

Australian Army Training Team  
Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report  
June 1970

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Training Team Vietnam (AATTV)

**Item:** [14]

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Headquarters  
Australian Army Training Team  
Vietnam

12 Jul 70

## AATTV REPORT JUNE 1970

### General

1. During Jun AATTV continued to be actively involved over the four CTZ's in operations, training and in providing advice on territorial security at province to hamlet levels. During the first week of Jun the intensity of enemy initiated activity within 1 CTZ increased but in the second half of Jun this intensity was not sustained.

### Casualties

2. AATTV casualties for the month were:

a. Battle

(1) On 2 Jun W01 Waters was WIA in Quang-Tri Province. He was evacuated to 1 Aust Hospital. He was RTA on 29 Jun.

(2) On 2 Jun W02 Birnie was WIA in Quang-Tri Province. He was evacuated to 1 Aust Hospital. He was RTA on 29 Jun.

(3) On 24 Jun W02 Mavin was WIA in Thua-Thien Province and evacuated to 1 Aust Hospital and returned to duty.

b. Non Battle. The following advisers were hospitalised during the month:

|     |           |                               |
|-----|-----------|-------------------------------|
| W02 | Speechley | RTA 29 Jun                    |
| W02 | Storan    | Returned to duty              |
| W02 | Breakwell | Will return to unit early Jul |
| W02 | Parker    | Returned to duty              |
| W02 | Green     | Will return to unit early Jul |

### Deployment

3. During the month:

a. The 2nd Mobile Strike Force (2 MSF) commitment was reduced to four advisers. During Jul this commitment will be reduced to one.

b. The fifth Mobile Advisory and Training Team (MATT) was raised in Phuoc Tuy Province.

c. Capt Tear and W02 Leal were redeployed in Thua-Thien Province.

d. W02 Green was redeployed from II to I Corps.

e. AATTVs posted strength increased by 13 over the month.

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4. Attached at Annex A is the AATTV deployment as at 1 Jul 70.

I Corps

5. During the first week of Jun the intensity of enemy activity within I CTZ increased and remained at this intensity during the second week. The latter half of the month saw a marked drop in enemy activity, due in the main to massive allied air activity in Quang-Tri and Quang-Nam Province, during the first two weeks.

6. In the main most of the air effort mentioned in para 5 above was directed near FSB Fuller (GR YD018593, FSB Tun Tavern GR YD059328 in Quang-Tri Province and in the area of GR ZC085536 in Quang-Nam Province. In the latter battle over 100,000 pounds of napalm was dropped from CH 53s from a height of 2000 feet above the objective. In addition to massive normal air ordnance thousands of pounds of CS was also dropped.

7. Enemy activities in 12 DTA were at a greatly reduced level. There were no significant actions in the area for the month.

8. From the 1 Jul the US, ARVN and ROK MC forces in I CTZ intend to:

a. Conduct combined offensive operations to destroy and/or neutralize enemy forces, logistic bases and command and control installations in the Khe Sanh Plain, Da Krong Basin, A Shau Valley, Base Areas 112 and 127 and other designated locations in central and western I Corps.

b. Continue operations to support GVN pacification and development; protect the population, national resources and major installations, improve lines of communication and assist in the elimination of the VCI and enemy influence in local areas, with emphasis on Quang-Nam, Quang-Tin and Quang-Ngai Provinces.

9. The conversion of CIDG forces to Rangers in I Corps has already commenced.

10. Attached are extracts of reports by AATTV advisers in I Corps as follows:

a. Summary of Significant Incidents Involving Units with Australian advisers in I Corps - Jun 70 Annex B

b. Summary of Caches and Contents Discovered in I Corps - Jun 70 Annex C

c. Report by Maj Connor, Assistant Province Adviser (Military) in Quang-Tri Province Annex D

d. Report by Capt McGurgan, Senior Adviser in 1st Bn 51st ARVN Regt. This report covers some of the activity in Quang-Nam Province outlined in para 6 above Annex E

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- e. Report by Capt Deane, Senior Adviser in 3rd Bn 51st ARVN Regt on the activities of both the 2nd and 3rd Bns 51st ARVN Regt. The report covers the activities at Tun Tavem mentioned in para 6 above. It was in this operation that both WO Waters and WO Birnie were WIA. The report is very critical of the units. Unlike the 1st and 2nd ARVN Regts, the 54th Regt had not been subjected to such concentrated enemy activity for a very long period. Like the 5th Regt at the Hiep Duc battle last month the 54th Regt officers and men had not been conditioned for such activity. Although the results in both cases were not good I believe the long term effects will result in an improvement in both regiments. Annex F
- f. Report by Capt Brock Senior Adviser in 3rd Bn 2nd ARVN Regt located on FSB Fuller Annex G
- g. Report by WO2 Gee, Adviser in the 4th Bn 2 ARVN Regt Annex H
- h. Report by WO1 Burns Adviser in the 1st Troop 7 Cav Regt Annex I
- i. Report by WO2 Killion Medical Adviser in Thua-Thien Province on the Medcap Programme in the Province. There are some interesting points of view on how medcaps should be conducted in this report Annex J

11. Attached at Annex K are some documents on the conversion of CIDG forces to Rangers in I Corps.

## II Corps

12. During the month five Cambodian infantry and two Cambodian engineer battalions withdrew into Vietnam with the withdrawing ARVN forces. The Cambodians are now approximately 15,000 kilometres south of Pleiku at Camp Arari. It is stated that:

- a. The Cambodians withdrew with the ARVN as their position would have been untenable had they remained alone in Cambodia.
- b. The ARVN or SF would retrain the units in Vietnam.
- c. After retraining the units would be reinserted into Cambodia via IV Corps.

13. The last Australian conducted Mobile Strike Force (MSF) basic training course will be completed on 18 Jul. Only one Australian will remain with 2 MSF after the 19th Jul.

14. The 1st Bn 2 MSF was deployed to the general area of Plei Me on 14 Jun and was extracted on 4 Jul. No significant contacts were made during the period. The 2nd Bn 2 MSF is still located in the Ben-Het area. Dak Seang and Dak Pek areas appear to be relatively quiet.

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15. Attached at Annex L is the After Action report for 1st Bn 2 MSF's operation at Plei Me. The battalion is commanded by Capt Shilston.

## III Corps

16. Four MATTs are now working in Phuoc-Tuy Province and a fifth team is at the USARV Advisor School. Teams 6 and 7 will be raised on 9 Aug and team 8 on 28 Aug. Teams 9 and 10 will be raised on 8 Sep and teams 11 and 12 on 16 Sep. All these teams will of course undertake the 18 day course at the USARV Advisor School before becoming operational. No real difficulties are foreseen in the raising of these teams.
17. There have been some difficulties in both the operation of and the administration of the teams already raised but this was only to be expected. Most of the difficulties have now been overcome or arrangements are in hand to solve them. Some of these difficulties are expounded in Maj Beale's report attached at Annex M and in the MATT Leaders' reports attached as appendices to Annex M. There are a few problems which should be covered in more detail. They are:
- a. Interpreters. It is dangerous to deploy a MATT without an interpreter and it is becoming evident that each MATT should have two interpreters. This point has not yet been stressed by AATTV as we have had difficulty in getting just one interpreter. However each interpreter is entitled to four days stand down leave per month and 15 days per year and these periods can occur at the most critical periods, such as the short notice operation into the Long-Hai's. In addition one interpreter limits the team to one training or operational activity at a time and thus does not permit the full utilization of the personnel in each MATT. In addition there is a requirement for at least three interpreters with the MATT that operates with the RF battalion. This whole problem will be taken up at staff level.
- b. Logistics. Probably the greatest weakness in the Vietnamese system is their logistic system. Such items as defence stores which should be available in the A and DSL Coy are simply not available. The MATTs have correctly insisted that the RF Coys request and get these items through the correct channels. When the indents are submitted the MATTs have followed through the requests only to find out that the items are not available. Even after harassment the items are not forthcoming and therefore the MATTs could not perform one of their main functions; the improvement of the base defences. In order to save time I have told the MATTs to obtain some defence stores from Australian sources and to make it clear to the RF Coy commanders that they are to repay the items "lent" when the indents have been finalized. I do not like this course but can see no other solution, at this stage.
18. The AATTV command and control arrangements were changed in Phuoc-Tuy Province late in June with the arrival of the QM. HQ AATTV Vung-Tau is now established as a detachment of HQ AATTV and in the main will perform a Q function. AATTV Baria is now established as a separate identity to command and control the AATTV province activities in Phuoc-Tuy Province. No additional staff was required to effect this reorganization.
19. The detailed achievements and problems in AATTV in Phuoc-Tuy Province are contained in Maj Beale's report and the appendices to that report.

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## IV Corps

20. The AATTV Night Operations Advisory Team (NOAT) continued the training of RF Coys in Ben-Tranh District in Dinh-Tuong Province. The details for this team for Jun are included in the report, attached at Annex N.

21. Minutes for a briefing for assessment of the NOAT results held on 6 Jun are attached at Annex O.

22. All sorts of charts and statistics are being produced by the Americans at District, Province and Corps level to prove that the NOAT system is a success. I do not agree with many of the conclusions being drawn from these statistics but there is no doubt that the NOAT is really improving the standards in the RF Coys. I consider that greater success is being achieved in the field of basic subjects than in night operation techniques. However as long as the term NOAT is the "in thing" in the Delta it is worth proceeding with the scheme in order to get the necessary US and SVN backing to improve the RF Coys in the basic subjects and to show them that it is possible to train, and fight a war at the same time.

23. There is a move in IV Corps for the NOAT to train 30 officers in 7 ARVN Div and 115 officers in IV CTZ in night operations. This would be a really worthwhile task and it will probably be started in Aug. If this task does not start in Aug the NOAT will commence training RF coys in Cho Gao District in Dinh-Tuong Province.

*J.A. Clark*  
(J.A. CLARK)  
Lt Col  
Comd

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AATTV DEPLOYMENT  
AS AT 1 JUL 70

ANNEX 'A' TO  
AATTV MONTHLY REPORT  
FOR JUN 70

| Serial              | Rank   | Inits  | Name       | Corps    | Unit       | Employment          | Due RTA: | Location |
|---------------------|--------|--------|------------|----------|------------|---------------------|----------|----------|
| <u>AATTV SAIGON</u> |        |        |            |          |            |                     |          |          |
| 1.                  | :LtCol | : J.A. | : Clark    | : RA Inf | : HQ AATTV | : Commander         | : Jan 71 | : Saigon |
| 2.                  | : Maj  | : K.R. | : Phillips | : RAAC   | : "        | : Second in Command | : May 71 | : "      |
| 3.                  | : Capt | : J.C. | : Hartley  | : RA Inf | : "        | : Adjutant          | : Apr 71 | : "      |
| 4.                  | : WO1  | : D.L. | : Howells  | : RA Inf | : "        | : Admin WO          | : Feb 71 | : "      |
| 5.                  | : WO2  | : L.A. | : West     | : RA Inf | : "        | : Admin WO          | : Jul 70 | : "      |
| 6.                  | : WO2  | : D.I. | : Campbell | : RAASC  | : "        | : Admin WO (Pay)    | : Nov 70 | : "      |
| 7.                  | : WO2  | : B.   | : Davies   | : RA Inf | : "        | : Admin WO (Movs)   | : Oct 70 | : "      |
| 8.                  | : Cpl  | : G.M. | : Eldridge | : RAASC  | : "        | : Clerk             | : Mar 71 | : "      |

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| Serial                            | Rank | Initia | Name     | Corps  | Unit              | Employment                          | Due RTA | Location                 |
|-----------------------------------|------|--------|----------|--------|-------------------|-------------------------------------|---------|--------------------------|
| <u>I CTZ</u>                      |      |        |          |        |                   |                                     |         |                          |
| <u>AATTV : QUANG TRI PROVINCE</u> |      |        |          |        |                   |                                     |         |                          |
| 9.                                | Maj  | C.S.S. | Connor   | RAAC   | Quang-Tri Sector  | Asst Province Adviser<br>(Military) | Oct 70  | Quang-Tri                |
| 10.                               | WO1  | B.R.   | Lawrance | RAAMC  | " " "             | Medical Adviser                     | Apr 71  | " "                      |
| 11.                               | WO2  | A.J.A. | Joyce    | RA Inf | Cam-Lo Sub-Sector | Assistant Adviser                   | Aug 70  | Cam-Lo                   |
|                                   | WO2  | J.T.   | Barnes   | RA Inf | 1/1 ARVN Bn       | " "                                 | May 71  | Near Quang-Tri (Regt HQ) |
|                                   | WO2  | D.T.   | Powell   | RA Inf | 2/1 " "           | " "                                 | Oct 70  | " " " "                  |
|                                   | WO2  | G.H.   | King     | RA Inf | 3/1 " "           | " "                                 | May 71  | " " "                    |
|                                   | WO2  | R.J.   | Oliver   | RAASC  | 4/1 " "           | " "                                 | Nov 70  | " " "                    |
|                                   | Capt | G.J.   | Brock    | RA Inf | 3/2 " "           | Senior Adviser                      | Apr 71  | Dong-Ha (Regt HQ)        |
|                                   | WO2  | B.M.N. | Ryan     | RA Inf | 1/2 " "           | Assistant Adviser                   | Jan 71  | " " "                    |
|                                   | WO2  | D.W.   | Bell     | RAA    | 2/2 " "           | " "                                 | Aug 70  | " " "                    |
|                                   | WO2  |        | Hodgson  | RAA    | 2/2 " "           | " (Desig)                           | Jun 71  | " " "                    |
|                                   | WO2  | J.M.   | Lefel    | RA Inf | 3/2 " "           | " "                                 | Jan 71  | " " "                    |
|                                   | WO2  | A.E.   | Gee      | RA Inf | 4/2 " "           | " "                                 | Feb 71  | " " "                    |
|                                   | WO2  | L.J.   | Storan   | RA Inf | 5/2 " "           | " "                                 | Jan 71  | " " "                    |
|                                   | WO2  |        | Bouveng  | RA Inf | 5/2 " "           | " (Desig)                           | Jun 71  | " " "                    |
|                                   | WO1  | G.     | Burns    | RAAC   | 3/7 ARVN Cav      | " "                                 | Oct 70  | Quang-Tri                |

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| Serial                           | Rank   | Inits  | Name          | Corps      | Unit                | Employment  | Due RTA  | Location             |
|----------------------------------|--------|--------|---------------|------------|---------------------|---|----------|----------------------|
| <u>I CTZ (Cont)</u>              |        |        |               |            |                     |   |          |                      |
| <u>AATTV THUA THIEN PROVINCE</u> |        |        |               |            |                     |   |          |                      |
| 25.                              | : WO2  | : D.G. | : Killion     | : RAAMC    | : Thua-Thien Sector | : Medical Adviser   | : Jul 70 | : Hue                |
| 26.                              | : WO1  | : M.R. | : Steiger     | : RAAMC    | : " " "             | : " " (Desig)   | : Jun 71 | : "                  |
| 27.                              | : Capt | : W.D. | : Tear        | : RA Inf   | : " " "             | : RF/PF Territorial Security Adviser                        | : Oct 70 | : "                  |
| 28.                              | : WO2  | : J.F. | : Leal        | : RAA      | : HQ 1 ARVN Div     | : RF/PF Thua-Thien Junior Leader School Adviser/Instructor. | : Apr 71 | : "                  |
| 29.                              | : WO2  | : J.   | : Kendall     | : RA Inf   | : " " "             | : Sensor/Adviser  | : Jun 71 | :                    |
| 30.                              | : Capt | : W.R. | : Deane       | : Aust Int | : 3/54 ARVN Bn      | : Senior Adviser  | : Jul 70 | : Phu-Loc (Regt HQ)  |
| 31.                              | : WO2  | : R.E. | : Mills       | : RAEME    | : 3/54 " "          | : Assistant Adviser   | : Jun 71 | : " "                |
| 32.                              | : WO2  | : G.E. | : Paxton      | : RA Inf   | : 4/54 " "          | : " "   | : Jun 71 | : " "                |
| 33.                              | : WO2  | : D.E. | : Watts       | : RA Sigs  | : 1/3 " "           | : " "   | : Jul 70 | : Near Hue (Regt HQ) |
| 34.                              | : WO2  | : A.W. | : Lancaster   | : RA Inf   | : 1/3 " "           | : " "(Desig)  | : Jun 71 | : " " "              |
| 35.                              | : WO2  | : J.F. | : McKenner    | : RA Inf   | : 2/3 " "           | : " "   | : Jul 70 | : " " "              |
| 36.                              | : WO2  | : A.R. | : Clutterbuck | : RA Inf   | : 2/3 " "           | : " "(Desig)  | : Jun 71 | : " " "              |
| 37.                              | : WO2  | : R.E. | : Heathcote   | : RAA      | : 3/3 " "           | : " "   | : Nov 70 | : " " "              |
| 38.                              | : WO2  | : K.H. | : Mavin       | : RA Inf   | : 4/3 " "           | : " "   | : Aug 70 | : " " "              |

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| Serial                            | Rank | Initis | Name      | Corps  | Unit                | Employment                          | Due RTA | Location            |
|-----------------------------------|------|--------|-----------|--------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|---------|---------------------|
| <u>I CTZ (Cont)</u>               |      |        |           |        |                     |                                     |         |                     |
| <u>AATTV : QUANG NAM PROVINCE</u> |      |        |           |        |                     |                                     |         |                     |
| 39.                               | Maj  | R.J.   | Aitken    | RA Inf | HQ I Corps          | Assistant to Chief of Staff I Corps | Apr 71  | Danang              |
| 40.                               | WO1  | G.S.   | Munt      | RA Inf | AATTV Danang        | Admin WO                            | Oct 70  | Aust House Danang   |
| 41.                               | WO2  | D.     | Burke     | RA Inf | " "                 | " "                                 | Aug 70  | " " "               |
| 42.                               | WO2  | T.H.   | Breakwell | RA Inf | 21st Ranger Bn      | Assistant Adviser                   | Dec 70  | Near Danang (Gp HQ) |
| 43.                               | WO2  | L.B.   | Green     | RAAC   | 3/17 ARVN Cav       | " "                                 | Nov 70  | Hoi-An              |
| 44.                               | Capt | B.F.   | McGurgan  | RAE    | 1/51 ARVN Bn        | Senior Adviser                      | Mar 71  | Mieu-Bong (Regt HQ) |
| 45.                               | WO2  | C.D.   | Dermody   | RA Inf | 2/51 " "            | Assistant Adviser                   | Jan 71  | " " "               |
| 46.                               | WO2  | W.T.   | Jones     | RA Inf | 3/51 " "            | " "                                 | Aug 70  | " " "               |
| 47.                               | WO2  | P.J.   | Heslin    | RAE    | Hoa-Vang Sub Sector | " "                                 | Oct 70  | Hoa-Vang            |

