


AWM38
Official History,
1914-18 War: Records of C E W Bean,
Official Historian.

Diaries and Notebooks

Item number: 3DRL606/227/1

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Comprises typed copies of items 3DRL
606/206/1 - 3DRL 606/215/1.



AWM38-3DRL606/227/1

ANM38

DIARIES AND NOTES OF C. E. W. BEAN
CONCERNING THE WAR OF 1914-1918

THE use of these diaries and notes is subject to conditions laid down in the terms of gift to the Australian War Memorial. But, apart from those terms, I wish the following circumstances and considerations to be brought to the notice of every reader and writer who may use them.

These writings represent only what at the moment of making them I believed to be true. The diaries were jotted down almost daily with the object of recording what was then in the writer's mind. Often he wrote them when very tired and half asleep; also, not infrequently, what he believed to be true was not so—but it does not follow that he always discovered this, or remembered to correct the mistakes when discovered. Indeed, he could not always remember that he had written them.

These records should, therefore, be used with great caution, as relating only what their author, at the time of writing, believed. Further, he cannot, of course, vouch for the accuracy of statements made to him by others and here recorded. But he did try to ensure such accuracy by consulting, as far as possible, those who had seen or otherwise taken part in the events. The constant falsity of second-hand evidence (on which a large proportion of war stories are founded) was impressed upon him by the second-hand nature of the Gallipoli Campaign, notwithstanding that those who passed on such stories usually themselves believed them to be true. All second-hand evidence herein should be read with this in mind.

16 Sept., 1946. C. E. W. BEAN.

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N° 227

NOTES OF INTERVIEWS

WITH

BATTALION OFFICERS &c.

This folio contains copies of
Books N°s 206 to 215

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27th BATTALION - August 8th

Came up Pineapple Switch to Albert. They got there just before the barrage which was more on the right and over.

After Zero before the Bn had gone 300 yards they were lost - at 8 am. They had a guide when the sun began to get through. The sound of the barrage was the only guide. They got to the objective in time. A few posts had to be dealt with - isolated posts (one near four trees about 33 Central.) There was a S.P. in the German main line in 33 A - which a tank dealt with (fairly good trenches.)

As the advance got on they found it and very difficult to know where they were. One party took out its M.Gs and struck towards Arafusee - knowing they should strike it - found the valley, went down it NE into the back of Warfusee so they rounded them up - the tanks were just coming into the town as this was done.

The S.P. at 34 B 7.1 to 7.4 was still holding out when the 5th Division came through. having been missed in the fog. It was firing three M.Gs from there as the prisoners came back along the main road. When the 5th Div. came along they gave in.

They halted on the objective. In the valley they took 9 77.guns which had been firing and were hot when they got there. A lot of prisoners were taken in this valley. As they got down the gully a number of Germans in the dugouts near the batteries put up a red flag and surrendered. They were in an advanced dressing station. This looked like an artillery group centre.

The trenches were very well camouflaged - with matting and grass and the guns were well camouflaged.

Lt. Bennett was lightly wounded and hung on.

50 casualties o.r.s. One Coy had only one casualty going across. Chance shells were largely responsible. The German barrage at the start accounted for some. Three tanks were with them, each flying the Bn colours. One tank lost its direction at once, turning at right angles to the right.

At 3 pm. that day they had a hot stew and some of the officers (loosely gathered) for dinner, 5th Division went through at time. At 11 am. Bn moved south of Bayonvillers to the railway 1 and rested on the railway. C. O. who had been to Bde came back there and explained to all officers what was to be done.

They got into the field behind the Crucifix and had lunch/ The show was to be at 4.30 pm.

The tanks came on fast and at about 4 pm. the Bn moved behind them and got into the old Amiens line. At that moment a number of German planes came on very low - 5 or 6 in one bunch. There were as many more above. 25th Bn was on the right in the road through 12 a at this time.

At 4.30, 27th Bn moved out as front line, with 25th on right and 17th on left.

As soon as they started the German began to shell from Lihons way. He could see the troops advancing and they could see the guns on the heights firing. There was no infantry opposition.

Bn got too far to the right and going past

Champagne Alley found the Germans - practically a battalion of them - going back with packs ahead of them. The Bn skirted the north side of the village and took a 4.2 howitzer there; and Framerville was to be Bn left flank - Vauvillers its right flank. The right Coy worked to left with 25th Bn/ The left Coy and a half swung left and passed the 5th Bde objective right out where Lane's Coy of 18th Bn was. The three tanks of the 17th Bn were making that way - towards the main road. As the tanks got close to the road an anti-tank gun (or 2 or 3) possibly at 28 D 3.3 suddenly flared out at them and hit all three. The crews got out and tried to mount their Hotchkiss guns, but the Germans were creeping up behind the main road and were right on top of them and they had to give themselves up - they were practically in the trench attacking it when they were hit. One man black with oil, and soot, made a bolt and did get back.

It was terribly hot there - Lt. Horwood was there. Lt. Harris (wounded there) Lt. Newman (wounded there) Lt. Devonshire, Lt. Willis, Lt. Ferguson. They dug in as best they could and hung on till dark - they withdrew to the road, reorganised and came back through Framerville to the Bn. (They had thought that Rainecourt was Framerville)

The left of the Bn's objective was taken by Col. Chalmers and HQrs, who were left in the gap and went to about 10 A 6.8 (HQrs was in three sections - and came on in file. The German artillery as soon as it saw the tanks switched on to them which cleared his barrage for to some extent from where HQrs advanced.) As none of Bn was seen, Col. Chalmers went on past objective into the top of the long gully. There was a steep bank opposite. The C.O. went straight into a dugout which was there and hopped in and out came three Germans.

Capt. Brice - Lt. Hughes and party was with 25th As the 25th Bn came up Champagne Alley it took a small number of prisoners there. When the party with Hughes got to 15 B 9.5 dozens of Germans were going over the hill north of 16 Central they could see these Germans clearing out (with others from the trenches ahead) in the direction of the high ground E.S.E. But when the attack stopped they began to come back in open order and got into trenches, probably in 17 A and C.

There was an aeroplane down over the trench where Brice's party reached and the Germans started to shell it at once and set the plane on fire. This party dug in about 16 2.4 - 0.8.

Lt. Reid's party got to an orchard S.E. of Framerville - they got a direction from a tank - (they could see a party digging in in front of the orchard in Framerville and being fired on by a T/M. from N.E. just south of Rainecourt) A tank told them of position in ~~front~~ right they went up to a cutting about 4 c.4.4 commanding the valley - where they could see the Germans for a mile N.E. in the valley and were sniping them. (They too with HQrs were ahead of ~~the~~ their objective)

In the evening 2/Lt/ Degenhardt was going out in front reconnoitring that night. The C.O. was out there ~~with~~ with him, and advised him to crawl back. Degenhardt came back walking straight up and was sniped.

Lt. Horrocks was killed with B Coy when the German barrage switched on to them near Vauvillers. He died of wounds. Lt. McCann was wounded in the post beside the 25th.

27th Bn adjusted its post. Bn HQrs went to the sunken Y road behind the front in 9 B. The orchard beside it was plastered very heavily by our own heavies on August 10th. (The German Red Cross Flag on Framerville tower was a mark for miles around)

26th and 28th Bns moved through on the morning of August 11. Very foggy that morning.

That night 11.12 27th Bn moved back to the hospital. They were bombed that night (when 6th Bde took over) and every night this used to happen. Two men were wounded that night - the planes did not drop flares. Strength then 16 officers 250 o.rs. They went back to near the crucifix. On 9th August casualties were 100 - including 6 officers.

Bn was near Froissy Dump - On August 28 moved about 4 pm. to this position which had been vacated by 5th Bde.) They remained in readiness to move at half hour's notice. Left L 34 B 67 at 5 am. and passed through 6th Bde at 7.30 About Herbecourt (27 Central?) Germans were shelling and a bit of M.G. fire but all the artillery was east of the Somme. One prisoner was taken.

On the right there was opposition to B Coy - Capt. Brice was rushing a M.G. and got within 10 yards when he was shot grazing the eye and nose by this M.G. He lost the eye in hospital

Lt. Rollins took over the Coy and pushed posts on to the Canal bank/ Brice was hit near Beaches down the slope.

Capt. Willshire M.C. was killed near Canal wood by the explosion of a shell.

Bn pushed through to Biaches and got posts on to the Canal Bank. As they came up a train pulled out of Peronne. Quarter of an hour later the engine came back and pulled out another. During the night the foot-bridge to Radejonde was blown up - and the other duckboard bridge across the canal further north. They were blown up in the marshes.

From after onwards and all next day Biaches was heavily strafed.

A patrol was sent to have a look at the Canal du Bord which was supposed to be dry. As the patrol went along and got on to the canal but could not get as far as the bridge at the other end.

On the right the patrol found a German on one of the footbridges. He pulled the plug of the mine as they came up/ They got the L. G. on to him and he went up with his mine. No other efforts had to be made to cross.

Lt. Church was wounded on Aug. 29

27th Bn stayed where it was.

(On August 31 when 5th Bde attacked they could see the Germans getting out of the trenches near Prague and Florina and running back towards Anvil wood - along the road - could not see our men)

On Sept. 1 Bn moved to left around to the Omiecourt bridge. The Germans had seen the Engineers building the bridge and were shelling it - the shells splashing in the water and sending up spray.

Along the bank on the other side were hundreds of Australians - part of the 14th Bde crossed just after the same afternoon - it was afternoon - cooks, etc. under the bank there Prisoners came down in hundreds carrying stretchers with our wounded.

Lt. ~~Os~~ Oswald was killed there by a shell that night.

As soon as Coys crossed they moved into Pekly Trench and the trenches behind it. Major Roper was in charge. That night about midnight C.O. was sent for to Bde (at this time Bn thought it would ~~not~~ be there 24 hours before attacking) He came back about 3 - Coy Commanders waiting for him from 2 a.m. and gave verbal orders for an

attack at 5.30 am.
It was a Bde attack.

28 //	22/	→	The J. O. line was the main road from the Canal at Feuillacourt southwards to about the bend of the road.
	25/		
28 //			
	26/		

The objective was out along the Aziécourt Road (St. Denis' extreme right for Be) 27th Bn had to attack with its front parallel to the Bapaume road and at right angles to the canal as far as Haut Allaines - and then on clearing E side of it turn due E towards objective - to make a flank for 74th Division. The arrangements were very

	D	hurried owing to the attack being unexpectedly soon.
Capt. Hosking	Lt. Arthur Lt. Coombe	There was no reconnaissance.
B.	Major Julge	
	CB A	→

The first opposition came from Tortille trench (the river was a trickle) That was easily crossed. In Allaines the opposition was heavier. The troops got ahead of the barrage which was ragged/ Brunn trench brought a very very heavy enfilade fire to bear on the troops getting through Allaines. (it was a smashed up village of the old Somme days) Capt. Hosking joined in the sunken road south of the village facing Brunn Trench with Bloy and some details; they tackled Brun trench. They got an officer, 60 prisoners and a number of M.Gs. The prisoners got to the road and the German officer formed them up and marched them back to our line) Going across the open east of Haut Allaines the other Coys had very heavy casualties largely from a couple of batteries one near Aziécourt and one east of Square 30. Capt. Hosking had 28 men here to 5 Central and Lt. Rollins. From these they went on and had to pull up at about I 6 B 9.7 under M.G. fire and direct whizzbanging fire. There was an old camouflaged post there.

At this time the Germans could be seen retiring in front of the 74th Division (who did not get forward of Scutari Trench) They were retiring in an orderly way, and when they got up to the batteries at 30 Central they reformed and took up prepared positions. They had also cleared up the valley from Allaines in the direction of Moislains. There was a German barrage on the slope of the valley ahead of the British.

This left flank our flank open for 2000 yards. Bn H.Qrs coming along to the sunken road N of 11 Central found a number of our men in it but could not get touch with Capt. Hosking or any of the Coys. A patrol was sent out but all the officers of the Coys, except 2, had been killed or wounded.

(Pyke a runner came back from this patrol on a captured bike.)

Eventually a man was seen coming across from the front into Brunn trench, this turned out to be Lt. Rollins.

Four Coys of a Bn of Royal Sussex which were to have gone N of Haut Allaines got over south of it.

Major Raper had his H.Qrs in Brunn trench then. One Coy of them was sent to the sunken road north of the Central; one was kept in Brunn trench/

27th BATTALION - October 3.

27th Bn jumped off from a NNW and SSE line practically through 24 Central - a little E of it. They had to pivot on their left. Objective from extreme south of Mt. St. Martin to road WSW of Lormissett. (The north end of the objective was extended at the last minute to the road of trench junction WNW of Lormissett.)

Just as they were getting into position Fritz dropped a barrage of 5.9 and 4.2. They got into position with few casualties.

On the left a few men had to advance NW to cover the left pivot. They were held up by M.G. fire from the village. The officer in charge, Lt. McLean called on a tank to blow these out. The tank went between them but did not fire - did not see them - and the guns started again. They continued firing till our men on the right were well across the gully and swinging round - the Tommies had started them and these gunners cleared. When the Battalion started it was not known that the Tommies were attacking. Left of 27th Bn was held (after going about 400 yards) by the barrage for the Tommies. When the barrage had lifted the left went on and dug in on the bank without opposition - the Tommies had ~~was~~ advanced so B. Coy (Capt. Beddon) dug in on the road bank E of the Canal about 13 A 4.3-6 without opposition - facing NE. They remained here till they were ordered to move to Mushroom Quarry in the afternoon to support 26th Battalion who were expecting a counter attack.

They dug in in the Beurevoir line north of the Quarry (where there was a good supply of German rations). They were relieved by a Bn of Manchesters at 10.p.m. and returned to the Camp they had come from in G 11 D near Nauroy.

Lt. Maclean was wounded by a M.G. bullet in the neck from the M.G. in St. Martin - and also by a shell. The actual front line Tommies on the left never knew our troops were attacking - these didn't anyway.

The Right Coy pushed off from the tram line a bit ahead of J. O. T. and met no opposition till met the Copse in 13 C where our artillery was firing short and there were a few stray bursts of M.G.

B
Capt. Beddom
C
Capt. Pellew
D
in support

After passing the copse (no one in it) they were again held up by our artillery; they found some Germans running NE up the road towards Lormissett. They cleared out these Germans who fired some shots and cleared again.

At the road corner at 13 Central they saw a number of Germans lining the sunken road to Gouy and firing M.Gs towards the British advance about 100 Germans. They put a L.M.G. on the road corner (together with 25th Bn) and about 30 Germans were found there later wounded.

Just after this they saw the Tommies moving up the hill towards this road - 27th at once went down the road and took the Germans just as the Tommies got over into the road.

A German M.G. had been firing from the Beurevoir line N.W of Lormissett. As the 27th and 25th got back to the Beurevoir line and attacked up it, these Germans cleared out up the line (which was better dug on the above than lower

down). The 27th Bn put a post on the next road at 13 B 5.8 (their objective) and one further down the hill.

A platoon had been left about 13 C Central. Later, when the fight was going on ahead Pellew tried to get them dug into the sunken road from 13 Central to Gouy; but the German at once shelled this road in enfilade from N.W. and this post had to be dug in again N of the copse in 13 C where they could use their guns if necessary.

The platoon which had been in the sunken road since grabbing the Germans there was brought onto the Beaurevoir Line W of Lomissett.

About 11 pm they were relieved by a company of a Manchester Bn. and came back to the Le Catelet Nausoy Line. 27th Bn went in 210 strong bayonets and lost 70/ B Coy lost 50 per cent.

Oct. 5

When 6th Bde attacked Montbrechain 27th Bn was moved up into support S of the Roman road about 28 C 8.4.

In the morning about 10 am D Coy was sent off to the cross roads at H 6 A Central to help 24th Bn. Lt. Reid went round to the W of the village where a line was being formed and found that there were sufficient troops there. So D Coy came down to the sunken road in H 5 A and B. Later they returned.

B. Coy was sent about 11 am to the same place - Capt. Beddon found that they were not needed and so put them in the railway cutting in H 5 B 9.6. They stopped there till relieved - Reid came back to say that the troops were not needed when they went (both Coys) back to the Quarry.

The work which Lt. Reid did there was exceptional. The line was not known. He went out with Lt. Clough 24 Bn and helped to fix the line W of the village.

About 10 pm they were relieved by Americans of 30th Division who had left everything behind at Nauroy.

27th Bn marched back to between Templeux Guerard Hargicourt arriving 2.30 am. a long march (Look up distance of this)

There a big German gun killed one man of the 27th - the last casualty the Bn suffered.

One man was wounded on October 5th by a bullet from an aeroplane - the only casualty.

2nd PIONEER BATTALION - MONTBREHAIN

Had had two companies in the 29th Sept. fight and following days. They were near Bellicourt; and two near Templeux had been standing by.

On October 3 the whole Bn got into trenches south of Nauroy becoming divisional reserve.


On morning of October 4 C.O. met Gen. Rosenthal who said he thought he would have to use them that day. He was glad he had not had to as they were technical troops and it was a bit of a waste. However on evening of Oct. 4

they were ordered into the line to take over from 38th British Bde relieving two Bns. C.O. went up to reconnoitre. They relieved on night of 4/5 in the front line around the front of Ramicourt. Their patrols that night took one prisoner.

C.O. got Coy Commanders together at Nauroy just before the reconnaissance, and gave them verbal notes, confirmed later. They were bombed on the way up - but no one was hit - (the same the night they went up to Nauroy)

Relief was complete before midnight and all Coys patrolled.

T.O. Tape was laid on a straight line NW and SE from 12 Central to 5 B.c.7 21 on right and 24 on left formed behind this; Pioneers fell back behind it 15 minutes before Zero.



The orders were to pivot on D. Three Companies to swing so as to establish their left on the right of 21st Battalion at I.2D.b.g. (N.W. of Doon Mill)

A Company to mop up cross roads and trenches in H.6A and B and send small parties through the streets. Finally to take position at Quarries near road which runs NE through H 12 B (i.e. to support right. This Coy was eventually used on left as that was the danger point later.

D. Coy had some casualties through shelling. They swung out in front (SE) of the railway line and got hold of five German M.Gs which they got working. The Germans made one definite attack against them in which the M.G. but did not make any headway (this was from SE over high ground, about 11 am. They tried to advance in skirmish order with a smoke barrage but Vickers and L.Gs drove them back. Our patrols later went out 200-300 yards and found no Germans but it was decided to keep line obtained as field of fire was good and right had not advanced. D Coy was under Major King.

C Coy (under Capt. Ahlston) met the Germans on the sunken road cross road and Quarries and the railway running to Nevill's Cross. They advanced in skirmishing order with one platoon in support. This Coy got beyond the final objective - and the Germans came at them from both flanks. This was early in the fight. Lt/ Murrell seeing this brought his platoon down the right of B Coy and covered the withdrawal of the left of C Coy, but the platoon commander Lt. Peacock, had his thigh wounded and was captured. Murrell found a party of British cyclists about this time and got them to dig in on his line. They had got lost.

During C Coy's advance Lt. P.S. Robinson had his platoon hung up near the railway. He moved to the flank with Pte Ollis. Robinson with his revolver and Ollis with bombs blew the head off the German officer in charge and the whole post, 40 Germans with 5 M.Gs put up their hands (About 7 A 5.2. on railway)

B Coy (Capt Dimant) moved by a right incline passing gradually rear of 21st Bn. Soon after passing the road before the railway they got heavy M.G. fire from the railway near Neville's Cross. and from the Copse near the Quarries. A tank was diverted by an officer of 21st Bn to this point and with the assistance of 2nd Pioneers fire they silenced guns.

B Coy continued to advance crossing the road south of Montbrehain Railway dump and in getting over the top of the hill came under very heavy M.G. fire from Doon Mill Copse and whizzbang. A M.G. got them also from the left flank behind their flank. They got M.G. fire from both flanks and had to dig in behind the crest, retiring a little way. They could see the German gunners working their field guns. The shells burst on the crest in front and the crest behind going over their heads harmlessly.

As C Coy was hidden from them by a rose they put two L.Gs between to cover the gap. B Coy dug in about from A central to 2 C Central.

The Germans began to dig in about 1.40 pm. in the gully at I 8c.1.0 to I 8.A.00 a line of posts very close together. (These were ultimately shelled at Col. Amand's request.)

Later the 18th Bn (50 men) were obtained to reinforce the left flank of Pioneers. They were under Lt. Bryden. They went up in the afternoon and had no casualties.

Two Vickers Guns took up position dominating the valley in I 7c and D They were under Lt. Wilkinson and had some splendid shooting.

A Coy (under Capt. Roth M.C. killed next day at the rear by a shell) during the early part of the attack came under heavy M.G. fire from a post on the left (near the the cemetery probably) They tried to rush the post and Lt. Edwards was badly wounded. The platoon sergeant Howell took charge. By making a diversion they captured the post and got 8 M.Gs and a 4.2 Howitzer with the crews

They then followed parties of the enemy on the left and mopped up through the village. As they got to the E end of the village and were turning back after mopping up the German put down a heavy barrage on the village and they lost a number of men. When Capt. Roth was collecting them to take up position in support he noticed that 21st and 24th were being driven back on the left and through the village, so he slipped across and took up a position from H 6 B 3.5 to B.30 c 9.3/ Colonel Annand later ordered him to extend his flank and join up with the 23rd and sent up another Vickers gun which did excellent work there.

They were then connected up on the left with the 23rd Bn. They did good work in reporting concentrations of Germans in the sunken roads and valleys N of the village and the artillery were put on to these.

Casualties

1 officer wounded and captured.
 21 O.Rs killed
 2 died of wounds
 6 officers 81 o.r. wounded.
 Captured 8 officers and 327 O.Rs of Germans.

- Battalion probably went in about 450 rifles.
- A. Lt. R.W. Edwards) severely wounded. Rich in the
 Lt. H. Rich) village.
 Lt. J. Ride hit in the face in the village.
- B. Lt. A. E. Robertson on the objective - by M.G. fire
 from Doon/
- C. Lt. Traves, while inspecting posts after Bn dug in
 was wounded by shell -
 Lt. S.J. MacCullagh, early

Bn was relieved by the Americans - Not a shot
 was fired after 8 pm. The relief was a good one.

2nd Pioneer Bn was first in the line in
 France, and owing to a delay in this relief through an
 American Coy getting lost was probably the last out.

21 MMs.
 1 Bar to MM
 2 D.C.M.s
 2 M.Cs.
 Bar to D.S.O.
 Mention in Corps Orders.

11th BATTALION

Landing and
Battle on T Posts.

13th BATTALION

Russell's Top - April 26th

49th BATTALION

August 1-7
Domart
August 11-16
Etinhem

50th BATTALION

August 11 -

52nd BATTALION

Mouquet

51st BATTALION

Noreuil

SOMME WINTERSTORMY TRENCH

ANZAC LANDING

Louch - N.C.O. 11th Bn. landed - not knowing where he was to go or what he was to do or anything. Most of the men were in the same condition, he says.

He saw a flare low down on the beach as they came in. Then the knock of rifles - a relief - They landed N. of Ari Burnet. Turks were firing at them from the left - what looks like the foot hills of Walker's Edge - 500 yards away. They could see this. He took cover and Colonel Johnston was beside him - they sat side by side till a Turk bullet hit the ground between them - from the enfilade on the left. Then they lay up very close to the bank both of them. They were not allowed, by their orders, to load and fire. Louch asked the Colonel: What are we to do sir - What do you think we had better do?

Old Johnstone said:- "Oh, I don't know I'm sure - everything is a terrible muddle." They waited there and then saw men rushing up the hillside south of them. These everyone took for 9th Bn (though it may not have been) because it was to their right where 9th Bn was to be. They decided that they had better go on up the hill. They pushed inland South of the Sphinx and then up the steep hill on their right (South side of Reserve gully) Louch had a mate with him carrying ammunition. The Turks were still shooting at them. The way they got up was up a bit of a watercourse north of Ari Burnet and then up the very steep slope.

On the way up Louch's mate was slightly wounded. That ammunition box was awfully heavy.

At the top they crossed the plateau and got into some old Turk trenches. While they were up here the first Turk shrapnel sang over and there was still sufficient dusk for the shell to flash brightly - and the shrapnel fell in the water off the Ari Burnet point. The men were fascinated watching these first shells for a time.

Then Louch was pushed off behind Crowley, down the steep slope past some T. Tents with a pick handle sticking up which everyone advised each other to avoid. Then up a steep slope opposite (Braunds) then down into a watercourse, then up another slope and over the top into Wire Gully.

It was at the top of Wire Gully - some way down the slope that Louch and party stayed. Crowley was somewhere to the left. There were Turks (no one knew who they were at first) to the right front.

On that evening the Turks came up saying that they were Indians. Louch was in a pothole with a man named Thompson (an old Indian soldier, I fancy who spoke Hindustani well.)

Thompson said he would go out and see if they were Indians. He hadn't gone 10 yards when he was shot dead. Louch could hear Crowley swearing away on his left though he could not see him. Crowley too was seeing if they were Indians.

About three of the Turks came up - opposite Louch's pozzy - not far away - he only saw about three of this lot.

On the following afternoon about 5 pm. little H.W.(?) Goldring of the 3rd Bn. came down the valley saying "We've been ordered to go down here" - there had apparently been a post further down the gully and some of the men had been killed and MacConaghy of 3rd Bn had given the order to reinforce the post (at any rate he was in that part. Goldring grabbed the 7 or 8 men near him - and they all went down with him - "Come on you seven!" he said. All but two were hit on the way down. Goldring had just reached the post below - they had just seen the potholes and were diving for them - and Goldring was flung flat when he was hit across the chest and abdomen. Louch and another man (Clark, I think) and a 3rd Bn man who was there already were down there - Clarke(?) and Louch in the same pothole. One could stand up while the other sat, so they took it by turns.

Goldring got delirious soon after and was calling for stretcher bearers. Soon after dark however, when they had given him up. (Louch tried to dress his wounds) he seemed to wake and said sensibly: "Well if you won't get a stretcher-bearer, I'll walk in myself." He got up and began to walk. They got the 3rd Bn man to help him and the two went up over the top of the gully. Goldring had tried to take some morphia; but Louch not knowing if it were good for him (he had the tablets in his pocket or purse) would not let him - and when he asked for water would only moisten his lips because he was hit in the abdomen.

The post in which Louch was had another man dug in about 20 yards up the hill on the left and they continually "amused themselves" by passing or throwing written messages. That was probably what they were there for. There were men of ours on the hill on the right - it was a high ridge - and Turks on it also on the right front. They did not know on the first night, when these men were digging in, that they were Turks.

On the second day a young stretcher bearer came down to them with a water bottle - a most brave thing to do. After that for two days they had no water at all. The last day they were pretty well dazed. On the fourth evening some men of the 7th Bn came looking for the 4th Bn and said they were to relieve them - and asked if this were the place. They relieved the two there - and Louch and his mate after sitting low in their hole for so many days found themselves sitting on the side of it with their backs to the Turks, yarning to the 7th Bn men. Then they went off up the

gully. They were surprised there to drop into big excellent trenches - and eyeopener. Louch found a tin of water and then fell to sleep. After that he went down to the beach, got some sticks, boiled a dixie for some tea, and, while it was boiling, cleaned his rifle! Then he tried to drink the tea and didn't want it. Then he started off to Hell Spit along the beach, trailing in one hand, by the tab, a 3rd Bn overcoat which he had brought with him from Wire Gully- and with the other trailing his rifle through the same by the sling. When some Westralian friend asked him where Clark (who had not been with him since leaving the Gully) was, he said "Yes - he's here" - and then realised that he was not and had not been (Clarke turned up later. Louch had been scratched by a bullet above the eye and his face was all blood and he had four days' beard.

Goddring had taken a photo of him on the first mornigg in a pothole at the top of Wire Gully.

April 26th, 1915

On the morning of April 26, 1915, Capt.(?) Herring who had just arrived, was told by Col. Burnage to take his Coy of 13th Bn up on to Walker's Ridge and junction west of New Zealanders.

Having led them up Monash Gully past Pope's and then up the steep slope through the scrub. The Turks fired a little at them there but not much on the way up. On top they could see no one. They lay out in the scrub and the Turks from the Baby 700 direction fired at them. They were also under fire from their right. There were no New Zealanders to be seen. The man on one side of Herring was killed; then the man on the other side of him.

Finally Herring told them to withdraw - and as they did so they came under very heavy fire.

When they got further back some of them did find the New Zealanders there - a good way further back than where our trenches afterwards were. The place where the Coy first got to was further forward than our original trenches towards the Nek.

49th BATTALION

On August 10, during day, 49th Bn had outposts along the canal. There was still fighting in Gressaire Wood that day.

Got orders about 6.30 pm. for attack at 9.30 pm. Left at 7 pm. to march to the point of assembly in Gressaire Wood where it covers both sides of the Bray-Corbie road.

There was a slight taste of gas in the wood going up the bottom of the valley through the wood and got on to the Bray Rd at 9.25 pm. The two tanks were waiting on the road for them at the bend in 18 C.

They got away at 9.30 in sections in artillery formation on the south side of the road. There were American tanks right and left but 49th Bn did not see them in the dark. Directly the tanks started the Germans heard them and opened fire with M/Gs and fired flares. There were outposts and night posts 200 or 300 yards. They were sweeping the country. The M.G fire was much too high and Bn was able to advance beneath it without casualties.

These M.G posts withdraw before Bn got there.

About 1000 yards out Bn came under more accurate M.G fire. The tanks had gone up the road (on Bn's left) and were well out in front. They (the tanks) were firing pretty heavily. At this point Bn broke down into lines of skirmishers. These posts were fired a few flares and a few shots - and then got up to retire. Bn could then see them in the light of the flares and opened on them. --After this and they retired. After this they Coy reformed into Artillery formation and continued to advance. The next opposition was near the Crucifix at the final cross road. (The huts on the map near here do not exist)

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(See next page)

The Coy again shook out into line and took a few prisoners in potholes and shellholes and fixed their outpost line on the objective. They were just behind the Crucifix - scattered posts covering each other. The tanks after the Coy was on its objective were heard coming back and returned to the rear down the road. The tanks probably went about 200 to 300 yards ahead and a bit left.

B Coy dug in with its left on the Bray road, thence round W of the Crucifix and around the head of the first reentrant. Here (as soon as the posts began to be established) they got in touch with 50th Bn.

From these posts especially round the reentrant the E of Bray, the church, and La Neuville were visible.

Things were very quiet during the night. Flares were coming from the bottom of the cliffs and from the next ridge E of Bray.

August 11

An aeroplane came over at daybreak and dropped flares all over the position of 49th Bn.


About 9 am. the German artillery opened with all calibres and gas and lasted till about 2pm. They were firing from a ridge ahead. There were 49 casualties in B Coy (110 men) alone.

There were a number of Germans at times noticed working down the canal bank southwards. All this afternoon the Germans were dribbling down the face of the slope NE of Bray with the dead ground NW and SW of Bray. It looked evident that his idea was a converging counter-attack. There seemed about three bns in all (coming down in dribbles for four hours) to NW of Bray.

A message was got back to the artillery and this shelled the reverse slope with heavies (it was too steep

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for 18 pdrs) No attack developed against the Crucifix front. The Germans eased off its harassing fire for the rest of the day (A red bodied German plane with short wings used to come over very low down at dawn and dusk. Every rifle and machine gun was turned on it. It would coolly come round and drop a bomb near any post which annoyed it.) Our fighting patrols were out ahead all night and got in contact with German posts which were working about 300 yards ahead either ~~ever~~ wiring or digging. The covering parties would be what fired at our patrols. They were down the reverse slope.

49th Bn was relieved on night of 14/15 and came back to a sunken road. Through 19 Central in support.

On 16/17 they were relieved by 3rd Division. The backareas were all fairly heavily shelled & Gressaire Wood was heavily shelled all the time.

August 1 - 7

DOMART - HANGARD

When 49th Bn went into Hangard Wood its line there was in two quarries with small T head saps. They had relieved a French Arabian Bn in support Aug 1 and in the front line on Aug 3. The French had left about 3000 to 6000 grenades in a dump in quarries and a couple of their grenade rifles (where the bullet goes through) The 49th Bn fired about 350 grenades from the quarry each day- firing at the point where the Germans fired his M.G. and flares at night. The Germans one day retaliated with rifle grenades. They saw where these were coming from and Lt. Cutts and a rifle grenadier took out two rifles with cupo fuses one on each flank of him. While the Germans fired 6 they fired 10 and 11 respectively and no more grenades were fired. But the Germans turned on a pretty heavy artillery

When B. ~~Day~~ 49th Bn was reconnoitring to take over the line from 15th Bn on Aug 3rd a German patrol got in between two posts of 15th Bn and were ousted but cleared without casualties.

The same day a tank officer walked out from the front along the road south of the wood and was going towards the Germans when he was called in by a sergeant of 15th Bn. On night of August 7/8 at dusk there was a Canadian lieutenant and a sergeant who came through to reconnoitre. They went straight out towards Hangard village and were fired on by a German M.G. post and both wounded. The officer was shot badly through the chest. He crawled into a post of ours. The sergeant came in to report. It was not known if he had any papers on him which could have given the show away. The stretcher bearers may have found him on the way in.

49th BATTALION - August 10th

As B Coy was getting settled near the Crucifix they rooted out two or three Germans. One German in a hold there wanted to attract attention without attracting a bullet. He kept low and kept calling "Alloo, alloo, alloo me corporal." Lt. Cutts cottoned on to what it was. He said "Alloo, alloo, alloo, me Australian officer, come out you - - -" A big German came out.

The right flank of B Coy about the head and the ravine was at first not in touch with 50th Bn. A small party of Germans under an officer with a M.G. in a hedge took up a position and tried to bluff us by firing the M.G. Our scouts were out and tackled this party. The officer was wounded badly and the rest bolted. The officer was found next morning. The stretcher-bearers brought him in and the German snipers down by the river banks on the right fired on them and shot them. B Coy lost 8 stretcher-bearers, one killed (Pte Sutton) and 7 wounded.

When the German of Alloo fame was waiting at Coy HQs they told Capt. Tambling O.C. a pitiful tale. They were all three, (two others were there) were under 19 years. They had been there four days. They said "the next thing we knew when English soldier came along". Tambling said "Not English- Australian!" They all three jumped up after sitting there an hour) and said "Kamerad, kamerad". The big chap at Bn H.Qs asked Maj. Arroll "whether he was going to be killed or not".

A scout called Hockey (they were out about 100 yards ahead in threes - during the advance to stir up any trouble that might be there) came on a German post firing on our advanced platoon (Lt. Strike) Hockey was apparently not noticed. He threw a bomb and then jumped into the post with his bayonet - and got 6 prisoners (and M.N.) This was as they were getting near the crucifix. He took his prisoners to Bn. H.Qs.

