

Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report
September 1970

Series: AWM103 - Headquarters 1st
Australian Task Force (Nui Dat) records

Item: R723/1/57/25

Folio No	Referred to	Date	Clearing Offrs Initials	Folio No	Referred to	Date	Clearing Offrs Initials
1	G OPS	4/2 25/1	AB				
	Comd	5/2	AB				
	D Comd	5/2	AB				
	CO CA Unit	7/2	AB				
	P/A	8/2	AB				
	Coms.	18/3	AB				
	D Coms	18/3	AB				
	G 2 (ops)	19/11/70	AB				
	P/A	19/11/70	AB				
	G 2 OPS	23/5	AB				
	Comd	26/5/70	AB				
	D Comd	26/5	AB				
	G 2 (OPS)	1/7	AB				
	Comd	1 Jul 70	Segu				
	D Comd	3/7	AB				
	Coms	28/7	AB				
	D Coms.	24/7	AB				
	G 2 (ops)	13/8	AB				
	Comd info	18/8	AB				
	D Comd info	17/8	AB				
	G 2 (Ops) - Annex C	2/8	AB				
	Comd	30/9	AB				
	D Comd	30/9	AB				
	G 2 (Ops)	1/10	AB				
	Comd	28/10	AB				
	D Comd	29/10	AB				
	G 2 (OPS)	30/10	AB				
B/F	G 2 (OPS)	23/11	AB				

COVERING SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



AUSTRALIAN FORCE VIETNAM

HQ IATF REGISTRY
723 / 1 / 57 (5)
Folio _____

QUOTE IN REPLY

R 723 / 1 / 35

HEADQUARTERS

Army Component

24 Oct 70

AHQ (C)
1 ATF
HQ NZ V Force

AATTV MONTHLY REPORT - SEP 70

1. Enclosed for your information is one copy of the AATTV Monthly Report for Sep 70.

C.A.E. Fraser
(C.A.E. FRASER)
Major General
Commander Australian Force
VIETNAM

Enclosure: 1. AATTV Monthly Report - Sep 70.



COVERING SECRET

SECRET
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam

15 Oct 70

AFV (3)

HQ IATF REGISTRY

723	1	57
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Folio _____

AATTV REPORT - ^{SEP} AUG 70

General

1. During the month AATTV continued to be actively involved in MR1, MR3 and MR4 in operations, training and in providing advice on territorial security at province, district village and hamlet levels. The main ARVN activity was in the area of Fire Support Base (FSB) O'Reilly.
2. On 30 Sep 70 AATTV was presented with the United States Unit Meritorious Commendation at Vung-Tau.

Casualties

3. Three advisers were wounded in action during the month:
 - a. WO2 Powell received a fragmentation wound to the upper left leg and a graze wound to the head on 11 Sep 70 in the vicinity of FSB O'Reilly. He returned to his unit on 13 Sep.
 - b. Capt Caligari received a shrapnel wound to the right cheek on 13 Sep 70 in Thua-Thien Province. He remained on duty.
 - c. WO2 Dodds received shrapnel wounds to his face and arm on 30 Sep when his vehicle ran over a M16 mine in Phuoc-Tuy Province. He remained on duty.
4. The following advisers were hospitalized during the month.
 - a. WO2 Storan was hospitalized at 1 Aust Fd Hospital from 11 to 27 Sep when he was downgraded to unfit for tropical service and was RTA on 1 Oct 70.
 - b. Sgt Edwards was hospitalized at 1 Aust Fd Hospital from 16 to 22 Sep with influenza.
 - c. Cpl Kuring was hospitalized in 1 Aust Fd Hospital from 16 Sep with influenza. He is still in hospital.
 - d. WO2 Pennington was admitted to 95th Evacuation Hospital with malaria on 19 Sep 70.
 - e. WO2 Bell was admitted to 1 Aust Fd Hospital on 24 Sep with stomach trouble.
 - f. WO2 Muir was hospitalized in 1 Aust Fd Hospital from 29 to 30 Sep with diarrhoea.

SECRET

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Deployment

5. Attached at Annex A is the deployment of AATTV as at 2 Oct 70. During Oct 5 Cpts and one Maj should march in and one Capt and one Maj will RTA.

MR 1

6. The AATTV activity in MR 1 is covered in Maj Aitken's report attached at Annex B. Appendices to that report cover:

- a. A summary of significant contacts involving ARVN units having Australian advisers in I Corps Appendix 1
- b. A report by Maj Connor, the S3 Adviser in Quang-Tri Province Appendix 2
- c. A report by Capt Brock, Senior Adviser in 3/2 ARVN Bn Appendix 3
- d. A report by WO2 Oliver, Adviser in 4/1 ARVN Bn on his unit's activities around FSB O'Reilly. Appendix 4
- e. A report by Capt Tear, the District Senior Adviser in Phu-Thu District Thua-Thien Province Appendix 5
- f. A report by Capt Martens, Senior Adviser 2/1 ARVN Bn on his unit's activities around FSB O'Reilly over the period 25 Jul - 26 Sep. Appendix 6

7. Most of the significant events in MR 1 during Sep are covered in the above reports. Events which need to be elaborate upon on which are not covered are:

- a. It appears that the 1 ARVN Div will continue to operate around FSB O'Reilly during the wet season. This is not normal however the NVA apparently gained a psychological/political advantage when the seasonal evacuation of FSB Barnett took place. It is understood that President Thieu does not want the same situation to occur over O'Reilly. It has been stated that the battery of 105mm guns will be withdrawn but the infantry units are to remain around O'Reilly. The infantry can be adequately supported from FSB Barbara where there are three artillery batteries.
- b. A road is to be built to FSB Anne to enable road resupply during the wet season.
- c. FSB O'Reilly has been subjected to CS rounds from both 82mm mortars and 120mm rockets.
- d. The 11 Cav Regt is to replace 7 Cav Regt in the C1, A2, A1 area in the every near future.
- e. 54 ARVN Regt is to be given an AO in the FSB Anne - FSB Barbara area so that it can operate as a regt. It is stated that this will assist in upgrading the standard of the regiment.

f. The establishment of one FSB in each of the three regimental AOs in 2 ARVN Regt is a new adventure. The FSB's are to be established approximately 6000 metres further west than has been normal in the wet season and the aim is to delay further west the normal NVA intrusion into the low lands. Sensors will be used in conjunction with these bases.

g. During the month the 5 ARVN Regt HQ conducted a complete battalion combat assault without the use of advisers at that level. Command ship, slicks, gunships, artillery and tac air were all supplied from Vietnamese sources.

h. The 258 Vietnamese Marine Bde moved from An Hoa in Quang-Nam Province to Mai Loc in Quang-Tri Province during the month. The Special Forces Camp at Mai Loc has been closed down. It appears that the standard of the marine battalions is not very high.

MR 3

8. A comprehensive report on AATTV activities in Phuoc-Tuy Province by Maj Phillips is attached at Annex C. Appendices attached to Annex C are:

- Appendix 1. Tasks and responsibilities of the territorial forces advisers at Phuoc-Tuy Sector Headquarters.
- Appendix 2. Report by Capt Opie - Senior Adviser 302 RF Bn - Sep 70.
- Appendix 3. Report by WO2 Stephens - Team Leader MATT 1 - Sep 70.
- Appendix 4. Report by WO2 William - Team Leader MATT 2 - Sep 70.
- Appendix 5. Report by WO2 Palmer - Team Leader MATT 4 - Sep 70.
- Appendix 6. Report by WO2 White - Team Leader MATT 6 - Sep 70.
- Appendix 7. Report by Capt Hartley PSDF Adviser Phuoc-Tuy Sector - Sep 70.
- Appendix 8. Report by WO2 Osborn - RD Adviser Phuoc-Tuy Sector - Sep 70.

9. Attached at Annex D is a report by Maj Throssel the CORDS Territorial Forces coordinator at HQ MR 3 for Phuoc-Tuy, Binh-Tuy and Long-Khanh Provinces. The interesting fact about this report is that apparently there is an effort being made to upgrade all Sector TOC's.

10. JWTC. Progress on the establishment of the Jungle Warfare Training Centre (JWTC) continued during the month of Sep. A Joint Planning Staff was established consisting of the Commandant Elect, his AATTV Senior Adviser and a team of Vietnamese and AATTV officers and warrant officers. During the month:

- a. A Programme of Instruction (POI) was prepared and agreed upon for a six weeks course. The course is aimed at instructing students in the techniques of Jungle Warfare at platoon level. Emphasis is given to the improvement of the standard of junior leadership.

- b. A school site plan has been produced by the DCRE 1 ATF.
- c. A plan for the initial deployment into the 8 RAR lines has been produced together with an outline timetable for a handover of the 8 RAR lines to the JWTC.
- d. The AATTV advisory staff was built up to two officers and 8 warrant officers. A further two warrant officers and four captains will be added to the staff during Oct 70. Unfortunately two of the captains will not be available until the last few days in the month.
- e. The cooperation, advice and assistance from 1 ATF has been excellent.

11. There are many difficulties still to be overcome in the establishment of the JWTC and it is hoped that most of these will be overcome in Oct 70.

MR 4

12. NOTT. During Sep 70 the Night Operations Training Team (NOTT) located at the 7 ARVN Div Training School completed the second course conducted for RF officers and the initial course for officers from the 7 ARVN Div. One more course is to be conducted for ARVN officers and then the team will conduct courses for RF officers until mid Dec 70.

13. NOAT. The Night Operations Advisory Teams (NOAT) is still deployed in Cho Gao District. The report by the warrant officer controlling the two teams is attached at Annex E attached to the Annex as Appendix 1 and 2 are reports by the two team leaders. The NOAT will continue to operate in the Cho Gao District until about mid Nov 70, when all RF Coys in the district will have been trained.

General

14. The highlight of the month for AATTV was the presentation of the United States Unit Meritorious Commendation to AATTV at Vung-Tau on 30 Sep 70. The team managed to get 134 advisers on parade, including ex members now with HQ AFV, 1 ATF and 1 ALSG. The success of the day would not have been possible without the excellent cooperation and assistance given by the commanders and staff of:

- a. HQ AFV
- b. HQ 1 ALSG
- c. HQ 1 ATF
- d. The various US advisory organizations and SVN commanders.

15. The strength of AATTV on 30 Sep 70 was 180. During Oct the strength will further increase to over 200.

J.A. Clark
(J.A. CLARK)

AATTV DEPLOYMENT
AS AT 2 OCT 70

ANNEX 'A' TO
AATTV MONTHLY REP
FOR SEP 70

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA:	Location
					<u>HQ AATTV</u> <u>SAIGON</u>			
1.	: Col	: J.A.	: Clark	:	HQ AATTV	: Commander	: Jan 71 :	Saigon
2.	: LtCol	: W.M.	: Silverstone	: RAA	"	: Second in Command	: Jul 71 :	"
3.	: Capt	: I.W.	: McQuire	: RA Inf	"	: Adjutant	: Mar 71 :	"
4.	: WO1	: D.L.	: Howells	: RA Inf	"	: RSM	: Feb 71 :	"
5.	: WO2	: D.I.	: Campbell	: RAASC	"	: Admin WO (Pay)	: Nov 70 :	"
6.	: Sgt	: K.A.	: Edwards	: RAASC	"	: Sgt Admin	: Aug 71 :	"
7.	: WO2	: B.	: Davies	: RA Inf	"	: Admin WO (Movs)	: Oct 70 :	"
8.	: Sgt	: W.L.	: Eddington	: RAASC	"	: " " " (Desig)	: Aug 71 :	"
9.	: Cpl	: G.M.	: Eldridge	: RAASC	"	: Clerk	: Mar 71 :	"

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA:	Location
<u>VUNG-TAU</u>								
10.	Capt	J.D.	Gilliland	RAEME	HQ AATTV Vung-Tau	QM	Jun 71	Vung-Tau
11.	WO2	R.T.	Cullen	RA Inf	" "	RQMS	Jul 71	"
12.	Bdr	D.	Hewton	RAA	" "	Dvr	Aug 71	"
13.	Cpl	R.D.	Davies	RAEME	" "	Veh Mech	Jul 71	"
14.	Cpl	E.J.	Furtell	RAA	" "	Storeman	Aug 71	"
15.	Cpl	W.J.	Booth	RAAC	" "	Tpt Supervisor	Aug 71	"

JUNGLE WARFARE TRAINING CENTRE

16.	LtCol	J.W.	Sullivan	RA Inf	JWTC	Senior Adviser	Jul 71	Nui-Dat
17.	Maj	P.W.	Beale	RA Inf	"	Assistant Senior Adviser	Jan 71	"
18.	WO1	C.	Crapper	RA Inf	"	RSM	Sep 71	"
19.	WO1	I.	Robinson	RA Inf	"	Assistant Adviser/ Instructor	Sep 71	"
20.	WO2	L.	Jackson	RA Inf	"	" "	Sep 71	"
21.	WO2	K.	Gabriel	RAASC	"	" "	Sep 71	"
22.	WO2	G.	Francis	RA Inf	"	" "	Sep 70	"
23.	Cpl	R.A.	Cross	RAASC	"	Clerk	Sep 70	"
24.	Gnr	G.J.	Honour	RAA	"	Driver	Oct 71	"

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA:	Location
<u>MR I</u>								
<u>QUANG-TRI PROVINCE</u>								
25.	Maj	C.S.S.	Connor	RAAC	Quang-Tri Sector	Asst Province Adviser (Military)	Oct 70	Quang-Tri
26.	WO1	B.R.	Lawrance	RAAMC	" "	Medical Adviser	Apr 71	"
27.	WO2	R.P.	Taylor	RAA	Hai-Lang Sub-Sector	Assistant Adviser	Jul 71	"
28.	WO2	J.T.	Barnes	RA Inf	1/1 ARVN Bn	" "	May 71	Near Quang-Tri(Regt HQ)
29.	Capt	H.E.N.	Martens	RA Inf	2/1 " "	Senior Adviser	Apr 71	" " "
30.	WO2	D.T.	Powell	RA Inf	2/1 " "	Assistant Adviser	Oct 70	" " "
31.	WO2	G.H.	King	RA Inf	3/1 " "	" "	May 71	" " "
32.	WO2	R.J.	Oliver	RAASC	4/1 " "	" "	Nov 70	" " "
33.	Capt	C.J.	Brock	RA Inf	3/2 " "	Senior Adviser	Apr 71	Dong-Ha (Regt HQ)
34.	WO2	B.G.	Long	RA Inf	2/2 " "	Assistant Adviser	Sep 71	" "
35.	WO2	S.R.	Wells	RAASC	1/2 " "	" "	Aug 71	" "
36.	WO2	W.B.	Rogers	RA Inf	3/2 " "	" "	Sep 71	" "
37.	WO2	J.	Bouveng	RA Inf	4/2 " "	" "	Jul 71	" "
38.	WO2	A.E.	Gee	RA Inf	5/2 " "	" "	Feb 71	" "
39.	WO2	F.	Beattie	RAAC	3/7 ARVN Cav	" "	Sep 71	Quang-Tri

