

Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report
February 1971

Series: AWM103 - Headquarters 1st
Australian Task Force (Nui Dat) records

Item: R723/1/57/30

AWM 103

723	1	57
(FILE No.)		
[P41]		

AWM 103

SECRET
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

HQ IATF

AWM 103

AATTV

869487

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SECRET

TO BE PASSED BY HAND

AWM 103
AATTV

SECRET
FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

NOT HOLD this file when lapses in action may exceed
n (7) days.

012-2632 REPRINTED APR. 67

ARCHIVAL
CATEGORY

.....

.....

.....

723	1	57
(FILE No.)		
[P41]		

SECRET



AUSTRALIAN FORCE VIETNAM



QUOTE IN REPLY

R723 / 1 / 35

HEADQUARTERS

Army Component

24 Mar 71

AHQ (c)
1 ATF
HQ NZ V Force

AATTV MONTHLY REPORT
FEB 71

Enclosed for your information is one copy of the AATTV Monthly Report for Feb 71.

K. Grayson Capt

(K.J. GRAYSON)
Captain
For Commander Australian Force
VIETNAM

Enclosure: AATTV Monthly Report - 1 copy



SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Headquarters
Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam

20 Mar 71

AFV (3)

AATTV REPORT - FEB 71

General

1. ARVN operations in Laos and Cambodia dominated all other activities in Feb. The ARVN incursion into Laos (Operation LAM-SON 719) has particularly affected AATTV activities, especially in 1 ARVN Division.

Casualties

2. The following battle casualties occurred in the month:
- a. Bdr C.J. Cavanagh. Wounded in action in Phuoc-Tuy Province on 1 Feb 71. He remained on duty.
- b. Capt J.J. Smith. Wounded in action in Nghia-Hanh District in Quang-Ngai Province on 24 Feb 71. He sustained multiple fragment wounds to the chest, abdomen and left thigh. He was evacuated medically to Australia on 8 Mar 71.
3. The following non-battle casualties were hospitalized in February:
- | | | |
|-----|---------------|---------------------------|
| WO2 | A.R. West | 20-22 Feb 71 |
| WO2 | D.J. Jones | 27 Feb - 10 Mar 71 |
| WO2 | W.E. Shennan | 26 Feb - 5 Mar 71 |
| Bdr | R.A. Kennedy | 27 Feb - 1 Mar 71 |
| Cpl | K.P. Glover | 2 Feb - 2 Mar 71 |
| Cpl | P. Hanley | 1-12 Feb 71, 16-18 Feb 71 |
| Cpl | B.A. Williams | 13-26 Feb 71 |

4. Deployment. Attached as Annex A is the deployment of AATTV at 1 Mar 71. The strength at that date was 35 officers, 106 warrant officers, 77 sergeants and corporals, giving a total strength of 218 all ranks.

MR 1

5. A report on activities in MR 1 by Maj R. Aitken is at Annex B. The ARVN operations in Laos are covered in detail in this report and in its attached appendices. AATTV advisers whose battalions have crossed into Laos are now concentrated either in the Quang-Tri area or are at Da-Nang.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../ 2

MR 2

6. Night Operations Training Pleiku. Attached as Annex C is a report by Capt Caligari, the Team Leader at Pleiku. The intention to move the School from Pleiku to Phan-Rang requires explanation. The reasons for the move are:

- a. The weather. The wet season in Pleiku is much more restrictive. 100 inches of rain at Pleiku compared to 40 inches on the coast.
- b. The climate. The cold nights at Pleiku (Temperature of 37° F in December at 0330 hrs) are not conducive to good training as most of the students come from the coastal area.
- c. Administrative convenience.

7. Ranger Training Centre Duc-My. Warrant Officers Pavlenko and Shennan are still employed at the Ranger Training Centre Duc-My. Pavlenko is in the Training Department and Shennan is the adviser on the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Wing. The strength of the students at RTC has dropped considerably in the last month because of the Laotian operations.

MR 3


8. A detailed report on AATTV activities is covered in Annex D and its attached appendices. The only point requiring amplification is an explanation of operation Dong Khoi. This operation is aimed at the VCI. It entails the conduct of simultaneous operations by every District in a Province. Dong-Khoi operations conducted in MR 4 in December and January were very successful. The operations in MR 3 while successful have not produced the results hoped for.

JWTC

9. A report by Lt Col J.W. Sullivan the Australian Team Leader at the JWTC is attached at Annex E. It needs no amplification.

MR 4

10. A report on the activities of AATTV is attached as Annex F. The report has been prepared by Maj J. Browne. The report states that there is a requirement for an officer to be posted to each of the Schools on Dong-Tam and Bac-Lieu. This is a valid requirement and an officer has now been posted to each school.


(G.J. LEARY)
Col
Comd

HQ AATTV SAIGON
AS AT 1 MAR 71

Annex 'A' to
AATTV Monthly Report
for Feb 71

HQ AATTV
SAIGON

Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
1.	Col	G.J.	Leary	HQ AATTV	HQ AATTV	Commander	Dec 71	Saigon
2.	Lt Col	W.M.	Silverstone	RAA	"	Second in Command	Jul 71	"
3.	Maj	R.P.	Webb	RA Sigs	"	Major Q	Jan 72	"
4.	Capt	J.D.	Gilliland	RAEME	"	Adjutant	Jun 71	"
5.	WO1	I.	Robertson	RA Inf	"	R.S.M.	Sep 71	"
6.	WO2	D	Pearce	RAASC	"	Chief Clerk	Oct 71	"
7.	WO1	B.R	Lawrance	RAAMC	"	Admin WO(movements)	Mar 71	"
8.	WO2	V.F.	Metzroth	RA Inf	"	Admin WO (designate)	Feb 72	"
9.	Cpl	G.M.	Eldridge	RAASC	"	Admin Sgt (Pay)	Mar 71	"
10.	Cpl	J.W	Kelly	RAASC	"	Clerk	Apr 71	"
11.	Cpl	A.J	Hennesy	RAASC	"	Asst Instr	Jul 71	"
12.	Cpl.	B.J.	Cook	RAASC	"	Clerk	Feb 72	"

.../2

- 2 -

VUNG-TAU

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
13.	Lt	M.	Evans	RA Inf	HQ AATTV Vung-Tau	QM	Aug 71	Vung-Tau
14.	WO2	J.V.	Holt	RA Inf	" "	RQMS	Oct 71	"
15.	Sgt	K.A.	Edwards	RAASC	" "	Admin Sgt	Jul 71	"
16.	Bdr	G.J.	Honour	RAA	" "	Tpt Supervisor	Apr 71	"
17.	Cpl	R.D.	Davies	RAEME	" "	Beh Mech	Jul 71	"
18.	Cpl	E.J.	Purtell	RAAC	" "	Storeman	Aug 71	"
19.	Cpl	V.J.G.	Booth	RAAC	" "	Tpt Supervisor	Aug 71	"

.../ 3

MILITARY REGION 1
QUANG TRI PROVINCE

Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
20	Maj	K.J.	Redman	RA Sigs	Quang-Tri Sector	Territorial Security Adviser.	Oct 71	Quang-Tri
21	WO2	B.L.	LeSueur	RA Inf	" "	Admin WO	Oct 71	"
22	WO2	R.P.	Taylor	RAA	Hai Lang Sub-Sector	Asst Adviser	Jul 71	"
23	Capt	I.W.	McQuire	RA Inf	2/1 ARVN Bn	Senior Adviser	Mar 71	Near Quang-Tri (Regt HQ)
24	Capt	R.A.	Baird	RA Sigs	2/1 " "	" " (Designate)	Feb 72	"
25	WO2	J.R.	Peel	RAE	2/1 " "	Asst Adviser	Oct 71	"
26	WO2	K.A.	Gabriel	RA Inf	3/1 " "	" "	Sep 71	"
27	WO2	R.J.	Curran	RA Inf	4/1 " "	" "	Oct 71	"
28	WO2	S.R.	Wells	RAASC	1/2 " "	" "	Aug 71	Dong-Da
29	WO2	K.D.	Pryde	RA Inf	4/2 " "	" "	Oct 71	"
30	WO2	J.L.	Bouveng	RA Inf	5/2 " "	" "	Jun 71	"
31	WO2	F.J.J.	Beattie	RAAC	3/7 ARVN Cav	" "	Sep 71	"

.../ 4

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
32	Maj	R.J.	Aitken	RA Inf	HQ I Corps	Asst to Chief of Staff I Corps.	Apr 71	Danang
33	WO1	J.S.	Calcutt	RA Inf	AATTV Danang	Admin WO	Mar 71	Aust House Danang
34	WO1	B.I.	Muir	RA Inf	AATTV Danang	Admin WO (Designate)	Sep 71	"
35	WO2	M.G.	RODGER	RAEME	AATTV Danang	Admin WO (Movements)	May 71	"
36	WO2	L.T.	Murrell	RA Inf	37 Ranger Bn	Asst Adviser	Jul 71	Near Danang (Gp HQ)
37	WO2	W.J.	Noble	RAAC	3/17 ARVN Cav	" "	Nov 71	Hoi-An
38	WO2	F.	Sykes	RA Inf	2/51 ARVN Bn	" "	Jul 71	Mieu Bong (Regt HQ)
39	WO2	W.S.	Dickey	RA Inf	3/51 " "	" "	Jul 71	"
40	WO2	J.E.	Barker	RA Inf	Hoa-Vang Sub-Sector	" "	Jan 72	Hoa ang
41	WO1	R.A.	Kean	RAAC	2/4 ARVN Cav	" "	Sep 71	

.../ 5

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>MR I.</u>								
<u>THUA THIEN PROVINCE (CONT)</u>								
42	WO1	M.R.	Steiger	RAAMC	1 ARVN Div	Medical Adviser	Jun 71	Hue
43	WO2	J.	Kendall	RA Inf	"	Sensor Adviser	Jun 71	"
44	Capt	R.J	Ashfield	RA Inf	3/54 ARVN Bn	Senior Adviser	Oct 71	Phu Loc (Regtl HQ)
45	WO2	N.	Smith	RA Inf	4/54 "	Asst Adviser	Oct 71	"
46	WO2	A.B.	Clutterbuck	RA Inf	2/3 "	" "	Jun 71	Near Hue (Regtl HQ)
47	WO2	J.F.	Leal	RAA	3/3 "	" "	Apr 71	" " "
48	Capt	I.E.K.	Wischusen	RA Inf	Phu Thu Sub Sector	Senior Adviser	Oct 71	Phu Thu
49	WO1	B.C	Addington	RAA Pro	" "	Asst Adviser	Aug 71	" "

Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location	
Quang Tin And Quang Ngai Provinces									
50	WO2	W.E	Bray	RA Inf	4 ARVN Regt	Recce Coy	Senior Adviser	Oct 71	Quang Ngai
51	WO2	B.F	Mc Grath	RA Inf	1/5 Awn Bn		Asst Adviser	Feb 71	"
52	WO2	P.R.B.	Gleeson	RAA	2/5 "		"	Oct 71	"
53	WO2	N.	Johnston	RA Inf	4/5 "		"	Oct 71	"
54	WO2	R.	Lennon	RA Inf	2/6 "		"	Feb 72	"
55	WO2	P.W	Teague	RA Inf	3/6 "		"	Oct 71	"
56	WO2	C.A	Chambers	RA Inf	4/6 "		"	Aug 71	"
57	WO2	W.A	Nesbitt	RAA	HQ 2 ARVN Div		Sensor Advisor	Sep 71	"
58	WO2	E.J	Pirani	RAAMC	" "		Medical Adviser	Sep 71	"
59	WO1	R	Deed	RA Inf	MR Assistance		Team Leader MATT 21	Jun 71	Quang Ngai
60	WO2	G.A	Francis	RA Inf	"		Team member	Sep 71	"
61	WO2	B.G	Long	RA Inf	"		"	Sep 71	"
62	WO2	P.D	Lawson	RA Inf	"		"	Feb 72	"
63	Capt	J. J	Smith	RA Inf	"		Team Leader MATT 22	Jul 71	"
64	WO2	W.B	Rogers	RA Inf	"		Team member	Sep 71	"
65	WO2	C.L	Black	RA Inf	"		Team member	Aug 71	"
66	WO2	J.W	Pratten	RA Inf	"		Team member	Feb 72	"
67	Capt	C.J	Brock	RA Inf	MR Assistance		Team Leader MATT23	Apr 71	"
68	WO2	E.M	Schmudt	RA Inf	"		Team member	Jun 71	"
69	WO2	D.W	Jenkinson	RA Inf	"		"	Oct 71	"
70	WO2	W.A	Robertson	RA Inf	"		"	Feb 72	"

Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>UNALLOTTED MATTS MR1</u>								
71	Capt	J.A	Fitzsimon	RA Inf			Oct 71	Quang Ngai
72	Lt	A.J	Kirwan	Ra Inf			Feb 72	"
<u>MILITARY REGION II</u>								
<u>KHANH HOA PROVINCE</u>								
73	WO2	P.J.	PAVLENKO	RA Inf	Ranger Training Centre Instructor/ Adviser		May 71	Duc My
74	WO2	W.E.	Shennan	RA Inf	"	"	Oct 71	"
<u>PLEIKU PROVINCE</u>								
75	Capt	B.J	Caligari	RA Inf	Night Operations Training OC NOTT		Jul 71	Pleiku
76	WO2	A.W	Lancaster	RA Inf	"	Team member	Jun 71	"
77	WO2	A.R	West	RAE	"	"	Oct 71	"
78	WO2	B.H	Cox	RA Inf	"	"	Jan 72	"
79	WO2	L	Jackson	RA Inf	"	"	Sep 72	"

MILITARY REGION III
BIEN HOA PROVINCE

Lt Col W.A. WOOLSTON

RAEME

Territorial Forces Adviser MR III

Oct 71 Bien Hoa.

MR III PHUOC TUY PROVINCE
JUNGLE WARFARE TRAINING CENTRE

80	Lt Col J.W. SULLIVAN	RA INF	JWTC.	Senior Adviser	Jul 71	Nui Dat
81	Maj C.A. SWAIN	RA INF	"	Adviser	Jan 72	"
82	Maj B.J. O'NEILL	RAA	"	Adviser	Jan 72	"
83	Capt W.M. GUNDER	RA INF	"	Adviser	Oct 71	"
84	Capt R. MOUNTFORT	RNZR	"	Adviser	Oct 71	"
85	Capt H.E.N. MARTENS	RA INF	"	Adviser	Apr 71	"
86	Capt T.J. PROPERJOHN	RA INF	"	Adviser	Oct 71	"
87	Capt B.M. STRAKER	RAASC	"	Adviser	Feb 72	"
88	WO1 C.W. CRAPPER	RA INF	"	RSM	Sep 71	"
89	WO1 D.R. CHERRY	RA INF	"	Assistant Instruct	Jan 72	"
90	WO2 K.F. Mc DONALD	RA INF	"	"	Jul 71	"
91	WO2 W.J. McINERNEY	RA INF	"	"	Apr 71	"
92	WO2 G.H. KING	RA INF	"	"	May 71	"
93	WO2 T.J. NICHOLLS	RAA	"	"	Apr 71	"
94	WO2 A.G. URQUHART	RA INF	"	"	Jan 72	"
95	WO2 GVR WINZAR	RA INF	"	"	Oct 71	"
96	WO2 H.J. WRIGHT	RA SVY	"	"	Sep 71	"

49

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment		Location
97	WO2	LF	McIntosh	RA Inf	JWTC	Assistant Instructor	Jul 71	Nui Dat
98	WO2	A	Egan	RA Inf	"	" "	Jun 71	"
99	Cpl	GW	RAE	RA Inf	"	" "	Aug 71	"
100	Cpl	RA	Cross	RAASC	"	Clerk	Sep 71	"
101	Bdr	SM	Boyd	RAA	"	Assistant Instructor	Oct 71	"
102	Bdr	DA	Hewton	RAA	"	" "	Oct 71	"
103	Cpl	WD	Boyle	RA Inf	"	Interpreter	Oct 71	"
104	Cpl	LL	Parfitt	AACC	"	Supervisor Army Messes	Jan 72	"
105	Cpl	EM	Lloyd	RA Inf	"	Storeman	Oct 71	"
106	Cpl	FW	Brady	RAE	"	Assistant Instructor	Nov 71	"
107	Cpl	RJ	Iearson	RAAMC	"	Medical Assistant	Nov 71	"

Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
MR III MOBILE ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAMS								
<u>PHUOC TUY PROVINCE</u>								
100	Maj	K.R.	Phillips	RAAC	Phuoc Tuy Sector	Territorial Security Adviser	May 71	Baria
100	Maj	W.D	Thomas	RAA	" "	Sector Psyops Adviser	Oct 71	"
110	Capt	J.C	Hartley	RA Inf	" "	Adviser	Apr 71	"
111	WO1	L.F.	Larsson	RA Inf	" "	" "	Jan 72	"
112	Sgt	W.L	Eddington	RAASC	" "	Admin Sgt	Aug 71	"
113	Cpl	K.G	Jarrett	RA Inf	" "	Driver	Sept 71	"
114	Cpl	A.T	Roberts	RAA Pro	" "	Driver	Aug 71	"
115	WO2	R.E	Mills	RAEME	" "	Chieu Hoi Adviser	Jun 71	"
115	WO1	R. J.	Hayes	RAA	Van Kiep National Training Centre	Instructor/Adviser	Oct 71	Baria
116	WO2	L.D	Osborn	RA Inf	Phuoc Tuy Sector	Adviser RD Cadre	Jul 71	"
116	WO2	U	Moldre	Ra Inf	"	Linguist	Dec 71	"
119	WO2	JA	Baird	RNZR	" "	Team Leader MATT 1	Oct 71	Binh Ba
120	WO2	L	JAAGO	RA Inf	"	Team 2IC "	Jul 71	"
121	Cpl	DN	Manski	Ra Inf	" "	Team member	Aug 71	"
121	Cpl	P	Hanley	RAAMC	" "	Team member	Nov 71	"
122	Cpl	RJ	ATKINS	RAE	" "	" "	Dec 71	"
124	WO2	A. J. N	DODDS	RA Inf	" "	Team Leader MATT2	Jul 71	Dat Do
125	Cpl	T. P.	Mullins	RAA	" "	Team member		
126	Cpl	G.M.	Schraven	RAAMC	Phuoc Tuy Sector	Team member	Aug 71	
127	Cpl	C. F. A.	Clark	RAE	" "	"	Nov 71	
128	Capt	L. M.	Opie	RA Inf	" "	Team Leader MATT3	Apr 71	Long Dien
129	WO2	A.V. S.	Pennington	RAA	" "	" 2IC	Aug 71	

Serial	Rank	Inits:	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
130	WO2	N.E.F	Youl	RA Inf	Phuoc Tuy Province	Team member	Aug 71	Long Dien
131	Cpl	J.C.	Monk	RA Inf	" "	"	Jan 71	
132	Cpl	R.L.	Thornton	RAAMC	" "	"	Sep 71	
133	WO2	N.R.	Shoveller	RA Inf	" "	Team Leader MATT4	Oct 71	Hoa Loi
134	WO2	R.A	Luckman	RA Inf	" "	" 2IC	Jan 72	"
135	Cpl	A	Schneider	RAAMC	" "	Team member	Apr 71	"
136	Cpl	I.A	Kuring	RA Inf	" "	"	May 71	"
137	Cpl	G.R	Hore	RA Inf	" "	"	Nov 71	"
138	Cpl	T.R	Mc Laine	RAE	" "	"	Apr 71	"
139	WO2	R.G	Davies	RA Inf	" "	Team Leader MATT5	May 71	Hoi My
140	WO2	G.E	Paxton	RA Inf	" "	" 2IC	Jun 71	"
141	Fdr	C.J	Cavanagh	RAA	" "	Team member	Sep 71	"
142	Cpl	I.W	Roe	RA Inf	" "	"	Aug 71	"
143	Cpl	G.L	Fudge	RAAMC	" "	"	Jan 72	"
144	Cpl	G.R	Grey	RAE	" "	"	Nov 71	"
145	WO2	M	Muir	RA Inf	" "	Team Leader MATT6	May 71	Hoa Long
146	WO2	R.B.D	Rutherford	RA Inf	" "	Team 2IC MATT6	Jan 72	"
147	Cpl	P.D	Baker	RA Inf	" "	Team member	Aug 72	"
148	Cpl	M.B	Walker	RA Inf	" "	"	Nov 71	"
149	Cpl	I.N	Felton	RAAMC	" "	"	Nov 71	"
150	Cpl	J.T	Ronaldson	RAE	" "	"	Aug 71	"
151								

Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
152	WO2	R.A.	Neagle	RA Inf	Phuoc-Tuy Province	Team Leader MATT 7	Jul 71	Ong Trinh
153	WO2	J.J.	Cootes	RNZ1R	" "	Team 21C "	Jul 71	"
154	Bdr	M.H.	Partridge	RAA	" "	Team Member "	Nov 71	"
155	Cpl	P.G.	Rhodes	RAAMC	" "	" " "	Aug 71	"
156	Cpl	B.J.	Arthur	RAE	" "	" " "	Aug 71	"
157	WO2	M.T.	Roberts	RA Inf	" "	Team Leader MATT 8	Aug 71	Xuyen-Moc
158	WO2	E.L.	McCoombe	RA Inf	" "	Team 21C "	Jan 72	"
159	Bdr	F.C.	Gebbett	RAA	" "	Team Member "	Aug 71	"
160	Cpl	K.R.	McMillan	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Jul 71	"
161	Cpl	W.A.	Belcher	RAAMC	" "	" " "	Aug 71	"
162	Cpl	D.R.	Quick	RAE	" "	" " "	Aug 71	"
163	WO2	J.H.	Griffith	RA Inf	" "	Team Leader MATT 9	Sep 71	Phuoc-Loi
164	WO2	G.L.	Millington	RAAC	" "	Team 21C "	Jan 72	"
165	Bdr	D.D.	Keech	RAA	" "	Team Member "	Jun 71	"
166	Bdr	R.F.	Miller	RAA	" "	" " "	Sep 71	"
167	Cpl	H.	Dolensky	RAAMC	" "	" " "	Sep 71	"
168	Cpl	P.C.	Aylett	RAE	" "	" " "	Sep 71	"
169	WO2	D.	Taylor	RAAOC	" "	Team Leader MATT 11	Sep 71	Phuoc-Hoa
170	WO2	B.L.	Maher	RAA	" "	Team 21C "	Jan 72	"
171	Cpl	G.A.	Hazel	RA Inf	" "	Team Member "	Sep 71	"
172	Cpl	C.P.	Chadwick	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Sep 71	"
173	Cpl	M.G.	Springett	RAAMC	" "	" " "	Jan 72	"
174	Cpl	M.L.	Phillips	RAE	" "	" " "	Aug 71	"

.../ 13

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
175	WO2	R.T.P.	Cullen	RA Inf	Phuoc-Tuy Province	Team Leader MATT 12	Jun 71	An-Ngai
176	WO2	R.J.	Hunnisett	RA Inf	" "	Team 21C "	Jan 72	"
177	Cpl	R.A.	Kennedy	RAA	" "	Team Member "	Sep 71	"
178	Cpl	R.S.	Sparke	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Sep 71	"
179	Cpl	P.M.	Gadsen	RAAMC	" "	" " "	Sep 71	"
180	Cpl	N.W.C.	Burgerhof	RAE	" "	" " "	Sep 71	"
181	WO1	B.	Roe	RNZR	" "	Team Leader MATT 14		Long-Lien
182	WO2	G.J.	Darlington	RA Inf	" "	Team 21C "	Sep 71	"
183	Cpl	T.D.	Blackhurst	RA Inf	" "	Team Member "	Aug 71	"
184	Cpl	O.C.	Moon	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Sep 71	"
185	Cpl	D.W.	Beck	RAAMC	" "	" " "	Sep 71	"
186	Cpl	A.J.	Walker	RAE	" "	" " "	Sep 71	"
187	WO2	K.J.	Prior	RA Inf	" "	Team Leader MATT 15	Nov 71	Long-Son
188	WO2	E.	Harkin	RAA	" "	Team 21C "	Oct 71	"
189	Cpl	L.G.	Buckley	RA Inf	" "	Team Member "	Aug 71	"
190	Cpl	A.	Skowronski	RAE	" "	" " "	Aug 71	"
191	Bdr	J.R.	Anderson	RAA	" "	" " "	Nov 71	"
192	Cpl	T.G.	Fitzgerald	RAAMC	" "	" " "	Aug 71	"
193	Cpl	K.P.	Glover	RAE	" "	" " "	Sep 71	"

Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
194	Cpl	P.J.	Geil	RA Inf	Phuoc Tuy Province		Feb 72	
195	Cpl	W.G.	Rowe	RA Inf	" "		Feb 72	
196	Cpl	W.	Davis	RA Inf	" "		Feb 72	
197	Bdr	J.	McKenzie	RAA	" "		Feb 72	
198	Cpl	B.R.	Williams	RA Inf	" "		Feb 72	
199	Lt	D.R.	Bird	RAA	" "		Feb 72	
200	2Lt	L.	Shearwin	RAAC	" "		Feb 72	
201	2Lt	J.A.	Bendiech	RAAC	" "		Nov 71	
202	Bdr	I.L.	Lee	RAA	" "		Sep 71	
203	Maj	J.	Browne (RTA 4Mar 71)	RAA	Cords IV Corps	Assistant to chief of Territorial Security (Designate)	Mar 71	Can Tho
204	Maj	J.G.	Hughes	RAA	" "		Feb 72	"
205	WO2	A.K.	Jones	RA Inf	" "		Jun 71	"
206	Capt	B.F.	McGurgan (RTA 25 Mar 71)	RAE	Night Advisory Team 1	O.C. Nights Advisory Team 1	Mar 71	"
207	WO2	I.C.	Caskey	RNZR	" "	Team Member	Nov 71	
208	WO2	P.R.	Conway	RAASC	" "	"	Oct 71	
209	WO2	J.	Clarke	RA Inf	" "	"	Oct 71	
210	WO2	G.L.	Herschall	RA Inf	" "	"	Apr 71	
211	WO2	W.C.	Date	RA inf	" "		Feb 72	
212	WO1	H.	Buckley	RAE	Night Advisory Team 2	I/C Night Advisory Team 2	Oct 71	
213	WO2	J.T.	Barnes	RA Inf			Nov 70	
214	WO2	K.D.	Charlton	RAA			Dec 71	
215	WO2	B.M.	Prosper	RA Inf			Jan 72	
216	WO2	D.I.	Jones	RA Inf			Sep 71	
217	WO2	G.J.	Sutherland	RA Inf			Jun 71	

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Annex B to
AATTV Report Feb 71

REPORT BY MAJ R.J. AITKEN
SENIOR AUSTRALIAN ADVISER MR 1

General

1. The major item of interest during the reporting period was the commencement of operation Lam-Son 719/Dewey Canyon II into Laos.
2. The operation commenced on 31 Jan 71 when elements of 1st Bde 5th Div (Mechanised) moved from Dong-Ha Combat Base along the axis of Route 9 to Khe-Sanh. On 8th Feb 71 ARVN units crossed the Laotian border. The ARVN forces were supported by US air units, but all US ground forces, including US and Australian advisers, remained in Quang-Tri Province, South Vietnam.
3. Prior to the commencement of Operation Lam-Son 719 Allied deception measures, aimed at leading the enemy to believe that an invasion of North Vietnam across the Eastern DMZ was likely, were mounted. Subsequent reports received from agents indicate that these measures were highly successful, in that the reaction by the enemy was extensive.
4. At the time of reporting agent reports still indicate that the enemy has not discounted the possibility of an Allied thrust across the DMZ.
5. A summary of contacts from 7-20 Feb 71 is attached at Appendix 1 to this report, and a resume of Operation Lam-Son 719/Dewey Canyon II is attached at Appendix 2.
6. The ARVN ground force engaged on Operation Lam-Son 719 is to be increased, within the week, by the move of the remaining brigade of the 1st VN Marine Division together with its supporting units to bring the Division to its full strength on this operation. In addition the 4th ARVN Regiment from Quang-Ngai Province and the 4th ARVN Cavalry Regiment are moving to Dong-Ha at time of reporting.
7. US air elements supporting ARVN forces are to be increased by the addition of six Cobra gunship platoons and six UH/CH helicopter companies, three of which are US marine units previously warned for return to the United States.
8. The HQ 11th Bde, 23rd US Division and one battalion plus artillery elements are moving from Duc-Pho District, Quang-Ngai Province and will come under command 101st Airborne Division which is to assume responsibility for the security of the DMZ area.