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Serial : Rank : Inits : Name : Corps : Unit : Employment : Due RTA : Location

I CTZ (Cont)

AATTV : QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

|    |        |          |            |           |                         |                     |          |                               |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-----------|-------------------------|---------------------|----------|-------------------------------|
| 48 | : WO2  | : W.J.   | : McInerny | : RA Inf  | : 4 ARVN Regt Recce Coy | : Senior Adviser    | : Apr 71 | : )                           |
| 49 | : Capt | : W.     | : Gunder   | : RA Inf  | : 1/4 ARVN Bn           | : " "               | : Apr 71 | : )                           |
| 50 | : WO2  | : G.E.   | : Munro    | : RA Sigs | : " " "                 | : Assistant Adviser | : Sep 70 | : ) Quang-Ngai Province       |
| 51 | : WO2  | : W.E.   | : Tillett  | : RA Inf  | : 2/4 " "               | : " "               | : Sep 70 | : ) (Regt HQ near Quang-Ngai) |
| 52 | : WO2  | : L.G.   | : Schmidt  | : RA Inf  | : 3/4 " "               | : " "               | : Jan 71 | : )                           |
| 53 | : WO2  | : R.W.   | : Cairns   | : RA Inf  | : 4/4 " "               | : " "               | : Apr 71 | : )                           |
| 54 | : WO2  | : G.D.   | : Heath    | : RA Inf  | : 1/5 " "               | : " "               | : Feb 71 | : )                           |
| 55 | : WO2  | : A.H.   | : Franks   | : RA Inf  | : 2/5 " "               | : " "               | : Jan 71 | : ) Quang-Tin Province        |
| 56 | : WO2  | : G.     | : Joyce    | : RA Inf  | : 3/5 " "               | : " "               | : Jan 71 | : ) (Regt HQ near Tam-Ky)     |
| 57 | : WO2  | : D.     | : Rolph    | : RA Inf  | : 4/5 " "               | : " "               | : Nov 70 | : )                           |
| 58 | : WO2  | : E.M.   | : Schmidt  | : RA Inf  | : 4/5 " "               | : " "(Desig)        | : Jun 71 | : )                           |
| 59 | : WO2  | : D.W.   | : Eather   | : RA Inf  | : 1/6 " "               | : " "               | : Jul 70 | : )                           |
| 60 | : WO2  | : M.G.   | : Rodger   | : RAEME   | : 1/6 " "               | : " "(Desig)        | : May 71 | : ) Quang-Ngai Province       |
| 61 | : Capt | : H.E.N. | : Martens  | : RA Inf  | : 2/6 " "               | : Senior Adviser    | : Apr 71 | : ) (Regt HQ near Quang-Ngai) |
| 62 | : WO2  | : J.I.   | : Shaw     | : RA Inf  | : 2/6 " "               | : Assistant Adviser | : Feb 71 | : )                           |
| 63 | : WO2  | : J.     | : Nicholls | : RAA     | : 3/6 " "               | : " "               | : Apr 71 | : )                           |
| 64 | : WO2  | : J.F.   | : Ghilotti | : RAAC    | : 2/4 ARVN Cav          | : " "               | : Aug 70 | : Quang-Ngai                  |

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| Serial:                                | Rank : | Inits : | Name :     | Corps :  | Unit :   | Employment :         | Due RTA : | Location :      |
|--|--------|---------|------------|----------|--|----------------------|-----------|-----------------|
| <u>II CTZ</u>                          |        |         |            |          |  |                      |           |                 |
| <u>AATTV : PLEIKU (SPECIAL FORCES)</u> |        |         |            |          |  |                      |           |                 |
| 65.                                    | : Capt | : P.J.  | : Shilston | : RA Inf | : 2nd Mobile Strike Force: Bn Comd<br>Command, Det B-20, 5th<br>Special Forces Group<br>(Airborne) |                      | : Aug 70  | : Pleiku (Base) |
| 66.                                    | : WO1  | : J.S.  | : Calcutt  | : RA Inf | : " " "  | : Coy Comd (Trg Coy) | : Mar 71  | : " "           |
| 67.                                    | : Sgt  | : A.J.  | : Miller   | : RA Inf | : " " "  | : Pl Comd            | : Jul 70  | : " "           |
| 68.                                    | : WO2  | : R.A.  | : Barnes   | : RA Inf | : " " "  | : " "                | : Feb 71  | : " "           |

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Serial : Rank : Inits : Name : Corps : Unit : Employment : Due RTA : Location

II CTZ (Cont)

AATTV - II CORPS AREA

|    |       |        |            |           |                          |                      |          |          |
|----|-------|--------|------------|-----------|--------------------------|----------------------|----------|----------|
| 69 | : WO1 | : W.A. | : Eade     | : RAA Pro | : Ranger Training Centre | : Instructor/Adviser | : Feb 71 | : Duc-My |
| 70 | : WO2 | : P.J. | : Pavlenko | : RA Inf  | : " " "                  | : " "                | : May 71 | : "      |

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| Serial                        | Rank   | Inits  | Name        | Corps    | Unit                                 | Employment              | Due RTA  | Location               |
|-------------------------------|--------|--------|-------------|----------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|----------|------------------------|
| <u>III CTZ</u>                |        |        |             |          |                                      |                         |          |                        |
| <u>AATTV - III CORPS AREA</u> |        |        |             |          |                                      |                         |          |                        |
| 71                            | : Capt | : J.D. | : Gilliland | : RAEME  | : HQ AATTV Vung-Tau                  | : QM                    | : Jun 71 | : Vung-Tau             |
| 72                            | : WO1  | : E.B. | : Ostara    | : RA Inf | : " "                                | : Admin WO              | : Jul 70 | : "                    |
| 73                            | : WO2  | : M.   | : Muir      | : RA Inf | : " "                                | : RQMS                  | : May 71 | : "                    |
| 74                            | : WO2  | : R.T. | : Cullen    | : RA Inf | : " "                                | : " (Desig)             | : Jun 71 | : "                    |
| 75                            | : Maj  | : P.W. | : Beale     | : RA Inf | : Phuoc-Tuy Sector                   | : MATT Coordinator      | : Jan 71 | : Baria                |
| 76                            | : Maj  | : M.W. | : Farmer    | : RAAC   | : " "                                | : Sector Psyops Adviser | :        | : "                    |
| 77                            | : WO1  | : R.   | : Deed      | : RA Inf | : " "                                | : Admin WO              | : Jun 71 | : "                    |
| 78                            | : Sgt  | : W.F. | : Roughan   | : RAA    | : " "                                | : Sgt Clerk             | : Jan 71 | : "                    |
| 79                            | : Pte  | : G.R. | : Hains     | : RA Inf | : " "                                | : Dvr                   | :        | : "                    |
| 80                            | : WO2  | : D.F. | : Hedges    | : RA Inf | : Phuoc-Tuy National Training Centre | : Instructor/Adviser    | : Aug 70 | : "                    |
| 81                            | : WO2  | : O.   | : Stevenson | : RA Inf | : " "                                | : " "                   | : Aug 70 | : "                    |
| 82                            | : WO2  | : G.   | : Kealy     | : RA Inf | : Phuoc-Tuy Sector                   | : PF Adviser            | : Aug 70 | : "                    |
| 83                            | : WO2  | : L.D. | : Osborn    | : RA Inf | : " "                                | : Adviser RD Cadre      | : Jan 71 | : "                    |
| 84                            | : WO2  | : E.A. | : Taylor    | : RA Inf | : " "                                | : Adviser ARVN Trg      | : Jul 70 | : Nui-Dat (Horse Shoe) |

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| Serial                         | Rank   | Initis | Name       | Corps     | Unit               | Employment           | Due R A  | Location             |
|--------------------------------|--------|--------|------------|-----------|--------------------|----------------------|----------|----------------------|
| <u>III CTZ</u>                 |        |        |            |           |                    |                      |          |                      |
| <u>AATTV -- III CORPS AREA</u> |        |        |            |           |                    |                      |          |                      |
| 85                             | : WO2  | : J.   | : Stephens | : RAASC   | : Phuoc-Tuy Sector | : Team Leader MATT 1 | : Oct 70 | : Phuoc-Tuy Province |
| 86                             | : WO2  | : A.G. | : White    | : RA Inf  | : " " "            | : " 21C "            | : Jan 71 | : " "                |
| 87                             | : Cpl  | : W.O. | : Parry    | : RA Inf  | : " " "            | : " Member "         | : Nov 70 | : " "                |
| 88                             | : Cpl  | : M.N. | : McIntyre | : RA Inf  | : " " "            | : " " "              | : Nov 70 | : " "                |
| 89                             | : Cpl  | : J.A. | : Peach    | : RAE     | : " " "            | : " " "              | : Sep 70 | : " "                |
| 90                             | : Cpl  | : M.H. | : Dawkins  | : RAAMC   | : " " "            | : " " "              | : Nov 70 | : " "                |
| 91                             | : WO2  | : R.D. | : Smith    | : RA Inf  | : " " "            | : Team Leader MATT 2 | : Oct 70 | : " "                |
| 92                             | : WO2  | : A.S. | : Williams | : RA Sigs | : " " "            | : " 21C "            | : Oct 70 | : " "                |
| 93                             | : Cpl  | : A.J. | : Eade     | : RA Inf  | : " " "            | : " Member "         | : Feb 71 | : " "                |
| 94                             | : Pte  | : G.J. | : Kalembe  | : RAAMC   | : " " "            | : " " "              | : Feb 71 | : " "                |
| 95                             | : Cpl  | : B.   | : Willis   | : RAE     | : " " "            | : " " "              | : Dec 70 | : " "                |
| 96                             | : Cpl  | : R.P. | : Smithson | : RA Inf  | : " " "            | : " " "              | : Feb 71 | : " "                |
| 97                             | : Capt | : L.M. | : Opie     | : RA Inf  | : " " "            | : Team Leader MATT 3 | : Apr 71 | : " "                |
| 98                             | : WO2  | : G.M. | : Logan    | : RA Inf  | : " " "            | : " 21C "            | : Oct 70 | : " "                |
| 99                             | : WO2  | : F.M. | : Moffitt  | : RA Inf  | : " " "            | : " Member "         | : Apr 71 | : " "                |
| 100                            | : Cpl  | : M.N. | : Talbot   | : RA Inf  | : " " "            | : " " "              | : Nov 70 | : " "                |
| 101                            | : Cpl  | : J.C. | : Monk     | : RA Inf  | : " " "            | : " " "              | : Jun 71 | : " "                |
| 102                            | : Cpl  | : M.B. | : Byrne    | : RAE     | : " " "            | : " " "              | : Aug 70 | : " "                |
| 103                            | : Cpl  | : J.H. | : Riley    | : RAAMC   | : " " "            | : " " "              | : Jan 71 | : " "                |

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| Serial                               | Rank    | Inits  | Name        | Corps    | Unit               | Employment           | Due RTA  | Location             |
|--------------------------------------|---------|--------|-------------|----------|--------------------|----------------------|----------|----------------------|
| <u>III CTZ</u>                       |         |        |             |          |                    |                      |          |                      |
| <u>AATTV - III CORPS AREA (Cont)</u> |         |        |             |          |                    |                      |          |                      |
| 104                                  | : WO2   | : D.F. | : Heenan    | : RA Inf | : Phuoc-Tuy Sector | : Team Leader MATT 4 | : Jul 70 | : Phuoc-Tuy Province |
| 105                                  | : WO2   | : D.M. | : Palmer    | : RA Inf | : " "              | : " 21C "            | : Jan 71 | : " "                |
| 106                                  | : Sgt   | : H.K. | : Karaka    | : RNZR   | : " "              | : " Member "         | : Nov 70 | : " "                |
| 107                                  | : Cpl   | : I.A. | : Kuring    | : RA Inf | : " "              | : " " "              | : May 71 | : " "                |
| 108                                  | : Bdr   | : P.H. | : Harding   | : RAA    | : " "              | : " " "              | : Feb 71 | : " "                |
| 109                                  | : Pte   | : A.   | : Schneider | : RAAMC  | : " "              | : " " "              | : Apr 71 | : " "                |
| 110                                  | : Cpl   | : T.R. | : Hogg      | : RAE    | : " "              | : " " "              | : Apr 71 | : " "                |
| 111                                  | : WO2   | : W.C. | : Green     | : RAASC  | : " "              | : Team Leader MATT 5 | : Nov 70 | : Baria              |
| 112                                  | : WO2   | : R.G. | : Davies    | : RA Inf | : " "              | : " 21C "            | : May 71 | : " "                |
| 113                                  | : L Bdr | : D.D. | : Keech     | : RAA    | : " "              | : " Member "         | : Jun 71 | : " "                |
| 114                                  | : Cpl   | : V.P. | : Stuart    | : RA Inf | : " "              | : " " "              | : May 71 | : " "                |
| 115                                  | : Sgt   | : J.F. | : Kimberley | : RAE    | : " "              | : " " "              | : Nov 70 | : " "                |
| 116                                  | : Cpl   | : J.S. | : Kolaric   | : RAAMC  | : " "              | : " " "              | : Jan 70 | : " "                |

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| Serial | Rank | Initis | Name       | Corps         | Unit            | Employment                                 | Due RTA | Location            |
|--------|------|--------|------------|---------------|-----------------|--|---------|---------------------|
|        |      |        |            | <u>IV CTZ</u> |                 |  |         |                     |
| 117    | Maj  | J.A.   | Browne     | RAA           | CORDS, IV Corps | Assistant to Chief of Territorial Security | Mar 71  | Can-Tho             |
| 118    | WO2  | H.J.   | Hartman    | RAAMC         | HQ IV Corps     | Medical Adviser                            | Jul 70  | "                   |
| 119    | Capt | W.     | Sheppard   | RA Inf        | AATTV RF Trg    | OC Night Operations and Advisory Team      | Sep 70  | Dinh-Tuong Province |
| 120    | WO2  | C.N.   | McEvoy     | RA Inf        | " " "           | DIOCC Rep                                  | Dec 70  | " "                 |
| 121    | WO2  | D.B.   | Bell       | RAE           | " " "           | Team Leader                                | Dec 70  | " "                 |
| 122    | WO2  | D.C.   | Parker     | RA Inf        | " " "           | Team Member (Desig)                        | Oct 70  | " "                 |
| 123    | WO2  | S.     | Booth      | RA Inf        | " " "           | Team Member                                | Feb 71  | " "                 |
| 124    | WO2  | A.K.   | Jones      | RA Inf        | " " "           | " " (Desig)                                | Jun 71  | " "                 |
| 125    | WO2  | W.E.   | Butler     | RA Inf        | " " "           | Team Leader                                | Jan 71  | " "                 |
| 126    | WO2  | G.J.   | Sutherland | RA Inf        | " " "           | Team Member                                | Jun 71  | " "                 |
| 127    | WO2  | D.A.   | Strachan   | RA Inf        | " " "           | Team Leader                                | Oct 70  | " "                 |
| 128    | WO2  | G.     | Herschell  | RA Inf        | " " "           | Team Member                                | Apr 71  | " "                 |
| 129    | WO2  | V.L.   | Harris     | RA Inf        | " " "           | Admin WO NOAT                              | Sep 70  | " "                 |

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Annex B  
to AATTV Report  
Jun 70

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS INVOLVING  
UNITS HAVING AUSTRALIAN ADVISERS  
I CORPS - JUN 70

1. At 301015 H in the vicinity of ZC 094537, 1st Bn 5th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: Friendly; one KIA, two WIA. Enemy; eight KIA and two AAMG captured.
2. At 301435 in the vicinity of YD 307371, 3rd Bn 1st Regt searching found six VC bodies killed by air (KBA) estimated two days old, 30 kg of polished rice, 20 x B40 rounds, 100 kg SAA, three AK 47 rifles, and destroyed five tunnels.
3. At 301700H in the vicinity of AT 893265, 4th Bn 5th Regt clearing found five enemy bodies KBA estimated three days old.
4. At 300900H in the vicinity of YD 315255, 1st Bn 1st Regt found two graves with 10 bodies KBA estimated four days old.
5. At 311305 H in the vicinity of YD 039354, 1st Bn 54th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force and received an unknown quantity and type of incoming resulting in: Friendly; four KIA and 25 WIA. Enemy two KIA and one AK 47 captured.
6. At 311500 H in the vicinity of ZC 087546, 1st Bn 51st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: Friendly four WIA. Enemy eight VC KIA, one individual weapon and 100 rounds SAA captured.
7. At 010855H Jun in the vicinity of YD 025355, 1st Bn 54th Regt at LZ Langley received 7x75mm RR rounds, resulting in: Friendly five WIA. One UH 1H Dustoff received one round and was forced to land at LZ Langley.
8. At 011100H in the vicinity of ZC 088536, 1st Bn 51st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: Friendly four KIA, six WIA, two individual weapons lost. Enemy seven VC KIA and two individual weapons and 10xB40 rounds were captured.
9. At 011900H in the vicinity of YD 825355, 1st Bn 54th Regt received a ground attack by an unknown sized enemy force sustaining one KIA and one WIA.
10. At 012255H in the vicinity of XD 995304, 1st Bn 54th Regt observed a lighted 15 truck convoy. Direction of movement not stated.
11. At 020445H in the vicinity of YD 057324, 2nd Bn 54th Regt received a ground attack and an unknown number and type of mortar rounds. Results: Friendly; one US KIA, three US WIA, one Aust WIA (WO1 Waters), 22 ARVN KIA, 24 ARVN WIA incl Bn XO KIA and Bn Comd WIA; ARVN Arty five KIA, four WIA seven MIA; ARVN Engr nine KIA, 19 WIA, 10 MIA; LCDB two KIA. Enemy 81 KIA, one VC captured and nine crew-served weapons, 24 individual weapons and one radio captured.
12. At 021310H in the vicinity of YD 023355, 1st Bn 54th Regt received a ground attack by an unknown sized enemy force. Results: Friendly five WIA.