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>MR I (Cont)</u> <u>THUA-THIEN PROVINCE</u>								
40	: WO1	: M.R.	: Steiger	: RAAMC	: Thua-Thien Sector	: Medical Adviser	: Jul 71	: Hue
41	: WO2	: J.	: Kendall	: RA Inf	: HQ 1 ARVN Div	: Sensor Adviser	: Jun 71	: "
42	: WO2	: D.B.	: Bell	: RAE	: 1/54 ARVN Bn	: Assistant Adviser	: Dec 70	: "
43	: Capt	: B.J.	: Caligari	: RA Inf	: 3/54 ARVN Bn	: Senior Adviser	: Jun 71	: Phu-Loc (Regt HQ)
44	: WO2	: R.E.	: Mills	: RAEME	: 3/54 " "	: Assistant Adviser	: Jul 71	: " "
45	: WO2	: G.E.	: Paxton	: RA Inf	: 4/54 " "	: " "	: Jul 71	: " "
46	: WO2	: A.W.	: Lancaster	: RA Inf	: 1/3 " "	: " "	: Jul 71	: Near Hue (Regt HQ)
47	: WO2	: A.R.	: Clutterbuck	: RA Inf	: 2/3 " "	: " "	: Jul 71	: " " "
48	: WO2	: J.F.	: Leal	: RAA	: 3/3 " "	: " "	: Apr 71	: " " "
49	: WO1	: W.A.	: Eade	: RAA Pro	: 4/3 " "	: " "	: Feb 71	: " " "
50	: Capt	: W.D.	: Tear	: RA Inf	: Phu-Thu Sector	: Senior Adviser	: Oct 70	: Phu-Thu
51	: WO1	: A.C.	: Addington	: RAA Pro	: " "	: Assistant Adviser	: Aug 71	: "

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA:	Location
<u>MR I (Cont)</u>								
<u>QUANG-NAM PROVINCE</u>								
52	Maj	R.J.	Aitken	RA Inf	HQ I Corps	Assistant to Chief of Staff I Corps.	Apr 71:	Danang
53	WO1	G.S.	Munt	RA Inf	AATTV Danang	Admin WO	Oct 70:	Aust House Danang
54	WO1	J.S.	Calcutt	RA Inf	" "	" "	Mar 71:	" " "
55	WO2	M.	Muir	RA Inf	" "	" " (Designate)	May 71:	" " "
56	WO2	D.T.	Murrell	RA Inf	29th Ranger Bn	Assistant Adviser	Jul 71:	Near Danang (Gp HQ)
57	WO2	L.B.	Green	RAAC	3/17 ARVN Cav	" "	Nov 70:	Hoi-An
58	Capt	J.J.	Smith	RA Inf	1/51 ARVN Bn	Senior Adviser	Jul 71:	Mieu-Bong (Regt HQ)
59	WO2	F.	Sykes	RA Inf	2/51 " "	Assistant Adviser	Jul 71:	" " "
60	WO2	V.	Pennington	RAA	3/51 " "	" "	Jul 71:	" " "
61	WO2	P.J.	Heslin	RAE	Hoa-Vang Sub-Sector	" "	Oct 70:	Hoa-Vang
62	WO1	R.A.	Kean	RAAC	2/4 ARVN Cav	" "	Sep 71:	"

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Seri	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>MR I (Cont)</u>								
<u>QUANG-TIN AND QUANG-NGAI PROVINCE</u>								
63	WO2	:W.J.	: McInerny	: RA Inf	: 4 ARVN Regt Recce Coy	: Senior Adviser	: Apr 71	:)
64	Capt	:W.	: Gunder	: RA Inf	: 1/4 ARVN Bn	: Senior Adviser	: Apr 71	:)
65	WO2	:C.L.	: Black	: RA Inf	: " " "	: Assistant Adviser	: Aug 71	:)
66	WO1	:B.	: Muir	: RA Inf	: 2/4 " "	: " "	: Sep 71	:)
67	: WO2	:G.D.	: Heath	: RA Inf	: 1/5 " "	: " "	: Feb 71	:)
68	: WO2	:S.	: Booth	: RA Inf	: 2/5 " "	: " "	: Feb 71	:)
69	: WO2	:G.	: Joyce	: RA Inf	: 3/5 " "	: " "	: Jan 71	:)
70	: WO2	:E.M.	: Schmidt	: RA Inf	: 4/5 " "	: " "	: Jul 71 *	:)
71	: WO2	:M.G.	: Rodger	: RAEME	: 1/6 " "	: Assistant Adviser	: May 71 *	:)
72	: WO2	:J.I.	: Shaw	: RA Inf	: 2/6 " "	: " "	: Feb 71	:)
73	: WO2	:J.	: Nicholls	: RAA	: 3/6 " "	: " "	: Apr 71	:)
74	: WO2	:W.A.	: Nesbit	: RAA	: 4/6 " "	: " "	: Sep 71	:)
75	: WO2	:E.J.	: Pirani	: RAAMC	: Quang-Ngai Sector	: Medical Adviser	: Sep 71	:)

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Serial: Rank : Inits : Name : Corps : Unit : Employment : Due RTA : Location

MR II

KHANH-HOA PROVINCE

76	:	W02	:	P.J.	:	Pavlenko	:	RA Inf	:	Ranger Training Centre	:	Instructor/Adviser	:	May 71	:	Duc-My
77	:	W02	:	C.D.	:	Dermody	:	RA Inf	:	"	:	"	:	Jan 71	:	"
78	:	W02	:	K.F.	:	MacDonald	:	RA Inf	:	Lam-Son National Training Centre	:	"	:	Jul 71	:	"
79	:	W02	:	W.S.	:	Dickey	:	RA Inf	:	"	:	"	:	Jul 71	:	"
80	:	W01	:	M.A.	:	Evans	:	RA Inf	:	"	:	"	:	Aug 71	:	"
81	:	W02	:	C.A.	:	Chambers	:	RA Inf	:	"	:	"	:	Aug 71	:	"

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA:	Location
<u>MR III</u>								
<u>PHUOC-TUY PROVINCE</u>								
82	Maj	K.R.	Phillips	RAAC	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	MATT Coordinator	May 71	Baria
83	Maj	M.W.	Farmer	RAAC	" "	Sector Psyops Adviser	Nov 70	"
84	Maj	W.D.	Thomas	RAA	" "	" " " (Desig)	Oct 71	"
85	Capt	J.	Hartley	RA Inf	" "	RF/PF Adviser	Apr 71	"
86	WO1	R.	Deed	RA Inf	" "	PSDF Adviser	Jul 71	"
87	Sgt	W.F.	Roughan	RAA	" "	Sgt Admin	Jan 71	"
88	Cpl	S.	Sturgess	RA Inf	" "	Dvr	Mar 71	"
89	WO2	R.E.	Heathcote	RAA	Phuoc-Tuy National Training Centre	Instructor/Adviser	Nov 70	"
90	WO2	T.H.	Breakwell	RA Inf	" "	" "	Dec 70	"
91	WO2	D.	Rolph	RA Inf	" "	" "	Nov 70	"
92	WO2	L.D.	Osborn	RA Inf	" "	Adviser RD Cadre	Jan 71	"
93	Cpl	J.	Buchan	RA Inf	" "	Linguist	Aug 71	"
94	WO2	J.	Stephens	RAASC	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	Team Leader MATT 1	Oct 70	Binh-Ba
95	WO2	M.	Youl	RA Inf	" "	" 21C "	Aug 71	"
96	Cpl	W.C.	Parry	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Nov 70	"
97	Cpl	A.	Skowronski	RAE	" "	" " "	Aug 71	"
98	Cpl	M.H.	Dawkins	RAAMC	" "	" " "	Nov 70	"
99	Cpl	D.	Rae	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Aug 71	"

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA:	Location
<u>MR III</u>								
<u>PHUOC-TUY PROVINCE (Cont)</u>								
100	: WO2	: A.S.	: Williams	: RA Sigs:	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	: Team Leader MATT 2	: Oct 70	: Dat-Do
101	: WO2	: R.A.	: Barnes	: RA Inf	: " "	: " 21C "	: Feb 71	: "
102	: Cpl	: G.J.	: Kalembe	: RAAMC	: " "	: " Member "	: Feb 71	: "
103	: Cpl	: A.J.	: Eade	: RA Inf	: " "	: " " "	: Feb 71	: "
104	: Cpl	: B.	: Willis	: RAE	: " "	: " " "	: Dec 70	: "
105	: Cpl	: R.P.	: Smithson	: RA Inf	: " "	: " " "	: Feb 71	: "
106	: Capt	: L.M.	: Opie	: RA Inf	: " "	: Team Leader MATT 3	: Apr 71	: Baria
107	: WO2	: N.	: Dodds	: RA Inf	: " "	: " 21C "	: Jul 71	: "
108	: Cpl	: J.C.	: Monk	: RA Inf	: " "	: " Member "	: Jun 70	: "
109	: Cpl	: J.H.	: Riley	: RAAMC	: " "	: " " "	: Jan 71	: "
110	: Cpl	: D.	: Quick	: RAE	: " "	: " " "	: Aug 71	: "
111	: WO2	: D.M.	: Palmer	: RA Inf	: " "	: Team Leader MATT 4	: Jan 71	: An-Ngai
112	: WO2	: L.F.	: McIntosh	: RA Inf	: " "	: " 21C "	: Jul 71	: "
113	: Cpl	: I.A.	: Kuring	: RA Inf	: " "	: " Member "	: May 71	: "
114	: Bdr	: P.H.	: Harding	: RAA	: " "	: " " "	: Feb 71	: "
115	: Cpl	: A.	: Schneider	: RAAMC	: " "	: " " "	: Apr 71	: "
116	: Cpl	: A.K.	: Cameron	: RNNZR	: " "	: " " "	: :	: "
117	: Cpl	: T.R.	: Hogg	: RAE	: " "	: " " "	: Apr 71	: "

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Serial	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA:	Location
<u>MR III</u>								
<u>PHUOC TUY PROVINCE (Cont)</u>								
118	WO2	R.G.	Davies	RA Inf	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	Team Leader MATT 5	Nov 70	Hoi-My
119	Bdr	D.D.	Keech	RAA	" "	" Member "	Jun 71	"
120	Cpl	V.P.	Stuart	RA Inf	" "	" " "	May 71	"
121	Sgt	J.F.	Kimberley	RAE	" "	" " "	Nov 70	"
122	Cpl	J.S.	Kolaric	RAAMC	" "	" " "	Jan 71	"
123	Cpl	I.	Roe	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Aug 71	"
124	WO2	A.G.	White	RA Inf	" "	Team Leader MATT 6	Jan 71	Hoa-Long
125	WO2	T.	Lyddieth	RAASC	" "	" 21C "	Jul 71	"
126	Sgt	M.N.	Talbot	RA Inf	" "	" Member "	Nov 70	"
127	Cpl	T.	Fitzgerald	RAAMC	" "	" " "	Aug 71	"
128	Cpl	P.	Baker	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Aug 71	"
129	Cpl	J.	Ronaldson	RAE	" "	" " "	Aug 71	"
130	WO2	R.D.	Smith	RA Inf	" "	Team Leader MATT 7	Oct 70	Ong Trinh
131	WO2	R.A.	Neagle	RA Inf	" "	" 21C "	Jul 71	"
132	Cpl	L.	Buckley	RA Inf	" "	" Member "	Aug 71	"
133	Cpl	J.	Hammer	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Aug 71	"
134	Cpl	B.	Arthur	RAE	" "	" " "	Aug 71	"
135	Cpl	P.	Rhodes	RAE	" "	" " "	Aug 71	"

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Serial : Rank : Inits : Name : Corps : Unit : Employment : Due RTA : Location

MR III

PHUOC-TUY PROVINCE (Cont)

136	: WO2	: L.G.	: Schmidt	: RA Inf	: Phuoc-Tuy Sector	: Team Leader MATT 8	: Jan 71	: Xuyen-Moc
137	: WO2	: M.	: Roberts	: RA Inf	: " "	: " 21C "	: Jan 71	: "
138	: Bdr	: F.	: Gebbett	: RAA	: " "	: " Member "	: Aug 71	: "
139	: Cpl	: K.	: McMillan	: RA Inf	: " "	: " " "	: Aug 71	: "
140	: Cpl	: G.	: Schraven	: RAAMC	: " "	: " " "	: Aug 71	: "
141	: Cpl	: M.	: Phillips	: RAE	: " "	: " " "	: Aug 71	: "
142	: Cpl	: W.	: Belcher	: RAAMC	: " "	: " " "	: Aug 71	: "

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
143	WO2	W.C.	Green	RAASC	MATT (Unalloted)		Nov 70	
144	WO2	A.H.	Franks	RA Inf	" "		Apr 71	
145	WO2	G.	Hodgson	RAA	" "		Jul 71	
146	WO2	H.J.	Wright	RA Inf	" "		Sep 71	
147	WO2	G.J.	Darlington	RA Inf	" "		Sep 71	
148	WO2	J.A.	Griffith	RA Inf	" "		Sep 71	
149	WO2	D.	Taylor	RAAOC	" "		Oct 71	
150	Cpl	N.W.	Burgerhof	RAE	" "		Sep 71	
151	Cpl	K.G.	Jarrett	RA Inf	" "		Sep 71	
152	Bdr	C.J.	Cavanagh	RAA	" "		Sep 71	
153	Cpl	O.C.	Moon	RA Inf	" "		Sep 71	
154	Bdr	R.A.	Kennedy	RAA	" "		Sep 71	
155	Cpl	A.J.	Walker	RAE	" "		Sep 71	
156	Cpl	H.	Dolensky	RAAMC	" "		Sep 71	
157	Bdr	R.F.	Miller	RAA	" "		Sep 71	
158	Cpl	P.C.	Aylett	RAE	" "		Sep 71	
159	Cpl	D.W.	Beck	RAAMC	" "		Aug 71	

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
160	WO2	J.M.	Lefel	RA Inf	Advisor School		Jan 71	Di-An
161	WO2	B.W.M.	Ryan	RA Inf	" "		Jan 71	"
162	Cpl	R.L.	Thornton	RAAMC	" "		Sep 71	"
163	Cpl	G.A.	Hazel	RA Inf	" "		Sep 71	"
164	Cpl	P.	Hately	RAAMC	" "		Sep 71	"
165	Cpl	C.P.	Chadwick	RA Inf	" "		Sep 71	"
166	Cpl	R.S.	Sparke	RA Inf	" "		Sep 71	"
167	Cpl	K.P.	Glover	RAE	" "		Sep 71	"
168	Cpl	P.M.	Gadsden	RAAMC	" "		Sep 71	"

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Serial:	Rank :	Inits:	Name	: Corps :	Unit	:	Employment	:	Due RTA :	Location
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MR IV

VINH-LONG PROVINCE

169	: Maj	: J.A.	: Browne	: RAA	: CORDS, IV Corps	:	Assistant to Chief of Territorial Security	:	Mar 71	: Can-Tho
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DINH-TUONG PROVINCE

170	: Capt	: B.F.	: McGurgan	: RA Inf:	Night Operations Training Team	:	OC Night Operations Training Team	:	Mar 71	: Dong-Tam
171	: WO2	: A.K.	: Jones	: RA Inf:	" "	:	Team Member	:	Jul 71	: "
172	: WO2	: W.E.	: Butler	: RA Inf:	" "	:	Team Member	:	Jan 71	: "
173	: WO2	: G.J.	: Sutherland	: RA Inf:	" "	:	Team Member	:	Jul 71	: "
174	: WO2	: D.A.	: Strachan	: RA Inf:	Night Operations Advisory Team	:	Team Leader Night Operations Advisory Team	:	Oct 70*	: Cho Gao
175	: WO2	: D.A.	: Herbert	: RA Inf:	" "	:	Team Member	:	Jul 71	: "
176	: WO2	: G.	: Herschell	: RA Inf:	" "	:	Team Member	:	Apr 71	: "
177	: WO2	: D.I.	: Jones	: RA Inf:	" "	:	Team Member	:	Sep 71	: "
178	: WO2	: D.G.	: Parker	: RA Inf:	" "	:	Team Member	:	Oct 70	: "
179	: WO2	: C.N.	: McEvoy	: RA Inf:	" "	:	DIOCC	:	Dec 70	: "

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Annex B
to AATTV Report
Sep 70

REPORT BY MAJOR AITKEN
HQ I CORPS ADVISER - SEP 70

General

1. The high point in the level of activity throughout Military Region 1 (MR 1) occurred during the second and third weeks of the reporting period. In aspects other than the number of incoming rounds received, there has been a steady decrease in activity since 19 Sep 70.
2. Most of the activity in MR 1 has been centered around the FSB's O'Reilly/Barbara/Barnett area. Elsewhere activity has been very light, except for four attacks by fire in the vicinity of An-Hoa, Quang-Nam Province, and a heavy attack by fire together with a ground attack against Tra Bong Ranger Border Camp and District Headquarters.
3. A notable point is that the enemy has caused negligible damage to allied Fire Support Bases considering the high number of rounds fired by him.
4. It is obvious that the enemy is having little trouble in moving his resupply in Northern I Corps, but the story is different in Southern I Corps. In this area, Quang-Tin and Quang-Ngai Provinces, PW have stated that they are having difficulty in accumulating sufficient food to enable him to launch a major offensive. It is believed that many enemy units are suffering heavily from malaria due to a shortage of medical supplies.

