

Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report
September 1971

Series: AWM103 - Headquarters 1st
Australian Task Force (Nui Dat) records

Item: R723/1/57/37

AWM103

1ATF

723 2	1	57
----------	---	----

(FILE No.)

[REDACTED]

AWM 103

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SECRET

TO BE PASSED BY HAND

AWM103 723 / 1/57
1ATF -

(FILE No.)

[14]

ARCHIVAL
CATEGORY

DO NOT HOLD this file when lapses in action may exceed
seven (7) days.



AUSTRALIAN FORCE VIETNAM

ComD.

HQ IATF REGISTRY

723	1	57 (S)
Folio _____		

QUOTE IN REPLY

R723 1 35

HEADQUARTERS
Army Component

18 Oct 71

1 ATF

AATTV MONTHLY REPORT - SEP 71

Enclosed for your information is one copy of Parts 1 and 2 of the AATTV Monthly Report for Sep 71.

(G.A. CLIFTON)
Major
for Commander Australian Force
VIETNAM

Enclosure: 1. AATTV Monthly Report Parts 1 and 2 - One Copy.

Comd. D/19/10
 D/10 20/10
 GSO 20ps. 19 ps.
 G2 Int. 26 ps.

SECRET

Copy No 4

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Headquarters
Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam

6 Oct 71

220/1/4

AATTV REPORT - SEP 71
PART 2

- Reference:
- A. AATTV Report Part 2 - May 71.
 - B. " " " - Jun 71.
 - C. " " " - Jul 71.
 - D. " " " - Aug 71.

General

1. The aim of this report is to update References A, B, C and D, and comment on any changes in the situation of the Territorial Forces in PHUOC-TUY Province which have been observed during the month of September. This report is based on:

- a. Further TFES studies.
- b. Views expressed and observations made by AATTV advisers at a conference held at JWTC on 4 Oct 71. Present at this meeting were:

Col	G.J. Leary	-	Comd AATTV
Lt Col	J.D. Stewart	-	Deputy Comd AATTV
Lt Col	K.H. Kirkland	-	Team Leader JWTC
Maj	R.V. Musgrove	-	TF Adviser Phuoc-Tuy Province
Maj	B.J. O'Neill	-	DSA Xuyen-Moc District
Maj	R.P. Webb	-	DSA Duc-Thanh District
2Lt	A.J. Morris	-	MATT Leader, Ong Trinh
WO2	N. Shoveller	-	MATT Leader, Long Dien

2. The withdrawal of 1 ATF from operations is continuing to have an effect on both the Territorial Forces and the civilian population in PHUOC-TUY Province. Refugees and squatters, who up until now have been prepared to settle in areas relatively remote from villages and hamlets, are moving, of their own volition, into the larger hamlets for security. Also, reports have been received during Sep of VC infiltrating into the more outlying districts, such as XUYEN-MOC. Their mission apparently has been to influence voters against taking part in the Presidential Elections.

3. There has been no significant increase during the month in the number of Territorial Force Units operating in the 1 ATF AOs. However, a reduction of the AO, for which PHUOC TUY Sector will be responsible, is currently under discussion. It has been suggested that PHUOC TUY Province North of the 80

.../ Northing

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Northing become the joint responsibility of 18 ARVN Div and 3rd Cav Bde with the inter formation boundary being the 54 Easting, 18 ARVN Div having responsibility for the Western sector.

4. As anticipated in the report for August, there has been no change in the deployment of 302 RF Bn, and it is not expected that the unit will be concentrated for at least another 5 to 6 weeks.

AATTV Report Part 2 - Aug 71

5. Additional PF Platoons (para 7). The following PF platoons have been raised during September:

- a. DUC-THANH District - two new platoons
- b. LONG DIEN District - one, possibly two
- c. DAT DO District - two new platoons

There are strong indications that in some cases district chiefs have formed the new platoons from existing platoons and an overall increase in PF platoon strength is not yet apparent.

6. Fire Support (para 8). The platoon of US 155mm guns is still located at FSB "CARMEN", however a platoon of ARVN 155mm guns has now been deployed at the HORSESHOE and a platoon of ARVN 105mm is now located at 13 395626. Both platoons are additional to the previous allocation of artillery to the province.

7. Deployment of TF Units (para 9). 946 RF Coy is due to move from JWTC NUI DAT when JWTC is re-located at VAN KIEP National Training Centre. Its future location is not yet known.

Standard of Leaders

8. Changes and Variations. DSAs and MATT Leaders have re-assessed the standard of RF commanders and principal staff officers of RF Gp HQ.

- a. LONG LE District.
 - (1) 637 RF Coy - Comd - Very good
 - (2) 945 RF Coy - Comd - Good
- b. LONG DIEN District.
 - (1) 3/48 Gp HQ - S1 - Good

Standard of Training

9. Variations and Changes.

- a. XUYEN MOC District. In place training of PF platoons completed, but no significant improvement in operational performance yet noted.
- b. LONG LE District. Attitude towards training has improved, in particular, PF platoon and squad leaders have shown keenness to receive re-training in platoon support weapons, M79, M60 etc.

../c. Long-Dien

- c. LONG DIEN District. Increased interest in mortar and artillery fire control has been shown during recent weeks.
- d. DUC THANH District. Two week refresher courses are popular with PF platoons but district headquarters is not giving much support.

10. The positive improvement in the performance of some PF platoons following attendance by pl and squad leaders at JWTC courses is still noticeable. These cadre courses will be deferred for a month to allow for the move of JWTC to VAN KIEP and will re-commence in November.

11. There has been an overall improvement in attendance by PF platoons at in-place training. It is possible that it is realized that, with the run down of MATTs from 8 to 2, this could be the last opportunity for some to receive this training.

Morale

12. The morale of both the civilian and military population has deteriorated since the announcement of the withdrawal of the 1 ATF from PHUOC-TUY Province. Those who can afford it are sending their children from the outlying districts to live and be educated in Saigon. ARVN and TF are showing a reluctance to use the roads.

13. The ambush of a truck of 3rd Coy 302 RF Bn at YS 510545 in day light on 17 Sep 71 has had a marked effect on the morale of this unit. 9 RF were killed, and 6 wounded, 2 of whom later died of their wounds. There were no known VC casualties. The VC used a 105mm or 155mm shell which was command detonated. The fact that this ambush took place at the edge of a village at 0820 hrs indicates the confidence of the VC.

14. In contrast the good performance of PF and RF units at NGAI GIAO Hamlet in DUC THANH District on 1 Oct 71 is a very heartening sign and indicates that when aggressively led, the TF is capable of giving a good account of itself. Details of this action are:

- a. At 1945 hrs 1 Oct 71 at YS 465793 a 40 PF Pl ambush 200m NW of NGAI GIAO sighted enemy movement to their front and opened fire with small arms then withdrew to the hamlet. En fired 10 rounds of 61mm mor into hamlet causing 1 WIA.
- b. Enemy followed up, exploding some mech ambushes but reached the edge of the hamlet. PF withdrew 100m to vic of schoolhouse.
- c. 626 RF Coy ambush 500m West also came in contact with en. PF ambush from BINH GIA 1000m East also saw movement. En to NE & East were engaged by MG from DUC THANH. 37 PF Pl from DUC-THANH Compound moved to reinforce 40 PF Pl. Guns from DUC-THANH and FSB ROBIN provided illumination. PF launched counter-attack and drove enemy from the hamlet. Enemy withdrew northward taking their dead and wounded with them. 105mm guns from DUC THANH, FSB ROBIN fired tasks on withdrawal routes. Action ended at 2145 hrs.
- d. Casualties were: En: 6 KIA (body count), 1 AK47 CIA, others possible wounded (blood trails). Friendly: 1 civ WIA (frag).

.../ 15. 37 PF Pl

15. 37 PF Pl and 40 PF Pl are the two highest rated platoons in DUC-THANH District according to TFES reports and 626 RF Coy one of the two highest rated RF Coys in PHUOC TUY Province. Their performance in this action tends to confirm these ratings.

Protection and Reaction Capability

16. The deployment of the TF to provide protection to the urban areas during the period leading up to the Presidential elections on 3 October has markedly reduced the TF reaction capability. In LONG DIEN District however there has been a noticeable increase in the aggressiveness displayed by 3/48 Gp HQ. Resulting from an increase in the number of VC sitings, the number of ambushes deployed and H and I missions fired has increased.

Availability of Arms, Ammunition and Equipment

17. Except for some improvement in LONG DIEN District, the situation as described in the report for August has continued. Of particular concern is the shortage of claymore mines.

Intelligence Resources and Handling

18. The handling over of intelligence data from 1 ATF to PHUOC TUY sector is currently under discussion. There has been no improvement in the dissemination of intelligence from sector to district.

TFES Evaluation

19. With the exception of DUC THANH and XUYEN MOC Districts which recorded no significant change, the TFES ratings throughout the remainder of PHUOC TUY Province indicated a general up trend. This was particularly marked in DAT DO District where three of the six RF companies showed overall improvement of between 50% and 100%, due mainly to increase in personnel strength and improvements in performance. The Senior Australian Adviser, from personal observations, could not support these results.

20. On the other hand, the August ratings for LONG DIEN District, which recorded one significant retrogression and three marked improved performances, were considered to be a reasonably accurate reflection of the situation. It is understood that the DSA is now playing an active role in the rating of TF units.

21. Overall it is considered that the credibility of the TFES is questionable and it is confirmed that the accuracy of the results is dependent almost entirely on the objectivity, experience and honesty of the rating officer. The document must not be studied in isolation, but viewed in the light of reports and comments from advisers.

Conclusion

22. Overall, the Territorial Force situation in PHUOC TUY Province has improved marginally during the month of September. However the


.../ isolated

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 5 -

isolated success of 626 RF Coy, 40 PF Pl and 37 PF Pl in DUC THANH District should not be taken as a indicator of the ability of the TF to secure the province.

23. It is believed that only after 1 ATF vacates NUI DAT will the true picture start to emerge. Activities over the next four to six weeks will be watched with great interest.



(G.J. LEARY)

Col
Comd

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Headquarters
Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam

12 Oct 71

AFV (3)

AATTV REPORT - SEP 71
PART I

1. The AATTV Monthly Report is again published in two parts.
2. The following members of AATTV were admitted to hospital during the month:

1200116	WO2	D.B.	VOGELE	-	1 Sep - 4 Sep 71
44340	Cpl	G.O.	SIMS	-	1 Sep - 6 Sep 71 (Medevac)
39001	Cpl	W.J.	STONEHOUSE	-	3 Sep - 3 Sep 71
138338	Cpl	B.M.	RIGBY	-	13 Sep - 13 Sep 71
14150	WO2	D.S.	FORD	-	11 Sep - 30 Sep 71
156474	WO2	G.L.	WHEAT	-	17 Sep - 20 Sep 71
1732955	Cpl	P.S.	DURY	-	25 Sep - 26 Sep 71

MR 1

3. A report by the Senior Australian Adviser in MR1 is attached as Annex B. The move of 31 NVA Regt, 2 NVA Div into north QUANG TIN Province, presumably to establish a new divisional base, was the major enemy activity during the month.
4. Operation LAM SON 810 by 1st ARVN Div into Northern QUANG TRI Province was moderately successful in achieving its stated aim, the capture of enemy caches.
5. JGS has directed that a new third division be raised in MR1. However difficulties are being experienced in manning and equipping this new formation.
6. Individual Adviser's reports of particular significance are:
 - a. WO2 PRYDE - Adviser 2nd Regt 1st ARVN Div.
 - b. Capt ROBERTS - Adviser HQ 1st Armd Bde.
 - c. Maj REDMAN - Territorial Security Adviser, QUANG TRI Province.

.../ MR 2

MR 2

7. A report from Senior Australian Adviser MR2 is attached as Annex C. Eight courses have been conducted by the Night Operational Training Teams (NOTTs) at PHU-CAT since activities were started there in April 71. Including the courses run at PLEIKU December 70 - April 71, these NOTTs have trained 399 PF platoon and squad leaders in night patrolling and ambush techniques.

8. Problems of security, training support and logistic support which troubled the team during the early part of their occupation at PHU CAT now appear to be solved.

MR 3

9. The report on the situation of the Territorial Forces in PHUOC TUY Province is contained in AATTV Report for Sep, Part 2.

10. A report from Senior Australian Adviser MR3 is contained in Annex D. The reduction in MATTs from 8 to 2 will be completed by 31 Oct 71. One MATT will continue to conduct PF Cadre courses at JWTC, the other will carry out in-place training of RF/PF companies and platoons throughout the province.

JWTC

11. A progress report from Team Leader JWTC is attached as Annex E. Since the start of training at NUI DAT in February 71, 315 Officers and 226 NCOs have attended courses at JWTC. There are currently 120 Officers and 99 NCOs under training.

12. The decision to vacate NUI DAT and occupy VAN KIEP will dislocate temporarily the running of courses. It is likely that 5/71 Senior NCO course, due to commence on 11 Oct 71 will have to be postponed. The move to VAN KIEP NTC is to be completed by 16 Oct 71. What effect, if any, the new location will have on the standard of training has yet to be assessed.

Psyops PHUOC TUY Province

13. Attached as Annex F is the End-of-Tour Report of Maj W.D. THOMAS, Province Psyops Adviser. This report requires no further amplification.

CORDS, MR3

14. Attached as Annex G is the End-of-Tour Report of Lt Col W.A. WOOLSTON, Operations and Intelligence Officer, Territorial Forces Advisory Division (TFAD) CORDS MR3. The report is self-explanatory and requires no comment.

MR 4

15. A report from Senior Australian Adviser MR4 is attached as Annex H. Since August 70 when courses commenced at DONG TAM, 341 officers and 198 NCOs have attended the NOTT courses, while at BAC LIEU, which commenced courses in February 71, 138 officers and 123 NCOs have been trained. The


.../ interpreter

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 3 -

interpreter shortage has been eased, however the vehicle repair position remains a constant problem.

16. Reports from Team Leaders at BAC LIEU and DONG TAM are attached as Appendices 3 and 4 to Annex H.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'G. J. Leary', written in dark ink. The signature is fluid and somewhat stylized, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

(G.J. LEARY)
Col
Comd

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

DEPLOYMENT OF AATTV
AS AT 31 AUG 71

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Inits</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Corps</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Employment</u>	<u>Due RTA</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>HQ AATTV SAIGON</u>								
1.	Col	G.J.	Leary MID	Aust Staff Corps	HQ AATTV	Commander	Dec 71	Saigon
2.	Lt Col	J.D.	Stewart MC MID	RA Inf	"	Second in Command	Jul 72	"
3.	Maj	S.R.	Hearder	RAA	"	Supernumerary	Mar 72	"
4.	Capt	B.M.	Straker	RAASC	"	Adjutant	Feb 72	"
5.	WO1	A.G.	Stanley MBE MM	RA Inf	"	RSM	May 72	"
6.	WO2	D.	Pearce	RAASC	"	Chief Clerk	Oct 71	"
7.	WO2	V.	Kirsch	RAASC	"	Admin WO Pay	Mar 72	"
8.	WO2	V.E.	Metzroth	RA Inf	"	Admin WO Nov	Feb 72	"
9.	Cpl	B.J.	Cook	RAASC	"	Clerk	Feb 72	"
10.	Cpl	R.P.	Shanahan	RA Inf	"	Asst Instr	Oct 71	"
11.	Bdr	T.P.	Mullins	RAA	"	Asst Instr	Nov 71	"
12.	Cpl	R.J.	Atkins	RAE	"	Asst Instr	Dec 71	"
13.	Cpl	P.J.	Millett	RA Inf	"	Asst Instr	Aug 72	"

.../ 2

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>VUNG-TAU</u>								
14.	Capt	L.A.	Ransome	RAE	HQ AATTV Vung-Tau	QM	Aug 72	Vung-Tau
15.	WO2	I.C.	Caskey	RNZIR	" "	Regt-Duty WO	Oct 71	"
16.	WO2	J.R.	Cousins	RA Inf	" "	" "	Apr 71	"
17.	WO2	J.V.	Holt	RA Inf	" "	RQMS	Oct 71	"
18.	Cpl	R.K.	Costolloe	RAEME	" "	Veh Mech	Jul 72	"
19.	Cpl	D.R.	Hinchliffe	RA Inf	" "	Driver	Oct 71	"
20.	Cpl	R.F.	Poirrier	RA Inf	" "	Storeman	Aug 72	"
21.	Cpl	R.W.	Fitzsimmons	RAE	" "	Tpt Supervisor	Aug 72	"
22.	Bdr		McKenna	RAA	" "	Supernumerary	Feb 72	"
23.	Bdr	B.M.	Rigby	RAA	" "	"	Apr 72	"
24.	Cpl	G.P.	Byard	RAEME	" "	Veh Mech	May 72	"

.../ 3

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>MR I - QUANG TRI PROVINCE</u>								
25.	Maj	K.J.	Redman	RA Sigs	Quang-Tri Sector	AC of S for Territorial Security	Oct 71	Quang-Tri
26.	W02	B.L.	Le Sueur MM	RA Inf	" "	Assistant Adviser PSDF	Oct 71	"
27.	Capt	R.J.	Ashfield	RA Inf	1st Regt	Adviser	Oct 71	La-Vang
28.	W02	K.D.	Pryde	RA Inf	2nd Regt	"	Oct 71	Dong-Ha
29.	W02	W.J.	Noble	RAAC	20 Tank Sqn	Instructor	Nov 71	Quang-Tri
30.	W02	G.L.	Millington	RAAC	" "	"	Jan 72	"
31.	W02	R.J.	Curran	RA Inf	3 Div	Adviser	Oct 71	"
32.	W02	D.W.	Teague	RA Inf	"	"	Oct 71	"
33.	W02	R.	Lennon	RA Inf	"	"	Feb 72	"
34.	W02	N.G.	Walters	RA Inf	"	"	May 72	"
35.	W02	I.S.	McPhial	RA Inf	"	"	Aug 72	"
36.	W02	T.J.	Jewell	RA Inf	"	"	Aug 72	"
37.	W02	R.J.	Hunnisett	RA Inf	"	"	Jan 72	"
38.	W02	E.L.	McCoombe	RA Inf	"	"	Jan 72	"
39.	W02	G.C.	Jenkin	RA Inf	"	"	Jun 72	"

.../ 4

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Inits</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Corps</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Employment</u>	<u>Due RTA</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>MR I (CONT)</u>								
<u>THUA THIEN PROVINCE</u>								
40.	WO2	W.L.	Reynolds	RAAMC	1 ARVN Div	Medical Adviser NTP Hospital	Apr 72	Hue
41.	WO2	R.P.	Lawson	RA Sigs	" "	Sensor Adviser	Feb 72	"
42.	WO2	M.J.	Poole	RA Inf	3 Regt	Adviser	Jul 72	An-Lo
43.	WO2	B.	Vogele	RA Inf	3 Regt	"	Jun 72	"
44.	WO2	B.F.	McGrath	RA Inf	54 Regt	"	Feb 72	Near Huế
45.	WO1	B.C.	Addington	RAA Pro	Phu Thu Sub Sector District Adviser	Asst DSA	Oct 71	Phu Thu

.../5

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>QUANG NAM PROVINCE</u>								
46.	Lt Col	P.T.F.	Gowans	RAA	HQ I Corps	G3 Trg Adviser	Mar 72	Danang
47.	WO1	L.T.	Allan	RA Sigs	AATTV Danang	Admin WO	Aug 72	"
48.	WO2	J.R.	White	RA Inf	" "	Mov WO	Jul 72	"
49.	Capt	F.A.	Roberts MID	RAAC	1 Armd Bde	Ops Adviser	Apr 72	
<u>QUANG NGAI PROVINCE</u>								
50.	WO2	W.E.	Bray	RA Inf	4 Regt	Adviser	Oct 71	Mo-Duc
51.	WO2	P.R.B.	Gleeson	RAA	HQ 2 Div	TOC Adviser	Oct 71	Quang-Ngai
52.	WO2	K.	Charlton	RAA	HQ 2 Div	Sensor Adviser	Dec 71	"
<u>QUANG TIN PROVINCE</u>								
53.	WO2	N.	Johnston	RA Inf	5 Regt	Adviser	Oct 71	Tam-Ky
54.	Capt	N.K.	McDermott	RA Inf	5 Regt	"	Jun 72 .../ 6	"
							.../ 6	

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>MR II</u>								
<u>PHU-CAT</u>								
<u>BINH DINH PROVINCE</u>								
55.	Capt	J.E.	Weiland	RA Inf	Night Operations Training Teams	OC NOTT Team 1	Jul 72	Phu-Cat
56.	Capt	K.G.	Gallager	RAASC	" "	OC NOTT Team 2	Mar 72	"
57.	W02	B.H.	Cox	RA Inf	" "	Team Member	Jan 72	"
58.	W02	B.R.	Day	RA Inf	" "	" "	Apr 72	"
59.	W02	D.W.	Jenkinson	RA Inf	" "	" "	Oct 71	"
60.	W02	J.W.	Pratten	RA Inf	" "	" "	Feb 72	"
61.	W02	N.	Smith	RA Inf	" "	" "	Oct 71	"
62.	W02	B.	Foster	RA Inf	" "	" "	Jun 72	"
63.	W02	S.F.	Reid	RAE	" "	" "	Jun 72	"
64.	W02	I.R.	Ramsay	RA Inf	" "	" "	Jun 72	"
65.	W02	F.	Lawler	RA Inf	" "	" "	Jul 72	"
66.	W02	J.A.	Gibson	RA Sigs	" "	" "	Jul 72	"
67.	W02	B.L.	Maher	RAA	" "	" "	Jan 72	"
68.	W02	D.A.	Duffy	RA Inf	" "	" "	Aug 72	"
							.../ 7	

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>MR III</u>								
<u>BIEN-HOA PROVINCE</u>								
69.	Lt Col	W.A.	Woolston	RAEME	Territorial Forces	Adviser MR III	Oct 71	Bien-Hoa
<u>PHUOC TUY PROVINCE</u>								
<u>JUNGLE WARFARE TRAINING CENTRE</u>								
70.	Lt Col	K.H.	Kirkland	RA Inf	JWTC	Senior Adviser	Jul 72	Nui Dat
71.	Maj	C.A.	Swain	RA Inf	"	Adviser	Dec 71	"
72.	Capt	K.J.	Properjohn	RA Inf	"	"	Oct 71	"
73.	Capt	W.D.	Tresise	RA Inf	"	"	Apr 72	"
74.	Capt	K.J.	McTaggart	RA Inf	"	"	Jul 72	"
75.	Capt	K.W.	Barlow	RAASC	"	"	Aug 72	"
76.	Lt	J.T.	Holland	RAA	"	"	Dec 71	"
77.	Lt	A.J.	Kirwan	RA Inf	"	Assistant Instructor	Feb 72	"
78.	WO1	R.J.	Hayes	RAA	"	" "	Oct 71	Nui Da.
79.	WO1	D.R.	Cherry	RA Inf	"	" "	Jan 72	"
80.	WO1	E.	Gason	RAAC	"	" "	Jun 72	"
81.	WO1	L.J.	Stanford	RA Inf	"	" "	Aug 72	"
							.../ 8	

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
82.	Sgt	F.W.	Brady	RAE	JWTC	Assistant Instructor	Dec 71	Nui Dat
83.	W02	J.E.	Barker	RA Inf	"	" "	Jan 72	"
84.	W02	A.	Egan	RA Inf	"	" "	Jan 72	"
85.	W02	R.I.	Bennett	RA Inf	"	" "	Apr 72	"
86.	W02	E.G.	Lewis	RA Inf	"	" "	Apr 72	"
87.	W02	J.P.	Hudson	RA Inf	"	" "	May 72	"
88.	W02	B.G.	Wilson	RA Inf	"	" "	May 72	"
89.	W02	P.	Hulsing	RAAMC	"	" "	Jun 72	"
90.	W02	D.	Aylett	RA Inf	"	" "	Jul 72	"
91.	W02	F.N.	Nicholas	RA Inf	"	" "	Jul 72	"
92.	W02	M.J.	Shave	RA Inf	"	" "	Jul 72	"
93.	W02	C.E.	Ebner	RA Inf	"	" "	Aug 72	"
94.	W02	D.S.	Cochrane MM	RA Inf	"	" "	Aug 72	"
95.	W02	R.J.	Clancy	RA Inf	"	" "	Aug 72	"
96.	W02	R.R.	Gurney	RA Inf	"	" "	Aug 72	"

.../ 9

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
97.	Bdr	S.M.	Boyd	RAA	JWTC	Assistant Instructor	Oct 71	Nai Dat
98.	Cpl	E.M.	Lloyd	RA Inf	"	Storeman	Oct 71	"
99.	Bdr	J.R.	Anderson	RAA	"	Assistant Instructor	Nov 71	"
100.	Cpl	M.B.	Walker	RA Inf	"	" "	Nov 71	"
101.	Cpl	L.L.	Parfitt	AACC	"	Supervisor Army Messess	Jan 72	"
102.	Cpl	T.C.	Young	RAE	"	Assistant Instructor	Apr 72	"
103.	Cpl	B.J.	McDonald	RAAMC	"	" "	Jun 72	"
104.	Cpl	P.S.	Dury	RA Inf	"	" "	Aug 72	"
105.	Cpl	T.J.	Robarts	RAAMC	"	" "	Aug 72	"
106.	Cpl	N.J.	Stonehouse	RA Inf	"	" "	Aug 72	"
107.	Cpl	R.H.	Remyense	RAAMC	"	" "	Aug 72	"
108.	Cpl	C.D.	Carroll	RAE	"	" "	Aug 72	"
109.	Cpl	M.J.	Gooley	RAASC	"	" "	Aug 72	"
110.	Cpl	P.C.	Schulte	RAAC	"	" "	Aug 72	"
111.	Cpl	D.R.	Geale	RA Inf	"	" "	Sep 72	"

