

Series: AWM95
Australian Army commanders' diaries
[Vietnam]

Infantry units

Item number: 7/1/33

Item: 1 Battalion Royal Australian
Regiment

Additional Annex material

[1-30 Sep 1965]

SECRET

File

PRECEDENCE ACTION
PRIORITY
FROM 12AB

PRECEDENCE - INFO
PRIORITY

DATE - TIME - GROUP
01 06 25 2

CO. A, B, C, D, Adm, Sp Coy, Asst Ftr, A/tk Pl,
Mor Pl, PWLF, 161 Field Bty RMZA, D/16 Assault,
2/5038 Bn, 2nd Bde.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATORS NUMBER
OPS 12

INFO 173d Abn Bde (Sep), CO, 2IG, MSM

WARWING G ORDER . Op 10/65 to secure and protect gun line position of 161 Field Bty
and atts on 3 Sep 65 . A Coy to arrange with PWLF for mov to SPRINGBOARD pass on
2 Sep 65 . Remainder NO move before 0900 hrs 3 Sep 65 . Maps TAN UYEN 1:50000 .
Op is scheduled to last one (1) day . O Op this loc 0900 hrs 2 Sep 65 . ACE

R. J. ... Capt Lt Col
for CO 12AB

SECRET

OP OVERLAY - AREAS, SECTORS, BOUNDARIES



Co.	D+1	D+2	D+3	D+4	D+5	D+6	D+7
A	R	R	R	R	11	11	-
B	1	2	3	10B	12	15	-
C	4	5	6	10C	R	R	R
D	7	8	9	10A	13	14	-

AREA A SECTORS 1-9
 AREA B SECTORS 10-15
 AREA C SECTORS 16-20

A. D day to D+4
 B. D+4 to D+6
 C. D+6 to D+8

20/11/48
 11/13
 Map no. 028

Appendix W to War Diary
IRAR SVN

21

SECRET

INT SEC

I.RAR

BIEN HOA

Sep 65

Amdt to OPS 27

1. Ref OPS 27 delete para 5(g) insert new para 5 (g)

PERIOD	CHALLENGE	PASSWORDS
141200-151200	DANCE	Name of any DANCE
15200-161200	CIGARETTE	Name of any CIGARETTE
161200-171200	SPORT	Name of any SPORT
171200-181200	FRUIT	Name of any FRUIT
181200-191200	TREE	Name of any TREE
191200-201200	BIRD	Name of any BIRD
201200-211200	CAR	Name of any CAR
211200-221200	BOY	Name of any BOY
221200-231200	GIRL	Name of any GIRL
231200-241200	SODA	Name of any SODA or POP
241200-251200	WEATHER	Name of any WEATHER (i.e. Rain, SNOW, etc)

ALTERNATES : GUM = Any GUM
RELIGION = Any RELIGION

SECRET

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS BDE OP 24-65.

Reference A: 173 Bde OpO 24-65 dated 12 Sept 65.
 B: confirmatory notes to verbal orders COMAR dated 13 Sept 65.

Serial a.	Timing		Events d.
	Date b.	Time c.	
1.	D-2 1200	0100Z.	Msg O. issued to A, B, C, D, SH Coy, Admin Coy, OC 1RAR Det PWLN
2.	D-2	2030	173 Bde OpO 24-65 received
3.	D-1	0800	Briefing by bonds OC 1RAR Det PWLN
4.	D-1	0830-1030	Rece by bond and OC 1RAR Det PWLN
5.	D-1	1405	O lgh.
6.	D-1 1500	2000	confirmatory notes to verbal orders to 1RAR issued.
7.	D 1400	0530	R lgh departed BIEN HOA.
8.	D	0800	Road convey departed BIEN HOA. (D Coy, PWLN, Mess and Aslt Pns.)
9.	D	0810 0845	LO arrived at Snake Pit. BIEN HOA air base.
10.	D	0910	Estimated time from hel pad Q-1 (1000 hrs) (received as 'Full Forward' from this location (Operational Base)).
11.	D	1015	Full Forward. (Moving to air base).
12.	D	1040	Arrived hel pad.
13.	D	1105	Bn HQ, B Coy, C Coy, elms A Coy lifted from hel pad
14.	D	1130	Arrived LZ BUSTER.
15.	D	1150?	Remainder A Coy lifted from hel pad.
16.	D	1155	B Coy Annex DELTA (In hours).

a.	b.	c.	d.
17.	D	1156	T1 FILTER PLANT (BEN CAT)
18.	D	1204	C Coy RIVER DELTA.
19.	D	1220	A Coy RIVER DELTA.
20	D	1250.	Standing Patrol names passed to coys. B Coy 748348 732348 C Coy 756356 724354 D Coy 762342 718348 ANTI TANK 702344 727344
21	D	1915.	a total of 110 refugees held in church at LZ BUSTER
22	D+1		Patrol Programme:- A Coy - Reserve. B Coy - sector 1 C Coy - sector 4 D Coy - sector 7.
23	D+1	0625.	Harbour to remain this loc further 24 hrs.
24	D+1	0725	B Coy moved out to ptl sector 1.
25.	D+1	0810.	D Coy commenced to move out to ptl sector 7.
26.	D+1	1420	8 pl C Coy contacted 3 VC (Local Forces) at GR 715372. 1 VC KIA and 1 wpr recovered. Remainder evacuated moved SOUTH.
27	D+1	1440	Money Box received from C Coy. HO (Number VCC) 1 BO (Are there any docs) NOT KNOWN CO (Location LZ) Fri 42-2 00-1. DO (Time ready for evacuation) Q+4.
28	D+1	1501.	C Coy req evac car and docs by ABC. Ordered to bury car and docs be returned
29	D+1	1510.	Returned to base loc. No comms 41
30	D+2		Pll Programme - A - Reserve. B - Sector 2 C - Sector 5 D - Sector 8.

a.	D.	C.	SPL
89.	D+8	? J+9 22	B Coy P P P P P Contact with 5 VC 2 wounded darkness prevented follow up. Moved SE direction.
90	D+8	2130	bn POW stated 8 KIA and 2 WIA from contact with B Coy.
91	D+8	2300	5 en came very close to one of B Coy sub units. These were engaged by B Coy and arty fire.
92	D+9.	0915	D Coy located an en camp site at GR 761454. Eating implements for one per recovered.
93	D+9	1037	Mouldy Tent passable to soft skin vehs.
94	D+9.	1120	Incident report from 3 Pl A Coy. One Local Force VC at AIR BASE. The VC moved NORTH WEST
95	D+10	1115.	1 walking wounded as result of Booby TRAP exploding
96	D+11	1305.	C Coy contacted 2 VC (Local Force) at GR 742465. Direction of move not known.
97	D+11	1623.	7 Pl C Coy located an en camp at GR 754476 consisting of thatched roofed houses and underground tunnels. Suspected VC in tunnel.
98.	D+11.	1600	C Coy contacted 1 VC (Local Force) at GR 761271. VC moved South

94 a.

D+9

1715.

1st

elms

ck,

annived

Boon

94 b.

Dt 10 1000. Anti Tanks

ammunition from beam

~~12~~ 94C.

D+10

1238.

List elms

D Coy

anniversary Beemre.

a.	b.	c.	d.
76.	D+6	1500	A Coy located 3 huts in village at GR 714440. The huts were destroyed whilst this was taking place a grenade exploded giving minor wounds to 2 ACoy pers.
77	D+7	0930	A Coy contacted 2 VC (Local Forces) at GR 717447. The VC moved NE.
78.	D+7	0935.	A Coy crepe mesh. A ₀ crepe mesh. B ₀ at 717446 C ₀ Now. D ₀ 1 litter.
	D+7	1007	ACoy. "BOWIE STREET". casevac died (Sgt Smith) KIA
80	D+7	1045	Evac of POW complete.
81	D+7	1118	2 PL ACoy located a village at GR 727405. The village was not occupied. Suspected rubber tapper huts.
82	D+7	1020	Incident Report. ACoy. 3 PL One VC at GR 718448. VC was local force moved NORTH.
83 83	D+7	1200	3 PL ACoy contacted 1 VC at GR 719449. Local force. VC moved NORTH EAST.
84	D+7	1218	2 PL ACoy located a village of 15 huts extending from GR 711442 to GR 714443. Village to large to destroy.
85	D+7	1500	ACoy Complete at air Bag
86	D+7	1335.	Report on MURPHY TENTS from 17 Coy
87	D+7	1440	D Coy located a small en dug in posn containing POCs at Doon Knob
88.	D+8	1530.	B Coy contacted 1 VC (Local force) at GR 764467. Direction of move NOT known

84 r.

D+7

1420.

B coy located 50 buffalo at

GR 741415 well away from

grazing land.

disposal instructions from Bde

disperse as much as possible

87 a.

D+8

1000

B Coy airlifted to pass

Boom.

GR 786462

10 a.

D+6 .

1542.

B Coy Money Box.

A. 8 not 3, The KIA was a female

B. Docs recovered.

C. Unknown at this time Aconn has yet to view them

D. Possibly with resp to message.

a	b	c	d.
69	D+6	1445.	D coy located an en village with at least 9 huts with an underground tunnel system at GR 7264450. A home ammo plant was discovered. 20mm shells were recovered. The huts had been occupied by families (Local Forces)
70	D+6	1530	B Coy located fresh rations and fresh ration boxes plus sandbags at GR 722418
71	D+6	1620	B Coy located 2 en camps ^{the first} at GR 722423 and the second at GR 722420. The first camp contained docus and the second is a staging camp for est 1 coy str. They captured after contact 1 POW.
72.	D+6	1655.	D Coy annex "AIR BAG" a gap of 6 to 8 ft wide and a depth of 4 ft was reported
73	D+6	1730	Contact Report B Coy A @ 23A 1630 B @ 743418 C @ 1 D @ LOCAL
74	D+6	1745.	4 Pl B Coy sighted 2 en approx 300 metres from their loc moving NORTH @ Dressone wearing black the other wearing melting
75	D+6	1756.	D Coy found 4 women with suckling babies in huts at GR 736450. No men were present and the women did NOT possess passes.

a.	b.	c.	d.
61	D+5.	2129.	11 Pl. D Coy sighted 2 to 3 bn moving NORTH towards Anti Tank and Asst Ant Asm.
62	D+6.		Pl programme. A Sector 11 B Sector 15 C Reserve D. Sector 14
63	D+6	0820	Bn released from stand by duty.
64	D+6	1025.	D Coy located a wrecked ac at GR 725 429
65.	D+6	1234	D Coy located 2 huts containing agricultural equipment at GR 7304340 An underground bunker was also located
66	D+6	1240	D Coy Incident Report. A0 1240 B0 730435. C0 Nil D0 Unknown E0 3 x 20mm. F0 Unknown.
67	D+6	1320	D Coy contacted 3 VC (local force) at GR 728442. 1 VC KIA remainder moved NE. a fire mission was called results NOT known
68	D+6	1425.	A0 1425. B0 GR 725445 C0 Nil D0 Unknown possibly mobile E0 Nil. attempt to destroy bunker system. An auto perimeter to village found.

a	b	c	d.
52	D+5.	1114.	4 Pl B Coy engaged 8 ev, and fell up. Ev moved ^{at GR 723423} NORTH.
53	D+5	1210	B Coy made a further contact one weapon captured. Followed blood trails result negative.
54	D+5	1245.	B Coy located one ev transit camp at GR 723423 and a further camp at GR 725419. 3 pushbikes and 1 hand grenade were recovered.
55	D+5	1931	D Coy clearing patrol contacted 1 VC EAST of loc to WEST of B Coy loc. The VC turned and fired one shot pl returned fire. VC moved WEST.
56	D+5	2000	6 pl B Coy were fired on by 5 VC in an attempt to draw their fire.
57	D+5.	2042	11 Pl D Coy fired on a party of up to 10 VC who were possibly moving towards him.
58	D+5.	2112	3 to 4 ev appeared WEST of road, ^{who were} engaged by 11 Pl D Coy. The ev moved back across road.
59	D+5	2105.	12 Pl D Coy reported 2 ev moving SE in front of their posn. Another group of unknown size were moving to the WEST.
60	D+5.	2127	Moss engaged, 1 VC moving to the WEST of their loc.

a.	b.	c.	d.
44.	D+4	0900	D Coy contacted 3 VC (Local Force) at GR 704 384. 1 VC possibly KIA. VC moved EAST. Some equipment was recovered
45	D+4	0919	^{contact} D Coy found bloodstains believed to be continuation of 1st. contact.
46	D+4	0955.	D Coy continued to search area of contact. Definite Bloodstains were found. Requested permission to continue search. Permission granted to search for a further 45 mins.
47	D+4	1150	D Coy searched area of 2 contacts. NO bodies found. Recovered shoes and 1 multi wave Transistor.
44	D+4	1227	D Coy moving to NEW loc.
45	D+4	1320.	C Coy arrived at new loc. (CHALK Box).
46	D+4	1349	D Coy arrived at New loc (CHALK Box).
47	D+4	1500	A, B, ATK, Bn HQ, MORS lifted by hel from LZ BUSTER to new location.
48.	D+4	1557.	A Coy complete in new location (CHALK Box).
49.	D+4	1610	C/S 42 contacted contacted 1 VC at GR 716425 0 VC moved NORTH.
50.	D+4	1545.	Mon Pt. sighted 1 VC at 712426 0 sighted a VC camp at GR 707423 containing 5 buildings. The VC moved South
51	D+5.		Patrol Programme - A - Sector 11 B - Sector 12 C - Reserve. D - Sector 13.

a	b	c	d.
39.	D+3	1620	Money Box D Coy. The fol items were recovered:- Order of Battle, Roll books, photos, map course details and tgt lists, clo, luxury items and other incidentals
40	D+3	1732.	Incident Report D Coy. A O 171200 B O 680360 C O UNKNOWN EST 10. D O Possibly Mobile E O N/A F O Unknown. Money loss O A newly built but incomplete hut was located with well and tunnel system. The fol items were recovered. ① 18 lbs of CHINESE TNT and 1x1½ lb slab. ② 92 USA fuse mine combination MARK 605 complete with detonators. ③ 253 cell batteries in 4½ VOLTS.
40A	D+3	1850	Frag Order of 171200 H received and acknowledged
41	D+3	1800	D Coy located an en staging camp for up to 10 pers. at GR 677360 at 1300 hrs. Type of VC unknown.
42	D+4		Roll programme:- A O Reserve. B O Sector 10 B. C O Sector 10 C D O Sector 10 A
43	D+4	0818	c Coy contacted 1 VC (local force) dressed in Black and carrying a rifle at GR 716396. The VC moved EAST.

a	b	c	d.
31	D+2	1645.	C Coy contacted 1 VC (Local Forces) at GR 74380. VC escaped ^{moved} to the NORTH
32	D+2	1720.	D Coy located a <u>en camp site</u> at GR 685376. No <u>en</u> <u>scene</u> in the camp but it could accommodate ⁱⁿ up to 50 pers. Some letters and papers were recovered.
33	D+3	0025	MOATREPS from D Coy:- A0 0010. B0 6400 C0 800 metres. D0 4800 miles E0 600 metres F0 20 secs. Passed to D Coy that this was 2/503 Mts. D Coy req they be stopped.
34	D+3		PL programme:- A0 Rosene. B0 Sector 3. C0 Sector 6. D0 Sector 9.
35	D+3	0915.	11 PL D Coy continued to search camp site at GR 685376
36	D+3	1030	Bw reported to Bde. "C306 VC Bw had been at GR 685377 in deserted village approx 48 hours ago".
37	D+3.	1520.	C Coy located a VC camp at GR 680375 extending to GR 680373 approx 100x70 100x70 200x in width comprising of hospital, Kitchens, and half built hunkers and tunnels & <u>bamboos</u> huts believed to be part of extension of similar works at GR 687370 Both camps showed signs of recent occupation.
38	D+3	1614.	Incident Report (D Coy). A0 171130 hrs B0 GR 685374 C0 Unknown probably camp site for 50. D0 Possibly Mobile E0 Nil F0 Unknown.

a.	b.	c.	d.
99	D+17	1820	8 pl B Coy contacted 1 VC (Local Force) at GR 752485. 1 VC KIA and 1 mpm recovered.
100	D+17	1815.	4 Pl B Coy contacted 2 VC (Local Force) at GR 743418. 1 VC wounded in action direction of movement North. Follow up revealed 1 well set up camp. Explosives clothes recovered. bamb destroyed.
101	D+18	1407	B Coy apprehended two women and 1 man at GR 778423. These were told to return to their village.
102	D+12	2010	5 rounds 60mm mortar fire from GR 795460.
103	D+12	2037	man reported noises in rubber at GR 787457.
104	D+12	2047	Above tgt engaged by man.
105	D+12	2040	C Coy asked if Bw was firing at their posn
106	D+12	2000	Details of cas 5 minor wounds
107	D+12	2345	SKC fired 2 rnds landed South.
108	D+12	2348	Mpm firing is 57mm RCL
109.	D+12	2350	^{c coy} br rounds fell close to 8 pl.
110	D+12.	2354	Likely en posn engaged with 10 mds mortar fire. No apparent effect
111.	D+12	2357	Pms fired 4 mds m79 into basal edge of rubber at S/SW edge

a.	b.	c.	d.
112	D+13	0945 1020	3rd A Coy contacted 4 VC (Local Forces) ER 798457. 1 VC WIA direction of move EAST. 5 grenades and 100 rounds recovered.
113	D+13	1030	1 Pl A Coy contacted 3 VC (Local Forces) at ER 799435. VC moved EAST

SUB - UNIT OPERATION ANALYSIS

1. Sub-unit A Coy
2. Comd Maj JB HEALY
3. Operation Name / No 11/65
4. Duration 14 days
5. Outline of Sub-unit tasks Phase 1 - Protection of LZ
Move to CHALK BOX.
BUSTER and Bn reserve. Phase 2 - / patrolling in
Sectors 17 and 19, and route recce. Phase 3 Protection
of A Bty at CHALK BOX and convoy escort to MOULBY TENT.
6. Sequence of Events and comments Phase 4 patrolling WEST of BOOM
 - a. Phase 1 ended with a move to a Coy harbour between BUSTER and CHALK BOX on D+3. Coy then withdraw to BUSTER and flew in to CHALK BOX, where Bn was held for one day as reserve for 11/503 op.
 - b. Patrolling in Sectors 17 and 19 was generally disappointing, with no significant finds. More time to search ~~may~~ the areas thoroughly may have produced better results. Cpl SMITH was killed by a sniper during this phase, while his pl were clearing and recceing the route to AIR BAG.
 - c. The escort task proved difficult, due to the breaking up of the tracks and ~~the~~ poor convoy procedures and discipline.
 - d. The area of search in phase 4 was again disappointing, with very few signs of VC activity in the area to the WEST of BOOM. The half day of
7. ~~Assessment of operation~~

Patrolling EAST of the Hwy produced contacts for all those pls, and with more time would have yielded better results.

7. Assessment of Operation

- a. The many changes of plan imposed on the Bn were reflected in the fact that during the 14 days of the op A Coy was actively patrolling on only 4 days.
- b. The biggest problem proved to be the maintenance of wpns and ammo. The time required to properly clean wpns seriously cut into time available for patrolling.
- c. Despite the unfavourable weather health was generally good, and the cooler weather meant there were few skin complaints developed.
- d. Clothing and equipment deteriorated rapidly during the op. The resupply system worked well and no major problems were encountered.