New Enemy Tactics

5. An incident at A-1 (YD 270734) involved rockets with long delay fuzes. This occurred at 0210 hrs on 2 Sep 70. The six rockets detonated at 0645, 0715, 1150, 1330, 1340 and 1507 hrs, but did not cause any casualties or damage.
6. Two instruction manuals on the use of chemical fuzes were captured in Nov 67 and May 68 and fuzes of this type fitted for 82mm mortars were captured in 1968 near Khe Sanh. Reports on these indicate that the fuzes are factory produced in North Vietnam and can be set for a delay of 2.5, 3.5, 5 and 8 hours. The timing is controlled by crystal tubes, containing corrosive solvent, which are inserted into the detonator assembly. The colour of the tube indicates the length of time delay. The tube is fitted into the detonator and is tightened with a wrench. The solvent dissolves a piece of plastic retaining the firing pin. As the plastic is dissolved the firing pin is released detonating the round. Variation in delay time averages 20% depending on the ambient temperature. The fuze can be fitted to 60mm, 82mm and 120mm mortar rounds, 75mm RR rounds and the 107mm rocket round.

Enemy Order of Battle

7. There have been no detected changes to the enemy order of battle since the Aug 70 report.

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Future Intentions

8. **Opinions and reports on likely friendly force intentions vary. It is not yet clear whether ARVN units will remain on FSB O'Reilly during the coming monsoon season, although this seems to be politically desirable.**

9. In Southern MR 1, the 2nd ARVN Division plans to occupy three new fire bases during the Autumn/Winter period. These are:

- a. FSB Judy (AT 860015) - 5th ARVN Regt.
- b. FSB Honey (BS 450805) - 6th ARVN Regt.
- c. FSB Victory (BS 565575)- 4th ARVN Regt.

10. It is planned to occupy each of these bases with a battalion, while two battalions of each regiment are to be located at regimental bases and one battalion of each regiment will be employed along the coastal lowlands.

Summary of Significant Contacts

11. A summary of significant incidents involving ARVN units having AATTV advisers is at Appendix 1.

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Annex B to
AATTV Report
Sep 70

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS

1. At 311450 H Aug 70 in the vicinity of YD 332224, 2nd Coy 3rd Bn 1st Regt, searching, found 20 enemy bodies killed by air (est 24 hrs), 10 x AK47 destroyed and destroyed 100x60mm mortar rounds in place.
2. At 011000H in the vicinity of YD 317228, 1st Bn 1st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in: Friendly; 2 KIA, 4 WIA; Enemy: 3 KIA, two individual weapons, 117x82mm mortar rounds, 40xB40 and B41 rounds, 60 claymore mines all captured and 2x82mm mortar locations destroyed.
3. At 021130H in the vicinity of YD 319231, 1st Coy 1st Bn 1st Regt, searching found 15x75mm RR rounds.
4. Between 021030H and 021400H in vicinity of YD 319231, 1st Bn 1st Regt, searching, found a 75RR position and captured 93x75mm RR rounds. This is a separate report to serial 3.
5. At 021800H in the vicinity of YD 193297, 3rd Coy 4th Bn 3rd Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in four enemy KIA and the capture of 1x60mm mortar and 20x60mm mortar rounds.
6. At 030445H in the vicinity of YD 316229, the CP and two companies of 1st Bn 1st Regt received a ground attack from an unknown sized enemy force, resulting in: Friendly, 6 KIA and 8 WIA. Enemy: 17 VC KIA and the capture of 1xB41, 2xB40 and two individual weapons.
7. At 031150H in the vicinity of AT 980374, 2nd Bn 51st Regt, searched a bunker, found one individual weapon and destroyed 2000 kg of polished rice and 500 kg of unpolished rice by burning. No transport was available for evacuation.
8. At 041040H in the vicinity of YD 185736, 1st Coy 4th Bn 2nd Regt, searching, captured 17x60mm rounds, 20xM26 grenades and three AT mines.
9. At 041745H in the vicinity of BS 283414, 1st Bn 4th Regt, searching, discovered 20 tons of ammunition, including 140mm rockets, 107mm rockets, 82mm and 60mm mortar rounds, B40 and B41 rounds and AK 47 ammo. Plans in hand to evacuate to Quang-Ngai 5 Sep.
10. At 050640H in the vicinity of YD 188283, 3rd Bn 3rd Regt received 30x60mm rounds and a ground attack from an enemy squad using B40 and small arms, resulting in 8 friendly WIA and 6 enemy KIA. Captured were three individual weapons, 10 Chicom grenades, 6xB40 rounds and two claymore mines.
11. At 051245H in the vicinity of YD 193221, 1st Coy 3rd Bn 3rd Regt, searching, found 100xB40 rounds and 30 huts. Ammo and huts were destroyed.
12. At 051515H in the vicinity of YD 303236, 3rd Coy 2nd Bn 1st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in three friendly WIA, 5 enemy KIA and the capture of one crew-served and one individual weapon, 2xB40 rounds and one claymore mine.

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13. At 060525H in the vicinity of YD 023464, 3rd Bn 2nd Regt, searching friendly mine location found 9 VC killed by the mine and one individual weapon.
14. At 060930H in the vicinity of YD 197274, 3rd Bn 3rd Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force, resulting in one friendly WIA and 4 VC KIA and two individual weapons captured.
15. At 061345H in the vicinity of YD 195324, 4th Bn 3rd Regt on Barnett received 45x82mm mortar rounds. Results: negative.
16. At 062200H in the vicinity of BS 626543, 4th Regt Recon Coy ambushed an unknown sized enemy force resulting in four enemy KIA and the capture of one individual weapon and 10 grenades.
17. At 070225H in the vicinity of YD 336224, 1st Coy 1st Bn 1st Regt received a ground attack from an unknown sized enemy force resulting in two friendly KIA, and two WIA; 5 enemy KIA and the capture of 1xAK47, 20xB40 and B41 rounds and 110 blocks of TNT.
18. Between 070900H - 071130H in the vicinity of YD 308240, 2nd Bn 1st Regt (-) received 100x82mm and 60mm rounds mixed. Nil casualties.
19. At 071325H in the vicinity of AS 831983, 3rd Bn 5th Regt, searching, captured 1000 bottles of penicillin, 5000 vitamin pills, 1000 bandages, 3000 chloroquin tablets and 1000 aureomycin tablets.
20. At 071355H in the vicinity of AT 862058, 2nd Bn 5th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force, resulting in one enemy KIA, one individual weapon and one protective mask captured and 2250 kg of corn destroyed.
21. At 071430H in the vicinity of AT 920070, 4th Bn 5th Regt destroyed four acres of corn and rice.
22. At 071440 H in the vicinity of AT 923078, 4th Bn 5th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force, resulting in one enemy KIA and the capture of three VC - two of them females.
23. At 080845H in the vicinity of AS 820983, 3rd Bn 5th Regt searching, killed 5 enemy and captured seven individual weapons, two Chicom telephones and an unknown quantity of documents.
24. At 080850H in the vicinity of AT 862012, 5th Regt Recon Coy received 15 people who were living under enemy control. People will be evacuated to Hau-Duc.
25. At 081200H in the vicinity of YD 196295, 1st Coy 3rd Bn 3rd Regt, searching, destroyed 30 VC huts, captured one US 6RC 9 radio, 20x82mm rounds, three blasting caps for 122mm rockets, 800 rds SAA, one wheel of .50 cal AAMG and found 5 graves.
26. At 081910H in the vicinity of YD 324258 (O'Reilly), 3rd Bn 1st Regt Bn 1st Regt received 8x82mm rounds. Two rounds were unknown type tear gas.
27. At 081300H in the vicinity of BS 550759, 4th Regt Recon Coy, searching, killed four VC, captured four VC and captured 10 grenades.

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28. At 081455H in the vicinity of YD 308240, 2nd Bn 1st Regt received an unknown number and type of mortar rounds and a ground attack by an unknown sized enemy force, resulting in: Friendly; 2 KIA and 5 WIA and Enemy; 17 KIA and the capture of 5xAK47 and 1xB40.
29. At 081000H in the vicinity of BS 270424, 1st Bn 4th Regt found one unknown type road construction vehicle, 2x140 rocket launchers and destroyed 5000 rounds of MG ammo, 5000 rounds SAA and 10x60mm rounds.
30. At 091130H in the vicinity of YD 202305, 3rd Bn 3rd Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in friendly; 2 KIA and 2WIA. Enemy; 5 KIA and 1xAK 47 captured.
31. At 091720H in the vicinity of YD 324258 (O'Reilly), 3rd Bn 1st Regt received 127x82mm and 8x75mm RR rounds, sustaining 1 WIA and 1x105mm How 80% damaged.
32. At 100515H in the vicinity of YD 333233, 1st Bn 1st Regt received 200x82mm rounds and a ground attack by an unknown sized enemy force. Results - Friendly: 1 KIA, 10 WIA; Enemy; 8 KIA and the loss of three individual weapons, 250 blocks TNT and 50 x B40/B41 rounds.
33. At 091540H in the vicinity of AT 929061, 4th Bn 5th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 4 VC KIA and the capture of two individual weapons.
34. At 101600H in the vicinity of BT 022427, 2nd Bn 51st Regt captured 2 VC and 3000 kg of rice. Rice was distributed among unit.
35. At 110200H in the vicinity of YD 300250, 2nd Coy 3rd Bn 1st Regt received a ground attack by an unknown size enemy force resulting in friendly 2 KIA and 5 WIA and enemy 8 KIA and the capture of one crew-served and one individual weapon, 12 lbs TNT and 40xB40 rounds.
36. At 110420H in the vicinity of YD 203297, 3rd Bn 3rd Regt received a ground attack by an unknown size enemy force resulting in 8 enemy KIA and the capture of two individual weapons.
37. At 111240 H in the vicinity of AT 944105, 4th Bn 5th Regt received 57 people from VC control. Will be evacuated to Hau Duc SS.
38. At 111255 H in the vicinity of AT 830973, 3rd Bn 5th Regt, searching, contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in 7 enemy KIA and the capture of 5 individual weapons, 40 kg of documents, and the destruction of 40 huts.
39. At 111535H in the vicinity of YD 302360, 1st Coy 1st Bn 54th Regt, searching, contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in one enemy KIA and the capture of 10 Chicom grenades, 10xB40 rounds and 200 rds AK 47 ammo.
40. At 111150H in the vicinity of YD 305233, the Lt CP and two coys 2nd Bn 1st Regt engaged an unknown size enemy force in fortified bunkers using TAC air, gunships and tube artillery. Friendly elements made several unsuccessful attempts supported by mortar fire, to assault enemy position. Contact was broken at 111530H when friendly elements withdrew to conduct medevac and establish a Night Defensive Position (NDP). Friendly casualties were: 8 MIA, 21 WIA including 1 Coy Comd and WO2 D.T. Powell who received a fragmentation wound to the head and left leg. Nine individual weapons were lost.

31. Between 120920 - 120940 H in the vicinity of YD 313243, 2nd Bn 1st Regt received 150x82mm mortar rounds resulting in two friendly KIA and 6 WIA.
42. At 121500 H in the vicinity of YD 173328, 2nd Coy 4th Bn 3rd Regt, searching, found and destroyed one bunker, 100x60mm, 27x82mm, 40 blasting caps and one hut.
43. At 122100H in the vicinity of BS 822316, 2nd Bn 4th Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 5 enemy KIA and the capture of one crew-served and one individual weapon.
44. At 122300H in the vicinity of YD 906083, 2nd Coy 2nd Bn 54th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 5 enemy KIA and the capture of one B40 launcher and two AK 47.
45. At 131125H in the vicinity of YD 332224, Lt CP and 1st Bn 1st Regt minus contacted an unknown size enemy force and received 100x82mm mortar rounds, resulting in Friendly: 2 KIA and 5 WIA; Enemy: 10 KIA and the loss of one B40 launcher, 3xAK 47 and 57xB40 rounds.
46. At 140245H in the vicinity of YD 170328, 2nd Coy 4th Bn 3rd Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force resulting in 5 friendly KIA and 7 WIA, and 25 enemy KIA and the capture of 3xAK47, 1xB40 round and 200 lbs TNT.
47. Between 151030 - 151325H in the vicinity of BS 377775, 1st Bn 6th Regt, searching, killed 7 enemy and captured two individual weapons.
48. At 151645 - 151715 H in the vicinity of YD 333221, 1st Bn 1st Regt Lt CP and two coys received 200x82mm, resulting in two friendly WIA.
49. At 151700H in the vicinity of YD 063544, (Carroll) 2nd Regt CP received 21x122mm rockets, resulting in one Korean civilian KIA and 3 US Arty WIA.
50. At 161715H in the vicinity of YD 309234, 4th Bn 1st Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in 4 VC KIA and the capture of two individual weapons, two Chicom telephones, 150 packs, 150 uniforms, 300 blocks TNT, numerous maps and destroyed 20 tunnels 3x4 metres.
51. At 161110 H in the vicinity of YD 306232, 2nd Bn 1st Regt minus, searching, contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in four friendly WIA and 46 enemy KIA. One map, 50x82mm rounds and numerous documents were captured.
52. At 171400H in the vicinity of YD 316225, 1st Coy 4th Bn 1st Regt, searching, contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in two friendly WIA and 7 enemy killed by air and aerial rocket artillery. One MG and one AK 47 were destroyed by air.
53. Between 181015 - 181045H in the vicinity of AT 865015, 2nd Bn 5th Regt, searching, captured 100 chickens, 108 pigs and destroyed 210 huts.
54. At 181200 H in the vicinity of BS 324844, 2nd Bn 6th Regt, searching, contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in 5 enemy KIA, one BAR and 12 grenades captured.

