

Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV)

Monthly report
February 1972

Series: AWM293 - Australian Army
Training Team Vietnam (AATTV)

Item: [34]

SECRET

FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY
SECRET AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

Headquarters
Australian Army
Assistance Group
VIETNAM

R176-1-1

THIS ITEM IS DECLASSIFIED BY
AUTHORITY, THE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, CANBERRA

29 Mar 72

See Distribution Below.

AATTV MONTHLY REPORT - FEB 72

1. Attached is the AATTV Monthly Report for Feb 72.

Signed by
Capt P.J. Rollinson
For (I.A. GEDDES)
Brigadier
Commander Australian
Army Assistance Group
VIETNAM

Distribution:

Army Headquarters (DMO & P) (2)
Department of Defence JIO (1)
Comd NZATGV (2)
AATTV (2)
Australian Embassy, Saigon (1)

The Esac. - 1
Ops Branch - 2
Pers Branch - 1
Ing - 3
Int - 1
Inf - 1
Mil Hist - 1
Five copy to: Honours
Arty
Inf. (for selection)

Original - HHD. file

SECRET

FOR AUST/NZ EYES ONLY
SECRET AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

HQ AATTV
VAN KIEP

20 Mar 72

HQ AAAGV

AATTV REPORT - FEB 72

USARV Individual Training Group

1. Attached as Annex A is a report from the LONG HAI Training Battalion.
2. Attached as Annex B is a report from the PHUOC TUY Training Battalion.
3. The Australian Group has settled down and is highly regarded by both US Commanding Officers. Already changes to improve training, particularly in command, leadership and signals have been suggested by the Australian welcomed by the Americans and implemented.

JWTC

4. Attached as Annex C is a report from JWTC.

Territorial Forces PHUOC TUY Province

5. Attached as Annex D is a report by the RF/PF Adviser.

AATTV

6. Attached as Annex E is a manning detail of the team as at 29 Feb 72.

Signed by
Capt K.W. Barlow
for (K.H. KIRKLAND)
Lt Col
Acting Commander

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

ANNEX A TO
AATTV REPORT
DATED 20 MAR 72

REPORT ON AATTV DET LHTB
PERIOD 25 JAN - 25 FEB 72

GENERAL

1. Training of all FANK Bns (4) is proceeding satisfactorily, see reports attached as Appx 1 to this report.

The current US curtailment of tours has reduced US training personnel in the programme and resulted in Australian instructors assuming some 70% of the formal training at LHTB. This requirement is being met without difficulty except in mortar training.

PROBLEM AREAS

2. Currently there is a lack of trained mortar instructors in the Training Committee. Future AATTV replacements to this programme would be of great value where they have had previous mortar training.

Once in the programme they will receive the additional training to make them familiar with the 60mm mortar and the 4.2 inch mortar, the latter being used for camp defence.

NEW TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

Feed back information from Cambodia has resulted in the inclusion in the programme of instruction of the following subjects:

- a. 30 Cal MG firing from bunkers - including the use of tripods and range cards.
- b. DZ, selection, marking, reception and security including instruction in the formula for receipt of parachute stores.

A rationalization of some subjects previously taught to battalion's as a class has been undertaken. Only the leaders will receive instruction and TEWTS in these subjects, while the bulk of the battalion receives concurrent training in soldier level subjects.

Examples of subjects to be taught only to the leaders are as follows:

- a. Battalion attack and defense
- b. Break out of an encirclement
- c. Company/Bn link up operations
- d. Retrograde operations
- e. F. O. procedures

.../2

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

ENEMY ACTIVITY

No enemy activity has been directed against LHTB. However two company sized elements are reported to have been located in the Long Hai mountains to the East of this location over the reporting period.

CONCLUSION

The programme at LHTB is proceeding without problems of any significance. Integration of AATTV personnel into the training is complete in all aspects.

<u>Appendices:</u>	1.	Training Report LHTB	30 Jan - 5 Feb 72
	2.	" " "	6 - 12 Feb 72
	3.	" " "	13 - 19 Feb 72
	4.	Biographical Data	

SECRET

USARV ITG LHTB

APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX A TO
R176-1-1 DATED
20 MAR 72

SUBJECT: Training Bn Performance Report Period Covered 30 Jan - 5 Feb 72

PART ONE:

Para 1: 11th Bn (FANK 1st Abn BC, 1st Parachute Bde) (Ethnic Cambodian)

A. STRENGTHS: The 11th battalion is now in the 12th week of training and is preparing for graduation and departure. During the 2nd FTX, the battalion performed in an excellent manner. The construction of defensive positions, and security at night were excellent.

B. WEAKNESSES: None

C. PROBLEM AREAS: Ref LHTB Msg No 232 DTG 261245Z Jan 72, Subject; FANK Bn equipment shortage report.

D. ACTIONS TAKEN: None

E. BN CO: Maj HAY SENG is the best battalion commander with whom the battalion cadre has worked. He is a strong commander, who cares for his mens' health, welfare, and training.

F. BN XO: TAN ROS is an excellent XO and has demonstrated that he is fully qualified to command a battalion.

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 5 OFF 56 NCO'S 451 EM TOTAL: 512

Para 2: 13th Bn (FANK 3rd Abn BC, 1st Parachute Bde) (Ethnic Cambodian)

A. STRENGTHS: High morale, experience and competence of senior NCO's are the strong points of the battalion.

B. WEAKNESSES: Lack of discipline and supervision due to inexperienced officer leadership are the major weaknesses. Once orders are given, not enough is paid to assuring their prompt and efficient execution.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: None

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: Cadre personnel supervised preparations for the second FTX.

E. BN CO: LTC HOEUNG NOU still sets a bad example, shows inadequate supervision, and does not exercise proper control of the troops.

F. BN XO: LT YIN NITH was placed in this position after being relieved as 2nd Company Commander. He is still exhibiting those traits as Bn XO that caused him to be relieved as 2nd Company Commander.

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 14 OFF 35 NCO'S 463 EM TOTAL: 512

Para 3: 19th Bn (FANK 115 BC, 12 Bde) (Ethnic Cambodian)

A. STRENGTHS: At this point in the 19th Battalion training the only inherent strength readily noticed is in the area of leadership. The leaders in general are young but experienced. Their attitude is one of independence and self confidence, however they do respond to instruction and guidance.

SECRET

.../2

SECRET

- 2 -

B. WEAKNESSES: The 19th battalion's major weakness is directly related to its strengths. Their self confidence, independence and prior experience interferes somewhat with their overall attitude toward basic combat training. It is felt that as the cycle progresses this weakness will subside.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: There are no problem areas outside the battalion that restrict its progress or performance.

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: The US cadre of the 19th Bn recognizes the weaknesses mentioned in paragraph B of this report. It is felt that close supervision by the US cadre combined with an effort to work directly through the leaders will eventually prove effective.

E. BN CO: Maj KHY HAK, demonstrates fine leadership traits and a professional knowledge of his military duties. Maj KHY HAK's major weakness noticed at this time is the limitation placed upon him due to wounds.

F. BN XO: 1LT MAO KUN, demonstrates extremely promising traits for becoming a fine commander. LT MAO KUN is young and proud; he sometimes takes guidance given him by the US cadre as a personal affront. When 1LT MAO KUN learns that the guidance given him is to be taken as a learning experience he will become much more effective as a leader.

G. STRENGTHS: 26 OFF 38 NCO'S 451 EM TOTAL: 515

Para 4: 20th Bn (FANK 116 BC, 12 Bde) (Ethnic Cambodian)

A. STRENGTH: In the short time of contact with this battalion it is quite apparent that the leaders have been together for a long time. The battalion commander stated that the majority of the battalion has been together for two years. The battalion has a definite chain of command which is effectively used. Senior NCO's take the initiative to correct the ordinary soldier. The battalion commander seems to be a well experienced officer and he speaks fluent English. Morale is high.

B. WEAKNESSES: The battalion has a sizable number of young soldiers whose ages are considerably under 16.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: Ref LHTB Msg No 232 DTG 261245Z Jan 72, Subject: FANK Bn equipment shortage report.

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: None

E. BN CO: MEY THIRITH, rank Captain; 116 Bn, 12 Bde, 9th Div; DOR: 15 December 1970. CPT THIRITH has had 6 years of prior military service, to include combat experience against Viet Minh (1952-1954) and the NVA/VC since 1970. He has a high school degree, and attended civilian schools in France, the Phillipines and Australia. He is also a graduate of the Khmere Military School and the Malaysian Jungle Warfare School.

F. BN XO: THOU RIN, rank Captain; 116 Bn, 12 Bde, 9th Div; DOR: 28 December 1971. RIN has had 6 years of prior military service, to include combat experience against the Viet Minh (1952-1954) and the NVA/VC since 1970. He has finished civilian secondary school and has graduated from the Khmere Military School.