.../ 10

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>MR III - PHUOC TUY PROVINCE</u> <u>MOBILE ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM</u>								
112.	Maj	R.	Musgrove	RAAC	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	Territorial Security Adviser	Apr 72	
113.	Maj	R.P.	Webb	RA Sigs	" "	DSA - Long Le	Jan 72	
114.	Maj	B.J.	O'Neill	RAA	" "	DSA - Xuyen Moc	Jan 72	
115.	Lt	D.R.	Bird	RAA	" "	Team Leader	Feb 72	
116.	2Lt	J.A.	Bendeich	RAAC	" "	" "	Dec 71	
117.	2Lt	L.	Shearwin	RAAC	" "	" "	Feb 72	
118.	2Lt	A.J.	Morris	RA Sigs	" "	" "	Jun 72	
119.	W01	G.E.	Wease	RA Inf	" "	Adviser	Aug 72	
120.	W01	H.	Buckley	RAE	" "	"	Oct 71	
121.	W01	J.A.	Baird	RNZIR	" "	Team Leader	Oct 71	
122.	W01	B.G.	Roe	RNZIR	" "	" "	Oct 71	
123.	W02	N.R.	Shoveller	RA Inf	" "	" "	Oct 71	
124.	W02	R.A.	Luckman	RA Inf	" "	Team Member	Jan 72	
125.	W02	R.B.D.	Rutherford MM	RA Inf	" "	" "	Jan 72	

.../ 11

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
126.	W02	F.K.	Eberle	RA Inf	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	Team Member	Apr 72	
127.	W02	E.J.	Fraser	RA Inf	" "	" "	May 72	
128.	W02	L.W.	Covill	RAA	" "	" "	Jun 72	
129.	W02	R.	Stewart	RA Inf	" "	" "	Jun 72	
130.	W02	D.F.	Ford	RAASC	" "	" "	Jul 72	
131.	W02	R.D.	Couttie	RA Inf	" "	" "	Jul 72	
132.	W02	J.	Woods DCM	RA Inf	" "	" "	Jul 72	
133.	W02	G.L.	Wheat	RA Inf	" "	" "	Aug 72	
134.	W02	J.C.	McNamara	RA Inf	" "	" "	Aug 72	
135.	W02	B.	Morgam	RA Inf	" "	" "	Aug 72	
136.	W02	P.	Verkuylen	RAA	" "	" "	Aug 72	
137.	Sgt	R.R.	Ryan	RAASC	" "	Admin Sgt	Aug 72	
138.	Cpl	C.F.A.	Clark	RAE	" "	Team Member	Nov 71	
139.	Cpl	G.R.	Grey	RAE	" "	" "	Nov 71	
140.	Cpl	U.	Moldre	RA Inf	" "	Linguist	Dec 71	
141.	Cpl	W.	Davis	RA Inf	" "	Team Member	Feb 72	

.../ 12

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
142.	Cpl	P.J.	Geil	RA Inf	Phuoc-Tuy Sector	Team Member	Feb 72	
143.	Cpl	T.J.	Whitwam	RA Inf	" "	" "	May 72	
144.	Bdr	R.G.	Mellier	RAA	" "	" "	Jun 72	
145.	Cpl	R.G.	Mackrill	RA Inf	" "	" "	Jun 72	
146.	Cpl	B.W.	Burgess	RA Inf	" "	" "	Jun 72	
147.	Cpl	A.	Forsyth	RAE	" "	" "	Jul 72	
148.	Cpl	J.M.	Zegenhagen	RAE	" "	" "	Jul 72	
149.	Bdr	C.M.	Angles	RAA	" "	" "	Aug 72	
150.	Cpl	I.K.	Anderson	RAE	" "	" "	Aug 72	
151.	Cpl	N.D.	Hartigan	RAAMC	" "	" "	Aug 72	
152.	Cpl	P.A.	Gallagher	RA Inf	" "	" "	Aug 72	
153.	Cpl	D.J.	Townsend	RA Inf	" "	" "	Aug 72	
154.	Cpl	P.J.	Tucker	RA Inf	" "	" "	Aug 72	
155.	Cpl	P.J.	Ryan	RAE	" "	" "	Aug 72	
156.	Cpl	G.K.	Johnson	RA Inf	" "	" "	Aug 72	

.../ 13

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>MILITARY REGION IV</u>								
157.	Maj	J.G.	Hughes	RAA	CORDS IV CORPS	Assistant to Chief of Staff Territorial Security	Feb 72	Can-Tho
158.	WO1	I.C.	Wall	RA Inf	" "	Admin WO	Jun 72	"
159.	Capt	W.M.	McLaughlin	RAA	Night Operations Training Teams	OC Team 1	Apr 72	Bac-Lieu
160.	WO2	P.R.	Conway	RAASC	" "	Team Member Team 1	Oct 71	"
161.	WO2	J.	Clarke	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Feb 72	"
162.	WO2	W.C.	Date	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Dec 71	"
163.	WO2	K.J.	Prior	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Nov 71	"
164.	WO1	D.E.	Wise	RAA	" "	" " "	Aug 72	"
165.	WO2	B.	Elphick	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Aug 72	"
166.	Capt	R.	Mountfort	RNZIR	" "	OC Team 2	Oct 71	Dong-Tam
167.	WO1	L.	Larsson BEM	RA Inf	" "	Team Member Team 2	Jan 72	"
168.	WO2	B.M.	Prosper MM	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Jan 72	"
169.	WO2	J.J.	Cootes	RNZIR	" "	" " "	Oct 71	"
170.	WO2	B.	Morrow	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Aug 72	"
171.	WO1	K.A.	Hall	RA Inf	" "	" " "	Aug 72	"

REPORT BY LT COL P.T.F. GOWANS
SENIOR AATTV ADVISER IC AND MR1

Enemy Activities

1. Enemy initiated activities remained at a relatively low level in MR1 during the reporting period. Most major units from northern QUANG-TRI withdrew across the DMZ border early in the month, and have not yet returned to their normal AOs.
2. The most significant enemy activity was the move of 31st NVA Regiment, from 2nd NVA Division, into northern QUANG TIN Province, presumably to start work on a base area for their division. Due to excellent intelligence, including captured operation orders and signal instructions, 5th ARVN Regiment were able to successfully engage 31st NVA Regt, claiming a total of 329 killed for the whole operation.

Friendly Activities

3. Operation LAM SON 810 was relatively ineffective, considering the assets used. Appendix 2 to this report gives the results of that operation in terms of supply caches discovered, the avowed aims.
4. As ARVN units deploy into their monsoon and election postures, friendly initiatives are expected to decrease.
5. The discovery of bodies in PHU THU District (see Appendix 10 to this report) is expected to reduce the estimate of about 2,000 still missing from the HUE massacres of 1968.

Deployment of AATTV in MR 1

6. AATTV provided 9 advisers for MACV Team 155, the new advisory team for the 3rd ARVN Division, which was to be raised on 15 Sep 71. Regrettably, the advisory team was assembled prior to the division materializing, and temporary adviser misemployment has resulted. An interim scheme to assist QUANG TRI Province in upgrading PSDF was approved on 28 Sep 71, and will result in productive employment for AATTV advisers in the immediate future.

3rd ARVN Division

7. The 3rd Division is expected to be delayed in formation by:
 - a. Political pre-election sensitivities to the conversions of RF to ARVN.
 - b. A financial dispute between JGS and MACV on logistic and combat support for the division.
8. Although 3rd Division was intended to reinforce MR1 in fact the Division merely re-allots combat resources within MR1, and provides a structure for re-inforcement in the future.

.../ 9. The

9. The process of severing long established ARVN connexions continued, with advisers being withdrawn from 6th and 51st ARVN regiments, and from THUA THIEN Province Team during the reporting period.

Contacts

10. A summary of significant contacts for units with AATTV Advisers is attached at Appendix 1 to this report.

Miscellaneous

11. Reports by individual advisers are attached as Appendices 3-10. The reports by Capt ROBERTS and WO2 PRYDE are of particular interest.

1. Summary of Significant Contacts for Units with AATTV Advisers.
2. Operation LAM SON 810 - Results.

1 Div

3. Report by WO2 B.F. McGrath, 54th Regt.
4. Report by WO2 K.D. Pryde, 2nd Regt.

2 Div

5. Report by Capt M.K. McDermott, 5th ARVN Regiment.
6. Report by WO2 K.D. Charlton, Sensor Adviser 2nd ARVN Division.

1st Armd Bde

7. Report by Capt F.A. Roberts, HQ 1st Armour Bde.
8. Report by WO2 W.J. Noble 20 Tank Sqn Training Team.

CORDS

9. Report by Maj K.J. Redman, Quang-Tri Province.
10. Report by WO1 B.C. Addington, Phu-Thu District.

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS
FOR UNITS WITH AATTV ADVISERS

1. At 291500H Aug 71, near YD 044622, 1st Bn/54th Regt Contacted an enemy force. Results were: 2 friendly MIA, 20 enemy KIA; a B40 launcher, 1 HMG, 2 AK47s, 1x120mm mortar, 50 grenades, 100 block of TNT and 40 rds of B40 captured.
2. At 290500H near BT 086285, 3rd Bn/5th Regt received an unknown number of type of mortar and B40 rounds and a ground attack. 4 friendly were WIA, and 19 enemy KIA, with 6 AK 47s, 120 concussion grenades captured.
3. At 291405H near BT 077287, 3rd Bn/5th Regt received 15x82mm mortar rounds and a ground attack. 4 friendly were KIA and 2 WIA. 4 enemy were KIA and 1 AK 47 captured.
4. Between 290815 and 291400H, 54th Regt CP at CARROLL received 50x122mm rockets. 2 friendly were KIA and 4 WIA. 2 M16, 1 M60, 1x105mm, 2 ammo bunkers, 3 food storage bunkers were destroyed.
5. At 301255H near BT 077297, 5th Regt Recce Coy contacted an enemy force. 1 friendly was KIA and 1 WIA. 5 enemy were KIA and 1 MG, 2 AK47s and 60 grenades were captured.
6. At 301030H near YD 043604, 1st Bn/54th Regt found 6 bodies killed by air.
7. At 020840H Sep 71, near XD 999545, 2nd Bn/54th Regt found 7 ARVN bodies belonging to 1st Bn/2nd Regt, which were KIA on 18 Aug 71.
8. At 020900H near BT 078282, 1st Bn 5th Regt contacted an enemy force. 2 friendly were KIA and 2 enemy KIA, with 1 AK 47 captured.
9. At 021400H near BS 874344, 1st Bn 4th Regt captured 6 VC.
10. At 021855H near YD 039606, 1st Bn/54th Regt received a ground attack. 3 friendly were KIA, and 1 WIA. 5 enemy were KIA and 50 field packs, 1 AK 47 captured.
11. At 030740H near BT 077288, 1st Bn, 5th Regt found 9 enemy bodies killed by arty, and captured 1 AK 47, 20x82mm mortar rds, 12xB41 and 20 grenades.
12. At 030740H near BT 076294, 1st Bn/5th Regt contacted an enemy force. 5 friendly were WIA, and 7 enemy KIA, with 1 SMG, 3 AK47s, 25x82mm mortar and 10xB40 rounds captured.
13. At 031240H near BT 065286, 2nd Bn/5th Regt found 5 enemy bodies killed by arty, and capture 1xB40 launcher and 1 AK47.
14. At 031200H near XD 999549, 2nd Bn/54th Regt found 4 bodies from 1st Bn/2nd Regt estimated to be 16 days old.
15. At 040630H near BS 507895, 2nd Bn/6th Regt raided as enemy force. 7 enemy were KIA and 2 M79s and 60 grenades captured.

.. /16. At 041420H

16. At 041420H near BT 020283, 2nd Bn/5th Regt found 17 VC bodies, and captured 3 packs and destroyed 10 tunnels.
17. At 041050H near BT 060283, 2nd Bn 5th Regt searching found 6 enemy bodies killed by artillery.
18. At 051910H near AT 938316, 3rd Bn/5th Regt mechanically ambushed an enemy force, killing 4.
19. At 052210H near BS 500920, 3rd Bn/6th Regt ambushed an enemy force, killing 5 and captured 1x50 cal MG and 17 grenades.
20. At 060400H near BS 895310, 1st Bn/4th Regt contacted an enemy force, capturing 20 VC suspects.
21. At 060800H near AT 935312, 3rd Bn/5th Regt contacted an enemy force. 5 enemy were KIA and 2 AK47s and 20 grenades captured.
22. At 310800H Aug, near BT 077295, 3rd Bn/5th Regt searching found 50 enemy bodies killed by artillery.
23. At 061800H near AT 959649, 3rd Bn/51st Regt contacted an enemy force, 1 friendly was WIA. 3 enemy were KIA, 4xM14 mines and 1 B40 round plus some documents and a VC suspect were captured.
24. At 071720H near BS 426794, 2nd Bn/6th Regt contacted an enemy force. 4 enemy were KIA and 1 AK47 captured.
25. At 080125H near BS 862329, 1st Bn/4th Regt raided an enemy force. 2 friendly were WIA, and 4 enemy KIA with 1 M16 and 7 grenades captured.
26. At 081140H near BS 733430, 3rd Bn/4th Regt searching contacted an enemy force. 3 enemy were KIA and 1 VC suspect, 1 AK47, 1 carbine and 15 grenades captured.
27. At 081305H near BT 095294, 1st Bn/5th Regt found 7 enemy bodies killed by arty, and captured 5 field packs.
28. At 090315H near BS 470774, 1st Bn/6th Regt contacted an enemy force. 4 Montagnard VC were KIA, and 2 field packs and 6 grenades were captured.
29. At 090230H near BS 525940, 3rd Bn/6th Regt contacted an enemy force. 5 enemy were KIA, 1 carbine, 10 grenades and 4 field packs were captured.
30. At 090410H near AT 968304, 3rd Bn/5th Regt found 6 bodies killed by air, and captured 2 AK47s.
31. At 100920H near AT 953624, 4th Bn/51st Regt searching contacted an enemy force. 5 enemy were KIA, and 2 M16s, 1 carbine, and 1 AR 15 captured.
32. At 100245H near BS 774505, 4th Regt Recce Coy raided an enemy force. 4 enemy were KIA and 1 M16 captured.
33. At 100900H near AT 946306, 3rd Bn/5th Regt mechanically ambushed an enemy force, killing 5.
34. At 100900H near XD 922340, 3rd Bn/1st Regt searching found 3 gas cans and a wheeled vehicle parking area, and destroyed 21 bunkers.

../ 35. At 101455H

35. At 101455H near XD 929335, 4th Bn/1st Regt found and destroyed 30 bunkers.
36. At 101455H near XD 881352, 4th Bn/1st Regt found 20 enemy bodies killed by B52, 3 AK47s, 1 K43 SMG, 1x60mm baseplate, and 35 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, and destroyed 7 bunkers.
37. At 111415H near YD 010626, 2nd Bn/54th Regt found and destroyed 50 bunkers.
38. At 110430H near BS 880350, 1st Bn/4th Regt capture 11 VC suspect, and destroyed 4 boats.
39. At 120700H near AT 957523, one individual from 2nd Bn/57th Regt detonated an alluminating flare, wounding 6 ARVN.
40. At 121000H near XD 988310, 1st Bn/1st Regt found enemy tank tracks moving east, approximately 10 days old.
41. At 121105H near AT 930283, 3rd Bn/5th Regt found 4 enemy bodies killed by air.
42. At 130900H near BS 814314, a 4th Regt Long Range Recce patrol killed 4 enemy, and captured 1 colt .45.
43. At 130710H near BS 495839, 2nd Bn/6th Regt contacted an enemy force killing 4 and capturing an AK 47.
44. At 131055H near BS 516426, 2nd Bn/6th Regt captured 5 enemy.
45. At 131250H near BS 527804, 1st Bn/6th Regt captured 5 enemy.
46. At 130800H near XD 898334, 4th Bn/1st Regt found and destroyed 30 huts, 40 bunkers and 20 NVA uniforms.
47. At 140630H near BS 834303, 4th Regt Recce Coy contacted an enemy force. 5 enemy were killed, and 1 AK47, 4 packs, 5 grenades and 1 bag of medical supplies captured.
48. At 160530H near BS 727414, 4th Bn/4th Regt raided an enemy force, killing 5 VC. 2 M1 carbine, 2 K44 SMGs, and 8 grenades were captured.
49. At 160440H near BS 575743, 2nd Bn/4th Regt raided an enemy force. 5 enemy were KIA and 1 carbine and 1 M16 captured.
50. At 160905H near AT 902320, 3rd Bn/5th Regt found 4 enemy bodies killed by air, approximately 4 days old.
51. At 161720H near BS 888318, 3rd Bn/4th Regt searching killed 5 enemy, and captured 2 VC, 1 M79, 1 AK47.
52. At 160925H near XD 900349, 4th Bn/1st Regt found and destroyed 2 lanterns and 1000 litres of oil and gasoline.
53. At 170830H near BS 542787, 1st Bn/6th Regt found 1 ton of rice and distributed it to the troops.
54. At 191750H near BS 822298, 4th Regt Recce Coy contacted an enemy force, killing 4 and captured 1 AK47, 30 grenades and 4 field packs.

.../ 55.

55. At 211100 - 1245H near AT 985295, 2nd Regt Recce Coy contacted an enemy force. 7 NVA were KIA and 1 M79 captured.
56. At 211305H near YD 013585, 4th Bn/54th Regt searching found 6 enemy bodies killed by arty, 15 days old.
57. On 21 Sep 71, PHU Thu Sub Sector found 17 bodies from the Tet MAU THAN offensive of 1968, and 1 US body estimate dead since 1966. (2 bodies were found at YD 865245, 2 at YD 857233, 10 at YD 880240, 3 bodies at YD 912217 and the US body at YD 885242)
58. At 221120H near AT 919319, 3rd Bn/5th Regt found 5 enemy bodies killed by arty, and 1 AK47.
59. At 221515H near YC 266403, 4th Bn/1st Regt found 5 enemy bodies killed by arty, 2 carbines and 1 AK47.
60. At 221120H near AT 919315, 3rd Bn/5th Regt contacted an enemy force. 1 friendly was KIA. 25 enemy were killed by arty. 4 US and 6 VNAF airstrikes were conducted controlled by JK 24, JK 26 and VNAF FAC. 6 NVA were killed by ground action, and 1 HMG destroyed, 4 AK47 captured.
61. At 231150H near AT 924316, 3rd Bn/5th Regt found and destroyed an R&R Centre, consisting of 20 huts.
62. At 240930H near BS 543807, 1st Bn/6th Regt searching, contacted an enemy force. 5 enemy were KIA, and 1 M16, 2 field packs captured, plus 4x105mm round (booby trapped) destroyed.
63. At 241050H near BS 810306, 4th Regt Recce Coy destroyed 800 kgs of rice in bad condition.
64. At 241340H near YD 007582, 4th Bn/54th Regt searching found 3 enemy bodies killed by air, and 1 B41 launcher, 30xB40, 20x60mm mortars, 3 bunkers were destroyed.
65. At 241640H near YD 309359, 1st Bn/1st Regt searching found 80 rds of B40 ammo, 5 rds of 75mm, destroyed 3 tunnels, and killed 3 NVA.
66. From 20-24 Sep, near YD 8525, PHU THU SST found 41 bodies killed during Tet MAU THAN offensive, 1968.
67. At 241750H near AT 930336, 3rd Bn/5th Regt found 5 enemy bodies killed by arty, approximately 5 days old.
68. At 251005H near BS 558717, 2nd Bn/4th Regt contacted an enemy force, 3 friendly were WIA, and 10 enemy KIA.
69. At 250845H near BS 483783, 6th Regt Recce Coy found and destroyed a VC market, 1000 kgs of rice and 15 cases of Nuoc Mam.
70. At 260530H near BS 545796, 1st Bn/6th Regt contacted an enemy force. 3 enemy were KIA, and 2 PWs and 1 AK47 captured.
71. At 260430H near BS 715865, 4th Bn/6th Regt raiding contacted an enemy force. 4 enemy were KIA, 1 K44, 11 grenades and 2 packs captured.

.../ 72

72. At 261200H near BS 554783, 6th Regt Long Range Patrol found and destroyed 2 tons of rice in bad condition.
73. At 261400H near BS 525780, 1st Bn/6th Regt captured 15 VC.
74. At 270920H near BS 803212, 1st Bn/4th Regt found and destroyed 2 huts and 2000 kgs of rice.
75. At 271205H near BS 803316, 4th Regt long range patrol contacted an enemy force, killing 8 and capturing 1 AK47.

LAM SON 810 - RESULTS

1. 091645H XD986528 83 RDS X 82mm MORTAR
2. 100900H XD922340 PARKING AREA, 21 BUNKERS
3. 101055H XD892354 1 X NVA UNIFORM, 1 X 60mm MORTAR BASE PLATE, 5 BUNKERS
4. 101455H XD929335 30 BUNKERS
5. 111415H YD010626 50 BUNKERS
6. 131030H XD946610 AIR STRIKE RESULTED IN SEVERAL SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AND ONE FIRE
7. 131225H XD993529 8 RDS X B-40, 200 RDS X 82mm MORTAR, 7 RDS X B-41, 5 BUNKERS
8. 131340H XD991529 200 RDS X 82mm MORTAR, 8 RDS X B-40, 3 RDS X 75mm RR
9. 131335H XD678497 ONE MOLOTOVA TRUCK, 60,000 LITERS GASOLINE
10. 130800H XD898344 30 HUTS, 40 BUNKERS, 20 NVA UNIFORMS
11. 130815H XD678497 1 X 122mm GUN, 200 RDS X 122mm ARTY, 6,000 LITERS GASOLINE, 2 MOLOTOVA TRUCKS, 5,000 METERS COMMO WIRE, 2,000 KG RICE, ONE TELEPHONE
12. 140730H XD986519 162 RDS X 82mm MORTAR, 210 RDS X 12.7mm, 42 FOXHOLES, 100 METERS OF TRENCH LINE
13. 150840H XD890520 204 RDS X 75mm RR, 400 RDS X B-40, 196 RDS X 57mm, 200 RDS X 82mm MORTAR
14. 151000H XD781530 200 LITERS GASOLINE
15. 151150H XD780530 20 WAREHOUSES CONTAINING 100,000 RDS X 37mm, 2,000 RDS X 122mm ARTY, 300,000 RDS X AK-47, 4,000 LITERS GASOLINE, 10,000 KG RICE (UNPOLISHED), 10,000 METERS COMMO WIRE
16. 160930H XD974476 3 RDS X 75mm RR, 5 BUNKERS
17. 160925H XD900349 ABANDONED MOTOR POOL, 1,000 LITERS OF GAS AND OIL

REPORT BY WO2 B.F. McGRATH
ASSISTANT ADVISER 54 ARVN REGT

1. After 54th Regiment moved to Camp CARROLL, they still had attached one battalion of the 3rd Regiment. On 23 Aug 71 a raid was conducted West of CARROLL after a B52 strike. The raid went in at 0730hrs and was out by 1100 hrs with one coy of 1/3 and one coy in reserve. Results were 1 friendly slightly wounded, 76 NVA KBA, 9x12.7 MG captured, 3xB40s captured and many documents and bunkers destroyed. On this same day, about 4 km NW of CARROLL, another 6 2nd NVA Regiment bodies were found and extracted.
2. B52s continued to fly missions West and North of CARROLL and more 2nd Regiment bodies were found in the next few days. Fire was adjusted from the air on rocket, mortar, and 75mm RR positions during the next week and many secondaries were observed. Also the air strikes North and NW of FULLER were very successful with many secondaries.
3. Scattered mine incidents throughout 54th Regt AO were prominent early but have died off in the last week. KHE GIO took 20x122mm rockets on the 25 Aug. 200 x 82mm mortar on 28 Aug 71 were fired at FULLER, and 60x122mm at CARROLL on the 29 Aug. Apart from these, up to 3 Sep 71 sporadic rockets and mortars were fired at all three locations, CARROLL taking some 4 KIA and 7 WIA with 1x105 destroyed and 1 damaged also 4 bunkers completely destroyed, casualties were light on KHE GIO and FULLER.
4. On 27 Aug 1st Bn (North East of FULLER) contacted unknown size enemy results friendly 2 KIA, 1 WIA; enemy 15 NVA KIA. Next day 7 more bodies were found in the area plus 4 AK47s. On 29 Aug, 1st Bn made contact in the same area with a coy plus. Results 20 NVA KIA, 1x12.7, 3 AK47s, 1x120mm mortar, 52 grenades and 80 satchel charges. On the same day 2/54 contacted an estimated platoon NW of this location results 3 NVA KIA, 1 AK47. On the night of 29 Aug a coy of 1st Bn received a ground assault. No friendly KIA, 6 NVA bodies were later found after a sweep of the area next day.
5. On 2 Sep FULLER was again hit with a ground assault of a platoon. Five mortar locations supported the assault. Results 3 friendly KIA, 1 WIA. 8 NVA KIA and 50 packs with equipment found.
6. On 5 Sep two units moved North of FULLER into what was a free-fire zone. A few caches were found also graves & bodies but contact was light. Both units received indirect fire in the first few days but casualties were light. Since this date and the start of LAM SON 810 very light ground contact has been reported.
7. Training the Vietnamese in English and re-supply and air techniques is almost complete.
8. Artillery and air continued to get secondary explosions and 1 man has been killed since 5 Sep by an NVA sniper.
11. Since coming to CARROLL, the Regiment has done very well and used artillery and support well. They have patrolled and worked the limits of their AO with the limitations placed on them and I venture to say they could do without advisers at this time.

END OF TOUR REPORT OCT 70 - SEP 71
BY WO2 R.D. PRYDE

1. Employment.
 - a. From 26 Oct 70 to 1 Aug 71 Bn Asst Adviser 2/2 Bn.
 - b. Duties. Adviser to Bn XO, initially responsible for calling and directing medevacs, resupply helicopters, gunships, airstrikes and US arty but from 1 Jan 71 gradually phased out to a strictly advisory and training role.
 - c. Bn Senior Adviser 4/2 Bn at various times up to 6 weeks duration during the absence of the nominated Senior Adviser on leave or other duties.
 - d. Employment Adviser to the Bn Comd with similar responsibilities as Asst Adviser but with a greater chance to influence policy.
 - e. Regt Asst Adviser 2 ARVN from 1 Aug 71 as adviser to Regt Comd and Regt XO, S1, S2, S3, and S4 and liaison officer with US units working in support or on combined operations.
2. Successes.
 - a. From Dec 70 instituted a training programme which was adopted by other Bn Teams; in speaking English on radio, control of US air assets and Arty. Proof of programme success is present status; e.g. Vietnamese can operate the MACV radio net in English, thus eliminating the need for any US radio operators.
 - b. Convincing ONE Bn Comd, to operate as a Bn, rather than two 1/2 Bn with light and heavy CP, although to keep the Regt happy he reported light CP loc each night.
3. Failures.
 - a. Failed to convince or, at least, failed to get action on destroying or removing unusable ammunition lying around fire bases.
 - b. Failed to get the Bn to adopt squad tactics.
 - c. Failed to get operations plans down to squad level. I was almost convinced that it was not desirable, due to the reluctance of low ranks to risk action.
4. Evaluation.
 - a. The ARVN soldiers I have seen in operation are capable as a group (Pl, Coy, Bn); but below that level have no opportunity for initiative even if they have the capability. Even Bn Comds have little opportunity for initiative, most moves are dictated by Regt HQ. The standard of the individual soldier is poor as far as rifle shooting, and weapon maintenance. Field hygiene is almost non-existent despite directions from Bn level. As soon

.../ as contact

as contact is made the ground Comd calls for gunships before Arty. As units, the ARVN I have worked with, are aggressive hard fighting troops, but the individual soldier in the lower ranks lacks motivation and never really knows what is going on. The fact that most actions result in a favourable kill ratio can be put down to US support, mainly air in most cases. The NVA seem to be better motivated and far more determined to achieve their objectives.

