkers. B Company

was coming from the north in a wedge formation. The lead platoon was commanded by First Lieutenant Zinn, the point squad by Sergeant Lopez. Sergeant Lopez approached the village but could not see it because it was very well camouflaged. An automatic weapon opened fire a little bit to his left front. The fire hit his squad and killed Private Johnson and wounded another man in the squad. The squad hit the ground and was almost immediately attacked by 12 to 16 VC who jumped out of their positions and ran forward towards them. The squad opened fire with fire and grenades. They counted seven VC knocked down in this particular brief engagement. They stopped the VC. The platoon leader, Lieutenant Zinn, was immediately behind the point squad. He came forward and was killed very quickly by automatic fire. The Company Commander, Lieutenant Bennett, forward to find out what was going on. Sergeant Davis, the platoon sergeant, took command of the platoon. Sergeant Davis began to move the second squad under Sergeant Howard around to the left. Sergeant Howard was killed. The platoon was rather effectively pinned down at this time. The company commander called Sergeant Ku, the commander of the left rear platoon and told him to move around to the left and to try and get the VC from that location. Sergeant Ku moved out.

In the meantime Sergeant Davis attempted to find the machine gun. He deliberately exposed himself three times, ran around and tried to get the machine gun to fire at him. He finally located it. After three attempts to find it he crawled back to the company commander and said, "I've got it", but he was exhausted. Some time around this time one of our privates was killed by sniper fire. He had five bullet holes in the back of his helmet; damn good shooting on somebody's part.

When the firing first started, I sent my S2, Captain Warfield, up to try and find out what information he could. Captain Warfield went up with a squad from the mortar platoon. He got there about the time Sergeant Davis got back to the company commander. Captain Warfield got together with Sergeant Davis and Sergeant Schempt. The three of them went back to knock out the machine gun. This was the fourth time for Sergeant Davis to go forward. They got up there but were unsuccessful at this time in knocking it out.

In the mean time let's go back to Sergeant Ku. Sergeant Ku had worked his platoon around to the left and gotten into position when another machine gun opened up on him. They thought the first machine gun was a .50 caliber because it had a very low, slow cycling rating, while the second one was thought to be a .30 caliber. Sergeant Ku was able to find the second gun, and fired an M72 at it. He did not succeed in knocking it out, but very shortly after he fired at it, the VC counterattacked him. He was deploying his platoon to assault at the time, and they repulsed the counter-attack. Under cover of the counterattack, he could see the VC withdrawing the machine gun and carrying off many bodies. Immediately as they pulled back, he pushed on and got to the edge of the village.

In the meantime the company had called for a Dust Off helicopter to try to evacuate the wounded, but the wounded were pinned down. Dust Off was orbiting around up there, so the company commander, Lieutenant Bennett, asked him if he had armed helicopters with him, which he did. Lieutenant Bennett got the armed choppers on the radio and brought them in on the

village. Captain Warfield, Sergeant Davis and Sergeant Schempt were up quite close to the machine gun at this time. They marked their positions with smoke, and from this Lieutenant Bennett talked the choppers in and hit the village, within 50 yards of where Captain Warfield, Sergeant Davis and Sergeant Schempt were lying, and the VC's pulled out. The two platoons swept on through the village. The right rear platoon had attempted to get around to the right but took a long time and never was effectively involved in the fight.

Company B fired 42,000 rounds of ammunition in this fight, both 5.56 and 7.62. In mopping up, they saw bodies being dragged out. In one case, Sergeant Lopez saw a man go down in a hole, and he came right after him and threw a grenade down in it. He later went down in the hole but it didn't go any where and there was no body there. It must have contained a trap door, but it was never found. I might mention that while this fight was going on, I stopped the movement of Alpha and Charlie Companies and they set up "L" type ambushes on both sides hoping to catch the escaping enemy, however, the enemy did get away.

Now how much was in there? I would say by U.S. standards that this village would normally be defended by a platoon. The fact that they had two automatic weapons makes me think that it was probably conducted by a larger force than this. Also the fact that they had to have enough people to carry off the bodies. I gave the estimate of a platoon at the time but I think it was more probably a VC company. We could be conservative and say there was at least a platoon in there, plus at least a squad of snipers in the trees behind the village.

After this action, the wounded and dead were evacuated to an LZ. We got choppers in to evacuate them and bring in a resupply of ammunition. Because this was going to take time, I told A and C Companies to move on out and passed Headquarters Company through B Company continuing to the south toward the objectives of the day.

I would like to comment that I feel that the enemy in this case made a gross mistake. He violated the basic rule of the guerrilla, which is never to fight when he doesn't have every thing going on his side. I don't know why he stood and fought in this village, because it was not too far from the LZ and he must have had a good idea of how much strength we had. He chose to stay and fight. This convinces me that he was not a guerrilla, but a main line unit. He got the hell kicked out of him. The spirit of our men was tremendous, both during the action and afterwards. I came up a few minutes after they got in the village, and there was no sigh of any shock on any part of the men. They were busy going about their business. They had established security and were cleaning out the village, burning it down, cleaning out the tunnels, throwing hand grenades down them, with everybody performing professionally. However, it did cost us. We had five killed, four from B Company, and eight wounded.

I would like to mention very briefly a side affair in this particular action. The night before, the Cavalry troop had sent out an ambush patrol. This particular patrol apparently strayed a little too far, and that morning when we jumped off, we had a report of five men missing from the Cavalry Troop. We didn't know where they were. They had come west and had

stumbled across a cache of arms. This cache had 17 shoulder fired weapons, three PRC6 and one PRC10 Radios. The NCO in charge had left three men there, and he and another man started to try and get back and get some other people to help carry this cache of weapons. They came in on the back side of the village where B Company had its fight. Private First Class Rice from Cavalry Troop was shot and seriously wounded and died later before he could be evacuated. So that was the fifth man killed in this action. B Company linked up with the NCO right after the action, sent a patrol over, found the cache, and brought the weapons and radios back along with the three other men from the Cavalry Troop.

We continued the movement of the battalion to the south. C Company arrived on its objective first, with the Cavalry Troop arriving on its objective around the same time. I might mention that the Cavalry Troop that morning surrounded a VC. He refused to surrender and blew himself up with a grenade. When C Company arrived on its objective, they sent platoon sized patrols out to search. One platoon led by Sergeant First Class Crabtree came to a village and was fired upon. The platoon deployed, went through and captured the village, drove the VC out and definitely killed one that they saw and several others that they thought were killed. The platoon had two wounded, and thus they became faced with an evacuation problem. Luckily they were walking wounded.

Company A in the meantime pushed on to its objective, and in the process of destroying some rice, one man got burned by a grenade. The Company Commander, Captain Stang, was also faced with the problem of how to evacuate this casualty in the jungle. About this time General Williamson's chopper arrived overhead, entered the battalion command net, and helped considerably in the communication. I was then moving through the jungle with a short antenna and was having difficulty communicating. Captain Stang threw smoke to identify his position and asked the General's Aide in the chopper if he could tell him where the nearest LZ was for evacuation. This turned out to be a large rice paddy running across the battalion front several hundred meters due south of Captain Stang's position in Area 2B. Captain Stang requested permission from me to move one platoon down there to evacuate his wounded man, which I granted. Shortly thereafter, Captain Stang called again and asked permission to move the whole company to the rice paddy, since he felt that there was considerable enemy activity in the area, and he wanted a stronger force. About that time C Company also called and asked permission to move down to the rice paddy to evacuate their wounded. On the basis of this I made probably the best tactical decision I made in the whole problem, to move the whole Battalion to the rice paddy, even though we were not suppose to go into that area until the next day. Inasmuch as the CG's chopper was doing the relay and I got no denial of permission here, I assumed that permission was granted. This movement to the rice paddy in Area 2B brought on the next big fight, which was initially by A Company, and eventually involved about two-thirds of the battalion. I would like to describe this in some detail if I might.

Company A was moving down from the high ground to the open field in a two up and one back formation, and they ran into a classic "L" type ambush. From Captain Stang's description, this must have included at least two different VC companies, because they had two different uniforms. The VC to

the front along the base of the "L" wore fatigues, steel helmets and packs on their backs. Along the stem of the "L" to the left flank of A Company, they wore khakis with blue bandannas on their heads. Now actually A Company discovered the VC first. The left front platoon of A Company was commanded by Lieutenant Lancaster. His point man crossed a small trail and noticed that the brush was bent down recently across the trail, so he got down on his hands and knees and crawled across. When he got up he saw a VC in khakis moving away. The point man jumped up and shot the VC, and this triggered the VC on the base of the "L" to fire. These VC were not dug in; they were lying on the ground. However, they had placed mines out in front of them, and grenades were put up in trees where they could be pulled to go off in the air, so the position was well protected. Lieutenant Bouldin's right front platoon got into the fight. He deployed to conduct an assault to the front. Just as he started to get ready to assault, the VC along the stem of the "L" to the left opened up, and Lieutenant Bouldin's platoon got caught in a cross fire. There were at least two automatic weapons across the front, and another opened up near the rear of the stem cutting a tree down behind Captain Stang which fell and knocked him over. He was convinced that this must have been at least a .50 caliber. So Lieutenant Bouldin's assault failed. They were pinned before they got started. Captain Stang then called back to Sergeant First Class Barker, the commander of the rear platoon, and told him to move around to the left and assault the stem of the "L", which he did successfully. He moved out, deployed, assaulted, and forced the VC, along with the heavy machine gun, out of their prepared positions.