Local Operations

9. The tempo of operations in the lowland areas has increased sharply during the past three weeks. The brunt of these operations is being borne by RF units which are acquitting themselves well. In the majority of contacts casualty ratios are favourable to the RF units.
10. Of particular note was 711 RF Company's contact on 24 Feb 71, during which the company killed 47 NVA and captured 2 NVA while sustaining 6 KIA and 7 WIA themselves.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../ 2

11. In the DMZ area and against most major bases and airfields attacks by fire have increased. Away from the DMZ most of these attacks consist of rocket fire. The general lack of casualties and damage caused by rockets continues to emphasize the expense of these weapons when related to results. During one attack on Danang Air Base a C130 received a direct hit from a rocket and the aircraft was destroyed.

12. During the last eleven months an average of two attacks by fire consisting of up to nine rockets have been directed against the Air Base. In all but two cases - the C130 mentioned in paragraph 11 and a fuel dump of 150,000 gallons of JP4 fuel which was hit in January - only very minor damage has been caused.

Casualties

13. Capt J.J. Smith was the only battle casualty suffered by AATTV in MR 1 during the reporting period. He was evacuated to 27th Surgical Hospital on 24 Feb 71 with multiple fragmentation wounds to the left side and left leg. In resultant surgery his spleen was removed. Capt Smith was evacuated to 1 Aust Field Hospital on 2 Mar 71.

Summary of Significant Contacts

14. A summary of significant contacts of ARVN and RF/PF units having Australian advisers is attached at Appendix 3. Details of contacts of those units, having Australian advisers, which are engaged on Operation Lam-Son 719 are not included.

Advisers' Reports

15. Reports submitted by advisers in MR1 are attached in Appendices:

- Appendix 1. Special Report Lam-Son 719/Dewey Canyon II
Part 1 to XXIV Corps Perentrep 5-71.
- Appendix 2. Special Report Lam-Son 719/Dewey Canyon II
Part 2 to XXIV Corps Perentrep 5-71.
- Appendix 3. Summary of Significant Contacts.
- Appendix 4. Report by Maj K.J. Redman, Territorial Security
Adviser Quang-Tri Province.
- Appendix 5. Report by Capt I. Wischusen, District Senior Adviser
Phu-Thu District.
- Appendix 6. Report by Capt R.J. Ashfield Senior Adviser
3/54 ARVN Bn.
- Appendix 7. Report by WO2 F. Beattie, Adviser 3/7 ARVN Cav Regt.
- Appendix 8. Report by WO2 K. Pryde, Adviser 4/2 ARVN Bn.
- Appendix 9. Report by WO2 F. Sykes, Adviser 4/51 ARVN Bn.
- Appendix 10. Report by WO2 R.P. Taylor, Adviser Hai Lang District.
- Appendix 11. Report by WO2 J. Barker, RF/PF Adviser Hoa-Vang District.

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 1 to
Annex B to
AATTV Report Feb 71

ANNEX E (SPECIAL REPORT: LAM SON 719/DEWEY CANYON II) PART 1 TO XXIV
CORPS PERINTREP 5-71 (U)

DTG	COORD	SUMMARY
071805- 1820H	XD 773497	While moving into night defensive position elements of the 4-3 Inf received small arms fire and hand grenades from an estimated four to six enemy. The unit returned SA and M-79 fire. Res: Enemy casualties unk. three KIA and one WIA friendly casualties.
071820H	XD 8950	Elements of 1-77 Armor Task Force received 16 x 122mm rockets. Res: One friendly WIA. Counter-battery was fired into SEL XD 946524. Res: Unk.
071840H	XD 957549	B-1-77 and G-1-61 Mech received six RPG rounds resulting in three friendly WIA. Organic weapons fire was returned on suspected enemy location. Res: Unk.
080140- 0210H	XD 9853 YD 0356	A truck convoy from 377th Trans Company was ambushed at YD 033561 by an USEF using RPG, SAF and AWP. The lead gun jeep from 504th MP Bn received a direct hit. After the area was cleared the convoy proceeded to XD 982532 where it was again ambushed. Results of these two ambushes were: one friendly KIA, eight friendly WIA, one 5500 gallon tank trucks destroyed, five 5500 gallon tank truck damaged, and two MP escort jeeps destroyed.
080905H	XD 965545	An APC from C-3-5 Cav det a mine resulting in seven friendly WIA. Dust off was engaged by 82mm mtr rds and SAF, however no hits were sustained.
080955H	XD 9555	An APC from C-3-5 Cav detonated an unk type mine. Res: Four friendly WIA. APC sustained moderate damage.
080955H	XD 997467	An element of A-1-61 Mech det a daisy chain consisting of 100 x 60mm mtr rds, one and one half km S of FSB Vandergrift.
081110H	XD 954557	B-1-77 and C-1-61 Mech found a cache containing 141 x 60mm mtr rds, 73 with fuses, 10 boxes of 60mm primers, 12 x RPG rds, 99 rds of unk type ordnance, three unknown type mines, one field phone, seven NVA rack sacks, one NVA map, 11 x B-40 launchers, one B-41 rd and miscellaneous clothing.
081145H	XD 697375	C-1-11 Inf contacted an estimated enemy squad. Res: One friendly KIA and six friendly WIA. En: Unk.
081300H	XD 550497	21st Rngr Bn received 12.7mm machine gun fire. Res: 11 friendly WIA.

E-1 of E-14

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

081332H XD 713392 C-1-11 Inf found cache located in a bunker complex containing 12 cases of 51 cal ammo, nine RPG rds, 22 x 60mm mtr rds, 100 x 57mm recoilless rifle rds and an unknown number of 7.62mm rds.

081500H XD 7227 2-3 ARVN contacted an USEF. Res: Five friendly WIA, two helicopters downed, nine enemy KIA, one 12.7mm machine gun, one AK-47 rifle, and one Chicom radio captured.

081500H XD 590368 A UH-1H received an unknown number of hits and crashed. Res: 10 friendly KIA.

081930H XD 632370 37th Rngr Bn received 50 x 105mm and 82mm mtr rds. Res: Three friendly KIA and 15 friendly WIA.

08 Feb XD 395423 391429 During the night, AC 130 aircraft destroyed six trucks and damaged one at XD 395423 and destroyed four trucks and damaged one at XD 391429.

091000H XD 721263 While searching, 2-3 ARVN captured documents identifying 73d NVA Bn and Team 559.

091420H YD 019593 FSB Fuller received three 120mm mtr rds. There were no casualties or damage. Counter-battery was fired from Camp Carroll into SEL XD 972662 with unknown results.

101000- XD 647289 Four helicopters received ground fire resulting in
101200H two helicopters destroyed, two damaged and four friendly WIA.

101200- XD 565552 Two helicopters received 37mm fire and exploded
1300H 562523 in mid air. Status of crew is unknown.

101230H XD 517473 While searching, 3d ARVN Abn Bn contacted an USEF. Res: Neg friendly casualties, neg enemy casualties. Six Russian made trucks were captured. One truck contained an unknown number of 120mm rds, one SKS and one AK-47 rifle.

101252H XD 648236 2-17 Cav observed and killed two NVA. At the same time, a C/G gunship from C-7-17 received 300-400 rds. The ship took six hits, and returned to base where it was found non-flyable. There were two friendly WIA.

101300H XD 696395 C-1-11 Cav received two 82mm mtr rds. Neg casualties or damage. Counter-battery was fired and gunships were called on station. Res: Unk.

101525H XD 948527 C-3-5 Cav unit was ambushed by an USEF. Res: Six friendly WIA. En: Unk.

E-2 of E-14

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

101530H XD 725345 3-1 ARVN received eight 122mm rockets. Res: Seven friendly WIA and one 155mm howitzer slightly damaged.

110400H XD 643434 2d Abn Bn was attacked while in NDP. Res: One friendly KIA and one friendly WIA. Bn: Unk.

110915H XD 643434 2d Abn Bn contacted an USEF. Res: One friendly KIA, two friendly WIA, four NVA KIA, one B-40 launcher and one AK-47 rifle captured.

111000H XD 573493 An OH-6A from G-2-17 Cav received approximately 300 rds of SAF with no hits. Gunships were called on station and engaged the enemy. Res: Seven NVA KBA.

111215H XD 728240 2-3 ARVN received ten 82mm mtr rds. Neg casualties or damage.

111350H XD 922540 An OH-58 received 51 cal fire, crashed and was destroyed. Res: Three friendly WIA. A UH-1H, with an ARP security force, attempted to land and was shot down by 51 cal fire. Res: Two friendly KIA and four friendly WIA.

111400H XD 647302 4-1 ARVN contacted an USEF. Res: Four friendly KIA, 12 friendly WIA, eight enemy KIA, two AK-47 rifles and one SKS captured. 36 foxholes, 38 huts, two stone houses, 5,000 rounds of M-60 ammo, 50 B-40 launchers and five claymore mines were destroyed.

111510H XD 700240 1-3 ARVN contacted five NVA. Res: Neg friendly casualties, three NVA KIA, one AK-47 rifle, two B-40 launchers and three B-41 rds captured.

111550H XD 727240 2-3 ARVN contacted an USEF. Res: Six friendly WIA, 14 NVA KIA, four AK-47, 220 pounds of rice, 80 tires, one dog, 25 x B-41 rds, 1,000 meters of telephone wire captured and 12 foxholes destroyed.

111615H XD 622277 3-1 ARVN found 23 NVA bodies and four AK-47 rifles.

111820H XD 483504 21st ARVN Rngs contacted an estimated NVA platoon. Res: Neg friendly casualties and 11 NVA KIA.

111850H XD 714383 2-94th Arty Battery received 10 x 122mm rockets 11 and one half km SW of Lang Vei. Neg casualties or damage.

111915H XD 995485 1-77 Armor received five 122mm rockets one and one half km S of LZ Sarge. Neg casualties. One fork lift was destroyed, one maintenance truck and one POL tanker damaged.

111930H XD 595378 1st Abn Bn contacted an USEF. Res: Neg friendly casualties; 19 NVA KIA and two AK-47 rifles captured.

E-3 of E-14

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

112000H XD 605329 1st Abn Bn contacted an USEF. Res: Neg friendly casualties; seven NVA KIA and two AK-47 rifles captured.

120815-0900H XD 922553 A platoon from A-4-3 Inf was ambushed by an USEF. A second platoon moved to assist and was pinned down. Res: Two friendly KIA, eight friendly WIA, En unk.

120845H XD 613428 2d Abn Bn contacted an USEF. Res: Three friendly KIA, 32 enemy KIA, four BA rifles, three B-40 launchers, 15 AK-47 rifles and one CKC captured.

120900H XD 958561 While searching area of detonated mechanical ambush, 1-61 Mech found one NVA body, one AK-47, one M-16, one telephone and one radio SOI.

121121H XD 6747 37th ARVN Rngrs contacted an USEF. Res: One friendly KIA, four friendly WIA, 10 enemy KIA and seven AK-47 rifles captured.

121122H XD 582503 21st ARVN Rngrs received 40 x 82mm mtr rds. Res: Six friendly WIA.

121130H XD 694403 C-1-11 Cav found a cache containing 34 Chicom claymores, 150 lbs of TNT, seven hand grenades, 100 lbs of rice, one 152mm Russian arty rd, and one NVA body killed by arty.

121230H XD 6748 C-2-17 Cav sighted an enemy battalion digging in with 12.7mm machine guns. Arty was placed on the area and Tac Air called. Res: Unk.

121245H XD 608252 3-1 ARVN found a cache and POL dump containing 60 SKS rifles, 202 x AK-47 rifles, six unknown type machine guns, 400 miscellaneous type small arms, large amount of 12.7mm ammo and 122mm rockets, two K50 machine guns, 30 tripods for 57mm recoilless rifle, 13,000 lbs of salt, 2,500 lbs of rice, 2,500 blankets, 1,000 picks and shovels and 82 x 55 gallon drums of fuel.

121300H XD 6125 2-17 Cav discovered 50 plus enemy bodies believed to have been killed by air or arty withing the last two days.

121315H XD 508473 3d Abn Bn found 15,400 lbs of rice and 250 mixed 75mm and 120mm mtr rds.

121405H XD 655487 C-2-17 Cav observed and engaged 15 NVA. Res: 15 NVA KIA.

121700H XD 622253 1-1 ARVN found cache containing 4,750 lbs of rice, 625 lbs of salt, 500 lbs of sugar, 20 pigs, 17 cases of 12.7mm ammo, 100 pans, 30 shovels, two cases of TNT, 70 uniforms, and 100 jackets.

E-4 of E-14

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

130150H XD 575503 39th Rngr Bn contacted an USEF. Res: One friendly KIA, 10 friendly WIA, 43 enemy KIA, two 37mm AA wpns, 13 x AK-47, two unknown type machine guns, 2,000 rds of AK ammo, 10 B-40 launchers, 30 rucksacks, eight gas masks, 20 shovels and two unknown type sights captured.

130210H XD 914550 4-3 ARVN observed an estimated 15-20 enemy with packs. Arty was employed. Eight hours later in the same location, an estimated company of NVA was again observed. Enemy engaged by arty and air-strike. Res: 46 NVA KIA.

130700H XD 588505 21st Rngr Bn contacted an USEF. Res: One friendly KIA, two friendly WIA, four enemy KIA and 300 cases of anti-tank ammo captured.

130800H XD 6125 3-1 ARVN made contact with an USEF. Res: 28 enemy KIA. The unit also found one unknown type machine gun, seven RPD machine guns, two B-40 launchers, two CKC rifles, two 17KW generators, three water pumps, one ton of boots, 70 x 200 liter cans of gasoline, 2,000 cooking utensils, 200 chickens and ducks, and two tons of paper. The following items were destroyed: Ten AK-47 rifles, two RPD machine guns, two B-40 rds and three B-40 launchers.

130915H XD 582226 An OH-6A received small arms fire. Gunships were called on station and engaged the enemy. Res: Eight NVA KIA.

131030H XD 723228 2-3 ARVN captured three new Russian trucks.

131130H XD 615438 3d Abn Bn contacted estimated NVA platoon. Res: Neg friendly casualties, six enemy KIA, one NVA captured, one B-40 launcher and one AK-47 rifle captured.

131240H XD 715383 A-2-94 Arty received 12 x 122mm rockets. Neg casualties or damage.

131245H XD 684419 C-1-11 Inf received 12 x 82mm mtr rds. Neg casualties or damage.

131300H XD 610502 C-2-17 Cav observed and engaged a 12.7mm and 37mm AA position. Res: One 12.7mm MG and one 37mm AA gun destroyed.

131415H XD 500495 6th Abn Bn contacted an USEF. Res: 14 friendly KIA and 26 friendly WIA, en unk.

131510H XD 575314 1-7 Cav received 12.7mm MG and 37mm fire. Enemy was engaged by gunships, Tac Air and artillery. Res: One 37mm AA gun, two 12.7mm MG, two concrete bunkers destroyed and two secondary explosions.

E-5- of E-14

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

131645H XD 697224 1-3 ARVN found six NVA killed by arty, one AK-47, six cases of 12.7mm ammo, three cases of AK-47 ammo and one 12.7mm MG tripod.

132230H XD 608258 3d Abn Bn contacted an USEF. Res: Four friendly WIA, two enemy KIA and one CKC captured.

14 Feb Tac Air strikes flown on 14 Feb resulted in an estimated 304 tons of ammo destroyed at the following locations: XD 596509, five tons; XD 596507, 60 tons; XD 592509, 37 tons; XD 600506, 52 tons, and XD 605507, 150 tons.

140530H XD 722228 2-3 ARVN received 100 x 82mm mtr rds. Res: 16 friendly WIA.

140830H XD 617293 4-1 ARVN discovered 54 huts 12' x 19' containing five tons of rice. Rice was destroyed in place. Unit also destroyed five hectares (12.4 acres) of planted rice and potatoes.

140935H XD 518470 3d Abn Bn contacted an USEF. Res: Neg friendly casualties, four enemy KIA, one PW and two AK-47 captured.

141115H XD 697215 1-3 ARVN received unknown number of 82mm mtr rds. Res: One friendly KIA and seven WIA.

141350H XD 506471 3d Abn Bn received an unknown number of unknown type rds. Res: Six friendly KIA, three WIA and one bulldozer destroyed.

141400H Air strikes conducted in the following areas resulted in the following items destroyed: XD 596512, unknown amt of ammo; XD 599503, unknown amt of CS gas; XD 583497, unknown amt of unknown type ammo plus 300 cases of 37mm ammo, one 12.7mm MG, one 37mm AA gun and one unknown type Russian tank.

141405H XD 522419 1st Armor Bde and 8th Abn Bn received an unknown number of mtr rds. Res: Three friendly KIA and 31 friendly WIA.

141510H XD 652478 2-17 Cav observed and destroyed two enemy trucks with on board ordnance. Res: 18 secondary explosions and six 55 gallon drums destroyed.

141540H XD 927547 A-4-3 Inf received 30 x 82mm mtr rds. Res: two friendly WIA.

141600H XD 505307 2-1 ARVN found three Russian trucks.

141645H XD 586284 A-2-17th Cav observed two huts, six to 10 x 200

E-6 of E-14

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

pound bags of rice, three tents, two stretchers, two blackboards, two fighting positions, two bunkers, four 55 gal drums, and eight to 10 boxes. The area was engaged resulting in five secondary explosions and two NVA KBA.

141647H XD 527465 One 158th Avn Bn UH-1H hit by hostile mtr fire. Res: Three friendly WIA and one helicopter destroyed.

141830H XD 912550 C-4-3 Inf observed and engaged five NVA moving along river. Res: Five NVA KIA, four AK-47 and one unknown type radio captured.

141830H XD 515407 8th Abn Bn found cache containing 300 bicycles, 300 bicycle tires and miscellaneous bicycle parts.

141840H XY 001482 1-77 Armor received eight 122mm rockets. Res: One friendly WIA, and moderate damage sustained by two friendly M-49 trucks.

141910H XD 914552 A-4-3 ARVN observed and engaged seven NVA. Res: Two friendly WIA and three enemy KIA.

141900H XD 910563 4-3 ARVN received 30 x 82mm mtr rds. Res: Neg casualties.

150735H XD 912533 4-3 Inf observed and engaged two groups of NVA. Res: Three friendly WIA and three enemy KIA.

150800H XD 855481 A-3-5 Cav made contact with an USEF. Res: Two NVA KIA, five RPG rounds, seven RPG launchers and five pounds of explosives captured.

150900H XD 912552 C-4-3 Inf observed approximately 24 NVA carrying packs and weapons. Enemy engaged by SAF. Res: 15 NVA KIA, four AK-47, two radios, and unknown amount of Morse code equipment, miscellaneous maps, documents and SOI items captured.

150900H XD 597267 3-1 Abn found one training center, 400 huts, one vehicle repair shop with two Russian trucks needing repairs, and four tons of truck parts. 100 x 55 gal drums of gasoline and five Russian trucks in good condition were found in vicinity of the repair shop.

151030H XD 924548 Patrol of 4-3 Inf was ambushed by a command detonated Chicom claymore mine and received SAF from an estimated 10-15 NVA. Res: Three friendly KIA, six friendly WIA, en unk.

151110H XD 502473 3d Abn Bn received an unknown number of 122mm rockets. Res: Two friendly KIA, and four friendly WIA. Counter-battery was fired into SEL XD 528428. Res: Unk number of secondary explosions.

E-7 of E-14

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

151200H XD 540312 2-1 ARVN discovered eight tons of rice and 175 x AK-47.

151215H XD 574247 Elements of 1-1 ARVN were in contact with an USEF when they received eight 82mm mtr rds. Res: Two friendly KIA, eight friendly WIA, three enemy KIA and two AK-47 captured.

151330H XD 595515 39th Rngr Bn recieved an unknown number of mtr rds. Res: Five friendly WIA.

151355H XD 429417 C-7-17 Cav received SAF. Enemy engaged by gunships. Res: 11 NVA KBA.

151445H XD 540317 2-1 ARVN discovered 45 bags of rice and 43 NVA bodies KBA.

151605H XD 652377 Hoc Bao Company discovered and destroyed one 37mm AA gun position. 27 AK-47, one tone of AK-47 ammo and 82mm mtr rds and two Russian trucks. The company also destroyed eight bunkers.

151730H XD 580505 21st Rngr Bn received an unknown number of unknown cal rounds. Res: Three friendly KIA and four friendly WIA.

151915H XD 696217 3d Regt CP received 20 x 82mm mtr rds. Res: One friendly KIA.

152245H XD 590514 39th Rngrs contacted enemy platoon. Res: Two friendly WIA and five enemy KIA.

160715H XD 920528 4-3 Inf was engaged by SAF from an estimated 15 NVA. The unit returned organic weapons fire and employed arty. Res: Three friendly KIA, one friendly WIA and three enemy KIA.

161020H XD 590514 2-3 ARVN contacted an estimated NVA company. Res: Four friendly KIA, seven friendly WIA, seven enemy KIA, one AK-47 and one CSW captured.

161100H XD 488407 An APC from 1-11 ACAT detonated an anti-tank mine. Res: Four friendly WIA and the APC destroyed.

161110H XD 692222 1-3 ARVN contacted an USEF. Res: Three friendly WIA, six enemy KIA, one AK-47, one B-40 launcher and five packs captured.

161410H XD 518485 6th Abn Bn received an unknown number of mtr rds. Res: Two friendly KIA and 12 friendly WIA.

161745H XD 924550 4-3 Inf received mortar and heavy SAF. Res: Eight friendly WIA.

161730H XD 563254 1-1 ARVN engaged an USEF and received mortar fire. Gunships were called on station. Res: Seven enemy KIA, four AK-47, 11 grenades and 36 packs captured.

E-8 of E-14

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

162200H XD 583503 21st Rngr Bn contacted an USEF. Res: Seven friendly WIA, six enemy KIA and 50 hand flares captured.

170555H XD 502425 Elements of the 8th Abn Bn and 11 ACAT made contact with an USEF and received unknown number of mtr rds. Res: Four friendly WIA, 36 NVA KIA, one PW, 15 AK-47, one Korean radio, one CSW, and 600 lbs of TNT captured.

170600H XD 696216 3d Regt CP received 250 x 82mm mtr rds and was attacked by an USEF. Res: Six friendly WIA, eight enemy KIA, one AK-47 and 35 blocks of TNT captured.

170635H XD 565235 3-1 ARVN contacted an USEF. Res: 15 enemy KIA, seven AK-47, one 12.7mm MG tripod, 50 kgs of 12.7mm MG ammo, 300 kgs of AK ammo and one AK-50 captured.

170800H XD 630272 4-1 ARVN discovered commo storage area containing six Chicom radios, two GRC-9 radios, 500 batteries, one ton commo spare parts, one radio test set, 600 huts were destroyed.

170830H XD 692214 1-3 ARVN discovered eight enemy bodies, one automatic rifle, 20 blocks of TNT and 12 x B-40.

170830H XD 630270 4-1 ARVN contacted an USEF. Res: One friendly KIA, one friendly WIA, eight enemy KIA, two AK-47, two K43 SMG and one M-2 carbine captured.

171030H XD 528427 8th Abn Bn and 17th ACS discovered one PT 76 tank, two Russian Trucks, one 12.7mm AA gun and two 7.62 MG.

171105H XD 607393 1st Abn Bn made contact with an USEF. Res: One friendly KIA, two friendly WIA, two enemy KIA and one IW captured.

171530H XD 692163 2-3 ARVN received an unknown number of mtr rds. Res: Three friendly KIA and eight friendly WIA.

180830H XD 677457 1st Rngr Gp received eight 82mm mtr rds. Res: Two friendly KIA and four friendly WIA.

180950H XD 695162 Elements of 2-3 ARVN contacted an USEF. Res: Two friendly WIA, five enemy KIA and two AK-47 captured.

180745H XD 646403 1st Abn Bn contacted an USEF. Res: Eight enemy KIA, two AK-47 and one 110V generator captured.

180830H XD 677457 1st Rngr Gp received eight 82mm mtr rds. Res: Two friendly KIA and four friendly WIA.

E-9 of E-14

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

180845H XD 565254 1-1 ARVN contacted enemy force and received 80 x 82mm mtr rds. Res: One friendly KIA, eight friendly WIA, seven NVA KIA, two AK-47 captured and four M-16 destroyed.

180900H XD 608394 1st Abn Bn contacted an USEF. Res: One friendly KIA, eight friendly WIA, 38 NVA KIA, one PW, five AK-47, two RPG, 150 hand grenades, and 16 gas masks captured.

180950H XD 695162 2-3 ARVN engaged an USEF. Res: Two friendly WIA, five enemy KIA and two AK-47 captured.