5. Advisory Effort.

- a. I am sure that initially the strong commitment to advise the ARVN was warranted; but since I have been here the adviser has been NEEDED ONLY for what he could supply. The fact that within 2nd Regt, the advisory effort has been successfully cut down to almost nil in 8-9 months of determined effort seems to indicate that previous advisers worked towards a different goal. It was easy for the adviser to call up air support, but the aim should have been to make the ARVN able to prosecute their own war. To make the situation worse the supply of US gunships support instead of being cut down gradually, was cut by 80% overnight.
- b. There are examples I have seen of advisory teams attempting to be self perpetuating e.g. a team of about 27 with at least 7 working to support the rest. The remaining 20 give advice to counterparts who don't listen, and write reports that may be read but on which no action can be taken. The crux of the matter seems to be that some advisers feel that they are running the war, not advising the Vietnamese how to run their own war.

6. Support.

- a. In general all forms of US support to the ARVN Regt I have worked with has been more than satisfactory. I feel that the reduction in air support should have been more gradual, so that after training the ARVN to use air support more time could have been spent getting them used to doing without it.
- b. MACV support to advisers in the field (US and Aust) has been some what less than perfect, particularly in the case of rations and certain essential equipment (compasses, strobe lights and air panels.) Most of these items have had to be "scrounged" by the individual adviser concerned.

7. Conclusion. I feel that during my time with the 2nd ARVN Regt my presence has been worthwhile overall. I may not have had a great deal of results from the advice I have offered but I feel that the training programme that I instigated has gone a long way toward making the Regt self reliant.

REPORT BY CAPT M.K. McDERMOTT
ADVISED 5TH ARVN REGT

General

1. During the month of September 1971 the activities of the 5th ARVN Regt were mainly the conduct of Regimental operations and in-place training.

Training

2. After I had organised a small training programme last month, the US helicopter liaison team visited HAWK HILL and two fire support bases. The aim of the team was to teach all the methods and procedures required when ordering and using helicopters. The subjects covered were helicopter UH1B and CH 47.

- a. Helicopter gunships.
- b. Medevacs, day and night.
- c. Resupply.
- d. Combat assaults.
- e. Sling loading of CH 47.

3. I was impressed by the preparation of the instructor and the many charts, techniques and illustrative devices which the US team used to teach. These are necessary when teaching a class of another language and to soldier level.

Significant Activities

4. Closing out of BLT. The liaison teams were closed out on 1 Sep 71 in accordance with the MACV directive. Results:

- a. A surplus of personnel.
- b. Made it possible for US personnel to obtain a reduction in length of tour.
- c. RCAT is now operating in S2/S3 staff sections of the regiment.

Operation DC025/QT504

5. Whilst Senior Adviser to the 3rd Battalion I was able to observe the working of the ARVN battalion and confirm the effectiveness of previous advisory efforts under most situations.

6. During late August and early September the 3rd battalion came in contact with 31 NVA Regt (-) (7 bn, 9 bn, Regt CP and 2 heavy weapons companies) and was surrounded by them. The battalion headquarters (ARVN light CP, ARVN HQ pl and advisers) came under ground attack by a superior enemy force, a heavy

.../ mortar

mortar attack (100 rds plus of 82mm) and heavy rocket attack as fire support to ground attack (120 rds of RCL), performed a withdrawal whilst under heavy MG and mortar fire, a counter attack against an aggressive enemy, medevac of casualties whilst under fire and emergency resupply of ammunition by air.

7. Over the period 27 sorties of gunships were used (three gunships shot down) 7 medevacs and 13 tactical airstrikes (both VNAF and US).

8. The third battalion performed well while under pressure from the enemy carrying out all manoeuvres and function well. When not pressured they tended to be lax in many matters although surrounded by visible enemy fortifications at ranges of 500-700 metres. Noted peculiarities:

- a. Vietnamese soldier's strength is sapped quickly but a short rest will revitalise him quickly.
- b. Only forward most troops are alert.
- c. Love of high ground positions even if it is of no tactical advantage.

9. The battalion is evaluated as No 3 in this regiment, No 7 in the division.

REPORT BY WO2 K.D. CHARLTON
SENSOR ADVISER 2 ARVN DIV

General

1. This report contains a summary of the activities of the 2nd (ARVN) Inf Div Electronic Combat Detachment, MR1 for the reporting period 25 Aug - 24 Sep 1971.
2. The ECD advisory team lives within the ECD Compound at BAU TRAI, approximately 5 kms west of the provincial city of QUANG NGAI.
3. The posted strength of the team is: 1 captain (US), 1 WO2 (AATTV), and 1 sergeant (US).

Active Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS)

4. At the time of reporting the 2nd Div have a total of 121 various sensor devices deployed in 34 strings. Where practicable strings are deployed to comprise 3 to 4 devices spaced between 200 metres and 400 metres apart in a mix of at least one confirming device of the acoustic or magnetic type to each string.

Monitoring Sites

5. The 2nd Div ECD employ phase three UGS only and monitor the 34 strings from 5 sites as follows:

a.	BAU TRAI	2nd Div	10 Strings
b.	BINH MINH	4th Regt	5 Strings
c.	MO DUC	4th Regt	7 Strings
d.	WEST	5th Regt	7 Strings
e.	HOANG OANH	6th Regt	5 Strings

Mission

6. The prime mission of the ECD is to support units of the 2nd (ARVN) Inf Div with their operations. As the sensor programme expands it is anticipated that additional support will be given to the regional forces.

Line Sensors

7. Line sensors of the Balanced Pressure System type are employed at two locations only.

a.	MO DUC	4th Regt	4 BPS as base defence
b.	ARTILLERY HILL	6th Regt	9 BPS as base defence

../Multipurpose

Multipurpose Concealed Intrusion Detectors (MCID)

8. The ECD has on hand 5 Multipurpose Concealed Intrusion Detectors (MCID), available, for which it is indented to deploy them at 4th Regt HQ at FSB BINH MINH.

Significant Operations

9. During the reporting period a number of operations were conducted by the ECD. These consisted of major implant operations to routine battery changes in existing strings. A number of devices were recovered and redeployed in new locations.

10. The FSB at MARY ANN was deactivated on 9 Sep. Assets from this site were recovered and redeployed.

11. On 10 Sep a major sensor mission was conducted in support of 5th Regt operations in their AO north of FSB WEST.

12. VNAF helicopters, including gunships, were used to deploy a total of 12 Air Deliverable Seismic Intrusion Detectors (ADSID) in 4 strings in areas known to contain units of the 31st NVA Regt.

13. The mission was carried out in three phases as follows:

- a. Phase I - VR of the drop zones.
- b. Phase 2 - Practice of the ECD and helicopter crew.
- c. Phase 3 - The actual drop mission.

14. The mission was completed successfully and without incident. During the drop mission itself it was a requirement that the helicopter fly level, at a height of 300 feet at a steady speed of 60 knots, however because of the vulnerability of the aircraft to ground fire the pilots would not fly below 500 feet and slower than 80 knots. It was confirmed that the 31st NVA Regt were equipped with 57 cal MG.

15. The ADSIDs were successfully deployed. An activation the next day on one of the strings resulted in 5 NVA KIA by artillery and 2 weapons captured.

Summary of Activations.

16. During the reporting period a total of 91 activations were recorded at the 5 monitoring sites. This resulted in 875 rounds of artillery being fired. The approximate total of personnel detected for the period was 830.

17. Apart from the 5 NVA KIA and 2 weapons captured as noted in para 15, BDA by the unit for the period was negative.

Logistics

18. The meeting of requisitions continues to be a big problem. During the period a total of 16 new devices and 25 batteries only, were received. This represents a small proportion of the requisitions placed.

19. As from 1 Nov 1971, ARVN will take over and handle all maintenance and supply facilities including the weekly and monthly reports which are currently filed by US channels.

.../ Problem

Problem Areas

20. Apart from the logistic problem, the major shortcomings appear to be the lack of co-ordination between sensors, artillery and air support. It is a rare occasion when BDA is conducted after artillery has fired on sensor activations.

21. There is a need to make commanders more aware of the potential of UGS. It is anticipated that the advisory team will conduct familiarization tours to the units within the 2nd Div to stress the potential of UGSs and how they can be best employed during normal operations.

Conclusion

22. Despite the shortcomings, the 2nd (ARVN) Inf Div sensor programme continues to improve, due mainly to the planning ahead and deactivating devices then redeploying them in more fruitful areas. The logic being that each sensor string represents a patrol on the ground.

REPORT BY CAPT F.A. ROBERTS
TRAINING ADVISER 1 ARMD BDE

General

1. 1 Armd Bde having been reactivated in late Aug was committed to operation LAM SON 810 on 3 Sep 71 and commenced the operations 6 Sep, continuing until 19 Sep 71 when Bde HQ and 17 Cav returned to the DANANG area. The other squadrons comprising the Bde for the operation returned to operate in the DMZ.
2. A separate after action report for the operation will be forwarded on completion.
3. Generally the Bde functioned reasonably but without aggressiveness, despite contact with only light elements.
4. The Bde HQ which had not controlled operations since LAM SON 719 was not functioning to maximum efficiency and several staff weaknesses were manifest. Most of these improved during the period.
5. The units showed the effects of the long periods of garrison and area security tasks in QUANG NAM and on the DMZ when called on to function in the more traditional armoured manner, however they also improved during the operation.

Major Weaknesses

6. The following weaknesses were noted:
 - a. Centralized Command. The inability and unwillingness of staffs and subordinate commanders to make independent decisions in the commander's absence was common. This is a definite Vietnamese military trait, that I do not consider will be altered by advisers.
 - b. Weak Staff Officers. Staff officers were lacking in training, initiative, and motivation. The effects on the operation were considerable, particularly in the G3 area.
 - c. Lack of Prior Reconnaissance. For planning, no attempt was made to overfly the operational area to allow difficult areas to be noted and appropriate deployment of engineers made.
 - d. Basic weakness in Soldier Skills, (gunnery vehicle handling, crew drills) and platoon and troop tactics. There was a lack of demolition capacity evident in both armour and engineer elements when required.

Action to Overcome the Weaknesses

7. The weaknesses are known to the SA and were progressively advised to the Commander who attempted in all instances to correct the deficiencies.

Unit Strengths

8. As the operation progressed, the units particularly the 7 and 11 Cav demonstrated the capacity to patrol effectively and utilize infantry elements in the areas of difficult going.

.../ 9. The

9. The junior members of the staff functioned well when not inhibited by their superiors, particularly the G3 operations officer (Capt) and the signals officer (Capt).

Major Duties

10. As a result of the hasty reactivation of the Armd Bde advisory team, several officer shortages were experienced. Currently I have filled, as necessary, the role of G2/G3/Training Adviser. I have been in command of the team for the period of the SA's leave in USA, 22 Sep through 8 Oct.

Advance Intentions

11. The Bde is expected to remain in DANANG for the period of Oct then move NORTH to a location yet to be confirmed. My tasks will remain essentially the same until the appropriate officers arrive.

12. Additional emphasis is being placed in on equipment and vehicles for the team, and in the absence of the SA I will be overseeing these tasks particularly the vehicles/radio situation which was desperate for the recent operation.

Remarks

13. US staff procedures, writing, expression and presentation remain a problem. Aquisition of the US methods is not practicable for the period of service and this must inhibit effective contribution as the adviser effort readjusts to formation staff levels. The US officer in the same situation is already aware of the systems, expression etc and since the VN staff system is largely patterned on the US, can make an immediate and effective contribution.

14. It is also noted that the strength of 1 Armd Bde team is excessive for the requirements and could be reduced. A recent armoured command advisory letter indicated the Bde teams would reduce to paralled infantry advisers and that the Bde equivalent to a DCAT would comprise the following:

- a. 1 Lt Col
- b. 1 Maj G2/G3/G5
- c. 1 Maj G1/G4
- d. 1 E7 Opn NCO

It is presumed such reductions would follow the current time frame for rundown of adviser elements.

Attachment

1. Combat Operations After Action Report, LAM SON 810.

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

ATTACHMENT 1 TO
APPENDIX 7 TO
ANNEX B TO
AATTV REPORT SEP 71

HEADQUARTERS
US ARMY COMBAT ASSISTANCE TEAM
First Armor Brigade (ARVN), Advisory Team 116
APO San Francisco 96349

28 September 1971

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Lam Son 810

THRU : Deputy Senior Adviser
I Corps and MRI
ATTN: MACMR-LOP
APO 96349

TO: Commander
United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96222

1. OPERATION: LAM SON 810, Search and Destroy.
2. PERIOD : 6 September to 19 September 1971.
3. LOCATION : Northwest area of QUANG TRI Province Map 1:50,000,
Sheet 6342 I, 6342 II, 6342 III and 6342 IV.
4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 1st ARVN Division.
5. REPORTING OFFICERS:
 - a. Advisor Listing.

(1) LTC ABRAHAM F. MUSCARI	SA 1st Armor Brigade
(2) Maj LAWRENCE HERZOG	SA 17th Cavalry
(3) Maj WESTFORD D. WARNER	SA 7th Cavalry
(4) Maj WILLIAM R AIKEN	SA 11th Cavalry
(5) Maj HENRY E. JEFFREY	SA 1st Ranger Group

.../ b. Extent

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

b. Extent of advisor effort:

- (1) Advice to the commander and staff on the following:
 - (a) Fire support.
 - (b) Conduct of operations at brigade level.
 - (c) Employment of units.
 - (d) Engineer tasks (preparation of roads and use of demolitions).
- (2) Parallel of Medevac requests.
- (3) Assistance in clarifying helicopter requests through ARVN staff channels.
- (4) Assisting the commander and staff in all matters rather than accomplishing the Vietnamese tasks for them.

6. TASK ORGANIZATION: The 1st Armor Brigade was task organized as follows:

a. Ranger Group:

- (1) 03 Ranger Battalions, 21st, 37th and 39th Battalions.
- (2) Ranger Group Headquarters, 11th Cavalry (-), 02 companies, 61st Border Ranger Battalion, 01 Battery, 10th Artillery Regiment (155mm), 01 Battery 14th Artillery Regiment (105mm), 01 company 101st Engineer Battalion.

b. 7th Cavalry Group:

- (1) 7th Cavalry
- (2) Hac Bao Company
- (3) 1 Platoon 101st Engineer Battalion

c. 1st Armor Brigade:

- (1) Brigade Headquarters
- (2) 17th Cavalry
- (3) 61st Border Ranger Battalion (-)
- (4) 01 Battery 10 Artillery Regiment (105mm)
- (5) 101st Engineer Battalion (-)
- (6) 1 Battery 14th Artillery Regiment (155mm)

d. US Artillery units located as follows:

- (1) 01 Battery 1/39th (8") FSB BINH DINH (Vandergrift)
- (2) 01 Battery 1/39th (8") FSB BIEN HOA (Elliot)
- (3) 01 Battery 2/94th (175mm) FSB BINH DINH (Vandergrift)

.../ 7.

7. SUPPORTING FORCES:
- a. Artillery - support was adequate for all operational requirements.
 - b. Tactical Air - on call through FAC, minimum requirements existed and in nearly all instances artillery was utilized.
 - c. Helicopter - Support was provided by 101st AB (US) and VNAF. The brigade generally received 01 helicopter daily for C&C, VR and resupply tasks. Some difficulty was experienced in ascertaining availability through ARVN staff channels. It was emphasized to brigade staff that requests must be followed through once initiated in order to receive support. Considerable improvement was noted in this area as the operation progressed.
8. INTELLIGENCE: This area was notably weak. Intelligence information was developed primarily from that provided by the 1st ARVN Division. Little or no attempt was made to develop intelligence from 1st Armor Brigade resources, i.e., individual soldier patrols, terrain and weather evaluation. This weakness was emphasized to the commander and staff on several occasions. Terrain intelligence was lacking, for example, reconnaissance of the Red Devil road would have revealed the difficult going, areas requiring engineer effort and plans could have been made to overcome these difficulties in advance.
9. MISSION: The initial mission directive was to establish two fire support bases (BINH DINH and BIEN HOA), support the operation of three Ranger Battalions throughout the 1st Armor Brigade AO, and an armor link up by the 7th Cavalry with the 37th Ranger Battalion. The mission of the armor element scheduled to link with 37th Ranger Battalion was subsequently changed due to the inability of tanks to traverse the Red Devil road and conduct the link up operation.
10. CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION: The Armor Brigade units were to search the areas astride Q19 and Red Devil road in the designated area of operations. One element the 7th Cavalry was to link up with the 37th Ranger Battalion along the Red Devil road. The Ranger Battalions were to search the mountainous areas in the NW of the area of operations. The concept of operation as expressed in ARVN orders remained vague. This fact linked with the staff weakness of the 1st Armor Brigade Headquarters together with complete dependence on the commander for all levels of decision resulted in a lack of clarity of concept and execution of the operation plan by subordinate commanders.
11. EXECUTION: The 1st Armored Brigade concentrate at DONG HA on 4 Sep. On 6 September Brigade moved via Q19 to occupy fire support bases; Brigade Headquarters located at FSB BINH DINH (Vandergrift) and Ranger Group Headquarters at FSB BIEN HOA (Elliot). The move to the FSBs was extremely slow, due to the use of foot troops to precede the vehicles, the absence of engineers with the leading element and the lack of prior reconnaissance. Convoy discipline and security was poor, vehicles closed up, and no attempt was made to provide security during the numerous halts that occurred. Deployment of the brigade headquarters was not effected until the commander had personally indicated locations to the staff. Movement by the brigade commenced at 0630 hours and was complete at 1630 hours. Concurrent with the movement of the 1st Armored Brigade, three battalions of the 1st Ranger Group, 21st, 39th and 37th were inserted by air into LZ's in the west of the AO (XD886539, XD904501). Movement was complete at 1230 hours and the battalions commenced to search to west and northwest. The Armored units deployed as follows:

.../ a. 17th

- a. 17th Cavalry security for brigade headquarters at FSB BINH-DINH (Vandergrift).
- b. 11th Cavalry secured the road from BINH DINH to KHE GIO.
- c. 7th Cavalry moved to link with 37th Ranger Battalion at their LZ, following the Red Devil route. The 7th Cavalry while moving to link with 37th Ranger Battalion detonated mines vic (XD435523 and XD942522) resulting in 02 APC's destroyed, 04 ARVN WIA. The unit made contact with a VC squad vic (XD940540) result 04 VC KIA, 01 60mm mortar, 01 AK47 and several mines captured.

7 September - 7th Cavalry received 5-6 rounds of US artillery fire resulting in 01 M113 destroyed, 01 US Adviser WIA, 02 ARVN KIA, 07 ARVN WIA. 7th Cavalry while continuing to move along Red Devil route detonated a mine vic (XD946524) resulting in 01 M113 damaged, 08 ARVN WIA.

8 September - The mission of 7th Cavalry was changed to searching the area west and north of FSB BIEN HOA (Elliot), because of terrain and a badly eroded section of the Red Devil route. Remaining elements continued to operate as designated on the 6 September.

9 September - All elements continued the operation.

10 September - 17th Cavalry elements conducted a search south of FSB BINH DINH vic (XD963507). 11th Cavalry while continuing to secure Q19 detonated a mine vic (XD979546), resulting in 01 M113 damaged, 06 ARVN WIA. 7th Cavalry continued to search its area, locating a cache vic (XD946539) containing 01 .30 Cal MG and 01 M-16 rifle.

11/12 September - All elements continued operations.

13 September - 11th Cavalry with elements of the 61st Border Ranger Battalion while searching areas adjacent to the road located caches vic (XD991520 and XD993529) containing 200 rounds of 82mm mortar rounds, 08 rounds B-40, 06 rounds of 75mm RR and 126x82mm fuzes.

14 September - 7th Cavalry located a cache vic (XD986509) containing 162 rounds of 82mm mortar rounds and 210 rounds of 12.7, 42 foxholes were also destroyed.

15/17 September - All elements continued to search and secure their areas.

18 September - 17th Cavalry while sweeping the area NW of FSB BINH DINH detonated a mine vic (XD975510) resulting in 01 M113 destroyed 05 ARVN WIA.

19 September - 1st Armored Brigade terminated operation LAM SON 810 and moved back to DONG HA. Brigade headquarters and 17th Cavalry moving out with 1st Ranger Group and 7th Cavalry following. 11th Cavalry with engineer elements provided the rear guard. All elements closed at DONG HA by 1630 hours. In summary armored elements operated as follows:

- a. The 7th Cavalry attempted to link with 37th Ranger battalion until terrain difficulties prevented further movement west. They then conducted operations to the W and NW of FSB BIEN HOA (Elliot) until the termination of the operation experiencing several vehicle losses due to mines and discovering minor caches.

.../ b. The

- b. The 11th Cavalry provided route security between FSB BINH DINH (Vandergrift) and KHE GIO throughout the operation and searched the areas adjacent to Q19. The 11th Cavalry discovered minor ammunition caches and an old company sized position to the east of Q19. The 11th Cavalry experienced some mines in its area.
- c. The 17th Cavalry provided security for the FSB BINH DINH and patrolled in the SE of the area of operations and immediately around FSB BINH DINH. One small ammunition cache was located to the NW of BINH DINH.
- d. The Ranger Battalion after insertion into their LZ's searched the west and northwest areas experiencing minor contacts and locating several ammunition caches. The battalions walked out to FSB BIEN HOA at the conclusion of the operation. The detail of 1st Ranger Group aspects of the operation is the subject of a separate report.

12.

RESULTS:

		KIA	WIA
a. Friendly:	7th Cavalry	2	29
	11th Cavalry	1	8
	17th Cavalry		6
	Hac Bao Company		6
	ARVN Artillery	-	<u>4</u>
	Total	3	53

(1) Vehicles:

- (a) 01 M-41 destroyed, 01 damaged
- (b) 08 M-113 destroyed
- (c) 01 Bulldozer damaged

b. Enemy:

(1) KIA 9

(2) Weapons:

- (a) IW 4
- (b) CSW 2

(3) Ammo and Equipment:

- (a) 120mm mortar bounds 20
 - (b) 120mm mortar fuzes 10
 - (c) 82mm mortar rounds 362
 - (d) 82mm mortar fuzes 126
 - (e) 82mm mortar secondary charges 18 cases
- .../ (f)

(f) B-40 rounds	8
(g) 75mm RR rounds	11
(h) 12.7mm	210
(i) Anti tank mines	31
(j) Rucksacks	3
(k) Foxholes	47

13. ADMINISTRATION: The administration was satisfactory, however, no personal liaison was effected by the brigade S-4 who remained in the rear throughout the operation. An initial tendency by squadron commanders was to effect resupply on an as required basis at irregular intervals rather than daily. ARVN commanders responded to suggestions of daily resupply and an adequate daily system was maintained for the main period of the operation.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: The capacity to carry out effective demolitions was lacking by the brigade and supporting engineer unit. An example was the inability to destroy captured ammunition by any means other than burning with gasoline. The engineers and armored elements required training in field expedients and techniques to overcome eroded areas of road as confronted the 7th Cavalry on the Red Devil road.

15. ADVISOR ANALYSIS: Overall results of the operation indicate that it was marginally successful. The operation revealed numerous deficiencies that must be corrected through well planned and executed training to include:

- a. Movements - should be executed rapidly and aggressively and a detailed plan provided by the staff. Failure to provide such a plan resulted in extremely slow movement into initial areas (Elliot and Vandergrift) and noticeable lack of control.
- b. Mine clearing - engineer elements to include bulldozers should be positioned well ahead in columns during movement. Mine detectors should be carried on one of the lead vehicles and assistance provided by troops riding on personnel carriers in locating and clearing mines. Training in laying mines is also indicated.
- c. Employment of crew served weapons - crew were extremely slow throughout the operation in employing crew served weapons, this includes tanks, 106 recoilless rifles, mortars and machineguns. Vigorous crew training is required at platoon level.
- d. Leadership - Except in a few instances leadership was noticeably lacking. This was particularly prevalent in the 17th Cavalry and 7th Cavalry squadrons. Small unit leaders including platoon leaders hesitated to initiate actions on their own and waited for the next higher commander to give orders. Staff personnel at armor brigade level appeared to lack initiative in performing even minor tasks preferring to wait on the commander's decision before taking action in his name. The

.../ brigade

brigade G-3 was particularly deficient. Although it is realized that the Armor Brigade Staff has not functioned as a staff for a considerable period, the failures were basic and can be resolved by CPX's and the publication of SOP's which provide guidance. The staff did not assist the commander by making staff visits to units except in the company of the brigade commander.

- e. Command supervision - Although the brigade commander was aware of the need for command supervision, less than 10% of his time was spent in the supervisory role. Frequent visits were made to Ranger Group and squadron headquarters level but very little contact at troop level was made. No visits were made to ascertain proper conditions for the individual soldier. It appeared in most instances that the individual soldier was left to fare for himself.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. A programme of training which emphasizes crew served weapons, squad and platoon level training must be initiated to ensure future success in combat.
- b. ARVN I Corps Staff should conduct a command inspection of the 1st Armored Brigade Staff in order to evaluate its capabilities and provide much needed assistance in operations, intelligence and training.