Next day, Aug. 11, the Coy suffered from sniping down on the main to the right. They themselves saw the Germans in artillery formation working down across the mouth of the ravine (on the other side of the river) and got L.G. and Vickers Gun on to them at 1100 yards. The Germans had to deploy at once. The Germans were fired at by 59th Bn in one direction down the ravine and the 49th from the other. The Germans opened heavily with artillery on this post with the Vickers and 7 men with the L.G. team were blown out. The same day the Germans were seen coming down from Chalk Pozzies from about 1 till dusk to the N E of Bray and they got artillery on to them. That evening everyone was ready for a counter attack but it never came off. It would have been a heavy counter attack.

This day the runners were subjected to rifle fire and M.G. fire from both sides.

There had been an anti-tank rifle on the front of the woods at the start of the attack/

Lt. Fearnside was wounded rather badly in the shoulder on August 11 by shell fire. He was down the ravine in his platoon post at the head of it. He came back to Coy H.Qs at was going back to Bn H.Qs along the Corbie Rd. when he and two other wounded men were grabbed (one had a broken arm) This German post was still left by the road. C Coy saw them later (about 1 pm.) and sne out but the party came under heavy fire.

Corporal Crouch (who had a Belgian Croix de Guerre) ^{Paschendale} one of the bravest men in the bn who was known as the best scout in the bn - cpl in the leading platoon but not scouting that night - was killed by a shell on Aug. 11. A fine youngster - linesman and runner by name of Bogg - was killed working on the lines near the road - it was a very heavy day for linesman and runners.

A German M.C. post at the bottom of the ravine was annoying the 49th on the morning of Aug 12. Tambling got the artillery on to it and the 4th shot lobbed right into it.

The Bn was not sure if the tanks would be there or not - and it was a great source of confidence to the men to see them turn up. They looked on them as a sort of flank guard. One tank stayed by the cross roads at Gressaire Wood and fired NE. Two or three others went out along the road.

B Coy had 10 killed, 1 missing and 31 wounded.

Lt. Fearnside wounded and prisoner

Lt. Armstrong by one of our own shells

Lt. Carroll wounded during later stage

B Coy had 1 officer and 9 o.rs. wounded


Fires in NE Bray were started on night of August 11 by our artillery. Others were started in Newville apparently by the Germans. The whole back country E of Bray seemed to be burning villages - the German had set fire to them.

There was no regular hop over by the Germans against the 49th. A few Germans may have dribbled up on the left.

52nd BATTALION

MOUQUET FARM

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September 3.5.15.


The two left platoons got to the farm. Sergt. Cutts with right platoons was still in touch with them to about A. There the line split and the left went into the Farm. (Lt. Taylor was killed as soon as the attack started. 2/Lt. Dickson got into the Farm, was shot in the leg and took a German coming out of a pozzy with a M.G. in the Farm. He made this German carry the M.G. out, and got back and was sent to hospital. The two platoons on the left more or less disappeared - some of them have never been accounted for at all. The other two platoons got into two shell-holes in front of the German post at 77 and between it and the rest of 52nd Bn. There were Germans at Z but at the time they did not know that there was a post at 77 - No post was seen at first but later the Germans were seen at about where it is marked in the sketch. The 51st Bn could be picked up on the left front digging in. The shell-holes which Cutts and the two platoons were in were part of an old Trench very badly blown about that morning.

About 9 am. (the Germans being between there and the 51st) Cutts went across to the Farm - going as fast as he could - and saw a Company HQrs of 51st Bn there. They were in the mouth of the dugout. The other end of it was full of Germans, whom they had shut in. They promised to send a platoon to connect up with Cutts party. (B Coy - Major MacPherson was in charge of front line there)

Just after Cutts asked for these the Farm was very heavily. The platoon did not arrive. It was

shortly after this that the Germans came working in between 52 and 51 and were clearly getting heavily fired at from the 51st - the 52nd was also firing at them. (Cutts had sent out to get touch with the 52nd on the right but could not get touch with them at any time. Only about (?) were left in this group at this time. To start with there had been about 20. (A number of

prisoners had been got in posts on the right of the farm - as far as can be remembered - and escorted back, and a number of men had been wounded. Most of these casualties were by M.G. fire from the right front.)



The Coy HQrs was at an old cellar entrance to a dugout at A.

Men were digging a Communication Trench from B to A (about 2 feet deep then)

The German counter attack got as far as E. They were using egg bombs against 51st Bn. They did not get into the Farm at this time.

The party with Cutts moved back to about F.J. round the edge of the Farm, connecting with 51st Bn which was still in the Farm. The small party had had two more casualties before they came in and were only about 7 or 8 now.

The 51st Bn at that time was in the Sap B - A and round S. There was still an officer in the HQrs at A. The party with Cutts tacked itself on to their right.

~~The 51st Bn had at that time was in the Sap B - A and round S. There was still an officer in the HQrs at A. The party with Cutts tacked~~

The 51st Bn had a post on the brick Mound. with a L.G. The position remained thus - 52 party on right of this L.G.

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50th BATTALION

Etinham

August 9th

In the afternoon started to Cerisy and were there for about an hour, took over from 1st Bn.

That night they had a sort of half circle around the E and NE of Chipilly. About midnight Major Fowler with other Coy Commanders went across to reconnoitre the ground first - they were told to take some sergeants with them and go carefully

One wounded German was found at the church.

Next morning some Tommies and 10(?) Londons were found up near the top of the Chipilly Peninsula - an Major Loutit was with them. - he was attached to the Americans and was going along with Major Morrell to find out exactly where the Americans were. While 50th Bn was taking over from 1st Bn they could see the fighting still going on (between 4 and 5 p.m) through Celestin's Wood and across the gullies towards Bois de Gressaire.

During the night the Bn was moving across the and settled about 10 am.

Stayed there that day - not shelled.

That afternoon at 5 pm. the C.O. called a meeting of Coy Commanders. This was at HQrs in the gully N of Susan Wood.

That afternoon at 5 pm. the CO. called a meeting of Coy Commanders. This was at HQrs in the gully N. of Susan Wood. The orders were explained. They had to get back to Coys, explain the to officers and N/C.Os of Coys - men had to get tea - and move off by 7.30 pm. (Bde did not know what the stunt was to be they only knew they were to be ready to pull out and go up N. They thought into rest)/

Leading Coy (C.Coy, Lieut Hodge O.C.) moved about 7 pm.


They halted at the Quarry by Gressaire Wood and Bn HdQrs was established here for the fight. The O.C. Coys went out to have a look out from the front of the Wood. There was only just time to get back and get the Coy up by 9.30 pm.

It was a silent attack. There were to have been two tanks - Corps were trying to get more but 50th Bn was warned not to count on them.

A D B C →

Battalion moved up the road on to the crest just south of the wood and skirted the wood on this road. There were no shells near - only gas falling away in the wood to the left. At the old front line there were Yanks who wished them all sorts of things as they passed through

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Before the Yankee line.

The Coys were organised into two platoons each as above (each - is a section, and the C is Coy Commander. Lt. Hodges with four scouts was-ahead and runner was ahead of C Coy.

Just before starting, permission was obtained to block right up so that the last Coys would miss any barrage. This happened - what shelling there was went over. It was very dark and the four Companies went close up.

Before starting off they could hear the tanks - hear the enquiries around the corner and the wood by the Bray-Corbte Rd. The German did not wake up. 50th Bn/ tanks did not turn up at all - this was not unexpected.

One M.G. fired at them from the first cross road. He cleared out. The Bn and the scouts went on. Then from beyond the road ahead there went up a German flare. The flare went clean over the Bn and fell behind the last Coy. It looked like a Bde steadily moving. This flare was followed at once by M.G. fire from about a dozen guns in the German line of posts (5 posts of about 20 to 25 yards each) a few hundred yards E of the road. Flares began to go up thickly and the fire was pretty heavy.

Some of the leading Coy got down in the sunken road - the rest of Bn lay down ahead - It looked a pretty difficult position. Then the 49th was heard firing away on the left and bombs going - and the 50th Bn went on over the top and the Germans ran. They left some of their M.Gs.

After crossing this road there was no opposition till a couple of flares were fired near the head end of the reentrant.

But these Germans scuttled back. Lt. Hodges Coy had extended at the sunken road but the others were still in a artillery formation.

As they got up to the Bray Etinhem road the ground became a number of divergent trails used by transport - These were a first surprise as the direction had seemed simple on the map. But no air phot had been seen. It made the direction very difficult to decide as the track was the only guide. The tracks on the map were wrong & there should have been a road crossing but the track really curved gently in to the road leading to the crucifix. Lieut. Hodge presently realised that he was on the wrong road - too far to the left. No cross road was there. He sent back a message while Bn halted and lay down. Major Fowler came up and presently all the Coy Commanders and most of the officers were up there with their maps and compasses and electric torches. The maps also were wrong with a lot of hospital huts marked (which were not there)

HdQrs went along the road towards the Crucifix and Capt. Bereford towards the gully. Bereford picked up Lt. Fearnside or some of his men in the gully. This gave them their direction. (The 49th Bn also had taken a mark - line of double telegraph poles - as a matter of fact there were five lines of telegraph poles.) which led them considerably too far right (Lt. Cutts) However, both these errors were soon mended. After half an hour's wait 50th Bn moved off to take up its position near the sunken-~~road~~ southern reentrant.

Lt. Hodges Coy was just lying out, sorting themselves to dig in on the edge of the gully when there was a call from ahead "Who are you?" It was in good English and the men thought it was a Tommy, or else the Americans (who had shouted that they would come on with them). Someone shouted back - "Australians here, don't shoot" - they were standing up. The voice came back - "All right & Come on Australia" and then a

gun only 30 yards or so ahead opened on them. These men still thought it was a Tommy and started cursing him. "50th Battalion Australians" they said. He answered again "Come on Australians" and put in another burst. Then our chaps took a tumble. They got down and someone threw a bomb at him. He ran and left his gun. There was high grass there where he was & he got away. From his position his gun ~~was~~ just swept the slope where our men were, like a glacié. He must have had our men fair against the sky and seen them long before in the flares.

In this burst Lt. Bills was killed with several M.G. bullets through the head. Almost all the men hit that night were hit through the head. - the men were mostly hit by these grazing bullets as they lay down. About 13 or 14 casualties here.

Major Fowler reported the Bn on its objective - and 13~~th~~ or 14 casualties | this was about midnight.

The 50th Bn was then dug in as shown on my map in a line of posts - B.C finally dug a continuous line. They could get splendid observation from their right down the gully to Bray. In their centre they had not such good observation - the cliff side here consists of a steep series of bumps or benches. Their right was on the highest ground from there the hill ~~skirted~~ sloped down to a quarry on the hill top with a hedge along the N edge of it.

The contact plane came over and they lit their flares about 7 am. Then a German plane came over with a red nose - very cheeky - must have been armour plated for our infantry. hit back at him with everything they had in the way of a L.G. The German could be seen leaning over and waving his arm. (The trenches were shallow for the ground was tough limestone, especially on the right) The plane was over from half an hour to an hour. About an hour to 1½ hours later the German artillery began. It began to get the range at once. It was very heavy indeed. The Germans had a gun NE of Prozart (behind 9 central) It enfiladed the right entirely. This enfiladed Hodges Coy especially. There was another batter shooting direct from just behind La Neuville. There were also guns behind or on Froissy Beacon. There ~~were~~ field guns ahead. The Germans could see the white parapets on the green hill - we had tried to camouflage these with grass (a mustard crop) but of course he could see.

Hodges had eight men killed. Capt. Beresford's Coy had two posts completely blown out - one shell fell into the shell hole where two L.Gs and their gun were. Maj. Fowler's Coy had a shell into one post of 9 men and N.C.O. - 4 were killed, and 3 wounded by a 4.2 No shells were wasted - all seemed to fall on the trench. The stretcher-bearers did very heavy work - and practically all those in two of the Coys were hit.

The snipers in the gullies were also very active. They fired from behind the banks and there were M.Gs there/ One officer of Fowler's Coy, Lt. Wills, hearing a man call who had been hit, jumped out on the parapet - his batman who followed him everywhere jumped out at once and was hit straight through the head immediately.

This day the Germans were seen coming down the road from Suzanne - most of them came down the road into the village. They were out of range here. Our men tried to snipe them at an open space near the church where they crossed - with extreme sights - but it was too far. The Artillery were called for and they landed a shell fair in the road after the first big lot had passed.

At one time a motor car had come up along this road, dropped an officer at some trenches near the top, turned round, waited 1 and about 10 minutes later took him away again/

The Germans had probably cleared out during the silent attack of the night before. The authorities at the back knew would probably know very little of it till their plane came over next day. They probably thought our objective was Bray and had cleared out and this morning they were ordering their garrison back. Those whom 50th Bn saw were clearly making for the NW edge of the village. The Germans who were shot down here were there on the next day (Aug 12) after the 51st had made its attack.

That day the Germans dug in on foot of the Peninsula/ On this night (11/12) 3rd Division took Mericourt. On the next night 12/13 Lt. Livesey (about the same as 51st Bn - 1 am.) took a fighting patrol down the S. gully. Two parties followed - one under Lt. Billing, to form the pivot for 51 Bn - a liaison post between 50 and 51. Lt. MacBude was to dig in a post down the slope by the road, with Livesey's party covering him, in order to block traffic along the road entirely.

At the same time a fighting patrol of Maj Fowler's Coy went down the Northern Gully under Cpl. Mengersen (D.C.M. for this) He was, if possible, to place a post at the mouth of this gully too.

Livesey got down all right - and the centre platoon of Fowler's Coy was going to push ~~back~~ out and dig in on top of the promontory between the two gullies/ They could not dig in there because of four German M.Gs half way down the slope firing up at them - and they on the skyline. Lt. Craven was wounded trying to do this and 2 killed and some wounded/ They took up a position across the Arc instead. The Germans worked down south into the southern gully and attacked Livesey down there and from the road below. Both parties put these Germans down at 150 to 200. MacBridge got a M.G. and a T.M. and Livesey 16 prisoners (he had 15 men) and 2 M.Gs. He fought his way back - brought in his 2 guns and the 16 prisoners. Cpl Mengersen stayed down there till the morning in the N. Gully. He could see the guns above firing at our people up the slope. He tried with his men several times to get at these guns but could not get his bombs up at them. He was very ~~young~~ young but would not come in till he had a message from Maj. Fowler who brought him in when he heard that Livesey had failed.

This clearly frightened the Germans away during the balance of the night (as often happens)

On the morning of Aug. 13th a heavy stray (a am. till 6 am.) was put on to the Quarry/

On next night (Aug. 13/14) Livesey went out again this time taking no kit but bare rifles and a lot of bombs including phosphorous bombs - and from the top of the south lip of the south gully two Stokes Mortars fired into the bank (this had been too steep for the artillery to get its shells into) The Stokes fired about 47 rounds in one minute. Livesey then rushed along and threw bombs into the dugouts as he passed - but the Germans had already gone and the posts were put out across the road.

The Americans would not take it over when they relieved 50th Bn (and the Coy of 49th) on the night of 14/15 It was too solitary. The Americans had had no rations.

One platoon came to relieve a Coy of ours, they had struck a gas barrage at Etinhem. The Germans put down a really very heavy barrage at 3 am and the Americans lost a number of men.


Out 50th Bn was 300 strong and one Coy of Americans was to relieve it. This Coy turned up 100 strong. The

relieving Company Commander only arrived at midnight to reconnoitre his front - By 2 am. only three platoons were in when a message came from an American NCO on the phone a few hundred yards away from the Germans. He said "One platoon of ours is here, and he does not know whom he has to relieve. All your men are out!" The O.C. didn't have a map. Major Fowler took him all round, where he put his guns and his strength - and placed his guns for him. When Fowler got back he sent off his two last platoons and a few signallers and offered to stay. But the American though he knew nothing, would not allow of this.

As our people went out dawn came the barrage. This was probably counter-preparation - every morning about 3 am. it came down very heavily.

The American only had 4 L.Gs with him there - and one gun only had 3 magazines & one of them with its team was blown up before the relief was complete. They must have had 40 or 50 casualties that morning. The Coy Commander was in a complete whirl - but a fine chap.

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13th BRIGADE - STINHEM

On August 10, General Herring was sent for to see General Monash personally - the car took Herring down to Division by 11.30 am. It came as a bit of a surprise that the attack was to be that night. - the 50th was tired and Herring would have liked the next night much better. However General Monash said it must be done that night.

Herring wanted the tanks up and the attack started before it was too dark - at the same time he did not want the tanks seen. So 9.30 pm. was the time he chose. There was just time to get the Bns there by then and so he agreed to do the attack at that hour.

The C.O. of the Tank Bn was sent up by Division to Bde Hqrs - and got there about 4 pm. He said "I don't know if I can do it" His tanks had had a very heavy time at Gressaire Wood. He would try to get four tanks up but could only guarantee two. He was told all he need to do was to move up and down the Bray road a couple of times and fire grape shot down it - it being night he did not want to get off the road - tanks are very blind - but it was a well defined road.

That night when the tanks came up Arrol told them to go down the road straight ahead and come back - they were fine chaps - just wanted to know what was wanted. They did this and when they came back and asked Arrol what he wanted them to do. He told them they had done it already and they were very surprised and pleased - and went off home.

July 31/Aug/8

When General McLagen saw General Herring and told him what was wanted of B Bde and that the attack was going to be made, Herring said that he would do it but what if they were raided. Maclagen said they did not want any men lost - Herring said that he could not guarantee that a great front could be held without men being captured.

Herring gave orders that there were to be nothing less than platoons together so disposed that at least a platoon would be involved in any action.

The original arrangement was that 13th Bde was to support 4th Div. in the attack of Aug. 8th. Herring was to hold part of the French line till Aug 5. On Aug 5/6 it would relieve the whole 4th Div. including a portion which the 4th Bde had taken over on Aug 4 from the 2nd Div. so as to reach 600 yards further up to the railway line (to be the boundary between the two Corps) This meant 8000 yards of front with 1500 fighting men. The 13th Bde was to hold this for the night of 5/6th and to be relieved on night of 6/7th by Canadians who would hold the line till night of 7.8th when they would attack at dawn.

When the raid took place, Gen. Rawlinson decided that the Canadians could not be placed in the line until the last night - as if the Germans identified first Australians and then the Canadians, they would smell a rat. The Australians being identified, made this necessary. Herring was accordingly told by Maclagen that he was sorry he would have to ask 13th Bde to stay there another night. Herring said that two nights were no worse than one - that of course he could not guarantee against a heavy raid of 100 men (the long

line was still held by platoon units and not less - if split, they must be able to support each other)

Herring was quite sure he would be raided - the difference in helmets and manners made this certain.

This involved leaving 13th Bde out of the first attack and splitting 1st Div. by attacking 1st Bde to 4th division.

The actual fact of the raid certainly helped our plans rather than hindered them. The German examination of our prisoners (afterwards captured amongst his papers) proved this.

The 51st Bn men told the Germans that they had been doing no special training for an attack. As a matter of fact they had been training with the tanks - the officers and NCO's of 51st Bn had - and the whole of 50th and 49th officers, NCO's and men - and the men of the 51st Bn although not so trained themselves must have known this.

50th BATTALION
-----SOYECOURT

When east of Soyecourt Col. Salisbury wanted to get some information about the Germans in a wood and find how it was held. Hawker, a brother of the Flying Corps V.C. was an ~~efficient~~ platoon officer and was sent in charge of a patrol. He ~~came~~ was working out in the dark when they ran on a party of Germans who were a post evidently.

Expecting a relief, they shouted "Are you the ----th?" in German. Hawker spoke German and he shouted back that they were - and then ordered his men to open fire. About then another party of Germans - the real relief - came up behind them and cut them off and they had to fight their way back. Next day the 50th Bn attacked on the strength of this information and were very successful.

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
51st BATTALION

NOREUIL

The Bn had found the line just beyond Vrancourt cemetery - a little beyond the town (I don't know if this means the little military cemetery in the valley near the prisoners' cage) They had pushed the line more or less peaceably forward till the right was just ahead of Vrancourt Copse, and the left up near the Vrancourt Longatte road on the hill. There was a crater in the road there, and every night the Scots on the left, and the Germans, seemed to take and retake this crater. The Scottish Bns HQs sent in one night to say that they had the crater and had taken the Germans dinner boiling on a Primus stove. A couple of hours later it was German again.

When 51st Bn lined up on the tapes to take the left hand slopes past Noreuil it lay across the hill top just beyond Vrancourt Copse. Messages came in at once from the right Coy Commander to say that his men were all mixed up with the Scots! Presumably a message came from the left to say the same. The Scots were to go for Longatte! This was incomprehensible till it was found that the Scots had laid their tapes wrong - that put them out as if the attack were on Noreuil!

xxx



The 51st and Scots went on together and struck heavy opposition from 3 or 4 M.Gs. at the top of the sunken road between Noreuil and Longatte. (B) They had several officers and a number of men killed or wounded in front of this. Then a youngster named Earle got with a few men into the sunken rd at A (further on the right) and, working up it, shot the crews of the guns - and the Bn got ahead. They killed a number of Germans in this road and also had a bit of fighting at the village end of it where their right just ~~teased~~ brushed past the village.

They went on and occupied a trench east of Noreuil - beyond the town. It was a good trench and bent back a bit on the left. They none of them had known of its existence and there was some comment in the Bn on their not having had aeroplane photos before to show them the ground. They reported being in touch with Scots on the left and 50th on their right. This was true; but as a matter of fact they were only odds and ends of Scots and 50th who had come along on their flanks. Longatte was apparently not taken. However a M.G. was placed on the sunken road from Noreuil to Longatte where it goes into the dip just N of the point B on the above sketch. And the British (later that day?)

took Longatte. (51 and 50th Bns had HQs far apart. Nowadays we know enough to put them together. They would be in the same dugout)

SOMME WINTER

Bulls run dugouts were winding mostly untimbered galleries - too small for comfort. They used to get suffocatingly hot even in midwinter and a visible steam used to exude from them in the early mornings. Men even slept there without any clothes on owing to the "fug".

45th BATTALION - STORMY TRENCH

Major Howden second in command of 45th Bn who was a splendid officer advised Hering when the Coys arrived which were to make a set attack on Stormy Trench that the men were in no condition to do it. They had been coming up in the mud and rain and many were lost - they were out of spirits. This was about 11 pm. The attack at 12 (for which the artillery were all ready) was put off - about the last moment - the artillery officers and others all disappointed - and it was done later (? next night) with a barrage of Stokes mortars up the trench about 300 yards ahead of the troops and rifle grenades about 60 yards ahead. Bombing platoons were still in use at this time. They were done away with before Ypres.

13th BRIGADE -- Etinhem

The reason ~~which~~ why the Bn went in in the order laid down was that 51st had had the hardest time and suffered the most casualties at Hangard. The 49th had gone in last there and was strong and fresh - so had the most difficult job 50th had been digging the night before on moving to Thapilly - they were not so fresh but less knocked about than 51st. So they got the second job though tired. The 51st was to be put in whole but only one Coy was actually committed in order to have something in hand as there was no other reserve - and the Coys. held back eventually carried out the second attack.

13th M.G. Coy. was split amongst Bns. and lost heavily.

228a following


50th BATTALION - MOUQUET - August 12

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When 50th Bn went over on August 12/13, the Lahore Divisional Artillery put up a splendid barrage. The whole Bn could be seen by the flames of it - a continuous flash of shrapnel bursting almost over the men's foreheads. The relief was a daylight relief and the men had been pretty depressed - the Germans saw them about 300 yards after they turned into Tom's Cut where the trench became broken and his artillery came down. In Park Lane the whole of the 16th Bn was met - they had had a very bad time - nearly the whole of the 16th and whole of 50th were both there - and the men were three deep and the trench hopelessly congested. 16th Bn dribbled out as it got dark - their officers simply told them where to go back to. - O'Meara was splendid with their wounded - would not go as long as there were wounded men there. This he did with the help of 50th Bn bearers partly. He must have been there all the next day making many trips.

When the 50th saw the barrage their spirits changed completely. It cheered them and many of them were almost fascinated with it. The barrage got away from the Bn - not like a "creeper" of these days. The feeling was like that of a wall ahead of you - like a protective wall. You had no idea of getting hit. The man who spoke of leaning against the barrage was not so much out. They were convinced when shells began to fall amongst them later next morning that it was our own guns (landing near the trees). But it was certainly the German fire from the two flanks.

XXX



41st BATTALION - 8th AUGUST, 1918.

NOTE.- In my notes the details of officers wounded are wrong:

For Lieut. Clark wounded it should be Lieut. R. Nihill wounded.

29th September: Following wounded:

Lieut. Clark,
2/Lieut. Richardson, gassed,
Lieut. Wiles,
Lieut. Hanley,
Lieut. Robinson,
Lieut. (as on my list with Notes).

N.B. -

41st. Bn. has never lost a prisoner. If Gordon is a Queenslander born this is the first V.C. won by a Queenslander (this is worth verifying).

Two Lieutenants have been awarded D.S.O. in the field - 2/Lieut. W. A. Fraser and Lieut. H. J. Wiles (from Mackay, English-born); Fraser from Sydney. They were both Sergeants in 41st Bn. and original members, and were promoted in field.

The other point in history of 41st Bn. is its success in front of Saily le Sec. It is admitted by G.H.Q. and Army lecturers that these minor successes induced G.H.Q. to undertake the offensive and attack with the same troops who were holding the ~~the~~ line. (Bn. did about six raids in seven nights at that time. Analysis of this in diary with air photosmaps, etc.)

11th August was the most difficult show Bn. was ever in, and was also clean and successful. The most trying period was the day following July 31 - the six days following it.

43rd. BATTALION - BOUCHA/VESNES.(From I.O., Oliver, and)

Bn. had to jump off from road, if possible - i.e., if held by us. They were told that the 10th Bde. were practically certain they had it but no definite information that the whole road was held.

C.O. accordingly ordered Coys. to move to assembly position - and patrol, and if patrols found road clear to move up to it.

The Coys. were out in assembly position when the information was sent out that Zero was changed. The information (which arrived in the early hours of the morning) was sent out by runner, but Coys. were hard to locate and it did not reach any of them.

It was a very dark night. When the attack was made D Coy. (on right of 41st Bn.) went well forward - 2/Lieut. Patterson, M.C., and at least two men actually reached Scutari trench - the body of Patterson and one man were later found in the trench - the other man was seen going up there. The main portion of D Coy. got into Kassa Trench and the next Coy. on their right - C Coy. - got into Zimmermann Alley.

A Coy. (on right) starting half an hour before 2nd. Div. struck trouble at Feuillacourt Bridge and sent a platoon round south of Canal - (?was canal exclusive or inclusive to 43rd Bn.). It formed a defensive flank approximately along N. edge of Canal from a little west of the road to a point opposite the quarries half-way to Allaines.

B Coy., which had been shelled on its lying-up position, finding barrage not fall, withdrew to near the Skub trench.

From L/Cpl. Thompson:

A Coy. within 100 yds. of the starting struck the Canal du Nord near a very big dug-out and crossed it, down into it and up the other side. There was no fire at this moment. They worked along the south of the canal (the coy. was only about 40 strong - under Lieut. Tucker), left being on the canal. They were in skirmishing order. They got to the village., which was a mere tumble of a few old walls and grass and a few shrubs. As they got through this they struck opposition from a M.G. which was on the ramp (which was fairly good) - there was a bridge of brick and concrete also. This M.G. held them up on the canal bank but the right was down by the main road further south. From the right where L/Cpl. Thompson had a L.G. fire was brought onto this post while another L.G. fired at it from the ruins. The Germans got down into the Canal and cleared out. The Coy. then crossed the road at Feuillacourt.

By this time 2nd Div. had attacked and was coming up. A Coy. didn't get this barrage, which was very weak.

2nd Div. were hung up west of the road by M.G. fire from the road embankment south of the village. A Coy. fired a M.G. straight down along the road and most of the Germans left - they could be seen lining the back of the road till then.

When they cleared A Coy. pushed on and got about 80 or 90 yds. east of road clear of the village (which stops at the road). They then got hung up with M.G. fire from right, across the gully.

They stopped there about 1 hour in shellholes - didn't see 2nd. Div. go beyond the road.

After that hour A Coy. (about 7 or 8 wounded by then) got into the canal, in order to get away from the fire from south. In the canal the Germans had a M.G. firing straight down the canal from the bend at Allaines. They tried to work up the canal but the M.G.'s cut off the two or three men who got along there and they had to stay there.

A Coy. stopped there two hours. All the while there was a sentry at the corner by the bridge keeping a watch over the flat.

By that time B Coy. came up the canal in dribbles and joined. They were there together half an hour.

A Coy. had been trying to get up into Rollin trench from canal, but M.G.'s at Allaines stopped it. They then with B Coy. went round by Jesupol trench past Ponsot trench into Rolin trench, and came down the trench which is in the side of the hill with the flat in front of it. They stopped there till.... and then put a section out onto the crossroad in 3 Central, which was there all night until next morning's attack. During the night they crossed over into Boeseler Alley and attacked from there, got into Graz trench without opposition, and then worked up it to NE. There they struck opposition and bombed the Germans out. The Germans (2 Guards Reserve Divn.) fought well with bombs but were outfought with L.G.'s and bombs - one platoon worked up Fiume, the rest up Usler trench (where some Germans were killed).

By about 8-8.30 they had Scutari and Fiume trench. A big batch of prisoners was got from Usler trench near its junction with Fiume. When this opposition was struck L/Cpl. Thompson turned his L.G. down the trench from the junction of Usler-Zimmermann - and L/Cpl. Weathers jumped up on the side of the trench where he could see the Germans, went along it 7 or 8 yds. and then threw bombs at them. They didn't give in at the first go. He got down into the trench and got some more bombs. The L.G. was turned on again. Weathers jumped up again in the same place and hurled some more bombs (the guns had shot at him but missed) and the Germans gave in. They got out on top and marched back. There were about 150 of them - 200 were taken by this Coy. alone.

43rd BATTALION - BRAY-sur-SOMME.

The 43rd Bn. made its approach march about 6 a.m. 22 August and came under very heavy shell fire on the way to support position, having about 50 casualties.

Lay in support all day. Was then ordered to form a defensive flank for the Australian Corps, N. of Bois de Tailles - independent of anything that the British were doing. They moved there evening 22 August. There about 2 hours - and found that the British had already made this. Flank being secure Bn. was withdrawn to Bois de Gressaine again.

Night of August 25/26. - During advance in dark, heavy thunderstorm - men advancing to get touch with the enemy - firing L.G.'s into dugouts as found them in pitch black.

43rd BATTALION - SEPTEMBER 29 - OCTOBER 2/3.(From I.O., Lieut. Oliver).

Bn. was camped near Templeux-Guerard.

42nd	43rd	41st	→
		44th	

43rd was in this position because after passing green line the front expanded and they were to become left Bn. of brigade in the front line, going up on the left of 41st.

They left Templeux at 7 a.m. and advanced in artillery formation across country north of Hargicourt.

Message that 41st and 44th were held up came back to Bn. H.Q. about 9.30 and Bn. stopped automatically in support 500 yds. behind 41st Bn. (one Coy. in trench south of blown-out tanks, another Coy. in the sunken road south of Ronssoy).

At 4.50 p.m. Bde. cancelled the advance - and said that further instructions would be issued. Later came a preliminary order for 43rd ~~in~~ to assemble with 42d and 44th in A27 Central, to attack northwards up the Hindenburg line towards Bony.

The Bn. at 8.15 moved up into Triangle Trench (whole Bde. going up as far as it could); later the Coys. went across near Quennemont Farm and thence into Top Lane. The night was very very dark - and drizzling. The Bn. tumbled almost by mistake onto a part of 42nd Bn. in Quennemont Farm - heard from them that there were others (some 42nd Bn. nearer Hindenburg Line and 44th Bn. near 27 Central). They got into Top Lane and getting near the far corner of it near its junction with the Hindenburg line, ran into a German post. They did not know where the Germans were - fire was coming from N and NE and the German was known to be close.

They bombed the Germans out and pushed on to the junction - pushed down to join 44th, and at same time established posts facing N and E around the junction.

(In this operation direction was very difficult indeed to find owing to darkness, drizzle and wire - 42nd found this also).

Capt. Moran (senior officer present) then decided to try and push up and clear Germans out of the system towards Bony (in both trenches).

September

~~xxxxx~~ 30th. - This began at 11.30 next day when 44th supplied a Coy. in the support trench of the line and 43rd worked up front trench. 44th Coy. reported at noon that they could not get on owing to opposition by M.G.'s, artillery and bombs at the junction of Top Lane and the support line.

At 1 p.m. 43rd Bn. had got to A21B0.2 and was held there. Two men got out and worked to a position to the SW of BONY and there sniped the crew of a German T.M. which had been firing at them from the end of a sap SW of the village. The gun was stopped (and later captured).

But in the party of 43rd Bn. which had worked up the trench three officers were wounded and 4 men wounded and 2 men killed. The names of these officers were:-

Lieut. M.K. McDonald,
Lieut. R.W. Scott,
Lieut. R. D. Thompson.

The party had to withdraw to the strongpoint near the northern

end of the sunken road, where a block was put in. 44th. Bn put in a block level with this (300 yds. north of Top Lane).

OCTOBER 1st. - Next day at 4 a.m. 44th Bn. was withdrawn and 43rd took over the line in both trenches and connected with 42nd in the space E of the support line (in prolongation of Top Lane).


At 8 a.m. it was noticed that there was no M.G. sniping from Bony and thereabouts - and the Germans were seen going out of it in ones and twos. Patrols pushed forward towards the village, which was entered at 9 a.m. One Coy. 42nd Bn. moved down the tunnel embankment and joined up on right.

The 33rd Bn. of 9th Bde. had been put into Top Lane on Sept. 30 and was to support 43rd if the fight up the Hindenburg line went along well. They were not used, though under shellfire.

(The early stages of this battle are a matter of Coy. or advanced Bn. H.Q. initiative entirely).

In Bony got touch with 10th Bde., who came down from north. 33rd. came in on left of Bony up to the Canal.

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At 2.50 p.m. on October 1st the above operation was ordered. This began at 5 p.m. This was done by pushing out patrols and following them up with the line. There was no barrage - the idea was that the German was clearing out.

The advance had gone up to about the Green Line (the difficulty being fire from the North, by Le Catelet, etc.), when it was countermanded and the troops ordered to hold the Green Line as an outpost line. 33rd. and 42nd did this.

Though the 43rd was in Bony first, 10th Bde. report got through first.

They were relieved by English troops.

What saved the ~~situation~~ position on night of Aug. 29 was the preparatory order to take up a position in 27 Cent. as assembly position. This was received at 11.20 p.m.

All Bns. acted on this.

