

# Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report  
October 1970

**Series:** AWM103 - Headquarters 1st  
Australian Task Force (Nui Dat) records

**Item:** R723/1/57/26



COVERING SECRET  
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



**AUSTRALIAN FORCE VIETNAM**



QUOTE IN REPLY

R723 / 1 / 35

HEADQUARTERS

Army Component

15 Nov 70

AHQ (C)  
1 ATF  
HQ NZ V Force

AATTV MONTHLY REPORT - OCT 70

1. Enclosed for your information is one copy of the AATTV Monthly Report for Oct 70.

*C. A. E. Fraser*  
(C.A.E. FRASER)  
Major General  
Commander Australian Force  
VIETNAM

Enclosure: 1. AATTV Monthly Report - Oct 70



COVERING SECRET  
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

1 AATF

Headquarters  
Australian Army Training Team  
Vietnam

12 Nov 70

AFV (3)

AATTV REPORT - OCT 70

General

1. During the month of Oct 70 AATTV continued to be actively involved in MR 1, MR 3 and MR 4 in operations, training and in providing advice on territorial security at province, district, village and hamlet levels.

Casualties

2. Battle Casualties - Nil

3. Non battle casualties - The following advisers were hospitalised during the month.

a. WO2 Bell was readmitted to 1 Aust Fd Hospital on 17 Oct with further stomach trouble. He is still hospitalised.

b. WO2 Heath was treated overnight 6 Oct - 7 Oct at 95th Evacuation Hospital and returned to duty.

c. WO2 Butler was hospitalised 1 Aust Fd Hospital 17 Oct to 25 Oct.

d. WO2 Pennington was discharged from 1 Aust Fd Hospital 8 Oct. He is to be readmitted for further treatment 3 Nov.

e. WO2 Herbert was hospitalised at 1 Aust Fd Hospital 27 Oct - 30 Oct for medical examination.

f. Bdr Harding was hospitalised at 1 Aust Fd Hospital from 14 Oct to 17 Oct for treatment of bruised ribs.

g. Cpl Roe was hospitalised at 1 Aust Fd Hospital from 1 Oct to 10 Oct with PUO.

h. WO2 Wright was hospitalised at 1 Aust Fd Hospital 21 Oct - 24 Oct.

Deployment

4. Attached at Annex A is the deployment of AATTV as at 1 Nov 70. The AATTV strength on 1 Nov 70 is 26 officers, 109 warrant officers, 7 sergeants and 63 corporals making a total strength of 205 all ranks.

MR 1

5. The AATTV activity in MR 1 is covered in Maj Aitken's report attached at Annex B. Appendices to that report cover;

.../2

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 2 -

- a. A special report taken from XXIV Corps Perintrep 35/70 for the period 27 Sep - 3 Oct on the NVA construction activities in the eastern DMZ. Appendix 1
  - b. A special report taken from XXIV Corps Perintrep 35/70 for the period 27 Sep - 3 Oct on the NVA major routes and trails in Quang-Nam Province. Appendix 2
  - c. A special report taken from XXIV Corps Perintrep 35/70 for the period 11 - 17 Oct covering NVA road and trail activity near the Laotian border in Quang-Tri Province. Appendix 3
  - d. Enemy locations in MR 1 as at 10 Oct 70. Appendix 4
  - e. A summary of significant contacts involving ARVN units having Australian advisers in I Corps. Appendix 5
  - f. Report by Maj Connor - S3 Adviser Quang-Tri Province Appendix 6
  - g. Report by Capt Caligari - Senior Adviser 3/54 ARVN Bn. Appendix 7
  - h. Report by Capt Brock - Senior Adviser 3/2 ARVN Bn - This report covers the unit training conducted at Dong Da National Training Centre Appendix 8
  - i. Report by WO Beattie - AATTV Adviser 2/7 Cav Regt - This report includes an ambush After Action Report Appendix 9
  - j. Report by WO2 Oliver - Adviser 4/1 ARVN Bn - This report covers activities in the FSB O'Reilly area Appendix 10
  - k. Report by WO2 Long - Adviser 2/2 ARVN Bn Appendix 11
6. Most of the significant events in MR 1 during Oct are covered in the above reports. Events which need to be elaborated upon and which are not adequately covered are;
- a. 1 ARVN Div is still operating to the North and West of FSB O'Reilly. There does not appear to be any NVA in the area around the FSB which was abandoned during the month.
  - b. The monsoon has set in with a vengeance in MR 1. The rains started on 28 Sep and very heavy and continuous rain occurred during the last week of Oct.
  - c. 11 Cav Regt and 7 Cav Regt changed locations during the month. At the present both regts are being used, in the main, in a static pillbox role. All advisers concerned are urging for the proper use of the cav and tank troops.
  - d. There has been a change in the role of 54 ARVN Regt and it apparently is not now to be given on AO in the FSB Anne - FSB Barbara area. It will remain in its traditional AO.

.../3

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 3 -

MR 2

7. As a result of a request by CG II Corps for AATTV to conduct night operations training for RF in MR 2 Comd AATTV together with the 21C and a major from Central Training Command called on the CG on Mon 26 Oct to ascertain the requirement. It was decided, that if JGS gave approval for the request that AATTV would establish a night operations training wing in the RF/PF training school at Pleiku. Courses of approximately two weeks duration for thirty RF students would probably commence on 1 Dec 70. Although essentially a CORDS province it has been arranged that the AATTV advisers will come under the operational control of the Senior MACV Adviser in HQ II Corps. This step was taken because:

- a. Dep Cords and his staff are located at Nha Trang.
- b. It is easier to establish the wing in Pleiku than in Nha Trang as
  - (1) The CG II Corps will guarantee the necessary support where as it would be more difficult at Nha Trang.
  - (2) It would be more difficult to obtain operational areas etc in Nha Trang where US Special Forces, US field units, ARVN and Korean units operate;
  - (3) The MACV advisers will support the AATTV advisers.

MR 3

8. A comprehensive report on AATTV activities in Phuoc-Tuy Province by Maj Phillips is attached at Annex C. Appendices attached to Annex C are:

- Appendix 1. Report by WO Youl - Team Leader MATT 1.
- Appendix 2. Report by WO Barnes - Team Leader MATT 2.
- Appendix 3. Report by WO Palmer - Team Leader MATT 4.
- Appendix 4. Report by WO Davies - Team Leader MATT 3.
- Appendix 5. Report by WO White - Team Leader MATT 6.
- Appendix 6. Report by WO Neagle - Team Leader MATT 7.
- Appendix 7. Report by WO Lefel - Team Leader MATT 11.
- Appendix 8. Report by WO Franks - Team Leader MATT 14.
- Appendix 9. Report by Capt Hartley - PSDF Adviser - Phuoc-Tuy Province.
- Appendix 10. Report by WO Osborn - RD Adviser - Phuoc-Tuy Province.

.../4

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 4 -

9. In his report Maj Phillips covers a further reorganization in the Phuoc-Tuy Province Advisory Team. This is the third reorganization in this team since MATTs were first introduced into the province. Unfortunately this type of reorganization is not isolated to Phuoc-Tuy Province. My own impressions are;

- a. As additional officers become available new posts are being established in various CORDS organization to accommodate them.
- b. There is a tendency in the creation of new jobs to provide for the increased US reporting work. load rather than the SVN requirement.
- c. The adviser/advised counterpart relationship is becoming a little obscure because of the new jobs.

10. The MATT Appendices to Annex C show how the MATTs are continuing to work with the RF whilst training the PSDF. WO Palmer report (Appendix 3) is of particular interest in this respect.

11. It was pleasing to hear of the Phuoc-Tuy Province Senior Advisers reaction to an observation made by Comd AATTV that most District Senior Advisers (DSA) were not directing the MATTs in their districts. Two conferences were held at Sector HQ to which all DSAs and MATT Leaders were present. One of the results of the conference is the letter attached to Capt Hartley's report (Appendix 9).

12. JWTC. 8 RAR lines will be officially handed over to Central Training Command (CTC) on 3 Nov 70 in a simple ceremony in the 8 RAR lines. COMAFV and the CG CTC will officiate.

13. A progress report on the development of JWTC has been produced and will be forwarded under separate cover. Pertinent aspects are:

- a. The students will be mainly Sgts, WO, 2nd Lts, and Lts from RF and ARVN from all MRs.
- b. Separate courses will be conducted for officers and NCO's.
- c. The first course of 50 students starts on 1 Feb 71.
- d. Joint General Staff (JGS) has issued an instruction to all MR's on the establishment of JWTC and has included a schedule of courses for 1971. By May 71 the school will be conducting two courses each of 50 students and by Jul two courses, each of 100 students.
- e. The Commandant National Training Centre Van-Kiep has been given the task of fostering the raising of JWTC.
- f. At present 76 Vietnamese have been posted to the staff of the school.
- g. A newly formed RF company has been given the defence task at the school.
- h. The AATTV conducted course for the Vietnamese staff is planned to commence on 30 Nov 70.

.../5

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



MR 4

14. A report on general and AATTV activities in MR 4 by Maj Browne is attached at Annex D. Appendices attached to Annex D are:

- Appendix 1. Report by Capt McGurgan OC Night Operations Training Team (NOTT) at Dong-Tam.
- Appendix 2. Report by WO Strachan OC Night Operations Advisory Team (NOAT) in Cho Gao District Dinh-Tuong Province.
- Appendix 3. Report by WO Hershall Team Leader Team 1 NOAT.
- Appendix 4. Report by WO Jones Team Leader Team 2 NOAT.
- Appendix 5. A translation of a message issued and signed by the CG IV Corps concerning night operations in MR 4.
- Appendix 6. A translation of a message issued by the Assistant CG IV Corps showing the schedule of courses, students etc for the NOTT for 1970.

15. Of particular interest in Annex D is;


a. Appendix 5 in which Gen Truong directs all provinces to conduct experimental night operations for a test period of three months in selected districts.

b. Appendix 2 paragraph 7 which shows that after NOAT training in Ben Tranh district;

- (1) Apparently the VC & VCI are trying to operate before the night ambushes are in position.
- (2) The number of VC initiated incidents have shown a marked drop in numbers since the NOAT training.
- (3) The ratio of kills in the district has improved tremendously.

General

16. Four New Zealanders, one Capt, two WO1 and one WO2 joined AATTV on 23 Oct.

  
(J.A. CLARK)  
Col  
Comd



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

AATTV DEPLOYMENT  
AS AT 1 NOV 70  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

ANNEX 'A' TO  
AATTV MONTHLY REPORT  
FOR OCT 70

Serial:	Rank :	Inits :	Name	: Corps :	Unit	:	Employment	:	Due RTA:	Location
					<u>HQ AATTV</u> <u>SAIGON</u>					
1.	: Col	: J.A.	: Clark	:	HQ AATTV	:	Commander	:	Jan 71 :	Saigon
2.	: LtCol	: W.M.	: Silverstone	: RAA	"	:	Second in Command	:	Jul 71 :	"
3.	: Capt	: J.	: Gilliland	: RAEME	"	:	Adjutant	:	Jun 71 :	"
4.	: WO1	: D.L.	: Howells	: RA Inf	"	:	RSM	:	Feb 71 :	"
5.	: WO2	: D.	: Pearce	: RAASC	"	:	Chief Clerk	:	Oct 71 :	"
6.	: WO2	: D.I.	: Campbell	: RAASC	"	:	Admin WO (Pay)	:	Nov 70 :	"
7.	: Cpl	: G.M.	: Eldridge	: RAASC	"	:	" " " (Desig)	:	Mar 70 :	"
8.	: Sgt	: K.L.	: Clarke	: RAE	"	:	Admin WO (Movs)	:	Feb 71 :	"
9.	: Sgt	: W.L.	: Eddington	: RAASC	"	:	Sgt Admin	:	Aug 71 :	"
10.	: Cpl	: J.W.	: Kelly	: RAASC	"	:	Clerk	:	Jan 71 :	"
11.	: Pte	: A.J.	: Hennessy	: RAASC	"	:	Driver	:	Jul 71 :	"

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../2



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 2 -

Serial	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
--------	------	--------	------	-------	------	------------	---------	----------

VUNG- TAU

12.	Lt	M.	Evans	RA Inf	HQ AATTV Vung-Tau	QM	Aug 71	Vung-Tau
13.	WO2	R.T.	Cullen	RA Inf	" "	RQMS	Jul 71	"
14.	WO2	J.V.	Holt	RA Inf	" "	" (Desig)	Oct 71	"
15.	Bdr	D.	Hewton	RAA	" "	Dvr	Aug 71	"
16.	Cpl	R.D.	Davies	RAEME	" "	Veh Mech	Jul 71	"
17.	Cpl	E.J.	Purtell	RAA	" "	Storeman	Aug 71	"
18.	Cpl	W.J.	Booth	RAAC	" "	Tpt Supervisor	Aug 71	"

BIEN-HOA

19.	Lt Col	W.A.	Woolston	RAEME		Territorial Forces Adviser MR 3	Oct 71	Bien-Hoa
-----	--------	------	----------	-------	--	------------------------------------	--------	----------

.../3

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 3 -

Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA:	Location
--------	------	--------	------	-------	------	------------	----------	----------

JUNGLE WARFARE TRAINING CENTRE

20.	:LtCol	: J.W.	: Sullivan	: RA Inf	: JWTC	: Team Leader	: Jul 71 :	Nui Dat
21.	: Maj	: P.W.	: Beale	: RA Inf	"	: Assistant Senior Adviser	: Jan 71 :	"
22.	: Capt	: W.	: Gunder	: RA Inf	"	: Instructor	: Apr 71 :	"
23.	: Capt	: J.A.	: Fitzsimmons	: RA Inf	"	: Instructor	: Oct 71 :	"
24.	: Capt	: R.M.	: Mountford	: RNZR	"	: Instructor	: Oct 71 :	:
25.	: WO1	: C.	: Crapper	: RA Inf	"	: RSM	: Sep 71 :	"
26.	: WO1	: I.	: Robinson	: RA Inf	"	: Assistant Adviser/ Instructor	: Sep 71 :	"
27.	: WO2	: K.	: McDonald	: RA Inf	"	: " "	: Jul 71 :	"
28.	: WO2	: L.	: Jackson	: RA Inf	"	: " "	: Sep 71 :	"
29.	: WO2	: W.S.	: Dickey	: RA Inf	"	: " "	: Jul 71 :	"
30.	: WO2	: K.	: Gabriel	: RAASC	"	: " "	: Sep 71 :	"
31.	: WO2	: C.	: Chambers	: RA Inf	"	: " "	: Aug 71 :	"
32.	: WO2	: G.	: Francis	: RA Inf	"	: " "	: Sep 71 :	"
33.	: Cpl	: J.H.	: Riley	: RAAMC	"	: Clerk	: Jan 71 :	"
34.	: Cpl	: R.A.	: Cross	: RAASC	"	: Clerk	: Sep 71 :	"
35.	: Bdr	: S.M.	: Boyd	: RAA	"	: Asst Instructor	: Oct 71 :	"
36.	: Gnr	: G.J.	: Honour	: RAA	"	: Driver	: Oct 71 :	"
37.	: Cpl	: W.D.	: Boyle	: RA Inf	"	: Interpreter	: Oct 71 :	"
38.	: Cpl	: E.N.	: Lloyd	: RA Inf	"	: Storeman	: Oct 71 :	"
39.	: WO1	: J.	: Boyd	: RA Inf	"	: " "	: " "	"

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../4



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 4 -

Serial:	Rank :	Initis :	Name	:	Corps :	Unit	:	Employment	:	Due RTA:	Location
MR I QUANG-TRI PROVINCE											
39.	: Maj	: K.J.	: Redman	:	RA Sigs:	Quang-Tri Sector	:	Asst Province Adviser (Military)	:	Oct 71	: Quang-Tri
40.	: WO1	: B.R.	: Lawrance	:	RAAMC	: " "	:	Medical Adviser	:	Apr 71	: "
41.	: WO2	: R.P.	: Taylor	:	RAA	: Hai-Lang Sub-Sector	:	Assistant Adviser	:	Jul 71	: "
42.	: WO2	: B.L.	: Lesueur	:	RA Inf	: 1/1 ARVN Bn	:	" "	:	Oct 71	: Near Quang-Tri (Regt HQ)
43.	: Capt	: H.E.N.	: Martens	:	RA Inf	: 2/1 " "	:	Senior Adviser	:	Apr 71	: " " "
44.	: Capt	: I.	: McQuire	:	RA Inf	: 2/1 " "	:	Senior Adviser (Desig)	:	Mar 71	: " " "
45.	: WO2	: J.R.	: Peel	:	RAE	: 2/1 " "	:	Assistant Adviser	:	Oct 71	: " " "
46.	: WO2	: G.H.	: King	:	RA Inf	: 3/1 " "	:	" "	:	May 71	: " " "
47.	: WO2	: R.J.	: Oliver	:	RA Inf	: 4/1 " "	:	" "	:	Nov 70	: " " "
48.	: WO2	: R.J.	: Curran	:	RA Inf	: 4/1 " "	:	" " (Desig)	:	Oct 71	: " " "
49.	: Capt	: C.J.	: Brock	:	RA Inf	: 3/2 " "	:	Senior Adviser	:	Apr 71	: Dong-Ha (Regt HQ)
50.	: WO2	: B.G.	: Long	:	RA Inf	: 2/2 " "	:	Assistant Adviser	:	Sep 71	: " "
51.	: WO2	: S.R.	: Wells	:	RAASC	: 1/2 " "	:	" "	:	Aug 71	: " "
52.	: WO2	: W.B.	: Rogers	:	RA Inf	: 3/2 " "	:	" "	:	Sep 71	: " "
53.	: WO2	: J.	: Bouveng	:	RA Inf	: 4/2 " "	:	" "	:	Jul 71	: " "
54.	: WO2	: A.E.	: Gee	:	RA Inf	: 5/2 " "	:	" "	:	Feb 71	: " "
55.	: WO2	: K.D.	: Pryde	:	RA Inf	: 5/2 " "	:	" " (Desig)	:	Oct 71	: " "
56.	: WO2	: F.	: Beattie	:	RAAC	: 3/7 ARVN Cav	:	" "	:	Sep 71	: Quang-Tri

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../5



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA:	Location
--------	------	--------	------	-------	------	------------	----------	----------

MR I (Cont)  
THUA THIEN PROVINCE

57.	: WO1	: M.R.	: Steiger	: RAAMC	: Thua-Thien Sector	: Medical Adviser	: Jul 71	: Hue
58.	: WO2	: J.	: Kendall	: RA Inf	: HQ 1 ARVN Div	: Sensor Adviser	: Jul 71	: "
59.	: WO2	: D.W.	: Jenkinson	: RA Inf	: 1/54 ARVN Bn	: Assistant Adviser	: Oct 71	: "
60.	: Capt	: B.J.	: Caligari	: RA Inf	: 3/54 " "	: Senior Adviser	: Jul 71	: Phu-Loc (Regt HQ)
61.	: Capt	: R.J.	: Ashfield	: RA Inf	: 3/54 " "	: Senior Adviser (Desig)	: Oct 71	: " "
62.	: WO2	: R.E.	: Mills	: RAEME	: 3/54 " "	: Assistant Adviser	: Jul 71	: " "
63.	: WO2	: N.	: Shoveller	: RA Inf	: 3/54 " "	: " "	: Oct 71	: " "
64.	: WO2	: G.E.	: Paxton	: RA Inf	: 4/54 " "	: " "	: Jul 71	: " "
65.	: WO2	: N.	: Smith	: RA Inf	: 4/54 " "	: " " (Desig)	: Oct 71	: " "
66.	: WO2	: A.W.	: Lancaster	: RA Inf	: 1/3 " "	: " "	: Jul 71	: Near Hue (Regt HQ)
67.	: WO2	: A.R.	: Clutterbuck	: RA Inf	: 2/3 " "	: " "	: Jul 71	: " " "
68.	: WO2	: J.F.	: Leal	: RAA	: 3/3 " "	: " "	: Apr 71	: " " "
69.	: WO2	: P.R.	: Conway	: RAASC	: 4/3 " "	: " "	: Oct 71	: " " "
70.	: Capt	: I.K.	: Wischusen	: RA Inf	: Phu-Thu Sector	: Senior Adviser	: Oct 71	: Phu-Thu
71.	: WO1	: A.C.	: Addington	: RAA Pro:	: " "	: Assistant Adviser	: Aug 71	: "

.../6

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



**SECRET**  
**FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY**

Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
MR I (Cont) QUANG NAM PROVINCE								
72.	Maj	R.J.	Aitken	RA Inf	HQ I Corps	Assistant to Chief of Staff I Corps	Apr 71	Danang
73.	WO1	J.S.	Calcutt	RA Inf	AATTV Danang	Admin WO	Mar 71	Aust House Danang
74.	WO2	D.B.	Bell	RA Inf	" "	" "	Nov 70	" " "
75.	WO2	G.K.	Joyce	RA Inf	" "	" " (Desig)	Jan 71	" " "
76.	WO2	D.T.	Murrell	RA Inf	29th Ranger Bn	Assistant Adviser	Jul 71	Near Danang (Gp HQ)
77.	WO2	L.B.	Green	RAAC	3/17 ARVN Cav	" "	Nov 70	Hoi-An
78.	Capt	J.J.	Smith	RA Inf	1/51 ARVN Bn	Senior Adviser	Jul 71	Mieu-Bong (Regt HQ)
79.	WO2	F.	Sykes	RA Inf	2/51 " "	Assistant Adviser	Jul 71	" " "
80.	WO2	V.	Pennington	RAA	3/51 " "	" "	Jul 71	" " "
81.	WO1	W.	Eade	RAA Pro	Hoa Vang Sub-Sector	" "	Feb 71	Hoa-Vang
82.	WO1	R.A.	Kean	RAAC	2/4 ARVN Cav	" "	Sep 71	"