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13. At 021430H in the vicinity of BS 578208, 4th Bn 4th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 11 enemy KIA and the capture of two MG, three AK 47, 12 grenades, and the destruction of five huts.
14. At 021430H in the vicinity of AT 973247, 3rd Bn 6th Regt found four VC bodies KBA estimated seven days old, 1000 metres of telephone wire and 12 x B40 rounds.
15. At 021700H in the vicinity of ZC 077541, 1st Bn 51st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: six VC KIA and six B40 rounds captured.
16. At 020845H in the vicinity of YD 059329, WO2 Birnie 2nd Bn 54th Regt received shrapnel wounds to back and buttocks and was evacuated to 18th Surgical Hospital and then to USHS REPOSE.
17. Between 030650H and 030935H in the vicinity of Tun Tavern 1st Bn 54th Regt captured two NVA soldiers, five individual and two crew-served weapons.
18. At 031453H in the vicinity of YD 002346, 1st Bn 54th Regt found 20 enemy bodies KBA estimated two days old.
19. At 031215H in the vicinity of ZC 078541, 1st Bn 51st Regt received 20 x 82mm mortar and 75 RR rounds resulting in four KIA and four WIA.
20. At 040100H in the vicinity of AT 894264, 4th Bn 5th Regt ambushed an unknown sized enemy force resulting in three enemy KIA, one VC captured, and two individual weapons and five B40 rounds captured.
21. At 040300H in the vicinity of BS 723886, 1st Bn 6th Regt ambushed an unknown sized enemy force killing five VC and capturing one individual weapon and 10 grenades.
22. At 041500H in the vicinity of YD 057323, 3rd Bn 1st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 10 VC KIA and the capture of two individual and four crew-served weapons.
23. At 041630H in the vicinity of YD 057322 and YD 053328 3rd Bn 1st Regt found 45 enemy bodies killed in contact with 2nd Bn 54th Regt at Tun Tavern.
24. At 051000H in the vicinity of ZC 082539, 1st Bn 51st Regt received an unknown number of 82mm mortar and 75 RR rounds sustaining one KIA and 24 WIA.
25. At 060545H in the vicinity of YD 043331, 3rd Bn 1st Regt was attacked by two NVA Coys. Results: Friendly one KIA, five WIA; Enemy 11 NVA KIA, two individual and one crew-served weapons captured.
26. At 061410H in the vicinity of YD 035343, 1st Bn 54th Regt found 12 VC bodies KBA, one B40 launcher, two AK 47 rifles and 10 x B40 rounds.
27. At 061855H in the vicinity of ZC 087537, two companies of 1st Bn 51st Regt were attacked by one company NVA supported by 82mm mortar barrage. Contact was broken at 062105H. Friendly one KIA, seven WIA.
28. At 061745H in the vicinity of YD 430297, 4th Bn 1st Regt ambushed a VC Platoon resulting in five VC KIA and the capture of three individual weapons.

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29. At 062250H in the vicinity of BS 640613, 1st Bn 4th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in five VC KIA and one individual weapon captured.
30. At 070700H in the vicinity of BS 644623, 1st Bn 4th Regt killed five VC and found seven VC bodies estimated two days old.
31. At 071300H in the vicinity of AT 941597, 2nd Bn 51st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. Results: two friendly WIA, nine VC KIA, nine VC captured and five individual weapons captured.
32. At 072100H in the vicinity of BS 614570, 3rd Bn 4th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in seven VC KIA and the capture of one AAMG, one AK 47 rifle, 20 x B40 and 40 x 82mm mortar rounds.
33. At 080830H in the vicinity of ZC 087537, 1st Bn 51st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force resulting in friendly one KIA and 23 WIA.
34. At 081300H in the vicinity of YD 072348, 1st Bn 54th Regt found a VC mortar location and captured 17 x 82mm rounds.
35. At 090930H in the vicinity of YD 103318, 3rd Bn 1st Regt in a contact killed five enemy and captured three individual weapons.
36. At 091230H in the vicinity of BS 687915, 4th Bn 6th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force killing 16 VC and capturing two AK 47 rifles, 13 US shotguns, one 82mm mortar complete, two 60mm mortars complete, 100 x 60mm rounds, 50 x 82mm rounds and 90 Chicom grenades.
37. At 101610H in the vicinity of ZC 088543 - ZC 083542, 1st Bn 51st Regt found 41 enemy bodies KBA estimated two days old.
38. At 110125H in the vicinity of AT 885258, 4th Bn 5th Regt was attacked in its night defensive position, sustaining five WIA, and killing six enemy and capturing four AK 47 rifles.
39. At 110220H in the vicinity of BS 616853, 1st Bn 6th Regt in a contact killed five enemy and captured two M1 rifles and 12 grenades.
40. At 110700H in the vicinity of AT 915248, 3rd Bn 6th Regt received three Hoi Chanhs.
41. At 110125H in the vicinity of AT 906262, 2nd Bn 6th Regt received seven 82mm mortar rounds and a ground attack by an unknown sized enemy force resulting in seven friendly WIA and eight enemy KIA, two VC captured and the capture of one MG, one M16 rifle and two K 50 carbines.
42. At 110955H in the vicinity of BS 350610, 4th Regt Recon Coy found 10 AK 47 rifles and 15 x 82mm mortar rounds.
43. At 111040H in the vicinity of BS 355612, 4th Regt Recon Coy in contact with an unknown sized enemy force killed 15 enemy and captured complete one 81mm mortar, one 82mm mortar and 20 AK 47 rifles.
44. At 130200H in the vicinity of BT 187150, 3rd Bn 5th Regt ambushed an unknown sized enemy force resulting in one friendly KIA, five enemy KIA and the capture of one individual weapon.

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45. At 151340H in the vicinity of YD 628183, 4th Bn 3rd Regt contacted an enemy squad killing five VC and capturing one individual and one crew-served weapon.
46. At 151930H in the vicinity of BS 597503, 4th Bn 4th Regt ambushed an unknown sized enemy force killing seven VC and capturing two individual weapons, 14 grenades and seven packs.
47. At 161200H in the vicinity of BS 619554, 3rd Bn 4th Regt found three tons of good polished rice in a tunnel. Cache estimated to be two months old.
48. At 161430H in the vicinity of YD 465054, 1st Bn 3rd Regt contacted enemy platoon killing eight VC and capturing two individual and one crew-served weapons.
49. At 170345H in the vicinity of YD 441063, 1st Bn 3rd Regt was attacked by an estimated platoon of C3 Coy, K1 Bn NVA. Enemy attacked with small arms and satchel charges. Results: Friendly - nil casualties. Enemy - 32 NVA KIA, three B40 launchers, three AK 47 rifles, 70 x B40 rounds, 300 x  $\frac{1}{2}$  lb blocks TNT, 50 Chicom grenades, 10 packs, 20 kg food, 300 NVA piastres, 30 kg rice and 1000 x AK 47 round captured.
50. At 170700H in the vicinity of BS 725566, 4th Regt Recon Coy received two Hoi Chanhs and two AK 47 rifles.
51. At 180530H in the vicinity of YD 350405, 2nd Bn 3rd Regt raided an enemy position killing four VC and capturing two individual weapons, 15 VC grenades and 17 x AK 47 magazines.
52. At 181300H in the vicinity of BS 287613, 2nd Bn 4th Regt found an enemy position killing four VC and capturing three individual weapons, 100 suits of black clothing, 100 handkerchiefs, 14 cases of medicine, seven bicycles, eight cases of B40 ammo, six cases AK 47 ammo, one case of coloured smoke grenades, two cases of PRC 9 batteries, two anti-tank mines, four cases .50 cal MG ammo, four rounds 82mm mortar ammo. Seventy-nine VC huts were destroyed and three tons of local unpolished rice were evacuated.
53. At 181330H in the vicinity of ZC 184485, 21st Ranger Bn found an enemy position containing two VC huts, 10 covered trenches, 10 kg of medical supplies, five kg of band aids, 200 rounds AK 47 ammo, 10 cases 12.7mm Chicom ammo, five rounds 82mm mortar ammo, 5000 rounds 7.62mm link belt, 22 assorted uniforms and 50 kg of rice.
54. At 181700H in the vicinity of BS 618492, 4th Bn 4th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force killing three VC, capturing one AK 47 rifle and six grenades and destroying 10 sampans and 2000 kg of local rice in bad condition.
55. At 190700H in the vicinity of YD 035630, 4th Bn 2nd Regt contacted a VC squad killing two VC and capturing the bipod and baseplate of an 82mm mortar and 20 x 82mm mortar rounds.
56. At 190300H in the vicinity of AT 927272, 3rd Bn 6th Regt ambushed an unknown sized enemy force sustaining one KIA and killing four enemy and capturing one carbine.
57. At 201000H in the vicinity of BS 608478, 4th Bn 4th Regt received one Hoi Chanh

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58. At 201040H in the vicinity of YD 182306, 1st Bn 1st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force sustaining one WIA and killing two enemy. Captured were one AK 47, three K 50, one K 51, one carbine, one typewriter, and one mimeograph machine. Five huts were destroyed.
59. At 201310H in the vicinity of YD 347360, 2nd Bn 3rd Regt found 30 x 105mm, 60mm and 82mm rounds which had been converted into mines.
60. At 211330H in the vicinity of BS 283645, 4th Regt Recon Coy searching a bunker captured 150 x B40 and 60mm rounds, 30 x 82mm rounds, 100 x B41 rounds, two cases of medicine and one case of PRC 25 batteries.
61. At 211640H in the vicinity of BS 624515, 4th Bn 4th Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force sustaining one KIA, two WIA and one M79 90% destroyed. They killed six enemy and captured two AK 47 and ten grenades.
62. At 211400H in the vicinity of YD 189235, 2nd Bn 1st Regt found 40 VC huts with foxholes and two training fields. Huts and foxholes were destroyed.
63. At 221600H in the vicinity of YD 172268, 1st Bn 1st Regt found an enemy training centre comprising 50 new huts with underground bunkers, one firing range and an ammo storage area containing 10,000 x AK 47 rounds, 200 x B40 rounds and 40 suits of khaki NVA uniforms.
64. At 221420H in the vicinity of YD 190233, 2nd Bn 1st Regt destroyed 100 huts.
65. At 221600H in the vicinity of YD 172240, 2nd Bn 1st Regt destroyed a base camp of 130 huts.
66. At 221630H in the vicinity of YD 170265, 1st Coy of 1st Bn, 1st Regt destroyed six huts and 1,000 rounds of AK 47 ammo.
67. At 221630H in the vicinity of YD 178265, 2nd Coy 1st Bn 1st Regt destroyed 50 huts and 40 x B40 rounds.
68. At 231045H in the vicinity of YD 168278, 1st Bn 1st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force killing four enemy and capturing two AK 47 and 120 kg of rice in bad condition.
69. At 231450H in the vicinity of YD 184256, 1st Bn 1st Regt contacted an unknown sized enemy force. 1st Bn sustained four WIA, killed 47 VC and captured one 60mm mortar, four B40 launchers, two 12.7mm AAMGs, one towed AAMG, three SPD MGs, 8 x AK 47 rifles, one M2 carbine, one M1 rifle, 30 Anti-tank mines, one Chicom radio, one 12.7mm MG belt, 150 cases 12.7mm MG ammo, 220 cases AK ammo, 780 rounds of B40 and B41 ammo, 1000 lbs of salt, three tons of rice. All ammo, 160 huts ( 4x6 metres ) and two with 20 beds in each were destroyed. Weapons, food and ammo was in good condition.

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Annex C to  
AATTV Report  
Jun 70

## SUMMARY OF CACHES AND CONTENTS DISCOVERED I CORPS - JUN 70

| Serial | Date/Time             | Location  | Searching Unit        | Contents of Cache  |
|--------|-----------------------|-----------|-----------------------|--|
| 1.     | 211210H               | XD 898286 | Hac Bao Coy           | 10 x B40 rounds.<br>3 x 100 kg bags rice.  |
| 2.     | 211530H               | XD 886288 | Hac Bao Coy           | 1 x AK 47<br>10 x $\frac{1}{2}$ lb blocks TNT<br>400 x 100 kg bags rice (40 tons)<br>1 medicine store                                      |
| 3.     | 211330H               | BS 283645 | 4th Regt<br>Recon Coy | 150 x B40 and 60mm rounds<br>30 x 82mm rounds<br>100 x B41 rounds<br>2 cases medicine<br>1 case PRC 25 batteries                           |
| 4.     | 221400H to<br>221630H | YD 172268 | 1st Bn<br>1st Regt    | a. 10,000 x AK 47 rounds<br>200 x B40 rounds<br>40 suits khaki uniforms<br>b. 40 x B40 rounds<br>c. 1000 x AK 47 rounds                    |
| 5.     | 221600H               | XD 885286 | Hac Bao Coy           | 15 x 122mm rockets<br>40 x 75mm RR rounds<br>250 x B40 rounds<br>23 cases 12.7mm MG ammo<br>19,500 x AK 47 rounds<br>10 x 100 kg bags salt |

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| Serial | Date/Time | Location  | Searching Unit     | Contents of Cache  |
|--------|-----------|-----------|--------------------|--|
| 6.     | 230840H   | XD 866288 | Hac Bao Coy        | 10 x 122mm rockets<br>250 x 75mm RR rounds<br>200 x B40 and B41 rounds<br>152 rifle grenades<br>100 cases 12.7mm MG ammo<br>50 Anti-tank mines<br>25 boxes pressure firing devices<br>500 kg dried cabbage<br>1000 kg salt<br>300 kg canned fish<br>400 kg dried beef                                      |
| 7.     | 231450H   | YD 184256 | 1st Bn<br>1st Regt | 1 x 60mm mortar<br>4 x B40<br>2 x 12.7mm MG<br>1 x rowed AAMG<br>3 x RPD MGs<br>8 x AK 47s<br>1 x M2 Carbine<br>1 x M1 rifle<br>30 Anti-tank mines<br>1 Chicom radio<br>1 x 12.7mm MG belt<br>150 cases 12.7mm MG ammo<br>220 cases AK 47 ammo<br>780 x B40 and B41 rounds<br>1000 lbs salt<br>3 tons rice |
| 8.     | 241615H   | YD 189255 | 1st Bn<br>1 Regt   | 25 x 100 kg bags Chinese rice<br>500 x B40 and B41 rounds<br>720 x 60mm mortar rounds  |

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Annex D to  
AATTV Report  
Jun 70

REPORT BY MAJ C.S.A. CONNOR - S3  
QUANG TRI SECTOR - JUN 70

## Introduction

1. This report is prepared for the period 25 May - 16 Jun as the author will be absent from 17 to 26 Jun. The remainder of June will be included in the July report.

## Enemy

2. In the reporting period, the level of enemy activity has dropped. There have been some contacts with regular forces, and, notably, some company sized incursions into the populated area. The last week has seen an almost complete disengagement.
3. Attacks were made on FSB O'Rielly on 27 May and on Tun Tavern on about 4 Jun. In the O'Rielly attack 76 NVA were killed but they did not penetrate the defences (two ARVN were killed). Tun Tavern in the Da Krong valley, was being reopened, thus threatening the major lines of communication to the Ba Long Valley. In this engagement, the enemy inflicted heavy casualties (51 KIA, and some 90, including WOs Waters and Birnie, wounded). The NVA casualties finally totalled 91 KIA.
4. NVA sapper companies were detected in My Chanh and Hai Vinh Villages of Hai Lang district on 27 May. The apparent aim was to disrupt development activities, and re-establish conditions favourable to the insertion of an effective VC infrastructure. The reaction, and results so far suggest that this aim was not achieved (see paragraph 9).
5. A sapper style attack on the Mai Linh district military compound was a military failure or at worst a draw. It could be held as a political success for the enemy. 9 NVA were KIA against 4 PF soldiers. The compound was constructed as a result of Catholic agitation. The fact that it was attacked and penetrated probably achieved the VC objective.
6. A mortar attack on Quang-Tri city missed both of its possible objectives, the MACV compound and the Sector POL store. It did disturb the rest of the MACV team, and incited an intensive anti-VCI operation in the area from which the mortar was fired. It is likely that the enemy has lost a previously hospitable area by this action.
7. There is substantial evidence that the 66th and 27th Regts are being replaced, due to the casualties they have suffered. It appears that the next offensive will start towards the end of June (coinciding with the period of low illumination). Objectives will probably be:
  - a. Further attempts to disrupt the Pacification and Development plan, and re-establish the VCI.
  - b. Disruption of the Province Council elections on 28 Jun 70.
  - c. Further casualty producing attacks by fire in the Fuller/DMZ area.

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d. Removal of, or infliction of heavy casualties on ARVN forces operating in the Da Krong Valley and nearby areas, in the hope of preventing a further incursion into the Ashau Valley.

Friendly Forces

8. 1st ARVN Division, in spite of continuing casualties, has moved into the Da Krong Valley, and has continued to clear the area to the east of that valley. Dong-Ha mountain (FSB Fuller) is by now relatively clear of the NVA who encircled it in the wet season. Clearing activities continue west and south of the Rockpile. The eastern DMZ area has been relatively quiet, with mines and mortars being the chief hazard. Project Delta has been particularly active in the border area, with unknown results. The US Brigade has been working in support of ARVN operations, but has had no notable contacts.

9. In the action mentioned in Para 4, both ARVN and RF were used to eject the sappers. The operation was conducted in populated, close country. There were only 4 civilians killed and remarkably small property damage. 80 NVA were killed, against 20 friendly troops killed. This operation was swift and effective. The only weakness was the time taken, after the enemy were located, to decide who was to command the operation, and what forces were to be used. Fortunately, both ARVN and RF commanders had deployed adequate resources, and the operation commenced as soon as the commander was chosen. Vigorous follow-up operations by Psywar and Refugee service teams have, hopefully, minimised the effects of the NVA incursion.