The detailed operation order was not received till much later and the senior officers on the spot did not receive it in time - it was difficult for runners to find the Coys, - there was a long way to go. The result was that senior officers of Bns. in the Hindenburg line came to their own decisions (based on the warning order), and the attack was carried on on the lines decided by them. They got the detailed order before the attack began - but it was too late to act on a changed plan, and the attack was carried out by those on the spot. A barrage had been planned - and there was great anxiety lest 44th Bn. might get too far forward and get into the barrage not knowing of it. The only way to get messages out was by runner - lamp was no good for sending forward an order; and wires could not be used from Bn. forward.

44th BATTALION - BOUCHAVESNES.

(From Lieut. Piper, Mackenzie, Bites, ~~Maddeford~~ Maddeford and others. The Adjutant's story is sometimes corrected by the others).

44th Bn. was in support in Clery Gully, along the banks about 30B Central.

42nd Bn. were to make and advance across the main Bapaume Road south of Bouchavesnes. One Coy. of 44th Bn. (D Coy. under ~~Lieut.~~ Capt. Foxworthy) was attached to them as they had a Coy. also lent to 9th Bde. (33rd. Bn.).

at 5.30 a.m. D Coy. left Bn. They passed Red Wood and came under heavy artillery fire (on some unknown or mistaken target), got through without casualties. One platoon was previously sent as liaison with the Tommies - and got lost. As Coy. got up and caught sight of the old trees along the road and came under heavy M.G. fire (Zero was about 5.30 a.m.).

They thought this was indirect fire as the ground was supposed to be clear. They deployed from artillery formation and moved on to Quarry Farm (which is no more than old trenches in bushes).

About 120 yds. short of it Capt. Foxworthy saw a German ahead throw back his arms to throw a stick grenade. This was the first idea they had that the Germans were there. It was very foggy. They opened L.G. fire from the left section and started to envelop with the right, - men ordered to do this - extending further. As they went on about 4 men were knocked, and a few rifle grenades were fired onto the M.G., which could not be seen, on the extreme NW corner of the farm. The Germans closed fire under the grenades. They rushed him and when we were about 20 yds. off they put up their hands. At the NW corner there were (in the first party) about 32 Germans (we had ~~24~~ 24 all told) and 2 M.G.'s. Then they started to mop up the farm where there were dugouts. There were other M.G.'s on the SW side, and as our people mopped up some revolver shots were exchanged, but these Germans were all taken within $\frac{3}{4}$ or $\frac{1}{2}$ -hour. There were 81 in all and 8 M.G.'s. There were Kaiserin Augusta Regt. there. Of the first 32 at least 20 came out wearing Red Cross armbands. The place was a strongpoint.

They cleared the place up and found about 6 of 42nd. Bn. there (probably from left flank of 42nd which may have swung south) in a dugout on the south of the farm.

D Coy. consolidated there facing NE. They had been at the farm about 25 minutes when the right flank of the British passed about 50 yds. north of the farm. They were advancing as the right flank of the advance - an hour behind the barrage. Daylight was now increasing, and as they came down the east slope of the hill (farm was on a knoll on the crest) they came under M.G. fire and rifle fire. Could not say how far they got.

The 42nd Bn. was just a bit in advance on the right. Their left flank might have been about C.21.c.8.8.

The other platoon came up then. (No necessity to mention its being lost).

44th. Bn. D Coy. was relieved that night, Sept. 1/2 by English troops of 74th Division.

* in Captain Foxworthy's party

44th BATTALION - SEPTEMBER 29th.

map

42nd	43rd	41st	→
		44th	


Left Templeux at 7.30 in artillery formation: across country in heavy fog.

D	Capt. Bremner (wounded)	C	Capt. Fowler (wounded)	→
B	Capt. Lewis (wounded)	A	Capt. Hunt (wounded)	

They were making straight for Green line, a good distance north of Cabaret Wood Farm. During the advance they came to our own artillery positions and came into a fairly heavy gas. All Coys. had reconnoitred as far as the line held by the Americans on Aug. 28. (They didn't mention whether this agreed with the line given officially). Owing to the heavy fog the Coys. lost touch on the way up. They had to pass the Brown line at 9 a.m. and it had been decided to make a halt there to get touch and direction.

They passed the tape just in rear of it - there were wounded Americans near Malakoff Farm. 44th Bn. was to pass between Malakoff Wood and Quennemont Farm.

As soon as they left the sugar factory (there hadn't been any halt) they noticed M.G. fire coming from Quennemont Farm. They pushed straight on - there was heavy artillery fire of an area shoot nature (5.9) - and as Coys. got up towards broken surface just west of Hindenburg outpost line they began to suffer from this M.G. fire from Quennemont Farm. C Coy., which was on the left, suffered pretty heavily (the Americans also had). Capt. Fowler was hit there and Lieut. MacDermott (C Coy.) killed. As 41st Bn. came up the Germans started to retire from Quennemont Farm (59th. must have struck it later). A and B got into the Hindenburg outpost line at once south of Malakoff Wood.



C Coy. was in artillery formation. The M.G.'s which caused the casualties were firing from the direction of Bony. They could not see these guns - they were further than Top Lane because some of the sections got up in the land and there was nothing there. The M.G.'s probably included some of those which were tunnelled into his wire. MacDermott was killed at the bottom of the valley in A25 - this was where they all caught it at once. Fowler was in the centre of the Coy. They got under cover for about 15 minutes, sparking bullets on the wire.

Sections of C Coy. got into Top Lane - the greater part got into the Hindenburg line south of it.

Meantime H.Q. came ahead of the Bn. as far as Malakoff Wood and established there for half an hour the ~~H.Q.~~ H.Q. previously decided on. From the sugar refinery on they were under artillery fire and, as they went on, under M.G. fire.

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At the valley short of Malakoff Wood they met several wounded Americans coming back, who said that the Americans had gone on about three miles - but the Colonel knew this was impossible on account of the fire concentrated on that valley. These men themselves were hit near Malakoff Wood just east.

Just after this H.Q. was established, D Coy. began to work through to the Hindenburg Line just north of Malakoff Wood. As they went they struck artillery fire, and both the Coy. commander, Capt. Bremner, and Lieut. Gaze were wounded. This Coy. was the last through. Col. Clark then informed Bde. that tempy. H.Q. had been established there and that they intended moving forward half an hour later; they got there at 9 and were going to move at 9.30 to the H.Q. previously arranged, east of the Canal tunnel. (They were going to dugouts south of 16 Central).

They moved round the southern edge of Malakoff Wood under shell and M.G. fire, till they reached the Hindenburg line. They found that D Coy. had occupied the trench, just north and south of the junction of the C.T. at 27B.3.5. 59th Bn. was there too. 44th. established a H.Q. in a dugout there.

When they got there they found that the whole trench system northwards up to Bony was held by Germans, heavily, with M.G.'s. The whole of the canal tunnel from the same C.T. northwards was also held by them with a strong position on the knoll near where Bn. had been going to make its H.Q.

A Red Cross flag was flying on this knoll and men were walking about there - and it was uncertain whether they were ours or Germans. It was not till Bn. H.Q. got to the extreme left in the Hindenburg trench that they realised that fire was coming heavily from there onto the extreme point reached in the trench - and that the men there were Germans.

This knoll would be about 22A.0.7. (The high place where we met General Burgess. - C.E.W.B.)
on October 4th.

The moment the Adjutant and Lieut. Mackenzie of D Coy. put their feet outside the trench in the little steps which lead out eastwards, bullets began to spit all round. Clearly M.G. trained on the point. A and B Coy. had meanwhile worked south of the C.T. and reached the canal tunnel in 28C where there were about 50 Americans. On the way there they found German field guns firing over open sights from Cabaret ~~Wood~~ Wood Farm. They lost men in reaching the tunnel.

From there they saw that they were too far to the right, so they began to work north. They had just passed up the road to eh NE when casualties became heavy. Lieut. Bryant was hit there. They could not get on and occupied the C.T. The Coy. Commander, Captain Hunt, was wounded here in the trench by a shell. Capt. Lewis of B Coy. was wounded in this C.T. also, by a shell. The fire which got onto these men was coming along the west side of the canal.

C Coy., which had been the last to arrive, got into the Hindenburg line in 27A.

The 2 M.G.'s which had been following Bn. came across from Malakoff Wood and established themselves in Top Lane. B and A had organised the Americans found at the tunnel bank, and had them in the C.T.

When it was found that the position was impossible for the plans to be carried out, H.Q. went back to the same point where 59th Bn. had their H.Q. (see my map).

D Coy. was then ordered to bomb its way along the Hindenburg support trench, while B and A pushed along the canal tunnel. D Coy. got up to where the trench crosses the sunken road in 21D.3.0. But A and B which tried to advance by pushing out L.G.'s and riflemen up the bank side, had to come back owing to casualties. This attack was planned by C.O. 44th. before changing the H.Q. and the Coy. commanders

were told what was to be done.

Dispositions had before then been sent by Bn. to Bde.

Two platoons B and all A Coy. on reaching the tunnel where telegraph crosses it, seeing they were too far to the right, tried to push up the road towards their objective at 22 Central. As they came along the road they came under heavy M.G. fire and L.T.M. and had to get off the road into the C.T.

After this, when Capt. Longmore came along, they tried to push up the west side of the tunnel and got along 200-300 yds. There seemed to be direct whizzbang fire from the knoll. B Coy. was leading and they lost a few men wounded. But the knoll looked right down on them. So they occupied the C.T.

As they occupied the C.T. they saw the men of D Coy. (with whom they hadn't yet had touch) work up to the sunken road at 27B2.9. There were a number of Germans in the trench further up and D Coy. at this moment masked the fire of B onto these. These Germans were in the sunken road and counterattacked D Coy.; but D, using Mills bombs, drove them off easily. These Germans worked down the sunken road from the NW.

At the same time C Coy., under Lieut. Mitchinson, could be seen fighting in the front Hindenburg trench at 27A Cent. The Germans had one or two M.G.'s there. These were worrying D Coy. and even killed an A Coy. man in the bottom of the C.T. (firing in direct easterly direction enfilading this trench). Here Sergt. Ingvarren (got a bar to D.C.M.) jumped out of the trench and shouted for the L.G. to follow him - firing ~~his~~ his rifle at the Germans as he ran. He shot some of the machine gunners and took about 20. They did this because they could see this M.G. firing in the direction of B Coy.

Mitchinson only had 8 men with him including the above - 4 men who had been sent across from D Coy. to see what was doing (as our men could be seen there) joined this party and made it 12.

There were some hundreds of Yankees on the tunnel bank. They had no officers - probably got lost in the artificial mist - and they were difficult to organise, being very apathetic. They didn't seem to realise their own danger. About 50 were later organised by 44th Bn. These were splendid.

That afternoon 59th Bn. was taken out and B Coy. filled in with D Coy. and took their place.

There were still Germans in the Hindenburg trench junction with Top Lane.

Moran of 43rd Bn. joined up through Top Lane and bombed these Germans out.

Lieut. Warry of 42nd was to bring his Coy. round to the support line of the Hindenburg line and bomb up ahead of D Coy. This was the intention:

43rd.	42nd.
44th.	44th

D Coy. was at the road trench crossing. Lieut. Warry came along after dark and made his H.Q. in a dugout at this point. His men were in the same portion of trench as D Coy 44th Bn. Warry's instructions were to work up the support trench towards Bony. Warry had two platoons with him - and one had been lost. He sent a patrol out but no definite attack was made that night.

SEPTEMBER 30th. In the morning a barrage was put down Word from Bde. was sent at 6 a.m. which arrived at (?) 6 a.m. that a barrage was being put ~~down~~ down and that 44th

Bn. D Coy. was to work up towards Bony. (C COY. and part of B - Mitchinson - was to go up the other trench). It was the M.G. in front of Mitchinson which prevented D Coy. from crossing the sunken road - this was outed at noon by Mitchinson's ~~gun~~ platoon B Coy. (not Ingvarsen's gun).

It was impossible to follow the barrage, which was like an area shoot - M.G. fire was too intense. Lieut. Scarr and another got out of the trench forward, but were so heavily fired on that it was clear nothing could be done. Scarr was hit later by shell in trench. D Coy. notified H.Q. that it could not be done. About three hours later owing to the work of B Coy. in front line, Capt. Lewis (wounded but R.O.D.) and Lieut. Mackenzie got across the sunken road (which breaks the trench for about 50 yds.) and into the trench again. They came back and about this time got orders to go forward again and continue with the job. They dribbled over followed by B Coy. into that trench. Two M.G.'s were found in this portion of trench which had been firing direct on D Coy. down the trench. They had killed Sergt. Blick and a corporal sniping. Two men were dead by these M.G.'s, lately killed.

Warry stayed where he was. They got just past the next trench junction to 21D Central. There the trench goes down hill in direct enfilade from the knoll. They decided to wait a while and have another go in two hours - which they eventually did. Lieut. Mackenzie with riflemen and bombers, four of them, got about half-way down the straight when they saw a German officer stand up on the knoll. He held his hand up, and when he dropped it M.G.'s started and also a L.T.M. - and it was very hot: the five had to go back 150 yds. to the corner. 43rd Bn. followed in behind D and B Coys. as far as the C.T. junction.

(B Coy. as well as D Coy. had received the order to attack at 6 a.m., but it was impossible. They saw the barrage first and rang up to find out what it was).

For the night the position was at 21 Central.

At dawn of October 1st, 43rd Bn. took over the position and 44th. went back to the Hindenburg outpost line near Malakoff Wood.

On Oct. 1, about 2 p.m., they moved again to occupy the two Hindenburg lines east of Bony and connect with 43rd. Bn. on left.

(They had about 70 Americans with them up to the night of October 1st and two American officers - the officers were helpless from inexperience).

Bn. was finally relieved in front of Bony by K.R.R. (?) One Coy. of K.R.R. relieved whole Bn. They had full Coys.

Casualties for this ~~xxxxx~~ battle, out of about 250 bayonets (came out 104 bayonets):

Killed: MacDermott.

Wounded: Scarr, Hunt, ~~Bryant~~ Bryant, Lewis (R.O.D.), Fowler, Bremner, Gaze; 112 O.R.

Following came out: Col. Clarke.

Capt. Biles, Adj.; Capt. Longmore, 2nd in command; Capt. Skinner, Information Officer; Lieut. Rogers, I.O.; Lieut. Hughan, Sigs.; Captain Germon, M.O.; and about (roughly):

A.	2 - 48 (Madaford and Piper)
B.	2 - 35 (Lewis and Mitchinson)
C.	2 - 30 (about - Newmann and Kerr)
D.	1 - 22 (Mackenzie and (later) Hatton).

C Coy. about 30 casualties).

This was the hardest fight 44th Bn. has had. There were no instructions.

fighting) - Be careful about Warry's Coy's part in this

THE LANDING.

(Capt. Everett (later Major Everett, 44th Bn.)
Written too long after to be verbally accurate -
especially times.

~~Dr~~ Drake Brockman is a Perth man (born Bridgetown way?) and brother of Lady Hackett (Sir Winthrop Hackett, founder of the "West Australian").

Everett was with A and C Coy. on the LONDON (A Coy. officer), 2 in/c to Brockman.

Our tow after about half-way to the shore - the picket boat funnel suddenly flared about 3 ft. high for about half a minute. Shortly after they heard the first rifle. Then the firing began; within half a minute it was general.

About the same time as the rifle was fired a bright light - a huge lamp - seemed to flare up some distance to the south (Everett saw it a few nights later, apparently up on the cliffs, about where the CLYDE came in ^(sic)). As soon as the firing started the picket boat turned with the tow and ran parallel with the shore for a distance. She nearly dragged the last boat in the tow over. Then the boat turned and raced towards the shore. You could just see the dull outlines of the hill - on the horizon.

The picket boat cast them off about 500-600 yds. from the shore. They out oars and pulled. The boat was hit in several places with bullets and the water was rising in it. She eventually grounded about 20 yds. from the shore in a sinking condition. Everett gave the order every man ashore. They got out into deep water and scrambled ashore. As they got there Everett told the men to get down as M.G.'s were enfilading from Fisherman's Hut, striking sparks from the stones. No men had been hit in that boat. D. Brockman was in a tow which went off further south. The men dropped their packs on the beach. It was just breaking day. Everett told them to crawl away from their packs up into the scrub, leaving the packs on the beach.

As soon as they reached the scrub they moved forward as quick as they could - the main job seemed to be locating and cleaning up snipers. These were well posted and very thick. Some of the men were hit as they landed, on the beach, by these M.G.'s. None killed there. They had artillery flags to carry. Everett's batman had his - red and yellow. This flag was hit so often that when the pole was hit Everett told the batman to roll ~~it~~ it up and carry it in his kit.

There were snipers up at the cathedral. A couple of men tried to climb up and get around to these snipers. They managed to get them out, and Everett heard later that they had killed them. It was getting daylight. These men were moving to the flank as Everett's party moved up the hills

xxx



Everett got up as shown - When he got on to Walker's plateau. Rockliffe was with him. Everett kept his men down on the top of this ridge, as they were getting casualties. He went across to the left towards the Nek to reconnoitre the position for digging in, as instructions had reached him from the C.O., on Plugge's, to dig in where he was.

As the position was most unsatisfactory for digging in, being commanded all round, Everett came back and informed

C.O. that effect. He found then that Brockman was on Plugge's with the other half of the Coy.

As soon as Everett got in touch with him Brockman came over and met Everett on the back of Walker's Top, bringing his other half Coy. with him.

Lieut. Sellby and Lieut. Macfarlane were there, and Rockliffe.

Brockman reconnoitred the position with Everett again, and decided it would be hopeless to dig in there. They could see 9th and 10th Bns. moving forward on the right - up towards the Lone Pine plateau. Everett told Brockman what he wanted to do was to work across to the position later known as Courtney's - and Brockman sent Everett with a half-company across to ~~Sanna~~ Courtney's.

They went down the tail end of Walker's Top and then wound up the narrow track towards Courtney's. It was all bushes on the actual climb to Courtney's, and very steep. Everett got up with the half-coy. While on Walker's top Everett saw Capt. Lalor moving forward on his left. (This was while waiting on Walker's). Lalor was moving forward with about $\frac{1}{2}$ -coy. in the direction of what was later Quinn's Post. Lalor had a sword and waved it at him. Everett warned him about a M.G. which was firing on his left from the high ground on the left of the Nek. He saw Lalor take his troops up swinging a bit to the right and then to the left again, but never getting into the gully. Lalor was leading his people over the open ground by the Nek towards the scrub just beyond. He got driven back from the scrub and tried immediately to cross the open again - two or three times this happened.

When Everett got onto Courtney's he got into touch with Major Denton - by now the destroyer crowd (the 2nd line) were beginning to move up.

When Everett got up to Courtney's a certain number were kept behind the edge of the hill - a certain number worked forward about 10 yards in the low scrub (about 2ft. 6in. high) and formed a firing line.

The Turks had run back in front of us across the valley (there were half goat tracks up the valley side). Some of these Turks got into a trench already ~~xxx~~ dug about 300yds across the plateau - you could only guess where the fire was coming from. The earth of the parapet had been removed and the scrub in front of the trench hid it. The moment our men got up and started to crawl over they were fired at.


Men by now were arriving up the gully. Major Denton was standing behind the ridge in one place in the left end of Courtney's bend, and Everett was in the right, and as men came up the gully they assembled them and apportioned them to the line. Denton was about 50 yds. from Everett.

Other units began to arrive - ~~xxxx~~ 1st Bn., 3rd Bn., 7th and 8th Bns. - and they were put into the line wherever there was a casualty. They would pull wounded men by the heels - and then as they got them to the edge of the ridge they were pulled over the sudden drop.

Everett dug in an observation post on the top, about 15 yards in, on Sunday night. The men dug little rifle pits on right of this and a few on the left and these were disconnected till about Wednesday or Thursday. They used to work at night on them, tunnelling from one to the other to connect up. If you threw up the earth by daytime you were shelled with shrapnel.



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On Sunday the main effort of the Turks was on the left. Everett could see the left and notify Bde. On the Sunday the Turks made no serious counterattack till after dark. After dark they were attacking all along this line and the men had to work, one digging and the other shooting.

April 26. - By Monday morning rifle pits and the O.P. were down below ground, with some parapet.

On the Monday there were only a succession of small attacks.

On Tuesday the Turks put an attack in on the left in order to cover a movement of Turks along the trench which they had begun - about 500 Turks moving towards the left with 6 M.G.'s - you could see them carrying the guns.

Everett got word through that these Turks were moving round; and asking for fire on the Neck where these Turks were assembling under cover of the timber. Prompt reply was given by the ships' guns and well-directed fire demoralised and dispersed this attempt. The attacking force was badly mauled by our fire from the edge of the cliff which we were holding. This attack appeared to be led by German officers in a sort of helmet, waving revolvers and urging the Turks on. They seemed to be different troops altogether to those who were moving in rear towards the Nek. The attacking troops seemed to be scallywags, the others, in dark uniforms, well-equipped. They were clearly trying to get round the timber on the Nek to reach Walker's Ridge, from which they could fire into our rear. No one seemed to be holding the Nek and the timber there at this time.

The first shells of the ships' guns, which followed in about 10 minutes, caught them beautifully - shrapnel - and scattered them in every way.

A second attempt was made about an hour later and they were caught in the same way - a couple of Lyddite shells lodging fair in the middle of them. Some of them then ran forward demoralised and got into the pocket between Pope's and Walker's, and our men on Pope's ~~xxx~~ started firing into them. But others did get along into the scrub on Walker's and gave us a bad time later by sniping in our rear.

This was on Tuesday: On Monday or Tuesday night there was a blowing of bugles and howling and shouting apparently in the trenches on the far left - about in front of Pope's. And this made us suspect a feint.

On Tuesday there was a lot of calling out in front of Courtney's (?Monday or Tuesday). There were calls of "Cease Fire" - "Cease fire on the left". There had been heavy firing going on. Everett could not make out who was giving the order and told the men to continue. He worked along the line to find out what the hubbub was - he was out in the potholes - it was a shallow trench. He could hear men calling

out in front - "Cease fire!" "Indian troops! Where can we come in?" He saw three men kneeling behind a bush about 20 yds. out and called to them to stand up - our men had ceased fire there. They had fixed bayonets but the bayonets seemed to be dulled as with mud - it was faint moonlight. Everett moved out a few yards to get a closer inspection - and they seemed to have turbans on. At the same time he saw the faces of men crawling up through the scrub. He at once realised the position and jumped back towards the trench and gave the word to open fire on them just as the Turks sprang to their feet and were rushing forward. The fire immediately stopped them and many were killed and wounded.

They drew off then for a time. This sort of thing was going on all night.

(The following night came the same gag about - "The French are coming through!")

Everett could hear Crowley calling out at the same time further right.

On the Tuesday Sellby joined Everett - he had been in another part of the line - not far away.

Captain Carter, of 16th Bn., had come along with some men of his Coy. - under the edge at night time - and saw Everett. Everett told him to go down to the left as the left was very weak, and the attacks were occurring there. Capt. Miller came along shortly after (also 16th Bn) and as Everett had had heavy casualties he got him to leave 20 men for support (that is all he could find cover for). Some of 14th Bn. Everett found later dug in to a gully-side just short of Bde. H.Q., apparently without officers. He did not notice 15th or 13th.

BRENNAN: Brennan on the first day established his aid post just below Courtney's in the left-hand angle of it. He was indefatigable in hauling up food and ammunition and passing it over the top. He was always looking after the wounded - and organised the bringing up of food, ammunition and water, so that everyone who came up brought up some. He took rations and ammunition from the wounded and stored them in the 1st Aid Post, passing them up as required.

Everett never saw Drake Brockman after the time on Walker's ridge.

Major Lamb, 3rd Bn., was just around the edge from Courtney's, on Quinn's. He had dug into the edge of the cliff. The Turks had a trench opposite him which he could not see; and the Turks would creep out from the rear trench and scratch in a forward trench. The Turks were potting Lamb's men from within 30 yds. without Lamb seeing them. Everett warned Lamb of this, so Lamb's men got up, came over the top, made a charge, and cleared all the Turks from this position ahead of them and retired into the trench again.

Eventually we started to sap forward at Quinn's opposite this trench, and T out and join up - and then the close fighting started.

The first trench the Turks made (the Tuesday night) was the top trench on the Chessboard - where they made a sap and removed the parapet some distance to the rear of it, making a false trench behind the real trench, about 30 yds. away. It looked as if the earth had been carried back at night.

About - ?Thursday or Friday - the Turks attacked about dusk from directly in front of Courtney's. They got to within about 30 yds. in some cases. The R.M.L.I. at this time were at Quinn's, dug in to the top of the hillside instead of making trenches

These R.M.L.I., some of them, fired coolly enough over the top at the Turks; but others were sitting with their backs to the trench firing their rifles into the air. Many of these were afterwards shot of this position by a M.G. from Walker's which the Turks managed to get through. (That would be on Friday - A rope had been fixed up to a tree and Everett had taken T. up by means of this a short time before that day to the Marines' position to observe.

When Everett came from Courtney's Col. Courtney relieved and Everett took his 22 men of all Bns. out. They were of 12 different units. On the 6th day Major Gellibrand had come along - the first staff officer - and had told them he was arranging the relief. The next day they got word that they could not be relieved as the coy. of R.M.L.I. told off for it had received severe casualties (that was the R.M.L.I. Coy.) and they would have to hang on another day or two. It was not till Monday night that they were relieved. Some of the men had lost their reason in the trench through strain at night and want of sleep. Our own dead were lying around for days - buried in the parapet if possible.

They had no shovels at first - only entrenching tools. By the time they were relieved the trenches were pretty good.

A whole string of men had been shot on the M.G. at Courtney's. The men said 17 men had been shot working it. A man had been shot there and Pte. Macleod (?12th Bn.) had no one to help him work the gun. He shouted to Everett to know if he could send him someone. A man named Smith (a Victorian) immediately volunteered. Everett asked if he knew how to work a gun. "No; but I'll bloody soon find out", Smith said. The gun it self was next knocked out. When this happened Macleod was hit across the forehead and had his hands bleeding. Everett told him to go out to the ~~the~~ Aid Post. But he went into the trenches with a rifle. Two days later he came out to the Aid Post for a smoke and spell. Everett found him there - that was the first he knew of his still being there.

One private of 12th Bn. used to go down with water-bottles down the exposed rear slope of Courtney's and fetch water in a chain of waterbottles hung round his neck. He one day got a kerosene tin and was bringing it up on his shoulders and scrambling up the slope on hands and knees. A bullet was put through it. He put it down quickly - looked to see the hole - found it above the line, and turned round and made a long ~~long~~ nose at the Turk.

There were 10th Bn. on Everett's right at first. They were relieved on the Tuesday. Everett was marked as missing, and someone gave evidence that they had seen him killed (and it got to Australia unofficially). Everett's own men were mostly casualties - he had New Zealanders (some came and dug in front of his left one time and he had to pull them out).

The trench to the right was not connected through - nor to Quinn's. 1st. Bn. were on the right some distance away.

Everett was evacuated sick.

11th BATTALION - TURKEY KNOLL.

22/5/15

Some days before the Turkish attack on May 19 they had been digging on Turkey Knoll. M.G.'s could play down over this knoll, and orders were given to go out and see what the digging was.

Everett had Barnes's Coy. after Barnes's death. He took out his Coy. after dark by a sap - not over the bags, as the Turks used to clip our bags with M.G.'s.

The party was divided into (1) a party to go over the Turk trench (under Lieut. Jackson), bayonet the men in it, and lie out beyond it.

(2) A party under another subaltern to go into the Turk trench and examine it.

(3) Covering parties left and right.

About 100 men went out altogether.

Party (1) under Jackson filed out of the sap into the old Turk trench close to our sap (about 30 yds. away), which proved full of old dead.

The second party for searching the trench (Major Roberts thought there were M.G. positions there), and the covering parties, went out - one left front of Turkey Knoll and the other across the gully onto the height where Tasmania Post was later built.

It took about 1½ hours to get out. Then the signal to advance was a whistle blast. The parties (1) and (2) moved together. Party (1) bayoneted the Turks in the trench all except one who ran screaming down the gully and gave the alarm to the others.

There was nothing in the trench - there was an old blanket over the right-hand end of it covering a heap of dirt (which had made our people nervous and had to be specially examined. Everett found this to be only a blanket on a heap of dirt - probably to create suspicion.

The Turk giving the alarm, up came a flare and dropped near the feet of Jackson who was lying out with his men on the forward slope of Turkey Knoll. The Turks didn't see him (there were dead Turks there too - our men kept still). Then there started heavy rifle and M.G. fire against our trench parapet but over the heads of the men lying out.


After waiting for this to cool, Capt. Everett (and having got the information required, including the flash of several M.G.'s), the whistle was blown to retire. All came in except one - the roll was called at once, and one was found to be missing. A search was made for him in the trench. Presently a man was found standing in the trench with a kit in his hands - he said he had gone out with the forward party and that the man beside him had been killed, shot through the head. He had his kit and his paybook and rifle. The dead man had fired his rifle and was the only one.

Each officer had to do a stunt. Leane had Gaba Tepe, and so on.

(See page 245)

CAPTAIN EVERETT'S SORTIE IN MAY.

XXX



25th BATTALION:

August 8th (Davies)
Mont St. Quentin (Fletcher)
 (Lennon)
Pozieres (Davis)
Beaurevoir (Davis)

26th BATTALION: (Same)

(Francis, Cooper,
 Stapleton)

Lagnicourt


(Stapleton)

28th BATTALION: (Same)

(Col. Currie,
 Capt. Allen,
 Lieut. Tozer,
 Lieut. C.A. Walker).

25th BATTALION - AUGUST 8th.

7th Bde. held from road to railway. 25th Bn. was carrying for all three - picks, shovels, ammunition, bombs, water, whatever Bns. wanted. No difficulty in finding way.



Two platoons to each Bn, two to T.M.'s, and two to M.G.'s; two for liaison between 5th and 7th Bdes.; one as P. of W. escort. Some reported to units before leaving Villers Bretonneux; others marched up independently and formed behind units.

The objective was east of Marcelcave and La Motte.

About 35 mins. before Zero the Germans put down a pretty heavy barrage on the J.O.T. Our J.O.T. was ahead of the old support line - and it was this line he shelled, fortunately. Bn. H.Q. was there. There was a fair amount of M.G. fire also. It looked as if he had heard them. Also our M.G.'s were firing to drown noise of tanks, and this may have stirred them.

About 20 mins. before Zero this eased and ceased 10 mins. before. At zero our fire barrage opened. It was very misty - they expected that it would give them great difficulty, but the men simply went towards the Germans and by good fortune got straight there.

Each Bns. carrying party eventually joined the front line and gave a certain amount of assistance in getting their objectives.

North of Marcelcave, in the houses, one officer, 2/Lt. Dix, came on a yard with an iron gate and a German officer standing just inside. He went up to take this officer prisoner. The German shut the gate and motioned him away, speaking in German. Dix pointed his revolver at him and he opened the gate and was taken.

The attack went on without great incident till the objective was reached. The mist was so heavy that you

couldn't see any direct fire by guns - probably Germans kept their guns on barrage. 28th and 27th Bns. got some guns.

5th Div. then leapfrogged - mist cleared about 7 a.m.

It was a wonderful sight that morning, after the Zero, from H.Q. to see a bde. of cavalry in mass (if not more) which came along just north of the railway, crossed the railway and massed near Card Copse. Also the whole 5th Div. was advancing in artillery formation and about 100 tanks, mostly whippets, coming up to support the second leap. Armoured cars and unlimited mechanical and horse transport were streaming along the road East of Villers Bretonneux road, and batteries limbering up and galloping up into action. To crown everything German prisoners coming back by the score into the middle of all this - astonished.

30 or 40 mins. after Zero there were touring cars going up the main road - it all looked a certain, confident success. Within an hour or two balloons, too, were going forward.

25th Bn. rendezvoused in ~~34~~ 34 B and D. - all were reorganised and ready in the trenches there by 7.45 a.m., carrying jobs finished (they just did the one trip).



They stayed there the night, due north of Marcelcave.

August 9th. - Next day they were told that the line was East of Harbonnieres and they were to be prepared to attack at short notice. This was at 11 a.m.

About 11 a.m. Bn. was ordered to go forward and C.O.'s to meet G.O.C. in W 8 Central, north of Guillancourt.

A little after noon they met and received verbal orders for an attack that afternoon on Vauvillers and Framerville and further east. The line then held was the old French system east of Harbonnieres.

Zero was to be 4.30 p.m.

Bn. came on under senior O.C., Captain Cross (Major Page was with ~~the nucleus~~ the nucleus), and met C.O. at W 8 Central and they lunched there, and moved forward to W 10 B., west of Harbonnieres. Reached there about 3 p.m. - little shelling. Bde. H.Q. was about 11 A.L.O. in sunken road. C.O. (Col. Davis) went forward and had a final conference with G.O.C. He then went back to Bn. and ordered them on, and went forward to front line and made a reconnaissance of J.O.T. East of Harbonnieres they got on a downward slope (12A and B) and came under shell fire - they also had six tanks coming up, moving with the Bn. from behind Harbonnieres and they "drew crabs". They reached the old trench at 4.15 - the J.O. line. Just ~~about~~ as they were about 200 yds. short of them a squadron of German planes, about 20 strong, flew very low (50 to 100 ft.) overhead as all firing as hard as they could with M.G.'s. This lasted about 5 minutes - the Bn. had to go on forming up and could do nothing. A Sqdn. of our own planes came over and engaged them - which made it a bit heavier till they scattered - bullets everywhere but loss none or slight (a very remarkable affair). The German sqdn. had a double triangle mark  as well as their 

and was clearly a circus. They got to the trenches about the time when these planes scattered.

At 4.30 they jumped off in touch with 27th Bn. on left and 5th Bde. on left of them. 26th and 28th Bns. were in support to the attack.

28th	5 Bde	
26th	27th	→
	25th	

They advanced through Vauvillers with very little opposition - got a 77 gun there. The right boundary was out along the grid running between X 8 9 10 and the
14 15 16

left boundary 1000 yds. left of this. The objective was about W.10 B. and D. joining diagonally to SE with 1st Division. No troops were attacking on the right - to this day it is not known by Bn. if 1st Division attacked before or after. They did not attack at the same time, though Bn. was told that they were going to.

After getting through Vauvillers, in trying to gain touch with 1st Division, they eased more and more to the right and actually followed the line of Champagne Alley (which made right flank boundary) - still unable to get touch with 1st Division. Rifle and M.G. fire was not heavy during the attack, but shellfire was moderately heavy.

On reaching the fork road in 15B. they got a good haul of prisoners, who put up no fight. There were stables and light timber and ruberoid buildings there.

They went on into the trenches in 16 Central, which made the final objective.

The final objective was to have been through 10D (it wasn't known at the time whether trenches would be found there - the lines on the map turned out to be very old French trenches).