By this time Captain Stang had ten casualties, one of them, Private First Class Meehan, a medic, very seriously wounded. There was a total of four litter cases and six walking. Captain Stang called Lieutenant Lancaster and told him that his left front platoon had to break through to a small entrenched knob to their left front just beyond the hinge of the "L" and break loose the VC to their front. About this time the company commander got communications with an armed chopper, which came in and had a very effective strike. With the help of that Lieutenant Lancaster pushed through, emptying about seven magazines himself in the process. His platoon seized the entrenched knob and forced the withdrawal of the VC to the front. Captain Stang immediately reorganized and began movement down to the rice paddy, using one rifle platoon as litter bearers and his weapon platoon as rear security.

In the meantime let's get back to the rest of the battalion. B Company had finished reorganizing and resupplying at the village and started out to follow Headquarters Company. I was with B Company at the time of the decision to move the Battalion to the rice paddy. I instructed Headquarters Company to hold in place and I would push B Company through them again. In the jungle the two companies missed each other, so I later call Headquarters Company and told them to continue to the rice paddy. As it turned out, B Company was the first unit to arrive at the rice paddy, and C Company broke out in the open a little while thereafter. A Company's fight took place during the latter stages of B Company's move to the rice paddy. As we were getting down there, Captain Stang called me and asked me to move a company along the rice paddy to where he was going to come out, because he had the VC following him. So I directed B Company to move over there and go into

position, which they did. Now we had an interesting affair. We had what you call a concentration on the field of battle. Captain Stang came out of the woods from the north, Company B came up from the east, and the two of them got tied in together rapidly forming up a line. The VC followed Captain Stang out of the jungle, and about that time Headquarters Company, also coming out of the jungle a little to the east, hit the VC on the flank in a engulfing engagement. So the VC caught it from the front and the flank as they came out into the open. Headquarters Company did a very fine job for themselves. They deployed rapidly and moved in the assault, while A and B stood in their positions in the rice fields and opened on the VC in the open. Frankly I think we cut the hell out of them. They cut to the north and went back into the jungle.

By this time it was getting quite late in the day. I called C Company and the Cavalry Troop to come to the west and join up with the rest of the Battalion, and we formed a perimeter for the night. We commenced bringing in resupply by helicopter, and this continued until after dark. We got the casualties out, but in this we ran into one problem until the Commanding General personally came in and helped. The CG stayed with A Company on the ground while his chopper made three evacuation runs and one trip in with a resupply of ammunition.

This fight that Captain Stang was involved in lasted an hour and fifty minutes. He had ten wounded. He had three confirmed VC killed and eight that they saw knocked down in the fight and were convinced that they were dead. I think that a good part of a VC battalion was very seriously hurt, and again the aggressiveness of our men was most evident. The A company Commander commented that for an hour the men were assaulting by crawling forward. The mass use of fire power by A Company and then by the whole Battalion, practically two-thirds of it, down at the rice paddy had quite a bit to do to insure the success of this operation.

I shall touch very briefly on the final two days of the action. On D+2 we continued south with our four abreast to sweep the remainder of this area with A, B, C, and Cavalry Troop in order from west to east. As we approached the final position that night, we had had no contact to speak of. C Company came to an open rice paddy that we were going to use for an LZ; and just as they hit it, they were fired on from the other side of the paddy. This was the second platoon of Company C, commanded by Lieutenant Hartle. The platoon reacted in a classic fashion; the first squad immediately returned fire and the other two squads came up on line and by fire and maneuver they crossed over and drove the VC out. The company took the position on the far side and settled down there for the night.

The third day, we continued with four abreast. The Cavalry Troop, immediately upon starting out that day, ran into an "L" shaped ambush. One man was wounded in the hand. They also took over and assaulted and cleaned this out in a very rapid fashion.

The Battalion reached the extraction LZ around 1230 hours, a little bit before our scheduled extraction. All companies were moved into positions and deployed around the LZ. I had planned to have everything organized for the

23
extraction considerably ahead of time, but the extraction was moved up on us over an hour. In fact I had two companies getting into position, actually lined up, and the extraction officers were returning to the other companies to give their instructions when the choppers started landing. (Note: The RAR had gotten into a fight and the extraction was shifted from the RAR LZ to the 2/503d on little or no notice). As a result we got four elements out with no sweat, but when the fifth element came in, we could only fill up about four choppers. We orbited the sixth element for awhile, and we got enough people in after that to keep it going.

I would like to read some statistics as to what 2d Battalion accomplished on this operation. We destroyed 79 buildings of various semi-permanent type. We destroyed 27 tons of rice. This is an estimate and in the future we are going to report rice in terms of cubic feet destroyed rather than tons. We can't estimate weight, but we can estimate size pretty well. We also destroyed 34 domestic animals, including water buffalo, hogs, and chickens. During the Headquarters Company attack, one man reported three elephants on his flank, they were water buffalo. We destroyed one dam or fish weir, recovered four radios and 20 weapons, and we have a definite body count on 9 VC killed with 27 other VC believed killed by testimony of witnesses, and unknown VC casualties in addition to the above. We are certain that there are considerably more. We captured 26 POW's of all ages, male and female, four mines, many booby traps, VC grenades, three new ox carts, and a considerable amount of intelligence information was recovered. We noted that the VC had dynamite, C4, and various US and foreign artillery shells, wire and batteries, and medical supplies. We also recovered a pack of US type which we are convinced belonged to a Private First Class who was reported missing in action here about two weeks previously. There was an empty box of 5.56 ammunition which was the same lot number that B Company had in the previous action.

Commanding General: George, have you been told that one of the documents that you turned in stated that the VC had found the body of this man and had buried it?

Colonel Dexter: I would like to make a few observations about the exercise. We cannot destroy these tunnels. We would have to spend a whole day to adequately destroy those in one small village. They go down as much as twelve feet under ground. As it was, we had a problem getting adequate demolitions. We can destroy everything on top, but getting down under ground is a real difficult problem. Now it's a great danger of course to clean them out, and I recommend the use of some chemical agents, tear gas or something of this nature. We can carry gas masks, and it is a pretty dangerous affair to get men to go down there to get them out.

We had much trouble with air support throughout the exercise. We were turned down on five request, we got three. Air strikes were delayed or cancelled because of weather, higher priority missions, or something of this nature. One of the main things we wanted to accomplish on this exercise was the use of air support, and we didn't get it, or it was late.

The dogs were useless. We did not get any use out of them.

This time the supply worked far better than it has ever before, since every night we were at LZ's and the choppers had a good place to bring in the supplies. Our problems came up in extracting empty water cans in the morning. There are all kinds of reasons why the chopper can't get in - low ceilings and what have you. The morning of the second day, one company left behind a small group of people to extract the water cans. Now the VC's would have paid a high price to get that 81mm mortar and it isn't worth it for a few water cans. In the future if we don't get those aircraft in when we're ready to move out, those cans will be destroyed. I understand that there is no problem on the availability of cans, and I'm not going to leave people back just for that purpose in the future.

Commanding General: I hope by then we will have the plastic cans.

Colonel Dexter: We had some minor problems on Dust-Off and the handling of casualties. Dust-Off came in very quickly in every case, except for one time when Captain Stang came down with his ten casualties. Colonel Brumfield I don't think realizes that he was on the Brigade net giving the longest report that I've ever heard. I think he was reporting squad locations. I kept trying to break in to the net to say that I had an emergency. Finally one of the aircraft picked me up and got the traffic stopped and my message through. The Commanding General got in on the problem soon after that and personally brought his chopper in to help but I think it's possible that one man might have lived, if we had been able to get through on the net sooner.

There is a question of whether we violate security if we call on Dust-Off and say I've got four litter and five walking wounded. Maybe we had better look into some kind of code for this. I tried to give the KIA in code, and never tried to talk about it any other way. But the giving of wounded in the clear is SOP in requesting Dust-Off.

E'm still having trouble on the equipment of these casualties. Somebody on the medical side of this thing has really got to stomp on this. I realize when the casualty gets in, everybody thinks, "lets take care of the casualties", and the equipment gets thrown off on the other side. We still have two weapons missing from Captain Stang's company from evacuated casualties. Now this is something we've got to watch, or the weapons are going to end up staying out in the field. We can't carry them with the people we have left in the field.

From the Battalion's point of view, I see two big problems in the jungle. Both of these actions, when they were triggered, were too close to the enemy for bringing in effective artillery or mortar fire. In all cases the commander and the artillery FO on the spot stated that supporting fire would have caused more casualties among our people than they would have among the enemy, because the enemy were dug in. The mortars might have been able to be walked in, but the mortars have jungle canopy mask clearance to worry about. In both cases the company commanders did use the armed choppers

fairly effectively. I think maybe your own helicopter bombers might be the answer to the problem. (Note: An experiment of dropping 81mm mortar shells from helicopters).