181037H XD 4442 C-2-17 Cav engaged and destroyed one two and one half ton POL tanker and killed five NVA.

181230H YD 304482 Two light observation helicopters from D-3-5 Cav received SAF from two NVA causing one to force land. RF moved into area supported by gunships. Res: Two NVA KBA.

181310H XD 5025 Elements of B-7-1 Cav observed and engaged eight enemy two and one half ton POL tankers. Res: Eight POL tankers destroyed.

181440H XD 620220 1-3 ARVN found and destroyed 1,00 pounds of rice Unit also destroyed 10 bunkers, two 82mm mtr pits and one 12.7mm MG.

181530H XD 715383 2-94 Arty and 8-4 Arty received 11 x 152mm howitzer rds. Res: Three friendly WIA. Counter-battery was fired into SEL XD 71183854 and XD 70154007. Res: Unk.

181645H XD 465415 An OH-6A from 2-17 Cav received unknown type enemy fire and exploded in the air. Res: Three friendly KIA.

181825H XD 682152 2-3 ARVN mechanical ambush detonated by an USEF. Res: four NVA KIA and two AK-47 captured.

181845H XD 660383 3-3 ARVN received 20 x 82mm mtr rds. Res: 11 friendly WIA.

181925H XD 813367 Rearm and Refuel point for C-1-1 Cav received three 82mm mtr rds. Res: 20,000 gallons of JP-4 fuel, and one UH-1H helicopter destroyed and one UH-1H helicopter damaged.

181900H XD 527413 3-4 ARVN received 21 x 122mm rockets. Res: One friendly KIA and eight friendly WIA.

182000H XD 858386 I Corps TOG and 1st ARVN Div CP FWD received 21 x 82mm mtr rds. Res: Two friendly WIA.

E-10 of E-1A

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

190830H XD 530355 2-1 ARVN found 35 drums containing 200 liters of fuel per drum and three Motolova trucks. Res: Fuel and trucks destroyed.

190915H XD 911595 Recon 3-187 observed three NVA setting booby traps. Enemy engaged by ARA. Res: Three NVA KIA.

191040H XD 530472 3d Abn Bn found and destroyed 2,000 gal of gas.

191050H XD 671158 2-3 ARVN found 20 tons of rice.

191050H XD 497415 8th Abn Bn made contact with an USEF. Res: One T-34 tank, one generator and four .51 cal machine gun barrels destroyed.

191245- XD 501390 B-2-17 Cav observed pipeline. Target engaged by gunships.
1315H 521325 Res: Pipeline severed and burning. In the second area, B-2-17 Cav observed and engaged pipeline. Res: One NVA KIA.

191246- XD 668124 Gunships from 2-17 Cav observed and engaged two
1301H NVA. Res: Two NVA KIA. Gunships observed and engaged two NVA at XD 653157. Res: Two NVA KIA. Gunships observed and engaged 25 NVA at XD 664405. Res: 25 NVA KIA.

191320H XD 575218 3-1 ARVN contacted an USEF. Res: four tons of 82mm mtr ammo, B-40 launcher and 12.7mm MG ammo destroyed.

191615H XD 574251 1-1 ARVN received ground attack and approximately 40 x 82mm mtr rds. Res: Three friendly WIA and 17 NVA KIA.

191700H XD 506471 3d Abn Bn received four rds of 130mm mtr fire. Res: Two friendly KIA, four friendly WIA, two 105mm guns damaged and one radio damaged.

191700H XD 530472 3d Abn Bn discovered a cache containing one truck 100 barrels of oil, and 110 tons of rice. All destroyed by Tac Air.

191700H XD 697216 3d Regt CP received 30 x 82mm mtr rds. Res: Neg casualties or damage.

191715H XD 842469 D-1-11 Inf and 3-5 Cav contacted an USEF. Res: Four friendly KIA and seven friendly WIA.

192115H YD 002565 I Corps Area Log Comd convoy was engaged by an arty, SAP, AWP, and possible claymores. Res: One friendly KIA, one friendly WIA, and five two and one half ton trucks damaged.

200430H XD 897497 B-3-5 Cav received intense AW and RPG fire from USEF. Res: One friendly KIA, seven WIA and three vehicles damaged.

E-11 of E-14

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

200635H XD 530400 9th Abn Bn received 11 x 122mm rockets. Res: One friendly WIA.

200635H XD 506471 3d Abn Bn received seven 82mm mtr rds. Res: Neg casualties or damage.

200850H XD 506471 3d Abn Bde received unknown number of rockets. Res: 1,000 rds 105mm ammo destroyed.

200930H XD 569250 1-1 ARVN contacted an USEF and received 250 x 82mm mtr rds.. Res: Nine friendly KIA, 23 friendly WIA, 15 enemy KIA, two AK-47s and one B-40 launcher captured.

201630H XD 578245 3-1 ARVN contacted estimated two enemy platoons. Res: Three friendly WIA, 20 enemy KIA, seven AK-47 and one 82mm mtr base plate captured.

202351H XD 982532 A convoy from 26th Group was ambushed by an USEF. Enemy position engaged by gunships. Res: Three POL tankers destroyed, three jeeps damaged, one friendly KIA and two friendly WIA. En casualties unk.

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 2 to
Annex B to
AATTV Report Feb 71

ANNEX B (SPECIAL REPORT: LAM SON 719/DEWEY CANYON II) PART 2 TO XXIV
CORPS PERINTREP 5-71 (U)

Analysis and Discussion:

On 8 February ARVN forces crossed the Laotian/Vietnamese border to launch the second phase of operation Lam Son 719. Initial enemy resistance was light. However, the density of enemy AA assets deployed throughout the rear services system was soon reflected by intense AA fire. The AA weapons include 12.7mm, 14.5mm, 23mm, 37mm, 57mm and some 100mm guns. During the initial ARVN thrust observers reported major enemy efforts to move materiel south, out of the AO. Efforts by the enemy to relocate AA weapons to the western Tchepone area were also reported. As ARVN forces moved near the border the enemy also revealed his conventional artillery capability by launching heavy artillery attacks. These artillery attacks, along with mortar and rocket attacks on fixed ARVN positions and fire support bases, continued sporadically. The artillery weapons include confirmed 122mm field guns and 105mm howitzers and possible 85mm and 130mm field guns. During the initial drive on Route 9 and during the air assaults north and south of Route 9, ARVN forces were opposed by an estimated two NVA regiments (later identified as the 1st Regiment, 2d Division and elements of the 24B Regiment, 304th Division) plus a regimental equivalent of rear service troops. Extending their operations from secure areas to areas along Routes 925 and 1032B in the north, Route 9 in the center, and Routes 626 and 92C in the south, ARVN forces initiated numerous small contacts and uncovered sizeable storage facilities along all major routes. Captured equipment included trucks, POL, commo equipment, and various types of AA and infantry weapons and ammo. This reflected the sophistication of the enemy logistical system. Major enemy units defending the area just west of the border during the initial phase were the 1st VC Regiment, 2d NVA Division, and the 24B Regiment, 304th Division. Additionally, rear service units put up strong, but isolated, resistance while withdrawing to the west and north. Tentatively identified as being in this immediate vicinity was a K20 unit (possibly the 20th Sapper Battalion) and other 304th Division support elements. On 12 February, enemy resistance began to stiffen, particularly around Ban Dong and Route 1032B. This probably coincided with the arrival of substantial enemy reinforcements from North Vietnam. The entire 308th Division has been identified as being among these reinforcements. From 10 to 14 February ARVN and US units intercepted large enemy formations attempting to move east toward Khe Sanh, possibly pre-empting 88th Regiment plans to attack Khe Sanh. A PW captured at XD 670477 confirmed this supposed intention of the 88th Regiment. ARVN forces overran a 308th CP at XD 646403 on 18 February indicating that the entire 308th NVA Division was being deployed near the Laos/Quang Tri (P) border area. Two prisoners disclosed on 11 February that the 64th Regiment, 320th NVA Division arrived in Laos on 4 February and began operating in the Bon Dong area. (On 14 February a PW from the 64th Regiment stated that the 7th Battalion with 450 men and the 9th Battalion were in the area. He also disclosed that an unidentified NVA tank unit with 15 PT-76 amphibious tanks was located at XD 5446). The 64th Regiment and the tank unit are probably operating as a task organization as ARVN elements contacted armor at XD 517473 on 10 February. Tanks have also been either sighted or destroyed at a number of other places. In the south, documents captured at XD 725257 on 8 February identify the 4th Anti-Aircraft and 75th Engineer Battalion of Binh Trám

E-13 of E-14

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

41. The documents also contained a defense plan that indicated Binh Tram forces and a supporting infantry regiment would defend in place, then withdraw to the junction of routes 920 and 926. This infantry regiment may be the 812th Regiment, 324B Division. A captured document established one segment of the pipeline from North Vietnam to Base Area 611 as running along XD 4739, XD 5039, XD 5138, XD 5233, XD 5132, and XD 4630. Allied airstrikes have destroyed other segments of the pipeline north of Base Area 604. VR indicates the enemy continues to move material via western and southern routes and reveals evidence of new road construction in some areas. Finally, agents report NVA forces in MRTTH organizing "Laos Liberation Battalions" to assist in the Laotian fighting. This may be related to two other reports indicating that elements of 324B Division are moving west to defend the Salient area and Route 616.

Probable Courses of Action:

The fact that the enemy has reinforced the Lam Son 719 AO with up to six regiments, coupled with recent strong and determined resistance makes it apparent that he intends to defend his vital logistical network. The enemy has had ample time to organize and deploy his reinforcements. Counter-attacks of up to regiment size can, therefore, be expected. The enemy will also probably attempt to attack behind ARVN forces and cut friendly LOC and take the high ground in order to bring AA to bear on Allied aircraft.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 3 to
Annex B to
AATTV Report

Feb 71

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS

1. At 020115 H in the vicinity of BS 589750 4th Regt Recon Coy ambushed an enemy platoon, killing 9 and capturing 1 x M16, 1 x AK47, 1 x AN/PRC10, 2 x Chicon grenades and 2 field packs. There were no friendly casualties.
2. At 021250 H in the vicinity of BS 506748, 2nd Bn Regt contacted an enemy squad, resulting in 4 VCKIA, 1 VCC and 20 grenades captured.
3. At 021800 H in the vicinity of BS 480755, 2nd Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force, killing 5 VC and capturing 1 VC (female nurse) and 1 x M16.
4. At 021730 H in the vicinity of BS 570782, 4th Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force. Results:

Friendly: 2 KIA, & 8 MIA

Enemy: 20 VC KIA and 5 x AK47 and 120 Chicon grenades captured.
5. At 021800 H in the vicinity of BS 480755, 2nd Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force, killing 10 VC and capturing 5 VC (including one female nurse), 2 x M16 and 1 x M79.
6. At 030800 H in the vicinity of BS 560796, 4th Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force, killing 6 VC and capturing 1 x AK47 and 30 grenades.
7. At 040825 H in the vicinity of BS 497748, 2nd Bn 6th Regt found one bunker and killed 2 VC, captured 3 VC (including one female nurse), 1 x AK47 and one pound weight of documents.
8. At 041050 H in the vicinity of BS 49 750, 2nd Bn 6th Regt found two bunkers, killing 7 VC and capturing two carbines and 12 grenades.
9. At 070905 H in the vicinity of BS 506797, 3rd Bn 6th Regt contacted a VC platoon, killing 12 VC and capturing one VC, 1 x RPD and 1 x AK 47.
10. At 100500 H in the vicinity of BS 507840, 3rd 6th Regt, conducting a raid, contacted an enemy platoon, killing 5 VC and capturing 3 VC, 1 x M79, 1 x M79 round and 4 grenades.
11. At 112105 H in the vicinity of BS 463835, 1st Bn 6th Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force, killing 4 VC and capturing one carbine and 50 kg of rice.
12. At 120925 H in the vicinity of BS 487758, 2nd Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force, killing 6 VC and capturing 1 x M60, 20 grenades and one VC.
13. At 131715 H in the vicinity of BS 480780, 2nd Bn 6th Regt captured 100 electric fuzes and 5 x 105 mm mines.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

...2/

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

-2-

14. At 140130 H in the vicinity of YD 395433, 1st Bn 5th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force, killing 4 VC and capturing 2 x AK47, 10 grenades and three packs.
15. At 150815 H in the vicinity of BS 464794, 1st Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force, killing 5 VC.
16. Between 150905 - 151000 H in vicinity of BS 498771 - BS500769 2nd Bn 6th Regt contacted and killed 5 VC and captured 1 x M1 rifle, 1 x M79 round, 10 AP mines and 32 electrical fuzes.
17. At 151230 H in the vicinity of BT 145243, 4th Bn 5th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force, killing 4 VC and capturing 2 x AK47 and 10 grenades
18. At 170730 H in the vicinity of BS 500813, 2nd Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force, killing 5 VC and capturing 4 VC and 20 grenades.
19. At 210300 H in vicinity of AT 977607, 1Pl, 1st Coy 4th Bn 5th Regt received a ground attack by a VC Coy. Result were:
- Friendly: 2 WIA, 2 MIA; 1 x M60, 1 x M79 and 1 x PRC25 radio lost.
- Enemy casualties are unknown.
20. At 211815 H in the vicinity of BS 003931, 5th Regt Recon Coy contacted an unknown size enemy force, killing 5 VC and capturing 2xCKC. Six houses were destroyed.
21. At 212310 H in the vicinity of BS 477840, 4th Bn 6th Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force, killing 5 VC and capturing 1 x M1 rifle, 10 grenades and four field packs.
22. At 240900 H in the vicinity of BS621613, 711 RF Coy contacted a force estimated to be an NVA Bn (-). Results were:
- Friendly : 6 KIA , 7 WIA (incl Capt Smith and 3 US Advisors).
- Enemy: 47 NVA KIA, 2 NVA captured, 1 x 12.7AAMG, 1 x LMG, 4 x B40 launchers, 9 x AK47, 2 x M16, 1 x Chicon telephone and 20 field packs captured. The enemy unit was 5th Bn 21st NVA Regt.
23. At 251030 H in the vicinity of BS 617613, 3rd Bn 4th Regt found two bodies presumed to be NVA killed in contact with 711 RF Coy (Serial 22) and also found 2 x 82 mm mortar rounds, 20 x 60mm rounds 1 x B40 round and 4000 metres of telephone wire.
24. At 272120 H in the vicinity of BT 140297, 4th Bn 5th Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force, killing 4VC and capturing 1 x AK47 and 16 grenades.
25. At 281920 H in the vicinity of BS432789, 1st Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown size enemy force, killing 4 VC and capturing 1 x AK47 and 5 grenades.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 4 to
Annex B to
AATTV Report Feb 71

REPORT BY MAJ K.J. REDMAN
TERRITORIAL SECURITY ADVISER QUANG TRI PROVINCE

New Operations

1. During the reporting period two major operations commenced in western Quang-Tri Province. These operations are:

- a. DEWEY CANYON II. A US operation mounted from 1/5 Inf Div (Mech) AOs into western Quang-Tri Province commencing 31 Jan 71.
- b. LAM SON 719. A GVN operation mounted from a firm base provided by 1/5 Inf Div (Mech) in the Khe Sanh area, western Quang-Tri Province, into LAOS commencing 8 Feb 71.

2. Both operations are still continuing but both are now referred to as LAM SON 719. This operation gives every indication of being a protracted operation with my current assessment, being at least a further two months. Early reports reveal that considerable damage has been done to the enemy infiltration and resupply route, the "Ho-Chi-Minh" Trail, and if the operation progresses as intended it undoubtedly will greatly improve the security of Quang-Tri Province and most probably the remainder of South Vietnam.

3. The operations have been covered by a deception plan. Exact details of this plan are not known. If the rapid movement and deployment of both US and GVN troops, into and out of the populated area of the province during the month is any guide, the deception plan is still in effect. These moves together with the rumours rife in the province suggest the plan is to pose a threat south of the DMZ. Within a month seven units will have occupied AOs adjacent to the DMZ. These are TF of 1/5 Inf Div (Mech), two separate battalions of 101 Airborne Division, battalion of the Americal Division and the 2nd and 4th ARVN Regiments.

4. The visible logistic build up for the operations was achieved in a matter of days. The logistic support, particularly the air effort can best be described as immense. Even so there have been problems, the major one being the delay in the opening of the Khe Sanh airstrip. It is thought that logistic problems have imposed delays in the operations not originally planned, particularly in LAOS.

5. Some new lessons will be learnt from the operation in LAOS; however, it is too early to form firm conclusions. Some observations will be made in this and later reports.

Dewey Canyon II

6. The primary mission of the operation was the establishment and security of a firm base and road L of C for further operations in western Quang-Tri and LAOS. Such a base is also ideal for operations south into the Ashau Valley. Major logistic bases have been established at Khe-Sanh and Vandergrift (VIC YD0047). Route 9 was open to road transport from Dong-Ha to Khe-Sanh within a few days and is now open to the LAOTIAN border.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../ 2

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 2 -

7. The 1/5 Inf Div (Mech) was reinforced to a strength of six TFs for the operation; one original TF, 1/61 Armour, did not take part in the operation and remains in AO Orange south of the DMZ. The six TFs with ample air and artillery support included:

- a. Three infantry TFs. Additional battalions came from 101 Airborne Division and the Americal Division.
- b. Two cavalry TFs. An additional cavalry squadron came from the Americal division.
- c. One armour TF.

8. The brief concept of the operation is as follows:

- a. Armour TF secure a forward base (to be developed into major base) at Vandergrift.
- b. One infantry TF CA by air into Khe-Sanh airstrip area and the remaining two infantry TFs CA along route 9 between Khe Sanh and Vandergrift.
- c. Cavalry TFs move across country north of route 9 to Khe-Sanh.
- d. Airlift of engineer effort required to open route 9 and establish Khe-Sanh airstrip and base.
- e. Further operations to clear west to the LAOTIAN border and north of route 9 particularly into the NW and west of the Rock Pile.
- f. Deployment of 1/5 Inf Div (Mech) Headquarters at Khe-Sanh and Forward 24 Corps Headquarters at Quang-Tri Combat Base. The former headquarters has now split; the Commander controlling three TFs from Khe Sanh and the Deputy Commander for operations from Vandergrift.

9. Initially enemy activity was slight, the enemy generally avoiding contact. Major contacts have since occurred in the operations north of route 9 in the Rock Pile area. Attacks by indirect fire occur most nights with some ambushes on route 9. Friendly casualties have been light. US tactics have been primarily to locate the enemy and then call for artillery and air. This support appears to have accounted for the majority of the enemy casualties, now approximately 500 KIA. Activity in the last ten days has been quiet and it now appears that the enemy seems content to adopt, what could be called a defensive posture, south of the DMZ.

LAM SON 719

10. This operation was mounted by I Corps with the following basic orbat deployed in western Quang-Tri Province:

- a. 1st ARVN Division (less two regiments)
- b. 1st Airborne Division (eight battalions)
- c. 457 Marine Brigade (three battalions)
- d. Ranger Task Force (three battalions)
- e. Independant Armoured Brigade (four squadrons)

SECRET

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 3 -

11. The concept of the operation was to:
- a. Thrust along route 9 into LAOS with an armoured column to a depth of between 12-15 miles.
 - b. Airlift the 1st ARVN Division into LZs south of route 9 and 1st Airborne Division into LZs north of route 9. Both forces to secure the flanks of the armoured thrust and then conduct operations to locate and destroy enemy men and material.
 - c. Insert two ranger battalions north of the Airborne units to provide security in depth on this flank.
 - d. Establish FSBs in LAOS to provide artillery support.
 - e. Deploy divisional and below tactical headquarters into the Khe-Sanh area or forward and I Corps Forward to Dong-Ha Combat Base.
12. Initially enemy reaction appeared hesitant; contact not being as heavy as expected with the enemy reluctant to commit troops to the battle until he was sure of the friendly intentions. After several days enemy resistance has increased appreciably and as reported in the press there have been several major battles. All six of the known enemy regiments in the general area have been encountered but to date there are no indications by the enemy of move to reinforce from other areas. Initial enemy intelligence assessment showed a possible battalion of tanks; latest estimate puts this now at regimental strength. The majority of tanks sighted have been PT 76 but T34 and some T54 are also reported. The enemy base areas, 611 and 604, and the Ho Chi Minh trail complex have proved to be heavily defended with anti aircraft weapons. Of considerable concern are the numbers of 23 and 37mm weapons in addition to the large numbers of 12.7mm. Heavier weapons up to 100mm have also been reported. Finally, enemy conventional artillery weapons are also being used.
13. From all reports it is apparent that the 1st ARVN Division elements have performed best of the troops employed with the reverses suffered by the airborne and rangers a major cause in the slower progress of the operation than planned. Nevertheless it is considered that the forces employed have acquitted themselves well with enemy casualties thought to be in excess of 3000 KIA and much material captured or destroyed.

General Observations

14. Some general points that should be mentioned are:
- a. The delay in the completion of the Khe-Sanh Strip undoubtedly caused logistic problems which resulted in a slow down of operations. Shortages of petrol and ammunition being reported. Some delays were also caused by poor flying weather; conversely the lack of rain during the operation has greatly assisted the movement of supplies by road.
 - b. A new type of Laser bomb is reported to be in use by the US Air Force. Reports indicate it is most effective against tanks.
 - c. A FAC has reported sighting a SAM near route 9 about 25 miles into LAOS. No support equipment was reported.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../ 4

- d. The helicopter is proving very vulnerable when used in areas, such as base areas, with strong anti aircraft defences. Gunships in particular seem to be taking many hits and there appears to be an acute shortage of the "Cobra" type. Air mobile concepts will need re-examination after the LAOTIAN operations.
- e. An enemy POL pipeline was discovered and extensively damaged south of route 9.
- f. There are conflicting reports as to the performance of the ARVN troops in handling support agencies normally handled previously by advisers. A better assessment should be possible in my next report.
- g. The road L of C is in use day and night (with headlights). Most of the night movement is the backloading of empty trucks. Convoys are mainly ARVN with free flow traffic being used on eastern route 9 and route 1. There have been some ambushes with casualties fairly light.

Enemy - Eastern Quang-Tri Province

- 15. There was a decided lull in enemy activity for two weeks after friendly operations commenced. Major activity during this time were some assassinations and kidnapping, in one instance six members of a PF squad were stabbed while asleep in a hamlet. Also during this period there were some attacks by indirect fire. In this period enemy activity against regular troops has remained quiet with attacks by indirect fire the only points worthy of note. FSBs FULLER, CARROLL, A4, C2, A2, A1 and B1 have all been subjected to rocket or mortar attacks.
- 16. In the populated area enemy activity increased sharply in the last two weeks. This activity was primarily in the northern districts although there was a lot of activity south and SW of Quang-Tri City in Mai Linh District. The enemy appeared to be much bolder during these weeks, firing at helicopters close to populated areas and in several cases moving openly in daylight. Most enemy parties encountered have been in squad or platoon strength with probable intentions being to conduct small raids (there have been several), proselytize and carry out attacks by fire, terrorist activities also continued.
- 17. In Gio-Linh district two possible enemy company incursions took place on both occasions "bumping" friendly positions around the B2 compound. On one occasion the compound came under small arms and mortar fire. The nightly activity in Gio-Linh appears to be primarily aimed at the CUA VIET where naval traffic has increased. Two attacks have been carried out on anchored vessels by swimmer planted mines. One vessel was sunk and two damaged with seven friendly KIA.
- 18. There were six rocket attacks directed at Dong-Ha and Quang-Tri cities with one attack directed at the Quang-Tri Combat Base. Significant damage was caused in the populated area in addition to civilian casualties. No damage or casualties resulting from the attack on the Combat Base. Two attacks occurred at unusual hours; 1730 on a Sunday and at 0700 after an attack during the night.
- 19. Sector Vietnamese staff indicate that most of the recent activity is 5th Front originated and that 7th Front activity can now be expected.

Friendly - Eastern Quang-Tri Province

20. The redeployment of forces for LAM SON 719/Dewey Canyon II initially resulted in a net loss of six battalion sized tactical units previously providing security to the populated area. The only new units moved into the province initially were two battalions of the 5th Regt to replace the four battalions of the 1st Regt. During the month elements of the Marine Brigade moved north and a battalion of 101 Airborne Division (US) occupied the A1-A2 AO for several days. In the last few days a further redeployment has taken place and within the next few days it is anticipated that the following will be deployed in eastern Quang-Tri Province:

- a. One Brigade, 101 Airborne (three battalions).
- b. Brigade headquarters and one battalion, Americal Division.
- c. An armoured TF with the 1/5 Inf Div (Mech) under the operational control of the Americal brigade.
- d. Three battalions of the 5th Regiment.
- e. Three battalions of the 4th Regiment.

21. The territorial forces have a company working with a battalion of 101 Airborne out of FSB SARGE and for several days during the period took over FSB ANNE with the departure of the Marines. The major problem during the whole period was the loss of continuity, co-ordination and liaison caused by the frequent moves. The Territorial Forces invariably found out "after the event" and much time was spent reestablishing Fire Support, Air Support and fire clearance channels. For most of the month artillery support was "thin" in comparison to that previously available and gunships non existent. This situation has now improved greatly with the arrival of the 101 Airborne elements.

22. On the credit side, a greater responsibility has been placed on the territorial forces, with the RF operating further than ever from the populated area. RF/PF operations were primarily cordon and search type operations with two successful operations conducted as a result of information received from a "Hoi Chanh". With so many night contacts returning a negative result it pleasing to see a good ambush by an RF Coy in Gio-Linh account for eight enemy KIA.

Other Matters

23. Considerable emphasis is placed in the Sector 1971 Community Defence and Local Development Plan on raising the standard of the PSDF. Current plans are to use most of the Sector MAT teams on the training of PSDF. Moves to implement the training plan have been upset by unexpected calls on MAT teams to operate with isolated companies in remote locations.

24. The strength of MACV Team 19 remains at a high level even though most departing members have been receiving a reduction in tenure of posting of from 30 to 60 days. This is because replacements are still arriving, in many cases **three** to four months early. One good side effect is that all DSAs are experienced majors with one exception, CAM LO has a very senior captain. This is resulting in a significant improvement in operational and training matters in most districts.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 6 -

Up Date LAM SON 719

25. As of 2 Mar 71 there were strong indications that further troops were being deployed forward preparatory to an increase in activity in LAOS. It is my opinion that the GVN troops have now consolidated their position, have gauged enemy reactions and have planned and are about to implement new phases in the operation.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 5 to
Annex B to
AATTV Report Feb 71

REPORT BY CAPT I. WISCHUSIN
DISTRICT SENIOR ADVISER PHU THU DISTRICT

General

1. The situation at Phu Thu remained quiet during the month with minor enemy activities.

Enemy

2. During the month there were no enemy initiated contacts and one incident involving two VC; at YD 869259 at 162215H, 2 VC tripped a mechanical ambush set by PF 100. VC were engaged with SA fire, which they returned while fleeing to the South. Result: 1PF WIA. Agent reports still indicate some infiltration from Phu Loc, however this has not been borne out by district operations during the month.