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55. At 191440 H in the vicinity of YD 328248, 2nd Bn 1st Regt on O'Reilly received 3x120mm, 10x82mm and 3x75mm which detonated 71x81mm friendly ammo on O'Reilly. No friendly casualties were sustained but an 81mm mortar sight and bipod, one PRC 25 radio, two M16 rifles, one telephone, one medical kit and an unknown quantity of documents were destroyed.
56. At 200740 H in the vicinity of BS 617484, 4th Bn 4th Regt, searching, contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting two enemy KIA, three enemy captured and the capture of one individual weapon and 6 grenades.
57. At 201300 H in the vicinity of YD 309219, 4th Bn 1st Regt, searching, contacted an unknown size enemy force and received an unknown number and type of mortar rounds. Twelve friendly troops were wounded in the contact and two individual weapons were lost. Enemy losses unknown.
58. At 201245 H in the vicinity of YD 334219, the Lt CP and 1st and 3rd Coys of 1st Bn, 1st Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in one friendly KIA, 21 WIA (11 seriously), 15 enemy KIA and the capture of 3xAK47, 43xB40 rounds, 4xB41 rounds, 6 AP mines and 250 blocks of TNT.
59. At 210845 H in the vicinity of BS 432637, 4th Bn 6th Regt, searching, contacted an unknown size enemy force killing 5 VC and capturing two crew-served and four individual weapons.
60. At 211215 H in the vicinity of YD 334218, 1st Bn 1st Regt, searching, captured 30xB40, 80x60mm and 2000xAK 47 ammo. Will be evacuated to Regt CP.
61. At 220415 H in the vicinity of YD 334221, Lt CP and 3rd Coy, 1st Bn 1st Regt received a ground attack from an unknown size enemy force, resulting in two friendly KIA, two friendly WIA, three enemy KIA and the capture of one individual weapon, 200 lbs TNT, 16x60mm rounds, 21xB40 and B41 mixed and 6xAK47 magazines.
62. At 221700 H in the vicinity of BS 565754, 3rd Bn 4th Regt, searching, contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in four VC KIA and the capture of one individual weapon.
63. At 230530 H in the vicinity of BS 464838, 2nd Coy 4th Bn 6th Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force resulting in 4 VC KIA and the capture of two individual weapons and 5 grenades.
64. At 240410 H in the vicinity of YD 308219, 3rd Coy 4th Bn 1st Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force. A first-light sweep revealed 26 NVA KIA. One NVA (Wounded) was captured along with 3 x B40 launchers, three individual weapons and 600 blocks of PE.
65. At 240900 H in the vicinity of BS 467837, 4th Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in three friendly WIA, 11 VC KIA and the capture of one crew-served and four individual weapons.
66. At 240935 H in the vicinity of YD 353377, 3rd Coy 3rd Bn 54th Regt, searching, contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in friendly 1 KIA and 1 WIA. Five enemy were killed, and one individual weapon and 18 x B40 rounds were captured.
67. At 251100 H in the vicinity of XD 928547, 5th Bn 2nd Regt commenced a CA using 101st Airborne Div (Ambl) helicopters. The LZ was "hot". A total of 10 slicks and one Cobra went down as a result of hostile fire. Five

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aircraft flew to secure LZ's to land. Six aircraft went down in the AO. Of these 5 were extracted by CH 47 and one was reflown to a secure area. One aircraft went down as a result of engine failure and was recovered. All twelve aircraft are secured. Casualties were : ARVN; one KIA, three WIA; US; one KIA, three WIA.

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Appendix 2 to
Annex B to
AATTV Report
Sep 70

REPORT BY MAJ CONNOR
S3 ADVISER - QUANG TRI PROVINCE SEP 70

Enemy

1. The level of enemy activity has, this month, been the lowest this year. Early in the month there were some small contacts in the Northern Districts. There have been a number of inconclusive contacts west of Dong-Ha mountain (Fuller), and more recently in Base Area 101 (between FSBs Barbara and Anne). For the second two weeks of the month, there were one contact, and one mine incident in the populated area.
2. However, of significance was the continued pressure on FSB O'Reilly, in Thua Thien Province. This position dominates the normal enemy approach to Base Area 101, which gives access to the lowlands. In the last few days this pressure appears to have slackened.
3. In spite of the enemys' apparent lack of activity, there is no indication that his aims have changed. A strong possibility is that he is waiting for the monsoon to once again launch into the lowlands. This aims still appear to be directed at disruption of the pacification effort. His forays in the dry season left him vulnerable to the air and mobility advantages held by the GVN forces. Reduction of this advantage, combined with less depth in the screen around the lowlands (see below) may result in increased enemy efforts to enter the lowlands; the aims would be to destroy pacification and rebuild the VCI.
4. A document captured on about 10 Sep 70 said that, in theory at least, the enemy incursions into the populated area were experimental. Unfortunately, there was no expression of how successful these experiments were thought to be.

Friendly Forces

5. Activity has been directed at;
 - a. Preventing a further incursion into the lowlands. 54 Regt has been given an AO in the peidment west of the highway 1, in Hai Lang District. In effect this gives one more bn in this area, and plans responsibility for it on 54 Regt, rather than 11 Cav Regt. 11 Cav Regt is now operating in a small AO, and has no Infantry resources.
 - b. Effecting plans to change posture, due to the monsoon season and consequent inability to resupply distant fire bases.
 - c. A final effort to clear the Da Krong valley before the monsoon season.
 - d. Reaction to enemy attacks. There has been some aggressive activity west of highway 9.
 - e. Holding fire base O'Reilly.

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6. By far the most significant activity is the fight for O'Reilly. 1st ARVN Regiment has been heavily engaged since early August, and has suffered in consequence. Casualties are being replaced, but the experience and leadership qualities of many of the officers and NCOs lost cannot be swiftly replaced. Due mainly to the rather ill written newspaper stories about this battle, 1st ARVN Div has decided that it must stay at O'Reilly at all costs, probably through the monsoon. The cost could be 1st Regt. Morale is still satisfactory, but could easily drop if the regiment were to feel it has been abandoned.

7. A Vietnamese Marine Brigade moved into the former Mai Loc Special Forces Compound, and intended to clear the Da Krong valley. This brigade has not had any significant contact. One wonders whether this unit can operate effectively in this changed environment. I have not been able to get more than isolated opinions, most of which are unfavourable to the Marines. It would appear that 9 NVA Regt does not wish to make contact.

8. Two complete new MATs have arrived in province. Unfortunately the Vietnamese have not yet adjusted to the idea of having MATs for each RF Coy Gp, and these MATs are consequently still looking for work. The experience of these MATs does appear to be greater than of province's MATs, and once the RF can be persuaded to accept them, they may have a beneficial effect on RF performance.

Other Matters

10. This has been a remarkably quiet month. The Vietnamese appear concerned at the threatened US departure, but neither they nor I can get any firm dates of departure. Adviser strength in ARVN formations continues to be far under establishment, while the Province team has received a considerable increase, almost up to full strength. Many of these recent replacements are not particularly suitable, for instance, a number of Air Defence officers are appearing. These officers usually have little knowledge of company level tactics, and only a hazy idea of staff procedures.

11. In this report, which is the last but one I will write, I have the pleasure of complimenting the advisers of 1st ARVN Regt. They have done well under extreme stress in the prolonged and violent battle around O'Reilly. This pressure comes at the end of six months of almost continuous contact.

REPORT BY CAPT BROCK
SENIOR ADVISER 3/2 ARVN BN
SEP 70

1. Aims of Unit for Period under Review

- a. From 26 Aug to 29 Aug. Search and destroy operation in the area NW of the "ROCKPILE" (Centre GR 9359).
- b. From 30 Aug to 15 Sep. Security of FSB SARGE and recce in force ops in the AO surrounding SARGE.
- c. From 15 Sep to 20 Sep. Reserve in DONG HA and preparation for attendance at the National Training Centre at DONG DA.

2. Methods Used to Achieve the Aims

- a. The Bn did a Combat Assault (CA) into two LZs (GR 930585 and GR 924591) and swept on two axes to clear and secure the high ground. Once this was accomplished the low ground was patrolled to determine enemy locations.
- b. Because of the addition of a Bty of 155s to SARGE two coys were required to secure the FSB. The two remaining coys maintained a vigerous programme of platoon patrols and ambushes.
- c. NTR.

3. My Opinion of The Success of Operations

- a. The operation was well conducted but was unsuccessful due to the fact that no enemy force was in the area at the time. Very recent traces were found but a bad breach of security by the Advisers Control Operation 5 hours before LZ time was probably all the warning the enemy needed to vacate the area.
- b. There were signs of enemy movement in the SW corner of the AO (Centre point 0446) but despite extensive ambushing only two were sprung resulting in 11 EN KIA for no friendly losses.

4. Highlights of The Period

a. CA Operation to Area 9359

- 26 Aug. The Bn CA into two LZs, CP plus 2 coys to GR 930585 and the Light CP plus 2 coys to GR 942591. The highground on the feature was searched in force with no result.
- 27 Aug. Two enemy sightings. 0720hrs 1 man sighted 036586 no contact was made. 0810 hrs 3 enemy sighted at 925593, resulting in 3 enemy KIA. A very large bunker complex was found at GR 917610 and 119614, this was thought to be a staging post as the complex is astride a major infiltration route. The complex had been vacated within the previous 24 hours!

28 Aug. Bunker complex of medium size found at 943593. The bunkers were damaged and heavy blood stains were in evidence. Thought to be the results of LZ preparation fire.

29 Aug. CA to FSB Sarge. Because of the terrain only one new LZ could be used. The Light CP and two coys left from 923598, the CP plus two coys from their point of insertion at 930585. The Light CP were evacuated safely but the CP was under Mortar and Rocket fire throughout the extraction (45 to 55 rounds total). No casualties were sustained.

One helicopter was shot down at GR 971583 by Hy MG fire resulting in 2 KIA ARVN. This was despite the Comd of the C in C ship being warned that there was a suspected Hy MG site near those co-ordinates.

Results of Operation.

Enemy	3 KIA	ARVN	2 KIA (helicopter crash)
	2 AK 47		4 WIA (" ")
	Map and documents.		3 WIA (1 mine, 2 contact)

b. Ambush GR 025452 on 5 Sep

A platoon ambush was sprung at 2125 hrs resulting in enemy 9 KIA, no friendly cas.

c. Ambush GR 047455 on 11 Sep

A platoon ambush was sprung at 1130 hrs resulting in enemy 1 KIA plus 1 female KIA, no friendly cas. The man was dressed in NVA uniform, the female was not but was accompanying the man.

31 Aug. 0650 hrs. FSB O'Reilly received 6 rounds of 75mm RR fire and 10 rounds 82mm mor from GR YD 317230.

Results:- Friendly 1 KIA
1 WIA

1 Sep) Bn returned to La Vang for rest and re-issue of equipment. Advisers
13 Sep) started English lessons on use of US air and artillery.

14 Sep. Bn combat assaulted (CA) into GR YD 331240. No contact.

15 Sep. 0700 Lt CP moved to GR YD 317225 made contact with pl size en force in bunkers, used gunships and tac air on positions. 1 and 2 coys attacked.

Results:- Friendly 10 KIA
10 WIA

En 8 KIA (Body count)

Captured 20 rounds B40
3 AK 47
1x12.7mm Gun frame

1300 hrs. 3 Coy made contact with squad size enemy unit guarding 20 huts with bunkers at GR YD 309237.

Results:- En 3 KIA

Captured 2 AK 47
150 ruck sacks
150 uniforms
2 telephones
300x¼ LB blocks plastic explosive.
5 maps of O'Reilly area.
Documents about unit.

Destroyed 20 huts 3x4 metres.

16. Sep. Lt CP moved to GR YD 316225 - 0800 hrs made contact with pl size en force. Lt CP and 2 Coy received 30 rounds of 60mm mortar. Contact lasted all day. Used tac air - gunships and 8" artillery in support. En broke contact after dark.

Results:- En 3 KIA (Body count)
1 AK 47
1 CKC
20 rounds B40
15 rounds B41
200 blocks ¼ lb plastic explosive

Friendly:- 2 KIA
5 WIA
2 M16 destroyed.

17 Sep. 0600 hrs 1 Coy moved to GR YD 317224--enemy in bunkers. Lt CP and 2 Coy moved to GR YD 316223. 0800 hrs Lt CP and 2 Coy received 30 rounds 82mm mor from FR 312224. Unit in contact all day, secured positions at 1830 hrs.

Results:- En 8 KIA (Body count)

Captured 1 AK 47
1 RPD
2 AP mines plastic
20 rounds 60mm mortar
20 rounds B40

Friendly 3 KIA
8 WIA
2 M16 destroyed

18 Sep. 0400 hrs GR 316226 Lt CP and 2 Coy received 30 rounds of 82mm.

0630 hrs 1 Coy and Lt CP attack, hill GR YD 312224 fire 10 rounds 8" artillery - used 4 sets tac air, en had 3x51 cal position on ridge line GR YD 312218 - 315214 - 319219. Fired ARVN 105mm artillery into positions.

0800 hrs 3 Coy made contact with enemy platoon at GR YD 305220.

Results.- 1st contact

En 2 KIA
1 AK 47

Friendly 3 KIA
7 WIA

2nd contact

En 3 KIA
2 AK 47
5 rounds of 82mm mor
10 rounds of 60mm mor
20 uniforms

1420 hrs. 3 Coy made contact with Pl size en force at GR YD 308220.

Results:- En 4 KIA
2 AK 47

Friendly 1 WIA

19 Sep. Bn moved to GR YD 308219. Lt CP and 2 Coy made contact at GR YD 309220. Enemy Coy 30 strong. En hit Lt CP 1 and 2 Coy from front and both sides.

Lt CP and 2 Coy.

Results.- En 4 KIA (body count)

Captured 2 AK 47

Friendly 2 KIA
4 WIA

CP and 1 Coy also attacked from front and both sides, at same time as Lt CP, at GR YD 310218 used 4 sets of gunships to route the en.

Results:- En 2 KIA (body count)

 Captured 1 AK 47
 30 blocks ¼ lb plastic explosive

 Friendly 2 KIA
 6 WIA
 1 M16 destroyed

Both groups unable to advance, so both units joined up for night defence.

20 Sep. 0600 hrs Lt CP and 2 Coy took 20 rounds of 82mm mor from GR YD 317219 and 15 rounds of 60mm mor rounds from GR YD 309221. 2 Coy attack GR YD 309220. En still in fighting position, enemy size pl plus (40) Lt CP and 2 Coy in contact all day, broke contact at 2100 hrs.

Results:- En unknown

 Friendly 1 KIA
 8 WIA

21 Sep. 0200 hrs HQ, 1 and 2 Coys pulled off hill under darkness and moved to GR YD 310228. At day light, 0600 hrs, moved to GR YD 306223 and attacked GR 309220. Still unable to shift enemy from location. Lt CP and 3 Coy moved to GR YD 307220 and put in 4 sets tac air and fired 46 rounds 8" artillery into en position.

1600 hrs Lt CP and 2 Coy received 25 rounds of 82mm mor from GR YD 305205. Called in a hunter killer team, and every time they came in low, a 51 cal weapon fired at them. It was found that protecting each mor site was at least one 51 calibre AA Gun.

22 Sep. 0600 hrs Lt CP and 3 Coy moved to GR YD 305220 to put in 4 Tac air and **fired 46 rounds artillery into target, GR YD 309220 and ambush trails** leading to en positions.

0935 hrs Lt CP and 3 Coy received 45 rounds of 82mm mor from GR YD 294223.

Results:- Friendly 2 WIA

23 Sep. 0530 hrs. Ambush by 1 Pl HQ Coy at GR YD 299223, ambushed 5 NVA bringing supplies forward.

Results:- En 3 KIA
 1 AK 47
 70 lbs of rice
 2 x 4 lbs dried fish.

 Friendly Nil

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- 5 -

24 Sep. 0400 hrs 3 Coy received sapper attack at GR YD 306223.

Results.- En 21 KIA
 1 POW
 2 B40 launcher
 5 AK 47
 600x ¼ lbs block plastic
 15 B40 rounds

Friendly - Nil

0800 hrs 2 Coy searching area GR YD 304225 ambushed en.

Results:- En 2 KIA
 1 POW
 1 Launcher B40
 1 AK 47

Friendly Nil

Total Results: of Aug - Sep Report:-

En KIA (Body count only) - 79

Captured 2 PW
 36 AK 47
 1 CKC
 1 RPD
 3 B40
 75 rounds B40
 15 rounds B41
 2 mines AP plastic
 1 82mm mor
 6 82mm mor rounds
 30 60mm mor rounds
 1 12.7 cal machine gun mounting
 150 ruck sacks
 150 uniforms NVA
 2 telephones
 1130x¼ lbs plastic explosive
 50 lbs rice
 4 lbs dried fish

Destroyed 20 huts with bunkers.