J. Blaney Maj.

..... Coy
1 RAR

..... 64
(Date)

Adj
1 RAR

DPI PREPAREDNESS CHART

Correct as at
(Date)

Reference 1 RAR Op Instruction 1/62.
1 RAR 36.5.5 of 16 Jun 64

1. Members ofCoy are at DPI standard with the following exceptions:-

<u>Medical</u>	Blood Gp	
	Med Cl	
	Med Exam	
	X Ray	
	Vacc and Innoc	
	Tab	
	TET	
	Chol	
	Chol Booster	
	Flu	
	IEC	
<u>Dental</u>	Dental Exam	
	Classified Fit O'seas Service	
<u>Personal Particulars</u>	Underage	
	Due Discharge Within 3 Mths	
	Photographs	
	Will	
	Kit Check	
	Official Secrets	
	ID Discs	
	Pers Particulars	

I certify that the above is a true transcription from Coy documents.

OC Coy
Maj

SUB - UNIT OPERATION ANALYSIS

1. Sub-unit **B Coy**
2. Comd **MAJ ID**
3. Operation Name / No **1RAR OP 11/65.**
4. Duration **14 Days. 14-27 Sep 65.**
5. Outline of Sub-unit tasks **D to D+3 Search + destroy en in Secs 1, 2, 3.**
D+4 to D+7 Ptl Sectors 10B, 12, 15.
D+8 to D+13 Secure LZ Boom and ptl sectors B1, B2, B3.

6. Sequence of Events and comments

- a. D Day the Coy moved to Buster LZ and on for three days patrolled sectors 1, 2, 3 without result.
- b. D+4 the Coy moved by hel to LZ Chalk Box. On D+5 contact was established with 14 VC in two gps. ^{one VC was captured plus} One serious ~~cas~~ was inflicted on en. Artillery fire on suspected getaway route killed 8 VC. On D+6 a Coy comd of Phu Hoi BN was captured and ~~two~~ two VC villages found + destroyed plus a large number of ~~docs~~ ^{docs} ~~blkd~~. On D+7 two more en camps were found plus approx 50 water buffalo approx 1500 metres from habitation + cultivation. These were dispersed by arty fire. The Coy returned to Chalk Box for the ni and secured A arty guns and 2/503 soft vehs.
- c. D+8 the Coy moved by hel to LZ Boom and secured it. Sporadic sniper fire was pursued without result except 1 am tp WIA. 5 VC were engaged by SA and Arty without known result.

7. Assessment of operation

- a. D+11 commenced patrolling sectors B1, B2, B3. Destroyed one small village and shot (suspected killed) one VC.
D+12 encountered many rubber workers in area. ~~These plus~~
All traffic on Hwy 13 was screened for 3 hours.
D+13 returned to Boom for exfil to Bien Hoa.
- d. D+9 Patrolled for 3000 yds around Boom. Searched village near Boom without result. Estb rd block on all vehs on Hwy 13 without result.

7. Assessment of operation.

- a. More time spent in sectors 12, 15 would have probably produced better results. However it was obvious that no large cone of en was in area. Smaller areas plus converging pths particularly at inter coy bdys would possibly have trapped more en.
- b. As shown in previous ops of similar nature, the VC is unable to react in sufficient time to contest the initiative from us. This produces ideal situations for immed savage and aggressive action at section level using all firepower avail to attack larger en parties. ^{may} ~~be~~ ~~done~~

C Coy
29 Sep 65

SUB-UNIT OPERATION ANALYSIS

1. Sub-Unit - C Coy

2. Comd - Maj J. TATTAM

3. Operation No - 11/65

4. Duration - 14 - 28 Sep 65

5. Outline of Sub-Unit tasks -

See trace attached for areas searched

6. Sequence of Events and Comments

a. Sep 14 - Moved by helicopter to Ben Harbour at
GR 724354

b. Sep 15 - Patrolled Sector 9 - one contact at
GR 716369 - 1 VC KIA / 1 KIA. Returned
to Ben Harbour loc on 15/16 Sep

c. Sep 16 - Patrolled Sector 5 - one contact at GR 694380
- no result. Coy harboured at GR 694
381

d. Sep 17 - Patrolled ~~sector~~ ^{sector} 6 with 2 pls and Sector 6A
with 1 pl. Installation found at
(see reports submitted by 8 and 9 pls)
Moved to Coy harbour loc at GR 707395

e. Sep 18-22. Maj EAST to rd to receive fresh
orders. Had^a contact at GR 715396 - VC
was in ambush on EAST side of clearing.
1A failed to catch VC - VC was
probably wounded. Coy moved to Ben
Harbour at GR 713427. Coy remained
in protection role at that loc till
morning of 22 Sep

Comment Defence of Harbour site on 18 Sep
was hazy with cogs not knowing who
was where

AD on 22 Sep

f. Sep 22-24. Coy moved by APC^s to GR 723449 then by foot to secure convey and Ben Harbour loc at GR 743453.

Coy protected convey check point until morning of 24 Sep

g. Sep 24-25. Coy moved ~~the~~ by APC on morning 24 Sep to GR 762457 then by foot to Ben Harbour loc at GR 788462

h. Sep 25-27 Coy patrolled sections C1 and C2. Contacts at GR 79346 - 760471 - 753485 resulted in 1 VC KIA and one wpn captured (See contact reports by 8 pl and Coy HQ)

Coy received fire from a possible VC 57 M1 KCL on the m 26/27 whilst in harbour at GR 777467 ^(HQ + 1 pl) and GR 778475 (1 pl) 3 rds fell near both positions and appeared to come from approximately ~~the~~ square 7745

Coy secured LZ at GR 787464 for extraction of A B ^{CO} D and Ben HQ on afternoon of 27 Sep

j. Sep 27-28. Coy responsible for convey comprising 161 Bty - B Bty 319th M1 pl - prod pl - B-teams from HQ - APC up from LZ BCOM to LAI KHE and convey minus B Bty 319th M1 pl from LAI KHE to S161 HQT. Convey came off without incident

7. Assessment of operation

a. It is realised that the complexity of the operation required numerous changes at all levels and this is accepted as an operational hazard.

b. SITREPS. Info from HQ was lacking on numerous occasions. It is realised that the SITREP picture is hard to forecast but an internal action need to be sent to all coys at least once per day - possibly during the m after stand down time

c. RESULTS Generally good though on occasions
the wrong items were received (boats
is in lieu of 5 boats)
It is realised that large quantities of
rocks (170 pm received by coy) greens,
shells etc were requested but this
must be accepted in ^{an} operation of this
nature

- d. Line eqpt (1) The ADPK10 set performance was
not good - 50% of coy sets became
O/S during the op
(2) 10 set batteries are unreliable and
too many have to be carried to
counteract this weakness
(3) The system of carrying line eqpt is
loose & coys cannot carry line, telephones
whatsoever in the mov. perhaps line eqpt
could be permanently carried on APC's for
use when necessary.

e. DF tasks I am not happy about DF tasks
being sent in clear particularly close
DF's when coy is harboured above.
I would suggest no DF's with a target
registered near by on DF. for info
and only sent by arty rep in code
and co-ordinated at Sn level.

Jattam May

SUB - UNIT OPERATION ANALYSIS

1. Sub-unit. DCoy, IRAR.

2. Cond. Maj B.J. Harper.

Pl Comds -

a. 10 Pl. 2 Ls hind; 400 Frost, No 2 Pincite.

b. 11 Pl. 400 Miles.

c. 12 Pl. 2 Ls Boushe.

3. Operation Name / No.

11/65.

4. Duration. 14-28 Sep 65.

5. Outline of Sub-unit tasks.

a. 14-19 Sep. See Confirmatory Orders to CO IRAR Verbal Orders at Bien Hoa at 1405 hrs 13 Sep 65, dated 13 Sep 65 (Ops 27).

b. 19-28 Sep. Issued verbally, without written confirmation, by either CO IRAR or 2IC IRAR.

6. Sequence of Events and comments

Serial	Date/Time	Event	Comments
1.	140900-141145 -141330.	Road movement by APC (4, 1/5 PWLH) BIEN HOA - BEN CAT - LZ BOSTER.	<p>a. Ready to move time was advanced by 30 mins, on one hour notice. Reduction of morning time for movement can only be gained AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION of the time the new requirement takes to reach the individual soldier.</p> <p>b. <u>Traffic Control</u>. If Comd 1/5 PWLH informed a Day that 0/6 Asmd Coy was providing traffic control posts enroute. This point was not included in CO IRAR orders. The posts did not operate. Day off become entangled with several ARVN and US road columns near BEN CAT. Due to enemy activity and this lack of traffic control, the latter stages of the movement could have become chaotic. Traffic control is essential in any road movement. Any route security must be combined with the basic organization and not allowed to become a comic opera with tragic results (the death of two NZ soldiers because of a road mine explosion).</p> <p>c. <u>APC Batching</u>. One APC, with one section 10 Pl embussed, sank whilst attempting to cross the River SONG THI TINH 736332. The sinking could have been avoided if care had been taken prior to committing the lead vehicle to a stream of unknown characteristics. "A little time spent on reconnaissance..."</p>
7. <u>Assessment of operation</u>			

SUB - UNIT
OPERATION ANALYSIS

1. SUB - UNIT
2. CODE
3. OPERATION Name / No
4. DURATION
5. OUTLINE of Sub-Unit tasks

6. Sequence of Events and Comment

Serial (a)	Date/Time (b)	Events (c)	Comments (d)
2.	141400 - 160830	a. Occupation L2 BUSTER. b. Patrolling into Sectors 7.	a. <u>APC Allotment.</u> One section of PWK was placed in Dlog locality at L2 BUSTER for nights only. The degree of control over this section by Dlog was not made clear. Definite orders are needed in future, I consider. b. <u>Patrolling</u> (1) <u>Clash of Routes.</u> The movement of Bloy to Sectors 1, 2, 3 created a "traffic jam" the selection of routes ^{being left} to Coy Comd, inevitably left a vacuum which caused a convergence of two coys onto the same routes. Bin control is required from the outset. 2. <u>11 Pl Incident.</u> One old man, plus documents and home-made ammunition, apprehended at 724338. Report submitted separately. c. <u>Loss of PRC 10 Radio Set, Signal Equipment, Personal Clothing and Equipment.</u> (1) Co IRAR gave verbal orders at L2 BUSTER night 15/16 Sep concerning Coy patrolling into Sectors 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9. (2) <u>Baggage.</u> Co IRAR stated that excess baggage could be loaded onto APC in Coy areas for movement to new IRAR harbour area. Coys would make their own harbours nights 16/17 Sep, 17/18 Sep. Dlog baggage was handed over to NCo's section APC on the morning 16 Sep by 2IC Dlog. The items were apparently left at L2 BUSTER. The items included:-

7. Assessment of Operation

Distribution List 'E'

Int
13 Jul

SUB - UNIT
OPERATION ANALYSIS

1. SUB → UNIT
2. COND
3. OPERATION Name / No
4. DURATION
5. OUTLINE of Sub-Unit tasks

6. Sequence of Events and Comment

Serial (a)	Date/Time (b)	Event (c)	Comment (d)
			<p>(a) PRC 10 set complete.</p> <p>(b) One telephone K.</p> <p>(c) One mile cable D10.</p> <p>(d) Two cable dispensers.</p> <p>(e) One cable laying frame.</p> <p>(f) A number of packs, 37 pattern containing clothing (a separate submission on these articles is to be made).</p> <p>(g) \$50 in MPC belonging to Sgt Frost (evacuated to BOTHERWORTH) plus other items in the soldier's wallet - yet to be determined.</p> <p>(3) 1/503 Bn may have the items.</p> <p>(4) Clearance of a bus harbour area, after it has been vacated, may be in order, to stop incidents of this nature. Responsibilities, concerned with movement of baggage, must be more explicit in the future. In this case, the many tasks given to Plond PWLH may have caused him to overlook the uplift of 5 day baggage by his section commander.</p>
			<p>7. Assessment of Operation</p> <p>Distribution List 'E'</p>
3.	16 Sep	Patrol sectors 8,9.	<p>(1) 10 Pl. Patrol Sector 9. No comments.</p> <p>(2) 11 Pl. Patrol Sector 8. Rd discussed:-</p> <p>(a) Camp site at 685376. See Installation Report submitted separately.</p> <p>(b) 2nd VC at 694383. Information</p>

Int Sec
13 Jul 68

SUB - UNIT
OPERATION ANALYSIS

1. SUB → UNIT
2. COMD
3. OPERATION Name / No
4. DURATION
5. OUTLINE of Sub-Unit tasks

6. Sequence of Events and Comment

Serial (a)	Date/Time (b)	Event (c)	Comment (d)
			<p>passed to OC Bloy who engaged VC in vicinity track junction 694380.</p> <p>(3) <u>Montasing of Bloy Harbour location:</u> Bloy went into harbour at 689375 for the night 16/17 Sep. Mortar rounds (81mm) were received immediately ^{WEST} of the harbour area at 2020 hrs, 0010 hrs. MORTREPS were submitted on each occasion. OC Bloy was informed at 0040 hrs that the fire came from 2/503 Bn. It would be stopped. A thorough investigation would appear warranted to enquire into:-</p> <p>(a) Operation of the 173 Bde FSC.</p> <p>(b) Boundaries current during the night 16/17 Sep.</p> <p>(4) <u>Stopping of Bloy Artillery Fire Task:</u> An artillery task was arranged for 2000 hrs onto the camp site at 683376. At the request of OC Bloy, this task was stopped during firing. OC Bloy stated that rounds were falling near a pl of Bloy. As Bloy was operating in sectors 2, 3 some 1500m to the SOUTH, this request appeared ridiculous. However, the task was stopped. Subsequently, at 170900 hrs 5 Pl Bloy was met by 12 Pl at 685372, coming from the EAST. The Pl Comd stated he had been moving in Sector 8 16 Sep and had gone into harbour at 693373 approximately for the night. This explained the call for cease fire by OC Bloy. <u>Nonsense like this mysterious movement of 5 Pl Bloy must be stopped TO AVOID ACCIDENTS in the future. Commanders must understand that operations are not training exercises with a friendly enemy and blank rounds.</u></p>

7. Assessment of Operation

Distribution List 'E'

Lat 13 July

SUB - UNIT
OPERATION ANALYSIS

1. SUB → UNIT
2. COND
3. OPERATION Name / No
4. DURATION
5. OUTLINE of Sub-Unit tasks

6. Sequence of Events and Comment

Serial	Date/Time	Event (c)	Comment (d)
4.	17 Sep	a. Search sectors 8, 9. b. 10 Pl. Search Sector 9. Follow -ing found:- (1) Mats containing TNT and mine fuses at 680360. Installation Report submitted. (2) Overnight VC Harbour site at 677360. Installation Report submitted. c. 11 Pl. Search 8, NORTH area. Found Camp site at 684374. Documents sent to HQ IRAR. Installation Report submitted.	NIL.
7. Assessment of Operat SOUTH area.			
a. 12 Pl. Search 8, SOUTH area. c. Co Visit. 1600 hrs at new Coy harbour area track junction 694380.			
5.	18 Sep	a. Day moved by track and road to new IRAR Harbour Area at NW corner Sector 10A. Distribution List 'E' b. 11 Pl. 11 Pl forward section made contact with 3 VC opols on track at 703383. One VC wounded. Equipment recovered. After Action Report submitted.	a. Footwear.. Boots, rubber canvas are not suitable for extended periods in a wet climate. When walking on a hard surface follows, extensive use in wet areas, the proportion of soldiers virtually crippled with blistered feet is stunning. A boot with a hard rubber sole but with a quick drying upper and drainage holes is an urgent requirement.

SUB - UNIT OPERATION ANALYSIS

1. Sub-unit
2. Comd
3. Operation Name / No
4. Duration
5. Outline of Sub-unit tasks

6. Sequence of Events and comments

id (a)	Date/Time (b)	Event (c)	Comments (d)
6.	19 Sep	<p>a. Day formed part of IRAR Harbour Area in Sector 10A.</p> <p>b. <u>Infiltration/Reconnaissance</u> <u>Missions</u> 19/20 Sep. Continuous movement by the enemy around and towards Day locality took place 1920-2230 hrs.</p>	<p>a. <u>Layout of IRAR Harbour</u>. Reference to the SW of the IRAR Harbour was left to 2/503 Bn. After the first contact by Day clearing patrol at 1920 hrs, OC Day moved 6 soldiers to the road with a task of giving early warning of an approach from this open flank. In future, HQ IRAR staff officers must not rely upon paper security. If troops are not on the ground, any area is not secure by night. Detailed coordination is also necessary.</p> <p>b. <u>DF Tasks</u>. MFC Day submitted DF tasks to Montar RL Comd on 18 Sep. These DF tasks were requested by OC Day. The tasks were not approved. An enquiry by MFC Day brought the comments from Montar RL Comd "mind your own business". These DFs were OC Day's business. I suggest Montar RL Comd consider all DF requests and coordinate them as expected of him in conjunction with the appropriate artillery advisers.</p>
7.	20 Sep	<p>a. Patrolling Sectors 13, 14.</p> <p>b. Route Reconnaissance including crossing sites.</p> <p>(1) 12 Pl. Contact 1330 hrs, 72743 with up to 8 VC. One KIA. After Action Report submitted.</p> <p>(2) 10 Pl / Day HQ. Village found 724445 - 729434. Up to 10 huts. Installation Report submitted.</p>	<p>a. <u>Family Groups Taken Prisoner</u>. Several large family groups were apprehended at track/creek crossing 7345. After preliminary interrogation all were evacuated by helicopter morning 21 Sep. Buildings were left intact on orders from HQ IRAR. They were subsequently destroyed by other Corps. CIVILIANS SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED IN ANY OPERATIONAL AREA. THOSE WHO ARE MUST BE AUTOMATICALLY SUSPECT.</p>

7. Assessment of operation

Serial (a)	Date/Time (b)	Events (c)	Comments (d)
8.	21 Sep	<p>(3) Truck/Creek Crossing 7244. Outline report given. O'Clay task to report in detail.</p> <p>(4) 11 PL. Patrolled SOUTH Sector 13.</p> <p>a. Route, crossing Reconnaissance b. <u>Patrolling Sector 14.</u></p> <p>(1) Crossing at 7645 and truck junction 76457 investigated. Crossing found to be unsuitable.</p> <p>(2) New crossing - in use by vehicles - found at 760457.</p>	<p>a. Technical experts required on any route, crossing site reconnaissance. These experts must be familiar with all requirements and vehicle characteristics. An Artzmann help would not be an expert capable of judging armoured vehicle characteristics.</p> <p>b.</p>
9.	22 Sep.	<p>O'Clay moved to new crossing site and secured site. Several one-man campsites discovered in the vicinity.</p>	<p>a. Stores, etc for crossing should have been delivered this day, in my opinion.</p> <p>b. Some preliminary work should have commenced also also, using O'Clay with Artzmann advisers.</p>
10.	23 Sep	<p>a. O'Clay continued Crossing Site Security Operations.</p> <p>b. Reconstruction of the Crossing Site.</p> <p>c. Movement of some B vehicles to new IRAR Harbour Area at APBAU BANG (BOOM) 7846.</p>	<p>a. <u>Security Operations.</u> Continued without incident. The movement of vehicles to BOOM, unescorted by infantry, was chancing fate, I consider.</p> <p>b. <u>Reconstruction of the Crossing Site.</u> Artz mann assumed at site 0745 hrs. Some stores (PSP) were not delivered until 1400 hrs. One pl O'Clay was used as labourer. Once its task was complete, the pl could had no idea of his future tasks. O'Clay sent him to BOOM as fast escort.</p> <p>c. <u>Movement of Vehicles.</u> The movement of vehicles across the crossing site was chaotic. To avoid future occurrences, the following points are suggested:-</p> <p>(1) <u>Command.</u> One officer with communica- tions must be placed in command of the site. He must have definite powers.</p> <p>(2) <u>Vehicle Movement.</u> Vehicles cannot move in a guerrilla infested area without proper protection and control. From the crossing site to BOOM, there was no infantry protection organised.</p>

Serial (a)	Date / Time (b)	Event (c)	Comments (d)
24 Sep.	<p>a. Vehicle Movements to BOOM. b. Movement of Dlay to BOOM. c. Reception at BOOM of Dlay.</p>	<p>d. <u>Passage of Information</u>. Little information was passed to O Day on 23 Sep. At 1700 hrs O Day raised the question of security of vehicles in the crossing site area. Orders were changed three times in thirty six minutes. O Day, already given orders by CO IRAR, continued on his plan of movement until 1845 hrs. O Day started his plan of night security. The whole crux of the matter lay in control on the spot. See my comments in sub-sub-paragraph C(1) above. However, PWH difficulties at the time are appreciated.</p> <p>a. <u>Vehicle Movements</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) 2IC Dlay passed IC crossing by O Day. (2) Pfound PWH considered he was in command. To avoid this clash in future, see my comments at paragraph 10 column (d) sub-sub-paragraph C(1) above. (3) Final vehicle cleared 1030 hrs. (4) No foot protection from crossing to BOOM. Some vehicles made their own way. <p>b. <u>Movement of Dlay and Reception</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Dlay cleared the crossing site at 1115 hrs, after its destruction was complete. (2) On arrival at BOOM, there were no guides. Eventually SEXGOU MINAR placed Dlay in an impossible position. A query to SEXGOU confirmed the location. The location was altered at 2IC IRAR orders at 1500 hrs, after Dlay had commenced preparation in the original area allotted. HQ IRAR staff officers must plan a harbour in advance and guide corps to their area. Some warning is possible of an impending move. To not give any warning, shows a lack of planning by the staff at HQ IRAR. 	