During all the advance they were in touch with 27th Bn on left. But no touch was gained with 1st Division till about 7 p.m. Then a wounded man of 5th Bn. wandered in. Then 5th Bn. were found in the trench South of Champagne Alley in 16C. They said they had been supports but were now front line. 25th joined 27th about 16 B.2.6. and 27th came right round to the Bde. boundary north of 10 Central.

The casualties were not very heavy - about 50 - practically all from shell fire. They went through in artillery formation to the end - and extended into line just on reaching the final position.

All the tanks with them were put out of action - one in 15 B5.5., another just 200 yds. east of 16 Central - one had been disabled further back near the ~~sk~~ start. The crew of the tank which was stopped by broken crank shaft in 15 B. Central offered to go on with the Bn. and fight. They were pretty done with the fumes and so were told to go back. They had helped to rout Germans out of Champagne Alley. The other tank was knocked out ahead of our infantry by direct ~~fire~~ hit. The crew were found dead around the tanks with empty revolvers next morning - all dead. That morning the 25th Bn. made a further little attack and recaptured it. They had gone for a M.G. post there and had been blown - they stayed by their tank and the Germans attacked them at once - it was all over before anything could be done to rescue them. There was pretty solid M.G. fire coming from this little nest of trenches and the tank had gone out to deal with it. (All down Champagne Alley - a deep, very wide trench 6ft. deep 8ft. wide, probably an old mule trench - there was German gear of all sorts. About 250 Germans were got out of it - all surrendered freely. They had niches cut in it with M.G.'s firing to SW and NW. It looked as if they had left rifles and packs and cleared.

August 10. - The 25th Bn. was ordered to attack this morning in conformity with an attack by 1st Division on the right - swinging up the right flank to about 500 yards on right, pivoting on left in 27th Bns. sector. This was for 8 a.m. The first Division jumped off at 7.45 a.m.

(The night before, in gaining touch with 1st Division,
~~the day~~

the Coy. Commander of right Coy., Lieut. Auchterlonie, M.C. and Bar, had been killed - the Bn. had arrived about 6 p.m. and he was killed after dark about 10 or 10.30 p.m. in going out to find first division. He was killed between 25th Bn and the tank. The burst of M.G. fire came from the tank and it was later found that the Germans had occupied the tank as a post. (M.C. at Hamel, Bar on July 17 - never knew he won the bar. He was the last of three splendid sons to be killed - only about 23; one brother was the first officer killed in 25th Bn. and another in Light Horse - both these in Gallipoli - Gympie men).

In the morning the Bn. bombing officer, Lieut. MacCulloch, took the right Coy. over to this attack. Col. Davis went up with him. They met with very heavy M.G. fire from the start - they started over the top. They were going for a copse on left front - very heavy with M.G.'s. MacCulloch only lasted half an hour - the C.O. was showing him where MacCulloch was to take some men when MacCulloch was sniped through the lung - he died next day. Davis took the Coy. on himself. They went in sections - and rushes of one and two men - the fire was very heavy, very accurate and very short range. As they had no support, neither artillery, T.M. nor tanks - it became clear that the loss would not be worth the small gain; the Coy. on the left had not got forward at all. They had actually done all that was necessary for helping the 1st Division by getting this nest of trenches and the tank, and routing the Germans out of the nest. The Germans had to be fought out of this whole nest. Lieut. Eather (Int. Officer) and Lieut. Harrison (L.G. officer) had both gone up knowing that the Coy. was short of officers. Eather took a L.G. himself and assisted very largely by working up the trench. They killed a good many Germans. The rest of the Germans went back, fighting step by step, due East, as 1st Div. had got well on on the right. Bn. was within 150 yds. of objective. C.O. sent back dispositions to Bde. (they had got up about 50 rounds of Stokes and were going to use it for a barrage in the afternoon). Bde. ordered them to stand fast where they were about 150 yds. short of objective - they could see 1st Div.

C.O.'s were sent for to Bde. H.Q. at the Pigeon House, Harbonnieres.

Brigadier issued verbal orders for another attack next morning to be carried out by 26th and 28th in conjunction with 5th Bde.

26th Bn, which had been in Vauvillers till then, relieved at 1 a.m. on morning of 11th, prior to which 25th Bn. had ~~xx~~ laid a J.O. tape across the whole front. This was necessary as there was 100 to 150 yds. between posts, and it was fairly dark. Their attack was timed for daylight on 11 August. Eather and 26th Bn. I.O. (Pearson) did this.

When relieved at 1 a.m. on 11 Aug. they moved back to positions vacated by 26th Bn. in and around Vauvillers, and stood by to support the attack if required.

The attack succeeded, so 25th were not used.

During the German retaliation the German put a lot of gas into Vauvillers (very heavy indeed on Framerville). On night of 11th Aug. 7th Bde. was relieved by 6th Bde. The details in Vauvillers were in good German dugouts and cellars - rest in trenches. No gas casualties owing to very strict precautions and previous experience at Passchendaele and Mericourt.

26th and 28th came back into old French line east of Harbonnieres, and 25th and 27th on the tram line immediately west of Harbonnieres in 10 D.

(Neither Australian soldiers nor British had left any trace in the village).

It looked as if 8th Bde. had caught it in front of the village and had been unable to get ahead and got back into

the old Amiens line.

During 9th Aug. it was impossible to know if you were miles out ahead of others or if they were miles ahead of you No one knew, at the front.

At Harbonnieres the Germans were still shelling with a H.V. gun the balloon which was immediately west of Harbonnieres and which went up from the middle of the 25th Bn. camp. Its predecessor had been put down on Aug. 9 (afternoon) by one of our planes after a brave attempt against the German H.V. gun. On Aug. 11 Germans were shelling this balloon with H.V. shrapnel and Lieut. Harrison was wounded by a ~~hit~~ pellet in the head.

This made the 3rd O.C. of D Coy. to be hit in 3 days.

Aug. 8. Lieut. Templeman was killed during the advance by our own barrage.

Aug. 9. Lieut. Adair, wounded near NE of Vauvillers by shell.

Lieut. Inghram, mortally wounded (and died later) about the same place, also by a shell.

Bn. went back to Bussy and stayed there till 27th Aug. Moved up and attacked through 6th Bde. just east of Herbecourt.

27th	
25th	
28th	
26th	

(This order?)

25th Bn. moved on to east of Flaucourt. Very few casualties this day. Stayed there till Aug. 30, afternoon. Then moved across to left bank of Somme near Clery. Were stopped just before crossing, and remained in bivouacs on the canal side and peninsula of Omiecourt, all that night (to let other Bdes. cross) till afternoon of Aug. 31.

25th Bn. then crossed, on night of Sept. 1/2, at Omiecourt, and moved round to Galatz and Agram Alleys.

On evening of Sept. 1st the C.O.'s were sent for to Bde. near Boscourt Cemetery about dark, and verbal orders issued for an attack at dawn on Sept. 2. Major Page was a/ in command this time.

Page got back to Bn. about 1 a.m. It was a very hurried conference at about 3 a.m. - where they made arrangement for breakfast and the move up to J.O.T.

$\frac{1}{2}$ -28th		27th	
$\frac{1}{2}$ -28th		25th	
		→	
$\frac{1}{2}$ -28th		26th	

This was the first they knew of the attack. Breakfast had been ordered previously - dry bread, cold beef, cold tea no milk, no sugar.

For 25th Bn. the J.O. was 700 yds. from there. This had to be done all by 5.30. The leading Coy. reached the tape at 5.5 a.m. They were all there between 5.10 and 5.15, after great anxiety. The front started on width of 1000 yds. and widened out to 1500 on objective. The Coys. were

B		D		C	
				A	
				→	

The idea was that each Coy. should have 500 yds. front eventually, D Coy. feeding into the gap between A and C.

The Coys. were each three platoons. The advanced Coys. advanced with one platoon extended as a line of skirmishers over each Coy. frontage. The other two platoons advanced 75 yards in rear in lines of sections in artillery formation. Direction was very difficult to maintain on account of no previous reconnaissance, and the formation of the hill ahead tended to make the troops to move to the left. The troops were brought back during the advance onto their proper front by signal - and ended on their proper objective.

They jumped off from the Bapaume Road just NW of Mont St. Quentin.

Opposition was first met in the German line of outposts just east of the Wood - this ran more or less N and S. These were overcome without difficulty. 6th Bde. were passed just east of the wood.

The Germans main line of resistance ran from the point of Hill 115 and along Brunn Trench. The M.G. fire was terrific - the heaviest we have met in the war, and immediately stopped our advance, about 400/500 yds. from the German line. It was just about here that Major Page, who was coming along in front of the reserve Coy. with Bn. H.Q., was hit. Capt. Cross was hit (O.C. B COY. on left).

A small party of one L.G. section had worked up Lugus trench and had knocked out a M.G. position in it, a little east of the junction with Laibach trench (under Sergt. Anderson - they got it with Lewis Gun). They were right in now the German main line of resistance. They immediately fired on and cleared out a post about 50 yds. on the right which was occupied by about 50 Germans. The X of the trench just on top of ~~the~~ Hill 115 was very strong indeed, their main post containing 17 M.G.'s and 2 T.M.'s. Owing to the convex shape of the hill they could not reach with their fire the position where our party was.

Capt. Fletches - a fearless man - did most splendidly throughout this fighting. At first it looked hopeless. Then, when Sergt. Anderson and his party went on so well, everything seemed all to be plain going. Then when the 120 Germans came up and they only had 2 M.G. magazines left, it looked very black again - then up came the V.G.'s and it brightened.

Sergt. Anderson and Cpl. Anderson (both Murwillumbah boys) did their two shows on their own ~~own~~ initiative - one out in front of the strongpost, the other up the trench.

The Cpl. Anderson who held out in front of the S/P was a brother of Sergt. Anderson. ~~He said to the small party -~~ "I know you can't take it, but go on and hang on to them," said Fletcher on finding them.

The rest of A Coy. (which had reconnoitred and found out the position) moved up Lagus trench and gradually worked up the trench till they were immediately looking down Brunn trench, where the Germans were holding out very strongly and causing serious opposition to C Coy.

(A Coy: Capt. Fletcher, Lieut. McLaughlan, Lieut. Graham; C Coy: Capt. G. Cromey, Lieut. Annat, Lieut. Ross, Lieut. Izdebski; D Coy.: Capt. Lennon, 2/Lieut. Stuart, Ward, Norman; B Coy.: Capt. Cross, Pain, Hoge, Cadzow; Bn. H.Q.: Major Page, Capt. Carroll, Lieut. Eather).

They were now in full view of the Germans who were in this trench and were looking down on them.

When fire was directed on them they began to clear out in small parties and ceased fire.

At that moment a party of about 120 Germans in column of fours began to come west towards this point, coming in view about 500 yards away. Two Vickers Gun teams had just arrived and this target was shown to them as the ammunition of the infantry was almost exhausted. The Vickers gun could only

fire single shots so a burst of L.G. fire was ordered when the Germans were about 350 yds. away. They broke and fled leaving a number of wounded men. (This was from the same point). Attention was again turned to Brunn trench, and it was seen that the Germans were still running away in small parties and that C Coy. were enveloping them on the flat on the left. The Germans had ceased firing entirely.

C Coy. was then seen advancing, and the rest of the Germans (about 50) surrendered without opposition.

D Coy. had no opportunity yet of working in. They were following up in ~~Lugus~~ Lugus Trench.

C Coy. advanced across the open in excellent formation and followed so closely on the heels of the Germans as they ran that they did not make a stand in Antigone Alley but retreated beyond the main road, throwing away many M.G. packs and other kit. As the road was the objective, C Coy took up a position in Antigone Alley. A Coy. advanced up Lugus Trench and turned right down a good system of trenches which the Germans had been previously occupying. No Germans were found there but they linked with 26th Bn. near the corner of Koros Alley. Several German M.G.'s were still holding out between there and the road, but they were soon forced to retire by fire being brought onto them. Outposts were then thrust down all the saps towards the main road and eventually - during the day - posts were established linking up with C Coy.

D Coy. following A mingled with 26th Bn. who were too weak to hold the line at the junction of Koros Alley and Brunn trench. That important corner was strongly held by us.

Meanwhile the strong German post on the hill had been absolutely ignored and word was sent to the T.M.'s in the rear, who fired a couple of shots onto the position, but a few men going forward (Cpl. Anderson and four men), ~~found~~ who had held on in front of it all the time, found that the Germans had (as was suspected) left this post. The Germans took the locks out of their M.G.'s but left all equipment and all sorts of stores. The Cpl. counted 17 M.G.'s and 2 T.M.'s. The Germans had escaped across Koros Alley and over the triangle.

The objective was finally reached about 7.30 a.m.

B Coy. had followed closely on C in the advance from Brunn Trench and joined in with that Coy. in Antigone Alley. The casualties inflicted on the Bn. had been very great.

The posts in the trenches were put in during the afternoon.

(On map: the small cross represents this afternoon's posts - in trenches. The cross in circle posts were put later by the relieving Bn.)

A reconnoitring party sent along to the Rupprecht Trench crossing - one man creeping ahead saw that just across the road was a very strongly held German post about one man to every yard. Our post was established about 75 yards from the road so as to have a field of fire.

There was a gap between 27th Bn and 25th Bn. Lieut. Eather with a small party (about 3) reconnoitred the previously obscure trenches to Athene and Hera Alley, and found that the Germans were not holding the junctions of Antigone Alley with these trenches. Some of 28th Bn. were used in forming posts there - and others on the flank in Koros (i.e., they were put into the two gaps left after the attack).

Where the British Bn. was used was in completing defensive flank from Hera and Athene on the left.

Bn. was relieved on night of 4th.

(Later records show that a special sharpshooting Bn. had been put in to reinforce this front).

The M.G. fire here was heavier than on July 28/29 at Pozieres.

see
p.251

25th Bn. came back on night of 4/5th Sept. to Mereaucourt Wood and moved on 5th to Eclusier. Stayed there till Sept. 27th.

At 6.30 p.m. started by road for area east of Peronne, arriving 1 a.m. 28th September. On next night 28/29th. Bn. marches to Templeux la Fosse, arriving about 9.30 p.m.

On morning of Oct. 1, Bn. marched to Hargicourt, arriving midday. There was no accommodation of any sort for the men. As it was probable they were going to move again that night no preparation was made. Just before dark the men began to make bivvies. About 5.30 p.m. C.O.'s were sent for to Bde. in some quarries near Hargicourt, and verbal orders given to march to NE of Nauroy, - 25th Bn being the most advanced Bn. and immediately behind front line - part of the area was in Nomansland.

They started at 8.30 p.m. and they had a long tiring march through densely black, drizzling night, along filthy roads by the black road (not the plank road) which was quite indistinguishable - practically it didn't exist. This brought them through Bellicourt to NE of Nauroy in G.6.B. Arrived there about 1.30 a.m. or 2 a.m. Owing to the filthy condition of the road and dense black night it was most difficult to find the way over this Hindenburg line country. (The only thing which showed the road was the congestion of traffic, horses bogged, limbers overturned).

On afternoon of Oct 2nd, C.O.'s were sent for again to Bde., just west of Bellicourt in Pillbox in Hindenburg line, and verbal instructions given for an attack next morning. These were followed by written orders late that night.


On night of Oct. 2/3 Bn. relieved 20th Bn. in the sunken road (Estrees to Gouy) NE of Follemprie Farm. They attacked at dawn on Oct. 3.

In this road there was some gas shelling, but nothing very heavy. Follemprie Farm was shelled all the time, so a detour was made round it by those who passed it, and they passed in perfect safety.

25th Bn. had the first objective on nearly the whole Bde. front. It included the Beaurevoir line. The line here was found to be very good, with good pillboxes and fire-step behind them and very thick wire. The attack, (which was a peculiar one, planned so because they did not know if an attack were being made on the left - it was only found just before zero that the left would attack) went very well to the Beaurevoir line.

The 27th Bn. was to make a flank in this way:

xxx



They were late. 25th Bn. had to mop up a copse in 27th Bn. area - just a few rifle shots came from it, but there was no real resistance.

xxx

The barrage was good to this point (Beaurevoir line). At that line a good deal of resistance was met. Here two of the tanks, which were late at the J.O.T., caught them up.

Shortly after the attack, as the 25th Bn. were about approaching the Beaurevoir line, the C.O. and Adjutant, standing together at the J.O. line, saw a number of men with their rifles at the port and bayonets fixed come over the knuckle of the 27th Bn.'s ground and ~~xxx~~ straight up the hill towards them. It was a Tommy Coy., or else a battalion, under a poor kid of an officer, a lieutenant, which had lost direction and was coming in the wrong direction (A-B).

They thought that this might be a British unit being relieved, but the boy said he was attacking. The Adjutant swore at him and he began to cry. They said he might use his eyes; and pointed to our line. He then began to form his Coy. up in mass facing the right direction and the Germans shelled them - they went off towards the Torrens).

Back at Eclusier had come word that 25th Bn. was to be broken up. This was delayed until after this attack. Col. Davis saw G.O.C. and told him that it was the unanimous wish of the Bn. to go into the next fight and have the hardest job to do. There would either be no Bn. to break up or they would have made a record which made it impossible to break them up. The men fought in this action perhaps better than they ever fought, and the results were astonishing.

(The 25th. Bn. never actually disobeyed the order to break up, as 21st Bn. did (?), though it would have done so. The men were probably determined to stand by their fellows in 21st Bn. (Some officers of 21st Bn., so Col. Forbes tells me, addressed a meeting of 19th Bn., but the officers of 19th Bn. were all loyal). Anyway, when the report spread, the 25th Bn. paraded before its Colonel (Davis). The Regtl. Sergt.-Major took charge of it and brought the parade to attention - it was a most ceremonial occasion. The C.O. got them around him and had a talk to them. He told them that the 25th Bn. had always had a great record for doing what it was told to do; that it had to be done - it was necessary; and they could not hope to get up against the people of Britain with success. The whole A.I.F. was only a fleabite compared with the British Army. The War Office had ordered this - and the order has got to be carried out.

They said: "Look, Colonel, the 25th from the first has been built on esprit de corps. We have been taught that the regiment is everything, and you have often told us that we must sacrifice everything for the honour of the regt. We have always obeyed you - and we always will obey you in everything else. But we cannot obey you in this just for that reason - we would sacrifice anything for the Battalion."

The break-up was postponed, fortunately. Davis wanted it done then, if it at all, and urged in on Wisdom. It was done later without any stir at all. Davis ~~was~~ on Aug. 10 told the men (who asked him) that it was already done (they didn't have to move at all or shift billets).

They turned up on the next parade - and the thing was over.)

They had to advance 1200-1500 yds. down a bare slope with the slightest protection - no more than a few small bushes over ground visible to the Germans the whole way. The Germans were holding a very strong and strongly-wired line (around the quarry the wire was tremendous), with pillboxes, and 60 M.G.'s were taken on 25 Bns. front.

On reaching the wire in some parts of the Coys. could not get through it. On the left Sergt. Sievwright crawled under the wire about 50 yds. from a strong German post. He rushed along the parapet of the trench and the whole garrison of 52 Germans and 7 M.G.'s surrendered to this one M.C.O. (The Coy. was making a frontal attack and the L.G. would be going, and this assisted him). These Germans must have had so many defeats that as soon as they saw our line start they must have given up in spirit. Otherwise the attack was impossible. Our barrage was not as heavy by many times as it has often been, and cannot account for it.

They had to take three lines of good trenches and isolated pillboxes echeloned besides. A German officer, who was taken there, said to Col. Davis: "You Australians are all bluff. You have no troops at all." We had less than 300 bayonets in the attack, and with the loss of about 80 men, 25th Bn. took between 600 and 700 Germans and killed about 200; took 60 M.G.'s and a few T.M.'s; also pigeons (later eaten as pie in rest billets), and several bicycles and a piano from a dugout.

After the tanks caught up, they made a couple of lanes through the wire - these helped Bn. to get through. The whole hold-up on this line would not be more than 10 or 15 minutes. In the Lormissel Farm was a big ammunition dump - after we took it we steered clear of it, as it was consistently shelled and the dump blown up by a shellburst.

The 20th Bn. could be seen on the right during the advance as far as Torrens Canal.

At the Beaurevoir Line 26th Bn., which followed through, went out towards the final objective. Later, when they came back to the ditch, 25th Bn. sent C Coy. (Capt. McSkimming) up to reinforce them.

The Bn. consisted of three Coys. The other two were used to form a defensive flank on the right - part down the ditch west of Kukri Valley, and part in the second Beaurevoir line NE of Mushroom Quarry.

Capt. McSkimming
C
A. Lt. Richards.

P. Lt. Barlow D

C Coy. was in ditch with ~~25~~ 26th Bn. about 3ft. 6in. deep - pretty good trench.

A Coy.'s ditch was very shallow - they had to dig in. D Coy. had a good trench.

Word came that 5th Bde. was going on to conform to present line of 7th Bde. at 4.30 p.m. and the barrage came down, but no attack. The attack took place at 6.30, when they came up.

25th Bn. was relieved about 1-2 a.m. by 7th British Bde. The men had marched 18 kilos. and were in full marching order with packs up. They had no knowledge of whether they were to attack the following morning or not. They did attack at 6 a.m. (?), but the message giving Bn. Commander his orders for the attack (much less his zero hour) did not pass through his Bde. forward station until 10 minutes before zero and he was 20 minutes away. (c.f. 9th Oct. the year before - these other Manchesters - same Bn. had been relieved by 25th Bn. and had been to Italy since).

25th Bn. then moved back to position occupied before relieving 20th Bn. (trenches behind Folemprie).

Stayed there from early morning of Oct. 4th to about 2 a.m. morning of 5th Oct. They were to have been relieved by some Americans, but these never turned up. (A guide went to meet them and bring them up, and had got them some distance when an American runner caught them up and diverted them (planes were dropping bombs around very close).

Finally 25th Bn. received orders to move back without relief to Hargicourt. This was done without incident.

Oct. 7. Bn. marched to Roisel and entrained at 3.15 p.m. to Amiens, which was reached late at night.

Oct. 7/8. Marched by night from Amiens to Berteaucourt, about 15 miles, arriving there 5 a.m. 8th October.

On October 11th word was received that 25th Bn. was to be amalgamated with 26th Bn. as from 12th October.

This was carried out by 6 p.m. on Oct. 12th as far as transfer of personnel was concerned, the new Bn. retaining name of 26th Bn. A and B Coys. were original 26th Bn. C and D Coys. were original 25th Bn. Each Coy. retained its own officers and N.C.O.'s throughout - whole 25th Bn. wears 26th colours as a base, with half-size 25th Bn. colour in centre.

17th July attack gave in some ways a promise of the work which was done later. It was hurried, was done with very few men, and had very big objectives. There was quite a heavy fight on the East end of the mound - where the Germans counterattacked twice; once at daylight next morning, July 18, and then again at dusk, July 18. Col. Davis commanded this time; Major Page at Hamel; and Major Davis at Morlancourt. Davis joined as a private in 25th Bn.

POZIERES.

Capt. J. E. Nix was reported on a Townsville paper. Lieut. W. P. Healy was on the staff of the Sydney "SUN". He became R.S.M. and was killed at Flers.

Lieut. M. Healy, who was killed at Zonnebeke, was with Paton and got his brother transferred to 25th Bn. on Gallipoli from 17th Bn.

A big Irish guardsman - Pat. O'Gorman - was in the attack on July 28/29, lying before the wire. He lay in a shellhole for a bit. The he got tired of that method. "Come on, chaps. Let's have a charge" he said. He dashed up and at the wire - and he was killed.

Q.M.S. Davis, 25th Bn., who was killed by a shell at Bonnay, when he was lying half-conscious, was thinking all the while of the meat which he had undelivered, across the road. He was trying to get up and get to it. "Don't let the boys say that meat's lying there and I never got it to them" he kept saying.

Colonel Walker, 25th Bn., at Messines before Pozieres was going round and found the men crouching in the trenches. He asked why they were not firing. "There has been our Coy. Commander killed there this morning with a bullet through his brain", they said; and the next man who put his head up got a bullet through it". They had put up periscopes after that and had them shot at once, and an officer who had put up a stick had it shot through.

"Oh, what's this about getting shot?" Walker said. "We'll see if they can shoot - it's always 'getting shot'", he said. (He was an Irishman - brute of a man, and a bit mad probably). He put his elbows on the sandbags and looked over. A bullet whizzed 6 inches from his head, but he never stirred.

"He's a damned bad shot" he said; "that was six inches away".

Whit!q- went another past.

"Here, give us a rifle," he said, "and I'll teach the b---- to shoot."

He took a rifle and as he did a bullet hit the sandbag.

He looked over the top again: "I must let him have another one first to see where he is" he said.

Whit! - went another past him.

"Och! - there you are me man" he said and took up his rifle and aimed and fired - he was a very good shot - and the German did not fire again, whatever happened.

Davis and the officer on the spot had been looking at a 5.9 hole and saying they would bury him there behind the trench!

At Pozieres Walker went up, over the top of course, and stood on the edge of the trench looking down and asking the men why they were not shooting. They told him to come down - he would be shot. (They didn't care a damn if he were, but they didn't want him drawing crabs on them from Thiepval which enfiladed the place completely and was constantly onto that end of the line).

"Always all this about getting shot", he said. "Will I get shot -?" And with that he walked straight out over the trench and 50 yards out into No-man's-land - and picked up a German rifle and came in with it.

The next man who put his head over the bags got a bullet through the brain!

26th BATTALION - AUGUST 8th.

26th Bn. came up from Bois de l'Abbe, a little light shelling on the way up. Bn. was to be on railway just behind the bridge, left near the road.

xxx

/D /C.
2/Bn / /B /A →
1.Coy

About $\frac{1}{2}$ -hour before the J.O. they put down a barrage - up went a red light and then a green light, and down came the barrage. This was heavy. Some of the men were in shellholes and some in the open. But very few casualties.

When the barrage came down the German artillery stopped. As they were waiting the men, some of them, said: "Oh, well, they're having their fun now - wait till our barrage starts and we'll give them hell."

From the start the M.G. fire was heavy. This seemed to be coming from south of the railway and from Card Copse and the trenches north of it. When Bn. got to the trenches in 32 D. there were Germans there badly shaken and some of the M.G.'s were hot. The Germans seemed to be holding the ground in M.G. posts scattered in depth. It was about at this point they first saw the tanks. (There were to be 4 tanks with each Bn. and one supply tank, but this was burnt). The attack was a bit too fast for the tanks. It was ~~xxxx~~ so misty that they kept running on top of M.G.'s before they opened and swamped them. The first casualties were before Card Copse.

Coming along the north of the railway line Bn. took

three well-camouflaged field guns. ~~before they could point
swampy area.~~

The railway was inclusive to the Canadians. When the opposition began to come from Marcelcave the Canadians swung in to their right.

On reaching Marcelcave the Canadians on the right were held up, and our people on the left of the village were held up by fire from the south side of the railway. One of the tanks there worked along the north side of the village firing her 6-pdr. and then round across the railway line to the south beyond the village. Later she came back again north over the railway.

The crew of a 5.9 battery were shot as they tried to run away from a quarry. From there to the objective there was no one.

The Canadians came through Marcelcave in fine style - there had been a great noise of fighting there - and they came out and joined us looking as if on parade. About 5 minutes after we had got past.

When 26th Bn. got to its objective it came under direct fire from a whizzbang battery which it could see firing from the west side of Pieuret Wood. The Vickers guns were beginning to fire on them.

These guns were finally stopped by the Canadians and the tanks getting up to them.

Behind the wood were found two or three guns, with their teams all in them shot dead. They had pulled back from across the railway.

350 prisoners,

5 5.9's

2 4.2's

6 77's

15 H.M.G.'s

11 L.M.G.'s

1 minenwerfer, granatenwerfer,

periscopes, rangefinder, telephones, etc. There was a Q.M. store in Marcelcave and a German paymaster. They had a hot lunch on the objective - the men had an operation order for a barrage of biscuits and rissoles.

KILLED: Capt. Cameron, killed by M.G. near Card Copse.
Lieut. Cockrill, killed rushing a M.G. and died about 2 yds. from it.
Lieut. Hamilton, d. of w. own barrage at the start.

WOUNDED: Lieut. Weston, wounded just before Card Copse.
Lieut. Croft, was hit by a M.G. before start.
Lieut. Millard, on the objective by shell splinter.
Lieut. McDonald, badly wounded during advance.
Lieut. Leech, before the objective.
Captain Cooper, slightly wounded.

23 O.R. killed; 109 wounded; 3 missing.

There were numbers of M.G. emplacements all along the railway bank - and these caused a lot of the casualties.

As soon as the barrage started they all lit their cigarettes.

Camped on objective for a day. Then got orders about 11 a.m. to move towards Harbonnieres. J.O.T. for this day's attack was in the sunken road in 12 A and C, east of Harbonnieres. In the attack they moved to the trenches east of Vauvillers.

They struck no posts of 5th Division East of Vauvillers. Stayed there a day. Moved up to 10 Central on night of 10th.

On Morning of Aug. 11, 26th Bn. attacked from line occupied by 27th and part of 25th, and reached the grid between X 10 and 11.

This attack was a straightening-out process. There was a good deal of distant M.G. fire but no close fighting. 28th on left took some prisoners (Barrage but no tanks).

Lieut. Single was wounded on J.O.T. by M.G. fire, but went through with Bn. and dug in.


Relieved there by 7 6th Bde. and went back for 10 days to Bussy.

26th BATTALION - BEAUREVOIR.

OCTOBER 3rd.

Battn. marched up from Eclusier through Peronne to Doingt. Day and a half there; next night at Templeux la Fosse. Day or so there. Then to east of Templeux Guerard. Got there in afternoon. Moved same night to the Le Catelet - Nauory line in G 11.B. Got there 1/2nd. Stayed there 2nd. Moved night of 2/3rd. to the ditch north of Folemprise Farm to Mint Copse. Col. Robinson was hit passing the side of Folemprise Farm ~~and~~ and Capt. Cooper took charge.

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The Zero was 6.5. a.m. They went off in artillery formation. The Germans put a heavy barrage on the northern down slope of that hill.

26th Bn. got up with 25th Bn. the Beaurevoir line and were fighting with them there, especially on the left, and in Mushroom Quarry. A M.G. was shooting from the quarry and had annoyed them coming down the slope. Two or three men got round on the south side. L.G.'s held the German M.G.'s attention and these men bombed it and also got into the back of the road north of the quarry.

On the left there were about three heavy belts of wire at Lormisset. The tank which was with them turned upside down just in the road before the farm. The left had to climb over the wire and go straight at Lormisset Farm. There were three pillboxes each with a M.G. at the Fork Road north of the farm. The troops were absolutely with the barrage there and this was the only thing that saved them.

Sergt. Miller, 26th Bn, there rushed a M.G. on his own. They surrendered. One of them then shot him through the neck when he was turned the other way. Miller blew this man's brains out.

26th Bn. went straight on from there. All up the trenches were pillboxes each with 10 or 12 Germans in - pretty badly shaken. They captured the whole lot of these; the trenches

were dug around each pillbox - the trench tracing connecting them from 4 ft. to 18 ins. deep - very deep round the pillboxes.

At Bellevue Farm a couple of whizzbangs guns were taken and 8 German prisoners in the house and shellholes, ~~some~~ some of them with two M.G.'s in the open waiting to be taken. (There was one M.G. later in the top storey of the Farm at the SE corner).

The right got 300-400 yds. past Bellevue Farm which was a big place with covered-in trenches. The whizzbangs were not firing in the farm. One whizzbang alongside the mill, was firing point-blank and two up the village. Also an odd gun (possibly two) on the NW edge of the village. On left, where C. Lieut. Stapleton, was there was a post established about 40 yds. west of Guizaucourt Farm - with M.G.'s. Two men went into the farm to look for souvenirs - one came back to say that there were no Germans in it.

28th Bn. was on left here also. The 50th Div. was on the left over Prospect Hill. They reached the trench which runs along north side of the hill. They were under a Sergt. Major there - mixed up. These were good troops, and went over dressing by the right as if it were a cinema show.

The 26th Bn. had a few posts in the trench which runs NW out of Beurevoir - it was a deeper continuous trench than the Hindenburg trench, but not a good trench. No one was ahead of this. There were Germans in this trench and in the sunken road ahead of it - probably troops who had run back - there were droves of Germans who had been retreating before the attack on the left.

On the right at Bellevue Farm there were no flanking troops. It was difficult to hold this right with a few scattered posts. The posts were first withdrawn to the farm. Then a post was left in the farm and the right withdrawn. It ended at about the road junction in 15A.3.6. through B 8.D. across the sunken road at B. 8.B.4.4. and then NW to the Beurevoir trench, and then N along trench to B.2.D.2.7. The line south of Bellevue was held by a few small posts. It was strengthened at nightfall by a Coy. of 25th Bn.

After 6th Bde. attacked 26th Bn. got touch with them on their right.

(During the afternoon the Germans got a M.G. into the SE corner of the farm - they got the guns onto them and put 6 shells into that building. The artillery was also put onto a minenwerfer in Gouzacourt Farm. The infantry had a line through Bde. to the artillery and the artillery was sniping for them.

Rather than a definite counterattack there was a gradual creeping back - (1) Through Beurevoir and so south-east of the Farm into the farm; (2) In the sunken road through 3C - gun limbers and transport (which we took for the British cavalry) came right down to this.

About 2 a.m. to 4.30 a.m. they were relieved by British troops and came out to Nauroy.

Casualties:

Col. Robinson (as above),

Capt. Lloyd, wounded just after start (150 yds.) by a shell of the German barrage.

Lieut. Whittaker (Sig. Offr.) wounded in front of Jill Copse by a shell (probably ours).

All H.Q. had now gone except 2 signallers and Capt. Cooper.

Lieut. Gillie, was wounded before the 1st objective.

Lieut. Blake, " Just after 1'Ormisset was reached.

This was 8.20.

~~Lieut. Carter~~ was

Lieut. Carter was killed just after L'Ormisset.
Lieut. Amiet (I.O.) was wounded just after l'Ormisset by one of our own shells, and also 20 men. (Amiet went through the fight).

Lieut. Breaford was killed walking near Bellevue farm out in front of the line about 4 p.m.

Lieut. Greenwood wounded round Bellevue farm during attack.

2/Lieut. Christie wounded before reaching l'Ormisset Farm.

O.R. - 17; 90 wounded; 13 missing.

This was 2 killed, 8 wounded; and 110 men - i.e., 50 per cent of attacking troops.

Capt. Hockings, when Cooper took over Bn., took on A Coy. and was the only officer left in A and half of D. He was on the right.

Capt. Stapleton had Lieuts. Brown and Hay left with him.


Lieut. Francis came up when Lloyd was wounded and acted as adjutant to Capt. Cooper.

These six were the only unwounded officers left.

26th BATTALION - LAGNICOURT.

(Stapleton).

Posts were placed around the front of the village as shown.



Germans were actually within 15 yds. Posts at (1) were knocked in. Of the Germans some were killed within 2 yds. at (2).