ABRAHAM F. MUSCARI
LTC, AR
Senior Advisor

REPORT BY WO2 W.J. NOBLE/WO2 G.L. MILLINGTON
20th TANK SQN TANK TRAINING TEAM
FROM 23 AUG 71 TO 25 SEPT 71

1. The general aims of the unit for the period were to provide training on the M48A3 Tank for personnel from the Vietnamese Armour School, as a cadre, to become instructors and to commence training instruction on the vehicles of the 20th Sqn.
2. The methods used were:
 - a. A two week's training course of the Armour School group to a level where they were able to instruct personnel of the Sqn in overall components and use of the vehicle. Where necessary, assistance from the team was provided.
 - b. The commencement of training for the Sqn in the form of a two week period covering general gunnery, maintenance and driving at individual levels and continued by crew and sqn training at a higher level.
3. Achievement of the aims has, to a degree, been curtailed due to the unsatisfactory condition of the old tanks which were received for the initial period of training. However, this was overcome due to a great deal of previous experience on the part of the Vietnamese instructional group, and their part of the training was concluded successfully. They are now conducting training of the sqn with members of the tank training team assisting where required.
4. At this time the first troop has received its new tanks and these are being used to implement training to a greater degree.
5. The overall standard of the Sqn at this time cannot be gauged to any significant degree. Initially there was a morale problem due to the fact that members came from so many units and were separated from their families. Also the condition of the sqn area required a major amount of work done to it. The Vietnamese are aware of all these problems and it will be a matter of time before they are corrected.
6. The major weakness has been the condition of the vehicles for training. This has now been corrected with the arrival of the new tanks also the approach of some of the students initially to the training was adverse due to the factors mentioned.
7. No outstanding strong points have been observed at this stage. This is due to the form of training being conducted and the sqn not yet being operational.
8. Major duties for AATTV members have been assistance in the drawing up of the training schedule and the assessment of instruction and co-ordination with the Vietnamese training staff.
9. Advance intentions are to continue with assisting in training where required and helping to overcome any major weaknesses which may require attention.
10. Unless essential items such as radios, inter communication sets tools and spare parts arrive quickly, training are operational readiness dates will be delayed.

REPORT BY MAJ K.J. REDMAN
TERRITORIAL SECURITY ADVISER
QUANG TRI PROVINCE

General

1. This report will be the last full monthly report on territorial security from QUANG TRI Province. A further report to cover the Vietnamese Presidential Election period will be prepared before my final departure from the province. This report will also include some observations and comments about aspects of territorial security in QUANG TRI Province pertinent to my period in the province.

Enemy

2. In the last three to four months enemy activity has fluctuated against friendly regular forces with several high points followed by periods of calm. Generally, activity in the populated area has followed similar trends but not so markedly. At present activity against regular forces is in a calm period but the reverse is true in the populated area, which to some extent, is a trend against the general pattern.

3. There are two possible explanations:

- a. The regular force operations in Western QUANG-TRI have forced the enemy to lie low. These operations were mounted into enemy bare areas where little contact was made. The indications are that the enemy was well dispersed and in small parties which avoided contact.
- b. The increased activity in the populated area was VC inspired. It is significant that during the period, enemy killed in the province were 3:1 VC to NVA. This is the opposite to overall figures for the year.

4. Also, indicators of activity, through agents and electronic means have been considerably lighter during the period. It is my assessment that the enemy has withdrawn to regroup and recuperate from the heavy campaigns in June and August and with the onset of the wet season will slowly build up strength for an offensive in the Spring of 1972. The unknown quantity is just how bad the immense support provided during this period has hurt the enemy. Also I feel that the populated area can expect constant low level activity during the coming months to attempt to maintain pressure.

5. With the approaching Presidential Election most people predict an upsurge in enemy activity; so far they have not been wrong. The increase has been essentially in the areas of proselytizing food collection and abductions. The proselytizing is naturally aimed at the forthcoming election although there have been increased anti American overtones. Abductions appear to be of selected people (mainly female) who are reportedly taken with North Vietnam for indoctrination training. None of those abducted has subsequently been

.../ reported

reported dead; those selected for assassination usually die on the spot.

6. To date there have been no demonstrations or confrontations in the province and in this regard the province chief insists that he has a firm control of possible problem groups. Just how is hard to determine!

7. Attacks by fire, much reduced, have generally occurred along the DMZ although both QUANG TRI City and QUANG TRI Combat Base received a rocket attack in the last week. This is the first such attack for several months.

8. To sum up, all districts have been active with the exception of TRIEU PHONG, (considered the most secure) with the emphasis being along the districts bordering the DMZ. In keeping with the heavier activity in this area, water mining in the CUA VIET increased with a new twist; water borne booby traps being encountered for the first time in my experience. This activity is largely negated by an effective mine sweeping operation each day and the constant reporting of activity by fishermen.

Friendly

9. The regular forces mounted a major operation with three infantry and one armoured regiment into Western QUANG TRI during the month. The operation was planned to interfere with enemy preparations and destroy caches in the area. Although several good caches and 4x122mm artillery pieces were captured, I consider the results most disappointing. The infantry regiments involved were one each of Marine, Ranger and ARVN. From hearsay the Marines and Rangers performed poorly and the Armour activity was very limited. From reports of this operation and from previous reports, the performance of the Marines and Rangers falls a long way short of the high standard these elite units are supposed to be capable of.

10. The recent operation did however give the initiative back to the GVN forces and has undoubtedly kept enemy regular forces off balance in the critical pre-wet season period. If for no other reason it can be labelled a success.

11. Territorial forces were more active and aggressive during the month. Most of the improvement noted being directly attributable to the new RF/PF Commander (Deputy Province Chief for Security) recently appointed. He has demanded more vigorous and continuous activity from District Chiefs and Company Group Commanders and this period has been a good example of the increased effectiveness of forces with capable leadership. One aspect that could bear results in the future is an increase in intelligence activity with all agencies directed to show improvement.

12. In this area there has been much effort spent in attempts to make the PHUONG HOANG programme more effective. September did see a targetting operation conducted without success which was unfortunate. It would appear that such operations are an annual event as my predecessor reported a similar activity in his final report!

13. September also saw an increase in air mobile operations, all with VNAF support. This is the first effective support provided to the province by helicopters from VNAF and also included were VNAF gunships. The latter were the first available to the territorial forces as far as can be ascertained. The results of the airmobile operations were in the main negative and the performance of the forces taking part, both RF and PF, left much room for

.../ improvement

improvement. A factor in this regard is that such operations are a rarity in this province as the previous RF/PF Commander preferred purely ground type operations.

14. Present and future activity planned is designed to throw a tight screen around the populated area during the coming week to secure the election polling booths. The plans being used generally follow those found successful during the recent Lower House elections. With current level of activity, the friendly forces should be able to ensure a reasonably trouble-free election.

15. The withdrawal of US troops from the province has caused ARVN redeployments; particularly affecting headquarters. The province now has the ARVN headquarters and the sector headquarters located about 3-4 kilometres apart. This has produced some improvement in co-ordination and cooperation between the regular and territorial forces. A further improvement could be expected once the proposed division in QUANG TRI is formed to replace the current 1st ARVN Division Forward command structure.

Other Matters

16. Advisory Effort. The province now has only four district advisory teams; three having closed out. Although several MATT teams still exist on paper all have in effect closed. So far there has been no noticeable effect caused by the withdrawal of advisory staff and some anticipated problems have failed to eventuate.

17. Economic Stability. To the layman there are continuing signs of economic progress in QUANG TRI City and surrounding districts. New building is, if anything, increasing in magnitude and shops and stalls display an increased and expanded range of merchandise. This has been a gradual but steady growth and augurs well for the future of the province. The people obviously have faith in the future security of the province.

18. Civic Action. With the departure of most of the US forces in province, (the last remaining battalion sized unit is scheduled to depart in two months) there has been a major decrease in Civic Action programmes. Neither the ARVN or territorial forces do much in this area. With the turnover of many US Barrack Areas to the GVN, a golden opportunity existed to allocate materials for projects and where not immediately required, stock pile others. Unfortunately the Vietnamese agencies responsible for control and security of the areas have allowed them to be removed onto the local market and into individual private stocks. There have been many examples of corruption in action! The pity of the matter is that items badly needed for security tasks are not available through supply channels but can be bought on the "black market".

REPORT BY WO1 B.C. ADDINGTON
ASSISTANT DSA PHU THU DISTRICT

General

1. The situation remained quiet in PHU THU District during the month with no enemy initiated incidents and there were no friendly initiated incidents.

Friendly Activities

2. Friendly activities have been confined to small unit operations by way of sweeps and night ambushes. One sweep has had a significant result as listed here-under:

- a. On 21 Sep at YD 856245 PF 100 discovered a grave containing the remains of 2xVN male persons.
- b. 21 Sep 71 at YD 857253 PF 100 discovered a grave containing the remains of 2xVN male bodies.
- c. 21 Sep 71 at YD 885242 PF 100 discovered a grave containing the remains of 1xUS Marine.
- d. 21 Sep 71 at YD 880240 PF 100 discovered a grave containing the remains of 10xVN male persons.
- e. 21 Sep at YD 912217 PF 100 discovered a grave containing the remains of 1xVN female.
- f. 21 Sep at YD 913218 PF 100 discovered a grave containing the remains of 2xVN persons.
- g. 22 Sep at YD 913218 PF 100 discovered a grave containing the remains of 7 bodies one of which is suspected to be US.

3. The Vietnamese are currently conducting an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the deaths of the persons concerned. So far it has been learned that the Marine was believed to have been killed by VC in 1966 after being separated from his unit. Some of the bodies were bound with wire but it is not known if this was the method of transportation from the scene of the killings to the grave site or whether they were bound and shot.

4. A further flame drop was put in at YD 848202 using three CH47 sorties each of 7 barrels of Foogas on suspected bunker positions. There were no secondary explosions nor were any bunker positions discovered, however it has had the effect of rendering the area clear of cover and the PF/RF are more confident when operating in the area.

MAT

5. The remaining MAT co-located with the District Team has been employed in the closing down phase. The current strength is 1 Officer and 2 NCOs and on 28 Sep it will have been reduced to 1 NCO.

.../ Rural

Rural Development

6. Rural development is progressing at a satisfactory rate and as a further five new tractors have been introduced to the district a further improvement may be anticipated. A VR conducted on 23 Sep 71, revealed the farmers industriously working their gardens and they appear to be in good heart. The 27 Engr Bn in conjunction with ARVN engrs have completed work on a ferry site which is planned to link the island District of VINH LOC with the mainland district of PHU THU. A regular ferry has not yet been put into operation.

Close of PHU THU District

7. The closing down phase of the district is running smoothly and all but essential equipment has been returned. The attitude of the Vietnamese to the closure remains good and that of the District Chief excellent. It is proposed to hold a combined close out function of Vietnamese and Advisers on Sun 26 Sep 71. The Vietnamese are supplying the food and the district will supply the refreshments. The PSA and many of the Staff Officers from Sector plan to be in attendance. At the time of writing it is anticipated that nothing appears to be in the way of a successful closure of the District.

8. In accordance with standard CORDS practise, I am to be debriefed by MACV in SAIGON before RTA.

REPORT BY CAPT J.E. WIELAND
SENIOR AUSTRALIAN ADVISER MR 2

Current Situation

1. Since last month's report, training has been halted for a period of two weeks in order to conduct the evaluation phase. Training recommenced on Monday 27 Sep 71 with a new course 9/71 of 33 PF P1 Leaders. Problem areas mentioned in last month's report have eased considerably. The team has now been assigned nine interpreters which is actually in excess of requirement. The vehicle situation has improved to the extent that the team now has a total of six jeeps. Three of these are reliable enough for long range tasks and the remaining three are suitable for the local training area tasks. The completion of five new bunkers, a command post, and an 81mm mortar pit has improved the team's security situation.

Training Progress

2. Prior to the evaluation phase commencing, courses 7/71 and 8/71 successfully graduated. These courses brought the total number of students trained to 237 of whom 207 have successfully graduated. Balance to train in BINH DINH Province including the current course is 267. At the present rate BINH DINH Province will be completed by mid December 71.

Evaluation Phase

3. This phase proved to be an interesting one and has provided some pointers for future training. A full report is being compiled at this time and will be forwarded during the next two weeks. There will be no major adjustments to the present course syllabus or methods of instruction as a result of the evaluation.

Election Period (Lower House)

4. Despite rumours of increased enemy activity during this period the Province suffered little more than the isolated case of terrorism. It is currently believed by both US and VN authorities that, during the forthcoming Presidential Elections, the NVA Regiment may step in and play an important role. However there have been no positive indicators of this possibility to date. The VC activity has risen sharply during the past week 21 Sep - 28 Sep in the form of daylight ambushes on QL 1 and the destruction of bridges along QL 1 by night.

Future Intentions

5. At this stage training will continue as normal. At completion of compilation of the final evaluation report, Director SRAQ, and the Province Senior Adviser will be fully briefed and some recommendations presented to them.

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

ANNEX D TO
AATTV REPORT SEP 71

REPORT BY MAJ R.V. MUSGROVE
SENIOR AUSTRALIAN ADVISER - PHUOC TUY PROVINCE
PERIOD 1 - 30 SEP 71

General

1. An upsurge in mining and ambushing of TF, with an emphasis on road interdiction, resulted in a noticeable increase in TF casualties for the period. Many of these casualties could have been reduced by correct control and deployment procedures. The incidents have highlighted the weaknesses evident in the 3/47 Group and its group commander. In addition the effectiveness of 3/302 RF Bn, who suffered the majority of the casualties, has shown a marked deterioration. The 3/47 Group has been chosen by Sector for re-training at VAN KIEP commencing 4 Oct 71.
2. Some success has been achieved in the training of RF in artillery fire control and mine warfare procedures. Good results are being achieved from the PF platoon/squad leaders course at JWTC however the PF pl in-place training results vary, dependent on the interest shown by the District Chief.
3. Team 89 has been advised that AATTV members attached to the team will be reduced to 12 with effect 24 Oct in line with the Australian withdrawal. This will reduce the number of MATTs to 2.
4. Criticism of the Province Chief in Saigon newspapers, added to the election fiasco, lent weight to the rumour that he was to be replaced. As a result he either journeyed to Saigon or stayed home without seeing visitors. This made the job of the PSA extremely difficult during a period of constant upheaval. It would appear the journeys to Saigon may have achieved the desired result as no announcement has been made to date.

1 ATF Withdrawal

5. At the time of writing the DPSA is completing a project on the feasibility of the B36 training centre moving into NUI DAT. This is strongly supported by Team 89 and just as strongly resisted by B36. There is no other force within province that could occupy NUI DAT. Indications are that the ARVN are not interested in taking it over and despite many other independent surveys no other organization would appear suitable.
6. The splitting of the northern part of the province into separate AO's for 18 ARVN Div and 3 Bde is not a welcome move. Neither of these formations appear to be particularly interested and it will mean a stretching of already thin resources. Sector have already received disinterested replies from 18 ARVN Div to approaches to discuss details of the new AO. There is a need for close liaison as Sector are understandably concerned with the populated areas of northern DUC THANH and wish to clarify the responsibilities of 18 ARVN Div and the TF.

MATT Activities

7. It was pleasing to see that despite the uncertainty and upheaval of the withdrawal, the MATTs increased rather than slackened their efforts. This speaks well for the professionalism of the present team leaders.
8. Those MATTs with RF Coys are now limited in effectiveness, and with the exception of MATT 4 have been withdrawn. In the areas of PF pl training, artillery fire control, and mine training, the MATTs are still usefully employed

../ especially

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

especially in the two latter cases. The concept of MATTs living in RF compounds and training RF in general military skills is no longer applicable. The requirement now is for specialized training from specialist MATTs. This enables greater discrimination of subjects taught with all the advantages inherent with specialization. For the past month, only 6 MATTs could be classified as effective and these to varying degrees. Within the next few months this number would be reduced even further. By 1972 it is believed two MATTs could be properly employed in the province.

9. The efforts of the MATTs involved with PF training have been disrupted, and on occasions rendered ineffective, due to lack of support at District level. This has reinforced past experience that for training to be effective, the soldier must be removed from the control of his own HQ and physically re-located.

10. The efforts of the MATTs involved with the training of RF in artillery fire control and engineer mini-team training are reflected in the very good results achieved. So far 44 officers have been practiced in fire control procedures and 26 soldiers have completed mini-team courses. A report from the mini-team MATT is attached.

PSDF

11. The US adviser has now been re-located to the TOC leaving the PSDF without assistance. Due to the requirement to have some idea of the situation even if only to brief VIP and fill in CORDS reports it is proposed to utilize Cpl MOLDRE to keep some form of contact open.

TF

12. An additional pl of ARVN 105mm guns has been received and located NORTH of BARIA and an additional pl of ARVN 155mm guns located at the HORSESHOE. This now gives the province:

3 x 105mm pls
3 x 155mm pls
2 x 4.2 in mors

13. It is anticipated that the US pl of 155mm will depart shortly. Their refusal to co-operate with Sector/Team 89 in the past resulted in the PSA requesting their removal when the ARVN 155mm guns were located at the HORSESHOE. It is considered that the present allocation of fire support, properly deployed, is sufficient for the province. Advice has been given on this matter but sector appears to be waiting for a decision on NUI DAT before final commitment; which is a wise move.

14. The 302 RF Bn remains split up with no indication of re-grouping in the future. The movement of 3/47 Gp, complete, into VAN KIEP for re-training is now being used as the excuse for not committing the Bn in the NORTH or the province.

Conclusion

15. The past month has shown no change in the status of the TF but there exists definite feeling that the VC are starting to take the initiative away from the TF in regards to the security of the populated areas. There is much uneasiness in DUC THANH and XUYEN MOC, and with good reason. One hopes the TF can handle all but large scale incursions by NVA or main force units from outside the province. However, in the process of the TF adjusting and finding themselves there could be short term reversals and disruption to the civilian community which may well be needed to shake the TF out of their apathy.

Appendices Appx 1 - After Action Report - 3 Coy, 302 RF Bn.
Appx 2 - Course Report - Mini-Team.

AFTER ACTION REPORT
BY WO2 F.K. EBERLE

Unit 302 RF Bn 3 Coy.
Period 25 Sept 71.
Loc Grid Squares 4866 and 4966.
Mission Search and Destroy.

1. 1200 hrs. Coy moved out from HORSE SHOE on APCs to GR 489647 where they dismounted and then moved on foot.
2. HQ element and a section moved off road to West and moved North to 489655 clearing to a width of 200 metres as they moved.
3. HQ then remained at 489655 while section put in block from GR 486657 to 489655. HQ element was joined by two armoured vehicles. All civilians were searched and checked in the HQ location.
4. The remainder of the Coy moved from dismount point North to search AO. Reports put them in the area of GR 490658 and then at approx 1400 hrs at GR 484664 and GR 489663.
5. At 1550 hrs the Coy had re-grouped at the HQ location and returned by truck to HORSE SHOE arriving at 1555 hrs.

Comment

6. The aim of the op was not carried out for fol reasons:
 - a. HQ Group did not get within 500m of AO.
 - b. Dismount from APCs was approx 1400 metres short. Allowing reported VC ample time to move out of AO.
 - c. It is doubtful if remainder of Coy did in fact enter AO and search.
 - d. Coy Commander to me seem reluctant to move close enough to make contact. He split his force and did not move into AO as was the plan before leaving HORSE SHOE.

COURSE REPORT - MINI TEAM TRAINING TEAM
BY CPL G.R. GREY, RAE

Minewarfare and Demolitions

1. Following is a course report conducted by MTTT at AN NGAI with the 3/48 Group.
 2. A total of 16 soldiers attended consisting of 4 Sergeants, 1 Corporal and 11 Privates. On the second day a soldier was dismissed from the course because of lack of interest. The soldier Pte CUONG was from 480 Coy. On the sixth day of the course Pte HAI of 124 Coy became ill and missed a total of 5 days of the course. He too was dropped from the course. Of the 14 men left on the course, none failed, which was exceptional in our opinion.
 3. Subjects covered were:
 - a. All aspects of Minewarfare.
 - b. Demolitions of trees, wells, bunkers, tunnels and blinds.
 - c. All aspects of Booby-trapping.
 4. During the course there were two field trips conducted. One at 1 Field Sqn RAE, where they were put through the mines room and were shown a practical demonstration as well as theory on a mine incident drill. The second trip was to JWTC where they were given advanced training in minewarfare and booby trapping.
 5. The students showed a keen interest in the course from the very start by taking many notes and asking various technical questions on mines and explosives. All these questions were answered by the instructors, assisted by drops or practical demonstrations.
 6. The course had two written and two practical examinations. The practical examinations consisted of:
 - a. The use of live explosives.
 - b. The destruction of hand grenades, mortars, 105 artillery shells, M72 rocket launcher, M79 rounds, bunkers and wells.
- The students performed well at all these practical tests.
7. On the first written examination, which was conducted on the third day of the second week, the class average was 64%. On their final examination, which was carried out on the final day of the course, the class average was 79% an increase of 15% on the first written exam. A most pleasing effort.
 8. The instructors all agree that the students, on their first time dealing with explosives were above average. It was quite obvious that by the end of the course, the students had absorbed all of the knowledge, passed on to them by the instructors.

.../ 9. It was

9. It was a disappointment to find that the students on completion of their course, could not be moved to 1 Field Sqn, for their in-the-field training owing to operational commitments and withdrawal of the unit from the theatre.

10. In the instructors opinion, the course was a success. The students were keen and anxious to learn. However only time will tell, when the occasion arises to use this knowledge correctly.

Remarks

11. 3/48 Group, administration wise-left a lot to be desired as regards transportation of Vietnamese students. In one instance the truck arrived two hours late. The Vietnamese admin and liaison officer was hardly ever in the compound.

REPORT JWTC - SEP 71

Training

1. 4/71 Junior Officer Course marched out 4 Sep 71. Thirty four students failed out of a total student strength of 129. The attitude displayed by this course was poor, particularly during the final operation.
2. 4/71 Senior NCO Course, which started 23 Aug 71 is on its final operation and scheduled to march out 2 Oct 71. Student strength is 99.
3. 5/71 Junior Officer Course started 6 Sep 71. Student strength is 120.
4. 4/71 Popular Forces Cadre Course commenced 6 Sep 71. A number of thefts described later in this report forced a cancellation of one week of this course 20-26 Sep 71. Adjustments to the syllabus have been made and the course will be completed 1 Oct 71. Student strength is 30.
5. The three RF companies detached from NTC VAN KIEP to carry out training at JWTC and provide security for JWTC, started training 13 Sep 71. Coordination by JWTC staff has proved an irksome task. No Aust advisory assistance has been provided. Superficial impression of training being done is depressing. Units involved are:

3/129 Coy	GIA DINH Sector	-	105 all ranks
3/278 Coy	GIA DINH Sector	-	113 all ranks
3/971 Coy	LONG KHANH Sector	-	90 all ranks
6. On the 22 Sep 71, JWTC was directed by CTC to transfer all stores and personnel to NTC VAN KIEP. Movement to begin not before 4 Oct 71 and to be completed by 16 Oct 71. Future Aust participation has not yet been decided. JWTC has been allocated a sector within NTC VAN KIEP. Accommodation is not of a high standard. Training facilities including lecture rooms, training areas and ranges are centralised under NTC HQ control. The transfer will disrupt training but to what extent is not yet known. 5/71 Senior NCO Course scheduled to start approx 11 Oct 71 may be cancelled. A detailed appraisal of NTC VAN KIEP facilities will be given in the report for Oct 71.
7. A cinema projectionist course was conducted for Vietnamese Staff 14-17 Sep 71. Five out of six students qualified. Interest was keen and the staff now have the projectors and operators to run their own amenities and training films without Aust aid.

Visits

8. Visitors during the month were:

Comdt JWS Kota Tinggi)	
Comdt Trg Centre Port Dickson)	7 Sep 71
COMAFV		8 Sep 71

.../ MAC(T) rep

MAC(T) rep	10 Sep 71
QMG AHQ	12 Sep 71
Reps from JGS, CTC, MR3 and Sector	14 Sep 71
AHQ Stores Assessment Team	20 Sep 71
COMAFV	21 Sep 71
CCOS (Aust)	24 Sep 71

Defence

9. Three RF Coys (undergoing refresher training NTC VAN KIEP) marched in 11 Sep 71 and were held in the JWTC perimeter. Area occupied and defended by C Sqn 1 Armd Regt was transferred to JWTC 1000 hrs 16 Sep 71 and two RF Coys moved in. No problems encountered.
10. Week end 18/19 Sep Aust Advisory Team incl 198 Wks Sect occupied NORTHERN sector of 1 ARU area.
11. 23 Sep 1 ARU vacated their SOUTHERN sector which was occupied by the remaining RF Coy.
12. The above dispositions will stand until 15 Oct 71, when the three RF coys are expected to return to their parent units.
13. Night 18/19 Sep large scale thiering occurred in the PF training area and the engineer project office recently established within JWTC perimeter. Some items have been recovered, evidence showing that soldiers from one, possibly two RF coys, were involved. Security within the perimeter is lax despite corrective action by the Comdt. The incident demonstrates the weakness in using RF personnel, rotated every five weeks, for defence and security.

Admin and Log

14. A report by the Adviser attached to Admin and Log Sect JWTC is attached as Appendix 1.

Engineer Works

15. 198 Wks Sect moved into location with JWTC advisory team 19 Sep 71. The thefts and vandalism 18/19 Sep in their project office will delay progress by at least 3 weeks.
16. Upgrading of the roads within JWTC has continued although curtailed by wet weather. The site for Stage 2 students mess building has been cleared. Dumping of sand and gravel has commenced.

Aust Advisory Team

17. During Sep the average strength was 45 all ranks, which rose to approximately 70 with the march in of 198 Wks Sect. No major difficulties were experienced.

Appendices

- Appendix 1. Admin and Log Report.

REPORT BY LT J.T.A. HOLLAND
ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS DIVISION, JWTC

General

1. There has been considerably less contact between the Australian adviser and the A&L Division this month compared with the past. This was due to R&R leave on the adviser's part, and concentration by the Vietnamese on acquiring all equipment handed over to JWTC by the Armd Sqn and 1 ARU.
2. The prompt action taken by the A&L Division in clearing all stores from the new areas was very comprehensive, and apparently there was minimal loss by theft etc.
3. The Table of Equipment (TOE) has still not arrived at JWTC, so most of the equipment shortages mentioned last month still stand.

Materiel and Services

4. Ammunition.
 - a. JWTC has requested that all outstanding ammunition be forwarded as soon as possible. As yet it has not arrived here.
 - b. With the exception of explosives, the ammunition delivered last month is still sitting out in the open under tarpaulins as storage space is not yet available in bunkers.
5. POL. Although there has been an increase in transport, kitchen stores etc. there has been no corresponding increase in fuel rationing for JWTC.
6. Water.
 - a. Water still remains the biggest single problem confronting the logistics side of JWTC. Contributing factors are as follows:
 - (1) Breakdown of the only existing pump within JWTC, thus cutting the married quarters off for water. Lack of constant mechanical supervision is part of the problem because the Australians cannot spare a man full-time for this task, the Vietnamese do not have men capable of the job at this stage.
 - (2) The MK 3 International 500 gallon water tanker is totally inadequate for the task, having such a small load capacity. The truck has been handed over to the Vietnamese motor pool but they do not effectively control the driver and his delivery of water.
 - (3) The promised arrival of a loan tanker from VAN KIEP NTC for use by the RF defence companies has not eventuated. Instead they have been given one 500 gal. trailer by the A&L Div.