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 33 OFF 60 NCO'S 382 EM TOTAL: 475

SECRET

.../3

SECRET

- 3 -

Para 5: 21st Bn Ldrs (FANK 271 BC, 22 Bde) (Ethnic Cambodian)

A. STRENGTHS: This is a very well disciplined unit, which is primarily due to the excellence of their commander. They are attentive students who approach instruction enthusiastically.

B. WEAKNESSES: None

C. PROBLEM AREAS: None

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: None

E. BN CO: CPT KIN NINH is doing an excellent job so far in this course, he sets a fine example for his men to follow. His complete authority is obvious, and he displays excellent leadership traits.

F. BN XO: Not in leadership course.

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 12 OFF 31 NCO'S 0 EM TOTAL: 43

Para 6: 23rd Bn Ldrs (FANK 381 BC, 48 Bde) (Ethnic Cambodian)

A. STRENGTHS: The Bn leaders have displayed diligence and enthusiasm toward all aspects of their training. The executive officer is active in his assistance with all aspects of training to date. Minimal attendance for medical attentions has been a characteristic since the first days of the course, when outstanding problems were treated.

B. WEAKNESSES: None

C. PROBLEM AREAS: None

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: None

E. BN CO: Not in leaders' course

F. BN XO: Captain THACH SO VANN is very enthusiastic and participates freely in training.

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 9 OFF 34 NCO'S 0 EM TOTAL: 43

Para 7: Armoured Cavalry Leaders, Class I

A. STRENGTHS: This group is a very steady one, consistent and professional in all aspects of training. The senior adjutant leads the group well; unit cohesive-ness and esprit de corps are strongly evident.

B. WEAKNESSES: No major weakness is evident to date.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: The group is still concerned with returning to Cambodia with weapons.

SECRET

.../4

SECRET

- 4 -

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: The class observed the Vietnamese Armour School range practice being conducted on the Long Hai training battalion ranges. Class members were shown the M48A3 tank, M113 APC, mortar carriers, tracked load carriers, and V100 armoured cars; firing and mobility of the vehicles were demonstrated.

E. BN CO: None

F. BN XO: None

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 6 OFF 14 NCO'S 0 EM TOTAL: 20

SECRET

SECRET

USARV ITG LHTB

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX A TO R176-1-1
DATED 20 MAR 72

SUBJECT: Training Bn Performance Report Period Covered 6 Feb - 12 Feb 72

PART ONE:

Para 1: 13th Bn (FANK 3rd Bn, 1st Para Bde) (Ethnic Cambodian)

A. STRENGTHS: Chief strengths are the high morale of the battalion personnel and the number of highly motivated and experienced senior NCO's.

B. WEAKNESSES: Poor leadership and lack of experience on the part of some of the higher ranking leaders and a resulting low level of discipline in the battalion are its chief weakness.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: None

D. OTHER ACTION TAKEN: Battalion leaders and troops were advised and assisted on the second FTX by the Training Cadre Detachment in order to improve their leadership techniques and procedures.

E. BN CO: LTC Noeng Nou's performance tends to be marred by a poor attitude, little supervision, and lack of attention to detail in planning and execution of assigned tasks.

F. BN XO: Nith Yin has continued his substandard performance in this capacity after being replaced as the Second Company Commander. He did nothing during the second FTX to improve or detract from the Battalion's performance.

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 14 OFF 35 NCO'S 463 EM Total: 512

Para 2: 19th Bn (FANK 115th Bn, 12th Bde)

A. STRENGTHS: Leadership and experience of the overall Battalion at this point is their greatest strength. This leadership, however, has not been utilized to its maximum.

B. WEAKNESSES: The major weakness at this stage of training stems from the lack of support and poor attitude demonstrated by the Battalion Commander and his Executive Officer. The Executive Officer, who is felt to be a capable leader, is not aggressive, and as a general rule, not responsive to the guidance and requirements as set forth by the US Advisor Team working with the Battalion. The rusty weapons allowed by the Commanders manifest this attitude best.

C. PROBLEMS AREAS: None.

D. OTHER ACTION TAKEN: Continued US Cadre critiques, combined with counselling by the newly arrived FANK Liaison Officer, Col Dong Phuon, have resulted in an improvement in the maintenance of the Battalion's weapons.

SECRET

.../2

SECRET

- 2 -

E. BN CO: Major Khy Hak has the leadership ability to effectively lead his men in a commandable military matter. However, up to this point, Major Khy Hak has not chosen to take advantage of the opportunity to lead his soldiers and benefit from the training at Long Hai.

F. BN XO: 1LT Mao Kun has demonstrated he has the mental capability to effectively lead the 19th Battalion. However Lt Kun cannot take constructive criticism nor does he accept the training status he occupies.

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 26 OFF 38 NCO'S 451 EM Total: 515

Para 3: 20th Bn (116th Bn, 12th Bde) (Ethnic Cambodian)

A. STRENGTHS: Throughout the first week of training the Bn's enthusiasm has been very high due to the leadership from the Bn's Officers and NCO's. The leaders have constantly taken an active role in the control and training of personnel. On many occasions the leaders have taken action to correct faults in individuals or units without having been told to do so. On several instances the leaders have conducted concurrent training using their own AI's while being supervised by US personnel. All leaders throughout the Bn have shown a concern in supervising the instruction and performance of the younger members of the Bn. It is a rare occasion that the Bn has to be told twice to do anything.

B. WEAKNESSES: The staff does not seem to have enough contact with the Bn personnel. They conduct their affairs away from the other soldiers. Whenever the Bn is told to do something, the staff feels they are exempt.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: Equipment shortages are the same as the previous week.

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: Two extra hours of PT was conducted by cadre members for trainees who had difficulty in grasping the techniques of the bayonet. Continuing correction by the cadre is expected to improve the attitude of the staff. An accelerated program of training for the 28 personnel was possible due to the small number of men involved and they were able to rejoin the Battalion, properly prepared, on Monday of the second week of training.

F. BN XO: CPT Thou Rin is a quiet man. He has taken corrective actions on several occasion.

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 33 OFF 60 NCO'S 410 EM Total: 503

Para 4: 23rd Bn (FANK 381st Bn, 48th Bde) (Ethnic Cambodian)

A. STRENGTHS: Some of the leaders have combat experience gained from campaigns in Cambodia and RVN. The Battalion has been formed for 13 months and has seen combat on five occasions in Cambodia.

B. WEAKNESSES: This unit contains approximately 200 new and inexperienced troops.

SECRET

.../3

SECRET

- 3 -

C. PROBLEM AREAS: The only apparent problem area at this time is the availability of equipment. The Bn is short suspenders, field packs, machetes, socks, canteens, and 81mm mortars; however, this is not considered critical during this initial phase of training.

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: Maximum effort is being exerted to insure all trainees attend training. This includes close medical attention to reduce the number of trainees missing training for medical reasons.

E. BN CO BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH:

Name: Son Thuong

Rank: Major

Age: 32

DOR: 1 June 71

Years Service: 12

Combat experience: 7 years

Education:

Military: Recon Dong Ba thin, CIDG Dong Ba Thin, USARPAC Intel School Okinawa, Intel Recon School Phnom Penh

Civilian: High School Education

F. BN XO BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH:

Name: Thach Savane (corrected spelling)

Rank: CPT

Age: 30

DOR: 27 Oct 70

Years Service: 11 years

Combat Experience: 6 years

Education:

Military: Recon Dong Ba Thin, CIDG Dong Ba Thin

Civilian: High School Education

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 18 OFF 55 NCO'S 439 EM Total: 512

Para 5: 21st Bn Leaders (FANK 271st Bn, 22nd Bde) (Ethnic Cambodian)

A. STRENGTHS: The morale and motivation of this group continue to be the major strong points.

B. WEAKNESSES: None

C. PROBLEM AREAS: None

D. OTHER ACTION TAKEN: Because the 21st Bn did not arrive as scheduled on 3 Feb 72, this group of leaders will receive an additional week of training consisting mainly of those areas in which most leaders are normally weak, "IE" map reading and security concepts.

E. BN CO: No change from previous report.

F. BN XO: Still in Phnom Penh.

.../4

SECRET

SECRET

- 4 -

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 12 OFF 31 NCO'S 0 EM Total: 43

Para 6: Armoured Cavalry Leaders Class I

A. STRENGTHS: This mature group of leaders continues to perform in an admirable manner.

B. WEAKNESSES: None

C. PROBLEM AREAS: None

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: This group will receive graduation certificates and will graduate with the 13th Bn on 9 Feb 72.