The other problem from the Battalion's point of view is that of concentration of companies in the jungle. If we run into something big enough to require more than one company to handle in the jungle, it is going to be a hell of a problem to tie in two or three companies and really get them in close. I was really sweating this thing out when Art Stang got in his fight and I considered the possibility of bringing another company through the jungle to help him out.

One final comment. We captured prisoners, and I was somewhat shocked to find out that my men stripped some of the prisoners all the way down in searching them. Further, my S4 observed that when the prisoners got back to the rear, they were roughed around a little too much. We are building ourselves some pretty bad propaganda in allowing this to happen among the Americans. I realize that we've got to be careful about prisoners, because they are deadly. But I still feel that they are going to get away sometime and get back and pass the word that the Americans grossly abused the men, women and children when they were captured in this operation. I think we've got to handle this one with kid gloves. We certainly should get a Vietnamese female to search the female prisoners.

In summary I would say the Battalion got well bloodied on this operation. We suffered, including the Cavalry Troop, 6 killed and 31 wounded, but we drove off the VC. When they chose to stand and fight, we drove them off, and when they tried to pursue us, we caught them and kicked the hell out of them. We fought them and hurt them pretty badly, and I'll tell you one thing, I am mighty proud of being the Commander of the 2d Battalion. Thank you.

Major Butler - Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry

We went in right after the 2d Battalion and landed on Objective 5. Our mission was to first secure this landing zone which we did with C Company and elements of Headquarters Company. After securing the LZ, and bringing the rest of the Battalion in we moved out to seize the first day's objectives in the northern most portion of our area. Now the organization of our unit was similar to what the 2d Battalion had. We have 818 present for duty and we took 708 out with us. We did not have all 818 here as we still had people coming up from Vung Tau at the time. We had enough there to man the 4.2's that we left behind. We formed a composite platoon in Headquarters Company, with clerks, cooks, every odd ball we could find in there, most all of them wanted to go, we put them in and used them very effectively. In landing, the choppers did a beautiful job of bringing us in. We landed right on the LZ in the position that we were told to go, and the forming of the companies went very fine. They went out and seized the initial objectives and secured the LZ. We moved out in three companies securing the objectives. Captain Marshall went to the north in this area, and Captain Jackson moved C Company up here and Captain Daniels moved his company initially to this area, he chose to go where he did initially to avoid any possible conflict with the Australians. I would like to mention one thing before I proceed further. The Australians were coming in to an LZ on the west shortly thereafter. We had of course marked our flank in that direction with green smoke, and this has been duly relayed to the choppers. The choppers came in under preparatory fire on the Aussie LZ and by and large they did a real fine job except on one occasion one of them cut loose a little too soon with machine gun fire, and it came through one of Captain Daniel's platoon positions. Fortunately no one was hurt, but dame fortune was smiling on us there. Initially it appeared that we were out there for a cake walk in the area, not a hell of a lot more. There were positions, some recently built, and well used trails in Captain Marshall's area. Evidence of recent occupation of positions, cans of sardines, chinese flashlight batteries from Shang-Hi, and other minor impedimenta found in his area of operation. C Company moved on up here and found nothing in this particular area. Captain Daniel moving up into this area, found a VC village right here that had been fairly recently occupied. He destroyed it, burned what could be burned and blew what could be blown. Again we had the same problem with these villages that Colonel Dexter mentioned. After we had moved into these positions and secured them, I moved C Company back down to the vicinity of Objective 5 and tied in for the night with Headquarters element and the CP group. Captain Daniels had pulled back down to this objective, and stayed there for the night. Captain Marshall moved into this general vicinity and set up for the night. During the night we had really no activity to speak of. One thing that did occur that should be mentioned in Captain Marshall's area (B Company). During the night and I don't know exactly when, the VC came in and set up two Chinese claymores on his flank, and about two o'clock in the morning a God awful sound came about, but no one was hurt. The next morning at day light, Captain Marshall sent someone to investigate and found the second claymore that was in the vicinity of the first, this second one had been hit by the first explosion and cut the detonating wires. There were also pieces of fragments in the rear, so the second one did not explode. He got this one out through intelligence channels. We continued the second day's operation, moving the companies back down to this position and just as we were about to move the Battalion (-) out, one man was shot by a sniper, and very fortunately the Commanding General was out there at this time

and within a minute after the man was shot, we put him on the CG's chopper and took him back in. Unfortunately, the man died as a result of the shot. Going up to the place where the man was shot, and checking the circumstances under which he was shot, I'm convinced that he was shot due to his own damn fault. He went up to the trail and sat on the trail, and the VC, approximately 75 or 100 meters down the trail, plugged him right through the chest. Now this had been made clear, and I think well made, with the troops of this outfit that when picking a place to set up security during movement, that we shouldn't pick a trail to sit on. To compound this man's felony, he was looking in the opposite direction out towards the LZ which had been secured for 24 hours. The Battalion continued to move in a southerly direction at this time. With still no contact with any enemy at that time. I say we continued to move, we continued to move with two companies. Captain Marshall (the third rifle company) had to wait about three hours for resupply. This is the only problem on resupply that I had during the operation. We didn't have any water resupply, we used streams with no problems at all. It was very fine. We used iodine tablets and stream water, and it tasted pretty good. The resupply did finally get in about ten o'clock after we had started calling for it about nine, and after Captain Marshall was resupplied he moved out. As we moved up into up into here, our night objectives, I was going to stop B Company in this area, but Captain Marshall requested to go on down to this area (pointing), to which I agreed. As we moved in, it was getting fairly close to dark, about 1800 if I remember correctly and as he moved into this area, he had his company deploy sort of a box formation, with very adequate security out front. His lead element was hit as it was actually moving into a village. I call it a village, but that's not the right word for it, it was a fort. The damndest thing you've ever seen, and I will describe it in more detail later. But Captain Marshall moved into this fort, and was hit by sniper fire, snipers all over the place with some automatic weapons fire from these dug in positions. B Company immediately returned the fire and kept maneuvering people around to the right, where they continued to draw fire from snipers. At this time I believe he had six casualties at this location. One man was killed out right and one other was very seriously wounded. He was located about 800 meters from the nearest open area into which he could get Dust Off. It was getting dark, in fact it got dark during this action I speak of now. This was very thick jungle with thick undergrowth. I think it was the thickest that we have found on any operation we have been on yet. The darkness was terrific. The medic advised Captain Marshall against trying to move a couple of the very seriously wounded through this because he was sure it would cost them their life. Captain Marshall decided at this point to hack an LZ out in the jungle, right at the vicinity of this fort. This he did. They used over a hundred pounds of C4 that they had with them, and they had a couple of axes and hacked with their machettes. They worked the best they could with this and C4 and some of these large mahogany trees was like banding a rubber tree out here to get the rubber out. It took the bark off and made a few splinters, and that was about it. These trees were almost total resistant to the charges. We called back to Brigade and asked for axes and some demolitions. We finally got this, and under the circumstances, they did real well, and I apologize to the gentlemen whom I asked to get off his tail back there. We finally got this stuff into us, and Captain Marshall's company worked on through the night under sniper fire, clearing this area for the choppers to come in and get the wounded out. By this time another man had died at 1030 that night. The next morning at daylight, we started trying to get Dust Off to them, as the area was by now large enough to get one chopper in at a time.

At nine o'clock in the morning we got the first Dust Off in. This lateness was due, as I understand, was due to a series of things, there was a priority priority for target over in the 2d Battalion area about this time. The Artillery was firing over there, and we could not get choppers in because of that. The bad weather had almost everything socked in. The chopper came in and picked up four people and got out and later made two more trips. All total it took from nine to twelve o'clock before we got these casualties evacuated out of there. My plan had been that at daylight, or just at the crack of dawn, to get those people out of there and by firing suppressive fire at VC snipers and the small elements which had broken up in the area. There were no large forces such as Colonel Dexter ran into. In order to deal with the VC properly we hoped to get our casualties out first. Then Captain Marshall was going to pull his company back a few hundred meters and we would get artillery in on the fort. We realized at this time, having had people already in the perimeter of the thing, that it was an extensive - very extensive place. Rather than put blood and guts against this sort of thing we hoped to use artillery and possible air against it. Of course this delay in Dust Off caused us to have to change our plans and although we did try to get artillery we never really got a fire mission lined up for this. Seeing how the thing was developing, about 0930 - 1000 hours in the position in which I was located with the Battalion (-) here, I moved this way and came in from this side of the village joining Company B. At the time we moved in there was no opposition, there had been intermittent sniper fire throughout the morning exchanged between Captain Marshall's people and the VC. The fort area was thoroughly booby trapped. We found one rice cache that had been left there with a 155mm booby trap. This was found and exploded and the rice destroyed. Captain Marshall's men then in conjunction with Charlie Company, as I said, just about this time, we had gotten all the casualties out, swept around through this fort and cleared it out. We began destruction of the fort. This was an area, probably of a total of 35 to 40 thatched and tin roffed huts, and some fairly large structures obviously class rooms, or training centers. It had kitchens, latrines, everything set up, huge underground tunnels that were connecting. The troops would throw smoke in on the tunnels and you could see little puffs coming up all over the place. The area was very intricately interwoven with all sorts of fortifications, we used the demo that had been dropped in and left over from the night before, blowing what could be blown. We actually found no VC in the village at this time. We assume the dead and wounded had been dragged off. Captain Marshall estimates that, seeing the bodies, seeing when they were hit, and fell in the village, that there were probably four or five dead VC at the village and approximately 8 or 10 wounded. This is probably a conservative estimate. (General Williamson speaking: After clearing the village, would you give us an estimation of the size of the village?). Yes sir! We had an ARVN scout dog team with us, with a couple of very fine ARVN NCO's who had a very long length of service, quite experienced, and highly thought of by their American advisors. At the fort there was a salt pile which the VC had been using. I don't know what the estimate of the weight of it can be. The ARVN soldiers looked at the village site, the complex that was there, the salt, and some of the supplies and equipment that were there and estimated, that this fort was the home of 800, maybe 1200 VC. Seeing it, I could believe it was well within those figures. It was a very huge complex. By the late afternoon they had begun to pull the Battalion (-) out of this area, which now included Bravo Company, and moved through the area again, tearing the village out, and suffered one more wounded man, WIA, shot in the face and in the arm. Rather than try to go back in and get to the real small LZ again, and get sniped at by the guys that were never found before. We decided to move down with the