Friendly 26 KIA
 56 WIA
 14 Sick

Destroyed 6 M16.

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REPORT BY CAPT TEAR
DISTRICT SENIOR ADVISER - PHU THU DISTRICT
THUA-THIEN PROVINCE

General

1. The situation at Phu-Thu District remains quiet with no significant enemy activity.

Enemy

2. During the month of September there were no enemy initiated incidents and it would seem the various highs have failed to materialise; it is expected that the enemy will attempt to build up their supplies of rice and foodstuffs before the monsoon, due in early or mid October. Reports received through the District Intelligence Operations Co-ordinating Centre (DIOCC) indicate that the various elements are short of food and as the rice crop has recently been harvested it is expected that a more determined effort is to be made (before movement is restricted because of flooding) to increase food supplies.

3. The results of friendly operations are:

- a. 7 VC KIA
- b. 5 VC and VCS captured
- c. 1 Chieu Hoi
- d. 10 AK 47 IWC
- e. 3 CSWC (1 x 60mm mortar, 2xB40)

Of the seven VC killed four were graded as A/B VC and one was a District Current Affairs Committee man.

Resettlement of Refugees

4. The results of the recent refugee move is disappointing; of the 250 families scheduled to move only about 60 are living permanently in one of the four new hamlets. The reasons for this poor response are the lateness of the move, the extremely poor organization of the actual move and the fact that many people are employed at the various Military establishments in Phu-Bai area and there is little work available within the district.

5. Some Village Self Development Projects (VSD) have been started by the hamlet committees (a school and wells but the lack of sufficient material is holding these projects back).

Civic Action

6. Civic Action (CA) by the 101st AB Div is still restricted to a weekly Psy/Ops propaganda session and a twice weekly MEDCAP. It is anticipated that a more determined effort is to be made once the monsoon restricts operation in the 101st AO.

Reduction of Mobile Training Teams

7. Because of shortages of personnel three of the 101st AB Mobile Training Teams (MTT) have been withdrawn and another is to be in the near future, leaving one four man team within the district. The 101st Liaison Team is to remain indefinitely.

Mobile Advisory Teams

8. On 12 Sep 70 a second Mobile Advisory Team (MAT 1 - 87) was deployed, at present the strength is three with little prospect of raising the team its established strength of seven; manning problems have already reduced MAT 1-99 to two. MAT 1-87 is to be deployed with the 7th RF Group HQ at Dien Dai YD 852292 and MAT 1-44 is currently employed with the Peoples Self Defence Force (PSDF) group.

Future of Australian District Senior Adviser

9. During a recent conversation with the DPSA he indicated that owing to MACV attempts to up-grade the present system of DSA's the Australian DSA may be at somewhat of a disadvantage owing to the fact that he is not trained to the same degree as his American counterpart and the position may be re-assigned to an American. The DPSA did not indicate when or if this may happen in the near future but he advised me to bear this in mind for future planning.

Assessment of District Chief

10. On 10 Aug 70 the District Chief (DC) was rotated and a Maj Hau was assigned from Hue city. Initially he appeared to be a dynamic, conscientious and honest person but his performance these last three weeks leave a lot to be desired. He no longer accompanies the various operations conducted within the district and is absent from the area for long periods during the day and spends at least two nights a week in Hue. The reason for this change could be that he may be transferred to IV MR but at this stage this move has not been confirmed. It is also noted that the DC has attempted to use the Advisory system as his personal supply system and reserts being refused these demands.

Construction of Facilities

11. The defence and messing facilities under construction are still being held of because of a lack of material. Indents, submitted eight weeks ago are still not filled. It is hoped to have all tasks completed before the DSA's change in late October.

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Appendix 6 to
Annex B to
AATIV Report
Sep 70

REPORT BY CAPT MARTENS
SENIOR ADVISER 2/1 ARVN BN
PERIOD 26 JUL - 26 SEP 70

General Aims

1. During the above period the unit's aims were:
 - a. Security of FSB Barnett (YD 199323), 26 Jul - 12 Aug 70.
 - b. Search, clear and secure West flank of unit's operating towards the South from FSB O'Reilly (YD 324257) 13-26 Aug 70.
 - c. Drive the NVA further South from FSB O'Reilly 4-19 Sep 70.
 - d. Security of FSB O'Reilly (with under OP CON 1st DIV RECCE Coy) 20-26 Sep 70.

Methods Employed to Achieve Aims

2. Security of FSB Barnett was achieved by:
 - a. Locating the CP, the HQ Coy and 1 Rifle Coy on the FSB. Their daily tasks were to:
 - (1) HQ Coy - provide 2-3 squad sized ptls to search and ambush an area inside 500 meters of the FSB. One of these ptls remained out at night.
 - (2) Rifle Coy - provide 2 Pl ptls outside 500 meters and inside 2,000 meters of the FSB. One of these ptls remained out at night.
 - (3) During anyone single day each squad or pl ptl covered one third or half of the area around the FSB respectively.
 - b. Two Rifle Coys controlled by a Light CP (consisting of the Bn XO, an adviser and radio operators). The tasks of the Light CP group included:
 - (1) Searching the area outside the 2,000 meter circle from the FSB and preventing the enemy from concentrating against the FSB.
 - (2) Be prepared to redeploy quickly to:
 - (a) Re-inforce the FSB.
 - (b) Re-act against enemy direct and in-direct fire weapons firing onto the FSB.
 - (c) Assist the smaller Pl and squad sized ptls in the event they strike a much larger force.

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- c. It is to be noted that when the Light CP group failed to locate any enemy or signs of them, a Rifle Coy was detached and dispatched to operate on its own, in an effort to cover more ground. When that coy made contact with a significant sized force of NVA, the other Rifle Coy and the Light CP were redeployed to reconstitute the Light CP group.
3. The searching, clearing and securing of the West flank of units operating towards the South from FSB O'Reilly was executed by:
- a. Securing a high ground tactical objective and clearing the areas around it, down to the features extent.
 - b. Ambushing tracks and trails running from West to East towards the units who were being provided the flank protection.
4. Driving the NVA South from FSB O'Reilly was to be achieved by:
- a. Bn CA into LZ's at YD 300248 (CP Group) and YD 300240 (Light CP group). Once established on the ground with the areas secure, the Light CP was to hold its ground whilst the CP moved to YD 308239.
 - b. The Light CP was then moved through the CP to the East with the aims of securing hill 665 (square 3122) via YD 313236. At that co-ordinate (313236) the Light CP struck opposition from a dug in force with 3 LMGS estimated at Pl plus. Shortly afterwards the CP Group (still at 308239) was attacked from two directions by 2 NVA Coys plus. This resulted in the Light CP being redeployed at 306239. The following day ptls and ambushes were dispatched whilst the unit cut LZ for resupply.
 - c. Following the resupply the Light CP group was given the task of pushing south from YD 303238 to take objective YD 305229. Simultaneously the CP Group set out to take the 665 feature via YD 315237 then 303236. The CP Group had secured 315237 when the Light CP was assaulted whilst on the move, by a Bn of NVA, at 306234. The Light CP group commander panicked and withdrew the HQ and the reserve coy too far and too fast rather than deploying them as a consolidated force for the coy in contact to withdraw through. This left the Coy in contact, without assistance to fend for itself. This Coy took heavy casualties and would have taken many more had it not been for the excellent way in which the Coy Commander handled the situation. This situation caused the Bn Commander to regroup his whole Bn as one unit.
 - d. These contacts (sub paras 4 b and c), plus aerial recce conducted subsequently, confirmed the occupation of the 665 feature and the area of YD 305229 by a Bn of NVA on each. This information led to the commitment of an other ARVN Bn to the task of capturing the 665 feat whilst the 2nd Bn penetrated South along the ridge line in square 3023.
5. The security of FSB O'Reilly was achieved in a similar manner as that of FSB Barnett. The major difference was that at O'Reilly the Bn had under op con the 1st Div Recce Coy. This enabled the Bn Commander to allocate areas to 3 Coys:

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- a. One Coy around YD 299255
- b. One Coy around YD 306239., and
- c. One Coy (Div Recce Coy) around YD 352252.

As there was another Bn operating in the area of square 3322 and another South, West and on the 665 feature, he chose to have a pl operate around the area of YD 331240. Normal squad and Pl size Ptls secured the area to 1,000 meters around the FSB.

Unit Success in Achieving Aims

6. The aims as presented in sub para 1 a above was achieved in every respect. Excellent security was provided to the FSB, which was not on any occasion actually hit by direct or indirect enemy fire, nor was the enemy in the area (NVA Bn strength, plus sappers) allowed the opportunity to concentrate and attack the FSB. On the occasions that he tried, ptls detected and frustrated his efforts.
7. Good flank security was provided (aim para 1 b) through:
 - a. Preventing the enemy from reinforcing from the West by blocking his approach routes and by engaging those units already in the area.
 - b. Being in a position to counter enemy fire support activity (mortars) from West of the creek line running North, South between squares 3021 and 2825.
8. The Bn aim of driving the enemy further South from O'Reilly was not achieved without the assistance from another Bn. This was because of the subtended reasons:
 - a. The Bn was given a task which was not based on sound intelligence.
 - b. In view of this lack of intelligence, the Bn Senior Adviser recommended to the Bn Commander that he should ptl to obtain information on which to base his plan. When this advise was not acted upon, the Senior Adviser then suggested, that as the enemy strength on both objectives was unknown, he should endeavour to take out one objective at a time with his whole Bn concentrated, in the event that either or both objective was occupied by a force too large for either the CP group or Light CP group to handle individually. This advise once again was not accepted. Fortunately the light CP group made contact whilst the CP Group was not yet in contact, for had they both been in contact simultaneously matters may have really got out of hand,
9. The aim of providing security for FSB O'Reilly was successfully pursued. During the period the FSB only received one round of 75 mm RR fire. The weapon was subsequently captured the following day.

Overall Standard of The Unit

10. Considering the poor basic training the ARVN soldier receives and the lack of time available for NCO and officer training, as well as other rank re-training, the overall standard of this unit is very high. This however is mainly due to the dynamic leadership of the Bn and Coy Commanders, the

excellent advise and assistance provided Coy level by WO2 D. Powell and a US Sgt First Class and the initiative, freedom of movement and flexibility the Regt Commander allows his Bn Commanders.

Major Weaknesses

11. Unit major weaknesses are:
- a. The unit's excessive reliance on Air Support. This is a strong criticism, however justifiable reasons exist for this over reliance:
 - (1) The lack of men within the unit to carry their intregal unit support weapons.
 - (2) Restrictions in use due to jungle canopy.
 - (3) Resupply of ammunition necessitates cutting LZ's.

(Note: The writer is assured that in the low lands where (2) and (3) are no longer applicable, these weapons are carried).
 - b. The lack of a properly functioning S3 office. This is due to a shortage of officers and will be rectified when officers become available.
 - c. Weak and badly trained Pl leaders and squad leaders. The effect this has on unit tactics is:
 - (1) Great emphasis on Coy ptls.
 - (2) Practically no pl and even bn squad ptls.
 - d. The unit's inability to overcome the NVA RPG teams, of which they are extremely frightened.
 - e. Inability of ARVN Commanders to use ground and terrain to advantage.

Suggestions Made To Overcome Weaknesses

12. To overcome the lack of unit intregal fire support problem, the following suggestions were made:
- a. Slight increase of first line holdings of M79 ammunition and hand grenades.
 - b. In addition that each group (Light CP and CP group) carry at least 1x60mm and 30 rounds.

These suggestions were accepted and are now SOP.

13. To overcome the Junior Officer and NCO leadership problems, the following suggestions were made and are being effected, looked into or are being investigated:
- a. Being effected now is the after action, and operation awareness is being cultivated, of the importance of the private soldier and the effect his mental condition/approach has on the outcome of the subsequent battle.

b. Under investigation is the possibility of a 4 separate level training programme during unit re-training. The separate levels are:

- (1) Basic tactics - to the private soldiers.
- (2) Squad tactics to junior and potential junior NCOs.
- (3) Pl tactics and admin to Senior NCOs and junior officers.
- (4) Coy tactics and staff considerations, planning and functions (at Bn level) to the Coy Commanders and unit staff officers.

All this of course it is hoped will be heavily flavoured with leadership and man management training to all commanders from squad upwards.

c. Instruction and practice to all commanders from squad upwards, in the use of artillery and air support procedures, so that these assets can be more readily used at a lower level.

14. To overcome the NVA RPG teams it was suggested to fight fire with fire and make the M72 the ARVN answer to the RPG. This suggestion caused the M72 first line holdings to be increased, however as yet no determined effort has been made to properly utilise them.

15. Many suggestions have been made to try and drive home the necessity to asses ground and make best use of it in every way, this particular weakness will be the more difficult to rectify, however some aspects have already been grasped and the unit no longer:

- a. Moves along base ridgelines and spurs.
- b. Occupies high base features.

A more commonsense approach is now used in relation to a and b above. Camouflage, occupying features of tactical significance and movement defiladed from view as well as fire is practised.

Unit Strong Points

16. The above would include:

- a. Good relationship and a sense of trust and acceptance between the advisers and unit/subunit commanders.
- b. Good Unit Commander and Coy Commanders.
- c. Aggressive fire and manoeuvre when contact is made.
- d. Well defined and rewritten Unit SOPs.
- e. An excellent unit resupply system.
- f. Adequate handling of 'A' matters within the unit.

REPORT BY MAJ K. PHILLIPS - SENIOR AUST ADVISER
PHUOC-TUY PROVINCE SEP 70

Introduction

1. Maj K. Phillips replaced Maj P Beale as the Senior Australian Adviser in Phuoc-Tuy Province on 29 Aug 70. The correct title in respect to the organization of Team 89 is Assistant for Territorial Forces resulting in having two counterparts, the Province Deputy for Security and the RF/PF Inspector. To perform the duties a small staff section has been established comprising the assistant for territorial forces, assistant RF/PF adviser and PSDF adviser. This group therefore covers RF-PF-PSDF advisory effort in the Province.
2. With the build up of AATTV MATTs in Phuoc-Tuy, the control tasks of the Senior Australian Adviser has greatly increased and consequently a captain from AATTV was deployed to Team 89 during the reporting period. The arrival of this officer - Capt J. Hartley - has been most beneficial to the AATTV contribution to the advisory effort.
3. To further explain the division of tasks and responsibilities of the staff in the territorial forces section, attached as Appendix 1 is a diagrammatic layout together with the duties of each member.
4. Mr R Walkinshaw commenced the duties of Province Senior Adviser on 21 Sep 70 replacing Mr M Christie who was reposted to the Saigon area. The approach to be used by the new PSA is not yet fully known but appears to be rather different to the previous PSA.
5. During the reporting period on additional two US majors joined the team and it is understood that a third major is to march-in in the near future. The employment of the additional officers is confusing particularly as the increase is contrary to the supposed reduction in US Advisory effort in this Province. One of the two new majors is to perform the duties of 51/54 adviser and the second major is apparently to be what could be loosely described as the overseer of the military advisory effort ie S1, S2, S3, S4, RF/PF but as he does not have a counterpart it is difficult to clearly define his responsibilities. The third major when he does arrive is to assume the duties of adviser to the SM & DSL Centre.

Deployment of MAT/MATTs.