10. Regional forces continue to operate in and around the populated area. There seems to be little effort to get outside the populated area, although that would be most desirable. A number of VCI have been killed in recent ambushes, and some quick search operations have eliminated a number of guerillas. Some more village fences and small outposts have been constructed (in spite of vigorous protests). These are supposed to give heart to the loyal civilians, although the sector staff acknowledge that their military effectiveness is small. Two combined US Coy/RF Coy operations are planned, to prevent interference with the Province Council elections. These should be successful.

Other Matters

11. The Bru (montagnard) of Huong Hoa continue to decamp for greener pastures. They usually are returned. There is little hope of an early solution. The Vietnamese indifference to the Bru does little to alleviate the problem. The Province Chief is trying hard, but the indifference of his subordinates and the avarice of the Bru Village Chief and The Ethnic Minorities Chief are frustrating his efforts. The NVA is still trying to persuade the Bru to return to the hills - they seem unwilling to do that either.

12. Development and political activity appear to be proceeding smoothly. Political meetings related to the Province Council elections have started; the Dai-Viet held a large meeting on 14 Jun (a Sunday). The Vietnamese appear determined to make this election worthwhile.

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Annex E to  
AATTV Report  
Jun 70

REPORT BY CAPT B MCGURGAN  
BN SENIOR ADVISER, 1/51 ARVN BN - JUN 70

## PART 1

BN OP 1 JUN 70 - 11 JUN 70

### General

1. This was the second phase of the En op which commenced 14 May 70. The AO was bordered by eastings 06 and 10 and by northings 53 and 56. In reality the battalion operated for the majority of the time in grid square 0853 due to heavy enemy opposition and probing by company size enemy elements.
2. The battalion took up defensive positions on co-ord ZC 85536 (CP and two companies) and co-ord ZC 087538 (two companies). This area is the feature 686 metres high and we were unable to move onto our objectives at co-ord ZC 071540 and ZC 074544.
3. During the last six days the enemy constantly hit us with company size elements, on three flanks on one occasion, and we suffered heavy casualties as a result. The enemy in his own defensive locations was very heavily dug in, and had flanking fire (RR and RPG and mortars) to cover all approaches to his location. The ridge lines were heavily mined with 'claymore' type mines in the trees and we took casualties on all his approach routes.
4. It is estimated we were opposed by an NVA Regiment of two battalion strength reinforced with two heavy weapon companies and a 122mm rocket company.
5. In my opinion our battalion more than held their own but the fact remains we failed to take over objectives.
6. Extensive air-strikes, gunships and night bombing plus artillery did not prove so successful against the NVA's ground fortifications.

### Results (Period 2400 1 Jun 70 - 0930 11 Jun 70)

7. I am of the opinion we killed a lot more enemy than we physically counted but results as they were are as follows:-
  - a. Friendly :- 13 KIA  
97 WIA  
1 MIA (head and body found 22/23 Jun 70)  
3 M16 (  
(lost to enemy)  
1 ANPRC 25 (  
22 sick
  - b. Enemy 70 KIA  
3 AK 47

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Fire Support - General

8. Friendly :- 112 Jet sorties

56 Gun ships

9. Enemy:- During this period the NVA fired between 700/800 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortars onto our locations. We also took 6/8 122mm rockets onto our positions.

Air Support

10. During the period fifteen Dustoff helicopters and nine resupply choppers were used.

11. A Phantom F4 aircraft was downed at co-ord ZC 068540 at 1300 hrs of 7 Jun 70. One pilot was killed in the crash and the rear pilot was rescued.

12. A CH 46 which we found on our LZ for the second phase of the operation was later found to have been a result of an operation two months prior to our movement to this area.

13. An UH 1 B with the senior advisers to 51st Regt was also shot at with negative casualties and crash landed at Thuong-Duc (grid square 1553).

Artillery Support

14. Two FO teams once again came out with us. Extensive use of USMC 8 ins guns was made during day contacts and for H and I's at night. A couple of times 175mm were used for counter mortar/rocket fire.

15. The 105mm (ARVN) were once again quick to deliver fire and on most occasions accurate. The USMC are very slow to get clearances (20 - 60 mins) thus effecting our deployment.

16. Rounds Fires :- USMC - 750

ARVN - 450

Conclusion

17. For the whole of this operation including phase I we took heavy casualties. Heavy due to the fact that each rifle company is down to between 40/55 men and a lot of good officers and NCO's were killed or seriously wounded on this operation, thereby reducing our leadership quality in the rifle companies.

18. Casualties during the period 14 May 70 - 11 Jun 70 were:

|            |         |                |
|------------|---------|----------------|
| Friendly:- | 17 KIA  | ) Total of 186 |
|            | 1 MIA   |                |
|            | 113 WIA |                |
|            | 55 SICK |                |

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Enemy:- 111 KIA (47 KBA included)  
2 x 12.7 MG, 1 x B41, 7 x AK 47, 100 B40/41 rounds,  
2000 grenades, 50 kilos of uniforms, 2000 x AK 47 rounds,  
50 bunkers made U/S.

19. Support from all US sources was very good and timely on all occasions (except for artillery). I feel without this support we would have taken a lot more casualties. As I said before the ARVN soldiers fought well on all occasions and we got a lot more than the figures show.

20. Our ambushes, although negative results again, enabled us to know where the enemy was moving at all times and thereby use our superior support.

PART II

PERIOD 12 JUN 70 - 24 JUN 70

Deployment

21. On 13 Jun 70, after two days at our battalion area on hill 55, the battalion moved to "Dodge City" co-ord AT 992578.

22. We now provide security on Route 4 from our battalion compound to the bridge at river co-ord AT 967606. The HQ Coy remains in the compound, and three rifle companies along the road from Hill 55 and Route 4 provide security, and the remaining rifle Coy is at "Go Noi" co-ord BT 038546.

23. On 22 Jun 70 a battalion sweep was carried out to the south of Hill 55 with negative results. The battalion returned to its locations at 1700 hrs the same day.

24. At this stage a USMC Pl works with our security elements and 75% of ambushes have 50% USMC soldiers and 50% ARVN - this is proving a very workable combination.

ARVN Hospital

25. At 0800 23 Jun 70, Major Thanh (CO), Lt Boyer and myself visited all our sick and wounded at ARVN hospital at Danang, and little bags of "gifts" were distributed. The hospital itself is very overcrowded and hygiene is very poor. Three/four per bed is normal, flies all over the place and dirty conditions prevail. The trip and visit concluded 1500 23 Jun 70.

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PART III

SUMMARY FOR MONTH

26. After our venture into the mountains the battalion right now is "resting up" to some degree with our main concentration on security of the road. This involves good ambushing at night to keep the VC off the road being constructed. Small company (-) size sweeps are conducted to distances of 1500 metres from roads of our concern. There has been negative mine incidents on our road since we took it over.

27.. I expect to see reinforcements arrive at the end of this month or early next month. The Regt No 2 Senior Adviser has assured me that we are No 1 priority for replacements.

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Annex F to  
AATTV Report  
Jun 70

MONTHLY REPORT : CAPT W R DEANE  
BN SENIOR ADVISER 3/54 ARVN  
JUN 70

(Report for period 20<sup>th</sup> May - 16 Jun)

## Introduction

1. Due to the medevac of WO1 Waters and WO2 Birnie this report is written in respect to both the 2/54 and 3/54 ARVN Battalions.

## Aims

2. The general aims for the units for the period under review were as follows:

a. 2/54 ARVN

(1) 31 May - 3 Jun. Secure LZ Tun Tavern GR 059328 (map sheet 6342 II) and build a fire base for six 105mm.

(2) 3 Jun - Continuing. Re-equip and re-training of the unit.

b. 3/54 ARVN

(1) 23 May - 30 May. Search and destroy in area between Quang-Tri river and Dak Rong river in vicinity of grid square 1037 (map sheet 6342 II).

(2) 30 May - 15 Jun. Provide security for FSB Holcombe grid reference 118431.

(3) 15 Jun - Continuing. Search and destroy mission on area between grid squares 1037 and 1537 (map sheet 6342II).

## Methods Used

3. The methods used to achieve the aims were:

a. 2/54 ARVN Operations. HQ Coy, two rifle coys, together with 30 ARVN engineers and artillery personnel were deployed to defend and construct FSB Tun Tavern. One company as a defensive screen and reaction force.

b. 3/54 ARVN Operations. Normal battalion size operations on two axis approximately two - three km apart with elements of two companies on each axis.

## Resultant Activity

4. 2/54 ARVN. This unit was unsuccessful in establishing the fire base at Tun Tavern and abandoned the operation three days after the combat assault (CA) into the area. Further details of this operation are given in paragraph 6 below.

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5. 3/54 ARVN. The battalion has had no contact with the enemy to date, but has lost one KIA and three WIA as a result of booby traps. The battalion light CP, with two US assistant advisers, saw a platoon size enemy force on an LZ about two km from their position but requested gunships instead of using artillery. The result was that by the time the gunships had arrived on station the enemy had disappeared. A major effort is being made throughout 54 Regt during the present operations to endeavour to make the ARVN use artillery more frequently rather than gunships. To date all advisers report varying degrees of "consumer resistance" to the plan.

Sequence of Events - 2/54 ARVN Tun Tavern

6. The following is the sequence of events during the unsuccessful attempt to establish a fire base at Tun Tavern during the period 31 May - 3 Jun.

a. 31 May

0700 hrs. Capt Deane and WO2 Waters accompanied 1 Coy 2/54 ARVN on combat assault (CA) into Tun Tavern, then move out to hill 618 about one km to SE. Sporadic incoming mortar fire.

0800 hrs. 2/54 CP with Capt McCann, USMC - the battalion senior adviser - and WO2 Birnie, HQ Coy, two rifle companies, and artillery and engineer personnel established on Tun Tavern and commenced fortifications. A bulldozer was unavailable as the weather conditions precluded a plant airlift.

b. 1 Jun. 1 Coy moves 150m SE. Bulldozer finally airlifted into Tun Tavern.

c. 2 Jun

0430 hrs. Position comes under mortar, rocket, and small arms fire.

0600 hrs. 1 Coy leaves night location to relieve Tun Tavern.

0630 hrs (approx). Enemy inside perimeter from SE, and break through in the area of the ARVN engineers and artillery personnel.

0700 hrs (approx). Enemy overrun eastern half of Tun Tavern, gunships fire inside perimeter.

0730 hrs. 1 Coy reach foot of Tun Tavern, advance up to and through perimeter, in line and clearing bunkers on the way. Sporadic small arms fire and grenade throwing.

0800 hrs. 1 Coy reaches TOC and links up with Bn CP which had withdrawn to the mortar pits on the west perimeter. WO2 Birnie found wounded in back. Sporadic mortar and small arms fire being received from outside perimeter.

1030 hrs. First dustoff - WO2 Birnie medevac.

1700 hrs. WO2 Waters received mortar fragments while digging foxhole.

1745 hrs. WO2 Waters medevac.

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d. Night 2/3 Jun. C119 gunship and flare ship remained on station until first light.

e. 3 Jun

0730 hrs (approx). First dustoff received direct mortar round and wrecked. Capt McCann wounded.

0800 hrs. New LZ established outside perimeter. Capt McCann, dustoff crew, and others medevac.

0800 - 1430 hrs. Medevacs continue including lift out of 65 ARVN KIA.

1450 hrs. Bulldozer wrecked with explosives. ~~Rescue~~ personnel on Tun Tavern (200 ARVN and one Aust adviser) pull out to LZ 500m to SE.

1530 hrs. Extraction to Dong-Ha.

Post Operation Study - 2/54 ARVN

7. Features of the attack and aftermath of Tun Tavern were:

a. The extremely accurate, and continuously sporadic mortar fire. During my time on Tun Tavern the TOC complex received at least two direct hits and three-four rounds landed within 20m radius of the TOC. The advisers' conex took a direct 82mm mortar hit during the attack, killing one ARVN. Every helicopter that landed drew at least two mortar rounds, which sometimes landed amongst the wounded waiting to be evacuated. In between dustoffs an incoming round would be received about once every 10 minutes, unless there was excessive movement of troops in the area of the helipad, which appeared to also attract fire. In spite of continuous air support, mortar activity continued right up to the time Tun Tavern was abandoned.

b. The disgusting eagerness of the ARVN's to medevac themselves, (officers and men) after they had received the slightest wound, and their complete disregard of the needs of more seriously wounded soldiers. By the time the first dustoff had arrived, about 20 seriously injured, some of them with limbs missing, were lying on stretchers or ponchos beside the helipad. By the time the advisers had helped WO2 Birnie on board and had returned with a stretcher borne US soldier, the dustoff was crowded with ARVN soldiers who had been able bodied enough to board the dustoff of their own accord, while those more handicapped were unable to get help. In the event, the wounded US soldier had to be thrown across the ARVNs already sitting on the floor, and died on the return trip. For subsequent dustoffs, the ARVN officers were asked to detail those people who were to board the aircraft, and provide stretcher bearers, while Capt Deane and WO2 Waters stood at either doorway holding back less seriously wounded cases. Little success was achieved, as each dustoff arrival was accompanied by a mad stampede, and while the advisers were grappling with one or two, others would slip past and on, and the short touch down time, about 15-20 seconds precluded any detailed sorting out. Several stretcher cases who may have otherwise survived, died in the sun beside the helipad. The last stretcher case resulting from the initial attack was not cleared until mid-afternoon. Also about this time the TOC received a couple of direct

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hits seriously wounding the Bn Comd and wounding to a lesser extent all the other battalion and artillery officers. Some of the wounds, particularly those received by the S-3, did not appear to me to warrant the officers concerned leaving the fire base. Nevertheless all were insistant they be medevaced as soon as possible, leaving only the advisers and rank and file on the fire base. Capt McCann requested 54 Regt Senior Adviser to ask his counterpart to order the S-3 to remain at his post in order to provide a link between advisers and ARVNs - this was done. Late in the afternoon, with the possibility of only 2 or 3 more dustoff flights, it was necessary for the advisers to personally examine the wounds, in some cases lifting up the bandages to do so, in order to allocate priority. It was patently obvious that many people had smeared blood, from superficial wounds, over themselves and covered themselves with a large wad of dressings to enhance the effect. The S-3 in particular implored me to allow him to board the dustoff on account of the seriousness of his injuries, which none the less did not prevent him from marching 500m uphill to the PZ 24 hours later. We have since heard that he is to be decorated for his gallantry in remaining on Tun Tavern. The day we left Tun Tavern I met WO1 Lawrance AATTV, at Quang-Tri hospital, and he told me he saw many of the ARVN wounded as they came off the dustoffs and he was surprised that some of them had come out of the field.

c. The willingness of the ARVNs to subordinate themselves to the advisers. During the morning of 2 Jun it became obvious that Capt McCann was virtually in command of Tun Tavern, with most decisions being referred to him for approval.

## Standard of 3/54 ARVN

8. The overall standard of 3/54 is as follows:
  - a. The last three weeks of operations have shown a marked improvement in operating procedures generally, e.g. movement, lack of noise, concealment, although this is probably due to the fact that the Bn Comd is now in the field and that the general area is notorious for VC. However, the change is probably temporary, and future operations around our normal AO at FSB Anzio will probably show a regression.

## Major Weaknesses

9. The major weakness is a reluctance to use artillery.
10. To help overcome this weakness I have suggested the following:
  - a. An SOP for a contact as follows:
    - (1) Contact made, artillery called in as close as possible to forward troops.
    - (2) Regt not to forward gun ship request until first round leaves gun.
    - (3) Artillery to continue right up to arrival and briefing by adviser on the ground. Ground troops to make every effort to advance and maintain contact behind artillery screen.

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(4) Artillery to be lifted only on instructions of adviser, who will have previously identified positions of forward troops to air support. Immediately artillery fire is lifted, gun ships to engage enemy in close support of ground troops.

(5) I have stressed that if ARVN do not use their artillery, then gun ships will not be called in.

Adviser Duties

11. My major duties during the period were:
- a. 21 - 30 May with 3/54 on operations
  - b. 31 May - 3 Jun " 2/54 at Tun Tavern
  - c. 4 Jun - 10 Jun standby at Dong-Ha
  - d. 11 Jun - 14 Jun standby at FB Holcombe
  - e. 15 Jun - continuing with 3/54 on operations.

Future Intentions

12. Current intentions are to bring 1/54 and 3/54 back to Anzio at the end of Jun 70.

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Annex G to  
AATTV Report  
Jun 70

MONTHLY REPORT - CAPT C. BROCK  
BN SENIOR ADVISER 3/2 ARVN  
JUN 70

(Period of report : 25 May - 21 Jun 70)

Aims of Unit for Period

1. The aims of the Bn were:
  - a. To relieve the 4/2 Bn at FSB Fuller.
  - b. Clear the en from the AO surrounding the FSB.

Method

2. The relief of 4/2 Bn was achieved on 25 May. The 3/2 Bn embarked on an aggressive patrolling plan by the three companies not committed to the defence of the FSB. Maximum use was made of air in clearing the area. Judging by the number of secondary explosions and destroyed bunkers the air was used to good effect.
3. The operations were hampered by incessant mortaring of both the FSB (276 x 120mm in the first 14 days). Any company that made contact quickly drew enemy mortars. Five or six of these mortar sites were silenced by air strikes.
4. By 3 Jun the AO was firmly under control, and any attempt by the enemy to re-enter the AO was met and repulsed. On 6 Jun the Bn AO was extended 3 km north and a coy has been operating to the north without contact since.
5. The FSB continues to take mortars almost daily which has hindered work on improving the defences. Despite this a vast improvement has been made to the FSB, and work continues nightly.

Highlights of Period

6. 262130 May : Sapper attack, est two platoons, on FSB Fuller was repulsed without loss. Two company size groups were seen but did not press the attack once the sappers failed. No enemy casualties were found as they had ample time in which to recover them.
7. 30 May. Company size contact grid ref 007587 at 1535 hrs. En squad size guarding a suspect FO position.