The Germans were 1000 yds. or so away when they began to congregate. The M.G. post on the right (where 5th Divn. ought to have - by plan - been supporting) had to be withdrawn from position (1) to position (2), as the Germans by working up behind the trees on the road could have made it impossible to hold it - one sniper in the trees would have settled it.

The German attacked as shown - but ~~was~~ was stopped on the left front where marked. He then got round on the right and attacked through the manure heaps (some crept up very close there) and worked up to the trees and around the right flank across the road. Lieut. Jerry of 28th. Bn. brought up his platoon on the right flank and made four posts there. But the Germans simply wiped them out, and only Jerry and his batman got away. Then the Germans got in closer; and the left post and the post fourth from the left were scuppered; and the German line was all

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round the remaining posts as shown by the dotted line . The rest of our people (Cherry was with them) met to decide whether to stay on and be scuppered or whether to retreat now - and decided to stay (Stapleton was amongst those there), when the Boche gave in first - and retired.

Just as the Germans got in behind about M one L.G. stopped. Camouflaged bivvies in sunken road, with a lot of German ammunition, saved them whenever a man's rifle got chocked.

26th BATTALION.

Somme, August 29th.
Mont St. Quentin.

Started with three Coys. in lead and one in support. Bn. left Chuignolles at 3.30 a.m. Organised on road south of sugar factory Dompierre. Left there about 6 to cross a line running NW from Assevillers to N7 Central by 7.30.

This was done exactly in time - working in artillery formation from Sugar Mill.

There was a little fighting seen away on left by Flaucourt. But north of Barleux in the old trench system they came under M.G. fire near Meendon Wood. They had to get down here a bit - and from there broke into extended order and attacked in rushes.

Bn. finished on Somme from Lamire Farm to Grid between 9 and 3 Central.

On the trenches on the heights NW of Eterpigny a rear-guard of Germans put up a fight. Their shooting was erratic.

On reaching the Somme the Bn. found the bridges over the Somme intact, but they were mined and were blown up that night. We had a patrol down trying to stop them, but they could not.

On Aug. 30. About 6 a.m. Capt. Cooper's Coy. tried to cross by the track through the marshes (duckboarded) south of 9 Central. The engineers brought a pontoon down during the night and put it in, and Coy. crossed at dawn. The track petered out at the water 150-200 yds. east. The O.C. put out in an old punt looking for crossings but could find no way across owing to natural difficulties. Even on the other side it was no better. Cooper found the marshes with high reeds and quite impossible for infantry. No M.G. opposition.

Aug. 30.- That night they were relieved and came into trenches south of Herbecourt.

26th BATTALION - MONT. ST. QUENTIN.

On Aug. 31 they were SW of Herbecourt. About 1.15 p.m. they got orders to go via Feuilleres via Clery-sur-Somme to Lost Ravine. Camped there night of 31st and during afternoon of 1st September came up road North of Prk Wood into Florina and Prague trenches. Fairly continuous shelling.

They turned in without any thought of an attack. About 1 a.m. Col. Robinson rang up to say he wanted to see O.C.'s Coys. and they went down to H.Q., in Prague trench, when a scheme was laid out, with no operation order.

The Coys. sent out one officer each to reconnoitre the roads south of Mont St. Quentin and approached.

At 4 a.m. they left Prague and Florina, A Coy. leading. They came up Florina onto road, Up Agram Alley and then cut east into the road from Mont St. Quentin into Anvil Wood. (The German, they later found, was holding Gott mit ~~Uns~~ Uns). A Coy. got into position all right but couldn't find any trace of the other Coys. there. They should have been on the road further right.

Zero was 5.30 a.m. Barrage opened to time.

There was no trace of anyone - A Coy. went, 40 strong, with the idea of making a flank for the 25th Bn. They went straight out into a tremendous German barrage of all sorts into Koros Alley - they disappeared in smoke and shells and split into two parties - one up Koros and one up Kurilo Alley. They chased Germans, overran them, ran him down, got ahead of the barrage, losing about 15 out of 40 going through. The two parties went on crossfiring at the Germans from one trench to the other up the alley - the Germans once made to shift their M.G.'s. Never got them going again. They got as far as a cross-trench in (I. 11c. and I 17a. and another along ~~Rupprecht to the road~~ Rupprecht trench to the road in I.11.D.


As 25th Bn. were going under the barrage (26th were through it) they drove Germans down behind the 26th into all these alleys - in rear of them. Only 25 were left. The party at the head of Rupprecht trench came back and fought these Germans in Rupprecht trench and took many prisoners. A party of Germans (30) came down Brunn trench. Got to within a few yards of Cooper's small H.Q., who thought they were prisoners.

About 7.30 Capt. Fletcher, 25th Bn., came down Brunn Alley and sent a Coy. down to help the flank. 28th. Bn. later sent a platoon up Koros Alley. 25th pushed along Rupprecht to the road again.

Lieut. Lawson of A Coy. was badly shot in the head while leading the left attacking party up Kurilo Alley.

The other Coys. hopped off from west of Gott mit Uns trench.

The plan was as follows:-



C Coy. under Major Woods, with half B Coy. in support, came up Agram Alley, then right across the aviation grounds.

They had to lie in the huts waiting for the start. C Coy. hopped off at 6 a.m. with 5th Div. They, with half B Coy. which had been lying in support and came under very heavy barrage during the wait. (This barrage was brought down by the 5.30 attack on their left).

D Coy. (centre) started off at 5.30 a.m., making due east; as A Coy. went along they caught a glimpse of men moving down in that direction. D were cut to pieces in the open. They seem to have met Germans first from the Sugar factory, but the deadliest fire was in the triangle between the two roads.

Lieut. Monteith, commanding them, was killed; Lieut. Major was taken prisoner. (Capt. Paul had been evacuated wounded the day before - and these were all their officers) Major seemed to have got away on his own to the far tree-lined road and reached some small trench about the road. There were several strongposts with M.G.'s along that road. Major Woods was killed in the same triangle. (The half of B Coy. which should have followed A lost both its officers - Lieut. Taylor was killed following D Coy, shot through the thigh and ~~was~~ bled to death. He and Sergt. Jenkins got into a shellhole. Taylor was hit just as he reached it and bled to death. Lieut. Suffolk was wounded before getting so far.)

The right half of B Coy. followed C Coy. across to the factory and into the open triangle. There was a bank just south of Koros Alley parallel to ~~it~~; south of this the triangle was very level. There was a M.G. sharpshooting Coy. protecting the German front here, and the M.G. fire was unparalleled. The 26th Bn. was in touch with 5th Div. as far as St. Denis. But as the M.G. fire continued across the triangle it was realised that 5th Div. had been held up and remainder of 26th Bn. was held up there too.

There were a few posts with Lieut. Ibbott across the open from the Factory north towards the Bank. They were sniped with M.G.'s all day in the open - the German artillery was more onto the road and the S.E. corner of Mont. St. Quentin. village.

5th Div. had this nearest post in the big claypit by the brickworks railway at about 11.A.6.7.

They were there till dusk. After dark a post was put in the farm on the Aziecourt Road at 17.C.4.9. and the post at the head of Koros Alley on the road was re-established, and another at the head of Kurilo trench on the road. Thence there were no posts till Rapprecht's trench, where there was a post on the road.

The St. Denis road corner was still German that night.

Bn. stayed there that night 2/3rd, day of 3rd, day of 4th, and were relieved by 5th Div. on night of 4/5th.

28th BATTALION - AUGUST 8th.

All officers making reconnaissance had to be very careful - not go except in early morning, careful about maps, etc. Early in night of 7/8th. advance parties to lay tapes were sent up, and guides.

Bn. went up the main road and found it completely empty despite instructions - then crossed the railway line, H.W. in Halfmoon trench, and men got onto tapes without a casualty.

The Canadians were about the Villers Bretonneux railway station forming about Monument Wood - men were in crowds, but the Germans got none of them. The men stood quite still

while flares were up.

25th	27th	
	28th	→
	26 th	

No casualties in German barrage.

B	A	→
D	C	

So few men that really made a wave and a half. There were 12 paces between men of leading wave - skirmishers. Three tanks. Each leading Coy. took only 2 L.G.'s - dumped 6; carried only 10 mags. per man instead of 20. They were so short of men that there would have been all carriers and no bayonet men. The Coys. were 3 platoons, so they went 2 platoons in front rank and one platoon in second.

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They were in position an hour before Zero. Colonel sent his name through - this was the code word. The barrage was good - like a thunderclap. The mist which came up half an hour before was the chief point in this battle. Direction was maintained by following the tanks and following compasses. The tanks went straight. Col. Currie had told the men that they would have a chance (they always grumbled at not going far)enough) of taking the enemy's artillery. If they found themselves on the railway they were 600 yds. too far right - if on the Roman road it was 600 yds. too far left - and quite a number did find themselves in both places.

The 6th Bde. withdrew half an hour before Zero. We soon came on German outposts. They took these. It became a matter of small bunches of men going straight ahead. A heavy M.G. fire started soon after Zero - probably the tanks. A continuous trench through 33 A and C. and 2 B. was the German main line of resistance. A lot of prisoners were got here. A few were taken in the scraps of trenches further east. Others were taken in the Amiens line in 4B (a French line). Bn. dug in about 300-400 yds. in rear of the objective on account of the short shelling.

Two tanks started with the attack - the third got stuck on Halfmoon trench, but the first batch of German prisoners gave it a push and it caught up. Bn. H.Q. went to the S/P in Amiens line - 2 Germans came out of it as Col. Currie went into it - slightly wounded men.

~~xxxx~~ The mist was now lifting about 7.30 a.m. This ground was partly wheatfield. General Elliott was met on the way. He said - "My men are all over the place - but I hope when the sun rises on them they'll be all right."

The brigade was withdrawn to the Amiens line after 5th Div. had gone through. The cookers came up there as promised. One ran onto a land mine which the Germans had scattered out about 40 yds. west of Amiens line. (28th Bn. knew them from Monument Wood). The cooker did not put the mine up. A man standing on the striker (which is held by a small pin, would put it up. The mines were all collected by the 28th Bn. and put in a dugout.

Some of the guns (77's) were still firing when the Bn.

came up - but were firing on S.O.S. line in the mist.

One of the 5.9's in the Quarry north of Marcelcave had a direct hit on it.

In the main line of resistance (at about 32 D.8.2.) the Germans put up a good fight. The line was held up. Lieut. Gaby got through a hole in the wire. Then a man was seen walking along the parapet firing his revolver. 40 to 50 Germans and 4 M.G.'s surrendered. The man turned out to be Lieut. Gaby, a Tasmanian who was working in W.A. He commanded D Coy. in this attack. The Germans chucked their resistance in that line when the tanks came up.

Lieut. Farquharson (wounded three times before - who had been in 10th L.H. charge at the Nek, when laying the tape was wounded in the neck and continued on and led his platoon to the objective. He was sent away later.

2/Lieut. Shorrock got a D.S.O. for a similar action to Gaby's in the same system.

Lieut. Kell, sig. officer, killed. Went out to fix the line himself half an hour after Zero.

Lieut. Patterson, killed; as liaison officer to 27th Bn. by a shell which nearly got Col. Chalmers.

Lieuts. Farquharson,

Flannigan - twice from main line of resistance.

Stokes, - do.

Hopkins - also very early in advance.

Only 24 O.R. were hit (2 killed).

Coy. Commanders.

A. Lieut. Hopkins.

B. Capt. Mactaggart, D.C.M. (killed by whizzbang on 9th Aug. He was at the head of his platoon which got 14 or 15 men hit by the same shell).

C. Capt. Dunkley.

D. Lieut. Gaby.

Mactaggart was on his way to a school when he saw the Colonel and asked to be allowed to go into the offensive.

AUGUST 9th. - On Aug. 9th. the Bn. moved up at 11 a.m. 28th Bn. was to follow 1000 yds. behind 26th Bn. (as Bn. in reserve). About the crucifix the Bn. was coming in artillery formation. The G.O.C. told them to keep an eye on Vauvillers. Out of the sky came a German plane with three of ours onto him. There was not one of our men hit, though there was this German plane and several of ours chasing it and fighting low. This was ~~the crucifix~~ near the crucifix near Harbonnieres.

Bn. dug in 500 yds. east of the Amiens line, on the road 1000 yds. NW of Vauvillers. One 26th Bn. pte. got a big pile of German notes in the hospital and the Bn. got 7 four cows there. Bn. H.Q. was 1000 yds. ahead in order to keep touch with the support Bn.

28th Bn. stayed there that day - the Germans shelled the hospital very heavily.

On afternoon of 10th Aug. at 5 p.m. Col. Currie was called to Bde. and learned that there was an attack at dawn next day. C.O. went up with Coy. Commanders to see the ground. He decided to attack with three Coys. in front line and one in support. The 5th Bde. however were 500 yds. behind at this stage, and so C.O. decided to have B Coy. make a defensive flank if necessary. Each attacking Coy. had a frontage of 250 yds.

(Lt. Ditchbourne) B|

D| (Lt. Gaby - killed)

C| (Captain Dunkley)

A| (Lt. Loveday - killed)

The numbers were very low and they went over in one wave of two lines. They had to go 600 yds-700 yds. to reach the hilltop.

They all got into position without casualties. It was densely dark and the C.O. realised that he was on a track not the right road, but Framerville was in view and they reached the big bank which they were to form under. The 5th Bde. being behind, 28th Bn. did not have to start for 15 mins. in order to let 5th. Bde. come up. The moment the barrage started there was a tremendous burst of M.G. fire. This wait saved things. When the troops went over they found the Germans down in their trenches, one chap smoking a cigarette. He said - "Oh, we not think Australians come!" Gaby led his Coy. over to the objective. As he walked along the parapet to see that the posts were all connected up he was sniped through the heart. Loveday was wounded as they were digging in - he died later. He passed his C.O., saying from the stretcher - "We're winning, Sir - we're winning".

There had not been a German in the position ahead of the 28th Bn. the day before - as far as could be seen - the Germans were fresh troops who had come into the position that night. 16 M.G.'s, 2 officers and 64 men were got in the pot holes about 150 yds. ahead of our line and in the roadbank, etc.

The sniping was very hot that day - no trenches to get into and few shellholes.

Lieut. Maskiell was wounded there.

28th Bn. was relieved by 6th Bde. Went to Bussy. Came back to Cappy. (The 32nd Division which relieved 28th Bn. in Amiens line brought its band up!) The advance party officer came up - thought he was going into billets. He had no tin hat, no gas mask, no revolver, no map. He said there had been a mistake, he thought!

AUGUST 29th. - - 28th BATTALION.

The Bn. arrived at Cappy on afternoon of 28th August. About 8.30 p.m. came word of a conference at Bde. at 9 p.m. C.O. went down at 9 p.m. and heard of the attack next day 5 miles away. They had to pass through 6th Bde. at 7.30, but it was not known where 6th Bde. would be - it was thought they would have Herbecourt.

26th Bn. was on right; 28th in centre; 27th on left; 25th in reserve. 28th Bn. attacked on a 3 Coy. front of 1400 yds.

	27th	
25th	26th	→
	26th	

B.	Capt. Macintyre		→
C.	Edmondson		
A	Lt. Hardwick		
D	Major Glyde (reserve)		

They left the big bank south of Cappy at 5.15 a.m. A limber was at the head of the column with all L.G.'s and panniers. They marched past the Chateau orchard with 100 yds. between Coys. in column. (Word arrived that 6th Bde. had taken Herbecourt).

They formed on the road running north of Dompierre. Left there at 7 a.m. A line of scouts first, 300 to 400 yards ahead of artillery formations - then artillery formation.

Orders were to get ahead - no one had seen the place before. The C.O. rode forward to where he could see Flaucourt and he showed it to them as they passed. That was the centre of the objective, he said.

A section of R.H.A. was attached that day. Col. Currie told the officer this morning before starting - "What if we say you meet me at the cross-roads east of Hancourt at 9.30". He said "Right-oh"! and there he was waiting for them.

6th Bde. were in the trenches south of Herbecourt - whole Bde. moved through them exactly on time.

Flaucourt was protected by very thick wire - and by C.O.'s instructions was enveloped; but no one was in it.

No opposition was struck till the ridge in front of the river. They were held up there before Biaches wood. But 26th Bn. got on and the Germans, seeing this, began to clear back across the bridges. In the wood 28th Bn. got 1 officer and 24 O.R.

About 200 Germans crossed the road bridge into Peronne and shortly afterwards these bridges went up (much to everyone's relief - as the troops were to get round to Doingt!) Both the Bristol bridges were blown up.

H.Q. were in the Maisonette. On the way up, while they were lunching in the bank in N.6.B., our 6-in. shells were falling 1000 yds. behind. The C.O. rang up and told them to lift at least two miles. The shelling shortly ceased. The R.H.A. officer and battery afterwards came up to this bank. The German shelling on that afternoon was pretty active.

About 11 a.m. on 30th August Lieut. Tozer and a fine scout named Barber (Sergt. Hugh Barber, M.M.) were sent to see if the bridges (Bristol bridges) were crossable. They went down and Barber was actually standing on the bridge and looking over the side (the 20 or 30 ft. on our end were standing), when he was shot through the head. His brother, Lieut. R. Barber, was killed on November 16, 1916, at Flers).

No officers were hit that day - and not many men.

The morning of Aug. 30 the 26th Bn. was to secure a crossing. 7th Field Coy. was to make two footbridges. 26th Bn. was to cross and swing round to Doingt and 28th to follow and secure their right. The bridges were both made across the Canal, but the marshes stopped them.

(General Elliott was to relieve them. Pompey Elliott came in and threw his bag down on the side of the Maisonette: "Brigade H.Q. here," he said).

The two Bns. went down and lined the bank. They were withdrawn at dawn in the mist.

15th Bde. relieved there. 28th came back to trenches south of Herbecourt on night of Aug. 30. From there on till after Mont St. Quentin Major Mitchell of 13th A.L.H. had command of the Bn. (attached for experience). At Montbrechain Major Brown had command.

AUGUST 31st. - 28th Bn. crossed at Feuilleres into the big bank at west end of Clery. Stayed there 31/1st Sept.

On Sept. 1 (Sunday) they moved to Kholm trench and camped there night of 1/2nd September.

Just after troops settled there Major Mitchell went back on summons to Bde. H.Q., Bozcourt. He returned about 1.20 a.m. and had a ~~sumps~~ conference of Coy. Commanders till 2.30 a.m. Breakfast was ordered by him on his way back

(from the cookers at the Clery bank) at 4 a.m. Bn, moved at 5.25.

Plans were for 28th Bn. to have 2 Coys. (A and B) supporting 26th Bn. on right and two (C and D) under Major Mitchell supporting 27th on left.

(Major Mitchell) C & D	27th	
	25th	→
(Major Glyde) A & B	26th	

They jumped off in artillery formation of platoons from Kholm trench - moved very well into a heavy barrage - particularly heavy (all 77 and 4.2) and a lot of gas - men had to move in their gas helmets. The H.Q. with Major Mitchell had only just cleared the H.Q. dugout and a 5.9 got fair into it.

They moved up the trench through Moineville Alley past Capt. Colpin's Aid Post (of 25th Bn.) when, near the quarry, Lieut. Edmondson was killed and Lieut. Farquharson badly wounded (for fifth time in war). They were supposed to be 600 yds. behind 27th Bn. (same as with two Coys. on right behind ~~27~~ 26th). Heavy M.G. fire was coming from the north side of the hill. They got into Plevna trench. Getting across from Koverla trench to Tortille trench (when M.G. fire moderated) the German caught them with 8-77's from C.30 Central as they crossed from Tortille to Brunn. The T.M.'s with mules were coming up forward of Brunn trench about 11A.1.1. were hit by these guns. Just in the corner of Brunn and Logus trench was a wireless (captured by 25th Bn.) driven by a 2-seated bike.

Most of the stretcherbearers were working in the open under white flag - and were not being hit - but a shell got under four who went through a trench and killed two or three bearers and the rest wounded. A man was lying out there also with one leg off at the knee and the other at the hip. The stretcherbearers asked Capt. Walters if it were worth carrying him in. Walters said "No". He saw Capt. Harper, the doctor, later and told him of it. The doctor went over to see him. The man asked him quite calmly - "Is there any hope for me?" The doctor said - "Oh, I'll do what I can". The man (25th Bn.) said again - "I suppose there's no hope of my recovering." The doctor said "No - I'll just give you some morphia". The man was quite apologetic - sorry to trouble the doctor. He was quite normal. He could see that the stretcherbearers were missing him.

In Haut Allaines a platoon of 28th Bn. under Lieut. McKee, with Sergt. Connolly, went to this village to help to clean up a M.G. which was holding 27th Bn. before 27th could cross to Brunn trench. Sergt. Connolly with a revolver routed out these Germans and was wounded there.

Eventually 28th Bn. coys. settled in Brunn Alley with 27th Bn.

Later some of 28th Bn. were lent to clean part of the trench at 11 Central, where there were Germans at the fork of the trench. 2/Lieut. Folley took up a platoon of about 8 men and was shot dead there during the bomb fight by which it was cleared - the trench was shallow.

A whole Bn. of - ?Royal Sussex - from Palestine, wearing a diamond much like our 2nd Div. (?yellow and dark blue) came across much the same track as the 27th Bn. (only later and from the NW). The 77 batteries had been pulled out by their teams. These troops had full packs and had done a heavy march, and at 2 p.m. they were lining the road N & S through 11C.

About 2 p.m. the Germans were seen dribbling back by single men at 40 yds. interval from Cardinal Wood up towards Darmstadt trench and the main road. The German 77's on the hill in 18 B & D used to fire on any movement on the hill in 17 A & B.

28th Bn. was relieved on Sept. 4 by English troops.

The two Coys. on the right went up on the right of the village, between Mont St. Quentin and St. Denis. They started in fine style - the men were never better, nor the barrage. They crossed the St. Denis road - they were 600 yds. behind right of 26th Bn. - but 5th Div., who had to come south of St. Denis to ~~Darmstadt~~ Darmstadt trench, were not able to get forward.

On crossing the road Major Glyde was wounded. The 26th Bn. had disappeared in the smoke and barrage. After crossing the road they came under very heavy M.G. fire from the brickworks and sugar factory and the tree-lined road. Casualties were very heavy. The triangle was simply impossible. You had either to get back or stop in a shell-hole. They got in touch with C.O. of 26th Bn. on the road near 16 Central, where there is a bank. Lieut. Ditchbourne was wounded there. Col. Robinson was there. The bank could not be held so they worked along to the left and up Koros Alley. They then formed a defensive flank as far up as about 16B.9.7. Later they pushed out advanced posts right to the road. Lieut. Tezer placed this post at the head of Koros Alley on the road.

Their job was to find who was in Darmstadt trench and let 5th Div. know.

After dark patrols were sent out and found that both Darmstadt trench and the road to St. Denis from there were strongly held. They worked round the copse and quarry there and were heavily fired on.

It was not till the 4th Sept. that a patrol of 5th Div., Lieut. Thorburn, of 60th Bn., came after dark into Koros trench and got touch with them from east of the road. Fritz was then in Darmstadt trench.

On night of 4th, 26th Bn. with this part of 28th, was relieved by 32nd Bn.

Lieut. Stephenson was wounded on morning of September 2 crossing the road break in Koros Alley (by fire from trees round quarry copse on the main road).

(Aug. 29-30th. - Lieut. Boyle, 26th Bn., who joined from Northern Territory, was with 26th Bn. on the Aug. 29 attack. He had four brothers, New Zealanders, all previously killed or died).

The men were never better than this day - pushing off under a heavy German barrage. They were in good spirits after Aug. 8 and 9).

The 28th Bn. lent a platoon stretcherbearing to 6th Bde. on Sept. 1st. 6th Bde. spoke highly of their work. They were under Lieut. Stephenson).

28th Bn. came out to the Omiecourt Canal - thence to Cappy (under Col. Currie, who had been ill).


Suddenly orders were received on September 27th. (after American transport had gone through by night, miles and miles of it), to go to Doingt, thence to Templeux-la-Fosse. The troops were cheered here by Bulgaria throwing it up. All this by night. Thence to Hargicourt at 9.30 one morning, arriving in afternoon. At dark 28th Bn. moved up the "black" road through Villeret. It was raining. They moved half a

mile forward of Bellicourt to Cabaret Farm. It was absolutely dark - Major Mitchell and his mare found the road for them and left them only at Bellicourt. The cooks got up to the railway cutting north of Bellicourt. This was the night of Oct. 1/2.

On afternoon of Oct. 2nd. the C.O., Major Brown, was called to Bde. H.Q. He had a conference with Coy. Commanders so that they could go up and reconnoitre the ground.

They jumped off from the open behind 26th Bn. near Mint Copse. The troops took a lot of advantage of a cable cutting which ran parallel to the Torrens canal, and about 600 yds. short of it. They got into the barrage there. The Germans were very slow with their barrage. A M.G. was troubling them from in front of Estrees. There were three Coys. only, as the Bn. was weak. H.Q. Coy. under Lieut. Burt worked with C Coy. (about 1 platoon strong).

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28th Job was to push up Beurevoit line through 27th Bn. and behind left flank of 26th Bn. Then swing left and form a left flank in the Beurevoit line as far south as near L'Ormisset. The 28th Bn. would then push down the trench on north side of Preyart Hill (with one tank) - this was Tozer's job; and Pugh was to detail a platoon to go similarly along the south side of Prospect Hill and join up with Tozer by a line of posts over the top of the hill so as to command the western slope of Prospect Hill - it was not known that the Tommies were attacking, and a flank was required towards Gouy.

It was decided by Major Brown to do this by pushing up the Beurevoit line. The tank didn't appear at the destination, though one went to Bellevue.

Cotterill was killed by a shell going up about 8c.7.2.

Burt was shot dead about 8 d.1.5. trying to help 26th Bn., away from his own party. His batman got stretcher-bearers to go up under the white flag, but his batman was wounded in doing so - under white flag.

The Tommies came up on the left onto Prospect Hill - which made it unnecessary for Tozer's party to go out. Also the Beurevoit line was not continuous. The position was very hot indeed north of 2 Central, and Tozer's Coy. was eventually established there (post under Lieut. Britt).

Capt. McIntyre had posts in the drain which runs across the south side of Prospect Hill. He had some of the British troops also under him there, when they came back. Pugh's Coy. was with 26th Bn. H.Q. was finally established in the sunken road N. of L'Ormisset in a pillbox in a trench.

Lieut. Keillor (I.O.) was killed in the advance near L'Ormisset farm. He was a very brilliant I.O. - succeeded Meysey Hammoné. (His body and Cotterill's were brought back and buried at Hargicourt). Birt was a Tembelpud lad. He got a M.C. on Aug. 11. He had a brother who joined the British army at the beginning of the war, being in England on a visit - Charlie Birt - as a private and is now Lt.-Col. C.O. of a Bn. of Border Regt., D S.O. with 2 bars. He had a sister in the WAACS and another running a hospital in England).

MacIntyre this day had half a dozen German revolvers on him. He got very close to a shell and lay up at Bn. H.Q. bleeding from nose and mouth. He took his successor out to his post. He shot 2 German officers; and his information

was very reliable.

A reinforcement officer (permanent staff man), Scott, was in this show - his first. He got two fingers shot away and carried on till the line was settled. He got a M.C. out of this fight.

Lieut. Spencer was wounded.

Lieut. Smiley also wounded.

Casualties - 7 6 officers and 91 O.R. out of about 330 taken in.

MacIntyre stayed on his post and was not evacuated.

Lieut. Tozer was wounded and Lieut. Britt took over.

28th Bn. was relieved that night by a Bn. of Manchester Regt. They had been marching for a long while and had packs up.

The German teams were ~~was~~ seen taking their artillery away at the beginning of this attack and bringing them back later. They were bringing motor lorries close down to the front - and their troops were streaming down all the afternoon into the sunken road NW from Beurevoir.

28th Bn. came out that night to Cabaret and from there were attached to 6th Bde. in front of Estrees.

They were relieved on night of 5/6th. by 30th. American Division.

15th BATTALION September 18 and Aug. 8
45th BATTALION August 8
48th BATTALION August 8
September 18
10th BATTALION Landing (Col. Loutit)
48th BATTALION Bernancourt
(Brown and Shepherdson)

15th BATTALION *Aug 8th*

From Lt. Semon I.O.15th Bn

There was no difficulty in getting to the tapes. They were in a big crop of ripe wheat in which lamps were placed to show where the flanks of each Coy were to rest. They had to line up by about 3.30 am. There was no fog at this time. While lying there most of them dug a bit of shelter in case of barrage when the 3rd Division started. They stayed there till 6.10 am. The tanks were a bit later the fog was a bit thick just after daylight. After Bn moved off it came on very suddenly and so thick that after about 300 yards you could not see even a tanks at 5 yards. There had only come over about half a dozen shells when 3rd Division went over, and they did not fall on 15th Bn. The Cerisy Rd made 15th Bn's right flank from their tapes and the old front line west of Hamel onwards. This kept them on their direction. The limbers and guns of 3rd Division were ahead and those of 15th Div Bn were with them, and the 15th Bn's tanks were with the Bn and kept on the roads - these were not smashed at all by the shell fire because of their sensitive fuses which were used. Prisoners kept passing and a few dead Germans - seemed to - were passed. Germans seemed to have no defence - just a few potholes and M.Gs. The 3rd Division wounded who came back said "You won't see him, 15th, you won't catch him."

Behind the hospital at Sailly, 15th Bn began to form up in waves. This was finished E of the hospital. The tanks moved off the road there and formed behind their respective Coys. A small calibre field gun put in a few shells here & you could not see it. The fog had lifted a lot by then.

By the time they reached 3rd Div. about 400 yds west of the Cerisy Cemetery, the fog had pretty well lifted. There the tanks went through 15th Bn. 15th Bn waited there just behind 3rd Divn or on their line (which was scattered) while tanks moved through. This was just at zero hour.

By this time from Cerisy village was coming hot machine gun fire and also from the hill to south. They could not tell where this fire was coming from at first but it turned out to be from the top of the bank of the sunken road above the Somme Bend just SE of Cerisy. This is a high point and there was a German M.G. Bn in reserve here and they had their guns up on the top of the bank. The Bn's on the right also got a good share of this fire.

All the tanks were west with the Bn. One M.G. was firing from the village from a mud plaster house at the

near end of it. A tank went for it firing its gun at it and then butted the house down and ran over it. Other tanks went into the village too. The guns in the village put up very little fight once the infantry and tanks got close to it - the infantry followed the tanks closely. 400 prisoners were got out of the cellars in the village and about 400(?) of them had red cross armbands - more than could be needed for the Red Cross Station in the village.

Just before they got to the village, a hare started up and ran towards the village - as it dashed towards the village something turned it and it doubled right and ran along the front of the line. Everyone had a shot at it and for the time no-one thought of the Germans - everyone was centred on the hare. Someone shot it through the neck and it dropped. The three Coys which had to go through the village, - i.e. to the bridges so as to stop anyone getting across them - they were footbridges with one road bridge on the left - but were broken by our shell-fire.

The fourth day Coy D Coy under Lt. Goss had to take the position of the river bank SE of the village where the M.G.s were.

The tanks had by this time all six been directed up the hillside south of Cerisy towards these M.G.s. They got on to the crest, one or two first had tried to go round the road through the village, but when they got round the corner it looked as if they would be jammed in between the bank and the river so they came back and went over the hill south of Cerisy.

On the north bank of the Somme where the London Regt. had not got up there were a couple of field guns. These were pulled out by their crews - and one in the village of Chipilly (which could be clearly seen) - and opened direct over open sights at the tanks. There were also a number of Minenwerfers on the bank with the M.G.s which could be fired like a gun at the tanks and these blazed off at 50 yards range. Between the two they knocked out every tank except one or two which saw it was impossible and turned.

D Coy had to withdraw under this fire to the sunken road down the crest into Cerisy. They had lost Lt. Shaw killed and a number of men in front of the road; the road was still enfiladed by the two guns on the ridge in Malard Wood (you could see all three guns) The gun at Chipilly was within L.G. range and was silenced by our L.G. fire from Cerisy.

The 2 guns in Malard Wood (on top of the ridge) now fired at any one on the north side of the village whom they could see. They would snipe at any single man. On the canal bank there was some screening by trees but in the sunken road there was none.

Word went back to Bn and to Bde of the position and that the north of the river was not occupied by the British. The C.O., Major Sampson (Col. McSharry had been killed the morning before the fight in the marshes near Corbie - out of his tent attending to a wounded man at the moment (a shell got this man and he ran out - the next shell hit a tree close by about 5 feet above the ground and killed MacSharry - he died an hour later at the dressing station. The shell also killed the wounded man whom he was leading away and badly wounded the adjutant. This was in the strafe laid down by the Germans attacking the Tommies near Morlancourt) Major Sampson sent Lt. Semon across to north of the river to get connection with the Tommies. He took a scout and crossed the road bridge and the other bridge - our 4th Field Coy Engineers were already at work patching them. There was the kit of an engineer on a

the bridge and some blood. They said that there had been a number of Germans putting up a white flag on the big cliff north of the Somme. They went across to bring them in prisoners - and this man was hit by a missile coming from further back. By then the Tommies had started to come down and as Semon got across the Tommies were collecting these prisoners. The Tommies by this time should have been east of Chipilly. They should have been east captured Chipilly before we got to Cerisy.

The officers said that they had just arrived. They were engaged collecting Germans and there were more Tommies there than prisoners.

As Semon got back he saw the Tommies slowly going forward. There was no firing. But presently he saw them going slowly back. Out mensaid that as the Tommies got forward they saw the Germans with the two guns which were not then firing (the other in the village had been silenced by now) The men saw the Germans clear in one direction while the Tommies cleared in the other direction. The guns were not fired then.

Semon told the British officers that our men were being killed. By the time he got back the Bn on the right was getting forward. This caused the Germans at the steep river bank with the M.Gs. to give up heart. They were all in their dugouts. The M.Gs were all on top of the bank - with live belts in them and ~~xxx~~ lots of empties beside them. The guns were mostly heavies - about 20 odd guns in all 1 and six minenwerfers. These also had been fired and the shells were beside them. About 50 Germans were taken in the dugouts including a very badly wounded Bn C.O. There were also some tank men who had been captured from the destroyed tanks - they were released.

A battery of our Howitzers - 110th How. Bty, took up a position about 9 A 55. firing over in the direction of Mericourt. The two German guns north of the river saw it. They opened fire on our guns at once. The first shot killed one of our attillery officers and several men, and these turned to engage the German guns - but before they got a chance the Germans smothered the place with shells firing in shell after shell. Shortly after a team of horses came down the road galloping - hooked up the gun - the Germans firing at them all the time and pulled the gun out; ten minutes later a team came down again and pulled the other gun away. This was at the stage when Semon was going across the river to the other side.

