

Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report
October 1971

Series: AWM293 - Australian Army
Training Team Vietnam (AATTV)

Item: [30]

AWM 293

Oct 71
pt 1

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SECRET

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Headquarters
Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam

9 Nov 71

AFV (3)

AATTV REPORT - OCT 71
PART I

1. The AATTV Monthly Report is again published in two parts.
2. The following members of AATTV were admitted to hospital during the month:

34387	Maj	R.P.	WEBB	18 - 23 Oct
39037	Lt	J.T.	HOLLAND	3 - 4 Oct
13468	WO1	D.E.	WISE	27 - 31 Oct
51389	WO2	J.	CLARK	27 - 31 Oct
1200116	WO2	D.B.	VOGELE	10 - 26 Oct
14150	WO2	D.F.	FORD	1 - 4 Oct (Medevac 4 Oct 71)
156474	WO2	G.L.	WHEAT	1 - 6 Oct) 16 - 18 Oct) (Medevac 18 Oct 71)
39001	Pte	W.J.	STONEHOUSE	22 - 24 Oct
216911	LGpl	D.R.	GEALE	18 - 20 Oct

MR 1

3. A report by the Senior Australian Adviser in MR 1 is attached as Annex B. The report on the establishment of a NVA base area in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces was forwarded to HQ AFV and Military Attache, Australian Embassy earlier this month.

4. In view of the manning situation and equipment difficulties facing 3rd ARVN Division, it is considered that it would be unwise to forecast when the new formation is likely to be fully operational.

5. Individual Adviser's reports of particular interest are:

- a. WO2 CHARLTON - 2 ARVN Div Sensor Adviser.
- b. WO1 ADDINGTON - End of Tour Report.

MR 2

6. A report from Senior Australian Adviser MR 2 is attached as Annex C. Training is proceeding at a high level with district cadre courses superimposed on the scheduled NOTT courses.

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7. In anticipation of a possible withdrawal of AATTV from MR 2, and in order that the Night Operations Training courses may continue with minimum interruption, a combined US/ARVN Team is currently undergoing a familiarization and instruction course at Phu Cat Training Centre. This team should be in a position to take over from AATTV if, and when the Team withdraws from MR 2.

MR 3

8. The report on the situation of the Territorial Forces in PHUOC TUY Province is contained in the AATTV Oct Report, Part II.

9. A report from RF/PF Adviser PHUOC TUY Province is at Annex D. The reduction of MATTs from 8 to 2 was concluded, without incident on 26 Oct 71.

JWTC

10. A report from Team Leader JWTC is at Annex E. The move from NUI DAT to VAN KIEP NTC was concluded on 15 Oct 71 without incident. Training of the officer and NCO courses was affected only to a minor degree, however the PF Cadre Course for October was cancelled and will now be conducted in December.

11. On 16 Oct 71, the AATTV at JWTC reduced to the proposed new establishment strength of 7 Officers 14 Warrant Officers and 6 Corporals. Temporary accommodation at Van Kiep is satisfactory, however it is planned to move into the new Training Team compound before Christmas 1971.


12. Notes on Van Kiep NTC are at Appx 1 to Annex E.

MR 4

13. A report from Senior Australian Adviser MR 4 is at Annex F.

14. As in MR 2, courses are being conducted by AATTV at DONG TAM and BAC LIEU for ARVN Training Teams who will eventually take over responsibility for the running of Night Operations Training Courses in MR 4.

15. Reports from Team Leaders, BAC LIEU and DONG TAM are at Appendices 1 and 2 to Annex F.



(G.J. LEARY)
Col
Comd

DEPLOYMENT OF AATTV
AS AT 31 OCT 71

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>HQ AATTV SAIGON</u>								
1.	Col	G.J.	Leary MID	Aust Staff Corps	HQ AATTV	Commander	Dec 71	Saigon
2.	Lt Col	J.D.	Stewart MC MID	RA Inf	"	Second in Command	Jul 72	"
3.	Capt	B.M.	Straker	RAASC	"	Adjutant	Feb 72	"
4.	WO1	A.G.	Stanley MBE MM	RA Inf	"	RSM	May 72	"
5.	WO2	R.	Roberts	RAA	"	Chief Clerk	Oct 72	"
6.	WO2	V.	Kirsch	RAASC	"	Admin WO Pay	Mar 72	"
7.	WO2	R.D.	Couttie	RA Inf	"	Admin WO Mov	Jul 72	"
8.	WO2	V.E.	Metzroth	RA Inf	"	Admin WO Mov	Feb 72	"
9.	Sgt	R.R.	Ryan	RAASC	"	Clerk	Aug 72	"
10.	Cpl	B.J.	Cook	RAASC	"	Clerk	Feb 72	"
11.	Cpl	R.J.	Atkins	RAE	"	Asst Instr	Dec 71	"
12.	Cpl	P.J.	Millett	RA Inf	"	Asst Instr	Aug 72	"
13.	Cpl	R.H.	Remyse	RAAMC	"	Asst Instr	Aug 72	"
14.	Bdr	C.M.	Angeles	RAA	"	Asst Instr	Aug 72	"

Serial	Rank	Initia	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>VUNG-TAU</u>								
15.	Capt	L.A.	Ransome	RAE	HQ AATTV Vung-Tau	QM	Aug 72	Vung-Tau
16.	Maj	S.R.	Hearder	RAA	" "	Supernumerary	Mar 72	"
17.	WO2	J.R.	Cousins	RA Inf	" "	Regt Duty WO	Apr 72	"
18.	WO2	J.V.	Holt	RA Inf	" "	RQMS	Dec 71	"
19.	WO2	A.E	Reidel	RA Inf	" "	RQMS	Oct 72	"
20.	Cpl	R.F.	Poirrier	RA Inf	" "	Storeman	Nov 71	"
21.	Cpl	R.W.	Fitzsimmons	RAE	" "	Tpt Supervisor	Aug 72	"
22.	Cpl	G.P.	Byard	RAEME	" "	Veh Mech	May 72	"
23.	WO2	J.	Woods	RA Inf	" "	Supernumerary	Jul 72	"
24.	WO2	J.C.	McNamarra	RA Inf	" "	" "	Aug 72	"
25.	Cpl	C.F.A	Clark X	RAE	" "	" "	Nov 71	"
26.	Cpl	G.R.	Grey *	RAE	" "	" "	Nov 71	"
27.	Cpl	W.	Davis *	RA Inf	" "	" "	Nov 71	"
28.	Cpl	A.	Forsyth	RAE	" "	" "	Nov 71	"
29.	Cpl	D.J.	Townsend	RA Inf	" "	" "	Nov 71	"
30.	Bdr	J.	McKENNA	RAA	" "	" "	Dec 71	

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Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>MR I - QUANG TRI PROVINCE</u>								
31.	WO2	W.J.	Noble	RAAC	20 Tank Sgn	Instructor	Nov 71	Quang-Tri
32.	WO2	G.L.	Millington	RAAC	" "	"	Nov 71	"
33.	Maj	R.B.M.	Donaldson	RAA	3 Div	Adviser	Oct 72	"
34.	WO2	I.S.	McPhial	RA Inf	"	"	Aug 72	"
35.	WO2	R.J.	Hunnisett	RA Inf	"	"	Nov 71	"
36.	WO2	G.C.	Jenkin	RA Inf	"	"	Jun 72	"
37.	WO2	N.G.	Walters	RA Inf	"	"	May 72	"

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
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MR I (CONT)

THUA THIEN PROVINCE

38.	WO2	T.J.	Jewell	RA Inf	1 ARVN Div	Sensor Adviser	Aug 72	Hue
39.	WO2	B.F.	McGrath	RA Inf	54 Regt	Adviser	Feb 72	Near Hue

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Initis</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Corps</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Employment</u>	<u>Due RTA</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>QUANG NAM PROVINCE</u>								
40.	Lt Col	P.T.F.	Gowans	RAA	HQ I Corps	G3 Trg Adviser	Mar 72	Danang
41.	WO1	L.T.	Allan	RA Sigs	AATTV Danang	Admin WO	Aug 72	"
42.	WO2	J.R.	White	RA Inf	" "	Mov WO	Jul 72	"
43.	Capt	F.A.	Roberts MID	RAAC	1 Armd Bde	Ops Adviser	Apr 72	"
<u>QUANG NGAI PROVINCE</u>								
44.	WO2	M.J.	Poole	RA Inf	HQ 2 Div	TOC Adviser	Jul 72	Quang Ngai
45.	WO2	K.	Charlton	RAA	HQ 2 Div	Sensor Adviser	Dec 71	"
<u>QUANG TIN PROVINCE</u>								
46.	Capt	N.K.	McDermott	RA Inf	5 Regt	Adviser	Jun 72	Tam Ky

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>MR II</u>								
<u>PHU CAT</u>								
<u>BINH DINH PROVINCE</u>								
47.	Capt	J.E.	Weiland	RA Inf	Night Operations Training Teams	OC NOTT Team 1	Jul 72	Phu Cat
48.	Capt	K.G.	Gallagher	RAASC	" "	OC NOTT Team 2	Mar 72	"
49.	W02	B.H.	Cox	RA Inf	" "	Team Member	Nov 71	"
50.	W02	B.R.	Day	Inf	" "	" "	Apr 72	"
51.	W02	J.W.	Pratten	RA Inf	" "	" "	Feb 72	"
52.	W02	B.	Foster	RA Inf	" "	" "	Jun 72	"
53.	W02	S.F.	Reid	RAE	" "	" "	Jun 72	"
54.	W02	I.R.	Ramsay	RA Inf	" "	" "	Jul 72	"
55.	W02	F.	Lawler	RA Inf	" "	" "	Jul 72	"
56.	W02	J.A.	Gibson	RA Sigs	" "	" "	Nov 72	"
57.	W02	B.L.	Maher	RAA	" "	" "	Aug 72	"
58.	W02	D.A.	Duffy	RA Inf	" "	" "		

Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>MR III</u>								
<u>PHUOC TUY PROVINCE</u>								
<u>JUNGLE WARFARE TRAINING CENTRE</u>								
59.	Lt Col	K.H.	Kirkland	RA Inf	JWTC	Senior Adivser	Jul 72	Van Kiep
60.	Maj	C.A.	Swain	RA Inf	"	Adivser	Dec 71	"
61.	Capt	W.D.	Tresise	RA Inf	"	"	Apr 72	"
62.	Capt	K.J.	McTaggart	RA Inf	"	"	Jul 72	"
63.	Capt	D.J.	Mead	RAASC	"	"	Oct 72	"
64.	Capt	K.W.	Barlow	RAASC	"	"	Aug 72	"
65.	2Lt	A.J.	Morris	RASIGS	"	"	Jun 72	"
66.	WO1	D.R.	Cherry	RA Inf	"	"	Dec 71	"
67.	WO1	E.	Gason	RAAC	"	"	Jun 72	"
68.	WO1	L.J.	Stanford	RA Inf	"	"	Aug 72	"
69.	WO1	D.	Morrison	RMZIR	"	"	Oct 72	"

Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
70.	Sgt	F.W.	Brady	RAE	JWTC	Assistant Instructor	Dec 71	Nui Dat
71.	WO2	E.G.	Lewis	RA Inf	"	" "	Apr 72	"
72.	WO2	J.P.	Hudson	RA Inf	"	" "	May 72	"
73.	WO2	B.G.	Wilson	RA Inf	"	" "	May 72	"
74.	WO2	P.	Hulsing	RAAMC	"	" "	Jun 72	"
75.	WO2	M.J.	Shave	RA Inf	"	" "	Jul 72	"
76.	WO2	C.E.	Ebner	RA Inf	"	" "	Aug 72	"
77.	WO2	D.S.	Cochrane MM	RA Inf	"	" "	Aug 72	"
78.	WO2	R.J.	Clancy	RA Inf	"	" "	Aug 72	"
79.	WO2	R.R.	Gurney	RA Inf	"	" "	Aug 72	"
80.	WO2	B.	Willis	RAE	"	" "	Oct 72	

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
81.	Cpl	T.C.	Young	RAE	JWTC	Assistant Instructor	Dec 71	Nui-Dat
82.	Cpl	B.J.	McDonald	RAAMC	"	" "	Jun 72	"
83.	Cpl	P.S.	Dury	RA Inf	"	" "	Aug 72	"
84.	Cpl	M.J.	Gooley	RAASC	"	" "	Aug 72	"
85.	Cpl	P.C.	Schulte	RAAC	"	" "	Aug 72	"

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Serial	Rank	Inits	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>MR III PHUOC TUY PROVINCE</u>								
<u>MOBILE ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM</u>								
86.	Maj	R.	Musgrove	RAAC	Phuoc Tuy Province	RF/PF Adviser	Apr 72	Baria
87.	Maj	R.P.	Webb	RA Sigs	" "	DSA Duc Thanh	Dec 71	Duc Thanh
88.	Maj	B.J.	O'Neill	RAA	" "	DSA Xuyen Moc	Dec 71	Xuyen Moc
89.	WO2	R.I.	Bennett	RA Inf	" "	Team Leader MATT 1	Apr 72	Baria
90.	WO2	G.J.	Hall	RNZIR	" "	Team Member	Oct 72	"
91.	WO2	F.N.	Micholas	RA Inf	" "	" "	Jul 72	"
92.	Cpl	B.W.	Burgess	RA Inf	" "	" "	Jun 72	"
93.	Cpl.	C.D.	Carroll	RAE	" "	" "	Aug 72	"
94.	WO1	G.E.	Wease	RA Inf	" "	Team Leader MATT 2	Aug 72	"
95.	WO1	T.R.	Samuels	RNZIR	" "	Team Member MATT 2	Oct 72	"
96.	WO2	B.	Morgan	RA Inf	" "	" "	Aug 72	"
97.	Cpl	P.A.	Gallagher	RA Inf	" "	" "	Aug 72	"
98.	Cpl	R.G.	Mackrill	RA Inf	" "	" "	Jun 72	"
99.	Cpl	U.	Moldre	RA Inf	" "	Linguist	Dec 71	

Serial	Rank	Initis	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location
<u>MILITARY REGION IV</u>								
100.	Maj	J.G.	Hughes	RAA	CORDS IV CORPS	Assistant to Chief of Staff Territorial Security	Feb 72	Can-Tho
101.	WO1	I.C.	Wall	RA Inf	" "	Admin WO	Jun 72	"
102.	Capt	W.M.	McLaughlin	RAA	Night Operations Training Teams	OC Team 1	Apr 72	Bac-Lieu
103.	WO2	R.	Stewart	RA Inf	" "	Team Member	Jun 72	"
104.	WO2	J.	Clarke	RA Inf	" "	Team Member Team 1	Feb 72	"
105.	WO2	W.C.	Date	RA Inf	" "	" "	Dec 72	"
106.	WO2	K.J.	Prior	RA Inf	" "	" "	Nov 71	"
107.	WO1	D.E.	Wise	RAA	" "	" "	Aug 72	"
108.	WO2	B.	Elphick	RA Inf	" "	" "	Aug 72	"
109.	Capt	J.R.	Sherriff	RNZIR	" "	OC Team 2	Oct 72	Dong-Tam
110.	WO1	L.	Larsson BEM	RA Inf	" "	Team Member Team 2	Nov 71	"
111.	WO2	B.M.	Prosper MM	RA Inf	" "	" "	Nov 71	"
112.	WO2	B.	Morrow	RA Inf	" "	" "	Aug 72	"
113.	WO1	K.A.	Hall	RA Inf	" "	" "	Aug 72	"

.../12

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ANNEX B TO
AATTV REPORT OCT 71

REPORT BY LT COL P.T.F. GOWANS
SENIOR AATTV ADVISER IC AND MR1

Enemy Activities

1. Enemy activity remained at a low level during the reporting period, although the reduced contact level would be partially due to allied inactivity.
2. There was a mild high point, principally in attacks by fire, during the Presidential Election period.
3. The most significant enemy activity discovered during this month, was the North Vietnamese plan to prepare over the next three years a large base area in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces, to support long term defense plans for the Indo China Area. A separate report on this item was forwarded through HQ AATTV.

Friendly Activities

4. 3rd ARVN Division has been allocated AO's and operational roles with effect from 1 Nov 71. All new manoeuvre elements have been activated, and those units to be organic transferred, with the exception of 4th Bn/51st Regt, and 4th Bn/6th Regt. JGS has directed that 6,000 recruits and 790 deserters be allotted to the division during the period 1 Oct 71 to 1 Mar 72, to provide manpower for new units. However, it is anticipated that other units in MR1 will suffer as the manning priority passes to 3rd ARVN Division. JGS and MACV are still disputing the provision of equipment for this new formation, and temporary loans are being used as an interim equipment solution.
5. While 2nd ARVN Division has continued operations at a fairly moderate level, the remainder of I Corps units have reverted to a monsoon (static) posture. A significant item was the killing of 47 NVA in a single PF mechanical ambush.

Employment of AATTV Advisers

6. Redeployment or withdrawal of Australian advisers continued in accordance with general advisory reductions previously forecast. AATTV's long association with 1st Regt, 2nd Regt, 4th Regt and Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces was severed during this period. The final programme in Quang Tri Province consisted of a PSDF upgrading campaign by AATTV advisers from Team 155 (3rd ARVN Division). This campaign achieved considerable success and was a fitting conclusion to our effort in Quang Tri Province.
7. The employment of AATTV Advisers with the 3rd Division is shown in Appendix 4 to this Annex.
8. My principal task on the HQ USAAG I Corps Staff continues to be supervising the raising and training of the new medium tank regiment, 20th Tank Squadron. I also have additional responsibilities in the raising of 3rd ARVN Division.

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Contacts

9. A summary of significant contacts for units with AATTV Advisers is attached as Appendix 1 to this report. The small size of the Appendix reflects the low level of activity as well as the cessation of AATTV contact with most regiments of I Corps.

Miscellaneous Items

10. Typhoon Hester made 200,000 people homeless with 70 dead or missing. The typhoon came ashore near CHU LAI and caused considerable damage to aircraft and other assets of the withdrawing 23rd US Division. Aid on a national level is being directed to most provinces of MR 1.

11. After Typhoon Hester removed many of the roofs in the region, the normal monsoon re-asserted itself causing further hardship to the homeless.

Appendices

Appendix 1. Summary of Significant Contacts for Units with AATTV Advisers.

2nd ARVN Division

Appendix 2. Report by Capt R.K. McDermott, Adviser 5th ARVN Regt.

Appendix 3. Report by WO2 K.D. Charlton, Sensor Adviser.

3rd ARVN Division

Appendix 4. Report by Maj R.B.M. Donaldson, G3 (Ops) Adviser, 3rd Division.

1st Armd Bde

Appendix 5. Report by Capt F.A. Roberts, G3 Trg Adviser, 1st Armd Bde.

Appendix 6. Report by WO2 W.J. Noble and WO2 G. Millington, 20th Tank Sqn.

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Appendix 7. End of Tour Report by WO1 B.C. Addington, ADSA Phu Thu District.