Friendly Activity

3. Friendly activities for the month have followed a similar pattern to previous months, consisting of small unit operations throughout the district, ambushes each night and two large scale district operations following two helicopter crashes on 16 and 18 Feb 71. Friendly forces within the district have been reduced during the month by 3 RF Companies and one PF platoon. The RF Companies have been used to fill gaps in other districts caused by ARVN units moving North and the PF Platoon is undergoing refresher training at Dong-Ha Training Centre.
4. On 4 Feb 71 agent reports indicated that the District HQs Compound was to be attacked by sappers, there were some indications of this as dogs in the adjoining Hamlet (Hoa Da Tay) were being poisoned. This tactic had apparently been used previously within the district. The adjoining hamlet and area were cordoned and the population screened during the following two days: with negative results.
5. Two helicopters crashed within the district during the month. A UH1H on 162000H at YD 955154 killing all 7 US personnel on board and on 181815H at YD 959159 a USMC Jolly Green Giant, killing 9 US personnel. Following each crash a large scale sweep of the area was employed as it was thought the Aircraft may have been downed by ground fire, however no sign of enemy forces was detected.
6. Results of friendly operations for the month were:
 - a. 171500H at YD 972148, Intelligence Squad found 3 old bunkers containing 300 rds of AK47 ammo.
 - b. 181020H at YD 944180, PF Pl 161 found bunker. Containing 1 M1 Carbine in good condition.
 - c. 200930H at YD 964150, PF Pl 107 found bunker containing 2 bags of rice. (Very Old).

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../2

- d. 200930H at YD 834214 PF Pl 160 found bunker containing 2 - B40 rds, 1 - block TNT and 20 blasting caps.
- e. 211100H at YD 884232 RF Coy 955 found bunkers containing 4 - B41 rds (Very Old)
- f. 211100H at YD 863215 RF Coy 955 found bunker containing 1 - B41 rd, 400 rds AK47 ammo. (Old)

District Chief

7. The attitude of the District Chief has shown some improvement and he has been spending more time at the district, however he is still not enthusiastic with pacification type work and prefers to concentrate purely upon the military side of things.

Civic Action

8. Civic action by the 101st Airborne Div continues to be good throughout the District. MEDCAP, Audio-Visual and PSYCH Operations visit Hamlets regularly each week. The fertilizer distribution programme is working well and is popular with the people.

Campound Depence

9. Finally the defensive works started by my predecessor (Capt Tear) have been completed at the District HQ and the advisory team now has adequate protection from fire or ground attack. There are still some improvements to be made however this is a continuing process which helps keep the team members busy when not out in the district.

Visits

10. During the month the following visitor was received LTG McCAFFREY Deputy Commanding General USARV who visited on 22 Feb 71 accompanied by Maj Aitken. He had a brief tour of the District HQ and talked at length to the Australian Advisers stationed both here and in Hue.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

APPENDIX 6 TO
ANNEX B TO
AATTV REPORT

Feb 71

REPORT BY CAPT R.J. ASHFIELD
SENIOR ADV SER 3/54 ARVN BN

1. The general aims of the Unit were:
 - a. 23 Jan - 26 Jan. To provide security in an AO approximately 6 kilometres west of fire base CHARLEY ONE, on the occasion of the release of PWs by President THIEU across the DMZ.
 - b. 27 Jan - 30 Jan. To provide security and protection on and around fire support base ANZIO.
 - c. 1 Feb - 15 Feb. To provide security in an AO around fire base VIPER, primarily against rocket attack into HUE from the rocket belt.
 - d. 15 Feb - 23 Feb. To provide security in the CITADEL, HUE, and act as reaction force for attacks on disturbances in and close to HUE.
2. The methods used to achieve these aims were:
 - a. Continuous patrolling and ambushing programme in the AO west of CHARLEY ONE.
 - b. A programme of night ambushes in the AO round ANZIO.
 - c. A continuous and aggressive patrolling and ambushing programme throughout the AO with the CP remaining on VIPER.
 - d. CITADEL security as per previous reports.
3. My opinion on how successful the unit was in achieving these aim is as follows:
 - a. No contact was made in our AO west of CHARLEY ONE, and no contacts, or incidents occurred in our rear.
 - b. Around ANZIO one night ambush was actuated resulting in 4 VC KIA and 2 AKs captured, with no losses on our side.
 - c. No rockets or mortars were fired into HUE or the PHU BAI complex from our AO when we were around VIPER. No contacts were made, but 3 NVA in bluish uniform were found in a fresh grave. The wounds, location, and time of discovery and estimated time of death indicated that these three KIA were the result of 81mm Mor H&I fired nightly from VIPER.
 - d. There has been little physical work to occupy the battalion in the CITADEL, and lectures and training for ORs, NCOs, & officers occupy each afternoon.

...2/

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

4. Highlights of the period were:

- a. 29 Jan 71. A platoon ambush from 1 Coy suffered 1WIA in a clash with an American patrol from PHU BAI at 2100 hrs approx. The US patrol was within our AO, and moving to an ambush location also in our AO. Flares were fired by the ARVN ambush to warn the patrol and show they were not enemy, however the US fired on the ambush. No fire was directed at the US patrol.
- b. A NIGHTHAWK was on call at ANZIO during the last month. The "NIGHTHAWK" is a BELL UH-1-D helicopter equipped with two searchlights in the nose and door gunners. The extra crewman carries both an M60 and M79. When the sensor and/or radar system round ANZIO is activated, at night, the NIGHTHAWK investigates. Further illumination can be requested from the artillery at ANZIO. An advisor and an officer from the CP of the battalion based on ANZIO are required on the helicopter for liaison with the ground forces in the suspected area. The method of operation is a systematic search of the suspected area by the NIGHTHAWK using its searchlights. A quick run at speed is made, followed by a slow methodic search of possible hiding places, such as bushes and trees. During this phase, the helicopter ~~hovers~~ its down draft blowing the bushes and foliage apart, over each possible hiding place. This continues until all possible hiding places have been covered. Should enemy be found, the target is cleared through the advisor and the Regt TOC. My personal opinion of the operation is that it is an effective method to eliminate false activations of the sensors by weather conditions and animals, this reducing the wastage of artillery fire which would otherwise be directed into the suspect area. However, I believe this method is extremely hazardous for the crew, and advisor on board, as the helicopter presents an easily seen, well lit, and often stationary target at such low altitudes as would tempt small arms fire, and a "sitting duck" for a B40, or B41 rocket.
- c. During the stay round VIPER, all officers of the CP and HQ Coy adjusted fire from FAC aircraft, called in resupply, and liaison helicopters, these showing their competence to call in, direct, and adjust, and generally control all types of US air support. This ability has yet to be demonstrated under fire.

5. My major duties during this period can be summed up in one word - supervision. I believe this battalion has no need of advisors under the present conditions, and while we are attached to the battalion, it will continue to rely on us for the control of US Air support, though they have demonstrated their competence in this, though not under fire. We have carried on training in this whenever circumstances allowed, in the classroom and in practice in the field to improve their standard.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 7 to
Annex B to
AATTV Report Feb 71

REPORT BY WO2 F. BEATTIE
ADVISED 3/7 ARVN CAV REGT

1. The general aims of unit were:
 - a. Maintenance of 2/7 troop at Fire Base SHARRON.
 - b. 3/7 troop to provide night security and daylight mine sweep protection at Fire Base NANCY.
 - c. 1/7 troop moved to A2 whilst 1/11 troop moved into AO for training and re-fitting.
2. Methods used to achieve aims were as follows:
 - a. 2/7 troop were to carry out track maintenance as required during the day and to provide two pls for night ambushes West and South of Fire Base SHARRON. During daylight hours, all tracks had track replacement. This was well overdue. Final drive sprockets were changed at the same time. Maintenance of 2/7 troop is good.
 - b. 3/7 troop received one 806 recovery vehicle. Schools had to be organized in the use of the vehicle. It is entirely new to their system. Major faults in the vehicle are lack of sufficient room to manouvre tow cable when ramp is raised. Also no splash board in side vehicle so water does not come in when ramp lowered. The manual operated winch is poor. (You must consider size of people using winch)
 - c. 1/7 troop moved to A2 so 1/11 Cav could complete re-fit and train with new anti tank round.
3. Highlights during reporting period were:
 - a. 2/7 troop conducted 6 day op and went inside DMZ on two occasions with nil casualties. Unit received local mortar fire on all nights in DMZ area.
 - b. On 29 Jan unit moved to C1. After briefing moved to C1, A2, Fire Base NANCY and A1. 2/7 troop being at A1. Troop conducted intensive ambush programme with occasional sweeps to North as far as DMZ. Unit 2/7 troop very mine conscious. During 23 days on A1. Unit has taken total of 45 rds 82mm, 6x122 rockets and found 38 TM 41 & 46 mines.
4. Overall standard of unit is average. 2/7 troop apart from being slightly over cautious about mines is good. 3/7 is good but lack operational experience. 1/7 is good and is finally being used in a role partially suitable to tanks.
5. Major weakness of unit still lies in maintenance and vehicles have to wait up to 3 months for major items (transmissions) minor items a lesser time. Contaminated fuel is still a major cause of carburettor failure. Fuel filters are now being changed at half the laid down period of 3000 miles to try to overcome the problem.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../ 2

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 2 -

6. To overcome the weakness the unit has almost finished a complete change and updating of maintenance manuals. Also the unit has been harrassing direct supply unit for minor parts that are slow in the system. However items such as, 548 drive belts (alternator) and (fan drive) belts are still not available. Steering unit for V100 armoured cars are also in extreme short supply along with fuel pumps for 548 (tracked load carrier).

7. My duties during the period were again in maintenance. The complete updating of manuals, and constant checking of requisition numbers etc. During the period employed on operations in role of fire support coordinator. Presently my job is fire support co-ordinator for A1.

8. Advance intentions include movement to C1 with which to supervise maintenance and general re-fit of 2/7 troop in preparation for a possible move west.

9. All anti tank TM 41 & 46 mines have been found in general area of B1 (Ocean View).

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 8 to
Annex B to
AATTV Report Feb 71

REPORT BY WO2 K. PRYDE
ADVISER 4/2 ARVN BN

1. The general aims of the Bn for the period under review were:
 - a. The defence of FSB SARGE and the interdiction of possible enemy infiltration route. (as per previous report)
 - b. The security of AO GREEN, an area extending from MAI LOC (YD 095517) in the West almost to Quang-Tri in the East.
 - c. Stand-down, with duties in the security of DONG HA Combat Base and possible division reaction force.
 - d. The security of FSB SARGE, KHE GIO BRIDGE and a modified AO around the bases.
2. The methods used to achieve these aims were as described in the previous report, except at Mai-Loc where a one day search of an area was carried out in classic style.
3. The unit seemed quite successful in achieving the above aims in that nothing untoward happened during the period.
4. The unit continues to maintain a very high overall standard.
5. A major weakness noted during the period is described below.
 - a. During the units period of operation in AO GREEN, the CP was located at HUONG HOA District HQ to facilitate liaison between district forces and the ARVN. Despite this, the chance to mount really worthwhile combined operations, such as cordon and search was missed, due to the reluctance of the Bn Comd and District Chief to co-operate, apparently through jealousy of their respective positions.
6. Ref para 6, of my previous report, classes are continuing as described. During the period under review a resupply in the field was conducted to two separate locations, controlled by the ARVN Comds. On the ground talking directly to US helicopter pilots. Sufficient to say that the operation was conducted without a hitch, and without any active help of advisory staff. Result: a couple of amazed helicopter pilots.
7. All the officers in the unit have expressed concern at the reported discontinuation of Bn advisory teams, but I feel they are close to the point of being independant of such help.
8. During the search of an area referred to in para 2, I saw the unit use formations other than single file for the first time. In fact, formations were varied during the search to suit both the terrain and vegetation. May be if you talk long enough somebody listens.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

APPENDIX 9 TO
ANNEX B TO
AATTV Report Feb 71

REPORT BY WO2 F. SYKES
ADVISED 4/51 ARVN BN

1. Results:

<u>ARVN</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>WPNS CAPTURED</u>
	4	22	2	1xM60MG. 1xM79. 1xM16. 1xPRC 25 Radio
<u>NVA/VC</u>	8	NEG	NEG	2xCKC. 1xM16. 1xK44. 1xAK47 10x M14 Mines.

2. During this period the 4/51st carried out two battalion sized operations, the first from 29 Jan to 7 Feb 71, and the second operation's duration was from the 11th Feb to 17th Feb 71. The period between and after these operations was spent in local defence of HILL 55 up to a distance of 2000 m around it, and normally of company sized groups.

3. The helicopter support for the first operation was completely VNAF, but due to the LAM SON 719 operation our support for the period 11 -17 Feb consisted of one BLACKCAT UHID per day and the battalion received a resupply by this A/C. Both BLACKCAT and DISTORT averaged a fairly high percentage of hits during this time and on one occasion a US adviser received fragmentation in the back resulting in hospitalisation. Tactically this ground fire should'nt have occurred as the majority of it came from areas on an average of 200 METRES from the BN CP location. Most of these incidents resulted in negative or very slow reaction from the ARVN in bringing direct fire or artillery on target.

4. On the night of 20 - 21st Feb a series of coordinated attacks occurred around HILL 55, one at 2230 hrs on a CUP unit 600 metres to the NE, the second at 2330 hrs 500 metres to the SW, and 4 x 122 mm rockets onto the hill at 2400 hrs, resulting in negative damage and 2 USMC WIA.

5. The next indication the advisory team got that something also had happened was at 210730 when two soldiers from the 1st Coy of 4/51st turned up at the CP on HILL 55 minus weapons or equipment. It appears that at 0230 that morning a platoon of the 1st Coy which was occupying a position 800 m to the SE of HILL 55 were overrun by a company of NVA - VC. The opening barrage of B40/GRENADES must have demoralised the platoon and the majority of them bugged out, one member claims to have seen the PL COMD & 1 ARVN being led away as PW. This position was constructed as a light company defensive position approximately two months ago, and the platoon occupying it numbered twelve men.

6. The reaction force next morning contacted fifteen VC while moving into the area but the VC evaded contact after this and suffered negative casualties. The ARVN company found eight soldiers hiding in the brush around the position, the majority without weapons but with boots on. Four of these had minor fragmentation wounds and the rest were unhurt.

...2/

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

-2-

7. For some unknown reason the VC/NVA did not carry out a very thorough search of the defensive position and the only weapons lost were those indicated. As the majority of the battalion HQ officers are reluctant to talk to advisers on what actually happened the overall story we have seems to have a couple of discrepancies. From what I have seen of this battalion on operations it would appear that there is little difference between the 2/51st and 4/51st while operating in the field. And after talking with the advisers from 1/51 & 3/51 most of the problems in relation to tactics and administration would appear to be the same throughout the Regiment.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 10 to
Annex B to
AATTV Report Feb 71

REPORT BY WO2 R.P. TAYLOR
ADVISER HAI LANG DISTRICT

1. There were 5 combat sweeps and 2 cordon and search operations carried out during period of report. Highlights during the report were:
 - a. 29 2100 Jan 71. At YD 477374, RF 148 ambushed an enemy platoon with SAF. The enemy returned fire also with an undetermined number of B40 rounds. Result one friendly KIA, one VC KIA; captured one AK47.
 - b. 04 2030 Feb 71. At YD 500363 a US 2½ ton GS truck was ambushed. Result no casualties.
 - c. 18 1400 Feb 71. At YD 463562 PF 157 while conducting a sweep located one dead VC: He had been dead for approx 3 months.
 - d. 17-20 Feb 71. Seven platoons of PF conducting a sweep in area YD383533, YD398540, YD440503 and YD415488 discovered four caves and found inside them 1AK47, 2 fd stoves, 1 shovel, documents, 4 B40 rnds and 4 B41 rnds.
2. My major duties were trying to tee up the Village Plan at HAI CHANH, with very limited success. Other duties were comprised of normal duties at Sub Sector level.
3. Advance intention is to break out into another two villages. The District Chief will accompany me to these villages on Monday 1 Mar 71 to introduce me to get off on the right footing. I have come to a point at HAI CHANH Village where I cannot seem to go any further. This village has really acted as a training ground for me and I have learnt a lot of dos and donts. I have now a few fresh ideas to try and with three villages to work in and fresh ideas may be I will be able to achieve more.
4. Personalities. Relationship with both US and Vietnamese seem to remain at a good level.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

APPENDIX 11 TO
ANNEX B TO
AATTV REPORT

Feb 71

REPORT BY WO2 J. BARKER
RF/PF ADVISER HOA VANG DISTRICT

1. 16 Jan 71. Assigned to Hoa Vang as RF/PF adviser from WO1 W. Eade
2. 17 Jan 71. Met DSA Mr. Ames and DDSA Capt Martin and Vietnamese counterparts. I was introduced to the administrative aspects of the task and given an outline of other elements attached to the team: DIOCC, VIOCC, HES.
3. 18 Jan 71 to 28 Jan 71. WO Eade conducted a tour of all platoon locations with a briefing and grading on the respective Coys and Pls.
4. 29 Jan 71. Liaised with Col Hau, Capt Quynh/S3, S3A of 2/1 Marines to conduct a cordon and search of Thon Con Dau island in CS0372 REF. Danang 1:50,000 for the purpose of taking VC, VCI and deserters. Medcap and Psy/Ops teams also were involved. 1 deserter and 2 VCI suspects taken in for questioning to NPFF HQ. Medcap team remarked on the cleanliness and general health of Hamlets in the area also the personal hygiene of the people. Village is Pro Govt and has a good VIOCC element operating. The general attitude is one of cooperation with the military forces and Govt Policy. Due mainly to the PSDF and the HES Hamlet evaluation system against VC interference and incursions.
5. 1 Feb 71. 1/34 RF Gp under the Comd of Capt Ly combined with 2 Coys of 2/1 Marines from MIAF (Marble Mountain Air Facility) against a meeting of approximately 200 hard core VC at GR 074856 REF: Danang 1:50000. On the first phase of the insertion 1 x UH1B was shot down by VC small arms fire. Casualties were Nil and all were extracted safely. 2/1 Marines requested clearance in the Grid Square to produce maximum fire power but due to the close proximity of own troops. The request was denied.
6. At the completion of op,
Results: a. 1 VC KIA - 9 VC WIA - 2 VC prisoners.
b. Friendly 1 Marine KIA 4 Marine WIA
2 RF KIA 3 RF WIA
7. 2 Feb 71 to 16 Feb 71. Continued to visit pl elements in order to determine, strength, morale, in situ training, and civil and aid, and assistance to PSDF. Also within this time frame met with Col Moore 3/1 Marines, Col Hau District Mil leader and Mr Ames at Hai Van pass HQ (CAP Unit) to discuss the positioning of an additional 6 RF GPS to cover and patrol from NAM O bridge to Lang Co bridge South & North of Hai Van Pass. To counteract enemy activity in these Grid Squares. A further meeting at Nam O bridge determined the siting of these groups.
8. 17 Feb 71. A local cordon and search at Liam Lac combining 54 PF and 49 PF Pls with 2 Pls of Golf Coy 2/1 Marines returned a negative result.
9. 19 Feb 71. On receiving a call from S3 2/1 Marines moved with 2 Doctors and security force of one section to the village of Binh Ky. On arriving at the village it was found that 12 people had died and another 29 were seriously ill. On examining one of the very ill villagers Major Sutton (Dr) determined with his counterpart that the village was suffering with Bubonic Plague.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

...2/

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

-2-

Informed S3 at 2/1 Marines and then contacted C . . to have the FWF in the area given plague shots. Informed the S3 that the village was to be isolated preventing people coming and going to the village. The local inhabitants at Nui Kim Son were treated early with Plague Shots.

10. 20 Feb 71. On arriving at the village on the following morning the Mobile Medical Team from Hoa Vang District were in the process of innoculating the local population of Binh Ky (700). The three most ill people the previous day had died bringing the total to 15. It was explained to the District and Village Chief that the lime brought to the village was to be used when burying the bodies and that the graves were to also be covered with lime, after some discussion this was agreed upon.

11. 21 Feb 71. No further deaths have been reported and the people who are ill are being innoculated for the next 5 days .

This concludes my report for the month of February 1971.

DIOCC (District Intelligence Operation Control Center)

12. The following figures comprise the DIOCC of Hoa-Vang Sub-Sector in regards to VCI activities.

VCI	-	KIA	-	1
VCI	-	Rallied	-	0
VCI	-	Cleared of Villis	-	4
VCI	-	Indentified	-	182
VCI	-	Captured	-	14
Phung Hoang (OPS) DIOCC	-		-	8

The above figures are correct as of 20 February 1971.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Annex C to
AATTV Report Feb 71

REPORT BY CAPT B. CALIGARI
AUSTRALIAN TEAM LEADER NIGHT OPERATIONS
TRAINING TEAM PLETKU

1. During the visit of Commander AATTV on 15 Jan 71 a discussion was held with the Chief of Staff II Corps on the future of night Operations training. At this meeting it was decided to suspend the current schedule of courses and to introduce two special night operations instructors courses for Vietnamese officers. The Aim of this concept was to establish night operations schools in each province and thereby sped up the training process.
 2. The proposal was to conduct two instructors courses each with 28 student for three weeks. Each province was to provide 4 instructors (3 from Binh Dinh) with a Capt or Lt as province team leader.
 3. Commander AATTV provided two additional instructors for the NAT Team to:
 - a. Ensure a good start for the new concept .
 - b. Enable cross training for all instructors.
 4. As mentioned in last report HQ AATTV produced a precis containing all of the lesson plans used on the NAT Course. The prompt reaction by Saigon to the original request was much appreciated and must have caused them a considerable work load but by all account the effort was well worthwhile judging by the results.
- 1st Course
5. The first course commenced on 24 Feb 71 and concluded on 12 Mar 71 with a total of 23 students. The course started two days late because of student late arrivals. On this occasion it was not possible to compensate by extending the course by two days because arrangements had been made for General DZU to present graduation certificates to students on 12 Mar 71. The shortfall in students resulted from one Malaria case and the team from Kontum being unable to attend because of increased enemy activity in that province.
 6. This course was very successful. The students were experienced officers and totally different from students on previous courses. They took all instruction seriously and were eager to learn.
 7. The overall class assessment average was 86.4% this high result can be attributed to the following factors:
 - a. Rank, calibre and experience of students
 - b. Extended course
 - c. Addition of two instructors to NAT Team .
 - d. Small class of 23 students.

- e. Each student provided with precis.
 - f. General DZU presenting graduation certificates.
8. Night firing ability increased significantly and students seem convinced that the techniques taught are worthwhile.
9. The student instruction conducted at the end of the course was good with most students presenting well prepared, and delivered, lessons.
10. The only difficulty experienced on the course was student. They frequently tried to overwhelm instructors with their rank, service and experience. This attitude is not difficult to understand as some students were Lien Dai Commanders (RF Bn). Some of the problems encountered were:
- a. Disbelief Some students were not prepared to accept the instruction. They frequently required proof (which in my opinion is a good sign but they wanted more than a reasonable amount of proof) eg. In theory on mechanical ambushing some students would not believe that an electrical circuit in series could work because, they deduced, when the first detonator exploded the circuit would be broken. When a demonstration with two claymores was provided to prove the point the students believed that one claymore explosion was the result of sympathetic detonation (5 metres apart?). To solve the problem further demonstrations were conducted to counter each new theory the students presented.
 - b. Over eager: On one occasion a prolonged discussion took place between the Team Leader and the senior student as to whether or not live detonators should be used during two sided exercises at night in an operational area. The student could not be convinced that the use of de'tonators in this situation could be dangerous.
 - c. Independence: A couple of students were under the impression that they were able to select which lessons they should attend.
11. However these were only minor problems and the overall result indicates that students worked hard and absorbed instruction well.

Future intentions

- 12.
- a. 13-16 Mar. WO's West, Lancaster and Jackson conduct preliminary tour of Pleiku to assist past students and to gauge some of the problems that could be encountered on the tour of MR II.
 - b. 20-25 Mar Team Leader and Course Commander visit CORDS MR II, NHA TRANG and PHAN TANG RF/PF Training Centre to investigate possibility of moving NAT Pleiku to PHAN RANG.
 - c. 24 Mar 2nd NAT Instructors Course Commences.
 - d. 30 Mar Team Leader departs on R & R
 - e. 9 - 11 Apr 2nd NAT Course concludes.
 - j. 11 Apr WO2 Jackson on R & R
 - g. 12-14 Apr Possible move of NAT to PHAN RANG .

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- h. 14 - 24 Apr Possible preparation of PHAN RANG for NAT courses
- i. 24 Apr Team moves to DANANG for ANZAC day.
- j. 24 Apr WO2 Lancaster on R & R
- k. 26 Apr Team Leaves DANANG.
- l. 30 Apr Commence tour of MR II
 - (1) Team A:
 - Team Leader and Course Commander.
 - Khanh Hoa
 - Binh Thuan
 - Ninh Thuan
 - Tuyen Duc
 - Nha Trang
 - (2) Team B:
 - WO2's West, Cox and interpreter
 - Binh Dinh
 - Phu Yen
 - Phu Bon
 - Kontun
 - (3) Team C:
 - WO2's Jackson, Lancaster and interpreter
 - Pleiku
 - Darlac
 - Quang Duc
 - Lam Dong
- m. 31 May Compilation of report
- n. 23 Jun New Team Leader arrives
- o. 30 Jun old Team Leader and WO2 Lancaster departs.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

REPORT BY MAJ K. PHILLIPS
SENIOR AUSTRALIAN ADVISER
PHUOC TUY PROVINCE

Introduction

1. There has been no significant increase in enemy activity in the Province during the reporting period. This could be attributed to the present deployment pattern of the known enemy forces, the increased activity of the RF-PF-PSDF (see later paragraphs), and the presence of 1 ATF.
2. During February there has been another change of S3 adviser. It would appear that this position is used as a "trial and Error" appointment in the advisory team. Coupled with a previous change in the S2 adviser, it is little wonder that co-ordination between S2 and S3 is almost non-existent. This general lack of co-ordination is reflected throughout the province if the results of the numerous operations are used as a guide.
3. The operation of the TOC (Sector) has improved slightly with the movement of the VN duty officer into a position where he can at least see the sector operations map. However the TOC is still generally the meeting place for all and sundry. The new S3 adviser (ex DDSA, Dat Do) has taken more of an interest in controlling the excessive movement in the TOC although there is still room for improvement. It would appear that a logical step would be the construction of a Sector CP at the rear of the existing TOC building. There is ample space available but engineer/stores assistance would be required. An elaborate building would not be required but provision should be made for such elements as the fire support co-ordination centre (FSCC) and air warning system office.