.../7

**SECRET**  
**FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY**



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Serial	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
MR I (Cont)								
QUANG TIN AND QUANG NGAI PROVINCE								
83.	WO2	W.J.	McInerny	RA Inf	4 ARVN Regt Recce Coy	Senior Adviser	Apr 71	)
84.	WO2	W.E.	Bray	RA Inf	" " " " " "	" " (Desig)	Oct 71	) Quang-Ngai
85.	Capt	T.J.	Properjohn	RA Inf	1/4 ARVN Bn	Senior Adviser	Oct 71	) Province
86.	WO2	C.L.	Black	RA Inf	1/4 " "	Assistant Adviser	Aug 71	) (Regt HQ near
87.	WO1	B.	Muir	RA Inf	2/4 " "	" "	Sep 71	) Quang-Ngai)
88.	WO2	G.D.	Heath	RA Inf	1/5 " "	Assistant Adviser	Feb 71	)
89.	WO2	S.	Booth	RA Inf	2/5 " "	" "	Feb 71	) Quang-Tin
90.	WO2	P.R.	Gleeson	RAA	2/5 " "	" "	Oct 71	) Province
91.	WO2	E.	Harkin	RAA	2/5 " "	" "	Oct 71	) (Regt HQ near
92.	WO2	N.	Johnston	RA Inf	3/5 " "	" "	Oct 71	) Tam-Ky)
93.	WO2	E.	Schmidt	RA Inf	4/5 " "	" "	Jul 71	) Quang-Tin Province
94.	WO2	M.G.	Rodger	RAEME	1/6 " "	Assistant Adviser	May 71	)
95.	WO2	J.I.	Shaw	RA Inf	2/6 " "	" "	Feb 71	)
96.	WO2	J.	Nicholls	RAA	3/6 " "	" "	Apr 71	) Quang-Ngai
97.	WO2	P.W.	Teague	RA Inf	3/6 " "	" " (Desig)	Oct 71	)
98.	WO2	W.A.	Nesbit	RAA	4/6 " "	" "	Sep 71	)
99.	WO2	E.J.	Pirani	RAAMC	Quang-Ngai Sector	Medical Adviser	Sep 71	)

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../8



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 8 -

Serial	Rank	Init	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
--------	------	------	------	-------	------	------------	---------	----------

MR II

KHANH-HOA PROVINCE

100.	: WO2	: P.J.	: Pavlenko	: RA Inf	: Ranger Training Centre	: Instructor/Adviser	: May 71	: Duc-My
101.	: WO2	: C.D.	: Dermody	: RA Inf	: " " "	: " "	: Jan 71	: "
102.	: WO2	: W.E.	: Shennan	: RA Inf	: " " "	: " "	: Oct 71	: "

.../9

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA:	Location
--------	------	--------	------	-------	------	------------	----------	----------

MR III  
PHUOC-TUY PROVINCE

03.	Maj	K.R.	Phillips	RAAC	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	MATT Coordinator	May 71	Baria
04.	Maj	W.D.	Thomas	RAA	" "	Sector Psyops Adviser	Oct 71	"
05.	Capt	J.	Hartley	RA Inf	" "	PF/DF Adviser	Apr 71	"
06.	WO1	R.	Deed	RA Inf	" "	Admin WO	Jul 71	"
07.	Sgt	W.F.	Roughan	RAA	" "	Admin Sgt	Jan 71	"
08.	Cpl	S.	Sturgess	RA Inf	" "	Dvr	Dec 70	"
09.	WO2	R.E.	Heathcote	RAA	Phuoc-Tuy National Training Centre	Instructor/Adviser	Dec 70	"
10.	WO1	R.J.	Hayes	RAA	" "	" " (Desig)	Oct 71	"
11.	WO2	T.H.	Breakwell	RA Inf	" "	" "	Dec 70	"
12.	WO2	D.	Rolph	RA Inf	" "	" "	Nov 70	"
13.	WO2	L.D.	Osborn	RA Inf	" "	Adviser RD Cadre	Jul 71	"
14.	Cpl	J.	Buchan	RA Inf	" "	Linguist	Dec 70	"
15.	WO1	J.A.	Baird	RNZR	" "	Team Leader MATT 1	Oct 71	Binh-Ba
16.	WO2	M.	Youl	RA Inf	" "	" 21C "	Aug 71	"
17.	Cpl	W.C.	Parry	RA Inf	" "	" Member "	Nov 70	"
18.	Cpl	A.	Skowronski	RAE	" "	" " "	Aug 71	"
19.	Cpl	M.H.	Dawkins	RAAMC	" "	" " "	Nov 70	"
20.	Cpl	D.	Rae	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Aug 71	"
21.	Cpl	T.	Blackhurst	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Jan 71	"

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../10



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA:	Location
--------	------	--------	------	-------	------	------------	----------	----------

MR III

PHUOC TUY PROVINCE (Cont)

122.	WO1	B.G.	Rowe	RNZR	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	Team Leader MATT 2	Oct 71	Dat-Do
123.	WO2	R.A.	Barnes	RA Inf	" "	" 21C "	Feb 71	"
124.	Cpl	C.	Scraven	RAAMC	" "	" Member "	Aug 71	"
125.	Cpl	A.J.	Eade	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Feb 71	"
126.	Sgt	B.	Willis	RAE	" "	" " "	Dec 70	"
127.	Cpl	R.P.	Smithson	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Feb 71	"
128.	Capt	L.M.	Opie	RA Inf	" "	Team Leader MATT 3	Apr 71	Baria
129.	WO2	N.	Dodds	RA Inf	" "	" 21C "	Jul 71	"
130.	Cpl	J.C.	Monk	RA Inf	" "	" Member "	Jun 70	"
131.	Cpl	R.L.	Thornton	RAAMC	" "	" " "	Sep 71	"
132.	WO2	D.M.	Palmer	RA Inf	" "	Team Leader MATT 4	Jan 71	An-Ngai
133.	WO2	L.F.	McIntosh	RA Inf	" "	" 21C "	Jul 71	"
134.	Cpl	I.A.	Kuring	RA Inf	" "	" Member "	May 71	"
135.	Bdr	P.H.	Harding	RAA	" "	" " "	Feb 71	"
136.	Cpl	A.	Schneider	RAAMC	" "	" " "	Apr 71	"
137.	Cpl	M.	Phillips	RAE	" "	" " "	Aug 71	"
138.	Cpl	T.R.	McLaine	RAE	" "	" " "	Apr 71	"

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../11



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA:	Location
--------	------	--------	------	-------	------	------------	----------	----------

NR III  
PHUOC TUY PROVINCE (Cont)

139.	: W02	: R.G.	: Davies	: RA Inf	: Phuoc-Tuy Sector	: Team Leader MATT 5	: May 71	: Hoi-My
140.	: W02	: H.J.	: Wright	: RA Inf	: " "	: " 21C "	: Sep 71	: "
141.	: Bdr	: D.D.	: Keech	: RAA	: " "	: " Member "	: Jun 71	: "
142.	: Cpl	: V.P.	: Stuart	: RA Inf	: " "	: " " "	: May 71	: "
143.	: Sgt	: J.F.	: Kimberley	: RAE	: " "	: " " "	: Nov 70	: "
144.	: Cpl	: J.S.	: Kolaric	: RAAMC	: " "	: " " "	: Jan 71	: "
145.	: Bdr	: C.J.	: Cavanagh	: RAA	: " "	: " " "	: Sep 71	: "
146.	: Cpl	: I.	: Roe	: RA Inf	: " "	: " " "	: Aug 71	: "
147.	: W02	: A.G.	: White	: RA Inf	: " "	: Team Leader MATT 6	: Jan 71	: Hoa-Long
148.	: W02	: T.	: Lyddieth	: RAASC	: " "	: " 21C "	: Jul 71	: "
149.	: Sgt	: M.N.	: Talbot	: RA Inf	: " "	: " Member "	: Nov 70	: "
150.	: Cpl	: T.	: Fitzgerald	: RAAMC	: " "	: " " "	: Aug 71	: "
151.	: Cpl	: P.	: Baker	: RA Inf	: " "	: " " "	: Aug 71	: "
152.	: Cpl	: J.	: Ronaldson	: RAE	: " "	: " " "	: Aug 71	: "
153.	: W02	: J.J.	: Cootes	: RNZR	: " "	: Team Leader MATT 7	: Oct 71	: Ong Trinh
154.	: W02	: R.A.	: Neagle	: RA Inf	: " "	: " 21C "	: Jul 71	: "
155.	: Cpl	: L.	: Buckley	: RA Inf	: " "	: " Member "	: Aug 71	: "
156.	: Cpl	: J.	: Hammer	: RA Inf	: " "	: " " "	: Aug 71	: "
157.	: Cpl	: B.	: Arthur	: RAE	: " "	: " " "	: Aug 71	: "
158.	: Cpl	: P.	: Rhodes	: RAE	: " "	: " " "	: Aug 71	: "

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../12



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 12 -

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
--------	------	-------	------	-------	------	------------	---------	----------

MR III

PHUOC TUY PROVINCE (Cont)

159.	: WO2	: L.G.	: Schmidt	: RA Inf	: Phuoc-Tuy Sector	: Team Leader MATT 8	: Jan 71	: Xuyen-Moc
160.	: WO2	: M.	: Roberts	: RA Inf	: " "	: " 21C "	: Aug 71	: "
161.	: Bdr	: F.	: Gebbett	: RAA	: " "	: " Member "	: Aug 71	: "
162.	: Cpl	: K.	: McMillan	: RA Inf	: " "	: " " "	: Aug 71	: "
163.	: Cpl	: W.	: Belcher	: RAAMC	: " "	: " " "	: Aug 71	: "
164.	: Cpl	: D.	: Quick	: RAE	: " "	: " " "	: Aug 71	: "
165.	: WO2	: G.	: Hodgson	: RAA	: " "	: Team Leader MATT 9	: Jul 71	: Phuoc-Loi
166.	: WO2	: J.A.	: Griffith	: RA Inf	: " "	: " 21C "	: Sep 71	: "
167.	: Cpl	: K.G.	: Jarrett	: RA Inf	: " "	: " Member "	: Sep 71	: "
168.	: Cpl	: H.	: Dolensky	: RAAMC	: " "	: " " "	: Sep 71	: "
169.	: Bdr	: R.F.	: Miller	: RAA	: " "	: " " "	: Sep 71	: "
170.	: Cpl	: P.C.	: Aylett	: RAE	: " "	: " " "	: Sep 71	: "
171.	: WO2	: J.M.	: Lefel	: RA Inf	: " "	: Team Leader MATT 11	: Jan 71	: Long-Dien
172.	: WO2	: D.	: Taylor	: RAAOC	: " "	: " 21C "	: Oct 71	: "
173.	: Cpl	: K.P.	: Glover	: RAE	: " "	: " Member "	: Sep 71	: "
174.	: Cpl	: G.A.	: Hazel	: RA Inf	: " "	: " " "	: Sep 71	: "
175.	: Cpl	: P.	: Hately	: RAAMC	: " "	: " " "	: Sep 71	: "
176.	: Cpl	: C.P.	: Chadwick	: RA Inf	: " "	: " " "	: Sep 71	: "

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../13



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 13 -

Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
--------	------	--------	------	-------	------	------------	---------	----------

MR III

PHUOC TUY PROVINCE (Cont)

177.	: W02	: B.W.	: Ryan	: RA Inf	: Phuoc-Tuy Province	: Team Leader MATT 12	: Jan 71	: Long-Le
178.	: W02	: M.	: Muir	: RA Inf	: " "	: " 21C "	: May 71	: "
179.	: Cpl	: R.	: Sparke	: RA Inf	: " "	: " Member "	: Sep 71	: "
180.	: Cpl	: P.M.	: Gadsden	: RAAMC	: " "	: " " "	: Sep 71	: "
181.	: Cpl	: N.W.	: Burgerhof	: RAE	: " "	: " " "	: Sep 71	: "
182.	: Cpl	: A.K.	: Cameron	: RNZR	: " "	: " " "	: 71	: "
183.	: W02	: A.H.	: Franks	: RA Inf	: " "	: Team Leader MATT 14	: Jan 71	: Long-Dien
184.	: W02	: G.I.	: Darlington	: RA Inf	: " "	: " 21C "	: Sep 71	: "
185.	: Cpl	: A.I.	: Walker	: RAE	: " "	: " Member "	: Sep 71	: "
186.	: Cpl	: O.C.	: Moom	: RA Inf	: " "	: " " "	: Sep 71	: "
187.	: Bdr	: R.A.	: Kennedy	: RAA	: " "	: " " "	: Sep 71	: "
188.	: Cpl	: D.W.	: Beck	: RAAMC	: " "	: " " "	: Aug 71	: "

UNALLOTTED

189.	: W02	: W.	: Green	: RAASC	:	:	: Nov 70	:
190.	: W02	: B.G.	: Jago	: RA Inf	:	:	: Jun 71	:

.../14

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR-AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA:	Location
--------	------	--------	------	-------	------	------------	----------	----------

MR IV

VINH LONG PROVINCE

191.	Maj	J.A.	Browne	RAA	CORDS, IV Corps	Assistant to Chief of Territorial Security	Mar 71	Can-Tho
192.	WO2	A.K.	Jones	RA Inf	" "	Admin WO	Jul 71	"

DINH TUONG PROVINCE

193.	Capt	B.F.	McGurgan	RA Inf	Night Operations Training Team	OC Night Operations Training Team	Mar 71	Dong-Tam
194.	WO2	W.E.	Butler	RA Inf	" "	Team Member	Jan 71	"
195.	WO2	G.J.	Sutherland	RA Inf	" "	Team Member	Jul 71	"
196.	Sgt	K.A.	Edwards	RAASC	" "	Admin Sgt	Aug 71	"
197.	WO2	G.	Herschell	RA Inf	Night Operations Advisory Team	Team Leader Night Operations Advisory Team	Apr 71	Cho Gao
198.	WO2	D.A.	Herbert	RA Inf	" "	Team Member	Jul 71	"
199.	WO2	G.V.	Winzar	RA Inf	" "	" "	Oct 71	"
200.	WO2	D.I.	Jones	RA Inf	" "	" "	Sep 71	"
201.	WO1	H.	Buckley	RAE	" "	" "	Oct 71	"
202.	WO2	A.R.	West	RAE	" "	" "	Oct 71	"
203.	Cpl	C.J.	Brown	RA Inf	" "	" "	Oct 71	"
204.	WO2	C.N.	McEvoy	RA Inf	" "	DIOCC	Dec 70	"
205.	WO2	J.	Barnes	RA Inf	" "	" (Desig)	May 71	"

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Annex B to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

REPORT BY MAJ AITKEN  
HQ I CORPS ADVISER - OCT 70

General

1. The level of activity throughout Military Region 1 (MR 1) fluctuated during the reporting period. Major interest revolved around saturation operations conducted by I Corps forces. This subject will be discussed in more detail later in the report.
2. Enemy activity in Quang-Tri and Thua-Thien Provinces was at a very low level, but included a small number of contacts with 2nd Battalion, 1st ARVN Regiment in the area of FSB O'Reilly, and attacks by fire on La-Vang Combat Base (Quang-Tri), Camp Evans, Camp Eagle, Phu-Bai Combat Base, Nam-Hoa Sub-Sector and two FSBs to the west of Hue.
3. In Quang-Tin and Quang-Ngai Provinces enemy activity increased during the period 4-17 Oct 70. However, activity dropped sharply in Quang-Tin Province in the period 18 - 24 Oct 70, as a result of the mounting of Operation Hiep-Dong III, an operation mounted by the Province Chief in which RF and PF forces saturated the lowland area west of Tam-Ky in an effort to eliminate the VCI and to deny the enemy access to food supplies.
4. Operation Hiep Dong III was a very successful operation, accounting for 273 enemy KIA, 44 VC captured and 68 Hoi Chanhs received. During the operation 60 tons of rice were captured.
5. From the beginning of the reporting period enemy initiated activity increased sharply in the area of Thuong-Duc, Quang-Nam Province. This activity is thought to be a renewal of attempts to draw allied forces from the lowlands to allow local enemy units more freedom of movement.
6. Although pressure has been maintained against the Thuong-Duc CIDG Camp and District Headquarters by the 38th NVA Regiment, by using ground probes and attacks by fire, the friendly forces have acquitted themselves well inflicting quite heavy casualties on the enemy. Despite these casualties a PW from 38th Regiment has stated that further attacks are planned.
7. The following is a summary of activity in MR 1 from 27 Sep 70 to 24 Oct 70.

Period	: Enemy :Initiated: :Incidents:	Incoming Rounds	: Enemy : KIA	: Enemy : PW	Mine/Booby Trap Incidents
27 Sep- 3 Oct	164	400	307	13	36
4 Oct-10 Oct	162	420	475	27	32
11 Oct-17 Oct	108	407	379	21	58
18 Oct-24 Oct	211	278	798	23	79
:	:	:	:	:	:

Note: These figures do not include results of Operation Hiep Dong III or Operation Huong Diu (discussed later).

.../2

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



#### Operation Huong Diu

8. Operation Huong Diu was mounted in Quang-Nam Province at 0100 hrs 22 Oct 70, with the purpose of eliminating the VCI in the lowlands and Danang City, protecting isolated villages and hamlets and denying the enemy access to much needed food supplies.

9. The execution of the operation was similar to that of Hiep Dong III and was based on a saturation of the lowland areas using ARVN, Allied and RF/PF Forces.

10. The operation continued until approximately 28 Oct 70 when exceptionally heavy rains produced flood conditions and a great deal of effort has since been diverted to relief operations. However, in the period of the operation so far, enemy casualties number in excess of 100 KIA and 40 captured. The operation has been suspended until the flood subsides.

#### Sensor Activity

11. During the period 11 - 17 Oct, four areas of Quang-Tri Province and Thua-Thien Province reported significant activity.

12. Below the central DMZ, sensor activity detected probable southward movement, possibly of personnel of the 27th Regiment. In the western DMZ, Route 1032A had a significant increase in sensor activity indicating route construction activity and possible localized supply movement.

13. Other readings indicated continued high level of activity on Route 9 near the Laotian border, and in the A Shau Valley.

#### Construction in The Eastern DMZ

14. Attached at Appendix 1 is a special report taken from XXIV Corps Perintrep 35/70.

#### Route 610 and Major Trails in Quang-Nam Province

15. Attached at Appendix 2 is a special report on the above-mentioned subject, taken from XXIV Corps Perintrep 35/70.

#### Ho-Chi-Minh Trail System

16. Attached at Appendix 3 is a special report taken from XXIV Corps Perintrep 37/70.

#### Enemy Disposition

17. Attached at Appendix 4 are the locations of enemy units by provinces.

#### Significant Contacts

18. Attached at Appendix 5 is a summary of significant contacts of ARVN units having Australian advisers.

#### Adviser Reports

19. Attached are extracts of reports submitted by advisers covering the reporting period.



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 1 to  
Annex B to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

ANNEX D (CONSTRUCTION IN THE EASTERN DMZ) TO XXIV CORPS PERINTREP 35-70 (U)

This report is a resume of activity in a section of the Eastern DMZ (EDMZ) bounded by coordinates YD 1977, YD 1477, and YD 1483. (See Figure 1) This report is in response to the recent high number of sightings within this area.

Three major trends have been noted in this area of the EDMZ. They are (1) an increase in overt military activity, (2) resettlement and reclamation of farm lands, and (3) road building or improvement of existing roads.

Within the designated area there are 10 locations with military-related activity. Seven of these areas were evident on aerial photography of January of this year. Photography of 13 September has shown that these areas have increased in size and are presently expanding. New construction in three other areas has been noted, but it is still too early for an exact determination of its function. The 10 areas are: (refer to Figure) 1) 1. Storage facility, YD 183815; 2. Transshipment point, YD 189828; 3. Transshipment point, storage and supply area, YD 167830; 4. Military installation, YD 174814; 5. New construction of approximately 60 huts, YD 153827; 6. Construction camp, YD 148822; 7. New structures, YD 155817; 8. Open storage area, YD 150799; 9. Headquarters-type building complex, YD 159783; 10. Open storage, YD 159789.

At location number 3, aerial photography confirms 2 reports by an agent concerning warehouses for stockpiling food and ammunition for the Northern Quang Tri Liberation Front. One report of 9 September told of truck convoy, consisting of 12 vehicles, having moved from the Dong Hoi area to a warehouse in the vicinity of location 3 in the Quang Xa area. The cargo consisted of approximately 500 122mm and 140mm rockets, approximately two-thirds of which had delayed fuses.

The most obvious trend in this area, and perhaps the most obvious explanation for the increased sightings is the resettlement and reclamation of farm lands. The use of bulldozers to fill in old bomb craters, and tractors for plowing and harvesting has been noted in a majority of the reclamation. The resettlement of this area extends as far south as the northern bank of the Song Ben Hai River.