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX B TO
AATTV REPORT OCT 71

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS
FOR UNITS WITH AATTV ADVISERS

1. At 270970H near BS803213, 1st Bn/4th Regt found and destroyed 2 huts and 2,000 kgs of rice.
2. At 271205H near BS803316, 4th Regt LRRP contacted an enemy force. 8 enemy were KIA and 1 AK47 captured.
3. At 282215H near BS808318, 1st Bn/4th Regt contacted an enemy force. 5 enemy were KIA, 1 carbine, 5 field packs, 15 grenades captured.
4. At 291000H near YD010596, 4th Bn/54th Regt searching, found and destroyed 20 bunkers and captured 400 metres of wire, 20 rds of 82mm mortar ammo, 30 rds of B40 ammo, 1 M60 MG.
5. At 300900H near YD345397, 3rd Bn/1st Regt mechanically ambushed an enemy force. 3 enemy were KIA and 1 AK47, 5 rds B40, 60 kgs of rice and 100 rds AK47 ammo captured.
6. At 271120H near AT902313, 3rd Bn/5th Regt found 9 bodies killed by arty and 100 bunkers.
7. At 031050H near YD 008593, 3rd Bn/54th Regt found 7 bodies killed by air, 2 AK47s, 1 B40 launcher captured.
8. At 051400H near BS 764554, 4th Bn/4th Regt contacted an enemy force, killing 4 and capturing 1 AK47.
9. At 060500H near BS 728625, 4th Bn/4th Regt raided an enemy force. 6 enemy were KIA and 16 VC suspects, 1 carbine, 1 AK47 and 1 M16 captured.
10. At 060435H near BS 800340, 3rd Bn/4th Regt raided an enemy force. 4 enemy were KIA and 1 AK47, 17 grenades captured.
11. At 061250H near YD 002585, 5th Bn/2nd Regt contacted an enemy force. 2 enemy were KIA, and 1 friendly KIA and 1 WIA.
12. At 061210H near YD 280430, 3rd Bn/1st Regt detonated a booby trap, wounding 4.
13. At 060800H near BS 929264, 3rd Bn/4th Regt captured 8 VC.
14. At 081050H near XD 999577, 5th Bn/2nd Regt contacted an enemy. 1 friendly was KIA and 2 WIA. 3 enemy were KIA and 5 field packs, 5 grenades and 1x60mm mortar rd captured. 6 huts were destroyed.

.../15. At 081400H

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15. At 081400H at the same location, the same unit contacted an enemy force, killing 4 enemy and capturing 1x60mm mortar, 25x60mm rds, 10 kgs of polished rice.
16. At 082100H near AT 957208, 5th Regt Recce Coy ambushed an enemy force. 5 enemy were killed and 1 BAR, 1 AK47 captured.
17. At 092145H near AT 908194, 2nd Bn/5th Regt ambushed an enemy force killing 5, and capturing 2 AK47s.
18. At 140700H near AT 855245, 2nd Bn/5th Regt contacted an enemy force. 5 enemy were KIA, 2 AK47's captured.
19. At 141100H near BS 804305, 4th Regt Recce Coy searching, contacted an enemy force. 5 enemy were KIA, 1 MG, 10 grenades, 5 field packs were captured and 2 tunnels destroyed.
20. At 141040H near YD 582016, 4th Bn/3rd Regt found 7 bodies killed by ARA, 2 AK47, 1 M16, 5 pairs of sandals, 5 field packs.
21. At 171035H near BS 625534, 4th Bn. 4th Regt contacted an enemy force. 6 enemy were KIA, and 1 AK47, 1 M16, 1 carbine, 10 grenades and 4 field packs captured.
22. At 181930H near BS 726456, 2nd Bn/4th Regt ambushed an enemy force. 1 friendly was WIA, and 4 enemy were KIA.
23. At 231625H near BT 187156, 1st Bn/5th Regt mechanically ambushed an enemy force. 5 enemy were KIA, and 1 BAR, 1 AK47 and 7 grenades captured.
24. At 281750H near BT 179114, 1st Bn/5th Regt contacted an enemy force. 4 enemy were KIA and 1 AK47 captured.
25. At 291430H near BT 189115, 1st Bn/5th Regt contacted an enemy force. 1 friendly was WIA, and 3 enemy KIA with 1 AK47 captured.

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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX B TO
AATTV REPORT OCT 71

REPORT BY CAPT M.K. McDERMOTT
ADVISED 5TH ARVN REGT

General

1. The major activity this month was again a change in the role of the adviser with the withdrawal of US assets. The operation which ended 14 Oct 71 was the final operation in the official campaign season. Establishing a training cycle has been the major new change to the 5th ARVN Regt.

Major Activities

2. 16 Oct 71 was the final day for ARVN use of US air assets and any joint operations between USA and ARVN. This has brought about a change in the role of the adviser for it has eliminated his task of controlling all the various types of US air and fire support.

3. Advisers. I am at present (from 16 Oct 71) advising G-3 on all matters of operations and training and G-2 on intelligence operations and keeping a liaison between 5th ARVN and provincial units between which there is a gap.

4. Since the end of Operation DC025/504/C in the G-3 section major changes have been made in the organisation of the Regimental TOC and the location of the G-3 and G-2 staff sections.

- a. TOC was changed from the larger rambling operations centre which housed a larger USA operations centre staff into a compact three (3) room operations centre, interconnected with voice communication.
- b. The G-3 and G-2 staff sections were not physically connected to the TOC when back at Hawk Hill so they have now developed more interest and closer liaison.

5. DC 025/504/C was the final campaign of the campaign season. The 5th Regt commander has maintained the same force out in the field and has not withdrawn to the coastal plain to wait out the rainy season.

The reasons for this are:

- a. The commander believes that his responsibility is to pacify the mountain region now known as the combat and consolidation zone, and the RF/PF will operate on the coastal plain.
- b. The withdrawal of US troops to the protection of Chu Lai has meant less troops in the 5th Regt AO.

6. The establishment of a training cycle has been a major event in the 5th ARVN Regt. In the past the only training cycle was at corps and divisional level, conducted at Dong Da and Quang Ngai training centres.

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5. The training is done at coy level as the coys are rotated from the field.

The programme includes:

- a. Basic wpns training.
- b. Operations training at platoon and coy level.
- c. Medical training.
- d. Voice procedure (down to NCO level).
- e. Control of air support (to NCO level).
(This is now possible with the advent of VNAF air support)
- f. Physical training - Consists of warm up, exercise, light run and obstacle course.
- g. Visiting lecturers - from Corps and Division, lecturers are brought to give general interest and instruction. Lectures on new pieces of equipment. e.g. individual detection devices.

6. Civic action. 5th Regt has undertaken a programme of building and reconstruction of soldier family housing, also a setting aside of a building for a dependants primary school. (The civic action programme is to be completed by Jan 72 but the typhoon may have set it back by up to 6 months as much of the equipment and materials will be used to repair the destroyed houses.

7. Valorous Unit Citation. On the request of Col Smith, Comd 198th Infantry Brigade, I have been documenting an action my battalion, 3rd battalion, was involved in from 24 Aug - 5 Sep 71. Documentation involved a narrative, record of events, results (KIA, WIA etc), maps, sketches. This will be used in a citation for a Valorous Unit Award for all involved (3rd battalion and part of 5th Recon Coy). I will be the witness for the citation.

Conclusion

8. Operations continue at a slow rate and they will continue throughout the campaign season. The training programme is being observed and some suggestions made are being accepted occasionally. (Both the Regt Comd and G-3 will listen to advice, and on some occasions use it). My activities will continue in G-3, orientated mainly towards training, in place at all FSB and at Hawk Hill.

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX B TO
AATTV REPORT OCT 71

REPORT BY WO2 K.D. CHARLTON
SENSOR ADVISER 2ND ARVN DIV

General

1. This report contains a summary of the activities of the 2D(ARVN) Inf Div, Electronic Combat Detachment (ECD) for the period 25 Sep - 22 Oct 1971.
2. The ECD advisory team continues to have a strength of one Capt (US), one WO2 (AATTV) and one Sgt (US).
3. The 2D (ARVN) Inf Div ECD HQ remains at Bau Trai, however it is anticipated a move will be made, in the near future, to Chu Lai and occupy an area to be vacated by the 23 D (US) Inf Div Target Mission Force (TMF).

Active Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS)

4. At the time of reporting the 2D (ARVN) Inf Div ECD have a total of 163 various sensor devices deployed in 42 strings.

Monitoring Sites

5. The 2D (ARVN) Inf Div ECD, staff five monitoring sites as follows:

a. BAU TRAI - 2D DIV	08 STRINGS
b. FSB BINH MINH - 4th REGT	13 STRINGS
c. FSB MO - DUC - 4th REGT	10 STRINGS
d. FSB WEST - 5th REGT	07 STRINGS
e. FSB HOANG OANH - 6th REGT	04 STRINGS

Line Sensors

6. 16 line sensors are operational at the following locations:

a. FSB MO - DUC - 4th REGT	04 Balanced Pressure Systems (BPS)
b. FSB ARTILLERY HILL - 6th REGT	09 BPS
c. FSB BINH MINH - 4th REGT	04 Multi-purpose Concealed Intrusion Detectors (MCID)

A total of ten line sensors of the BPS type were transferred from the 23 D (US) Inf Div on 21 October however as yet it is not known where they will be deployed.

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

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Summary of Activations

7. During the reporting period a total of 123 activations were recorded at the five monitoring sites. These activations resulted in 1102 rounds of artillery being fired. It is significant to note that there is an increase in the number of CVT rounds being fired as a result of sensor activations.

Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA)

8. BDA for the period again was negative and it is anticipated it will remain negative for some time yet due to the ever decreasing number of aircraft available to conduct visual reconnaissance (VR).

Influence on Operations

9. Despite a stalemate period during the Presidential elections, the number of operations conducted showed an increase over the previous reporting period. Battery changes were made, new devices were deployed and some strings showing little or no activations were redeployed to new areas.

10. It is significant to note that the ECD commander is now making much more detailed analysis of sensor activations with a view to providing information on enemy movements to units in the field and redeploying devices to more fruitful areas.

11. Implant teams have been successfully fitted into night activities conducted by the 4th Regiment and have deployed devices successfully under cover of darkness.

12. One set of the Radio Firing Device has been deployed to 4th Regiment. Initial reports have shown average success with the device.

13. Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detectors, (PSID), have been issued to each of the regiments (52 to each) but are not yet operational due to the non-availability of batteries from ARVN supply.

Operational Effectiveness Report

14. During the period 02 Oct to 07 Oct 71 a survey was conducted to ascertain, more fully, the effectiveness of the 2D (ARVN) Inf Div sensor program. A team comprising of WO2 K.D. Charlton (ECD Advisor) and Sgt R.A. Causey, (US Artillery Advisor) visited a number of the monitoring sites.

15. The purpose of the survey was to make recommendations, with a view to upgrading standards, where necessary, before 1 November when the UGS program will be completely Vietnamised.

16. A copy of the report submitted to the Senior Advisor, 2D (ARVN) Inf Div is attached as enclosure 1 to this report.

.../17.

USARV Sensor Management Conference

17. This conference was held at Long Binh of 15 September. Points effecting the 2D (ARVN) Inf Div ECD are:

- a. ARVN JGS Special Operations Centre to assume management responsibility for logistics and reports not later than 1 November 1971.
- b. Authorised transfer of one Sensor Analogue Relay System from 23D (US) Inf Div to 2D (ARVN) Inf Div. This was completed on 20th October 1971.
- c. ECD Advisors at division level not required, after 31 December 1971.

Logistics

18. The logistic problem has been largely overcome. All outstanding requisitions have or are being met. As the devices are received preplanned operations are put into effect as soon as possible to deploy them.

Conclusion

19. Commanders are now more aware of the potential of UGS and are taking them into consideration more when planning operations. It is most heartening to note that the 2D (ARVN) Inf Sensor Program has shown a marked upgrading of both devices deployed and new standards set. It is understood now that the 2D (ARVN) Inf Div, ECD have more UGS deployed over a wider area than the 1st (ARVN) Inf Div.

.../Enclosure

REPORT ON UNATTENDED GROUND SENSOR OPERATIONS-
2D (ARVN) INF DIV

General

1. The purpose of this report is to comment, generally, on Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) operations in 2D (ARVN) Inf Div with a view of improving overall efficiency.

2. Comments offered are not specific to any one monitoring site, but generally reflect the operational concepts and standards of the 2D (ARVN) Electronic Combat Detachment (ECD).

Monitoring Sites

3. The ECD staff five monitoring sites as follows:

a.	FSB BINH MINH	- 4th REGT	9 strings	30 devices
b.	FSB MO DUC	- 4th REGT	10 strings	36 devices
c.	FSB HOANG OANH	- 6th REGT	4 strings	16 devices
d.	FSB WEST	- 6th REGT	7 strings	23 devices
e.	BAU TRAI	- 2D DIV	6 strings	26 devices

Sensor Roles

4. UGS may be employed in three roles, not bound by offensive or defensive considerations nor by specific operational environments as follows:

- a. Target Surveillance
- b. Target Acquisition
- c. Alerting or Warning

5. Target acquisition, at the present time, is the prime role for UGS in 2D Div. This in turn must result in the closest co-operation between sensor monitor operator and the Fire Direction Centre (FDC).

6. The sensor monitor operator must be located in the FDC in order to overcome the time lag from time of requesting fire until the round is in the air.

7. In all cases observed, the time from requesting fire until the round was in the air varied from a minimum of 4 minutes to a maximum of 9 minutes. Minimum time was achieved once only in eight activations.

.../8.

8. Artillery concentrations have been registered in the vicinity of all sensor strings. The concentrations vary from between 200 metres and 400 metres from the sensor strings. In all cases more than one concentration has been registered.

9. At all monitoring sites there appears to be a fair amount of guess-work in determining the number of people traversing the string and when the artillery should fire. Invariably each time a sensor string is activated the number of personnel detected is either ten or twenty.

Suggested Solution

10. Once having achieved the first step of having the sensor monitor operator located within the FDC, a simple procedure, described below, could be adopted:

- a. Large scale sketch map (1:5000) be produced for each sensor string at the monitor site. This allows the sensor monitor operator to immediately relate the sensor device to the terrain.
- b. By timing from when the first device in the string activates and the second string and so on the sensor monitor operator can plot the movement of the personnel detected. Then by applying a simple formula of time taken for distance travelled, (already knowing the distance between devices as shown on the large scale map), he can reasonably determine the time the personnel detected will arrive in the vicinity of the artillery concentration point.
- c. Once the first device in the string activates a warning order should be issued to the guns in order to have them loaded and laid ready for fire. Working closely with the FDC officer the time of the detected personnel arriving at the artillery concentration point can be predicted.
- d. Allowing for time of flight, fire orders can be given to the gun so that the rounds arrive at the artillery concentration point at the same time as the detected personnel. Thereby having a better kill rate.
- e. The guns, when not engaged on other targets should be loaded and laid on sensor string concentrations.
- f. A secondary use for the large scale map, and equally important is that it allows the sensor team to know exactly where the devices are in the ground when it is time for battery changes or redeployment of the devices.

Bomb Damage Assessment

11. At no time has there been BDA as a result of sensor activations. Therefore it has never really been determined in 2D Div how effective UGS are proving.

.../12.

UGS in the Surveillance Role

12. The information gained from UGS in the surveillance role allows for better planning of night activities. Ambushes, either manual or mechanical can be located in areas where contact with the enemy is more likely.

13. Radio Firing Devices (RFD) can be employed more effectively. The RFD consists of one transmitter and four receivers to a set. Each receiver can detonate up to ten claymores in a string. At present the ECD is in receipt of two of the 2D Div authorized five sets.

14. In addition to providing information for the planning of ambushes, real time information can be given to the ambush commander in relation to size and spacing of enemy force.

15. The advantages of UGS in the surveillance role are summarized below:

- a. Expensive devices not likely to be destroyed by artillery.
- b. Provides better information for planning of night activities.
- c. BDA is immediate at the ambush site when manual ambushes are deployed.
- d. Enemy movement patterns are established in particular areas.

Effective Use of UGS

16. Because of the shortage of equipment there is a need for more emphasis to be given to analysing sensor string activations with a view of redeploying, to more fruitful areas, those strings which are receiving no activations or very few activations.

Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detectors (PSID)

17. The authorization for PSIDs per Division is 180 sets plus 5 sets per Ranger Company. At the present time the ECD has received 168 sets. At this stage it is not known when classes will be conducted.

Familiarization Classes

18. There is a need to conduct familiarization classes to allow more commanders to become aware of the potential of UGS.

Conclusion

19. All the points raised in this report have been discussed with the ECD Commander, however progress appears to be slow.

REPORT BY MAJ R.B.M. DONALDSON
ASSISTANT G3 OPS ADVISER - 3RD ARVN DIVISION

General

1. I assumed duty as acting G-3 Adviser on 4 Oct 71. The US G-3 arrived 19 Oct 71 and I assumed the appointment of Asst G-3 Ops Adviser.

Employments

- | | | |
|----|--------------------|---|
| 2. | Maj R.B. DONALDSON | Asst G-3 Ops Adviser, 3rd ARVN Div |
| | WO2 N.G. WALTERS | Asst G-4 Adviser, 3rd ARVN Div |
| | WO2 G.C. JENKINS | Temporarily TOC Offr, 3rd ARVN Div |
| | WO2 I.S. McPHAIL | Temporarily TOC Offr, 3rd ARVN Div |
| | WO2 R.J. HUNNISETT | Asst Electronic Combat Adviser, 3rd ARVN Div. |

Enemy Activity

3. There has been little significant enemy activity in the past month in Quang Tri Province in the reported period. The recent floods in and around Hanoi have obviously affected the enemy effort.
4. The enemy continues his road building program in the recon zone in the North West of the Province from the DMZ. This program is being continually interdicted by LORAN strikes and US arty fire.
5. Apart from the area mentioned above the other areas of activity are:
- a. North Eastern portion of the Southern half of the DMZ (Sources of intelligence - FACs, Sensors, Integrated Optical System (IOS), Ground Obs).
 - b. Along the Tach Hon river and adjacent track systems in the Southern portion of the Div AO.
6. There have been instances of mines and booby traps throughout the province and 5 water mines have been found in the Cua Viet by water patrols. There was only one rocketing incident onto FSB CARROL on 21 Oct 71 commencing 1515 hrs firing a total of five 122 mm rounds.
7. The enemy continues to use AO boundaries for infiltration and despite advice the ARVN are reluctant to change boundaries and conduct operations in these areas.
8. On the evening 18/19 Oct 71, 20 VC, dressed as marines entered the RF/PF compound near Truc Khe bridge (YD 224660) resulting in 4 VC KIA, and friendly 8 KIA, 12 WIA. Charges were placed on the bridge but not detonated.

.../9.

Vietnamisation

9. The following US Forces withdrew from Quang Tri by 1 Nov 71 (except for small liaison teams):

- a. 101st Abn Div (except elements in Recon Zone) to Camp EAGLE.
- b. 3/5 Cav to US.
- c. 8/4 Arty Bn to Phu Bai.
- d. FACs from Quang Tri strip to Phu Bai.
- e. Radars from DMZ fire bases.