Deployment of MATTs

4. There has been one change to the MATT deployment pattern during the reporting period. MATT 11 has been moved from LONG HUONG area to be co-located with 385 RF Coy at GR YS282639. This will relieve some of the pressure on MATT 7 resulting from the increased activity of the PF units.
5. Sector VN staff were approached on the redeployment of MATT 15 from LONG SON island. After much discussion the MATT remained in situ for the time being. To meet the requirement it is proposed to again discuss the deployment with the VN staff on the basis that elements of another MATT will be made available on a temporary basis for training of RF, PF, and PSDF on the island.
6. The movement of a MATT to NUI NHON (DAT DO) has been temporarily delayed pending the completion of a command bunker in the base occupied by MATT 2.

Employment of MATTs

7. The activities of the MATTs are covered in the respective MATT reports attached as Appendices to this Annex.

8. With the increase in RF activity resulting from the Dong-Khoi operation which commenced on 10 Feb 71, the MATTs, in general, have been fully committed. The training of PF and PSDF has been continued as much as possible but some limitations have been imposed. The presence of the RF MATs has assisted in ensuring that PF and PSDF upgrading has continued. The RF MAT programme is still in its infancy but all signs would indicate that they will be a valuable assist to the training/upgrading system.

9. There are six RF MATs in the sector, on the basis of one per district and one for sector. Activity has been directed to both PF and PSDF. A more detailed coverage of the progress to date is included in the PSDF Adviser's report attached as Appendix 1 to this Annex.

10. As a follow through to last month's report (Paragraph 7 of Annex D), some improvement has been noted with the PF but there is still a long way to go. As the RF commence to operate further field there is a possibility that the improvement should continue. As the PF operate primarily under village control, the ability of the village chief and village deputy for security can be a deciding factor. Not enough use is made of the PF potential with the possible exception of Duc Thanh District.

RF

11. As a direct consequence of operation Dong-Khoi (simultaneous) there has been a marked increase in the number of RF operations in the territorial forces (TF) AO in the sector. The operation commenced at 0800 hrs on 10 Feb 71 with TF deployed to predesignated target areas. The areas were supposedly selected on the basis of sound intelligence - the results would indicate that this may not have been so in a number of cases. Unfortunately the "numbers game" entered into the operation, when it soon became apparent that troops deployed and area covered were more significant than planned military operations. However, the operation did have the effect of activating what was becoming an extremely slow moving system.

12. There is still a lack of co-ordination of intelligence sources, the interpretation of such intelligence, and the subsequent forward planning. In the situation that exists in this province, the collection and collation of all intelligence information is essential if operational success is to be achieved. Intelligence information does become available but is not passed to the operations (S3) section in sufficient time to prove of value. Unless this process is put into effect there is little chance of improvement in the success of the TF. The increase in the TF AO with effect 20 Feb 71 makes it even more important for a sector concept of operations, based on sound intelligence, to be produced. This can only be done after a detailed appreciation has been completed. Until a sector concept of operations is produced there will continue to be the ever present "corridors" created by district boundaries and the use of TF within districts only. If co-ordination is effected at Sector it will only be a matter of time before such action will pass down to districts.

13. The problem with the RF Coys still appears to be at the junior leader level judging by after action reports submitted by MATTs. It was pleasing to note, however, that a number of companies previously graded as below average did show signs of improvement during the Dong Khoi operations. With the commencement of the next phase of this operation it is hoped that further

- 3 -

improvements will be noted. There is now ample area in which the RF can operate away from base (compound) locations and still provide security for the populated areas. This increase in area should be used as a proving ground before further increases are made.

PF

14. There has been a slight increase in PF activity but not as much as expected in view of the number of PF platoons in province. Sector has recently requested MR 3 approval to raise a further 21 platoons. The requirement is debatable in view of the existing use of the PF platoons.

PSDF

15. Complete details of the PSDF situation is given in the PSDF Adviser's report attached as Appendix 1. Included in the report is details of the employment of the RF MAT. The programme prepared for PSDF training in Phuoc-Le (Baria) has been promulgated by Dep Cords MR3 to all provinces in the region as a guide.

RD

16. The report by the RDC adviser is attached. As a follow up to last month's report, the proposed organization of the 10 man teams is indicated.

Conclusion

17. The reporting period has seen a number of significant changes, eg. the increased activity of the RF Coys, greater use of PF, the increase in AOs for the TF, and the commencement in detail of the RF MAT system. In these respects the future looks a little brighter although there are still a number of problems to be solved. The consistent changing of advisers does little to help solve the problem.

18. For future planning, consideration should be given now to the possible material assistance that may be given to the RF MATs by the Australian Army/Government. Currently the RF MAT has no equipment to assist it on its task - unless this is rectified a major problem may develop once the AATTV MATTs are phased down. This would be a retrograde step and any assistance provided now must prove of benefit in the long term.

19. Appendices. The following Appendices are attached:

- Appendix 1 - Report by Capt J. Hartley, PSDF Adviser Phuoc-Tuy Province.
- Appendix 2 - Report by WO2 A. Dodds, Team Leader MATT 2.
- Appendix 3 - Report by Capt L. Opie, Team Leader MATT 3.
- Appendix 4 - Report by WO2 R. Davies, Team Leader MATT 5.
- Appendix 5 - Report by WO2 M. Muir, Team Leader MATT 6.
- Appendix 6 - Report by WO2 R. Neagle, Team Leader MATT 7.
- Appendix 7 - Report by WO2 N. Roberts, Team Leader MATT 8.
- Appendix 8 - Report by WO2 G. Millington, Team Leader MATT 9.
- Appendix 9 - Report by WO1 B. Roe, Team Leader MATT 14.
- Appendix 10 - Report by WO2 L. Osborne, Adviser RD Cadre.
- Appendix 11 - Report by WO2 J. TAYLOR, Team Leader MATT 11

SECRET

Feb 71

REPORT BY CAPT J. HARTLEY
PSDF ADVISER PHUOC TUY PROVINCE

1. Interest in PSDF activities increased slightly with the issue of the Province 1971 Community Defence and Local Development Plan, the advent of PSDF training conducted by RF MATs and the proposed visit to the Province, and in particular to the Province PSDF Rally by President THIEU.

2. The province PSDF Advisor also assumed the role as PSDF advisor to the Vung Tau Special zone. This is in keeping with the increase in CORDS Advisory Team 89 commitments to maintain advisory responsibility for this area as well as Phuoc Tuy.

1971 PSDF Province Plan

3. This plan, attached as Attachment 1, is a vast improvement over the PSDF Plan published by the Province Chief initially (see last months' report). There are a number of areas which will receive only a token effort unless closely followed up. The advisor will ensure that other advisors of Team 89 are aware of these areas and inform his counter-part of what is being done by advisers. This has proved to be a useful means of advising, not only by ensuring the advisers are prompting their counter-parts but by also gently reminding the PSDF Chief of his commitments.

4. A number of areas in the Plan require comment:

a. The Plan states that 16-17 year old youths may have to be organized into common combat PSDF in order to achieve the established goals. At least one District Chief has stated that he will have to employ 14 years old to meet his requirements. As it is, a good number of youths younger than 16 are already in the PSDF. Statistics are a major problem. At least a third of PSDF numbers are "ghosts". In MR3 this means that there are probably 200,000 common combat or hardcore PSDF less than are actually on the books. No Vietnamese official would be surprised.

b. Political Training Team for PSDF. This is one programme which will not start. VIS has shown themselves to be singularly lacking in energy, enterprise and expertise. It is extremely doubtful that they have either personnel or experience for this type of training. The cadre referred to in the Plan is PSDF Cadre, a small number of whom exist at Province level. The only organization capable of effectively lecturing on political subjects is RD Cadre.

c. The training of team, inter team and assistant team and inter team leaders is to be done at the Long Hai Training Centre.

d. PSDF will be increasingly subject to election propaganda. The organization was initially established as an anticommunist element with no other political bias. If PSDF is to maintain its oldest principle, many people will be surprised. President Thieu's visit, although there will be no mention of an election, cannot fail to have a political influence in his favour.

e. More hamlets will be handed to the PSDF for internal security. However the TFES ratings have been received and there will be a number of reductions, particularly from B and C level.

.....2/

It is expected that PF will still maintain some security protection measures in most hamlets.

f. Plans have been made to previously involve PSDF with fire support. It is doubtful whether this Plan will be any more effective. A basic problem is communications. Radios issued to hamlets and village authorities are often not able to be tuned in with RF or PF radios.

g. National Police report that ID cards have been almost completely issued and it is anticipated that PSDF will not be greatly involved in this scheme.

h. A good deal of emphasis is being placed on security clearing PSDF particularly team and inter-team leaders.

5. On the credit side, much has been done to involve the PSDF with as many facets of administration as possible. More people are becoming more involved with PSDF than ever before. The idea of PSDF is still a Vietnamese project with only a minimal involvement by advisers particularly at the higher levels of province, region and national level.

Reorganization of Province PSDF Office.

6. Capt Tuong continues as PSDF co-ordinator and his replacement, a Maj Khiet, is not expected to assume duties until early May 71.

7. A number of changes in establishment and control have taken place. Decree 130 dated 19 Oct 70 issued by MO1 established a new organization for province administration, which placed the PSDF branch under command of the Internal security Office. At District level, an internal security and judicial section was also established.

8. The PSDF Co-ordinator, presently a captain and shortly to be a major is now assisted by two captains, a second lieutenant and six Sgts. This is a considerable increase in staff. At District level, a PSDF officer, usually a Lt or 2Lt is assisted by one or more cadre members.

Training of PSDF Leaders in 1971.

9. MO1 proposes to train 116,752 PSDF team and inter team, assistant team and inter team leaders at 16 Training Centres throughout Vietnam in 1971.

10. The first training cycle commenced on 8 Feb 71 at Dong Hai. This is a special training cycle to cater for the figures not reached in the 1970 goal. Van Kiep will continue to train PSDF but both Long Hai and Tay-Ninh have been opened to PSDF due to the increased emphasis on PSDF training.

11. There are to be five training priorities:

a. Priority 1. Category A is comprised of Interteam and Team Leader remaining from 1970 goals (already mentioned).

b. Priority 2. Category B is comprised of Assistant Team and Interteam Leaders of the Interteams and Teams organized in 1970.

- c. Priority 3. Category C is comprised of Interteam and Team Leaders of Interteams and Teams to be organized in 1971.
- d. Priority 4. Category D is comprised of Rural Team Leaders to be organized in 1971.
- e. Priority 5. Category E is comprised of Urban Hardcore Leaders to be organized in 1971.

12. A number of problems are being encountered. The greatest problem is for Districts to meet their requirements. Other problem areas are:

- a. Transport. This could previously be arranged with the Training Centre. This is now not possible and SM & DSLCP are being increasingly pressed by PSDF for transportation.
- b. Cadre. One cadre per 50 trainees is the requirement. There are a very limited number of PSDF cadre in Phuoc Tuy Province.
- c. Weapons. Students must arrive carrying their own weapons and basic ammunition load. If several students from one hamlet attend, this may reduce considerably the fire power available.
- d. Equipment. Students are temporarily issued the following:
 - (1) Poncho
 - (2) Head mosquito net.
 - (3) Individual mess kit
 - (4) Canteen.

All other items must be brought by the student. In many cases training centres have not been fully geared to meet the increased training demands on equipment.

Training by MATTs and RF MATs.

13. All District Chiefs have now commenced training using the RF MAT. Results in most cadres have been excellent. Training techniques, co-ordination between various agencies, logistical backup still leave much room for improvement but the enthusiasm of S3s, District Chiefs and particularly RF MATs has been quite promising.

14. Training has been conducted as follows:

- a. RF MAT DUC THANH with MATT 1. PSDF at Duc Tuong and Ngai Giao and PF Pls 10 and 65.
- b. Long Le RF MAT and MATT 6. More trouble was experienced getting this RF and MAT off the ground than any other. The problem was generally a lack of communication between advisor and counter part at district level. This problem has now been solved and the MAT is currently training PF Pl 6 having already trained PF Pl 51. The District Chief has issued an instruction laying out training until Aug 71 for PF.
- c. Long Dien RF MAT and MATT 14. This MAT conducted the entire training of An Nhut PSDF and is presently assisting in the training of Long Tam and Long Toan Hamlets.
- d. Dat Do RF MAT and MATT 9. Training of Phuoc Thanh PSDF is almost complete. Training by the RF MAT has been good, however other agencies such as RF Cadre, Chieu Hoi and VLS have not come to the

.....4/

party. Although POIs were received by each agency involved, there was a lack of co-ordination at the lower level. The RF MAT and MATT 9 have learnt a valuable lesson in co-ordination and hopefully this problem will not occur next time.

e. Xuyen Moc RF MAT and MATT 8. Two PF Pls have been trained and progress has been reasonable to date.

f. Both MATT 5 and MATT 14 continue training PSDF in Long Dien and Phuoc Hai.

15. The problems encountered in striking a proper balance in military and other type training has been more than favourably met. This has had a favourable reaction in most quarters. As a result, the POI at Attachment 2 is the first of the new series which it is hoped will eventually be used to train all combat and hardcore PSDF in the Province.

16. The staff procedures of PSDF are not always clear and a great deal of compromise is incurred at District and Province level by Vietnamese and Advisors. In order to commence PSDF training in a district the advisor must first of all clear this unit with his counterpart. Then the advisor must approach the District Chief, without his counterpart who does not wish to talk to a major as he is only a captain. The District Chief may only be approached through the DSA who will usually take some time to arrange this meeting. When the District Chief and the DSA have given their approval, the District Chief will give permission for the advisor to talk to the Commander of the PSDF in the district, the District Deputy for Administration. At this point the advisor's counterpart comes on the scene and discussions are held with the Deputy for Administration who will arrange an interview with the Village Chief concerned. When this occurs the advisor, counterpart, deputy for administration, MATT leader and RF MAT leader meet the village chief, who with some luck will have his own deputy for security and possible hamlet chief present. Otherwise the meeting is conveyed at yet another level. The next step is for the POI to be produced, timings fixed, locations arranged etc. However the subsector S3 is the only person responsible for training. So the whole delegation meets and discusses events with him. At this stage, the PSDF officer for District appears and adds his contribution. After many beers, cups of tea days of anxious waiting all is ready to start. However the RF MAT leader then wishes to go on leave.

17. Intentions.

a. Sector RF MAT. To commence training of Phuoc Le PSDF on 1 Mar 71. The village chief has arranged for 10 courses, each of almost one month to be conducted in Phuoc Le.

b. Long Le RF MAT. To commence training of PSDF in Hoa Long in two groups, training of each group approximately one month long.

c. Long Dien RF MAT. To commence training of Tam Phuoc PSDF on approximately 15 Mar 71.

d. Dat Do RF MAT. To commence second group of Phuoc Thanh PSDF training on approximately 15 Mar 71

e. Xuyen Moc RF MAT. To commence training of Xuyen Moc PSDF during Mar 71.

SECRET

- 5 -

18. Problem Areas.

a. Time delays are experienced in all facets of training requisitions, be they stores, range bookings, ammunition or transport. The responsibilities of S3, S4 and SM & DSLCs are not understood. The SM & DSLC commander spent one hour showing the advisor how it was that a vehicle requested for training had not been issued because it was not his duty. However on return to the unit, the advisor found the vehicle waiting there, where it had done so for the past two hours. The driver assured the advisor that he had been ordered to report there by the SM & DSLC supply Chief.

b. Training Ammunition: At Attachment 2 is the allocation of training ammunition for the Province. This shortage has been partly alleviated by serounging. Recently over 100,000 rounds .garand were uncovered in a bunker in Dat Do District.

c. Lesson plans, charts and training such for PF training are almost non existent. Van Kiep have provided some lesson plans which have been by Section RF MAT as a basis to write their own. This is being encouraged and copies will be made and passed to other MATs.

Psyops.

19. A major success occurred with the arrival of 5000 certificates. These certificates come as three types:

- a. General training
- b. Commendation
- c. Training at national Training Centres.

20. Phuoc Tuy will shortly, hopefully next month, commence producing its own newspaper for PSDF. The PSDF co-ordination has already produced a coversheet for which 1 ATF will be requested to produce a stencil.

Vung Tau, PSDF

21. Vung Tau has a population of 92,000 with a further possible 20,000 illegal residents. The number of PSDF involved are as follows.

- a. Organized:
 - (1) Combat 8690
 - (2) Support 21,864
- b. Trained:
 - (1) Combat 8650
 - (2) Support 19,158

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

....6/

22. Allowing for a third being "ghosts" and the completely mythical trained figure, this still represents a sizeable force. 3,124 weapons are also issued. This advisor has recommended that the advisory effort become involved as little as possible. Vung Tau have not had its own effective advisory element, PSDF wise, for many months, and it is felt that as PSDF are fully Vietnamised at this time, it would be a step back to endeavour to sort out the problems and intrigue of Vung Tau.

Contacts and Incidents

23. Incidents involving PSDF were as follows:

- a. On 31 Jan, PSDF sighted and engaged 2 VC in Long Dien. The VC withdrew and in the subsequent sweep detonating devices, grenades, 15xK54 rounds, a quantity of detonating devices, one transistor radio, a quantity of clothing, a large quantity of documents including anti 1 ATF propagandor leaflets, tax records, reports on enemy and friendly situations and sapper training lesson plans were found.
- b. On 4 Feb, at 0015 hrs on Long Son Island a squad of VC were contacted by 59 PF P1 and a PSDF team. One VC was KIA and 1 US .45 cal pistol CTA. The PSDF claimed the KIA and awarded a medal to the team leader.
- c. On 4 Feb, at 2135 hrs in Phuoc Hai, PSDF engaged an unknown number of VC. There were no results. Later that night, two PSDF groups contacted each other and a 15 minutes fire fight developed. Firing continued until both sides ran out of ammunition. The village Chief was complemented on his aggressiveness but not his marksmanship.
- d. On 11 Feb, at Hoi My, PSDF discovered a large mine placed under a school room.
- e. At 2105 hrs on 13 Feb, Phuoc Thanh PSDF sighted and engaged two VC. PSDF reported enemy fired at them from three directions and then eventually withdrew. One PSDF was slightly wounded. It is believed that the VC may have been trying to disrupt PSDF training being conducted by the RF MAT.

Presidential Visit.

24. This visit was scheduled between 22-27 Feb 71 but has been postponed by Gen Tri's death. The visit is being taken extremely seriously and is wholly Vietnamese organized.

Conclusion.

25. The Sector S3 (Training) has been intimately involved in the arrangements for training PSDF in Phuoc Le. As RF MATs become more involved and branch further afield, this officer will play an increasing part in the preparation of training programmes and in controlling and co-ordinating MATs.

26. In several areas, the training role of MATs, particularly in PF and PSDF training has been taken over to a great extent by RF MATs. However they do not have a logistics capability and MATs are still required for transport, communications and training aids.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

-7-

27. It is hoped that this coming month will see the establishment of a long range training program for PF and PSDF, the publication of a PSDF Newsletter and continued improvement and use of RF MATs.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

1. General

a. In the past years, the government has supported and directed all classes of people to form into fighting PSDF groups and supported the plan of making all members effective. In the execution of the rural development and pacification work in 1971, the PSDF must be the vanguard for rural work such as: self-defense, self-administration, and self-improvement and turn all VC infra-structures ineffective at villages and hamlets in order to bring 100% security to villages and hamlets.

b. To maintain the achievement gained in 1970, the quality of PSDF will be continuously improved through additional and refresher training programmes. At the same time, special attention will be paid to the training tests, awarding commendations and encouraging competitions to increase the ability of PSDF in the village/hamlet defense. To achieve this, the Province PSDF office prepared a plan for 1971 as follows:

2. Content

1/a. In 1970, the recruitment of combat PSDF was not reached because the manpower resource of 16-17 years, of age has already been grouped and the members who have been grouped before, have joined the PF, RF or ARVN. Therefore in 1971, the age between 15 and 16 must be listed and grouped into PSDF.

b. On hardcore PSDF members. The combat PSDF members must be turned effectively into hardcore PSDF members.

c. The organization of forming teams and inter-teams cannot be based on the standard of 35 members in one inter-team, because there were some hamlets which were very low on the PSDF members. The organization must depend on each hamlet; any hamlet which has over 7 members can form 1 team, 3 or 4 teams in adjoining hamlets can form 1 inter-team.

d. On supporting PSDF members - teen-agers and old men must be organized into inter-teams in order to have an effective support organization to key fighting inter-teams.

2/a. Training work for all PSDF members including fighting and supporting. On military training aspect, carry out the forming of mobile training teams in order to conduct basic training for new-formed key inter-teams and at the same time provide refresher training to all the PSDF members in the Province.

b. Form political training teams for PSDF. Gathering all the cadre, PSDF members, open-arms young men. (The VLS at sub-sector will be the section chief).

c. Regarding the training of inter-team leader, team leader and assistant inter-team leader and team assistant leader training will be based on the recommendation of the Province and District Chief.

3/Work of PSDF. Supporting the government in 1971:

a. Regarding the election of President and Vice-President, the PSDF will be educated to understand the election. Each PSDF member must be taught thoroughly the way of the Republic of Vietnam government. Each member must know the right of individual, family and the Fatherland and not let this country fall into communist hands. Therefore each ballot must be selected carefully to elect true nationalists, put aside all the neutral elements, pro-communist elements and false peace elements etc ...

b. Concerning the protection of villages and hamlets in 1971, PSDF will replace RF in providing security at hamlets A-B-C of 1970. However the replacement schedule will depend on the security in the province. The province (PSDF office) will effect liaison with Sector HQ (S-3) to set up the replacement schedule and this schedule will be submitted to the PSDF Department and Military Region and will notify village and hamlets later.

c. Coordinating to protect hamlets. Request Sector (S-3) set up the plan for RF/PF to coordinate activity and to provide fire support to all key inter-teams of PSDF in the task of protecting hamlets according to the general defense and practice plan of village and hamlets.

d. Encourage PSDF members to participate in the work of issuing ID Cards made by National Police teams to people and to call all members who are eligible in joining National Police Branch.

Security clearance of PSDF. Must clear and eliminate all the VC agent individuals in PSDF rank especially at key cadre levels (command level, inter-team leaders - team leaders - assistant inter-team leaders - assistant team leaders). In the meantime encourage the rewarding of all team members or cadre who have discovered enemy infra-structure of any level.

4/Supporting the special task of the government in 1971:

- a. Public information.
- b. Phuong-Hoang programme.
- c. Activity of farmers' association.
- d. Youth programme.

5/Check the monthly work in the execution of the above plan.

a. At the end of each month, the PSDF office will gather all the leaders of PSDF from villages and districts to Province to attend meeting which will be presided over by the Deputy Province Chief for Administration, currently PSDF commander, in order to check the work in the month and find out the cause of the success or failure in the execution of the programme and point out the deficiencies for the coming month.

.../ 3

6/Phase 2 from 1-9-70 to 28-2-71.

a. Organize PSDF grand meeting throughout the Province in order to check the work and to find out the procedures to solve the 1st phase of the Plan (if problems have been met and instructions have not been carried out as outlined) and obtain the advantages and deficiencies to add to the completion of all the work mentioned in the 1st phase of 1971.

The objectives in the paragraph mentioned above are planned to be distributed to the districts according to the attached charts.

3. Conclusion . The execution of the PSDF Plan in 1971 will be successful. The province hopes that all military men, civil servants and cadre in the province will cooperate together to bring a good result.

APPENDIX B1: PSDF Goals

1. Organization:

a. Overall organization.

District	Fighting PSDF(1)			Support PSDF(2)	Grand Total
	Key	Combat	Total		
Long Le	3067	1233	4300	12,600	16,900
Long Dien	2663	1187	3850	9400	13,250
Dat Do	1074	826	1900	7500	9400
Duc Thanh	381	409	790	2700	3490
Xuyen Moc	95	115	210	800	1010
Entire Province	7280	3770	11,050	33,000	44,050

(1) Goals for organization of Combat PSDF for Phuoc Tuy Province are increased 1550 compared with last year (1970).

(2) Goals for organization of Support PSDF are unchanged compared with last year (1970).

KH - I - B1 - 1

b. Key PSDF.

District	1970 Goals	1971 Goals				Total	
		Rural Key PSDF Inter-teams	Rural Key PSDF Teams	Capital Key PSDF Teams	Inter Teams	Teams	Mbrs
Long-Le	58 Inter-tms 2053 Members	(additional) 4 Inter-tms 140 Mbrs	10 Teams 104 Mbrs	70 Teams 770 Mbrs	62	80	3067
Long-Dien	$\frac{40}{1393}$	$\frac{4}{140}$	$\frac{61}{690}$	$\frac{40}{440}$	44	101	2663
Dat Do	$\frac{20}{694}$	$\frac{3}{105}$	$\frac{26}{275}$	Ø	23	26	1074
Xuyen-Moc	$\frac{3}{84}$	Ø	$\frac{1}{11}$	Ø	03	01	95
Duc-Thanh	$\frac{9}{326}$	$\frac{1}{35}$	$\frac{2}{20}$	Ø	10	2	331
Entire Province	$\frac{130}{4550}$	$\frac{12}{420}$	$\frac{100}{1100}$	$\frac{110}{1210}$	142	210	7230

Notes: (1) The Rural Key PSDF team is also organized with 11 members. However, Hamlets may form 12 or more in the team; In case the strength is not enough 11 members, it may also form into the team. At the Hamlets having organized Interteam, and still having extra members, may form additional teams.

(2) Strength of the "Capital Key PSDF team" organized at the populous quarter or capital may have 14 members.

c. Support PSDF.