Route 1111, 1A and an unnumbered road segment are the only improved routes carrying wheeled vehicle traffic in this section of the EDMZ. Route 1A is open from the "Freedom Bridge" area north, Route 1111 starts vic YD 185823 and extends eastward towards the coast. An unnumbered road segment from YD 160849 to YD 150815 has shown the most significant improvement in this area. January coverage showed this route to be under construction; it is now equivalent to Route 1A going northward. It was no doubt improved to facilitate the entrance and exit of supplies and other material into the area. There have been reports that convoys of NVA trucks have moved from the Vinh Linh area (See Figure 1) south on Route 1A and then on a road to reach the Hoang Xa area. The cargo is then unloaded at some unknown point and moved to a warehouse in the vicinity then distributed to NVA units operating in the DMZ. Photography confirms the report as probably true. A military area is located in the Vinh Linh area and the unnumbered road segment lies within 1 kilometer of Hoang Xa.

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

FIGURE 1

EASTERN DMZ :

Map Reference:

Scale 1:50,000

Stock Nos : L 7014 6443 III

L 7014 6442 IV





SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 2 to  
Annex B to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

ANNEX E (ROUTE 610 AND MAJOR TRAILS IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE) TO XXIV  
CORPS PERINTREP 35-70 (U)

This report is an update on Route 610 and recently noted trails in Quang Nam Province. The intelligence was gathered from aerial photography, agent reports, and a recent visit to then Nong Son CIDG Camp.

Movement of supplies from Laos into southwestern Quang Nam is the responsibility of the 220th transportation regiment. Route 969 in Laos, now sustaining light foot traffic, was once the main route to the border. At present, an alternate trail system seems to be carrying most of the traffic. This major trail, first noted on photography in July leaves Route 966C (Point A, YC 620085, Figure 1) and heads north toward Route 610. VR has also reported a trail running in this alignment (Point B, YC 640185 to Point C, YC 663245) through the jungle to A Ro. A hand-held photograph of a bridge along this route at location D, YC 641201, showed the route to be capable of sustaining bicycles.

Once incountry in the A Ro area, the enemy trail system forks into 2 main branches. The newer and heavier used route is along the Song Boung River, location E. The second route, which follows the old alignment of Route 610, is sustaining light to moderate foot traffic. Once these two trails join at the Song Cai at point G, YC 970362. Upon arriving at the river, we believe that the 260th Transportation Regiment takes over the duties of the 220th.

During the briefing at Nong Son CIDG Camp, a heavily used trail in the vicinity of location R, ZC 180305, was mentioned. From a subsequent study using photography and Special Force reports, two major trail systems were pieced together. These two major trails traverse Base Area 112.

A review of all September agent reports concerning Base Area 112 showed all unit locations given to fall on trails branching off either one of these two main trails, which would tend to confirm their importance as logistical routes. The units reported by the agents are as follows: elements of the 38th Regiment with a Weapons cache (Point 1, ZC 049385, Figure 1); K-1 and K-2 of the 39th Regiment allegedly waiting for supplies at Point 2, AC 01260; and the K-8 Battalion of the 38th Regiment which has approximately 200 men in the vicinity of Point 3, AC 205363. Other troop concentrations are located at Point 4, AT 809313.

We feel that once past Nong Son, the Song Thu Bon is the major supply route for the Que Son and possibly the Hoi An area.

In summary, it appears that the trail as outlined is the major logistical route from Laos supplying southern Quang Nam Province. Given the present alignment of this trail and the current absence of direct routes from Laos to either Quang Tin or Quang Ngai, it is possible that this trail may also be the primary means of supply for the southern provinces.

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

FIGURE 1.



CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 3  
Annex B to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

ANNEX D (ENEMY LOC) TO XXIV CORPS PERINTREP 37-70 (U)

This report concerns the Ho Chi Minh trail system paralleling MR 1 and focuses on Routes 9 and 926-616 in Western Quang Tri Province. In relating enemy logistical activity, this report also will attempt to explain the recent build up in Laos to the West and south of Khe Sanh and the recent large enemy contact along Route 9 in the Lang Vei area.

The shift of the incountry Arc Light effort to Laos combined with tac air has restricted enemy road construction and limited resupply. Construction activity has been heaviest in the tri-border area near the Western DMZ. Road use has consisted of a shuttle pattern between Base Areas 604 and 611. In light of the construction south out of the DMZ along Route 1032B and the enemy's limited ability at present to move supplies incountry, any increase in activity on any of the routes entering MR 1 would be a clue to enemy intentions.

Interpretation of aerial photography has indicated two significant developments: (1) an increase in activity along and south of Route 9 and (2) sustained road repair work on Route 926. (Figure 1)

ROUTE 9

Comparison of photographic coverage in the vicinity of a destroyed bridge, vic XD 755352, along QL 9, six km incountry, showed a significant increase in foot traffic along this route. A faint trail was visible on the western side of the bridge and no signs of activity were evident on the eastern side on photography of 22 September 1970. Photography over the same area on 6 October showed very clearly a ground scar left by infiltrating personnel. Two days after the date of the photography and within one km of the destroyed bridge (XD 757357 and YD 764257), C-1-17 Cav and C-1-11 Cav observed and engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 29 enemy KIA. Documents taken from the contact revealed that 10 of 11 men of a squad from an unidentified regiment were new recruits who were drafted in April and May. In all probability they had been incountry only a few days and Route 9 served as their means of infiltration into South Vietnam. Moderate to heavy foot traffic along Route 9 is evident for the first time from the Lang Vei area west into Laos. A well used trail branches off Route 9 at XD 603378 (point 1 on map) and heads northward along a stream to the vicinity of Ban Buk (V), XD 562432 (#2 on map). North-south trails paralleling Route 2032B connect this area with the western DMZ and North Vietnam.

Another document taken from the squad leader dated 2 August, lists two missions of this unit: (1) to open wide a road; (2) to guarantee transportation and road building. Another document was a poem titled "Engineer Soldiers". It is likely that the unit contacted on 8 October was an engineer unit, probably on its way south to work on roads. While the use of Route 9 as an infiltration route by enemy personnel is significant, it is not likely that their mission concerned Route 9. More probable, their destination was farther south, along Route 616. Hoi Chanh ~~██████████~~, a former 2nd Lieutenant from the 6th Regiment and a very knowledgeable individual about enemy roads, in a recent interrogation indicated that the primary means of infiltration for units operating in northern Quang-Tri was through the central DMZ and not along Route 9, which is considered too vulnerable to detection. Another route in this region, Route 608, especially in the vicinity of the Khe Sanh plains (XD 850418), is equally vulnerable due to the open terrain, as the enemy has found out on numerous occasions. The volume

.../2

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



of activity evident at the junction of Route 608 and Route QL 9 south of Khe-Sanh is also considerably less than the activity evident along the border. This former international highway has no fewer than 13 destroyed bridges along its length - all of which would have to be repaired, or suitable fords developed for the enemy to use the roadbed for wheeled vehicles. VR in the area of the contact on 8 October reported numerous bamboo lined bunkers with rice inside which would also tend to indicate this area as a probable way station for personnel infiltrating south rather than a major east-west LOC. With the former roads entering Thua-Thien, Quang-Tri and Quang-Nam presently closed, the forward supply caches used by the enemy to sustain units in the field have had to be established farther to the west and north. The last road open to the enemy was Route 9222 which led into the Fire Support Base Ripcord-O'Reilly area. Since 22 September, when that route was closed, there have been no active roads into the Corps AO. At present the area to the south-west of Khe-Sanh in Laos is the closest staging area to South Vietnam that the enemy can resupply by truck, except of course for the DMZ. There at present is no through truck traffic in the network of roads paralleling MR I. The extent of the enemy's ability to move supplies by truck is indicated by the shading on the map. The most successful shuttle has been between Base Area 604 and 611; but even traffic on this link has been sporadic due to heavy bombing. Trucks from the Tchepone area in Laos head east on Route 9G to connect with Route 92C. Rather than continuing east on Route 9H toward the border, traffic turns south on Route 92G to ford the Xe Pon at the Ban Dong Ford, XD 516383. Only foot traffic is visible from XD 526395 east along Route 9H. Spur roads off Route 92G south of the Xe Pon and spur roads off Route 926 are used to cache supplies in the region south of Route 9 and the Xe Pon. Aerial photography has noted open storage, agricultural activity, and heavy trail activity in probable bivouac areas in the following locations: along a trail from Route 9H to Ban Buk (V), from XD 596392 to XD 586412 (location A on map); along a spur road off Route 92C from XD 520355 to XD 540355, (location B); within a two km radius centered on Ban Huk (V), XD 620330 (location C); and within a four km radius around XD 700300 (location D). Traffic further south than this area has been severely limited by some of the heaviest bombing of the war.

In contrast to foot traffic along Route 9, is the nature of activity on Route 926. Meticulous road repair work is currently underway in an attempt to create an all-weather road. Former bomb crater interdictions have been filled halfway across to support vehicle traffic and this fill in turn has been shored up on the side by logs. The road is two lanes wide and will be able to support a heavy volume of traffic once interdictions are cleared. The presence of 55-gallon fuel drums on the flatbeds of destroyed trucks noted along the road also indicate the enemy may be building up POL dumps along the road to support heavy traffic. While at present, there is no indication of activity farther east incountry on Route 616, activity on Route 926 is evident to a point within a few kilometers of the border.

This extensive repair activity, the use of Route 9 as an infiltration route south for a possible engineer unit, and the buildup between Route 9 and 926 all suggest that the enemy intends to use Route 616 across the Salient to support its future actions in Quang-Tri and Thua Thien, once north-south supply routes from North Vietnam become open.



SECRET


[illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 4 to  
Annex B to  
AATTV Report Oct 70



UNLOCATED

A-22 of A-23


SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix  
Annex B to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

ANNEX A (DISPOSITION AND STRENGTH) TO XXIV CORPS PERINTREP  
36-70 (U)



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

ANNEX A (DISPOSITION AND STRENGTH) TO  
XXIV CORPS PERINTREP 36-70 (V)


THUA THIEN

HUE

UNLOCATED



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY





SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 4 to  
Annex B to  
AATTV Report Oct 7

ANNEX A (DISPOSITION AND STRENGTH TO XXIV CORPS PERIMETER 36 70 (U)

QUANG TIN

UNLOCATED

FD 6/230  
GK 38 1/2  
GK 10 1/2  
GK 57 1/2  
11 2

230

CL 4/230

2/230

230

5/230

GK 30 1/2

GK 33 1/2

GK 35 1/2

3/230

100

11

102

QUAM PU

14

TAM

KY

Q-L-1

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



4-1968 A-23



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 4 to  
Annex B to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

UNLOCATED



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 5 to  
Annex B to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS OF ARVN  
UNITS HAVING AUSTRALIAN ADVISERS

1. At 020700 H in the vicinity of YD 307217, 5 pers from 3rd Coy 4th Bn 1st Regt were searching the vicinity of 4th Bn 1st Regt NDP when they received 50 x 60mm mortar rounds and a ground attack from an estimated 2 Pls of enemy. One platoon of 3rd Coy was sent to reinforce. Results were: Friendly; 1 KIA, 2 WIA and one M16 destroyed. Enemy; 12 KIA and 1 x B40 launcher, 1 x IMG and three individual weapons captured.
2. At 021100H in the vicinity of BS 566739, 4th Bn 4th Regt, searching, contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in three enemy KIA, three captured and the capture of two individual weapons and 6 grenades.
3. At 060035H in the vicinity of AT 884521, 1st Bn 51st Regt in NDP contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in 5 friendly WIA.
4. At 060130 H in the vicinity of BS 574757, 4th Bn 6th Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force resulting in four VC KIA and the capture of one individual weapon.
5. At 060310 H in the vicinity of BS 569802, 1st Bn 6th Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force resulting in four VC KIA and the capture of one individual weapon.
6. At 060300 H in the vicinity of BT 115305, 2nd Bn 5th Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force resulting in four VC KIA and the capture of two individual weapons and 7 grenades.
7. At 060500 H in the vicinity of BT 150240, 4th Bn 5th Regt conducted a raid and captured 10 VC suspects.
8. At 061320 H in the vicinity of AT 960517, 3rd Bn 51st Regt, searching, contacted an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 8 VC KIA and the capture of 1 x B40 launcher, 3 x AK 47 and 2 x CKC.
9. At 061140 H in the vicinity of YD 646191, 1st Bn 3rd Regt contacted a VC platoon, resulting in 13 VC KIA and the capture of 1 x B40 launcher, four individual weapons, 50 x B40 rounds, 10 x AK 47 magazines and 100 uniforms.
10. At 071500 H in the vicinity of BS 512828, 4th Bn 6th Regt captured three VC and 11 VC suspects.
11. At 081020 H in the vicinity of BT 148225, 1st Bn 5th Regt received one Hoi Chanh and 16 civilians from VC controlled area.
12. At 081305 H in the vicinity of BT 154224, 1st Bn 5th Regt, captured one VC and received 15 civilians from a VC controlled area. Civilians had 500 kg of unpolished rice.
13. At 081540 H in the vicinity of YD 646181, 3rd Coy 1st Bn 3rd Regt, contacted one platoon of VC, resulting in 12 VC KIA and the capture of 1 x B40, 2 x AK 47, 190 kg of rice and various documents.

.../2

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



14. At 090815 H in the vicinity of BS 678813, 4th Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 6 VC KIA and the capture of 1 AK47 and one carbine.
15. At 091350 H in the vicinity of YD 630138, 2nd Bn 3rd Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force resulting in one friendly WIA, 8 enemy KIA and the capture of 3 x AK47.
16. At 091115 H in the vicinity of BT 156247, 4th Bn 5th Regt received 21 civilians from a VC controlled area.
17. At 091500 H in the vicinity of BT 156247 the same unit received another 20 civilians from a VC controlled area.
18. At 100630 H in the vicinity of BS 558962, 4th Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in 5 VC KIA and the capture of 5 grenades.
19. At 100830 H in the vicinity of BS 664829, 4th Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in 5 VC KIA, and one M60 and 15 grenades captured.
20. At 110200 H in the vicinity of BS 717543, 4th Regt Recon Coy, searching, contacted an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 5 KIA and the capture of one AK 47.
21. At 110305 H in the vicinity of BS 564912, 4th Bn 6th Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 5 KIA and the capture of one AK47.
22. At 130915 H in the vicinity of BT 238496, 3rd Bn 5th Regt searching, contacted an unknown size enemy force, resulting in friendly one KIA and one WIA, and 25 enemy KIA, 5 VC captured and the capture of 2 x AK 47, 1 x 82mm mortar sight and 57 grenades.
23. At 131600 H in the vicinity of BS 720476, 2nd Bn 4th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 3 VC KIA, the capture of 1 x Colt 45, 6 grenades, 500 kg of rice, 300 kg of salt, and the destruction of 10 VC houses.
24. At 141215 H in the vicinity of XD 964594, 4th Bn 2nd Regt contacted a VC squad resulting in 3 VC KIA and the capture of 1 x 82mm mortar, 100 x B40 rounds, 200 x 82mm rounds and 1000 kg of rice. Fifty foxholes were destroyed.
25. At 150810 H in the vicinity of YD 330240, 3rd Bn 1st Regt contacted two platoons of VC, resulting in 7 VC KIA and the capture of 1 x B40, 2 x AR15 and 10 kg of rice.
26. At 170001 H in the vicinity of BS 539775, one platoon of 4th Bn 6th Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force resulting in 4 VC KIA and the capture of one carbine and 13 grenades.
27. At 171430 H in the vicinity of YD 609152, 2nd Bn 3rd Regt contacted a VC squad resulting in 5 VC KIA and the capture of 2 x AK47. Two bunkers were destroyed.
28. At 171545 H in the vicinity of BS 543953, 1st Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force, resulting in friendly; 1 KIA and 2 WIA and enemy; 2 VC KIA and the capture of 1 x M79 and 6 grenades.

.../3



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 3 -

29. At 191720 H in the vicinity of BS 655556, 4th Bn 4th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in 5 VC KIA and the capture of 3 VC, three carbines, 10 grenades, 30 kg of rice. Five hundred kilos of unpolished rice was destroyed.
30. At 200530 H at La Vang, 4th Bn 1st Regt received 10 x 122mm rockets. No casualties or damage was sustained.
31. At 201030 H in the vicinity of BS 670579, 4th Regt Recon Coy captured 5 VC and 1500 kilos of unpolished rice. The rice was evacuated to the Regimental base.
32. At 202035 H in the vicinity of YD 903094, 3rd Bn 54th Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force, killing 4 VC and capturing 3 x AK 47.
33. At 210945 H in the vicinity of BT 110257, 4th Bn 5th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 4 VC KIA, 1 NVA KIA and the capture of 1 x AK 47, 1 x M1, 50 grenades and four packs.
34. At 210930 H in the vicinity of ZC 036988, 1st Bn 54th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 5 VC KIA and the capture of 1 x HMG, 100 x AK 47 rounds and 3 x B40 rounds.
35. At 221045 H in the vicinity of XD 997590, 3rd Bn 2nd Regt detonated a claymore mine which killed two ARVN and wounded 13 ARVN.
36. At 211210 H in the vicinity of BS 417778, 2nd Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in 2 VC KIA and the capture of 5 VC, 1 x AK47, 10 cans Nuoc Mam, 14 cans salad oil, 5 bags of rice, 50 cigarettes, one bicycle and an unknown quantity of medical supplies.
37. At 220455 H in the vicinity of YD 636174, 2nd Bn 3rd Regt raided an unknown size enemy force killing 5 VC and capturing 1 x M1, 1 x AK 47 and 1 x M16.
38. At 240715 H in the vicinity of BT 113308, 2nd Bn 5th Regt received 8 Hoi Chanhs.
39. At 241600 H in the vicinity of BT 113324, 2nd Bn 5th Regt received 6 VC Hoi Chanhs.
40. At 251730 H in the vicinity of BS 588,455, 1st Bn 4th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in 4 VC KIA and the capture of 1 x BAR and 12 grenades.
41. At 272225 H in the vicinity of AT 975604, 2nd Bn 51st Regt in NDP received an unknown amount of 60mm and B40 fire resulting in 5 KIA and 4 WIA.
42. At 281140 H in the vicinity of BS 669822, 4th Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in 9 VC KIA and the capture of 1 x LMG, 1 x M72 and 14 grenades.
43. At 281445 H in the vicinity of BS 533771, 4th Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in 5 VC KIA and the capture of one carbine and 5 grenades.

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 6 to  
Annex B to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

REPORT BY MAJ CONNOR  
S3 ADVISER - QUANG TRI PROVINCE OCT 70

Enemy

1. Enemy activity has slackened considerably in the reporting period. This change could be attributed to a number of different factors, either singly or in combination. They are;
  - a. A change of strategy/preceding acceptance of a ceasefire. GVN officials here support this idea and suspect that the NVA will now try to infiltrate the populated area, and continue their activities after the cease fire. This would, of course, initially leave the Regular forces well out of the fight, and immobilized by the ceasefire.
  - b. A logistic build - up for an offensive is being made. The location of an Engineer group and new road construction in the Lang Vei area supports this.
  - c. A combination of wet weather and the casualties suffered over the past few months have blunted the NVAs enthusiasm for further offensives at present. This tends to follow the traditional pattern of slacking off in the wet swason.

A captured document indicates that at some time in October, 7th Front and district officials were to meet and receive a new policy which is then to be disseminated and put into action.

2. It is now known that the VCI in Hai Lang, Mai Linh and Trieu Phong Districts have been far more numerous and active than previously thought. The clean up of this organisation is still going on, and the full extent of the organisation is not yet known. The major effect now obvious is that the GVN officials have been shaken out of their complacent attitude which could be unfortunate for the VCI. The VCI/Naval Sapper combination operation in Gio Linh District have not suffered this sort of reverse and continue to plant water mines in the Cua Viet at will.
3. Enemy intentions are not clear. There have been obvious changes of emphasis, but the direction and nature of the next offensive is not obvious. There is no reason to believe that the enemy has lost his desire to take control of this Province.

Friendly Forces

4. Regular forces have left FSBs O'Reilly and Barnett due to the difficulty of supplying these areas in the monsoon season. However 1st ARVN Div and 147 VN Marine Bde continue to operate aggressively, within the limits set by the bad flying weather. There are operations going on in the O'Rielly area, and 1/5 Mech Bde(US) is conducting artillery raids on the Laotian border.
5. Regional forces have continued their operations in and near the populated area, apart from being drawn out a little in Huong Hoa District on combined operations. A "Bunker finding campaign" initiated by Phoenix (at last!) targeting activities had probably rendered ineffective the Hai Lang District Special Action Unit. The follow up action and analysis of what has been achieved

.../2

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



is still going on. The results will not be fully apparent for some time yet; the stimulus to activity is pleasing to see. A further targeting operation in the village suspected of harboring the Naval sappers is under way at the moment.