10. Two btys of 1/39 Arty Bn have replaced the three heavy gun btys of 8/4 Arty Bn. These two btys are to be phased out when the ARVN complete 175 mm training in the near future.

11. Comments:

- a. VNAF are being forced to step up their program in order to provide quick air reaction in this area.
- b. The US withdrawal is also forcing the ARVN to streamline their logistic media, as US supplies are being drastically reduced.

Activation 3rd ARVN Div

12. Activation orders for the formation of 3rd ARVN Div to be effective 1 Oct 71 were received by ARVN 8 Oct 71. An activation ceremony was conducted at 0830 hrs 20 Oct 71 at Quang Tri combat base with the Commanding General, BG GIAI addressing the assembled troops outside his new TOC. It was an impressive ceremony, which I was proud to attend.

13. Basically the 1st ARVN Div Fwd TOC (at Quang Tri Combat Base) became the nucleus for the new division and those formations and units North of the Tach Hon river became either part of or op con to 3rd ARVN Div.

14. Comments:

- a. Reaction to activation dates programmed appears to be slow. Perhaps the programmed dates are too ambitious.
- b. Materiel (in a very broad sense) and funds are short.
- c. US logistic support is still required to operate Quang Tri airstrip effectively.
- d. AO's for both 1st ARVN Div and 3rd ARVN Div have not been really resolved but should be shortly.
- e. Both 147 and 369 VN Marine Bdes are to remain in 3rd ARVN Div AO until 3/56 and 3/57 Regts are operationally effective.

.../ Conclusion

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 3 -

Conclusion

15. The morale of the newly formed division appears to be high and the leadership in most cases appears to be good.

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

REPORT BY CAPT F.A. ROBERTS
TRAINING ADVISER 1 ARMD BDE ARVN

General

1. 1 Armd Bde headquarters has remained located at DANANG subsequent to Operation LAM SON 810 and is in effect a HQ in reserve since it has now no direct control over any squadron:
 - a. 11 Cav was designated as 3 ARVN Division's organic cavalry unit.
 - b. 17 Cav now under operational command of 1 Special Bde.
 - c. 20 Cav still the direct responsibility of HQ I Corps until completion of training.
2. With the turnover of ROKMC AO's to 1 Special Bde it is most likely that 17 Cav will become increasingly involved in the QUANG NAM area.
3. 1 Armd Bde Commander has three other separate command responsibilities, 1 Special Bde, DANANG Special Sector, DANANG Rocket Belt Security, and hence has left 1 Armd Bde Headquarters largely to the passive control of the Chief of Staff.
4. The month of October has been without single significance other than occasional liaison visits to 20 Cav at QUANG TRI.

Major Duties

5. In the absence of the SA, I completed the after action report for LAM SON 810 and also the quarterly effectiveness report (SEER). Both were accepted by HQ I Corps.
6. I have accompanied the SA on several visits to the 20 Cav for which, due to his expert tank knowledge, he has been given a charter of technical monitoring on behalf of HQ I Corps.
7. Incidental discussion has been introduced into VN G3 in the weaknesses evident on LAM SON 810, however no attempt has been made by the staff to compile training directives to cause programmes to remedy these deficiencies.

Advance Intentions

8. A very limited activity is forecast for November, with the SA heavily involved in assessment of 20 Cav and programming of staff officers through a three day familiarization course for 1 Armd Bde HQ. My function in these matters is limited due to a lack of technical expertise on what will be essentially D/S and gunnery training on the M48A3.
9. The situation is essentially one where there is only enough activity to involve two officers, while the rest of the Bde Advisory Team are surplus and must be employed on vehicle and equipment maintenance programmes.

REPORT BY WO2 W.J. NOBLE/WO2 G.L. MILLINGTON
20TH TANK SQN TANK TRAINING TEAM

1. The general aims of the unit for the period under review were continuation of the training programme to convert the Sqn to the M48A3 tank.
2. The method used was application of the programme covering driving, gunnery and communications by a cadre of Vietnamese Armour School personnel and members of the Tank Training Team.
3. In my opinion, the training was hampered initially by shortages in certain equipments, particularly 50 cal and M73 machine guns, radios and crew head sets. The situation has improved over the period, but spare parts for the above-mentioned equipments are still in short supply.
4. There have been no specific highlights during this period.
5. It is not possible, at this time, to give an overall assessment of the standard of training of the unit. The morale of the junior members of the squadron has been adversely affected by their separation from their families and the poor standard of the squadron living area.
6. The major weakness in the programme has been the low level of assimilation by a number of squadron personnel. This is due to the fact that the course is primarily one of familiarization and not detailed instruction. More time allocated to instruction is the only solution.
7. To help overcome these weaknesses further training has commenced for all members of the squadron concentrating on points where major difficulty has been experienced. Major weaknesses have been in use of rangefinder equipment, gunnery control equipment and adjustment of machine guns and application of gunnery techniques.
8. Major strong points appear to be in the headquarters command group, but at this time no detailed opinion can be given on the sub-units until individual training has been completed.
9. Major duties for the period were assistance and liaison with the Vietnamese training personnel, and assisting in conduct of range firing.
10. Advance intentions are to assist in conduct of range firing, and assisting in overcoming any other weaknesses which may develop during training.

END OF TOUR REPORT 41843 WO1 B.C. ADDINGTON
ADSA PHU THU DISTRICT

General

1. On 5 Aug 70 I arrived in country and three days later took up my assignment as ADSA Phu Thu District, Thua Thien Province MR1.

Tasks

2. a. Defences: The defences as far as the district team and co-located MATT I-87 were almost non-existent and this state of affairs became first priority. The erection of a bunker followed by the building of a 3' thick wall 4' 6" high of PSP and sand, corrected that situation.
- b. Operations: It was customary to accompany the RF/PF on any major operation often at short notice.
- c. Liaison: It became evident early in the period that a liaison net had to be established in order to obtain supplies of sand bags and PSP. This was established through the liaison of 101st Air-Borne Div and later by friendly relations with the US Army EOD Team located at Phu Bai.
- d. HES Data: It was the responsibility of the Team to obtain the Hamlet Evaluation Data, normally at hamlet level, which meant visiting each of the 53 hamlets contained in the seven villages of the district. The otherwise inaccessible village of Phu Luong had to be walked on each occasion.
- e. Maintenance: The maintenance of defective generators and vehicles was both time consuming and frustrating. To quote two instances, firstly a jeep brought out of repair, ran for 3 miles when it broke down and two 10 KW generators transported from Hue to district HQ on the same day, failed to function.
- f. Flood Relief ; During the monsoons from October 70 to February 71, the district was subject to severe flooding, which required the distribution of food stuffs and the transfer on one occasion, of 600 people to higher land.

Disadvantages

3. a. The supply of spare parts for vehicles materials were non-existent and the supply was dependent upon liaison with the neighbouring district of Huong Thuy and American Units, as mentioned in para 1 sub para c, above.

.../b.

- b. The Team although issued a Boston whaler boat, could not obtain a replacement motor after the original blew up after 20 minutes running, after its being repaired at the SM & DLC.
- c. Liaison Teams and Mats: There were some instances where the Liaison Team of 101st Air-Borne Div and the co-located MAT Team received replacement personnel from other areas where they were unacceptable for disciplinary reasons or attitude. Some of these people openly voiced their Anti-Vietnamese feelings and their attitude to the task in hand. Although there was prompt corrective action taken, there were areas of discord, even among themselves, which resulted as a last resort a further transfer to another team.
- d. Interpreters: Generally we received a poor class of interpreter, they were either lazy, not interested in the job or disliked their assignment to the District, in all, five were re-assigned from Phu Thu. The reasons for re-assignment ranged from disobedience, deliberate bad translations to deliberately failing to board a medevac helicopter, at night after a RF Coy had been in contact and sustained casualties.
- e. District Chief 1: The former District Chief Major Hau, although a likeable person and a distinguished officer was quite unsuited to the role of District Chief. He showed no interest in the welfare of the people or the civil administration. His prime interests appeared to be gambling, women and parties. He rarely could be found at District HQ at night and when he was there it was to gamble or to entertain a lady. This area was corrected on 7 Apr 71, but unfortunately his attitude reflected adversely on the RF/PF soldiers and the tasks in hand.

Advantages

- 4. a. District Chief 2: On 7 Apr 71, Major Dung was appointed District Chief and a transformation took place in a short space of time. The RF/PF soldiers took on a new bearing and attitude after having been visited, unit by unit by Major Dung. He attended the Village Council meetings and visited each hamlet in turn, some in which he spent the night. To visit some of these hamlets entailed the use of a sampan and then walk. On these visits he was accompanied by the DSA/ADSA with whom he freely discussed the problems of the people, and from whom he asked advice or assistance.
- b. Liaison with US Units: Without the good friendships established between the Team and the neighbouring district of Huong Thuy and elements of American Units, the functions of the Team would have been severely curtailed. Here I must add that Pacific Architects and Engineers also played a part with advice and material assistance. The services rendered ranged from supply of otherwise unobtainable barrier materials, lumber for bridges, and vehicle spares such as wheel bearings.

.../5.

Lessons Learnt

5. a. Courtesy: It appears to me that the Vietnamese instinctively know your reaction to them, like or dislike and I found a smile and nod of the head does much for rapport.
- b. A knowledge of the language and customs is a must. The language particularly where there is an interpreter involved and the customs so that one does not offend.
- c. Know the People: The people of my district were hospitable to a fault and by accepting their hospitality, the barriers were down and made communication easier on the next visit. Some of these visits entailed a stomach upset, and a depleted cigarette supply but it was well worth while.
- d. Children: The attitudes of the elders may be gauged by that of the children. The friendly wave of the hand when travelling and a conversation when stationary resulted in a particularly good relationship.
- e. Interpreters: I consider it to be unwise to live side by side with the average interpreter. "Familiarity breeds contempt" could not be truer in that situation. Whilst certainly treat them as equals set a space aside for them i.e. adjoining room or separate building.

Was I Equipped for the Task?

6. In the main I think the answer would be "yes" with reservations. Physically and mentally the task suited me, physically because of my country upbringing where I learnt to use tools, shovels etc without effort and a certain bit of "know how" when it came to a manual task. Mentally, I wanted to be on the Team and knew that the task ahead would often be difficult; with a result "tolerance".

 The week spent at the DSA course in Saigon equipped me for HES and pacification programmes.

 The area in which I had to make a rapid adjustment was in that of the language, as I did the language and orientation course early in 1970, followed by JTC and then a period of awaiting assignment and I found that I fell short in that field and had to assert myself to learn anew. The programme of training has since been reversed.

.../7.

Suggestions for Advisors in Similar Roles

7. (1) Know the language and customs.
- (2) Be courteous.
- (3) Mix with the people.
- (4) Show an interest in their daily tasks and they will take an interest in what you are doing.
- (5) Don't lose your temper under any circumstances.
- (6) Be ever watchful of your interpreter.

Conclusion

8. On 26 Sep 71, a combined Adviser/Vietnamese farewell party was held, attended by General Bowen US Army, Mr Lazar, Dep Cords and Lt Col Gowans, Senior AATTV Advisor MR1. The party was a great success and two days later the Team vacated Phu Thu District, with feelings of friendship on both sides.

REPORT BY CAPT J.E. WIELAND
SENIOR AUSTRALIAN ADVISER MR11

Current Situation

1. Since last reporting, training has progressed as normal. The state of the Teams logistic and administrative support has reached a satisfactory standard. The supply of a new ¼ton truck from VN resources has assisted considerably in this field. The Teams compound defensive works are now completed, except for a communication trench system and additional wiring, both projects being currently worked on.

Training Progress

2. Since the last report the following courses have graduated:

9/71 - 33 students - 28 passed

10/71 - 28 students - 22 passed

11/71 - 30 students - 28 passed

3. Courses 12/71 with 28 students and 13/71 with 27 students are currently in training. Total number of students trained to date is 328 of whom 43 have failed the course.

4. During 26 - 27 Oct a special two day course was conducted for district staff. This was aimed at training district cadres capable of supervising in-place training of PF platoons. A total of 37 students attended. It is proposed at this time to conduct a further two of these courses on 9 - 10 Nov and 11 - 12 Nov with the goal being to train an additional 100 students as district cadres.

Election Period (Presidential)

5. Although considerable increase in enemy activity was anticipated during this period, the Province was subjected to little more than isolated cases of terrorism.

Enemy Activity

6. Enemy activity has remained at a fairly steady level throughout the province, with his main emphasis being on infiltration of populated areas, and isolated attacks on bridges and PF outposts. Recent reports of a squad of local guerrillas wearing civilian or PF uniform operating by day in our local training area, have been partly confirmed by a mining incident on Monday morning 18 Oct 71. This occurred in one of the range areas and resulted in 2 PF recruit trainees receiving severe leg wounds.

.../7.

Future Intentions

7. A contingency plan for the handover of NOTT function to a combined US/VN team has been arranged. This will not be put into operation completely until a definite decision on the composition of the residual force has been received.

Evaluation of PF Platoons, Binh Dinh Province

8. Attached as Appx 1 is a report on the evaluation of PF Platoons in Binh Dinh Province conducted during the period 13-27 Sep 71.

Appendices:

Appendix 1 - Evaluation of PF Platoons, Binh Dinh Province.

FINAL REPORT ON EVALUATION OF PF PLATOONS
BINH DINH PROVINCE

The Evaluation and its Aim

1. During the period 13-27 Sep 71 a halt to training occurred and an evaluation phase was conducted. The aim of this evaluation was twofold; firstly to determine, by a series of questioning and practical testing of the platoon leader, whether he has absorbed the content of the course. Secondly, by means of a similar testing system, individual soldiers were used to determine whether the training is being passed on by the platoon leader. During the evaluation, additional points were discovered which will be mentioned later during this report.

Format of the Evaluation

2. The evaluation was conducted by three teams, each of three men deployed throughout Binh Dinh Province. After initial liaison with the District Chief and District Senior Advisor, the teams visited PF Platoons unannounced. In some cases, because prior security arrangements were necessary, platoons had to be forewarned. This was done at the last possible moment. Upon arrival at a platoon the evaluation team leader would conduct questioning and practical testing of the platoon leader. Whilst this was occurring, his two assistants would conduct a similar testing system with 2 to 4 individual soldiers, selected by the evaluation team at random from the platoon. Full details of results of these tests are attached to this report for perusal as required.

Points Revealed

3. In accordance with the original aim of the evaluation the following two main points were revealed:

- a. In the majority of the cases the platoon leaders displayed that they have in fact absorbed the content of the course.
- b. Testing of the individual soldiers reveals that in the majority of cases the platoon leaders are not passing their knowledge on to their platoons. This in fact means that the programme is ceasing when the platoon leader graduates from the course. Several contributing factors may be the cause for this, ranging from:
 - (1) Lack of effective present for duty strength.
 - (2) Inadequate logistic backing.
 - (3) Lack of training time due to daily operational commitments.

.../3b (4)

- (4) Lack of genuine interest and close supervision by higher authority.

The final point mentioned is often very evident.

Problem Areas Discovered

4. Throughout the course of the evaluation several problem areas, which do not relate specifically to the aim of the evaluation, were isolated. These will now be discussed in turn:

- a. Platoon Strength: The average assigned strength of the platoons was 29 all ranks. In the majority of cases this figure was never present for duty at the time of the visit. In some instances the present for duty strength was as low as 4 soldiers, excluding the platoon leaders and deputy leader. In one particular case a soldier from a platoon volunteered the information that members of his platoon held permanent jobs elsewhere.
- b. Pay and Allowances: Some platoon leaders complained of problems in acquiring their pay and entitled allowances on time. It is not intended to disclose the names of the platoon leaders or their platoon designations. However, the isolated cases of the complaint indicated that it is a problem province wide.
- c. Logistics: Logistical backing especially in the form of ammunition is lacking in most areas. The average platoon has only half the entitled basic load of grenades and few platoons can produce the revised basic load of 9 claymore mines. Platoon leaders, claim that requests for resupply through sub sectors takes too long to be effective. Some platoons also require urgent support in the form of sand bags, wire and engineer stakes.
- d. Enemy Penetration: This is a subject which most platoon leaders prefer not to discuss. However a few platoon leaders, (under favourable conditions, i.e. strict confidence) were prepared to talk about the problem. From these conversations it appears that a certain degree of enemy penetration of PF ranks exists.
- e. Motivation: This is an area where it is difficult to base an opinion on any factual observation during the evaluation. It is more a case of the impression gained from dealing with the soldiers during the tour. Although varying standards were encountered, the general impression arrived at, is one of a lack of genuine desire to get on with the job. If this is the situation existing the factors contributing to it could be any or all of the following:
 - (1) Inadequate pay conditions.
 - (2) Inadequate logistical support.
 - (3) Lack of interest and control by higher authority.

,.../4e (4)

- (4) Inadequate family housing conditions.
- (5) Fear of reprisals by local enemy forces.
- (6) Enemy accommodation within the unit.
- (7) Lack of a meaningful psy war programme.

Concerning the last point mentioned, although most platoon leaders claim that they receive psy war training for their platoons, it usually becomes evident during further questioning that there is no regular form of this training.

Mechanical Ambushing

5. The concept of mechanical ambushing is sound and will produce good results, but only if used correctly, intelligently and in conjunction with normal conventional ambushing. Any deviation from proper usage of this weapon is going to produce lesser results and possible casualties to friendly forces and civilians. The mechanical ambush, in itself, is not the answer to all the problems. However it is evident among many platoons that the popular trend is one of hiding behind a mechanical ambush. Proper tactical employment of this weapon to achieve best results does not seem to be occurring in many cases. As a result of this observation an additional two hours of instruction during future courses will be allocated to tactical employment of mechanical claymores.

Ambushing

6. Another point which became evident during evaluation was the fact that most PF night ambushes rarely exceed squad strength. To date the programme of instruction has dealt with principles and techniques of platoon sized ambushing. Although basic principles will not alter, there is a requirement to vary techniques slightly when dealing with a different sized force. Therefore for future courses, the existing programme will continue, with an additional emphasis being placed on the techniques to be employed when using a squad sized force. At present the platoons appear to have little knowledge of how to achieve flank and rear security is a squad sized ambush.

Final Recommendations

7. The following final recommendations for improvement of the present standards are offered:
- a. That a system of close supervision of PF platoons in training, and performance of their mission, be established.
 - b. Inadequacies in logistic support be rectified.
 - c. An effective, continuous programme of psy war training be implemented.
 - d. Problem areas in pay and allowances be investigated and rectified.

.../8.

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

- 4 -

Conclusion

8. It is believed that the evaluation tour has been fruitful. It has disclosed current problem areas and has allowed the team who are responsible for training, to see these problems in their home environment. It has also shown some of the difficulties under which a PF platoon operates. Armed with this information the team is now able to adjust the programme of instruction where necessary and hopefully produce better results. However, unless proper supervision is maintained to ensure the platoon leader who graduates from the course conducts in-place training, the whole programme is virtually lost.

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

REPORT BY MAJ R.V. MUSGROVE
RF/PF ADVISER - PHUOC TUY PROVINCE

General

1. The status quo within the province remained unchanged during the period with small scale successes by both the VC and TF. VC emphasis still appears to be on road interdiction and small scale acts of terrorism against PF and PSDF. Most TF success has been in Duc Thanh due mainly to opportunities presented and the aggressiveness of the District Chief in comparison to others in the province.