En 2 KIA, 1 AK 47, 20 rounds B40

2 packs and quantity of rice.

Fr 1 KIA, 3 WIA.

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8. 2 Jun. Company size contact 007587 at 0920 hrs. Three airstrikes, two sets gunships and 8 ins artillery were used but subsequent attack at 1745 hrs repulsed by heavy barrage of B40's. The position was finally taken 031130 hrs.

En 5 KIA 2 AK 47

Fr 2 KIA 5 WIA

9. 6 Jun. Contact 028601 enemy estimated squad size at 1900 hrs.

En 2 KIA 1 AK 47

Fr 2 WIA

10. 9 Jun. Ambush at 007587 sprung at 1330 hrs.

En 3 KIA, 1 RPD, 4 rounds B40, 2 claymores.

Fr 1 WIA

#### Overall Standard of Unit

11. The Bn remained aggressive and alert throughout the period. An example of this is that of eight immediate air strikes on suspect mortar positions, five produced secondary explosions.

12. The coys patrolled vigorously and an average of one day and two night ambushes per coy are set.

13. The only possible criticism is that troops are a little slow in attacking after air strikes on known enemy position. The main reason for this is the insistence of higher HQs not to accept casualties, and most of the delay is imposed by Regt.

#### Advisers Duties

14. To date I have directed 23 air strikes, six sets gunships, and 14 US artillery missions.

15. One major success in that both the Bn Comd and his staff are growing increasingly more aware of what fire support is better suited to various types of targets, and more use is being made of ARVN artillery. The one exception to this is the Bn S3 whose answer to everything is gunships. He seems reluctant to believe that 8 ins artillery is better suited to destroying bunkers than 2.7 ins rockets. Fortunately this belief is not shared by the rest of the officers.

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Annex H to  
AATTV Report  
Jun 70

MONTHLY REPORT : WO2 A E GEE  
BN ADVISER 4/2 ARVN - JUN 70

(Period of report is 20 May 70 to 20 June 70)

## Battalion Aims

1. The aims of the battalion for the period were:
  - a. To secure FSB Fuller and to search and clear Bn AO during operation Lam-Son 356 Phase 2 for period 20 May - 26 May.
  - b. Protection of Dong-Ha Combat Base for period 26 May - 4 June.
  - c. To secure outpost at Khe Gio Bridge and to search and clear Bn AO during operation Lam-Son 356 phase 3 for period 4 June - 20 June.

## Method

2. The methods used to achieve these aims were:
  - a. Patrol and search.
  - b. Securing Dong-Ha perimeter, ambushing and patrolling.
  - c. Patrol and Search.
3. All phases detailed in paragraph 1 above were carried out **successfully** and all areas searched were cleared of any enemy opposition.

## Highlights

4. Highlight of the period was the severe casualties inflicted on the bn by enemy mortar fire whilst securing FSB Fuller. The 20 day operation resulted in 113 NVA KIA and numerous amounts of weapons and equipment captured, among which included 12.7mm AA weapons and a Russian radio transmitter (very large - it took four men to carry it). I have not been told what type it was. Included in our own casualties were the Bn Comd and S3 both KIA by mortar shrapnel.

## Standard of the Battalion

5. The overall standard of the Bn is high and improving under the direction of the new Bn Comd and S3.
6. Major weaknesses noted during the period were:
  - a. The bunching of soldiers on the move and at halts. This is being remedied as we go along. Pl Comds and Sgts are now starting to police this fault.

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b. Lack of hygiene within the unit. Slowly this is starting to improve. I spoke to the new Bn Comd about this fault and he agrees that it has to be rectified. I have found that I have helped improve this fault by asking a different soldier each time for the loan of his shovel and then whistle on my way so that all soldiers around me could see me. At first this created a few laughs but now I have observed the odd soldier walking around the area with shovel and toilet paper in his hot little hand.

7. Some strong points noted within the Battalion are:

- a. The fitness of the soldiers.
- b. The high morale of the troops especially this month when enemy contact has been light.
- c. The honesty of the soldiers in regard to thieving from each other and from the advisers. I can't say much about their honesty in regard to others as I have found they will lift anything which isn't welded to a tank or dug six foot into the ground.

#### Adviser Duties

8. My major duties during this period were:

- a. Bn Senior Adviser.
- b. The control of gunship and artillery support.
- c. Control of medevacs.
- d. Parrelling all requests and occurrences.

9. During my period as senior adviser I became quiet close and friendly with the Bn Comd, XO, S3 and Coy Comds. During this period I had a lot of talks with all and now I feel I can start handing out a little advice and begin to earn my pay as an adviser and not as a glorified radio operator.

#### Battalion Commander

10. The new Bn Comd appears to have sound tactical ideas. This could be a result of the course he attended at the Jungle Warfare School at Kota Tinggi in Malaysia. He has shown during his short time with the Bn that his appointment as Bn Comd was justified.

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Annex I to  
AATTV Report  
Jun 70

## MONTHLY REPORT WO1 E C BURNS, 1/7 MECH TASK FORCE

JUN 70

### Introduction

1. 1 troop during the reporting period continued in its mission as ready re-action force for the DMZ in the allotted AO, based at Fire Support Base A2. 1 troop is supported in this role by one company of infantry op con. (currently 1st Coy, 2/2 Bn).

### Deployment Activity

2. The troop consists of three M41 tank platoons plus headquarters, headquarters troop and support. Because of a basic requirement to provide fire protection to the fire-base at all times, the troop will not, normally, deploy in full strength on operations.

3. Each morning one platoon is used to clear the QL 1 from the firebase south to the fire support base C1, a distance of some 5 kilometres. Usually without incident, this daily mission has at times produced a clash with NVA elements which have delayed too long in withdrawing from night activities in the settled areas East of QL 1. The last such clash was in late May at about 0700 hrs. The tank troop having re-acted to a report of an NVA squad crossing QL 1 near Gio-Linh village. Two ARVN troopers were wounded in the resulting fire fight. Casualties to the enemy remain unknown.

4. 1 troop is reasonably successful in its primary mission. The enemy avoid close presence to the fire bases, both at A2 and A4 where light and medium tanks are operational respectively. NVA infiltration routes across the DMZ are in the first case along a median line between fire bases A2 and A4 - a rough going area of deserted hamlets and numerous terraced fields and paddies long since overgrown by secondary jungle growth. Operation by tracks in this area is very difficult and infantry must be carried and used in the more inaccessible locations. In the second case, the infiltration route is over the sand through numerous dunes and creeks between fire bases A1 and B1 east of the highway (QL1). A cavalry track troop based on A1 and B1 has had good results re-acting against NVA infiltration in this area.

(Map Notes: Ref sheet 6442 IV, 1:50,000 Quang-Tri. Fire Support Base A4 (5 US Mech Div) is on the feature above the village of Con-Tien, sheet 6342 I. The median line referred to is usually accepted as the Easting grids 15 and 16, Quang-Tri sheet. Location A2, 213744; B2, 250721; A1, 264737; B1, 296748).

5. During the reporting period 1 troop has conducted minor operations on a daily basis in direct support of infantry search and clear operations in the immediate vicinity of the DMZ line west of the fire base A2. During one of these operations in square 1773 (Quang-Tri Sheet) an interesting duel between two US "Dusters" and NVA 60mm mortar fire took place.

The platoon which I accompanied as adviser consisted of 3 x M41 tanks and 2 x M42 US "Dusters", op con for the operation. Following tactical deployment of the tracks I advised supporting fire ahead of the infantry advance axis. This was favourably reported on by the infantry adviser so appears to have some real value as ~~supporting fire~~ in such cases where the tracks can deploy to a flank.

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The intensity of the automatic twin 40mm gunfire of the "Duster" tracks apparently unnerved the ARVN infantry commander and the guns were given a shift to a secondary task. At this time the enemy commenced firing 60mm mortars at the two "Duster" tracks only. The enemy mortar position was too well concealed to locate until he had completed bracketing fire, at this time the "Dusters" were moved in time to avoid the enemy fire-for-effect and a reading along the axis of the bracket was passed to the FAC on station. FAC was able to locate the likely position, a small knoll inside the DMZ at less than 1000 metres. Suppressive fires were called on this position. Nil casualties or damage.

6. The only other highlight for the period was a short but intense fire fight outside Gio-Linh village when an NVA squad was detected crossing QL 1 in light mist. An M41 platoon re-acted and engaged the enemy with main armament and .50 cal fire. Casualties to the enemy are unknown, but two ARVN troopers were WIA.

7. During the reporting period fire support base A2 was subjected to almost daily enemy mortar fire and occasional rocket fires. At this time I have not access to the TOC log book. However casualties were 30 plus, WIA, both US and ARVN. Substantial damage has occurred to bunker superstructures. It is also noteworthy, that the ARVN TOC and the Adviser bunker with their antenna arrays attract most of the incoming fire.

## Vehicle Maintenance

8. Standard of vehicle maintenance is only fair and there is need for improvement in this department. There are four dead-lined vehicles from electrical faults. Only one was examined by the Senior Adviser and the fault here was water in a junction box.

9. To help overcome this problem I had asked the Americans to provide a technical maintenance adviser. At the time of writing the adviser has arrived at A2 but not yet commenced the duties I consider he should carry out.

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Annex J to  
AATTV Report  
Jun 70

REPORT BY WO2 D G KILLION : MEDICAL ADVISER; HUE  
US MEDCAP PROGRAMME

Aims of Report

1. The aims of this report are:
  - a. Outline the functions of the US Medcap programme in Thua-Thien Province and the reasons why little has been achieved.
  - b. Suggested methods on improving the present system.

Provision of Medcaps

2. The US 101st Div provides the bulk of all medcaps operating in this province. Until recently there was no co-ordination between the Province Medical Chief and 101st Div. In some cases 101st Div failed even to co-ordinate with the District Medical Chief and the District Medical Adviser, which led to some rather ridiculous situations. At this time, co-ordination is very good. Originally 101st Div, overcommitted themselves by inserting, on the average, five Medcaps per week, into each district. This number has now been reduced to about two per district, a week.

3. The main aim of the US Medcap programme was, "ON THE JOB TRAINING" (OJT). This aim was supposed to be achieved by training the Vietnamese medical personnel, whilst the medcap was in progress. The secondary aim was diagnosing and treatment of patients. In my opinion, "On The Job Training", failed completely. The reason is simple: Vietnamese medical personnel resent being shown or told what to do in the presence of a patient. From my experience I have found that the Vietnamese are very receptive to new ideas and in many cases they have implemented these new techniques immediately, but I conveyed my message out of sight and hearing, of the patients.

Employment of Medcaps

4. When a medcap team arrives in location, the Vietnamese medical staff (in most cases) suddenly disappear and in some instances, the District Medical Chief also fades into the background.

5. The attitude of the medcap team is an important factor. On some medcaps I have observed, I was shocked and angered by the rough handling, complete disinterest and discourteous manner the medcap team conveyed towards the patient. If that is the price the people have to pay, then it is too high for what they receive in return.

6. The medical officer can only treat minor internal and nearly all external disorders. The District Medical Chief is adequately trained to do the same. The US enlisted personnel treat the patients, a chore that the Vietnamese can easily do (but I admit they - the Vietnamese - use incorrect procedures). The District Medical Chief and his helpers can conduct a successful medcap, but they need to be brought up to date with new techniques, and encouraged to maintain a high standard. This can be achieved by introducing training programmes, therefore there is no requirement for the US Medcap system, in its present form.

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## Recommendations

7. a. The Medcap team should be reduced to:
  - (1) One Medical Officer
  - (2) One Senior NCO
- b. The Vietnamese should conduct the Medcap with US supplementing the medical supplies (in this province there is not enough medical supplies) for the districts to conduct their own medcaps.
- c. The District Medical Chief should interview and diagnose the patients ailments, and the Medical Officer is to advise him, when asked.
- d. The Vietnamese orderlies are to carry out the treatments, ordered by the District Medical Chief, and the Senior NCO will also advise, when asked.
- e. After the Medcap is completed, all Vietnamese staff should meet with the Medical Officer and the Senior NCO, and conduct a critique, covering both good and bad points.
- f. A training course should be conducted by the Medical Officer and Senior NCO, for all district medical staff. This class should be held in the afternoons, as there is little activity around the dispensary. The scope of this course should be decided upon by the Medical Officer, Senior NCO, District Medical Chief and the District Medical adviser. As many members as possible, should attend these classes. The District Medical Chief, Chief Midwife, and others, should be included in the programme, as instructors, so that the programme becomes a joint effort. The Medical Officer's interpreter, if possible, needs to be medically orientated. After an initial course has concluded, follow up revision classes should be conducted regularly. Preventive medicine is a subject that many programmes overlook. This subject is important and should, under no circumstances, be left out. The Province Public Health Dept, may be able to supply the instructions, for this subject.

## Conclusion

8. I do believe that the present US Medcap system is outdated. The Medcap programme should have been placed into the hands of the Vietnamese many years ago, and the emphasis shifted to continuous training programmes. I'm convinced that a higher standard of medical care would exist today, within the districts, had this been so.

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Annex K to  
AATTV Report  
Jun 70

CONVERSION OF CIDG TO ARVN

1. Attached as appendices to this annex are copies of the minutes of two ordinary and one special meeting of the committee appointed to monitor the conversion of CIDG to ARVN.
2. Attached also is a copy of special Orders appointing members to the monitoring committee, together with a report of a telephone conversation between J3 Saigon and, G3 Plans Advisor USAAG ICTZ on Advisor Support for the Border Defence Group.

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Appendix 1 to  
Annex K to  
AATTV Report

HEADQUARTERS

US Army Advisory Group, I CTZ  
APO 96349

MACCZ-ICOP

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Joint Committee Meeting to Monitor CIDG Conversion.

1. A meeting of the appointed committee members to monitor the conversion of the CIDG camps to ARVN was held at 1515 hours on 4 June 1970. All appointed members were present with the exception of Colonel Elliott, the appointed co-chairman, USAAG, ICTZ and Major Hall, G-5 Advisor. Colonel Cox, Chief of Staff, USAAG, ICTZ represented Colonel Elliott. Colonel Vinh, Territorial Forces Commander, acted as chairman.

2. The following points were discussed:

a. The organization and mission of the committee (Incl 1):. Colonel Vinh requested that each member be permanently assigned to the committee for the entire conversion period (31 December 70). His intent is to remove turmoil within the supporting agencies.

b. The camps to be converted, and the proposed conversion schedule (Incl 2):- Colonel Vinh pointed out that General Lam has requested JGS that Mai Loc Camp be converted last instead of first as originally scheduled, reason being the camp is under consideration for closure and may not be converted. To date, no decision by the JGS has been made.

c. The activation of new Units.

(1) 1st Service Support Company (starting 1 June to be operational by 1 August) will have the capability to support 6,000 men, the company itself will have 270 men assigned. It will support the present Ranger Battalions and the Border Camps. It will be formed from the assets of Headquarters and Service Company of the Ranger Group.

(2) Signal Company -(Starting 1 June to be operational by 1 September) Company will have approximately 216 men assigned and will support the present Ranger Battalions and the Border Camps. It too, will be formed from the assets of Headquarters and Service Company of the Ranger Group, specifically the Signal Platoon, it will be augmented by Vietnamese Special Forces signal personnel.

(3) Border Camps (per conversion schedule). Each camp will consist of battalion size unit (approximately 445 men); it will have a headquarters section (61 men), a reconnaissance platoon (25 men) and three line companies (123 men each).

3. Comments by Colonel Vinh:

a. He recognizes there will be some problems, however, directed the committee to isolate them early and make recommendations, i.e., aircraft support to camps, turn over of equipment, etc.

b. Get medical examinations and records of present CIDG personnel

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up to date. Eliminate reshuffling of personnel between camps.

c. Instructed Rangers and Special Forces to work together under a "one army" concept.

d. Each Saturday afternoon, at 1500 hours, the committee will meet to evaluate the progress of the conversion plan.

JOHN H. LEACH, JR  
Major, IN  
Plans Officer.

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US ARMY ADVISORY GROUP I CTZ  
APO 96349

Appendix 2 to  
Annex K to  
AATTIV Report

MACCZ-ICOP

Jun 70

MEMORANDUM FPR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Advisor Support for Border Defense Group.

1. A telephone conversation with Col Fleshman, J3, Saigon (Tel 8/923-2888) was conducted by the undersigned on 8 June 1970. The topic of advisor support for the Border Defense Group Headquarters, Support Company, and the Signal Company was discussed, Col Fleshman stated there were no spaces available to support an increase in the advisor effort to these units, he also indicated that the advisors for these units would have to come out of present assets within the CTZ.

2. The increase of the advisor requirements to support the Border Defense Bases was favorably received by MACV, i.e. four man team per battalion.

(JOHN H. LEACH)  
Major, Infantry  
G3 Plans Advisor.

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HEADQUARTERS  
US Army Advisory Group, I CTZ Annex K to  
APO 96349

Appendix 3 to  
Annex K to  
AATTV Report

Jun 70

MACCZ-ICOP

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: 2nd Joint Committee Meeting.

1. The second meeting of the appointed committee members to monitor the conversion of CIDG was held at 1500 hour. All members were present. Colonel Dong represented Colonel Vinh, the appointed committee chairman, who was in Saigon. Colonel Fiske, Territorial Forces Advisor, sat in on the meeting.
  2. The following points were discussed:-
    - a. Committee received approval on the conversion of Mai Loc Camp to be last, and Ha Thanh's approval as the substitute camp.
    - b. The CTZ committee has requested JGS for the TO&E of the battalions or be provided with a guide for organization in lieu of a TO&E at this time.
    - c. VNSF CO pointed out that the present Ranger Headquarters and Service Company will remain intact until 1 July, an element will remain at their base camp after 1 July, to continue supporting the Rangers.
    - d. 15 June - a joint committee (7 officers) will visit ICTZ to meet the CTZ conversion committee and inspect VNAF "C" Dets and camps scheduled for conversion during first phase (June - August). Personnel will also visit the camps to be converted during this period.
    - e. VNSF CO commented on the initial two camps to be converted and work accomplished. Two teams of 11 men each (including a doctor) have been sent to the camps. The examinations and significant problem areas. Results to date:-
      - (1) Tra Bong - 516 personnel.
      - (2) 335 processed.
      - (3) 181 remaining - expected completion date of processing is 16 June.
      - (4) Ha Thanh - 465 CIDG.
      - (5) 260 Processed.
      - (6) 205 remaining - expected completion date of processing is 15 June.
- \* C/S noted that this is a very important phase of the conversion, the screening, physicals and establishing of birth records is difficult but should be thorough.