6. Co-operation between regional and US forces continues. US suspicion and misgivings about the ability of RF and ARVN to work together is growing. This is certainly the case at a superficial glance. On closer inspection one realises that this is not the case. When the NVA has entered the RF area of operation in strength, immediate and effective combined operations have ejected him. When US units have been similarly committed there has been a good deal of confusion, most US/RF operations are carefully planned some days in advance, and still take some time to become effective. I believe the US attitude overlooks

a. The heavy commitment of ARVN to operations outside the populated area, leaving little time for secondary operations.

b. The lengthy preparations made for most US/RF operations.

c. The desirability of working with US units (from the RF point of view). This gives access to the US logistic system in various ways. ARVN does not have these resources.

7. Current indications are that friendly forces will not attempt any large scale operations in the near future. US Civic action activities have slowed down, due to the reduced availability of materials and engineer resources. This is unfortunate, as the local populace is now able to see past the immediate need to survive, and is asking for help with long range projects, which would be more effective.

#### Other Matters

8. The proper and effective employment of MATs in Quang Tri Province has always been a problem. This problem may be resolved in the near future with the introduction of five new MATs, allocated to the five RF Coy Gps, with whom they are to live. At present District MATs live in the District compound and are loth to get out for more than daily visits. This produces lack of rapport, and consequent effectiveness. The District MATs are not mobile (this being a state of mind) and are in many cases a waste of time. The new MATs have a Capt as leader, and with this leavening of greater experience should be able to perform an effective task within a few months. The lack of interpreters will be a jurdle for some time.

9. The 1971 Pacification and Development plan is now being developed by province officials. The planning for this programme should be more effective than for the 1970 plan which was received and developed in a matter of 3 weeks. This plan will have about 3 months to develop. VSD plans must now be fully costed before acceptance, and materials will become available through commercial organisations, rather than through the Province warehouse. This should give a fillip to the local economy; frustrations with the lethargy of civil administration officials could equalise the benefits of this.



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 7 to  
Annex B to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

REPORT BY CAPT CALIGARI  
SENIOR ADVISER 3/54 ARVN BN  
OCT 70

1. The general aims of the unit were:
  - a. Security of FSB Anne till 10 Sep.
  - b. Reconstruction of FSB Anne
  - c. Intensive ambushing between Phu-Bai and FSB Anzio west of Route 1 and Headquarters Company providing security on FSB Anzio.
2. Methods used to achieve these aims were:
  - a. Two Coys patrolling around FSB Anne. However most of this effort was concentrated east to south east from Anne at approximately 5,000 metres.
  - b. One rifle coy and Headquarters coy occupying FSB Anne, with the aid of one engr tp, rebuilding the bunker complex.
  - c. Three rifle coys (each coy providing two pl and two squad sized ambushes) located in the foot hills during the night pulling back to the Highway 1 villages during daylight.
3. My opinion of how successful the unit was in achieving these aims are as follows:
  - a. Security of FSB Anne very good. Aggressive to mediocre close to medium range patrolling prevented any enemy concentrations or build up in the AO. However, the western portion of the AO was somewhat neglected through insufficient forces for further patrolling. A period of heavy contact during the latter part of last month in a 4000 metre square 5000 metres due east of Anne provided good results. Although it was a little disappointing to learn that this area was not further exploited after the advisers left this particular company late last month to attend the AATTV parade. I believe this particular area of contact was a VC camp security and maintenance force of one coy plus to two coys. On return from Vung-Tau intelligence sources revealed that most NVA units were withdrawn to the south west and further patrolling in the contact area indicated that the VC forces had also moved.
  - b. Reconstruction of FSB Anne was top priority. All forces on FSB Anne were employed from approx 0600 hours to 2300 hrs daily. Hold-ups in the programme, usually, were the result of shortages in sandbags and PSP. Unfortunately, I believe the design of the bunkers to be poor although the original concept was excellent. Initially all bunkers were to be constructed on the VC/NVA principle - below ground using an A frame support. From experience this type of bunker proves practically indestructable from all weapons except tac air delay bombs and delay 8" Artillery - a capacity the enemy cannot employ. The bunkers constructed at FSB Anne incorporated an A frame in the centre with two square portals at each end; the whole structure above ground. I believe these bunkers have the following weaknesses.

.../2

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



(1) The profile is far too high. The enemy could easily deduce which bunker is used for what purposes and eliminate them by a flat trajectory weapon from some distance over a period of time.

(2) The bunkers are unstable. The A frame principle is excellent when supported under ground. However, above ground its strength becomes a major weakness through lack of support. My overall impression of the reconstruction of FSB Anne is that it is a great improvement over what existed. However, a little more work would have produced an excellent result.

c. Ambushing during the latter part of the reporting period netted good results.

(1) 19 Oct - 3 NVA KIA, 1 NVA captured, 2 AK47 captured.

(2) 20 Oct - 5 NVA KIA, 2 AK47 and 1 B40 captured

(3) 22 Oct - 2 NVA KIA, 1 AK47 captured.

4. Highlights during the period were:

a. Inspection of rear area (Long Tho) by 1 Div. 3/54 reported to have best rear area in Division.

b. Inspection of 3/54 by C of S 1st Div (connected with "New Horizons" project) reported to be very impressed.

c. Visit by CO and advisers to soldiers in hospital and distribution of suitable presents.

d. Trip to Vung-Tau for presentation.

e. Visit of COMAFV.

5. The overall standard of the unit is as follows:

a. An influx of new officers to the Bn has practically brought the staff up to strength. Although there is no appreciable improvement, the potential exists.

b. Morale is high and a certain amount of this can be attributed to the good reports from inspections. The relationship between the Regimental Commander (LTC HUONG) and the Bn Comd (Maj KHA), previously very strained, has improved out of sight. Recently the Regt Comd made the unprecedented move of visiting the Bn Comd and staff one night for social reasons only.

c. Overall standard as previously reported with improvements in the aspects above. Negative deterioration has been detected.

6. Major weaknesses in detail are as follows:

a. Bunker construction as reported in para 3 b. However, the plans were laid down at Regt or Division which did not leave the CO with much alternative.

b. Some instances of misuse of fire support occurred.

c. Instances of poor sighting of claymore mines and occasional accidental detonation of mechanical claymore mines.

d. Live ammunition still being left on Night Defensive Positions FSBs and rifle ranges.



REPORT BY CAPT BROCK  
SENIOR ADVISER 3/2 ARVN BN  
PERIOD FROM 19 SEP - 19 OCT 70

1. General. Throughout the period under review the Bn was undergoing retraining at the Dong Da National Training Centre (DDNTC).
2. Aims of DDNTC. The aims of DDNTC is in part to provide retraining for ARVN Bns in basic skills and teach new procedures and developments in technique.
3. Training Areas
  - a. Ranges. The ranges are generally good. They are well laid out, well maintained and all range practices are well run.
  - b. Tactical Training Areas. These are too small, and the country is far from ideal. There is no natural cover and the terrain is generally featureless. There is nothing that the DDNTC can do to improve this state of affairs as Saigon has rules that safety during training from enemy interference must be guaranteed.
4. Standard of Instruction. This is generally just satisfactory, occasionally good but all too often poor. The main faults are:-
  - a. The instructors have no recent battlefield experience, if they have had any before at all. (A classical example is that the Commandant has been at the DDNTC for 8 years, but still considers himself an infallible source of knowledge on ARVN Bns. Even to the point of telling Bn Comds what they do and don't do - generally wrongly - in the field).
  - b. The instructors are reluctant to ask the Bn officers about Bn SOP's and consequently much of the training contradicts Bn SOP's.
  - c. Most of the instructors are too junior in rank and experience, especially when it comes to tactical training at platoon level or above for their views to carry any weight.
  - d. In the early stages too much time is spent on unnecessary elementary basic knowledge type instruction. E.g. soldiers are lectured for a complete morning on the characteristics of the M16 rifle.
  - e. The inflexibility of the instructors to rush over what is known by the students and if necessary introduce more advanced lessons earlier than stated in the programme. This particularly applies to the more basic lessons in both weapon training and tactics. More time should have been devoted to marksmanship and fire and manoeuvre and less to recruit type lectures.
5. Attitude Adopted by Bn. The Bn Comd was determined to get what value he could out of the period. To this extent he was unusual, as most ARVN Bns

.../2



use the period as R&C and take little interest in the proceedings, allowing their officers and NCO's to do no work, consequently the soldiers do and learn nothing. Steps taken by the Bn Comd to achieve this included:-

- a. Maximum members attended training each day. The Bn maintained 94% attendance over the period.
  - b. One officer and a suitable number of NCOs accompanied every class.
  - c. On tactical training all NCO's and officers attended every period of instruction with their Coys.
  - d. The Bn Comd spend on average 5-6 hours a day in the training area visiting and supervising training.
6. Value of Training to The Bn. The training received falls into two categories, weapon training, tactical training and staff training. Each will be dealt with separately.
- a. Weapon Training. As with all ARVN units the Bn marksmanship is not good and this was a valuable phase of the training. The Bn Comd took the opportunity to train up almost 100% reserves on all crew served weapons (81mm mor, 60mm mor, M60, 57 RR). The ranges and range practices are good, especially the grenade and M79 ranges. The two big weaknesses were that individual weapons were not zeroed and that at no time did the instructors coach the bad shots. Some attempt was made at coaching by the Bn NCOs but they did not have the training to achieve much.
  - b. Tactical Training. This was very poorly run. As previously stated the instructors did not have the experience and the presence of the Bn officers at times proved embarrassing to the instructors. Very little emphasis on fire and maneuver is given by the DDNTC, and this is regrettable as the training areas lent themselves particularly well to practicing this maneuver. Some value was obtained by the younger of the squad leaders but apart from that, little was learned. One impressive fact was that the Bn Comd insisted, and frequently checked, that at all times every soldier was fully briefed on the situation both enemy and friendly, mission and execution of any tactical problem set. This was done not only in an attempt to add interest and realism to the training, but to practice comds at all levels in the giving of orders.
  - c. Staff Training. This was very bad indeed. A big effort is being made to improve this subject by the Advisers to DDNTC but it has a long way to go. Examples are that whilst a full day is spent with a Second Lieutenant lecturing on map reading only a morning is devoted to the production of operational orders. The former all the Bns officers are good at, the latter was virtually a new, and very important, subject. The weakness in this subject is all the more regrettable as one of the Bns main weaknesses is that the staff does not work as a staff, more as a group of "odd job men" for the Commander. However some of it was useful and every little helps.

.../3



7. Duties of Bn Advisers

- a. Bn Senior Adviser. His task was to accompany the Bn Comd on his visits to training and report and comment to the DDNTC Advisory Staff on the standard of instruction and what value it is to on ARVN Bn. It was also a valuable opportunity to see what the ARVN are taught, as opposed to how they apply it in the field. Fortunately their application of the theory is more realistic than most of the theory.
- b. Asst Adviser. His main task was to take the opportunity to re-equip the Bn from US Rubbish Dumps and to get all the Bn technical eqpt inspected and repaired, if necessary, by US technicians. It was also a useful opportunity to get to know the various Pl and Coy Comds and their mode of operating.

8. Conclusion. Unfortunately this was a valuable opportunity wasted by an out of date syllabus, poor instruction and an attitude that to combine battlefield experience within theory to practice new ideas is not to be encouraged. Until, and unless, a system of staffing NTCs with officers and NCOs from successful battle tested units is introduced, and at maximum time limit on length of posting is set, things are unlikely to improve. The time was a rest from battle, and a change of air and station but not a period of valuable retraining.



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 9 to  
Annex B to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

REPORT BY WO BEATTIE  
AATTV ADVISER 2/7 CAV REGT  
OCT 70

1. During the reporting period 7th Cav Regt moved from Firebases on the DMZ to FSB Sharon and FSB Nancy.
2. 2 Troop is at FSB Nancy. The remainder of the Regt is at FSB Sharon. During the month 2/7 Troop has maintained 17 vehs. One vehicle is still in the supply system. This vehicle has been forthcoming for approx 7 months now. All inquiries cease with the S4 at Hue who says it is coming. The month also saw the fitting of mine kits and boyancy kits to all APC's.
3. October 17 the troop was involved in an ambush on the road to FSB Barbara. The after action report is attached.
4. The troop is being misused at FSB Nancy and all efforts to change the role from FSB pill boxes has come to a standstill. APCs. should be used in a mobile role not in a static role, as now applies. The troop provides daily security for the road to FSB Barbara.

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 9 to  
Annex B to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

REPORT BY WO BEATTIE  
AATTV ADVISER 2/7 CAV REGT  
OCT 70

1. During the reporting period 7th Cav Regt moved from Firebases on the DMZ to FSB Sharon and FSB Nancy.
2. 2 Troop is at FSB Nancy. The remainder of the Regt is at FSB Sharon. During the month 2/7 Troop has maintained 17 vehs. One vehicle is still in the supply system. This vehicle has been forthcoming for approx 7 months now. All inquiries cease with the S4 at Hue who says it is coming. The month also saw the fitting of mine kits and boyancy kits to all APC's.
3. October 17 the troop was involved in an ambush on the road to FSB Barbara. The after action report is attached.
4. The troop is being misused at FSB Nancy and all efforts to change the role from FSB pill boxes has come to a standstill. APCs should be used in a mobile role not in a static role, as now applies. The troop provides daily security for the road to FSB Barbara.

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

AFTER ACTION REPORT  
WO BEATTIE - ADVISER 2/7 CAV REGT

Task

1. The daily task of 2/7 troop ARVN Cav at FSB Nancy (Grid sq 4439) is to provide an APC Plt for security for an Engineer Mine Sweep team from C Co 14 Engineers US who sweep the road from Nancy to CP 7 (Grid 366369). Once the mine sweep is completed the PC's return to various locations along the road to provide security to CP 7.

Action

2. On 17 October 1970 the task was allotted to 2nd plt with 5 APCs. The Engineer plt was made up of 1 bulldozer, 1 Jeep and 3x5 ton tip trucks. At 0700 hours the convoy left Nancy. At approximately 0905 hours at CP 5 (Grid 374371) the front of the Mine Sweep came under heavy small arms and B41 rocket fire. Almost simultaneously the APCs came under extremely heavy B40, B41 rocket fire. Knocking out the 2 and 3 APCs in the column (The positions of the enemy were at this time a maximum of 40 meters from the road). The rear of the column was some 1200 meters from the head of the column and was also taking small arms fire. The whole column was pinned down by accurate fire.

3. At 0930 hours 2/7 troop minus reacted to the call and arrived on the scene at 0940 hours. By this time the Engineer Sunray had summoned help from 2 plts of his own troops and 2 Duster Vehicles who had all ready gone to the assistance of the ambush. The Plt in ambush called for a medevac on a Hot LZ thus ceasing any Arty fire that was likely to be put in. At this time the Engineer Sunray was controlling the situation from FSB Nancy. He had 3 plt of troops on foot, a Dustoff and 2 Gunships, a resupply link with FSB Barbara all on the same frequency thus chaos arose. No gunships could be employed because of the number of stations of the frequency. 2/7 troops eventually put in 3 sections of ARA by hand signals on the possible escape routes of the enemy. At 1045 hours another Dustoff was requested and came in untouched. The contact was continuing and a 3rd Dustoff came in at 1145 hours again on a hot LZ. At approximately 1150 hours the enemy broke contact and headed south. The area was swept by people from 2/7 troop while the engineers tended their vehicles and accessed the damage. At approximately 1215 hours small arms fire was received from the Knoll north of CP 6 (Grid 373372). This was silenced by the Duster who had moved up to the PCs.

4. At 1300 hours 1x60mm round was received from vicinity of (Grid 368359) - counter mortar fire was returned by ARVN Arty from Nancy. At 1530 hours the Engineers recovered their disabled vehicles to FSB Nancy. At approximately 1730 hours 2/7 troop returned to FSB Nancy.

Results

<u>Own Troops</u>	2 US KIA	7 US WIA
	No ARVN KIA	12 WIA
<u>Vehicles</u>	2 x APCs u/s	
	1 x Bulldozer u/s	
	1 x Jeep u/s	
	1 x 5 ton tip truck u/s	

.../2

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 2 -

Enemy

11 KIA  
1 x B40                      1 x B41 rocket launcher  
7 x B40, B41 rounds  
2 x AK 47s

Note

1. The enemy was not dug in at any stage. The surrounding area provided all the cover needed. Terrain is hilly and covered with low scrub.
2. The ranges of the contact were from 15 ft to 40 metres.
3. Confusion arose because of the number of stations on the net and the sunray trying to control the situation from Nancy.
4. Enemy strength was estimated at approximate 80 because of the length of the ambush.
5. No artillery was fired until after 1200 hours some 3 hours after the contact.

Maps.

1. Hai Lang No 6442-2
2. Ba Long No 6442-3

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 10 to  
Annex B to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

REPORT BY WO2 OLIVER  
ADVISED 4/1 ARVN BN OCT 70

### General

1. 4th Bn 1st ARVN Regt was still in support of the area FSB O'Reilly until it was closed at 0930 hrs on 6 Oct, then the bn pulled back to a area west of FSB O'Reilly to search and destroy any enemy locations or troops. The bn remained in this area until 15 Oct then was air lifted back to La-Vang for refitting and reissue of equipment, and rest for the troops.

### Operations

2. 4 Oct. I rejoined the bn after the parade at Vung-Tau. at GR YD 307229. The light command post (LCP) joined 1 Coy at GR YD 317224 and received 75x82mm mortar rounds between 1900 hrs and 0300 hrs.

5 Oct. LCP and 1st Coy moved to GR YD 315223 at 1330 hrs LCP and 1 Coy received 15x82mm mortar rounds. Results 3 WIA. Fired 40 rounds of 8 in into enemy mortar location GR YD 316216. Results confirmed by Pink Team: 15 bunkers 4x3 metres destroyed.  
2 mortar pits destroyed.  
1 x 82mm mortar destroyed.  
3 KIA (NVA).

I also fired 22 rounds 8in into GR 313218. Nil results.

6 Oct. 3 Coy made contact with pl size enemy at GR YD 307219. Used 6 sets of Tac Air and 1 Pink Team. Also fired 14 rounds 8in. Results unknown because it got dark before we could get into location, also FSB O'Reilly closed at 0930 hrs.

7 Oct. Bombed enemy locations from 0830 hrs to 1000 hrs. Moved into enemy locations, no sign of enemy. LCP and 1 Coy then moved from GR 307219 to GR 305245 searching areas GRs 313225 - 318240 - 305245. No contact.

8 Oct. 1 Coy ambushed in area GR 309232, 2 Coy ambushed area GR 294235. All units returned to night location at 1830 hrs. No contacts.

9 Oct. 1 Coy, 2 Coy, light CP joined up with the main CP at GR 300246 and received resupply. The LCP and 2&3 Coy then moved to the west to search and destroy in the area GR 299238. At 1900 hrs 3 Coy conducted a night raid on Hill GR 290235. No contact.

10 Oct. LCP and 2 Coy moved to GR 285242, in area of GR 290235 - GR 285242 where there were many enemy bunkers and fighting pits. Also sign of the enemy. At 1500 hrs 3 Coy ambushed at GR 280243 made contact with 5 NVN. Results enemy 2 KIA. Friendly - Nil. Captured 1 AK 47. At the same time as this contact LCP and 2 Coy received 15 rounds 82 mm mortar.

11 Oct. LCP and 2&3 Coys moved to GR YD 278245 at 1100 hrs received 10 rounds 82mm mortar. At 1125 hrs a pl of 2 Coy formed a new base camp at GR 275247. I fired 8in into the area. Results:

.../2

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 2 -

2 huts destroyed.

100 lbs rice captured

50 rounds 61mm mortar captured

500 rounds .51 Cal AA. captured

2 friendly WIA

Results. 12 Oct. 2 Coy moved to the area GR YD 270249 at 0200 hrs, to raid.  
Nil.

2 Coy at 0800 hrs moved to GR 273248 to search and ambush.  
Results; Nil.

3 Coy 0700 hrs moved to GR 283255 to search and ambush. Results; Nil.

13 Oct. 2 Coy moved to GR 265256 to search and ambush. Results; Nil.

3 Coy moved to GR 275245 - GR 275245. At 1400 hrs 3 Coy made contact at GR 267253 with an NVA pl in a base camp. Used two sets of ARA. Results; Enemy - 3 WIA, 1 KBA.

14 Oct. LCP and 1 Coy Hele lifted from GR 300246 to FSB Nancy. Then by truck to La Vang at 0800 hrs. LCP, 2 & 3 Coys walked from GR 273257 to GR 311275 at night to be hele lifted out at 1000 hrs on 15 Oct. No contact.

15 Oct. Hele lifted out of GR 311275 to FSB Nancy, then trunked to La-Vang.

15 Oct - 20 Oct. Unit resting, refitting and reequiping. 120 personnel on leave every three days for three days.

#### Info

From 10 Aug until 6 Oct the unit was in contact with enemy units around FSB O'Reilly but after 0930 hrs 6 Oct the enemy broke contact and moved most of his forces to the south toward the old FSB Ripcord and then west towards the area of the new road which they built.

As this unit did not have any heavy contacts with large size enemy units after 6 Oct, it is thought that the enemy have pulled back to rest and reequip before their next move.

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 11 to  
Annex B to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

REPORT BY WO2 LONG  
ADVISER 2/2 ARVN BN  
FROM 20 SEP TO 20 OCT 70

General Aims for Period

1. To occupy Firebase Khe Gio at GR 029563, protection of Khe Gio bridge and patrolling of AO bounded by Grids 04 to 08 and 57 to 69. Lastly to assist in protection of Camp Carroll.