Serial (a)	Date/Time (b)	Event (c)	Comments (d)
12.	25-27 Sep	<p>a. Day placed in Battalion res at BOOM.</p> <p>b. Standing Patrol Tank to East of Route 13 each night.</p> <p>c. Movement to Ambush site 791450, 25 Sep.</p>	<p>a. <u>Battalion Reserve</u>. No comments. However, any employment of Day would have meant a redeployment of the IRAR area to ensure all-round defence. This possible re-deployment must be considered.</p> <p>b. <u>Standing Patrol Tanks</u>. These single tanks could have had disastrous results due to two occurrences:-</p> <p>(1) <u>USA B Bty Unreadiness</u>. Despite a personal visit to OC B Bty, the return of the Standing Patrol on the night 26/27 Sep, on orders CO IRAR, produced a "rattle of bolts" and the cocking of weapons. Obviously soldiers and NCOs were not briefed on this patrol's likely movements. This matter MUST BE CO-ORDINATED THOROUGHLY AT HQ IRAR, NOT AT A SUB-UNIT LEVEL.</p> <p>(2) <u>Mortar DF Task</u>. During the mortar attack on the IRAR Harbour area night 26/27 Sep, Mortar Pl Co and IRAR - I presume on orders HQ IRAR - attempted to fire a DF task which was subject to query with OC Day before firing. MFC Day managed to stop the task. Eventually, the standing patrol was withdrawn. HQ IRAR must be aware of patrol location. The FCE at HQ IRAR must also be aware of any DF restrictions. In addition, advice of the patrol commander as to direction and approximate distance to the enemy mortar should have been taken. As it happened, DF tanks were fired some 2000 mils off line.</p> <p>c. <u>Movement to Ambush site</u>. On arrival at the site, the site of detonation of the road mine appeared to be booby-trapped. One soldier was slightly wounded. The congestion in the area was something to</p>

Serial (a)	Date/Time (b)	Event (c)	Comments (d)
13.	27 Sep	Return to Bien Hoa.	<p>behold, with civilian traffic mingling with ARVN foot and vehicular traffic and US 173d's vehicular traffic. Pertinent comments are:-</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) No road column can move in this country without the route being cleared and secured. This may mean movement by bound and enter at infantry force. In addition, an air-borne quick-reaction force is essential. The command of any road column should be air-borne. (2) Civilians must be kept out entirely of any operational area. (3) Complete information on friendly forces movements must be available to sub-unit commanders. <p>NIL.</p>

7. Assessment of Operation. The operation appeared confusing at the sub-unit level. To the individual soldier it must appear more so. The problems facing the 1RAR are resolved by OC Day. The sound policy of keeping as many changes of plan away from sub-units as possible is sound and should be followed in the future. However, this should not be followed to the point where such orders are issued. Time to disseminate orders at all levels must be allowed for in planning. Although executed as best as possible in the circumstances, I do not think the rushed planning necessary to cater for changes of ideas allowed the 173d and 1RAR missions to be fully implemented.

Bernard J. Hansen Maj,
OC Day 1RAR.
30 Sep 65.

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation No.....
2. Report by No. 54520 Rank CPH Name B. COLLETT
3. 22 Sec 8 Pl C Coy
4. a. Time of Action approx 1430
b. Duration 5 minutes
c. Date 15 SEP 65
d. Location GR 716 369
5. Unit / Sub-unit tasks S + D

6. Was it?
a. Contact
b. Incident.....
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence
a. 1st Scout came on 3 VC standing in line
b. shots exchanged 1 VC fell to ground
c. 2 others ran off 1 appeared to have been hit
d. 2 VC attempted to return to recover hit VC
e. Fire by Sec Comd, Scout + 3rd member with M79 drove off 2 VC.
f. VC Body, weapon + ammo recovered.

8. VC
a. Strength 3
b. Type of VC (Guerrilla, RF or Main Force) Guerrilla local
c. VC cas
i KIA - 1
ii WIA - 1 (suspected)
iii VCC

8. d Were VC cas disposed of by

i Mol evac.....Time.....

ii Buried.....Location.....

iii Other means.....

e. Summary of docs and kit recovered

f. Type and number of wpns recovered

g. Wpns identified on action

h. VC dress

j. Summary of VC actions

9. Own cas

KIA

MIA

10. Lessons learned

11. Comments by Coy Comds

Comd.....

Coy Comd.....

(Handwritten notes and stamps)

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation No.....
2. Report by No. 54520 ~~Ref~~ clh Name COHETT B.
3. 22 Sec 8 Pl C Coy
4. a. Time of Action 0930
 b. Duration 45 minutes
 c. Date 18 SEP 65
 d. Location 714 396
5. Unit / Sub-unit tasks S + D

6. Was it?
 a. Contact.....
 b. Incident YES.....

7. Summary of action in chronological sequence
 - a. Fwd Scout + vc saw each other on crossing clearing
 - b. vc fired shot which was returned by scout
 - c. vc fled up track - appeared to be limping
 - d. Sec continued move - vc continued move ahead
 - e. vc moved into scrub - sec fired M79 & threw grenades in location
 - f. Search revealed no trace

8. VC
 - a. Strength 1
 - b. Type of VC (Guerrilla, RF or Main Force) Guerrilla local
 - c. VC cas
 - i KIA
 - ii WIA - 1 suspected
 - iii VCC

8. d Were VC cas disposed of by
- i Hel evac.....Time.....
 - ii Buried.....Location.....
 - iii Other means.....
- e. Summary of docus and kit recovered
- f. Type and number of wpns recovered
- g. Wpns identified on action
- h. VC dress
- j. Summary of VC actions

9. Own cas

KIA

MIA

10. Lessons learned

11. Comments by Coy Comds

Comd.....

Coy Comd.....

Contact / Incident Reports

- A. Date, time of action. 18 09 15 L
- B. Grid reference of Action 70538K
- C. VC strength 3
- D. Type of VC. (guerilla, LF or main force) Guerilla
- E. VC cars + weapons uncovered 1 KIA. Blood trail sighted.
- F. Direction of movement North East.

Remarks

CONTACT REPORT

1. Operation NR 165

2. Report by 16264 NT W. Giles.

3. 11 PL D Coy

4. (a) 1615.

5. (b) Duration 5 mins.

(c) 18 Sept. 65.

(d) Loc. 717424.

5. Unit subunit tasks.

(a) 4 sec fired on one VC who was moving through rubber.

(b) 5 sec did sweep of edge of scrub where VC disappeared.

(c) More fire was requested and refused.

6. Action was a contact.

7. (a) Pl was clearing HL of area 10A when a VC was sighted at a distance of 150 metres. The flank man of the point sec opened fire with an m16 but effect was not observed.

(b) 5 sec then did a sweep but no trace of VC was found.

8 (a) VC strength. 1.

(b) Type of VC. Local.

(c) VC cas nil.

W. Giles NT.

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Op no 1/65.
2. Report by 16264 HT W. Giles
3. 11th Day
4. (a) 0915
(b) Duration - 15 mins.
(c) 18 Sept 65
(d) 705384.
5. Unit/ Subunit tasks
 - (a) 4 sec made contact.
 - (b) 6 sec did sweep on left flank.
6. Action was a contact.
7. Summary of action.
 - (a) 4 sec point scout fired on 1 VC who appeared to be on HP at track edge. The scout reported hitting the VC in the stomach and blood trails were later sighted.
 - (b) 6 sec then did a sweep on the left side of the track and found two cooking tins, and three native type hats approx 30 metres in from the track.
 - (c) 11th and 10th then carried out a further and more extensive search of the area with nil result.
8. (a) VC strength. 3.
(b) Type of VC local
(c) VC cap
WIA - 1.

W. Giles W.

After Action Report

- ① Op No:
- ② Report By No: 53160 Rank: SGT Name: PROSSER
- ③ 4.45 Sec 5 Pl B Coy.
- ④ (a) Time of Action: 1130
(b) Duration: $\frac{1}{2}$ Hour
(c) Date: 19th Sept
(d) Loc: GR 723423
- ⑤ Unit Sub Unit Task: Search & Destroy
- ⑥ Was it? (a) Contact: No.
(b) Incident: Yes
- ⑦ Summary of Action in Chronological Order:
I sent 2 sections less MG's to retrieve packs field left behind during earlier action whilst having intelligence we encountered 5 VC. We fired at them and wounded one. Blood trail followed but lost.
- ⑧ VC (a) strength 5
(b) Type (Local, Mobile, Main Force) Local
(c) VC. Cas (i) KIA NIL
(ii) WIA 1
(iii) VCC NIL

Jul 65

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Person Reporting.
No. 213307 Rank CPL Name MC CRAVOCK
2. Commanding S Sec I pl C Coy ARCD
3. Date and time of action 1600 hrs 19 Jul 65 location AP-BEN-DONG GR 694350
4. Sequence of events leading up to the action. The action had been given an order to secure for destruction. I was placing my men into fire positions when we had the contact
5. No of VC encountered 1
6. Armed with Grenades held in a hat
7. What were they doing. The VC had walked into a clearing on our right flank about 30 meters away
8. What did you do (brief summary of action). Pte Hamill and the VC saw each other at the same time. The VC went for something in his hat (grenade) at the same time Pte Hamill fired from the waist, the VC then ran, he jumped a fallen log, I then opened fire with two shots from the waist, the VC disappeared into the scrub on our right flank, a search of the area was carried out, only foot tracks were found
9. Casualties.
(a) Own NIL
(b) VC NIL
10. Weapons captured NIL
11. Documents captured NIL
12. Lessons learned It doesn't matter what the stop may be or for how long, always have sentries out covering each flank, in our case I feel this should have been done before placing fire positions, also fire then ask question.

.....Patrol Comd Jattam Coy Comd
 29 Sep Date

Contact/Incident Report

- A. Date, time of action 201330
- B. Grid reference of action 728442
- C. VC strength 6
- D. Type of VC (Guerrilla, R.F. or main force) Guerrilla
- E. VC cars + weapons recovered. 1 KIA. (FEMALE)
- F. Direction of VC movement North East.

Remarks

Em fired on start + withdrew. one was a little slow + was caught up in the contact drill + killed.

Jul 65

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Person Reporting.
No. 18252 Rank. 2 Lt Name. J R BOURKE
 2. Commanding Sec. 12 pl. D Coy
 3. Date and time of action 20.1330 location 728442
 4. Sequence of events leading up to the action. 12 Pl.
..... was patrolling NORTHWARDS on a track which
..... was slightly WEST of the ck near this loc
 5. No of VC encountered 6
 6. Armed with Lt cal. rpm, possibly M1. The gp
had time to fire only 2 shots. Probably they had only one
rpm.
 7. What were they doing. Resting beside a track
 8. What did you do (brief summary of action). Fwd sec
carried out a normal contact drill, killing
one ev. Ev fled NORTH EAST. A DF was
fired about 300' NORTH of our loc and
the fire shifted to the NORTH EAST. Blood
trails were later sited
 9. Casualties.
(a) Own NIL
 - (b) VC 1 KIA - female
 10. Weapons captured NIL
 11. Documents captured. Photographs, contained
in several packs which were captured
 12. Lessons learned -
(a) As well as having some portion of a
section returning fire, some members
must snipe at the ev. This would have
given us more kills.
(b) Constant navigation and good covering
fire (DF) pay off.
- J R Bourke Lt Patrol Comd Coy Comd
..... Date
13. Type of VC - LOCAL FORCE
 14. Contact or incident CONTACT

After Action Report

- ① of no.....
- ② Report by no: 14746 Rank: SGT Name: KIRBY.
- ③ SEC. Co. Pt. Coy
- ④ (a) Time of action: 1700 hrs.
(b) Duration: 1 min.
(c) Date: 20 SEPT 65
(d) Location: GR 746 414
- ⑤ Sub-unit tasks: Search & Destroy.
- ⑥ Was it?
(a) Contact: no
(b) Incident: yes
- ⑦ Summary of action in chronological sequence.
A recon patrol of 4 men ~~was~~ fired on what was thought to be a VC. It turned out to be a buffalo. Apparently a VC heard the shots and ran into the Station Harbour. He had no weapon or couple of shots were fired and he surrendered.
- ⑧ VC (a) strength: one.
(b) type of VC (local, mobile, main force) } Maintenance
Tactical
(c) V.C. Cas. (i) KIA: nil
(ii) WIA: nil.
(iii) VCC: ONE!

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation No. 11/65
2. Report by No. 37615 ~~11/65~~ 2Lt Name BROWN
3.Sec 2 Pl A Coy
4. a. Time of Action 27.1030-1040
b. Duration 10 MINUTES
c. Date 27 Sep 65
d. Location 6R 779441
5. Unit / Sub-unit tasks Searching to EAST of H/WAY 13.
6. Was it?
a. Contact
b. Incident
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence

Pl started across paddie clearing moving to EAST. 1 Pl
A Coy were proceeding likewise about 800' to SOUTH.
VC Str 4-5? showed upon Section 1 Pl in clear. Section
2 Pl + HQ reached E Side of clearing, fired briefly as
VC withdrew from 1st incident 2nd Section 2 Pl
hounded across clearing, front scout fired at from about
50' to South Section moved across after firing 2x on 79 Rando

8. VC x M60
 - a. Strength 4-5 4 1
 - b. Type of VC (Guerrilla, RF or Main Force) ~~Main Force~~ guerrilla
 - c. VC cas
 - i KIA
 - ii WIA NIL
 - iii VCC

8. d. Were VC cas disposed of by
- i. Mol evac.....Time.....
 - ii. Buried.....Location.....
 - iii. Other means.....

e. Summary of docus and kit recovered

f. Type and number of wpns recovered

g. Wpns identified on action

h. VC dress

unrecognizable

j. Summary of VC actions

*fired on 1 pl in other for 5 minutes
withdrew EAST. 1 person probably stayed behind
& stayed at us.*

9. Own cas

KIA *NIL*

MIA *NIL*

10. Lessons learned

*for large clearings ~~request~~ ^{recapd.}
arty ^{of} before proceeding. Pl commander to
stay with wireless at all times. We could
not react effectively to 1 pl's contact.*

11. Comments by Coy Comd

*Covering fire was requested
by 2 pl to cross open, but clearance could not
be obtained to fire so they proceeded to cross
without covering fire. On contact arty*

Comd.....

Coy Comd.....

*Line was requested and obtained
immediately on VC probable withdrawal
routes.*

*Blessly May
OC A Coy*

1 Pz A Coy.

CONTACT REPORT

- (a) 271030. M
(b) ~~797~~ 798434
(c) 6
(d) KOCAN
(e) NIK
(f) EAST
(g) NIK

Two sections of 1 Pz + PzQ
left the firm base at 794435 and
was patrolling EAST.

While the lead section was
crossing a 250' wide paddy field,
it was fired upon from the EAST
bank by 6 VC. This section
immediately went to ground
and returned fire.

The second section was
brought up on the RIGHT of
the WEST bank and gave

216300 Pte Diamond P.C

NO NO



AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation No.....

2. Report by No. 38175 2LT Name E. WILLIAMS

3. 9 Sec 3 Pl A Coy

4. a. Time of Action 1000

b. Duration 5 mins

c. Date 26 Sep 65

d. Location 798457

5. Unit / Sub-unit tasks

Patrolling

6. Was it?

a. Contact.....

b. Incident.....

7. Summary of action in chronological sequence

Sec was following the line of the track heading NE. They came upon the road and saw 50 yds away 4 men digging all were unarmed. Sec was put on the ground M4 covering. When sec came approached men they downed tools and ran. Sec opened up M4 double feed on first round. Search of area turned up equipment + diggings were pits for ambush of the rd junction. Fire was returned from 100 yds away but shots were completely ineffective.

8. VC

a. Strength

b. Type of VC (Guerrilla, RF or Main Force)

c. VC cas

i KIA

ii WIA 1

iii VCC

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation No.....
2. Report by No. 23058 ~~IRAR~~ W02 Name R.E. JONES
3. CHQ Sec Pl C Coy
4. a. Time of Action 1600 hrs
b. Duration 10 MIN
c. Date 26 SEPT 65
d. Location 759470
5. Unit / Sub-unit tasks
C Coy IRAR - SECURING ~~THE~~ LZ
6. Was it?
a. Contact.....
b. Incident..... YES
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence

CAPT LE BARS WAS SECURING ~~THE~~ ^{LZ} FOR CO ARRIVAL WITH CSM + 1 SEC FROM 9 PL WHEN HE SIGHTED MOVEMENT IN BUSH TO THE EAST. UPON INVESTIGATION PTE CORRALL OF 9 PL SIGHTED 1 VC MOVING FAST THROUGH SCRUBS CSM + HALF SECTION GAVE CHASE SIGHTED MOVEMENT A NUMBER OF SHOTS WERE FIRED FROM SLR'S OF CSM + PTE HANUSZENKZ BUT VC ESCAPED THROUGH BUSH HEADING SOUTH.

8. VC
a. Strength 1
b. Type of VC (Guerrilla, RF or Main Force) LOCAL FORCE
c. VC cas NIL
i KIA
ii WIA
iii VCC

8. d Were VC cas disposed of by
i Hel evac.....Time.....
ii Buried.....Location.....
iii Other means.....

e. Summary of docus and kit recovered *NIL*

f. Type and number of wps recovered *NIL*

g. Wps identified on action *NIL*

h. VC dress *BLACK SHORTS + SUFFS*

j. Summary of VC actions

*AS SOON AS HE WAS SIGHTED SPRINTED TO THE
EAST THEN SOUTH*

9. Own cas

KIA *NIL*

MIA *NIL*

10. Lessons learned

SECTION TO BE MORE ALERT

11. Comments by Coy Comds

Comd..... Coy Comd.....

3PL A COY.

CONTACT REPORT

A. 26 1030
B. 798458
C. 4
D. Local
E. 1 wounded
F. EAST

Sequence of events

I sec was following the line of a track heading NE until they reached the road at the CR shown. They saw four persons on the side of the road digging. There were no apparent weapons, the sec landed put the sec on the ground and then started to approach the men who were 50 yds away. As soon as they saw him they downed tools and fled whereupon the sec opened up. The MG double feeding on the first round. One of the men was

887 A 100

CONTACT REPORT

A 86 1030



B 824 875

C 4

D 10000

E 1

F 1




on the first round. One of the men was
 sec opened up. The MC double feeding
 downed both and fell backwards. The
 enemy the soon as they saw him they
 approached the men were 20 yds
 on the ground and they started to
 stagger. The sec took but the sec

seen to be hit in the back by an
armalite bullet. No VC were captured
a search of the area turned up,

2 US grenades M26 or launchers,
3 Chinese grenades, 40 rounds of M1
ammo, 2 belts with pouches, waterproof
ropes and entrenching tools. All
items were attached to the belts.