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f. C/S requested that the advisor teams be made available to the two camps at the earliest possible date to assist in the turn-over of equipment and continuity of operations.

3. The next meeting is a special meeting to be held on the 15th of June at 1000 hours to meet the Central Committee. Next regular meeting to be held at 1530 hours on 20 June.

JOHN H. LEACH, JR  
Major, IN  
Plans Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS

US Army Advisory Group, I CTZ  
APO 96349

Appendix 4 to  
Annex K to  
AATTV Report

Jun 70

MACCZ - ICOP

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDS

SUBJECT: Special Meeting of CIDG Conversion Committee.

1. A special meeting of the CIDG Conversion Committee was held at 1015 hours on 15 June in the ICTZ briefing room. Colonel Dong, Chief of Staff, ICTZ, represented Colonel Vinh, the appointed chairman. All advisor committee members were present with the exception of LTC Schackleton, LTC Horwedel, and Captain Hall. The following named personnel represented the Central Conversion Committee from Saigon:

Colonel Lieu - Chairman  
LTC Coleman - J-3  
LTC Howard - J17  
Captain Vandiver - J-4.

2. The following points were discussed after the G-3, ICTZ introduced the CTZ committee members to the Saigon delegation (a copy of the XXIV Corps orders was furnished the J-3 representative).

a. The current status of the conversion: The work accomplished to date within the first two camps was pointed out to the committee. The teams sent to both camps will finish their processing by 16 June. It was pointed out that morale was high in each camp and no significant problems were encountered.

b. LTC Khoai, Commander, VNSF, ICTZ made the following comments:

(1) He would like advisors for the Border Defense Headquarters Group now to assist in the conversion. Colonel Elliott stated he would look into the possibility of having SS advisors to function in this area for the immediate future. He addressed LTC Coleman with the problem. LTC Coleman restated the MACV position; that advisors for the BDH, Service Support Company and the Signal Company would have to be provided by present assets within the CTZ.

(2) That a Signal Company Commander be appointed. After much discussion it was agreed that a Captain from Nha Trang would be provided to be the commander.

(3) That Service Support Company be provided specialist to assist in establishing the records and files of the camps. After discussion, Colonel Lieu agreed to provide the company with four specialists to assist in this area.

(4) To provide aircraft to support the camps. LTC Coleman stated the Central Committee would look into this area again, however, CTZ should continue to use the units presently providing the support. Major Brown, XXIV Corps, was tasked to draft a paper on the requirements/availability of aircraft to support the camps.

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c. Colonel Lieu, Central Committee representative, made the following comments:

(1) The biggest problem in the conversion appears to be the support of the camps; aircraft being the major item. (LTC Coleman recommended using LOC where possible).

(2) Advisors should be provided the camps ASAP. LTC Coleman stated that advisors were programmed into each camp 30 days before conversion date. (S-1, Support Group was notified of this requirement).

d. Captain Vandiver, J-4, stated copies of the TO&Es for units should be provided the committee NLT 20 June; this should facilitate the conversion.

3. Meeting adjourned at 1125 hours. Central Committee members were to visit Tra Bong and Na Thanh Camps in the afternoon.

JOHN H. LEACH, JH  
Major, IN  
Plans Officer.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT  
1st BN 2 MSF OPERATION  
PLEI ME

Annex L to  
AATTV Report  
Jun 70.

1. Friendly Forces: Artillery support from Camp Plei Me, FSB Oasis, and FSB Nr 1.
2. Mission: Search and Destroy.
3. Concept of Operation: Reconnaissance in Force of the AO.
4. Execution:

14 June 1970: Bn HQ's airlifted by UH-1D to Plei Me at 1210 hrs. At 1330 hrs airlift was aborted for the following reasons:

- a. 1 UH-1D was fired on by VC on the initial lift and became inoperable;
- b. Weather closed in.

15 June 1970: 70 personnel airlifted by CH-47 to Plei Me, by 1330 hrs the weather had closed in and the airlift was aborted.

16 June 1970: Remainder of Bn airlifted to Plei Me. Lift completed at 1600.

17 June 1970: Operation commenced. Bn moved to ZA 200059. No sightings or contacts.

18 June 1970: Bn moved to ZA 219064. No sightings or contacts.

19 June 1970: Bn moved to ZA 200074. No sightings or contacts.

20 June 1970: Bn moved to Plei Me for resupply. Received orders to have 211 MSF Co at Plei Me for return to Pleiku for conversion to Rangers. 1 CIDG wounded, accidental discharge of an M-16, CIDG evacuated to Pleiku.

21 June 70: Bn remained in Plei Me for resupply and reorganization.

22 June 1970: Bn moved out of Plei Me and commenced road clearing operation in support of an expected convoy from Pleiku. At 1200 hrs, the convoy from Pleiku was cancelled and Bn moved to ZA 217108. No sightings or contacts.

23 June 1970: Bn moved to ZA 217105. No sightings or contacts.

24 June 1970: Bn patrolled in company sized elements to the following locations: ZA 223134, ZA238123, ZA230104, ZA 218096, ZA200100, ZA204122, to N/L at ZA 214125. No sightings or contacts. 1 CIDG wounded: punji stake in the left leg.

25 June 1970: Bn moved to ZA 220130. At 1430 hrs, Maj J. Bullard and Aust, P R representative inserted to Bn location and remained over night.

26 June 1970: Bn conducted Cordan and Search operation on village at ZA 238122. No sightings or contacts. SSGT Lewis sprained ankle.

1130 hrs: SSGT Lewis, Maj Bullard, and Aust P R representative airlifted to Pleiku.

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- 1130 hrs: Bn received orders to C/A into area ZA 1410 and reinforce the Plei Me Camp Strike Force who were reported to be in heavy contact. 1445 hrs Bn Comd moved to Plei Me and carried out VR over area of CSF contact.
- 1530 hrs: Bn commenced C/A to ZA 046121. Lift completed by 1700.
- 1700 hrs: Bn formed perimeter in area of C/A and commenced to dig in. At this time the CSF had been reinforced by personnel from Plei Me and had not had any contacts since the initial one at 1200 hrs.
- 1730 hrs: Bn Comd requested the following information: Mission, Who is in command?, and AO. Received the following answer: Search and destroy, 1st Bn Comd was to command all troops on the ground, assume the AO of the CSF.
- 1930 hrs: Bn in contact. Estimated 1 squad of VC walked into the Bn perimeter. Bn initiated contact at approx 30 meters. Results of contact: Friendly - 1 CIDG KIA, 1 CIDG WIA; Enemy - 6 NVA KIA, 3 AK-47 CIA, 5X100 lbs bags of rice CIA.
- 2000 hrs: Shadow gunship and flareship in support of the Bn. These aircraft were utilized throughout the night and at approx 270430 hrs Shadow 46 reported secondary explosions as a result of supporting fire at the SW edge of the Bn perimeter.
- 27 June 1970: At approximately 0730 hrs the LLDB Comd of the CSF informed the 1st Bn Comd that he intended to return to Plei Me at 0800 hrs. 1st Bn Comd requested clarification of the situation and was told that the LLDB and CSF were to remain in the field under command of 1st Bn. At 0800 hrs the LLDB and CSF moved to Plei Me.
- 0830 hrs: 1 CIDG KIA and 1 CIDG WIA evacuated from Bn position. Bn moved to ZA 065125. No contacts or sightings. At approx 1500 hrs the Bn requested artillery fire on the area of contact. At approx 1600 hrs 1X175mm round landed approx 200 meters outside the Bn perimeter. Artillery was not called for for the remainder of the operation.
- 28 June 1970: Bn moved to ZA 078124 and established company sized ambushes at ZA 083132 and ZA 082124. No contacts or sightings.
- 29 June 1970: Bn moved to ZA 060120. 1530 hrs, Lt Col Clark and Maj Rondiak visited the Bn in the field. No contacts or sightings.
- 30 June 1970: Bn moved to ZA 058085, no contacts or sightings.
- 01 July 1970: Bn moved to ZA 083082, no contacts or sightings.
- 02 July 1970: Bn moved to ZA 098064, no contacts or sightings.
- 03 July 1970: Bn moved to Plei Me, no contacts or sightings.
- 04 July 1970: Bn extracted by CH-47 from Plei Me to Pleiku.

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Annex M  
to AATTV Report  
Jun 70

REPORT BY MAJ BEALE - SENIOR AUSTRALIAN ADVISER  
PHUOC TUY PROVINCE -- JUN 70

## General

1. During the month MATTs 3 & 4 have been deployed and MATT 5 raised and is currently undergoing training. Operations and activities of the MATTs were generally successful throughout the month but a number of problems associated with the accelerated deployment became apparent.

## HQ Baria

2. The original control concept with the HQ located at 1 AATT Vung-Tau with the orderly room and Q facilities while the OC was located at Baria proved unworkable and on 22 Jun 70 was re-organized. The HQ AATTV Vung-Tau, while continuing to provide Q facilities to AATTV Phuoc-Tuy comes under the direct control of HQ AATTV and a small command HQ AATTV Phuoc-Tuy to comprise:

OC

Admin WO

Admin Sgt

Driver

Interpreter

will control the AATTV members within the Province. It is considered this will be a more practical and manageable arrangement.

## MATT 1 (655 Coy RF - Binh-Ba)

3. Operations in the early part of the month continued to be hindered by lack of information resulting from poor liaison between District HQ and 8 RAR. This problem has been largely resolved with a better flow of information to the MATT and operations now being extended in duration and locale. The Coy plus two PF platoons continues to be responsible for the security of four villages spread 5000 metres along Route 2 for which its strength is totally inadequate, giving a resultant sense of futility to the commanders. It is understood that a further two PF platoons are to be eventually assigned to the area.

4. The MATT has continued to receive a good response to training and has noted an improvement in the standard of patrolling and ambushing.

5. Continued efforts to improve the defences of the Binh-Ba compound through the Vietnamese logistic channels have been unproductive, and if only to guarantee the MATTs safety they have had to resort to "scrounging" of defence materials. The current defences are totally inadequate.

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6. Relationships between the MATT and the commanders has continued to be good and contact is being developed with PF, PSDF leaders and Hamlet Chiefs.

7. The Team Leader MATT 1 report is attached at Appendix 1.

## MATT 2 (578 Coy RF - Dat Do)

8. Strong representation to the DSA early in the month resulted in the assignment of an AO and the delegation of responsibility for all TF operations within that AO to the RF Coy Comd advised by the MATT. This arrangement has proved very satisfactory with better planned, coordinated, and executed operations.

9. It is thought that there are numerous VC caches located in banana groves within Dat Do Village and that these caches are heavily mined and booby trapped. Large scale cordon and searches which have avoided the groves have been unproductive. To gain access to the caches a five day course for six volunteers from the Coy in mine warfare was conducted by the MATT with the assistance of 7 RAR at the Horse Shoe. The students showed great receptivity and enthusiasm and the plan for small mine clearing teams should be successful if the necessary equipment is provided through Vietnamese channels. Currently the only equipment held by the company is one unserviceable, obsolete detector. Requisition action has been taken.

10. On 17 Jun 70 the MATT was directed to accompany an operation by 609 Coy RF at the Eastern base of the Long-Hai Hills. Nil contact was made but the Coy suffered 1 KIA and 7 WIA from a mine incident. The Team leader's report of the operation is attached at Appendix 2. Although aware of the pending operation the OC AATTV Phuoc-Tuy was not approached on the employment of the MATT. The problem has been rectified and the PSA has assured that in future instances where a MATT is to operate with other than its assigned Coy that the OC shall be approached for prior approval.

11. The development of the compound continues and with the assistance and advice of the MATT is developing into a model example.

12. Relationships with the RF commanders continues to be good and contact has been made with TF commanders, and Village and Hamlet Chiefs.

13. The Team leader MATT 2 report is attached at Appendix 3.

## MATT 3 (302 Bn RF)

14. The complete MATT deployed with the Bn on 17 Jun 70 and comprises:

|               |      |        |
|---------------|------|--------|
| Team Leader   | Capt | Opie   |
| Team 21C      | WO2  | Logan  |
| WO Instructor | WO2  | Moffit |
| Instr Inf     | Cpl  | Talbot |
| " "           | Cpl  | Monk   |
| Instr RAE     | Cpl  | Byrne  |
| Instr RAAMC   | Cpl  | Riley  |

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15. The Bn completed its training at Van-Kiep NTC on 13 Jun 70 and deployed to provide security for the populated areas during the elections to be conducted on 28 Jun 70 with Bn HQ and three Coys around Baria and one Coy at An-Ngai in Long-Dien District.

16. On 20 Jun 70 Bn HQ and two Coys were committed to a heliborne operation in the Long-Hai Hills. The operation was recalled after a mine incident resulting in 5 KIA and 13 WIA. RF operations in the Long-Hai Hills involving five RF Coys between 17 and 20 Jun resulted in 9 KIA and 47 WIA from mine incidents with nil results. The 302 Bn operation on 20 Jun 70 was recalled by 18 Div and as a result of the heavy casualties it is considered unlikely that future operations will be conducted in the area by RF. The Team leaders After Action Report is attached at Appendix 4.

17. On 21 Jun 70 one Coy was redeployed from the Baria area to provide security for the refugee camp located at La Voi, where it is planned to conduct a two month indoctrination and screening of the 5-10,000 Cambodian refugees allocated to the Province.

18. No definite plans for the employment of the Bn after the election on 28 Jun seem to exist. It is considered very probable that the Bn will continue to be employed as at present as two Coys are virtually committed to static roles (An-Ngai and La Voi) and another is providing a continuing essential security role on the Southern border of Baria. It is possible the Coys will be left in these postures being concentrated only for short Bn strength operations.

19. Due to the undecided future of the Bn the MATT is currently living in tented accommodation with the Bn HQ located at a pumping station on the Northern edge of Baria.

20. Relationships between the MATT and the commanders is good although there seems reluctance on the part of the Bn Comd to keep the MATT fully informed.

21. The Team leader MATT 3 report is attached at Appendix 5.

MATT 4 (An-Ngai)

22. The MATT was deployed to the An Ngai Compound on 17 Jun 70 and comprises:

|             |               |
|-------------|---------------|
| Team Leader | WO2 Palmer    |
| Team 21C    | WO2 Heenan    |
| Instr Inf   | Cpl Kuring    |
| " "         | Bdr Harding   |
| Instr RAE   | Cpl Hogg      |
| Instr RAAMC | Pte Schneider |

23. The compound is located on the Southern boundary of Long-Dien Village and although astride a major VC infiltration route into the villages had been occupied for the last three months by a Group HQ and a PF Platoon who had

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undiscriminately stripped the compound of its defences. On 14 Jun 70 a company of 302 RF Bn was deployed to the compound to assist in the security of the area during the 28 Jun 70 elections, and placed under operational control of Long-Dien District.

24. All except the frame work of the hut had been removed and the MATT are currently living in tented accommodation pending the construction of a team hut by 1 ATF (P26 submitted). The MATT is in a vulnerable location and has concentrated its efforts on the improvement of its immediate defences.

25. Until clarification of whether or not the Coy of 302 Bn is remaining in the area little can be achieved by the MATT. The Coy with the prospect of moving has not shown any enthusiasm for developing the defences and is operating in a desultory manner.

26. The MATT is severely hampered by not having an interpreter. 1 ATF, severely short itself, is unable to provide further interpreters.

27. On 23 Jun 70 a single burst of small arms fire from approximately one hundred metres North of the compound struck the Northern Wall at 2220 hrs. There were nil casualties but this is indicative of the sensitivity of the area.

28. Attached at Appendix 6 is a report by the team leader MATT 4.

#### MATT 5

29. The team was raised on 11 Jun 70 and dispatched to the USARV Advisers' Course.

30. The team should be available for deployment on 2 Jul 70 and it is planned to locate them with 609 Coy RF at Phuoc-Hai in Dat Do District. Their deployment will be dependant on the availability of interpreters and stores.

#### Village Adviser

31. WO Kealy's report is attached at Appendix 7.

#### ARVN Adviser

32. WO Taylor's report is attached at Appendix 8.

#### RD Cadre Adviser

33. The RD Cadre Adviser was absent on R and R at the time of submission of this report.

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Appendix 1  
to Annex M  
to AATTV Report  
Jun 70

REPORT BY TEAM LEADER MATT 1 - BINH BA  
JUN 70

Training

1. During the month of Jun, training of 2 Pl and 3 Pl 655 Coy RF was completed. Training of 3 Pl 655 Coy RF was completed at Ap Suoi Nghe. It was found that both Pls accepted training very well and learned from the instruction given them.
2. Apart from three good Sgts, the NCO level is the weakest link in the company structure. The Team plans to conduct a period of instruction for the NCO's only, to help overcome this weakness.

Officer Manning

3. At one stage of the month the Coy was down to only one officer, the OC. A new 2Lt was then marched in and took over the Pl at Ap Suoi Nghe.

Operations

4. The Coy has still been limited to very small search operations in the area of grid references 420740, 450740, 420710 and 450710. MATT 1 has utilised these operations as an opportunity to test the soldiers' assimilation of instruction given by the team. The weakest point has been map reading and it is the team's future policy to concentrate on this subject, especially with the officers and NCO's.
5. The Coy has been very actively engaged in night ambushing in the area. The team accompanies these ambushes at least three or four nights a week. The RF soldiers carry out their ambush drills very well; but unfortunately no contact has been made with the enemy.
6. During the last two days of the month the detached Pl at Ap Suoi Nghe has been replaced by two PF Pls and 3 Pl has now joined the remainder of the Coy at Binh Ba. This redeployment will allow greater control by the Coy Comd and will provide better security for the villages of Binh Ba and Duc-My. It will also allow for more operations of Pl size, or greater.