Battalion (-), to the next objective. This was a cleared area. We moved them down to that location, got the wounded man out after being weathered in about three hours before we were able to get him out. This took care of all the casualties. Captain Daniels, while this fort was being taken back here, had moved his company down and had found a series of villages over on his right flank. At one point he went into a village that had a great deal of rice in it. He found false floors with a spider trap under the things and at one entrance he had men go down and they found a series of tunnels. His men went down a spiral staircase, he estimated about 30 feet down, with tunnels he could stand in with his helmet on and walk in. Of course this was after a grenade had been thrown in, white phosphorus, or what have you, still a lot of smoke down there, and he had his men crawl along these tunnels under the smoke, they found little rooms carved out to the right and left of the tunnels as you go down. Some tunnels still had warm rice down there. Some papers, books, documents, grenades, ammunition, etc., were found and brought out. Again a very intricate tunnel system, extremely well prepared and almost totally immune to anything that we could throw on it.

After securing this area, the next morning, and here I am speaking of is the final day, we moved the Battalion out again. I had Captain Marshall's company with me, as I had moved it into the Battalions perimeter the previous night to let them get a little sleep, as they had been up all night the night before dodging sniper fire and cutting down mahogany trees. The next morning I put them out over this area and they discovered another village, with a rice mill, and more rice, a couple of water buffalo, which are now stinking up the area, and chickens and usual household goods and things found around the villages. We destroyed them and burned the area and continued to move on towards this point. Alpha Company had moved on down in this direction and entered this objective which was really nothing, then moved down to the link up with our sister elements, the Australians, on our right flank. Charlie Company, with Headquarters trailing, moved in this direction on around toward the LZ. There were a few stray rounds of fire at this element that we were with in conjunction with the fire that Captain Marshall then received over here as he moved around, (pointing - I cut him across this way because of time running out), by this woodline and drew fire. Again the men very beautifully returned the fire, moving across the rice paddies, one whole platoon turned and laced the area with fire. He estimates that he got probably a couple of people in there in the area. They actually saw some of these people. As he moved forward after firing there, the VC withdrew and quit firing. In moving forward one of his platoon leaders looked to the rear and saw about eight VC moving along in the open. He set up his 81mm mortar, brought fire in on them, and watching the effects and impact of the fire on the VC, he feels he probably got them with his mortar fire. This was one of the few times we were to catch them out in the open and fire our indirect fire weapon on them. As we moved the Battalion again to secure Objective 3, which would be our LZ, Alpha Company, moving in this direction, had made contact with the Australian Battalion at this point. With the other two companies we set up a very fine security of the LZ, and waited for the chopper elements to move in for extraction. It was timed fairly decently and we were not running the last three miles like we did on the last operation. As Alpha Company moved into position around the right of the LZ, Sergeant Akuna, a very fine NCO, spotted a VC guarding a rice cache. The VC made the mistake of apparently trying to run, and someone shot him. He took the shot in his leg.

We brought him forward, and we got him out by helicopter, so he could be interrogated. He had grenades and ammunition with him. So there was not much doubt he was not an agrarian reformer anyway, we got him out and about the time we were getting him out, Sergeant Akuna came back with four more, and of course he was quite estatic. So was I, at this stage of the game. All these VC guys, he was dragging them out of holes, down in a terrace, toward the end of the LZ. They were all young men between the ages of 18 and 29 years old. Very sturdy and obviously not rice farmers. As he brought those four in, word came back that he had gone back and found three more and brought them out. One of these kicked an NCO and then ran, of course he didn't get very far. By the time we got him up to the LZ he was dead, I think, but I still got him out as he was a body. We got him back here along with seven other male prisoners.

Let me just mention here that the night before Captain Daniels, had taken another tunneled village. After grenading the heck out of this thing, an old woman ran out. I expected her to be that one legged woman that 2d Battalion got last time while they were looking for an air medal. We had no choice but to hold her that night. We fed her some "C" rations, which she liked, and the next morning we got a chopper in and got her out and brought her back here. We had 1 female and eight male POW's.

Let me digress back to the VC fort again. As Captain Marshall moved through this area, after Battalion (-) had withdrawn and started to the next objective, he moved slightly to the left, before tying in with us. As he moved out, his company found a fantastic number of booby traps, such as 81mm mortars hung in trees, most of these were to be electrically detonated, and most of them had been geared to the approaches to the south. The VC apparently expecting any elements to be moving from this direction (from the river). They snipped wires on many of the booby traps.

General Williamson: Ray, What do you estimate was the number of 81's and other types booby traps we found there?

Answer: Over a hundred. There was a very intricatly set-up area, I think probably a lot of the people from there had gone over to meet Colonel Dexter, I'm not sure, but it is the only thing I can surmise, as it was not heavily defended. The resistance was mostly scattered and broken into small groups. After we had withdrawn from here and gotten well out of the way, Captain Shaffer, the artillery representative with my battalion got us a battalion volley, I think it was what, six rounds right after this withdrawal, with delay fuses. Of course at this time there was no guessing game. We knew where they were, and it was pin point. Later that evening, about three hours later in fact, we got one more battalion volley of six rounds. We fell that we massaged the terrain back there pretty well. The next morning Captain Thomas, our FAC, got an air strike on it for us also. It was the best we could get, though not really sufficient, as the strike consisted of two F-100's with four 750 pound bombs each, plus their automatic cannon fire. We had a total of two air strikes, (there was one I neglected to mention which we got the day before over at this area), which according to my intelligence, contained a possible VC base camp. Captain Daniels went in to look this area over and discovered that it was not a VC base camp, although there were some storage sites in the area, rice bins, full of rice that had been perforated by fragments that came from the bomb. That's generally the operation in a nutshell. As far as our movements were concerned and what we did there are things that I would like to comment on as far as lessons we learned out there

And which we intend to emphasize. One is recon by fire when moving into a suspicious area. Captain Mossberg and Captain Jackson spent the night bivouac-
ed getting the Battalion (-) perimeter set up. Before the Battalion (-)
even moved out the next morning, we sprayed the area with fire because we had
had VC movement in the area the night before. We were highly suspicious that
once the Battalion started to move out again, we would be ambushed. So a few
hundred rounds of ammo was expended by automatic weapons fire and M-16 fire
around the entire perimeter. We had no contact when we did move out. This
has been used by units moving into villages, or any site that appears to be
at all suspicious. I think that this idea has proven very effective, although
we haven't realized how effective, because the VC won't tell us of course.
We, as I mentioned before, intend to continue to do this .

Where at all possible use local water, both rainwater and streams, to
save time and confusion of getting water cans in and out, that's a pain in
the neck.

Another thing that I feel very strongly about out here is stopping your
units just before it gets dark. I feel we must stop just before it gets dark.
With your unit, whether you have a Battalion or a company out there, it is al-
most impossible to maneuver anything out there in that jungle at night. You
cannot move, even to set up a perimeter with any sort of effectiveness after
it gets good and dark. We set up just before dark and where possible, dig in.
Then we start putting the clamps on, keeping everybody shut up, quiet, trying
to bury the guy's heads that had bronchitis and keeping them from hacking all
night, though really, the main noise being made in the area was by the command
group on the radio, and this is another point. We are on the air too much.
We have got to figure out a better system than we are using right now, I think.
On these reports, particularly long drawn-out dissertations, gotta cut them
down. It is noisy, and attracts attention to your position out there. You
don't necessarily want to be found. Now, as to gathering intelligence infor-
mation, our troops reacted real well in obtaining this. Documents and things
they scuffed up in the villages contained among other things, unmailed letters
written by VC soldiers to their families and I presume friends. Unmailed let-
ters giving unit designations, also mail that had been received, which had
come from VC relatives and friends. The MI representatives got these and were
very delighted to get them, along with what appeared to be diaries, books,
journals and various other printed matter. My intelligence sergeant came in
with a rucksack full the final day which he hadn't been able to get out the
night before (about 40 pounds of stuff). We turned it in. Major Mullens, the
S2, has a very fine idea of putting something out to the troops telling them,
"Now look, this is what you found out by turning in this information. You have
allowed us to determine who is out there and in what strength, etc., thus
illustrating the results of their cooperation". I think it is a very fine idea.
Colonel Duddy mentioned one thing we are going to do, if we can get the equipment
that is, that is to carry an auger or something out with us so that if we get
stuck again having to blow an LZ, we won't expend 15 pounds of C4 taking the
bark off mahogany trees.