William H.
(3A Co)



There was a wad in
the top of each gran to
keep the string in.

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation No. 11/65
2. Report by No. 61253 Name CPL CRICK G.G.
3. 24 Sec 8 Pl C Coy
4. a. Time of Action 1745
b. Duration 1 min
c. Date 25 SEP 65
d. Location 755 483
5. Unit / Sub-unit tasks
overnight ambush
6. Was it?
a. Contact
b. Incident
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence
a. Ph in ambush position
b. Sec had 1 member several yds forward on listening watch beside track
c. VC walked toward sentry who allowed him to come within several yards and fired.
d. VC fell to ground
e. Area checked no further personnel around, weapons and ammunition recovered.
f. Ph moved from area.
8. VC
a. Strength 1
b. Type of VC (Local Guerilla, RF or Main Force) gentle local
c. VC cas
i KIA - 1
ii WIA
iii VCC

- S. d Were VC cas disposed of by
 - i Hol evac.....Time.....
 - ii Buried.....Location.....
 - iii Other means.....
- e. Summary of docus and lct recovered
- f. Type and number of wps recovered
- g. Wps identified on action
- h. VC dress
- j. Summary of VC actions

9. Own cas

KIA

MIA

10. Lessons learned

11. Comments by Coy Comds

Comd.....

Coy Comd.....

SV
AC
AC
AC

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation No. 11/65
2. Report by No. 54520 CPH Name COHETT, B.
3. 22 Sec 8 Pl C Coy
4. a. Time of Action ~~1230~~ 1230
- b. Duration 1 MIN
- c. Date 25 SEP 65
- d. Location 743 465
5. Unit / Sub-unit tasks
 S + D
6. Was it?
 - a. Contact ✓
 - b. Incident
7. Summary of action in chronological sequence
- a. Sec on Recce of track area
- b. while in ^{sec} base position, 2 VC walked into area along track - only 3 members of sec present.
- c. Told to hold fire + let VC walk close, member of sec moved hand which was seen by VC who fled.
- d. Same member (new rec) fired 2 shots from hip with SLR but missed.
- e. no further trace of an found.
8. VC
 - a. Strength 2
 - b. Type of VC (Guerrilla, RF or Main Force) guerrilla - local
 - c. VC cas N/A
 - i KIA
 - ii WIA
 - iii VCC

8. d Were VC cas disposed of by

i. Hel evac.....Time.....

ii Buried.....Location.....

iii Other means.....

e. Summary of docus and kit recovered

f. Type and number of wpns recovered

g. Wpns identified on action

h. VC dress

j. Summary of VC actions

9. Own cas

KIA

MIA

10. Lessons learned

11. Comments by Coy Comd

Comd.....

Coy Comd.....

After Action Report

- ① Op No: 1011
- ② Report by no: 53760 Rank: SGT Name: PROSSER
- ③ ... 4 ... Sec ... 5 ... Pl - B Coy.
- ④ (a) Time of action: 1100
(b) Duration : 10 mins
(c) Date : 22 Sept
(d) Loc : GR 193461
- ⑤ Unit/Sub Unit Tasks: clearing patrol.
- ⑥ Was it? (a) Contact: Yes
(b) Incident: no.
- ⑦ Summary of action in Chronological Sequence:
4 sec was returning from patrol, whilst filling water bottles at creek fired on his sniper wounding Pte Fraser. The remainder of section were detained from carrying out a contact drill due to an American A.P.C. that fired on them from 400 yards away. However an eventual clearing of the area found nothing.
- ⑧ VC (a) Strength ↓
(b) Type (Local, Mobile Main Force) Local
(c) VC Cas (i) KIA. NIL
(ii) WIA. NIL
(iii) VCC. NIL.

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation No.....
2. Report by No. 38175 2LT Name E WILLIAMS
3. 9 Sec 3 Pl A Coy.....
4. a. Time of Actions 0930 - 1030 2 incidents
1 contact
b. Duration Each \pm 10 min
c. Date 21 Sep 65
d. Location 448718 448719 449720

5. Unit / Sub-unit tasks

Route recon with visit pro element

6. Was it?
 - a. Contact.....1.....
 - b. Incident.....2.....

7. Summary of action in chronological sequence

The first 2 incidents were instigated by 1 enemy sniper. Contact drills were carried out without result. The contact occurred when to effect the sniping a section was sent to circle back onto the track 200 yds away. The sniper heard them and was running away when the contact took place at approx 150 yds range.

8. VC
 - a. Strength 1
 - b. Type of VC (Guerilla, RF or Main Force) UNKNOWN
 - c. VC cas
 - i KIA
 - ii WIA NIL
 - iii VCC

At 221030 at 722449 whilst the pl was providing security for the creek crossing a sniper fired one round from the creek 100 yds N of the crossing. 2 pl and anti tank pl evaded off the area while 3 pl did a sweep. He was not found. 2 persons who caught a glimpse of him say he was dressed in a camouflage suit.

8. d. Were VC cas disposed of by
- i. Hol evac.....Time.....
 - ii Buried.....Location.....
 - iii Other means.....

e. Summary of docus and kit recovered

f. Type and number of wprns recovered

g. Wprns identified on action

Thought to be of approx 7.62 cal

h. VC dress

j. Summary of VC actions,

In the first 3 NE.

9. Own cas

KIA

MIA

10. Lessons learned

After general line of withdrawal is ascertained after first action attempt to block withdrawal M79 proved to be an extremely useful wprn.

11. Comments by Coy Comds

Comd.....

Coy Comd.....

J. B. Leahy May

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation No.....
2. Report by No. 18270 Rank 2LT Name CULPITT
3.Sec 1 Pl A Coy

4. a. Time of Action 27/1030
b. Duration 20 mins.
c. Date 27 Sep 65
d. Location GR 798434

5. Unit / Sub-unit tasks
Patrol map square 7943

6. Was it?
a. Contact NO
b. Incident YES

7. Summary of action in chronological sequence
(a) 2 sec was crossing 250' wide paddy field. The forward scout had reached the EAST bank when the sec was fired upon by at least 3 VC.
(b) Because of a deep creek it was 5 mins before 3 sec could bring about fire sp on the RIGHT flank on the WEST bank.
(c) 2 sec under covering fire then did a sweep SOUTH in area GR 798434 but the VC were NOT seen, and then swept NORTH but to no avail.

VC (d) 1 sec was security at a firm base GR 794435.
a. Strength 6. Seen by 2 Pl A Coy.
b. Type of VC (Guerrilla, RF or Main Force) HOVAN.
c. VC cas NIL
i KIA
ii WIA
iii VCG

8. d. Were VC cas disposed of by *N/A*
i. Hel evac.....Time.....
ii. Buried.....Location.....
iii. Other means.....

e. Summary of docus and kit recovered *N/A*

f. Type and number of wpsns recovered *N/A*

g. Wpns identified on action

h. VC dress *NOT seen because of heavy rain and thick smog.*

j. Summary of VC actions

VC withdrew to NE after firing 6-8 rds.

9. Own cas *N/A*

KIA

MIA

10. Lessons learned *Never to cross a clearing of any size or nature without firstly positioning the fire sp see.*

11. Comments by Coy Comd

Only fire called onto likely VC routes of withdrawal. Results unknown.

Comd.....

Coy Comd.....

Stuart May

INSTALLATION REPORT

Report on instl. *En. Camp.* at gr *685736*

at *16:17:15* hrs by *W. J. Giles*

1. Type of instl (hamlet, bunkers, complex, single bunker, wpn pits, trenches, panjis). *six kitchen areas.*

2. Area covered by instl (in square yds) *10,000 sq yds*

3. Defensive layout (answer fol questions and any more details that can be given).

a. Were there wpn pits and tunnels *yes*

(1) Wpn pits only *N/A*

(2) Tunnels and pits *N/A*

(3) Tunnels only *N/A*

b. Were there tunnels and pits interconnecting and if so to what extent? *no*

c. Depth underground of tunnels *3 to 4 feet*

d. Type of construction used *N/A*

(1) Tunnels *earth + timber*

(2) Wpn pits *earth + timber*

e. Number of pits and tunnels and unit or sub unit you estimate would occupy them. *Exact no unknown. Estimate that it would hold 350 men*

f. Direction pits were facing *all round defense*

g. Were the pits

(1) Individual

(2) 2 man

(3) 3 Man

(4) Crew served wpn. *2*..if so what type of wpn do you estimate...and what direction...*EAST*.....

h. How old were

(1) Pits *7 days at most.*

(2) Tunnels *7 " " "*

(3) Bunkers *7 " " "*

(4) Any other instl *N/A*

j. Was the defensive layout near river, track, road, forl, etc *25 meters from road and 700 meters from creek in clearing immediately south.*

k. Were there any early warning posts or devices *none seen*

4. ~~Village, hamlet, hut~~ etc *village.*

a. How many *30+ huts.*

b. Family or individual *family.*

c. Presently occupied or not *NOT occupied.*
If NOT how long ago do you estimate *7 days at most*

(1) Built 7 days.

(2) Occupied 3 days

d. For what use do you consider this instl was used *Jug camp.*

e. By how many people *300.*

f. Was the defensive layout

(1) Part of hamlet *yes*

(2) Separate from *NIA*

g. Brief description of building materials used

local materials cut in situ.

5. Obstacles. Attach diagram showing obstacles relative to pits bunkers, huts etc (obstacles are panjis, natural vegetation thorns etc, fallen logs fences, barbed wire, booby traps etc)

6. Does it appear that the area has been bombed or strafed recently *no.*

How long ago




7. Remarks (including your unit/sub unit actions on destruction of village, defensive complex etc)

Area was searched on the surface was insufficient time was allowed to search all bunkers or to destroy any.

(1) Built

Giles Lt.
OC 11 PL

N. ↑ 9-316



INSTALLATION REPORT

Report on instl..... at gr
Hut *729420*

at.....hrs by
20-9-65 *4 pl Berry*

1. Type of instl (hamlet, bunkers, complex, single bunker, wpn pits, trenches, panjis). ~~Hamlet~~ *Timber Hut*

2. Area covered by instl (in square yds) *60' Radius clearing*

3. Defensive layout (answer fol questions and any more details that can be given).

a. Were there wpn pits and tunnels

(1) Wpn pits only *2*

(2) Tunnels and pits

(3) Tunnels only

b. Were there tunnels and pits interconnecting and if so to what extent?

c. Depth underground of tunnels *pits was 2x2x3ft deep*

d. Type of construction used *trench was 4x2x2 1/2 ft deep*
approx 120 ft from hut

(1) Tunnels

(2) Wpn pits

e. Number of pits and tunnels and unit or sub unit you estimate would occupy them.

f. Direction pits were facing

g. Were the pits

(1) Individual

(2) 2 man

(3) 3 Man

(4) Crew served wpn.....if so what type of wpn do you estimate.....and what direction.....

h. How old were

(1) Pits

(2) Tunnels

(3) Bunkers

(4) Any other instl

j. Was the defensive layout near river, track, road, forl, etc

k. Were there any early warning posts or devices

4. Village, hamlet, hut etc *Hut*

a. How many *1*

b. Family or individual

c. Presently occupied or not
If NOT how long ago do you estimate

(1) Built

(2) Occupied

d. For what use do you consider this instl was used

e. By how many people

f. Was the defensive layout

(1) Part of hamlet

(2) Separate from

g. Brief description of building materials used

5. Obstacles. Attach diagram showing obstacles relative to pits bunkers, huts etc (obstacles are panjis, natural vegetation thorns etc, fallen logs fences, barbed wire, booby traps etc)

6. Does it appear that the area has been bombed or strafed recently *NO*

How long ago

7. Remarks (including your unit/sub unit actions on destruction of village, defensive complex etc

Destroyed earlier by another Sub Unit

Bomb shelter under bed

9-316

INSTALLATION REPORT

Report on instl. *Barrack* at gr *728421*.....

at *20-9-65* hrs by *Hpt. Be...*

1. Type of instl (hamlet, bunkers, complex, single bunker, wpn pits, trenches, panjis). *Huts*
2. Area covered by instl (in square yds) *100' x 10'*
3. Defensive layout (answer fol questions and any more details that can be given).
 - a. Were there wpn pits and tunnels *YES*
 - (1) Wpn pits only *✓*
 - (2) Tunnels and pits *one of each*
 - (3) Tunnels only
 - b. Were there tunnels and pits interconnecting and if so to what extent? *YES. Tunnel from house to pit.*
 - c. Depth underground of tunnels *4' x 4' x 10'*
 - d. Type of construction used
 - (1) Tunnels
 - (2) Wpn pits*} Earth*
 - e. Number of pits and tunnels and unit or sub unit you estimate would occupy them. *7 men*
 - f. Direction pits were facing *North from hut*
 - g. Were the pits
 - (1) Individual
 - (2) 2 man
 - (3) 3 Man
 - (4) Crew served wpn.....if so what type of wpn do you estimate.....and what direction.....
 - h. How old were *8 mths*
 - (1) Pits
 - (2) Tunnels
 - (3) Bunkers
 - (4) Any other instl
 - j. Was the defensive layout near river, track, road, forl, etc *on track*
 - k. Were there any early warning posts or devices *NIL*
4. Village, hamlet, hut etc *Hut*
 - a. How many *one*
 - b. Family or individual *Possible section Barrack*
 - c. Presently occupied or not
If NOT how long ago do you estimate

- (1) Built
- (2) Occupied
- d. For what use do you consider this instl was used
- e. By how many people
- f. ^{Build} Was the defensive layout
 - (1) Part of hamlet
 - (2) Separate from
- g. Brief description of building materials used

5. Obstacles. Attach diagram showing obstacles relative to pits bunkers, huts etc (obstacles are panjis, natural vegetation thorns etc, fallen logs fences, barbed wire, booby traps etc)

6. Does it appear that the area has been bombed or strafed recently *NO*
How long ago

7. Remarks (including your unit/sub unit actions on destruction of village, defensive complex etc.....)

Destroyed hut. Trunks + documents recovered

9-316

INSTALLATION REPORT

Report on instl *Buffalo Camp* at gr *743 418*
at *24-9-65* hrs by *Lt Col. Beay*

1. Type of instl (hamlet, bunkers, complex, single bunker, wpn pits, trenches, panjis). *Buffalo Camp*
2. Area covered by instl (in square yds) *100' x 50'*
3. Defensive layout (answer fol questions and any more details that can be given).
 - a. Were there wpn pits and tunnels *1 underground bunker*
 - (1) Wpn pits only
 - (2) Tunnels and pits *NO*
 - (3) Tunnels only
 - b. Were there tunnels and pits interconnecting and if so to what extent?
 - c. Depth underground of tunnels *Bunkers 4ft*
 - d. Type of construction used *Earth + wood*
 - (1) Tunnels
 - (2) Wpn pits
 - e. Number of pits and tunnels and unit or sub unit you estimate would occupy them.
 - f. Direction pits were facing
 - g. Were the pits
 - (1) Individual
 - (2) 2 man *YES*
 - (3) 3 Man
 - (4) Crew served wpn.....if so what type of wpn do you estimate.....and what direction.....
 - h. How old were
 - (1) Pits
 - (2) Tunnels
 - (3) Bunkers *9-12 mths*
 - (4) Any other instl
 - j. Was the defensive layout near river, track, road, forl, etc *150 yds across raddy to track*
 - k. Were there any early warning posts or devices *NO*
4. Village, hamlet, hut etc
 - a. How many
 - b. Family or individual
 - c. Presently occupied or not
If NOT how long ago do you estimate

- (1) Built
- (2) Occupied
- d. For what use do you consider this instl was used
- e. By how many people
- f. Was the defensive layout
 - (1) Part of hamlet
 - (2) Separate from
- g. Brief description of building materials used

5. Obstacles. Attach diagram showing obstacles relative to pits bunkers, huts etc (obstacles are panjis, natural vegetation thorns etc, fallen logs fences, barbed wire, booby traps etc) *left deep paddy field almost all around installation with thick jungle at rear*

6. Does it appear that the area has been bombed or strafed recently

How long ago

7. Remarks (including your unit/sub unit actions on destruction of village, defensive complex etc

Destroyed 3 Buffaloes, spread rice + burnt the hut

9-316

INSTALLATION REPORT

Report on instl. *PMS* at gr *756438*
at *261030* hrs by *IP*

1. Type of instl (hamlet, bunkers, complex, single bunker, wpn pits, trenches, panjis). *OVER 300 ONE MAN WPN PITS WITH O/H HEAD COVER.*
2. Area covered by instl (in square yds) *AT LEAST 150 x BY 400 x*
3. Defensive layout (answer fol questions and any more details that can be given).
 - a. Were there wpn pits and tunnels
 - (1) Wpn pits only ✓
 - (2) ~~Tunnels and pits~~
 - (3) ~~Tunnels only~~
 - b. Were there tunnels and pits interconnecting and if so to what extent? *NO.*
 - c. Depth underground of tunnels *N/A.*
 - d. Type of construction used
 - (1) ~~Tunnels~~
 - (2) Wpn pits *ALL EARTH.*
 - e. Number of pits and tunnels and unit or sub unit you estimate would occupy them. *OVER 300 PITS - AT LEAST A VC BN POSN.*
 - f. Direction pits were facing *ALL ROUNDS DEF.*
 - g. Were the pits
 - (1) Individual ✓
 - (2) ~~2 man~~
 - (3) ~~2 Man~~
 - (4) Crew served wpn.....if so what type of wpn do you estimate.....and what direction.....
 - h. How old were
 - (1) Pits *BETWEEN 3-4 WEEKS.*
 - (2) ~~Tunnels~~
 - (3) ~~Bunkers~~
 - (4) ~~Any other instl~~
 - j. Was the defensive layout near river, track, road, forl, etc *NEAR CREEK.*
 - k. Were there any early warning posts or devices *DID NOT SEE ANY.*
4. Village, hamlet, hut etc
 - a. How many } *N/A.*
 - b. Family or individual }
 - c. Presently occupied or not
If NOT how long ago do you estimate *OCCUPIED UP TO 1 WEEK AGO.*

(1) Built

(2) Occupied

d. For what use do you consider this instl was used

STOPOVER DURING A MAJOR MOVE.

e. By how many people

f. Was the defensive layout

(1) Part of hamlet

(2) Separate from

g. Brief description of building materials used

Quite a bit of rubbish was found incl:

- (1) 1 cap.
- (2) 3 sets clothes
- (3) "CAXON" batteries
- (4) tubes of used toothpaste.
- (5) tins of condensed milk.
- (6) used med sups.
- (7) paper tgt

5. Obstacles. Attach diagram showing obstacles relative to pits bunkers, huts etc (obstacles are panjis, natural vegetation thorns etc, fallen logs fences, barbed wire, booby traps etc) *NIL.*

6. Does it appear that the area has been bombed or strafed recently

How long ago *NO.*

7. Remarks (including your unit/sub unit actions on destruction of village, defensive complex etc)

9-316

posting place
~~SECRET~~
INSTALLATION REPORT

Report on instl..... at gr *724418*.....

at.....hrs by *Ep. Hiltner*.....