E. BN CO: None

F. BN XO: None

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 6 OFF 14 NCO'S 0 EM Total: 20

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX A TO
AATTV REPORT
DATED 20 MAR 72

USARV ITG LHTB

SUBJECT: Training Bn Performance Report. Period Covered: 13-19 Feb 72

PART ONE:

Para 1: 19th Bn (FANK 115th Bn, 12th Bde) (Ethnic Cambodian)

A. STRENGTHS: The attitude of the individual soldier combined with solid leadership have contributed to satisfactory training progress and performance of the Battalion.

B. WEAKNESSES: Presently, the only major weakness stems from the inadequate number of officers within the Battalion. The 19th Battalion is presently functioning with only four officers excluding adjutants and including the Battalion Commander. This shortage results in one line company without an assigned commander. That company is currently commanded by the Battalion Executive Officer.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: No problems exist at this time which restrict the progress or performance of the 19th Battalion.

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: In reference to paragraph 1B the Battalion Commander with the assistance of the US personnel, will try to alleviate the shortage problem by assigning a strong, knowledgeable NCO to act as company commander.

E. BN CO: Major Khy Hak demonstrates outstanding leadership traits and characteristics. He sets high standards for himself as well as for his subordinates. His military knowledge is, in general, superior to many of his contemporaries. Maj Khy Hak's only drawback is the physical limitations imposed upon him by wounds sustained in combat operations.

F. BN XO: 1LT Mao Kun Ha improved greatly since the first performance report. 1LT Mao Kun's attitude and acceptability of constructive criticism has also improved greatly. Shortcomings of 1LT Mao Kun Lie mostly in his inexperience in leading a large group such as an infantry battalion. With time, 1LT Mao Kun could become an effective leader of a Khmere Infantry Battalion.

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 26 OFF 38 NCO'S 451 EM Total: 515

Para 2: 20th Bn (116th BC, 12th Bde) (Ethnic Cambodian)

A. STRENGTHS: As in the past, the leadership of both officers and NCO's is exceptionally high. Corrective advice from the Cadre is immediately implemented. Morale continues to be very high. The Bn CO's fluency in the English language has been an asset in the control of the Bn.

B. WEAKNESSES: None at this time.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: Logistical problems unchanged from previous report. See LHTB mag 071, DTG 100034Z Feb 72 subject: FANK Bn Equipment Shortage Report.

SECRET

.../2

SECRET

- 2 -

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: Continuous emphasis on the importance of leaders participating in all training activities has been placed by the US Cadre.

E. BN CO: See Para 2B above.

F. BN XO: Although still not forceful, he is an effective man in the Bn Staff. I have noticed several occasions that the XO will enforce the CO's Policy and take corrective action on his own, especially in areas of punishment of soldiers. I had been informed by the CO that the XO will receive his own Bn on the completion of this course and the 1st company CO the XO position.

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 33 OFF 60 NCO'S 409 EM Total: 502

Para 3: 21st Bn (FANK 381st, 48th Bde) (Ethnic Cambodian)

A. STRENGTHS: As previously mentioned, strengths inherent to the Battalion include combat experienced leaders from the CO down to Squad Leaders, the Battalion's eagerness to learn, high morale and good discipline.

B. WEAKNESSES: This Battalion has approximately 200 recruits with no military experience. Additionally the Bn Staff is lacking in knowledge of Staff procedures.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: See LHTB msg 017 DTG 100030Z Feb 71, Subject: FANK Bn Equipment Shortage Report.

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: Continued routine instruction and special Cadre classes should correct the lack of knowledge by the Battalion's new soldiers and staff.

E. BN CO: Major Son Thuong's performance during the first week of training has been very good. He has exercised a high degree of supervision and efficient utilization of subordinate commanders. He often seeks information matters pertaining to his Battalion and efficiently disseminates information to all echelons.

F. BN XO: Cpt Thach Savane's performance also has been very good.. Like the CO, he exhibits a high degree of supervision and a desire to accomplish the mission. He is considered a strong leader with a high potential for future positions of significant responsibility.

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 18 OFF 55 NCO'S 439 EM Total: 512

Para 4: 23rd Bn (FANK 271st Bn, 22nd Bde) (Ethnic Cambodian)

A. STRENGTHS: The Battalion has several highly experienced NCO's and has been together as a unit for over a year. Leaders appear to be strong, if not experienced.

B. WEAKNESSES: There are approximately 50 young soldiers who, despite assurance to the contrary, seem to be younger than the eligible age for military service. Further evaluation of this apparent weakness will follow in future reports.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: See LHTB msg 071, DTG 100030Z Feb 71, Subject: FANK Bn Equipment Report.

SECRET

.../3

SECRET

- 3 -

D. OTHER ACTION TAKEN: Close attention is being given to the performance of the younger troops to determine their value to the unit.

E. BN CO: Cpt Kim Nimh has been the Battalion Commander for eight months. He has been in service for two years. Prior to entering the service, Cpt Nimh completed work on BS and MS degrees in physics at the University of Phnom Penh. He had been working toward a PHD for two years when drafted. After entering the military service, Cpt Nimh served on both Battalion and Brigade Staffs. After serving with this unit for eight months as its commander, he was assigned to the staff of the newly formed 64th Bde, but was returned to command when this Battalion was sent to Long Hai. Cpt Nimh is a highly intelligent and conscientious leader and should do well as Bn CO.

F. BN XO: 1Lt Thavh Seng Sarath has been the Battalion Executive Officer for almost two years. Prior to entering the service, he was employed as a newspaper reporter for a Vietnamese language newspaper. The Lieutenant has spent all of his two years in service with this Battalion and has participated in all of its major engagements. With little guidance, he should do well as Battalion Executive Officer.

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 22 OFF 32 NCO'S 458 EM Total: 512

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX 4 TO
ANNEX A TO
AATTV REPORT
DATED 20 MAR 72

BIOGRAPHIC DATA - 19TH BN CO

The 19th Battalion Commander, Major KHY HAK, was born in the province of TAKEO on 1 Jan 1940. From 1947 to 1952 he attended grammar school; his secondary schooling was at the KAMPOT School and the SISOWATH School in Phnom Penh. From 1958 to 1960 he attended the Khmere Military Academy and graduated first in his class. In 1960-1961 Major KHY HAK attended the Basic Infantry Officer School at KOMPON CHANG, after which he served in the 18th Infantry Battalion as a company executive officer until 1962. From 1962 to 1965 Major KHY HAK's assignment was to the Ministry of Defense (Sports Department) and in 1966-1967 Major KHY HAK continued his military schooling at the FANK General Staff Course (Operations & Training). From 1967-1969 he was a company commander in the 34th Infantry Battalion. In 1969 and 1970 he studied at the Khmere Military School at Phnom Penh. From April 1970, to the present, Major KHY HAK has been the commander of the 115th and 12th Battalions. Additionally, from August 1970 to August 1971, he served as commander of the 121st Regiment and the 12th Battalion. The 121st Regiment consisted of: The 115th, 116th, and 143rd Battalions. In 1961-1962 Major KHY HAK conducted operations against the Hoa-Hoa (A political/military band of Vietnamese infiltrating into the Cambodian province of TAKEO). In 1967 through 1969 he participated in a campaign against Khmere terrorists. His campaigns in 1970-1972 were in Svay Rung, Prey Veng, and Randal, and the battles of Saang Siemreap and Angkor. He was seriously wounded twice in 1970. Major KHY HAK was cited in the Order of the Day by Major General SO KAM KHOY during the battle of SIEMREAP - ANGKOR from 6-12 Jun 1970. He has also received the National Defense Medal for service to his country.

SECRET

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC DATA - 20th BN CO

Captain MEY THIRITH was born 10 Nov 1937 in the capital city of Phnom Penh. He has a high school education, is married and the father of eight children. Captain MEY THIRITH first saw combat in 1952. In 1953 he was a company commander in the Khmere Serei under Dr. SON NGOC THANH. Since 1970 he has fought the VC and NVA. From 1955 to 1959 Captain MEY THIRITH was a Professor of History at the University of Soriya Eintriey. In 1960 he worked for a Cambodian broadcasting company and in 1960-64 he attended a radio broadcasting procedure course in the Philippines. In 1963-64 Captain MEY THIRITH went to France to be trained as a radio and television director and producer. On 28 March 1970 Captain MEY THIRITH became a company commander in the 116th B.C., he also served as Chief of Staff. In September of 1970 he was an instructor at the senior non-commissioned officers' training course and in early 1971 he attended the Jungle Warfare School in Malaysia.