1ATF Withdrawal

2. The power struggle for the assets left by 1ATF at NUI DAT, rather than the effect of their departure, seems to be the major concern of the VN. Rapport with the RF/PF adviser is at an all time high. One would like to think it is because of charm and personality but unfortunately the mercenary aspect is the decisive one. Requests keep coming in and are dutifully handed over to 1ATF.

3. 3 Bde have shown minimal interest in operations in the province as have 18 ARVN Div. This is understandable with the move of 274 VC Regt and 3/33 NVA north of the province. A late report, not yet confirmed, places 1/274 Regt poised NORTH of Route 15 on the Bien Hoa/Phuoc Tuy province border. As this report is written plans are being made for a joint province operation. If this takes place it will be the first for some considerable time.

MATT Activities

4. October saw the completion of all PF platoon training, artillery fire control training and engineer mini-team training and the re-location of MATT 1 and MATT 2 at VAN KIEP. All other MATTs were withdrawn without incident and personnel and surplus stores moved to VUNG TAU.

5. MATT 1 will commence to re-train PF platoon and squad leaders on 2 Nov 71 and is under the control of JWTC for operational deployment and local administration. MATT 2 remains under the operational control of Team 89. Future plans for this MATT include:

- a. Three weeks of in-theatre re-training, preparation, and a course in instructional techniques using interpreters.
- b. Conduct of NCO courses in:
 - (1) Training a battle shot.
 - (2) 60mm and 81mm mortar training.
 - (3) .30 and .50 MG training.
 - (4) Claymore and illumination training.

.../6.

6. It is proposed to concentrate solely on the training of NCO's. There will undoubtedly be times when Team 89 will require MATT assistance in other fields. Each request will need to be considered in view of priorities and security. At this stage MATT 2 will not be used on operations.

TF

7. Duc Thanh showed the lead during October with aggressive and successful actions by both PF and RF. The success of 40 PF platoon in repulsing a company of 274 NVA Regiment on the night of 1 Oct 71 was most heartening. It is of note that in the last few months the platoon has received four weeks training by a MATT and the platoon and squad leaders have completed the PF cadre course at JWTC. However the decisive factor is the aggressive leadership of the platoon leader.

8. Elsewhere in the province the TF forces had minor contacts and none were of major significance. The mine incident at LONG SON has overtones of an assassination attempt by elements other than the VC.

Conclusion

9. No change can be seen in the overall standard of the TF. The successes at DUC THANH are encouraging but need to be considered in the light of the situation in other areas where the VC gained the initiative temporarily. The most important factor facing the TF at present is the problem of mobility. A troop of APCs would make a tremendous difference to the effectiveness of the TF in this province.

REPORT BY LT COL K.H. KIRKLAND
SENIOR ADVISER, JWTC, VAN KIEP NTC

Training

1. 5/71 Junior Officer Course marched out 23 Oct 71. Twenty nine students failed out of a total student strength of 119. The transfer of the Centre to VAN KIEP National Training Centre (VKNTC) caused some disruption during the operations phase of this course.
2. 4/71 Senior NCO Course marched out 2 Oct 71. Fourteen students failed out of a total student strength of 95.
3. 5/71 Senior NCO Course started 18 Oct 71. Present student strength is 100. The commencement of this course immediately after transfer from NUI DAT to VKNTC reflects credit on the Vietnamese training staff.
4. 6/71 Junior Officer Course is scheduled to start 2 Nov 71. As at 25 Oct 71 six students had arrived.
5. 4/71 PF Cadre Course marched out 1 Oct 71. All 30 students qualified although the standard was low due to a one week reduction in syllabus.
6. 5/71 PF Cadre Course was cancelled due to the transfer of the Centre to VKNTC. Facilities have been allocated by Sector adjacent to VKNTC and 6/71 PF Cadre Course is scheduled to start 2 Nov 71.
7. The three RF coys on refresher training returned to their parent locations 16 Oct 71.
8. Attached as Appx 1 is a brief description of VKNTC. Although initial problems of co-ordination and accommodation have been experienced, these will disappear in time and the Centre should function efficiently. Changes in the training programme have been made but these are in sequence, not content. The VKNTC staff and MACV Team 78 have been very helpful.

Visits

9. Visitors during the month were:-

Assistant Services Attache UK	1 Oct 71	Nui Dat
COMAFV	1 Oct 71	Van Kiep
COMAFV	6 Oct 71	Nui Dat
Aust Ambassador	21 Oct 71	Van Kiep

.../10.

Movement JWTC from NUI DAT to VKNTC

10. The transfer was executed with minimum Aust assistance and limited, grudging help from Central Logistics Command (CLC). Accommodation and storage space at VKNTC is very restricted and as a result JWTC is holding certain stores which cannot be used. Comdt JWTC tried to return these to CLC in situ but was directed to move them to VKNTC. Disposal instructions are still awaited.
11. Living accommodation at VKNTC is inadequate. Efforts are being made to convert all beds to double bunks to increase floor space.
12. The physical handover of buildings at NUI DAT was badly handled, despite frequent representation by Comdt JWTC. The area was allocated to 5 ARVN Div for stripping in order to construct married quarters in their own location. Demolition started 16 Oct 71, priority being given to roofing material.

Security

13. 2/43 Bn, less one coy, moved into JWTC area 6 Oct 71 and took over the Northern perimeter. Between 8-15 Oct familiarisation patrols were performed in the immediate AO. Wef last light 15 Oct, 2/43 Bn together with 946 RF Coy assumed responsibility for the defence of the old JWTC area.
14. Security within VKNTC is under control of HQ VKNTC and JWTC is a sub-unit with a small perimeter. JWTC Advisory Team operates as an outstation on the Sector Adviser's Net when required for activities outside the perimeter.

Admin and Log

15. The JWTC Table of Organisation and Equipment has finally been published and one copy has been received. This fact together with the immediately available resources at VAN KIEP should lessen admin and log difficulties.
16. A detailed report on this aspect will be submitted in the November Report.

Engineer Works

17. The site of the new adviser's compound was cleared by 16 Oct 71 and 9 Constr Tp, operating daily from VUNG TAU, started horizontal construction 18 Oct 71. Despite rain, work has progressed satisfactorily. It is estimated the compound will be ready for occupation mid-Dec 71.
18. Contract work on JWTC buildings is planned to commence 1 Dec 71.

Advisory Team

19. Wef 13 Oct 71, the team was reduced to its future establishment strength as part of the Residual Force, including one MATT under JWTC control for conducting PF courses. On 14 Oct, this MATT moved to VKNTC into the MACV compound. On 15 Oct the team, plus 10 all ranks from 198 Wks Sect/9 Constr Tp, moved to interim accommodation at VKNTC. This group is self-sufficient, excluding messing, which is under MACV arrangements. No problems have been encountered. A direct radio link with HQ AATTV SAIGON is operating.

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- 3 -

20. Two NZ Warrant Officers marched in 23 Oct 71. One is being employed with JWTC, the other with PF Cadre courses.

21. 9 Constr Tp (minus), under comd for local administration, is to move from VUNG TAU to VKNTC by 1 Nov 71. It will occupy temporary accommodation adjacent to the work site.

Appendices

Appendix 1 - Van Kiep National Training Centre.

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX E TO
AATTV REPORT OCT 71

VAN KIEP NATIONAL TRAINING CENTRE

General

1. VKNTC is one of four training centres directly controlled by ARVN JGS through CTC.

Location

2. At PHUOC LE (BARIA), 101 km SE of SAIGON on Route 15.

Mission

3. To conduct new and refresher trg for Inf, Marine, Airborne and Regional Force Bns and RF Coys; CIDG Coys; trains recce coys; provides ARVN, RF and Navy recruit trg; presents various leadership and NCO courses; and trains Team Leaders and Inter Team Leaders PSDF and mobile Trg Teams.

Capacity

4. By TOE 3500 students 600 staff
Proposed 1971 6000 students.

Trg Facilities

5. Class Rooms 8
Auditorium 1
Ranges 18 (These incl all types of SA ranges up to 300 M and one 81 mm mor range)
Trg Areas 40 (Various terrain, being restricted by civil encroachment)

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ANNEX F TO
AATTV REPORT OCT 71

REPORT BY MAJ J.G. HUGHES
SENIOR AATTV ADVISER MR 4

DRAC Activities

1. The CORDS, DRAC Overview for the month of September is attached as Appendix 1.

Enemy Activities

2. Perintrep NR 39-71 is attached as Appendix 2.

Bac Lieu Night Operations Training Team (NOTT)

3. The report by Captain McLaughlin, Team Leader, is attached as Appendix 3.

DONG TAM NOTT

4. The report by Capt Mountfort, Team Leader, is attached as Appendix 4. This will be the last report to be submitted by this officer, as he returned to NZ on 28 October. Captain Sherriff, RNZIR, is now Team Leader at Dong Tam.

Change of AATTV Role

5. The composition of the AFV Residual Force has not yet been confirmed; naturally, the future role of AATTV in MR4 is dependent on the role of the Residual Force. In view of this uncertainty, Comd AATTV, after consultation with Lieutenant General Truong, CG IV Corps and MR4, decided that plans should be made to allow for the present tasks of AATTV in MR4 to be taken over by Vietnamese officers.

6. A detailed plan for this transfer of responsibilities was coordinated with the staff of HQ IV Corps and is as follows:

- a. 18-24 October 1971. AATTV-conducted cadre courses for ARVN officers and NCO's. Detail is given in Appendices 3 and 4.
- b. 25 October-6 November 1971. ARVN Instructors, under supervision of AATTV instructors, to conduct the next-scheduled PF Platoon Leaders Course. This course is currently in progress.
- c. This contingency plan will not be put into operation completely until a definite decision on the composition of the residual force has been received.

Conclusion

7. There are no major problem areas.

.../Appendices

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- 2 -

Appendices

- Appendix 1. CORDS DRAC Overview for Sep 71.
- 2. PERINTREP NR 39-71.
- 3. Team Leader NOTT BAC LIEU Report.
- 4. Team Leader NOTT DONG TAM Report.

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**HEADQUARTERS
DELTA REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND
APO San Francisco 96215**

APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX F TO
AATTV REPORT OCT 71

MACDR-CR-PPR

14 October 1971

SUBJECT: CORDS/DRAC Military Region Overview for the Month Ending 30
September 1971 (RCS: MACCORDS 32.01 R3)

Commander
U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Attn: MACCORDS-RAD
APO 96222

1. (U) Reference: Joint Directive 4-70, Change 1, subject: MACCORDS Military Region Overview dated 8 March 1971.
2. (U) Submitted herewith is the subject report.

1 Incl
as

J. H. Cushman
J. H. CUSHMAN
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

MACCORDS/RAD-R	- 40
CG, USARV (ATTN: G5)	- 1
CG, DRAC - 5	G3 - 2
G1 - 1	G4 - 1
G2 - 2	G6 - 1
SA, MR-1 - 2	SA, MR-3 - 2
SA, MR-2 - 2	DEPCORDS - 5
DCAT, 7th Inf Div (ARVN)	- 1
DCAT, 9th Inf Div (ARVN)	- 1
DCAT, 21st Inf Div (ARVN)	- 1
SA, 44th STZ	- 1
SA, 4th ARM BDE	- 1
SA, AFAT 4	- 1
Each PSA, MR-4	- 1
Each CORDS/DRAC Staff	- 1
45th Mfl History Det.	- 1

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FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

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MILITARY REGION OVERVIEW
(RCS: MACCORDS 32.01 R3)

MILITARY REGION 4

Period Ending: 30 September 1971

1. (C) OVERALL STATUS OF THE COMMUNITY DEFENSE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT EFFORT:

During September, the major thrust of all activity was focused on the presidential election. Most activity was of an administrative nature. Political campaigning was restricted and military activity centered around extensive security measures designed to preclude disruption of the plebiscite with corresponding embarrassment of the GVN. Tran Van Huong, the vice-presidential candidate, made public appearances in Soc Trang, Chau Doc and Ben Tre. Demonstrations were conducted in a few provinces, and students and veterans' associations were responsible for the firebombing of one US vehicle in Can Tho City during election week, and the attempted firebombing of two others.

The election itself capped several months of preparation and progressed very smoothly. As in previous elections, there were reports of various irregularities to include proxy voting and ballot box stuffing, however there were no official complaints lodged at provincial courts. 94.5% of the registered voters reportedly cast their ballots with the Thieu ticket receiving 98% of votes cast. Most provinces reported their vote totals to be at least 20% higher than the actual number of people who seemed to be voting. The most significant opposition ballots were cast in the cities of Can Tho, My Tho, and Rach Gia; traditional focal points of discontent. Most provinces reported that had earlier candidates remained in the race, the Thieu ticket would still have won a majority of votes in the Delta.

Enemy activity remained low throughout the election period with emphasis on propaganda activity encouraging voters to boycott the elections. Terrorist and harassment activity which showed a noticeable increase subsequent to 21 September, is still categorized as light for the period. Major contact with NVA forces was made in the U-Minh Forest resulting in an outcome significantly favorable to the 21st ARVN Division.

Although progress in pacification programs slowed due to concentration on the election, this is not considered to be a regression in the status of internal security. The ARVN success in the U-Minh and the demonstrated ability of the GVN to provide security for the elections are evidence of a high degree of government control and territorial security within the region.

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2. (C) SITUATION, PROBLEMS AND ANALYSIS:

a. (C) Self Defense

(1) (C) Territorial Security

ARVN AND TERRITORIAL FORCE STATUS

MONTH	MILITARY INCIDENT		ENEMY KIA		EN WPNS CPTD		GVN KIA		GVN WPNS LOST		KILL RATIO	LOST/CPTD WPNS RATIO
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	GVN:EN	GVN:EN
SEPTEMBER	165	-12.7	2525	+15.6	964	-31.0	492	+18.8	233	+30.2	1:5.1	1:4.1

Combat activity in MR-4 during September was highlighted by a significant increase in the number of friendly initiated incidents (913, an increase of 88%). The 21st ARVN Division achieved considerable success in the U-Minh Forest and indications are that these operations preempted the enemy's planned multi-battalion attacks on several fire bases located there. The 7th and 9th ARVN Divisions continued operations targeted against enemy units and base areas. Elements of the 4th Ranger Command under the operational control of the 44th STZ conducted cross border operations. Territorial Forces concentrated on Dong Khoi and sector/subsector operations aimed at providing election security.

(2) (C) Regional Forces/Popular Forces

(a) RF/PF status is shown below. Figures reflect the reallocation of Territorial Force units implemented on 1 September 1971.

SEPTEMBER	AUTH	IN TRAINING		RECRUITED WAITING TNG	TO BE RECRUITED	DEPLOYED	DESERTION PER 1000
		BASIC	REFRESHER				
RF CO.	625	5	20	2	17	581	12
PF PLAT.	3809	157	40	95	78	3439	11

(b) Six outposts were overrun during September, an increase of 2 over the preceding month. An Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Chuong Thien and Kien Phong Provinces had one each, while Ba Xuyen had 2. Casualties included 47 KIA, 20 WIA, and 27 MIA. Equipment losses consisted of 1 pistol, 18 carbines, 74-M16s, 4-M79s, 5-Mls, 1 BAR, 1 CAL. 30 MG, 1-60 MM Mortar, 9 Radios and 1-RC 292 Antenna.

(c) Redeployment of territorial forces is continuing, however there have been no significant changes from last month's report.

(d) As of 15 September, 93.4% of scheduled RF companies had completed refresher training which was conducted by the Province Mobile Training Teams (PMTT). Refresher training (PMTT) has been completed for 47%

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of the required 572 PF platoons. Forty-seven of the new 357 platoons (13%) have completed required training and have been deployed.

(e) During the month the Australian Team conducted Night Operations Courses for PF platoon and squad leaders from Kien Phong and Kien Giang provinces.

(3) (C) PSDF

(a) September PSDF status is shown on the following chart:

ORGANIZED		TRAINED		<u>A R M E D</u>		RATIO
NEW	TO DATE	NEW	TO DATE	NEW	TO DATE	CBT:SPT
-22,773	1,582,832	+23,375	1,357,490	-3,250	208,208	1 : 3

(b) Tactical status is shown below:

MILITARY INCIDENTS		VC KIA		WPNS CPTD		PSDF KIA		WPNS LOST		KILL RATIO	WPNS RATIO
#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	VC : PSDF	VC:PSDF
22	-31	8	-47	5	+40	27	+22	84	+87	1 : 3.4	1 : 17

(c) The problem of inflated statistics concerning the number of PSDF organized and armed has been recognized at region. A joint US/GVN Conference is planned for 15 October in order to develop measures to increase the accuracy of reporting procedures. The pressure exerted at region is evidenced to some extent in the status chart shown above.

(d) The high weapons lost ratio is attributable to three incidents, one each in Phong Dinh (28), Ba Xuyen (30), and Bac Lieu (19), in which a total of 77 weapons were lost. The primary cause was lack of alertness in each case. Appropriate advisory recommendations have been made.

(4) (C) LOC Security

(a) There were 5 enemy initiated incidents on land LOCs this month in comparison to 11 in August. Three occurred in Dinh Tuong Province, and one each in Chuong Thien and Kien Tuong.

(b) The security status of LOCs has remained constant during September with 97.4% of land LOCs rated green and 2.6% rated amber; 84.5% of waterways considered LOCs in the Delta are rated secure, while 15.5% are rated open.

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(5) (U) National Police:

a. Terrorist activity increased by 36% (105 incidents) during September. This total is still well under the CD&LD Plan goal of 126 incidents per month. The increase is felt to be related to actions designed to disrupt the election.

b. A study is underway which will examine the feasibility of removing ARVN military prisoners and prisoners of war from correction centers in order to relieve overcrowding.

(6) (U) Phung Hoang: During September, neutralizations dropped from 746 in August to 538, the lowest number of neutralizations recorded for any month in 1971. This drop in neutralizations is undoubtedly due in part to the upcoming elections. This month's total is 17% below the national goal of 650 and 33% below the MR-4 goal of 800 per month. Only 5 provinces (Ba Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Phong Dinh, Sa Dec, and Vinh Binh) met their national neutralization goals for September, compared to 10 in August. Twenty-five per cent of the total neutralizations for September were district level or above. This is the highest percentage of district level or higher VCI neutralized during any month this year, and is 5% above the 1971 average figure of 20%. The number of VCI sentenced this month was 139, a slight increase over August's total of 127. However, this is still below the monthly average of 189. There were no significant changes in specific targeting for this month. Thirty-six per cent of the total captures for September were effected via targeting which is about average for the year. Twenty-five percent of the total neutralizations were targeted which is slightly above the 23% average for the period January thru August.