1. Type of instl (hamlet, bunkers, complex, single bunker, wpn pits, trenches, panjis). *Dug in post.*

2. Area covered by instl (in square yds) *100 x 850**

3. Defensive layout (answer fol questions and any more details that can be given).

a. Were there wpn pits and tunnels

- (1) Wpn pits only *3 rows apart*
- (2) Tunnels and pits
- (3) Tunnels only

b. Were there tunnels and pits interconnecting and if so to what extent? *NO*

c. Depth underground of tunnels *4ft 6in*

d. Type of construction used ~~Earth~~

- (1) Tunnels
- (2) Wpn pits *Earth*

e. Number of pits and tunnels and unit or sub unit you estimate would occupy them. *8-10 men*

f. Direction pits were facing *all direction*

g. Were the pits

- (1) Individual
- (2) 2 man
- (3) 3 Man
- (4) Crew served wpn.....if so what type of wpn do you estimate.....and what direction.....

h. How old were *6*

- (1) Pits *6-9 months*
- (2) Tunnels
- (3) Bunkers
- (4) Any other instl

j. Was the defensive layout near river, track, road, forl, etc *track*

k. Were there any early warning posts or devices *NO*

4. Village, hamlet, hut etc *NO*

a. How many

b. Family or individual

c. Presently occupied or not
If NOT how long ago do you estimate

(1) Built

(2) Occupied

d. For what use do you consider this instl was used

e. By how many people

f. Was the defensive layout

(1) Part of hamlet

(2) Separate from

g. Brief description of building materials used

5. Obstacles. Attach diagram showing obstacles relative to pits bunkers, huts etc (obstacles are panjis, natural vegetation thorns etc, fallen logs fences, barbed wire, booby traps etc)

Natural obstacle of bamboo

6. Does it appear that the area has been bombed or strafed recently *NO*

How long ago

7. Remarks (including your unit/sub unit actions on destruction of village, defensive complex etc

This area could have been used as a rest or staging area whilst in transit

9-316

INSTALLATION REPORT

Report on instl *Camp*.....at GR...*685376*.....
at *0930*⁽⁰⁺³⁾.....hours by.....*991 Coy*.....

1. Type of instl (hamlet, bunkers complex, single bunker,
wpm pits, trenches, panjis.)

*Hut frames with wpm pits on perimeter, kitchens and
bunkers shelters under huts.*

2. Area covered by instl (insquare yds) *60000 sq yds (200x300)*.

3. Defensive layout (answer fol questions and any more details
that can be given.)

(a) Were there wpm pits and tunnels

(i) wpm pits only..... *with bomb shelters under huts*

(ii) tunnels and pits.....

(iii) tunnels only.....

(b) Were there tunnels and pits interconnecting and if so to
what extent?

(c) Depth underground of tunnels

(d) Type of construction used

(i) Tunnels.....

(ii) Wpm pits.....

(d) Number of pits and tunnels and units or sub-unit you estimate
would occupy them. *Did not search the area extensively but estimate
that it could hold at least a reinforced coy.*

(f) Direction pits were facing *all round def.*

(g) Were the pits
(i) individual

(ii) 2 man *YES.*

(iii) 3 man

(iv) Crew served wpm.....if so what type of wpm do you
estimate.....and what direction.....

(h) How old were

(i) pits.....

(ii) tunnels.....

(iii) bunkers.....

(iv) any other instl.....

*Oldest instl no more than 2 weeks
Newest no less than 36 hrs.*

(j) Was the defensive layout near, river, track, road, ford etc.

*Was on the southern side of the track and visible from
it*

(k) Were there any early warning posts or devices?

*None seen close by but individual pits
and brush shelters were found in area of tree line from
672370 to 370680 and showed recent use, (2 days?)*

4. Village, hamlet, hut etc Hut frames only

(a) How many? Not known

(b) Family or individual Possibly 2 or 3 men

(c) Presently occupied or not?
If not how long ago do you estimate:-

- (i) Built Within last 2 weeks
- (ii) Occupied Within last 2 days.

(d) For what use do you consider this instl was used? ~~base camp~~
Part of camp complex found in area by C Coy & D Coy

(E) By how many people Coy plus

(f) Was the defensive layout

- (i) part of hamlet yes
- (ii) separate from

(g) Brief description of building materials used

Hut frames were constructed from sticks and vines and looked as if designed to take some type of light plastic covering. Each 3 or 4 frames had a earthen kitchen with smokeless chimney and each frame had a bomb shelter beneath. Pts were U shaped and NOT revetted.

5. Obstacles. Attach diagram showing obstacles (relative to pits bunkers, huts etc (Obstacles are panjis, natural vegetation thorns etc, fallen logs fences, barbed wire, booby traps etc)

6. Does it appear that the area has been bombed or strafed recently
How long ago H and I had fallen within 50 yds the previous night.

7. Remarks (incl your unit/sub-unit actions on destruction of village, defensive complex etc)

As the instl was in D Coys area, D coy was notified and a pl sent to the area to complete a further search. Some documents were left for D Coy however a number of documents were evacuated by C Coy.

Date 29 Sep 65

Signature [Signature]

INSTALLATION REPORT

Report on instl at GR. 680 375
at D+3 ¹³⁰⁰ hours by 8 Pl C Coy

1. Type of instl (hamlet, bunkers complex, single bunker, wpn pits, trenches, panjis.)

Hamlet + bunkers in initial stages of construction - Hospital, wpn pits, hitchens. Considered part of instl found by 9 PL or extension

2. Area covered by instl (in square yds) 40000
(200' x 200')

3. Defensive layout (answer fol questions and any more details that can be given.)

(a) Were there wpn pits and tunnels *yes (1/2 constructed)*

- (i) wpn pits only.....
- (ii) tunnels and pits.....
- (iii) tunnels only.....

(b) Were there tunnels and pits interconnecting and if so to what extent? *no*

(c) Depth underground of tunnels 6' to 8'

(d) Type of construction used

- (i) Tunnels..... ~~shale~~ *hand dug in ground*
- (ii) Wpn pits..... ~~shale~~ *shale*

(e) Number of pits and tunnels and units or sub-unit you estimate would occupy them. 1 Coy

(f) Direction pits were facing all round defense

(g) Were the pits

- (i) individual ✓
- (ii) 2 man ✓
- (iii) 3 man

(iv) Crew served wpn..... if so what type of wpn do you estimate..... and what direction.....

not known as most pits not completed

(h) How old were

- (i) pits.....
- (ii) tunnels.....
- (iii) bunkers.....

approx 2 days to 14 days

(iv) any other instl.....

suspected RAP/Hospital as bandages + glass (broken) found.

(j) Was the defensive layout near, river, track, road, ford etc.
creek + track

(k) Were there any early warning posts or devices?

none apparent

4. Village, hamlet, hut etc

- (a) How many? *hut, frames only*
- (b) Family or individual *not known - could hold 2-3 people*
- (c) Presently occupied or not? *no*
If not how long ago do you estimate: *within 2 days.*
- (i) Built *partly*
- (ii) Occupied
- (d) For what use do you consider this instl was used? *part of camp complex*
- (E) By how many people
- (f) Was the defensive layout
 - (i) part of hamlet - *part of an extension of instl found by 9th Coy + subsequently taken over by D Coy.*
 - (ii) separate from
- (g) Brief description of building materials used

5. Obstacles. Attach diagram showing obstacles relative to pits bunkers, huts etc (Obstacles are panjis, natural vegetation thorns etc, fallen logs fences, barbed wire, booby traps etc)

nil.

6. Does it appear that the area has been bombed or strafed recently

How long ago *shelled - previous night by RNZA. little damage as shells had landed on fringe of area.*

7. Remarks (incl your unit/sub-unit actions on destruction of vilage, defensive complex etc)

No destruction carried out as unit moved from area but it is understood US air force bombed the area shortly after

Date *29 Sep 65*

Signature

McNamee Lt.

Jul 65

INSTALLATION REPORT

Report on instl Possible REST AREA at GR. 754476.....

at...1500...hours by...7th C Coy.....

1. Type of instl (hamlet, bunkers complex, single bunker, wpn pits, trenches, panjis.)

Huts, bunkers, Night harbour areas

2. Area covered by instl (in square yds) approx 300' W, Wnt a 1/2 of GR given

3. Defensive layout (answer fol questions and any more details that can be given.)

(a) Were there wpn pits and tunnels Tunnels

(i) wpn pits only.....

(ii) tunnels and pits.....

(iii) tunnels only... under each hut

(b) Were there tunnels and pits interconnecting and if so to what extent? no

(c) Depth underground of tunnels approx 6ft

(d) Type of construction used

(i) Tunnels... earth & timber

(ii) Wpn pits.....

(e) Number of pits and tunnels and units or sub-unit you estimate would occupy them. 8 huts found all with bunkers adjoining

(f) Direction pits were facing small tunnels leading to them

(g) Were the pits
(i) individual

(ii) 2 man

(iii) 3 man

(iv) Crew served wpn.....if so what type of wpn do you estimate.....and what direction.....

(h) How old were

(i) pits.....

(ii) tunnels... approx 1 week

(iii) bunkers... approx 1 week

(iv) any other instl... small harbour areas in rubber north of GR.

(j) Was the defensive layout near, river, track, road, ford etc.

tracks run E.W. above huts, good deep creek & rice paddies to East as per map

(k) Were there any early warning posts or devices?

sentry posts on eastern flank of area

4. Village, hamlet, hut etc

- (a) How many? *8*
- (b) Family or individual *family*
- (c) Presently occupied or not? *occupied till our arrival*
If not how long ago do you estimate:-

- (i) Built *some still under construction*
- (ii) Occupied

(d) For what use do you consider this instl was used?

resting area for troops

(E) By how many people *Coys +, possibly more*

(f) Was the defensive layout

- (i) part of hamlet
- (ii) separate from *sentry posts overlooking low ground to the east.*

(g) Brief description of building materials used

atapa, bush timber

5. Obstacles. Attach diagram showing obstacles relative to pits bunkers, huts etc (Obstacles are panjis, natural vegetation thorns etc, fallen logs fences, barbed wire, booby traps etc)

nil

6. Does it appear that the area has been bombed or strafed recently
How long ago *no*

7. Remarks (incl your unit/sub-unit actions on destruction of village, defensive complex etc)

huts have recently been built, incl bunkers some still under construction.

area West of 15th covered with small fire places & hatchie spaces. occupied recently before our arrival.

Huts destroyed, inc, 200 lb inc, bottles of Metho. large bag tobacco.

Date

Signature

29 Sept 65

A. Dwyer 2A

INSTALLATION REPORT

Report on instl *kp1 Blay* at gr *77k 454*

at.....hrs by *Cpl. Hillier*

1. Type of instl (hamlet, bunkers, complex, single bunker, wpn pits, trenches, panjis). *Rubber factory*

2. Area covered by instl (in square yds) *200' x 100'*

3. Defensive layout (answer fol questions and any more details that can be given).

a. Were there wpn pits and tunnels

(1) Wpn pits only *6*

(2) Tunnels and pits

(3) Tunnels only

b. Were there tunnels and pits interconnecting and if so to what extent? *Not known*

c. Depth underground of tunnels *10ft*

d. Type of construction used *Perit*

(1) Tunnels

(2) Wpn pits

e. Number of pits and tunnels and unit or sub unit you estimate would occupy them. *Estimated pl*

f. Direction pits were facing *All directions*

g. Were the pits

(1) Individual

(2) 2 man

(3) 3 Man

(4) Crew served wpn.....if so what type of wpn do you estimate.....and what direction.....

h. How old were

(1) Pits *3 mths some still under construction
clock still going in outer building.*

(2) Tunnels

(3) Bunkers

(4) Any other instl

j. Was the defensive layout near river, track, road, forl, etc

k. Were there any early warning posts or devices

4. Village, hamlet, hut etc *Rubber factory*

a. How many

b. Family or individual

c. Presently occupied or not *Yes*
If NOT how long ago do you estimate

- (1) Built
- (2) Occupied
- d. For what use do you consider this instl was used
- e. By how many people
- f. Was the defensive layout
 - (1) Part of hamlet
 - (2) Separate from
- g. Brief description of building materials used

5. Obstacles. Attach diagram showing obstacles relative to pits bunkers, huts etc (obstacles are panjis, natural vegetation thorns etc, fallen logs fences, barbed wire, booby traps etc)

6. Does it appear that the area has been bombed or strafed recently *From BR 774457 to 776454*
 How long ago *NO*

7. Remarks (including your unit/sub unit actions on destruction of village, defensive complex etc)

Because of time factor + Action strength, this area was not rec'd completely.

2 small ducks ~~in a room~~
+ 1 hen

9-316

MAT

Copy No 25
Hq, 173d Support Battalion (Abn)
Bien Hoa, RVN
221100 H September 1965

OPORD 10-65

References: VOCC Lt Col Staigers 211830 hrs
OPORD 13, Hq's 2/16 dated 210600
Annex A Operations Overlay

TASK ORGANIZATION: No Change

1. SITUATION:

- a. Enemy Forces Current ISUM. VC have been killed and others observed in Bn TAORS by 2/16 Inf.
- b. Friendly Forces:
 - (1) 2/16 Inf conducts operation away from 173d Abn Bde (Sep) bivouac area.
 - (2) TF Staigers assumes patrol responsibility for 1 RAR TAOR and 2/503 TAOR during absence of 2/16 Inf.

2. MISSION: TF Staigers patrols TAOR of 1 RAR and 2/503d to give early warning of VC approach and deny VC entry into Bde Bivouac Area.

3. EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operation:

- (1) Each unit continues defense of assigned sector.
- (2) 1 RAR and 2/503 patrol TAORS with two squad size patrols each during daylight and establish two patrol ambush bases after darkness.
- (3) Fire Support thru FSCC 2/16 thru Dong Noi SS.

b. 1 RAR (Rear)

- (1) Organize two squad size patrols for operation in TAOR (Annex A Operations Overlay).
- (2) Patrol sector to and around patrol bases during daylight hours.
- (3) Establish ambush sites and move patrol base after darkness.
- (4) Relief and resupply prior to 1500 hours daily.

c. 2/503d Inf (Rear)

- (1) Organize two squad size patrols for operation in TAOR (Annex A Operations Overlay).
- (2) Patrol sector to and around patrol bases during daylight hours.
- (3) Establish ambush sites and move patrol base after darkness.
- (4) Relief and resupply prior to 1500 hours daily.

d. 1/503d Inf (Rear):

- (1) Continue to man present defense line in TAOR.
- (2) Be prepared to furnish one squad for operational control to 1 RAR or 2/503d for patrols in TAORS.

This document is regraded CONFIDENTIAL after October 31st and may be destroyed. No certificate of destruction required by this headquarters.

Mat is a Vietnamese classification equivalent to SECRET and will be handled accordingly.

MAT

- e. D/16 Armor (Rear)
 - (1) Coordinate with 2/16 Inf for manning of LPs vic of old garbage dump.
 - (2) Continue defense of assigned sector.
 - f. 173d Spt Bn (Abn)
 - (1) Be prepared to furnish one squad for operational control of 1 RAR or 2/503d for patrols in TAORS.
 - (2) On order commit Strike Force Delta to support patrol base of 1 RAR or 2/503d Inf.
 - g. 173d Engr (-)
 - (1) Be prepared to furnish two squads for operational control of 1 RAR or 2/503d for patrols in TAOR.
 - (2) Maintain all roads in 173d Bde Bivouac Area so as to permit shifting of combat elements by vehicle.
 - h. E/17th Cav (Rear)
 - (1) Defend present assigned sector.
 - i. Admin Co (-)
 - (1) Be prepared to furnish one squad for operational control of 1 RAR or 2/503d for patrols in TAORS.
 - (2) Defend present assigned sector, HHC (Rear)
 - j. HHC (Rear)
 - (1) Defend present assigned sector.
 - (2) Coordinate defense of 3d MSH.
 - k. 3/319th Arty
 - (1) Defend present assigned sector.
 - (2) In absence of FSCC 2/16 coordinate fire request of 1 RAR, 1/503d and 2/503d.
 - l. Coordinating Instructions:
 - (1) 1 RAR and 2/503 patrol leaders establish liasion with Regional Forces located vicinity TAOR.
 - (2) All resupply completed prior to 1500 hours daily.
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTIC: No Change.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:
- a. Signal
 - (1) Current SOI in effect.
 - (2) 1 RAR and 2/503 lay wire to patrol base in TAOR.
 - (3) Radio net operational 24 hours . All patrols equipped with radios.

MAT

OPORD 10-65, dated 221100 H September (Con't)

MAT

b. COMMAND

- (1) 1 RAR and 2/503 control patrols in TAOR, report to Parachute per SOP.
- (2) FSCC located 173d Abn Bde (Sep) CP

Acknowledge:

STAIGERS
Lt Col

ANNEXES:

A - Operation Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z

OFFICIAL:


Carmichael
CARMICHAEL
S3

MAT

MAT

ANNEX A (Operations Overlay, 173d Brigade Bivouac Area) to OPORD 9-65

00
+ 20



08
14 +

1 RAR - 2 squad size patrols operate in assigned sector. 22 Sept 65 occupy patrol base PSN Alfa during daylight, patrol to and from PSNs BRAVO and Charlie. After darkness move patrol base to vicinity PSN Charlie, Ambush vic from Charlie. Relief and resupply prior to 1500 hrs daily.

2/503 - 2 squad size patrols operate in assigned sector. 22 Sept 65 occupy patrol base PSN 1 during daylight, patrol TAOR from North to South-east. After darkness move patrol base to vic PSN 2, ambush vic from PSN 2. Relief and resupply prior to 1500 hrs daily.

NOTE: Point of Origin coordinates - 1602 DOG } Patrols do not have.
1605 CAR } Using Br code sheet.

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex Z

STAIGERS
Lt Col

OFFICIAL:

Carmichael
CARMICHAEL
S3

MAT

ANNEX Z (Distribution) to OPORD 10-65

UNIT/ADDRESSEE

COPY NR

CG	1
DCO	2
1/503	3-7
2/503	8-9
3/319	10-11
2nd Inf Bde	12-15
Admin Co	16-17
E/17	18-19
D/16	20-21
Engr Co	22-23
RAR	24-25
ALSC	26
173d Bde S-3	27-28
FSCC	29
Spt Bn	30-34

Acknowledge:

STAIGERS
Lt Col

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z

OFFICIAL:


CARMICHAEL
S3

FWD/VCB

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

VIETNAM



Headquarters
 Australian Army Force
 1 Tran Hoang Quan
 CHOLON

24 Sep 65

In Reply Please Quote		
31	1	5

AAFV ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION 6/65
MOVEMENT AND MOVEMENT DOCUMENTATION BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND VIETNAM

General

1. Movement to and from VIETNAM of personnel of AAFV will normally be by air, either by scheduled civil airlines or service aircraft, the latter includes chartered civil aircraft. Which method to be used is to be decided by HQ AAFV.
2. When civil aircraft are used the route is to be via MANILLA (PHILLIPINES). Service aircraft are to use routes as determined at the time.

Dress

3. Whichever method of travel is used personnel are to travel the full journey in uniform, unless otherwise directed in writing.

Passports

4. Passports are NOT required for either means of travel provided the stopover in MANILLA does NOT exceed 72 hours. For any person unavoidably delayed in excess of 72 hours the AUSTRALIAN Embassy MANILLA is to act as guarantor and will arrange movement on the first available means of transport.

Documentation

5. Units despatching personnel are to ensure that they are in possession of the documents listed in Annexures A and B to this Instruction. Units receiving personnel are to ensure that documents are disposed of as indicated.

Reporting and Reception

6. a. Arrivals.

Personnel arriving in SAIGON will be met by a member of MC Det SAIGON and processed through Customs and Immigration. Personnel travelling by service aircraft will be met at BIEN HOA by a member of MC Det ALSC. Personnel deplaning at SAIGON for units in the BIEN HOA area will move direct to BIEN HOA on the same day. MC Det SAIGON will advise units of the mode of transportation and the ETA of the member(s) at BIEN HOA.

b. Departures

HQ AAFV will advise units whether the member is to travel by civil or service aircraft.

(1) Civil Aircraft

Units are to ensure that personnel departing SAIGON by civil air report to MC Det SAIGON at least 24 hours prior to departure for briefing and documentation check.

/(2) Service Aircraft

(2) Service Aircraft

On receipt of advice from HQ AAFV units will liaise direct with MC Det ALSC regarding documentation and time and place of reporting BIEN HOA.