Methods Used

2. Firebase was occupied by HQ Coy and one Rifle Coy less two platoons, one of these platoons was situated on Khe-Gio bridge and the other patrolled around the 275 feature at GR 021558 - this dominating feature looks directly down on the Fire Base and was used successfully by NVA sappers when Khe-Gio was overrun in Feb of this year.

3. The AO was covered by two coys and LCP for two weeks with negative contact and no signs of recent enemy movement. AO was later changed to cover area bounded by Grids 95 to 04 and 52 to 57; the same system was employed and once again negative results.

Achievement of Aims

4. In all cases it was just routine patrolling and ambushing which was carried out quite satisfactorily.

Highlights During Period

5. NIL. There was considerable NVA activity to North and North West around Firebase Fuller in area of Grids 93 to 02 and 57 to 68, this appears to be the major cache and supply areas, also major rocket and mortar positions. The NVA do not appear to be interested in coming below the 57 Grid at this stage.

Overall Standard

6. Standard of unit at this stage is very good with moral high and very few desertions. This Bn had a bad time on Fuller, just prior to my arrival, when a mortar ammo dump caught fire and blew up. The Bn suffered 17 dead and 30 odd wounded however, with a 10 day spell in the base area at Dong-Ha and 30 days in the relatively quiet and relaxed atmosphere of Khe-Gio, the Bn is now full strength and fully operational.

Major Weakness

7. Care of weapons and control of ammunition and equipment is a major problem, no regular check has been made on weapons, either personal or crew served with the exception of 81mm mortars which are kept in excellent condition, this is possibly because they are fired daily.

8. It is a common sight both around the Firebase and in the field to see bandoliers of M16 ammo, flares and pieces of equipment discarded. When confronted about this the Bn Comd stated it was not his men but other units

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../2



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 2 -

however, as all items were not as yet badly affected by weather, no other troops had been in the area very recently and one can assume NVA do not discard items of use it must be this unit; still the Comd is most emphatic it is not his troops so the problem remains.

Suggestions for Above

9. Regular inspection of all Bn weapons to ensure good working condition. Inspection by Pl Comds morning and night, in the field, of all flares, grenades and ammunition and therefore instil in the soldier the fact that he must ensure he keeps the items to show his superior at any time. In this way the wastage could be cut considerably.

10. I have already been asked and have carried out two inspections of all Bn weapons and found the following:

a. One GPMG M60 had not been fired or stripped for some time, as a result I had to use force to get the gun pulled down. In an emergency this weapon would have been completely useless.

b. Another M60 also had not been fired for some time, in fact the previous gunner had been killed and with him went the wrench for the gas cylinder and from then was never opened, the plug froze and the weapon would only fire single shots.

c. The .50 cal spotter rifle mounted on 106 RCL had not been fired due to lack of ammo and therefore had not been cleaned, in fact the crew did not know how to strip. I have assisted them twice in stripping and cleaning and this is now done regularly and with much enthusiasm by the crew.

Strong Points of Unit

11. Close association between Commander and all troops, he observes as much of the training as possible and in many cases such as range practices, he takes over, talks to troops individually, explains and gives tips, making for a close knit unit with good moral.

Major Duties During Period

12. Worked on relieving basis with US Assistant Adviser in travelling with LCP in field to co-ord artillery, air, resupply and medevacs and while at base assist and instruct in care and maint of all Bn weapons.

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Annex C to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

REPORT BY MAJ K PHILLIPS - SENIOR AUST ADVISER  
PHUOC TUY PROVINCE OCT 70

Introduction

1. Some changes have been made to the organization of Team 89 as a result of the increase in US personnel in the team. A new sub division has been created to embrace the full range of territorial forces advisory effort. The sub division is controlled by a US major for whom the job, I believe, was made to provide meaningful employment to the officer. The title given to the appointment is "Plans, Operations, and Support (POS) and under this appointment there are the following:

- a. S1/S4 Adviser - Majority of time spent on logistics for the US personnel and very little if any advisory effort.
- b. S2 Adviser - Does not really advise the VN S2 due to the multitude of tasks given to this officer to fulfill US reporting procedures.
- c. S3 Adviser - Yet another change has been to this appointment due to the DPSA's absence on extension leave. The current S3 Adviser is a US captain who certainly endeavours to fulfill his task but is hampered by the number of Advisory Staff he must consult before implementing any advisory effort. I would recommend that Australia should consider seriously the possibility of providing the S3 Adviser. If this occurred the officer selected must be made fully aware that he would be an adviser and not the Sector Operations Officer.
- d. RF/PF/PSDF Adviser - This is really the basic element of the Territorial Forces advisory effort. Included in this element is the responsibility for the co-ordination of the MAT/MATTs in province. The element comprises one AATTV major, (RF/PF), one AATTV Captain (PSDF) and one US Lieutenant (Assistant RF/PF - primarily concerned with TFES).
- e. SM & DSLC Adviser - Position occupied by a US major and a staff of approximately eight - most of whom are underemployed.

2. The new PSA, Mr R Walkinston, is fully in control of the Team and is a pleasure to work for due to his diplomatic approach and grasp of the problems of an advisory team. He has a high regard for the AATTV members, particularly the MATTs, of the team and pays periodic visits to the MATTs, to indicate his interest.

*Walkinston*

.../2

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



Deployment of MAT/MATTs

3. Deployment of AATTV MATTs, 1 to 8 inclusive is as shown in paragraph 6a of the monthly report for Sep 70.
4. Deployment of the remaining AATTV MATTs is as follows;
- a. MATT 9 - Phuoc Loi on route 44 and co-located with 480 RF Coy.
  - b. MATT 14 - This MATT was previously referred to as MATT 10 but due to the significance of the number "10" in the VN system has been renumbered to "14". The MATT is co-located with 586 RF Coy in Long-Dien District at GR YS 425605.
  - c. MATT 11 - Currently deployed and co-located with Long-Le District HQ at Hoa-Long. This is a temporary expedient pending the availability of pre-fabricated MATT accommodation buildings to be provided through RAE courses. The buildings are not yet available. It is planned to deploy the MATT in the area of Long Huong on Route 15 and co-locate it with 445 RF Coy. Further details are given later in this report.
  - d. MATT 12 - Final deployment was made to Tam Phuoc and co-located with 576 RF Coy. The MATT moved into the building previously occupied by US MAT 63. The original intention to deploy the MATT with 577 RF Coy (GR YS 406596) was changed due to accommodation problems and lack of a real requirement for a MATT with 577 RF Coy.
5. US MATs 63 and 64 have now left Phuoc-Tuy province, leaving a total of 13 MAT/MATTs in the province - this includes US MAT 70. It is understood, but not confirmed that this MAT will be moved from province in the forthcoming 30 days.

Employment of MAT/MATTs

6. With the exception of MATT 3 (302 RF Bn) all MAT/MATTs are currently involved in upgrading the PSDF in accordance with directions issued by MR 3. There is some misconception that by such employment the AATTV MATTs are no longer employed with RF. It should be appreciated that training of PSDF can only be completed for certain limited periods each day and does not in itself create an over employment of the MATT. In fact in some areas the opposite effect has been noticed in that the MATTs are now fully employed and can operate with the RF and still play their part in the upgrading of the PSDF.
7. A letter has been sent to the Province Chief by the Province Senior Adviser (PSA) indicating that the MATTs should not be directly involved as the instructors for the PSDF but rather that the MATT train selected soldiers/NCOs from the RF Coys to perform the duties of instructors to the PSDF on military subjects. This has been tested by MATT 2 and appears to work satisfactorily.

.../3



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 3 -

8. Due to some apparent confusion on just what the MATT medical NCOs can and cannot do, a meeting was arranged through the RMO 1 ACAU with the Province medical officer at the Baria hospital. All medical NCOs from the MATTs (including US MAT 70) attended the meeting/briefing which proved to be highly beneficial to the NCOs judging by the number of questions from each NCO. Emphasis was placed on the fact that the NCOs are advisers and should act as such rather than implementing their own medical treatment system. However, it should be appreciated that a medical NCO is trained to provide medical aid/treatment to those in need, and situations will arise where the medical NCO will have no alternative but to treat the individual in need of such attention.

9. Detailed employment activities for each AATTV MATT during the reporting period are covered in the respective MATT reports attached. Specific comments on the reports are as follows:

a. MATT 1. Binh Ba. Primary activity has been the clearance of the minefield around the compound. The clearance has created a deficiency in the defensive capacity of the compound. Pressure on the VN supply system did produce some results but insufficient to fully improve the defences. With the closing of FSB Le Loi by 1 ATF, an offer was made by Comd 1 ATF to the VN at Sector that they could have access to the FSB in its existing state or alternatively use of the defence material. The Sector Chief of Staff, DPSA, and RF/PF Adviser visited the FSB with the possible aim of moving 655 RF Coy from Binh Ba to FSB Le Loi. After some discussion and inspection of the area, the Chief of Staff decided against occupying the FSB and requested only the materials. This request was met by 1 ATF the extent of extending the closing date of the FSB a further two days to allow the VN to have maximum time. Constant requests to the Chief of Staff to provide transport and soldiers for the task were not fully successful and much valuable time was lost. 655 RF Coy gained most from the materials and together with the MATT personnel were able to obtain a considerable amount of defence stores for use on the Binh Ba compound. Due to the pressing requirement to improve the compound, MATT 1 has been built up to nine including two RAE NCOs and one WO1 from HQ AATTV Baria. To date materials being used have come from VN sources, FSB Le Loi, and currently from FSB Lynch which is being reduced in size due to the reduction in the 2/25 US Bde in the area. A request has been made to the Sector Chief of Staff to reduce the number of operations (more often than not "walks through the bush") for 655 RF Coy until the defences of the compound are greatly improved. A report from Team Leader MATT 1 is attached at Appendix 1.

b. MATT 2. No further comments to add to the report attached at Appendix 2 except that MATT2 is a well organized group and handling their extended responsibilities in an efficient manner. Much credit for this must be given to WO2 AS Williams the previous MATT leader who worked hard to achieve the results which are so now evident.

c. MATT 3. Once again 302 RF Bn is not being effectively employed as a single operational entity. This is disappointing after what appeared to be a promising change with the Long Hai Route 44 clearing operations. Sector staff appear to have no desire to employ the Bn in a well defined AO - the advisory effort is therefore open to

.../4

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



question. There are a number of areas in the province which as a result of intelligence information could prove worthy of employment of the Bn. 302 RF Bn correctly employed could be an asset now with the withdrawal of 8 RAR, rather than "sun baking" on the beach.

d. MATT 4. An Ngai. A detailed report by the MATT leader is attached at Appendix 3. Included in the report are details of the operation on Lon Son Island when five RF soldiers were medevac as the result of an ambush by VC. The use of the MATT element in this operation does indicate that MATTs are not operating solely with the PSDF. Highlights of the operation are indicated in the report but not included on such factors as the requirement for more airmobile training, the correct use of flank protection, and security at the halt. The reaction of the Coy Comd to the ambush was apparently good but the fact remains that five RF soldiers were WIA (two seriously) with negative results. The medevac was made to 1 Aust Field Hospital at Vung-Tau due, in my opinion to the urgent medical treatment required for the seriously wounded. The assistance, co-operation, and treatment given by the CO and staff of the hospital was excellent and reflected the high standards of the unit. As the RF/FF adviser and the person on the helicopter at the time I cannot express sufficiently my personal admiration for the assistance given by the hospital staff. The question of a relay station on the island for future operations when MATT personnel are involved have been noted and will be effected by the MATT system.

e. MATT 5. The report by the MATT leader is attached at Appendix 4 and includes the after action report on a combined operation conducted under the control of CO 2 RAR. Although the results were not as good as expected, based on the information provided, the operation was effective in deploying RF Coy from one district to another. The assistance given by 1 ATF, in particular the helicopter support, ensured that the operation did go as smoothly as possible bearing in mind the number of elements involved. Comd 1 ATF explained in detail at the end of the operational briefing that the operation was primarily an RF task and only 1 ATF assistance would be provided. Once again, as in previous operations, the approach made by 2 RAR assisted in the upgrading of the province RF Coys.

f. MATT 6. No further comment is added to that of the report by the MATT leader attached at Appendix 5. It is possible that 701 RF Coy may become more active in the area of Hoa Long with the withdrawal of 8 RAR. MATT members have accompanied all operations of any magnitude by 701 RF Coy.

g. MATT 7. Report by the MATT leader is attached at Appendix 6. With the deployment of one group HQ (3/15 RF Gp HQ), and three RF Coys (252, 384, 385) along Route 15 in the area of interest of MATT 7, this MATT has more than enough to do. Emphasis will change back to the RF Coys in the near future when the first phase of training the PSDF combat elements are completed.

.../5



h. MATT 8. Construction of the compound in the vicinity of the village office at Xuyen Moc is continuing. Some problems are being experienced in administrating this MATT due to the insecurity of the road from Dat Do to Xuyen Moc. Escorts are required for the resupply vehicle and with the limited assets of the team, this requirement is sometimes difficult to overcome but is not insurmountable. Once established this MATT will have a full calender as neither of the two RF Coys at Xuyen-Moc are of a high standard - in fact both are poor even though the DSA may state otherwise to visitors to the area. A report from the MATT leader is not included due to the limited activity of the MATT to date.

i. MATT 9. This MATT was deployed during the reporting period and is still in the process of becoming established and making contact with the RF Coy Comd. However, the MATT has completed a study of the deficiencies in the compound and with the RF Coy Comd have produced a plan for the improvement of the compound.

j. MATT 11. This MATT was deployed during the reporting period and the activities of the MATT since deployment are included in the MATT leader's report. As a temporary measure, the MATT is located in the Long Le District HQ compound and operates from this area on a daily basis. It is proposed to deploy this MATT to Lang Huong on Route 15 and co-locate the MATT with 445 RF Coy. This RF Coy is not assigned to Phuoc Tuy Sector and is directly controlled by Comdt, National Training Centre, Van Kiep for security of the range area. The purpose in locating the MATT with this Coy is long term planning as it is proposed that short training courses for Sector RF Coy officers and NCOs be conducted by this MATT after the training of PSDF has been completed. The close proximity of the range area was a deciding factor in proposing the locating of the MATT with 445 RF Coy. It is stressed that the proposal to use the MATT in the course training role is only a proposal at this stage. It may be necessary to readjust the rank structure of the MATT by inter MATT movement to achieve a desirable level of experience and instructor ability to implement the short training courses. The team leader's report is attached at Appendix 7.

k. MATT 12. After a delay in the movement of US MAT 63, MATT 12 was finally deployed on 16 Oct 70. A report is not included for Oct 70 due to the limited activity in the period. The original plan to use this MATT as a Sector "Reserve" MATT may have to be varied slightly in view of the performance of 576 RF Coy on the Lon Son island operation (see comments - MATT 4).

l. MATT 14. This MATT is now well established and achieving promising results in all fields as indicated in the MATT leader's report attached at Appendix 8. The highlight for the period is the request by the Coy Comd for the MATT members to accompany ambushes by the Coy.

RF

10. A total of 28 RF Coys (including the Boat Coy and Polwar Coy) were deployed in Province until 28 Oct 70 when the RF Coy (946) that marched out of Van-Kiep National Training Centre (VK NTC) on 3 Oct 70 was detached to VKNTC for security duty with JWTC at Nui Dat. A further two RF Coys (945 and 955) are currently undergoing training at VKNTC and are due to march out at the end of Nov 70. The deployment of these two RF Coys is not known.

.../6



11. RF Coys, in general, continue to be used in operations of short duration and of limited value. The majority of so called operations are generally not based on sound intelligence due to an apparent breakdown in the collection, collation, interpretation, and dissimulation of the intelligence information available. The majority of operations are planned on limited and unconfirmed information from a variety of sources usually at low levels. The accepted reason for the numerous operations is search and destroy on ground analysis. To further complicate the system most operations are conducted in areas for which a platoon could adequately fulfill the tasks. It is not unusual to find during research for the reasons for the operation that a clearly defined mission (aim) is never stated - hence the continued repetition of "negative results".

12. The fragmented deployment of the RF Coys throughout the Province does not assist in the basic problem of upgrading the RF to such a standard to replace FWMAF in the area.

13. Insufficient use is made of the RF Gp HQ to control operations of more than one Coy. In the one instance where a Gp HQ element was deployed in the combined operation with 1 ATF the system proved successful in application. In the operation on Lon Son island where two coys and elements of a third coy were deployed the Gp HQ concept was not used and a lack of co-ordination occurred.

PF

14. There has been no significant change to PF capabilities since the last report. Currently the PF are the "poor relation" in terms of employment and direction of advisory effort.

15. In a number of instances the PF are restricted by the close proximity of RF Coys and the method of employment of the RF Coys in close in operations.

PSDF

16. A report by the PSDF Adviser (AATTV) is attached at Appendix 9.

17. It was interesting to note that during a recent visit by MACV/DEPCORDS PSDF advisory staff the only area of concern was that the figures presented during the inevitable briefing were identical to those held in Saigon.

18. A close working relationship has been established between the PSDF Adviser and the PSDF VN Staff Officer at Sector. It is possibly one of the most frustrating fields for an adviser and full credit must be given to AATTV officer currently filling this appointment in Team 89, for the interest he has generated and the confidence he has gained with his counterpart.

RF Cadre

19. The report by WO2 Osborn, the RD Adviser, is attached at Appendix 10.

Conclusion

20. Not a great deal of progress has been made in the employment of RF Coys. MATTs are restricted if the RF Coys are not used on meaningful operations

.../7



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 7 -

with specific missions. There is a growing scope for the use of the RF in Phuoc-Tuy if firstly the intelligence/operations sections were better co-ordinated, and secondly some consideration were given to group the RF Coys to reduce the number one compound security duty and the introduction of better planned operations.

21. In some areas the provision of an S3 adviser to provide continuity in advice would be a decided asset. The constant changing of the S3 adviser must be most frustrating to the VN as with a change of adviser a variation in advice is an inbuilt factor on such changes.

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Apeendix 1 to  
Annex C to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

REPORT BY WO2 YOUL  
TEAM NEADER MATT 1

General

1. During this past month the clearing of the Binh Ba Compound minefield was cleared by ATF Holdfast team. At this time four concertina fences have been completed around the perimeter.

Operation

2. Night ambushes have been maintained, however, with the lack of compound defenses these have been at a minimum, however at least twice per week a platoon has patrolled the outer perimeter during hours of darkness. One ambush per night.

3. Combined Op. 655 RF Coy took part in a combined operation on the 8th Oct with the US 4/23 25th Div. Grid Squares 4487/4489.9 female suspects detained on first objective G.S. 4487.3 female suspects detained on second objective G.S. 4489. Operation cleared through to lower extremes of G.S. 4489. A qty of rice, tobacco, glucose candy, collected. Apart from 3 VN men seen running from Objective 1, no other males over the age of 12 years were sighted.

4. 655 RF Coy Ops.

12th Oct. to Grid Squares 4174. 4274, 4275, Neg Results WO Stephens, Cpl Parry attended.

15th Oct to Grid Squares 4673 - 4675. Neg Results. Nil Advisors.

21th Oct. Intelligence Squad to Grid Squares 4874 - 4974, 4875 - 4975. Neg Results.

22nd Oct. with 622 RF Coy Operation cancelled due to lack of choppers due to bad weather.

PSDF

5. Elementary First Aid Course conducted at Vinh Tanh Dispensary. PSDF of Ngai Gio, Vinh Tanh, La Vang, 1 member each RD Cadre Vinh Tanh 2 members. Results above average and PSDF interested in more courses of this nature.

6. PSDF at Ngai Gio seem reluctant to take part in any physical labour to improve the defences and general situation in their hamlet. With the increased number of Hoi Chanhs coming into this area and with the increased activity, an intensified effort is being made through District for a programme of Night Firing exercises and general training. The hamlets of Vinh Tanh and La Vang have had team members stay overnight observing night activities, both PSDF work with the local PF Platoons.

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 2 to  
Annex C to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

REPORT BY WO BARNES  
TEAM LEADER MATT 2

Training RF

1. 578 RF. Negative training. When 609 RF Coy complete their training we hope to start training 578 Coy again.

2. 772 RF

a. Completed their training by platoons.

Total Periods

2 Pl 10 Hourly Periods

3 Pl 11 Hourly Periods

b. Average attendance 20.

3. 609 RF

a. Started training the Coy by platoons. We have increased training periods to 25 to carry out practical training. First platoon has completed their training.

b. 1st platoon - 25 periods - average attendance 20.

4. Training has been stopped owing to RF Coys training for their National day parade. As soon as their National day has passed we will resume training again.

5. Range practice was conducted at the Horse Shoe under the control of MATT 2.

Unit involved were:-

1 Pl 578 Coy

1 Pl 609 Coy

1 Sqd 55 PF Pl

PSDF

6. It was pleasing to see the good weapon handling from all units and the accuracy of each individual.

7. PSDF Training

a. Training began on 12 Oct 70 and was completed on 19 Oct 70. The training was carried out by 9 RDC and 578 RF NCOs.

b. Training program was only for 7 days - 6 days training and 1 range practice. The Village Chief would not allow any more than a total of 7 days because the PSDF had to go back to the fields to work.