.../(4) HQ Coy

- (4) HQ Coy of 1 ATF is the only unit providing a daily delivery of water to JWTC, and as TF continue their attempts to extricate themselves from any involvement at all with JWTC this source of supply may well be cut off very shortly.

7. Transport.

- a. One additional GMC truck has been sent to JWTC, giving a total of five. The truck that was in VUNG TAU workshops also returned to the Centre, however a careless accident put another truck in for repairs the same day.
- b. After the theft of the fuel injection pump from the International tractor, the machine was handed over to the Vietnamese and is still sitting in the motor pool awaiting parts.
- c. Apparently the promised ambulance jeep is in Saigon awaiting pick-up but it's arrival date at JWTC is unknown.
- d. All four jeeps here are now operational.

8. Medical.

- a. It is expected that a Vietnamese doctor will be posted to JWTC soon.
- b. A new building was taken over as a joint medical centre with both the Australian WO and the Vietnamese doing a lot of work to get it well set up.
- c. Medical equipment is coming in from a few Australian sources but only some minor drugs so far from Vietnamese channels. One new refrigerator was taken by the Australian adviser from ARU for use in the centre,
- d. There have been no major illnesses this month at JWTC.

9. Education. There are now about seventy children attending the school within JWTC. Consequently one of the officer's wives has commenced teaching to help the GVN teacher, however the Commandant of the Centre is paying the extra woman himself because there is no provision for GVN funds.

10. Married Quarters.

- a. After some initial "Teething" troubles the quarters have been all occupied.
- b. Because the officers' area is lower than the NCO's water pressure is very poor in the latter area and there is always a selfish attitude in existence.
- c. Insufficient paint has been provided, and used, to do all front doors, and windows in the quarters.
- d. The Vietnamese have been forced to take over sole responsibility for garbage collection, with the result that the job is done every two or three days, compared with a regular daily collection in the past by the Australian WO.

.../ e. An

- e. An American veterinary sergeant visited JWTC and inoculated all available dogs for rabies.

11. Polwar. Since the Australians moved across to ARU the Vietnamese have not shown any films for their own entertainment despite the fact that they have had personnel trained and tested in the use of the projectors. There is always an English movie drawn for them each day, and there is an easily available supply of Vietnamese films at Sector as well.

12. Miscellaneous.

- a. The students' kitchen has been effectively enlarged and partially enclosed and is quite capable of producing the extra food needed for the defence companies.

END OF TOUR REPORT BY MAJ W.D. THOMAS
PROVINCE PSYOPS ADVISER - PHUOC TUY

General

1. This report covers the period of my tour from 1 October 70 to 30 September 1971.
2. During this time I was a member of AATTV assigned to the Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) and detached by them to MACCORDS Advisory Team 89, BARIA, as Province Psyops Adviser (PPA) PHUOC TUY. I was the fourth and last Australian officer to fill the post. During this period JUSPAO began to run down its strength in line with the US policy of Vietnamisation and disengagement.
3. For background details, job description and a synthesis of the JUSPAO organization I refer the reader to End of Tour Report of Maj M.W. FARMER, my predecessor. My Debriefing Report, a MACV requirement, is also attached (Appendix 1). The references should provide continuation of detail from June 1968 to August 1971.
4. The posting gave me experience of the US and Vietnamese Psyops organizations, both military and civil and some insight into the MACCORDS organization. It also gave me a feel for the US Advisory team concept and an outsider's view of some of the Australian effort in Vietnam.

Aim

5. The aim of this report is to offer some comments and recommendations not covered or not fully developed in Maj FARMER's report. In view of the current withdrawl of Australian forces these will be limited to points which may be important in other places at other times.

Australian Psyops/PR Guidance

6. JUSPAO policy guidance was always timely and clear. For example the important speeches of President Nixon were disseminated in bilingual booklets within a short time of their being broadcast. These booklets would be accompanied by a suggested method of exploitation. This quick production of the "party line" ensured that the speech was interpreted uniformly and the ready availability of the approved text in Vietnamese assisted in clearing up doubtful points and allaying rumours.
7. No such service was available in Province for Australian policy decisions and announcements. For example, I first saw the text of Mr McMahon's speech of August 17 when it appeared in an English language Saigon newspaper and although questioned by Vietnamese officials was unable to comment authoritatively. (As JUSPAO's representative I could comment an US Policy thanks to the policy guidance). On the 27 August a UPI release appeared in "CHINH LUAN" a Saigon newspaper giving details of the 1st Australian Task Force withdrawl. These details were substantially accurate but so far as I was concerned had been classified secret and in consequence not discussed. I believe that timely guidance on important Australian announcements should be given. I understand that no system exists for circulating directives from

.../ the

the Australian Embassy and would recommend that a system be developed, possibly through the Department of Foreign Affairs. I am not suggesting that we need an organization as elaborate as JUSPAO, or USIS from which it sprang, but some machinery for transmitting guidance to Psyop field operators is necessary.

8. In Vietnam US information services have supplied the Australian press with much of its material. The Australian PR effort has been mainly confined to local boy stories. JUSPAO has handled press briefings and its News and Third Country Division has prepared and circulated stories and film clips for dissemination world wide. Much activity on the part of Australian forces and Australian Embassy officials has not been covered by this organization because the appeal of such stories is to a limited audience. We do not seem to be concerned that no organization exists for giving the Australian press material which would enhance the image of the government we are supporting and publicize the overall Australian effort, military and civil. Such an organization could be developed in conjunction with that suggested in para 6.

The Advisory Team

9. The advisory concept displayed many weaknesses. The major weakness is the unsuitability of many advisers for their task. This is not the place for an extended essay on the ideal adviser, but to select, for this type of work, people with abrasive personalities and inflexible attitudes is counter productive. The Australian adviser rarely fell into this category, but the few occasions on which he did, present a strong argument for careful selection involving personality assessment. The youth of many advisers too was a handicap. In the main, maturity was a greater help than expert knowledge.

10. The ability to speak the language is a great asset. My three weeks language course at Woodside was a help, but I often wished that I had attended a longer course. It was noticeable that a small effort to speak the language met with an inordinately favourable response. In consequence I would recommend that any future advisory elements should receive the most comprehensive language training possible.

11. Ignorance of local customs and procedures was another hurdle that had to be overcome. No amount of detailed briefing and background reading can fully prepare an adviser for work with the people of the country. Ideally the adviser should work and live with his counterparts. Security may demand changes from the normal living pattern but luxurious adviser accommodation and facilities tend to handicap the adviser in his work.

12. If it is thought that Australian forces will in future employ the advisory team concept, provision should be made now for the selection and training of the advisers. Postings to the countries where the concept may be employed should be made for potential advisers who could, at first hand, become acquainted with the geography, language and customs of the country. I am reminded of the effectiveness of the Field Intelligence Officers in Aden and Malaysia who lived and worked with the people without benefit of massive administrative support.

Psyop Intelligence and Information

13. As PPA it was often necessary to work closely with allied intelligence agencies. Although the data I was gathering was not strictly military intelligence it was nevertheless held to be useful to 1 ATF and HQ AFV. I understand that a Psyops cadre will be maintained at the Intelligence Centre, Woodside and that the links between intelligence and Psyops/information activities will be maintained.

.../ 14

14. One of the most useful psyops information gathering agencies was the Province Research Team (PRT). This consisted of a group of Vietnamese, trained in opinion sampling techniques and speedy production of Attitude Surveys. The team was employed in PHUOC TUY about once a month and produced reliable data on public attitudes. Their modus operandi was different to that of 1 ATF ground teams, being more indirect and of the people. It is recommended that this approach to opinion sampling be used in any future deployment of Australian psyoperators.

Conclusion

15. The years work in a field quite new to me has proved interesting and enjoyable. I believe it will have been of benefit to the Australian Army in that another field operator has been added to the small number of psyops experienced officers and NCOs. Greater benefit could accrue if the need for psyops/information operators in areas in which Australia may find herself involved is recognized and steps are taken now to design and implement an integrated psyops/information organization.

Appendices

Appendix 1. Debriefing Report (RCS: MAC J3-119) Maj W.D. Thomas.

PSYOPS DEBRIEFING REPORT

(RCS: MAC J3-119)

LOCATION : PHUOC TUY Province.
REPORTING OFFICER : Major W.D. THOMAS (Province Psyops Adv.)
DATES OF TOUR : 1 October 1970 - 30 September 1971
DATE OF REPORT : 12 August 1971

Conditions on Arrival

1. Material Shortages.

a. VIS.

- (1) Vehicles were in very short supply, there being only two tri-lambrettas and three four wheeled vehicles available. Of these one was beyond repair and VIS had been awaiting authority to auction it for some months. Another, the Renault Fourgnette, was awaiting repair by MOI. No plans for replacement of vehicles existed.
- (2) 43 public TV sets were deployed, an insufficient number for the Province. Radios and broadcast equipment, however, were held at all district VIS HQs in sufficient numbers and a fair state of repair.
- (3) The M85 press was inoperative and had been so for three months. Expendables for the M85 were supplied by JUSPAO, but repair of the machine was MOI's responsibility.
- (4) Province VIS HQ was housed in an old building badly in need of repair. The M85 was located in an adjacent outhouse more suitable for use as a privy than a printing shop. Plans were being considered for a new building and funds (\$1,300,000VN) had been voted for this project, by MOI.
- (5) VIS Cadre were understrength and at hamlet level, poorly trained, due to their draft eligible status.

b. POLWAR

- (1) Polwar Company was housed in cramped and unsuitable accommodation behind Sector HQ. No equipment had been issued to the company.

.../ 2. Working

2. Working Relationships.

- a. Working relationships within Team 89 were good. The PSA required the PPA to oversee the Chieu-Hoi service and Polwar, in addition to VIS. On arrival this presented some difficulties as neither a Chieu Hoi adviser nor an S5 adviser were on strength. Captain ELLIOTT, an excellent young officer, arrived on 30th October and became the S5 adviser and WO2 S. BOOTH, of AATTV filled the Chieu Hoi Adviser's position in November. The "Psyops Shop" thus formed worked closely and harmoniously together and set an example of co-operation which benefited the Vietnamese members of the Psyops Community. Continuity was supplied by Mr BACH QUANG DUC, the JUSPAO Assistant, whose help throughout the year proved invaluable.
- b. The relationship established by my predecessor with the VIS Chief was good and happily this continued to be the case during my tour. The relationship between the Chief of Staff Sector S5, the lynch pin of the Polwar bloc, and the PPA was poor due to my predecessor having tried to have him removed. (An action I later heartily agreed with).
- c. The Province Chief's interest in Psyops was not great. Although nominally chairman of the People's Information Committee he delegated most of the responsibility to the Deputy Province Chief for Administration.

3. Adequacy of Psyop Materials.

- a. JUSPAO published periodicals were being distributed in adequate numbers, although more could have been used. It was necessary for the PPA to collect the periodicals from Psyops Division MR 3 on a weekly basis.
- b. VIS produced a good quality newspaper once or twice monthly. The copy being prepared at Province VIS HQ and the printing done in Saigon, on a commercial press. Funds were supplied by MOI.
- c. All District VIS produced a mimeographed newsletter monthly.
- d. Considerable reliance was placed upon 1 ATF Psyops unit for printing support, which was always forthcoming upon request.
- e. Films were available from JUSPAO Cultural division to the VIS Chief. MOI occasionally issued an extremely dull newsreel.

4. Adequacy and Timeliness of Support from Corps and Saigon.

- a. Guidance and support from Directorate Psyops MR 3 was good, despite a division at BIEN HOA between CORES Psyops Directorate and the military. This did result in some difficulties when, for example, the Psyops unit at 1 ATF was given instructions to conduct a Popularization of Territorial Forces Campaign about which the Psyop single manager in Province knew nothing.
- b. Directives were received which required "doing" rather than "advising". When a parallel instruction was not passed down the Vietnamese chain of command this required powers of persuasion on our part and a deal of tolerance by our counterparts.

.../ c. Support

- c. Support from MOI Saigon was poor and the MOI Inspectorate ineffective.

5. General Effectiveness of All Psyop Effort.

- a. The overall Psyop programme in the province was progressing at a slow but steady pace. The current Information Programme was being followed, albeit in some respects superficially.
- b. The Province Mobile Psywar team comprised of S5, VIS and APTs had ceased to be effective when the JUSPAO funded drama team and direct support from 6 Psyops Battalion was withdrawn prior to my arrival.
- c. The culture drama team of the RD Cadre was occasionally used but was not effective.
- d. The Chieu Hoi service chief and the APT commander were not speaking to one another and neither was contributing a great deal to the Psyop effort.
- e. Tactical Psyops; Sector Psywar took little initiative and relied on preplanned support. This was erratic and little or no follow up was carried out to improve CPOC's performance despite pressure from my predecessor. Another inhibiting factor was the small AOs then allotted to Sector Forces. 1 ATF was most active in province in immediate exploitation of contacts and ralliers. The capacity of the 1 ATF Psyops Unit being as great as a similar US Unit assigned to a Division.
- f. The People's Information Plan of the Pacification Plan was being tackled by VIS who, in the main, were achieving their statistical goals. Other agencies were not deeply involved, with the exception of 1 ATF ground teams. These were operating in the villages, in support of local authorities, for periods of 2 - 3 days.
- g. VIS had established a temporary information centre for the Cambodian refugees in the Refugee Village and was under the personal direction of the VIS Chief, giving active help to the inhabitants.
- h. Psyop coordination had been the area in which my predecessor had made his major effort. As a result of his labour a fledgling People's Information Committee was meeting periodically. Although not actively chaired by the Province Chief, minutes had been written and circulated to him.

6. Local Obstacles.

- a. The inactive role played by the Chief of Staff Sector S5 prevented the Polwar bloc from realizing its potential. Not only was he sluggish himself but he handicapped his active and able deputy by not delegating the authority he himself would not use.

.../ Conditions

Conditions on Departure

7. Material Shortages.

a. VIS.

- (1) There are two tri-lambrettas and one jeep which run. The Renault Fourgnette is still rotting at VIS HQ awaiting action by MOI. The VIS Chief writes periodic letters to MOI about it and these are paralleled to JUSPAO with no results. One vehicle was auctioned, none were replaced and no plans for replacement have been made.
- (2) Public TV sets have been maintained quite well but there is still an insufficient number for the Province. A request to MOI for additional sets was refused, although JUSPAO information was that a stock was held in the AID warehouse. Repair facilities at AN DONG for TV Set is improving.
- (3) The M85 was repaired shortly after my arrival using scrounged spares and a technician from CORDS, BIEN HOA. During the period it has broken down twice and been quickly repaired using the same sources. Since the MOI signed a contract with National Cash Register the press has been repaired once, in late July, but ran for only a few days before becoming inoperative again. It is at present broken and awaiting the attention of NCR technicians. The VIS Chief has been nagging MOI to repair the press. In five days he has sent a hand carried letter, a signal, and his deputy to Saigon in order to get action. MOI remain unresponsive. JUSPAO ceased to supply paper and expendables for the M85 in January. Since that time no expendables have been received from MOI. Some reams of newsprint were delivered. But for the scrounging of the PPA, condoned by BIEN HOA, printing would have ceased.
- (4) Province VIS HQ is still housed in the dilapidated building referred to in Part I of this report. Rising costs have made the \$1,300,000VN voted insufficient for a new building. The VIS Chief has attempted to persuade MOI to either increase the vote or allow him to modify the plans in order to build a new VIS HQ. MOI has not reached a decision.
- (5) VIS Cadre are up to strength and are now draft exempt. Training Courses have been run at Province for Hamlet and Village Cadre with encouraging results. Most of the Village and District Cadre have attended a course at VUNG TAU National Training Centre.

b. Polwar.

- (1) Polwar Company is up to strength and has been rehoused in suitable accommodation in BARIA. Some equipment has been issued, notably vehicles and arms, but their complete TOE has yet to be issued. It is to Polwar's credit that despite material shortages of technical equipment they function efficiently. At present they rely very much on equipment (projector, tape recorder, musical instruments) borrowed from JUSPAO or bought through AIK funds.

.../8. Working

8. Working Relationship.

- a. Relationships within Team 89 remained good throughout the year. A policy change saw the Chieu Hoi responsibility transferred to the PHUNG HOANG adviser and the departure, without replacement, of the Chieu Hoi adviser. Unfortunately the transfer of responsibilities and the departure of the Chieu Hoi Adviser coincided with the run down of APT and a drastic fall off in the number of Hoi-Chanh. Capt ELLIOT was transferred to another advisory position on the Team but his replacement recently arrived, will continue to assist the Psyops Community in province as the PPCVA. Mr BACH QUANG DUC proved to be an excellent adjutant and it is greatly to be regretted that no position can be found for him on my departure and the subsequent closure of the PPA's office and JUSPAO representation in Province.
- b. The VIS Chief is not a young man. Nevertheless he has been open to suggestion and our working relationship has been good. His performance of his duties has been satisfactory, if sometimes patchy. He will now tackle MOI repeatedly about his problems and has no hesitation about supervising the District VIS staff. He is reluctant to tackle the Province Chief, as are many province officials. His deputy, who will hopefully replace the VIS Chief on his impending retirement, is an active and astute man who will be able to carry on the good work and may well improve it. The Chief of Staff Sector S5 departed province on a series of courses and eventual reposting in February. This was the turning point in the development of Sector Polwar. Under the deputy, Dai-Uy HUONG, many of the problems disappeared, almost overnight. Polwar Company was rehoused and re-organized. Four ground teams were formed with equipment borrowed from VIS. The mobile Psywar team was properly programmed and supervised. HUONG was an easy man to work with and his relationship with both the advisory element and with the other members of the Psyops Community was excellent. It is to be hoped that his promised promotion (Well deserved) is realized.
- c. The Province Chief continued to delegate his responsibility for the People's Information Committee to his Deputy for Administration. He did at times show an interest in Psyops but it is to be regretted that the interest was never timely and often showed an ignorance of principles. However his Deputy S5, HUONG, was always available to modify these infrequent demands. This he did with considerable tact.

9. Adequacy of Psyops Materials

- a. Printed materials from JUSPAO have been gradually run down in the last few months. Distribution has now been passed over to MOI. It is too soon to say how the new system will work but, considering MOI's performance in other fields, I am pessimistic.
- b. The Province newspaper ceased regular publication in February when MOI withheld funds already budgeted. Despite several letters and signals from VIS no funds were forthcoming and protests were stifled by the bland announcement from the Ministry that "a committee has been established to determine

.../ which

which provinces will be allowed to continue publication of a newspaper". Parallel action proved ineffectual and so VIS produced a periodic magazine in place of the paper. The magazine is not as effective as the newspaper but is an indication of the VIS capability to function despite the ministry. No decision from the committee (if indeed one was ever formed) has been promulgated.

- c. District newsletters continued to be published throughout the period. Recently, village newsletters have been produced following a course run by Province VIS for Village Cadre.
- d. 1 ATF continued to be a reliable source of printing support. Early in my tour an agreement was reached with 1 ATF that they would only respond to requests for assistance when Vietnamese channels had been tried and failed. Once the message had been absorbed more reliance was placed upon Vietnamese channels and, although MOI never responded to a printing request from VIS, CPOC is now quite a reliable source of posters, leaflets and plates. VIS learned to rely primarily upon the M85 and paper masters.
- e. Films continue to be available from JUSPAO cultural division. Some were issued through Polwar Saigon and rarely from MOI. An attempt was made to activate the supply of films from MOI. Several visits to MOPIX Saigon failed to produce a copy of "Vietnam Vietnam" in Vietnamese although an English language copy was loaned to VIS. Eventually a copy was obtained from Cultural Division JUSPAO Saigon. This excellent propaganda film was reported to have been issued to Province VIS from MOI but had not. A MOPIX Team visited province to shoot a propaganda film dealing with the PHUNG HOANG Programme. A great deal of support was given to the film unit from Province resources because of the tight budget allowed the unit by MOI. It is to be regretted that so much of the capacity of MOPIX is being diverted to other activities in Saigon.

10. Adequacy and Timeliness of Support from Corps and Saigon.

- a. Guidance and support from Directorate Psyops MR 3 remained, in the main good. The recent amalgamation of the CORDS Psyops responsibility and the military psyops function in the person of the Director Psyops MR 3 will prove most helpful. At last we have, in reality, a Psyops single manager at Region.
- b. JUSPAO Psyop. Policy guidance was always excellent, timely and well produced.
- c. The distinction between "doing" and "advising" is still not always realized e.g. The recent order to begin a campaign of rewards for information leading to the turn in of mines and booby traps was not accompanied by an instruction to our counterparts through Vietnamese channels. We are still expected to achieve at our level what has not been achieved at a higher level.
- d. Support from MOI has been abysmal.

.../ 11. General

11. General Effectiveness of All Psyops Effort.

- a. The overall Psyops programme in province is still progressing slowly, but it is progressing. The 1971 Peoples Information Plan is being carried out and the Psyops community will, no doubt, meet the statistical goals set.
- b. The Province Mobile Psywar Team, now comprised of S5, VIS, RD Cadre and APT, was resurrected and is an effective Psyop. tool. It is programmed by the Current Affairs Section of the Peoples Information Committee and stages soft-sell propaganda performance in the villages and hamlets (the Team was weaned from RF Compounds in under two months) at night and face to face information activities during the day. It is equipped with a vehicle (Polwar Company) musical instruments (AIK funds and Aust CA funds) loudspeakers (VIS). The whole is a tribute to the co-operation achieved by all agencies. The performers are drawn from Polwar and the RD Cadre.
- c. The RD culture drama team is now part of the Mobile Psywar Team although it retains the ability to function independently, which it does very effectively. Recently the team put on an hours performance for VN TV.
- d. The Chieu Hoi Service Chief and the APT Commander now work together. Unfortunately the responsibility for the Chieu Hoi advisory effort has been transferred to PHUNG HOANG and, at the same time, the number of APT has been cut. This, coupled with the fall off in the number of ralliers, has caused the Chieu Hoi participation in the overall Psyop. effort to decline.
- e. The departure of the Chief of Staff Sector S5 and the subsequent assumption of responsibility by his deputy was the beginning of a much more vigorous approach in Province to Tactical Psyops. Capt HUONG produced an SOP for VN agencies which explained in detail the methods to be used for ast Psyops exploitation. The Principle adopted was that VN channels would be tried first and if these failed S5 would request help from 1 ATF or JUSPAO. As a result CPOC was called upon to produce voice aircraft, posters and leaflets in addition to the preplanned missions already fairly well established. At first CPOC found the requests difficult to fulfil but there has been a steady improvement in CPOC support and a growing confidence in the Vietnamese systems. There are still deficiencies in the system; Polwar does not own a tape recorder and so must borrow from VIS or JUSPAO; there is no plate making capacity in Province and the only Polaroid belongs to JUSPAO. 1 ATF's co-operation both with the adviser and with the S5 was excellent and the knowledge that they would help, often at very short notice, if CPOC failed was very reassuring. The enlargement of Sector AO's during this time was an added incentive to Sector Polwar to perform tasks previously left to 1 ATF Psyops Unit.
- f. The Peoples Information Plan for 1971 is being carried out. Supervision of the Plan is done by the Deputy for Administration. The 1 ATF ground teams have run down their operations but

.../ greater

greater co-operation between the Psyops Community has more than compensated for this. Support for the priority tasks is quite good, PHUNG HOANG having been best served. All agencies react quickly to directives from senior levels.

- g. The temporary refugee village closed and VIS carried on their good work (not always appreciated by the Cambodians) in both NUOC NGOT and PHU MY.
- h. Psyops Co-ordination showed remarkable gains during the period under report. The Province Chief, although the chairman, did not attend one meeting of the PIC and quite early in the year it was decided we could probably do without his presence providing he read the minutes and gave support. This he did, but often the committee would wait for a long time to have his approval for some scheme. The PIC Current Affairs Section consisted of VIS Chief as Chairman, Sector S5, Polwar Company Commander, Chieu Hoi Serve Chief, RD Cadre Chief, PSDF, 1 ATF Psyops representative and the PPA. Other department chiefs attended some meetings when action was required for their departments e.g. National Police for the anti-drug campaign. The CA Section of the PIC developed throughout the year into a body quite capable of forward planning of Psyop activities. Time for production of printed material was always tight however and particularly when the request came from those not normally involved with Psyops. Co-operation between the members of the committee has become very good. Joint efforts include the Province Mobile Psywar Team already commented upon and co-ordinated schemes such as the NGUYEN TRAI IV campaign; the PHUONG HOANG Information Campaign, and many others.

12. Local Obstacles.

- a. The failure of MOI to support the Province VIS has been, and remains, the major obstacle to a really smooth running Psyop organization. The performance of MOI has been uniformly bad and shows little or no signs of improving. MOI inspections have been superficial and have achieved nothing.
- b. Polwar Company is still without its TOE and relies upon borrowed equipment. The JUSPAO equipment should be transferred to the incoming PPCVA so that Polwar Company can continue to function until its TOE is issued.

General Overall Assessment of Programme and Recommended Changes for Improvement

With the impending withdrawal of FWMAF and the cut back in advisory effort the Vietnamese Psyop community will be left with a difficult task. Security in PHUOC TUY has been good and there are many signs of pacification. Despite this the attitude of the bulk of the population remains one of "wait and see".

It is this fact which leads me to the conclusion that the overall result of the programme so far has been little better than a stalemate.

.../ The

The population of PHUOC TUY tends to be suspicious of GVN policies no matter how much effort is put into selling them by the psyop community. They see corruption at all levels. They see nepotism and inefficiency. Then they are asked to believe the official organizations which speak for the government. It is no wonder that they remain sceptical and it is to the Psyops community's credit that the game is drawn and not lost.

Unless Saigon can duplicate the material support given by the advisers and FWMAF there will be a fall off in the quantity of psyop effort. I have no doubt that this will be the case. The quality of the psyop effort will, I believe, remain constant, but doubt whether this will change the attitude of the majority in PHUOC TUY unless the psyop community have a better product to sell.