I would also like to recommend that if at all possible, an H-34 chopper,
I don't care what chopper it is, it can be a bird as far as I am concerned,
be obtained that can lower a stretcher down through a hole in the canopy to
take out a wounded man without resorting to this tree moving situation that

we had out there. This can be critical and frankly, I think we must have one in inventory somewhere. We need to get one. I asked for one that night and was told it was not available. And one final thing on communications, that if possible, we get a workable log net, and not clutter up the command net. This gets back to my point earlier. We need the additional PRC-25's, this is something we must do somehow.

That's all I have gentlemen, in covering the operation I want to emphasize one final thing as far as the men in the Battalion are concerned, and the leaders, unit leaders, platoon and company commanders, squad leaders, they did a fabulous job. They came out full of P and vinegar just like they went in. They were still scrapping and fighting, slugging through there all the way, and I, like Colonel Dexter, am proud to be a member of the outfit. It was a fine show!

Lieutenant Colonel Surut: Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion (Airborne), 319th Artillery

Gentlemen, we are rapidly approaching the time when the critiques will be as long as the exercises. Once again the artillery lent dignity to what would otherwise have been a vulgar brawl. From Position 33, our mission was to support the three infantry battalions during the period D-Day through D+3. During this critique I shall cover three points: What we did, how well we did it, and what we can do to improve our operations.

The Artillery fired 4857 rounds of 105mm ammunition during the 4 day exercise. 1/503 was supported with 1492 rounds, 2/503 was supported by 1636 rounds, and RAR was supported with 1212 rounds. 251 missions were fired in direct response to calls from FO's and LNO's. 69 missions were H and I and protective fires. Types of ammunition fired were 3505 HE, 1155 WP, and 197 illuminating. Fuze types fired included quick, delay, time, and VT.

The Artillery supported the three infantry battalions with 10 FO's (including my property book officer), 3 LNO's (including my communications officer), and two air observers (including the Headquarters Battery Commander). Three separate firing channels were used for radio transmission. All missions required clearance through FSCC.

The security of Position 33 was provided by the Armor Company and Engineer

Company. The Armor conducted 24 patrols of 3000-8000 meters distance, 16 of these conducted at night. The Engineers patrolled on foot to the north and east of the position. It was this aggressive patrolling that secured the area throughout the 4 day stay.

The Artillery achieved several "firsts" during this operation. The guns marked targets with WP smoke for Air Force air strikes on D+1. High angle missions were fired over the helicopter formations during the extraction on the afternoon of D+3.

How well did we do? The support of three infantry battalions "exercised the system." As you recall the Commanding General directed that we "exercise the complete system" to work out any bugs that we could find. Fire support co-ordination initially slowed some missions; but by D+2, this bottleneck was overcome. Safety checks slowed the firing somewhat; however, these checks are a necessity for close support, particularly with three major maneuver elements abreast. One need was clearly demonstrated; the need for FDC and FSCC to know the urgency of missions called in by the forward observers. During the exercise, priorities were not correctly assigned to fire missions because the observers failed to indicate the urgency of immediate fire on a VC position. In spite of these imprevable areas, the artillery put a lot of bullets on the target and accounted for significant destruction and VC casualties. The protective fires on the night of D+1 amounting to 850 rounds proved particularly effective in preventing VC attacks on the infantry perimeters. Additionally, communications were good throughout the operation with LNO's and with FO's.

The battalion ammunition section deserves special praise for moving swiftly over 120 tons of 105mm ammunition.

Finally, how can we improve our operations? First, we need to get grid zone clearance to fire from FSCC instead of clearing each fire mission. Second, we must establish a code word for priority fire missions which tells the artillery and the FSCC, "Stop whatever else you're doing and fire for Me." Third, we need practice in comms, FDC teamwork, and firing responsiveness in support of a three battalion operation. In addition, applicable to the brigade, we need to change SOI items more frequently, specifically the operations code. We need a tighter system for identifying Vietnamese elements attached such as the VHF retransmission unit. And last, based on our experience, we recommend the use of the American district advisers in the operational areas for intelligence and co-ordination with popular forces activities.

Major Clark - S-3, 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment

We were here on the operation, as you can see on the map, on the western flank of the area. On D-Day we were flown in moving in after 1/503, and after preparation of Objective 16 which was a disused rice paddy. We flew in with a strength of four companies of 110 and Battalion Headquarters, including the mortar platoon and protection of 140. We arrived on the LZ later as the take off time was delayed because of refueling and the turn round of the choppers but once we moved in we were ready and quickly settled in the area. The companies moved out in their patrol areas. The way that we looked at the problem here was that first of all that we had to find out where the VC were before we could do anything about it so we had two and a half days in there, and a day in this area here which is really a drawback, we split the area roughly into four sections and each rifle company had the area which it patrolled on a platoon basis from north to south. The platoons were patrolling out by themselves until such time that we could determine the strength of the enemy and if the strength was such were you had the quantity for a company fight we would do so. First thing we noticed of course was a vehicle steering off along this track here, along this road, the armed choppers were around, they couldn't strike immediately, but did so as soon as possible. The companies then moved out into their TAORS and reported their platoons in position. They were all in within two hours of the first chopper touching down. Communications were established and their mortar targets were laid on. Sooner after this Battalion Headquarters was sniped at intermittent for quite a period, we couldn't stop this sniper. We went out to have a look for him where we found roughly a hundred yards from the LZ was a series of tunnels with little entrenches by every other odd tree and this chap slid into one of those tunnels and he knew the network, but we didn't and as Major Butler stated we put in the white phosphorous and smoke was coming up from all over the place. I don't know whether it was worth mentioning sir, but CS gas is the right thing for that. We tried smoking them out with green leaves and everything we had, but it must be something most objectionable, but otherwise it won't have any affect. One sniper scuttled into the bush before we could do anything about it. We went into the village the next day when D Company moved up. The other companies also working in this area were fired on by the same sniper and the next day they went out in the morning and they searched the village up near A Company, 1/503. The village when they first went in was deserted, and they came back to it again and found that there had been no tracks, so they shoved on. They went out again, we put mortars on that village because we thought they had moved back and that someone was in that area. We kept our eyes on the village, put guns on them, called an air strike in, then more mortars, and then turned back. By devious means we still knew they were there. The whole thing was stepped up, because the mortars, the artillery, and air strikes went on 400 yards south of the village. This was our own map reading fault, never the less it might have worked really well. On that day we found a total of four villages, five hides. The difference between a hide and a village is that a hide is off the tracks where they can go and rest with dug in positions where there is occasionally a bit of concrete conduit piping where they can go in there and hide. The village is where you have a class room, four or five houses and the normal comfort of that sort of thing. We burned these down and blew up what we could. Once again sir, the problems of tunnels is a must. In this area here right above the LZ around noon when we

get in to hedge rows back from the LZ, we could have had a lot of trouble, assaulting that position. The tunnel in this place was mainly a concrete conduit piping, water piping. They had obviously brought it down this road. This road was used a lot and could have been used for this. Also they had mortar positions already dug in. At 1640 hours on that same day, D Company went the same way and found another village with huts and tunnels and contact was made with 13. We believed we had two VC hits, but couldn't confirm it, because we couldn't find the bodies.

The same afternoon a chopper reported from this location that he was being sniped at. We sent a platoon across there and they came across them, and they were sniped on, but we were unlucky, they kept their distance from us the whole time. We couldn't pin them down properly and later turned the mortars in on them, but they got away. They are a bit too cagey.

By D+2, the companies had now swept south in to their areas and were poised actually to move into section RB. The Battalion Headquarters had closed up on C Company, D Company came up the back, A company was in this area here. They had a bit of fun with mortars and we heard the enemy firing their 57mm recoilless rifle high angle fire, we put our mortars down on this and they did not fire anymore that night.

We swept south because of the timing to get into here. we could only patrol on a one man front and therefore the area was not searched. We moved out the next day, it was a bit of a rush, A Company got a kill along about here. After one VC was killed, they left what they thought was the dead one there and went after the wounded one, didn't find him, went back after the dead one, and he was gone by the time they got back. So the answer is two shots in the dead one, so he will be there when you get back. (Note: The VC will expend any amount of effort to evacuate his dead),. We then rushed in. The less said about the extraction the better. It was a case of leave it to the soldiers as we didn't quite know what was going on.