District	1971 Goals for Support PSDF	1971 Goals for Dev. Support PSDF Inter Teams	Remarks
Long Le	12,600	$\frac{62 \text{ Interteams}}{2170 \text{ Members}}$	- Support PSDF members will be transformed into "Development Interteam".
Long Dien	9,400	$\frac{40}{1400}$	- The Development Interteam consists of 3 Teams:
Dat Do	7,500	$\frac{25}{875}$	+ 1 old man team
Xuyen Moc	800	$\frac{5}{175}$	+ 1 woman team
Duc Thanh	2,700	$\frac{10}{350}$	+ 1 children defense team in order to effectively support fighting key PSDF Interteams.
Entire Province	33,000	$\frac{142}{4970}$	- Goals for support PSDF are unchanged compared with 1970

2. Training

a. Combat PSDF

District	1971 Goals	Remarks
Long Le	1233 members	-100% of the organized Combat PSDF members will be trained in Basic training by the concerned District at the spot.
Long Dien	1187 members	
Dat Do	826 members	
Xuyen Moc	115 members	
Duc Thanh	409 members	
Entire Province	3770 members	

b. Key PSDF
(1) Details:

District	1971 Goals Key PSDF		1971 Goals Rural Key PSDF Interteams					1971 Goals Rural Key Teams		1971 Goals Capital Key Teams	
	Asst Inter tm Ldr	Asst Tm Ldr	Inter Tm Ldr	Asst Inter Tm Ldr	Tm Ldr	Asst Tm Ldr	Mbrs	Tm Ldr	Mbrs	Tm Ldr	Mbrs
Long Le	58	174	4	4	12	12	108	10	100	70	700
Long Dien	40	120	4	4	12	12	108	61	610	40	400
Dat Do	20	60	3	3	9	9	81	26	260	0	0
Xuyen Hoc	3	9	0	0	0	0	0	1	10	0	0
Duc Thanh	9	27	1	1	3	3	27	2	20	0	0
Entire Province	130	390	12	12	36	36	324	100	1000	110	1100

District	Key PSDF Leaders + Members must be trained in 1971							Grand Total
	Inter-tm Leader	Asst. Intertm Leader	Team Leader	Asst Tm Ldr	Mbrs	Ldrs	Mbrs	
Long Le	4	62	118	118	1014	362	1014	1376
Long Dien	4	44	80	80	1070	258	1070	1328
Dat Do	3	23	39	39	274	144	274	418
Xuyen Moc	0	3	3	3	11	19	11	30
Duc Thanh	1	10	6	6	55	43	55	98
Entire Province	12	142	246	246	2424	826	2424	3250

c. Support PSDF.

Goals for training of this support PSDF equal with 100% of the goals for organization of the Development Interteam.

3. Weapons

District	Weapons Key PSDF	Weapons Combat PSDF	Total	Remarks
Long Le	1533	337	2070	(1) 1 weapons for 2 members in average
Long Dien	1341	338	1679	
Dat Do	539	295	804	(2) 1 weapon for 5 members in average
Xuyen Moc	47	33	80	
Duc Thanh	180	137	317	
Entire Province	3640	1140	4950	

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Attachment 2 to
Appendix 1 to
Annex D to
AATTV Report

Feb 71

PROVINCE TRAINING AMMUNITION FOR 1971

<u>District</u>	<u>Bar</u>	<u>Carbine</u>	<u>Gerand</u>
Long Le	27,300	62,000	37,000
Long Dien	25,000	56,000	32,000
Dat Do	12,200	27,000	17,000
Duc Thanh	3,400	8,100	6,000
Xuyen-Moc	1,325	1,900	3,250
Total	69,625	155,000	95,250

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 2 to
Annex D to
AATTV Report Feb 71

REPORT BY WO2 A. DODDS
TEAM LEADER MATT 2

Training

1. 578, 609 and 771 RF Coy's have received no training from the MATT during the past month. 578 Coy had one day of Polwar training early in Feb. Negotiations are under way to commence a course whereby members from the three Coy's will be cross trained in the use of the Coy heavy organic weapons. It is also hoped that the heavy weapons squad from 578 Coy will be trained in the use of the .50 cal MG.
2. The PSDF of Phuoc Long Village are still continuing their nightly guard of the village office. The village chief has been asked on a number of occasions to notify the MATT when he is ready to commence training again. As yet there has been no indication when this is likely to occur. The MATT was to conduct range practices for the PSDF of Phuoc Thanh and Phuoc Tho Villages. Owing to the proposed move of half the team to Nui Nhon the task has now been handed over to another MATT.
3. 55 PF Pl is now undergoing a five week refresher course at Van Kiep.

Operations

4. Apart from the normal daily patrols in and around the villages, the following operations were conducted during the period:
 - a. 578 Coy. One 5 day search of a small portion of their normal AO. There were up to 5 ambushes sited each night during this period, 14-18 Feb.
 - b. 609 Coy. One 1 day sweep of an area NE of the town of Dat Do. One 3 day sweep of the same area 20-22 Feb. Operation report with DSA's comments are attached at Attach -
ments 1 and 2.

Operations Results

5. All Coy's Negative.

Medcaps

6. Medcaps in Phuoc Hoa Long have come to a full stop. The Coy medic of 578 Coy has no interest whatsoever, likewise the village chief. On Sat 6 Feb it was brought to our notice by the medic from District Headquarters that the villagers were complaining about there being no medcaps. The MATT medic approached the Chief and asked him to broadcast to the villagers that the medcaps were still going on. The village nurse has always attended the clinic on Sat mornings. During the Tet holiday period the clinic was broken into and completely ransacked and with the exception of one medicine cabinet all furniture was stolen. The Coy carpenter is making new furniture out of ammunition boxes. 609 Coy have not as yet commenced medcaps in the Phuoc Tho village.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../2

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 2 to
Annex D to
AATTV Report Feb 71

REPORT BY WO2 A. DODDS
TEAM LEADER MATT 2

Training

1. 578, 609 and 771 RF Coy's have received no training from the MATT during the past month. 578 Coy had one day of Polwar training early in Feb. Negotiations are under way to commence a course whereby members from the three Coy's will be cross trained in the use of the Coy heavy organic weapons. It is also hoped that the heavy weapons squad from 578 Coy will be trained in the use of the .50 cal MG.
2. The PSDF of Phuoc Long Village are still continuing their nightly guard of the village office. The village chief has been asked on a number of occasions to notify the MATT when he is ready to commence training again. As yet there has been no indication when this is likely to occur. The MATT was to conduct range practices for the PSDF of Phuoc Thanh and Phuoc Tho Villages. Owing to the proposed move of half the team to Nui Nhon the task has now been handed over to another MATT.
3. 55 PF Pl is now undergoing a five week refresher course at Van Kiep.

Operations

4. Apart from the normal daily patrols in and around the villages, the following operations were conducted during the period:
 - a. 578 Coy. One 5 day search of a small portion of their normal AO. There were up to 5 ambushes sited each night during this period, 14-18 Feb.
 - b. 609 Coy. One 1 day sweep of an area NE of the town of Dat Do. One 3 day sweep of the same area 20-22 Feb. Operation report with DSA's comments are attached at Attach -
ments 1 and 2.

Operations Results

5. All Coy's Negative.

Medcaps

6. Medcaps in Phuoc Hoa Long have come to a full stop. The Coy medic of 578 Coy has no interest whatsoever, likewise the village chief. On Sat 6 Feb it was brought to our notice by the medic from District Headquarters that the villagers were complaining about there being no medcaps. The MaTT medic approached the Chief and asked him to broadcast to the villagers that the medcaps were still going on. The village nurse has always attended the clinic on Sat mornings. During the Tet holiday period the clinic was broken into and completely ransacked and with the exception of one medicine cabinet all furniture was stolen. The Coy carpenter is making new furniture out of ammunition boxes. 609 Coy have not as yet commenced medcaps in the Phuoc Tho village.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../2

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 2 -

Remarks

7. This month has shown a marked improvement with the Coy Comd and the MATT. Since the new year (TET) nine bunkers have been completed around the berm, with more sites selected for future development. The Coy still only employs one squad per day on improving the compound defences, one day consisting of two hours in the morning.

8. An 1 ATF Psyops Team paid another visit to the Coy for a period of five days. They showed films in all compounds and also at the Phuoc Hoa Long Village office.

9. An EOD Team from 1 ATF spent five days at the compound removing blinds and booby traps from the wire. Their unfortunate and tragic death occurred prior to the task being completed. Blinds removed included:

- 52 x M26 grenades
- 23 x 60mm Mor HE
- 8 x 60mm Mor Illum
- 4 x 81mm Mor HE
- 5 x 81mm Mor Illum
- 5 x m18 Claymore mines (in dangerous condition)
- 3 x WP Frag Grenades
- 13 x M19A Trip Flares
- 31 x M79 HE Grenades
- 2 x M72 Rockets (one still in the tube)
- 1 x B40 (fired)
- 4 x M16 Mines (just lying on the ground without fuses)
- Qty small arms ammo. (this when added to that which exploded during a grass fire in Dec, would amount to a Coy's first line reserve)

10. The combined command bunker is almost completed, without the aid of the Vietnamese. The Coy Comd has promised on seven occasions to supply a work party to assist the MATT. A total of sixteen 81mm Mor HE rounds were removed from the site during construction.

Attachments:

1. MATT Leaders Report on 609 Coy/Intel Pl Incident.
2. DSA's Comments on 609 Coy/ Intel Pl Incident.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Attachment 1 to
Appendix 2 to
Annex D to
AATTV Report Feb 71

OPERATION REPORT 609 RF COY
AO - Eastings 52,56 Northings 62,65

1. At 0600 hrs on the 20 Feb, 609 Coy received a warning order. From 0900 hrs to 0930 hrs the OC conducted an equipment inspection, 18 claymore mines, 2000 rds. 7.62 linked belt. At 1000 hrs rations were issued. At approx 1015 hrs the Coy received the operation order, a final check of equipment was made and the advisors were informed that there would be 69 members of 609 Coy going on the operation.
2. The Coy departed their compound at 1035 hrs by vehicle and crossed the start point YS 524614 at 1045 hrs. From here Coy conducted a sweep north to grid 525630, (object 1). After setting up a good perimeter defense the Coy had lunch at this loc. At 1400 hrs the Coy continued the operation, sweeping NE to grid 528648, (objective 2). The Coy then moved E to grid 537647 (objective 3) arriving there at 1600 hrs. The Coy harboured here for the night, the harbour being completed by 1700 hrs. The Coy Comd then received orders by radio from Sector that he was to remain at this location until he received further orders. He was also informed that the G2 Intel Pl would meet him at this loc the next day.
3. On 22 Feb at approx 1330 hrs the Intel Pl was inserted into the area by helicopter, and commenced to move towards 609 Coy. Radio contact was made and the exact location of 609 Coy was passed to the Intel Pl. Last radio contact between the two elements was approx 2 to 3 minutes before the shooting commenced. During this last radio contact the Intel Pl was informed that they would shortly sight his (609) forward elements, 609 Coy pers were also informed that they should sight the forward members of the Intel Pl within minutes and not to shoot. When the Intel Pl sighted the SE elements of 609 Coy, they commenced firing immediately with M16 and M79. The men that were fired on then stood up and tried to signal, to stop firing. This did not help. Smoke grenades were then thrown by the Coy and the firing increased. The firing lasted for approx 12 minutes and during this time not one round was fired in return by 609 Coy, 6 members of 609 Coy seriously wounded and a Medevac was called in and completed by 1605 hrs. At this time the Intel Pl returned to BARIA.

At 1620 hrs the Coy moved South to grid 535635 where they received orders to remain for the night. At 0800 hrs the next morning the operation was terminated and the Coy was ordered to the pickup point at grid 533614 arriving there at 0850 hrs.

Summary.

In the MATT elements opinion, 609 Coy operated extremely well, They travelled well during the day using good dispersion and at night, noise and light discipline were excellent. All sentries appeared to be awake and very much alert. The OC kept his men well informed and were in control of them at all times. Both the Coy Comd and his XO were very co-operative with the MATT elements.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 3 to
Annex D to
AATTV Report Feb 71

REPORT BY CAPT L. OPIE
TEAM LEADER MATT 3

General

1. Following some VC activity along Route 326 during and after TET, company size patrols were instituted in the land-cleared area between Route 44 and the Long Hais on the Eastern side. With the arrival of the Heavy Weapons Pl and 1 Coy from AP SUOI NGHE, the battalion was complete for the first time since late Sep (when the clearing of Route 44 south of the Long Hais commenced).
2. The bty of 155mm guns made a brief stop in the bn AO prior to the commencement of "High Point" operation. Observed shoots were conducted using 7 RAR Possum (following the taking of ground fire by VR helicopter 13 Feb) with 155mm guns and RAAF helicopter against LONG DAT HQ and dam area YS4750 with NGF from USS Dehaven. Also 1 ATF tanks conducted a daylight shoot.
3. An airstrike with bombs, miniguns and napalm by 2 x F100 was conducted on 24 Feb against suspected OP YS471516 (A Hoi Chanh from C1/D445 had reported that a daylight OP was continually manned and from this, among other things, movements of all APs were observed. He also stated that 302 Bn compound had been recced with a view to attack by fire at an unknown date).
4. The battalion commander shows increasing reluctance to remain overnight and apart from some Coy OCs, very few officers remain in the area. 14 VRs of the AO, Long Hai tracks were conducted using Sector, RAAF & 7 RAR helicopters.

VC Incidents

5. During ni 26/27 Jan VC erected flag, banner, strung letters addressed to PF/RF Hoi My and 302 Bn and left leaflets in Vietnamese and English incl. 8 Points Peace Plan along Route 326 at YS495556. The display was dismantled by MATT and items handed to Sector S2 after Districts had examined them.
6. Ni 30/31 Jan 2 x 105mm shells set up for remote command detonation along Route 326 were found at YS 489556. Shells were placed against concrete culvertsside facing road and buried, possibly earlier, but wire had been placed overnight, running back to treeline approx 300m. In view of 155mm arty raid conducted 24 Jan and expected repeat one week later, it is probable that the ammo vehs were targets.
7. On 5 Feb 302/3 Coy patrol accompanied by MATT had a VC squad followed up rear of patrol and initiated contact with B40, and SA fire. Results: two tps slightly WIA. See After Action Report attached at Attachment 1.
8. On 12 Feb a Chicom anti tank mine found on Route 44 by 302/3 at YS 477488. It was destroyed. ^{was}
9. On 18 Feb at 0540 hrs VC (resupply) squad attacked 4 Coy AP at YS 485545 with B40 and SA. Results: 1 friendly KIA. Sweep revealed 1 bag containing 10 kg rice, 1 bag fruit, cigarettes. The ambush personnel were badly sited and asleep.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../ 2

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 2 -

10. On 13 Feb at 1630 hrs 1 member 302/3 detonated M16 mine YS480530 while attempting to remove after finding. Results 1 KIA 1 WIA.

Contacts

11. The following is a summary of contacts:

- a. 5 Feb. See Attachment 1.
- b. 6 Feb. 302/1 vic AP SUOI NGHE 1130 hrs contacted VC party and engaged.

Results: 3 KIA
1 WIA CIA (female)
1 SKS captured

- c. 9 Feb. At 1725 hrs 302/4 patrol contacted 1 VC YS475552. En withdrew to E. This was unforeseen as contact was made by lead man who was operating mine detector with no security. Coy had received orders to return to Route 326 to secure 155mm guns.

- d. 16 Feb. At 1900 hrs 1/302 rear party from operation contacted 1 squad VC armed with 2 x B40, 3xAK47 and 1 SKS while on way to set up AP.

Results: 1 VC (NGHIA, member C1/D445) KIA
1 B40 and 2 rds and documents CIA.

Unconfirmed report from agent states that 10 VC KBA 6 WBA following 155mm fire in retaliation to VR helicopter taking hits from ground fire 13 Feb.

Operations

12. The following is a summary of operations for the month:

- a. Prior to Dong Khoi 302/3 and 302/2 were conducting coy size patrols from the sand dunes up to the 53 Northing. OC 302/2 caused so much trouble with his HQ and MATT that he was removed and replaced by the Bn XO on 10 Feb. It is understood the former OC has been taken into custody at Sector.

- b. Troops from PFTC LONG HAI allegedly crossed the Long Hais between 52, 53 Northing on 10 Feb. They appeared unannounced and uncleared in the midst of our AO. MATT radioed Sector and DPSA flew out to identify. This averted a near disaster as the FO was prepared to fire and clearance was given. The CO and bn officers did not ever appear to be interested, refusing the loan of the Intel Squad to conduct a recce with SA.

- c. Additional MATT members, radios, maps etc were obtained to enable each of the 4 coys to have representation for Dong Khoi commencing 15 Feb and on 14 Feb all info regarding arty, gunships, medevac, VR support was given to the CO. However, on 15 Feb, he refused to provide guides to coys, stated he did not need advisers and was quite capable of calling arty if required. Since this was the units first foray

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../ 3

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 3 -

into the Long Hais since 22 Jun 70. SA obtained 7 RAR Possum and attempted to locate the coys.

302/1 reported at YS 455555 and leading E was at YS 460560 leading SW

302/4 reported at YS 466535 leading E could not be located

302/3 which did not follow route on op order was lying under trees and around ruins along the back road from LANG PHUOC HAI. Bn Comd after watching the Possum for some 10 minutes, ordered the bn 81mm to fire in its path as it completed VR and headed back towards the Horshoe. With the conclusion of Phase 1, 18 1800 Feb, coys returned to locs but CO has refused to alter ambush locs. 2nd phase ended 22 1500 Feb. On 19 Feb, MATT accompanied a 302/4 AP and the OC insisted on a change; however for the last 4 nights of the reporting period, APs have remained unaltered despite daily objections by SA.

Artillery Support

13. With the departure of the ATF FO and party on 18 Feb and the difficulty of getting through to the S3 that the guns at Dat Do (now AN NGAI) belong to Sector, not District and the failure of Sector to clear grids to shoot, the Vietnamese faith has dissipated. It was hoped that the arrival of a VN FO/LO would result in an improvement, but this officer was so shocked at the conditions (he thought 302 Bn was quartered in Baria) prevailing in this area that he departed for Baria after a one night stay.

Personalities

14. With the exception of 3 Coy, the unit coy officers are at their best level for months. The previous XO of 2 Coy (2Lt LE, ex JWS Kota Tinggi students) has returned from a Coy Comd's course as OC.

15. The XO, useless in camp has performed well in the field (1 Coy) Lt Thinh (ex Rangers IV Corps, ex 609 RF Coy) continues to perform well. Even 3 Coy, once removed from their rest area on the beach work reasonably well.

16. The CO has spent a total of seven nights in camp over the past month. After a trip to Saigon at the weekend, he remained in Baria and pays daily visits of approx 1 hr to the compound.

17. Capt Hung, S3 continues to be the workhorse of the unit but is anticipating a move to his home province.

18. The S2 has not been seen since his second visit approximately 2 weeks ago.

Conclusion

19. With the 7 RAR presence removed from the MAY TAO area and the 3 Bde 1st US Air low ops Southward in the NUI BE area, combined with agent reports it is more than probable that D445 will return to the LONG HAIIs.

20. The present strength of C1 at 25 and LONG DAT at 35 plus associated groups for a total of about 100, would indicate that now is the time to take the Long Hais rather than wait for the remainder of D445. VRs of the track pattern show that there are virtual highways running along the Eastern flats with tracks running off to HOI MY, Route 326 and DINH CO. The fear of mines does not exist in the minds of the troops, who have found them (the only mine casualty since Jun 70 was caused by incautious tampering) without the aid of mine detectors and if told to do so, will go into the hills. As with real estate, the price

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

DSA COMMENTS

22 Feb 71

I have reviewed the comments by SSG GRIFFEN and they co-incide with the information I have been able to gather concerning the 609 RF/Intel Pl incident. At 1630 hrs 20 Feb I was radioed by TOC that their Intel Pl would air assault into grid 549675 at 1330 hrs 21 Feb. At 1145 hrs 21 Feb this team was advised by TOC, that this air assault would be conducted on Watson Nomad frequency 57.30. I advised the MATT pers with 609 Coy to monitor the insertion, and be prepared to mark their position with smoke in case of armed helicopter fire during the insertion.

At the first call on the radio (at about 1545 hrs 21 Feb) concerning the contact, I could not locate any Vietnamese Officer in the compound. The District Chief came to my quarters at bout 1930 hrs and I discussed the mishap with him. He stated that 609 Coy knew about the scheduled linkup, but the Intel Pl did not. I find this hard to comprehend, since the Intel Pl moved directly the location 609 Coy. This could not have been done unless someone had informed them where to go, and logically why to go there.

The MATT pers with 609 Coy also stated in their report that radio contact was established between the two elements, shortly after the insertion.

I feel that the of 609 Coy conducted themselves with a great deal of restraint and discipline, when they did not return fire while being subjected to intense fire for some 12 minutes. This is an indication of the strong control exercised over the Unit by it's leaders. The Intel Pl was advised to depart 609 Coy area very quickly before stunned disbelief turned to intensive rage.

Although the 609 medic must have done a fine job, I see no reason to recommend him for any type of American award. The entire incident was between Vietnamese Units and no enemy element was involved. I will however strongly recommend to the Vietnamese that the Coy medic be appropriately recognised through Vietnamese channels.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Attachment 1 to
Appendix 3 to
Annex D to
AATTV Report Feb 71

3/302 RE BN AFTER ACTION REPORT
BY WO2 PENNINGTON

1. At 0820, 3/302 moved out from 499521, after about 500m we came across what appeared to be a marked mine field at 495523. We proceeded through objective 1 (486534) without mishap but when we were at approx 485530 smoke from a cooking fire was spotted at 473530, the coy comd requested 81mm mortar from Bn HQ also permission to move into that area, both requests were not granted. We moved through Objective 2 (482522) where after a further 200m we stopped for lunch. The rear squad were hit by 2 rounds B40 and several bursts of small arms fire, a further 2 B40 rounds were fired into our general area, there was also 1 M79 round fired within 30m, the origin of this round is unknown. Suspected locations of en, was approx 472533, 465536 and 475535. 3 Coy retaliated with M79-M16 and got support from Bn 81mm mortar and 105mm from Horse Shoe. Results of contact was 2 WIA from fragments from B40, both slight. Sweep not permitted from Bn, told to return to Bn HQ. Suspected route of withdrawal was W. suspect squad size. Many foot prints seen, incl children and female.

2. On returning back to Bn HQ more sign of foot prints were seen. Also at 485555 was seen approx six 1 man fighting pits dug next to paddy bunds, close by was a sign similar to a mine notice, skull and cross bones also the letter C in top left hand corner.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 4 to
Annex D to
AATTV Report Feb 71

REPORT BY WO2 R. DAVIE
TEAM LEADER MATT 5

1. This month has seen the departure of WO2 H. Wright to Nui Dat, the arrival of WO2 G. Paxton as Team 2i/c, Cpl. G. Fudge has also joined the Team and is currently attending the Advisers course at Di An. The months activities have been greatly disrupted by Tet, and things are now back to normal, we feel that all Advisers who are in MATT's should be introduced to Vietnamese whisky early in their tour to prepare them for the Tet festivities, or else they should plead their religion forbids them to drink, probably the wisest course. An attempt has been made in Hoi My to commence the training of PSDF again, so far no progress has been made, they say they are all trained, including the support elements, this is utter nonsense, further efforts will be made. The PF platoon in this village will commence refresher training on the 1 March, also the two platoons in Phuoc Hai. The PSDF training of the combat units in Phuoc Hai is now near its completion, training of the support element is still dubious at this time. The standard of the PSDF has certainly improved greatly and nightly patrolling is being carried out within the hamlets, whilst one element is held in reserve by the Dep for Security at the market place, normal turn out is about 45 to 50 each night. These patrols also have two to three PF with them. The refugees have now either left the area or been absorbed into the village. It is proposed that Cpl Grey runs a one week basic course on mines and demolitions for 3 members from our two companies, and one member from each of our three PF platoons. Our operational area has now been extended to include all terrain east of Route 44 to the Song Rai and south of Route 23. Dai Uy Tam has now returned to Dat Do District HQ, and Group is once more commanded by Dai Uy Liem. We have completed our new septic tank toilet and are now waiting for the delivery of our pre-fab toilet to complete the program.

I feel that our training of PSDF in this area is drawing to a close, once we have re-trained the PF, our work will once more be mainly as operational advisers.

2. 124 Company. Still working well, however, it is being penalised for its ability. It is being used mainly as static security because they are apparently keeping the VC out of Phuoc Hai. The Company Commander feels his unit will stagnate if it does not participate in Company sized operations more frequently, I agree, I have spoken to the Group Commander and he is going to increase the frequency of the operations, this applies to all units in the Group.

3. 189 Company. Ali Baba and his 95 thieves still swashbuckle in their own inimitable way. This could be a good Company if the Coy Comd and his 2i/c were booted out, there is apparent hope for the soldiers if they have firm leaders. Right now, they are hopeless, I can find no other words to describe this ill disciplined rabble.

4. 35 PF Platoon Hoi Ky. This unit is under strength, it has had one of its members blown up on their own booby traps within the compound. Training will commence soon.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

...../2

5. 36 and 63 PF Platoon Phuoc Hai. These two units have shown well this month and will soon commence training.

Village and Area Personalities

6. Captain Liem. Group Commander. I would hesitate to say that he is popular with his subordinates, however, he does have their respect, with one exception. He is quite demanding of his units within reason and keeps himself apart from his unit Commanders. He is keen to mount frequent and prolonged operations, but, Sector often alters these well planned operations until they almost become farcical. He accepts advice from the Team and we enjoy a good relationship with him.
7. Captain Thung. 189 Company. I have already made comments on this man's ability in the previous paragraph. He has very little knowledge if any, of navigation. Discipline is poor and he hates the Group Commander. I feel this is because the Group Commander makes him do some work, this he dislikes, he'd sooner be in Vung Tau. He has recently made Captain and it's gone to his head, I have heard he is asking to have me removed from the Team, he now wants the team to work with him alone, and feels he is insulted because, I, the team leader work with a Lt, whilst he, a Captain has to put up with the team 2i/c. I also feel he objects to the fact that I work with the Group Commander and get along so well with him.
8. Duong Van Hoa. Dep. for Security, Phuoc Hai. This man has shown himself to be very weak in his position of PSDF leader, he has little or no control and seems to be afraid of asserting himself. The Village Chief has said several times that he will have him replaced, he's still with us.

9. VC Incidents.

The following is a Summary of VC incidents in the month:

- 28 January. 5-6 VC fired on by ambush of 35PF at GR 503562, neg results.
- 1 February Grenade incident at Hoi My, Bdr Cavanagh WIA.
- 4 February 2 VC fired on by ambush of 36 PF at GR 519533, neg results.
- 5 February PSDF and MATT 5 recovered a 30 -40ls Chicom mine from under school at GR 512543. Mine rigged for command det
- 6 February PSDF and MATT 5 located one grenade and two M16 mines from same area as previous day's incident.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 5 to
Annex D to
AATTV Report

Feb 71.