VC KILLED (A & B)	VCI RALLIED (A & B)	VCI SENTENCED (A & B)	VCI CAPTURED (A & B)
227	172	139	323

(7) (U) Chieu Hoi

a. A total of 617 HC rallied in MR-4 during the reporting period. This low rate continues to be attributed to the low profile being maintained by VC and NVA military units and by the present political situation. Kien Giang (112 HC) and An Xuyen (124 HC) continue to produce substantial numbers of ralliers due to the successes of the ARVN 21st Division in the U-Minh Forest. An increase in the HC rate can be expected by the end of October based upon post election results in previous years. Since 1 March 1971 MR-4 has received 10,481 returnees.

b. A total of 131 HC were used in one-time operational exploitations during this reporting period. 364 HC were offered basic vocational courses in provincial HC centers and another group of 69 selected HC started attending advanced courses at the Regional HC Center.

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CHIEU HOI STATUS

HOI CHANH	MONTHLY GOAL	% POLITICAL	% MILITARY	RELEASED	EMPLOYED
617	1,167	38%	52%	950	74

c. (U) Self Government

(1) (U) People's Administration Program

(a) During September, 8 village/hamlet chiefs were victims of terrorist activity. Of this total, six were assassinated, one wounded and one abducted. This represents a sharp increase over August and is the highest number of officials targeted since June. It is felt that the increase indicates an attempt to discredit GVN in relation to the election rather than a resurgence of concentrated terrorism directed against officials.

RPDC FIGURES	TOTAL	ELECTED	APPOINTED	NO GOV'T
VILLAGES	754	743	11	0
HAMLETS	4,247	4,059	153	35

(b) A significant improvement in attendance at in-province training sessions was evidenced during September with 1,175 officials attending courses of a scheduled 1,275 (92%). Attendance at courses at Vung Tau also increased with 278 officials attending of a total of 401 scheduled to attend (69%).

(2) People's Information Program: VIS activity once again focused on the elections with priority support given to themes related to "getting out the vote". During the increase in activity in the U-Minh Forest, VIS directed their efforts to producing high impact Chieu Hoi materials in order to capitalize on the tactical success of the 21st ARVN Division and induce more ralliers. Other programs continued without notable problems surfacing.

d. (U) Self Development

(1) (U) Land Reform Program: Status of the LTTT Program is shown on the following chart:

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PERIOD	NO OF. APPLICATIONS	HECTARES APPROVED	TITLES DISTRIBUTED	
			NUMBER	HECTARES
AUGUST *	242,199	334,173	141,292	193,349
SEPTEMBER **	256,618	356,567	158,174	217,883
CHANGE	+14,419	+22,394	+16,882	+24,534

* Official DGLA Figures

** Estimates Based on Preliminary Reports

Overall distribution rates slumped sharply during the month due to the use of Land Affairs Cadre in election activity. Compensation however, improved significantly, virtually doubling the previous total for the year to date.

(2) (U) Agriculture:

(a) Several courses have been developed and presented to provincial officials by the regional livestock and veterinary advisors. These courses cover a wide variety of subjects to include a six hour seminar on animal health. The Livestock Vaccinator Training Program has been conducted in every province in MR-4. As a result, vaccine distribution has doubled during the last year.

(b) The land clearing project in Chau Doc Province is 70% complete. This land, once cleared, will be used for growing grain sorghum for seed. Due to the onset of the dry season, it may be necessary to utilize land not seeded to sorghum by 10 October for other crops.

(3) (U) War Veterans Program: Results achieved in the Veteran's Housing Program have been variable depending upon the amount of funds appropriated for project completion. Chau Doc and Kien Hoa Provinces have had ample funds hence, reasonably well built homes with water and electricity. On the other hand, Vinh Binh and Phong Dinh have experienced considerable shortfall in their programs due to inadequate funding. The Ministry of War Veterans states that this situation will continue until the 1972 budgetary allowances are available. Continuation of this situation adds another grievance to War Veteran's associations' complaints against the government.

(4) (U) War Victims Program:

(a) Although considerable time was spent on electioneering by Social Welfare Service (SWS) officials, a degree of progress was achieved in making return-to-village payments. Additionally,

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Kien Giang and Chuong Thien Provinces have made good headway in determining the validity of U-Minh refugee claims and have initiated payment of benefits.

(b) Status of War Victims is shown on the following chart:

PERIOD	TEMPORARY REFUGEES	REFUGEES IN RTV PROCESS	REFUGEES PAID ALL RTV BENEFITS	WAR VICTIMS PAID
PREVIOUS MONTH	69,534	221,787	275,939	35,051
CURRENT	44,059	204,007	285,950	42,302
DIFFERENCE	-25,475	-17,780	+10,011	+7,251

(5) (U) Public Health:

(a) Civilian War Casualty (CWC) admissions for September totalled 899, the lowest recorded total for MR-4. So far this year CWC admissions totalled 10,591, 37.5% less than the same period in 1970. The resultant reduction in emergency surgery has made possible increased scheduling of elective surgery.

(b) The Community Health Specialist at Vinh Long has been alerted for transfer to Go Cong. Progress in general sanitation and ability to manage the rural health program on the part of provincial officials has negated the requirement for his services. Future advisory assistance will be provided Vinh Long on a request basis.

(c) Information has been received that the Philippine Surgical Team in My Tho, Dinh Tuong Province will undergo a personnel reduction from the present 18 to 10, effective 1 October. MILPHAP reductions continue by attrition as personnel reach DEROS. Only one fully trained US military surgeon remains.

(6) (U) Education:

(a) One of the most critical development problems facing this region is the shortage of elementary school teachers. In order to alleviate this shortage, 825 normal school graduates and 1,066 daily basis teachers were allocated to MR-4 in September. These teachers cannot begin teaching until the Ministry of Education approves their assignment, a normally time-consuming process which is further compounded by the absence of the Minister who is required to validate the approval. This means that a total of 1,891 classrooms remain empty and approximately 13,000 pupils do not have an opportunity to attend school. A simple solution to this problem would be granting authorization to Province Primary Education Service Chiefs to make immediate assignments in order to open

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classrooms pending subsequent approval of these assignments by MOE. Even if this were done, a shortage of 600 teachers would still exist within this region. A study is underway to determine the extent of the teacher shortage by province in an effort to devise measures to resolve this problem area.

(b) Contracts are being arranged for the development of a pilot high school practical arts program in high schools in Rach Gia, Long Xuyen, and Kien Hoa. This program will be funded by the American Aid Chapter. The first Province Secondary Education Service in MR-4 has been established in Sa Dec Province.

(7) (U) Public Works:

(a) During early September, representatives of CORDS/DRAC, ECAD, USAID, and concerned Vietnamese agencies inspected dredging and well drilling activity in the Delta. ECAD Team projects were also visited. All activities visited appeared to be progressing well.

(b) The 1972 DIRE program on irrigation and salinity control projects has been finalized. 49 projects are included in this program with a total funding outlay of 779 million piasters ultimately benefiting 68,500 hectares of land.

(c) As of the end of the 3d quarter of CY 71, 54 of the 97 Secondary Road and Bridge Projects are under construction, 14 are awaiting construction, two are being reprogrammed, one has been cancelled and 26 have been completed.

(8) (U) RD Cadre: RD Cadre status is shown on the following chart:

PERIOD	PERSONNEL STRENGTH	TEAMS DEPLOYED	RDC DESERTIONS	DESERTIONS PER 1,000	VC INCIDENTS
AUGUST	10,333	586	94	9.1	27
SEPTEMBER	10,224	568	58	5.6	18

The RD Cadre Program in MR-4 was the subject of a General Accounting Office (GAO) inquiry concerning payroll procedures on 22 September 1971. Regional staff members and three provincial RDC advisors were interviewed. A report of this inquiry was forwarded to MACCORDS as requested.

(9) (U) Village Self Development:

(a) In order to more effectively employ the skills of the remaining 14 Community Development Officers (CDO) within MR-4,

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
selected CDOs have been assigned more than one province to cover. This will enable continued coverage of the VSD and RD Credit Programs and the provision of training assistance region-wide. Kien Giang, An Giang, Kien Tuong and Sa Dec have had their CDOs withdrawn.

(b) A two-phase training program for Community Development Assistants (CDA) is being developed. One phase of training will be conducted for CDAs who have not received work-related skill basic training, while the second phase will focus on re-orientation of those CDAs who have completed basic training in 1969 and 1970. Training will be conducted at the province level.

3. (C) FUTURE PLANNING:

Conversion of Territorial Forces: While examining the status of Territorial Forces in areas which are considered pacified with a view toward their redeployment to less secure areas, the question of converting PF spaces to RF surfaced. The organizational structure of PF does not facilitate redeployment to areas where more Territorial Forces are required, nor does it lend itself to the employment of these units in a mobile role. Since Territorial Force space authorizations are considered interchangeable, subject to JGS/MACV approval, conversion to RF of surplus PF platoons would enhance more effective use of these forces. A request has been submitted for authorization to convert 114 PF platoons (51 from An Giang, 63 from Go Cong) to 30 Lien Doi and 20 RF companies. It is estimated that conversion could be completed within four months after receipt of approval. Further study is in process to determine if PF spaces in other provinces can be converted.

4. (U) ACTION ITEMS: (None)


WILBUR WILSON
Deputy for CORDS

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HEADQUARTERS
DELTA REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND
APO San Francisco 96215

IV

PERINTREP



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ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:

COSVN ORDER PROVIDES INFORMATION ON ENEMY INTENTIONS FOR ELECTION
IN LIGHT OF FLOODING IN NVN - Page 2

REPORT DISCUSSES RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF YOUTHS FOR VC UNITS - Page 3

REPORT STATES VC HAVE BEEN ORDERED NOT TO TERRORIZE DESERTERS OR
RALLIERS - Page 3

HOI CHANH GIVES INFORMATION ON MISSION OF Y4 SECTION OF COSVN - Page 4

CAPTURED DOCUMENT DESCRIBES ORGANIZATION OF VC YOUTH GROUPS TO
COUNTER GVN PACIFICATION PROGRAM - Page 4

REPORT DISCUSSES VC ASSASSINATION PROCEDURES IN CHO LACH DISTRICT,
(VC) VINH LONG PROVINCE - Page 4


PW PROVIDES INFORMATION ON INFILTRATION OF MEN AND SUPPLIES FROM
CAMBODIA TO U MINH AREA - Page 5

HOI CHANH REPORTS ON CURRENT DISPOSITION OF DT1 REGT - Page 7

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MR 4 ENEMY REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS
(VC Province Boundaries)
26 September 1971



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DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION	1
A. Enemy-Initiated Activity and Outpost Overrun	1
B. Information Received During the Period	2
2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD	6
A. Strength and Dispositions	6
B. Order of Battle	6
C. Reserves and Reinforcements: <u>Enemy Infiltration Groups</u>	6
D. - G. Omitted	
H. Air Defenses	6
I. - J. Omitted	
K. Artillery (Including Rockets): <u>Enemy Expenditures During the Period</u>	6
L. - T. Omitted	
3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS	7
A. Enemy Identifications: <u>DT1 Regt/(VC) MR2</u>	7
B. Equipment and Supplies	7
C. Omitted	
D. Casualties	7
E. Omitted	
F. Enemy Defenses, Minefields, Fortifications, Barriers, Obstacles and Other Defensive Works	8
G. - H. Omitted	
I. Weather	8
J. Omitted	

GROUP 4 DECLASSIFIED ON 26 SEP 83 DOD DIR 5200.10.....

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4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

A. - B. Omitted

C. Significant Terrorist Activity

9

D. - F. Omitted

5. CAPABILITIES, VULNERABILITIES AND OUTLOOK FOR THE COMING WEEK

9

A. Enemy Capabilities

9

B. Enemy Vulnerabilities

9

C. Outlook for the Coming Week

10

ANNEXES:

A. Enemy-Initiated Incidents

B. Strength and Dispositions

C. Combined Sensor/Air Surveillance Operations

D. Climatological Outlook for MR-4

E. October 1971 Calendar

F. Base Area Reconfigurations

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DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71

Period Covered: 190001H Sep - 252400H September 1971

DRAC

CAN THO, RVN

26 September 1971

1. (C) GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION:

A. Enemy-Initiated Activity: A total of 50 enemy-initiated incidents were reported during the period, representing an increase from the 31 reported during the previous period. Harassments accounted for 82 percent of the incidents, terrorist activity for 10 percent, ambushes for 6 percent, and ground attacks for 2 percent. Outposts and watchtowers accounted for 52 percent of the targets, troop concentrations for 18 percent, LOC interdictions for 12 percent, hamlets and villages for 10 percent, district towns for 4 percent, and province capitals for 4 percent. There were no significant enemy moves during the period.

(1) (VC) Military Region 2 (MR2): The number of enemy-initiated incidents reported in MR2 increased during the period with 30 incidents reported as compared with 9 during the previous week. DINH TUONG Province reported 17 incidents, followed by KIEN HOA with 9, KIEN PHONG with 3, and KIEN TUONG with 1. There were no incidents reported in AN GIANG, CHAU DOC, and GO CONG Provinces. In KIEN TUONG Province at 190030H Sep, MOC HOA PT was harassed with 4 rounds of 82mm mortar fire with negative results. In KIEN PHONG Province at 191100H Sep, 4 CIV returning from an RF position were terrorized with SA fire resulting in 3 CIV KD and 1 CIV WD. In DINH TUONG Province at 200430H Sep, CAI BE DT was harassed with 3 rds of 82mm mortar fire with negative results. In KIEN HOA Province at 210035H Sep, BEN TRE PT was harassed with 6 rds of 82mm mortar fire with negative results. In DINH TUONG Province at 210205H Sep, SAM GIANG DT was harassed with 3 rds of 82mm mortar fire with negative results. Also in DINH TUONG Province at 210205H Sep, DONG TAM Base was harassed with 8 rds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 1 ARVN KIA and 1 ARVN WIA. In DINH TUONG Province at 210300H Sep, LONG DINH Village Office was harassed with AW/Petard and LONG DINH Bridge received 12 rds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 3 CIV KD and 7 CIV WD. In DINH TUONG Province at 221630H Sep, the LONG VINH 461 RF OP was harassed with SA fire resulting in 1 RF KIA. In DINH TUONG Province at 241930H Sep, the AP TAY RF OP was harassed with 6 rds of 81mm mortar fire and 4 rds of B40 RKT resulting in 1 RF KIA and 6 RF WIA. There were no airfields targeted in (VC) MR2 during the period.

(2) (VC) Military Region 3 (MR3): The number of enemy-initiated incidents reported in MR3 decreased during the period with 20 incidents reported as compared with 22 during the previous week. CHUONG THIEN Province reported 6 incidents, followed by BA XUYEN with 5, KIEN GIANG and PHONG DINH with 3 each, VINH LONG with 2, and the PHU QUOC SZ with 1. There were no incidents reported in AN XUYEN, BAC LIEU, SA DEC, or VINH BINH Provinces. In VINH LONG Province at 200140H Sep, the GIONG KE Hamlet Chief was assassinated with SA fire resulting in 1 CIV KD. In the PHU

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DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

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DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

QUOC SZ at 212300H Sep, the 4/31 RF LIEN DOI and the 4/16 NDP were harassed with 4 rds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 1 ARVN KIA and 3 RF WIA. In BA XUYEN Province at 211430H Sep, PF's from the AN NGHIEP OP on a resupply mission were ambushed with SA fire resulting in 1 PF KIA and 1 x M16 lost. In VINH LONG Province at 230005H Sep, the KACH RANH 237 RF OP was attacked with B40 RKTs and AW fire resulting in 1 RF KIA, 6 RF WIA and 60 percent damage to the OP. In PHONG DINH Province at 230300H Sep, TAN QUOI Hamlet was infiltrated by an unknown size VC force resulting in 1 PSDF KIA, 6 PSDF MIA and 7 x carbines lost. In PHONG DINH Province at 230400H Sep, THANH MY Hamlet was infiltrated by an unknown size VC force resulting in 10 PSDF MIA and 1 x BAR, 2 x MGs, 1 x Garrand, and 6 x carbines lost. In KIEN GIANG Province at 230040H Sep, the THU 3 PF OP was harassed with 15 rds of 60mm mortar fire with negative results. In CHUONG THIEN Province at 251645H Sep, BA LON PF's on a resupply mission hit a mine 6 km SE of KIEN HUONG resulting in 2 PF KIA and 1 x pistol lost. In CHUONG THIEN Province at 252230H Sep, the 13th Gp NDP was harassed with 15 rds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in 1 RD cadre KIA and 3 RD cadre WIA. There were no airfields targeted in MR3 during the period.

(3) Outposts Overrun: There was one outpost overrun in MR 4 during the period, bringing the total of outpost overrun this year to 36. In KIEN GIANG Province at 210145H Sep, the CAU MUONG PF OP was attacked by an estimated 50-60 VC using grenades and SA fire. Sappers penetrated the perimeter while other attackers used a foot bridge to enter the OP. A guard near the bridge and another near the sappers' point of entry were both killed. The VC threw grenades into the bunkers and set fire to dependent's living quarters and an ammunition stockpile before withdrawing. A neighboring OB was shelled with 82mm mortar fire prior to and during the attack, apparently to prevent help from being sent to the OP. Results included 5 PF KIA, 9 PF WIA, 1 PF MIA, 3 CIV KD, 2 CIV WD, 1 CIV MISSING, 2 RD cadre KD, and 1 RD WD. Equipment lost included 9 x M16s, 2 x carbines, 1 x .30 cal MG, and 1 x PRC25 radio. Equipment destroyed included 7 x M16s, 3 x carbines, 1 x P38, 1 x HT1, 1 x PRC10, and an undetermined amount of ammunition.

Enemy activity in GVN MR 4 increased during the past week, reaching a level of comparable size to that of the last week of August. The greatest portion of this increase was noted in (VC) MR2, with the largest number of incidents occurring in DINH TUONG Province. It is possible that this increase in (VC) MR2 corresponds to an enemy thrust in the U MINH Forest earlier this month. The most notable change in the type of enemy activity this past week was the substantial increase in indirect fire attacks targeted against district towns and province capitals.

B. Information Received During the Period:

(1) (VC) Military Region 2 (MR2): Information recently obtained from a high-level GVN MR2 cadre, concerns a COSVN order apparently

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DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

issued in response to the tactical implications of increased flooding in NVN. As a result of this flooding, large-scale attacks directed against the four GVN provinces around SAIGON (LONG AN, HAU NGHIA, TAY NINH, and BINH DUONG) have been postponed indefinitely and all other units (NFI) have redeployed to LAOS in light of a possible ARVN/US offensive in these areas. Enemy activity during the 3 October elections, therefore, will be limited to incidents of terrorism and attempts at fomenting dissident demonstrations against the electoral process. This source further stated that a general attack would only be launched in the event that THIEU and KY supporters engage in open conflict. Additionally, finances have been set aside to pay "SAIGON criminals" to execute various acts of violence, especially against the electorate. (DRAC G2 Cmt: Although this information pertains to planned enemy activity in GVN MR 3, the implications of such a shift in policy might be felt in the Delta. Severe flooding in NVN has apparently slowed down the flow of men and material destined for use in all four Corps areas of SVN. If enemy units have suddenly found it necessary to alter their plans for a major election offensive because of these flood conditions, it is possible that activity in GVN MR 4 will be similar to that predicted for the SAIGON area.)