Lessons learned on this one: First when you get a kill, make sure he stays dead. We found that the resupply is really too often, and the amount of choppers around give the enemy a regular picture of your position. Now this is unfortunate, but there must be some way to getting around this. We feel perhaps the answer is to carry more rations, and smaller loads and some new ideas for the carrying of water, or we can use streams when there are streams, but many places up in that area, there are not any. As long as the enemy is in there, they've got to drink water, so we should be able to find their source. We found that the VC moved back into their camp area as you moved out. We attacked this village three times and three times we went back into the same village, and two times the VC had moved back. They obviously have men located in that village which could take up to 150 men. It is designed to take a company that's moving around. The squad is suppose to stay there and guard the camp. We had the same trouble in the other area. Every time we would move back in it, the squad had moved back in. While we're sweeping through, I think we are losing a bit of our kill factor, and we can get more if we stand there and wait them out. (Question from CG: Do you believe he leaves, or do you believe he holds up and you pass over him?). He can do that to sir. But if you read a special report that we have it will tell you exactly what he does in there. The report has all the information as to what he did in that village. Another point sir, whenever we've been caught by him, we have been moving on tracks, this is the only time he's caught us.

When we are moving through the scrub he has never caught us and we can pick him up, because he uses the scrub himself. On the use of Dust Off choppers, we need the HULB with a winch. It could only take out one casualty at a time, it's a long business. The choppers have to stand around, and apparently they don't like it. In all indications I agree with Major Butler, Colonel Dexter in that we're on the air all the time sending locations, I know you want them sir, but it keeps me and a very small staff at Battalion Headquarters busy all day. Now the reason we send in our platoon location and squad, by the way in fact that they are by themselves and as it is we've had H and I. Our first lot of H and I was actually fired as defensive fires, and we can't allow this to happen. I would like someone to make an assessment to what extent do we lose the initiative by the excessive use of helicopters. By the use of them, the enemy can determine where you are, and the strength your in. Next point, to get there (to an LZ) in any short length of time, you have to use tracks and cannot patrol correctly. That's all I have to say.

Captain Bliss: Brigade Army Aviation Officer

We started off with airlifts of 2098 troops into three LZ's. Except for a little delay on timing it appeared to be one of the smoothest air mobile assaults conducted. The critical point on timing was coordinating preparation of three LZ's with landing of troops immediately after. Fifty slicks made nine trips into three LZ's. During the assault, the ships were fired on from five different locations south and southwest of Objective 27. The armed ships tried to neutralize the fire but were unsuccessful. However, only four ships actually took rounds. After the assault our mission was primarily resupply, fire support and command and liaison.

Resupply problems: Perennial - Right supplies, right place, right time.

Communications: Communication did improve - ARC 54 will not net with PRC-10's. Alternate solution was to get on Battalion Command Net. Some LZ's were too small to extract from. Consequently two birds flew into trees trying to get empty water cans out, however, they were not badly damaged. Both of them flew out. Extraction delays sometimes delayed the tactical situation. The night resupply worked out better than expected. Troops on the ground need to be commended for the manner in which they guided the helicopters to the area.

Fire support from armed choppers: Most missions were accomplished, one fire team failed to deliver ordnance because it couldn't locate friendly troops. Mark location with smoke, give azimuth and distance to the target. Make sure that the fire team knows the nature of the target. It is futile to attack .50 caliber machine gun positions head on with armed chopper.

FSCC: After first day of operation, FSCC set up was able to coordinate all activities over the operational area to give continuous fire support and helicopter coverage at the same time.

Final day and extraction: Even though it must be done in an orderly and professional manner, the primary objective is to get the troops out of the area rapidly.

There were 1494 sorties flown in support of OPOD 17-64. Brigade aircraft got its first purple heart. I request your comments on any indication of the effectiveness of the armed chopper, reconnaissance and suppressive fire laid down during assault.

Captain Howard, Air Force - United States Air Force Liaison Officer

I am sure that your Air Liaison party learned as much, if not more than anyone else in the Brigade, as a result of this operation. This was our first actual use of close Air Support in the true sense of the word.

As you remember our last critique, I expressed concern over the problems we had yet to face in our air request system. We instituted this "Brave" request system - requests on targets on low priority for lack of a better one, primarily to "exercise the system". It was our intent to honor these requests with some sort of ordnance if only a burst of gun fire, to prove that the system would work and to uncover problem areas.

We received one "Brave" request from 2/503 which could not be approved because the aircraft ran low on fuel and was released from station before the last lift was completed and cleared of the target area. After that there was no need for artificialities - the requests were real. The first actual request from 2/503 was for 0800 on 7 July which was disapproved by MACV. We learned of the disapproval at 0755 too late to prepare for the assault with artillery. Later that day the 1/RAR requested two strikes on villages and the 1/503 requested one on a suspected VC base camp. Two of these strikes were flown by A4D's from the Navy and their accuracy was commendable.

On the 8th of July all six air requests were from 2/503. Four of these were cancelled for weather during the morning. The other two were flown in the afternoon.

On the 9th and final day of the operations, the 2/503 once again had asked for an assault preparation strike. The 1/503 had asked for an attack on a fortified village. The ASOC advised us that one flight was equipped with CBU - the other with 750 pound bombs. The first flight to check in had 750 pound bombs so it was expended upon the village. Another flight checked in and was able to finish its attack at 0900 hours sharp, but it too was equipped with 750 pound bombs. We do not know what became of the CBU. During the landing one preparation CBU was augmented. We learned about it during the lift of the 2d Battalion into the first LZ. By the time we were committed to the north - south perhaps because of the position of friendly forces while the LZ was oriented east and west. Had we known earlier we could have had more effectively used the ordnance on the first LZ while we had freedom to vary the attack. While on the subject of CBU, I was barely able to catch Major Butler in time to brief him on the CBU bomblets. We passed the word to his troops in short order, and they did indeed find and destroy two CBU duds. (At this point an inert CBU bomblet was produced). I would like to reemphasize the fact that this bomblet does have a sensitive fuze and the fragments from it have an initial velocity comparable to rounds from the M16. It is quite dangerous and should be treated accordingly.

The next flight for 9 July was expended on a company of foreign speaking orientals in the vicinity of the RVN blocking position. The aircraft was expended on the same target as it came off station. The last flight to

strike did so in heavy rain. The last pilot to strafe saw troops running from the trees into the target area.

The box score: 51 sorties TAC Air, 6 sorties for the flare ship, and 16 airborne FAC sorties.

We can't hold a candle to the Army on this operation for sortie rate, but we do have a bigger bomb --- Seriously, the 750 pound bomb has been known to cave in bunkers 80 meters away when used with a "delay fuze". One bunkered village is marked well with the chopper pad we will return to it with bombs. In future operations, any semi-permanent mark on the target will allow the Air Force to destroy the installations after our troops withdraw. Major Butler's suggestion to use a helicopter to drop illumination round parachutes into the upper foliage is excellent.

- We benefited from this operation in that we faced our close air support problems at last in practice, rather than in theory. The FAC's gained experience - just as in your profession - the class room is a far cry from actually delivering weapons in close proximity to friendly troops.

Once again we were plagued with radio problems - The ALO radio in the FSCC worked like a charm until an important transmission or reception was sorely needed. With the VHF out we were occasionally forced to use the Brigade Command Net which was over crowded with higher priority traffic. For the next operation, a separate air request FM Net has already been established. A bank of batteries with a generator is being put into service FSCC communications which should alleviate our power failure problem.

We have uncovered a number of in-house problems which we are busily engaged in correcting. On the strength of what we have learned, we can promise you far better air support in the future.

Lieutenant Colonel Staigers - Commanding Officer, 173d Support Battalion
(Airborne), 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)

I won't bore you with a lot of unexciting statistics except to say that there were 118 helicopter resupply sorties flown. We ran into the usual problem of communications which was covered by Captain Bliss in his comments. I strongly recommend that we set up a separate Admin-Log Net once we have sufficient PRC 25's. Using the Command Net has proven to be a strain on the system.

We have now reached the stage of experience that we are ready to develop a Helicopter Resupply SOP and put into use a revised Logistics Brevity Code that will simplify transmission of requests. At present we sometimes get requests for "more small arms ammunition" which presents us with the dilemma of sending you too little or overburdening you with an immobilizing surplus.

We tried one innovation which proved very successful, that was to send a unit S-4 representative on the chopper with the first load each day. This paid off in flexibility. An example was: On one load Captain Harper was flying and the unit to receive the supplies was in a fire fight and could not accept them. Captain Harper, knowing the supply status of his Battalion units, diverted the load to another unit. Previously the helicopter would have returned to the resupply pad and waited until it was clear to go in.

The major problem encountered by Support Battalion was one of morale. Our people, except for the Medics, felt like they were sitting on the bench. Each time a casualty came in the troopers were struck as though their own brothers had been hurt. A dozen times I had to clear them away from the clearing station. They wanted so much to help that they were getting in the way. When the first KIA's came in I was besieged with troops wanting to go out as replacements. You've never seen such frustrated anger in your lives.

I have a proposal to make that would profitably employ some of my troops, that is to use them for specialized missions which now occupy the line troops. We can form demolition and destruction teams to destroy these tunnels, bunkers and villages. There are a few of us still around who have had some experience along this line and I believe we could train effective teams who could carry the load and do a more complete job.

Other places we could assist would be in providing CP security groups, field commo maintenance teams, scout teams to augment Armor Company's APC crews. We are anxious to participate with you.