REPORT BY WO2 M. MUIR
TEAM LEADER MATT 6

TET 1971.

1. During this period 25 Jan - 1 Feb 71 MATT 6 supported both 701 and 384 RF Coys. An element of the MATT team was located with each of the Coys. Negative contacts in either Coy during the TET period.

Operations

2. In the period 2 - 25 Feb 71 384 RF Coy conducted 3 Major operations and 1 hamlet search, no contact was made on any of these operations.

3. Operation period 2 - 5 Feb 71. 384 RF Coy with two members MATT 6, WO2 Rutherford and Cpl Ronaldson plus two members of MATT 11 and a liaison party from 2 RAR, conducted an operation in the Nui Thi, Nui Dinh area, centre of Mass YS 335635. At GR YS 330645 Coy located an old ruin with 500 metres of road laid, road ran from east to west. Coy also located at GR YS 323643 a well used track running from NE to SW to a village at the foot hills. This op was planned jointly by RF Coy Comd and 2 RAR, beneficial in this respect because it allowed the Coy Comd to direct this troops at a distance.

4. The next operations was conducted in the Long Phuoc area during the period 10-14 Feb 71. Coy was accompanied by WO2 MUIR and Cpl Ronaldson. Three hides were located at GR YS 444635 hides were very old but still usable. No sign of recent use was found. Found in the first hide were 100 pieces of assorted eating bowls and 4 old cooking pots. At GR YS 455654 Coy located enemy tunnel system, tunnel was old but in good repair no sign of recent use. Tunnel dimensions length 80 metres, width 1ft to 3ft 6ins 0'head cover 2ft 6ins to 4ft. The main tunnel had two branches one 24 metres long and the other 5 metres long. Coy Comd requested a Combat engineer team, the team came from 1 Fd Sqn RAE. They successfully destroyed tunnel.

5. In the period 19- 23 Feb 71 Coy conducted an operation in the Nui Thi area centre of Mass YS 380650, Coy was accompanied by WO2 MUIR & Cpl Walker MATT 6. Under Comd for the operation was 577 PF pl and one platoon of PRU. Negative contacts resulted but Coy had two sightings the first at GR YS 374654 the other at GR YS 378649. Artillery was requested by Coy Comd and was fired with negative results.

6. A hamlet search was conducted of AP Dong (Hoa Long). Centre of Mass YS 424641; with negative results, WO2 Muir and Cpl Walker accompanied the Coy.

...2/

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

-2-

PF Trg.

7. The RF MATT assisted by MATT 6 trained 51 PF pl 15 - 22 Feb 71. They are at present training 8 PF platoon. The RF MATT are doing a good job, they are **keen** and willing to work.

Future Activities.

8. 384 PF Coy has **keen** warned for operations 26 Feb-3 March 71.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 6 to
Annex D to
AATTV Report Feb 71

REPORT BY WO2 R NEAGLE
TEAM LEADER MATT7

23 Jan Feb

1. 3/15 Gp HQ and RF Coys operations curtailed to Route 15 and Hamlet and Village Security - TET Period.
2. Matts have secured extra claymores and flares for compound defences. Matts limiting movement by road and working on Matt security in compound.

27 Jan 71

3. At approx 1515 hours sound of shooting at Phuoc Loc Hamlet. Two bursts of firing - second at approx 1520 hours. Investigation proved it was between 180 Arty Bn C Pl and II PF Platoon. No casualties. Investigatory hearing held at Ong Trinh by 3/15 Gp Comd Major Dong. Three soldiers of Arty Platoon apprehended by PF Platoon and three M-16 rifles captured. Weapons recovered by 3/15 Gp. Soldiers had been drinking in Hamlet.

28 Jan 71

4. US Special Forces inserted in AO VIRGINIA. IO det and rear link at 3/15 Gp Hq.

29 Jan 71

5. Day Op with 10 PF Platoon. Three Matt members went with Platoon. Well trained Platoon. Negative result.

30 Jan 71

6. Day Op with II PF Platoon. Three Matt members with platoon. Negative result.
7. US Special Force IO det departed area.
8. 2300 hours report that member 386 RF Coy Cay Diep compound shot in foot. Soldier returned to 3/15 Gp Hq. "Dusted off" 0300 hours.

31 Jan 71

9. Setting out compound defence 386 RF Coy (Claymores) at Ong Trinh.
10. New FSB (US) 3 x 155 mm and 2 x Dusters set up at GR 272662. FSB DORA.

1 Feb 71

11. Approx twenty VC entered My Xuan Hamlet from WEST and took eleven weapons from PSDF. Time 1900 - 2100 hours. No casualties. Shots fired by VC on withdrawal. Two VC recognised as Tam Chon and Hoang Giang. North Vietnamese was heard to be spoken.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../2

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 2 -

12. At 0630 hrs a body was found at GR 302612. Gunshot wound in head. Body identified as 56/801621 Huynh Cuong.

13. Soldier 386 RF Coy Cay Diep Compound shot through arm brought to this location. SIW. Medevac by road after treatment by MATT's Medic.

2 Feb 71

14. Discussion with Coy Offr 386 RF Coy over operational and training problems in past operations and training required to counter these problems.

3 Feb 71

15. Advising on Compound Defence improvement with 386 RF Coy Ong Trinh.

16. Discussion with Coy Comd 385 RF Coy to formulate plan for future operation.

5 Feb 71

17. 386 RF Coy commence four day Search Operation in AO 2466. Two Matt members with Coy.

6 Feb 71

18. 386 RF Coy Search Operation terminated by 3/15 Gp Hq. Too much difficulty crossing tidal creeks in AO. Coy needs training in basic flotation drills.

7 Feb 71

19. Matt members recondition equipment after operation. Coy debrief.

8 Feb 71

20. At approx 1830 hours at Chu Hai Hamlet GR 320610 six civilians were arrested by VC and taken to GR323603 - 310600 - 308600 consecutively. VC spoke to civilians and released them. VC wore mixed dress of uniforms and carried mixed weapons. VC went away in boats.

9 Feb 71

21. 0600 hours a member of 386 RF Coy patrol returning from AP detonated an M 14 mine. Soldier wounded in foot - 1st and 2nd toes nearly blown off and remainder of front of foot badly lacerated. GR 263678.

22. Visit of Comd AFV and Comd AATTIV.

10 Feb 71

23. 386 RF Coy commence seven day Search Operation in AO 2772. Three MATT members with coy. Ceased 160900 hours. Negative result.

24. Visit CO 2 RAR with Gp Comd to discuss future Operations with 386 RF Coy by Air Mobile Insert with 2 RAR Liaison Team and Matts.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../3

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 3 -

11 Feb 71

25. 252 RF Coy commence Search Operation in AO 2374. One MATT member from MATT 7 went with MATT II on this Operation. Negative result.

13 Feb 71

26. Drunken soldier from 386 RF Coy Ong Trinh shot himself in forearm with M-16 rifle. Not serious. Medevac by Vietnamese road ambulance.

14 Feb 71

27. 385 and 252 RF Coys commence four day Search Operations in AOs 3063 and 2676. Ceased 170700 hours. Negative results.

17 Feb 71

28. A soldier of 386 RF Coy Ong Trinh handling an unfamiliar weapon 9 MM SMG (OWEN) accidentally fired a short burst, an other soldier standing close by was grazed by two rounds near right Knee - Not serious. Medevac by Vietnamese system by road ambulance.

29. Debrief of 386 RF Coy Operation. Coys efficiency is improving with MATT on the job training in the field. Coy's main faults is in command level lacking experience.

20 Feb 71

30. Visit of CO 2 RAR with Gp Comd Major Dong to discuss future operations in area.

31. 386 RF Coy commence three day Search Operation in AO 2965. Two MATT members with Coy. Negative results. Soldiers of Coy still improving but main problem is with command elements. Inexperience in basic map reading and navigation.

23 Feb 71

32. 386 RF Coy cease operation. Negative result.

25 Feb 71

33. Air Mobile Training 386 RF Coy.

34. B53 Special Forces return to AO Virginia for three day operation.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 7 to
Annex D to
AATTV Report Feb 71

REPORT BY WO2 N. ROBERTS
TEAM LEADER MATT 8

General

1. As from the 28 Jan 71 the MATT team has been involved in training PF Pls and going on operations with the two RF Coys in this area. On the 6th Feb Cpl's J. Anderson & Cpl A. Skowronski were moved to MATT 15 at Long Son.

Operations

2. 10 to 21 Feb. The following is a list of operations for the period:
 - a. Five day operations with 612 RF Coy and two Ambushes
 - b. One day air mobile operation and two normal day operation with 772 RF Coy.
 - c. Four day operations with 47 PF Pl.
 - d. One day operations with 31 PF Pl.

there were two MATT members on each of these operations

Training.

3. Training with the PF Pls finish on 26 Feb 71. The standard reached was fair. More practical patrolling and map reading is required by 46 & 31 PF Pls. On each of the days of training approx 16 - 22 members' turn up for training.

Break Down	47 PF	average 21 soldiers attended		
	46	average 18	"	"
	31	average 16	"	"

47 PF Pl

4. The following lists 47 PF Pl activities:
 - a. Contact with enemy One at GR. 629711 and one VC WIA
 - b. Three woodcutters who were with VC. were detained and returned to District.
 - c. A Camping spot for approx 10 people at GR YS 662651. Found were , burnt out batteries coffee and rice. Found also at 662646, six M79 rounds in good condition (RDs Marking Red & Green)
5. The Aust MATT team are having some problems with VN MAT. The main reason for this is I think caused by VN MAT team leader not liking the Xuyen Moc area. Thus is trying hard to up set the Aust Team. At this stage he is not doing too bad at it. I have had words with the VN S3

SECRET

....2/

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 2 -

the DSA the DC and think we have straightened out the problems.

6. It has been found that 1 ATF in their pending ops required the RF coys in some phases. Although I have been told by 1 ATF that MATT members would be required on these ops. The DSA as yet, has not been informed.

7. Also in ref to RF and their last lot of ops, it was found that unless the MATT or their Coy Commander went on the operation the people involved did not go to their AO.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONL

Appendix 8 to
Annex D to
AATTV Report

Feb 71

REPORT BY WO2 G. MILLINGTON
TEAM LEADER MATT 9

955 RF Coy

1. In the period the coy has conducted 52 ambushes and daily village security patrols. Negatives results in all incidents.
2. The compound defence has been improved with the construction of a berm. However further improvements to the perimeter wire have been hampered by the Coy being involved in Pol War Trg and security of HOI-MY compound on two occasions when the Coy (from that location went on operations. During construction of Berm. a further eight M16 mines were discovered, apparently they had been placed in a hole and covered over. They were in a safe condition.
3. The village PSDF still only patrol one Hamlet LOI CHI then return to their compound. With the removal of the PF platoon to DAT DO. the patrolling of the village would be at a minimum. There being only approx 28 members of the PSDF in Phuoc Loi.

PSDF Trg Phuoc Thanh

4. The training of the PSDF of this village commenced on the 10 Feb 71. The RF MAT involved in the training are of a high standard and understand the subjects to be taught.
5. The continued late arrival of members to be trained suggests on alteration to the training syllabus for future courses. The commencement timing was originally 1800 hrs. It has progressed to be as late as 1840 hrs. On the 23 Feb 71 it had not even commenced by 1850 hrs.
6. The overall standard of marksmanship of this PSDF element is average with outstanding marksmen. They have had two range practices.
7. For the two periods conducted nightly for the first period an average of 28 persons attended for the remaining period an average of 35 persons.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 9 to
Annex D to
AATTV Report Feb 71

REPORT BY WO1 B.G. ROE
TEAM LEADER MATT IV

1. RF Training. The MATT has continued to increase training with 586 RF Coy. Commencing Mon 22 Feb, 10 pers daily were taken to the LONG HAI Range and fired the following weapons:
 - a. M16
 - b. M60
 - c. M79
 - d. M72
 - e. threw 2 M26 grenades
 - f. fired 1 Claymore per group
2. The MATT Engineer has on numerous occasions been called upon for advise on compound and bunker defences.
3. Further training activities for the company are planned and the MATT is receiving full co-operation from the Coy Comd.
4. RF Operations. The MATT accompanied 586 RF Coy on two operations during the preceding month. Details are as follows:
 - a. 4 days, centre of AO 445 582, WO1 ROE and Cpl WALKER accompanied, results negative.
 - b. 5 days (returned to compound nightly), centre of AO 440 615 WO2 DARLINGTON and Cpl WALKER accompanied.
5. PF Training. MATT 14 have been training 22, 50, 54 and 64 PF platoons since Oct 70. These platoons are all in LONG DIEN VILLAGE and the training is always in conjunction with the PSDF syllabus. The main type of training is ambushes and Village security as they accompany PSDF on these activities.
6. PF Operations. The MATT accompanied PF on one operation during the previous month. Details are as follows:
 - a. 2 days, 26-27-28 PF Platoons, centre of AO 420 525, WO2 DARLINGTON and Cpl BECK accompanied. Results negative.
7. PSDF. PSDF training continues to be MATT 14s main work load. During the previous month the following training has been undertaken by this MATT:
 - a. Initial training Hamlets LONG TAM and LONG TOAN, 8 Feb - 6 Mar 71
 - b. Continuation training AN NHUT VILLAGE, 8 Feb - 20 Feb 71.
 - c. Continuation training Hamlets LONG TAN and LONG LAM, 1 Feb - 6 Feb 71.
 - d. Specialist training, 1-2 members from each Hamlet PSDF Inter Team in LONG DIEN VILLAGE, 8 Feb to 24 Feb 71.
8. Since this MATT commenced PSDF in LONG DIEN Village the strength of all inter teams has steadily increased. Range practices are held each Sat at LONG HAI Range and on SAT 13 Feb over 120 members fired. These came from 3 Inter Teams.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../2

SECRET

-2-

9. The VN RF MAT has been working with MATT 14 during the previous month and have earned high praise from this MATT and village officials. A letter of commendation has been forwarded to the Province Chief by Comd MATT 14 for their efforts in the training of AN PHUT Village PSDF.

10. The complete training and continuation training of PSDF in LONG DIEN Village will be completed by the end of March. Plans for further specialized training of these PSDF teams by MATT 14 include the following:

- a. Inter Team Leader Refresher Course - 2 weeks.
- b. Advanced training for Hardcore PSDF - 2 weeks.
- c. Continuation Retraining of all inter teams.
- d. Weekly Range practices.

11. General. The MATT continues to maintain good relations with the compound officers and the officials from Village and District. This is a big advantage in regards to organization of training.

12. The plans for the forthcoming month are; PSDF training will continue to be our main task with a big increase in training activities with 586 RF Coy and co-operation in training and ambushes/hamlet security with PF/PSDF combined.

SECRET

AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 10 to
Annex D to
AATTV Report Feb 71

REPORT BY WO2 J. TAYLOR
TEAM LEADER MATT 11

General

1. During the above period this team was involved with a four day operation with 384 RF Coy, a four day operation with 385 RF Coy, a one day operation with 252 RF Coy, 10 one day operations with PF pls, destruction of blinds at RMK, vehicle service at Vung Tau, a Dust off of WO Maher and shift of location.
2.

<u>Operations</u>	<u>Results</u>
4 days with 384 RF Coy	Negative
4 " " 385 RF Coy	"
1 " " 252 RF Coy	"
2 " " 4 PF pl	"
3 " " 5 PF pl	1 PF wia
5 " " 17 PF pl	Negative
3. Demolitions. 1 x 8 in, 1 x 155, 2 x 105 and 1 x 81 blinds were destroyed in situ at the RMK quarry.
4. Dust Off. WO Maher was dusted off from an operation with 385 RF Coy, cause suspected scorpion bite, he returned to duty the following day.
5. Shift of Location. We are currently involved in this shift which will take longer than first thought; reasons being R & R R & C, one member at DI-AN, lack of materials and no carpenters kit.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/TZ EYES ONLY

Appendix 11 to
Annex D to
AATTV Report Feb 71

REPORT BY WO2 L. OSBORNE
ADVISER PHUOC TUY RD CADRE

1. Training

- a. A refresher course for Team and Deputy Leaders was held 7 Feb 71 to 18 Feb 71.
- b. Members detached to Village councils to assist in Village Self Development had a three day refresher course period 15 - 17 Feb 71.
- c. The RD Cadre have been assisting in the training of PSDF in conjunction with MATT Teams.

3. Civic Action

- a. During the reporting period two houses for the poor have been completed and two more are under construction. Materials for these houses was supplied by 1 Aust CA Unit.
- b. A school for the refugees at PHU MY was opened on 15 Feb 71. The teachers for this school are supplied by RD Cadre Team 4.
- c. 100 children from AN NGAI and TAM PHUOC Villages were taken to the beach at VUNG TAU, great assistance was given by members of HQ Coy 1 ATF. This picnic was held on 14 Feb 71.
- d. Minor Medcaps have been held twice a week in all villages where the RD Cadre are deployed.

4. Intelligence Reports. There has been a great increase of intelligence reports from the RD Team during the month of February.

5. Morale. The morale of all members is extremely high at this stage. There have been no cases of AWOL or desertion this month.

6. Deployment RD Cadre 1971

- a. Set out below is the proposed plan for RD Cadre 1971:

30 x 10 man Teams
5 x District Leaders
20 x Mobile Instructors
25 x Man Control Group or HQ
82 x Man Detached to VSD
432 Total of 432 RD Cadre.


- b. There are 5 Districts and 22 Villages in this Province. Each village will have 1 x 10 man Team and there will be 8 Mobile Teams for deployment where considered necessary. Each District will have a District Leader plus 4 Mobile Instructors.

- c. Attached is the proposed establishment of a 10 man Team.

SECRET
AUST/TZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

A 10 MAN RD CADRE TEAM



SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Annex E to
AATTV Report Feb 71

REPORT BY LT COL J.W. SULLIVAN
AUSTRALIAN TEAM LEADER JWTC

1. The important event which occurred in Feb was the commencement of the initial Students' Course. It began on Mon 9 Feb instead of 2 Feb because of the lack of student numbers, and the delay of one week increased the number attending by 16. The proximity of the starting date to 'TET' celebrations was a Vietnamese error and was not caused by the Australian advisers.
2. An assessment of the course cannot be made but a number of observations have been made and these will be included in this report.

Training

3. There are a number of poor Vietnamese officer instructors posted to the Centre and these officers have detracted from the initial successes achieved in the past two weeks of the first course. The officers mentioned collectively and individually have the following faults:
 - a. Laziness. They will not work.
 - b. Indiscipline. On many occasions they have displayed an insolent manner and they will not obey orders.
 - c. Arrogance.
4. If some action is not taken to remove these men from the Centre I'm afraid we are not going to achieve much in the coming months. It is interesting to note that these officers have had the best officer (and pro-Australian) sacked from the Centre.

Commander

5. I have said twice before and I report the unfortunate fact that Lt Col PHAN VAN KIM is a grave weakness in the project. He is incompetent in every possible aspect of command and I believe that confidential steps should be taken to remove him. I say confidential because if he gets the slightest hint that I have initiated such action my value at the centre would end immediately.
6. Four examples of Kim's weaknesses are given to highlight the situation:
 - a. He is thoroughly unfit - he suffers from gout and arthritis and has not walked more than 50 metres at any one time since last November. This is not good enough in a School of this nature.
 - b. He shows no enthusiasm for work. On three occasions only has he been to observe the initial course.
 - c. His officers dislike him because he has his favourites and even the lazy officers referred to previously say Kim is lazy!

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

.../ 2

d. Whilst he will usually act upon advice he does nothing to establish a routine of work in the Centre. Hygiene is non existent despite many and varied approaches to establish even minimal standards. Kim recognises the need for such standards but the job of achieving them is far too demanding.

Building Programme

7. The construction of 60 brick married quarters has commenced and the planned date for completion is Jul/Aug 71. The partitioning of the buildings used as temporary married quarters is almost complete and the families are happy with the work being done.

8. Other work completed or commenced in Feb were:

- a. Grenade range. This should be completed by late Mar 71.
- b. VC Village. Clearing of the site has been completed and materials from Australia are expected in early Apr for the construction phase.
- c. Officers' Mess Kitchen and Ante Room. Renovation and re-painting. This should be completed in May/Jun 71 as it has a low priority. The work done so far has been of a self help nature being done mostly by the Australian Officers.
- d. Rifle ranges, lecture rooms, mines room, students kitchen and temporary water supply for married quarters need no further work at this stage and what has been done is a credit to 17 Constr Sqn.

Observations on Students and Initial Course

9. The following observations are of a general nature but they serve to highlight the problems confronting the Australian Advisers:

- a. The work is at too low a level. A "we've done it all before" attitude prevails although student practice usually reveals an abysmal lack of even the rudiments of military knowledge.
- b. "Skipping" through periods in a fraction of time allocated to subjects so that extra rest can be taken by staff and students alike. Three periods (each of 40 minutes) on patrolling and navigation were covered in 32 minutes by an "Instructor" despite the fact that his lesson plans had been prepared by the Australians, and had been accepted by the Vietnamese Training Staff as "No 1". On being questioned the "Instructor" explained his actions by stating that the students looked tired - the periods were the first three of the day!
- c. Rank is all that really matters. The senior students (lieutenants) are never questioned by Aspirant Instructors, only by Committee Chiefs, who are Captains. Consequently much of what is said at times is absolute rubbish. It is not always possible to have a Captain present or the Training Branch only has three and each is responsible for a different aspect of the course. More senior ranks are expected to arrive this week and the problem should then be solved.

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Annex F to
AATTV Report

Feb 71

REPORT BY MAJ J.A. BROWNE
SENIOR AUSTRALIAN ADVISER MR4

General

1. Over the reporting period three significant events occurred, they are:
 - a. Presentation to Maj Gen Truong on 2 Feb 71 of the progress of Night Operations Training.
 - b. Commencement of courses at two schools, Bac Lieu and Dong Tam on 22 Feb 71.

Detail.

2 As the training has covered five days only, no monthly reports have been required from the Field Teams.

3 The Field Teams over the past month have been employed in practical preparation for the courses. This preparation includes:

- a. Liason with Province Teams.
- b. Liason with Training Centers.
- c. Construction of living quarters.

Problem Areas.

4 A problem still exists with the provision of five new ¼ ton vehicles. Maj Gen Truong has personally stated that MR4 will provide these new jeeps for the Australian team. Until new vehicles arrive 4 ALC have agreed to provide vehicles to relieve the situation. One such vehicle has already been selected and necessary transfer action is currently proceeding.

5 It is felt that an officer is required at both schools. The practical reason for this being the rank level necessary to deal with support and command echelons allied with each school.


6. Attached at appendix 1 is "CORD, DMAC Field Overview for Month Ending 31 Jan 71".

SECRET
AUST/NZ EYES ONLY



CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
DELTA MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND
USAAG, IV CTZ. APO 96215



MACDMAC-CR-PP&R

12 February 1971

SUBJECT: CORDS/DMAC Field Overview for the Month Ending 31 January 1971
(RCS: MACCORDS 32.10)

Commander
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Attn: MACCORDS-RAD
APO 96222

1. Reference Joint Directive 2-69, Subject: MACCORDS Field Reporting System, dated 1 July 1969.
2. Submitted herewith is subject report. Appended thereto is Appendix A, incorporating staff comments on the actions required by the Province Advisory Teams.
3. The most urgent problems requiring Saigon level assistance are those surfaced in Appendix A to this report.

1 Inclosure
with Appendix a/s

Copies for:

COMUSMACV - 25
CG, DMAC - 5
SA, MR 1 - 5
SA, MR 2 - 5
SA, MR 3 - 5
DEPCORDS - 5
DCAT, 7th Inf Div (ARVN) - 1
DCAT, 9th Inf Div (ARVN) - 1
DCAT, 21st Inf Div (ARVN) - 1
SA, 44th STZ - 1
Each PSA, MR 4 - 1

John P. Vann for
HAL D. McCOWN
Major General, USA
Commanding

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED FROM
CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CORDS DMAC MILITARY REGION 4
(RCS: MACCORDS 32.10)
JANUARY 1971

I. (C) OVERALL STATUS OF PACIFICATION EFFORT

The most significant part of pacification in MR-4 during January is the momentum which the Special Transition Campaign generated. In the past, Christmas and Tet have caused a general slowdown in pacification and development. It took great efforts to get going again, and, as in 1970, substantial progress was made only in the second phase of the pacification and development campaign. The advent of the Special Transition Campaign with campaign goals, has served to markedly reduce the year-end slump. As a result, MR-4 expects to have a running start at the beginning of the 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Campaign.

II. (C) PRIORITY PACIFICATION PROGRAMS

a. Improve Territorial Security

1. The number of enemy-initiated incidents increased over the December total. There were no significant shifts in the per cent of incidents in the various TAORs, and the distribution of the type incidents has remained the same for the past several months. Harassments still account for approximately 84% of all incidents. Troop positions and outposts account for 75% of all targets engaged.

MILITARY INCIDENTS		IN KIA		WPNS CAPTD		GVN KIA		WPNS LOST		KILL RATIO	WPNS RATIO
#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	GVN:EN	GVN:EN
740	+10%	2928	+1%	1028	-21%	594	-10%	439	+15%	1:4.9	1:2.3

The 21st Division operation in the U Minh Forest has improved the security situation along the Can Gao Canal in Kien Giang. However, intelligence reports show that the enemy routes of supply from Cambodia have been reestablished as evidenced by the use of 107mm rockets and the observation of 122mm rockets by friendly agents. The 95A NVA regiment continues to dominate the "Dam-Dong Cung" (Lake) area in An Xuyen and maintains the LOC open between the U Minh and Nam Can.

The 9th Division operation in the Mo So Mountains has made little progress. The effort in the Three Sisters area has not appeared

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

to hamper enemy movement. Additionally, the Seven Mountains Campaign is progressing much slower than expected and the security situation at Nui Coto is tenuous. As a consequence, the resettlement of nine "N" hamlets in Tri Ton has not begun.

Delay in pacification of the Cang Long base area in Vinh Binh has resulted in a vigorous response by MG Truong who has directed an intensive campaign be undertaken there. With this impetus there should be improvement in February.

Dong Khoi and boundary interdiction operations continue to receive high level interest and, where implemented, show good results.

2. The status of RF Company and PF Platoon training and deployment is shown below:

	AUTHORIZED	IN TRAINING	TO BE RECRUITED	DEPLOYED	DESERTION RATE (PER 1000)
RF CO	625	21	3	601	6
PF PLT	3455	117	31	3307	5

The drop in desertion rates cannot be explained by advisors or counterparts.