END OF TOUR REPORT BY 235016 LT COL W.A. WOOLSTON
OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
TERRITORIAL FORCES ADVISORY DIVISION (TFAD),
CORDS, MR 3

History of Employment

1. I replaced Major I. Throssell RA Inf, after a week handover, on 16 Oct 70 as the Area Coordinator for the three provinces of BINH TUY, PHUOC TUY and LONG KHANH. My duties required are to maintain a watching brief on all aspects of Territorial Force activity in the three provinces. My point of contact was to be the province advisory staffs and the Deputy Assistant for Territories III Corps/MR3.
2. The Territorial Force Advisory Division was re-organized in November 1970 and I became responsible for the Operations and Intell Branch together with the Training Branch. The Territorial Artillery Branch was added in January 1971 when three Artillery officers were appointed to advise the appropriate section of III Corps headquarters during the raising, training and deployment of territorial artillery platoons throughout the eleven provinces of MR3.
3. Due to a temporary dislocation in the MACCORDS replacement programme I assumed the duties of the Deputy Director in May and was the senior member of the division for a short period in July.

Function of TFAD

4. TFAD is one of the three uniformed divisions of CORDS MR3. Together with PHUONG HOANG Division and Public Safety Division it is responsible to the Deputy for CORDS for the coordination of all advisers' effort directed towards the improvement of security in MR3. Initially TFAD was used almost exclusively as a staff division of the Military Senior Adviser and carried out unilateral staff studies, assessments and surveys which were used to support recommendations to the Senior Adviser III Corps (Commander II Field Forces Vietnam). Later on the accent was placed on supporting the staff sections of III Corps/MR3 and each action officer of TFAD was accorded a counterpart in that headquarters. While independent staff action continued to be required of the Division, an increasing amount of time was spent in addressing the problems identified by Vietnamese rather than by other advisers.
5. At the beginning of 1971, there were 135 US and Australian MATs deployed throughout MR3; there was also an RF/PF advisor and a PSDF advisor in every province. These agencies provided an independent reporting channel and a system for disseminating adviser comment on training and operational techniques. By July their numbers had been reduced by 50%. No serious attempt was made to retain adviser input to the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) or the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) after that date. These two monthly publications had previously been the starting off point for much of the analytical work required of TFAD. They had proved to be a quick means of establishing first order approximations to many of the questions involving population and territorial security on a regional basis.

Thoughts and Impressions

6. TFES and HES. I believe these systems to be a worthwhile application of EDP despite the expense involved in collecting and collating data. Apart

.../ from

from their ability to indicate areas requiring priority of effort to all users, from the national level down, the setting up of the system required a clear statement of the aim and permitted the establishment of goals. Used correctly by an adviser it put him quickly intouch with the problem areas and from that point related his efforts to those of his opposite numbers throughout the region. Detractors were often found to have made an improper use of the system through a lack of understanding of its limitations. There are 1900 small territorial force units, scattered throughout the 3½ million people of MR3, whose training, equipment status and operational effectiveness could not have been monitored in any other way. The one major difficulty with these systems is that they inevitably become report cards for responsible officers and should not therefore be forced on to the host nation when the advisory input is withdrawn..

7. CORDS. Much of the activity of CORDS was nonproductive and directed solely towards its self justification. It does however provide a vehicle for gifted civilians and military personnel who have made worthwhile contributions in totally unpredictable areas. It is not likely that Australia could afford such casual flexibility should we ever be required to provide a similar organization. As a guide however an effective counterpart relationship invariably indicated effective work. As an extension to this thought advisers should be withdrawn from any area where this relationship is not established as they are then counter productive and infact misleading to the advisory system.

8. Mobile Advisory Teams. The team leader is the essential, perhaps the sole requirement. He can be of any rank however young career officers generally brought the most initiative to the job and established the closest rapport. Should this relationship be lost, for any reason, the adviser should be removed immediately.

9. Mixed Nationality Advisory Teams. It was my impression that mixed teams generally succeeded in bringing out the best in the individuals. It brought a leavening of thought to each number and forced him to reconsider many national procedures that would otherwise have been "sold" to his counterpart without further analysis.

10. Conclusion. My experience with the Team has been personally most rewarding. Working with and for a third nationality group I gained in double measure. To be an adviser is a sobering experience as it calls for as much efficiency and attention without the satisfaction of command. An adviser who attempts to usurp the commander, in even the smallest respect, is automatically shut out from the thought processes of the Commander from that point on.

REPORT BY MAJ J.G. HUGHES
SENIOR ADVISER MR 4
23 AUG - 25 SEP 71

Drac Activities

1. The CORDS, DRAC Overview for the month of August is attached as Appendix 1.

Enemy Activities

2. Perintrep NR 36-71 is attached as Appendix 2.

AATTV Team Activities

3. BAC LIEU NOTT. The "interpreter" problem has been eased with the arrival of a third interpreter.
4. DONG TAM NOTT. Attempts are being made to have the unserviceable vehicles repaired by the 7th Division Logistic Bn. This avenue has been attempted previously but as there has been a change of staff in this unit, we are hopeful of more positive result on this occasion.
5. Overall Progress. Four out of the proposed eight training cycles for PF leaders have been completed. The original schedule called for 480 leaders to have completed training by this time. It is expected that with the attendance of additional students in cycle 5/71, the progressive goal of 600 will have been exceeded.

Conclusion

6. There are no major problem areas.

Appendices

- Appendix 1. CORDS DRAC Overview for Aug 71.
2. PERINTREP NR 36-71.
3. Team Leader NOTT BAC LIEU Report.
4. Team Leader NOTT DONG TAM Report.



CONFIDENTIAL

**HEADQUARTERS
DELTA REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND
APO San Francisco 96215**

APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX H TO
AATTV REPORT SEP 71

MACDR-CR-PPR

14 September 1971

SUBJECT: CORDS/DRAC Military Region Overview for the Month Ending 31 August 1971 (RCS: MACCORDS 32.01 R3)

Commander
U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Attn: MACCORDS-RAD
APO 96222

1. (U) Reference: Joint Directive 4-70, Change 1, subject: MACCORDS Military Region Overview dated 8 March 1971.
2. (U) Submitted herewith is the subject report.

1 Incl
as

J. H. Cushman
J. H. CUSHMAN
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

MACCORDS/RAD-R	-	40
CG, USARV (ATTN: G5)	-	1
CG, DRAC - 5	G3	- 2
G1 - 1	G4	- 1
G2 - 2	G6	- 1
SA, MR-1 - 2	SA, MR-3	- 2
SA, MR-2 - 2	DEPCORDS	- 5
DCAT, 7th Inf Div (ARVN)	-	1
DCAT, 9th Inf Div (ARVN)	-	1
DCAT, 21st Inf Div (ARVN)	-	1
SA, 44th STZ	-	1
SA, 4th ARM BDE	-	1
SA, AFAT 4	-	1
Each PSA, MR-4	-	1
Each CORDS/DRAC Staff	-	1
45th Mil History Det.	-	1

**REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES**

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MILITARY REGION OVERVIEW
(RCS: MACCORDS 32.01 R3)

MILITARY REGION 4

Period Ending: 31 August 1971

1. (C) OVERALL STATUS OF THE COMMUNITY DEFENSE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT EFFORT:

Major activity during the month of August revolved around the Lower House elections. Reports received from provinces subsequent to the elections indicate a majority of them experienced voting irregularities. These ranged from inadequate ballot supplies and ballot manipulation in Vinh Binh Province to outright violence in Bac Lieu Province. In Vinh Binh and Bac Lieu the furor climaxed with the apparent rejection by voters of well-known incumbents opposed to President Thieu's policies. As was the case in the 1970 Upper House elections in the Delta, anticipated increases in enemy military and terrorist activity failed to materialize. This was partly due to effective execution of security measures in most provinces. However, it was also due to the fact that enemy actions were predominantly political in nature, consisting of proselyting and propaganda activities. This was apparently in consonance with the guidelines set forth in a recently captured document which directed a "diplomatic attack wave" rather than overt military actions. Indicative of this shift in tempo is the fact that the three-month lull in enemy activity continued and that outpost overruns showed a 64% decrease over the preceding month, breaking a two-month upward trend.

Significant progress was also achieved in the conduct of military operations over the reporting period. Combined operations involving both ARVN and Territorial Forces operating in the same Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) under a single commander were conducted. TAOR's assigned crossed provincial borders and the commander of forces had full authority within his assigned area. An operation of this type was conducted in portions of Kien Phong, Dinh Tuong and Sa Dec Provinces during early August with another in the Vinh Long - Vinh Binh border area later in the month. Continued operations of this type will curtail the enemy's ability to exploit jurisdictional disputes between provinces which previously have allowed him to conduct commo-liaison activity and infiltration with relative impunity.

The salient feature of this reporting period is that with the turbulent emotions inherent in elections, the often inflammatory rhetoric between candidates, and expected VC attempts at disrupting proceedings and discrediting the GVN; the electoral process functioned fairly efficiently and government agencies were capable of precluding widespread disturbances. This attests to the degree of internal security present within this region.

2. (C) Situation, Problems and Analysis:

a. (C) Self Defense

(1) (C) Territorial Security

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ARVN and Territorial Force Status

MONTH	MILITARY INCIDENT		ENEMY KIA		EN WPNS CPTD		GVN KIA		GVN WPNS LOST		KILL RATIO	LOST/CPTD WPNS RATIO
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	GVN:EN	GVN:EN
August	186	-11.5	2185	-25.1	736	-39.3	414	-22.8	179	-44.4	1:5.3	1:4.1

Combat activity in MR4 continued at a lower level during August than any other month of 1971. Three Dong Khoi operations were conducted during the month. All were territorial forces operations, although the latter two were scheduled as combined operations. Emphasis during the 3d phase (21 - 31 August) was concentrated on election security. ARVN divisions continued operations within their respective TAORs targeting enemy base areas and specific units. Elements of the 9th Division, 4th Armored Brigade, and the MR4 Ranger Command conducted cross border operations.

(2) (C) Regional Forces/Popular Forces

(a) On 21 August CG, MR4 directed a reallocation of 19 RF companies and 68 PF platoons effective 1 September 1971. These are to be recruited by 31 October 1971. The effect of this directive will be to change figures cited below in the areas of units recruited and awaiting training and of understrength units actually deployed. RF/PF personnel status as of 31 August is shown on the following table:

AUGUST	AUTH	IN TRAINING		RECRUITED		TO BE		DESERTION PER 1000
		BASIC	REFRESHER	WAITING	TRAINING	RECRUITED	DEPLOYED	
RF CO	625	2	24	2		2	595	11
PF PLT	3809	146	57	103		124	3379	10

(b) Four operating bases were overrun, 2 in Vinh Long and 2 in Chuong Thien. Casualties included 16 KIA, 38 WIA and one MIA. Equipment losses consisted of 2 pistols, 1 M-1 rifle, 22 carbines, 1 BAR, 30 M-16s, 1 M-79, 5 radios, and 1 antenna. Three of the four attacks occurred in contested areas (2 HES Rating C, 1 - D, and the last B).

(c) Redeployment of territorial forces is continuing. An Giang has 13 RF companies and 10 PF platoons operating in Kien Giang and Chau Doc. Phong Dinh and Sa Dec each have 4 companies operating out of province, while Go Cong has 6 companies on similar missions. Of deployed RF companies, 39% are located in AB hamlets, 25% in C, and 36% in DE. 62% of available PF platoons are located in AB hamlets, 27% in C rated hamlets and only 11% in hamlets rated DE.

(d) As of 15 August, 41 of 46 RF companies scheduled for refresher training by Province Mobile Training Teams (PMTT) had completed training. PMTT refresher training has also been completed for 39% of the scheduled

CONFIDENTIAL

572 PF platoons. Twelve of the 357 new PF platoons have completed Basic Unit Training (BUT).

(e) During August, the Australian team conducted training for PF squad leaders at Bac Lieu and Dong Tam. In-place training was also conducted by the team at PF outposts in Kien Hoa and Chuong Thien Provinces.

(3) (C) PSDF

(a) August PSDF status is shown on the following chart:

ORGANIZED		TRAINED		WPNS ISSUED TO PROV SM&DSL		R A T I O	
NEW	TO DATE	NEW	TO DATE	NEW	TO DATE	CBT:	SPT
15,208	1,605,605	+ 39,945	1,334,115	2,373	211,458	1	: 5

(b) Tactical status is shown below:

MILITARY INCIDENTS		VC KIA		WPNS CPTD		PSDF KIA		WPNS LOST		KILL RATIO	WPNS RATIO
#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	VC:PSDF	VC:PSDF
32	+104	15	-	3	-	22	-1	45	-40	1 : 1.5	1 : 15

(c) Visits to Training Centers indicate that many of the personnel attending PSDF leaders courses are not leaders. Spot checks at Dinh Tuong, Vinh Long, and Cao Lanh Training Centers show that as many as 50% of trainees are only PSDF members sent to fill part of the training quota because team leaders are unwilling to attend training. This further aggravates the shortfall in overall PSDF training which currently stands at 50%.

(4) (C) LOC Security

(a) Enemy initiated incidents on land LOCs more than doubled this month totalling 11. The preponderance of these incidents once again occurred on that portion of QL4 located in Dinh Tuong Province. Land LOC interdictions have increased steadily in the past two months reflecting recognition by the VC of the effectiveness of these measures in embarrassing the GVN. These incidents will probably be continued by the enemy in order to maintain a presence.

(b) There have been no appreciable changes in the security status of LOCs within MR4. Notwithstanding the increase in harassments, the majority of land and water LOCs are considered green (secure). 5% of land and 15.4% of water LOCs are rated amber (open).

(5) (U) National Police: Terrorist incidents decreased by 7.3% to 77 during August. This total is 38.9% lower than the CD&LD Plan goal of 126

CONFIDENTIAL

per month. A penal survey was conducted during the month by members of USAID/Saigon.

(6) (C) Phung Hoang: During August, neutralizations decreased slightly from 759 in July to 746. This figure is 7% below the MR4 goal of 800, but 15% above the national goal of 650. The number of neutralizations which were specifically targeted increased significantly, the first meaningful improvement in targeting this year. Thirty-two percent of total neutralizations were specifically targeted, an increase of 12% over July, and 9% over the 1971 average of 23%. However, the 127 VCI sentenced during August is the lowest monthly total this year. The number of individuals captured is also a low for 1971, and is 41 below the yearly average of 346. It was to be expected that fewer VCI would be sentenced this month since only 298 were captured during July. Even though neutralizations decreased slightly, total Phung Hoang operations increased by 24% from 3,195 to 4,156. A large percentage of these operations were defensive, conducted by the National Police to prevent disruption of the GVN elections. Ten provinces (An Xuyen, Ba Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Chuong Thien, Go Cong, Kien Giang, Kien Hoa, Kien Tuong, Vinh Binh, and Vinh Long), met their national neutralization goals, compared to 8 in July. Twenty percent of the inactivations (rallied, captured, killed), were district level or above. This percentage has remained constant since January.

VCI Killed (A & B)	VCI Rallied (A & B)	VCI Sentenced (A & B)	VCI Captured (A & B)
361	258	127	294

NOTE: Class "A". Full or probationary members of the Communist Party at any echelon from national through hamlet level, and all individuals who assume functions at these levels.

Class "B". Those individuals who do not exercise any command function or significant position in the communist ranks, but are VCI cadres, at any echelon from Central to hamlet.

(7) (U) Chieu Hoi Program:

(a) This month's total represents a 35% decrease from the previous month's 1,073 Hoi Chanh, and is the lowest monthly total since June 1968. The decline in the Chieu Hoi rate can be attributed to the low level of military activity prior to the Lower House elections and the uncertainty created by the current political situation. Only Kien Giang (with 186 HC) and An Xuyen (with 115 HC) maintained high returnee rates. This was a result of operations conducted in Hieu Le and Thoi Binh Districts. The Chieu Hoi rate is not expected to increase substantially until after the presidential elections. Nonetheless, MR4 still hopes to attain its original goal of 14,000 HC for the year.

(b) A total of 166 HC were used in one-time operational exploitations during the month. The Regional CH Center graduated 155 selected HC from its 3-month advanced vocational courses on 26 August 1971. An additional 465 HC were offered basic vocational courses in provincial CH Centers. A total of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

129 HC found immediate employment out of the 1,069 HC released from CH Centers during August.

Chieu Hoi Status

HOI CHANH	MONTHLY GOAL	% POLITICAL	% MILITARY	RELEASED	EMPLOYED
696	1,167	42.2%	52.9%	1,069	129

b. (U) Self Government

(1) (U) People's Administration Program

(a) During August, 1 hamlet chief was assassinated and another was wounded. This is the lowest number of terrorist incidents targeted against GVN officials recorded in 1971 and is a continuation of a downward trend which started in May. The district chief of Ha Tien District, Kien Giang Province, was replaced this month.

Status of Government *

As of 31 July

RPDC FIGURES	TOTAL	ELECTED	APPOINTED	NO GOV'T
VILLAGES	754	743	11	0
HAMLETS	4,247	4,058	152	37

* The lower number of hamlets having no government as well as the lesser total number of villages and hamlets reflects a readjustment of figures by RPDC. These resulted from absorption of hamlets and villages into autonomous cities and from population shifts.

(b) Reports of training of government officials during July indicate a 32% shortfall in in-province training and a 36% shortfall in those scheduled to attend courses at the National Training Center in Vung Tau. Reasons for non-attendance include inadequate per-diem, interference with official duties, conflict with the rice harvest and a general dissatisfaction with the quality of training.

(2) (U) People's Information Program: Information programs continued with good results. Priority support was given to election activities at the province level. There was no advisory participation in this effort. The large voter turnout is partially due to the well organized and well implemented information campaign conducted by VIS supporting election activities.

c. (U) Self Development

(1) (U) Land Reform Program: Status of the LTTT program is shown on the following table:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PERIOD	NO. OF APPLICATIONS	HECTARES APPROVED	TITLES DISTRIBUTED	
			NUMBER	HECTARES
JULY *	215,926	300,848	109,462	151,753
AUGUST **	237,236	326,030	127,898	179,763
CHANGE	+21,310	+25,182	+18,436	+28,010

* Official DGLA figures

** Preliminary figures based on initial Province Reports.

Acceleration of title application and distribution continued during August although remaining short of the level needed to achieve 1971 goals. Slow payment of landlords continues as the most serious problem in the program. In an effort to alleviate this problem, USAID/Saigon advisors have persuaded GVN to modify processing procedures. Preliminary reports from the provinces show a sharp jump in compensation but are not complete enough to allow for any firm projections to be made.

(3) (U) Agriculture:

(a) The final distribution of 7,000 day old chickens was completed in August. These chickens were used throughout the Delta to demonstrate the importance of improved breeding and management practices.

(b) The purebred swine import program has demonstrated the importance of new genetic bloodlines for producing vigor, larger litters, conformation, and the ability to produce a greater gain per unit of feed.

(c) The high price of feed is a matter of great concern to livestock and poultry producers. Feed prices are at an all time high while livestock and poultry products are at an all time low. A recommendation has been made to USAID/Saigon, that additional corn be imported to help alleviate the high cost of grain until in-country grain sorghum can be harvested in March, 1972.

(d) Land clearing operations were initiated in Nha Binh (V), Chau Doc Province, in order to prepare for planting sorghum for the dry season crop year. A mining incident on 30 August caused 2 ARVN casualties and rendered 1 of the bulldozers in this project inoperable.

(e) The first 650 ton shipment of rice from Ba Xuyen Province to central Vietnam is scheduled for 9 September. This is the first attempt to move Delta rice to central Vietnam without going through Saigon.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(4) (U) Public Health (U)

(a) Civilian War Casualty admissions for July were 1,020, the lowest number recorded since 1968. This amounted to 6% of total admissions, also the lowest recorded. For the first seven months of 1971, monthly average CWC admissions were 1,238 versus 1,905 for the similar period in 1970, a reduction of 667 CWC admissions per month. This reduction practically equals the monthly average CWC admissions reduction of the two year period of 1968 to 1970 which was 2,432 to 1,761 per month. Vietnamese surgeons are performing all general surgery in 10 province hospitals and three district hospitals.

(b) A Community Health Specialist was assigned to Bac Lieu Province to advise in the health program. Only two US Surgeons remain assigned under the MILPHAP program. Only one VPVN physician, an ophthalmologist, is currently assigned to MR4.

(5) (U) Education:

(a) Public elementary schools opened on 16 August. A large influx of students was experienced requiring operation of classes on a shift basis in order to accommodate the heavy enrollment.

(b) Teacher shortages continue as a major problem in MR4. The problem appears to be two-fold: first, salary funding limitations preclude hiring elementary school teachers; and secondly, centralization of the authority to assign teachers who graduated from the normal school system compounds the teacher shortage. In the latter case, June graduates have not been assigned to provinces, and several classrooms have been closed as a result of the lack of teachers.

(c) A recent survey showed large amounts of undistributed elementary school textbooks had been stored in warehouses, and, as a result, had deteriorated badly due to water damage and rats. These were furnished as part of a USAID-funded program to provide free textbooks to rural students. A direct order from the MOE to Province Education Service Chiefs will serve to get these textbooks distributed to the students for whom they were programmed.

(2) (U) War Victims Program:

(a) Considerable progress was made in validation of refugee name-lists in order that RTV or resettlement benefits can be paid. Particularly noteworthy was the progress made in Hieu Le District where reports of padded namelists required a re-survey to be conducted.

(b) Food for Peace Program stocks in provincial warehouses are being reduced and a team is visiting provinces in order to expedite disposal of spoiled commodities.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PERIOD	TEMPORARY REFUGEES	REFUGEES IN RTV PROCESS	REFUGEES PAID ALL RTV BENEFITS	WAR VICTIMS PAID
PREVIOUS MONTH	81,534	205,595	263,929	28,529
CURRENT MONTH	69,534	221,787	275,939	35,051
DIFFERENCE	-12,000	+16,192	+12,010	+6,522

(5) (U) Public Works

(a) During the month significant progress was made due to arrival of material at project sites and additional funding being approved. In August, eight (8) projects were started and five (5) were completed leaving seven (7) projects awaiting materials, three (3) projects awaiting action by CPDC, and four (4) projects with bids pending.

(b) Water levels along the Mekong River in Laos, Thailand and Cambodia are being monitored to ascertain the extent of high water levels which may occur in the Delta. In addition to the above stations, five stations within the Delta are being monitored.

(c) During August, a field survey was conducted and plans were completed for the Bay Thuoc Canal in Kien Tuong Province. Redesign drafting is also underway for a water distribution system for the provincial hospital in Vinh Long. Slow sand water filter standard plans for 100 to 500 families are also being redesigned. The drilling equipment located at Song Ong Doc, An Xuyen Province, was damaged by enemy action while awaiting transport to a new drilling site.

(d) The training program presently being conducted by CORDS to train Vietnamese in technical drafting skills is progressing well. Graduation is set for 31 December 1971.

(6) (U) RD Cadre: RD Cadre status is shown on the following chart:

RD Cadre Status

PERIOD	PERSONNEL STRENGTH	TEAMS DEPLOYED	RDC DESERTIONS	DESERTIONS PER 1000	VC INCIDENTS
JUL 71	10,473	625	56	5.3	12
AUG 71	10,333	586	94	9.1	27

(7) (U) Village Self Development Program: Figures from MORD-RPDC indicate a completion rate of 67.6% for reprogrammed 1969 - 1970 funds. 18% of

CONFIDENTIAL

those projects funded under the 1971 program have also been completed.

3. (C) Future Planning:

a. (U) Improvement of Coordination at Subsector Level: A study is presently underway which will make recommendations to improve the coordination of GVN security and pacification resources at district and village level. Although not yet approved, this study will recommend that the DIOCC be used as the district's central coordination mechanism for all GVN resources. An artillery officer and NCO will be added to the DIOCC from available resources to give the DIOCC a fire support coordination capability. A Military Coordination Team consisting of one RF officer and two NCOs will be established in villages where such assistance is required to coordinate and train village level security forces. It is felt that these innovations will achieve greater unity of effort within the district.

b. (C) Redeployment of Territorial Forces: A program is underway to develop a means to better employ Territorial Forces with an ultimate goal of further extending pacification. The concept involves turning over additional responsibilities to the police for security, law, and order in the more pacified areas. Concurrently, some Territorial Forces are to be redeployed from pacified areas where they are no longer required, to other areas where they are needed. Because PF platoons are not suitable for employment outside of their native communities, it is proposed that surplus PF spaces be converted to RF and that a suitable number of Lien Doi headquarters and RF companies be reorganized from these assets. Pilot projects have been instituted in An Giang and Go Cong Provinces to do this.

c. (U) High Value Rewards Program (HVRP): The Phung Hoang Bloc, Saigon, has accepted for consideration the dossiers on 2 key VCI submitted by Vinh Binh Province. On 13 August, the Prime Minister approved Vinh Long's participation in the HVRP. Three dossiers submitted by Vinh Long are also under consideration. It is unlikely that the HVRP will be initiated in either province until after the presidential elections.

4. (U) Action Items

a. (U) Higher Headquarters Actions Requested by Provinces

(U) Required Action - Chuong Thien Province

(1) Problem Statement: The pitiful lack of road maintenance equipment in the province virtually assures that the work completed by the U.S. 69th Engineers on LTL 31, as well as on other province roads, will regress badly over the coming rainy season. Though used and in need of repair, selected pieces of the equipment, now employed by the U.S. Engineers, would be extremely valuable assets to the province if turned over to the Public Works Service on departure of the elements of the 69th.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Action Taken to Date: On the recommendation of the Deputy CG/DRAC and the CO, 34th Engineering Group, the Advisory Team put together a request to CG/DRAC to arrange transfer of the equipment to the Province Public Works Service. We have ascertained that Public Works is able to perform up to 3rd echelon maintenance on the equipment.

(3) Action Requested: Support, as required to preclude expensive retrograde of equipment that is sorely needed and would be well maintained in Chuong Thien Province.

COMMENT:

USAID Order No. 130.3 establishes the procedures for the acquisition of excess property to be used in programs where funding agreements have been made between the United States and the Government of Vietnam. Logistics/CORDS/DRAC/MR4 and USAID/LOG/Saigon, are aware of the needs for engineering equipment by province public works. One of the requirements for receiving additional engineer road maintenance equipment is the ability of the Province Public Works maintenance shop to maintain the additional equipment. When Chuong Thien was inspected in May 1971, the PW maintenance shop did not qualify for maintenance of additional equipment, and a copy of the inspection report with corrective action required was forwarded to the PSA. A reinspection of their maintenance capabilities will be made at an early date. If the inspection is favorable, the additional engineer equipment will be recommended.

b. (U) Higher Headquarters Action Requested by Region: None.