EMERGENCY Leave

7. Units are to ensure that RAAF Forms MC 8 ("Application for Air Passage") are prepared and forwarded to HQ AAFV at least seven days prior to departure of the member from VIETNAM. In cases where advice to units of a member's departure is received under seven days units will ensure that the member is in possession of MCs 8 and instructed that they are to be handed to the Army MC Staff immediately upon arrival in AUSTRALIA. Supplies of MCs 8 may be obtained from MC Det AAFV. Six copies are required for each member moving.

Baggage

8. All ranks are permitted to take 80 pounds of baggage, this includes civil airlines free allowance. Excess baggage warrants to cover the difference between civil airlines free allowance and 80 pounds are to be issued by MC Det. A further 200 pounds may be shipped to AUSTRALIA by MFO through the MC Det.

Customs

9. Military personnel travelling to or from VIETNAM are NOT subject to Customs examination in SAIGON. However, personnel returning to AUSTRALIA should be made aware of the information contained in HQ AAFV precis "FACTS ABOUT CUSTOMS" issued in July, 1965, and where possible, be issued with a copy of that precis.

Intend-to-Emplane Signals

10. MC Det is to initiate "intend-to-emplane" signals to all concerned. AUSTEMBA MANILLA is to be shown as an ACTION addressee in the case of all movements through the PHILLIPINES. Signals are to be initiated in sufficient time to allow at least one full working day's notice, if possible, of arrival of draft.

Malaria Precautions

11. Personnel returning to AUSTRALIA are to be instructed in the special precautions to be taken as detailed in MBI 142-10 paragraphs 35-39. Units are to ensure that personnel are issued with sufficient paludrine to last until the prescribed course of drugs can be taken.

Currency

12. For members travelling to VIETNAM currency in possession upon arrival is to be credited to their paybooks or converted to UNITED STATES Military Payment Certificates (MPC) under Paymaster HQ AAFV arrangements. If travelling via MANILLA members may leave AUSTRALIA with US currency NOT exceeding \$5.

13. Units are responsible for ensuring that all personnel arriving in VIETNAM are made fully aware of MACV Directives regarding currency control.

14. Members departing VIETNAM will exchange MPC for US dollars or Australian currency with Paymaster or have it credited to their paybook. Permission may be granted for piastres to be converted NOT exceeding US\$ 40.

W. J. Gans Maj
DAAG

Distribution

105 Fd Bty, RAA	(2)	1 ALSC	(3)(Includes 1 for MOV BIEN HOA)
3 Fd Tp, RAE	(2)		
709 Sig Tp, RA Sigs	(2)	AATTV	(4)
1 RAR	(10) (per company and APC Tp)	Internal:	A, Q, Pay, Records, MC and Camp
161 Recce Flt	(2)		

MOVEMENT DOCUMENTATION VIETNAM TO AUSTRALIA

Serial	Document		Number of Copys	Disposal	Remarks
	Number	Title			
1.	-	International Health Certificate	1	Handed in to the Unit at destination	Must be up to date prior to embarkation.
2.	AAF A129	AMF Identity Card	1	Individual to carry until arrival in AUSTRALIA. To be withdrawn at first personnel depot visited.	Withdrawl in accordance with MBI 212-5.
3.	AAF Mob 3	Nominal Roll of Draft	As per MBI 150-4 Annex A. Ensure 1 copy is forwarded to HQ AAFV for Records.		
4.	-	Nominal Roll	12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. 4 copies to Immigration Authorities SAIGON. b. 3 copies to Immigration Authorities MANILIA. c. 2 copies to Immigration Authorities at the point of entry AUSTRALIA. d. 1 copy by post to receiving unit in AUSTRALIA with a copy of AAF Mov 3 and AAF T51. e. 1 copy to be handed to MC at destination. f. 1 copy for MC Det SAIGON. 	Detail to be the same as for the Nominal Roll for the journey from AUSTRALIA to VIETNAM as in the Table at Annex A.
5.	AAF T51	Strength Return on Embarkation and Disembarkation.	12	As fr Nominal Roll above.	<u>Note:</u> If travelling by service aircraft delete the requirement for documents at MANILIA.

MOVEMENT DOCUMENTATION AUSTRALIA TO VIETNAM

Serial	Document		Number of Copys	Disposal	Remarks
	Number	Title			
1.	-	International Health Certificate	1	Retain in Regimental Documents	Ensure that IHC is always up to date.
2.	AAF A129	AMF Identity Card	1	Individuals to carry at all times.	Issues, withdrawals and losses to be in accordance with MBI 212-5
3.	AAF Mob 3	Nominal Roll of Draft	As per MBI 150-4 Annex A. Ensure 1 copy is forwarded to HQ AAFV for Records		
4.	-	Nominal Roll	12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. 3 copies to Immigration Authorities <u>MANILLA</u>. b. 7 copies to Immigration Authorities SAIGON. c. 1 Copy with draft to HQ AAFV. d. 1 copy by post to HQ AAFV with a copy of AAF Mob 3 and AAF T51. 	Information on roll to include:- <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. AAF A129 number b. Army Number, Rank, Full Name c. Date and Place of Birth d. Names of father and mother (Including if deceased) e. Unit to which posted.
5.	AAF T51	Strength Return on Embarkation and Disembarkation	12	As for Nominal Roll above.	

Note: If travelling by service aircraft delete the requirement for documents at MANILLA.

Military

KIN

✓
57

TRANSLATION BRANCH
J2 - USMACV.
LOG #-9-3-65
TRANSLATOR # Split-9-Split
DATE 11 September 1965

Interrogation

Center

STANDARD REPORT

Country : SVN
Subject : Rallier Interrogation Report
Type of information : VC Military
Date of information : 3 June 1965
Date & place of acquisition : 5 June 1965
Source : ██████████
Report number : MIC Control # 0665
Number of pages : 53

RALLIER INTERROGATION REPORT
(Infiltrator)

Full name : ██████████ (1)

Position :

In NVN : ██████████ Squad/Anti-tank Platoon (B.40)/9th
Battalion/18th Regiment subordinate to the 325th Division.
After his infiltration into SVN, source still held the above
position.

Rallying date and place : Phu Tuc District (Phu Bon), 3 June 1965.

Weapons captured : - 1 AK SMG and 30 rounds of ammo.
- 4 grenades
- Tools used for assembling and disassembling B.40 weapon.
(Presently kept by local authorities).

Evacuating date and organization :

Received by the Interrogation Section/Military Intelligence Center from
G2/II Corps at 1500hrs, on 5 June 1965.

I. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA :

Full name : ██████████
Date and place of birth : ██████████ 1946, ██████████ Village, Giao Thuy
District, Nam Dinh Province (NVN).
Parents : ██████████ (both deceased).
Occupation : Student
Education : 7th class (7 years of schooling).
Prior conviction : None

(1) Preliminary interrogation report was published on 7 June 1965

KIN IS A VIETNAMESE CLASSIFICATION
EQUIVALENT TO CONFIDENTIAL AND WILL
BE HANDLED ACCORDINGLY

KIN

CERTIFIED CORRECT TRANSLATION :

Joe A. Harton
SP5 E5 JOE H. HARTON
J2 Translation Branch

KIN

Religion : Buddhist
Political affiliation : Member of the Labor Youth Group in March 1961.
Marital status : Single
Brothers and sisters : None
Brothers, Sisters or Relatives working for the VC in NVN : None
Brothers, Sisters or Relatives working for the RVN Government or the RVNAF : None

II. PHYSICAL FEATURES : Omitted

III. PAST ACTIVITIES :

31. From 1954 to 1965 :

- 1954 :

As a child, source attended the Giao Thuy District (Nam Dinh) 1st Level School. In 1963, he was in the 7th class (7 years of schooling) in the 2d Level School.

- 17 October 1963 :

One day while source was attending a class, a medical team and some local authorities came to the school conducted physical examination for the students stating that they were selecting able-bodied students for special training.

After the physical examination, source and three other students in the same class were informed that according to the observation of the medical board they were fit for draft.

They all reported at Giao Thuy District Unit and were later taken to Quang Binh for assignment to the 18th Regiment/325th Division.

- Late in January 1964 :

After three months of basic military training in his unit, source was sent to a special course on anti-tank weapons (B.40), conducted by Military Region 4 in Quang Binh for a period of eight months.

He graduated from this course as

- December 1964 :

Source returned to his unit and was appointed Squad/Anti-tank Platoon/9th Battalion/18th Regiment subordinate to the 325th Division.

- 8 February 1965 :

The whole battalion subordinate to the 18th Regiment was ordered to infiltrate into SVN.

- 28 April 1965 :

When the 18th Regiment arrived at the territory of Binh Dinh Province, the 7th Battalion stayed behind to protect the Regiment [Head-quarters] while 8th and 9th ~~Regiments~~ *Battalions* continued to move to Phu Bon Province for operations.

- 1 June 1965 :

The 9th Battalion/18th Regiment received orders to set up an ambush against the RVNAF on the axis of communication from Phu Bon to Phu Tuc. Upon arrival at the ambush site, source rallied to the RVN Government.

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32. Reason and circumstance of rallying :

Upon arrival in Binh Dinh, source found that the people there had a relatively happy life , quite different from the distorted propaganda lines of NVN authorities.

In addition, once in SVN, source was unable to endure hardships, starvation and the greatly-demoralizing daily RVNAF airstrikes. Therefore on 3 Jun 65 he escaped to Qui Nhon and rallied to Phu Tuc District.

33. Source's aspiration upon rallying :

Source said that his parents both died when he was a child and that he presently lived alone in SVN with no relatives.

For this reason , once his case has been legalized, source said he would like to join the RVNAF so as to contribute, partially at least, to the destruction of the VC.

IV. INFORMATION OBTAINED :

(See the attached annexes)

V. COMMENTS BY J2/JGS (INTELLIGENCE CENTER) :

Throughout the interrogation, source proved to be sincere and cooperative and tried his best to reveal details on the 325th Division. Since he belongs to a low echelon, information related to this unit is very limited.

A crosscheck with the recent statement by rallier [REDACTED] revealed that information on the infiltration into SVN by the 18th, 95th and 101st Regiments subordinate to the 325th Division is reliable. However further investigation is required.

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ANNEX I

(According to the statement of rallier [REDACTED])

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325th INFILTRATION DIVISION

I. INFORMATION ON THE 325TH INFILTRATION DIVISION :

- General.
- 101st Regiment/325th Div. (details unknown)
- 95th Regiment/325th Div. (details unknown)
- 18th Regiment/325th Div.
- 9th Battalion/18th Regiment.
- Units subordinate to the 9th Battalion.

II. STUDY IN PREPARATION FOR INFILTRATION INTO SOUTH VIETNAM :

- Organization of study.
- Issue of clothing
- Preparation for infiltration into South Vietnam.
- Routes used by the 8th and 9th Battalions/18th from Binh Dinh to Phu Bon.
- VC strategic routes.

III. INFORMATION ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE 9TH BATTALION/18TH REGIMENT:

- Cover designation of the 9th Battalion/18th Regiment.
- The ambush at Go Beo Hill (Binh Dinh).
- The ambush laid by the 9th Battalion.
- Movement regulation of the 9th Battalion.
- The organization of civilian laborers to supply the 9th Battalion.
- Policy of the 9th Battalion.

IV. MORALE OF CADRE AND SOLDIERS OF THE 9TH BATTALION/18TH REGIMENT:

- Draftees prior to 1963.
- Draftees after 1963.
- Squad level cadre
- Platoon level cadre and above.
- Characteristics of command cadre
- Deficiencies in the unit.

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I. THE INFILTRATION OF THE 325TH DIVISION INTO SOUTH VIETNAM :

General :

Source disclosed that during his stay in Quang Binh, all units of the 325th Division were stationed separately. In addition, source had no relation with them therefore he did not know any detail about them.

He only knows that the VC units rarely called one another by their designations but by the following cover names only :

- 325th Division, cover name "Bach Dang".
- 18th Regiment/325th Division, cover name "Song Da"
- 95th and 101st Regiments (unknown).

11. 101st Regiment/325th Division :

Since this unit was stationed in Hoan Lao area (Quang Binh), source had no information about it. However, in late 1964, he was told that the above regiment had infiltrated into South Vietnam in 1964 (?).

(Other details unknown).

12. 95th Regiment/325th Division :

This unit was stationed in Huong Khe, Ha Tinh Province. In January 1965, when the 9th Battalion/18th Regiment conducted a field maneuver at Co Liem Village, vicinity XE100665 Tuyen Hoa Village (Quang Binh) source saw this regiment move by. At that time, his companions told him that the 95th Regiment was infiltrating into South Vietnam.

In addition, when the 9th Battalion/18th Regiment arrived in the territory of Phu Yen Province, source met a Combat Support Company of the 95th Regiment and the latter was on its way to Phu Bon Province.

When the 9th Battalion halted and bivouacked in a forest (location unknown), this company continued to move to an unknown area.

13. 18th Regiment/325th Division :

Cadre :

- Regiment Commander : Lieutenant Colonel Xoan
- Field grade Political Officer : Major Le Tang
- Assistant for Operations and Training : Senior Lieutenant Thanh
- Medical technician : Lieutenant Chuc


Composition :

- 3 Infantry Battalions
- 1 12.7mm Anti-aircraft Company.
- 1 75mm RR Company.
- 1 Medical Company.
- 1 Transportation Company
- 1 Signal Company.
- 1 Engineer Platoon
- 1 Chemical Platoon.

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131. Organizational chart of the 18th Regiment/325th Division.



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132. 18th Regiment Headquarters :

Cadre :

- Commander : Captain Con
- Canteen manager : Lieutenant Nguyen van Vuc
- Transportation Company : Senior Lieutenant Liem
- Medical Company : Lieutenant Chuc

Source does not have any information on other units.

133. 9th Battalion/18th Regiment :

- Battalion Commander : Captain Le van Duc
- Political Officer : Senior Captain Truong Cong Tu
- Assistant Political Officer : Captain Nguyen van Chieu
- Chief of Staff : Captain Phong Ky
- Chief of Rear Services : Lieutenant Tinh
- Chief, Operations and Training: Lieutenant Son.

Strength : Approximately 570 men (?). But when the battalion arrived in Kontum, the local VC [unit] provided it with 200 additional civilian laborers.

Weapons :

- 8 75mm RR's
- 8 82mm mortars
- 3 12.7mm heavy anti-aircraft MG's
- 27 Short range Rocket launchers (B.40)
- 9 Heavy MG's
- Approximately 27 AR's.

Regarding individual weapons, this battalion was equipped with AK SMG's and CKC semi-automatic rifles.

Composition :

- 3 rifle companies
- 1 Combat Support Company
- 1 Anti-tank Platoon
- 1 Signal Platoon
- 1 Reconnaissance Squad
- 1 Liaison Squad.

1331. 1st Company/9th Battalion :

Cadre :

Commander : Senior Lieutenant Kien
Executive Officer: Lieutenant Chuong
Political Officer: Lieutenant Toan
Assistant Political Officer : Lieutenant Dong

Strength : Approximately 110 men (?)

Weapons :

- 3 Heavy MG's
- 9 AR's
- 35 AK SMG's
- A number of rifles.

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Composition :

- 3 rifle platoons
- 1 Heavy MG Squad
- (Other details unknown)

1332. 2d Company/9th Battalion :

Cadre :

- Commander : Senior Lieutenant Loi
- Political Officer : Senior Lieutenant Lach
- Assistant Political Officer : Lieutenant Thanh

Strength : Same as the 1st Company

Weapons : -"-

(Other details unknown)

1333. 3d Company/9th Battalion :

Cadre :

- Commander : Senior Lieutenant Hoang Xuan Dinh
- Executive Officer : Lieutenant Nguyen Minh Chanh
- Political Officer : Senior Lieutenant Nguyen van Tieu
- Assistant Political Officer : Lieutenant Nguyen Huu Doi

Strength :)
(Same as the 1st Company.

Weapons :)

Platoon cadre :

- 1st Platoon : Lieutenant Hong Kim Cuong
- 2d Platoon : Lieutenant Thai Dinh Hoat
- 3d Platoon : Lieutenant Mai Xuan Chau
- (Other details unknown)

1334. 4th Combat Support Company/9th Battalion :

Cadre :

- Commander : Senior Lieutenant Kinh
- Political Officer: Senior Lieutenant Du

Strength : 150 (?)

Weapons :

- 8 75mm RR's
- 8 82mm Mortars
- 3 12.7mm Heavy Anti-aircraft MG's

Composition :

- 75mm RR Platoon, commanded by Aspirant Quang.
- Anti-aircraft Platoon, commanded by Lieutenant Phan
- 82mm Mortar Platoon, commanded by Lieutenant Can.
- (Other details unknown).

1335. Signal Platoon/9th Battalion :

Cadre :

- Leader : Lieutenant Con

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Strength : Approximately 30 men (?)

Equipment :

- 9 telephone sets
- 2 2-watt radio sets
- 5000 meters of wire
(Other details unknown)

1336. Anti-tank Platoon (B.40) :

Cadre :

- Leader : Lieutenant Son

Strength : Approximately 28 men

Weapons : 27 B.40 [Rocket launchers]

Composition : 3 squads.

13361. 1st Squad :

- Leader : PFC Thap
- Soldier : Thin
(Other soldiers' names unknown)

13362. 2d Squad :

- Leader : Corporal Nguyen van Bao
- Soldiers : Yem, Lam, Lac
(Other soldiers' names unknown).

13363. 3d Squad :

- Leader : Corporal Cuong (source)
- Soldiers : Quat, Phuong, Do, Kinh, Cu, Trinh, Tu, Luan.

Weapons : 9 B40 [Rocket launchers] (2 shells for each weapon).

1337. Reconnaissance Squad/9th Battalion :

- Assistant : Corporal Dong
(Other names unknown).

II. PREPARATION AND STUDY FOR INFILTRATION INTO SOUTH VIETNAM :

21. Study organization :

Source revealed that upon their assignment to the 9th Battalion/18th Regiment cadre and soldiers daily received military training conducted by Platoon and Squad cadre.

In particular, after December 1964, the training was conducted more intensively, especially in field trips, formation of a combat unit, ambush, attack on strongholds, mountain-climbing and firing.

During breaks, the company political officer would brief them on the activity of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam and told them that the South Vietnamese people are suffering under the US domination and are longing for the North Vietnamese Army to liberate them.

After 3 months of field training, all the battalions of the 18th Regiment/325th Division began preparations for infiltration into South Vietnam.

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22. Issue of clothing :

When the 9th Battalion/18th Regiment arrived at Station I at Ho Village (Quang Binh) vicinity XD620920, all clothing bearing the designations of the North Vietnamese Army were collected and soldiers received the following items :

- 2 OD suits
- 1 black local pajama
- 2 pairs of underwear.
- 1 hammock
- 1 cloth hat
- 1 rice belt
- 1 nylon sheet for use as raincoat.
- 1 pair of Binh Tri Thien sandals
- 1 pair of long stockings.
- 5 cans of milk.
- 1 box of dry food
- 1 kg of powder salt
- 5 kg of rice
- 1 medical kit

In addition to the above items, source stated that no money was issued to the unit. However, according to unit cadre, each soldier would receive 20 piasters per month for daily expenses from local VC agencies in South Vietnam. But in reality, source received nothing for the last five months (since his infiltration into South Vietnam).

According to cadre, in North Vietnam, the families of soldiers who infiltrated into South Vietnam Nam, would receive from 17 to 225 NVN piasters according to the rank and longevity of military service [of infiltrations].

23. Preparation for infiltration into South Vietnam :

Source stated that particularly in this trip, a number of VC cadre in South Vietnam went to North Vietnam to personally act as guides for each infiltrating battalion.

Source was told that the above cadre had operated in South Vietnam and were thoroughly familiar with the terrain, therefore measures to avoid aircraft and maintain security for the infiltration route were carefully taken by them.