Captain MEY THIRITH'S awards and decorations are as follows:

CHEVALIER MONISARAPHON

CHEVALIER SONATHARA

ORDRE TRAVAIL

ORDRE DE LA REPUBLIQUE

DEFENSE NATIONALE, ORDRE DE L'ARMEE (2 AWARDS)

DEFENSE NATIONALE, ORDRE DE DIVISION

SECRET

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH - 21st BN CO

Major SON THUONG was born 10 June 1940, in Phnom Penh. In 1960 he completed his high school education. He is married and the father of 4 children who reside with his wife in Phnom Penh. Major THUONG entered military service 25 May 1960, in the Khmere Serei (Saigon) as a clerk. He remained in this capacity until 1963 when he became a security platoon leader at Linh Gia (IV Corps). He was trained for this position at Dong Ba Thin. In 1964 he underwent training as a recon platoon leader at Chi Lang and served in that capacity at B-56 from 1965 to 1967. He also received additional recon training in 1966 while at B-56. From 1967 to 1970 Major THUONG served as a security company commander at B-43 in Cao Lanh. In Oct 1970, he was commissioned as an officer in the Khmere Army and became S-1, Khmere Liaison Staff, Long Hai. He served 6 months in this capacity and transferred to Phnom Penh where he received intelligence training and then assumed the position of intelligence officer for the 16th Regiment at Phnom Penh. While in this position he attended the USARPAC Intelligence School at Okinawa. He assumed command of the 318th BC in March 1971, holding the rank of Captain. During his tenure as commander, the 318th has participated in five campaigns in Cambodia. Major THUONG has held the position as 318th Battalion Commander continuously since his appointment.

SECRET

SECRET

23RD BATTALION COMMANDER'S PERSONAL HISTORY

Captain KIM NINH was born on 30 April 1940, in Luong Hoa, South Vietnam. He is married, has six children, and possesses a masters degree in physics. Captain NINH had one year of military service in the active reserve prior to 1970; his reserve experience was as an instructor. On 20 Mar 1970, he was placed on active duty with the rank of captain.

Captain NINH's active duty service record is as follows:
On 1 May 70, he was assigned to the 8th Bde as Political Officer (S-5). In this capacity he participated in the battles around TAKEO, and KIRIKUN. After Kirikun, Capt NINH was assigned as military advisor to the 148th BC, 7th Bde. In Sep 1970, he was assigned to the 15th Bde as executive officer of the 240th BC. In Oct 1970, Capt NINH was reassigned to the staff of the 22nd Bde. He became Chief of Staff in May 1970. In Jun 1971, he was assigned as the commander, 271st BC, 22nd Bde. His battalion has participated in battles around Krek under his command. The 271st BC was then recalled from the field to undertake the training program at the Long Hai Training Battalion.

SECRET

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

ANNEX B TO
AATTV REPORT
DATED 20 MAR 72

REPORT ON AATTV DET PTTB
PERIOD 25 JAN - 25 FEB 72

1. Attached as Appendixes to this Annex are the weekly training reports on the FANK Bns at Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.

- Appendixes:
1. Training Report PTTB 30 Jan - 5 Feb 72.
 2. Training Report PTTB 6 Feb - 12 Feb 72.
 3. Training Report PTTB 13 Feb - 19 Feb 72.
 4. Training Report PTTB 20 Feb - 26 Feb 72.

SECRET - AUST/NZ EYES ONLY

SECRET

APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX B TO
AATTV REPORT
DATED 20 MAR 72

USARV ITG PTTB

SUBJECT: Battalion Performance Report Period Covered 30 Jan-5 Feb 72

PART TWO:

Para 1: 14th Bn (4th BC., 1st Bde)

- A. STRENGTHS. The 14th Bn received advanced company tactics during the 9th week of training. Subjects included: (1) breakout of encirclement (2) link up operations (3) ambush and counterambush (4) attack of fortified areas and (5) heliborne operations. Ambush practical proved to be a Bn strong point. Camouflage and properly covered kill zones were noted, in particular company sized maneuvers improved in quality. Great improvements were made in proper use of formations and security measures. Proper dispersion is being staged by the Bn leaders and overall tactical performance has improved greatly.
- B. WEAKNESSES. Bn leaders have a difficult time relating classroom principles to practical application. The transition from black board to actual terrain is very difficult for the leaders, all practical exercises are very beneficial to the training mission.
- C. PROBLEM AREAS. The POI does not allow enough time for command and staff preparation of practical exercise and field training exercises although every effort is being made at this headquarters to properly challenge each man the POI restricts the use of specialized preparation. IE S-2, Commo, S-3, any changes in the POI to increase the requirements of all levels of command would produce positive training results. Highly qualified interpreters remains a problem area. Specific deficiencies include: (1) dialects, (2) limited military vocabulary, and (3) marginal language ability. Any additional source of qualified interpreters would enhance the effectiveness of the training battalions.
- D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN. FTX preparation and upgrading the Bn's posture were the highest priorities during the 10th week of training. The Bn staff initiated the planning and preparation for the 10th week FTX while the remainder of the Bn improved defensive positions and conducted training ambushes with the local TAOR. All ambushes were monitored by 2 cadre members.
- E. BN CO: LTC CHHEY not only maintained his high standard of leadership through out the 9th week of training but seems to insist upon increased training progress with determination to each instructional period. He is constantly monitoring and improving Bn performance and has been an essential element in a successful training program.
- F. BN XO: LT KHEM YOUM. The XO has improved in self-confidence and highly proficient at any test whether training or real.
- G. STRENGTH FIGURES. 9 OFF 58 NCO 445 EM TOTAL: 512

SECRET

.../2

SECRET

- 2 -

Para 2: 16th Bn (275th BC, 23rd Bde)

A. STRENGTHS: During this reporting period, the 16th Battalion was in its 6th week of training. The subjects for this week was platoon tactics to include platoon formations, battle drill, day and night attack, defensive VC ambush and counter ambush, and patrols. The recon platoons received one week of specialized training while the mortar sections finished their mortar training. The battalion was very strong in platoon tactics, showing that their strength continues to be in the leadership at platoon company and battalion level.

B. WEAKNESSES: The squad leaders in the 16th battalion still have not reached a desirable level of competence. Although they are continuing to improve. With the whole battalion training together in platoon and company tactics, the squad leaders are beginning to understand more about tactics and where the squad fits in with the unit. The US battalion cadre are looking forward to their reaching the desired level prior to the six (6) day FTX.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: The 16th battalion billets still do not have electrical power, therefore, all weapons maintenance and paper work must be done in the day light hours. The electrical engineer unit has departed without finishing the job. Our own R & U section is currently working to complete the project.

D. OTHER ACTIONS: Equipment for the battalion started coming in through the S-4 this week. The 16th battalion received their entrenching tools, steel pots, ponchos and other badly needed items. The US battalion cadre has continued to conduct downtown shopping trips and assist when ever possible in the sports program. A FANK "PX" is now open to them where they can purchase necessary and nice to-have items.

E. BN CO: CPT SVAT SAMOEUN continues to display outstanding leadership ability. He shows a keen interest in tactics training and assist the US Bn cadre when ever possible.

F. BN XO: CPT NGUM SRENCH is also a very strong leader and is very interested in all phases of training. He enjoys working with the troops and gets involved as much as possible in training.

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 20 OFF 87 NCO'S 382 EM TOTAL: 489

Para 3: 18th Bn (275th BC, 23rd Bde)

A. STRENGTHS: 18th Bn completed its 7th week of training which consisted of platoon and company tactics. This training was well received with the leaders taking an active part during the practical exercises. They departed on their 6 days FTX on 30 Jan 72. Initial observation of their FTX indicated that at least 1 company is doing an outstanding job, 1 company is barely marginal and the 3rd is satisfactory.

B. WEAKNESSES: On 28 Jan 72 a 17 pound rocket fired by a cobra gunship during a TAC air demonstration effectively wiped out most of the battalion leadership. (2) company commanders and 2 platoon leaders were killed along with 3 soldiers; in addition many of those wounded were leaders. This accident has had a drastic effect on the morale of the entire battalion. The battalion was quickly reorganised and deployed to the field on schedule. One of the new company commanders is doing an outstanding job.

SECRET

.../3

SECRET

- 3 -

C. PROBLEM AREAS: Lack of electricity continues to be a problem. The assigned engineer unit has departed without finishing the job. Our own R & U section is presently trying to complete the work.

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: Due to the accident and preparation for the FTX no additional activities were planned or conducted by the Bn cadre.

E. BN CO: Major YOUK continues to show strong leadership. He was visibly shaken by the accident which took many of his best leaders but he has reorganised his battalion and is trying to make the best out of a situation.

F. BN XO: HUON NAT has returned to Cambodia with the 7 bodies. At the time of the accident he was very ineffective. A FANK message has been sent out asking that he be relieved. It is hoped that he will not return from his escort duty to Cambodia.

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 4 OFF 10 NCO'S 491 EM TOTAL: 505

Para 4: 24th Bd Ldrs (274th BC, 22th Bde)

A. STRENGTHS: The battalion leaders strength cannot accurately assessed at this time because they have been here only 4 days; however, from all indications the battalions leaders are alert, disciplined and ready to grasp all instructions.