A recent 525 agent report states that the VC government of SOUTH VIETNAM has published a new training document. According to this training document, the hamlet and village cadre must motivate "key" youths, from 15 years of age and older, to join the VC units in their area to upgrade those units from guerrilla to main force status. The document also stated that anyone who was not considered a "key" youth but volunteered to join the VC ranks, must have two long time cadre members vouch for them before they would be allowed to join the VC. The document stated that each village must provide from 10 to 15 men. (VC) MR2 would be in charge of providing training courses for these new recruits. The district committees must supply food for the recruits, but clothes and mosquito nets must be provided by the youths themselves. (DRAC G2 Cmt: This report agrees with reports previously received concerning VC recruitment of youths. The VC must now start recruiting youths because of the lack of males who wish to volunteer. It is not known how effective this recruitment program has been, but indications are that the villages are not achieving their required quota.

A 525 report has stated that the (VC) HAM LONG District, KIEN HOA Province communists have been ordered not to terrorize VC deserters or ralliers. The VC are to appeal to the ralliers to return to the VC cause and not embarrass their families. This order is intended to raise the morale of the VC troops who believe that the high level cadre are callous and care nothing for the VC troops. (DRAC G2 Cmt: This is the first report of an order not to hurt ralliers and deserters. A recent HOI CHANH has stated that the morale of the VC is low because of cadre who drink

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DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

and run around with women of ill repute. It is quite possible that the VC would issue an order similar to this in order to raise morale. But it is doubtful whether the VC will allow deserters and ralliers to go without punishment.)

HOI CHANH [REDACTED] gave the following information concerning the Y4 section of COSVN. The Y4 section was located in the KANTUOT Area of KANDAL Province, CAMBODIA (VT 840 605) and had a strength of 23 cadres, 21 of which were female. The Y4 section was directly subordinate to COSVN and had the mission of obtaining phoney GVN ID cards and the collection of intelligence data. The men of the unit would receive blank ID cards from an unknown source and then copy them to make phony GVN ID cards. The women of the section would get jobs as clerk typists in rallier and ARVN intelligence facilities. They would make extra copies of important documents and then transfer the documents back to the unit. Source stated that the female cadres would meet high ranking people and attempt to seduce them in order to learn intelligence data. (DRAC G2 Cmt: The Y4 section has been previously reported with the mission of making ID cards for legal cadre. Previous agent reports have mentioned that VC women are to get jobs with GVN officials and attempt to seduce them to obtain intelligence information.)

(2) (VC) Military Region 3 (MR3): A document captured on 9 Aug, by TIEU CAN District Forces, at TAN QUI Hamlet (XR 255 765) discusses the organization of youth groups to counter GVN Pacification programs. The document, which was signed by the Current Affairs Committee of Western NAM BO and dated 10 Jan 71, orders the (VC) TRA VINH Party Committee to establish youth organizations to support VC military and political activities. In order to recruit members, cadre are instructed to tell youths that ARVN Forces recently suffered defeats in LAOS and CAMBODIA and convince them to oppose the GVN. Youths will be organized into chapters, which will be controlled by party committees and politico-military cadre of military units. A chapter will consist of five or more members, including a secretary responsible for propaganda and training, a deputy secretary, a culture leader, and a living life or subchapter leader. Each chapter will meet twice a month and each subchapter four times a month. The functions of a chapter are to study VC doctrines, organize itself into a military assault team, recruit new members and raise the morale of present members. (Ref: NILO TRA VINH PERINTREP 18-71) (DRAC G2 Cmt: The VC emphasis on recruiting and organizing youth has been widely reported and may reflect the success of the GVN Pacification Program, since the enemy appears to be relying more on propaganda and proselyting rather than military action to counter pacification efforts. The youth chapters would seem to have more value as bases of political support than as effective military tools.)

A recent report discussed procedures used by VC in CHO LACH District, (VC) VINH LONG Province to process assassination plans. Any cadre who

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DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

believes a GVN official is creating difficulties for VC operations can recommend the assassination of the official. (The recommendation is reviewed by the Village Secretary and Security Chief, who then forward it to the District Secretary. The District Secretary must personally approve any proposed assassination. If approval is received, the District Chief issues an order to the Village Security Chief to carry out the assassination. The Village Secretary also receives a copy of the assassination order. There are presently 5 GVN officials targeted for assassination in HOA NGHIA Village, CHO LACH District, (VC) VINH LONG Province. The VC have had difficulty in carrying out their assassination plans because these officials live in secure compounds or close to GVN outposts. In addition, cadre from CHO LACH District have been forced to move to KIEN HOA Province because of increased GVN security measures. The last GVN official assassinated in HOA NGHIA Village was the BINH THANH Hamlet Chief, who was killed in Mar 69. (Ref: Fourth Riverine Area PERINTREP NR 19-71) (DRAC G2 Cmt: This report substantiates two previous reports, PERINTREP NRs 21-71 and 32-71, that assassination plans are being processed for GVN hamlet, village and city officials who threaten VC operations. It is significant that approval for these plans is now being granted at the district level rather than at province level as previously reported. The effectiveness of the GVN Pacification Program in CHO LACH District, (VC) VINH LONG Province is hindering VC plans to eliminate selected officials and might well have prompted such a policy decision.)

A recent interrogation of PW NGUYEN VAN LY, member of the HA TIEN commo-liaison team, has provided the following information concerning the infiltration of men (particularly the 13B NVA Regt) and supplies into MR 4. From the time he joined in 1969, until May 1971, the mission of his unit was to procure food supplies from the local populace and distribute them to all VC/NVA units located in the KIEN LUONG -HA TIEN Districts, KIEN GIANG Province (vic VS 45 45 and VS 80 39). In addition his unit made monthly trips to CAMBODIA to receive miscellaneous food, medical, and military supplies from MY DUC Village Guerrillas. The supply route utilized crossed the SVN-Cambodian border between VS 483 543 and VS 477 543 and continued to LY's base area at the MOSO Mountains (vic VS 60 23). Due to an increase in ARVN operations during the last quarter of 1970, VC/NVA units in the area were ordered to move from MOSO to the U MINH Forest. At the same time the source's unit dispersed throughout western KIEN LUONG and HA TIEN Districts and into CAMBODIA. From this period of relocation to the time of capture, source stated that another commo-liaison route was put in use. This ran from VINH TE, CAMBODIA to TAM NGAN, CAMBODIA (KINH SO MOT) to RACH GIA. The 195 Transportation Group was active along this route. Source stated that both routes were employed to transport men and supplies, but the route through the MOSO Mountains was used less frequently.

With regard to the infiltration of the 13B Regt source stated that during the first months of 1971 his team went to a Cambodian town near

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DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

Hwy 3 (NFI) where they met a battalion of the 13B Regt. As this unit infiltrated into MR 4 the HA TIEN commo-liaison team provided rear security for the 400 NVA of the 13B who proceeded through the AO of the source's unit into the U MINH Forest. (Note: PW knew nothing concerning sea infiltration routes (NFI)) (DRAC G2 Cmt: Source's description of the dispersal of commo-liaison units in western (VC) RACH GIA Province into CAMBODIA and throughout low-level, local guerrilla forces remaining in MR 4 corroborates information previously received. The operations of the ARVN 9th Div have apparently succeeded in disrupting well-constructed land supply routes operated by VC/NVA commo-liaison units in the area. These operations have also forced VC MF Transportation units (195 Bn and 196 Bn) to redeploy to CAMBODIA. Source's knowledge of the 13B Regt infiltration to MR 4 in early 1971 has been substantiated by previously reported information.)

2. (C) ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD:

A. Strength and Dispositions: ANNEX B.

B. Order of Battle: ANNEX B.

C. Reserves and Reinforcements: Enemy Infiltration Groups:

None reported during the period.

D. - G. Omitted.

H. Air Defenses: During the reporting period there were 63 incidents of ground-to-air fire reported in MR 4 (including delayed reports). Of this total 23 aircraft received 60 hits. The largest number of aircraft receiving hits was recorded in KIEN GIANG Province where 14 aircraft received 20 hits. (ref: 164th CAG)

I. - J. Omitted.

K. Artillery (Including Rockets): Enemy Expenditures During The Period: There was a total of 0.43 tons of large-caliber ordnance expended during the period as compared with the 0.20 tons of large-caliber ordnance expended during the previous week. The following is a recapitulation of the week's expenditures. Figures in parentheses are for the previous period:

	60/61mm Mortar	81/32mm Mortar	120mm Mortar	57mm RR	75mm RR	107mm RKT	122mm RKT
MR2	0 (45)	31 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	4 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
MR3	15 (3)	4 (32)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
MR 4 TOTALS	15 (53)	35 (32)	0 (0)	0 (0)	4 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)

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DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

L. - T. Omitted.

3. (C) OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS:

A. Enemy Identifications: DT1 Regiment/(VC) MR2: HOI [REDACTED] gave the following information concerning the DT1 Regt/(VC) MR 2: the E1 Regt (AKA DT1) operates in two elements. The first element consists of the 261B Bn, 269B Sapper Bn, half of the 401X Recon Co, half of the 522X 75mm RR Co, and a Med Co which operates south of Highway Four in CAI LAY and CHAU THANH Districts. The second element consists of the 261A Bn, half of the 501X Recon Co, half of the 122 Sig Co, half of the 522X 75mm RR Co, half of the Trans Co, the 506X 12.3mm AA Co, and the 516X 120mm RR Co, which operates north of Highway Four in CAI LAY District. Source stated that the DT1 Regt consists of a staff section, a political section, and a RR Svc section. The CO of the DT1 Regt was TAM VI, the XO was BA CONG, the PO was HOANG DIEN and the Chief of Staff was BA CHUNG KY. The 261A had a strength of 120 men, the 261B had a strength of 70 men. Source stated that approximately 80 percent of the personnel in the DT1 Regt were NVA. Because of hardships and length of the war, the morale of the men has declined and they are beginning to lose confidence in the final victory of the VC. Source gave the following strengths for special companies of the DT1 Regt: The 514X 82mm mortar Co had a strength of approximately 27 men divided into two platoons. It was equipped with two 82mm mortars and 14 rds of 82mm mortar ammunition. The 522X 75mm RR Co had a strength of approximately 25 men. The Co was equipped with four 75mm Recoilless Rifles. The 122X Sig Co had a strength of approximately 20 men. (DRAC G2 Cmt: Source comments concerning the area of operation for the two elements of the DT1 Regt agrees with previous comments by PWs captured from the DT1 Regt. There have been many reports that have said the morale of the VC in the DT1 Regt was low. DRAC G2 believes that the strengths of the 261A Bn and the 261B battalion are larger than what the source has stated them to be.)

B. Equipment and Supplies:

(1) Equipment: During the reporting period there were 182 x I/Wpns and 31 x CS/Wpns captured in MR 4. There were no weapons captured in CAMBODIA during the period.

(2) Supplies: There were no supplies found in caches in MR 4 and CAMBODIA during the reporting period.

C. Omitted.

D. Casualties (figures in parentheses are 1971 totals to date):

(1) KIA - 627 (24,226)

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DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

(2) PW - 40 (873)

(3) DET - 20 (13,755)

(4) HC - 131-60 mil, 55 pol, 16 other (10,197)

(Ref: DRAC G1 and G3; CHIEU HOI Div CORDS/DRAC)

E. Omitted.

F. Enemy Defenses, Minefields, Fortifications, Barriers, Obstacles and Other Defensive Works:

PROVINCE	DATE	COORDINATES	DESCRIPTION
BA XUYEN	21 Sep	XR 226 753	PFs on a resupply mission were ambushed on a rural road with SA fire.
CHUONG THIEN	25 Sep	WR 255 475	PFs on a resupply mission hit a mine on LTL 12.
DINH TUONG	20 Sep	XS 403 494	A Vietnamese military vehicle was ambushed on QL 4 with AW fire.
DINH TUONG	22 Sep	XS 396 494	A truck was ambushed on QL 4 with 1 rd B40.
KIEN PHONG	19 Sep	WS 349 495	Civilians on a rural road were terrorized with SA fire.

G. - H. Omitted.

I. Weather: During the period weather conditions in MR 4 remained seasonable with the southwest monsoon dominating our weather. General conditions during the period were: Winds - southwest at 8 knots; visibility - 7 miles; ceilings - 2000 feet scattered, 10,000 feet scattered and 30,000 feet broken. VINH LONG reported 0.96 inches of precipitation and a temperature range of 76/91F.

Outlook for the coming week: During the coming week the pattern of weather is expected to remain the same with the southwest monsoon continuing to bring afternoon and evening showers. General conditions are forecast at: Winds - southwest at 8 knots; visibility - 7 miles; ceilings - 2000 feet scattered, 10,000 feet scattered, and 30,000 feet broken. (Ref: 5th Wthr Squadron, VINH LONG)

J. Omitted.

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DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

4. (C) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

A. - B. Omitted.

C. Significant Terrorist Activity: Omitted.

D. - F. Omitted.

5. (C) CAPABILITIES, VULNERABILITIES AND OUTLOOK FOR THE COMING WEEK:

A. Enemy Capabilities:

(1) To conduct multi-battalion ground attacks in the outlying areas of MR 4. These attacks may be supported by rocket and mortar fire.

(2) To conduct propaganda, subversion, espionage, and terrorist activities.

(3) To launch sapper attacks.

(4) To conduct small scale ground attacks against selected targets in the outlying area; these attacks may occur day or night and might be supported by indirect fire attack and sappers.

(5) Harassment of installations and intensifying of LOC interdictions and ambushes.

(6) Infiltration of replacements and supplies into SVN through CAMBODIA and by sea.

(7) Positioning of cadre legally in government agencies in forward base areas in order to support his efforts to defeat the pacification of such areas.

B. Enemy Vulnerabilities:

(1) Dependence on the local populace for food, taxes and concealment.

(2) Concentrations of enemy forces are vulnerable to detection by reconnaissance activities and to destruction by air, artillery and naval gunfire and the employment of airmobile operations.

(3) The enemy's extended logistical system is vulnerable to interdiction and his caches to discovery by Allied operations.

(4) He is unable to withstand sustained combat; his main force

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DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

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DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

attacks have been characterized by extensive preparation and inflexibility of execution and are vulnerable to pre-emptive measures.

(5) The infrastructure is vulnerable to aggressive Allied operations.

C. Outlook for the Coming Week: During the past week there was an increase in activity in (VC) MR 2. This was probably the initiation of phase II of the Fall Campaign, which as has been reported, would coincide with the presidential election. This same phase was probably initiated in (VC) MR 3 during the previous week. As has been reported indications point to a possible increase in activity to continue through the election period. Nearly all reporting sources have substantiated a general enemy plan to discredit the election through an extensive propaganda program which is to play on the fact that only one candidate is running. The enemy intends to foment dissatisfaction among groups such as students and veterans organizations, as well as exploit dissension already existing between the various ethnic, religious, and political factions. Numerous incidents have been reported recently in the SAIGON Area involving attacks, primarily firebombings, against U.S. personnel and property which are probably an effort to demonstrate against the American presence. Although this type of activity has not been reported in the Delta, personnel should be made aware of the possibility of such demonstrations spreading to this area, and appropriate precautions should be taken. It is known that at least one student group from SAIGON had been sent to CAN THO to unite the university students here. SAIGON officials feel the demonstrations in their area will continue and probably increase as a result of the senate resolution calling for President THIEU's resignation. Another recent report concerning military activity in the Delta comes from a well placed agent who stated that military activity during the coming election would be concentrated in PHONG DINH, KIEN GIANG and AN XUYEN Provinces. This seems quite possible due to the recent activity in the latter two provinces and the possible movement of elements of the D1 Regt into PHONG DINH. The possible movement of the D3 Regt in VINH LONG supports agent reports and a captured document which states the D3 is moving into position to cut off Highway 4 in case there is a coup in SAIGON. To support this a PW in MR3 has stated that the VC have developed a contingency plan for major military actions in the event there is such a coup.

Generally on a countrywide basis there seems to be an overall plan by the enemy to conduct propaganda urging the population to boycott the election and at the same time exploiting dissensions that exist between different factions of the population. It is expected that military activity will be limited to attacks by fire, sapper attacks, and small scale attacks against isolated outposts, with a contingency plan for major attacks in the event there is a coup attempt.

It should be kept in mind that although most of the activity centers around the presidential referendum, the U.S. presence is a major issue and therefore all U.S. personnel and installations are targets for both

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DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

enemy attacks as well as harassment by dissident groups.


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MG

ANNEXES:

- A. Enemy-Initiated Incidents.
- B. Strength and Dispositions.
- C. Combined Sensor/Air Surveillance Operations.
- D. Climatological Outlook for MR 4.
- E. October 1971 Calendar.
- F. Base Area Reconfigurations.

Comments on the information contained in this PERINTREP should be submitted to DRAC G2, ATTN: CIIOB.

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ACofS, G2

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ANNEX A (Enemy-Initiated Incidents) to DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71

		<u>AMB</u>	<u>GA</u>	<u>ABF</u>	<u>HF</u>	<u>SAB</u>	<u>TA</u>	<u>T</u>
MR2	AN GIANG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	CHAU DOC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	DINH TUONG	2	0	0	14	0	1	17
	GO CONG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	KIEN HOA	0	0	0	9	0	0	9
	KIEN PHONG	0	1	0	1	0	1	3
	KIEN TUONG	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
	MR2 TOTALS	2	1	0	25	0	2	30
MR3	AN XUYEN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	BA XUYEN	1	0	0	4	0	0	5
	BAC LIEU	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	CHUONG THIEN	0	0	0	6	0	0	6
	KIEN GIANG	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
	PHONG DINH	0	0	0	1	0	2	3
	SA DEC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	VINH BINH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	VINH LONG	0	0	0	1	0	1	2
	PHU QUOC SZ	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
	MR3 TOTALS	1	0	0	16	0	3	20
MR 4	TOTALS	3	1	0	41	0	5	50

KEY: AMB - Ambush HF - Harassing Fire TA - Terrorist Activity
 GA - Ground Attack SAB - Sabotage T - Total
 ABF - Attack By Fire

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APPENDICES:

I. Enemy-Initiated Incidents by Types of Targets

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

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 ACoS, G2

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APPENDIX I (Enemy-Initiated Incidents by Types of Targets) to ANNEX A to
DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71.