231. Prior to the departure :

Source revealed that prior to the infiltration, all battalion commanders and chiefs of staff moved into South Vietnam one month earlier to survey the terrain (?). According to source's companions, the above officers moved by trucks from Quang Binh to Bac River (?) then by foot all the way to South Vietnam.

Regarding cadre of the 325th Division, they were broken down into small elements and incorporated into various battalions during the movement.

(Other details unknown).

232. Routes of infiltration into South Vietnam :

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Source disclosed that the 7th Battalion/18th Regiment moved on 4 February 1965 and the 9th Battalion /18th Regiment on 8 February 1965.

Source did not have any information on the 8th Battalion/18th Regt, nor the 12.7mm Anti-Aircraft, Medical, Transportation, Signal, 75mm RR companies and the Engineer and chemical platoons because they moved after he had left.

During the movement, the battalion was given one day's rest every four or five days. During this break, source saw division cadre come to the battalion to conduct regimental activities by lauding the victories of the Front and advising cadre and soldiers to disguise as cadre and soldiers of the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet Nam, once they arrived in SVN so as to deceive the RVNAF.

In addition to these Division cadre, a number of Front cadre occasionally came to the battalion to brief its cadre and soldiers on movement and how to avoid aircraft etc...

Throughout the movement, soldiers marched in the jungle, therefore source did not recall any details or the names of the places he had passed through except those on the route leading from North to South Vietnam. They are :

2321. Movements by trucks

Departing from Co Liem in the vicinity of XE100665 the group moved to Minh Cam in the vicinity of XE260700 where a convoy of trucks was waiting for it. After everyone had embarked, the convoy moved off to an empty barrack vicinity XE695310 (?) where it arrived at 0500 hours. The next evening it departed for Station 1 located in Ho Village, vicinity XD620920 so that soldiers could change their clothing.

2322. Movement by foot

After changing clothes, and resting up 3 days in the barrack, soldiers began to move by foot through the following points:

- Round Hill 1001 in the vicinity of XD690760.
- Past Hill 700, vicinity XD680716.
- Across Ben Hai River (location unknown)

Afterwards, the group moved southward on Laos territory, crossing Road #9 and Tchepone River.

Source does not recall the section of road from Tchepone River to Binh Dinh. He only remembered having gone past hill 1800 in the vicinity of YB830650 when moving on Kontum Province territory. Afterward the battalion moved to Captain Phuong's station (location unknown)

Here the battalion stopped to attend a briefing conducted by Captain Phuong on the political situation. The briefing covered the following:

- The present mission of cadre and soldiers is to promptly participate in combat.
- The activities of the Front are expanded and stronger every day. The guerrilla forces have been developed and are now strong enough to pin down RVNAF Regional Forces.
- Recently, the Liberation Army has achieved victory

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after victory.

Presently the South Vietnamese people are suffering from starvation and misery, therefore the supply of food will be inadequate. Cadre and soldiers will have to understand it, share the misery with the people and positively carry out the missions assigned by the people (?)

2323. Route used by the 8th and 9th Battalions/18th Regiment from Binh Dinh to Phu Bon (See attached sketch)

Source revealed that after a period of movement, the 9th Battalion/18th Regiment arrived in Binh Dinh Province on 28 April 1964. Here the unit met the Regiment Command Committee stationed in a forest in Nuoc Do area, vicinity BR660550 (?) within Vinh Thanh District (Binh Dinh).

Leaving the Regiment, the Battalion moved southward along Ha Giao River. On 30 April 1965 it stopped and had 4 day rest in a forest near Huu Giang Village, vicinity BR670440 (?) to wait for the 8th Battalion/18th Regiment source stated that during the bivouac, he met Captain Le van Duc, the battalion commander and Captain Phong Ky, Chief of Staff (1)

On 4 May 1965, the entire battalion moved across Ong My River, vicinity BR670437 (?). Here, source met the newly-arrived 8th Battalion /18th Regiment. Afterward the two battalions crossed road #9, vicinity BR665435 (?) together.

- Continuing to move along Go Beo mountain foot to the south, and crossing Dong Tre stream vicinity BR645410 (?).

- Following a trail to the south, the group came to an abandoned laterite road running across Road 19 vicinity BR660370 (?). The group then moved along this road to the south west and rested vicinity BR655340 (?).

From there, the entire battalion moved on jungle trails therefore source did not know any details. He only remembered that the battalion bivouacked at an area two days' march from Phu Tuc District, and its members hid their rucksacks to receive sand table training in preparation for an ambush on the road between Phu Tuc and Phu Bon.

When the unit arrived at the ambush site on 1 June 1965 source escaped and rallied on 3 June 1965.

233. VC strategic corridor: (See attached overlay)

General:

Source did not know the construction date of this corridor but during the movement, his comrades revealed the following:

Formerly the VC cleared several sections on this road and these are far apart. It was not until 1964 (?) did the VC use it to ship food, weapons and ammunition to supply the theaters of operations in South Vietnam.

2331. A few details of this corridor:

(1) These two officers left their unit for South Vietnam first. The battalion cadre and soldiers were commanded by Senior Captain Truong Cong Tu

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This corridor, 4.50m in width, runs from Road #9 vicinity XD527392 through forests and ends up at Bac River (1) vicinity YC 284748 (?) to the south. During the infiltration, the 9th Battalion/18th Regt marched along and 100m from this strategic corridor. Sometimes the unit had to move on this corridor therefore source saw NVN engineers repair bridges, clear hills, trees etc... in many sections.

Being extremely exhausted during movement, source could not determine the above sections. However source recorded the details listed below:

2332. Bridges across rivers:

Source disclosed that the 9th Battalion/18th Regiment had crossed about 5 wooden bridges, about 4m in width, built by VC engineers.

- The first bridge, approximately 50m in length, was built across the river (probably Se La Non River (?) vicinity XD604095.

- The second bridge, approximately 40m in length vicinity XE630045 (?) or XD630055 (?) (probably south of Muong Nong (?) and approximately 6 hours' march from the first bridge.

- The third bridge is as long as the second bridge, but its location was not remembered; however it might possibly be located in the vicinity XD800940 (?).

After crossing this bridge, the group moved along the river bank to a pine forest to the east.

- The exact location of the fourth bridge was not recalled, however it might possibly be located vicinity XC260897 (?). (probably across A Sap River (?).

- The fifth bridge aka Bac River bridge was located in the vicinity YC282740 (?) (probably across Dak N' Trall River (?).

From there, the 9th Battalion/18th Regiment followed the river toward the east then to the strategic corridor, therefore further details concerning this corridor were unknown to source.

2333. VC truck convoy on the corridor

After crossing Road 9, the 9th Battalion/18 Regiment moved on until 2200 hours then halted by the roadside in a forest, vicinity XD527330 (?). Source observed a convoy of 16 VC military trucks (4 and 6 wheel type) moving south. The cargo of the trucks was unknown. However he learned from his comrades' conversation that the trucks might possibly transport food supplies for the NLF SVN (?).

It was noted that when the battalion reached Station 17, vicinity YC220930 (?), at dawn after crossing the pine forest, source said 8 empty trucks parked with their fronts pointed to North Vietnam. The truck drivers were cooking rice.

Around 1900 hours, the group departed and moved south. 8 other trucks were seen running in the same direction. Source

(1) On the map, this river is called DAK N' Trail. But Bac Village is seen to the west, near the river.

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saw many 57mm RR ammunition (?) cases on the last two trucks.

(Other details unknown)

2334. VC gas depot:

Source disclosed that when the battalion was about 4km from station 16 vicinity YC110970 (near the pine forest), he saw a VC gas depot. When passing this location, he saw many 50-gallon drums scattered on the roadsides.

Many small huts were found about 200m from the road. In addition, when the battalion halted for lunch, source came to a stream to wash his bowl and saw many chickens, ducks and pigs roaming about, and a number of persons moving back and forth between the above huts.

(Other details unknown)

III. INFORMATION ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE 9th BATTALION/18th REGIMENT

31. Secret designation of the 9th Battalion/18th Regiment

Around April 1965, when the unit arrived at Binh Dinh Province, source heard Senior Captain Truong Cong (battalion political officer) disseminate the unit cover designations as follows:

- 18th Regiment: "Anh Ba" (Brother Ba)
- 9th Battalion: "A.3"

Around May 1965, these designations were changed as follows:

- 18th Regiment: "Tinh (Province) 3"
- 9th Battalion: "Huyen (District) 33"
- 1st Company/9th Bn/18th Regt.: "Xa (village) 331"
- 2d Company/9th Bn./18th Regt.: "Xa (village) 332"
- 3d Company/9th Bn./18th Regt.: "Xa (village) 333"
- 4th Combat support: "Xa (village) 334"
- Designations of other battalions unknown

32. Mission of the 9th Battalion/18th Regiment:

As a subordinate, source did not know the details. But during regimental activity, Senior Lieutenant Tuu 3d Company/19 political officer disclosed that the 8th and 9th Battalion/18th Regiment, upon their arrival at Phu Bon, would coordinate with K.75 Battalion (?). (Main Force of Military Region 5) to:

- Use K.75 Battalion to attack New Rural Life Hamlets.
- The 8th and 9th Battalions were responsible for ambushing and intercepting RVN reinforcements on Phu Tuc - Phu Bon communication axis.
- Conduct attacks to deter the US forces from using this area to train special forces.

(Other details unknown)

321. The ambush at Gò Beo hill (Binh Thuan)

On 4 May 1965, after the 9th Battalion/18 Regiment crossed Ong My River vicinity BR670437 (?), two platoons of 3d Company/9th Bn were sent out to collect rice. These 2 platoons received information

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on the approach of RVN operational forces from southwest: when crossing road 19 vicinity BR670430 (?).

The 2 platoons of 3d Company/9th Battalion were immediately deployed on Gô Beo hill BR665427 (?), some 300m from road 19, in an attempt to attack RVN troops if the latter were numerically inferior.

However after the deployment of the troops, the VC saw the large number of operational forces and ordered their troops to remain motionless until RVN operational forces moved away. After that the above two platoons moved on their way.

(Other details unknown)

322. The ambush of the 9th Battalion/18th Regiment:

At 1700 hours 30 May 1965, the 9th Battalion/18th Regiment received sand table training in a forest North East of Phu Tuc forest (location unknown) in preparation for an ambush on the Phu Tuc - Phu Bon communication axis.

Captain Chieu (assistant political officer) disclosed that this ambush was commanded by an unidentified VC Colonel from Military Region 5 and the participating units were as follows:

- The K.75 Battalion responsible for the attack on a New Rural Life Hamlet (location unknown).
- The 9th Battalion/18th Regiment, composed of 4 companies (1) responsible for the ambush and interception of RVN reinforcements from Phu Tuc or Phu Bon.
- The 8th Battalion/18th Regiment acting as reserve force.

According to source, in this ambush, in addition to approximately 570 men of the 9th Battalion/18th Regiment, this unit had an additional 200 civilian laborers responsible for the evacuation of wounded soldiers, supply of food and ammunition for the battalion during combat action.

(See attached overlay of the ambush)

3211. Ambush conducted by the 9th Battalion/18th Regiment


The 9th Battalion/18th Regiment broke down into 3 companies ambushing near B M'Rok village from BQ070628 down to BQ450640.

Upon completion of training, in the morning of 1 June 1965, the 8th and 9th Battalions/18th Regiment departed and in the afternoon of 2 June 1965 reached a hill foot vicinity BQ465640 where source saw the above said Colonel and four VC 12.7mm anti-aircraft MGs on the hill top. Approximately one company was in charge of the defense of these 4 MGs.

After the deployment of troops, at 1800 hours, source escaped to rally, therefore further details were unknown.

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3212. Overlay of the ambush of the 9th Battalion/18th Regiment
(Not to scale)



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33. Movement operating procedures of the 9th Battalion/18th Regiment:

331. Method of eluding aircraft:

During discussions, the VC made known the method of eluding airstrike as follows:

a. In mountainous area

Combat experience has shown that RVN aircraft often conduct airstrike at valley basins or mountain slopes but never on mountain tops.

In case of airstrike, units must immediately disperse and scale the mountain top for shelter.

b. In the delta area:

VC cadre and troops are to carefully camouflage with tree-leaves. In case of airstrike, they disperse and take shelter in open or sparsely wooded areas.

The VC have learned through experience that aircraft always attach more attention to objectives in dense forests than those in open areas except the VC give away their positions.

332. Activity schedule during movement:

Usually during movement, the VC applied the following activity schedule.

- 0400 hours: Reveille
- 0500 hours: Movement
- 0700 hours: Rest for breakfast
- 0730 hours: Movement
- 1130 hours: Lunch
- 1230 hours: Movement
- 1600 hours: Rest

After that, the soldiers made underground stoves to cook rice for the following days.

34. Supply of civilian laborers for the 9th Battalion/18th Regiment:

341. Civilian laborer group

Source revealed that when the 9th Battalion/18th Regiment arrived at the territory of Kontum Province, local VC provided it with 200 civilian laborers to carry food and ammunition for the battalion (the VC called loyal civilian laborers). According to the revelation of his comrade-in-arms, the above quantity of food and ammunition was sufficient for five days' use to fight the RVNAF.

In addition, after the unit arrived at Phu Bon Province to conduct an ambush on the Phu Tuc communication axis, source saw, after the deployment of troops of the 9th Battalion/18th Regiment, approximately 200 other civilian laborers (?), carrying food to supply the unit. But later on they withdrew to an unknown location.

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342. Supply of food:

The supply procedures were unknown to source. He only knew the movement route. When rice was about to run out, the platoon contacted the company to lead the soldiers to collect rice.

Usually each individual was issued 3 cans (1 can = 250 grams) of rice. However, due to frequent movement in forest, the unit sometimes ran out of rice before reaching a rice supply point. In such cases VC cadre and troops were obliged to substitute rice for sweet potatoes and manioc.

(Other details unknown)

35. Modus operandi of the 18th Regiment/325th Division

Being a subordinate, source did not know the modus operandi of the regiment.

However according to the discussion of his comrades-in-arms, in the future this unit would possibly operate in Pleiku, Kontum and Phu Bon (?) Provinces. Consequently the 8th and 9th Battalions came there in advance to establish a base for the regiment to operate in the above provinces.

In addition, the mission of the 8th and 9th Battalions upon their arrival at Phu Bon was:

- To attack New Rural Life Hamlets within this province and the main target was Phu Tac District.
- Sever the Phu Tuc - Phu Bon communication axis.
- Prevent and foil the US plan of using this territory to train special forces.

(Other details unknown)

IV. MORALE OF CADRE AND TROOPS OF THE 9th BATTALION/18th REGIMENT:

Generally speaking all the troops of the 9th Battalion were draftees. They could be broken down into two types:

41. Draftees before 1963:

These draftees had completed their term of service but they volunteered to stay in the army. On an average about 20% of soldiers of each company were considered as combat experienced fighters.

Regarding their morale, although they were familiar with hardships, their good will and ideology could not be determined.

As infiltrators, they were given one side propaganda. Moreover, they had no chance to contact the people in South Vietnam especially they did not know the living standard of the people in the delta.

42. Draftees after 1963:

Eighty percent of these draftees were found in VC companies. They were easy to control as compared with the volunteer draftees above.

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They were not familiar with army life and discipline . They highly respected cadre and were much afraid of the latter's critique. As a consequence, they always complied with commanders' orders.

However, they were not very combat experienced.

43. Command cadre:

Source did not know battalion level cadre because he very seldom contacted them. Company level command cadre might possibly fall into two types.

431. Squad leaders

Each company was composed of 10 squad leaders (9 of the 3 platoons and 1 of the heavy machine gun squad). On an average, each company had 3 squad leaders graduated from training school of Military Region 4 located in Quang Binh.

The rest came from the rank of soldier. According to source's opinion, the ideology of the latter type was relatively more stable. However source could not say about their combat capabilities because he did not see them command any combat action .

432. Platoon leaders and above

Generally speaking platoon cadre were noted for their seniority in service and extreme combat experience.

They were old combatants of various units and promoted to platoon level cadre. Therefore their morale and endurance of hardships was all that could be desired .

44. Characteristics of command cadre:

Of the company commanders, source only knew Hoang Xuan Dinh, Commander of 3d Company/9th Battalion, who was very hot-tempered.

This is evidenced by the fact that when the soldiers were in training at Quang Binh, they were reprimanded by this man every day. His subordinate cadre were under constant critique.

The troops were criticized on many occasions for having taken their meals earlier than the scheduled time to satisfy their hunger as a result of training. They were also reprimanded when walking in disorder etc..

As a consequence, very few members in the unit as a whole were sympathetic towards him.

45. Shortage of necessary items in unit:

As stated earlier, generally speaking soldiers and cadre in VC units were not provided with sufficient food and medicines in case of sickness.

For this reason, stealing often occurred as follows:

During the time the battalion moved on Laos territory, some

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soldiers from 3/3/9 Platoon were provided with two cans of milk for recuperation from sickness. To avoid stealing, the milk was delivered to the assistant platoon leader. But since this man probably could not bear his hunger, he used it up. The following morning he reported that the milk was stolen. After investigation, he was indentified as the man who had stolen the patients' milk. Therefore, he was brought to the Party Chapter for criticism.

In addition, when the battalion arrived at Phu^Bon, a similar case happened again. But this time the quantity of milk was always kept by a medical cadre. One day when this man left his knapsack on the mountain to go down to the stream for a bath, Huynh, a soldier, stole two cans of milk from his knapsacks. When the milk was reported lost, everybody suspected that Huynh was culprit, but he denied. It was not until the following day when he suffered from a diarrhea that his culpability was revealed.

In addition, cases of cooked rice being stolen in the units often occurred (rice was generally cooked in the previous afternoon). Because of the above fact, as soon as rice was cooked, it was immediately handed out to the soldiers.


It was further revealed by source that each would carry the rice at his side and cherish it more than his weapon. Because he may have to suffer from starvation if he loses it.

ROUTE OF MOVEMENT OF 8th and 9th BATTALIONS
FROM BINH DINH TO PHU BON


ACCORDING TO THE INITIAL INTERROGATION REPORT
~~CFI RALLIER~~ SQUAD/B:40 ANTI-TANK
SUBORDINATE TO 9th BATTALION/18th REGIMENT/325th DIVISION

MAP: II CTZ

SCALE: 1/250,000




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
Departure from
18th Regt Hqs on
April 1965

Illegible




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Stream



BQ

60

0

Interprovincial
Road 7

○ Phu Tuc

EA BA River

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Legend:

→ : Route of movement

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ANNEX II

(According to statement of rallier Pham-Kien-Cuong)

I. THE TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL OF MILITARY REGION 4 ::

GENERAL:

11. Description of the school:

Sketch of the school

12. Regulations of the school:

- General regulations concerning trainees
- Training schedule
- Messing
- Trainees' labor mission

II. PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION:

21. Anti-tank rocket-launcher B.40:

- History
- Some details on the introduction of B40 rocket launchers into NVN units.
- Design of B40 Rocket launcher
- Genral characteristics of the B40 ammunition and weapon.
- Characteristics of the ammunition.
- Sketches of B40 rocket and launcher.

22. Characteristics of RVN tanks:

- General.
- Weaknesses of tanks
- Dimensions of tanks

23. Anti-tank aiming method:

- Anti-tank firing table
- Anti-tank firing table (approximate)

24. Anti-tank firing techniques:

- General
- Firing positions
- Selection of emplacements
- Method of digging foxholes

III. SITUATION OF THE PEOPLE IN NVN:

I. THE TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL OF MILITARY REGION 4:

General:

Source did not know the history of this school in detail. In April 1964, having been designated by his unit to attend specialized training on the B40 rocket launcher [at this school] he took this opportunity, out of curiosity to find out that:

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The school was organized by Military Region 4, to conduct technical training for draftees having a level of education of seventh grade [7 years of schooling] and higher.