WILBUR WILSON
Deputy for CORDS

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

**HEADQUARTERS
DELTA REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND
APO San Francisco 96215**

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX H TO
AATTV REPORT SEP 71

PERINTREP



GROUP 4
DECLASSIFIED ON 5 SEP 83
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

NR36-71

CONFIDENTIAL

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:

(VC) KIEN TUONG PROVINCE COMMITTEE PLANS ACTIVITIES DURING GVN
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - Page 2

NEW BIET CACH SPECIAL MISSION TEAMS DISTURB VC IN GO CONG PROVINCE - Page 2

MORE SEA INFILTRATION REPORTED INTO (VC) BEN TRE PROVINCE - Page 3

C3 CO, 263 LF BN REPORTED OPERATING IN EASTERN BINH DAI DISTRICT - Page 4

GIONG TROM DISTRICT PARTY COMMITTEE REPORTED FORMING SAPPER CELLS
IN LOCAL SCHOOLS - Page 4

PW REPORTS ON ORGANIZATION OF (VC) MR 2 HQ - Page 4

(VC) TRA VINH PROVINCE URGES DISTRICTS TO ADHERE CLOSELY TO BUDGETS
FOR 1971 - Page 6


(VC) MR 3 PROSELYTING SECTION STRESSES THE IMPORTANCE OF TRAINING
FOR ALL PENETRATION AGENTS - Page 7

(VC) TRA VINH PROVINCE REPORTED RECRUITING TEENAGERS TO BE SENT TO
NVN FOR TRAINING - Page 7

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MR 4 ENEMY REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS
(VC Province Boundaries)
05 September 1971



GROUP 4 DECLASSIFIED ON 05 SEP 83 DOD DIR 5200.10.....

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION
 - A. Enemy-Initiated Activity and Outpost Overrun
 - B. Information Received During the Period
2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD
 - A. Strength and Dispositions
 - B. Order of Battle
 - C. Reserves and Reinforcements: Enemy Infiltration Groups
 - D. - G. Omitted
 - H. Air Defenses
 - I. - J. Omitted
 - K. Artillery (Including Rockets): Enemy Expenditures During the Period
 - L. - T. Omitted
3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS
 - A. Omitted
 - B. Equipment and Supplies
 - C. Omitted
 - D. Casualties
 - E. Omitted
 - F. Enemy Defenses, Minefields, Fortifications, Barriers, Obstacles and Other Defensive Works
 - G. - H. Omitted
 - I. Weather

GROUP 4 DECLASSIFIED ON 05 SEP 83 DOD DIR 5200.10.....

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

J. Omitted

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

A. - B. Omitted

C. Significant Terrorist Activity: Omitted

D. - F. Omitted

5. CAPABILITIES, VULNERABILITIES AND OUTLOOK FOR THE COMING WEEK

A. Enemy Capabilities

B. Enemy Vulnerabilities

C. Outlook for the Coming Week

ANNEXES:

A. Enemy-Initiated Incidents

B. Strength and Dispositions

C. Combined Sensor/Air Surveillance Operations

D. Enemy Large-Caliber Ordnance Expended Per Month

E. August Summary of VC Activity and Losses

F. Comparison of Enemy-Initiated Incidents with GVN Operations Resulting in Contact

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71
Period Covered: 290001H August - 042400H September

DRAC
CAN THO, RVN
05 September 1971

1. (C) GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION:

A. Enemy-Initiated Activity: A total of 41 enemy-initiated incidents were reported during the period, representing a decrease from the 56 reported during the previous week. Harassments accounted for 75 percent of the incidents, ambushes for 14 percent, terrorist activity for 9 percent, and attacks by fire for 2 percent. Outposts and watchtowers accounted for 54 percent of the targets, troop concentrations for 15 percent, hamlets and villages for 12 percent, LOC interdictions for 9 percent, district towns for 7 percent, and airfields for 3 percent. There were no significant enemy moves reported during the period.

(1) (VC) Military Region 2 (MR2): The number of enemy-initiated incidents reported in MR2 increased during the period with 24 incidents reported as compared with 21 during the previous week. DINH TUONG Province reported 13 incidents, followed by KIEN HOA with 6, KIEN TUONG with 3, and CHAU DOC with 2. There were no incidents reported in AN GIANG, GO CONG, or KIEN PHONG Provinces. In CHAU DOC Province at 290030H Aug, the CHI LANG Airfield was harassed with 1 107mm RKT with negative results. In KIEN TUONG Province at 290310H Aug, MOC HOA PT was harassed with 3 rds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 2 CIV WD. In DINH TUONG Province at 012040H Sep, SAM GIANG DT was harassed with 4 rds of 82mm mortar fire with negative results. In KIEN TUONG Province at 012330H Sep, MOC HOA PT was again harassed with 4 rds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 1 CIV KD and 3 CIV WD. In DINH TUONG Province at 020140H Sep, the Hq 11 ARVN Regt was harassed with 7 rds of 82mm mortar fire with negative results. In KIEN HOA Province at 022015H Sep, the TAN LOI PF OP was harassed with 10 rds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 5 PF WIA.

(2) (VC) Military Region 3 (MR3): The number of enemy-initiated incidents reported in MR3 decreased during the period with 17 incidents reported as compared with 35 during the previous week. PHONG DINH Province reported 5 incidents, followed by CHUONG THIEN, KIEN GIANG, and VINH LONG with 3 each, BA XUYEN with 2, and BAC LIEU with 1. There were no incidents reported in AN XUYEN, SA DEC, and VINH BINH Provinces and the PHU QUOC SZ. In KIEN GIANG Province at 301900H Aug, the 1/14 ARVN Regt NDP received an attack by fire consisting of 50 rds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 3 ARVN KIA and 10 ARVN WIA. In PHONG DINH Province at 011830H Sep, a PF Sqd on a resupply mission was ambushed with SA fire. Results were 1 PF KIA, 2 PF MIA and 2 x M16s and 1 x PRC10 radio lost. In BAC LIEU Province at 020500H Sep, an unknown size VC force ambushed 3 PSDF from TRA THE Hamlet resulting in 3 PSDF MIA and 5 x I/Wpns lost. There were no airfields targeted in MR3 during

GROUP 4 DECLASSIFIED ON 05 SEP 83 DOD DIR 5200.10.....

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71 (CONT)

the period.

(3) Outpost Overrun: There were no outposts overrun in MR4 during the period.

Enemy activity remained at a low level again this week. An expected increase to coincide with the GVN Lower House Elections never materialized although it is believed the enemy did increase his political activity during the period.

B. Information Received During the Period:

(1) (VC) Military Region 2 (MR2): According to an OSA report, the (VC) KIEN TUONG Province Committee recently held a meeting to discuss actions to be taken during the period of the GVN elections. From 20 July until the Presidential Election has been designated the primary period for VC activity. Politically all cadre were urged to encourage people to demonstrate against the government on as many issues as possible and to work to create turmoil throughout the countryside. To assist the cadre, all province and district units would break down to squad-sized elements to work with the people on the hamlet and village levels.

Source stated that in mid-September VC main force units would begin assembling in preparation for the military phase of the campaign directed against the Presidential Election. KIEN TUONG Province forces would be responsible for attacking targets in TUYEN BINH District. The Z15 Regt of (VC) MR2 would take part in attacks in (VC) MY THO Province including attacks on MY THO City. Source estimated that 5 battalions would take part in these attacks. (DRAC G2 Cmt: Other reports have been received concerning political and military activity to be directed by the VC during the election period. This is one of the few reports that actually identifies units to be involved in these attacks. DRAC G2 holds that the Z15 Regt is the designator for elements of the 33 NVA Regt which remained in CAMBODIA when the K7, K8, K10 Bns and the Hq element/33 NVA Regt infiltrated into BA 470 in late 1969. The Z15 continues to operate in PREY VENG and eastern KANDAL Province, CAMBODIA and is believed to be rebuilding its battalions in an attempt become a full strength regiment again. No reports have been received indicating that the regiment would leave its AO in CAMBODIA to operate in MR 4. It is possible the source meant that the attacks would be carried out by the elements of the 33 Regt that are still operating in (VC) MY THO Province.)

A VC document captured on 31 Jul at XS 665 397 by HOA DONG Sub-sector Forces contained a VC reaction to a new ARVN tactic being used in GO CONG Province. RF companies have recently established BIET CACH special mission teams consisting of 6 men per team. These teams operate in the AOs of their RF Cos performing a combat/reconnaissance mission.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71 (CONT)

Their small size gives them the greater mobility needed to work against small guerrilla units, and their ability to move throughout their AOs with speed and quiet has helped them to surprise enemy forces. The captured document written by THAN VAN DUNG, a member of the GO CONG RRSvc Section, was addressed to the province military affairs section. In the document DUNG stated that the BIET CACH teams had deployed from THANH NHUT Village, HOA DONG District and had been able to surprise and ambush VC forces. DUNG stated that it was very difficult to defeat these teams because of their "irregular activities."

The document also stated that the VC were in desperate need of recruits, and that there was no money available to pay troops for July or August. (Ref: GO CONG Province, Sector S2) (DRAC G2 Cmt: According to the Sector S2 the BIET CACH teams have been responsible for 9 VC KIA and 14 VCC during their short existence. In an area where the VC operate in small-sized units such as GO CONG Province, small mobile teams can often hurt the enemy more than large units. All reports received indicate the VC in GO CONG Province are struggling to exist within the province and have lost almost all capability of influencing the people and/or initiating military activities.)

In a recent OSA report a source reported on the infiltration of supplies into (VC) BEN TRE Province. According to the source, the supplies were stored on a deserted island in the South China Sea off THANH PHONG Village, (XR 760 360) THANH PHU District, (VC) BEN TRE Province. The supplies were transported from the island to THANH PHONG Village by the 2nd Wing, Waterway Trans Unit C47A, (VC) BEN TRE Province Rear Service Section D43. The 2nd Wing was told when to pick up the supplies by a member of the province party committee and the supplies were always found buried in the same location on the island. The supplies were then transported by motorized sampan from THANH PHONG Village up the HAM LUONG River to an island offshore from Hamlet #9, THANH PHU DONG Village, GIONG TROM District (XS 590 140). Here the supplies were picked up by the 1st Wing, C47A Trans Unit and moved to Hamlet #9. The supplies were then distributed to combat units throughout the province.

Source stated that most of the supplies consisted of AK47 ammunition and B40 RKTs. Source believed that (VC) BEN TRE Province had received all its supplies by sea since the Cambodian cross-border operations in 1970. (DRAC G2 Cmt: Reports continue to be received concerning sea infiltration into (VC) BEN TRE Province and the transportation units involved in this movement. The D43 has been reported before as the province RRSvc Section but this is the first report received concerning a C47A Trans Unit and its subordinate wings. THANH PHU District has often been reported as an area used for both the storage and distribution of supplies brought into (VC) BEN TRE Province by sea.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71 (CONT)

A second source has reported that the C3 Co, 263 LF Bn, (VC) BEN TRE Province is now operating in eastern BINH DAI District near XS 924 193. Source stated the company was undergoing a retraining and indoctrination session which was led by 3 provincial level cadre. Source gave the strength of the company as 40 men. Security for the training session was being provided by a 20-man guerrilla unit. Source was told the C3 Co would operate in the district for two more months.

Another source had reported earlier that the 263 LF Bn was spread out in BINH DAI, TRUC GIANG and HAM LONG Districts to protect the (VC) MR2 commo-liaison route running through (VC) BEN TRE Province. (Ref: KIEN HOA Province, Sector S2) (DRAC G2 Cmt: Elements of the 263 LF Bn have usually not operated in eastern BINH DAI District. Reports have been received that BINH DAI District is the site of numerous VC supply caches and that supplies from these caches are distributed to units throughout the province and (VC) MR2. The C3 Co may be protecting the province commo-liaison route while supplies are being moved or may be providing security for cache sites in the districts.)

According to a recent agent report the GIONG TROM District Party Committee, (VC) BEN TRE Province has ordered its legal cadre to contact local youths, gain their support, and help them form anti-GVN organizations. So far two sapper cells have been organized including one which has been established at the THANH TRI High School, GIONG TROM DT. This sapper cell has 18 participating members, most of whom are students at the school. The VC plan to use these youths to perform surveillance on GVN officers and officials who will later be targeted for assassination. The students will also be used to spread anti-GVN propaganda leaflets. Several teachers and girl students are reportedly working with the cell as couriers. The second sapper cell is being established at BEN MIEU (NFI) near XS 624 251. (DRAC G2 Cmt: Other reports have been received of VC attempts to form and infiltrate anti-GVN organizations including student groups, but this is the first report received stating that sapper cells are being formed within the schools to support local VC units and the party committee.)

HUYNH PHUOC THO, Asst Chief of Cadre Section, Political Office, (VC) MR2 Hq was captured on 7 Jun near XS 247 536 in DINH TUONG Province. THO stated that (VC) MR2 Hq was organized as follows: a Staff Office, a Political Office, a RRSvc Office, 3 Inf Regts (DT1 Regt, 83 NVA Regt, and one regiment containing NVA and Khmer Rouge troops with an unknown designator), 1 Inf Bn (271 Bn), and ten special units of battalion or company echelon. (VC) MR2 Hq was dispersed north of QL 1 in SVAY RIENG Province, CAMBODIA. The CO of (VC) MR2 was TRAN DAN TIEN, the first XO was HOANG DINH CHUONG, and the second XO was TAM DAN.

Within the Staff Office of (VC) MR2 Hq were nine sections. The Operations and Training Section was assigned the mission of researching

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71 (CONT)

all ARVN tactics, developing counter-plans, and then teaching new tactics and techniques to MF units. The mission of the Militia Section was to develop guerrilla warfare plans for province and district units. The section would then teach these new plans to province officials so they could be taught to all district units. The Military Intelligence Section was tasked with following the activities, locations, and operations of ARVN units and to direct technical reconnaissance units which monitored ARVN radio transmissions. The MI Section also directed the operations of penetration agents within ARVN Forces. The Artillery Section trained and assigned artillery units to MF units. The Engineering Section maintained control over all (VC) MR2 engineering units including the 341X Engr/Spr Bn. The Sapper Section directed all sapper training and sapper units with a special emphasis on the 267B Spr Bn. The Personnel Section handled all personnel matters and administrative details. The Weapons Section performed all maintenance on weapons and saw to it that all units were equipped with their TO&E weapons. The final staff section was the Political Office which was responsible for conducting all political training, awarding all decorations and promotions, and handling all punishments for staff office personnel.

Source also had knowledge of the DT1 Regt. THO stated that the regiment strength was approximately 700 men and consisted of 3 infantry battalions and 5 special companies. Source stated that at the time of his capture the DT1 Regt was divided into two elements one operating north of QL 4 and the other south of QL 4 within DINH TUONG Province. The element north of QL 4 consisted of the 261A Bn, the C1 Co of the 269B Spr Bn, and half the strength of the special companies. The second element was made up of the 261B Bn, the C2 and C3 Cos of the 269B Spr Bn and the rest of the special companies.

THO stated that VC strength and support within (VC) MR2 were decreasing rapidly, and he gave numerous reasons for these problems: The VC were suffering from personnel shortages and there were no replacements expected. (THO felt (VC) BEN TRE Province was the only area that was not suffering from personnel shortages.) The VC have also lost respect for their officers because the officers were young and inexperienced. Source stated that the antagonism between VC and NVA soldiers became more critical every day and seriously effected the capability of some units. Many units suffered from ammunition shortages and the VC continued to have resupply problems. ARVN operations had forced VC units to disperse, thereby reducing their AO's and their capability to conduct large-scale operations. The construction of numerous GVN outposts limited the VC ability to conduct propaganda activities and gain the support of the people on the district and village level. All these problems had hurt the VC cause and they were no longer able to count on the local people for support and cooperation. (Ref: DRAC CIC Report # 0612) (DRAC G2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71 (CONT)

Cmt: Source had valuable information on the structure and activities of (VC) MR 2 Hq. Information provided on the DT1 Regt agrees with latest OB holdings. THO's statements concerning VC weaknesses agree with reports received from other HCs and PWs. The third regiment coming under (VC) MR 2 may be the Z15 Regt believed operating in CAMBODIA with both NVA and Khmer Rouge troops.)

(2) (VC) Military Region 3 (MR3):

A recent OSA report discussed a budgetary policy directive issued by (VC) TRA VINH Province earlier this year. The directive, issued by the Budget Managing Cell of the Finance-Economy Section, warned all districts that they must adhere to their budgets for 1971. The directive stated that districts could not expect help from the province if they ran short of money. The province was adhering closely to its "cost of living" budget and had no extra funds to loan the districts. The Budget Managing Cell recommended that all district combat units receive 25 liters of rice per man plus 4 piastres a day for extra food expenses. The directive also stated that district committees should pay no more than 500 piastres for one gia (20 kilograms) of rice, the top price for rice in the province.

This same report also discussed a directive issued by UT THIEN, Deputy Chief Finance-Economy Section of (VC) VUNG LIEM District, (VC) TRA VINH Province. The directive reviewed the results of the tax collection program for the district for the first five months of 1970 and then put forth the plan that would be used for Jun-Sep 71 in the district. The directive said that the district had collected approximately 60 percent of the goal established for the first five months of the year. This was an improvement over what was collected during the last part of 1970. While rice tax collections had been good, collections from businesses and laborers, especially those in the district town, had been very low. The directive urged all villages to improve their collections during Jun-Sep, and to do this more Finance and Economy cadre must be appointed and trained. The district recommended using legal cadre as tax collectors since they had freer movement throughout the district. Although the directive admitted that the GVN Pacification Program had done a great deal to hurt VC tax collections, it stated that the people were still willing to pay their taxes if the Finance and Economy cadre could reach the people to collect it. (DRAC G2 Cmt: This report confirms the finance problems facing the VC throughout the Delta. Other reports have indicated the VC are urging committees on all levels to keep their budgets at a minimum and to attempt to develop a self-sufficiency within their areas since less money would be coming from province level and higher. (VC) VUNG LIEM District is one of the few districts that has reported an increase in tax collections over last year even though it is known the VC have placed a renewed emphasis on tax collections this year.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71 (CONT)

An OSA report has indicated that the (VC) MR3 Proselyting Section issued a directive earlier this year concerned with the training and use of penetration agents. The directive stressed the importance of proper training and utilization of all penetration agents so they can be of full benefit to the VC. All agents should be trained in very small groups and each assignment should be known only to the individual involved so as to maintain the highest levels of security. It should be stressed to all agents that they must never drink or gamble or do anything that would attract the attention of GVN officials. They must be trained to be very observant and able to report all information in clear details. All agents should be able to withstand harsh interrogations without revealing information and must be prepared to be arrested if they make mistakes.

Once training was completed all agents would receive a forged GVN identification card. If an agent was young enough (16 or 17) he would be issued a false birth certificate so he could receive a real GVN identification card. The (VC) CAN THO Province Committee was reported to forge its own GVN identification cards and had various papers, inks, and stamps with which to make the counterfeit cards. (DRAC G2 Cmt: With each report received, the complexity of the VC military proselyting program becomes more evident. The VC are taking extreme care in the training and documentation of their agents, and the success they have had with agents helping to overrun outposts indicates they are finding their preparations and training worthwhile.)

A recently captured document from CANG LONG District, VINH BINH Province revealed VC plans to recruit teenagers to be sent to NVN for regroupment, training and eventual return to the South as cadre and soldiers. The (VC) TRA VINH Province Party Committee directed district committees to recruit the teenagers, preferably from the 12 to 14 year old age group. After recruiting the youths, districts were to send the names to province for the final selections. The document further stated that those youths selected would be sent to NVN via a secret route (NFI). (Ref: 7th DCAT Perintrep 5-71, 2 Sep 71)

2. (C) ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD:

- A. Strength and Dispositions: ANNEX B.
- B. Order of Battle: ANNEX B.
- C. Reserves and Reinforcements: Enemy Infiltration Groups:
None reported during the period.
- D. - G. Omitted

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71 (CONT)

H. Air Defenses: During the reporting period there were 28 incidents of ground-to-air fire reported in MR 4 (including delayed reports). Of this total 16 aircraft received 25 hits. The largest number of aircraft receiving hits was recorded in AN XUYEN Province where 7 aircraft received 11 hits. (Ref: 164th CAG)

I. - J. Omitted

K. Artillery (Including Rockets): Enemy Expenditures During the Period: There were a total of 0.34 tons of large-caliber ordnance expended during the week as compared with the 0.26 tons of large-caliber ordnance expended during the previous week. The following is a recapitulation of the week's expenditures. Figures in parentheses are for the previous week:

	<u>60/61mm Mortar</u>	<u>81/82mm Mortar</u>	<u>120mm Mortar</u>	<u>57mm RR</u>	<u>75mm RR</u>	<u>107mm RKT</u>	<u>122mm RKT</u>
MR2	10 (3)	32(12)	0 (0)	0(0)	0(0)	1 (0)	0 (0)
MR3	<u>0(52)</u>	<u>52(26)</u>	<u>0 (0)</u>	<u>0(0)</u>	<u>0(0)</u>	<u>0 (2)</u>	<u>0 (0)</u>
MR4 TOTALS	10(55)	84(38)	0 (0)	0(0)	0(0)	1 (2)	0 (0)

L. - T. Omitted

3. (C) OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS:

A. Omitted

B. Equipment and Supplies:

(1) Equipment: During the reporting period there were 97 x I/Wpns and 4 x CS/Wpns captured in MR 4.

(2) Supplies: There were no supplies found in MR 4 or CAMBODIA during the reporting period.

C. Omitted

D. Casualties (figures in parentheses are 1971 totals to date):

(1) KIA - 340 (22,048)

(2) PW - 17 (782)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71 (CONT)

(3) DET - 146 (13,244 inc PWs)

(4) HC - 117 inc 63 mil, 50 pol, 4 others (9,799)

(Ref: DRAC G1 and G3; CHIEU HOI Div CORDS/DRAC)

E. Omitted

F. Enemy Defenses, Minefields, Fortifications, Barriers, Obstacles and Other Defensive Works:

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
CHUONG THIEN	2 Sep	WR 507 804	A military vehicle was harassed with one B40 RKT on LTL 31.
DINH TUONG	30 Aug	XS 364 497	A civilian bus was harassed with SA fire on QL4.
DINH TUONG	4 Sep	XS 525 443	A jeep was ambushed on LTL 25.
KIEN HOA	4 Sep	XS 710 013	Four civilian sampans were ambushed with 3 B40 RKTs on BANG CUNG Stream.

G. - H. Omitted

I. Weather: During the period weather conditions in MR 4 were seasonable. General conditions during the period were: Winds - south to southwest at 8 knots; visibility - 7+ miles; ceiling - 1500 feet scattered, 10,000 feet scattered, 30,000 feet broken. VINH LONG reported 1.90 inches of precipitation and a temperature range of 74-92F.

Outlook for the coming week: During the coming week the pattern in MR 4 is expected to remain seasonable with the southwest monsoon dominating the weather. General conditions are forecast at: Winds - southwest at 8-10 knots; visibility - 7+ miles; ceiling - 1500 feet scattered, 10,000 feet scattered, 30,000 feet broken. (Ref: 5th Wthr Squadron, VINH LONG)

J. Omitted

4. (C) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

A. - B. Omitted

C. Significant Terrorist Activity: Omitted

D. - F. Omitted

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71 (CONT)

5. (C) CAPABILITIES, VULNERABILITIES AND OUTLOOK FOR THE COMING WEEK:

A. Enemy Capabilities:

(1) To conduct multi-battalion ground attacks in the outlying areas of MR 4. These attacks may be supported by rocket and mortar fire.

(2) To conduct propaganda, subversion, espionage, and terrorist activities.

(3) To launch sapper attacks.

(4) To conduct small scale ground attacks against selected targets in the outlying areas; these attacks may occur day or night and might be supported by indirect fire attack and sappers.

(5) Harassment of installations and intensifying of LOC interdictions and ambushes.

(6) Infiltration of replacements and supplies into SVN through CAMBODIA and by sea.

(7) Positioning of cadre legally in government agencies in forward base areas in order to support his efforts to defeat the pacification of such areas.

B. Enemy Vulnerabilities:

(1) Dependence on the local populace for food, taxes and concealment.

(2) Concentrations of enemy forces are vulnerable to detection by reconnaissance activities and to destruction by air, artillery and naval gunfire and the employment of airmobile operations.

(3) The enemy's extended logistical system is vulnerable to interdiction and his caches to discovery by Allied operations.

(4) He is unable to withstand sustained combat; his main force attacks have been characterized by extensive preparation and inflexibility of execution and are vulnerable to pre-emptive measures.

(5) The infrastructure is vulnerable to aggressive Allied operations.

C. Outlook for the Coming Week: Enemy activity during the past week continued at the same light level that has existed for the past two months. It is probable that the enemy will continue to emphasize

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71 (CONT)

political action rather than overt military action as he formulates his plans for the upcoming Presidential Election . The increase in lunar illumination will probably have a definite impact upon the enemy's level of military activity. It is therefore anticipated that the level of enemy activity will remain light.


CUSHMAN
MG

ANNEXES:

- A. Enemy-Initiated Incidents
- B. Strength and Dispositions
- C. Combined Sensor/Air Surveillance Operations
- D. Enemy Large-Caliber Ordnance Expended Per Month
- E. August Summary of VC Activity and Losses
- F. Comparison of Enemy-Initiated Incidents and GVN Operations Resulting in Contact

Comments on the information contained in this PERINTREP should be submitted to DRAC G2, ATTN: CIIOB.

OFFICIAL:



MARTINEZ, LTC
ACofS, G2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX A (Enemy-Initiated Incidents) to DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71

	<u>AMB</u>	<u>GA</u>	<u>ABF</u>	<u>HF</u>	<u>SAB</u>	<u>TA</u>	<u>T</u>
MR2 AN GIANG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAU DOC	0	0	0	1	0	1	2
DINH TUONG	1	0	0	11	0	1	13
GO CONG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KIEN HOA	1	0	0	4	0	1	6
KIEN PHONG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KIEN TUONG	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>
MR2 TOTALS	2	0	0	19	0	3	24
MR3 AN XUYEN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BA XUYEN	0	0	0	1	0	1	2
BAC LIEU	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CHUONG THIEN	1	0	0	2	0	0	3
KIEN GIANG	0	0	1	2	0	0	3
PHONG DINH	1	0	0	4	0	0	5
SA DEC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
VINH BINH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
VINH LONG	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
PHU QUOC SZ	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
MR3 TOTALS	2	0	1	12	0	2	17
<u>MR 4 TOTALS</u>	4	0	1	31	0	5	41


KEY: AMB - Ambush HF - Harassing Fire TA - Terrorist Activity
 GA - Ground Attack SAB - Sabotage T - Total
 ABF - Attack By Fire

CUSHMAN
MG

APPENDICES:

I. Enemy-Initiated Incidents by Types of Targets

OFFICIAL:




MARTINEZ, LTC
ACofS, G2

GROUP 4 DECLASSIFIED ON 05 SEP 83 DOD DIR 5200.10.....