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ANNEX B (Strength and Dispositions) to DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71

UNIT	STRENGTH	DATE/LOC LAST CONTACT	DATE/LAST PROB LOCATION
1 NVA Div			
Headquarters	100	No Contact	10Aug/VT 39 23
101D Regt			
Headquarters	350	No Contact	08Aug/VT 40 09
Z7 MF Bn	160	Jan70/VT 48 67	Poss w/Hq
Z3 MF Bn	200	Jan70/VT 43 67	Poss w/Hq
Z9 MF Bn	235/ 945	Jan70/VT 48 67	17Apr/UT 70 00
52 Regt			
Headquarters	300	No Contact	12Aug/VT 47 87
Z4 MF Bn	400	No Contact	Poss w/Hq
Z5 MF Bn	400	No Contact	Poss w/Hq
Z6 MF Bn	400/1500	No Contact	Poss w/Hq
E3 Regt			
Headquarters	250	No Contact	10Apr/VT 51 17
410 MF Bn	350	No Contact	10Apr/VT 50 75
D5 MF Spr Bn	250	No Contact	10Apr/VT 50 10
D9 MF Bn	300/1150	No Contact	10Apr/VS 30 79
Z22 MF Arty Bn	300	No Contact	Poss w/1 Div Hq
Z24 MF AA Bn	300	No Contact	Poss w 1/Div Hq
Z25 MF Engr Bn	200	No Contact	Poss w/1 Div Hq
Z26 MF Sig Bn	180	No Contact	Poss w/1 Div Hq
Z27 MF Trans Bn	200	No Contact	Poss w/1 Div Hq
D4 MF Spr Bn	225	No Contact	17Apr/VT 55 17
D5 MF Spr Bn	255	No Contact	17Apr/VT 55 10
211 Arty Regt			
Headquarters	220	No Contact	17Apr/WU 19 03
Z5 MF Arty Bn	200	No Contact	10Apr/WT 62 95
Z10 MF Arty Bn	200	No Contact	17Apr/WU 36 12
Z16 MF Arty Bn	200/ 820	No Contact	30May/WT 03 67
88 NVA Regt			
Headquarters	280	06Aug/WT 50 54	06Aug/WT 50 54
K7 MF Inf Bn	300	27Jul/WT 39 31	27Jul/WT 37 31
K8 MF Inf Bn	unk	No Contact	Poss w/Hq
K9 MF Inf Bn	230	08Jan/WT 61 36	03Jan/WT 61 36
K10 MF Spr Bn	60/ 870+	No Contact	NW of SVAY RIENG
MR2			
Headquarters	420	Oct70/WT 66 13	10Aug/WT 73 80
DT1 Regt			
Headquarters	280	06Jun/XS 24 53	13Sep/XS 21 40
261A MF Bn	150	15Apr/XS 15 65	25Sep/XS 03 54
261B MF Bn	120	Sep70/XS 26 40	25Sep/XS 19 45
269B MF Spr Bn	150/ 700	Nov70/XS 30 43	16Aug/XS 44 46
295 MF Bn	130	Aug70/WT 26 04	Aug70/WT 25 13
309 MF Arty Bn	130	Mar70/XS 44 11	27Jan/XS 41 47
271 Bn	80	No Contact	CAMBODIA

GROUP 4 DECLASSIFIED ON 26 SEP 33 DOD DIR 5200.10.....

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ANNEX B (Strength and Dispositions) to DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

D16 Trans Bn	195	No Contact	CAMBODIA
341X MF Bn	60	Jan70/XS 00 65	28Jan/XS 30 52
267B MF Bn	120	07Jul/XS 41 46	08Jul/XS 41 46
VC AN GIANG			
510 LF Bn	350	No Contact	14Jun/WT 13 19
512 LF Bn	250	Mar70/WT 15 09	03Sep/VS 91 57
VC BEN TRE			
516 LF Bn	160	18Sep/XS 57 22	25Sep/XS 50 26
560 LF Bn	112	09Apr/XS 43 31	25Sep/XS 43 26
516C LF Bn	150	No Contact	05 Jun/XR 78 98
263 LF Bn	140	Sep70/XS 50 15	25Sep/XS 51 36
VC CAO LANH			
502 LF Bn	150	04Mar/WS 34 35	25Sep/WS 31 57
713 MF Bn*	30	No Contact	KIEN VAN (D), MY AN (D)
VC GO CONG			
514A LF Bn	50	Apr70/XS 63 45	21Aug/XS 66 41
VC MOC HOA			
504 LF Bn	110	14Mar/XS 06 64	11Sep/XS 04 67
VC MY THO			
207 LF Spr Bn	100	Dec70/XS 47 47	Dec70/XS 47 47
514C LF Bn	163	04Feb/XS 30 52	25Sep/XS 30 52
Cmd Ele 83 NVA Regt	100	No Contact	CAI BE (D)
K7 MF Inf Bn	150	No Contact	CAI BE (D)
G26 Spr Co/K10 Spr Bn	30	No Contact	CAI BE (D)
MR3			
Headquarters	310	09Sep/VR 37 51	25Sep/VR 99 52
D1 Regt			
Headquarters	349	20May/WR 44 69	07Aug/WR 40 53
303 MF Bn	110	16Jul/WR 57 60	25Sep/WR 33 70
309 MF Bn	123/ 537	19May/WR 42 63	25Sep/WR 44 67
D2 Regt			
Headquarters	204	30Jun/VR 96 43	25Sep/WR 11 69
Z7 MF Bn	100	25Jul/WR 15 45	25Sep/VR 99 57
Z8 MF Bn	92	11Jul/WR 22 33	25Sep/WR 12 42
Z9 MF Bn	132	23Jun/VR 23 36	25Sep/WR 06 37
Z10 MF Spr Bn	104/ 632	25Jul/WR 21 50	25Sep/WR 10 52
D3 Regt			
Headquarters	230	Apr70/XS 17 05	27Aug/XR 14 87
306 MF Bn	190	23Mar/XS 33 05	11Sep/XS 28 07
308 MF Bn	53	28Mar/XS 32 05	25Sep/XS 39 04
312 MF Bn	143/ 616	Sep70/XS 23 03	25Sep/XS 17 10
95A NVA Regt			
Headquarters	340	25Mar/WQ 11 93	01Jun/VQ 92 92
Z7 MF Bn	143	09Jun/VR 34 40	25Sep/VR 36 27
Z8 MF Bn	134	04Sep/VR 33 32	23Sep/VR 96 31
Z9 MF Bn	230/ 847	03Sep/VR 34 37	25Sep/VR 34 41
18B NVA Regt			
Headquarters	420	No Contact	11Sep/VR 89 75

* This unit is currently held in an unconfirmed probable status by
DRAC G2 and ARVN MR 4 G2.

B-2

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ANNEX B (Strength and Dispositions) to DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

Z4 MF Bn	224	Jul70/WS 02 73	25Sep/VR 93 79
Z5 MF Bn	145	14Jun/VR 92 84	25Sep/VR 37 79
Z6 MF Bn	265	18May/WR 29 94	25Sep/WR 10 70
Z28 MF Spr Bn	194/1248	Sep69/WS 03 63	25Sep/WR 10 80
DOAN 6 Arty Sect			
Headquarters	25	No Contact	U MINH Area
2311 MF Arty Bn	137	06Mar/VR 94 65	25Sep/WR 44 85
2315 MF Arty Bn	110	03July/WR 03 72	25Sep/WR 07 73
DOAN 8 Spr Sect			
Headquarters	25	No Contact	U MINH Area
2012 MF Spr Bn	111	16Jun/VR 92 82	26Jun/VR 95 79
2014 MF Spr Bn	76	No Contact	26Jun/VR 39 47
2016 MF Spr Bn	47	No Contact	19Aug/VR 32 05
3173 MF Bn	150	20Jun/VR 99 46	07Aug/VR 96 48
307 MF Bn	140	18May/VR 95 80	03Jul/VR 97 89
962 RR Svc Bn	200	Jul69/WR 66 01	26Feb/WQ 43 95
410 Trans Bn	200	No Contact	KIEN GIANG (P)
195 Trans Bn	140	No Contact	24Apr/VS 75 49
196 Trans Bn	150	No Contact	CAMBODIA
T70 Tng Bn	164	No Contact	10Jun/VR 99 47
VC CA MAU			
U MINH 2 LF Bn	159	18May/WQ 34 97	21Sep/VQ 97 85
VC CAN THO			
TAY DO 1 LF Bn	150	Dec70/WR 30 82	17Sep/WR 78 98
VC RACH GIA			
U MINH 10 LF Bn	129	01May/WR 44 94	25Sep/WR 33 83
VC SOC TRANG			
764A LF Bn	168	01Mar/WR 99 43	02Sep/WR 91 33
VC TRA VINH			
501 LF Bn	120	Sep70/XR 51 61	25Sep/XR 30 78
VC VINH LONG			
857A LF Bn	70	Nov70/WS 97 14	23Sep/WS 96 24

Comments on the data in this annex are encouraged and should be submitted to DRAC G2, ATTN: CIIIB.

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MG

APPENDICES:

- I. Organization of Enemy Main Force Units in MR 4/CAMBODIA
- II. Organization of Enemy Local Force Units in MR 4

OFFICIAL:

Martinez
MARTINEZ, LTC
ACofS, G2


B-3

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APPENDIX I (Organisation of Enemy Main Force Units in MR4/CAMBODIA to ANNEX B to DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71



* Units depicted in this Appendix with broken lines are currently held in the category of unconfirmed probable by DRAC CII03 pending the receipt of further intelligence data confirming their existence.

GROUP 4 DECLASSIFIED ON 26 SEP 83 DOD DIR 5200.10.....


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GROUP 4 DECLASSIFIED ON 26 SEP 83 DOD DIR 5200.10.....

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APPENDIX II (Organization of Enemy Local Force Units in MH 4) to ANNEX B to DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71



* The 713 Bn is currently held in the category of unconfirmed probable pending the receipt of further intelligence data to confirm its existence.

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ANNEX C (Combined Sensor/Air Surveillance Operations) to DRAC PERINTREP
NR 39-71

1. (C) Unattended Ground Sensors: During the past week, sensor activations decreased from 92 to 72. Of the 72 activations, 53 were attributed to enemy movement. All but one of these were reacted to with artillery or mortar fire. As in the past, no battle damage assessment was conducted. In the 21st Div AO, a new monitoring site was established at BIEN NHE (VR 395 371), but no activations were reported. The number of active sensors decreased sharply, from 794 to 701. Three monitoring sites reported all of their sensor fields under water. They are located at VINH GIA, MY AN and CAI CAI. AS the Navy sites are utilizing the last of their phase one sensors prior to converting to phase three sensor equipment, it is expected that the number of active sensors will decrease for the next three weeks and then show a sharp increase.

2. (C) Aerial Surveillance: There were 11 Infrared (RED HAZE) sorties, 14 Side-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) sorties, and no photographic reconnaissance sorties flown by the 73rd Surveillance Airplane Company (SAC) in support of MR 4 objectives during the reporting period. Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) flew 6 photographic reconnaissance sorties in support of MR 4 objectives during the reporting period.

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APPENDICES:

I. Enemy Caused Sensor String Activations

OFFICIAL:




MARTINEZ, LTC
ACofS, G2

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APPENDIX I (Enemy Caused Sensor String Activations) to ANNEX C to
DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71



KEY:

Letters Designate Sensor Sites

s - Same number activations as previous week

i - An increase in activations over previous week

d - A decrease in activations from the previous week

n - No active sensors at site

. - Activations (number indicates total for week if more than one)

* - Location of activations not available

OFFICIAL:

Martinez
MARTINEZ, LTC
ACofS, G2

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GROUP 4 DECLASSIFIED ON 26 SEP 83 DOD DIR 5200.10.....

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ANNEX D (CLIMATOLOGICAL OUTLOOK FOR MILITARY REGION 4) to DRAG PERINTREP
NR 39-71

OCTOBER 1971

The following climatological outlook is furnished by Detachment 32,
5th Weather Squadron, Long Binh AI, Republic of Vietnam.

INTRODUCTION: MR 4 will experience a transition season during the month of October. Neither monsoonal system is predominate during this month. As the month progresses, periods of dominance by the southwest monsoon become less and less. By the end of the month, the northeast monsoon is the main factor influencing the weather in MR 4.

TEMPERATURES: Over MR 4, temperatures are 2 to 4°F cooler during October than in September. Mean daily maximum temperatures range from 84 to 88°F. Mean daily minimum temperatures range from 74 to 77°F.

TEMPERATURES

<u>STATION</u>	<u>EXTREME MAXIMUM</u>	<u>MEAN MAXIMUM</u>	<u>MEAN MINIMUM</u>	<u>EXTREME MINIMUM</u>
Can Tho	94	87	75	66
Quan Long	92	86	76	71
Rach Gia	91	87	77	71
Soc Trang	93	85	76	71
Vinh Long	93	87	77	72

PRECIPITATION: The decreasing influence of the southwest monsoon brings about an abrupt change to the precipitation regime between September and October. There is considerable variation in October rainfall from one year to the next and from one location to another. Precipitation occurs on more than 17 days over most of MR 4. The mean monthly rainfall in MR 4 ranges from 6 to 12 inches. The extreme monthly maximum is near 26 inches and the extreme monthly minimum is near 3 inches.

PRECIPITATION

<u>STATION</u>	<u>MEAN NUMBER DAYS RAIN</u>	<u>T-STORMS</u>	<u>MONTHLY MAXIMUM INCHES</u>	<u>MONTHLY MEAN INCHES</u>	<u>MONTHLY MINIMUM INCHES</u>
Can Tho	17	8	19.5	10.4	5.3
Quan Long	20	7	22.0	12.4	5.8
Rach Gia	17	11	16.3	10.5	4.3
Soc Trang	19	5	25.2	11.2	4.0
Vinh Long	19	10	16.6	9.4	4.1

D-1

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ANNEX D (Climatological Outlook for Military Region 4) to DRAC PERINTREP
NR 39-71 (CONT)

LIGHT DATA FOR CAN THO

OCTOBER 1971

DATE	BMCT	SR	SS	EECT	MR	MS	%ILLUM	PHASE
1	0626	0648	1848	1909	1610	0320	83	
2	-	-	1847	1908	1657	0417	91	
3	-	-	1846	1907	1743	0514	96	
4	-	-	1846	1907	1831	0611	99	
5	-	-	1845	1906	1920	0710	100	Full Moon
6	-	-	1845	1906	2013	0811	96	
7	-	-	1845	1906	2109	0914	91	
8	-	-	1844	1906	2208	1017	83	
9	-	-	1843	1905	2308	1120	73	
10	-	-	1843	1905	XXXX	1219	63	
11	-	-	1842	1904	0008	1314	52	Last Half
12	-	-	1841	1903	0104	1402	42	
13	-	-	1841	1903	0157	1446	32	
14	-	-	1841	1903	0246	1526	24	
15	-	-	1840	1902	0332	1603	16	
16	-	-	1840	1902	0416	1639	10	
17	-	-	1839	1901	0500	1715	5	
18	-	-	1838	1900	0543	1751	2	
19	-	-	1838	1900	0628	1829	0	New Moon
20	-	-	1838	1900	0714	1909	1	
21	-	-	1838	1900	0803	1952	3	
22	-	-	1837	1859	0854	2039	7	
23	-	-	1837	1859	0947	2130	12	
24	-	-	1836	1858	1040	2223	19	
25	-	-	1836	1858	1133	2318	28	
26	-	-	1835	1857	1224	XXXX	37	
27	-	-	1835	1857	1314	0014	47	First Half
28	-	-	1835	1857	1401	0109	58	
29	-	-	1835	1857	1447	0204	69	
30	-	-	1834	1856	1532	0258	79	
31	-	-	1834	1856	1618	0354	88	

BMCT & SR remain the same through the month.

D-3

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ANNEX D (Climatological Outlook for Military Region 4) to DRAG PERINTREP
NR 39-71 (CONT)

TIDE DATA FOR CAN THO

OCTOBER 1971

DATE	TIME	HT FT	TIME	HT FT	TIME	HT FT	TIME	HT FT
1	0358	9.4	1108	10.3	1343	8.6	2235	4.7
2	0422	9.8	1146	9.1	1508	9.4	2336	4.5
3	0448	10.1	1221	7.8	1614	10.2		
4	0027	4.7	0512	10.5	1256	6.4	1711	10.6
5	0111	5.2	0537	10.9	1332	4.7	1804	11.1
6	0149	6.0	0601	11.0	1409	3.5	1856	11.2
7	0226	6.8	0626	11.2	1446	2.9	1949	11.2
8	0301	7.8	0650	10.9	1527	2.4	2049	10.7
9	0335	9.0	0714	10.9	1611	2.5	2151	10.1
10	0411	10.0	0738	10.6	1659	3.0	2310	9.6
11	0450	10.8	0801	10.1	1754	3.9		
12	0054	9.2	0548	11.4	0820	9.4	1901	4.7
13	0226	9.4	0759	11.6	0806	8.9	2026	5.5
14	0318	9.4	1142	10.6	1252	8.1	2152	6.0
15	0350	9.6	1144	9.5	1445	8.6	2300	6.2
16	0413	9.8	1205	8.5	1552	9.1	2350	6.5
17	0433	9.8	1228	7.3	1644	9.7		
18	0030	6.8	0452	10.2	1253	6.2	1726	10.2
19	0103	7.3	0509	10.4	1318	5.3	1805	10.2
20	0132	7.7	0526	10.5	1343	4.5	1840	10.4
21	0200	8.3	0544	10.7	1470	4.0	1916	10.7
22	0227	8.0	0600	10.6	1438	3.5	1956	10.7
23	0253	9.5	0618	10.6	1508	3.4	2040	10.4
24	0321	10.1	0637	10.7	1542	3.4	2134	10.1
25	0350	10.8	0658	10.6	1622	3.7	2245	9.9
26	0429	11.4	0722	10.2	1710	4.2		
27	0015	9.7	0533	11.8	0750	10.1	1809	4.7
28	0137	10.1	0727	11.8	0831	9.4	1921	5.3
29	0224	9.9	0947	11.0	1117	8.6	2043	6.0
30	0258	10.2	1038	9.6	1357	8.9	2201	6.3
31	0324	10.4	1116	8.2	1517	9.7	2305	6.6

D-4

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NR 39-71 (CONT)

ANNEX D (Climatological Outlook for Military Region 4) to DRAG PERINTREP

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ANNEX E (October 1971 Calendar) to DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71

1. Introduction: The purpose of the following calendar is to provide a list of all important VC/NVA holidays which may be utilized as an aid in anticipating enemy highpoints involved in commemoration of these holidays.

2. The calendar shows two dates, the Western (Gregorian) and Lunar Calendar dates. The large digits indicate the Western Calendar dates with which we are familiar; the smaller digits indicate the Lunar Calendar dates for the equivalent western dates.

3. Lunisolar Calendar: The Lunisolar Calendar is a measurement of time utilizing characteristics of both the Lunar and Solar Calendars. In ancient times when electrical methods for measuring time were unheard of, people determined months of the year by phases of the moon. This system was based on a $29\frac{1}{2}$ day month or a 12 month, 354 day year. By using this system, however, over the years seasons occurred progressively earlier.

The Solar, or Julian Calendar, disregards the lunar months and assumes a standard length of time for its months. According to this calendar a year is $365\frac{1}{4}$ days long. The balancing factor in this system is the leap year.

In order for an agrarian society, such as the one in VIETNAM, to maintain a relatively standard measurement of time while simultaneously keeping a precise record of moon phases, the Lunisolar Calendar was adopted. This calendar adds a 13th month to a year approximately every three years. When the 13th month is employed, it falls between the 5th and 6th months of the normal year. Although there is no specific information available as to why this extra month is added here, it is probably done so in order to stabilize the more important months during which time harvesting and planting take place. The monthly series then becomes Month 1, Month 2, Month 3, Month 4, Month 5-1, Month 5-2, Month 6, Month 7, and so on through month 12. This year is one in which this extra month is employed.