After the Germans had cleared from those two guns there was not trouble from them. About about 3 pm. the Germans were seen to be getting down by driblets into Chililly. Word was sent to the rear and the heavy Howitzers concentrated on the village. It was the best sight the Bn had seen in France - Chipilly was like a volcano of red dust. The Germans got out running across the hill to the back, being hurried up by our M.Gs.

That evening after dusk, 15th Bn was relieved by 1st Bde and moved round in reserve to 16th Bn along the terraces east of Dudgeon Wood. They stayed there till about three days and then came back north of the Somme to

Sailly Laurette. While Bn was at the Terraces near Dudgeon Wood the German planes were very active machine gunning the roads and one man was wounded. The first 15th Bn had from the air. The 15th Bn got two guns in west of Cerisy village behind the cemetery. Most of the cellars were reinforced with concrete and garrisoned and there was a big dressing station in the village.

The guns which fired on 15th Bn were the three guns mentioned. When these were put out they got no fire from the north side of the river.

While 15th Bn was in Dudgeon Valley they were shown by a Tommy officer how to fire a 4.2 Howitzer. They turned them round and then all day long they were firing 4.2 shells on the Germans. They started on Bray and lengthened and shortened and were perfectly happy with themselves. The German that day put some 5.9 shell into the valley.

On August 9 about 3(?) a very fine barrage was put over and the Americans advanced in a N.E. direction from Malard Wood. Very heavy M.G. fire came from the direction of Chipilly but the Yankees missed this and worked up towards Gressaire Wood to cut off the peninsula. All along the top of the Peninsula the German flares were still going up even after the Yankees had got to Gressaire Wood.

Next morning, Aug 10, a Bn of 13th Bde(?) could be seen dug in a-long the east side of the cliffs and heights of the Chipilly Peninsula.

Lt. Shaw was killed.

Lt. Hockan wounded lat in the afternoon by a shell when things were pretty quiet (may have been a piece of one of ours from Chipilly)

Before August 8, the Germans made a daylight raid on 15th Bn in the trenches taken over from the French. This was beaten off. The account of the Bn I.O. is with that of Bde I.O. with the War Diary of the Bde.

In the day a Frenchmen never went over the top. They were very invisible. As soon as our people got in of course they could not be kept down. They were out getting iron roofs from Cachy and so on. The Germans could not help noticing the difference.

45th BATTALION - August 8th

(From Col. Johnston)

45th Bn started from the trenches near Mouse Copse. They were for the Red Line. They moved at 5.30, as Col Johnston decided that ~~this~~ this would bring them to move through the 3rd Division at 8 am.

There was great difficulty moving up. This was owing to the fog. There was a mule track as far as the old front line - but after that they had to rely on a compass and sense of direction (no barrage or anything to help.) After great difficulty they got to Accorche Wood and struck the road in P.16 Central. The C.O. decided to follow this road though it took him out of his course a bit for it was a guide.

When they got through the wood the fog lifted a bit and saved things somewhat. They formed up in the position they were to hop off from, on the slopes in 17 B & D and moved in artillery formation to J.O. line - the road W. of Kate Wood and Thin Wood. The tanks were not there till Lt. Vincent the I.O. who had gone earlier for them, brought them up from the slopes SE of Hamel. They would not have arrived otherwise. About 5 minutes before the attack the 7 tanks arrived.

Everything was quiet at the J.P. trench. p just the ordinary stray whizzbang shots. At 8 am. our barrage lifted and 45th Bn moved, 2 Coys in advance and 2 in support. The first Germans met were in Hamilton Wood and Leaa Wood. They put up no fight l there were guns, M.Gs, A.M.C. and so on. They were sent back in small parties. The tanks were working with the scouts, with the leading skirmishers within 50 yards of them

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They generally skirted the woods. The two rear Coys then mopped the woods up, coming through them. Only in odd instances did the Germans fight, One Section came on a post where an officer was sending a telephone message at the bottom of a dugout. He told the officer to stop but he went on; so he shot him (in Susan Wood) An odd M.G. would fire a few shots and then would clear.

But when they got to about the edge of the big Morcourt valley the 46th Bn struck trouble on the main road at the red brick house. Our heavy shells were

were still falling on the valley and the opposite slope and the Germans on top of the eastern side of the valley opposite the 45th Bn were firing on them across the valley. As soon as the shells lifted Lt. Vincent and the scouts rushed down the slope into the valley about 300 yards north of Caroline Wood and got in amongst 200 Germans. The scouts and Vincent were armed with 4 stripped L.Gs. and they fired these at the Germans standing and wounded about 15. The Germans then kameraned and so did those around. The tanks were at the back - the ravine being too steep for them. A couple of tanks had been knocked before this. The 45th Bn got across the ravine and the Germans in front of 46th Bn then gave up. 45th Bn got to Morgan Wood without further trouble and reached Red Line at 10.19 am. The Chipilly guns enfiladed them all the time they were digging in and caused casualties. The guns could be seen firing. They were on the Chipilly heights. They made it very hot for about three hours. Then they eased by about 1 or 2 pm. 45th Bn was the first Bn on the objective. It was in touch with the 13th Bn on the left, and 46th on the right. They dug in on the objective. And 48th Bn went through. Johnston told Perry all he knew of the situation ahead. They had the mark V Star tanks which were not a success. (48th Bn tanks hung their advance up for 2 or 3 hours)

That night 45th Bn relieved 48th Bn in Bray line from main road off the hospital. They got the flag of the hospital and sent it to the war records.

That ~~morning~~ morning an officer went out (Lt. Potts with one man), poking around for over 1000 yards towards the big dump. He could see the Germans in the big houses at Proyart. That night, Aug. 9/10 about 9 pm. orders were received to rush out to a line ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ running diagonally SE of Proyart to the road Junction at La Flaque. This was a very hurried show - C.O. decided two Coys should take it - one from the railway to the Road at 200 1.5 and one from the railway to the Main Cross Road. There was no time to reconnoitre so the C.O. went out with them and there was a lively time. The M.Gs. were very active indeed. The M.G.s were very active indeed. The scouts were out, also a patrol. Coys then moved in file. They had to get down every few yards. The aeroplanes were dropping star shells. The left Coy had a brush with a M.G. post and had a couple of men wounded. The Germans got away. They got a British escaped prisoner - in a terrible state (He got ~~th~~ through Proyart) There was no opposition from the dump. They located the Germans along the main road from La Flaque towards Proyart; and in trenches SW of Proyart. He had a M.G. screen.

When they got to the cross roads the Germans just beyond the factory began firing with T/Ms. 45th dug in without further incident - but it was an active night with the German M.Gs. The German planes did not drop bombs - only star shells.

The position could not be approached in daylight. Meals had to go up by night.

The night of August 8/9 the Bn had a very good hot stew. 9/10. The next night before going out they had a hot stew again.

Night of 10/11 ~~at~~ Col. Morshead came up to relieve Cannam. Godard and Morshead were having a conference in the dugout when ~~th~~ Johnston left. They were discussing the proposed attack and no one liked it very much.

On August 8th there was one officer slightly wounded - Capt. Ferguson. He was wounded at Caroline Wood by a shell. He got a tetanus injection and came back again next day. Vincent did splendid work this day. He got a bar M.C., D.C.M.

to his M.C. He is a Sydney boy.

Bn got to the red Line with 35 casualties, shell and M.H.

Total for whole tour, about 60. It was a wonderfully successful fight.

They got receipts for 370 prisoners (and really over 400) and 6.6 in. 5.8 Hows. Bty of 5.9, two 4.2s and other 77s, 27 guns in all, 48 TMs. (many in a workshop in the Harbonnieres valley, 10 Russian ponies and some waggons. a canteen - about 40 M.Gs (See War Diary)

The last phase

Dec. 3rd, Today in 15th and 16th Bns there was some trouble. the men coming to some of thier Coy commanders an saying that they would not parade. or that they thought the ought not to parade, owing to the shortage of rations. 15th Bn only had $\frac{3}{4}$ of its ~~rations~~ biscuit ration, I believe. Anyway it shows bow difficult out task would have been if t. the germans had simply retired more wuickly and further instead of fighting and then collapsing. (The French people say that there was noactual mutiny amongst the Germans, Their discipline had been noticeably slacker but the last few months.)

We cannot even now keep up with them owing to the blow up of the railays - Our lorries have to go back to Le gateau and fetch the rations up here - and they cannot feed out men properly, or provide even enough candles (a lot of this diary has to be written up ~~again~~ in half light. I have seen no newspapers since that of November 28th nor has anyone at 12th Bde HdQrs.) We could never have kept up with the Germans if they had adopted this policy.

52nd BATTALION - Dernancourt

Capt Fraser who was reported wounded and missing at Dernancourt was captured at Dernancourt wounded by the Germans and survives.

Lieut. L.C. BOASE who was also wounded after the great fight under the archway, was also captured.

Fraser in this fight (writing afterwards from Germany) hung on at his position about 100 yards down from the railway crossing until he saw the Germans crawling across the line, when 5 diggers came back from the subway. He then dashed across with two others about 200 yards coming under very heavy M.G. fire all at once and was hit slightly. He lay in a shell hole for a while until the M.G. quietened and then started. He managed another 100 yards and had to take cover again. This time the M.G. kept playing over him. The German infantry were advancing in extended order and the next thing he knew was a bayonet through his overcoat and a clout on the head from a rifle. He was later (when regaining consciousness) taken back prisoner.


Boase was early knocked quite unconscious wounded in ten places. He and some others had made several little attacks under the bridge, using bombs and revolver. He was seen to fall and was believed to be dead (in one of these rushes). Several men spoke of Boase's work as magnificent.

Fraser from Germany, thinking him dead, wrote as a prisoner: "I desire to recommend the late Lieut. Boase for a V.C."

45th BATTALION - September 18th

Major Loutit

45th Bn was in the railway line from before Vendelles to the Tommies on the right; the 48th Bn ahead in their front line. As soon as 48th Bn moved the 45th followed them at 400 yards distance.



Artillery formation of platoons.
HdQrs in rear of C.

It was diff cult to find your way owing to the drizzle and fog. You could see a man at about 20 yards & not more.

They checked themselves argely by the sunken road running aboutn the centre of the Bn frontage east and west, and the Cambresiels(?) Wood. The worst part of the whole business for 45th Bn really was coming up in rear of 48th Bn to their objective. The German barrage missed 48th Bn but ut fell on 45th Bn, shortening the whole way. While 48th was consolidating, 45th Bn waited for 1 1/2 hours on a previously decided position about 200 yards inrear of 48th Bn in shell holes-behind banks and in sunken road. It was getting lighter then.

The ridge top is practically flat - the Germans could not see the, - the cover and the fgg would prevent Germans froms eeing them, but they were in the German barrage.

Lt. Hinds was killed there while reorganising his platoon, by a German sniper who was on the rear side of barrage - The adjutant, Capt. Adams, was wounded here for the second tim by a shell. During the advance Major Loutit had been wounded just after the adjutant. Lt. Hill the signalling officer was killed at about the same time, Lt. Hughes, Int. Officer badly wounded - (died of wounds), adjutant wounded, and Maj. Loutit. The barrage was heavy - Lt. Horne O.C., C Coy was wounded at the same time, and Lt. Lifield, of D Coy wounded - The wire which was uncut (the the barrage was very good) was a nuisance. In places you had to walk 50 yards to find a gap. There was both old British wire and German wire.

After waiting 1 1/2 hours the barrage increased and moved forward. The Bn just before moved to within 50 to 80 yds of it and followed it when it moved.

As soon as 45th got through/ 48th, they met the Germans coming to counter aattack 48th Bn. They were actually asvancing in waves. As the Bn got over the slope of the gentle crest they saw the Ger,ans coming up extended (not more than 100 yards away) from the lower ground where he had massed Our barrage caught him, and the L.G. fire of our men some of whom took up positions and got on to the Germans - others firing from the hip. Those who were not caught by the barrage or L.G. simply threw down their rifles and walked right through the 45thm surrendering immediately - this was about 8 am. and the sun was up - things were looking a lot brighter.

There were probably 350 prisoners taken there - this counter-attack would certainly ve one and possibly two battalions strong. The 45th Bn had 471 fighting strength exclusinve of officers. The Germans had light and heavy M.Gs with them. Probably they thought our advance had finished with the first

objective, and weremaking an immediate counterattack. Three officers were captured there.

The advance continued without much opposition or shellfire till the final objective was reached. Two 77s. were captured just before reaching the objective, at Red Wood; and on the objective a complete battery of 5.9 Hows with a complete staff of officers - 6 guns and 4 officers. The horses were there. As the battalion came up a M.G. near by opened. The battery personnel was seen attempting to limber up - with their six teams there. One platoon of A Coy (Right) saw this and went beyond the objective and took up cover where with their L.Gs they could bring fire to bear on the horses. This was spontaneous. They shot all the horses except that of one officer who was captured. They shot the crew of the M.G. and got the gun later. This gun was evidently protecting the battery, (which was about 500 yards south of the centre of Somerville Wood.

Just to the NW of Somerville Wood was another battery of 5.9s - when Bn got to its objective it simply walked on to these 1 the crews had previously fled. (Two 77s., twelve 5.9s) 7 officers and 474 men prisoners.

This brought 45th Bn on to the high ground on our side of Ascension Valley overlooking the low ground to the Hindenberg outpost line. The opposite line could just be seen here and there and there were German transport, gun teams pulling out all over the country. There were also German guns firing at extremely close range. On the cross roads in the centre of Postruet village, for example, a Bty of 77s could be seen firing. Our barrage was in the village and all round them and they did not last long there. These guns were firing on to the high ground where 45th Bn were - you could see the flash and then came the shells.

Consolidation was chiefly troubled by this battery but was not difficult except for scattered shelling. Lt. Deitz, a 1914 man, just received his commission was hit direct by one of these shells. He was due to go back to Australia and would have gone as soon as the Bn came out. He would have been left out, but as it was his first time in as an officer, he asked to go in.

This battery was firing for quite an hour before the barrage shifted it.

The Tommies on the right - 1st Bn Suffolk Regt. who conformed with our movement and started with 45th Bn.

They got the Tumulus in line with 45th B. but shortly after that point they were held up - and reached their final objective with the assistance of 46th Bn some hours later.

The fire from the right front in British area did not consolidate constitute a serious obstacle to 45th Bn. Some undoubtedly came from there, but the German was so disorganised that our advance was not delayed by it. The right flank of 45th Bn was absolutely on its boundary on the objective. The 2nd right platoons were flung back. The left flank was in touch all the way with 13th Bn, who reached objective with 45th Bn.

46th Bn went through almost at once. The 45th Bn had gone out under the barrage and as soon as it lifted they went there and patrolled over ground which 46th Bn were to advance over. They took a prisoners of the parties who were wandering around. Bn had 471 strength captured 474 prisoners

The Battalion's total casualties were:-
 Lt. Hill killed, signal officer.
 Lt. Horne, killed, as above
 Lt. Hughes, wounded, died of wounds, as above.
 Lt. Hines killed by sniper (as above)
 Lt. Dietz, killed as above.

Wounded

Major Captain Young - wounded during reconnais-
 sance, day before the attack, by shell
 Major Loutit)
 Capt, Adams) wounded during advance behind
 Lt. Fifield) 48th Bn.

Other ranks:- killed 8
 wounded 101

Total 8 officers
 109 men.

Major LOUTIT (The Lt. Loutit) A Coy. 10th Bn., was in a destroyer and landed in a row boat south of Ari Burnet opposite Anzac Gully. One man was killed on the destroyer by a bullet in the head. From the time they got off the destroyer into the boat they were under rifle fire and three men were killed in the boat going ashore. They had one sailor in the boat who steered. The men rowed and did it well. They landed with rifles empty. You could just see the top of the hill. Flashes were still coming from there and there were Turks still on the beach and in the scrub at the bottom firing at point blank range as they landed. When the boats got in (several of A Coy and others) these Turks cleared up through the scrub (impossible to say how many) Our men's rifles were not loaded nor bayonets fixed till then.

They got ashore, dumped packs against the bank, and fixed bayonets, and loaded rifles; shooting then was coming from direction of Gaba Tepe and enfilading the beach. (Hell spit)

The 10th Bn rushed the hill and from the top in the open looked down into Shrapnel Gully where the Turks were retiring in single file down a small track at the bottom of the gully and up the hill towards the head of wire gully. They were shooting at these Turks from the top and then ran down in amongst them while they were still in Shrapnel Gully. They threw down their rifles and wanted to surrender, but there were too many and were shot.

* (There were three or four tents by this path down from Plugges, the lamps inside were still burning - they had been men's tents and our men went inside and came out holding up souvenirs - watches, kit, and so on.)

This refers to the tents in Owen's gully

~~He came on at them with them~~

As they were going down the hill they met Major Brand. He came on with them. They went on up to the head of Wire Gully - and down wire gully.

As they got down Wire Gully they saw several guns. The party saw these guns from the head of Wire Gully and opened - but the range was too great and the guns got away. They could see the Turks put teams in these guns. The teams were in, in some cases, when first seen. They had only a few yards to go to get over the crest. Brand told Loutit to keep going. He went back to the beach. He had seen these guns.

From there Loutit and Lt. Haig, (10th Bn) went on past where the guns had been (no dead Turks here) down the gully. At the bottom of Wire Gully a creek branched to the right. There was a stockyard there with some horses still in it. This creek ran away down to Kaba Tepe. They crossed this creek, a broad sandy shallow creek, and came on to a hill in front of the creek. Very few Turks were about except snipers who were scattered everywhere and sniped from behind and everywhere.

** Major Haig*

Loutit had 32 men with him, some his own, some 9th Bn, some 11th Bn. They went to the top of this next ridge where which was covered with holly scrub - and stopped just over the crest owing to opposition from Turks ahead.

Gaba Tepe was back over their right shoulders. The Turks were thick (when the party got to the crest) on another ridge of about equal height 400 yards in front. These Turks stopped them there with rifle and M.G. fire. They had lost many men. A few were killed in this position. They could see our men on the previous ridge, behind the gully they had crossed on both flanks of them. Some digging in, some crossing round potting snipers - nothing very organised on both their flanks, but no one on the same ridge. From there they sent back to the party on their right rear on Johnston's Joll

and asked them to come up and form on their right flank. They did so and turned out to be Capt. Ryder with about one platoon of 9th Bn - and they got up alongside on the right. In the meantime the Turks had worked to the left flank and were enfilading from about 400 yards on the left. You could not dig in (even from the first - too hot & we were lying behind the bushes firing through them.) Our line was then forced to retire starting from the right. Ryder sent a message along saying he was going to retire. Soon after he and part of his men were seen going back to their former position which they reached by going for all they were worth down the slope.

Loutit then retired. He left a section and retired by small parties under *mutual* covering fire till they got to a small mound about 100 yards on the Turk side of the entrance to Wire Gully.

(On the top of the furthest hill the water of the pardanelles was clearly seen) They thought this must be a very long way in. This was on the Turk side of the creek (S.E.) The Turks followed occupying the ridge they had just left. There they met Peck. He went was unwounded - with a few men. They stayed there half an hour using their rifles - It was very warm. The Turks had brought up one M.G. with them. Peck was wounded slightly and was taken back by one of the men.

From there they had to cross the flat (about 500 or 600 yards of grass through which the creek ran.) As they got half way across the Turks reached the knoll they had left two minutes before and made it very hot. From there the party got up Wire Gully, taking up a position at the bottom of Wire Gully on the Johnstone Jolly side of it overlooking the gully and the flat at the foot. It was then about 11 am. They then found there was a formed line about 80 yds in rear. By collecting strays in the gully the party (11 strong now) was made up to 19. Afterwards Lt. Frayne, 10th Bn, joined. He had a few men on Johnstone Jolly and came down to them. They dug in there and held there till relieved four days later by the Marines.

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The trench was at A. Maclagen was directly in left rear and Loutit could signal back about 300 yards to the Bde signallers there.

Late on Sunday night when the Turks pretended to be Indians some of them - worked up that gully and established themselves at the bottom of the gully directly enfilading this position. They fired into the outpost all night. There was no one in the gully. But on the far side was a post of 5th(?) 3rd(?) Bn. They would mutually watch each others side of the gully.

On Monday morning as soon as it was light the Turks at the gully foot had to work down the gully and across the same flat. They threw away rifles and kit and

ran across the flat one at a time and the

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outpost sniped them at about 100 yards to 150 yards - getting 19 - practically the lot. A good many Turks had come up in the party. Loutit could hear them saying saying "Don't fire - we are Indians!" and thought they were. It was only when they fired that he knew what they were. They had come up across the flat into the gully just where Loutit had crossed it. All the four days orders were coming down to unfix and fix bayonets, not to fire on such and such a spot as someone was going to advance.

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The cease fire orders were complied with till it became clear that nothing came of them. There was no Communication Trench to this trench. All the first night the Turks apparently attempting to reorganise, coming up and going back. All the four days there were parties crossing the gully and attempting to work up especially at night. On Monday night and Tuesday night a few men were extended across the gully at 10 paces to act as sentries but they could not physically keep awake.

On Monday by daylight about 5 pm. after blowing of trumpets and shouting a large body of Turks came forward across the same flat and on the other side of German Officers Ridge (North of it) They were extended and working in waves. Our people on the left got up and charged out to meet them. The Turks broke and went back to the flat.

In the morning of Monday crowds of Turks kept coming down Sari Bair but their formation and the whole attack was smashed up by the Queen Elizabeth by shells. These must have been battalions after battalions of them. One shell would burst and the whole hill seemed to move in the smoke and flame. Some of the Turks went back but small parties still dribbled down towards Quinns and Popes. German officers Trench hid them from Loutit. It was probably these and those from Gun Ridge across the flat who made the attack at dusk.



On Monday morning two men collected all the waterhottles of the 19th men and tried to go back over the shoulder where Maclagen was to obtain water but going over they were killed by snipers from the flat. They had 50 or 60 yards to get over the ridge They had to wait till Monday night when they sent back to Lt. Todd's post 150 yards in rear and got all rations and water from him. (Lt. Haig was there all the time).

The Marines who relieved lost ~~the~~ this post ~~the~~ same night and fell back on to Todd's post which became the original front line. Our men were ~~dopey~~ by this time for want of sleep. The whole time the Turk was trying to work up to between the two posts but never got up so far. The men supposed to be Indians got right up between the two but on the foot of the gully.

The Turks began trenches on the German Officers Trench Ridge, And had two guns somewhere down by the flat which shelled with shrapnel Johnston's Jolly and Shrapnel and Wire Gully. These guns could not be picked up/ Haig and Loutit had about 9 men when relieved. Behind was a cleft in the gully and into this they rolled the men who were killed. At the end small posts were dug down the valley across to 3rd Bn's post - just rifle pits.

45th BATTALION - August 8th

Green line was down the road west of Kate and Thin Wood.

There was one 77 gun in the small wood between Reginald and Lena Wood and immediately in rear there were six.

A couple of the guns behind the small wood were firing at the Bn while it was waiting to push off. No scrap was put up with small arms. The gunners had fun by the time Bn reached them. By the time they crossed the road east of Reginal Wood the R.H.A. came into action and started to cover the advance west of Lena Wood.

As they passed the SE corner of Reginald Wood a German M.G. was firing bursts for a few minutes. Then the crew ran and two were captured.

As they got into the gully before Susan Wood a German M.G. which was there mounted on an anti-aircraft mounting to protect the guns, opened. One of the tanks zettled this - he found it himself. To here the tanks were ahead of the Bn. A few stray rifle shots came from Susan Wood.

There was a Bn or Regt. HQrs in the terraces NW of Susan Wood and a major was captured there. A number of German artillerymen who had been wounded by our barrage were captured here. Also one tank had got down the valley and mopped it up and came back again as it could not climb the hill the other side. At this point the tanks of the 45th Bn, as they could not climb the hill, moved off right to 46th Bn front. 5.9 and 4.2 Hows were captured in this valley. The Germans had run round to the rear of Susan Wood and many were captured by 46th Bn. which had a straighter course and was a bit ahead.

There was a time belt of cavalry wire about one foot high along the bottom of Susan Valley -- German.

Bn was fighting in artillery formation all the time - never extended at all. They then pushed to the Crucifix Rd without opposition and waited there 15 minutes for the barrage to lift from the Morcourt-Harbo-nieres Valley. During this halt the Bn scouts pushed out to investigate this gully, one officer and 6 o.r. They were fired at by rifles and one M.G. from right and ene-- at Caroline Wood for a while. They went forward in two bodies in diamond formation - Vincent and three others to the left to the main gully, and Sergt Brown D.C.M. and two others to Grace Wood.

The Germans were running- and throwing away kit and arms and clearing out. A few were trying to loot a canteen but the scouts fired on them with M.Gs and killed a few and the rest ran. Our barrage was still on the gully - about three heavy guns and the R.H.A. (not much of a barrage). After looking into the stables and dugouts in the valley, they got up to 200 prisoners- an engineering shop, kit store, canteen and HQrs of some sort. (The Germans set fire to an orderly room here - a typewriter was salvaged from it but the papers could not be got/ The dugouts were near Susan Wood were burnt by throwing in of a phosphorous bomb which set fire to two of them. Out of one of them came 38 prisoners)

There was a canteen next to the orderly room, with grapes, wine, schnapps and champagne which we broke and liqueurs, cigars etc. 8 in howitzers, 5.9 guns and

M.Gs. were got there, but most of the M.Gs were along the bank west of Susan Wood. The objective was on the road on the next ridge. In a small wood just west of Morgan Wood, --The-objective-was-on-the-road-on-the-next-ridge a M.G. was holding out west with 15 men. They were enfilading 46th Bn, not firing on 45th Bn. Vincent and Cpl Sellick (D.C.M.) crept up to the edge of the wood and threw two bombs to about 30 yards of them - and the Germans surrendered. One man ran out of the wood (the post was on the edge) He shouted in good English "Don't shoot me, don't shoot me - I am an Australian - Vive la France."

They were now on the objective. Ahead there was a bit of low scrub with dugouts in it. They went straight on and got a number of prisoners out of this. Hope Wood was on their right flank.

Fully 1000 Germans were ~~fell~~ fleeing northwards towards Mericourt. There was a section of 77 guns which ~~shelled~~ wheeled round about on the final objective just north of the road and were firing at 45th Bn digging in. Another section was on the road west of Proyart. And one German M.G. for 1½ hours was fighting from the Willow (the advance was delayed at this stage a bit through 48th Bn tanks being knocked out.)

The sections of guns ahead were very well fought retiring and opening again - they were seen at this stage and L.G. fire was brought on to them and they cleared out. Our big gun at the back of Proyart kept on firing at intervals towards Corbie,

There was enfilade fire from north of the Somme.

On the objective the tanks presently came from 46th Bn direction. They cruised about a bit/ Then as they came back round Morgan Wood a 5.9 battery from behind Mericourt and Chipilly cliffs banged at them.

In the afternoon, 4 or 5 hours after the position was taken, a few 5.9s fell in the valley. Up to then all the fire had been enfiladed. The Germans had direct observation up the valley.

On the green line a few German planes came over wounded with M.Gs. and machine gunned them. Then droves of our planes did good work and the Germans cleared. On the objective our planes were scarcer (returned for petrol etc.) and one German plane put down three of them in ten minutes. (48 pushed through)

That night at dusk 45th Bn relieved right half of 48th Bn's front.

Next day (Aug.9) Lt. Potts, M.C. and one man went out by day and crossed the road from Proyart to La Flague factory. He met no opposition - just simply walked out. He had watched the place for an hour and reckoned there was no one there and went out to see.

The 2nd div. came through 5th Div that day and their left was at La Flague. 45th Bn had not been told to advance. That night 45th Bn was ordered to swing up (as marked on my map). First a reconnaissance patrol under Lt. Vincent was sent out and went along the railway line to the road to Proyart. They were just going on to the village when they heard German being spoken in their left rear - commands, and shovels rattling on marching men along the other road from Proyart S.W. Vincent withdrew his patrol as these Germans got into the trenches S.W. of Proyart. About an hour later they began to send up flares and tear in with M.G. fire -- and this seems to have been the first garrisoning of the line ahead at all. That night also the same Germans renewed the 77. fire along the main

road and the blue line. The La Flague dump~~s~~ was full of wood - some of the stacks were burning. Probably they had been set fire to. There was a very big dump of Mills grenades there.

(In the rear line of the Bray trenches north of the road were found two Pom Poms, 1½ in bore (about) with a brass cartridge case and hollow steel nose cap full of magazine powder (flare powder - white flare -) probably the flaming onions & not strings of sausages but a fast pale blue light. The sausage strings were said by a German prisoner to be fired by granaten werfers. The onions were tracers for a pompom.

From there 45th Bn went to Saily Laurette - and then to Harbonniers and Lihqs where they relieved the 3rd Bn and had some hot bombing. The Germans were very game there - continually renewing bombs/attacks - would not wear steel helmets - we are in the old German front line and the old French line was our support line and there were 25 CTs on 45th Bn's front each of which had to be held with a bomb stop. For the first two days bomb stops were not allowed as the Division was to advance.

This was the Alpine Corps, and were good shots.

48th BATTALION - 8th August

The mark V tanks started with their crews and parties. There were eight of them. They were to go just behind Bn. They all got to their assembly point (before the fog) in the valley behind the Bn's HQrs. It was light when 48th Bn moved (before zero) but fog came on just after moving. This gave a lot of difficulty in getting to Accroche Wood but all the tanks except one, and Bn got into position east of Accroche Wood with the officer wounded (Lt. B.A. Jones) one man killed and one wounded. The Germans had one 5.9 Battery playing along the Hamlet Warfúsee Rd. This caused these casualties and one tank was left behind.

Bn was east of Accroche Wood for 25 minutes. Then they moved to Rat Gully in platoons in Artillery formation. The tanks came on behind. The fog had cleared. The only trouble was one 77 gun firing possibly from near Susan Wood. This was easily avoided - it was firing on the one point near Rat Wood.

The tanks tailed out a bit. Bn got to Rat Wood/ Lt. Morley went out and got the information that the 46th Bn were going well.

Bn left half an hour after reaching Rat Wood in exact accordance with programme. The R/H.A. followed closely but tanks were a good way behind trying to cross the gully near Rat Wood. The parties with the tanks were marching along by them. They had tried getting inside but it was terribly hot and they got out again.

48th Bn moved on in artillery formation to near Susan Wood. The only shell fire was shrapnel fired from some point unknown and very high.

At Susan Wood Bn waited 15 minutes. A little indirect M.G. fire was met. The tanks were a kilo behind and could be seen.

Bn moved to Richmond Wood Gully, and at Q 28 they shook out into skirmishing order as they came under heavy M.G. and shell fire. Col Perry was wounded here and a few others hit. This was from near the hospital probably. 46th Bn was then fighting and 45th also. This fire was so sharp that the men were taken under command of their officers and pushed straight on as hard as they could to Richmond Gully. Bn now had its right on the road.

The above mentioned fire which got the Bn while it was advancing knocked out three tanks. These tanks had caught up here (six of the, - one missing and not known of) Bn was coming under the fire of this gun which was firing from between the road and the hospital at the tanks and this is why the officers took their Coys forward (at a steady double)

Bn now had ~~its~~ right on the main road. There it found that the 45th and 46th Bns had gone on to their objective.

The tanks were coming up on the right in order to get into the gully by the main road.


48th Bn remained in Richmond Gully about quarter of an hour to give the men a spell before the hop over. Meanwhile one of the scouts, Pte Gell, and Lt. Morley went out with the 45th Bn. Gell came back and reported 45th Bn O.K. When 48th Bn got up to 45th, Morley reported to C.O. (Col. Perry remained on duty - hit through left arm) that 4th Bde were all right on right flank but had trouble on left.

The tanks were not up here again they went astray. 48th Bn waited on the 45th objective. Under direct M.G. fire from the old Bray line on their left. There seemed to be 4 M.Gs firing and the Germans could be

seen moving about there.

While 48th Bn was lying up there one gun (77 from the left front) knocked out three tanks N.E. of Hope Wood. (they were Mark V tanks, probably of 45th Bn. This took the fire of the 48th Bn.

From this position all the men could see their final objective. About 15 minutes after reaching the objective (10.55) though only three tanks had arrived, 48th Bn decided to give it a go before the Germans began to reorganise.



They had been in skirmishing order since first under M.G. fire. Two tanks went with Coy. one tank, Orpheus, went out with D Coy on the left - a very fine action. This tank had its complement inside. It got 100 yards past the objective and was then hit. Several of the crew were burnt and two of our L. Gunners were killed getting out of the Tank (possibly Vickers also) by German sniping. Those who got out moved back to the old Bray line and got there about the same time as the leading Coy.

The other two tanks went to their objective. A Coy got to its objective with only 10 casualties - These tanks then reported back to Richmond Valley.

The centre Coy had some difficulty at the end of low scrub near R 13 central. Some M.Gs. held them up there - but by getting into the trench line and bombing and fighting with L.Gs they captured these with 80 prisoners.

Two platoons of D Coy moved in pretty quickly and came under heavy M.G. fire from just E of the objective (200 yards perhaps). They were on the left of C Coy. They got into the trenches there and the two platoons which were following them were caught and suffered pretty heavily by this M.G. fire which was very hard to locate. The L. Gunners of the two platoons which were held moved forward and dealt with these guns from the open. The Germans were trying to fire at them but they got in first. As their fire died, our men made for the trenches by short rushes and got in. 22 Germans surrendered from this place - they had no chance of getting away. A battery on the left flank above Mericourt putting in gas and H.E. caused a bit of trouble but the trenches were good.

To protect the consolidating fighting patrols were sent out in the afternoon. They killed a few Germans. They were almost to the outskirts of Proyart. Later in the afternoon the Germans got some other guns and fired into the gully by Bn Hqs where a supply dump was and a German canteen with plenty of beer..

In the fighting on the scrub on the objective at R 13 central the two tanks were sent for but had gone back. While the Germans held us here they must have established the small post which D Coy had to meet. In this fight the smoke bombs were either from artillery or aeroplanes - not smoke bombs from rifle grenades. The smoke was on the ridge after just about this point. In this fighting the officers concerned were:- Lt. Potts M.C. (now Bar) and Sgt Kealy.

Sgt Seal M.M. did well there too and Ote Berry.
They got round this opposition by bombing up the trench.

48th Bn had 65 o.rs.

The youngster who took out the fighting patrol
towards Proyart was Lt. M.B.T. McDowell. M.V. M.M. (the
same officer who with 6 men got through Monument Wood on May 31st)

An officer of 4th M.G. Bn is said to have got sent
into Proyart

On August 8, 48th Bn lost:-

Killed Lt. J.G.O'Neil on the final objective in front
of the little wood with C. Coy

Wounded, Lt. W.B. Carr, M.C. D.C.M. (who took Bn HQrs
at Monument Wood with Stokell) B

L.Gun was fired over his back at
Bulacourt- Hit after D. Coy got in.