.../2

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



8. Six Days Instruction Covered

- a. Weapons
- b. Organization PSDF
- c. Political Warfare
- d. Logistics
- e. Village and Hamlet Defence
- f. Radios - 10 Set & 25 Set
- g. Intel. in Village and Hamlet
- h. First Aid
- i. Patrolling

9. Time allocated by the Village Chief was inadequate to cover these periods for the PSDF. These subjects were briefly covered except weapons first aid, organization, political warfare and intel in village and hamlet. The RDC and RF instructors decided to make the periods one hour instead of forty minutes giving five periods per day.

10. Range practice was held at the Horse Shoe - the PSDF fired 60 rounds per man using M2 Carbines. Their weapon handling was very good as was their accuracy.

11. Prior to 12 Oct the Village Chief was not over keen on training his PSDF. The morning of 12 Oct, he would not give his authority for the RDC to begin training. The assistant DSA and the Village Deputy for Security put pressure on him after which he decided to give his authority for the 9 RDC to begin training.

12. On completion of the PSDF training the Village Chief showed keen interest and informed me that he would have 30 more PSDF to be trained in one month.

13. 9 TDC moved to Phuoc Hai on the 15 Oct. The same day a composite team from Phuoc Thanh and Phuoc Tho moved into the Phuoc Hoa Long compound. Their strength being 12 men.

Operations

14. The RF still do a lot of small one day operations but are now being utilised in 2 - 3 day operations further away from the populated areas.

15. The MATT has been accompanying 772 Coy and 578 Coy on these operations.

16. The Coys have been working well and doing a reasonable job of searching. 609 RF Coy have just formed their Intel Squad of 7 men. They are operating in Phuoc Tho and Phuoc Trung hamlets.

17. On 15 Oct 772 RF Coy conducted a search and destroy operation accompanied by two members of MATT 2 - Sgt Willis and Cpl Schraven with a FO party from 7 RAR.

.../3

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



18. On 22 Oct 578 RF Coy were involved in a joint operation with 189 RF Coy and 1 ATF. This operation was an air mobile operation for the RF Coys. The main task for 578 and 189 RF Coys was to be a blocking force for 1 ATF. The operation was accompanied by two members of MATT 2 - Sgt Willis and Cpl Smithson. The operation terminated on 24 Oct 70.

Operation Results

19.	<u>578 RF Coy</u>	6 enemy bunkers found at Grid 387762. Negative contact.
	<u>772 RF Coy</u>	On 15 Oct found and destroyed an enemy camp at Grid 537664. Negative contact.
	<u>609 RF Coy</u>	Found VC propaganda posters at Grid 494593. Negative contact.

Medical

20. Sat Medcap are continuing with generally good results. However the poor attendance on 26 Sept was due to no broadcast being made by the Village Office.

Medcap Attendance

21.	26 Sept	9
	3 Oct	48
	10 Oct	23
	17 Oct	26
	24 Oct	33

Total for period 139.  
Medics attending

22.	578 RF Coy	Cpl Medic
	Village	Village Nurse - always present
	MATT 2	Team Medic - advising

23. Our medical supplies took three weeks approximately in arriving. Vietnamese medical supplies are only ordered once a month. The Village nurse says she cannot order more frequently and the amount obtainable is very small. This is being checked by the team medic as to run the medcap properly more supplies are definitely needed. MATT 2 is supplementing a limited amount of supplies as villagers are being turned away due to the lack of supplies.

Team Changes

24. Cpl Schraven as Team Medic.  
  
WO2 Williams began R&C 21 Oct prior to RTA 29 Oct.

.../4



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 4 -

25. Stores. There has been no change in stores for 578, 772, or 609 Coys through the Vietnamese system. They have been informed by their sector, S4 that they must have their requisitions in by the end of the month of October for the next three months for stores.

26. The team is making an assessment on each compound for their requirement barrier materials and recording what is required.

Remarks

27. On the night of 6th Oct an I Cap was conducted in Hoa Loi hamlet by the Psyops from task force. MATT 2 provided the security for this I Cap, with one platoon from 578 Coy. The attendance to this was very good. Approximately 150 children and 50 adults of all ages were there along with the Phuoc Hoa Long Deputy for Security and members of the Village Council.

28. MATT 2 took delivery of their new vehicle on the 22nd Oct.

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 3  
to Annex C  
to AATTV Report Oct 70

REPORT BY WO2 PALMER  
TEAM LEADER MATT 4

#### Operations

1. Night patrols with PSDF in the village and hamlets are progressing slowly and at this stage we are getting them out for up to 3 hours. The deputy for security has been a big help in this regard. He is at present on a course for six weeks, and when he returns he should have the latest and be motivated enough to get things going better. While he is away we will still go to the village and work with the village chief who has now taken direct command of all PF and PSDF in the village whereas before he left this to the Deputy for security. One particular hamlet seems to be better than the rest (Cho Ben). This I put down to WO2 Kealy's training whilst he was PSDF adviser for this area. They are very responsive and their patrolling and movement is above average.
2. Two village searches yielded 2 VCI but it appears with prior information our troops went to pick up certain members only and not too much effort was put into the remainder of the cordon and the search.
3. One three day operation was conducted on Long Son Island with a composite group from three Coys. The operation started with a combat assault (CA) but word was not put out about the operation until about 1800 hrs the night before the CA. I have found out since that the Island Comd came to Baria to brief the patrol Comd three days prior to this; this seems to be a breakdown on the Vietnamese system. We got this briefing at HQ Long Son two days after the operation started when we came in for resupply. The briefing was excellent and would have made a big difference to the operation if we could have got it prior to commencement.
4. Communications are bad on the Island and we had communications for about 10 to 15 minutes and in one place only. In this regard we must do the same as the Vietnamese (VN) and put a relay team in the compound of the Island Comd. All requests for support (sp) had to go through the VN radio system and then a comd and control ship came out to direct and relay. It was pure luck Maj Phillips came out on a chopper to give me some supplies when we had just finished a contact and I had two seriously wounded and three others WIA, this chopper took them in for us. One had his leg blown off above the knee from a B40 and he would not have lasted much longer without a medevac.
5. The contact itself is worthy of mention. The area of the HQ Gp was secured and then patrols (ptls) were sent further out, a visual siting was made and the HQ element prepared to move forward. Just as we were shaking out, the VC had apparently (10-12 men) crept back behind the ptls, and ambushed us from three points with B40 and small arms. The initial burst gave us all our casualties. The Commander (Capt Truong Hoang Dung) reacted immediately by screaming out "charge" and then led the HQ element straight into the fire, the VC fire immediately became non effective and erratic and then fled in disorder. It was beautifully and bravely done. Without this prompt action our casualties would have been very very high as they had us dead in sight in a clearing which was a grave yard. As soon as we were back in the jungle he re-organised, and started pulling his ptls back to search while the wounded etc were taken

.../2

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



care of and evacuated. When we moved fwd we found a very well laid out camp of 4 lge bunkers and 10 individual fighting pits. The bunkers were of sawn square timber and corrugated iron. The camp was fairly new and very clean, but bad track discipline led us right to it. In the camp we found some salt and cooking utensils and ponchos. No VC were killed in the contact nor could we find any blood trails, which surprises me because of the quick and ferocious counter attack put in by 576 Coy. But I think the main reason was the VC were so shocked they just fled too quickly for us. I submitted an impact award of the ARCOM with V for the comd. For the rest of the time we patrolled the whole Island but could find no VC. Overall the comd did a good job and his no lights and no noise policy was above average. The only bad points were bunching up whilst moving and using the cleared ground rather than the jungle, but I feel we can fix these points fairly easily.

#### Training

6. A course of seven days duration concentrating on Infantry, weapons and shooting has been completed as per discussion with the CO AATTV. A copy of the syllabus is attached. The course was for 15 RF soldiers (3 Sgts 1 Cpl and 11 soldiers) and the result was good at the completion. Each day the Coy Comd (615) visited the training area and an officer from Gp HQ observed the training all the time. Every one seemed to like it and other Coys of the Gp have asked for slots for the next course. I have also asked the village chief if he wants RF and PSDF included; the answer yes, so the next course we will try to include all. The next course cannot start until after 4 Nov 70 as the parades and parade training do not finish until then, and all soldiers must attend this training on orders from Province. We gave a plaque for the best student, the Gp gave 4 days leave to him also and the best pte soldier was given 2 days leave from group. We also gave a certificate of training to each student, issued by the Gp Comd. One Vietnamese weapons instructor was used and is very good. Next course it is hoped one or more of the last course will be used as instructors.

#### Defenses

7. Work is still going on with bunkers. One bunker now has to be demolished as 2x105 Arty guns are being put in permanently in the SE corner of the compound. This whole corner has to be demolished and such things as the existing bunker will be shifted to a new location. The guns are part of the new RF Arty Bn.

8. Work on the team house/ops room is still progressing when time permits.



**SECRET**  
**FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY**

INFANTRY WEAPONS COURSE

14 Oct 70 to 20 Oct 70

<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Lesson</u>	<u>Instructor</u>
(1) 0800 - 0830	Assemble and opening address	CAPT Hao WO Palmer
0830 -0910	M-16 - Safety, stripping and assembling	SGT Ly
0920 - 1045	M-16 - Aiming exercise	WO Palmer
1300 -1600	M-16 - Zeroing/Grouping/Weapon Cleaning	WO Palmer CPL Kuring
(2) 0800 - 0815	M-16 - Weapon Inspection	LT Dinh
0825 - 1030	M-16 - Snap Shooting Gallery	CPL Kuring
1300 - 1600	M-16 - Automatic Practice and shooting competition	WO Palmer CPL Cameron
(3) 0800 - 0815	M-16 - Weapons Inspection	LT Dinh
0825 - 0930	M-16 - Safety, Stripping and assembling	SGT Ly
0940 - 1045	M-16 - Preparation for Firing	CPL Harding
1300 - 1600	M-16 - Firing Position & Firing & Weapons cleaning	CPL Kuring
(4) 0800 - 0900	M-79 - Safety, stripping and assembling	SGT Ly
0910 - 1000	M-79 - Preparation for firing and ammo	CPL Cameron
1010 - 1100	M-79 - Buckshot practice	WO Palmer
1300 - 1500	M-79 - HE practice, Demo smoke, flare CS Gas	WO Palmer
1510 - 1600	M-79 - Cleaning	SGT Ly
(5) 0800 - 0845	M-26 - Safety, description and preparation	CPL Kuring
0855 - 1000	M-26 - Grenade throwing	WO Palmer
1010 - 1100	M-16 - Grenade adaptor description and preparation for firing	CPL Cameron
1300 - 1415	M-26 - Firing grenade with adaptor	WO Palmer
1325 - 1600	M-18 AI - Safety, description, preparation for firing, preparing claymore banks, firing	CPL Phillips

**SECRET**  
**FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY**



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Lesson</u>	<u>Instructor</u>
(6) 0800 - 0900	45 Cal - Safety, stripping & assembling preparation for firing	CPL Harding
0910 - 1100	45 Cal - Pistol firing	WO Palmer
1300 - 1400	M-16 - Revision and firing, shooting competition	WO Palmer
1410 - 1600	M-16 - Night shooting lesson and daylight practice	CPL Kuring
1830 - 2030	M-16 - Night shooting practice	WO Palmer
(7) 0800 - 0815	M-16 - Weapons Inspection	LT Dinh
0825 - 1400	Revision & shooting all weapons	WO Palmer
1410 - 1600	Preparation all weapons & night shooting revision. Preparation and explanation of exercise "Ambush"	CPL Cameron
2830 - 2030	Exercise "Ambush"	WO Palmer
(8) 0800 - 0900	Issue of qualifying certificates presentation of Best Student award march out.	CAPT Hao WO Palmer

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 4 to  
Annex C to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

REPORT BY WO DAVIES  
TEAM LEADER MATT 5

1. This month has seen additions and adjustments to the team. It is now eight strong and broken down into groups to cover the area assigned.

Phuoc Hai

Village & RF  
P.S.D.F.  
P.F.  
Engineer

WO2 R. Davies  
Cpl.I.Roe  
Cpl.V.Stuart  
Sgt.J.Kimberley (Medic)

Hoi My

WO2.H. Wright  
Bdr.D. Keech.  
Bdr.J. Cavanagh.  
Cpl.J. Kolaric

WO2 Davies will also work with Group Headquarters as required, whilst Sgt Kimberley and Cpl Kolaric will work in either areas as necessary.

2. The team has been involved in all aspects of both civilian and military affairs this month, we have assisted in the setting up of a platoon base for 124 Company, aided 189 Company in the setting up of its new base of operations, carried out training of the use of claymores with both the above companies. We have accompanied both platoon and company sized operations, P.F. and P.S.D.F. ambushes and patrols. In addition work has been carried out for the improvement of both living and defence positions for the team. Further trucks have been obtained for the distribution of sand throughout the village, however, it is feared at this stage work may come to a halt on the temple for lack of materials. This fault lies at Village level as they just do not seem to want to submit the correct application through the correct channels.

3. Cpl. Kolaric had visited both Medical centres in the area on several occasions and feels that both dispensaries have adequate supplies and appear to be carrying out their respective functions correctly. It is thought at this stage that some drugs which should be provided free are being sold to the villagers, we have no definite information at this stage.

4. The big event of the month was the arrival of 196 families from the refugee centre. This increases the population by 869 according to the Police and they have been located at Cau Tung, it is believed they will be administered by Ap Hai Lac. Apart from the erection of some tents no preparations had been made for the reception of these people and the apparent attitude of various agencies to their plight was appalling. The team ran two trips with our 800 gallon trailer before any other water supply turned up. The situation has now improved and things have appeared to settle down. One male refugee received a bullet through the hip after his first nights sleep in the area, it came in through the roof, it seems it was accidental, at a guess one of the rounds fired as signals eventually hit someone.

5. Our activity with Group has increased during this month, the Group Commander seeking advice more frequently, not always using it and requesting that he be accompanied to conferences.

.../2

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



2.

6. RDC Team 9 have now moved into Phuoc Hai and appear to be actively engaged within the village. We still have only the one interpreter and this poses difficulties especially at the village level.

Units Within The Area

7. 124 Company. This company has carried out its normal routine tasks well and has been given an additional task of providing security to one flank of the refugee area. This now gives the company four platoon bases to protect, but it still maintains its share of ambushes and is even moving further afield with the ambush locations. The company has received training on the use of claymores from MATT 5, and twelve days Pol War from its own teams. The unit has been involved in two contacts with the VC and located and destroyed one camp/see VC Incidents and After Action Reports. One man was wounded in Oct by a reputed VC booby trap, investigation proved it was a self inflicted wound.

8. 189 Company. Training in the use of claymores has been carried out, the company has now been moved to Hoi Cuu, the HQ is now in their old outpost near Brigid, remainder are located around the hamlet. This unit reflects the attitude of their officers, undisciplined and couldn't care less, they have stolen a great deal of both personal effects and items of defence stores plus water cans and many other items. The Company Commander merely shrugs his shoulders when complaints have been made and does nothing about it. The unit has had two contacts with VC this month.

9. 946 Company. Moved into Hoi My on the 4th of the month direct from Van Kiep Training Centre. Their operations and ambushes have been confined to the local to date, I hope that training with this company will commence on the 26th October, however, this is subject to the Group Commander. We have been ready to commence training for sometime, but it is always put off for some reason or the other.

10. P.F. 36 Phuoc Hai. This unit has been accompanied by Cpl, Stuart and Roe, their sites selected for ambush are good, their performance leaves a great deal to be desired. Noise, undue movement within the ambush site and duration of ambush. When training is mentioned some excuse is always thought up.

11. P.F. 35 Hoi My. Seems to be of a good standard, ambush well but inclined to fire at shadows.

12. P.S.D.F. Phuoc Hai. Since the departure of the Dep for Security it has come to a grinding halt, no one is even prepared to discuss it. It is rather obvious that the village officials only pay lip service to this program. The number of eligible males in the village as to the numbers enrolled in the P.S.D.F. is beyond a joke.

13. P.S.D.F. Hoi My. They still mainly guard the area of the village office, no patrolling takes place and the Village Chief still places little or no trust in them.

Area Personalities

14. 189 Company, Lt Thung. How to start, this man for some unknown reasons gets away with murder. We have heard he has political pull, he must have. He has no control over his company, it seems discipline is an unknown word, He seems to have a fixation about carrying rations and using the local water supplies, his first question at any briefing is, who will carry out my resupply. On the recent operation the only way he could be made to carry his laid down scale of rations was for me to inform him that I would not call

.../3.



for a resupply until the end of three days and if his unit was not carrying the correct amount of rations they would go hungry, and because of water in the area, I would not call in a resupply of water.

15. 946 Company. Lt. Hong. I have attended several of his briefings for his patrols and they seemed quite reasonable, he has yet to go out on an operation so I can give no judgement on his ability in the field. In camp he is a strong disciplinarian, and has good control over his company.

#### V.C. Incidents

5th October. Ap Hai Lac. Two people spotted in area of school-unit opened fire, one person dropped a lamp and both fled; Sounds more like curfew breaking.

6th October. V.C. reported in area of theatre at Ap Hai Trung, patrol investigated, nil results.

7th October. Ap Hai Lac. Four persons seen in area of school, patrol opened fire, sweep carried out, negative results.

8th October. Ap Hai Cuu. Ambush patrol from 189 RF sighted 3 - 6 VC entering house at GR 512547. Patrol engaged, fire returned from AK 47, negative results.

9th October. Ap Lac An. Compound fired on three VC moving into hamlet, fire returned from several areas. Sweep in the morning indicated 10 - 15 VC, one could be wounded, blood trails found. One VN local woman received slight wound to face. Police reported VC Village Chief Be Du in Village.

10th October. Ap Hai Cuu. RD information led to the discovery and destruction of old VC bunker in area of GR 512542. Bunker protected by command detonated explosive devices, bunker not used for about three months.

11th October. Enemy camp located at GR 558573 by 124 RF. Camp occupied minutes before our arrival, comprised of 4 bunkers. Quantity of documents and stores were captured.

17th October. 124 RF received information that Be Du was in the Village, whilst preparations were being made to search the village, 189 RF at Hoi Cuu came under attack. 124 also received fire from area of main gate, RD took fire from their NE, Brigid reported sighting 4 RPG rounds, not seen by RF or MATT, Negative results. Enemy force estimated at 10 - 15.

23th October. Police report 9 VC in Village, Brigid claim they had reputed area of access under observation all night and saw no one, other sources in village deny VC entered village.

#### RF. Operations

16.	124 Company.	Company Operations	2	MATT accompanied	1
		Platoon Operations	32	MATT accompanied	5
		Ambushes	83	MATT accompanied	2
		Combined Ambushes	24		
17.	189 Company.	Company Operations	3	MATT accompanied	1
		Platoon Operations	25	MATT accompanied	1
		Ambushes	84	MATT accompanied	2



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

4.

18.	946 Company.	Platoon Operations	26	MATT accompanied	2
		Ambushes	44	MATT accompanied	1
		Combined	2		

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

AFTER ACTION REPORT  
BY WO2 DAVIES

Combined Operation. 'A' Coy 2 RAR, 1 Troop Tanks and APC's, 189 RF Company, 2 Platoons 578 RF, 1 Platoon 480 RF, 1 Platoon 424 RF.

Operation Area. GR 385776 reputed enemy location. Group Commander attended briefing 1 ATF, was provided with an interpreter but I feel he missed the point, and was under the impression that the Austs would write the operational order. We eventually organized things after some debate with 189 Company over rations to be carried. A briefing of sorts was carried out in the evening, whilst the final briefing was conducted, in the morning, prior to departure. As we had only one interpreter I requested the use of the English speaking soldier Long from 189. The Group Commander agreed, but, 189 Coy Comd refused and got away with it. The interpreter was required for use with the MATT attached to his element.

PZ GR 428652. We were met at this point by two FO teams and one LO group. The LO gave us additional information which indicated our blocking force would contact the NVA screening group, which at this stage we did not know existed, a rapid adjustment was made on the positions of the blocking force. The arrival at the LZ was without incident, but the move off was something else. It took almost 30 minutes before 189 Coy Comd decided to join the Group Commander despite several irate radio messages. Eventually the move started, order of march, 578 and 480 with MATT 2, Group and 124 with MATT 5, 189 Coy and MATT 5 in the rear. When we reached GR 388761 the point element located a bunker system at least six months old, and some fish cans of recent origin (there was no rust on them). The area was not searched because of the time element so the extent of this system was not realised. The force split at this point, 578 & 480 went up to the left to take up position, whilst the remainder followed up the line of the creek to GR 388764 where Group set up its base. 189 Coy moved off to the East and completed its part of the block, final position on the flank being GR 400767. 578 & 480 linked up from the west just prior to H hour. A check later in the day showed their flank position was 400 yards short of where it should have been. Due to tanks, and APC's finding the terrain rather hard going, 'H' hour was delayed. At 1700 hours we heard A Coy had reached the objective with negative results.

Day 2.

The Group sat around all day whilst 'A' Coy sent out patrols, and as it seemed that the operation could be extended, plans were made for re-supply of the Group and sent in. In the afternoon, we were given a mission to search the area of GR 388769, this was given to 189 Coy with the additional task of locating an LZ for resupply. They went straight to GR 385766 and sat there despite advice given by their MATT element, and they stayed there until the re-supply of 578 was flown in. The Group Commander spoke to the Coy Comd who then stormed off in a sulk. Same positions were maintained that night.