1 ATF Assistance

7. A Company of 8 RAR has left the district in the last few days of the month and has been replaced by a NZ company from 2 RAR/NZ (Anzac). The co-operation between ATF units, Sub Sector HQ and MATT 1 has improved a great deal. There is now a daily conference between the three, with an exchange of information for night ambushes and areas available for 655 Coy RF to operate.

Future Planning

8. It is the plan of Sub Sector HQ at Duc Thanh to concentrate on the mobilisation of PSDF in Binh Ba and Ap Suoi Nghe villages in the near future.

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MATT 1 will co-operate with the training and organising of these units. It is the overall future plan that the arming of these units will provide greater security to the villages and perhaps induce government officials to live in the villages on a permanent basis.

Conclusion

9. Apart from actual military training and operations the team is engaged in projects, such as improving the defences of the company compound, family hygiene in the compound, gaining the confidence of the village people, intelligence reports from civilians etc.

10. It is hoped that, in the near future, results of the team's efforts will begin to become more apparent.

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Appendix 2  
to Annex M  
to AATTV Report  
Jun 70

MATT 2  
AFTER ACTION REPORT  
609 COY RF - 17 JUN 70

Briefing

1. MATT 2 was briefed at approx 0800 hrs on the 17 Jun 70 for an operation which was to be take place at 0900 hrs on the same day.
2. The briefing was very quick and informal. The MATT 2 then moved down to prepare to go out with 609 RF Coy, which was situated at Phuoc-Hai.

Sequence of Events

3. We arrived at the outpost at GR 512525 to link up with the 609 RF Coy. The Coy Comd informed us that he was unaware that there would be a MATT with them.
4. The 609 RF Coy's objective was to clear the areas of grid squares 4950 and 4951. Prior to the company moving in there was an airstrike and after the airstrike there was a 5,000 lb bomb to be dropped. The Coy Comd knew that the airstrike was to go in but was not aware of the bomb being dropped.
5. As soon as the airstrike was completed the Coy Comd moved his troops out. I contacted the Sub Sector on this matter and requested that they stop the move, through VC channels. Before the order finally came through to halt the advance, we had covered about 600 metres from the outpost. The Coy was in the open when the bomb was exploded.
6. The Coy arrived at their objective and started to commence the sweep in the area given to them. At approximately 1330 hrs 3 Bl hit a mine with the result that they took casualties (1 KIA & 7 WIA).
7. The MATT called for a dust off but because of the bad weather it was approx 1420 hrs before the wounded were extracted. The other reason for the delay was that the whole area was infested with mines and the company had to pick their way, very slowly, out to the road so as to avoid further casualties.

Conclusion

8. It is the opinion of the MATT that the operation was of very little use, and with the lack of proper equipment the company should not have gone into this area which is known to be heavily mined.

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Appendix 3  
to Annex M  
to AATTV Report  
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REPORT BY TEAM LEADER  
MATT 2 - DAT DO DISTRICT - JUN 70

Team Activities

1. 25 May 70  
Day operation.
2. 26 May 70  
Return of stand down personnel plus night ambush.
3. 27 May 70  
Day operation.
4. 28 May 70  
Lessons on the Claymore, M16 and M14 mines plus night ambush.
5. 29 May 70  
Day operation and work on defence positions.
6. 30 May 70  
Defence positions plus night ambush with 772 RF Coy.
7. 31 May 70  
Two members to Vung-Tau on stand down plus improving defence positions.
8. 1 Jun 70  
Checked arty registration, improving defence plus night ambush.
9. 2 Jun 70
  - a. Two members back from stand down.
  - b. Lecture on first aid plus issue to 578 RF Coy of field dressings for taping onto weapons.
  - c. Soil brought into compound for sand-bag filling.
10. 3 Jun 70  
One member away to Advisor Course plus meeting with DSA.
11. 4 Jun 70
  - a. Meeting with District Chief and DSA.
  - b. Night ambush.

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12. 5 Jun 70  
Day operation plus defence work.
13. 6 Jun 70  
Maintenance on accommodation plus work on defence.
14. 7 Jun 70  
Day operation plus defence work.
15. 8 Jun 70  
Visit by Australian Ambassador, COMAFV and CO AATTV.
16. 9 Jun 70  
Two members return from stand down, plus night ambush.
17. 10 Jun 70  
PRU contacted VC, 2 enemy KIA. 578 RF Coy was on standby, and supported the contact with illumination.
18. 11 Jun 70
  - a. Day operation in area of PRU ambush.
  - b. Lecture on ambush techniques.
  - c. Defence work on .50 cal bunker.
  - d. Night ambush.
19. 12 Jun 70
  - a. Defence work on .50 cal bunker.
  - b. Preparation of training aids for a one week mine course.
20. 13 Jun 70  
Further work on .50 cal bunker.
21. 14 Jun 70  
One member on stand down plus further work on bunkers.
22. 15 Jun 70  
Start of mine detection and destruction course run by MATT 2. Course held at Horse Shoe for six days.
23. 16 Jun 70
  - a. Member returned from stand down.
  - b. Further work on defence tasks.

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24. 17 Jun 70  
Day operation with 609 RF Coy in the Long-Hai mountain area.  
Results of the operation were 609 Coy lost 1 KIA, 7 WIA through mines.  
(See Appendix 2 for After Action Report)
25. 18 Jun 70  
Further defence work.
26. 19 Jun 70  
a. Day operation with 578 RF Coy.  
b. Defence working in compound.
27. 20 Jun 70  
Defence work, plus night ambush.
28. 21 Jun 70  
a. One member on stand down.  
b. Day operation with 578 RF Coy.
29. 22 Jun 70  
a. One member stand down, one member R&R, two members on Adviser course, remaining two on defence work.
30. 23 Jun 70  
a. Member returned from stand down, one member returned from Adviser course.  
b. Day operation with 578 RF Coy plus defence work.
31. 24 Jun 70  
a. Recce with Maj Beale of 609 RF Coy and 772 RF Coy positions.  
b. Continued on defence work.

## Defence Work

32. a. Defence
- (1) At this state the defence materials that were indented for by 578 RF Coy are still not available.
- (2) Consequently this team was compelled to obtain sand bags through own means to enable it to bring the compound up to a reasonable standard.
- (3) The Coy Comd has been working his men well on defence tasks and has started further perimeter wiring with what wire he has at his disposal.

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b. Results

There is still much to be done to the defences of the compound, but it is a great improvement compared to the period of the last report.

Operations

33. Since we have been given a definite AO to work and the responsibility of picking our own areas for ambush, the difficulties mentioned in the last report have mainly been solved. in which

34. The problem of being warned for operations on extremely short notice has still not been completely resolved. On the 17 Jun 70 the team was warned to go out on a operation in the area of the Long-Hai mountains with an RF Coy the team had never even seen before 609 RF Coy. At this stage the team did not have its interpreter as he had been lent to MATT 4. The warning for the operation and the briefing was at 0745 hrs. The briefing took approx 5 mins, and the operation was to start at 0900 hrs from Phuoc-Hai, 7000 metres from our loc. An airstrike and the dropping of a 5000 lb bomb was to be the signal for the movement into the operational area. The 609 Coy Comd was not told that the MATT would be moving with them and neither were they told that they could not move until the large bomb was dropped. In fact they were not even told that the bomb was going to be used. Consequently they moved out towards the operational area before the bomb was dropped. The company was therefore in the danger area before the MATT could stop them. The results of the operation were 1 KIA, 7 WIA through a mine explosion.

Training

35. During the period of this report the team has managed to conduct training periods in between operational commitments.

A mine detection course was conducted from 15-20 Jun. So as the soldiers attending the course would not be used for operations during this period the soldiers plus Cpl Smithson moved up to the area of the Horse Shoe and the course was conducted there. Below is copy of course report by Cpl Smithson:

"Instructor: - Cpl Smithson  
Cpl Willis  
Pte Cuthbertson (att 7 RAR)

Students:- 1 Cpl and 5 Pte soldiers.

All students have a good knowledge of mine signs and markers. All were quick to learn the tuning and operation of the mine detector. Students were thoroughly tested on detection of buried objects and proved themselves capable of detecting mines of varying sizes with accuracy.

Prodding for mines with bayonets was fair but a lot of individual practice would be of great benefit to all.

Action taken on detonation of a mine was performed by students very satisfactory. Setting up of charges for destruction of mines should be further instructed on return to unit.

Remarks Attention was good and all students worked hard and showed interest throughout the course".

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Appendix 4  
to Annex M  
to AATTV Report  
Jun 70

AFTER ACTION REPORT  
302 RF BN

1. Period covered in report : 200615 Jun 70 - 201835 Jun 70.
2. Troops taking part : 236 Coy (Pl 98) + 2 MATT 3  
611 Coy (Pl 89) + 2 MATT 3  
Bn HQ (Pl 22) \* 2 MATT 3
3. Sequence of Events :
  - a. At 0615 hrs 20 Jun 70, elements of 302 RF Bn moved by road from field locations to PZ at Long-Hai Mobile Special Force (MSF) (YS 4551) for combat assault (CA) into the Long-Hai Hill area bounded by 47/49 Eastings and 50/52 Northings.  
  
Mission: To conduct a sweep of the area as per trace P attached searching caves and bunkers (one Hoi-Chanh accompanied the unit as guide) and Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) of Commands Vault dropped 18 Jun.
  - b. Following air preparation of LZ, fly in commenced 1110 hrs at YS 472513 and YS 474513 (each a 1 slick LZ) by 236 Coy followed by Bn HQ and 611 Coy. 1150 hrs lift completed without incident.
  - c. 236 Coy moved to Hill 323 (YS 477514) followed by Bn HQ and 611 Coy. One sandbag and log bunker (4mx2m) found at YS476513 was destroyed.
  - d. 1300 hrs 5 en sighted at YS 483513 and FAC (Kenny 13) contacted to direct gunships into the area.
  - e. 1345 hrs while the FAC was marking target, elements of 236 Coy set off 1 mine (suspected M16) vicinity 477513.
  - f. Due to close proximity of one more M16 mine (2m from initial explosion) there was considerable delay in extracting casualties. Result : 5 KIA 13 WIA.
  - g. 1350 hrs gunship engaged target with unknown results.
  - h. 1450 hrs Dustoff (US) medevac 9 WIA from prepared LZ (YS 477514)
  - i. 1500 hrs Bushranger (RAAF) medevac 3 WIA.
  - j. 1540 hrs Bushranger completed evacuation of 5 KIA, 1 WIA and equipment.
  - k. 1600 hrs orders received from Sector to return to LZ and wait extraction.

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- l. 1645 hrs LZ secured by 611 Coy.
- m. 1730 hrs Extraction commenced. Order of move 611 Coy, Bn HQ, 236 Coy.
- n. Suppressive fire directed at earlier enemy location by Bushranger.
- o. 1800 hrs Bn Comd changed order of move : Bn HQ to be last out.
- p. 1805 hrs 4 slicks (incl Bn Comds) diverted to beach at YS 502512 as security for Bushranger bought down by enemy ground fire from YS 483513.
- q. 1820 hrs all troops clear of LZ.
- r. 1830 hrs security element extracted from beach to PZ (aircrew remained to await alternate security force).
- s. 1835 hrs all elements complete at PZ, and vehicle move back to field locations.

4. Comments by MATT Leader

a. Mine Incident :

- (1) Due to undergrowth, known location of one additional M16 mine (lift in phase) and likelihood of a minefield, no further search was conducted after recovery of casualties.
- (2) No indication that enemy was aware of precise location of friendly force prior to mine detonating.
- (3) No reaction by enemy until the fire directed at Bushranger which forced it down.

b. Movement and Tactics

- (1) Initial deployment away from the LZ was good, but as more troops landed there was lack of dispersion which continued throughout and contributed to the high casualty figures.
- (2) Movement to the first objective was in single file due to the likelihood of mines.
- (3) Despite continual advice and example by MATT, troops kept closed up.
- (4) Security at halts was not good; while medevac was in progress, everyone watched the proceedings; ignoring fronts and flanks.

c. Action at Dustoff LZ :

- (1) XO of 611 Coy was in charge but did little to make his presence felt until a MATT member with the interpreter organized the evacuation of casualties.

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(2) Casualties were lined up on one side only of LZ making loading difficult as Dustoff was hovering at 3-4 ft.

(3) Individual soldiers attempted to throw weapons and equipment onto the helicopters although the Coy XO was informed that these items would wait until the last lift and go with the bodies.

(4) Casualties already moved back from the explosion area were left on the track instead of being moved direct to the LZ.

d. Return to LZ for Extraction:

(1) The move was generally good, though the recent lesson of dispersion was not learned.

(2) Rear coy remained on high ground covering withdrawal with 60mm mortars (not required).

(3) General security of LZ could have been improved; companies were divided between the two LZs which lead to confusion over responsibility.

e. Communications

(1) A breakdown occurred when the CO arrived at the beach and was unable to contact the S2 who remained at the LZ until the last lift of the extraction.

(2) There was some confusion as to troops remaining at LZ awaiting extraction. However, as all troops were in the open on the LZ and the S2 had a radio, he should have clarified the matter on return to the LZ.

(3) In accordance with MACV policy, two advisers flew in with each of the three element commanders and remained with them throughout the operation.

(4) The CO decided that En HQ would be last out, then took an earlier aircraft himself and there was no MATT member remaining to confirm that the LZ was clear.

f. Interpreters: Only 1 interpreter was available and there was some delay in passing information. At least one more interpreter (preferably two) is required for efficient operation of the MATT.

g. Conclusions

(1) The unit failed in its mission due to being recalled, although there was no apparent reluctance to move forward following the mine incident.

(2) Morale remained high and the general attitude of the troops was good.

(3) At the site of the downed helicopter, the security element was most reluctant to be extracted and leave the aircraft (as the troops thought) to the enemy.

(4) Emphasis must be placed on dispersion at all times.


(5) Rapport between MATT and counterparts was good.

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Trace P to  
Appendix 4  
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Appendix 5  
to Annex M  
to AATTV Report  
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REPORT BY TEAM LEADER  
MATT 3 - JUN 70

Introduction

1. WO2 G. Logan and WO2 F. Moffitt joined 302 RF Bn at Van-Kiep National Training Centre (VKNTC) on 26 May and Capt LM Opie joined the battalion on 4 Jun. The battalion completed its training on 13 Jun and deployed to field locations on 14 Jun.

|                   |                          |               |
|-------------------|--------------------------|---------------|
| 611 Coy and Bn HQ | to Baria Pumping Station | (YS 382629)   |
| 614 Coy           | to Old French Fort       | (YS 386625) * |
| 236 Coy           | to Baria City            | (YS 374604)   |

With provincial elections to be held on 28 Jun, the main role of the battalion during this period will be to protect the approaches to Baria and assist with security in connection with the elections.

(\* 614 Coy moved on 21 Jun to Phuoc-Lam (Long-Dien District))

Training

2. Members of MATT 3 observed training in the field at Van-Kiep and the following weaknesses were noticed:

- a. Attack : started off well but tapered off to zero at the approach of lunch.
- b. Cordon and Search : as for the attack; cordon quite good but no effort at search.
- c. Too much time wasted preparing for army training tests (ATTs) - troops not involved, so no training at all for six days prior to last three days of ATTs.
- d. Poor control by platoon commanders and NCOs.
- e. Staff work appeared to be comprehensive and of good standard.
- f. Company commanders exercised good control over their troops.

3. I believe the training at VKNTC is more in the nature of a rest than a hard training course and the only benefit possibly derived is the planning by the bn staff for ATTs. The actual conduct of ATTs if meant as drills would produce better results than the part exercise (with live enemy), part drill that is presently carried out. There is little, if any, briefing of the troops.

4. As the unit is in a static role, presently operating with only two companies, there is as yet little indication of its capabilities.

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5. Major weaknesses have been pointed out in the After Action report submitted to Sector. These are normal for GVN troops - bunching, lack of control at platoon and squad level, delay in passage of information etc.
6. The points mentioned above have been stressed to the CO and will continue to be emphasized at O Groups and conferences.
7. Morale of the unit is high and general standard of the troops appears to be about average for RF troops - a figure of 24 AWOL prior to VKNTC but zero during the course.
8. Assistance in providing stores etc and ensuring that Sub-Sector is advised of night locs have been the main tasks. Being responsible directly to Sector, the CO is casual to the point of ignoring the District Chief.

Highlights of the Reporting Period

9. 19 Jun. 236 Coy alerted to Combat Assault (CA) into Long-Hai Hills to assist 577 RF Coy. The company had short notice, but was packed and ready to go at the required time (1400 hrs). However, the weather closed in and the operation postponed.
10. 20 Jun. See Appendix 4 to this report.
11. The first week in the field was spent settling in and obtaining supplies for the MATT.
12. Liaison visits were made to Long-Le Sub-Sector, Sector S2, S3.

Future Intentions

13. Future intentions after election day are unknown.

Commanding Officer

14. The CO, Maj Toan was formerly Boat Company Commander and apparently enjoys the confidence of the Province Chief (PC). He was presented with the medal of the National Order 5th Plans on Armed Forces Day.

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Appendix 6  
to Annex M  
to AATTV Report  
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REPORT BY TEAM LEADER - MATT 4 - JUN 70

Introduction

1. The complete team finished the Di-An MAT Advisor Course on the 11 Jun 70 and returned to Vung-Tau. The course gave me a good opportunity to get to know the soldiers I would be working with as well the individual to get to know his team mates.
2. On the 12 Jun I moved to Van-Kiep, leaving the team at Vung-Tau, on a recce of the whole area and in particular our future base at An-Ngai. I moved around with Maj Beale and WO2 Kealy and was given a lot of local knowledge by them.
3. I moved back to Vung-Tau on the 11 Jun and we were issued with our equipment and early on the 12 Jun we moved to the compound at An-Ngai.