In analyzing the enemy situation it becomes necessary to understand this difference in recording time because the Lunisolar Calendar is used by both VC and NVA forces. If the enemy plans for an attack during the 9th month of the year it is necessary to realize the effect of this calendar to estimate the correct date.

4. The new phase of the moon, when the night is the darkest, marks the beginning of the new Lunar Month. In this case, it applies to 19 September when the first day of the month occurs. The 15th day of the Lunar month (3 October on the Western Calendar) always marks the full moon. (Ref: ANNEX G (Calendar of Important Vietnamese Holidays and Dates) to II FFORCEV PERINTREP NR 52-70)

E-1

ANNEX E (October 1971 Calendar) to DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

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ANNEX E (October 1971 Calendar) to DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

OCTOBER 1971

19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

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ANNEX E (October 1971 Calendar) to DRAG PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

19 September (1st Day, 8th Month) New moon occurs at this time.

1 October (13th Day, 8th Month) People's Republic of CHINA National Day. National Day in the People's Republic of CHINA signifies the fall of the KUOMINTANG and the beginning of the communist government under the leadership of MAO TSE-TUNG. The People's Republic of CHINA recognized the government of HO CHI MINH in January 1950. In February of the same year the Democratic Republic of VIETNAM began to receive assistance from the People's Republic, when General LO KWEI-PO arrived in VIETNAM to advise the VIET MINH. (1949)

3 October (15th Day, 8th Month) Activation Date of World Trade Union (1945 NVN) Mid-Autumn Festival (RVN)

10 October (22 Day, 8th Month) HANOI Liberation Day. On October 10 1954, the VIET MINH army of HO CHI MINH marched into HANOI following the withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Forces, in accordance with the GENEVA Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities.

19 October (1st Day, 9th Month) New moon occurs at this time. Representatives of the NLFSVN Visit HANOI. In October 1962, a delegation from the National Liberation Front for SOUTH VIETNAM headed by NGUYEN VAN HIEU, Secretary General of the NLF Central Committee visited HANOI. Their visit signified the first overt visit of NLFSVN personnel to the Democratic Republic of VIETNAM.

20 October (2nd Day, 9th Month) Establishment of the VIETNAM Women's Union. The VIETNAM Women's Union has been instrumental in helping to spread propaganda and influence of the LAO DONG Party and enforcing the new family life. Membership figures are available on the organization. (1946 NVN)

29 October (11th Day, 9th Month) Death of a Revolutionary PHAN BOI CHAU. PHAN BOI CHAU was a scholar who played an important part in the formation of the first military and political cadres for the fight to restore national sovereignty. He was born in 1867 in NGHE AN Province and by the time he was 19 years old, he had joined the anti-FRENCH movement. CHAU passed his Baccalaureate at the age of 33 but quit school to go into politics and soon became an expert on information and propaganda. In 1905, he went to Japan and had the opportunity to meet the political figures of JAPAN and CHINA. While there, CHAU wrote numerous pamphlets urging students and youth to go abroad for their education in preparation for liberation of the homeland. In 1908, the Japanese forced the extradition of all Vietnamese citizens because of their revolutionary movement. CHAU, like many Vietnamese revolutionaries, headed for CHINA where he set up a revolutionary organization, called VIETNAM QUANG PHUC HOI. Because of his work, a bombing incident

E-3

ANNEX E (October 1971 Calendar) to DRAG PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

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ANNEX E (October 1971 Calendar) to DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

took place in HANOI and the province chief of THAI BINH was assassinated, which resulted in CHAU being sentenced to death in absentia. The French were successful in bribing the Chinese Governor of HANGCHOW to imprison CHAU, but after World War I, the governor lost his post and CHAU was released. In 1917, after the attempted assassination of Governor General Merlin and the THAI NGUYEN uprising the French increased their efforts to capture CHAU. The French succeeded in kidnapping CHAU in CHINA and bringing him to HANOI for trial. CHAU was sentenced to death on 23 November 1925, but due to the nationwide movements for his release the French reduced his sentence to house arrest in HUE. Even though he was deprived of his liberty he kept active in the fight against colonialism through his writing. On 29 October 1940, PHAN BOI CHAU died in a small hamlet on the Perfume River near HUE.

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E-4

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ANNEX F (Base Area Reconfigurations) to DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71

The purpose of this annex is to provide Delta-wide dissemination of currently known information on the location of present VC/NVA Base Areas and a brief analyst's summary.

Base Area 400 - Reconfigured.

Location: VS 939 619, VS 992 542, VS 980 520, WS 030 450, VS 960 450, VS 870 570.

Summary: Overall enemy activity increased during the last quarter of 1970, decreased during the first quarter of 1971, and decreased further during the second quarter of 1971. The base area continues to be used as a transshipment center and depot for logistical infiltration from CAMBODIA; as a rest and training area for personnel infiltrating into MR 4, and as a support base for units operating in northwestern Military Region 4. The heavily vegetated, mountainous terrain and numerous caves provide the enemy both cover and concealment affording him excellent sanctuary. Early in the fourth quarter of 1970, the Z5 MF Inf Bn/18B NVA Regt infiltrated into the base area, while both the Hq/1 NVA Div and the 512 LF Bn (VC) AN GIANG Province, exfiltrated to the area west of Base Area 704 in CAMBODIA. The 18B NVA Regt continued to maintain its headquarters in the base area, as well as its four subordinate infantry battalions. During the first quarter of 1971, the Z4 MF Inf Bn, and possibly elements of the Z23 Spr and Z5 MF Inf Bns, all of the 18B NVA Regt, exfiltrated from the base area to the U MINH Forest. In the middle of the first quarter, the 512 LF Bn infiltrated back into the base area. During the second quarter of 1971, the Hq, Z6, and Z7 Bns of the 18B NVA Regt exfiltrated from the base area to the U MINH Forest, leaving only the 512 LF Bn to occupy the base area. During the last quarter of 1970, enemy activity within the base area remained at a high level with the exception of NUI CAM where elements of the 9th ARVN Div had begun construction of a fire support base and a helicopter landing pad. Enemy activity on NUI CAM declined significantly in November and December. During the first quarter of 1971, enemy activity decreased slightly over that of the previous quarter. Enemy activity on NUI CAM continued to decrease, while the two southern mountains (NUI GIAI and NUI CO TO) maintained a relatively high degree of enemy activity. During the second quarter of 1971, overall enemy activity within the base area dropped significantly, and enemy activity on NUI CAM was virtually nonexistent. For the Fifteenth Revision, the base area was reconfigured so as to delete the northeastern portion of the old base area including NUI CAM. This new configuration reflects the pacification achieved as a result of operations of the 9th ARVN Div and the construction of three fire support bases within the base area in vicinity of NUI CAM Mountain, located in the northeastern extension.

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ANNEX F (Base Area Reconfigurations) to DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

Base Area 470 - Reconfigured.

Location: WS 870 480, WS 920 580, WS 946 590, WS 990 540, XS 120 650, XS 190 550, WS 940 440.

Summary: Base Area 470 was reconfigured deleting the southern edge and a portion along the northern boundary of the old base area. This new configuration reflects the pacification achieved as a result of the construction of a fire support base at MY THI, garrisoned by the 12th Regt/7th ARVN Division, increased Regional Force outposting, and relocation of HOA HAO populace within the outlying border of the old base area. Despite continued difficulties in effecting logistical infiltration from CAMBODIA, Base Area 470 remains the center of enemy activity in (VC) MR2. Supplies and personnel infiltrated into the base area from CAMBODIA are distributed to units operating in eastern (VC) MR2. Some personnel and material continue to move between Base Areas 470 and 490. Early in the fourth quarter of 1970, the 341X MF Spr Bn moved from the base area to the vicinity of MY THO in eastern DINH TUONG Province. There has been recent evidence that during the first quarter of 1971 the 27, 28, and 210 Bns of the 88th NVA Regt have been resubordinated to act as cadre and fillers for local force units in VINH LONG, VINH BINH and KIEN HOA Provinces. The Delta Regional Assistance Command Order of Battle Section currently holds the Headquarters and the 29 Inf Bn of the 88th NVA Regt in CAMBODIA, northwest of SVAY RIENG.

Base Area 482 - Reconfigured.

Location: VQ 783 780, VQ 900 830, VQ 960 650, WQ 960 830, VQ 840 780, WQ 050 650, WQ 050 690 along CUA LON River to WR 350 023, Wq 470 950.

Summary: Base Area 482 was reconfigured deleting the northern edge of the old base area. This new configuration reflects the pacification achieved, in part, as a result of the establishment of the UNITED STATES Naval complex at NAM CAN, with its floating fire support base, sweep operations conducted by the 21st ARVN Division, and the outposting of that area along the northeastern edge of the old base area. The overall level of enemy activity recorded in 1970 and thus far in 1971 has remained relatively low. This continued low level of reported enemy activity is most likely attributed to the fact that the enemy characteristically operates in small units, most of which are engaged in rear service rather than tactical activity. Furthermore, the dense vegetation and absence of friendly personnel are great handicaps for intelligence collection. The only major Allied operation in the mangrove forested areas continues to be Operation Seafloat, which consists of river patrols along the CUA LON and BO DE Rivers. There has been recent evidence of substantial seaward infiltration into the mangroved areas of Base Area 482. As well,

F-2

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ANNEX F (Base Area Reconfigurations) to DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

numerous HOI CHANH and agent reports have indicated that the 962 Rear Service Group is responsible for moving logistics infiltrated by sea northward to enemy personnel in the NAM CAN/U MINH areas. This recent emphasis upon seaward infiltration is reportedly an outgrowth of continuing difficulties by the enemy in infiltrating logistics by land from CAMBODIA.

Base Area 483 - Reconfigured.

Location: VR 860 770, VR 960 890, WR 020 390, WR 020 760, WR 260 750, WR 260 600, WR 030 360, WR 050 360, WR 050 090, VR 795 090.

Summary: Base Area 483 was reconfigured deleting the southeastern edge and adding the "HUMP" area in the northernmost coastal portion. This new configuration in the deleted portion reflects the pacification progress resulting, in part, from extensive Regional and Popular Force outposting and the relocation of the civilian populace along the southeastern boundary of the previous base area configuration. The addition of the "HUMP" area in the northernmost coastal portion was based upon extensive logistical, cache and transshipment activity via seaborne infiltration, and the infiltration corridor and staging area it has provided enemy units. Base Area 483 remains the center of enemy activity in VIET CONG Military Region 3. This area (U MINH) has historically been an enemy stronghold, with the dense vegetation providing a secure storage, training, and staging area. Personnel and material are infiltrated into the base area from the Cambodian border of Western MR3, as well as by sea through access of the eastern coastline including the "HUMP", and overland from the south via the CAMAU peninsula. This logistic network distributes throughout eastern and southern (VC) MR3. Early in the fourth quarter of 1970, the Hq/ 95A NVA Regt, the 27 and 28 Bns of the the 95A, and the U MINH 2 LF Bn moved south of the base area to the vicinity of the SONG ONG DOC. During the first and second quarters of 1971, the 18B NVA Regt infiltrated into the U MINH Forest from their normal area of operations in the Seven Mountains Region. Captured documents and agent reports have indicated that the mission of the 18B Regt is to help the D2 MF Regt counter the pressure of the 21st ARVN Division's continuing U MINH Campaign. The U MINH Campaign is a 7000 man operation launched by the 21 ARVN Div against the U MINH Forest stronghold on 1 December 1970. The campaign was to have two phases. During the first phase, numerous OPs and four permanent fire support bases were to be constructed which would be capable of delivering supporting artillery fires throughout the U MINH Forest. During the second phase, Regional and Popular forces were to occupy the outposts and fire bases, freeing the maneuver battalions of the 21 Div for a mobile combat role. As of 1 May 71, the campaign entered its second phase, the fire bases are presently functioning, and the 21 Div is currently attempting to turn the campaign over to RF/PF

F-3

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ANNEX F (Base Area Reconfigurations) to DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

units. The campaign gives every indication of being very successful, but with the recent infiltration of the 18B NVA Regt, the enemy has indicated his intention to regain control of the U MINH and a significant enemy threat still exists in the region.

Base Area 487 - No Change.

Location: XS 367 131, XS 460 050, XS 390 020, XS 346 090.

Summary: Base Area 487 continues to be used as a base for local force units operating in the VINH LONG/VINH BINH Province boundary area. Late in the first quarter of 1971, this area experienced a significant increase in enemy activity which has been maintained to date. The D3 Regt and its three subordinate bns continue to operate in and around the base area.

Base Area 490 - Reconfigured.

Location: XS 480 188, XS 512 250, XS 540 210, XS 558 236, along HL 188 to XS 526 260, XS 550 274, XS 578 275, XS 613 247, XS 612 217, XS 575 188, XS 530 120.

Summary: Base Area 490 has been reconfigured deleting a portion along the northwestern boundary of the old base area. This new configuration reflects the pacification achieved, in part, as a result of the construction of a fire support base in the vicinity of PHUOC LONG, the collocation of the 10th Regt/7th ARVN Div, and the increased Regional and Popular Force outposting. This base area has been traditionally used as a support base and staging area for the 516th and 560th VC LF Bns as well as other local force units of KIEN HOA Province. Early in the fourth quarter of 1970, the 560th LF Bn moved to the northwest where it is currently held, in MO CAY District. Documents captured late in the first quarter of 1971 indicate that the DT2 MF Inf Regt has been disbanded and its subordinate units have been resubordinated. The 263rd MF Inf Bn has been resubordinated to the (VC) BEN TRE Province Committee and is currently carried by DRAC G2 as the 263 LF Bn. This latter unit is currently held within the base area. The VC Infrastructure is particularly active and influential in and around the base area, and concentrates its efforts at countering the GVN Pacification Program through political, economic, and terrorist activity. This area has been traditionally the home of hard-core Communist leaders since VIET MINH days, and in 1960, saw the founding of the National Liberation Front.

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ANNEX F (Base Area Reconfigurations) to DRAC PERINTREP NR 39-71 (CONT)

APPENDICES:

I. New and Old Base Area Map

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
MARTINEZ, LTC
ACofS, G2

P-5

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APPENDIX I (MR4 New and Old Base Area Map) to ANNEX F to DRAC PERINTREP
NR 39-71



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Martinez

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APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX F TO
AATTV REPORT OCT 71

REPORT BY CAPT W.M. McLAUGHLIN
TEAM LEADER - NOTT BAC LIEU

Training

1. 5/71 Squad Leaders Course.
 - a. This course marched in on 20 Sep 71 with a total strength of 45 PF soldiers (see Sep monthly report).
 - b. The course graduated on Wed 6 Oct 71. Unfortunately the standard of this course was not particularly high.
2. NOTT Instructor Course (VN).
 - a. In line with the current phase down of Australian troops a directive was issued by the C.G. MR4 (MSG# 06418/6/HL/T) to the effect that Australian NOTT instructors would train 20 ARVN officers and senior NCOs to take over the Night Operations Training that has been previously conducted by the Australians.
 - b. One of two courses was conducted at Bac Lieu from 18-24 Oct 71.
 - c. The students comprised:
 - (1) 21 ARVN Div Trg Centre;
 - 1xCapt
 - 1xLt
 - 1x2Lt
 - 2xSgts
 - (2) Chi Lang Trg Centre;
 - 1xCapt
 - 1xLt
 - 1x2Lt
 - 2xSgts
 - d. The students were of a high standard.

Assistance Phase

3. Due to the instructors course being conducted 18-24 Oct 71 the Kien Giang Asst phase was reduced to one week.
4. The phase was conducted from 11-16 Oct 71.

.../5.

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Personnel

5. I.C. Team WO1 D.E. Wise
Member WO2 K.J. Prior
Member WO2 B. Elphick
Interpreter SFC Phong

6. During the phase 12 outposts were visited. (Proforma for asst phase previously forwarded to HQ MR4 Can Tho).

Interpreters

7. The situation has improved considerably and the team currently has two (2) interpreters. (A third interpreter was dismissed for insubordination to team members).

Visitors

8. Visitors over the period were:

a. 25 Sep 71

Admiral Sir Victor Smith RAN CCOS (Aust)
Maj Gen Dunstan (COMAFV)
Col G.J. Leary (Comd AATTV).

b. 10 Oct 71

Maj Gen Murcheson M.C., E.D. (CMF Memb AHQ)
Col G.J. Leary (Comd AATTV).

c. 12-13 Oct 71

Chap E. Sabel.

Personnel

9. Personnel for the reporting period remains unchanged:

Capt W.M. McLaughlin RAA Team Ldr
WO1 D.E. Wise RAA Team 2IC
WO2 J. Clarke RA Inf Admin WO
WO2 W.C. Date RA Inf Team Member
WO2 B. Elphick RA Inf Team Member
WO2 K.J. Prior RA Inf Team Member

10. WO2 P.R. Conway RAASC returned to Australia, 21 Oct 71 on completion of 12 month tour of duty.

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APPENDIX 4 TO
ANNEX F TO
AATTV REPORT OCT 71

REPORT BY CAPT R.M. MOUNTFORT
TEAM LEADER, NOTT DONG TAM

General

1. The period this report covers was devoted to a course for Squad Leaders from Kien Phong Province, a weeks Assistance Phase in Vinh Long Province and a week long cadre course for Vietnamese officers and NCOs.

Squad Leaders Course - (22 Sep-6 Oct 71)

2. There were 38 students and one Liaison Officer on this course. The first few days of the course were observed by the Kien Phong NOAT consisting of one American Officer and one NCO, one Vietnamese Officer and an Interpreter. The course was run without significant problems. The Graduation Parade was held before Brig Gen Man CG 7 ARVN Div and other guests.

Assistance Phase - (10-16 Oct 71)

3. The only districts of Vinh Long Province visited in the weeks Assistance Phase were Chau Thanh and Vung Liem. Comments and observations on the Assistance Phase were the same as those from other assistance phases in the past.

Cadre Course - (18-24 Oct 71)

4. This course was attended by 5 officers and NCOs from 7 ARVN Div Training Centre, 5 officers and NCOs from Cao Lanh, and 4 members of the Police Field Force from Dinh Tuong Sector. The course was run without significant problems.

Administration

6. a. Course. There were no problems with the course administration.

b. Team.

(1) The Team vehicles are in poor condition but it is hoped that they can be kept mobile until the teams withdraw.

(2) During the reporting period the team was visited by Chaplain Simpson, Admiral Sir Victor Smith, Maj Gen Muchison, and Chaplain Sabel in addition to Brig Gen Nam, Col Uyen, Dr Evans and the other guests who all attended the Graduation Parade for the Kien Phong students, on 6 October 1971.

.../Personnel

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Personnel

7. The following movement of team personnel took place in the reporting period:

28 Sep, WO Cootes left the team for RTNZ.

22 Oct, Capt Sherriff arrived.

Interpreters

8. a. Sgt 1st Class Mai's daughter died. Sgt Mai is also moving his family from Saigon to My Tho.
- b. It is requested that when the association of Sgt An and Sgt Mai is terminated a letter be sent to them and to Dinh Tuong Sector, thanking them for their loyal service.

Problems

9. The problem of jeep servicability is the only significant problem.