" Lt. B. A. Jones, hit coming up to Accroche Wood.

Lt. Stokell M.C. at Richmond Gully, waiting.

Lt. L.L. Carter M.M. on the final objective, with
D. Coy. He was a B. Coy officer but

had come round to the left to see
what was holding up the two platoons.

He took them over the top where the
L. Gunners went forward.

Col. Perry, wounded R.O.D.


48th BATTALION

MONUMENT WOOD

After Monument Wood on May 3 the German Jaegers who fought so well, afterwards sent in Lt. Garland's and (?) Captain Cummings' effects)

48th BATTALION - DERNANCOURT

XXX



German barrage lifted again about 9 at the dead ground the re-advance in the Farm probably surprised him. At 9 he came on again. He got no further. The right flank came in about 11 am to Pioneer Trench. 5 Pltn got back with Cummings about 3. Brown went down to Shepherdson. Coy H.Q signalled to them to move to Pioneer Trench which they did as shown/

April 5


When Brown went down to the post he saw the Colonel of the Tommies and told him that they were moving back on to Pioneer Trench, and this left no-one on his flank. This- Their C.O. told Lt. Ferguson (Liaison Officer) that he was satisfied that everything possible had been done.

This brought the line into Pioneer Trench. Later the Tommies got out and swung across the valley from about Z northwards. During the attack Signaller Tregpeth in the morning went across to the Tommies and at X Y giving them the position on the right (as known to Bn HQrs) He first tried (as Coy Sgr) to signal the message across to the Tommies. They could not get it. He accordingly took it across. He was hit severely about half way across - he had 200 yards to go. He crawled and stumbled under this M.G. fire and was hit once more. He finally got to the Tommies and before his wounds were attended to he delivered his message and was taken away on a stretcher.

48th BATTALION - September 18

Killed Lt. Ward, M.C. - killed on night of September 18 when they went up to take the bit of trench on the right of our Bde sector.

The two Coys of 48th Bn got in at the fork trench at A where right of 46 Bn was.



Then they worked right to B where there was a straight point. They got 7 machine guns and 2 prisoners, the rest escaping towards X. All the morning the Germans bombed up from Z. Lt. Reid held this for 5 hours with his platoon. The German artillery and the artillery protecting the Tommies blew out of the trench about 2 pm Sept. 19, and they retired putting in three stops from B to A. The artillery put us out of there the Germans established themselves at B again. 48th established themselves in Onoto Trench and ~~trenched~~ ^{connected} with Tommies who by then were in Fourmie trench on our right (line from there uncertain to us)

Ward was killed by a shell in Onoto Trench.

After dark 19/20 the same Coys attacked up Pen-~~insula~~ Trench and over the top of Onoto, with a sprinkling barrage. They took the S/P at B and past blocks at X Y Z and connected with the Tommies by outposts south of Entrance Trench. That was the line handed over. The point B is the summit. They had the whole view of the hillside then.

Lt. R.W.J. Fletcher wounded, 18th Sept. just getting to D Coys objective (Centre Coy)

(for this)

This day Capt Anderson D.S.O. had worked out to the right on to the top of the ridge with his L.Gs and when the Germans counter attacked he got on to the right of the attack with his L.Gs and the 45th Bn from the left. As soon as 45th Bn started Anderson's men got up on the crest of the hill and saw these Germans and turned into them with L.Gs.

When 48th Bn struck Cooker Trench part of the German Coy which was holding it fought. Others got back to Bn HQs in a copse in rear and in the sunken road about 600 yds from the right of our objective. They too fought from here - their officers could be seen trying to reorganise them. Lt. Gelston and Lt. Parry's platoons of C Coy were pushed forward and Parry's Platoon worked round to the right; round the shoulder of the hill. The Tommies had got into Maire Trench on the right. Parry took the Tommies up to their trench. (He was the liaison officer with the Tommies' left flank)

He then came back to the Coy had his Pltn round the shoulder of the hill. The L. Gunners covered the Copse and the bombers worked round the reverse slope of the hill and took some German prisoners; bombed the Bn Hqrs dugout (Sgt Price who let this get a D.C.M.) and took a number of prisoners including 11 German officers and 60 or 70 men.

Meanwhile a $\frac{1}{2}$ Gnr from No. 9 Pltn named Rochford pushed well forward with his gun and when the Germans came out of the sunken road he opened fire on them. They were making for their Bn Hqrs. He killed 34 and all day long our ambulances were carrying back their wounded.

At the same time Gelston's Platoon had contributed by working over the crest (by the sunken road) and down the other side. The Germans therewere thus enclosed, and 187 prisoners were obtained (including Price's 60)

Just as these prisoners were coming back the 45th Bn was seen coming up the slope towards Cooker trench in artillery formation. They moved exactly as on parade though the German was shelling.

As they passed through C Coy 48th Bn began to dig in. The fight with the counter-attack was not seen by C Coy.

12th BRIGADE

Sailly Laurette.
July 8⁷ 1918.
August 8.

13th BATTALION

August 8 - September 18, 1918.

Landing.11th BATTALIONLanding

The first thing D. Brockman saw was a flare which went up on the beach. It was like a tow flare or a bundle of cordite. D. Brockman had looked at his watch on the way in - 3.45 a.m. The time when they landed was about 4.20 he thinks. The boats were then 700 to 800 yards out when the flare went up. Almost immediately machine-gun fire opened. Something went into the water before they landed - possibly Hotchkiss shells, and threw up a spray - a number of these were falling about.

They got rifle and machine-gun ~~fire~~ also while in the boats. (A Hotchkiss gun was trained by 10th Battalion, D. Brockman thinks, on Maclagans Hill. This probably did the shooting. They could not see the flashes or where the shooting was coming from - did not notice it anyway.

Beside D. Brockman in the stern of the boat was a little red headed midshipman. As the fire came on the boat, the men bent their heads and backs. As the boat got in the fire grew fiercer. The men bent down and this kid clambered over the backs of the men revolver in hand, jumped onto the beach, and ran up across the beach and into the scrub yelling out in his squeaky voice: "Come on my lads - come on my lads." (The two sailors in the boat had been like everyone else in the bottom of the boat - D. Brockman sitting by the midshipmite) Then the youngster realised that he had to go back to his boat and his face dropped.

D. Brockman's boat landed on the point of Ari Burnu - exactly on the point. The 11th Battalion was landing opposite this point. Col. Lyell Johnston X landed there too. Major D. Brockman was on the right of the point and Capt. Leane on the left of it. D. Brockman was the senior man of the whole of the battleship's party, (towed in to 700 or 800 yards). The flare would be a little to the South of where 11th Battalion was heading - probably opposite 10th Battalion. 2 Coys. 9, 2/10, 2/11, right to left.

The boat had rushed across the beach and dropped their packs in the scrub just off the beach. D. Brockman's pack was just round the left corner of the hill where you got shot at (when later you went to get the packs) from the left.

On the top of the hill, a man named Paddy Reid was just behind Major D. Brockman. D. Brockman had just got on the top of the plateau when 3 Turks jumped out and came for him with fixed bayonets out of the trench

on the top of the plateau. D. Brockman thought he was done for, when Paddy Reid appeared. He hit the first Turk over the head with his rifle butt - the second Turk swerved off and went for him. Paddy bayoneted him, and apparently could not get the bayonet out - so he dropped it. The third Turk came at him but he brushed his rifle aside, and caught hold of the Turk - threw him onto the ground and kicked him on the head and killed him. (He was a very fine looking man - originally an Irishman in the Dragoon Guards - (always in trouble) - probably a timber getter in W.A.)

On the top of Ari Burnu had been a trench in which there were Turks. They were shooting - Leane and Annear and MacDonald were lying together in the scrub at the foot of the hill when Annear was shot through the head and MacDonald wounded through the shoulder by these Turks. D. Brockman went up the hill to the right of this Turkish trench. D. Brockman could see these as he passed, and there was a quick fight there - the men killed them and went straight on.

On top of the plateau it was fairly daylight. The Turks ran down the steep slope into Shrapnel Gully. Four or five were shot down there as they ran. D. Brockman tried to give some morphia to one badly wounded Turk on the plateau. The Turk looked venom at him and spat it out.

On top of Plugges they reorganised - got the Coys. separated. Major D. Brockman personally sorted them out - put 9th Bn. on right, 10th in centre and 11th on left. The job of the covering party was then regarded as done. They were then being fired at from Walkers Ridge and McCay's Ridge.

Then the balance of the Bde. arrived behind in good order. Then MacLagan came up and D. Brockman saw him. His first order was to dig in where they were on the E. edge of Plugges Plateau and MacLagans Ridge. They were already doing this.

From there it looked as if the plateau over Walkers Ridge was continuous - as a matter of fact Monash Gully came in. (This was a bit before 6 a.m.) MacLagan's next order was to go and make good the left over Walkers Ridge way - it looked as if Baby 700 were the crest of a continuous ridge.

D. Brockman on getting these orders from MacLagan decided to send his own and Leane's Coy. on to the left up towards Baby 700; Denton's and Barnes' Coy. to Quinns and Courtneys.

Smith's Coy., which he then found there, he ordered to go in between Denton and Leane - about the Bloody Angle. It was clear from there that Courtneys and Quinns were across a valley, but not Baby 700. You could see the gully ran up to the corner of Walkers Ridge, but it seemed to end there (of course it really ran far ahead).

Shortly afterwards Major Roberts, 2 in/c 11th Bn. came up and kept Leane back on Plugges Plateau.

D. Brockman went off to Walkers Ridge (going into the top of Reserve? Gully (on the seawardside) up again). As he got on to where Walkers Ridge abuts into Shrapnel Valley he met Lawler's Coy, and Robertson's Coy. Lawler had laboured up the steep precipitous Reserve Gully - D. Brockman sent Robertson's Coy. along the valley with orders to work straight up to go for the ridge on the top of it.

Lalor he sent along the top of Walkers Ridge direct towards the Nek (then unknown); and 2 platoons of his own (D. Brockman's) Coy. up on to Popes, and 2 on to the high ground about Steeles (on the right of the valley) to work round to their left and junction with the others

at the head of the valley. These last two (Rockcliffe and Macfarlane) as a matter of fact stayed out there and did not junction to the left. Denton's Coy. went to Quinns as ordered and Barnes out to Courtneys - and two platoons there and some of Denton's under Crowley got out ahead there to what was afterwards German Officer's Trench. Everett 2. in/c of D. Brockman's Coy. was (in the reorganisation at Plugge's) put by D. Brockman in charge of a sort of composite company with Sergeants for platoon commanders - and D. Brockman sent him over at the same time as he gave orders to Denton to go out in the same direction as Denton (i.e. to Quinns). Everett had Lieut. Selby (a Duntroon boy) with him - and they went to the place indicated - the points were shown to them by pointing across the gully - and there all day Everett, from a position where he could see, sent back the exceedingly accurate reports which arrived all day through Denton to 3rd Bde. Headquarters. Denton was not himself so far forward by any means and he got the D.S.O.

It was from Walker's (afterwards Russells) that D. Brockman distributed his Company. They had then discovered that Monash Valley existed.

The parties then went off as ordered - Lalor up Walkers, Robertson into the valley and up Popes; Smith into the Bloody Angle (through the valley). Robertson worked over Popes and joined with Lalor on the slopes of Baby 700. D. Brockman then signalled back from Walkers to Plugge's Plateau and asked him to send another platoon - which Leane (who got the signal) did. This platoon, under Lieut. Cook, went with D. Brockman himself through the valley and up over Popes and then across the slope where they joined the parties (by this time they were mixed parties of all sorts) under Lalor and Robertson.

D. Brockman coming up with Lalor got into a charge - there were some Turks on the hill - Lalor was reorganising his lot when D. Brockman got to him. They could see the sea from there and knew there was no one there - and were being fired on from one of the ridges on the left.

D. Brockman realised that there was no one in this 1,200 yards below them and the sea. Looking to the right towards Maidos could be seen quite a number of Turk entrenchments (possibly on Gun Ridge or Lone Pine).

D. Brockman decided to tell Lalor to stay where he was and dig in to protect the left flank and Lalor agreed that this would be the right thing to do. He started to dig in at once.

D. Brockman then went back over Popes and came upon Major Kindon and 2 Coys. of 1st Bn. He explained the situation to them, and asked him to look after the left flank. Kindon said to his men: "Come on boys, the West Australian chaps are in difficulties up here - let's give them a hand." Kindon went up to the top of the valley with his lot.

D. Brockman went up towards Popes again to rejoin his own lot on Baby 700. On the top of Popes he met some of the men coming back. The men said that they had gone on (D. Brockman thought under Lalor's orders, but months afterwards he heard it was on Robertson's orders - that Lalor didn't want to go on and Robertson told him ~~xxxxxx~~ that he was his senior and he would have to go on.) The men said that when they got on they were overwhelmed with numbers. There was a heavy fire going on there then - it was a case of reorganising a line and D. Brockman got the men to dig in on Popes Hill - and this was the original and final line on Popes. They were dug in just on the edge of the crest. This must have been about 11 a.m.

From there D. Brockman went around the position as

far as it concerned him - i.e. to about German Officer's trench.

There were men all the way round - he could see Smith's people opposite the end of Popes - then Everett's, (some of D. Brockman's) then Denton, then Barnes, then Rockliffe and Macfarlane. On the right of them again was 10th Bn. - Shaw was there - and Todd of 10th Bn. Everett's people were out from the edge in a trench of potholes which they had dug (this was about 50 to 80 yards in and they had a series of potholes back to the crest. From their position they had a good command down the slope (where Everett got all the information).

Denton's men were on the crest. A platoon of Denton's was out with Barnes on the crest under Capt. Crowley. (Crowley was Denton's 2 in/c). Rockliffe and Macfarlane also were well out beyond the crest.

D. Brockman had in his mind after dark to link up Everett, Barnes, Rockliffe, and Macfarlane out where they had a good commanding view. (Barnes would be about by German Officer's trench). To get out there you had either to run or to crawl.

After dusk, when D. Brockman had sent for Barnes and Crowley - to tell them what he intended to do that night, Crowley came over to confer with him.

A rumour had come down the line that Indian troops had landed at Helles and were coming to help us. No one knew where that rumour came from - but many believed it. They knew there was a landing down S. (the first rumour was that the landing had been most successful and they were marching up to help us). Then this other rumour came along. Then just as Crowley and D. Brockman were conferring, close by 2 M.Gs. of 11th Bn. (one under Sergt. Halahan), there was heard on their right front (coming down through the gap between where Crowley was and where Macfarlane and Rockliffe were) a number of men shouting: "Don't shoot - don't shoot - Indian troop - Indian troop!" This was perfectly plain. They could then see men coming in the dusk - certainly hundreds. Crowley was an Anglo-Indian officer and could talk Hindustani very well, with a special pass. D. Brockman didn't believe that these were Indians and sent Crowley to see. He went off with his runner and in a few seconds the runner came dashing back to say they were Turks. Crowley made a dive for Barnes' trench to warn him. The two M.Gs. and all the rifles opened up as soon as D. Brockman told them that they were Turks and the Turks melted.

These Turks came up Wire Gully - (about opposite where MacSaurin was later killed).

After this - it being now dusk - D. Brockman met Col. Owen of 3rd Bn. D. Brockman had sent for Crowley after dusk as it was the only time when communication could well be carried out. Twice he had tried it - the first time his Sergt.-Major was hit through the chest following him out - and was with difficulty got back; just after they had finished getting him in D. Brockman saw Capt. Bean of 3rd Bn. hit and fixed up by Brennan. It was there that he saw old Col. Owen, but that was 2 hours later.

At this time Maj. Bennett came up. He was known to D. Brockman because he was one of the 2 only Majors senior to D. Brockman in the A.I.F. D. Brockman told him what he was going to do - and probably Bennett, who disapproved, thought that D. Brockman was going to do it all the same in spite of himself being in command.

Owen heard that a major was acting in command on the spot there. He sent for him and told him that he

had arrived and was in command. (Before this D. Brockman had seen Major Bennett, 3rd Bn. and had put the plan up to him, but Bennett didn't approve. He said he had not seen it. He evidently told Owen, and Owen sent for the Major. The Major was D. Brockman). D. Brockman put his intentions up to Owen. Owen said that he had not seen the place, and he would not send the men out to do this until he had reconnoitred it for himself. He told D. Brockman that nothing was to be done with the men under D. Brockman by D. Brockman, and that he was in command and D. Brockman would carry out the orders he gave. D. Brockman was very keen on getting the line forward at that time. He realised that their present position was militarily absurd and that they must get the observation if possible. He had grabbed a Coy. of 16th Bn. to help. When Bennett took over he took these men from him. Bennett clearly thought that D. Brockman would go on with his plans, and got Owen to stop him.

The chance for a reconnaissance had gone. It was only possible when D. Brockman did it - nothing was done that night to get the line out. D. Brockman stayed there the night and next day gathered up some stragglers from the Gully, many of 14th Bn, and sent them up Popes Hill way and went up there himself and met Pope there.

(Lamb would be about at Courtney's Post. He was very excited and sending a lot of messages).

D. Brockman picked up Darnell (then with Darnell, who was one of Barnes' Coy. - he was with one of the platoons on the crest which D. Brockman was going to push out) and went up to Popes with him. D. Brockman lost his water-bottle, which Capt. Macgregor, doctor of 16th Bn, had filled for him at the bottom of the hill - and sat down half way up the hill. There he was sniped at from Walkers - but stayed till he found a dead sapper and got his water bottle. On the top of the hill the Sergt.-Major of 13th Bn. told him to join a ration party - "Come on m'lad - we're all tired etc." taking him for a private by that time. Everyone was covered with thorns and with torn clothes. D. Brockman attributes his not getting hit to his having always been on the move.

On Monday night D. Brockman heard that Robertson and Col. Johnston had been killed. He knew of Leane's Company up there, so he went up there to get in/c. He went up to Plugge's and found Leane fuming. This was dawn on Tuesday. The C.O. was in a part of the original trench which Leane had started to dig the first morning. (Peck (the adjutant) had got forward the first morning as soon as he realised that the C.O. was not moving further forward). At this time on Tuesday morning there was a lot of firing from the left, Walkers Ridge way, and the "overs" were pretty thick. Johnston ordered D. Brockman to stay there, but he slipped away to where Everett's lot had been and there met Major Kindon (further left by 150 yards from where Capt. Bean was hit the first day). He left Kindon there and went back to Popes and stayed there till they came down.

Lieut. Cook was killed in the advance and retirement on the first day. Cook and Morgan on the first day had stayed where they had been told to by D. Brockman. When the advanced line came back their people were organised; they stopped them there. Then Cook was killed and Morgan badly wounded. The Sergeant carried Morgan in himself and got a D.C.M. for this. This Sergeant brought them back as far as Popes.

?Ayling - if so the men didn't think much of him.

After the 11th Bn. took over from 8th Bn. G.O.C.

came along the half dug trenches. According to the wretched map Turkey Knoll, Silt Spur and the other fingers were all one plateau - it was known as the 400 Plateau. (The Turks could then be seen on Turkey Knoll. There was a system of trenches dug before the landing at Turkey Knoll). Bridges wanted to occupy Plateau 400. It clearly at the S. end was not held by the Turks and he wanted to oust them. D. Brockman had previously been out to the second finger and knew that it was not all one plateau but that deep gullies were in between.

Bridges wanted his trench dug 150 yards out so as to make a Redan there (it would clear the Turks from Turkey Knoll also). He came along one day and finding D. Brockman in the trench told him to have the trench made. Gen. Maclagan had turned up meantime, and Col. Johnston. Bridges said an engineer would be needed to mark the place out. Capt. Bage (the S. Polar man - with David and Shackleton?) was walking up the trench and Bridges saw him. "Here's the man," he said, and told Bage that he was to go out with D. Brockman and site this trench. They were to peg it out. That night D. Brockman was to go out with 100 men, dig it and occupy it. Later a communication trench would be made to the line in rear.

Bridges saw them in the morning. At 3 pm they went out - got on to the top of the ridge - and there D. Brockman left the covering party under Selby. Then D. Brockman, Bage and 2 sapper youngsters went on crawling low through the scrub to do the actual pegging.

Immediately in front of our trenches was a dip, working up to a crest. Then a dip. It was on the face of this second dip that the trench was to be sited. D. Brockman had the Southern end of the bit of cord - Bage was on the North of it. They had finished the S face and Bage was hammering in his peg (they had crawled out) with a lump of stone when the Turks opened fire from the direction of Lone Pine. There must have been 5 M.Gs. and some rifles. Bage was hit first in the arm, then in the leg, then in the head (which killed him). He was brought in that night.

That trench was never dug. They got out eventually by tunnelling through into the first valley in three places (D. Brockman two, Leane one towards Turkey Knoll). Then a trench was built into the reverse slope of Silt Spur. Then they tunnelled through that again and broke out into a front line.

Just then 11th Bn. handed over to 10th Bn. D. Brockman came out and was hit by shrapnel in Reserve. This was about the middle of July.

At Pozieres - the system of attack by 16th Bn. on the semicircular trench which the 15th Bn. tried to take the previous night with the Suffolks was Drake Brockman's idea. Gen Cox had laid it down that it was to be taken by an assault W. of the road, as before. D. Brockman had seen the British lying there and he told Brand he would take it from the flank by the diagonal movement which was adopted.

April 11th -at Bullecourt. It was Black who decided to go on when the tanks were not at the wire - "Come on boys - bugger the tanks." He was, till then, at the rear of his Company, led them from there onward. He got them into the first trench and then to the second through the wire. He stayed to watch them through the wire and as

the last went through he said to his runner - "Tell them the first objective is gained." That runner came to H.Q. to D. Brockman but Black was killed as the message was given. Murray was his bosom friend. When he heard Black was killed he wouldn't be satisfied till he got out and went over and saw him himself, lying there. Black said to D. Brockman as he went out to this attack: "Well good-bye Colonel, I mayn't come back, but we'll get the Hindenburg Line."

12th Brigade August 8th from Gen. Leane.

12th Bde. had been in old front line. As soon as 3rd Div. moved through, 12th Bde. moved on in rear of the green line. The barrage was clear of the 14th Bde. which had Warfusee Road on its right.

The German shelling was very scattered and light - our heavies must have disorganised his guns. But the fog was so thick that (with the smoke) it prevented them seeing 3 yards ahead. Yet they had to move through Accroche Wood without getting lost and over the broken ground. The I.O. and a party went on in rear of the 3rd Div. - and laid tapes - then they returned to their Bns. But soon after the start the sun got up and gave them their direction. They then knew they were right. Before the lift of the barrage from the green line they were in place.

45 ↑ 46
 48

The 48th Bn. was to attack with parties (Vickers gunners, Lewis gunners and teams, Trench Mortars) in tanks; one Mark 5 Star tank failed to reach the start. In the other cases the parties went on with the tanks (in a few cases only in them - orders were against it as it was too hot - Leane ordered that they should not go in (tanks) and most of the parties moved beside the tanks. The Mark 5 Star tanks were not a success and the parties had eventually to go on without them.

Soon after leaving the green line they met Germans about the gun positions - both artillery and infantry. They held up the 45th Bn. for a while firing direct at the tanks. 46th Bn. however got ahead on the right and helped 45th Bn. forward.

The Red line came through the Harbonnieres Morcourt Valley. It was very well held; and from the opposite side the German batteries were firing direct. In that valley was a battery of 6-in. guns which had only arrived the night before from Lille - they had no ammunition. We captured the officers and guns and most of the men.

Our troops worked through this valley by using the cover but lost more heavily here than elsewhere. They found 60 transport horses - light horses - here. The mail cart was just getting away. They were clearing out on to the E. top of the gully near Amy Wood when the horse was shot and we got the mails and packages. There were two canteens in the valley and all sorts of stores.

This fight across the gully brought them to the E. crest where the Redline was - on the right just E. of Hope Wood. The 48th Bn. at once moved through them.

(The batteries attached to the 12th Bde. eventually finished E. of Caroline Wood, and were there very soon after the 45th Bn. had got the place. They followed the advance very close).

The 48th Bn. got forward with some M.G. enfilade fire from the left. The greater part of the artillery fire the whole of the first two days (until the 2nd afternoon) came from Malard Wood direction, and Chipilly Spur. This was on the left rear of the attack. At Jean Wood the Bde. H.Q. was getting direct fire from the exact left flank.

(In Beryl Wood (where there was a well) Gen. Leane wgeb up there about 2.30 on August 8th, was pinned in the valley by 8-inch fire, and 5.9 fire for 2 hours - he and Varley had to keep as close as they could in a hole in the bank - whizzbang fire mostly came from Progart.

This valley and the valley in which (at 24C.95.90) 48th Bn. H.Q. were, were heavily shelled all day and next day 24.D.30.50 was 45th Bn. H.Q. These H.Q. were simply in huts and not shellproof. At this spot one of our Australian planes fell, catching fire after a fight at 4 p.m. on Aug. 9th.

The 48th Bn. on reaching the valley (24 Central Valley) found it strongly held. It was a series of huts and holes in the ground - a camping area - and the Germans put up a fair fight there. Two Mark 5 Tanks appear to have reached this point. They cleaned this out - and on the right where the opposite was not so stiff and the Germans cleared they got on quickly to the Blue line at 19 and 25; on the left they had a pretty stiff fight in 13 C. The 16th Bn. had had some heavy fighting before and their left flank was swung back S. of Mericourt. 16th Bn. were not in the fighting at 13 A - the opposition on the left had dragged them that way. 48th Bn. took the trenches in 13 C. by a stiff fight. D Coy. of 48th Bn. was held up here near the Wood but Capt. Twining worked round with a party around on the N. and cleared this. The men were attacking there through a field of manure heaps. (Some of the fields were cultivated and there was a big camp in Progart).

This night after dark fighting patrols went out to Progart 750 yards ahead and reported that the Germans were holding it tightly with M.Gs. Other patrols worked through into the Engineers' Dump at La Flaque. The Germans had M.Gs. and snipers there.

The line for August 8th was on the old French line. The 13th Bn. (relieved by 1st Bde.) moved up and took over left of ground occupied by 48th Bn. up to 4th Bde. Boundary; and 45th Bn. took over right of 12th Bde. from main road to Hospital in R.19.C. On right was at first 32nd Bn. (then 29th?) August 9th - stayed there. But on night 9/10th they advanced again and swinging right more forward than left from R.19 Central to Road Junction at La Flaque in 26 D. A huge Engineer Dump was captured there by 45th Bn.

There was only M.G. opposition in making this advance - no one killed - a fair number wounded.

(On the night of 8th August Leane wanted to take Progart and it could have been done. But the flank was so far back that it was not allowed by Div. On night of August 9th Leane wanted to do it again, but was not allowed to attack it. He accordingly tried ~~xx~~ with fighting patrols to work round it - this not being an attack. But they found the road junction and houses held with M.Gs. and could not get through this night. The position was of course very different then. The German all the same was well organised N. of the rivers and would have made this difficult.

We were now within 500 yards of Progart and had patrols all night out to the town. They met no German patrols (In 6 weeks run in front of Hamel the 12th Bde. couldn't get a German patrol - they only met one in that time.

Finally Leane told 48th Bn. that they must that night get a patrol or raid the Germans next night. They went right up to his wire and caught a German who came out to urinate in a shell hole just outside his trench. This was July 1 or 2nd when identification was needed. A number of Germans ran out when this German shouted. But our people sent him back to one man while the rest covered the retreat.

On August 8th, 48th Bn. was on the Blue line at 12.10 a.m. digging in. They were not shelled so much there - the trenches were good and most of the shelling was in the valleys in rear.

On August 9th the patrols went out about 7? and the rest of the troops went up about 8.

This finished the advance of 12th Bde. They were relieved a couple of night later (10/12?) (The 3rd Divn. marched in in pretty close formation N. of the main road over the flat plateau. The Germans saw it as it was before dusk. The Germans that night bombed from 8 p.m. to dawn, all night long. He would drop a flare and then bomb. He killed the horses of Gen. Leane and others on Bde. H.Q., and wounded the grooms at Jean Wood. Padre Devine saved the life of one of the grooms, getting him carried in and tying him up and staying up with him all night putting hot fomentations on him - he is still alive - Devine got a M.C.)

This was the same night that 10th Bde. did its attack up the Proyart Road - the bombing was the worst that Leane ever saw.

(One feature of August 8th was the large number of prisoners taken - over 900 - by the 12th Bde; and about 30 to 40 field guns including 3/8-in. in Jean Wood, (and the 6-in. guns which we saw in Grace Wood).

N.B. On July 8? 12th Bde. went out up the N. of Somme Valley, and crossed the gully from in front of Sailly Sec and advanced to the very outskirts of Sailly Laurette; at the same time they cut off the corner that still remained N.E. of Hamel to the Somme. This was done in 2 stunts. Special patrols went out the night of July 7th to reconnoitre and find how the ground was held both N and S of Somme. On S. they found one post - but E. of this it seemed to be strongly held; on N. of Somme they struck German trenches 60 yards E. of our own, strongly wired. Leane decided as soon as it was dark to send out a covering party and dig in on the line. The German post was not occupied apparently this night though flares went up in front. Three hours later on the N. side a barrage was put down; 48th Bn. took all objectives, killed a number of Germans, and took 35 prisoners including some officers. They then had touch with the 5th Divn. at the Cross Roads on the left, N. of the Somme.

By doing the affair in two halves Gen. Leane was able to get all his gun fire concentrated on to the N. side of the Somme - the guns covering the brigade front were then made more useful. The barrage this night extended from Albert to in front of U/B (about). The men on the right of the Somme were dug in before the retaliation came; but there were a number of casualties on the N. of the Somme.

After August 8th the 12th Bde. went down to Lihons and relieved 1st Bde. Came up on night of 13/14th? and went in some nights later (15/16th) There in line over a week.

They came out on the night of 23/24th. There was constant bombfighting. The German Alpine Corps was on the right, in front of the Canadians and they affected our front too. 4th Bde. was on left, then 12th Bde, then railway, then Canadians on right. The Germans had their blocks close to us. On the left, just E. of the centre of Lihons, on the left of the Chaulnes-Lihons Road, between there and the wood, there was a bend in the old French system. There the German shelling was heavy; so 46th Bn. bombed along a trench so that instead of holding A B they held A C B.



The 48th Bn. snipers before Lihons worked out into the thistles and stayed there all day on the patch between the front and support line trenches. The Germans one day put down a heavy barrage on front and support line and the Germans got up in their trenches to have a look at it. These two boys stayed out there in the open and sniped through this barrage. (They could not get back any day till dark). Their names were Ptes. Klementilla (Dane, an old scout) and Fraser (M.Ms. for this).

(Meals. On both 8th August and Sept. 18th hot meals were got forward to the men on the night after the fight; on Sept. 18 they got their meal at 11 p.m. before the second advance).


The shelling at Lihons was very heavy. A lot seemed to be drawn by the Americans who were to have relieved the Bde. and were about the back country like flies. The Bde. lost pretty heavily in this position from this constant shelling.

12th Bde. then went back to Longpré and stayed there till it went up for Sept. 18.

12th Brigade - September 18th.

The 12th Bde. took over the line from 13th Bde. (4th also took $\frac{1}{2}$ from 13th Bde) on night of 16/17th. West of Cambrierai (spelling?) Wood. A steep valley ran from Le Verguier right across the front; and on the high ground on the far side of it was the Main ~~Old~~ Old British Line (the German main position). In the valley nearer to us and up over the high ground to Le Verguier was a continuous series of outpost positions - with deep short lengths of narrow new trench.

So in this part there were 4 distinct positions ahead.



Leane took over from Arrol of 49th Bn. on night of 16/17th in the Railway line on the grid line between 2.C and 8.A. The 48th Bn. was in the line; 45th in Railway line; 46th in rear West and South of VENDELLES.

The attack was at 5.20 of Sept. 18th. During the night 48th Bn. which had been holding the trenches, got into position to make the attack to the first objective. The J.O. line was practically the trench line. They formed up in the trenches and just in rear of them. They took the whole Bde. front to the first objective.

45th Bn. followed as support about 600 yards in rear.

46th Bn. remained W. of Vendelles where they were.

G.O.C. Bde. instructed 45th Bn. that it must not be drawn into the first unless 48th was definitely held up - as job of 45th was to take Red line.

48th Bn. ran pretty soon into the German outpost line. The Germans did not put up a big fight in the outpost line, but at Cooker Quarry and Cooker Trench he fought well. The British 1st Div. on the right was not up and 48th Bn. C. Coy. worked round the banks on the hillside, using sunken roads and banks, and got round through the British area and turned S. flank of this opposition. They got the position (British old main line) and went on and just over the spur came on a battalion of Germans forming up for a counter-attack and captured the lot. There was only . Company coming for the Germans - but we had our M.Gs. on them. (Leane afterwards asked the Bn. Commander how with such excellent positions and so many men - how was it that so few of ours captured more than their numbers of Germans. The German Bn. Commander - a professional soldier of 20 years service had been fighting at the front since the war started was captured later near Collins Quarry on the left. He said the Australians are so brave and so quick that it was impossible to stop them. He said he had been retiring before them since August 8th and that he would greatly have preferred if ~~attacking~~ the attacking troops had been British).

48th Bn. dug in in posts ahead of the old main line - (later, when they found ~~that~~ it was not shelled, most of them lived in the old main line because it was good with many dugouts).

The barrage rested there. The 45th Bn. was in rear getting into position under the cover of the ridge.

46th Bn. moved just in time to reach position supporting 45th Bn. half an hour before 45th Bn. attacked. This was to save them from backlash and they lost no one getting to this position.

The smoke was very heavy this morning and greatly helped them as far as the first position. Afterwards it helped but not so much because it was now light. Neither Bn. had any difficulty in finding the way.

To guide later troops and runners especially, parties of pioneers went up with both Bn. H.Q. to lay tapes up to Bn. H.Q. all the way - to both objectives.

45th Bn. had a pretty stiff fight in the Gully S. of Collins Quarry (i.e. S. end of Grand Priel Valley).

At the Tumulus N. of the Bellenglise Road there were Germans and a lot of trouble came from there. We never had rouch with the Tommies from the first. We had a liaison party of British with us, who fought well right through - but no others were anywhere near. Two sections of ~~the~~ guns were afterwards put by Gen. Leane to protect the right flank near Salt Trench. (Trench Mortars - 2

2 with each Bn. with 48 rounds of ammunition for each gun on 4 mules each carrying 12 rounds went with the Bns. right to their objectives and got through, mules and all. The same was done with V.M. Guns but some of the mules for these were lost.

The 45th Bn. had its chief opposition from the posts of the old British outpost line. (48th Bn. had been working out well ahead of its line when it caught the counter-attack party). They got round this. Holman of C. Coy. had a stiff fight but worked round a copse and enfiladed the Germans and caught a number.