Besides the training of Infantry squad leaders, this school also conducted technical training on: B40 rocket launcher, duty attendant, Medic, 75mm Recoilless rifle, 82mm Mortar, etc... In particular each specialized branch was the responsibility of several specialist cadre. Although the trainees lived together, they were too busy with their own studies to pay attention to other subjects.

The School Command Committee:

- Cadre:

Commandant: Lt Col (name forgotten)
Political officer: Lt Col Cao Long (?)
(Other names forgotten).

Location of the school:

In Phu-Xa area, vic XE700350 in Bo Trach District (Quang Binh [Province]).

11. Description of the school:

The school occupied a rectangular area about 250mx400m. It is surrounded by a simple wooden fence.

Looking in from the front gate, the barracks were constructed in a "U" shape each thatched roofed row being divided into many small rooms used as billets for training cadre and trainees.

In the center of the area, there was a big house serving as billets and offices for the command Committee members, in front of which a volley ball court was set up for recreation of the trainees.


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111. SKETCH OF THE TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL OF MILITARY

REGION 4

(Not to scale)



LEGEND

- (1) Billets and offices of the Command Committee
 members
- (2) Mess hall and classrooms of the trainees.
- (3) Kitchen and billet of the duty attendants.
- (4) Billets of the specialized instructors and arms
 storages.
- (5) 3 rows of thatch roofed houses, each divided
 into rooms used as billets for trainees.
- (6) Volley ball court
- (7) Sentry box
- (8) Gate

-----: Fence around the school

----- Small road recently built by the VC for
access to the school by automobile

Dong Hoi town

3/II
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12. School regulations:

121. General regulations concerning trainees :

Generally speaking, all trainees selected to attend a training course in this school, must have the following qualifications:

- Have a 7th Grade education or higher.
- Be of the poor farmer class.
- Have well carried out their labor missions in their units.
- Be of good behavior

- Upon their arrival at the school, trainees were grouped into squads and platoons and started on an 8-month training course. Upon graduation, trainees with high enough marks were promoted to Corporal, the rest were promoted to PFC.

122. Training schedule:

Morning:

- 0500 hours - Reveille
- 0530 hours - Physical exercises
- 0600 hours - Individual hygiene
- 0700 hours - Training
- 1100 hours - Break
- 1200 hours - Lunch

Afternoon:

- 1300 hours: End of siesta
- 1400 hours: Training
- 16.0 : Break
- 1630 hours: Review of deficiencies in trainees' studies
- 1700 hours: Sports
- 1800 hours: Dinner
- 1900 hours: Critique
- 2100 hours: Roll call
- 2130 hours: Sleep

123. Messing:

Generally speaking, messing for the trainees was provided by the school. Each trainee was allowed 7 and half lang_s of rice mixed with up to 30% camper day in summer and 7.8 lang_s in winter /TN: 1 lang= 100 grams/ .

Supplemental food consisted mostly of fish, salted fish and calabash soup. Meat was sometimes served, but was rather scarce.

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124. Labor mission of the trainees:

Besides their specialized training, trainees had to perform daily production tasks such as gardening, planting potatoes and vegetables etc...

Especially on Sundays, each trainee must carry out these tasks from 0700 hours to 1200h, then were given complete freedom in the afternoon for visiting around. However, only 30% of the Squad, in group of three, were allowed to go out from 1200 hours to 1800 hours.

II. PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION:

As stated above, all trainees were grouped [in Squads and Platoons] according to their specialization. Each course lasted 8 months.

Source's group consisting of 27 men was trained on the operation of the B40 rocket launcher by 3 lieutenant instructors (names forgotten) with the following subjects.

21. Anti-tank rocket launcher "B40" :

History:

This weapon was originally manufactured and used by the USSR during World War II, under the designation "40mm Bazooka".

In 1954, the Chinese Communists began the fabrication of this model and gave it to the Hanoi puppet authorities to equip their troops in 1959.

During his period of training in Quang Binh, source was told that:

Upon reception of these weapons, as the NVN units were not familiar with their operation, a demonstration was organized with the presence of representatives from NVN High Command. A Company executive officer volunteered to fire the weapon at a target ship off a beach. He missed the target and the shell fell 60m short of the ship. However it was sunk due to pressure of the detonation in the water. Due to this incident, the VC [authorities] discovered that the shell was more effective in water than on the ground.

From then on, the VC began to equip NVN units [with these weapons] which were successively called.

- Anti-tank rocket launcher
- Anti-tank rocket launcher [sic]
- Close range rocket launcher
- 40mm BAZOOKA
- B.40

According to disclosures from cadre, the Chinese Communists succeeded only in manufacturing the weapon and the propelling charge.

The shell itself must come from the USSR. Source confirmed this fact, since he saw that the markings on the propelling charge were written in Chinese characters, while the shells were marked with Western letters. (Source could not identify these due to his limited knowledge of foreign languages).

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211. Some details on the introduction of B40 rocket launchers

According to cadre's disclosures, prior to 1962, each NVN infantry battalion was equipped with 27 B40's.

But in 1963, this number was reduced to 9. Cadre attributed this fact to a shortage of ammunition, which was no longer provided by the USSR.

In early 1964, NVN units were reequipped up to the original TO +E/27 rocket launchers for each battalion with brand new weapons.

The allocation of ammunition was 2 rounds for each weapon.

(Other details unknown)

212. Design of the B40:

In principle, this weapon may be classified as a small recoilless rifle, as the propelling charge was employed to push the shell forward, at the same time, the gas (smoke + fire /Sic/) blew out the rear.

Theoretically firing this weapon would not even spill water from a bowl solidly attached to it.

Source never tested this. But when he once practiced firing, with one round, at a distance of 60m, he did not feel any movement of the weapon,

213. General characteristics of the B40 rocket launcher and its ammunition:

2131. The rocket launcher:

The weapon weights 2.750k, and is 0.95m long. It is composed of 4 main parts.

- The barrel
- The sight (see sketch)
- The firing mechanism (see sketch)
- Accessories.

This weapon is employed against various armored vehicles (including tanks), fortifications, blockhouses, culverts and bridges, ships and any concentration of infantry squads, platoons or larger, etc...

Its maximum range is 150m and its effective range is within 100m.

2132. Ammunition:

Each round of ammunition weighs 1.620k, 1.840k with the propelling charge. It is 0.50m long and 0.67m with the propelling charge. It is composed of 4 main parts.

- Body
 - Collar
-) See attached sketch

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- Fuze)
- Fin assembly)

The initial velocity of the shell is 82mm per second. It can penetrate 200mm of steel at 90° (perpendicular to the trajectory).

214. Characteristics of the ammunition:

Since the B40 rocket fuze has no safety pin, it can explode when hitting or falling on a hard surface.


Therefore, when packed in a container, the front of the rocket is padded with 5cm foam rubber to alleviate shock.

Upon contact with the target, the rocket explodes and gives out a heat ranging from 3000 to 4000 degrees centigrade. Therefore all metal would be melted, the harder the surface of the target, the more effective the destruction. On the contrary the effects are limited when the target is soft.

According to explanations of instructors, one rocket could completely destroy the men and weapons of one platoon in close formation.

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2141. SKETCH OF THE B40 ROCKET




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
2142. SKETCH OF THE B40 ROCKET LAUNCHER



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2143. TRIGGER MECHANISM OF THE B40 ROCKET LAUNCHER

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


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
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2144. SKETCH OF THE FRONT AND REAR SIGHTS OF THE B.40:



NOTE:

- The rear sight had 3 apertures marked 100 + 150 with 50, 100 and 150 meters ranges.
- When the sight is aligned, the top of the front sight is in the center of the aperture and aligned with the shoulders of the aperture as shown.



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22. Characteristics of the RVNAF tank:

Source disclosed that before starting the training on the B40, instructor cadre explained to the trainees the characteristics of the tanks employed by RVNAF in SVN as follows:

221. General:

At present, in SVN, RVNAF usually employs tanks in coordination with Infantry units to attack liberated areas.

Especially, each tank is equipped with one or two light machine guns or heavy machine guns and they can cross rivers, streams and swamp. Therefore, they hamper operations of Liberation Forces to a certain extent (?).

222. Weaknesses of tanks:

Although the tanks prove to be relatively dangerous in their supporting role in operations, they do have some shortcomings as shown by past combat experiences.

- Observation of fire from the tank is limited out to 100 meters SIC

- The armor is 40mm thick, while the B40 rocket can penetrate 200mm of steel.

- The fighting spirit of the tank crew is very low. If one tank is knocked out, the others will stop or slow down.

223. Dimensions of the tank:

Cadre's briefings disclosed:

The tank was a tracked vehicle, averaging 5.40m long, 2.40m high and 2m wide. The engine compartment is located 40cm above the track SIC.

Maximum speed is about 60km/hour. During operations, the average speed is about 25km/hour.

23. Anti-tank aiming method:

For accurate fire, the B40 gunner must know how to estimate the range based on the following formula:

The average height of the tank is known as 2.40m.

Divide this dimension in two equal parts, each measuring 1.20m.

The upper part (from the center up) is characterized by the sign (+) and the lower part from the center down to the track) is characterized by the sign (-).



These two signs are very essential for correct aiming

(See attached sketches)

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REMARKS(1) Zero is the basic aiming point.

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231. Anti tank firing table:

The sight alinement of the B40 is similar to that of other types of weapons, that is, use a line of sight from the center of the aperture to the top of the front sight. In particular, the range scale rear sight of this weapon had 3 apertures marked with 50, 100, and 150, for ranges at 50, 100 and 150 meters; Intermediate ranges are computed based on the firing table below

Range scale	RANGE AND AIMING POINT OF THE TARGET										
	50 meters	60 meters	70 meters	80 meters	90 meters	100 meters	110 meters	120 meters	130 meters	140 meters	150 meters
50	0	+ 0.6m	+ 1.3m (1)	+ 2.2m (1)							
100			- 1.9m (2)	- 1.5m (2)	- 0.8m	0	+ 0.8m	+ 1.7m (1)	+ 2.8m (1)		
								- 2.6m (2)	- 1.7m (2)	- 1.7m (2)	0

NOTES:

- (1) Aim beyond the tank (divide 1.20m in two and use it as reference)
- (2) In case the tanks is moving downhill, especially on a level ground, the gunner may use a smaller range scale, and aim at the top of the vehicle.

232. General range estimation table for firing at a tank:

This table is used for forgetful gunners who are unable to estimate the distance to properly use the sight.

Gunners may apply the following general table:

(Remember that the main aiming-point of a tank is its center, i.e. the midpoint of its 2.4m height)

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Range Scale	Distance	Aiming point
50	More than 50m	Aiming at the turret (of the tank)
50	Less than 50m	Aiming at the track of the tank
100	Less than 100m	Aiming at the track of the tank
100	More than 100m	Aiming at the turret of the tank
150	More than 150m	Aiming at the turret of the tank
150	Less than 150m	Aiming at the track.

NOTE: The above table for range estimation is somewhat different from the previously-mentioned one. However, it may be used effectively.

240. Method of firing B.40 :

General:

According to guiding principle, to accurately fire at a target, gunners should know how to estimate .

- Angle
- Distance
- Speed of the tank
- velocity of the bullet

The above data are found by means of a formula (but source does not remember it).

Source only knows that, normally, gunners of B.40 are not allowed to fire at a target beyond 100m. Within this distance, leading one length of the tank is effective.

241. Firing positions:

According to the terrain features or landmarks of the battlefield, gunners may fire from standing, prone or kneeling positions.

In theory, the nearer the gunners approach the tank, the safer they are, since the observation range of a tank is beyond 100m. Especially, when they are very close to the tank, the heavy guns on the tank cannot fire at them.

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242. Selection of firing terrain:

B.40 gunners should choose an open terrain, in their front as well as at their back, to conduct fire, or else, they would meet with difficulties, or even death, as a result of the heat that blows out the rear.

243. Method of digging foxholes of B.40 gunners:


Their foxholes are dug in the same way as those of individual weapon bearers.

However, B.40 gunners should build an embankment with the dug up earth in front of them, but absolutely not at their back, to avoid the obstruction of heat that may cause death to gunners.

(See attached diagram).

244. B.40 gunners' foxhole:

(Cross section)



NOTES:

- (1): Earth embankment in front of gunner
- (2): Small hole in the foxhole used to store 4 defensive grenades.
- (3): Steps to climb up
- (4): Earth-seat for gunner

/// : Earth

16/II
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III. PEOPLE'S SITUATION IN NVN:

Generally speaking, people of all strata in NVN, young or old, have to join associations for indoctrination, regimental activity, increase of production, and execution of all Resolutions of the Party. All these are aimed at developing the state economy.

Source stated that since he was but a schoolboy, he did not know about the organization regulations of these associations. He had a general knowledge as follows:

31. Organization of associations in NVN:

311. Youth Association:

In local areas, youth force plays a leading role in all activities from indoctrination to the increase of production or labor work. .. through the slogan: "wherever the people need them, the youths are present, whenever, the people encounter difficulties, the youths are present to help them" .

At present, everybody from 16 to 25 has to join this youth association.

According to the organization regulations, each VC village has one youth Group Chapter . Each chapter is composed of several sub-chapters each sub-chapter of several teams, each team of several cells and each cell of several members. Remarkably, the number of members in each cell is not limited. It depends on the availability of youths in each village. Normally, each cell has more than six members.

312. Women's Association:

Unlike the Youth Association, Women's Association absorbs women from 16 to 45.

Due to lack of inquisitive mind, source does not know the organization of these associations. He only knows that women also engage in regimental activity, indoctrination, labor work, production etc...in the same way as youths. Besides these daily jobs, they also participate in fund drives and meetings to encourage youths to fulfill their military duty.

313. Aged People's Association:

The VC also force persons from 45 years old and up to join this association except the old, weak or disabled persons.

Socially speaking , they must also participate in every labor, sanitary tasks etc...In addition, they must encourage their sons, brothers and relatives to perform military service.

314. Cooperatives:

In North Vietnam, all branches such as industry . handicraft, trade, agriculture etc...are administered by cooperatives. At present, throughout North Vietnam; Cooperatives concentrate production to serve the state economy.

Citizens from 18 years old and up must join those cooperatives as members.

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As for the agricultural cooperative in Giao Hồng Village of Giao Thuy District (Nam Dinh), source disclosed the following details:

3141. Missions of the members:

Every day, the members of this cooperative must take part in every agricultural task such as building dikes, harvesting, ploughing, growing vegetables etc...

The points for their daily work are given and recorded by the cooperative's administrative board and at the end of the crop the total quantity of rice obtained, after exacting part of it to pay tax to the Government, will be equally divided to the members according to their recorded points. The work of each member in one month earns him from 22 to 25 kilos of rice.

32. Exploitation methods of the VC in NVN under the form of tax:

Regarding the agriculture in NVN, the VC establish cooperatives to control the income of the people in order to collect taxes and at the same time agitate the people to increase their production output for the government interest. To source's knowledge, the agricultural taxes of the Ha Noi Government are fixed as follow:

Category A (fertile land): 470 kilos per hectare.

Category B (Average land): 440 kilos per hectare.

Category C (Bad land): 400 kilos per hectare.

In sum, every year the cooperatives must use from 45 to 50% of the total income to pay taxes to the government.

321. Selling rice with an encouraging price /low price/

Besides the above-mentioned taxes, good members whose recorded points are higher than the criteria of 22 kilos per month must sell the extra rice to the Government at a low price: NVN O\$22 per kilo instead of selling them to the people at NVN O\$46 per kilo.

It is called by the Ha Noi Government, "Selling rice at an encouraging price".

322. Selling rice as a duty:

It is reasonable to force members who earn more than the required criteria to sell rice at a low price. On the contrary, members who only get enough or insufficient quantity of rice for their families must also sell rice at the above price to help the government carry out its reconstruction plan.

323. Selling rice to support the people in SVN:

In addition, campaigns of selling rice to support the people in SVN are sometimes initiated and of course, rice is sold to the government with a low price.

Generally speaking, the VC reasoning of these campaigns is as follows: The people in SVN are suffering from famine as a result of floods and exploitation by the Americans (?). This makes the poor people become poorer. Therefore we (NVN people) should share their sufferings by selling rice at a low price to the VC government so that the government can send this rice to SVN to support the people there.

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324. Fund drives to support people in SVN:

In addition, the Hanoi puppet government has conducted throughout NVN a "fund drive to support the people in SVN".

On the average, each person has to contribute at least 0.5 NVN piaster once or twice per month. More than that, they can induce poor people, who have no money to contribute to the "fund drive", to work a day without pay "to support the people in SVN".

In short, though the people in NVN have to live in famine, they are being exploited by the VC government. The countrymen and regular troops, have to eat rice mixed with sweet potatoes or corn (from 30 to 50 percents).

325. Life of people in NVN:

In general, according to propaganda of the Hanoi puppet government, the people's life is as follows: NVN has made great progress. Thanks to the government, everyone old or young, male or female, has employment. No one is out of work (?).

But in reality, through source's statements, the people have to work very hard but get tittle benefit from their labor because.

According to the fixed ration, each person must eat rice mixed with 30 percents of sweet potatoes or corn; but poor families eat 70% percents of sweet potatoes and corn so as to save rice for sale. With the money derived from the sale of rice, they buy other necessities.

"Shrimp paste and vegetables", are the main foods of countrymen. A few families can afford to buy other foods such as fish or meat. But, these foods are rarely found. Even when they have money, they are not allowed to eat more than the quantity fixed in the tickets issued by cooperatives.

33. Control over the people:

In reality, the people are allowed to go from one place to another. However, they very seldom ask for permission to travel because all of them have to join production cooperatives and if they travel for some days, they have no point scores on those days and, thus, at the end of the crop, they will not have enough food for their families.

In case a cooperative member wants to go to another village, he must ask for permission from the local authorities and get a pass at the village administrative committee with a letter of introduction from his cooperative. Upon his arrival at any house, the house owner takes his pass to local public security agency which registers and keeps it. When it expires, the house owner should get it back and hands it over to the holder to return to his village.

In short, declaration of a stranger's presence in a house is, after the VC indoctrination, considered as an obligation of the people towards local authorities. Therefore, strangers can hardly do harm to the villages.

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340. People's activities:

As already mentioned above, citizens from 16 years of age have to join associations.

Besides, they are also members of cooperatives so as to assume production activities.

Thus, they have to attend regimental activities or training classes at night conducted regularly by their cooperatives or associations.

The purpose of regimental activities and critique sessions is to propagandize Socialism in NVN, and urge the increase of production, labor activities, contribution to support the struggle movement of people, in SVN and labor emulation etc...

35. Reactions of NVN people after VN-USAF bombardments:

According to source, after the VN-US bombardment in NVN on 5 August 1964, the units subordinate to the 18th Regiment/325 were ordered to dig fortifications around their bases in preparation for combat. When the defense system was completed, the regiment's subordinate battalions began to move into forests to conduct field training. Therefore, source was out of contact with the people and he knew no further details.


He only learned from radio broadcasts that the NVN army, in coordination with the people, had downed several VN-USAF planes, and that the people were preparing to fight against the Americans to the bitter end.

(Other details unknown).

19/II

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
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Huong Hoa District



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
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VC STRATEGIC VEHICLE ROAD FROM NORTH TO SOUTH VIETNAM FOR THE MOVEMENT OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION

According to the interrogation on report of rallier ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~


Squad leader of 3d Squad/B.40 anti-tank Platoon subordinate to 18th Regiment/325th Division

Map Scale: 1/100000



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
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Station 16




Pine forest



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Station 17

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LEGEND ←

- +++ +++ = Vietnam-Laos frontier
- - - → = One of two roads used by the VC
- → = Vehicle road can be used by the VC for infiltration
-  = Rivers across which the VC can construct wooden bridges for movement.

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A.SAP River

YC260897



The river leading through Buon Bac

Dak-N'Traii River

(?)

YC282740



Station 19 (?)

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