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I (Enemy-Initiated Incidents by Types of Targets) to ANNEX A to DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71



OFFICIAL:
Martinez
 MARTINEZ, LTC
 ACoFS, G2

GROUP 4 DECLASSIFIED ON 5 SEP 83 DOD DIR 5200.10.....

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX B (Strength and Dispositions) to DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71

UNIT	STRENGTH	DATE/LOC LAST CONTACT	DATE/LAST PROB LOCATION
2 NVA Div			
Headquarters	100	No Contact	10Aug/VT 39 23
101D Regt			
Headquarters	350	No Contact	08Aug/VT 40 09
Z7 MF Bn	160	Jan70/VT 48 67	Poss w/Hq
Z8 MF Bn	200	Jan70/VT 48 67	Poss w/Hq
Z9 MF Bn	235/ 945	Jan70/VT 48 67	17Apr/UT 70 00
52 Regt			
Headquarters	300	No Contact	12Aug/VT 47 37
Z4 MF Bn	400	No Contact	Poss w/Hq
Z5 MF Bn	400	No Contact	Poss w/Hq
Z6 MF Bn	400/1500	No Contact	Poss w/Hq
E3 Regt			
Headquarters	250	No Contact	10Apr/VT 51 17
410 MF Bn	350	No Contact	10Apr/VT 50 75
D5 MF Spr Bn	250	No Contact	10Apr/VT 50 10
D9 MF Bn	300/1150	No Contact	10Apr/VS 30 79
Z22 MF Arty Bn	300	No Contact	Poss w/1 Div Hq
Z24 MF AA Bn	300	No Contact	Poss w/1 Div Hq
Z25 MF Engr Bn	200	No Contact	Poss w/1 Div Hq
Z26 MF Sig Bn	130	No Contact	Poss w/1 Div Hq
Z27 MF Trans Bn	200	No Contact	Poss w/1 Div Hq
D4 MF Spr Bn	225	No Contact	17Apr/VT 55 17
211 Arty Regt			
Headquarters	220	No Contact	17Apr/WU 19 03
Z5 MF Arty Bn	200	No Contact	10Apr/WT 62 95
Z10 MF Arty Bn	200	No Contact	17Apr/WU 36 12
Z16 MF Arty Bn	200/ 820	No Contact	30May/WT 08 67
88 NVA Regt			
Headquarters	280	06Aug/WT 50 54	06Aug/WT 50 54
K7 MF Inf Bn	300	27Jul/WT 39 31	27Jul/WT 37 31
K8 MF Inf Bn	unk	No Contact	Poss w/Hq
K9 MF Inf Bn	230	08Jan/WT 61 36	08Jan/WT 61 36
K10 MF Spr Bn	60/ 870+	No Contact	NW of SVAY RIENG
MR2			
Headquarters	420	Oct70/WT 66 13	10Aug/WT 73 30
DT1 Regt			
Headquarters	230	06Jun/XS 24 53	08Aug/XS 13 59
261A MF Bn	250	15Apr/XS 15 65	04Sep/XS 15 55
261B MF Bn	120	Sep70/XS 26 40	04Sep/XS 18 46
295 MF Bn	240	Aug70/WT 26 04	Aug70/WT 25 13
309 MF Arty Bn	130	Mar70/XS 44 11	27Jan/XS 41 47
271 Bn	80	No Contact	CAMBODIA

GROUP 4 DECLASSIFIED ON 5 SEP 83 DOD DIR 5200.10.....

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX B (Strength and Dispositions) to DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71 (CONT)

D16 Tran Bn	195	No Contact	CAMBODIA
341X MF Bn	144	Jan70/XS 00 65	23Jan/XS 30 52
267B MF Spr Bn	120	07Jul/XS 41 46	08Jul/XS 41 46
VC AN GIANG			
510 LF Bn	351	No Contact	14Jun/WT 13 19
512 LF Bn	160	Mar70/WT 15 09	03Sep/VS 91 57
VC BEN TRE			
516 LF Bn	160	18Mar/XS 60 25	04Sep/XS 60 25
560 LF Bn	112	09Apr/XS 43 31	04Aug/XS 04 29
516C LF Bn	150	No Contact	05Jun/XR 78 93
263 LF Bn	123	Sep70/XS 50 15	04Sep/XS 51 36
VC CAO LANH			
502 LF Bn	150	04Mar/WS 84 85	04Sep/WS 91 47
718 MF Bn*	80	No Contact	KIEN VAN (D), MY AN (D)
VC GO CONG			
514A LF Bn	87	Apr70/XS 63 45	21Aug/XS 66 41
VC MOC HOA			
504 LF Bn	250	14Mar/XS 06 64	31Aug/XS 04 66
VC MY THO			
207 LF Spr Bn	100	Dec70/XS 47 47	Dec70/XS 47 47
514C LF Bn	168	04Feb/XS 30 52	04Sep/XS 37 55
Cmd Ele 38 NVA Regt	100	No Contact	CAI BE (D)
K7 MF Inf Bn	150	No Contact	CAI BE (D)
C26 Spr Co/K10 Spr Bn	30	No Contact	CAI BE (D)
MR3			
Headquarters	420	16Feb/VR 92 43	03Sep/VR 84 53
D1 Regt			
Headquarters	280	20May/WR 44 69	07Aug/WR 40 53
303 MF Bn	110	16Jul/WR 57 60	04Sep/WR 51 63
309 MF Bn	146/ 546	19May/WR 42 63	04Sep/WR 47 72
D2 Regt			
Headquarters	210	30Jun/VR 96 43	04Sep/WR 14 57
Z7 MF Bn	100	25Jul/WR 15 45	19Aug/WR 12 49
Z3 MF Bn	92	11Jul/WR 22 38	03Aug/WR 10 49
Z9 MF Bn	132	23Jun/VR 23 36	04Sep/WR 17 55
Z10 MF Spr Bn	110/ 644	25Jul/WR 21 50	29Jul/WR 17 51
D3 Regt			
Headquarters	230	Apr70/XS 17 05	27Aug/XR 14 37
306 MF Bn	140	23Mar/XS 33 05	20Aug/XR 22 98
308 MF Bn	50	28Mar/XS 32 05	31Aug/XS 36 12
312 MF Bn	151/ 571	Sep70/XS 23 03	03Sep/XR 10 93
95A NVA Regt			
Headquarters	340	25Mar/WQ 11 93	01Jun/VQ 92 92
Z7 MF Bn	143	09Jun/VR 34 40	04Sep/VR 97 51
Z3 MF Bn	102	04Sep/WR 33 32	04Sep/WR 83 32
Z9 MF Bn	300/ 885	No Contact	10Apr/VS 68 79
18B NVA Regt			
Headquarters	420	No Contact	04Sep/WR 09 67

* This unit is currently held in an unconfirmed probable status by DRAC G2 and ARVN MR 4 G2.

B-2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX B (Strength and Dispositions) to DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71 (CONT)

Z4 MF Bn	230	Jul70/WS 02 73	03Sep/WR 11 73
Z5 MF Bn	160	14Jun/VR 92 34	04Sep/VR 95 86
Z6 MF Bn	265	18May/WR 29 94	04Sep/WR 08 69
Z23 MF Spr Bn	194/1269	Sep69/WS 03 63	Poss w/Hq
DOAN 6 Arty Sect			
Headquarters	25	No Contact	U MINH Area
2311 MF Arty Bn	137	06Mar/VR 94 65	03Sep/WR 42 84
2315 MF Arty Bn	116	03Jul/WR 08 72	04Sep/WR 08 74
DOAN 3 Spr Sect			
Headquarters	25	No Contact	U MINH Area
2012 MF Spr Bn	111	16Jun/VR 92 32	26Jun/VR 95 79
2014 MF Spr Bn	57	No Contact	26Jun/VR 39 47
2016 MF Spr Bn	47	No Contact	19Aug/VR 32 05
3173 MF Bn	152	20Jun/VR 99 46	07Aug/VR 96 48
307 MF Bn	140	18May/VR 95 30	03Jul/VR 97 89
962 RR Svc Bn	200	Jul69/WR 66 01	26Feb/WQ 43 95
410 Trans Bn	200	No Contact	KIEN GIANG (P)
195 Trans Bn	140	No Contact	24Apr/VS 75 49
196 Trans Bn	150	No Contact	CAMBODIA
T70 Tng Bn	120	No Contact	10Jun/VR 99 47
VC CA MAU			
U MINH 2 LF Bn	160	18May/WQ 34 97	04Sep/WQ 32 93
VC CAN THO			
TAY DO 1 LF Bn	154	Dec70/WR 80 32	03Sep/WR 77 83
VC RACH GIA			
U MINH 10 LF Bn	135	01May/WR 44 94	04Sep/WR 36 33
VC SOC TRANG			
764A LF Bn	170	01Mar/WR 99 43	02Sep/WR 91 38
VC TRA VINH			
501 LF Bn	142	Sep70/XR 51 61	03Sep/XR 32 30
VC VINH LONG			
857A LF Bn	71	Nov70/WS 97 14	04Sep/WS 94 26

Comments on the data in this annex are encouraged and should be submitted to DRAC G2, ATTN: CIIOB.

CUSHMAN
MG

APPENDICES:

- I. Organization of Enemy Main Force Units in MR 4/CAMBODIA
- II. Organization of Enemy Local Force Units in MR 4

OFFICIAL:




MARTINEZ, LTC
ACofS, G2

B-3

CONFIDENTIAL


APPENDIX I (Organisation of Enemy Main Force Units in MR 4/CAMBODIA to ANNEX B to DRAC PERINTREP NR 36 - 71



Units depicted in this Appendix with Broken Lines are currently held in the category of unconfirmed probable by DRAC CIIOB pending the receipt of further intelligence data confirming their existence.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX XI (Organisation of Enemy Local Force Units in MR 4) - ANNEX B to DRAC PERINTREP HR 36-71



The 718 Bn is currently held in the category of unconfirmed, probable pending the receipt of further intelligence data to confirm its existence.

GROUP A - DECLASSIFIED ON 5 SEP 83. DOD DIR 5200.10.....

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C (Combined Sensor/Air Surveillance Operations) to DRAC PERINTREP
NR 36-71

1. (C) Unattended Ground Sensors: During the past week, sensor activations, attributed to enemy movement, increased from 77 to 79. The sensor site at NAM CAN (VQ 990 675) reported the most activations for the period with 15 while RANG DONG (VR 920 650) recorded 14 activations. All activations were responded to with artillery but no BDA was conducted so results are unknown. The number of active sensors decreased by 198 this week leaving a total of 847.


2. (C) Aerial Surveillance: There were a total of 13 Infrared (RED HAZE) sorties, 12 Side-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) sorties, and no photographic reconnaissance sorties flown by the 73rd Surveillance Airplane Company (SAC) in support of MR 4 objectives during the reporting period. The Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) flew 5 photographic reconnaissance sorties in support of MR 4 objectives during the reporting period.

CUSHMAN
MG

APPENDICES:

I. Enemy Caused Sensor String Activations

OFFICIAL:



MARTINEZ, LTC
ACofS, G2

GROUP 4 DECLASSIFIED ON 5 SEP 83 DOD DIR 5200.10.....

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I (Enemy Caused Sensor String Activations) to ANNEX C to DRAC
PERINTREP NR 36-71



KEY:

Letters designate sensor site

- s - Same number activations as previous week
- i - An increase in activations over previous week
- d - A decrease in activations from the previous week
- n - No active sensors at monitor site
- - Activations (number indicates total for week if more than one)

OFFICIAL:

Martinez
MARTINEZ, LTC
ACofS, G2

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 4 DECLASSIFIED ON 5 SEP 83 DOD DIR 5200.10.....

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX D (Enemy Large-Caliber Ordnance Expended Per Month) to DRAC
PERINTREP NR 36-71

This annex illustrates trends in the expenditure of tons of large-caliber ordnance in enemy-initiated incidents. For the purpose of this annex, large-caliber ordnance is considered to be the same as that reported in Para 2K of each PERINTREP.

The tonnages depicted in the following graph were obtained by multiplying the number of rounds expended by their respective weights. The following standard weights were used: 60mm mortar - 3.3 lbs, 82mm mortar - 8.6 lbs, 120mm mortar - 28.0 lbs, 57mm RR - 5.7 lbs, 75mm RR - 20.4 lbs, 107mm RKT - 41.8 lbs, 122mm RKT - 102 lbs. The totals obtained were then added together to obtain the total weight of ordnance expended each month.

CUSHMAN
MG

OFFICIAL:


MARTINEZ, LTC
ACofS, G2

GROUP 4 DECLASSIFIED ON 5 SEP 83 DOD DIR 5200.10.....

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX D (Enemy Large-Caliber Ordnance Expended Per Month) to DRAC
PERINTREP NR 36-71 (CONT)



CONFIDENTIAL

TONNAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX E (August Summary of VC Activity and Losses) to DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71

1. The following is a summary of enemy activity and losses during the month of August 1971. This report includes two appendices denoting the types of targets and types of incidents. The information was compiled by DRAC CIIOB. Figures in parentheses are for the month of July.

2. Number and Types of Incidents:

A. During the month of August there were a total of 184(228) enemy-initiated incidents reported in MR 4. For a detailed analysis of these figures by types of incidents, Division Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) and Military Region (MR) see APPENDIX I.

B. Of the total, 43 percent (39) of all incidents occurred in MR 2 and 57 percent (61) in MR 3. Of the 184 incidents, 52 percent (43) occurred in the 7th Div TAOR, 41 percent (46) in the 21st Div TAOR, 5 percent (5) in the 44th STZ, and 2 percent (6) occurred in the 9th Div TAOR.

C. Attacks by fire accounted for 5 percent (3) of all incidents. Of these, 77 percent (50) were in MR 3. The 21st Div had 7, the 7th Div had 2, while the 9th Div and the 44th STZ reported none during the period.

D. Ground Attacks accounted for 3 percent (9) of all incidents. Of these 84 percent (80) were reported in MR 3. The 21st Div had 4, and the 7th Div had 2 while the 9th Div and 44th STZ reported none during the period.

E. Harassments accounted for 84 percent (79) of all incidents with 156 reported. Of these, 66 (71) were reported in MR 2 and 90 (106) were reported in MR 3.

F. Miscellaneous incidents to include ambushes, sabotage, and terrorism accounted for 8 percent (9) of all incidents. Terrorism accounted for the majority of these incidents.

G. The highest number of incidents on a daily basis took place on 16 and 17 August when 12 incidents were reported on those days. The remainder of days were characterized by a light intensity of activity (0-19 incidents). The daily average was 6 (7) incidents during the month of August. Enemy activity again decreased to an all-time low level this month. An expected increase in activity to coincide with the Lower House Elections never materialized although there were reports of covert activity to include propogandizing and proselyting activities. The majority of incidents in August were again characterized by small scale harassments of outposts and troop positions.

GROUP 4 DECLASSIFIED ON 5 SEP 83 DOD DIR 5200.10.....

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX E (July Summary of VC Activity and Losses) to DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71
(CONT)

3. Types of targets discussed in this paragraph are broken down into types engaged most frequently by the enemy. For a detailed analysis of targets engaged by MR and TAOR, see APPENDIX II. The percentage distribution of targets engaged remained relatively unchanged. Outposts and troop positions accounted for 77 percent (80) of all targets. LOC interdictions accounted for approximately 9 percent (6). Hamlets and villages accounted for 6 percent (11), province capitals and district towns for 5 percent (3) and airfields for 3 percent (0). During August, CAN THO AF, BINH THUY AF and CHI LANG AF were all targeted in the Delta.

4. Enemy Losses:

A. The following enemy loss totals were obtained from DRAC G3. Enemy losses for August are as follows (July figures are in parentheses):

Total KIA - 2432 (2246)

Total Detainees - 847 (681)

Total CS/Wpns - 23 (110)


Total I/Wpns - 689 (865)

B. The highest daily KIA total occurred when 154 were reported on during the period 130600-140600 Aug. Of these 56 were as a result of 21st Div operations, 37 from 7th Div operations, 15 from 9th Div operations, and 9 from 44th STZ operations. PHUNG HOANG also reported 37 KIA for the period.

C. During the month of August there were 696 (1073) ralliers for a daily average of 22 ralliers. The highest daily total occurred during the period 040600-050600 Aug when there were 48 ralliers.

CUSHMAN
MG

OFFICIAL:



MARTINEZ, LTC

ACofS, G2

E-2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I (Types of Incidents) to ANNEX E to DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71

TYPES OF INCIDENTS	MR 2	MR 3	44TH STZ	7TH DIV	9TH DIV	21ST DIV	TOTALS
GROUND ATTACKS	1 (4)	5 (16)	0 (0)	2 (7)	0 (0)	4 (13)	6 (20)
ATTACKS BY FIRE	2 (4)	7 (4)	0 (1)	2 (1)	0 (2)	7 (4)	9 (8)
HARASSMENTS	66 (71)	90 (106)	8 (9)	82 (81)	3 (10)	63 (77)	156 (177)
AMBUSH	4 (3)	1 (1)	0 (0)	4 (3)	0 (0)	1 (1)	5 (4)
SABOTAGE	2 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)	2 (0)	0 (1)	0 (0)	2 (1)
TERRORISM	4 (7)	2 (11)	2 (1)	4 (7)	0 (1)	0 (9)	6 (18)
TOTALS	79 (90)	105 (138)	10 (11)	96 (99)	3 (14)	75 (104)	184 (228)

* Figures in parentheses are for the month of July

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II (Types of Targets) to ANNEX B to DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71

TYPES OF TARGETS	MR 2	MR 3	44TH STZ	7TH DIV TAOR	9TH DIV TAOR	21ST DIV TAOR	TOTAL
AIRFIELD	1 (0)*	3 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	3 (0)	4 (0)
PROV CAPITALS	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)
DIST TOWNS	7 (1)	1 (5)	1 (0)	6 (3)	0 (0)	1 (3)	8 (6)
HAMLETS AND VILLAGES	7 (8)	5 (16)	2 (1)	6 (13)	0 (2)	4 (8)	12 (24)
OP - WT	34 (44)	71 (90)	5 (7)	48 (57)	0 (4)	52 (66)	105 (134)
TROOP PSNS	17 (29)	20 (20)	0 (1)	22 (20)	2 (9)	13 (19)	37 (49)
LOCS INTERDIC	13 (9)	4 (6)	2 (0)	12 (10)	0 (0)	3 (5)	17 (15)
						RD CADRE	0 (0)
						TOTAL	184 (228)

* Figures in parentheses are for the month of June

OFFICIAL:



MARTINEZ, LTC
ACofS, G2

CUSHMAN
MG

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL


ANNEX F (Comparison of Enemy-Initiated Incidents and GVN Operations Resulting in Contact) to DRAC PEPINTREP NR 36-71

The purpose of this annex is to give a graphic comparison between the number of enemy-initiated incidents and the number of GVN operations resulting in contact during the month of August 1971. This chart also depicts enemy mines and booby traps incidents on a daily basis. The daily reporting period is from 0600 to 0600H hours.

CUSHMAN
MG

OFFICIAL:

MARTINEZ, LTC
ACofS, G2




GROUP 4 DECLASSIFIED ON 5 SEP 83 DOD DIR 5200.10.....

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX F (Comparison of Enemy-Initiated Incidents with GVN Operations Resulting in Contact) to DRAC PERINTREP NR 36-71

Incidents on this chart reflect the period 0600-0600 daily and they include delayed reports



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT BY CAPT W.M. McLAUGHLIN
TEAM LEADER - NOTT BAC LIEU
21 AUG 71 - 21 SEP 71

Training

1. Assistance Phase.

a. During the reporting period, 21 Aug 71 - 21 Sep 71, the 3/71 Assistance Phase (In-place training) was conducted in CHUONG-THIEN Province.

b. The following itinerary was adopted:

<u>Ser</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
1.	22 Aug 71 25 Aug 71	VI THANH	CPT A.R. THOMAS WO2 W.C. DATE WO2 B. ELPHICK
2.	30 Aug 71 01 Sep 71	KIEN HUNG	CPT A.R. THOMAS WO1 D. WISE WO2 K. PRIOR
3.	30 Aug 71 01 Sep 71	LONG MY	WO2 P. CONWAY

c. Assistance Phase Reports have already been submitted to Headquarters MR4, CAN THO.

2. Training Courses.

a. During the reporting period the 5/71 Platoon Leaders course was completed (6 Sep 71 - 17 Sep 71).

b. The 21 students who attended were from PHONG DINH Province.

c. The graduation of this course was held on Friday 17 Sep 71, and was highlighted by the presence of the Commanding General of Military Region 4, Major General now Lieutenant General TRUONG, accompanied by the Commanding General DRAC, Major General CUSHMAN and the Senior Australian Adviser Military Region 4, Major HUGHES, RAA.

d. On 20 Sep 71, the 5/71 Squad Leaders Course marched in with a total strength of 45 students. Of the 45, 11 are Platoon Leaders who should have been present for the 5/71 Platoon Leaders Course (21 Division Training Centre is capable of rationing and quartering the extra students).

e. The BAC LIEU NOTT now conducts Platoon Leaders' Courses over a 12 day period and Squad Leaders' Courses over a 15 day period. Of these, both comprise 11 days of actual training.

.../ Problem

Problem Areas

3. Read Maintenance. The condition of the road has improved somewhat with the laying of rock and gravel.
4. Interpreters. The Team continues to function with one good English-speaking interpreter, with the ever-present thought that his transfer to MR3 could arrive any day.
5. Vehicles. The loan of a jeep as a temporary measure from Team 51 (The 21 Division Combat Assistance Team) has relieved the situation for the present.

Personnel and Visitors

6. Visitors. Visitors over the period were as follows:
7-8 Sep 71 Maj TODD RAAMC, ADMS Office, HQ AFV
11 Sep 71 Maj Gen TRUONG, CG MR 4
" Maj Gen CUSHMAN, CG DRAC
7. Personnel. The NOTT now comprises the following:
CPT W.M. McLAUGHLIN RAA Team Leader (wef 13 Sep 71)
WO1 D. WISE RAA Team 21C
WO2 J. CLARKE RA Inf Admin WO
WO2 K. PRIOR RA Inf Team Member
WO2 W.C. DATE RA Inf Team Member
WO2 B. ELPHICK RA Inf Team Member
WO2 P. CONWAY RAASC Team Member
8. CPT A.R. THOMAS left the team on 8 Sep 71.
9. Conclusion. The team continues to function despite the problem areas, however, these should be rectified in the very near future.

REPORT BY CAPT R.M. MOUNTFORT
AATTV NOTT DONG TAM
20 AUG - 17 SEP 71

General

1. The period this report covers was devoted to an Assistance Phase in KIEN HOA Province and a Course for Platoon Leaders from KIEN PHONG Province.

Assistance Phase

2. All ex-students from KIEN HOA Province came from BA TRI District so the assistance phase was confined to that district.

3. Within the District, Platoons were widely dispersed and the team was able to visit only a percentage of the ex-students outposts. Sixteen of those visited were reported on.

4. General Observations were:

- a. The standard of outpost construction was high, but bunkers needed greater depth of overhead cover, and in some cases fields of fire needed clearing.
- b. Claymore cables and detonators need replacing in many cases and there is an acute shortage of illumination devices.
- c. It was pleasing that in some cases ideas taught on the course in DONG TAM had been implemented.

Platoon Leaders Course

5. There were 37 students and one Liaison Officer on this course. The course was run without any significant problems though ranges were sometimes not available owing to flooding or use by other units.

Administration

6. a. Course. There were no problems with the course administration.

b. Team.

- (1) The Team is experiencing some problems with jeep servability again. Jeep 154400 had problems with the rear differential. This was remedied by 7th Div Tgn Cen Motor Pool but noises indicate that this will probably reoccur. Jeep 119658 had alternator problems. These have been fixed but the battery is unserviceable and needs replacing. Jeep 118709 though mobile is very old and needs a variety of parts replaced. Team 66 is aware of the condition of this jeep and are endeavouring to obtain the parts for us.
- (2) During the reporting period the team was visited by the DINH TUONG Province PSA Dr. EVANS, and Maj TODD, RAAMC, ADMS Office, HQ AFV.

.../ Personnel

Personnel

7. The following movement of team personnel took place in the reporting period. WO1 BUCKLEY left the team and the team was joined by WO1 LARSSON. WO1 LARSSON took R&R and Capt MOUNTFORT and WO2 COOTES took R&E.

Interpreters

8. Recently both SGT AN and SGT MAI had been recommended for promotion to SGT First Class. Only SGT MAI was approved. SGT AN now will apply to DINH TWONG Sector for reconsideration.

Problems

9. Other than the problem of jeeps already mentioned there are no significant problems.

CONFIDENTIAL
 OBJECTIVE VIII - PROSPERITY FOR ALL

MR. A

PHASE SUPPLEMENTARY

MONTH JANUARY

<u>GOAL</u>	<u>PROGRESS TO DATE</u>	<u>PROSPECTS</u>	<u>PROBLEMS</u>
A. ISSUE FRENCH AND EXPROPRIATED LAND <u>56,129 HA.</u>	NA		
B. REGULARIZE SQUATTED LAND <u>1,735 HA.</u>	NA		
C. ISSUE NEW CULTIVATED LAND <u>2,360 HA.</u>	NA		
D. LAND TO THE TILLER <u>128,300 HA.</u>	135,720*	SURPASSED	
E. MIRACLE RICE <u>302,000 HA.</u>	296,000	VERY GOOD	
F. SORGHUM <u>5,000 HA.</u>	780	NIL BY 28 FEBRUARY	
G. RURAL CREDIT BANKS. EST. <u>3</u>	1	FAIR	
H. VILLAGE SELF DEVELOPMENT. FUNDS AVAILABLE <u>721,890,669\$VN</u>	630,301,362\$VN 3287	NOT LIKELY NOT LIKELY	

COMMENTS: *Applications approved at village level.

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
 SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

CONFIDENTIAL