B. WEAKNESSES: Battalion leaders weaknesses is difficult to assess due to lack of real pressure and challenges at such a early stage of training.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: The most prominent problem areas is lack of proper logistical support. At this stage of training the battalion leaders do not have all of their equipment or weapons. Weapons from the US assets have been issued for training.

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: Since their arrival the cadre has conducted a thorough orientation course.

E. BN CO: ING SARIN, Captain, DOB 26 Dec 37, graduated from Royale Administration College 1960 in the capacity of a practicing lawyer. From 1960 to 1970. He served as the chief administrator of Mekong Rubber Company. On 15 Nov 70 he entered the army as a Captain. Since his commissioning he has commanded 4 battalions. He is married and has two children and lives in Vilkei Parcheathipathay, Phnom Penh Cambodia. CPT SARIN is accomplishing his job well; he seems enthusiastic and assures that corrections and advice are needed by the leaders. His strong point is the discipline he wants to participate in rather than initiating leadership in all areas.

F. BN XO: Is not present with the leaders.

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 9 OFF 34 NCO'S 0 EM TOTAL: 43

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX B

USARV ITG PTTB

SUBJECT: Battalions Performance Report Period Covered 6 Feb - 12 Feb 72

PART TWO

Para 1: 14th Bn (4th Bn, 1st Bde)

A. STRENGTHS: The 10th week of training showed increased proficiency in all leaders. The week culminated the formal instruction and included the first 3 days of the final FTX. The planning and preparation stages for the FTX were completed in a timely and thorough manner. The chain of command was utilized and all leaders supervised the execution of their orders. The initial 3 days of the FTX showed that the battalion has learned from its previous mistakes. Formations were properly utilized, soldiers were alert and everyone maintained good noise discipline. Units remaining in the base camp maintained good aggressive patrolling schedule and all defensive principles were adhered to. Long patrols as well as company-sized operations were well executed. The battalion worked hard to correct the deficiencies of the first FTX and have operated as a fully trained combat-effective unit.

B. WEAKNESSES: Inexperience in the leaders necessitates a few reminders from the US Cadre. They are qualified and only practice can improve the few remaining errors.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: A few TO & E items still remain unissued with less than 2 weeks until the Battalion graduates. The combat serviceability of some equipment is questionable. The situation is known to all levels of command and the battalion understands that every effort is being made to properly equip them before graduation.

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: Local ambushes within the TA and strengthening the camp's defensive posture were two additional actions taken by the battalion. They performed both tasks with a high degree of professionalism.

E. BN CO: LTC CHHEY has continued to display his professionalism and has worked hard on his weak points utilization of fire support. He is a highly proficient CO and would be equally effective at a higher level.

F. BN XO: LT YOUM has made tremendous strides in improving his ability to command a Battalion. He is a very strong XO and with a little more experience, will be capable of effectively commanding a Battalion of his own.

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 9 OFF 58 NCO'S 445 EM TOTAL: 512

Para 2: 16th Bn (275th Bn, 23rd Bde)

A. STRENGTHS: During this reporting period, the 16th Battalion was in the 7th week of training. The training subject was company-sized tactics, to include formations, battle drill, company in the attack and defence. The entire battalion showed outstanding progress, especially in the live fire company in the attack exercise. At this point, the leaders at all levels have reached a desirable level of competence.

B. WEAKNESSES: The 16th Battalion has picked up a few bad habits, such as failing to carry the proper basic loads of ammo, and failing to keep individual weapons properly maintained and cleaned. The US Battalion Cadre is emphasizing the fact that leaders must check their troops out to correct this.

SECRET

.../2

SECRET

- 2 -

C. PROBLEM AREAS: At this point, there are no significant problems affecting the progress of the 16th Battalion other than the lack of internal billets lighting. This is currently being worked on by R & U.

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: The US Battalion Cadre has worked extra hours this week in reviewing operations orders with the leaders and helping them to better understand them. This will help them in the upcoming FTX. Weekly practices have been held this week to enable everyone to be familiar with his alert position.

E. BN CO: CPT SVAY SAMEOUN continues to be an outstanding leader. He is looking forward to the upcoming FTX and is a very serious and conscientious about making it a success. He continues to work well with the battalion and with the US Battalion Cadre.

F. BN XO: CPT NGUM SPENG supports his Battalion Commander and the US Cadre in all matters. He also, continues to display outstanding leadership ability. By the time this training cycle ends, he will be completely capable of commanding a battalion of his own.

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 20 OFF 87 NCO'S 382 EM TOTAL: 489

Para 3: 18th Bn (275th Bn, 23rd Bde)

A. STRENGTHS: During reporting period the 18th Bn conducted a field training exercise. Due to the previous accident in which several personnel were killed and injured, the Bn was placed under additional stress and confusion. However, the Bn Commander was able to maintain a stable situation.

B. WEAKNESSES: During the entire exercise, the morale of the Bn was very low, which led to their unsatisfactory performance. The Bn Commander managed to handle the situation, but the troops were constantly on edge.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: The Acting Company Commanders were unable to handle the sudden responsibility placed upon them. Many problems arose due to their lack of leadership, however, with the conclusion of the exercise, and a few days break from training, they are improving with the close guidance of the Bn Cadre.

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: During the off-duty time, the Bn Cadre have been showing movies and conducting intra-mural sports. They have also helped organize swimming and downtown shopping trips.

E. BN CO: MAJ YOUK continues to display outstanding leadership ability and constantly support the US Cadre, he strives to remain abreast of all situations.

F. BN XO: The Bn XO returned to Cambodia with the bodies of the accident victims.

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 4 OFF 11 NCO'S 490 EM TOTAL: 505

.../3

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

Para 4: 24th Bn (274th Bn, 22nd Bde)

A. STRENGTHS: The battalion leaders are intelligent, eager to learn new material and responsive to counselling.

B. WEAKNESSES: Lack of precision and the ability to quickly transfer from one system of accomplishing things to another is the biggest weakness. To compensate for this, the cadre has tried to integrate our system and methods into theirs whenever possible or feasible, and conduct extra training.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: The battalion leaders still lack helmet liner bands, first aid pouches and camouflage covers for helmets. Sufficient water supply for bathing and washing is still unsolved.

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: Extra training during evening hours to improve performance and sharpen their knowledge has been initiated.

E. BN CO: CPT ING SARING is doing his job well, takes an active interest in training and insures that instructions are carried out. His strong points are (1) strong commander image (2) combat experience (3) knowledge of US equipment and military skills.

F. BN XO: Did not accompany leaders.

G. PERSONNEL STATUS: 9 OFF 34 NCO'S Ø EM TOTAL: 43

SECRET

SECRET

USARV ITG PTTB

APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX B

SUBJECT: Training Bn Performance Report Period Covered: 13-19 Feb 72

PART ONE:

Para 1: 14th Bn (4th Bn, 1st Bde)

- A. STRENGTHS: During this reporting period the Bn participated in their 10 day FTX. The battalion was able to organise and operate from a Bn size defensive posture. The troops needed little or no supervision while digging in and clearing field of fire. Generally, crew served weapons were correctly placed and fields of fire interlocked and well defended ops and lps were correctly organised and placed where they would be most effective.
- B. WEAKNESSES: During the FTX command and control was virtually non-existing. This was exemplified by the fact that there was never any security during movement. The Bn moved as a Bn file, with no flank security. There was no security at halts or crossing danger areas, i.e. river or stream crossing, recon and security at the other side were never employed. During contacts with the enemy the troops were disorganised and reluctant to fight, even to the point of running from the contact. Effective fire from individual weapons as well as crew served weapons never evolved. Machine gunners laid their weapons over the side of defilade positions and fired without looking at their target, they did not even use the bipods or tripods during the contacts. The weapons were just laid on the ground. Americans or Australians had to physically move troops bodily into security positions.
- C. PROBLEM AREAS: The battalion has an absolutely negative attitude about closing with and engaging the enemy. This was reflected by performances by commanders down to the individual soldier. In both performance and conversation with members of the Battalion the attitude is that many things are O.K. during training but not for operations, i.e. 5 meters interval during movement, setting sights on machineguns. These are done during training but the individuals questioned indicated they would not use these techniques in combat.
- D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: During the FTX the Bn Cadre tried to make commanders use their subordinate, however, it just did not work. Company commanders were on the radio from dawn till dusk.
- E. BATTALION COMMANDER: LTC CHHAY was reluctant to commit his people to engage the enemy. At one point he became very excited and emotional and would not accept any Cadre recommendations, he also tried to circumvent the Cadre Chain of Command by trying to gain approval of plans from lower ranking Americans, rather than discuss the plan with the team leaders.
- F. BATTALION XO: LT KHEM YOROUN was ineffective, at one point an American discovered an 81mm mortar crew burying an amount of unexpended ammo to avoid carrying it. This was brought to the XO's attention, however, he did not discipline his people, rather he made excuses for them.
- G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 9 OFF 58 NCO'S 445 EM TOTAL: 511

Para 2: 16th Bn (169th Bn, 2nd Bde)

- A. STRENGTH: During this reporting period, the 16th Bn went on their 6 day FTX. The leaders at Bn, Coy and Pl level continue to be very strong and displayed outstanding abilities, training was conducted in squad, Pl and Coy tactics. The battalion did very well in all phases of offensive training.

SECRET

.../2

SECRET

- 2 -

- B. WEAKNESSES: Although the 16th Battalion is very strong in offensive tactics, their defensive positions were initially very poor. They set up where there were no fields of fire, they also were poor in field sanitation and seemed not to understand its importance. The US Battalion Cadre and the higher level FANK leaders worked with the squad leaders to correct these deficiencies and are continuing to strive for a higher level of competence among the squad leaders.
- C. PROBLEM AREAS: The only problem area that influenced the Battalion this week was the lack of usable area for FTX. The Battalion stayed in one place for the entire week and did not experience moving base camp. This problem was adequately justified by PTTB desire to have a reaction force readily available during the Tet holidays. The 10 days FTX will be conducted in a regular FTX area.
- D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: Upon returning from the field problem, the Battalion was paid therefore extra shopping trips downtown were conducted. Work has continued on the defensive positions and the berm in the FANK Billet Area.
- E. BATTALION CO: CPT SVAY SAMEOUN continues to be an outstanding commander. He experienced some difficulty in getting subordinated to do exactly as he wanted during the FTX, but he quickly straightened this out. He was eager for the Battalion to make enemy contact to see how well they were really trained.
- F. BATTALION XO: CPT NHUM SRENS also continues to display outstanding abilities. He adapts quickly to any changing situation and always gives maximum support to the Battalion Commander and the US Battalion Cadre.
- G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 20 OFF 87 NCO'S 382 EM TOTAL: 489

Para 3: 18th Bn (275th Bn, 23rd Bde)

- A. STRENGTHS: During this reporting period the 18th Bn was in its ninth week of training. The majority of training was concentrated on the Bn organization, mission and tactics, the Bn accomplished what was demanded of them but with a poor attitude and marginal performance. Their attitude and actions are slowly improving due to the fact that their training cycle is almost completed. The Bn Comd continues to be strong, but still lacks the support of his subordinate commanders.
- B. WEAKNESSES: The subordinate commanders are failing to support the Commander. The coy commanders and platoon leaders are more interested in obtaining the remainder of their equipment and their personal safety and comfort than getting good training. It appears that the Bn's only interest lies in the completion of training and their departure for Cambodia. The Bn Cadre is trying to restore morale, enthusiasm and interest in training.
- C. PROBLEM AREAS: The lack of proper lighting facilities coupled with the lack of water discipline are the Bn's major problem areas. These are currently being worked on by the Bn Cadre, US and FANK personnel.
- D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: In order to restore morale and enthusiasms, the Bn Cadre has organized downtown shopping trips, swimming parties and sport activities.
- E. BN CO: MAJ YOUK continues to be an asset to the Bn Cadre and displays his usual competence and confidence. Considering his lack of support and the Bn's attitude, he is doing an outstanding job.

SECRET

.../3

SECRET

- 3 -

F. BN XO: The former Bn XO has returned from Cambodia and has been appointed the 3rd Company Commander. There is currently no Bn XO as such.

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 4 OFF 11 NCO'S 490 EM TOTAL: 505

Para 4: 24th Bn (274th, 22nd Bde)

A. STRENGTHS: The Bn leaders are interested in having a good Bn.. They are intelligent and are responsive to the instruction and counselling.

B. WEAKNESSES: Lack of appreciation for detail and the ability to quickly transfer and utilize new methods are the biggest weaknesses existing within the Bn Leaders.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: The leaders still lack helmet liner bands, first aid pouches, sufficient number of magazines (Ammo), socks and camouflaged helmet cover. Water for washing and bathing is still a problem due to insufficient supply and good water conservation on the part of the FANK.

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: Bn Cadre conducted extra training which further strengthened knowledge, built confidence and sharpened their skills.

E. BN CO: CPT SARIN is doing a good job. He assures that the leaders follow directions and is interested in US methods of military warfare. His strong point is he is intelligent, interested, has a good deal of combat experience and has a strong command image. His weak point is lack of appreciation for fine details and letting too many of these fine details pass by without taking corrective measures.

F. BN XO: Not present.

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 9 OFF 34 NCO'S 0 EM TOTAL: 43

Para 5: 26th Bn, (153rd Bn, 5th Sp Inf Bde)

A. STRENGTHS: The 26th Battalion was given classes on the PRC 25 radio procedures, basic map reading, MOI and drill and ceremonies. During their first week of training. All the leaders seem to be alert and eager to learn.

B. WEAKNESSES: It is difficult to spot a weakness this early in their training cycle. Only time coupled with the strain of training will reveal any weaknesses.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: Due to the lack of equipment, the Bn had to borrow items for their classes, i.e. MG, M-79 and Compasses. They still lack some basic web gear items. The S-4 is currently trying to obtain these shortages.

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: The Bn Cadre has organised downtown shopping trips, swimming parties and organized sport activities.

E. BN CO: MAJ HAK MATH now appears to be a strong aggressive leader. He is straight forward and appears to be the type of commander that will be a tremendous asset to the training mission and cadre.

F. BN XO: Not present.

G. STRENGTH FIGURES: 8 OFF 34 NCO'S 0 EM TOTAL: 42

SECRET

SUBJECT: Battalions Performance Report PTTB 20 - 27 Feb 72

16th Battalion

A. STRENGTHS: The majority of the training was on company size operations, which included classes on search of a hamlet, ambush and counter ambush, road clearing and link-up operations. During this reporting period the Bn also conducted live-fire exercises against a fortified or built-up area. The 16 Bn leaders were given extra instruction on helicopter operations and mechanical ambushes. The training highlight for the week was a Bn size encirclement and search of a hamlet. The exercise was controlled by the 16th Bn leaders with little advice from the American Bn Cadre. The exercise was conducted with a few minor errors. Outstanding initiative and a desire to learn is the strongest asset working for the Bn.

B. WEAKNESSES: During the past week necessary details and security mission requirements have been at an all time high. This has an overall effect on the 16th Bn's morale and spirit when training. With the upcoming FTX we hope to eliminate this problem. The Bn Cadre has continued to show movies and insure that the Bn have all necessary items in an effort to improve morale.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: The main problem of the 16th Bn is lack of field equipment such as packs and first aid packets, also nice to have items such as machetes. The American S-4 is trying to acquire these items for the Bn.

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: Because of the heavy commitments this week for the security of the camp all efforts have been put to the task. Fortifying the 16th Bn area and teaching mechanical ambushes were two primary endeavors.

E. BN CO: CPT SVAY SAMOEUN has continued to show outstanding ability as a leader. His responsiveness to problems has greatly helped in the mission of training his Bn.

F. BN XO: CPT NGUM SRENG had the potential of being an outstanding Bn CO. He helps in every way possible to overcome any problems that arise. CPT SRENG backs the Bn CO with full support and supervises the staff to insure instruction are complied with.

G. STRENGTH: OFF 20 NCO'S 87 381 EM TOTAL: 488

26th Battalion Leaders

A. STRENGTHS: During their second week of training, the 26th Bn leaders received instruction in techniques of instruction and squad, platoon and company in the defence. The leaders display a high morale and much Esprit De Corps, partly due no doubt to the fact that all have had previous military instructions.

B. WEAKNESSES: Some of the leaders have shown that while they have the requisite knowledge and training they do not possess the strong character of leaders. This problem has been pointed out to the Bn Commander and he says that they will be replaced as soon as the remainder of the Bn arrives.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: Equipment shortages could hamper training if they are not rectified. For example - helmet liners were issued without sweat bands, entrenching tools without carriers and only one canteen per man. S-4 is attempting to overcome these shortages.

SECRET

- 2 -

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: Downtown trips have been organized to obtain needed and nice to have items.

E. BN CO: MAJ HAK MATH NO is abreast of the situation at all times. He believes in training and assists the instructor during practical exercises. He is respected by all members of his command.

F. BN XO: LT MONG YANG supports the Bn CO and all of his policies. In the absence of the CO he immediately assumes command. With his military bearing and knowledge, Lt Yang will soon be ready for a command of his own.

G. STRENGTH: 8 OFF 34 NCO'S TOTAL: 42

18th Battalion

A. STRENGTHS: During the last week of training the 18th Bn was instructed on Bn operations, i.e. Bn in the attack and Bn Retrograde operation. Although the Bn personnel showed interest in the training their performance was poor. The 1st few days of the 10 day FTX has also been poorly conducted.

B. WEAKNESSES: The biggest weakness of the Bn still lies in their poor company grade officers and their NCO leaders. They continue to show a lack of confidence needed in leaders. There is a lack of communication between Bn staff down to platoon level. Some personnel refuse to obey direct orders. There is a total lack of command and control.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: Lack of proper lighting facilities continues to be a major problem area. A lack of water continues to be a problem. The light situation is still being worked at, the water problem is shared by both US and Cambodians, there just isn't enough water available. An additional 5000 gal tanker will be in operation within four days.

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: None due to preparation for FTX.

E. BN CO: MAJ YOUK is failing during the first few days of the 10 day FTX. He rarely accepts advice from the Senior US Advisor and refused to allow US Cadre to accompany patrols or ambushes. His main concern is in getting his battalion their next few days of training and returning to Cambodia. CO PTTB counseled MAJ YOUK and the results are being monitored.

F. BN XO: There is none at this location.

G. STRENGTH: 4 OFF 11 NCO'S 490 EM TOTAL: 505

24th Battalion Performance Report

A. STRENGTHS: The 24th Bn spent this reporting period in processing, weapons familiarization and reorganization. The 24th Bn reported for training with 407 personnel. The vast majority of the personnel in the 24th Bn are recruits because the Bn was taxed for a combat operation in Cambodia. The Bn leaders organized quickly and efficiently. The Bn rallied to help upgrade the defensive posture of the camp. The Pl leaders, Squad leaders and individual soldiers did their job without constant supervision of company and Bn leaders. This junior leader aggressiveness may turn out to be a great asset to the development of a fully trained Bn. The junior leaders conducted physical training and classes on drill and ceremonies. The Bn does not hide the fact they are, as a whole, inexperienced but initial dedication to the training programme and an inherent sense of aggressiveness in the indiv may produce superior results.

SECRET

.../3

SECRET

- 3 -

B. WEAKNESSES: The Brigade was formed under combat conditions and the lack of experienced leadership could be a problem in the initiation of a complete concurrent training programme.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: Helmets are incomplete so the safety requirements can not be met on the ranges. Lighting remains a problem but they will be all eviated in the near future. The remaining 105 men necessary to fill the Bn will miss most of the initial week of training which is not a problem in itself but it is when combined with the neccessity to familiarize the Bn with all fundamentals inherent in implementing the increased defensive posture MR-111.

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: The Bn was given familiarization classes and firing of all TO and E weapons except 45 cal. Pistols and mortars. The mortar crews and medics were given classes on their duties in an alert situation. All squad leaders were given familiarization on the claymore and hand grenade with a practical exercise in throwing live grenades.

E. BN CO: CPT ING SARIN has been in the FANK Army for 2 years. He was born on 26 December 1938 in Takeo, Cambodia. Prior to his military service he worked in a rubber plantation, spent three years in France and taught High School. He is married with three children and is currently commanding the 4th Bn to be trained from the 22nd Brigade. Cpt Sarin seems to be an aggressive and strong leader and support the program 100 per cent.

F. BN XO: LT PRAK CHHUONG PRAR has just had corrective surgery on his left hand and a biographic sketch will be included in the next report.

G. STRENGTH: 10 OFF 50 NCO'S 344 EM TOTAL: 407

28th Battalion

A. STRENGTHS: Cannot be accurately evaluated at this time as the leaders arrived only last Thursday.

B. WEAKNESSES: Cannot be accurately be evaluated at this time for the same reason.

C. PROBLEM AREAS: Lack of proper or essential equipment such as ammo pouches, canteen covers, boots, helmet liner sweat bands, suspenders, socks, sufficient number of weapon cleaning kits, packs, 1st aid pouches and pistol belts is the major problem area. Sufficient water supply for washing is still a problem.

D. OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN: Extra training after classes is being conducted in an effort to improve the performance of the battalion leaders.

E. BN CO: CPT SOUN SOUEN at the present time is performing his duties satisfactorily. His strong and weak points cannot be accurately assessed at this time. Cpt Suon Souen was born in 1940 in Phnom Penh City. In 1953 he joined the army and shortly after he enrolled in the army schools. In 1960 he was inspired to become an officer due to his good performance as a senior NCO. In 1963 he became an officer through hard work, diligence and dedication to the army and his country. He has been the commander of his present Bn for about four months now, and enjoys the command position. His Bn has been in combat six different times and has won six combat stars- battle campaigns for valor and courage in the face of the enemy. Captain Soueng is married and has three children. He is happy to be here training.

F. BN XO: Not present.

G. STRENGTH: 4 OFF NCO 39 TOTAL: 43

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT ON JWTC FEB 72

ANNEX C TO
AATTV REPORT
DATED 20 MAR 72

Training

1. 1/72 Junior Officers Course marched out 26 Feb 72. Total student strength was thirty six. Eighteen qualified, six were returned to unit for disciplinary reasons, and twelve failed to reach the required standard. The final exercise for this course was restricted due to security problems resulting from increased VC activity.
2. 2/72 Junior Officers Course did not start on 28 Feb 72 but has been postponed for one week. This was expected.
3. 1/72 Senior NCO's Course is in its fourth week of training. Student strength is forty eight. Other than its small size, no problems have occurred, and the new training syllabus and organisation are satisfactory.
4. 1/72 PF Cadre Course marched out 4 Feb 72. The standard was again high, attitude excellent, and all thirty students qualified. No course was conducted during February, 2/72 PF Cadre Course being scheduled to commence 6 Mar 72.
5. No training was performed during Tet week 14-20 Feb. Staff were permitted to visit their families and relatives during the day but restricted to camp at night.

Visits

6. Visitors during the month were:

Brig Gen Bennett (International Control Commission)	11 Feb 72
COMAFV	15 Feb 72
Aust Ambassador)	
COMAFV)	22 Feb 72
CO USARV ITG	23 Feb 72
COS AFV	24 Feb 72
CGS)	
COMAFV)	29 Feb 72

Admin & Log

7. JWTC relies upon the VKNTC water supply, a deep well system developed by the US. A break in the pump shaft has cut all water off, and all water must be trucked in either from Baria or Vung Tau. No early repair seems likely.

CONFIDENTIAL

.../2

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

8. The JWTC area is still littered with surplus stores from Nui Dat awaiting return to Central Logistics Command. The Commandant has still not received approval to backload.

Engineer Works

9. The work on JWTC with minor exceptions has been completed. Exceptions are ground leveling, ceremonial gates and flagpole, a concrete verandah and certain drains.

10. The failure of the VKNTC water supply has prevented testing of the new ablution/latrine block.

11. The contract work on the 60 dependant shelters is progressing satisfactorily and should be completed by 1 Apr 72.

Advisory Team

12. Strength of the team including RF/PF Adviser and two MATTs is thirty eight.

13. Average Engineer strength for the month was thirty three.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MONTHLY REPORT OF RF/PF ADVISER

FEB 72

ANNEX D TO
AATTV REPORT
DATED 20 MAR 72

General

1. February provided the expected increase in enemy activity. The increase was anticipated due to Tet and President Nixon's visit to China.
2. There are indications that activity may continue to increase for a further short period. Province intelligence predicts a peak in mid March.

Enemy

3. The major unit activity during Feb was that of 2/274 Regt. This unit, contrary to intelligence beliefs that it was engaged in supply, appeared in the Xuyen Moc area and has repeatedly been engaged by Territorial Forces. The main engagement however was between 2/274 and 2/52/18 ARVN Div on 27 Feb 72 between Xuyen Moc and Dat Do.
4. A new unit, 74A Arty Bn with a strength of 70 is reported to be moving into Phuoc Tuy to conduct attacks by fire against the Van Kiep National Training Centre and other military targets. The unit has 2 x 82 mm mortars, 1 x 122 mm rocket launcher, 1 x 30 cal machine gun and 7 x B40 RPG. The late move by this unit supports the theory that mid March may be the time of peak activity.
5. The 3/274 Regt has been ordered to extend its operations from Phu My in the North West of Phuoc Tuy to Long Dien in the South.
6. Although the enemy has not conducted any attacks with a mission of capturing or holding during the month they have been reasonably successful in chance contact, attacks by fire and terrorist activities.
7. The ratio of Enemy/Own killed during the month is more in the enemy's favour than it has been for some time. The summary is:
 - a. Enemy KIA (BC) - 19
 - b. GVN KIA - 34
8. Contacts have resulted in equipment losses on both sides. Significantly the GVN forces have lost 4 x ANPRC 25 sets.

ARVN

9. ARVN have been in the Province twice during the month. A visit was deployed at Nui Dat during President Thieu's visit to Ap Suoi Nghe. A second unit, 2/52/18 ARVN Div, moved into the Province late in Feb specifically to conduct operations against the element of 274 VC MF Regt between Xuyen Moc and Dat Do. 6 x 105 mm guns accompanied 2/52/18 ARVN.
10. After the contact on 27 Feb 72, in which both the ARVN and VC force showed great tenacity, 4/52/18 ARVN and a Recce Coy were deployed into the Province in support of 2/52/18 ARVN.
11. 2/274 VC Regt at present seems to have eluded the ARVN and it is unlikely the ARVN will remain in the Province past the first week of March.

CONFIDENTIAL

...2

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Territorial Forces

12. Sector HQ have been responsible for much of the poor result shown by RF during February. There is a lack of confidence shown towards the RF. This lack of faith has communicated itself to the RF unit and the result appears, as it did during this month, in poor showings against main force VC.

13. There has been a failure by Sector to use its Territorial Forces. Intelligence had indicated the location of the 274 VC MF elements for most of the month. It was the failure of the Province Chief to employ Territorial Forces Against the area that resulted in the ARVN moving in.

14. The fact ARVN conducted the operation has caused some embarrassment to the US Senior Advisors in Phuoc Tuy. The lack of confidence in the RF is not shared by the advisory elements.

15. PF Platoons have been more successful. 40, 37 and 69 PF Pls had successful contacts during the month.

PSDF

16. February saw little activity within the PSDF. The Province Chief quoted the number of known infiltrators within the PSDF to be:

- a. Long Le - 23
- b. Long Dien - 8
- c. Dat Do - 14
- d. Duc Thanh - 0
- e. Xuyen Moc - 1

MATTS

17. The MATT has been used on visiting PF outposts to advise on defences. The results have been encouraging. The VMATT programme does not appear to be as effective as would be desirable. There is a lack of training supervision.

Conclusion

18. The current peak of activity in Phuoc Tuy is higher than it has been for some time. It is possible the level may increase further during March but is likely to taper off then due to lack of logistical backing.

19. The Territorial Force are generally capable but are not being used aggressively enough, eg as of 1 Mar 72 there were 5 RF Coys guarding route 23 from Dat Do to Xuyen Moc.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPLOYMENT OF AATTV AS AT 29 FEB 72

ANNEX E TO
AATTV REPORT
DATED 20 MAR 72

Serial	Rank	Initials	Name	Corps	Unit	Employment	Due RTA	Location	Remarks	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	
01	1	Lt Col	K.H.	Kirkland	RA Inf	HQ AATTV	CO	Jul 72	Van Kiep	Position Vacant Super By Rank
	2	Capt	K.W.	Barlow	RAASC	" "	Adjutant	Aug 72	" "	
	3	WO 1	E.W.	Gason	RAAC	" "	RSM	Jun 72	" "	
	4					" "	Clerk Admin		" "	
	5	WO 1	L.J.	Stanford	RA Inf	" "	RQMS	Aug 72	" "	
	6	Cpl	M.J.	Gooley	RAASC	" "	Clerk Admin	Aug 72	" "	
	7	Cpl	P.C.	Schulte	RAAC	" "	Storeman	Aug 72	" "	
02	1	Maj	R.B.M.	Donaldson	RAA	JWTC	Trg Supervisor	Oct 72	" "	
	2	Capt	K.J.	McTaggart	RA Inf	"	Admin & Log Adviser	Jul 72	" "	
	3	Capt	W.D.	Tresise	" "	"	Trg Adviser	Apr 72	" "	
	4	Capt	J.R.	Sherriff	RNZIR	"	" "	Oct 72	" "	
	5	Capt	D.J.	Mead	RA Inf	"	" "	Oct 72	" "	
	6	WO 1	D.	Morrison	RNZIR	"	Asst Admin	Oct 72	" "	
	7	WO 2	M.J.	Shave	RA Inf	"	" "	Jul 72	" "	
	8	"	B.	Willis	RAE	"	" "	Oct 72	" "	
	9	"	R.	Stewart	RA Inf	"	" "	Jun 72	" "	
	10	"	G.R.	Martin	" "	"	" "	Feb 73	" "	
	11	"	P.	Hulsing	RAAMC	"	" "	Jun 72	" "	
	12	"	R.J.	Clancy	RA Inf	"	" "	Aug 72	" "	
	13	"	C.E.	Ebner	" "	"	" "	Aug 72	" "	

ANNEX C

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)
	14	WO 2	D.S.	Cochrane	RA Inf	JWTC	Asst Admin	Aug 72	Van Kiep	
	15	"	S.F.	Reid	" "	"	" "	Jun 72	" "	
	16	WO 1	L.T.	Allen	RA Sigs	"	" "	Aug 72	" "	
	17	Cpl	B.J.	McDonald	RAAMC	"	Asst Med	Jun 72	" "	
	18	Sgt	H.H.	Zinke	AACC	"	Cook	Sep 72	" "	
	19	Cpl	P.S.	Dury	RA Inf	"	Driver	Aug 72	" "	
	20	Cpl	G.V.	Bayliss	RAEME	"	Mech Veh	Sep 72	" "	
	21	WO 2	J.P.	Hudson	RA Inf	"	Asst Admin	May 72	" "	Super to Estab
03	1	Maj	R.	Musgrave	RAAC	RF/PF	RF/PF Adviser	Apr 72	BARIA	
MOBILE ASST TRAINING TEAM										
04	1	WO 2	F.N.	Nicholas	RA Inf	MATT 1	Asst Admin	Jul 72	"	
	2	"	R.I.	Bennett	" "	"	" "	Apr 72	"	
	3	"	G.J.	Hall	RNZIR	"	" "	Oct 72	"	
	4	WO 1	G.E.	Wease	RA Inf	MATT 2	" "	Aug 72	"	
	5	WO 2	B.	Morgan	" "	"	" "	Aug 72	"	
	6	WO 1	T.R.	Samuels	RNZIR	"	" "	Oct 72	"	
	7	Cpl	B.W.	Burgess	RA Inf	" 1	Asst Instr	Jun 72	"	
	8	"	C.D.	Carroll	RAE	"	" "	Aug 72	"	
	9	"	R.G.	Mackrill	RA Inf	" 2	" "	Jun 72	"	
	10	"	P.A.	Gallagher	" "	"	" Med	Aug 72	"	
USARV INDIVIDUAL TRG GP										
05	1	Maj	I.W.	Gore	RA Inf	HQ USARV	Ops/Trg S3	Feb 73	Bein Hoa	
	2	Capt	J.E.	Weiland	" "	PTT Bn	Trg Adviser	Jul 72	Long Hai	
	3	"	O.S.	Lind	" "	" "	" "	Feb 73	" "	

ANNEX C

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)
4	Capt	F.A.	Roberts	RAAC	LHT Bn	Trg Adviser	Apr 72	Long Hai	Super by rank
5	"	W.M.	McLaughlin	RAA	" "	" "	Apr 72	" "	" " "
6	WO 2	B.R.	Day	RA Inf	PTT Bn	Asst Admin	Apr 72	" "	
7	WO 2	J.C.	McNarmara	" "	" "	" "	Aug 72	" "	
8	"	B.	Morrow	" "	" "	" "	Aug 72	" "	
9	WO 1	D.E.	Wise	RAA	" "	" "	Aug 72	" "	
10	WO 2	B.	Foster	RA Inf	" "	" "	Jun 72	" "	
11	"	M.J.	Poole	" "	" "	" "	Jul 72	" "	
12	"	R.R.	Gurney	" "	" "	" "	Apr 72	" "	
13	"	F.	Lawler	" "	" "	" "	Jul 72	" "	
14	"	I.R.	Ramsay	" "	" "	" "	Jun 72	" "	
15	"	R.	Roberts	RAA	" "	" "	Oct 72	" "	
16	"	J.	Woods	RA Inf	LHT Bn	" "	Aug 72	" "	
17	"	J.R.	Cousins	" "	" "	" "	Jul 72	" "	
18	"	I.J.	Jewell	" "	" "	" "	Aug 72	" "	
19	"	G.C.	Jenkin	" "	" "	" "	Jun 72	" "	
20	"	I.S.	McPhail	" "	" "	" "	Aug 72	" "	
21	"	D.A.	Duffy	" "	" "	" "	Aug 72	" "	
22	"	B.F.	McGrath	" "	" "	" "	Aug 72	" "	
23	WO 1	I.C.	Wall	" "	" "	" "	Jun 72	" "	
24	WO 2	B.	Elphick	" "	" "	" "	Aug 72	" "	
25	"	J.A.	Gibson	RA Sigs	" "	" "	Aug 72	" "	
26	"	P.	Verkuylen	RAA	" "	" "	Aug 72	" "	
27					" "	" "			Postn Vacant