An-Ngai Compound

4. The compound was and still is occupied by 787 Coy of the 302 Lien Doi Gp. 302 Coy is only temporary and may move out at a moment's notice. We were informed that 302 Coy would most likely be here for about two weeks then our permanent company would arrive. At the time of writing this I cannot find out firm dates or which company would be moving to our location.
5. The compound had been unoccupied for some months and is in a bad state of repair. It appears the compound has been stripped of tin, timber etc. The fighting positions have been destroyed, leaving the living area only. All that was left of the team house was a steel frame, and it was quite a good, secure building a little earlier, so I gather after talking to the previous MAT (US) team leader. Even the main gate is missing.
6. We have attempted to get the present company interested in the camp defences, but because of their temporary nature, they are not interested, but the officers are very friendly and do give us some help. I consider if they were staying we would be really able to work in well with them, and get somewhere.

Compound Defences

7. The wire around the camp is inadequate and is overgrown. We have since cleared the wire by borrowing a small dozer and burning within the wire. A lot more still remains to be done in the wire laying line. It took one of my corporals three minutes to get from the outside into the compound (dressed in basic webbing and weapon).
8. The team is living in a tent and are comfortable enough, but with no blast walls etc we are open to indirect fire particularly at night and this causes me worry. Therefore I have concentrated my activities to a team bunker firstly, as a safety factor, and secondly we are building a show bunker as we hope they will follow our lead.

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Improvements Achieved

9. Some of the small things we have achieved are:
- a. The correct method of sand bagging and then building a new 60mm mortar pit correctly.
  - b. Additional blast walls erected to close gaps in the perimeter, using 44 gal drums (these can be modified later to proper walls).
  - c. Claymores brought in, tested and relayed, but not all were tested, I fear, but a start.
  - d. Additional guards at night. At first only one guard was on duty on the main gate.
  - e. The flaming directional arrow repositioned from outside the perimeter to inside.
10. The claymore mines were bad with regard to sighting, C4 missing, leads burnt and bared and in some cases cut in half. A lot of the leads were laying on the ground about ten feet outside the inner perimeter, these we eventually got moved back under cover where some one may fire them if needed.
11. Hygiene is bad and we have had no luck in this department. The only hygiene done has been done by us, such as latrine burning, trash pit burning and covering.

Operations

12. I and one corporal accompanied a Pl on ambush, the movement was very good, the ambush well laid. The move out of the ambush was not well done and more like a picnic finishing with noise, talking etc. Overall it was better than I expected.
13. No day operations have been conducted since I have been here. This is purely at district level and beyond me, except to report it.
14. Most ambushes at night I am informed by my counterpart are of 30 men but I have only counted out and in 12 to 15 men.
15. The only enemy contact has been at 2215 hrs 23 Jun when about a squad size force entered the village of An-Ngai and threw a grenade (first reported as a B40) in the PF Compound, about 300m to our North, also there was some small arms fire. One burst of about 12 rounds from an AK 47 was fired at our compound, just to keep us inside, I think - there were no casualties. The company fired 4x60mm Illum rounds, of which two worked, in the general area. The team stood to but the company did not. I asked for illumination from District and after 55 mins checked my request only to find no action had been taken. This matter is at present under separate investigation.

Vision Aids

16. The camp is ideally situated for the use of a starlightscope, with a good tower which covers approaches from the Long-Hai mountains to the

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villages in this area. By day even binoculars would do if we could be issued with them. With these aids we may be able to obtain some pattern of the VC approaches and ambush accordingly. At present I consider the VC are entering the villages (almost every night) on both sides of our camp between the camp and the ambushes and probably within 200 metres of us. I have spoken to my counterpart on this, he agrees but can do nothing, he claims, as the District Chief details the ambush positions.

Conclusion

17. I consider myself very lucky to have such a good team, all work very long hours and very hard, they are willing at all times and work voluntarily after normal hours at various tasks that we have not had time to complete during the day. Morale is high and their team spirit is worthy of commendation. Even under these adverse living conditions, not one has complained and all have accepted the conditions as such; their only reaction is to work harder.

18. An interpreter is a must and to date I have borrowed two, but at this time I do not have one and subsequently I am not always sure the message has got across.

19. At District level I have received a lot of help from the Aust LO, Capt Dwyer.

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Appendix 7  
to Annex M  
to AATTV Report  
Jun 70

REPORT BY VILLAGE ADVISER  
PHUOC TUY PROVINCE - JUN 70

Areas of Responsibilities

1. I am directly concerned with three villages and one hamlet as follows:
  - a. An-Nhut
  - b. Tan-Phuoc
  - c. An-Ngai
  - d. Lo-Voi (hamlet)

Detailed Comment

2. An-Nhut village is continuing to do very well. Their only contact during the month resulted in the PF Platoon killing two enemy and capturing three weapons.
3. Tan-Phuoc is doing very well with only one occurrence during the month when a film (provided by Civic Action - CA) was being shown, The VC fired with small arms from two directions. M79 (HE) was returned to both locations. There were no casualties on either side.
4. An-Ngai is still a trouble spot. However three hamlets are doing well but the other two are not. An-Loc hamlet is being visited about every second night by VC of about squad size. Hoa-Loi hamlet has been visited once a week until this week and now they have been in five nights in succession. On one occasion there were 30 VC and on the other visits 5-10 members. They conduct meetings and search houses tearing up flags and the house number. They usually remain for 3-5 hrs.
5. Lo-Voi village has no PSDF but has one PF platoon. On the night of 28 May 70, 63 PF Pl was ambushed by a squad of VC as they moved out of their compound. 4 PF were killed (no weapons lost), no VC casualties. I suspect that a squad leader in the PF may be a VC. RD are checking the Pl for me. 28 PF Platoon has replaced them and are a very good sub unit. They are all North Vietnamese (RC) of which 29 are married (28 wives expect children next month). 5000 Vietnamese from Cambodia are expected in Lo-Voi on 26 June 70.

Supplies

6. Sandbags, are almost non-existent for issue to the PSDF-PF, although the Village Chiefs' request through the correct channels.
7. There is no issue of illumination rounds for these units.

Training

8. Most PSDF need more training with weapons. I am continuing our weapon training plan.

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Appendix 8  
to Annex M  
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REPORT BY ARVN TRAINING ADVISER  
HORSE SHOE: JUN 70

Training

1. During the month the following companies were trained at the Horse Shoe.
  - a. 3 Coy 3 Bn 48 Regt completed training 1 Jun (2 week)
  - b. C Coy 5 Cav started training 9 Jun (4 week)
2. Training of 3 Coy was conducted by Pioneer Pl Sp Coy 7 RAR.
3. Training of C Coy is being conducted by a composite group from 7 RAR under command of Capt Howard and called 7 RAR ARVN Cadre.
4. The training by both Sp Coy and 7 RAR ARVN Cadre was of a high standard.
5. 3 Coy training by Sp Coy covered fully the zeroing of personal weapons, handling and shooting. Minor tactics covered was directed at contact drill, fire and movement, ambush, pl formations and field signals.
6. In the minor tactics phase emphasis was placed on contact drills and fire and movement. If these lessons, which were taught thoroughly, are used it should improve the efficiency of the unit.
7. With C Coy 5 Cav the training has covered zeroing of personal weapons and shooting with all weapons issued to the unit. Training has been started on minor tactics. Due to operational commitments we had to complete three platoon size ambushes for two nights on the 19-20 June 70.
8. With the officers in the company, Capt Howard has conducted officer training for approximately eight days for two hours each day. The training covers map reading, orders, use of Sp weapons and calling in arty support.

Leadership

9. The standard of leadership shown by the officers and NCO's of 3 Coy was of a low standard. It would appear by their attitude that they were down here for a rest period.
10. The standard of C Coy 5 Cav appears to be much higher and the officer take a more active part in both officer and troop training.
11. The co-operation given by this unit has been until now very good, with only a few minor incidents.
12. Today there was 32 AWOL and there was a lack of personnel wearing complete web equipment. This was rectified by a parade for the equipment at 1330 hrs. The AWOL was caused by the soldiers being paid on the 23 June.

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Visitors

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14. Prior to the arrival C Coy 5 Cav, the US Adviser and the Senior ARVN Officer available for 5 Cav visited the Horse Shoe. During the training to date the Senior US Adviser of 5 Cav and the S3 have visited the unit.

Future Planning

15. In future training we are going to try to implement officer training in the first week in an attempt to assist the young platoon commanders.

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AATTV Report  
Jun 70

NIGHT OPERATIONS ADVISORY TEAM  
JUNE 1970

General

1. This report covers the period 23 May to 12 Jun 70. In that time the training of 203 RF Coy had been completed and the training of 174 and 408 Coys had been commenced.
2. The name of the team has not yet been changed from NOAT (Night Operations Advisory Team) to NOTT (Night Operations Training Team).

Information

3. Intelligence Gathered. Numerous sightings, and agent reports, tend to indicate that there is an enemy build up taking place in this District, and that some enemy units are moving through the District. At this stage the reasons for this build up, are unknown. It could be for an attack on My-Tho, or for further harassment of the Tan-Hiep Training Centre.
4. Timeliness of Intelligence. Where put to the test the intelligence has proved to be timely and accurate.

Unit Evaluation

5. Comparison of Units. Having worked with 174 and 408 Coys for only twelve days at this stage it is too early yet to make a real comparison. However, indications are that they are basically all the same. The standard of the units varies with the standard of their officers, and how much these officers are pushed and supervised by their superiors.
  - a. 203 RF Coy. In the time that we worked with 203 Coy they produced one-fourth of all the night kills for the whole Province (out of 68 RF Coys and 305 PF Pls). Since then they have participated in only one successful operation, and that was a joint action with a local PF platoon. One unit claims the 3 VC KIA and the other the two captured weapons; so it is not too clear who got what.
  - b. 174 RF Coy. Supposedly the best RF Coy in the District, some time ago. At the commencement of training they were two officers understrength, including the Coy Comd. A substitute was provided by Province, in an acting capacity. He has subsequently been promoted and will remain as the Coy Comd, so the standard of the unit may improve. Although it is yet too early to make a full evaluation I am not terribly impressed. A unit whose sentries go to sleep to the tune of their transistor radios cannot impress.
  - c. 408 RF Coy. Also lacking two officers, one on leave and one AWOL. Commanded by a very old soldier, who has been in this District 27 years - it should be a very good unit. But I have my reversations, even though it may be too early to judge yet, for the following reasons:-

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(1) Their AO, which consistantly produces kills and captured weapons for six man US Ranger Teams, leaves 408 Coy perpetually emptyhanded, with very few contacts.

(2) When accompanied by Advisers or NOAT members they operate all night; even though the plan seems to change about every hour. However, unaccompanied they invariably return to their outpost between midnight and 0200 hrs from an "all-night" operation.

6. Night Operational Techniques. Unquestionably the officers of all the three companies know their tactics. Whether with blackboard or sandmodel, lecture or discussion they all show a good sound knowledge. But that's where it stops. Knowing it and doing it seem to have little connection.

a. Formations. All agree that open formations and flank protection are desirable, day and night, but they are hardly ever employed. Some use flank protection, but as a rule a closed up single file formation is used. Asked "Why?", the answer invariably is "This is a secure area".

b. Ambush Techniques. With the exception of one officer all knew the requirements for a perfect linear ambush. And even that one exception would have had partial success. Yet the execution of those ambushes is a poor, and sometimes dangerous, substitute for their knowledge. On one occasion with 174 Coy I spent hours preparing and planning with the officers for a specific ambush for that night. Planned as a three platoon linear ambush along a road it eventuated as a Coy defensive position 100 meters from the nearest planned ambush site.

c. Rehearsals. I have yet to see it but all agree that rehearsals are an excellent idea.

d. Deception and Secrecy. All state that deception is a must. Yet all move in the general area where they are going to operate that night, directly from their compound, in the late hours of the afternoon. All agree that civilians must be avoided yet it is not uncommon to stop at a house to ask directions, and then set up an ambush 200 metres away. The fact that the lights in that house seem to be brighter, or flickering, or in a certain window only, or extinguished for the rest of the night doesn't seem to bother anyone but the NOAT members.

#### Training

7. The detailed syllabus for the three Coys, of the training conducted to date, is attached as Appendix 1. Through our experiences, initially with 203 Coy and subsequently with the other two, it was decided that more emphasis must be placed on teaching the individual skills to the soldier (i.e. Marksmanship, Claymores, Mortars) and less on the teaching of tactics to the officers. The officers know their tactics but are set in their ways.

#### Statistics

8. 203 RF Coy. One contact on a joint operation with a local PF Pl. 3 VC KIA, two individual weapons captured. One unit is claiming the bodies, the other the wpns. One friendly KIA and 1 WIA from a separate booby trap incident.

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9. 174 RF Coy. On 19 Jun 70 made contact with an enemy unit, strength unknown, enroute to an ambush site. Resulted in 1 VC KIA, 1 M79 captured.
10. 408 RF Coy. On 22 Jun 70 claim to have killed 2 VC. Produced a very old and battered M16 but state that the bodies were too far away to be carried in.

Conclusions

11. It is hoped that this report does not portray a picture of gloom and doom; that is not its intention. Overall the concept and employment of the NOAT has been beneficial, but it also has its limitations.
12. Limitations. Trying to get the officers to change their tactics, or to get them to employ those that they themselves know to be correct, is an impossibility. They are prepared to pay lip service to the tactics that they have been taught but in the execution of them they revert to their old ways. They know, and freely admit, that the enemy is hiding in the tree-lines and wooded areas. But the only time they will move into those tree-lines is when the District Chief is hovering over them in a helicopter, and then only along well defined tracks.
13. Benefits of the NOAT
- a. Improved Marksmanship. This, undoubtedly, has been the most beneficial result of the NOAT.
- b. Specialised Training. Two NOAT members have been conducting 18 hours training per Coy, of selected personnel, on Claymores and Mortars. This has also been very beneficial.
- c. Night Operations. Captured enemy documents have indicated that friendly night movement and night operations are disrupting their activities.
- d. Training. Our efforts here have shown the Vietnamese that it is possible to fight a war and conduct training at the same time.

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Appendix 1 to  
Annex N to  
AATTV Report  
Jun 70

DETAILED SYLLABUS - JUNE 1970

| <u>SUBJECT</u>      | <u>NO OF HOURS</u> |         |         |
|---------------------|--------------------|---------|---------|
|                     | 203 Coy            | 174 Coy | 408 Coy |
| Weapon Handling     | 1                  | 1½      | 6½      |
| Movement            | 1                  | ½       | ½       |
| Fire & Movement     | 1                  | ½       | 6½      |
| Day Firing          | 31                 | 41½     | 15½     |
| Night Firing        | 10                 |         | 2½      |
| Obstacle Crossing   | 1                  |         |         |
| Contact Drills      | 1                  | ½       | ½       |
| Ambushing           | 6                  | 2       | 1       |
| Radio Security      | 1                  |         |         |
| Night Observation   | 1                  |         |         |
| Mechanical Ambushes | 16                 | 13      |         |
| Mortar              | 2                  | 18      | 19½     |
| Cordon & Search     | 2                  |         |         |
| Total               | 75                 | 77½     | 52½     |

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Annex 0 to  
AATTV Report  
Jun 70

MINUTES FOR BRIEFING FOR ASSESSMENT TEAM  
NIGHT OPERATIONS ADVISORY TEAM  
0900 HOURS - 6 JUN 70

Present: Col Adkins; Maj Thom, Office of Chief Planning, Territorial Security, IV Corps; Cpt Bay, Statistics and Documents Officer, Territorial Security; Col Matson; Maj Browne and Cpt Ramirez, G3 Training DMAC.

1. The CO of Australian Army Training Team Vietnam was also present at the meeting.

2. Salient points contained in the briefing were as follows:

a. There have been no major difficulties encountered in the period since the last briefing.

b. Cycle of training is now complete with 203 Coy. The team will now split into 2 teams each of 3 warrant officers. The practical aspects being:

(1) 174 Coy moves to the outpost previously occupied by 203 Coy.

(2) 203 Coy moves to a new outpost under construction.

(3) 408 Coy remains in its present location.

c. The US MAT teams continue to train PF platoons as follows:

| MAT Team | PF Platoons   |
|----------|---------------|
| # 3      | 83; 91; 89    |
| # 83     | 92; 93        |
| # 26     | 256; 258; 259 |

(The principle intended is that the PF platoons cycle through the current location of the MAT at their outpost rather than the MAT moving to each outpost in turn.)

d. The cumulative results for the district over the period 1 May - 6 Jun 70 for the night operations are as follows:

(1) Enemy forces

30 KIA  
2 Captured  
14 Weapons captured

(2) Friendly Forces

10 KIA  
18 WIA  
5 Weapons Lost (Friendly squad ambushed by enemy at night)

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- e. Of the successful contacts in the whole of Dinh-Tuong Province - half of these were in Ben-Tranh district and of these contacts half were with 203 RF Coy.
- f. On the night 5/6 Jun 2 VCI were captured and are under interrogation at district.
- g. The majority of the VC incidents appear to be falling in the period 2000 - 2400 hrs.
- h. Shift in enemy pattern.
- (1) Mortar attack at 0600 hrs - VC followed up withdrawing ambush - First time in many months that VC mortared at this time of day.
  - (2) Unconfirmed reports indicate that enemy may have increased size of infiltration/harassing forces from 4-5 men up to 20-30 men.
  - (3) VC have planned and have produced propaganda along following lines.
    - (a) VC will capture 1 US and 1 Australian working on the night operations advisory project.
    - (b) VC plan to mine roads used by these teams.
  - (4) Col Matson was concerned about the enemy reaction to no daylight operation being conducted. Our intelligence believe that there is a possible shift to VC daylight movement in the SE, N, NE sections of the district. It was resolved that NPFF would be requested to assist in these areas where personnel were available.
- j. Lt Col Clark made the following decision regarding the employment of Australians in the project.
- (1) Sub Teams will not be broken down at any time to less than 3 warrant officers.
- Reason: Combat the enemy targeting to capture an Australian.
- (2) He suggested that the title of the team be changed from NOAT to NOTT (Night Operations Training Team).
- k. Gen Rosson visited the team at 203 Coy Outpost on 4 Jun 70.

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