6. At the end of the reporting period the MAT/MATT deployment was as follows:

a. AATTV MATTs

- | | | | | |
|-----|--------|---|----------------|------------|
| (1) | MATT 1 | - | Binh-Ba | 655 RF Coy |
| (2) | MATT 2 | - | Phuoc-Hoa Long | 578 RF Coy |
| (3) | MATT 3 | - | 302 RF Bn | |
| (4) | MATT 4 | - | An-Ngai | 3/47 RF Gp |

- 2 -

- (5) MATT 5 - Hoi-My 3/48 RF Gp, 189 RF Coy
Phuoc-Hoi 124 RF Coy
- (6) MATT 6 - Hoa Long 701 RF Coy
- (7) MATT 7 - Ong Trinh *3/15 RF Gp 385 RF Coy
- (8) MATT 8 - Xuyen Moc

Percentage deployment until 2 Oct 70.

b. US MATs

- (1) MAT 63 - Tam Phuoc 576 RF Coy

This MAT is due for redeployment in the near future to another Province in MR 3.

- (2) MAT 64 - Phuoc Loi 480 RF Coy

This MAT is due for redeployment in the near future to another Province in MR 3.

- (3) MAT 70 - Ap Suoi Nghe 626 RF Coy.

7. Planning for the deployment of MATTs 9 to 12 inclusive is:

- a. MATT 9 - Phuoc Loi to replace MAT 64 or Tam-Phuoc to replace MAT 63 depending on the date of movement of these US MATs.
- b. MATT 10 - Long-Dien (Nga Nam - GR YS 425605). To be located in 586 RF Coy Compound. This is at variance to that stated in the previous monthly report. Original planning placed MATT 10 at Long-Hoi, however on examination of the security situation (eg HES ratings) indicated that the MATT could possibly be under-employed in this area.
- c. MATT 11 - Probably at Phuoc-Hoa on Route 15 to reduce the current extensive workload on MATT 7.
- d. MATT 12 - Doan Trong Thao (GR YS 406596) on Route 23, with 577 RF Coy. The RF Coy does not require the advisory effort of a MATT but a requirement does exist for the availability of a MATT element that could be deployed at short notice (12-24 hours) with a sector planned operation.

Employment of MATTs

8. A detailed report on the activities of 302 RF Bn since its deployment on 14 Jun 70 is attached at Appendix 2. It is disappointing that this Bn has been deployed piecemeal in every operation until the current operation now on progress on Route 44 to the south of the Long Hais. Until the Bn is used as a complete unit with a correctly functioning Bn HQ it will not improve. Some dissention appears to exist between the MATT leader and the Bn Comd. The Bn Comd is not fully effective and no doubts feels that the

presence of the MATT has a restricting influence on his "extra curricula" activities. It is possible with the increased use of the Bn as a complete unit that the Bn Comd may improve or his deficiencies become so apparent to higher staff that he will be removed. The question of the interpreter problem is for ever present when the Bn moves at regular intervals. In fact an interpreter has been available but invariably disappears prior to an operation.

9. Other specific comments on the various MATT reports are as follows:
- a. MATT 1. Binh Ba. Report by WO2 Stephens is attached at Appendix 3. Clearance of the minefield around the compound is scheduled to commence on 28 Sep 70 with the assistance of 1 Fd Sqn RAE. New barrier materials have been released through VN channels.
 - b. MATT 2. Phuoc Hoa Long. Report by WO2 Williams is attached at Appendix 4. No further comments are offered. This MATT is proving effective in the area concept employment of the MATT.
 - c. MATT 4. An-Ngai. Report by WO2 Palmer is attached at Appendix 5. The problem of the lack of an RF Coy in the compound still exist. However the MATT has sufficient tasks in hand to maintain its continued presence in the area pending the availability of the RF Coy.
 - d. MATT 5. Hoi-My. Due to the problem with the construction of the new compound at Phuoc-Hai for 124 RF Coy, this MATT continues to operate from Hoi-My. Although this is not ideal it is not an insurmountable problem for the MATT and an element has established itself well with both the Village Chief at Phuoc-Hai and the Coy Comd of 124 RF Coy.
 - e. MATT 6. Hoa Long. Report by WO2 White is attached at Appendix 6. This MATT has only recently been deployed but has already become closely involved with the area concept of employment. It was fortunate that the MATT deployment coincided with the change of direct emphasis to the PSDF - PF rather than RF done.
 - f. MATT 7. Ong Trinh. Similar comment to that for MATT 6. Both MATTs are located in Long Le District which has a very effective District Chief and District Senior Adviser. Both take an active interest in the MATTs and are keen to assist whenever possible.
 - g. MATT 8. Xuyen Moc. An element only of this MATT has been deployed to date due to an accommodation/secure area problem and the impending absence of MATT members from the area for the presentation parade on the 30 Sep 70. A new system of deployment is to be used due to the poor state of the existing RF Coy compound. In this instance the MATT will be co-located with the village office. A co-ordinating conference was held at the District Office on 26 Sep 70 attending by the District Chief, District Senior Adviser, Village Chief, Village Deputy for Security MATT leader, and Senior Australian Adviser. The conference was arranged to ensure that all parties area aware of the requirements both in respect to the purpose of the MATT and the assistance to be provided by the VN. Both the District Chief and Village Chief are keen to have the MATT on the area which is on important start point in the deployment of the MATT.

10. It is important to note that during the reporting period there has been a change of emphasis for the employment of MAT/MATTs. Their primary mission now is in the direction of the PSDF and PF, with reduced emphasis on the RF. It is my impression that this is on urgent requirement as I believe that in many instances we were rapidly approaching the stage of over - advising the RF and therefore indirectly over controlling their activities. The RF should not be underrated purely on the bases of lack of contacts etc. In general the RF have been restricted in their employment either to virtually the confines of their compound or to "safe" areas. An RF Coy that is capable of moving at ten minutes notice on an airmobile operation speaks highly of their ability - see MATT 2 report.

RF

11. A total of 27 RF Coy (including the Boat Coy and Polwar. Coy) are deployed in Province and an additional three undergoing training at the National Training Centre Van-Kiep (NTCVK). One of the three undergoing training will be available for deployment on 3 Oct 70 - its deployment location is not known at this stage.

12. The major problem area that exists is in the command and control of RF Coys in respect to Sector/District/RF Gp HQ. Efforts are being made to resolve this problem but "vested interests" will undoubtedly be a deciding factor. Directly related to this problem is the continued use of RF Coys on operations that are no more than "walks in the bush" as many are not planned as the result of sound intelligence but more probably to satisfy a mythical statistical requirement. A combined intelligence centre may help to alleviate this problem providing action on the intelligence gained is passed rapidly to the S3 section to implement an operational plan.

13. Insufficient use is made of the available ARVN artillery in the Province. It is understood that planning is in progress to deploy four artillery platoons (each of 2x105mm guns) and one Sector Artillery HQ group into the Province in early 1971. It is therefore important that maximum use is made now of the existing guns to prevent a delayed reaction when the platoons are finally deployed.

PF

14. Generally of a poor standard throughout the Province. Very little emphasis appears to have been given to this section of the Territorial Forces organization in this Province. There is a general tendency for many people to always link RF/PF as if they were identical in organization, equipment, and deployment.

15. It is possible that the involvement of the MATTs with PF may help to upgrade their effectiveness. However there are currently 63 PF Pls in the Province and authority has been given for an additional three to make a total of 66. A simple mathematical calculation indicates that the MATTs have quite a task ahead of them.

16. A Province Mobile Inspection Team (MIT) - VN - comprising Deputy for Security, RF/PF Inspector S2, S3, S4 and Adviser (Assistant for Territorial Forces) is now active and make regular visits to each district. These visits coupled with follow up action by Sector may help in overcoming some of the problems.

PSDF

17. A comprehensive report by the PSDF Adviser is attached at Appendix 7. It is agreed that a vast amount of time is spent gathering useless statistics but the VN have learned that a magical graph at one of the many briefings will usually satisfy most questions.

18. It is of interest to note that the VC entered the village of Phuoc-Hai the night after the commencement of training of the PSDF. Their purpose apparently was to place posters throughout the village warning people not to actively participate in PSDF activities.

RD Cadre

19. The report by WO2 Osborn the RD Adviser is attached at Appendix 8.

Conclusion

20. Some progress is being made with the extension of RF activities in the Province but insufficient at this stage to gain a real impression of the operational standards of the coys.

21. The constant arrival of visitors does present problems at all levels and is a time consuming process as more often than not formal briefings occur. Attendance at briefings and the escorting of visitors automatically decreases the time available to be with your counterpart which is most frustrating when you are endeavouring to gain his confidence and more particularly conform to his programme.

TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF
THE TERRITORIAL FORCES ADVISERS
AT PHUOC-TUY SECTOR HEADQUARTERS

ASST FOR TERRITORIAL FORCES

Adviser: Maj K. PHILLIPS Counterpart: LTC LIEU
Maj AN

Asst RF/PF Adviser

Lt Wheeler (US)

Counterpart: Maj Quang

PSDF Adviser

Capt Hartley

Counterpart: Capt Tuong

WO1 Deed

AATTV Admin and

Asst PSDF Adviser.

Functions of Personnel

1. Asst for Territorial Forces

- a. Commands the RF/PF/PSDF Section.
- b. Senior Adviser to the Deputy Sector Commander.
- c. Overall Co-ordinator of MAT/MATTs in Province.
- d. Maintains liaison for the Deputy Sector Commander with FWMAF in Province.
- e. Advises and assists the territorial forces on all tactical matters.
- f. Accompanies territorial forces on tactical operations in order to evaluate and recommend improvements in the operational capabilities of the forces.
- g. Makes recommendations and provide assistance in improving the morale and living conditions of the territorial forces.

2. Asst RF/PF Adviser

- a. Carry out the policies of the Asst for Territorial Forces.
- b. Adviser to the Assistant to the Deputy Sector Commander for the completion of reports eg TFES.

c. Accompany territorial forces on tactical operations in order to evaluate and recommend improvements in the operational capabilities of the forces.

3. PSDF Adviser

a. Principal adviser to the Chief of PSDF of Province.

b. Advise and Assist Village and Hamlet Officials on the administration and employment of PSDF.

c. Assist the Chief of PSDF with the completion of all combined reports.

d. Accompany PSDF, with the Chief of PSDF, on their tasks to indicate and recommend improvements as necessary.

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Appendix 2
to Annex C
to AATTV Report
Sep 70

REPORT BY CAPT OPIE

SENIOR ADVISER - 302 RF BATTALION - SEP 70

1. The battalion completed 6 weeks of retraining at VKNTC and deployed to field locations on 14 Jun 70.
2. Initially the unit was given the task of the security of Baria fitting with 1 coy detached to Long-Dien District at An-Ngai (YS 440587). This was 787 Coy (later re-designated 3 Coy) and from the outset the local MATT had problems, as the troops refused to assist with defence of the compound, the company commander and 2IC having a minimum of control with discipline non-existent. 614 Coy (later 4) was detached to the Cambodian refugee camp at Phuoc-Lam on 22 Jun and with one short break has been fulfilling a security role ever since.
3. The following operations have been conducted by the unit:
 - a. 20 Jun. Two Coys air insertion in Long-Hai Mountains. 5 KIA, 13 WIA (M16) (1, 2 Coys)
 - b. 27/28 Jun Two Coys deployed to Dat Do District for National Election security (1,2 Coys).
 - c. 7/9 Jul Three Coys sweep around base of Nui Dinh Mountains (1,2,3 Coys).
 - d. 15/22 Jul Patrol and ambush in conjunction with 26 Boat Coy (2 Coy:)
 - e. 24 Jul/29 Aug. Cordon and Search Dat Do Village (1,2,3 Coys)
 - f. 14/21 Aug " " " Hoa Long Village (2 Coy)
 - g. 26/28 Aug Two Coy sweep S of route 23 (1,2 Coys)
 - h. 29 Aug/12Sep Highway 15 security from Phu-My (Phuoc Bien) to Ong Trinh (1,2,3 Coys).
 - i. 2/6 Sep Air insertion Nui Dinh Mountains (2 Coy) (in conjunction with
 - j. 7/10 Sep Air insertion and sweep east of My Xuan (2 RAR/NZ
 - k. 14/21 Sep Search South of Tam Phuoc to base of Long-Hai Mountains (2,3 Coys)
 - l. 14/21 Sep Patrol and ambush in conjunction with 26 Boat Coy (1 Coy)
 - m. 12 Sep Convoy escort Baria - Xuan Moc (1 Coy)
 - n. 21/22 Sep " " " - Long Binh (3 Coy)
 - o. 17 Sep " " " - Long Thanh(1 Coy)
 - p. 18 Sep " " " " "

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- q. A 15 day road clearing operation of route 44 on the Long-Hai Peninsular is planned to commence on 22 Sep 70.

4. MATT activities with 302 Bn.

- a. When first deployed, MATT 3 consisted of the following:

Capt
2 WOs
2 Cpls (Inf)
1 Cpl (Med)
1 Cpl (Engr)

A WO and one cpl moving with each coy and/or one cpl moving with the capt on operations.

- b. However, on 20 Jul, strength of the team was cut to four with the removal of one WO, one cpl (Inf) and one cpl (Engr), as the battalion, as presently deployed, could not field more than two coys, one of which always moved with Bn HQ.

- c. With the return of 4 Coy at the conclusion of the refugee operation, there will be a 3rd Coy available and a 4th if the operation at Co Mai Bridge with 26 Boat Coy terminates.

- d. It is felt, however, that the earlier large MATT is a waste of manpower and it would be preferable to draw additional members from previously established MATTs on a short term/turnover basis, unless the unit is to be used continuously on operations (which at present appears unlikely)

- e. The attitude of the CO towards the MATT is one of indifference and the impression gained is that he would rather be without it. With the exception of requests for maps, there has never been any co-ordination in the planning of operations and the minimum of information is forthcoming. Suggestions that VRs may be arranged in sufficient time is given have been accepted, but at such short notice that it has not always been possible to lay them on - while working with 2 RAR, the CO 2 RAR called to ask if the bn comd would care to visit the coy in the Nui Dinh by Possum. The bn comd was taking his siester at the time and was not interested, so the information was passed to 2 RAR. Just as the radio conversation concluded, the bn comd appeared fully dressed and said he would go.

While at Dat Do, a similar offer was made with the suggestion that the request be put through VN channels which the MATT would paralled. After much hesitation, the S2 called Sector at 1730 hrs requesting the helicopter for 0800 hrs the following day. When the task was finally arranged (for 1330), the CO insisted on meeting the MATT at the pad rather than moving together from the bn CP.

When it has been possible to glean the information (usually from the driver op the S3) that the bn comd is going to Sector for a meeting, he invariably rejects the suggestion that his counterpart accompany him or, as has happened twice, he has made an appointment for a certain time, and when counterpart has arrived, he has been informed that the meeting is over and will not volunteer any information as to the subjects discussed.

As his wife and family live in Baria, it is difficult to make an intelligent guess as to his intentions when leaving the CP; he does not inform the S3 (the only officer usually at the CP) when he is going or when he will be back.

There is a move afoot by the DPSA to have the Bn Comd ousted but bearing in mind his long service in the Province (previous posting was 5 years as Boat Coy Comd) and friends in high places, this is unlikely to happen.

f. If 3 Coy Comd or his XO were removed, some progress could be made on an individual company basis (2 Coy Comd was removed after the Hoa Long operation, perhaps due to being found asleep at 1445 hrs following a lunch time party and reports to the CO and DC of repetitions of like nature, though the official story is that he was unpopular with his troops. (His replacement shows promise of better things and the XO is possibly the best officer in the unit).

g. 4 Coy has had no training and little discipline while at Phuoc Lam and is a doubtful quantity, though the Coy Comd is impressive.

h. The Bn XO returned from Dalat on 31 Aug and after making a brief appearance fell off his Honda and has not been seen since.

i. The S2 is lazy and a playboy and disappears for days at a time, usually to be found working at Sector.

j. The S3 is the workhorse of the staff, being given very little time off by the CO. He is inflexible, and in the COs absence he cannot be prevailed upon to initiate orders.

5. Conclusion. Since deploying to the field, the battalion has not justified its existence for the following reasons:

a. Failure to operate as a battalion due to random commitments outside its role as a reaction force.

b. Lack of suitable AOs due to reluctance of 1 ATF to free potentially lucrative areas.

c. Lack of drive by CO with consequent lack by Coy Comds - in the last operation, unless the MATT forced the issue by moving with a platoon, coy comds were content to set up firm bases and have the platoons patrol from them with no checking or supervision and sub-units up to 600m away from stated locations. The CO visited his coys on two occasions (in the morning) after which he departed for the rest of the day, usually returning towards last light.

→ Col Silverstone
asked to explain

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Appendix 3 to
Annex C to
AATTV Report
Sep 70

REPORT BY WO2 STEPHENS
TEAM LEADER MATT 1, - SEP 70

RF

1. During the month 626 Coy RF, accompanied by US MAT 70, moved into Ap Suoi Nghe relieving the PF at Ap Suoi Nghe and taking over the responsibility of Duc My from 655 Coy RF.
2. 655 Coy RF continues with nightly ambushes, now concentrated in Binh-Ba and Duc Trung.
3. They carry out search and destroy operations both East and West of Highway 2. Though these have had small results, one known VC captured and one suspect detained, the Coy is operating very well.
4. During the month, at the Coy Comd's request, the Coy was retrained in movement in the field, detection and disposal of booby-traps and demolition.
5. The village of Duc Trung received 60 refugees from Cambodia and 655 Coy was engaged in both the preparation of the village for them and their protection since their arrival.

PF/PSDF

6. MATT 1 has taken over the responsibility of PF/PSDF in the hamlets of both Binh Gia and Ngai Giao villages. To date, most of the work has been liaison between MATT 1 and the hamlet chiefs. PSDF in both these areas are armed and operating successfully, combining with PF in their hamlets.
7. It is hoped that Binh Ba and Duc Trung PSDF, who were trained in weapons by MATT 1, will be armed in the near future. MATT 1 will be involved with the organisation and role they play in the Hamlet Defence once they are armed.
8. Once again the problem arises, as with RF, of getting the SVN S4 working and supplying materials. One instance is Binh Gia, which has requested materials for bunkers and the use of the MATT 1 RAE Cpl, but are held up waiting for supplies. MATT 1 is following this up and hopes for results very soon.

Summary

9. All round it has been a rather quiet month for MATT 1 in Duc-Thanh District. With the main objective being changed to PF/PSDF, work with the RF Coy has lessened, though we are still assisting in ambushing, operations, erection of bunkers, latrines etc.
10. In the future it looks as though MATT 1 will become more and more involved in PF/PSDF and the work load for all members will increase.

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Appendix 4
to Annex C
to AATTV Report
Sep 70

REPORT BY WO2 WILLIAMS
TEAM LEADER MATT 2 - SEP 70

Training - RF

1. 578 RF
 - a. 3 periods of refresher training on GPMG M60 by MATT and 1 period of working with APC's.
 - b. 16 Sep - Coy started 12 days Psy-War training with Viet Team from sector.
2. 772 RF. Started training coy by platoons. 11 periods per week starting with 1st platoon.

<u>Pl</u>	<u>Total Periods</u>
1st pl	11 hourly periods
2nd pl	3 hourly

3. 609 RF. Negative training. When 772 RF completed we hope to start same system as 578 RF.
4. Average attendance for all periods 25.

PSDF Training

5. The team now has Vietnamese lesson plans for all PSDF weapons. Phuoc Hoa Long Security Chief has given the names of 25 PSDF to be trained as soon as operational commitments allow.
6. This training could be started forthwith if the team had a second interpreter.

PSDF

7. Radio's for the village are now all operational.
8. Requisitions for ammo and equipment to bring PSDF up to scale have been submitted by the village office.
9. It is the aim of the team to try and get the village chief to allow the PSDF to attend RF ambush patrols as one method of training.

Operations

10. The concept of operations has changed considerably in the last month.
11. The RF still do a lot of small one day operations but in addition they are now being utilised in 2 - 3 day operations, farther away from the populated areas. The ops are normally conducted as recce in strength.

...../2

-2-

12. The MATT has been accompanying 578 RF Coy and 772 RF Coy on all these ops when they do not clash. Three members have been working with 302 RF Bn as from the 22 Sep.

13. The Coy's have been working well and do a reasonable job of searching.

Operation Results

14. 578 RF Coy
29 Aug 4 x M16 mines found at GR YS491595
30 Aug 11 x M16 mines found at GR YS 495587
1 x 81MM Motar
15. 772 RF Coy
17 Sep 3 VC huts, 7 bunkers, documents and clothing at GR YS37633
16. 609 RF Coy
18 Sep 1 VC captured
7 bunkers found at GR YS14592

Contents of bunkers recovered

20 Chicom grenades
2 AK 47 mags
440 Rds AK 47
2 entrenching tools
1 electric torch
3 sandbags rice - 1 x 4 gallon can of rice
1 kero stove
Misc equipment, clothing, boots and documents.

17. Air Mobile Operation - 772 RF Coy

a. 15 Sep - 0940 hrs MATT was conducting training at 772 RF, when 772 RF Coy and MATT were warned out for an air mobile operation. The choppers were due at approx 1000 hrs. By 1005 a LZ had been recced for the uplift and 70 men of the coy had been mobilised and moved 600 metres to the pickup LZ. With the help of the MATT the coy prepared for the pickup and were ready by 1010 hrs. The choppers arrived at 1015 hrs.

WO Williams and Cpl Eade moved out with Coy Comd and Capt Hartley on first lift. The Coy handled itself extremely well on this phase of the operation.

b. The object of the operation was a BDA on a VC coy area located the previous day.

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-3-

18. Remarks on the Air Mobile Operation

- a. It is believed the operation was conceived the previous evening but we were not notified until an extremely late stage.
- b. The actual area for the BDA turned out to be approx 600 - 800 metres from the original target.
- c. The area for the BDA was under water and therefore unlikely to have bunkers. This was apparent from the air on the way to the LZ.
- d. Except for the first 1½ hours the remainder of the operation was conducted in swamp chest deep. Two and a half hours were spent wading through paddy fields and 5½ hours through swamp.
- e. The going was extremely difficult and slow and when we broke out of the swamp and timber a request was submitted for choppers owing to the state of exhaustion of some of the troops, distance and time yet to travel - 4500 metres through sticky paddy fields.
- f. Request was denied (Reason:- request for choppers have to be submitted 24 hrs in advance).
- g. It took a further 2½ - 3 hours to move 4500 metres to a truck pickup point, carrying 6 of the troops that were so exhausted they couldn't stand by themselves.
- h. The move back by trucks was conducted after darkness over a distance of 14,000 metres on a road rather suspect without any escort and without comms as we were out of range for the entire operation.

19. Medical. Medcaps have been continuing every Saturday. The best attendance so far was 53 villagers on 5 Sep 70.

20. Stores. The MATT worked with 772 RF Coy on the development of a plan and requisitions for stores for the development of a coy compound.

21. So far none of the requisitions for defence stores or ammo paralleled by this team have been forthcoming since 6 May 70.

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Appendix 5
to Annex C
to AATTV Report
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REPORT BY WO2 PALMER
TEAM LEADER - MATT 4 SEP 70

1. The posn of our permanent coy arriving in this loc remains the same - rumours and counter rumours but no results. The Viet Gp HQ 3/47 has been handling people the same as us to no avail.
2. We have been subjected to a lot of inspections/visits up to the level of the province chief. All favourable so may get some results in the future.
3. Operations with various coys of the Gp remain above the same, with ½ to 1 day patrols in the district, the only exception was a two coy operation for 2 days. Small area cordon and searches have risen but the only result was one VCI captured. The last one was supposed to be a lot larger than we had been doing, involving 2 full coys of the Gp and most officials from District HQ, Gp did its part, but the District people failed to turn up until 0930 - 1000 - 1100 instead of 0700. This left the operation swinging for so long it was inoperative at any stage. I have spent one ni at the village office to observe procedures with regard to PSDF/PF and Village officials, most activity is towards local protection of the village office. I think they cannot be blamed a great deal for this as with no RF Coy in the area for reaction they are frightened to get involved in anything too big. Also they know it would take many hours to get help from another area. We tried to get PSDF members to accompany us on a small ptl within the village area but no go. We will try this again with a small hamlet on the edge of our AO (An-Thanh).
4. Work on our team house is progressing and now the tent is pulled down it is good to breathe again and have some room to move about in. This rise in our standard of living reflects on the team with good effect as to general well being.
5. Defensive work continuous with work on two Viet bunkers, a new blast wall behind the front gate, further wiring, claymores being banked on the perimeter, defoliation and a new second front gate in the first construction stages. Also gates on the wire gaps are near completion.
6. PSDF course has finished and so far on these courses 74 people have been put through from six hamlets of the village. On a follow up look at training without prior appointment I found the PSDF gathered but nothing in progress as regard training, so the deputy of security for the village who was with me, stayed when I left to reorganise things. He is very good gets very much involved with PSDF so I am sure we will get some results from it.
7. Medical training continuous on one or two days each week with our medic and various Vietnamese medics from Gp HQ and RF Coys of the Gp.

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Appendix C to
Annex C to
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REPORT BY WO2 WHITE
TEAM LEADER MATT 6 - SEP 70

1. MATT 6 moved into 701 RF Coy Compound Hoa Long on 29 Aug 70. From the start MATT 6 received co-operation from the coy commander and the coy. It took very little time to get our equipment unloaded and moved into the building vacated for the MATT. The first four days were spent settling in and getting to know the coy. A bunker was built on the perimeter by the team for its own protection. During construction the VN looked at us as if we were a bit mad because we belted sandbags flat with lumps of wood. Since then the coy has reconstructed their mortar pit, fighting bays on the perimeter, generator bunker and dug a drain through the berm. In all cases sandbags were used and were belted flat. The coy also followed the MATT in construction of a new toilet which should improve the health in the compound. Grass was cleared out of the wire to as far as the mine field. What is needed is more wire for defences but is in short supply in this province.
2. The Coy conducted itself well on operations, although it is restricted because of the closeness to 1 ATF. At this stage no training has been done with the company because MATT 6 is involved with training PSDF.
3. MATTs 6 and 7 met with the DSA of Long Le District and between us we thrashed out a training plan for PSDF. The main problem was time. PSDF have to be finished training by 31 Oct 70. Teaching the lessons put out by MR3 we broke it into 9 days training for each group, including one night of night firing and 3 nights of ambushing accompanied by MATT personnel. MATT 6 has almost completed training Hoa Long and at this stage results are better than we expected. Small problems keep cropping up, as usual, but nothing that can't be fixed. Working with PSDF has given us an opening into the village and the village people. When the team moved in here the people looked right through us as if we didn't exist, now they know who we are and are reasonably friendly.
4. Our plans for the future are to complete training the PSDF, train PF to a higher level and retrain the RF. Also we hope to establish a Medcap in the village using the team medic, RF/PF medics and the village nurses. At this stage we have informed the village through the PSDF if they have medical problems to bring them to the compound. The team medic Cpl Fitzgerald, has cleaned up the health in the compound and is a bit put out because he hasn't any more customers.

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REPORT BY CAPT HARTLEY
PSDF ADVISER PHUOC TUY SECTOR - SEP 70

Introduction

1. It is several months since a report was written on PSDF activities in Phuoc-Tuy. A new emphasis has been placed on PSDF and many people see this concept of territorial security as an answer, both politically and militarily, to the withdrawal of FWMAF. An upgraded PSDF could well release the RF from its semi static village/local defence role to fill gaps in the country left by the FWMAF, which are too large for ARVN to effectively control.
2. The aim of this paper is to cover the concept of PSDF generally and to discuss this concept in Phuoc-Tuy.

Background

3. On 19 Jun 68, the General Mobilization Law initiated the PSDF programme. This law provided for the compulsory enlistment of all fit males within the age groups 16-17 and 39-50. It also encouraged the voluntary participation of women, youth and elders. The Ministry of the Interior in Mar 70 lowered the age to seven for youths. In addition all males deferred from RVNAF draft, for other than medical reasons, together with those deferred because of ethnic minority status were required to join the PSDF. Former Hoi Chanhs have a similar status.
4. The PSDF programme supersedes all other militia type organizations. The Vietnamese translation is Nhan Dan Tu Ve which when translated into English may be taken as either Popular or People's Self Defence Forces. MACV has adopted the latter.

Aims

5. The aims of the PSDF programme are as follows:
 - a. To involve the maximum number of citizens in support of the GVN and its political and security objectives.
 - b. To provide the population with the means to defend their families, homes and villages against enemy infiltration, subversion and attack.
 - c. To assist the National Police and the RVNAF in maintaining security and public order.
 - d. To promote community development activities for self held and improvement of villages/hamlets in both rural and urban areas.
 - e. To assist the police in identifying and capturing the enemy.

Organization

6. The PSDF is controlled by means of a series of committees as opposed to a chain of command. At the national level, the programme is administered by the PSDF Directorate General, Ministry of Interior.

7. Consistent with the policy of freeing MR commanders from civil responsibility, PSDF committees are not established at Corps level. However, MR commanders are responsible for the military and security aspects such as training, supervision and organization.
8. Province Chiefs, are directly responsible for organizing, training, and arming PSDF. They are the chairmen of PSDF committees who plan, organize and monitor the province programme. District chiefs chair similar committees and perform similar functions at district level.
9. PSDF cadre are full time paid members, trained at NTC Vung-Tau, who are responsible for assisting local authorities in organizing, training and aiming.
10. PSDF are organized into groups, interteams, teams and cells. Annex A shows the organization of a basic PSDF group. Combat groups are established for those members designated as combat PSDF and support groups for those members engaged in civil activities. Combat PSDF are those listed in the mandatory category and female volunteers in the age group 16-50. At least one interteam in each Hamlet Evaluation Scheme (HES)/70, A, B and C hamlet is designated a "Key Interteam" (KIT). A KIT forms the nucleus of hamlet defence and each member is fully armed.

Operations

11. The PSDF are supposedly organized, trained and equipped to be capable of defending their village or hamlet only against small enemy units. In Phuoc-Tuy, D445 is a small unit. However, despite the fact that it only just outnumbers an RF Coy, it is called a battalion and causes far more influence on local defence than any other battalion, be it Australian or otherwise. What could appear to be a three man tax collection party or food gathering party, could well be the forward group of D445. This is a fact which is forever present in the minds of the PSDF.
12. PSDF have received little training and most of it quite out of keeping with their role of self defence. "Train a man to fire his rifle, train a hamlet chief to call down mortar fire" seems to be the idiom of US thought and teaching. This may sound quite feasible but it is a brave man who fires his rifle at a group of VC without knowing if he is to be supported. Then too, he becomes a marked man. He will be the next example and his day becomes a 24 hour period of fear and wariness. Most villages do not have registered mortar fire targets.
13. To date, training of PSDF has been carried out by a number of agencies including PSDF leaders, PSDF cadre, RF, PF, RDC, MAT and MATTs. Weapons have been continually handled. Youths of seven to ten can strip and assemble MI carbines. Shooting is poor as there have been very few range practices conducted. Some PSDF have been shown how to conduct area ambushes or taught how to patrol in groups of thirty through narrow village lanes. However the basic requirements of the PSDF to counter small unit incursions have not been taught.
14. MATTs have been concentrating on a training course employing the following topics:
 - a. Weapon training including day and night firing.
 - b. Small unit patrolling.