It is possible that it represents administrative foot dragging in picking up desertion statistics.

Two RF companies from Dinh Tuong and one company from Vinh Binh were reallocated to An Xuyen.

Overrunning of outposts continues to be a serious problem. Nine (9) outposts were overrun in January with losses as shown below:

<u>M-16</u>	<u>M-79s</u>	<u>CAL. 45</u>	<u>M-60</u>	<u>60mm Mortar</u>	<u>HT-1</u>
99	6	4	1	1	5
<u>PRC-10</u>	<u>PRC-25</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL CASUALTIES</u>
4	2	52	16	21	89

Chuong Thien lost 4 outposts with Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, Vinh Long, Phong Dinh, and Kien Phong losing 1 each. All outposts were lost due to negligence or traitors; none was the result of a large scale enemy attack.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Advisors continue to press counterparts for more aggressive action in outpost construction, Operational Readiness Inspections, and night ambushing.

3. The Australian Night Operations Team inspected the pilot districts in each province. The results were disappointing. Over half of the Vietnamese officers who had been trained were assigned to other duties. Few Province Chiefs take night operations seriously. This continues to be one of the most significant tactical failures in the war. The Commanding General of IV Corps and advisors have directed a renewed thrust in the provinces, and special courses for the training of PF platoon and squad leaders are in the process of being established with classes to start on 22 February.

b. Protect the People from Terrorism

1. National Police reports showed a slight decline in terrorist activity in January as compared with December.

TERRORIST INCIDENTS		GVN OFFICIALS TARGETED		VCI KILLED		VCI RALLIED		VCI SENTENCED	
#	%	#	%	AB	C	AB	C	AB	C
104	-6%	41	+20%	547	853	274	384	247	64

2. During 1970, the Phung Hoang program in MR-4 was effective from a numerical standpoint. A total of 22,372 VCI were neutralized in all of RVN. MR-4 accounted for 9,162 or 41% of the nationwide total. The neutralizations were categorized as follows: killed - 4,003; rallied - 2,965; and sentenced - 2,194.

During recent months, emphasis has been placed on neutralizing province and district level VCI. Of the 1,068 VCI neutralized in January, 75 were province level and 174 district level for a total of 23% province and district neutralizations. This compares favorably with intelligence information which reports that 20% of the total VCI population is comprised of province and district level personnel.

4. A program has been developed to specifically target region level VCI. The Dinh Tuong PIOCC will focus on VC MR II personnel and the Phong Dinh PIOCC will target the MR III VCI. To insure accomplishment of this task, each of these PIOCCs will have one highly qualified PSB Redactor assigned to act as Region Cadre Case Officer and two highly qualified PSB Inspectors assigned as Secret Investigators. It has also been recommended that one U.S. Advisor, Warrant Officer Grade, MOS 971 A, be assigned to each of the PIOCCs to insure the best possible professional advice is rendered.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5. The replacement of non-counterintelligence trained advisors with CI trained officers and NCOs has greatly enhanced the advisory effort. It is expected that the program will reflect a corresponding improvement as all of the non-CI trained personnel are replaced. In addition, a concerted effort is being made to effect better coordination between all U.S. Advisor/agencies concerned with Phung Hoang, and between the corresponding Vietnamese agencies. Applicable intelligence data, "Blacklists, Wanted Posters", and Operations Plans must be exchanged and coordinated if the program is to achieve its objective.

6. Presently, there are 94 NPFF platoons in MR 4. However, only 78 are physically located in districts. Ten (10) are in Dalat for training and 6 are used at Province Headquarters. Since NPFF is one of the primary reaction forces available for Phung Hoang Operations, and in the event of a cease fire would be the primary reaction force still available, it is imperative that all of the 94 platoons be used to the maximum extent possible for Phung Hoang Operations. NPFF personnel must become experienced and must be immediately deployable.

7. The National Police manpower figure in MR 4 now stands at 21,045 broken down as follows: MR 4 HQ - 510, uniformed NP - 15,790, NPFF - 3741, Marine Police- 1004.

8. In Can Tho City, where the "Foot and Mobile" patrol has gone into effect, there has been a general acceptance by the local inhabitants. The people are beginning to come to the police and offer them information about known illegal activities and known "gangsters". A recent visit by MG Tran Thanh Phong, Director General National Police, revealed that he was most impressed by this type operation and has summoned the Regional Director and the Provincial Police Chief along with the Can Tho City Police Chief to Saigon to brief all of the other Military Region staffs on the patrol operation. This patrol procedure will probably be adopted in all of the other major urban areas in RVN.

c. Improve and Expand PSDF

1. Numbers of PSDF organized and trained in January are given below:

Organized		Trained		Weapons Issued		Support:
New	To Date	New	To Date	New	To Date	Combat/Ratio
7,010	1,598,354	15,640	1,218,376	-1,131	179,179	1 to 1.7

This month the number of combat PSDF has increased; this reflects in the support/combat ratio. KIT status is as follows: authorized, 5,260 teams; organized, 4,879; deployed, 4,537.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2. During the month of January there were 37 enemy-initiated incidents against PSDF. The number of incidents was an increase of 16 over the previous month of 21. This higher incident rate indicates continued successful targeting by the enemy. In addition to the figures given below, PSDF losses also included 30 WIA and 27 MIA.

MILITARY INCIDENTS		VC KIA		WPNS CPTD		PSDF KIA		WEAPONS LOST		KILL RATIO		WPNS RATIO	
#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	VC	PSDF	VC	PSDF
37	+76	46	+15	33	+94	25	-68	90	+543	2	1	1	2.7

There were 18 incidents reported of PSDF in fortified positions or co-located with PF as compared to 19 non-outpost type incidents. The VC continue to regard fortified positions as lucrative targets and continue their attacks on them. The VC continue targeting PSDF weapons as well as increasing attempts to destroy the morale of local village/hamlet supporters of PSDF.

3. Training certificates have been published and forwarded to Province and Training Centers, to be issued to all PSDF who have completed the required in-place and NTC training. PSDF is also undertaking a poster campaign in conjunction with PSYOPS to discourage PSDF members from occupying and congregating in static positions. Also, the PSDF is emphasizing intelligence gathering and reporting procedures through PSDF channels.

4. The PSDF program is considered one of the most important of the P&D program by the advisory effort. It is evident, however, that the GVN does not indorse this. In the judgment of the DEPCORDS, at least two thirds of the reported KITs exist only on paper. Of the weapons reported issued, it is estimated that at least one third are locked up in OPs or village offices at all times. Of the two thirds which may be in the hands of PSDF, it is estimated that only a third of these are used on duty at night. All of this has been brought to the attention of the IV MR Commander and his Province Chiefs.

d. Improve Local Government

1. Province Chiefs were changed in three provinces (Go Cong, Kien Hoa, Kien Phong) and two district chiefs were replaced in January. The Province Chief of Dinh Tuong removed four Village Councils and threatened to remove two others in an effort to improve performance on the part of local officials. Eight hamlet elections were held; four new elections in Bac Lieu and four reelections in Chau Doc. In Chau Doc two Village Officials were killed and in Chuong Thien three hamlet officials were killed in January.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2. The chart below shows the status of local government in MR 4 reported by RPDC.

	TOTAL	ELECTED	APPOINTED	NO GOVT
VILLAGE	752	725	15	12
HAMLET	4244	3914	233	97

Arrete #060 dated 16 January 1971, appointed three Deputy Province Chiefs as Deputy Mayors of the autonomous cities within their provinces (My Tho, Can Tho and Rach Gia). Reflecting the high national priority being placed on developing local self-sufficiency, the Prime Minister, by Arrete #067, dated 18 January 1971, established a Central Tax Collection Committee and a Local Tax Collection Committee in the Prefecture of Saigon, in each province and each autonomous city. The Prefecture, province and autonomous city committees are responsible for implementing the local tax collection program, for making suggestions to improve collection procedures and for giving support to the local taxation services.

3. RD Cadre status is shown in the chart below:

	PERSONNEL STRENGTH	TEAMS DEPLOYED	RDC DESERTIONS	DESERTIONS PER 100	VC INCIDENTS
DEC	10,704	346	137	12.8	37
JAN	10,261	319	89	8.6	48

VC incidents against RD Cadre increased in January, but losses were lower. Desertions decreased 35 percent. MR 4 is scheduled to have 1395 ten-man teams with a strength of 13,950 under the proposed RD Cadre reorganization. Nine (9) provinces in MR 4 have been given authorization to recruit RD Cadre on a limited basis. However, in view of future reductions and the lack of job security, provinces will experience difficulty in filling their recruiting quotas.

e. Greater National Unity

1. A summary of the Chieu Hoi Program is shown below. January's total shows a decrease of 622 returnees over December 1970 and includes one NVA rallier (Kien Giang) and one Regroupee (Phong Dinh) among the ralliers, both of whom were high ranking. The NVA rallier was reportedly the C.O. of the 7th Co, J-8 Bn, C-2 Regt., and the Regroupee was the chief of the VC Medical Service of Can Tho. Three provinces, An Xuyen, Chau Doc and Kien Giang had significant increases from the previous month.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HC RALLIED	MONTHLY GOAL	% POLITICAL	% MILITARY	% RELEASED	% EMPLOYED
909	1500	36.6%	51.47	1,194	9%

2. A total of 556 Hoi Chanh were used in operational exploitations during the month. In Chuong Thien a Hoi Chanh led an operation which resulted in the capture of 17 individual weapons. In Ba Xuyen three Hoi Chanh-led operations resulted in the capture of seven individual weapons, 500 kg of rice, 52 land mines, 20 sampans and some temporary quarters destroyed. In Kien Hoa a Hoi Chanh-led operation resulted in the capture of a VC medical storage area, 4 individual weapons, ammunition and documents. In Dinh Tuong a Hoi Chanh turned in his unit's weapons. In Ba Xuyen during a two week period of Dong Khoi operations, Hoi Chanh participated in one of the most successful operations of the month with 34 VC KIA and 139 VCI apprehended, including 45 in the A&B categories.

3. The Vocational Training of Hoi Chanh continues to expand with new courses in animal husbandry, agriculture, refrigeration and TV repair planned but funding and facilities are a problem. Only nine provinces opened vocational training courses for Hoi Chanh during the month due to funds not being released.

f. Brighter Life for War Victims

1. January was marked by limited activity because of the Tet holidays, preparation of the 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan and preparation for the annual service chiefs conference in Saigon. Token amounts of money were allocated by the MSW to provinces; far short of the amount needed to pay Return-to-Village people awaiting payment. New Service Chiefs were appointed to Kien Giang, An Xuyen, An Giang and Kien Tuong, all recent graduates of the National Institute of Administration. The U-Minh operation continues to generate temporary refugees in An Xuyen, Chuong Thien and Kien Giang, with more than 30,000 now reported.

2. The Food for Peace Program continues to be plagued with conflicting positions between USAID and the GVN. Attempts are being made to operate two separate programs at province level; one authorized by the MSW and the other, much more restricted, approved by USAID. Needless to say the result is confusing, particularly to the Vietnamese.

g. Peoples Information

1. Kien Giang became the fourth province in MR 4 to expose 100% of all properly identified VCI operating in the province. Emphasis continues toward the goal of 100% VCI exposure in other provinces, with Ba Xuyen and Chau Doc close to achieving the goal. PSYOPS support for the Phung Hoang program continued to receive priority attention during January.

- 7 -
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2. PSYOP campaigns utilizing highly localized targeting continue by the 9th ARVN Division in the Seven Mountains area and the 21st Division in the U-Minh Forest. A number of new information materials have been developed to fill information gaps in the execution of the Land-to-the-Tiller Program.

h. Prosperity for All

1. The Village Self Development Program reported the following project status for 31 January.

VSD PROJECTS	APPROVED	UNDERWAY	COMPLETED	BALANCE (\$VN)
1970 CAT I	5418	2316	2877	91,589,307
1970 CAT II	1445	864	410	
1971				713,305,500

With the completion deadline for 1970 VSD projects rapidly approaching, some provinces have cancelled projects that could not be finished by the deadline. Other provinces have abandoned some projects so the allocated funds could be diverted to support completion of on-going projects. As a result of project cancellations the balance remaining to be allocated increased 30,631,358\$VN over the December balance.

2. Plans are being developed in Saigon to place military physicians at district level in some jointly utilized medical facilities. This would be a big step in the rural health program by providing, for the first time, physician care at this level and local supervision needed in the district health program. Vietnamese surgeons in MR 4 performed 76.9% of all major surgery and 84.9% of all minor surgery in January. However, in the two provinces supported by Free World Medical Teams* Vietnamese surgical participation was low. (Go Cong 20% major and 25% minor surgery and Dinh Tuong 41% major and 28% minor surgery).

3. Twenty-two (22) of the 40 price survey items increased modestly in January, as a result of the heavy Tet buying. The rice harvest is nearly complete and yields, with local exceptions, well above average. The planting goals for improved rice varieties will be exceeded.

i. Land-to-the-Tiller

1. The current status of the Land-to-the-Tiller Program is shown below:

	APPL. SUBMITTED TO VILLAGE		APPL. APPROVED AT VILLAGE		APPL. FORWARDED TO SAIGON		TITLE DISTRIBUTED	
	#	HA	#	HA	#	HA	#	HA
December	104,984	146,495	64,905	94,171	46,305	66,093	6,540	9,200
January	128,831	181,801	94,180	135,720	80,775	115,415	14,932	21,111


*Philippines/Dinh Tuong and Spanish/Go Cong

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Statistical progress for the month of January was impressive, resulting from both improved reporting procedures and increased activity. The program continues to receive support from the CG, MR 4, as he has personally urged Province Chiefs to expedite the distribution of titles. Most significantly, 20,000 titles for 25,000 hectares were printed in January.

2. The Land-to-the-Tiller publicity effort improved as requested posters, tapes and leaflets arrived from Saigon, to be distributed to the provinces. The problem of compensation is a continuing one. Perfection of the compensation system is proving more difficult than anticipated due to the need for control and accountability of funds. Token compensation ceremonies will continue in the provinces until the new system becomes operational.



JOHN P. VANN
Deputy for CORDS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CORDS DMAC MILITARY REGION 4
(RCS: MACCORDS 32.10)
JANUARY 1971

APPENDIX A: DETAILED COMMENTS ON PROVINCE REPORTS

Thirteen (13) MR provinces had no required actions for December.

CHAU DOC PROVINCE (44)

1. Required Action

a. Statement of the Problem: The 1971 Community Defense and Rural Development is based on the assumption that the 9th ARVN Division will remain in the Tri Ton area until they have completely eliminated all NVA in the mountains. If they are redeployed prior to completion of this mission, it is anticipated that overall pacification in Tri Ton will regress unless additional RF/PF forces or spaces are allocated to the Province.

b. Action Taken to Date: The Province Chief has stated in the 1971 Plan (Page 1-A-8 and 1-A-9) that he can recruit additional forces if he receives authorization. He has requested 12 RF companies, 3 Group CPs (LienDois) and 27 PF platoons. The PF platoon increase can be attained within current province assets if he receives authorization to reduce the current 32 man platoons to 28. The RF spaces from more secure areas outside the province. Transfer in of spaces (or additional allocations) will allow recruiting in areas that have been either ignored or unproductive in the past and at the same time reduce the VC manpower recruiting base. Any Ranger units remaining in the area (and it should be recognized that they have been marginally effective at best) should be under the operational control of the Province Chief. Saigon and MR 4 should be fully aware of the situation and troop requirement as stated, if the 9th ARVN Division is withdrawn prior to elimination of NVA forces in Tri Ton.

c. Action Requested:

(1) Saigon and MR 4 support the request for additional RF/PF spaces if the 9th ARVN Division is redeployed before they have eliminated all NVA forces from Chau Doc.

(2) Saigon send a Deputy for Administration to Tri Ton at the earliest possible date.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMENT

Para c (1): Reference Message #0150/IV Corps/MR4/G3 NLCT, Subject: Reduction to PF Platoon Strength from 32 to 29. CG, IV Corps/MR4 has proposed to JGS that strength of PF platoons be reduced from 32 to 29. When this proposal is approved by JGS, IV Corps, MR 4 will be able to redistribute 10,365 spaces that will be formed into 357 additional platoons. Since additional RF units are required to occupy V hamlets within MR 4, the CG, MR 4 has requested that the 10,365 spaces be formed into 25 RF companies and 251 platoons or 357 PF platoons, if the RF company quotas are not available. The Province Chiefs are to submit a formal request to CG, MR 4 for additional companies or platoons required. This request will also be paralleled by the Province Senior Advisors to DEPCORDS. (RF/PF)

Para c (2): A memorandum to ACofS, CORDS was dispatched requesting that a Deputy District Chief for Administration for Tri Ton District, Chau Doc Province be assigned at the earliest possible date. D/PAD thru USAID/ADPA/LGB will approach the office of the Ministry of Interior in Saigon on 13 February 71 and verbally request that a Deputy District Chief for Administration be assigned to Tri Ton District. (PAD)

CHUONG THIEN PROVINCE

2. Required Action

a. Statement of the Problem: The Agricultural Service Chief is completely detrimental to the development of the agricultural program.

b. Action Taken to Date: The Agricultural Service Chief is un-cooperative and has diverted resources to his own use and profit. Strong recommendations have been made requesting the removal of Mr. Bui Van Luong.

c. Action Requested: Removal of Mr. Bui Van Luong

COMMENT:

The only knowledge at this headquarters about this situation was provided by information copy of a letter to PSA from the Province Agriculture Advisor. This information was relayed to JB Davis, ADDP/Saigon and it was discussed by him with the Ministry of Land Reform Agriculture and Fishery Development. The Ministry indicated an interest in investigating the problem to determine what action would be justified. The action is now with the Ministry; should be followed-up by a letter from the Province Chief. (MLD/AGR)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

KIEN PHONG PROVINCE

3. Required Action


a. Statement of the Problem: The introduction of a dredge into the GRAND CANAL requires the dismantling of the bridge at the point where the canal meets the MEKONG RIVER. Local officials estimate that a minimum of three weeks would be required to dismantle the bridge by conventional means.

b. Action Taken to Date: The Province Chief has requested U.S. assistance in lifting the central span to permit passage of the dredge and replacing it afterwards. It has been determined that neither a Chinook class helicopter nor a CH-54 Sky Crane could handle the weight. A detailed request is now being drawn-up by the Vietnamese authorities for the assistance of the MR-4 Engineer, COL Anh.

c. Action Requested: The loan of a 25-ton crane for a 3-5 day period.

COMMENT

The 403rd Engr, 40th Engr Gp is scheduled to start this project on 8 February 1971. Estimated time is 3-4 days. PEA was notified by telephone 4 February 1971. (NLD/ENGR)


JOHN P. VANN
Deputy for CORDS

CONFIDENTIAL

OBJECTIVE I -- TERRITORIAL SECURITY

MR A.

PHASE SUPPLEMENTARY

MONTH JANUARY

GOAL	PROCESS TO DATE	PROSPECTS	PROBLEMS
a. POP IN HES AB RATING BY END OF PHASE <u>90%</u>	65.5%	NIL	TIME
b. POP IN HES ABC RATING BY END OF PHASE <u>100%</u>	91.7%		
c. ELIMINATE ALL HES VC HAMLETS <u>165</u>	17	NIL	TIME
d. REDUCE ATTACKS BY FIVE TO <u>408</u> BY THE END OF PHASE.	193	LIKELY	
e. PERCENT NP STRENGTH DEPLOYED TO DISTRICT LEVEL AND BELOW <u>50%</u>	50.8%	ACHIEVED	
1. NO. OF POLICE AT VILLAGE LEVEL	4866	EXCELLENT	
2. NO. OF VILLAGE POLICE SUBSTATIONS	721	EXCELLENT	
f. ISSUE ID CARDS <u>3,789,588</u>	2,541,366 REGISTERED 1,685,799 ISSUED	EXCELLENT	

DEGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OBJECTIVE II - PROTECTION OF THE PEOPLE FROM TERRORISM

MR 4

PHASE SUPPLEMENTARY

MONTH JANUARY

GOALS	PROGRESS TO DATE	PROSPECTS	PROBLEMS
a. VCI NEUTRALIZED PER MONTH <u>2,282*</u>	1068	SHORT	UNREALISTIC GOAL
KILLED <u>547</u>			
SENTENCED <u>247</u>			
RALLIED <u>274</u>			
b. REDUCE TERRORIST INCIDENTS TO A TOTAL OF <u>400</u> BY END OF PHASE.	322	CLOSE	
c. COMPLETELY ELIMINATE VCI IN <u>114</u> VILLAGES.	31	NIL	
d. IDENTIFY <u>2800</u> VCI NOT PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED.	961	NIL	
e. SENTENCE OR RELEASE 2/3 VCI CAPTURED WITHIN 30 DAYS AND 1/3 IN 42 DAYS: CAPT THIS MO. X 2/3 = <u>263</u> CAPT LAST MO. X 1/3 = <u>108</u> TOTAL TO BE SENTENCED THIS MO. <u>371</u> (SINCE 1 JAN 70, 3,517 SHOULD HAVE BEEN SENTENCED OR RELEASED).	247 2464		GVN INTEREST

COMMENTS: *RPDC/MR 4 has established a monthly goal of 2,282. This includes 800 province and district level and 1,482 village level A and B category VCI per month. This is nearly a three-fold increase over the Special Phase Goal. The goal of 2 per village, in addition to the regular goals, is considered literally impossible of accomplishment, and potentially, counter-productive.

DEGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

OBJECTIVE III - PEOPLE'S SELF DEFENSE

MR 4

PHASE SUPPLEMENTARY

MONTH JANUARY

<u>GOALS</u>		<u>PROGRESS TO DATE</u>	<u>PROSPECTS</u>	<u>PROBLEMS</u>
a.	ORGANIZE PSDF	<u>1,370,000</u>	1,598,354	SURPASSED
	COMBAT	<u>488,000</u>	470,261	NOT LIKELY
	SUPPORT	<u>882,000</u>	1,218,093	SURPASSED
	KEY INTER TEAM	<u>5,260</u>	4,873	NOT LIKELY
b.	TRAIN PSDF			
	COMBAT	<u>488,000</u>	455,967	NOT LIKELY
	SUPPORT	<u>882,000</u>	762,409	NOT LIKELY
	KIT	<u>5,260</u>	4,592	NOT LIKELY
				LATE START
				NOT ENOUGH HUMAN
				RESOURCES
				INSUFFICIENT
				EFFECTIVE MTT's
c.	ISSUE WEAPONS	<u>218,750</u>	179,179	NOT LIKELY
	COMBAT		47,403	
	KIT SMALL ARMS		127,267	
	KIT BAR		4,509	
d.	KIT MEMBERS ORGANIZED			
	<u>184,100*</u>	170,555*	CLOSE	SLOW IN SOME AREAS

COMMENTS: *The figure of 184,100 is an approximation based on the ideal goal of 35 men per Key Inter Team. Since MOI and MR 4 are allowing formation of teams below this figure and above it as well, there is no accurate determination available at the present time. Some weapons have been turned into ADM & SL Companies and 90 were lost. Approximately 5,474 weapons were shifted with combat personnel to KITs.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OBJECTIVE IV - LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

MR 4

PHASE SUPPLEMENTARY

MONTH JANUARY

GOAL

PROGRESS TO DATE

PROSPECT

PROBLEMS

- a. ELECTION IN V/H NOW APPOINTED
WORKING IN PLACE

VILLAGE 13
HAMLET 27

8
83

Likely

- b. RETURN EXILED V/H TO WORK
IN PLACE

ELECTED VILLAGE 3
ELECTED HAMLET 11
APPOINTED VILLAGE 6
APPOINTED HAMLET 164

0
0
0
0

NOT LIKELY

- c. APPOINT NEW V/H WHERE HOME EXISTS

VILLAGE 6
HAMLET 152

1
48

NOT LIKELY

- d. ASSIGN ADDITIONAL V/H STAFF
WHERE VACANCIES EXIST

VILLAGE 319
HAMLET 3065

91
497

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OBJECTIVE V - GREATER NATIONAL UNITY

GOAL

- a. RPDC SUPPLEMENTARY CAMPAIGN
RALLY 6,000 HOI CHANH

PER 4

PROGRESS TO DATE

3,801

PHASE SUPPLEMENTARY

PROSPECTS

NOT LIKELY

MONTH JANUARY

PROBLEMS

GOAL UNREALISTIC
FOR THIS TIME OF
THE YEAR AND THAT
LENGTH OF TIME.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OBJECTIVE VI -- BRIGHTER LIFE FOR WAR VICTIMS

MR. 4

PHASE SUPPLEMENTARY

MONTH JANUARY

GOAL

PROGRESS TO DATE

PROSPECTS

PROBLEMS

A. RESETTLE 41,389

14,313

NOT LIKELY

LACK OF FUNDS

B. RETURN TO VILLAGE 69,996

82,760*

GVN ADMINISTRATIVE
DELAYS

C. WAR VICTIMS TO
RECEIVE PAYMENTS 16,955

15,457

COMMENT: *This figure from MPDC is considered inflated

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
OBJECTIVE VII - PEOPLE'S INFORMATION

MR 4

PHASE SUPPLEMENTARY

MONTH JANUARY

<u>GOAL</u>	<u>PROGRESS TO DATE</u>	<u>PROSPECTS</u>	<u>PROBLEMS</u>
PROV. INFO CAMPAIGN (1/MO.) <u>64</u>	56		
PROV. STUDY TRAINING (1/WK.) <u>256</u>	174		
SEMINARS FOR MILITARY MEN (1/MO.) <u>64</u>	49		
CADRES, OFFICIALS:			
DISTRICT LEVEL SEMINARS (1/WK.) <u>1520</u>	1,132		
VILLAGE LEVEL SEMINARS (1/WK.) <u>11,456</u>	8,741		
HAMLET LEVEL SEMINARS (1/WK.) <u>61,345</u>	48,389		
HAMLET INFO. CADRES SEMINARS			
VISITING FAMILIES (5 FAM. DAILY) <u>1,482,000</u>	1,264,409		
PROV/DEP PROV CHIEF ATTEND'G			
MEETING AT VILLAGES (1/WK.) <u>256</u>	377		
DISTRICT INFO. CADRES VISITING			
VILLAGES (1/WK.) <u>1536</u>	1995		
VIL. INFO. CADRES VISITING			
HAMLETS (1/WK.) <u>10,476</u>	NA		
VILLAGES ABC PUBLICIZING			
BUDGET & SELF-DEVEL. PROJECT <u>3,786</u>	3,644		

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

CONFIDENTIAL