Day 3.

The Group Commander requested an area to search this day, eventually an area was granted, patrols were sent out negative results. We were bombarded in the morning by a needless air drop, we had requested a half hours warning prior to resupply, this was not given, we were still waiting for a decision

.../2

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 2 -

on the duration of the operation, when this chopper came on station refused to speak to control station 42 L, only wished to talk to 42 B, and requested smoke. When asked for its mission the answer was to rain rations upon us. 42 L ran and left his set, hoochies were hit etc. It is fortunate we received no injured. If the warning had been given **this resupply** could have been taken on the LZ or cancelled as it would have been once a decision had been made as to the completion of the operation. At 1400 we moved to GR 385776 and pick up commenced at 1430, the last lift being completed at Dat Do by 1630 hours.

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 5 to  
Annex C to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

REPORT BY WO2 WHITE  
TEAM LEADER MATT 6 - OCT 70

1. MATT 6 over the past month has mainly been involved with PSDF training. 701 RF Coy has had very little operational activity. Up to this point the MATT has been able to carry out operations with the RF Coy and train the PSDF concurrently. This is possible only because the Coy Commander can speak enough English to communicate with the MATT team. Most operations the interpreter does not accompany the members of MATT. This way we are able train PSDF and work operations with the RF Coy.

RF Coy Operations

2. 7 Oct 70 - 701 operation, three RF platoons two PF platoons centre of AO GR YS 430635 - Accompanied by WO2 White, Sgt Talbot - Negative results.

3. 18 Oct 70 - 701 Coy Air Mobile Operation - LZ - GR YS 360698 patrol south and back to base. Accompanied by WO2 Lyddieth, Sgt Talbot, Cpl Ronaldson, plus one member from MATT 11 as an observer. Negative results.

4. 25 Oct 70 - 701 Coy operation - Centre of AO GR YS 394658 - Accompanied by WO2 White, Cpl Fitzgerald. Negative results.

RF Training

5. 16 Oct 70 - In the afternoon we trained in helicopter drill. The results were impressive. Helicopters for training were supplied by RAAF. The Combat Assault on 18 Oct was successful as far as helicopter drill was concerned due to this training.

6. 701 Coy provides two (2) platoon sized ambushes around Hoa Long Village plus two (2) outer perimeter bunkers manned by a half platoon each every night.

7. Work is being done to improve the base area but it is limited by the amount of defence stores available (which is very little).

8. The problem with this coy is it does not belong to a Group in Long Le District. The Group HQ of the Coy is in Long-Dien District and the Coy is under direct control of the Long Le District Chief (DC). The DC.. will not allow the company commander to choose his ambush sites nor plan an operation. These are issued by the DC.

PSDF

9. PSDF training in MATT 6 area has been progressing reasonably well. Training of combat members will be completed by 29 Oct 70. Areas in which training has been completed are, Hoa-Long Village, Long Kien and Nguyen-Binh-Khiem Hamlets and Phuoc-Le. Training has just been completed in Xom Bau Hamlet Phuoc-Le - results were satisfactory although the attendance was about 20 members each day instead of 35. Reason given for the missing members was that they attended High School.

.../2

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 2 -

10. At present training is being conducted in Ap Dinh Hamlet Phuoc-Le Village. Although the hamlet has not yet been issued with weapons the attendance is good and all members are keen and interested. Five (5) RDC personnel are on hand each day to protect the MATT members and assist with training.

Future Plans

11. Complete PSDF training - Begin training PF in Hoa Long by 10 Nov 70. Improve Coy base defence - Fire PSDF again in day and night firing - Complete MATT 6 CP bunker.

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 6 to  
Annex C To  
AATTV Report Nov 70

REPORT BY WO NEAGLE  
TEAM LEADER - MATT 7  
PERIOD 23 SEP 70 - 22 OCT 70

23 Sep 70

Commence PSDF Training Phuoc Hoa. Attendance approx 60%. PSDF indoctrination given by village Chief and RDC.

24 Sep 70

No training. All PSDF taken to Province for Anti-Communist Anti Neutral Anti Senator Ngo Cong Dua.

25 Sep 70 - 27 Sep 70

Continue PSDF training.

On the night of 25 Sep 70 a Chieu Hoi ~~██████████~~ surrendered at ONG TRINH. He was held over night. I passed the info to 2 RAR (FSB GALL). Member interrogated by OC Capt GREEN (ex IO 2 RAR) - Info passed on to 2 RAR HQ and Sub Sector Long Tr.

Trg. The later part of the Range Shoot was cancelled because of heavy rain. As we moved our vehicle from the firing point some of the PSDF commenced to fire at targets left on the mound. There was no control for about ten minutes by PF or Village Chief. Re control was gained by MATT members. There seems a great tendency for PSDF to blaze away without thought of fire control and ammo conservation.

As a result of the range shoot some weapons were found to have damaged extractors, two had extractors completely missing, and also there was a problem of distorted operating handles (levers) separating from the bolt head lug on the MI carbine. Village Chief was informed to put in a report of the condition of weapons and also to put in a request for replenishment of ammo, to bring his PSDF up to their basic load.

28 Sep 70

Recondition of training stores and weapons from range shoot took place.

28 Sep 70 - 1 Oct 70

No training of PSDF - MATT members at Presentation Parade - Vung Tau.

2 Oct 70 - 4 Oct 70

PSDF Training Conferences and Parades etc at Province. The MATT conducted its own maintenance and administration and preparation of lessons and aids.

.../2

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

2.

5 Oct 70 - 9 Oct 70

Recommence PSDF Training. Attendance poor. There were 58 PSDF for 5 Oct 70. The attendance dropped gradually each day until on the 9 Oct 70 only 15 youths were attending. Females were to come to Medical training also on 9 Oct 70. None came - the village Chief stated women did not wish to come.

Regarding the poor attendance the Village Chief was requested to inform his higher authority earlier in the course. He states he did but he could not find the copy of his letter. He said the Hamlet Chiefs would not make the people come in to training when he the Village Chief told them to. Transport from Hamlets to Village is also a problem.

The PSDF in Phuoc Hoa sleep in the Village Office. A third of them are supposed to patrol the Village with the PF but this seems very doubtful. Regarding the PF ambush positions in village area there is a doubt also whether the PF normally occupy them at night.

As there was also considerable doubt whether the Village Chief had submitted the reports on Weapons - Ammo - Attendances to higher authority (as he still could not produce his copies) I had him submit them again on 9 Oct 70. These reports were submitted to the DSA's Office on morning of 10 Oct 70.

8 Oct 70

Visit by Comd AATTV

12 Oct 70

A.M. Visit by COMAFV and Comd AATTV

P.M. PSDF progress conference MATTs 6,7, 11 at DSA's office.

13 Oct 70.

The two ARVN 155 MM at Ong Trinh were reconditioned by US resources are now operative. They commenced firing H and I.

14 Oct 70

Commence Village Defence Plan Phu My.

15/16 Oct 70

252 RF Coy conducted a one day operation Phu My area. Negative result.

Interpreter granted seven days leave by HQ AATTV BARIA

18 Oct 70

PSDF Training Conference BARIA. Subject: Problems and improvement to PSDF training.

.../3

SECRET  
FOR AUST



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

3.

19 Oct 70

Visited Village Phu My regarding the Village Defence Plan. Left Village Chief approx 1700 hrs. At 2000 hrs Village Chief reported to 3/15 Gp HQ movement of 7 VC detected by PF ambush position. No Action Taken by 3/15 Gp. 2 RAR (FSB GALL) informed but could not take action because of prior commitments.

At 1530 hrs on 19 Oct 70 Village Chief had reported to 1 Lt ROHRS (DSAA's office) VC presence as from 17 Oct 70 to 19 Oct 70. I reported this information to 3/15 Gp. S3 Lt Phoung. No action taken or apparently to be taken to investigate the Village Chief's source of information - Reason - Don't believe villagers. Map reference of VC sighting 257744.

20 Oct 70

In early morning 2 RAR (FSB GALL) attempted to trail VC with tracker dogs. Negative result as bullock drays and woodcutters had disturbed tracks and scent.

Attended PSDF Training Committee meeting at Baria

21 Oct 70

Cpl Arthur (Engr) accompanied 2 RAR (FSB GALL) to help destroy new enemy bunker position located approx 1500 metres of Ong Trinh. Y S 236694.

22 Oct 70

Cpl RHODES (Med) attended Medcap to be held Lang Cat

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



REPORT BY WO LEFEL

TEAM LEADER - MATT 11

From 10 th to 23 rd Oct 70

1. From the 10th to 18th Oct the team was occupied with the settling in at Long Le Dist HQ, orientation in the district and preparation of training syllabus. Also during this period visits were paid to and meetings held with District, Village and Hamlet Chiefs and officials. With them the training syllabus was discussed, amended when necessary and stores lists and requisitions prepared. Some time was devoted to the preparations of training aids and lesson plans.
2. The Team has liased with other Mat teams regarding the PSDF training and some members accompanied MATT 6 during their training periods as observers.
3. The actual training of PSDF in Long Huong village commenced on the 19th Oct. The attendance and enthusiasm shown during these first few training periods was good although the attendance dropped off on the 22 Oct. A visit was made to the Village Chief concerning this and he offered the excuse that the people had to work, but promised to look into the matter.
4. An inspection of medical staff, facilities and supplies was carried out by the Team Medic on the 21 Oct. and they were found to be sadly lacking in many things.
5. The Team is working well and although some confusion was noticed during the first period of instruction, mainly due to having to instruct through an interpreter, this is now not evident and the instruction is progressing smoothly.
6. No problems with village and hamlet officials has been experienced and their cooperation is good.
7. a After the 29 Oct, when the training will be completed on the PSDF in the hamlets of Huong Son, Huong Giang and Huong Dien we intend to commence in the hamlet of Nui Dinh. These four hamlets comprise the village of Long Huong.
8. The planning and preparation for this hamlet are already underway and the necessary amendments and corrections are being made to the syllabus as faults come to notice.
9. The training standard of the PSDF we have handled so far has been quite good in regard to weapon handling. A range practice is to be conducted on the 24 Oct which will enable us to give a final assesment. Their tactical ability is as yet unknown, as these subjects will be handled during the next stage of training.



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 8 to  
Annex C to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

REPORT BY WO2 FRANKS  
TEAM LEADER - MATT 14

1. MATT 14 was established and colocated with 586 RF Coy on the 4th of October 1970. For the first week we were left along by DSA Long-Dien to allow the team to settle in and start a good working relationship with Coy Comd 586 Coy. This has been very successful over the period of time the team has been here.
2. 8th, 9th and 12th of October where Australian VIP visits which appeared very successful as the Coy Comd was very impressed with the VIP visits and this helped us in our working relationship with Coy Comd and Coy.
3. On 10 Oct, myself and the 21C were picked up by District PSDF Adviser and taken to meet Long Dien Village Chief who in turn accompanied us and introduced us to Long An Hamlet Chief where our PSDF training was to commence on the 16th of October. PSDF training at Long An Hamlet to date appears to be very successful. Of the 40 members we have had a minimum of 21 attend and a maximum of 37 on the daily training of this hamlet.
4. On 19th of Oct I approached Village Chief Long-Dien, reference PF strengths and locations and what type of training we can assist him in. He assures me that he wants MATT Team to start working with PF at a date and time that is suitable to him. As yet we have had no further word on this, but we are still chasing it up.
5. 586 RF Coy Long Dien. Although we have established a very good relationship with Coy Comd and Coy, Coy Comd has been very hesitant to allow Team to accompany him on night ambushes, even though he goes at least twice a week with ambushes. On 28 Oct the Coy Comd finally asked me if we would like to accompany him on his ambushes, I feel this is a big step forward for the Team.

Comments

6. I feel the establishing of a MATT Team colocated with 586 Coy has had a big effect on the Coy and Team has had nothing but co-operation and help from Coy Comd, Village and Hamlet Chiefs and DSA Long-Dien.

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 9 to  
Annex C to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

REPORT BY CAPT HARTLEY  
PSDF ADVISER - PHUOC TUY PROVINCE  
OCT 70

General

1. The emphasis on PSDF matters continued to be increased with visits by Col Dien from the PSDF Directorate, Dr Russell, the PSDF Senior Adviser from MACV and Lt Col Foster, the Deputy Senior Adviser.
2. There were no contacts involving PSDF and VC. One member of the PSDF accidentally shot himself in the leg.

Training

3. Nine of the 13 MAT/MATTs became involved in PSDF training. The standard of training, method of training and reception by PSDF varied greatly.
4. Use of the Van-Kiep, 1 ATF, Long-Hai and Horse Shoe Rifle Ranges was a considerable asset and all courses of instruction involved live firing.
5. A meeting involving DSAs, MATT leaders and various members of the Sector Staff was called to discuss a working paper concerning the training and concept of operations of PSDF. As a result of this conference, a letter was prepared and submitted to the Province Chief (a copy of the letter is attached), the results of this submission not yet being known.

Highlights of the Month

6. On the 1-2 Oct, a PSDF meeting was held at the Baria Stadium. The meeting involved over 1200 PSDF from all districts. Discussions, games and competitions were held and the culmination was a parade which was attended by Col Diem, Dr Russell, Brig Henderson, the PSA and others.
7. On 15 Oct, at Binh Gia a ceremony involving representatives from all hamlet PSDF units, saw the assumption of responsibility for internal security handed to the PSDF from the PF. A similar situation will exist in Long Dien in three hamlets before the end of Oct 70.

Conclusion

8. Province is to be encouraged to train more PSDF using their own mobile training teams. The province is approximately 1000 weapons short of its goal. 519 of these are at present held in the SM and DBL Coy awaiting magazines.
9. An active Psyops campaign involving posters, training certificates and the production of a PSDF newsletter will be encouraged.

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
Phuoc Tuy Province, II MR  
CORDS Advisory Team 89

AFFBG-PT

20 October 1970

LTC Nguyen Van Tu  
Province Chief  
Phuoc Tuy Province

1. The pacification of the country against the communists, and national reconstruction for military, political, economic and social development is a priority item by the Government of Vietnam in implementation of the national policy. The PSDF is an important part of that national policy. Since the initiation of the PSDF program only minimum accomplishments have been realized in Phuoc Tuy. In analyzing the PSDF program over the past period, there has been a general lack of belief in, and support of, the PSDF program by those individuals directly responsible. This must be overcome and the initiative of the program carried through to realize success. The development of a nationalistic spirit by the PSDF and responsible individuals must now be developed. After much research and detailed discussions, and analysis by an appointed committee, a plan for accomplishment of the PSDF program has been devised. This plan is being placed into effect immediately through the employment of the AATTV MATT. This plan is:

- a. AATTV MATT will discontinue direct role as instructors to PSDF.
- b. AATTV MATT will instruct RF/MTT. Three RF soldiers, two of whom should be NCOs should be temporarily detached from an RF Company. During daylight hours they will plan, rehearse and be trained and coached by the AATTV MATT. In the afternoon, the RF/MTT accompanied by AATTV MATT, goes to the village/hamlet and imparts lessons learned and rehearsed that day to PSDF.
- c. AATTV MATT will generally follow the program of instruction, outlined in Peoples Self Defense Force of the Republic of Vietnam booklet, published by the PSDF Directorate General, Ministry of Interior.
- d. AATTV MATT will accompany RF/MTT to monitor instruction and note deficiencies in training, etc ...
- e. AATTV MATT assist village/hamlet officials with plans for village/hamlet security.

2. Other means of improving the PSDF program which should be taken by Phuoc Tuy Province are:

- a. RD cadre used for nationalistic indoctrination of PSDF.
- b. Psycops incorporated through the Peoples Information Committee. This is an important initial step to build up confidence in PSDF and produce community awareness.
- c. Proper requisitions submitted by PSDF for ammunitions to include training ammunition.

.../2

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



- 2 -

- d. Mobile repair teams regularly visit PSDF to inspect and repair weapons.
- e. Firm continuous guidance given through command channels coupled with motivation of subordinates.
- f. An experienced military man should write the defense plan of the village/hamlet and the plan rehearsed thoroughly. Defense plan should follow the sample village defense plan, Soc Mau village.
- g. Adequate alert and warning system devised and made known to all members using HT-1 and TR-20 radios, land lines, flares, etc...
- h. Checking accountability of basic load for each weapon on regular basis.
- i. Training, and means of obtaining, evacuation of wounded, escape and evasion, fire fighting brigades and medevac...
- j. Designation of key interteam (KIT) to form nucleus of hamlet defense, providing the reaction force, and hamlet patrols.
- k. Establishment of roving patrols in village/hamlet. The traditional manning of strong points should be discouraged. A strong point will only cover the area that a man can maintain surveillance over by either observing or hearing. Strong points and ambushes are usually in fixed locations and, once identified, will be avoided by the VC. In village/hamlet with heavy vegetation strong points may be required, however, they should be moved on a nightly basis.
- l. Reaction to identified VC must be quick and thorough. A ready reaction force must be on stand-by near a point of control and communication such as the Village/Hamlet office.
- m. Training programs must be kept simple and interesting to obtain best results. Training must be organized continuously and protractively. Village/Hamlet Chiefs must ensure maximum number of members are made available for training on a regular basis. Roll books should be maintained by RF/MTT and village chief to show attendance of PSDF members.
- n. Each AATTV MATT should have an RF counterpart.
- e. Formation of RF/MTT to receive instruction from AATTV MATT. RF/MTT in turn will instruct the PSDF.
- p. The military instruction must incorporate political training. "The Way of the PSDF", local politics, current affairs, etc... are programs which RD cadre are taught to instruct PSDF. Communal activities to improve health, hygiene, adult education, etc... must be covered. Psyops should be actively involved and entertainment groups, films, plays and sports incorporated into the overall program.

/s/ Robert L. Walkinshaw  
/t/ Province Senior Advisor



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 10 to  
Annex C to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

REPORT BY WO2 OSBORN  
RD ADVISER - PHUOC TUY PROVINCE

1. Incidents

NIL.

2. Movement of Group. During the reporting period two Groups have been redeployed:

- a. Group 8 which has for the past two months been employed at the refugee centre Le Loi, have now been redeployed to Long-Binh Hamlet in Long-Dien District.
- b. Group 9 which has been employed in Phuoc Hoa Long Village for the last 10 months has now been deployed to Phuoc-Hai Village, Dat Do District.
- c. One section from Group 1 and one section from Group 12 have been detached to Phuoc Hoa Long to work during the day.

3. Training

- a. During the reporting period 27 members have attended a two week course on Land Tiller Reform at Vung-Tau National Training Centre. These members have now been detached to the Villages to be employed on the Land Tiller Reform programme.
- b. Refresher training on basic principles of RDC has been conducted for all members by the Mobile Instruction Team from Control HQ.

4. Civic Action

- a. The civic action programme is progressing well; minor medcaps and instruction on basic Hygiene have been carried out in all locations where the RDC are deployed.
- b. The house building project for the poor people has started again, now that the materials are available. 1 Aust CA Unit is providing the bulk of the materials.
- c. A picnic for 100 children from Phuoc-Tho Village, Dat Do District was conducted on 11 Oct 70 at Vung-Tau Beach, great assistance was given by 106 Fd Wksp, and the outing proved a great success.

5. Morale. The morale of all members remains very high. There have been no desertions during this period and only two cases of AWOL.

6. Summary. The RD Cadre are being more and more involved in Village and Hamlet tasks especially with Village Self Development and Land Tiller Reform programme. Resupply of some items of equipment is still a little slow but it is gradually improving, due to the fact that the supply officials are learning what has to be done.

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



Annex D To  
AATTV Report Oct 70

REPORT BY MAJ BROWNE  
CORDS ADVISER HQ MR4

Enemy Activities

1. Enemy initiated incidents are averaging at about 150 per week accounted as follows:
  - a. Harassments 80%
  - b. Attacks by fire 5%
  - c. Ground attacks 2%
  - d. Terrorist activity, sabotage and ambush 13%
2. There were no reports of any significant enemy unit movement during the reporting period.
3. The enemy were successful in overrunning six outposts in the reporting period.
4. From reports received the following enemy intentions are revealed:
  - a. 7 Div TAOR NVA replacements are continuing to infiltrate from Cambodia. In the latter part of June and the beginning of July, a total of 212 NVA replacements have entered the TAOR.
  - b. 9 Div TAOR. A directive has instructed all districts to train VC cadre to become false ralliers. After graduation from the Chieu Hoi program, the false ralliers are to serve as penetration agents in ARVN units.
  - c. 44th STZ. According to a Chau Doc National Police report, a meeting was conducted which directed VC cadre to infiltrate into the Hoa Hao Buddhist area of Chau Doc province. The purpose of this infiltration was to obtain rice which was to be taken across the Vinh Te canal into Cambodia.
5. The following shows the total number of enemy operating against MR 4:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Strength</u>
Division Headquarters	1 (1)*	1,750 (1750)
Regimental Headquarters	9 (1)	2,907 (350)
Main Force Battalions	39 (8)	6,937 (1867)
Local Force Battalions	16 (3)	2,212 (465)
Local Force Companies & Platoons	115	<u>4,260</u>
Total		18,066 (4,432)

.../2



2.