In closing I have to blow our own horn a bit for one group who did an outstanding job and that is our medics. They worked continuously and effectively. Not only did they treat the casualties with every skill at their disposal but they treated them humanely and compassionately. I watched Dr. Beach turn from a patient he was treating and put his hand on the shoulder of another who was waiting. He told him everything was okay and that he'd be taken care of him in a moment. You could just see the trooper relax his anxiety and breathe easier. That wasn't the only case, the other doctors and the enlisted medics did the same over and over again. Word got out too, the troops who came in later seemed to relax as soon as they hit the clearing station.

Once again, let me offer Support Battalion people to assist you anyway we can.

General Williamson: Gentlemen I agree with Colonel Surut, the time has now come when the critique is almost as long as the operation, however, I must state that I believe that all of us have learned as much in the last three hours as we have in any other like period.

I fully agree with the decisions of several of our company commanders. Had I been at their level under the same circumstances I believe that I would have made the same decision. At least three rifle company commanders chose to litterly run over enemy positions. That was done because day light hours were few and the enemy was between us and helicopter landing zones that would permit evacuation of casualties and resupply. Although the decision was correct at the time, I hope a similiar decision will never again be necessary. I want us to fight with bullets instead of with bodies. I want the forward foot maneuver elements to find and fix the enemy and then have our fire power destroy him. You have proved your bravery, you have adequately proved to me that the spirit of our men will drive forward in spite of enemy opposition. It is necessary that in the future we think in terms of the front line soldier finding and fixing the enemy and calling on their fire power that is immediately available to destroy the enemy. We will then have the foot soldier move in to confirm the victory. This point is particularly important to us all. We must get the job done but we must get it done with the minimum number of casualties.

My thinking for the future includes continuous stabs into War Zone "D", by ground movement, helicopter movement and fire power. In addition I want all of us to think in turns of more distant ground thrust into the surrounding areas to insure that we route out the VC where he sleeps, and throw him off balance when he moves.

The momentum that has been generated by our last four movements into War Zone "D" must act as a chain reaction. We must remain active and through our actions encourage others to do likewise.

Once again I am extremely proud of this organization. You have proved your worth. I only pray to God that I can give you the proper leadership and forward thinking that you so richly deserve.

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2d Inf Bde, TF
Bien Hoa (YT 052108) Vietnam
281900H July 1965
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Annex A (Fire Support Plan) to OFORD #3

- References: a. Draft OFORD 2, this hqs dtd 101200 July 1965.
b. Maps, Vietnam, 1/50,000, Sheets same as reference a above.

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Current ISUM.
b. Friendly Forces. Draft OFORD 2, this hqs, dtd 101200 July 65.
c. Attachments and Detachments.

(1) C Btry 8th Bn, 6th Arty detached from 1/7 Arty Bn and attached 173d Abn Bde (Sep) effective 280600H July 1965.

(2) 2d Bn 18th Inf (-) detached 2d Bde TF and attached 173d Abn Bde (Sep) effective 300600H July 1965.

(3) 173d Abn Bde (Sep) Rear, Operational Control 2d Inf Bde TF, effective 291000H Jul 1965.

2. MISSION

2d Inf Bde TF, effective 291000H July 1965, assumes responsibility for the defense in designated sectors C1, C2, C3, C4, F1, and F2 of Bien Hoa Airfield and Cam Rahn Port facilities. Maintains the capability to conduct limited mobile operation in defense of airfield/port facilities or to undertake counterinsurgency operations as directed.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operations: OFORD #3

b. Artillery Fire Support: 1/7 Arty (-) continues to support the defense of the Bien Hoa Airfield complex by planning defensive fires and delivering fire on call if necessitated by operational requirement.

- c. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) All preplanned fire of high trajectory weapons will be coordinated through Brigade FSCC for approval prior to firing.

(2) Fires necessitated by enemy attack do not require prior approval to be fired provided overhead air space is clear; however, as soon as practical, a report of the firing will be given to the Brigade FSCC.

(3) Requirement for additional fires will be directed thru parent Brigade FSCC to Corp FSCC.

Annex A to OFORD 3 - 2d Inf Bde TF

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

No change.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

Current SOI/SSI in effect.

Acknowledge:

SIMMONS
Colonel


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 Bien Hoa (TT 052108) Vietnam
 281000H July 1965
 FIG 1

OPORD 3

References: A. Draft OPORD 2, this HQ, dtd 101200 July 1965.
 B. Maps, Vietnam, 1/50,000, Sheets same as reference A above.

Task Organization:

2d Inf Bde, Task Force	173d Abn Bde (Sep) Rear
1st Bn Cbt Tn, 15th Inf	173d Spt Bn
TF Mac (2/16 Rear) Maj McMillan Cdr	1st Bn MAJ
40th Inf	Btry Arty (M2)
1/7 Arty (-)	HHC 2d Inf Bde TF
	Trains 2d Inf Bde TF

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Current ISUM.
- b. Friendly Forces. Draft OPORD 2, this HQ, dtd 101200 July 1965.
- c. Attachments and Detachments.
 - (1) C Btry 8th Bn, 5th Arty detached from 1/7 Arty Bn and attached 173d Abn Bde (Sep) effective 280600H July 1965.
 - (2) 2d Bn 18th Inf (-) detached 2d Bde TF and attached 173d Abn Bde (Sep) effective 300600H July 1965.
 - (3) 173d Abn Bde (Sep) Rear, Operational Control 2d Inf Bde TF, effective 291000H July 1965.

2. MISSION

2d Inf Bde TF, effective 291000H July 1965, assumes responsibility for the defense in designated sectors C1, C2, C3, C4, F1, and F2 of Bien Hoa Airfield and Gas Bahn Part facilities. Maintains the capability to conduct limited mobile operations in defense of airfield/part facilities or to undertake counterinsurgency operations as directed.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations.

- (1) Maneuver. This will be a temporary defensive operation during the absence of the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) participating in Operation 19-65. Adjustments will be made to existing TAO's of each Brigade to fill the void created by the temporary absence of primary units. Upon departure of 173d Abn Bde (Sep) and 2d Bn 18th Inf from the area, 2d Inf Bde TF coordinates, controls and directs all forces remaining in the defense of the Bien Hoa Airfield assigned sectors.
- (2) Fires. Priority of arty/battery fires and tactical air to units making contact and Brigade Reserve when committed. Annex A, Fire Support.

b. 1st Bn Cbt Tn, 15th Inf: No change to Draft OPORD 2.

c. 2d Bn 18th Inf:

- (1) Continue defense in sector to secure south portion of Bde area designated as F1.
- (2) Provide one rifle Co to TF Mac (2/16 Inf Rear).
- (3) Coordinate security of artillery pieces with G 1/7 Arty.
- (4) Maintain one rifle platoon as Brigade mobile reserve.

d. 2d Bn 18th Inf (Sep) Rear:

- (1) Designated TF Mac, Maj McMillan commanding.
- (2) Attached one company 2/16th Inf.
- (3) Operational control CO 2/16th Inf.
- (4) Continue defense in sector to secure north portion of Bde area designated as F1.

e. 173d Abn Bde (Sep) Rear: (Lt Col Stalgers Commanding)

- (1) Defend present sectors of C1, C2, C3, and C4 occupied as Bde Division areas.
- (2) Prevent enemy penetration from N, NE, and E into designated C areas.
- (3) Be prepared to provide blocking force of company size in 30 min 1 hour notice. (Coy 1 RAR)

f. 1/7 Arty

- (1) 1/7 Arty (-) GS.
- (2) Art Btry (M2) DS 173d Abn Bde (Sep) Rear.
- (3) Annex A, Fire Support.

g. HHC 2d Bde TF

- (1) Defend present assigned sector.
- (2) Prevent enemy penetration into CP.

h. Bde Trains:
 Defend present assigned sector.

1. Coordinating Instructions:
 (1) Unit disposition of relocated forces and adjusted TAOB overlay to 2d Bde TF S3 NLT 291200 July 1965
 (2) Major units submit hourly SITREP by land lines on the hour for 2d Bde units, on the half for the 173d units.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
 No change.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
 a. Signal:
 (1) Current 173d Abn Bde and 2d Inf Bde 'CI in effect.
 (2) Brigade Command Net Central: April Relief Baha, Freq 15.5 MC

b. Commands:
 2d Bde TF CP located via YT 052108

Acknowledge.

SP8ONS
 Colonel

Annexes: A - Fire Support

DISTRIBUTION: Special

OFFICIAL: Roy

53

MAT - A VIETNAMESE CLASSIFICATION
 EQUIVALENT TO SECRET, AND WILL
 BE HANDLED ACCORDINGLY.

173d ABN Bde

TAM

Int Sect
for filing

2/6/51
(2)

AWM 95
7/1/29
Map No. 435

1 RAR

BIEN HOA

281515 Jul 65.

(No change from verbal orders except
paras 3.e.(2).(b) and 3.b.(2).(b).)

CONFIRMATORY NOTES TO VERBAL ORDERS BY CO IRAR
at 1330 hrs Jul 65.

OpO 5/65

Map: TANUYEN, BIEN HOA, 1:50,000 composite.

2. Mission. To patrol sectors C2/C3 of Bde TAOR during Bde Op 19-65
29 Jul to 3 Aug 65.

3. Execution.

a. Gen Outline. One coy 1RAR TAOR, two coys 2/503 TAOR, one coy res.

b. A Coy.(1) Grouping

(a) Remaining under comd.