- c. Village, hamlet surveillance.
- d. Identification and reporting of VC.
- e. Passage of information.
- f. Alert systems to concentrate reaction forces.
- g. Ambushing by means of a mobile ambush.

15. PSDF must be encouraged to avoid manning fixed strong points. The advantage the PSDF has is his local knowledge of his hamlet, the people within the hamlet and the cover of darkness. The intruder does not have these advantages and must rely on his power of aggression and intimidation.

16. This concept of village defence is almost completely unknown. The average village which conducts a PSDF operation generally has a small number of members who congregate at the Village Office and remain there during the hours of darkness. These members are those who are wanted by the VC, are politically ambitious, or are actually VCI.

17. The PSDF is poorly armed and equipped. An average of one weapon for three combat members is normal. Weapons are all second generation US ex ARVN ex RF/PF. M1 and M2 Carbines, M1 Rifle, shotguns (gradually being phased out), Thompson SMGs and a few BARs. At a recent range practice half the weapons were found to be unserviceable. Ammunition varies from 80-100 rounds per rifle to about 6 rounds per shotgun. A village the size of Hoa Long with a population of 5,400, enclosed in an area with an outer perimeter of 12,000 meters has 367 males who should by law be in the PSDF. The village has no radios (it should have five), 65 M1 Carbines and 14 shotguns. At a recent training course the average turn-up of PSDF was 60 a night.

18. Generally, there is a total lack of co-ordination between RF, PF, village and hamlet levels. RF will not inform PSDF of their night ambushes for fear of VCI in the PSDF. RF ambushes may be placed very close to village perimeters. Therefore the PSDF do not move for fear of being ambushed by RF. In Hoa Long at night, without any knowledge of the MATT leader or his RF company commander, a unit conducted a patrol. Only the fact that a landrover had been seen earlier in the evening prevented the Village Chief reporting an enemy party. In the same village, a group of 10 PRU are rumoured to operate as a patrol at night.

19. Should any village receive a group of VC larger than a squad, the PSDF would require outside assistance. For this PF would be the logical force. However every village does not have a PF Platoon. In Phuoc Hai, the PF numbered 15 only for most of the month as the remainder of the platoon was absent on a six weeks' course. In most cases, the Village Chief does not have communication with RF except through his District Chief. Most RF Coys are not prepared to react to villages at night. Most compounds have only one entrance and a few VC snipers could bottle up a complete company for the night.

20. With the exception of three villages the KIT system does not exist. There are no defined reaction plans. No rehearsals or briefings are conducted. Only one village has a properly written and appreciated village defence plan which includes the use of reaction forces and supporting fires.

Weak Points in the PSDF

21. Apart from those all ready covered, there are a number of problem areas in the PSDF.

- a. Lack of interest shown by District Chief and staff. During this month, only one District Chief and his counterpart stayed overnight in a village. This happened for one night and following the inspection parade, the visiting dignitaries attended a party in their honour, slept off the results while the PSDF returned to bed. Some attention is paid to the PSDF during daylight hours when he is trying to work but none after dark.
- b. The advisory staffs assigned to PSDF by DSAs are either their weakest advisers or their executive officers who are generally hard pressed to keep up their other tasks.
- c. Lack of equipment including weapons, radios, ammunition, flares, webbing and medical kits.
- d. System of inspections. Three inspections are carried out weekly by members of Sector Headquarters. To date three inspections have taken place at Long-Hai, two at Phuoc-Tien, one at Binh-Gia and Long-Dien and two were cancelled at the last moment. All hamlets inspected have the best PSDF units and it would appear that inspections will continue in a small number of selected villages only.
- e. Training. Training should be done by the PSDF members assisted by PSDF cadre. This is not so in many cases. Training of support members should be done by RDC in addition to the PSDF. RDC are in some cases not accepted and in other cases are not available to conduct training. In Phuoc-Hai with a population of over 9000 people, there is no RD Cadre.
- f. Village Leadership. The PSDF is controlled by a political base as village and hamlet chiefs are elected by the people. Generally they are not motivated to a Saigon based hard line or have not got the leadership control to enforce PSDF issues.
- g. PSDF training and operating clashes with local communal activities such as fishing (catching early tides) and harvesting and planting rice crops.
- h. In Long Le, the majority of the PSDF are involved in school. Hours of training are thus restricted.
- i. The PSDF have not had an incident or contact in their favour to date and as a military force lack confidence.

Future Activities

22. The Province Chief will chair a two day conference, 1-2 Oct at Baria to discuss problem areas and future activities with members of the PSDF and those members of the staff who have some responsibility at either Sector or Sub Sector level. It is expected that about 500 PSDF will attend.

23. The PSDF Adviser will continue to accompany his counterpart on inspections and try to induce him to spend nights in the village. He will also take measures to upgrade the efficiency of PSDF adviser staffs at District level.

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Appendix 3
to Annex C
to AATTV Report
Sep 70

REPORT BY WO2 OSBORN
RD ADVISER PHUOC TUY SECTOR - SEP 70

1. Incidents

Nil

2. Training

a. During reporting period 58 members have attended a course on Village Self Development, at NTC Vung-Tau.

b. These members have now been detached to Village and Hamlet Councils to assist the Village and Hamlet Chiefs with the VSD Programme.

c. At present there are 26 members at NTC Vung-Tau attending a Course on Land Tiller Reform Programme. On completion of the course all members will be detached to Village Councils to assist in the Land Tiller Reform Programme.

d. The RD Cadre Province Control Chief is at NTC undergoing a refresher course. This course is of one week duration and will conclude on Sunday 27 Sep 1970

3. Civic Action

The RD Cadre Civic Action programme is progressing very well. During the reporting period, they have assisted in the repair of 15 houses in Dat Do and Long Dien Districts, also they have assisted in the repair of 200 metres of road in Phuoc-Thanh Village Dat Do District. The RD Cadre Medcaps have been restricted for a while due to lack of medical supplies. This matter has now been rectified.

4. PSDF

There has been an increase of PSDF training by members of the RD Cadre, this is due to the fact that Village Chiefs are now fully aware that they may call upon the RD Cadre for PSDF training.

5. Reorganisation

Due to the considerable number of members that have been detached and one to be detached, the number of groups in this Province has been decreased to 12. It is anticipated that this will be further cut by 2 more groups by 1 Oct 1970.

6. Morale

a. Morale dropped early in September, due to an article that appeared in the Saigon Press, stating that the RD Cadre was to be severely reduced.

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Training

7. The subject matter taught is sound and applies to subjects which the soldier has not been taught properly. I would recommend that more time be spent on the M60, and claymore. Although the claymore is taught in mechanical ambush, the soldier, it appears, has not been correctly instructed in sighting of the claymore. This is evident when checking the perimeter and watching the soldier set the claymore in ambush. I recommend that the M72 be taught. The companies hold the equipment, but they are in a shocking condition and the soldier does not know how to handle the equipment.

Programme Areas

8. The company is heavily committed during the day. I feel that this company has been sent to the grove to clear and secure the area.

9. The company is too frightened to send equipment to the A&L company because they feel they will not get it back in time or that they may lose the item.

10. Training the companies by platoons does not achieve the aim as effectively as training the company as a whole. The reason is that the platoons are not brought up to an equal standard simultaneously. Training the platoons one at a time restricts the effectiveness of the team because once having completed one platoon the team loses control over the platoon and their standards drop off.

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Annex D
to AATTV Report
Sep 70

REPORT BY MAJ I THROSSELL
AREA 3 CO-ORDINATOR CORDS MR 3

General

1. My area has again been very quiet this month with the exception of the incidents listed below. There was a very slight increase in enemy initiated incidents against Territorial Forces in MR 3 but it is believed that this rise is not significant.

Significant Incidents

2. a. During the first two weeks of September there was an increase in contacts with the enemy near QL 15 in Long Thanh District of Bien-Hoa Province and along QL 1 in Xuan Loc District of Long Khanh Province. In Long Khanh the VC appeared to be concentrating on re-supply and in Xuan-Loc resupply and propaganda especially against the PSDF.

b. The deployment of 1st US Cav Div in Binh-Tuy Province resulted in a large number of people who had been living in the jungle under VC domination returning to the GVN. Accurate statistics cannot be obtained at this time as the classification of these returnees is not yet complete. The Chieu Hoi Centre in Ham Tan was initially unable to accommodate all the returnees.

c. A combined RF/ARVN/US force made contact with 1/274 Regt and the Cau Su Mobile Force Southwest of Xuan Loc on 22 and 23 Sep 70. Although 57 KIA were inflicted upon the enemy the battle was not skillfully conducted. Co-ordination was lacking. This has pointed out again the inadequacy of Sector TOCs which really are not equipped or staffed to control a major engagement.

Developments

3. a. A combined US/VN TOC Inspection team has just completed its inspection of all Sector TOCs in MR3; Directives are in the process of being issued to facilitate the upgrading of all Sector TOCs to cope with the increased workload once FWA's withdraw..

b. A directive has been issued by MR3 to Provinces directing them to pay more attention to the PSDF. This programme is lagging and firm direction from above has been needed for some time.

c. Because of the increased emphasis placed on Territorial Forces the establishment of the Advisory Directorate is to be enlarged. The initial result is that my area has been reduced to three provinces - Phuoc-Tuy, Binh Tuy and Long Khanh.

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Annex E
to AATTV Report
Sep 70

REPORT BY WO2 STRACHAN
ON THE NIGHT OPERATIONS ADVISORY TEAM

General

1. This report will cover the training of the 109 and 705 Regional Force Companies operating in Cho Gao District of Dinh Tuong Province.

Information

2. Company commanders in the main are loath to divulge their source of local information, however, I know that regional development cadre personnel through their daily association with the local people are a reliable source. Other sources of information are through normal intelligence networks. I have been informed of and seen incidents where information has been acted on immediately.

Unit Evaluation

3. The 109 RF company compares favorably with companies in the Ben Tranh District, however the weapons platoon at company headquarters could be more gainfully employed in keeping the outpost in better condition.

I would further recommend that two members of the weapons platoon accompany the reconnaissance platoon from company headquarters nightly on operations.

After five night operations with the 109 company it is apparent to me that there is little to be taught in ambush techniques, however, movement obstacle crossing and coverage of weapons are poor and training emphasis was placed on these points.

The strength of the 705 RF company appears to be the Company Commander; when he is present the company is the best of the three. I have been associated with, however, the absence of the company commander brings about a notable lack of interest and discipline by all ranks.

A night operation carried out during his absence appeared to be organized so the "advisers" could attend rather than for a contact.

Two previous night operations commanded by the company commander resulted in contact and four VC killed.

AO Evaluation

4. Companies are allotted a permanent AO in which to operate, this is flexible enough to allow companies either from this or neighboring districts to operate in.

Training

5. The thirty day syllabus as used at present is satisfactory, I have, however, requested team leaders to submit a syllabus, these with the present one will provide a basis on which to improve the training programme.

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Statistics

6. All statistics are compiled daily by the district team.

Administration

7. Unit equipment deficiencies are always slow to be replaced, one bad example is the lack of cleaning equipment which is reflected by the poor maintenance of weapons.

Unit resupply of food and ammunition functions quite well.

The morale of both units we are training is good.

Team Morale

8. I have no hesitation in saying that the morale of NOAT is extremely good.

Appendices

9. Attached are:
- | | |
|--|------------|
| a. Report by WO2 Herschell, Team Leader NOAT 1 | Appendix 1 |
| b. Report by WO2 Parker, Team Leader NOAT 2 | Appendix 2 |

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Appendix 1 to
Annex E to
AATTV Report
Sep 70

REPORT BY WO2 HERSCHELL
NOAT 1 LEADER

1. The quality of the RD soldiers of 109 RF Co. varies; some are dedicated and show pride in their units; fortunately, the majority fall in this category.
2. Fieldcraft ability at night varies according to state of alertness. The RF soldier can be very slack, but at the same time -- if the situation warrants -- the soldier becomes alert and observes the basics of his fieldcraft training.
3. The RF soldier's ability to shoot accurately at night increases to an acceptable standard after approximately two weeks of training. I have found this to be consistent with other RF companies which have been trained by the NOAT.
4. Night operations are planned by the company commander. The commander's technique may not be as detailed as ours; however, his plans do achieve success.
5. On four night operations in which NOAT participated, the operations followed the commander's initial plan. This seems to be the general pattern of all night operations.
6. Although no contacts were made during the period covered by this report by the 109 Company, the company commander did conduct an operation every night. This I feel is as successful as getting kills because the VC are being denied the right to move at night.
7. Intelligence is fairly accurate and appears to give the company commander ample time for planning of operations. The commander will act on good intelligence; thus the size of the force committed will fluctuate accordingly.
8. The company commander does have his own intelligence network, mainly from the RD Cadre operating in the area. This appears to be accurate.
9. Subject matter taught was as described by commander NOAT. Grenade training was introduced this month. Each member of the company threw two grenades, and the training was well received.
10. It has been found that emphasis on claymore is essential. The laying, aiming, and setting of this mine is currently of a very low standard. This has been rectified in this company.
11. There was an operational problem because of locations of pls. The company has three locations, which makes a company-sized night operation virtually impossible.
12. The team has no administrative problems. WO2 Herbert joined the team during this training period and will be an asset to the team.

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13. The company commander of 109 RF Company was most cooperative. He showed interest in all aspects of the training period, and at all times ensured the team had troops to train.

14. A request has been made for retraining in the LAW 72 to be inserted in the training cycle. The initial request for this subject was made by the company commander 109 RF Co.

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Appendix 2 to
Annex E to
AATTV Report
Sep 70

REPORT BY WO2 PARKER
NOAT 2 LEADER - SEP 70

1. The retraining of 705 RF Company commenced on 8 September 1970. All members of the company have zeroed their weapons. Due to operational commitments, only 9 hours of training were completed in the first week of the reporting period.
2. Due to operational commitments, the team has not been able to observe night fieldcraft.
3. A common fault noticed is the tendency to fire too high. A rehearsal during daylight followed by a night practice has achieved the following:
 - a. One platoon has been taught how to fire at night.
 - b. The platoon achieved 75% hits firing at targets at night.

Whether this can be maintained on operations remains to be seen.

Night Operations - Planning Technique

4.
 - a. The company is given an overlay each week showing the night operations. This is adhered to in the main, but due to local intelligence, at times the plan is modified. The ambush generally set is either squad-sized or company-sized and is set in a large linear type when company-sized.
 - b. The feasibility of the plans is 75% good; 25% of the time an ambush is set just for the sake of having elements deployed at night (mainly for early warning).
5.
 - a. The company-sized ambush follows the initial plan, unless the commander receives late intelligence which he acts upon.
 - b. The success of the operations is evident as follows:
 - (1) 17 September 1970 - a company ambush killed 3 VC and captured 2 AK47s.
 - (2) 19 September 1970 - a squad ambush killed 2 VC and captured 1 AK 47 and 1 grenade.

Intelligence

6. At times, intelligence is good and comes from reliable sources. But intelligence received from local gossip is very doubtful. Sometimes the intelligence is good and timely; other times the intelligence has arrived too late to organize a reaction. The company commander has his own intelligence sources but is reluctant to discuss the matter.

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b. A statement by the RD Ministry Clarifying the article has been distributed to all members, and morale is once again of a high level.

c. There has been 3 resignations, one desertion and one member resigned upon being elected to the Provincial Council.

7. School Children

The RD Cadre have been very active in assisting school teachers in all districts. A picnic at Vung-Tau beach for 100 children of Hoa-Long Village was a great success, the success of the outing can be attributed greatly to the assistance of members of 106 Field Workshop of 1 ATF. It is anticipated that about two outings per month will be arranged.

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