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Strength</u>
Combat Support Battalions	2 (1)	392 (197)
Combat Service Support Battalions	5	840
Administrative Services	4	6,800
Guerrillas		<u>14,600</u>
<u>Total</u>		22,632 (197)
<u>Grand Total</u> -		40,698 (4,629)
VC 1		<u>23,000</u>
<u>Overall Total-</u>		<u>63,698</u> (4629)

\*Numbers shown in brackets designate the number of units and their strengths in Cambodia.

6. During the reporting period the enemy have been successful in a small number of assassinations of both hamlet and district level officials.

#### Friendly Activities

7. 7 ARVN Div is operating in the role of intensified pacification- specifically directed at canal and highway security. One regiment is deployed in Kien Hoa together with two battalions of 9 ARVN Div placed under operational control of 7 ARVN Div and operating as a task force.

8. 9 ARVN Div maintains one regiment (16th) in Vinh Binh and has re-deployed one regiment (21st) from Chuong Thien to Phong Dinh province. The task of the 21st Regiment being to seek out and destroy VC areas in Phong Dinh province.

9. Two ranger battalions (41 & 32) have been redeployed into the vacuum created by the 9 ARVN Div regimental deployments.

10. 21 ARVN Div continue operations in the U Minh forest and the Song Ong Doc district of An Xuyen.

11. Two ranger battalions (66 & 77) are deployed in the 7 mountains area together with one regiment (14th) of 9 ARVN Div. The specific areas being the Nui Cam and Dui Dai mountains. One armored cav squadron (2nd) is deployed in a mobile role at the base of these areas.

12. The divisional forces have achieved overall better results in this month. The focus of activity has been on small unit ambush and raid.

#### Night Operations

13. Nott. The last course concluded for the 7 ARVN Div students. It is of interest to note that a cadre has commenced further courses based on the Nott syllabus. An operational base has been constructed to assist the cadre in their continuation training. The first course directed at the cadre in their continuation training. The first course directed at territorial force officers at district level has been delayed pending the arrival of students.

14. Noat. Team 1 will complete activities in Cho Gao on 15 Nov 1970. This team will deploy to Ben Tranh to assess the retention aspect of the



3.

training previously conducted. Team 2 will continue at Cho Gao, both tasks will be completed on 30 November 1970.

15. Attached are reports as follows:

- a. Appendix 1. Report by Capt Mc Gurgan, OC NOTT Dong Tam
- b. Appendix 2. Report by WO Strachan, OC NOAT.
- c. Appendix 3. Report by WO Herschell, Team 1 Leader NOAT.
- d. Appendix 4. Report by WO Jones, Team 2 Leader NOAT.
- e. Appendix 5. A translation of a message signed and issued by the CG 14 Corps concerning night operations in MR 4.
- f. Appendix 6. A translation of a message issued by the assistant, CG 14 Corps showing the scheduled courses etc for NOTT for 1970 .



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 1 To  
Annex D To  
AATTV Report Oct 70

REPORT BY CAPT Mc GURGAN  
OF NOTT DONG TAM OCT 70

General

1. During the period 5 - 19 October 1970, the Night Operations Training Team completed the second course of twenty-four officers from the 7th ARVN Div. It is to be noted that the course consisted of personnel with rank of E7 and above.

ARVN Students

2. This course displayed a somewhat professional attitude to soldiering which was most evident on our night ambushes. The students consisted of 7 ARVN Div personnel who actually came from combat units at PL HQ level and above. The students showed keen interest in all subjects taught and opinions and discussion were a feature of several lesson periods.

Operations Conducted

3. Two ambushes were conducted during the course, the first lasting all night and the second for three hours.

a. First Ambush: This ambush was conducted 1500 meters SE of the main gate at Dong Tam base. The Ambush was set and in position at 1930 hours and terminated at 0600 hours the following morning. Negative contact was made with the enemy.

b. Second Ambush: This was the final ambush and conducted 2000 meters due EAST of main gate at Dong Tam. This ambush was terminated at 1840 hours due to one of the Div student standing on a small VC booby trap and suffering minor wounds to the arm and leg. At 1900 hours the whole course moved back to base by vehicle with the wounded student going direct to the hospital at Dong Tam.

Tactical Theory

4. A basic understanding of all the theory and tactics was indicated by the course. Formations, contact drills, movement and security at night was already understood, and we simply gave further ramifications of our theories and tactics. Special mention was made of the excellent job done on the subject of mines and booby traps. The students indicated this was outstanding both from an instructional and practical point of view.

Tactical Operations

5. Operationally, the course knew what they were about. Night discipline in both ambushes was excellent and movement in ambush location was kept to a minimum. Formation and movement through the paddly fields was also well conducted with good distances between men and noise kept to a minimum.

Administration

6. No administration problems were encountered on this course. This was due to the excellent support of the Training Center at Dong Tam

.../2

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



2.

Base. On all occasions either a Captain or a Lieutenant were on hand with the class to assist us in any way possible. The Lieutenant came out on both night ambushes and was of valuable assistance. Special thanks should go to Col Buoi for his own personal interest and assistance on the last course and the allocation of some of his staff to assist us.

Conclusion/Recommendation

7. The last course I consider to have been of very good value and eventually sound results will be gained by the students in their particular units and sub-units.

8. From my own personal observations, I consider training regular ARVN officers much more satisfactory and a more rewarding task, although it is contrary to our mission at Dong Tam, where we basically are to train the Officers of RF/PF units in Night Operation Instructional Techniques.

Current Course

9. This course was scheduled to commence 21 October 1970 with personnel from RF/PF units. Due to the non-arrival of the students on time the course will commence on 26 October 1970. At this stage, six students have presented themselves at the billets with the remainder still making their way to Dong Tam.



Appendix 2 To  
Annex D To  
AATTV Report Oct 70

REPORT BY WO STRACHAN  
OC NOAT - OCT 70

General

1. In the period of review the training activities of the 109, 207 and 638 Regional Force Companies on Cho Gao District of Dinh Tuong Province will be covered.

109 Company

2. The training of this company was completed on the 24 Sep. It was well received by officers and soldiers who attained a good standard. The co-operation of the company commander was excellent. Attached were four officers and five sergeants from Chau Than District who actively participated in officer and soldier training and also went on night operations.

705 Company

3. The training cycle commenced 7 September and was completed on 16 Oct. The extra time was required due to the absence of the team at Vung Tau for the presentation of the Meritorious Unit Citation. Due to operational requirements only one platoon could be released at one time for training, however, as the benefit of the team's efforts became obvious, the company requested extra training which was carried out.

207 Company

4. For training of the above company, the team remained in situ at 109 Company location thus allowing training to commence on 5 Oct and it will be completed on 6 November. As I was absent on R & C from 7 Oct to 15 Oct, I have been unable to spend my usual two days a week to observe the training. However, the team leader assures me it is progressing favorably. The Company is operating in a set AO which is subdivided to allow platoon size night operations to be run simultaneously.

638 Company

5. This unit moved into an outpost formerly occupied by a PF platoon on 18 Oct. A reconnaissance was carried out on 20 Oct and Team 2 moved to, occupied and commenced training on the 21 Oct.

District Team Support

6. The District Senior Advisor, Major Hunsicker, is taking an active interest in the team's activities. His visit to the outposts to observe training and talk to the team members was appreciated.

Ben Tranh District

7. An assessment of enemy, friendly activities reveals the following:

a. VC Initiated Incidents

Jun	25
Jul	3
Aug	5
Sept	3
Oct	3

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../2



b. Friendly Results for October

VC KIA 17

VCI KIA 4

VCI Captured 1

c. Weapons Captured

Individual Weapons 5

Crew Served 1

d. Sixty percent of contact was made around 1800 hrs. 30 Sept 68.

e. The kill ratio from contact has moved from thirty-five percent to sixty-five percent.

Visitors

8. Lt Col Mace and Major Ogilvie of New Zealand were briefed at District and visited the outposts to talk to team members.

Morale and Personnel

9. Team morale remains good. Warrant Officer Parker and Warrant Officer Jones carried out the training of the 705 RF Company under trying conditions to achieve good results.

Summary

10. At the conclusion of my tour and having been associated with NOAT since its inception, I am of the opinion that this program can and does improve the ability of the Regional Force officer and soldier.



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 3 To  
Annex D To  
AATTV Report Oct 70

REPORT BY WO HERSHELL  
TEAM 1 LEADER NOAT OCT 70

1. The quality of the soldier does not differ greatly from previous RF Coys trained. He is alert when the situation warrants.
2. Generally fieldcraft at night is good, carriage of weapons has improved, and they do cover areas of responsibility at halts.
3. Night shooting is improving; the soldier is inclined to fire far too fast at first but after a settling down period produces good results.
4. Night operations generally follow the initial plan. Operations are planned by the Coy Comd, but not necessarily carried out by him; he may on occasions deputize a PL leader as Commander. All troops taking part are briefed.
5. Having had no contact with V.C. this period, the measure of success is hard to define. However, this coy has up to four ambushes each night, therefore it is difficult for the enemy to move at night.
6. Intelligence in the main is gathered from local resources; however, district does get valuable intelligence from various sources. This is passed to Coys concerned and acted on. The R.D. Cadre working in the area does supply good intelligence and the Coy Comd reacts very quickly.
7. Subject matter taught is as laid down by Commander of NOAT. I have no recommendations to the training syllabus currently used.
8. 207 Coy is very receptive to training. Coy Comd is well motivated. This, of course, is reflected in the attitude of the soldier. Detailed weapon inspections are carried out at PL and Coy level.

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 4 To  
Annex D To  
AATTV Report Oct 70

REPORT BY WO JONES  
TEAM 2 LEADER - NOAT - OCT 70

#### Quality of Soldier

1. The fieldcraft at night of 705 Company was overall quite good. However, I noticed when on ambush the communications consisted of one soldier moving from group to group. I feel that this is a dangerous practice because:

- a. He may be easily seen or heard.
- b. He could get shot.

Consequently we suggested the use of communication cord.

2. Shooting at night showed a vast improvement while we were with the Company.

#### Night Operations and Planning Techniques

3. In our stay with 705 Coy we had little chance to observe planning of night operations by the Coy Commander mainly because he was such an aggressive man who was always out on operations with his men. But while we were there he carried out two successful night ambushes. In each case his plans were simple - let down only, I feel, by bad sighting of claymores. However, the results of these operations were five killed and four AK 47's captured.

#### Conduct of Night Operations

4. The plans were followed but the commanders do tend to organize on the ambush position and not at a firm base. The approach to the positions are good and quiet.

#### Intelligence

5. The Coy Comd has his own sources of intelligence and these seem to be good. He acted on all information very quickly and as already mentioned - with success.

#### Recommendations

6. More training in fire control for squad and platoon leaders is required. To exercise these leaders my team set up an ambush range with situations designed to test squad and platoon leaders. This was felt to be a success and so did 705 Coy Comd. For this reason I intend to start this form of training earlier with the next Coy.

#### Problem Areas

7. The Coy was always heavily committed on operations and this made our task difficult at times.

8. The Coy appeared to have great difficulty obtaining night illuminates. This was brought to our attention when we were discussing their use in night ambush.

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../2



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

2.

General Remarks

9. The training given to the RF Coy is of great value to them but on questioning our students who were attending the course from Chau Thanh, they said that most RF Coys did not carry any form of training. The reasons they gave for this were as follows:

a. No time. (This we told them was not acceptable.)

b. No ammunition, etc. but by the way the soldiers are always shooting at things - that does not seem a problem except in the case of illuminates and M79.

10. For reasons stated above, it does seem there is a need for a follow-up on our training if only to see that they zero their weapons. Even that important point as far as I could see was never done.

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 5 to  
Annex D to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

POSTAL MESSAGE

FROM: Headquarters/MR4 + IV Corps/G3

TO : Sector/DT, GC, KH, SD, VL, VB, KG, PD, OCT, BX, BL,  
AX, CD, KP, KT, AG.

INFO: -JGS/J3  
-Headquarters/MR 4 + IV Corps/G4  
-4th ALC  
-Headquarters/7 - 9 - 21 ARVN Divisions + 44th STZ  
-DMAC/G3  
-DMAC/CORDS (MSA - RF - PF/Div)

Text # 06813 / 6 / MCLT

Ref. - Memo # 02431/QD IV/V4CT/HQ dtd 19 April 70 of Hqters/IV Corps  
- Postal Message # 1252/6/HQ/M dtd 9 August 70  
- Postal Message # 05346/HL/K dtd 13 August 70 of Hqters/MR4+IV Corps.

1. Headquarters/MR 4 + IV Corps realizes that: the use of territorial forces to test the night operations at Ben Tranh Sub-Sector, in Dinh Tuong Sector starting on 01 May 1970 and lasting for 3 months, in conjunction with US and Australian Advisors, had a favorable result.

2. As a consequence, MR 4 + IV Corps Headquarters makes up its mind to order the Sectors to conduct the experimental night operations at the prescribed Sub-Sectors (see the attached list of Sub-Sectors). RF & PF located at the respective Sub-Sectors will play the leading role in these operations (except Dinh Tuong Sector which will take charge of conducting them for its subordinate Sub-Sectors).

The test will take effect on 1 November 1970 and will last for 3 months, under the direction and training of the officers who have attended the courses on Night Operational Techniques conducted at Dong Tam base and taught by US and Australian Advisors. All the night operations will be under the direction of Sub-Sectors Chief. Sector Headquarters will assume the responsibility of providing the means of transportation, supply, or air support.

3. After this testing period to find out the good and weak points, the Sectors will apply the night operational techniques to their respective Sub-Sectors at the same time.

4. It is requested that all the territorial security activities be maintained. The units which are used for testing the night the night operations should take a rest in the daytime.

5. IV Corps + MR 4/G4 ALC will issue ammunition, grenades for the training units in accordance with the Sector's needs.

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

19 1970



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

6. A meeting of showing how to conduct the experimental operations will be held at IV Corps + MR 4 Headquarters on 260900 hrs October 1970 for all Chiefs of the experimental Sub-Sectors prescribed above.

APO 5402, October 19 1970

MG NGO QUANG TRUONG  
Commanding General, IV Corps + MR4  
(Printed Signature)

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



LIST OF SUB-SECTORS SELECTED FOR TESTING NIGHT OPERATION

(Ref. Mes # 1252/6/HQ dtd 9 Aug. 70 of IV Corps HQ)

1. 7TH DIV. TAOR:

a. Dinh Tuong	:	Sub-Sector Cho Gao
b. Kien Hoa	:	" Ba Tri
c. Go Cong	:	" Hoa Dong

2. 9TH DIV. TAOR:

a. Vinh Long	:	Sub-Sector Chau Thanh
b. Vinh Binh	:	" Chau Thanh
c. An Giang	:	" Chau Thanh
d. Sa Dec	:	" Duc Thinh (Chau Thanh)

3. 21ST DIV. TAOR:

a. Kien Giang	:	Sub-Sector Kien Thanh
b. Phong Dinh	:	" Phong Phu
c. Chuong Thien	:	" Long My
d. Ba Xuyen	:	" Lich Hoi Thuong
e. Bac Lieu	:	" Vinh Loi
f. An Xuyen	:	" Quang Long

4. 44TH. STZ:

a. Kien Tuong	:	Sub-Sector Tuyen Nhon
b. Kien Phong	:	" My An
3. Chau Doc	:	" An Phu



TRAINING GUIDE TOPICS \*

1. Weapons handling
2. Movement
3. Fire and Movement
4. Day firing
5. Night firing
6. Obstacle crossing
7. Contact drills
8. Mechanical ambush
9. Ambush
10. Night observation
11. Duties of night sentry
12. Cordon and search
13. Scouting
14. Patrolling
15. Night harbour
16. Mortar training
17. Adjustment of fire
18. Radio security
19. Platoon attack
20. Action on lights



ORGANIZATION OF TRAINING TEAM

<u>FUNCTION</u>	<u>RESPONSIBILITY</u>
<u>Team Leader Officer</u> (Trained in night operational Techniques at Dong Tam base)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Command all Teams.</li><li>2. Train all RF/Cos Commanders and Plts Leaders and PF/Plts Leaders in Night operational Techniques.</li><li>3. Clear all obstacles in the operational area in every operation.</li><li>4. Record the statistics for evaluation and for briefing- (Annex 4)</li></ol>
<u>Intelligence Officer</u> (S2/Sub-Sector HQ)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Organize the people intel- ligence net.</li><li>2. Provide the accurate and worthwhile informations for Commander Officer to help the latter make the operation plan in time.</li></ol>
<u>Instructor Officer</u> (Sector HQ will select the experienced Officer)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Assist the Team Leader Officer in training all RF/PF units.</li><li>2. Accompany all RF/PF units in the operations.</li><li>3. Make comments on the operations to find out the good and weak points about the Night Operational experiences.</li></ol>



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Annex 4

TRAINING SCHEDULE OF RF/PF UNITS

TOPICS	RF COMPANY (a)	PF PLATOON	REMARKS
Weapon Handling			
Movement			
Fire & Movement			
Day Firing			
Night Firing			
Obstacle Crossing			
Contact Drills			
Mechanical Ambush			
Ambush			
Night Observation			
Duties of Night			
Sentry			
Gordon & Search			
Scouting			
Patrolling			
Night Harbour			
Mortar Training			
Adjustment of Fire			
Radio Security			
Platoon Attack			
Action on Lights			

T O T A L

(hours of Training)

NOTE: (a) Name of RF Cos & PF Plts trained.

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



# RESULT OF NIGHT OPERATIONS

THE WEEK OF.....70.....1970

Annex 4b

Units Taking Part in The Operation	Day Ambush		Night Ambush		Mechanical Ambush		Surprise Attack		Patrol & Reconnaissance		LOSSES									
	Number Or AMB	No Of Cont	No Of AMB	No Of Cont	No Of AMB	Favor- able Result	No Of Surp	Favor- able Result ATT	No Of Patrols	No Of Cont	Friendly				Enemy					
											Personnel		Weapons		Personnel			Weapons		
											KIA	WIA	MIA	Indivi- dual Wpns	Crew- sterved Wpns	Kil- led	Capt- ured	Hc	Crews- erved Wpns	Indivi- dual Wpns
RF CO																				
Pf Pltn																				
Total																				

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Annex 5

AMMUNITION REQUEST FOR TRAINING 1 RF CO.

ON NIGHT OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES

1.	M-16 Ball	15,000
2.	M-16 Tracer	2,000
3.	M-79 Ball, Explosive	100
4.	M-79 Illuminating	50
5.	M-Bounding Mines, Illuminating	50
6.	Flares, Hand held, 1 star with parachute	50
7.	Claymore Mines M-18 A1	24
8.	Grenades, hand, M-26	50
9.	Grenades, Smoke, Yellow	10
10.	Grenades, Smoke, Green	10
11.	Detonators, Electric	15
12.	Detonators	15
13.	Cord. Det	100

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 6 to  
Annex D to  
AATTV Report Oct 70

M E S S A G E

TOP URGENT

FROM: IV Corps/MR-4/G-3

TO : Headquarters 4 Administration & Logistics Center

7th Division Training Center

Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, Go Cong, Sa Dec, Vinh Long, Vinh Binh,  
An Xuyen, Kien Giang, Phong Dinh, Bac Lieu, Chuong Thien,  
Ba Xuyen, Kien Tuong, Kien Phong, Chau Doc.

INFO: JGS/Training Department - Admin/Logistics Department.  
Ordnance Dep.

- MR-4/Office of Assistant Commander
- IV Corps/MR-4/General Service Office - G-4
- EMAC/G-3
- 7th Division/G3- Hqs/Amin/Leg/My Tho

Message # 06768/6/HL/T

Reference Meassage # -4674/6/HL/T dated on July 31/70 IV Corps + MR-4/G-3.

Australian Advisory Team will organize Night Operations Techniques at 7th Division Training Center scheduling as follows:

- A. Session 3 - from Oct/21/70 to Nov/4/70
- B. Session 4 - From Nov/11/70 to Nov/23/70
- C. Session 5 - From Nov/25/70 to Dec/9/70
- D. Session 6 - From Dec/10/70 to Dec/24/70

FIRST: Sectors are requested to instruct each subsector to select a trainee officer + 1st Lieutenant or Captain + as following:

- A. Session 3 - Dinh Tuong 7 - Kien Hoa 9 - Chuong Thien 5
- B. Session 4 - Vinh Binh 7 - Phong Dinh 7 - An Xuyen 6
- C. Session 5 - Bac Lieu 4 - Kien Giang 7 - Chau Doc 5  
Vinh Long 7
- D. Session 6 - Ba Xuyen 6 - Kien Phong 6 - Go Cong 4  
Kien Tuong 4 - Sa Dec 4

Second: The trainee officer must be present at the 7th Division Training Center 2 days before the Session Opening, with completed equipment - M-16 and 1 firing unit - Money for 15 days

THIRD: SM/DSLDD/4 and 7th Division .

...2/

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 2 -

THIRD: SM/DSLC/4 and 7th Division Training Center have to execute item 2 & 3 of the above reference message for each training session.

FOURTH: Adnewledge reception to IV Corps/MR-4/G-3

Major General NGO QUANG TRUONG  
IV Corps & MR-4 Commender  
Brigade General NGUYEN HUU HANH  
MR-4 Assistant Commander

G-3 Commander  
LTC Le Van Tong

SECRET  
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY