


AWM38
Official History,
1914-18 War: Records of C E W Bean,
Official Historian.

Diaries and Notebooks

Item number: 3DRL606/85/1

Title: Diary, July - August 1917
Includes references to the 7th and 8th Battalions
at Pozieres.



AWM38-3DRL606/85/1

Original.

ALM 38

DIARY NO. 85.
DIARIES AND NOTES OF C. E. W. BEAN
CONCERNING THE WAR OF 1914 - 1918

302L 606 ITEM 85 [1]

THE use of these diaries and notes is subject to conditions laid down in the terms of gift to the Australian War Memorial. But, apart from those terms, I wish the following circumstances and considerations to be brought to the notice of every reader and writer who may use them.

These writings represent only what at the moment of making them I believed to be true. The diaries were jotted down almost daily with the object of recording what was then in the writer's mind. Often he wrote them when very tired and half asleep; also, not infrequently, what he believed to be true was not so — but it does not follow that he always discovered this, or remembered to correct the mistakes when discovered. Indeed, he could not always remember that he had written them.

These records should, therefore, be used with great caution, as relating only what their author, at the time of writing, believed. Further, he cannot, of course, vouch for the accuracy of statements made to him by others and here recorded. But he did try to ensure such accuracy by consulting, as far as possible, those who had seen or otherwise taken part in the events. The constant falsity of second-hand evidence (on which a large proportion of war stories are founded) was impressed upon him by the second or third day of the Gallipoli campaign, notwithstanding that those who passed on such stories usually themselves believed them to be true. All second-hand evidence herein **Must Be Read with a Minimum of**

16 Sept., 1946.

ACCESS STATUS

C. E. W. BEAN.

OPEN

ey 23. 85
1916

32

July 23. 85
1916

D 32

Sund. VIII Bon. 1

July 23. 4.45 moved from Sausage
Valley to Chalk Pit valley
near old gun position.

D Coy did all carrying
water ammo food etc.

Several barrages in
valley that day. Other 3
coys in "Dinkum alley"
under G.O.C. Lt Bide.

Abt 7pm. asked by
Smythe to move 3 ^{other} coys
up to Pozieres - 1 in
support 2 in village
by 9.30.

We were ordered to
advance (in platoons in
file up Chalk Pit Rd).
to take up position 300 yd

This in orders. Prob
 shd be. X 4 B 1.0.
 & X 4 a 8½. 1

N of Bapaume Rd. & Constr. 3
 Bapaume Rd. C Coy in
 reserve on Bapaume Rd.

[This Coy was afterwards
 with drawn at daylight
 on 24th. C Coy ^(support) while
 moving up rd beyond
 chalk Pit lost 17 men
 by one 5.9 shell & all
 25 in all.

Met no Germans going
 th 10 village

Str pts X 4 B ½. 4

& X 4 a ½. 5½

On left ^{part of} A Coy went too
 far & got right up near
 Cemetery - No oppositn.

D32

4

A Coy. found it had gone
too far & withdrew to strong
point (Western one).

At daybreak Germans
saw them & shelled them
heavily. We lost James (K)
Trail & Campbell.

Germans were in Kay
trench & in an offshoot
south of 6530.

Trenches in NW of
Willap also saw them.

They had dug in fairly
well in a shaped trench.
Had muffs to them & dug all
night & had sandbags.

July 24 at 20.20 Coulter

Just daybreak.

D37

was given instructions ~~at~~ H 5
further operation was to
take place at 3.30 on July
25. At 5 to 12 this
was cancelled by Bde (as
Divl orders sd "July 26"
by mistake.) Bde rang
up Divn + tried to get
Attack postponed (when told
this was a mistake).

At 1 a.m. C.O. sent for
to Bde H.Q. + told
Attack as on & go
operation orders.

2 Coys (C & D) moved
from Dunkin Alley &
took up position in Stray

July 25. 7.30am.
Serg 12 was foodwise
patrol - saw
men abt

R 34 central -
either observers
or on cable burying
work.

had got into

K trench at
abt cemetery

actually cut off
(abt 5 of them) all

retreating Germans
Germans getting
out of trench

34c central
were shot down
by 4 Bn m.g.

posts in Pozieres. (ab were to be starting M)
O.C. was
able to give them full instructions
& asked them to visit.
(A) & (B) in their posts.

Left Coy to reach Cemetery.

(8 Bn was attacking for 1st Bde -
Obj. to seize & occupy Pozieres
Strong posts to beat to Cemetery
X 4 B 07 Cemetery
(orchard)

3rd Bn were in support
(did it have to be called
up).

Attack in 2 lines of on
frontage of 2 coys

Each Coy 4 waves

Frontage abt 100 yds

Each Coy.

Cops to form on two posts. 8
 4 Bn to bomb up K trench.
 M.g. on East side of K
 trench cooperated working
 ahead of bombers &
 keeping enemy's head
 down. Our men were
 walking along bank of
 trench so no diffy
 in seeing where they were.
 M. gunner was walking
 there too.

4 thin Cops^{of 8} only used
 & 4 Bn bombers.

H.Q. moved forward before
 attack to X 4 C 7.2.

D32

At 3.30 attack was launched.
D Coy. was told to go
straight ahead without
worrying about intermediate
offshoot. trenches from K
trench.

C Coy was on their rt.
A was to take the intermediate
trench 1/2 off K (to East)
& B to go more towards
orchards.

D got thro w little
opposition - along cemetery
Rd. Germans in K &
offshoots were too busy
w bombing attack on left.

D37

10

A wh followed had opposite.
Germans bombed heavily
from first offshoot. Capt
Lodge pulled them together,
& tho' hit in shoulder
secured these trenches.
Some cleared into K
trench, but many killed.
One of carrying platoon hit a
German w a shovel - German
wanted to surrender.

They were keeping pace
w 4 Bn bombers! Everything
went well on this.

D was in position 50 yds
N of cemetery 5 am.

C. had hard fighting
but reached orchard
shortly after 5 - & dug in.

After 8 Bn (D Coy) had reached their
 objec. their C.O. & Sgt. Maj. Goodwin
 a Sgt, Corp, & a bombardier - went on
 patrol. First they came back into
 K trench & actually got in it behind 1
 German. The Germans they speak of
 as abt 1000 strong. They threw their
 hands up but Capt Hurrey tells me that
 8 Bn men sd - "There's too many of
 them" (remarks went round on
 all sides) & they were fired on. Of 100
 only 30 reached Capt Hurrey. Those
 in 1 trench seem to have bolted
 or streaked across country to left
 - sneaking from crater to crater -
 Hurrey thinks abt 500 were k or
 captured & abt 500 got away
 (Prob these figures are too



(large.)
 The patrol then turned.
 Someone in 4 Bn as
 he saw us firing on Germans
 in a trench beyond D Coy
 who looked like surrendering
 & they too got back into 2

D37

3 offrs. of C. were k. Germans ¹²
 were in trucks in village
 & Craters, mostly bayonet fight
 We captured 7 m. g. in this
 advance - we were under
 mg. fire. 2 of these m. g.
 were used on Germans

D Coy was well ahead
 of 1 German. 4 Bn
 was driving Germans
 up - & as they streamed
 Northwards D Coy's m. g.
 in Cemetery got them.
 Some started getting out,
 but meeting fire got
 into 2 of again & wormed
 away towards Mousquet?

got away. (we saw British do exactly same at Tricourt).

The patrol then went up K trench. Goodwin who went first was walking up it when he saw a German in front of him ~~not~~ coming out of a dugout. What say if 1 man saw him - but he turned to walk quietly up 1 trench.

Goodwin dropped his revolver at once & fired - 1 German dropped his pack & ran on - leaving blood marks along 1 Tg.

The patrol went on past 1 trench in front of D Coy. From further on they could see to their right the ridge behind the O.G. Tg - & there in 1 open was a line of scattered men. ~~either~~ At first they thought these men were ^a c. attack - but they seemed too scattered then they took them for arty observers.

D Coy sent forward a patrol - Serjt Maj. Goodwin, Capt ~~Hurrey~~ Hurrey (O.C.) & Serjt Schleon went up ~~to~~ open to within 100 yds of Mouquet Farm & only saw one German whom they shot. They saw Germans moving in force down O.G. 1 & O.G. 2 towards windmill. This was passed to Divn & arty got on to the Germans. (Patrol was out v. quickly)

At 3 pm. O.P. connected up & left 1st of

15

or the
man
laying
cable.
They find
on them at
abt 1000 yds
or more.

They then went
on past the
shoulder of hill
& their trench
here petered
out & they
see the mountain
Farm only
100 yds ahead.
(The trench got
v. shallow -
German &

told me this too). There seemed no one
abt. The walls of Farm had been bashed in
& roof had fallen - more or less
entire - to ground.

The higher authorities questioned
the accuracy of this patrol but it
certainly was an accurate report.

R 34.5.4.

1 2 1 2
u 6 2
✓ 18 2 6 7 7
- 2 2 2 2 2
✓ 2 4 2 2 2
- 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2

Patrol D got into 09

By ^{posts} at 77.78 2
1 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2

D32

16

8 Bn. (a dug a new line
in front of 8 Bn).

Intense shelling by enemy
all day hampered shelling
digging.

St Posts R 34 C 66 had to
R 34 d 23

be estab. that night.

July 26 At 3 am both posts
secure, latter strong.

At former point
we were bombed by
Warwicks - 4 men
were injured. Our
men withdrew as
they could fire. Officer
came round & apologized.

17

A battery of ^{our} 18 pounders on left saw digging in D Coy's advanced trench - & immediately 6 shells came - men withdrew from Y. An artillery observer came across & apologized.

That day Hurwicks men were fired at by Hurwicks from abt X B 2.8. our men were at ^R34 C central.

Another patrol sd to have found O.G. trenches fairly well North were empty.

Next day a patrol found, or thought it found, movement in trenches to N of us thro wh Goodwin had moved 1 day before.

This day a British officer came along Comm Y from left into K trench w bombs - & was astonished when he saw our men. "What-Australia!"

D37

All day heavy fire. 18
July 27. 3 am. Bn relieved
by 6 Aust Bde (~~2 Bns~~)

Total cas. ~~40~~

off	4	7	
o.r.	77	259	16

Missing 16 all wounded

Total now 373

4 hit still on duty.

In attack many were hit
by rifle m.g. & bombs.

D37

19

VII Bn. (from Col Jess)
July 23. By 6am. Co.

under 3rd Bde
A & B 2 Coys in Sunken Rd 2y 1 3 Bde
C & D 2 Coys in Black Watch Ave.
under 2 Bde

H.Q. in gunners Bailiff wood.

1 Barrage post behind
1 " " in front.

12.5 in afternoon message
from MacLellan to say
Bn was allotted to 1 am

3. Heard from Div that
allotment of C & D was
cancelled.

July 23/24 A & B Coys were
carrying for 3rd Bde.

D37 Monday.

20

July 24 morning: from 9 am
till 2 pm. enemy
delayed valley w lacrymator
& gas shells.

Had to use helmets
& goggles.

This night guns
moved up there & opened
covering 5 Bn operation

3.10 pm. message from Bde.

A & B Coys were placed
under his direction for
operation at night.

L2 M. was to see Coy
Commanders & give
them all instructions re
reconnaissance.

2 teams of regimental
bombers were to be attached
to protect left flank when

D37 they got in.

21

5.5 pm. Burrow in charge
of B Coy got shell shock
leaving 2/Lt Brown in
charge of B Coy.

Asked for Lt Hamilton
to replace (left in Albert).

5.45: sent to S-Bu:

Can you let me have
some knowledge of
scheme tonight in order
that I might help Swift
(O.C. A Coy) & new command
of B Coy, who is likely
to come up very late.

No reply.

Yes 7 pm. I went personally

D37

to 5 Ba & found Lem??
in the middle of his order.
While there waiting for
it to be finished I
got a message from
3 Bde saying that I had
to be again attached to
3 Bde & wanting to
see me.

Lem. promised to send
a copy of order to me.

At Bde H.Q. the
situation was explained to
me. I was told that A & B
were absolutely under
Lem's orders & to
divide Lewis's guns betw.

D37

the 2 assaulting Coys. ²³
Lt C & D Coys were 3 Bde
reserve under myself,
& were not to move
without orders in writing
from J.O.C. 3 Bde
or myself & Lt Br
H.Q. were to remain
where they were.

9.15 pm. Folly & Swift
A Coy. During operations
take instrns from either
Col. Le M. or Col 3 Bde.
2/Lt H Brown to carry
on with B Coy until
arrival of Lt Hamilton.

D37

3 Lewis m.g. have been
 allotted to each Coy.

Lt J P O'Connor
 and officers have been
 sent to you to give
 advice in their employment.

(5 Bn were then in Baitiff
 wood)

9.45 C & D Coys given
 outline of operations &
 then after 5 Bn had
 moved thru them
 they were to move
 forward & occupy 2
 vacated by A & B Coys 7 Bn
 & scout reconnaissance forward
 common 2 ~~for~~ ~~for~~ ~~adv~~

D37

At 10 p.m. sent to S. Bn. 25

"Have allotted 3 Lewis
mgs to each of my 2 Coys
wh have been attached to
you for tonight's operation.
Have instructed the 2 OCs
Coys concerned to take
orders from and commu-
-icate w you. Can you
let me know what time
the head of yr Bn will
be clearing the Commun-
ty leading from B. Watch
alley across Sunken Rd,
where your forming up
place will be, & what time
roughly, you estimate
you will clear it

D32

26

running from X S-C 83
to X 11 a 3.8. as I
have to occupy same.

No reply.

10.30 Lt Hamilton arrived
at Bn H.Q. I marked
his map & explained
situation but he could not
reach his Coy before
midnight & had no
opport. of reconnoitering
ground with us entirely
new to him.

July 28.

2.10 am ^(time sent) D Coy reported
that they could now move
into 1st forward Coy (vacated
by A & B (i.e. 5 Bn & A & B
were going thro'))

D37

[They were timed for 2.0²⁷
- it was then 2.10.]

At 5.15 (D + C were
in position in Sunken Rd
(2) Got this 9 from
O.C. D Coy.

"We got orders from
Col. Le M. & a Col.
Robinson, 3 Inf Bde.
to hold a strong pt.
threatened by a c-attack.
Have still 2 platoons
in reserve."

Le M. asked him to
come & put whole of
D Coy in, but he
wouldn't. Sent 1 platoon
away carrying, left 1, &

D37

took 2 in. [NB. written
instructions shd have been
required.]

28

5.15 Regt. Scout reported
tht 1 assault was a
failure owing to some of
S Bn & our A & B
Cops being directed &
finding themselves in
our own Comm
2/1

6.45. 7 from D Coy.

"Have been ordered into
the front line by Col de M."
Oates protested. Sd he
had written orders not to

D37

31

tried to get in between but
cdnt. Whole 5 Bn was
not clear till 2.10 (assault
laid down for 2 am.)

Swift was out in his
place when 5 Bn
moved to assault.

Barrage had already
lifted. Swift did what
he cd to keep touch

w left of 5 Bn &
found himself in
junction of O.G. 1 &
Pozieres 2nd B Coy
Johnto Copse Avenue.

Probbly B was directed
by an officer of 3 Bde
wh was making an assault

[Faint, illegible handwriting on the left page]

across 1 Bapaume Rd.
One platoon of A Coy
got in right direction
(under Lt Sutherland) &
dug in at 30 yds
from O/S 1 at 35-45-7.

The B Coy men who
got into the Copse and
were not fired on
by 3 Bde there &
found out that our
own men were holding
it. (no casualties)

Sutherland at dawn
had to come back. He
was quite isolated.

Swift found out where
A & B were & reported

D37

33

to Lt M. who put both
Coy. on carrying
bombs & amm..

July 25

7 am. C. Coy reported
to try were engaged
carrying bombs amm
etc under orders from
C.O. 5 Bn. (This
was the last Coy.)

At 7.55 folks from
Oates (D Coy) then
on 5 Bn left in O.G.I.
where 5 Bn got in
a little S of train.

"Under protest I sent
3 platoons to firing line.

D37

Orders from Col. de Lu. 34 Aug
4th Platoon is carrying
bombs."

At 8.45 I was instrd.
by S.O.C. 3 Bde (where
I was since 5 am.) to
take charge of C. Coy 6 Bn
& what I could get together
of any other Coy &
occupy a trench from
O.G. 1 to X5 Central
to X5 C 44

(i.e. Pozieres Y - Copse Ave
line.) To repel German
C. attack massing in
vicinity of windmill.
If nec; to p. in w/1
baronet.

D32

35

I saw ^{Capt} Keller - gave him
orders to go into
Pozieres by E of junction
w Copee ave.

Went to Sunnys,
O.C. Coy to occupy Copee
ave w all 1 men he
could get. For H.Q. to
junction of ~~Black~~
Sunken Rd by w
Common trench to Pozieres
by.

There found that one
platoon of C. Coy & Bn
had been taken & sent in.

C. attack was driven
off by our arty.

Jess stayed in new H.Q.
& ordered ^{A.B.C.} Coy after delivery

D32

bombs to reorganise in 36
Sunken Rd 2 * (D Coy
was in O.G. 1 engaged w
Enemy on left of 5 Bn).
Reported to Les M. abt 11am.

10.55. Message from 3 Bde
to reorganise C Coy 7
as carriers.

Numbers of Coys in hand
were to be used for reinf.
purposes without written
order from Bde.

At this stage 3 platoons
of C Coy 6 Bn were /
only formed troops
under Jess.

At 11.35 sent message to

S-Bn showing my
dispositions & asking
for situation of S Bn H.Q.
No reply.

At midday. Oates came
out & explained they
had been resisting bomb
attacks all morning
& had driven enemy
back abt 30 yds
up O.G. 1 towards
tramway (he held
Germans back w
revolver while they
built the barricade
behind him).

There were urgent
appeals for officers &

See plan (later in
(2)
this book.

D37

38

more troops - but ^{Common} trenches
behind were full of troops - indeed
these were better withdrawn.

Fight was by this time a
bomb attack in O/S 1 & 2.

Lt Harris was sent in to
~~assist~~ assist Oates -

Lt Anderson of 5 Bn came
up several times -

Oates & Harris were there
till 5 am. July 26.

Got within 25 yds of tramway
Pushed back to starting
pt - advanced 60 yds
and built barricade.

Germans were using stick
bombs (not pea bombs)

tho these were in 2y
in 100s - these our people
took to be tear bombs
& thought th they were
not using them bec.
they wanted to hold
2y themselves & advance.
Germans were throwing
stick bombs. We can
out - throw these (gun cotton
not shrapnel effect -
very local - 5 ft away
little effect of moral
effect). They were bringing
up fresh bombing
teams - reinforcing in
full marching order
across Bapaume Rd


Brown was hit near H.Q. +
by a splinter abt. 9 am. July 25.

The corp carrying bombs all
had 2 bombs in each mans
pockets. all time.

At last they were
carrying up bombs
in detonated.

from near windmill - 41
Capt Bates got barrage
across OG1 + up OG2
(sent back map reader to
F.O.O in trench some
hundred yds behind).

Barrage got on quickly.



The effect of
barrage was
to stop them
getting across
in more than

one or two. (Prob. abt.
7.30 am.)

When messages were
recd. that enemy was

C. attacking at afternoon
(abt 4 p.m.) Harris cd
see no Germans at all.
There was no C. attack
then. Possibly enemy
were reinforcing trench
N of windmill but
certainly not S of it.

When we put up our
barricade we cut
T trench on either side
of O.S. 1 wh prevented
us being surprised.

1 pm. Jess reported situation
normal. Bn reorg. etc.
D Coy wh still engaged
on flank of S Bn.

2.20. 3 Bde ordered to
 report at H.Q.
 3 Bde - to withdraw
 rear Coy & have rest
 ready to move when
 ordered. Instructions to
 O.Cs Coy to withdraw
 to Bailey Wood.

At H.Q. told me I was
 attached to 1 Bde - Report
 1st Bde H.Q.

Ordered to relieve
 172 Bns in Pozieres

Trench was too crowded
 by allies from behind.
 Our drill is as good
 as theirs. It is no use
 having infy in 2, but

D37


want remnants of bombers ⁴⁴
100yds behind - out of
bomb range. We want
men to string lightly along
L as you advance.
This was exactly what
was not done & reason
why we had to come
back from tramway.
But further back the
infy crowded the L
& men were too keen to
be w Oates & Sebinto
fight. Shd have been someone
there to ~~steer~~ hold men
up & organize.

(10 German bombs in
air above at times)

The German snipers are very good - they work w bombers. Some of our men got hit thro jumping out of Z, running along side of trench, & throwing bombs into trench.

This wd get enemy on run & start him - but of course men got hit by snipers (mostly thro head). Our Lewis guns were taking the Germans hands off as they threw.

Tess went on to Poz. Saw Z - sent word to trickle men thro barrage wh was very heavy. Relieved



47
1 v 2 Bns betw. 9 v 11 pm.
Few hit.

A v B reld. 2nd Bn in
K. trench (part of 4th ^{still} near
Cemetery in K 2 ahead).

C & D in trenches among
ruins S. of Bap. ~~Red~~
in Poz.

A Coy in spite of
being turned back by O.S.
5 Bn once. got there in
end.

Men were occupying
crater holes. ~~Pres. all~~
Enemy 5.90 large shells
averaged 15-20 per min
at one time.

Road line was worst
Esp. Chalk pit.

D32

July 26. 7.50. Evening 48
Shelling Pozieres &
all round w H.E. &
barrage battery.

9.30 ft tonight
Brought in Shell shock.
Bn H.Q. of 8 & 7 Bns in
Cement House.

Found Ham & tins
lived on it & got some
away. No papers.
Our rifles & their some
time old.

1.50 Hamilton wd

2.45 Saker (and wd).

3.30 Lt. Hoban wd
(lost leg since)

Leaving Jess, Boston,
Hill, Di Altra,

- A Swift Purbeck,
 B. Hoad Campbell
 C. Sinous Antony
 D. Oates Harris
 Kosminsky

E. From Lt Hillard went to
 B Coy.
 Hamilton (W.E.) to C.
 Coy.
 Frontline at this time
 was linked up.

July 26.

12.10 pm. Heavy shelling.
Men shaken.

12.21 Est. Casualties 6 offrs.
3700 r.
This is night.

At 3 pm. 4 Bn C. Os of 6 Bde
 Came up. We showed
 them all we 'ed.

4.56. Enemy still shelling heavily. Our arty replying. (could hear them).

Lt MacCutcheon ~~kept~~ 1st Div Sig Coy. kept wire going for 3 days by repairing it himself.

~~Notes~~

Bets 4 & 6.: later. Germans got it on so heavy th our arty. observers could observe — on a/c of brick dust. Who was in Cement House looking out for old german look out — This was being hit direct. (we could hear our arty).

D37

Men don't realise the c-batt⁵¹
work (days were lazy)
is helping them.

"If relieving force
intends to stay for any
length of time in this
position (they proposed to
put in 4 Bns) recommend
the not more than 2
be sent in 1st place!"

We had to cut off for
1½ hrs.

6.48. Enemy consistently shelling
all day. Trenches &
constr. adequate trenches
owing to pulped nature
of ground. However

(6 Bn HQ in log hut
 S of Bap. Rd opp
 Cement H., since
 destroyed). Cem H. front room

constituted N 2 of Poz
 are wiped out, & men
 are so dazed that they
 are incapable of digging
 or fighting." (Bennett
 had sent in awful report).

8 Bn. had had to take
 men into orchard as
 7th wiped out. 6 Bn thought
 8 had retired.

Runners came in
 dazed & blown. Things
 were fairly crook.

6 & 8 Bn could no longer
 this.

6. Officer of Heavy guns
 also smashed since 2 Sigs killed

got in in hell of state.
 only officer agreed this
 was heavy bombt preparation
 to attack. He got
 heavies (two arty
 phone wh we still
 joining) out German
 post 2 (MacLureon
 came in just then shot
 in arm - he finished
 repairing & then came in)

6.56. Smoke & brickdust
 around H.Q. So thick
 & observers cant see.

D37

55
Only thing (less lots
than thro phone) is to
set out German front
line + make it impossible
for enemy to get thro.

This got the focus on
to enemy trenches.

7.40 From ^{2nd} Belle: "Men must
+ will fight if necessary,
all arty now turned
on in bombardment."

10.16. No movement by officers
or men in shelled area
to retire has been made.
Men have stuck to

Crater holes + no one
will move in a rearward
direction. Messages were
sent to enable H.Q.s
in rear to realise
seriousness of position
as it is recognised that
Poz. is apex of
Salient. Since opening
of four arty enemy fire
has slackened considerably
but requirement of at
least 1 Bn to go there
as + dig in on unbroken
ground is apparent.

D37

57

All ranks to can be
Common? We are
Sticking bravely & hoping
to 1 German infy will
advance, but in their
present condition a
determined attack by 1
Every night succeeds.



Enemy art fire has
now considerably slackened
& art observers can
again see 1 front. no
Indication of attack
at present.

¹⁰
9:30 pm Enemy's fire
became v excited when

our heavy art opened & kept razing his Coy. He sent up red flares ~~for~~ & wind. changed to Shrapnel - wh he poured in in Salvos ^{waves} on roads to S & W of Pozieres.

He has kept this up till abt. ~~9:40~~^{10:10} but since then his arty fire has slackened & till it is now v. desultory & if relief is coming it is comparatively safe for them to move. We request th we might be inf by wire of their time of starting. (No reply)

(New arrangement)



July 27. 2 am. A+B Corp
relieved by 22 Bn.
Moved back to Sansay
valley.

4 am. Went to
nobody was to relieve
C+D - only 2 Bns
(incl of Bap Rd)

4.40. G.O. left Pozieres.

26 affrs 634 men
~~now~~ ^{then} in Regt.

(att 200 reinforcements since
800 now in Regt)

Jess only covered his Bn for
a day.

German issued an order

D3V

K.
2 cfts

W.
7

61
Side
1

or.

Aug. 10¹¹ 11. Yesterday (Aug 9¹⁰)

King visited contour. I

had a wire from Butler

wh caught me at 4 Bde

H.Q. to come at once.

Gen. Birchwood gave me a lift

- us, Gen. Napier -

[Artz believe in c-battery
work but ~~Infy~~ Infy all time
want c-infantry work. They
want to hear shells exploding
in enemy's trench when they
themselves are being shelled]

The King looked sunburned & healthy & spotafrankly. I liked his manner not a clever man but a man of character undoubtedly - downright & no humbug. He has a distinct accent ~~the~~ rather rough - it may be German or Norfolk. He has not easy manners - The P.O.W. was an English boy - a little tanned but with a perfectly clear complexion & healthy skin. He seemed well up in our organisation.

where our troops were - in an open car - but set a trotting pace - much too fast for I went properly to see him. It was a very very great pity th (time could not be spared) & it shd have been spared.

† He was probly thinking of Flagships Three.

(Aug 10)
Yest^y was first wet day we have had since being here. One other day low clouds. Even yest^y was only a drizzle barely eno^u to make mud.

Shelling was less intense.

I lunched wth Gen. Birdwood at Coligny after having got my boots more or less clean & shined. I then borrowed a cap from ^{young} Carruthers. The staff waited around the gate of the Chateau to meet the King. He shook hands with everyone. To old Smith he sd: "I hear you were ill in England after you saw me." To me he sd: "Hav^ent I read a ~~book~~ were you at Angac with the others? I sd I was. He sd "Didn't I read a book which you wrote abt it?" I sd. "The Angac book? The men wrote that, Sir." He sd: "No not that book - another." I sd: "No Sir, not one that I have written." *


He motored along the road

C4

Plan (Z)

7th Bn fight in O.G. 2. July 25th.
(described earlier)

D32



Crater w Lewis gun



Wickers gun

1st Barricade built here.
(Probably by 5 Bn)

Lewis gun here

O.G. 1

Battle of
Fromelles
Jul 19.16

66