MFC
Interpreter
Med Asst(b) Under comd from 0800 hrs
29 Jul 65.FOO party, 161 Field Bty, RNZA
four SBs.(2) Tasks.

(a) Be res forthwith until task 2 commences.

(b) Take over plr responsibility for 1RAR TAOR from 1200 hrs 30 Jul
until completion Bde Op 19-65.

(c) Two pls are to be in 1RAR TAOR at all times throughout op.

c. B Coy.(1) Grouping

(a) Remaining under comd

Interpreter
Med Asst.(b) Under comd from 1800 hrs
28 Jul 65MFC
FOO party, 161 Field Bty, RNZA
four SBs.SECRET

(2) Tasks.

- (a) Patrol northern area of 2/503 TAOR (sectors L, M, N.) from 0800 hrs 29 Jul 65 until completion on Bde Op 19-65.
- (b) Two pls are to be in the TAOR at all times.
- (c) Effect liaison with 2/503 before 29 Jul 65.

d. C Coy.(1) Grouping.

(a) Remaining under comd.

MFC

Med Asst

interpreter (on call if required)

(b) Under comd from 1800 hrs
28 Jul 65.

FOO party, 161 Field Bty, RNZA
(if available)

four SBs.

(2) Tasks.

- (a) Patrol southern area of 2/503 TAOR (sectors O, P, Q, R) from 0800 hrs 29 Jul 65, with at least one pl, until completion of Bde Op 19-65
- (b) Be prep to execute search and destroy ops on fol locs during period 29 Jul - 3 Aug 65.
- i. Tunnel. 057161-057156
 - ii. VC HQ. 075163.
 - iii VC suspected loc. 045170.
- (c) Effect liaison with 2/503 before 29 Jul 65.

e. D Coy.(1) Grouping.

(a) Remaining under comd

MFC

Med Asst

(b) under comd from 1800 hrs
28 Jul 65

four SBs.

(c) On call from Int sect from
0800 hrs 29 Jul 65

Interpreter

(2) Tasks.

- (a) Continue pl programme until morning 31 Jul 65.
- (b) Br res for counter attack, counter penetration, and reaction roles from 1200 hrs 31 Jul 65. Move on order Br HQ.

e(1) Mor Pl. Remain present loc. Be prep to have one sect avail and ready to move to Sp C Attk role and one sect to sp B and C Coys in 2/503 TAOR.

f. Anti tank Pl. Tasks.

- (1) Remain present loc
- (2) Be prep to :
 - (a) act as res within Bn area.
 - (b) escort resupply or convoys vehs if PW/M committed.

g. Aslt Pnt Pl. Tasks.

- (1) Remain present loc and continue tasks.
- (2) Be prep to allocate one sect to under comd PW/M to assist in road clearance.

h. PW/M. Tasks

- (1) Barrage of C Coy on selected area missions.
- (2) Resupply of deployed sub-units. Subunits are to provide escorts.
- (3) To under comd D Coy for C attack and C penetration rôles.

i. Artty.

- (1) FOO teams with A and B Coys, C Coy if possible.
- (2) 161 Field Bty RNZA avail for fire sp.

k. Coord tasks.

- (1) 173 AB Bde (Sep) Op 19-65 : 29 Jul (D day) to 3 Aug.
- (2) Section 2/503 TAOR Annex P.
- (3) Liaison.
 - (a) I.O. to co-ord liaison between S2 2/503 and Band C Coys.
 - (b) L.O. report to HQ 2 Bde at 0800 hrs 29 Jul 65. To have sig and radio on comd net.

(A) C attack rôle.

- (a) Comd. OC D Coy.
- (b) Tps.
 - i. D Coy as grouped.
 - ii. PW/M under comd HQ and two sects.
 - iii In sp.
 - A. 161 Field Bty.
 - B. troop 1 RAR.
 - C. troop 1/503 (-) 4-2 mtrs
 - D. troop 2/503 (-) 4-2 mtrs.

(c) Tasks. In priority.

- i. D/16 Armour loc, nickname LEAD BOTTOM.
- ii. C Bty 3/319 Arty Bn loc, nickname STEEL SCREEN.
- iii WESTERN sector 1/503 Bn loc, nickname ZINC CRENNI

(d) Rece. As arranged by O.C. D Coy.(e) Co-ord. To advise CO 1RAR of rece details and co-ord not after 1600hrs 29 Jul on priorities i and ii.

(d) Movement will be advised by nicknames in conjunction with area nicknames.

Serial (a)	Nickname (b)	Meaning (c)	Given by (d)
1	WALK	Group prepares to move	Bn HQ
2.	CANTER	Move to selected FUP	Bn HQ
3.	GALLOP	nickname, followed by times gives H hrs for Contact.	

(5) Illumination. Normal rules outside Perimeter Base.(6) Maximum use is to be made of available mortar and arty fire.(7) Rules of Engagement. Normal by day. After 1800 hrs, any person carrying a weapon can be shot, until 0600 hrs. All VC are to be engaged vigorously. RF/PF are out of the TAOR, or in posn on road bound.

(8) On completion of 173 Bde op 19-65 the nickname STUMPY DOG will be issued and coys are to resume scheduled tasks on receipt.

(9) Standing Patrols. Normal. D Coy responsible for an additional patrol in area WEST of present loc. The area is bounded by Track junction 004161 (excl) to 010160 to 009154 to 006156 then along track (excl) to 004161.4. Adm and Logistics

- a. Ammo and dress. No change.
- b. Resup where nec by APC. Escorted by sub-unit involved, Coord by OC Adm Coy. Requests to OC Adm Coy through C.P. All to carry both water bottles full and one days rations.
- c. Casevac. APC or escorted amb. Dust off may not be avail.
- d. VCC or VC KIA. Evac immediately to Bn HQ by APC. IO to effect reception and delivery to Bde HQ.

Cond and Sig

- a. Bn HQ. Remains present loc. may deploy for C attack role
- b. SOI. SOI changes 2359 hrs 31 Jul 65
- c. KAC Code. changes 2359 hrs 31 Jul 65.
- d. Signals.

- (1) Bn sigs diagram. No change.
- (2) Codes.
 - (a) Patrols in TAOR use code sheet
 - (b) Casevac. as per bn system detailed in OpO 4/65.
 - (c) SUMMARY OF CODE WORDS.

Serial (a)	Code word (b)	Meaning (c)	Issued by (d)
1.	LEAD BOTTOM	C attack area D/16	Bn HQ
2.	STEEL SCREEN	C attack 'C' Bly area 3/319 only Bn	Bn HQ
3.	ZINC CREAM	C attack WEST section 1/503 Bn area.	Bn HQ
4.	STUMPY DOG	Cops return to normal tasks. Op 19-65 completed.	Bn HQ

(3) Passwords. Bn Code Sheet

6. Civil affairs.

- a. Civilians apprehended with 10 cards and supporting documents are to be dispatched out of the TAOR.
- b. Civilians apprehended without docs are to be held and dispatched to TAN PHU (006177) as soon as is practicable.

I. R. W. BRUMFIELD
 Lt Col,
 CO, 1RAR.

Ack

Annex P-sectors 2/503 TAOR.

Dists. All

Authentication

[Signature]
 OC, Sp Coy, 1RAR.


SECRET

DISTR

	<u>Copy Number</u> <u>incl Annex P</u>
A Coy	1
B Coy	2
C Coy	3
D Coy	4
Sp Coy	5
Admin Coy	6
Men Pl	7-8
A/Lt Par Pl	9
Anti Tank Pl	10
Signs	11
PAWH	12
Sut Sect	13
RSM.	14
161 Field Bty, RNRA	15-16
173 Spt Bn	17-18
1/503 Bn (Rear)	19
2/503 Bn (Rear)	20
D/16 Armored Coy (Rear)	21
E/17 Cav Coy. (Rear)	22
3/319 Anti Bn (Rear)	23
173 ABN Bde (Sep)	24
AAFY	25
CO	26
2IC	27
File	28
Comds Diary	29-30
Spore	31-32

ANNEX 'P' LO
IRAR DPO 5/65
Dated 28 JUL 65

Overlay : Boundaries and Sectors
2/503 TAOR



SIC NSTR.

Signal 1. RADIO: Radio net as per Appendix 1 is to be used SOI 25-6 (radio nets) and ops code KAC HE-734 are in effect. Protocol for SOPon radiocomms will be used.

a. NIS

271200H - 281200H	-	KC
281200H - 291200H	-	MC
291200H - 301200H	-	AB
301200H - 011200H	-	KP
011200H - 021200H	-	CH
021200H - 031200H	-	UX
031200H - 041200H	-	MB

6 NETTING Bde comd net and Bn comd net will be netted 280800H.


c AUTHENTICATION Authentication codes 2, 13, and 25 are to be used from authentication sheet issued on Bn comd net. An Bde net authentication for gun will be used for the entire op.

d LINE Line will be laid by fol sub units to Bn HQ when ordered

- Ask P₁
- Ask P₁ + P₂

SECRET

Appendix 'A' 10



SECRET