45th Bn. reached its second objective on time. There was now only one Battery of artillery coming forward to assist Col. Corrigan, 46th. There were definite orders to Gen. Leane that he must not risk a man in attacking this line - he must not attack but merely exploit. There was only one way of taking a strong line like this - by a definite attack. Leane ordered Corrigan to send the whole Bn. forward, but send it in very great depth, in parties dribble and forward.

This was done. There was heavy enfilade M.G. fire from Pontruet, St. Helene, and 6.D (very high ground) - and there were a number of casualties as they crossed the valley. But by 6 p.m. the 46th Bn. were definitely reported at Victoria Cross Roads and along the Sunken Road further N. The right flank was kept back in a Southerly direction. The British were not yet at the Red line - they reached the road through 2.D pointing towards 8 Central by 11 p.m. (but had still not Berthancourt at 6 p.m.) We either had to get back or take the line A B.



Gen. Leane had a talk with Corrigan and decided that it must be done that night. 46th Bn. was very tired. They had a hot meal about 10 p.m. - attack was fixed at 11 p.m.

The right flank was the difficulty. The British were not sure where they were and so Leane sent 2 independent patrols from 2 Bns to find out, and one of these found, where the Tommies were supposed to be, 6 M.Gs. and a number of Germans and bombed them and brought in one prisoner and killed some - the rest ran. Then another German post came at him and he jumped on to the parapet and bombed them and they ran. The British G.O.C. (Gen. Streckland) persisted that they were there. Maclagan said he believed our account but that he would like it made certain and this patrol was sent out as a result. The youngster who was sent up for a V.C. was Pte. Woods. Leane ~~wanted~~ wanted to support this attack by moving over 2 Coys. of 48th Bn. to do a flank attack facing S.S.E. The German main line trenches ran in exactly where our right flank would be and gave the Germans a great chance of bringing up troops. The Observation Post which Leane placed on the high ground (near the Red line over 4th Bde Boundary in 25) saw during the afternoon Germans debussing on the far side of the Canal S.E. and marching towards Bellenglise. This made this flank an anxious problem.

The British G.O.C. Gen. Strickland strongly objected to our troops encroaching on their front. The troops had already moved to get into position - there was only an hour to go. But Leane had to send out to warn 48th that they must only throw back a flank and not encroach over

the bou

the boundary line of the Tommies'. The British said that they were going to attack it themselves at 12 p.m. and asked would we wait. Maclagan passed this on - and Leane, not feeling sure of their counter-attack, said he would not wait. The British attacked at 12 and made no headway - but their guns shot our right flank out of the trenches which it had taken.

In our attack at 11 p.m. the artillery, which was now up, put down a barrage for 5 minutes on the German wire while our troops crept up to get into position. While this was on the M. gunners were putting a heavy barrage on the support Hindenburg outpost line and the line in rear.

The attack was made by 2 Coys. of 46th Bn. of not more than 60 rifles each. They had 2 Coys. in support which followed the attack.

Exactly at 11 p.m. a very heavy rainstorm came up and this helped more than anything. The Germans got into their shelters. Our attack moved forward in this rain and were into the trenches before the Germans knew it. The Germans had lanes in their wire and their machine-guns were covering these lanes, but there was practically no fire from the Germans. The artillery had partly broken the wire.

There were over 500 Germans in these trenches opposite 46th Bn. The Bn. Commander was in a dugout on the main road (the remains of the old Roman Road) just beyond their trenches. He would not come up when asked to so they killed him. There were about 4 German prisoners to each Australian - over 500. They were going to counter-attack as at dawn - a mixed body from St. Quentin bussed up. It was during this fight that one of our men, a young Scotsman of the 46th Bn, getting into the German line (only 126 of our men to about 1500 yards of trench) was grabbed by the Germans and taken down into a dugout. He was asked by them where the Australians were. He said they were down there in thousands and they were going to attack these trenches. They said he was better down there. "Too right" he said. Then presently came the voice of an Australian down the stairs calling on them in the usual language to surrender. The youngster said: "There you are - they're up there now." He asked them what they were going to do. They agreed that they would surrender, and he led the 30 of them up. (On top they wanted to know where all the thousands of Australians were).

Our line ran right to the tangle of trenches on the Bde. boundary. But artillery fire - Corrigan said it was our own - drove them out of there and the line ran down Onoto trench to the Bde. boundary, while 48th Bn. (2 Coys) made a flank down the road just to the N. of it. This nest of trenches on the high ground to the right was very vital - the ground was high there and the system conveyed on it. Accordingly Leane decided to attack on night of Sept. 19th.

48th Bn. that night took over the right half of 46th Bns. position with instructions to attack and retake this ground. This was done about 10 p.m. with artillery assistance - no regular barrage - there were strict instructions not to fire on the English front on the right. The Bn. took the trenches practically up to their boundary, put in stops and had posts back inside the Tommies' boundary to Fournie trench where the English now were (for a short distance on the right). The trenches were fairly well cleared by artillery fire and the 48th bombed up and took 11 M.Gs. and 5 prisoners. This gave

them ~~the~~ high ground and the control of the Communication Trenches to Bellenglise and put them within 700 yards of the Canal where the British later crossed it. Fighting patrols were sent out to see if the trenches immediately West of the Canal could be peacefully penetrated. Some were wounded. They found the trench strongly held. One party North of the Communication Trenches at night was seen by the Germans and a party of Germans came out from the Communication Trenches and tried to get round them. They got back with 2 wounded. A few posts were ahead of our line.

We handed over to the 46th Divn. - a good relief.

From the position which we held we could look down right on to his Canal. The trenches were hopelessly badly sited from the German point of view. They were there to preserve essential ground. But they gave us 2 tiers of fire. The Eastern line was lower than the Western one - and the E. line can have been of no use to the German at all under any circumstances. They were an ideal position for us.

In the attack of Sept. 18th, 12th Bde. took in 3 weak Bns. and got (roughly) -

45	400	prisoners.
46	550	"
48	500	"

That is over 1450 prisoners including 51 officers and 80 M.Gs. ~~including~~ and many T.Ms. and guns up to 6-in. - about 12 or 14 of them - about 6000 yards advance against strongly held fortified lines.

The German artillery protecting his front, as always, came from the two flanks (as we do with our M.Gs.) We do not adopt this principle for some reason.

12th Bde. came out on the night of Sept. 21/22nd.

In the old British trenches on this front there was no sign of bombardment or fighting of March 21st.

4th Brigade. When the 16th Bn. was being fired into ~~from~~ the rear by German batteries in the rear of the Chipilly Spur, Major Smith C.O. of the Battery (39th) supporting 4th Bde. (whose guns early arrived very far forwards) was not allowed to fire on them as the British said they were there. Finally, after hours, Burgess gave him leave to fire if he saw the flash of the guns, and he did so. As a matter of fact they could see the guns all the time and had been reporting them but had been informed from Divn: The British have got Chipilly and are on their green line. This was not so. D. Brockman sent Bradley across next day to see.

On Sept. 18th as soon as the troops got forward, waggons picked up ammunition and wire and took it forward from a dump on the railway to a point in the steep valley close behind the Red Line; then they went back and got another load and brought it up. Coming over the old British main line they were in full view and could also be seen from the time they left the railway line. The waggons got through without a casualty. The Germans had high ground behind Bellenglise and Bellicourt with observation over this country on the crests.

13th Bn. August 8th.

Great trouble in finding way. Formed behind Hamel

(from Vaire). They got on to tapes without trouble about half an hour before the fight - 200 yards ahead of the field guns, in Square 3. The German barrage fell here ~~xxxx~~ when our first barrage opened and 5 men were killed or wounded.

Fog thickened at once after start - moving in artillery formation. Smoke thickened it - it was very thick indeed. Each Coy. was cut off but worked simply by compass. Ground was unknown - Tanks too went by compass. Coys. kept pretty well together by moving very close. There was no trouble between Coys. 3rd Divn. Coys. were met on the way who said they were right. The 4 Coys. were found exactly on the right position on the line near Record Wood where 2nd position. The fog lifted within 10 minutes of leaving there.

On the forward slope of hill W. of Cerisy 3rd Divn. were passed through. They cheered them on.

Shortly after this 14th Bn. on left was held up. ~~xxxxxx~~

In front of	15	Cerisy
Morcourt	14	
	13	

13th got some distance ahead with the flank in air. They had only met a few odd Germans - we didn't know what had happened. Capt. McKillop's Coy. was 3rd wave, mopping up - and he moved up Coy. on to left in the front line where flank was open and instructed O.C. Pioneer Coy. attached to 13th Bn. to ease left so as to cover flank if Germans came in behind. Practically no opposition was met and very few Germans captured.

The Germans cleared from the front of 14th Bn. (we had pushed through the weak spot). 14th Bn. caught up 13 well in front of Morcourt when they halted on the road above Dudgeon Valley.

13th Bn. had to wait for the barrage in Dudgeon Valley to lift.

One of 13th Bn's. tanks broke down on the heavy slope up before 3rd Divn. was reached, but at least one was with them W. of Dudgeon Valley and did fine work - shooting at all targets pointed out to it. (e.g. a M.G. position pointed out to it E. of Dudgeon Valley by Capt. Turner it fired at the tree clump from the opposite side of the valley).

As they got to the crest above Dudgeon Valley the diggers were getting despondent about souvenirs; when the barrage was still on, however, some transport could be seen, horses picketed - on the other side of the valley. When the barrage lifted they found a very big transport in the valley, about 60 horses in stables dug in on the W. side of the hill - a couple of canteens, pay office (where one man blew open a case with 25,000 marks in notes - good 1914 cigars, a complete photo store, boxes of maps, etc.) The men were mostly in shelters on the same slope - there were three tiers of hats, etc. included on tier of stables. There were grapes and eggs in the officers' mess. The spirits of the troops rose considerably. The German just ran out, and threw up his hands. The waggons were invaluable in getting the wounded back, and they were at once used in getting up water and stores. A post office was obtained here with a number of letters in it. Some of the transport was packed complete - 12 M.Gs. packed on cart. The horses were not in them - they may have been waggons just ready to move up, or just arrived.

The Red line was on the next slope (where marked in my map).

From Dudgeon Valley the troops moved on - after being re-organised - and went up the E. slope. Capt. Geary (an original man, formerly transport officer) galloped up the slope on the back of a captured horse, saddled and bridled, and the troops cheered him as he reached their head. As he got over the crest he handed the horse over to a T.M. officer. He was immediately after shot by a bullet.

When they got to the rise three Coys. dug in and the Pioneer Coy. was taken over by Capt. McKillop. Capt. McKillop's Coy. stayed on the Sunken Road up the slope in 23 A, as ordered - they would go forward later and take over part of the front line from 16th Bn.

While they were there the tanks (Mark 5*) for 16th Bn. went up the road past them on to the crest. This was a mistake as it turned out. There was a good deal of rifle fire from the opposite (E) side of the next gully; and 2 guns were firing from the direction of Chipilly across the canal; 3 tanks were hit there and a number of casualties caused in our line. The British had not got Chipilly.

b One gun was seen by a Captain of Pioneers (since killed) amongst the trees low down near the canal. Two Germans were working it. He put a Vickers gun on it and the Germans raised their aim or lowered it and blew out the Vickers machine gun. They sent word to an 18-pdr. It turned on and put a shell or two close to the gun and then the Germans switched round and blew out its crew.

Three tanks were stopped on the crest waiting to advance when the Germans guns N. of the river knocked them out wounding some of the crews - it was very unhealthy near the tanks.

Most of the 13th Bn. casualties were here. 16th Bn. formed up in the road where McKillop's Coy. was and moved on over the hill top on to the next rise into the system of old French trenches where there was some heavy fighting.

13th Bn. were not to go up till evening, word came back that 16th were hardpressed and could not hang on without reinforcements. 13th Bn. was ordered forward to reinforce, and did this by taking over the right half of 16th Bn. line. McKillop with C Coy. about 12.30 - 1 went up. Then D, then A. B Coy. and Pioneers eventually got to about where the tank was in 18 C.

About dusk a patrol was sent to Germaine Wood and found a large number of Germans - stragglers - moving through it. The wood didn't seem to be held in force. During the afternoon 13th Bn. had had no fighting. There were a lot of huts on the E. side of the valley behind Germaine Wood - and while we were shelling this German Nurses were seen to leave it and go away. That evening 13th Bn. re-organised - no fighting through the night. The Germans kept up a long distance M.G. fire from near Mericourt somewhere.


On night of August 9/10th one Coy. (left of 13th Bn.) swung forward on to the Mericourt Proyart Road on the hill top into the old French Trenches. The 16th Bn. were to link up making a flank down the road which curves towards Morcourt. 13th Bn. moved N. up the trenches; but on reaching the road at 7 C 8.5 they met the Germans who were holding a post just across the road. Every man who looked over the trench here - 3 or 4 of them - was shot and the road could not be crossed. They held the trench to near daybreak. Just before daybreak 3 or 4 Germans came out with a M.G. from their post there and came across the road towards our trench.

Lieut. Player who was at the end of the trench jumped out with some men, shot the crew and got the gun. After that there was no trouble but the flank was in air. There was good observation from there; but no one could get down the

road to 12 Central where the 16th Bn. was. The shooting from the trenches across the road was too hot.

The same night they took over from 48th Bn. to the S. corner of the copse in 13 A. This was part of the objective of the 16th, but 48th had taken it as 16th was involved on its left.

The place was pretty quiet then.



On August 9th in the afternoon? when Americans and British attacked Chipilly a splendid view was to be had by 13th Bn. The Germans could be seen behind the barrage - some coming up to have a look - some later running. There was a smoke barrage on Chipilly, but on the North of Spur by the woods troops could be seen coming on behind the barrage and the Americans in several places involved in or ahead of their barrage. They dug in on top of the cliff - they didn't seem to touch the low ground; and they seemed to lose Gressaire Wood after once having got it - there was a lot of M.G. fire, the tanks came out beyond the wood, the troops appeared but later were not noticed in the wood.

Sept. 18th - 13th Bn. was in the old British line some way S. of Jeancourt. Their objective was to connect with 15th Bn. beyond Le Verguier, 16th Bn. mopping up Le Verguier - exactly as at Hamel.

The smoke was thicker than on August 8th. It affected even the throat. It was impossible to avoid disorganisation as though you had a leader with a compass he could see practically none of his men. 48th Bn. as it was swerved right, and 13th Bn. struck 48th Bn. objective in part at Dean trench. At the hop off, Lieut. MacQuire of B Coy (who had heard of his M.G. the night before - one of the best officers Bn. had) was killed on the tapes by a shell of ours.

All the Germans met with before Dean trench seem to have been killed or wounded by our barrage. They had an outpost line.

At Dean trench, which was struck by isolated parties, one party consisting of Capt. Turner and 6 men worked up it. Just as they reached the trench a German M.G. opened on them by the sound. It killed Sergt. Lihou - D.C.M. and Bar and M.M. (from Wangarvan? near Dubbo). He was bombing down towards 48th Bn. on top of the parapet and the gun opened in his direction. Turner left 2 men to watch the right (after collaring that M.G.) and worked (sometimes using bombs) up towards Le Verguier. The fog was starting to lift and the Germans could be seen. They put up no scrap after this in this trench. (The party got 7 M.Gs. and crews, a Doctor, and an Advanced Dressing Station).

As they got up towards the road running S.E. through D B, a party of Germans passed going E. along the road about 200 yards away in full marching order. At first Capt. Turner thought they were his men, and started for them when he saw they were Germans. Unfortunately we had no L.G. there. They then dug in ahead of the brown line past the E. end of the copse at L 35 A 2.5.

They were hardly there long enough to reorganise when they had to start for the second objective. The Germans shelled them while on this line and they had a few casualties.

It was now clearer. As soon as the barrage came down (? 8.30) the men jumped out and shook themselves into artillery formation and went on up the ridge with very little opposition. There were to be 2 Coys. in the first advance and 2 in the second; but as the fog disorganised them the whole

whole practically went forward as one to the first objective; and afterwards in order to maintain connection with 15th Bn. on left and 48th on right the whole line had again to go forward.

Most of the casualties occurred before reaching the first objective - partly caused by our own barrage which was irregular in parts - and ~~partly~~ partly by German M.Gs. (Not many by German shelling).

On reaching the crest near the old British outpost line at Coronet Post etc. the line was close on its barrage and when the Germans were rushed they put up no show. About 70 to 80 prisoners were got out of the trench leading E. (beyond the line) near Ascension Farm - many in one deep dugout at the far end of it. They were the garrison of the post. 12 or 13 M.Gs. mostly mounted, were taken there, but not a shot was fired - and 2 minenwerfers.

They dug in along the forward slope



Three posts were sent out to the left across the gully to connect with 15th Bn. While fighting in they got a lot of M.G. fire from the outpost Hindenburg line across the valley. But as soon as 14th Bn. went through that fire was attracted by them. 14th Bn. went through in artillery formation and had to extend. 14th Bn. had a give and take scrap, could be seen working up and having to retire and working up near the road opposite and having to retire. By 6 p.m. they were seen digging in on the slope opposite as best they could. If the Germans had fought stubbornly the strength of the position and the wire would have made their attack impossible.

2 days later 13th Bn. relieved 14th Bn. in front line. That night they pushed forward posts. Information had been received that the front was held by disorganised troops and that the wood ahead (Pike Wood) was lightly held. Fighting patrols were ordered to push out and occupy if possible ~~in~~ the high ground commanding the Canal crossings. (Only a bit of the Canal could be seen). When they got down in that direction (20/21 at night on taking over) they were met with fire of about 10 M.Gs. - determined fire - from the direction of the wood. It was a bright moonlight night and the German was firing from trenches beyond his wire in an organised manner. On night 21/22 13th Bn. was relieved by British troops.

The Hindenburg line was a good one well wired with many dugouts.

Lossess - August 8th. -

Capt. Geary - killed.

Capt. Patrick - killed near the tanks at the same time. He was just back from Australia and knew he was going to be killed and had divided up his effects. The one anti-tank gun did most of this damage. (He was hit at Pozieres). Several officers were wounded, practically all at the same place.

Sept. 18th.

Lieut. McQuire - killed.

Capt. Parsonage - wounded, between the copse and Le Verguier - with a stick bomb - on the way to the first objective. (Both these were Coy. Commanders). Possibly there were others.


August 23rd at Lihons.

August 23rd at Lihons.

Capt. Rose - wounded by shell fire showing relieving Coy. round.

Lieut. Hall who was with the relieving Coy. was killed by the same shell.

13th Bn. went forward under the barrage this day between Lihons and Madam Wood, right pivoting on 15th Bn. But the Germans didn't fight - the trench the 13th Bn. took was unoccupied.



In 13th Bn. since March 11 Coy. Commanders have been killed or wounded in 13th Bn. Capt. E.A. McKillop is the only one who has survived throughout with the Bn.

48th Bn. at Monument Wood.


The Germans buried our men and put their paybooks on graves and sent in Capt. Cumming's effects.

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New Zealand Infantry Brigade and General Baldwin,
August 7/10th. 1915 from Colonel Temperly.

At 2 or 3 p.m. on the afternoon of the 8th. the New Zealand Infantry Brigade was told that a Conference would take place on the Headquarters of the Brigade at the Apex at which Generals Johnston, Cooper and Baldwin and General Godley alternatively Col. Braithwaite would attend and they were to make an observation post from which they could get a good view of what they were to do. It was by then about 4 p.m. probably. Johnston was by that time completely worn out and for various reasons practically unable to do anything. General Cooper and Baldwin came up there and went into the Brigade Headquarters to have a talk to Johnston and Temperly, whilst they were inside, got hold of Baldwin's Brigade Major and talked to him unofficially while they were waiting for General Godley to arrive. The Brigade Major said "How on earth are we going to do this show" - they had got a draft order. Baldwin was to form up behind the New Zealand Brigade and attack along the ridge with his left on the Farm and with (they had not seen the country and did not know how on earth they could do this). Temperly said "There is only one thing you can do" that is - "You have got New Zealand on the Razor back and then there is Hill Q and 971. Your only chance is to get two Battalions right up behind us by dawn and then pivot on your right hand man (? left hand man) and swing left and go right up the ridge. The whole five Battalions which were to do it were then at the bottom of Rhododendrum Spur. They were pretty tired already and very short of water and they were resting. The march from Anzac had been badly staffed. That started about 7 o'clock in the morning and they had had five battalions in single file moving about $\frac{1}{2}$ mile an hour - moving through the communication trenches; and they had been on their feet since 7 a.m. pushing on, standing pushing on, halting, pushing on again and so on. The Brigade Major said "How are we to get our fellows up here"? Temperly said "I will put an officer and a picquet. You will have complete and free access to the Dere. I won't allow even wounded men nor an officer now anything else to move down the Gully. You walk your men straight up in single file and begin to do that at dusk". The Brigade Major agreed - Temperly in the meantime was uncertain what arrangements Johnston was making with the Brigadiers. He went across to see the Brigadiers and it seemed to him that Johnston was, in his tired condition, giving a very confused idea of the situation. He was saying "Where you have to tackle it is with your right on the Farm. When you come to Cheshire Ridge" he said "drop down from there steeply - drop down and then go up and attack Hill Q from there". Johnston did not know what the going was like there. It was altogether impenetrable bush. It had not been reconnoitred nor did Baldwin suggest nor offer to reconnoitre it. He assumed that it would be alright. Temperly butted in and said "That is not the way to do it". He told us what he had told to the Brigade Major and added "I am quite sure that is the only way we shall succeed". Baldwin said "This other way is the shortest way why shouldn't we go that way". He was affected by the fact that his infantry was close up under Cheshire Ridge and they would have a shorter way to go - all this time - all this time - all this time they

were waiting for General Godley. While THEY were discussing Temperley's plan a wire arrived from Division. General Godley, it said, "is very sorry he cannot attend the Conference. Detailed orders will be issued direct to General Baldwin". All three Brigadiers said "Well that closes the discussion. It is no use us deciding on any plan, it is obvious it will be disclosed back and later on Temperly got orders to block the track down from the Apex at that point (at Cheshire Ridge). Braithwaite went back to Divisional Headquarters. Baldwin got orders that he was to march on the Farm and take Q. from that direction and so they never attempted to come up to the New Zealand Brigade position at all. Temperly did block the path with the Signal Officer, the only Officer left on Brigade Staff. Baldwin's Brigade wandered over and spread out in all this impenetrable bush below the Farm and by 7 a.m. his most advanced troops were just beginning to reach the Farm.



Braithwaite and Godley undoubtedly meant the attack to go the way in which Temperly had intended. Temperly afterwards told Godley that if he or Braithwaite had been at the Conference the whole history of the war might have been different.




New Zealand Infantry Brigade - Night attack 7/8th August.

I was under the impression that when Otago got up to Rhododendrum Spur he sat down there and had his breakfast when he ought to have been pushing on to the summit of the ridge. This was the result of the account given me by the Wellington Mounted Rifles. It needs comparing with what Temperley says. Temperley said that Otago and Canterbury were to make a combined attack on the Turkish trenches on the Rhododendrum Spur. On their having captured Rhododendrum Spur, Wellington was to attack through Otago and Canterbury and go on supported by Auckland to capture the top of the ridge. Jacky Highes had got lost and by that time had given his men an order to go back to the starting point. Otago was late owing to the fighting in Chailak Dere. Malone instead of going through Chunuk Bair in broad daylight picketed. Johnstone had told him that he must picket to clear the troops in the bed of the Chailak Dere - that was by 8 o'clock. Temperly was with the most advanced troops. Between 8 and 9 o'clock Johnston, Y (?Young) and Malone had a conference. They were joined up there by the 10th Ghurkas who were with Cox's Column and ought to have attacked Hill Q. They could see Monash's Column right down in the valley. There was no one near Q Hill and no one at the farm. In view of the fact that they were the only troops anywhere near on either flank they were absolutely alone. Temperly wrote out a wire which ran "In view of the fact that there is no success on the Nek and that the left column is still on the plane they did not consider it prudent to push the attack on Chunuk Bair." The only reply they got was to "Attack at once". They got six machine guns up to try to cover the advance and occupied with them a line looking over the Farm - exactly the place where they did such great execution in the counter-attack of August 10th-. Auckland and the Ghurkas were ordered to attack at 10.30. There is a little dip between the pinnacle and the Apex where 30 or 40 men go abreast. The Apex is so curiously placed that you can form a whole Battalion up under cover until they get over into that dip. These troops went over platoon by platoon, only one platoon could go at once. It was perfectly ghastly. They were led most gallantly. As they got on to it they faltered a little bit at first. You could see the line hesitate. Then Sammy Grant (whose first action it was) went ahead and said- "Come along lads" and waved his pistol and on they went. They lost 200 men in 20 minutes, but they reached the little Turkish trench on the far side on this exposed bit and garrisoned that. Temperly said to Johnston as they were watching it "We cannot do any more". The Churkas swerved towards the Farm. They did not quite get to the Farm, but they hung on below it all day and were withdrawn at night to the Chailak Dere.

CAPTAIN ALLEN, 17th BATTALION.MONT ST. QUENTIN.

A Coy. was leading. C was behind. The plan was when they got to the first fork of the roads north of Freckles Wood that two Coys. should form up east of the road and two Coys. west of it, the two southerly coys. being the attacking Coys. and the two northerly ones in support:




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The idea was for the whole Bn. to move south in this formation till they reached Park Wood or the Ravine, and then swing inland to Mont St. Quentin.

They had not got 20 yds. before the Coy. nearest the river (A) began to meet a tremendous lot of Germans. These did not put up a big fight: they seemed surprised; they simply walked through as prisoners. A few fought. Each platoon mopped up a post or two. There were also a lot of Germans down on the river bank amongst the trees on the steep bank. These were collected also by one platoon.

C Coy. came into line with A Coy., further inland; the other two Coys. kept easing further east, and as the ~~light~~ light grew and they could see Mont St. Quentin, they made straight for it down the dip across Brasso Redoubt. The only barrage they could see was our own barrage playing on Mont St. Quentin, on the village. There was a very heavy German barrage falling on the river and on the western slopes of it, where he evidently expected us to cross.

xxx



As there were so many Germans on the right flank, Capt. Allen arranged with Lieut. Small (who was killed in this fight) that A Coy. should go on clearing out the Germans from Park Wood and Halle, while C Coy. went on and took up A's original job of making Gott mit Uns and Uber Alles.

In the ravine and the woods around it a great number of Germans were found. The Coy. could not leave any men to escort the prisoners back - they simply had to leave the Germans to stream back themselves. There were M.G.'s and arms in plenty left behind - but the Germans would be picked up by our wounded men on the way back - and none made an attempt to fight.

The Germans were scared altogether. On reaching one post of them at Limberlost Wood, Sergt. Rixon simply jumped straight in with a L.G. (which he had taken from one of its crew who was hit), killed 3 Germans and the remaining 20

he brought up as prisoners.

Just as A Coy. got involved in Park Wood Lieut. Small's Coy. moved ahead towards Gott mit Uns, as A Coy. was entangled and could not get clear.

Park Wood was thick, and Halle was in pretty good repair, with plenty of cover. After getting past the ravine the men simply worked in little groups through Park Wood and Halle. There was a lot of M.G. fire but not many casualties.

Allen himself with a party worked out onto the eastern edge of Park Wood (there were bivvies in the wood, a few G.S. waggons, etc.). He could see the other three Coys. just charging up Mont St. Quentin - a regular old-fashioned charge, and the Germans clearing out in front of them. He reported that the village was taken and things were going right.

At this time the M.G. fire from the Florina and Prague trenches was very heavy; and on A Coy. working clear of Park Wood it came under it. A lot of the casualties were sustained as the men worked out on the Peronne side of Halle and the Park Wood. Just as they left Park Wood the German began a heavy shelling of it which lasted all day.

Capt. Allen at this time had with him his two runners - the two other officers (Lieut. Robertson and Lieut. Phelps) were at this time also in Park Wood with two little parties; and Sergt. Rixon had a party somewhere by the sunken road running from Halle to Radegonde - and so on. Allen sent his runners out and collected about 10 men and with these went across to a trench a few hundred yards north of the NE corner of Park Wood, and then through this trench up through ~~Gott mit Uns~~ Gottlieb and Save trench to the point where Save meets Agram Alley, and there established a post. Lieut. Phelps and a few men were already there - probably having dodged across to it.

A lot of M.G. fire was coming down from a small wood (which is not marked on the maps) at the NE end of the avenue of trees along the Peronne Road. Our post could see these Germans and could enfilade Florina trench - could see the Germans moving into the small wood, and also hopping out from Johannes trench into Florina trench and hopping about in Florina trench. This was reported, and later in the day, when they found that the post was not in Gott mit Uns, as it had thought it was at first, a Vickers M.G. position was established on the western side of the Somme enfilading Florina trench, and no movement was seen there after - the Germans got out of it quickly.

The post may have been at the junction of Salaty and Save, or Agram and Save - it looked directly onto the small wood at a distance of between 200 and 300 yds. The post stopped there till Bn. was relieved about 11 a.m. on Sept. 1.

When Allen found he was not in Gott mit Uns he went round and found some of 19th Bn. (Captain Hinds) in Agram Alley from the St. Denis-Clery road to the edge of Mont St. Quentin, where he was in touch with some of 17th Bn. His trench was ver shallow and they had had a number of casualties with M.G. fire from the aerodrome and T.M.'s from the village.

Nothing happened during the day except that the Germans put down a heavy barrage just behind Gottlieb trench and Brasso redoubt - just missing them.

During this afternoon there was a minor attack by 23rd. Bn. They went through the little wood north of the road, very finely, and cleared the Germans out of it, but they did not hold it. The Germans came back again into it. The Germans got in, apparently, through Johannes trench (in the night they could have walked over anywhere), and got into a position somewhere near the junction of Gottlieb and Florina

trench. Some of them seemed, by their flares, actually to work down Kholm trench. They came at Allen's post creeping up on all sides and threw a few bombs. But the post (15 men) had 2 L.G.'s and a German gun. They had only one bomb, but they had opened up a pretty heavy fire when the German flares sailed over them and lay fizzling in the grass in front, and the Germans probably thought that there were more men than there were. The Germans withdrew to their post near Gottlieb and Florina and were firing their guns all night. Allen then went down to Maxwell, 18th Bn., in Brasso redoubt, who sent him up a platoon (about 12 men) about 2 a.m. This platoon remained the rest of the night.


Just before daybreak the Germans opened with T.M.'s (probably from their trench) and threw a few flares - but didn't come at it.

Again at daybreak the Germans put over some more T.M. bombs, and presently our barrage came down in the distance. This showed that something was doing and 23rd Bn. was coming out. The Germans got up as if to leave their trenches and our L.G.'s got onto them at about 100 yds. A lieutenant and 19 men were killed and 4 taken prisoner. The post contained 3 light M.G., and the 18th Bn. ration party had clearly walked into this lot, for part of the rations (white bread) was there. The Germans had put the white bread into their packs.

The men were very tired after a long march to start with - lasting several days on and off. They had had a rough time west of Clery in the old bank shelled with 5.9's. But in this fight the men worked almost on their own - three or four in a party. The Coy. was weak from the start - ~~about 70~~ not more than about 70 when west of the Somme - lost a few at Clery. The casualties were in the end 28 - of whom 2 were killed, the rest all being M.G. wounds and a few bombwounds.


The bombs which got into the post were just egg bombs. An officer with a Vickers gun and team came up during the afternoon (?). The officer placed them in Save trench, and they stayed there in reserve. When Allen was attacked he sent for this gun which was brought up (on the occasion of one of these attacks). 2 machine gunners were killed.

XXX




STRONGPOINT EAST OF CLERY (from east of Clery village).

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


PERONNE, WHERE ATTACKED BY 53^{re} BATTALION.


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FEUILLACOURT, FROM MONT ST. QUENTIN, showing importance of crest occupied by 40th Bn. on August 31st.



FEUILLACOURT, FROM BAPAUME ROAD, MONT ST. QUENTIN.




THE QUARRY ON MONT ST. QUENTIN, LOOKING NORTHWARDS TOWARDS BOUCHAVESNES.

52nd BATTALION, DERNANCOURT - APRIL 5th.(Capt. Fraser and Lieut. Boase).

Lieut. Boase had the right of his platoon about where the buffers at the east end of the railway shunting switch was; left of platoon was at the bridge.

The men were dug in in pozzies on the top of the bank on its north side. For a field of fire on the Germans they ~~depended~~ depended on firing over the rails. The position was an awkward one. The ledge at the foot of the bank on the south side would have given some cover - but with bombs, etc., falling on the bank above it could not have been held. The easiest position would have been the old trenches in front of the G.C.S. and there was an old trench just north of the bridge opening about 30 yds. from the opening and commanding it.

xxx



They had had a warning of the attack from C.O.

There was a lot of movement over there also before the attack. You could see the Germans moving from one place to another across the Ancre. Just as it got light they could be seen on our side of the Ancre in 20 c. and d., evidently just lining up to come out.

A T.M. bomb was the first sign of the barrage. The T.M. was just south of the river - it was a pineapple thrower - and it seemed to be trying to reach our T.M. which was a little to the right of the bridge.

(B Coy. had its right on the level crossing over the hospital siding; and its left about 10 yds. east of the subway).

The first news that Capt. Fraser had of the Germans actually massing was about an hour before the show started. Capt. Williams's Coy. (D) had a front of about 500 yds. of railway east of B Coy. He said that Lieut. Denn, one of his officers, who had been out on a dawn patrol, had seen the Germans massing and was driven in by one of the German parties. Fraser then sent out Lieut. Boase with Sergt. Morrison, a Coy. runner and three others. They went under the subway and down towards the Ancre and then ~~xxx~~ turned right and moved down parallel to the river in diamond formation. As they got to one of the small footbridges a dog - which seemed to be on guard there - started to growl and bark. They could hear a lot of movement behind the river (wagons had been heard there the night before, Apr. 3/4th - some guns apparently been brought down there and put in, and ammunition for T.M.'s. Boase had reported the guns and Fraser sent the reports, which appeared in Div. Summary. There was movement also in the village. It was quite certain that the Germans were massing.

(Lieut. Lade - who had the right platoon - reckons that he killed 50 or 60 opposite his sector after the attack began).

It was so certain that the Germans were coming that Fraser stopped the breakfast going out, and the men stood to.

At the start the artillery barrage seemed to go over the back - it seemed to be coming from the left and going well back.

About quarters of an hour after the fight began the Germans T.M.'s seemed to concentrate on the subway and a definite attempt occurred to blow us off that part. About 5 or 10 mins. after the artillery had begun the German infantry was seen advancing.

Opposite the embankment the Germans came out from the direction of the river bank in extended order - you could only just see the Germans owing to the mist.

Against the subway the Germans came out of the houses, out of the back gardens, and everywhere, very thick. There was a hidden M.G. in Boase's ~~platoon~~ platoon, on the forward slope of the embankment, hidden behind the hedge on the S.W. side of the subway. This M.G. was firing down the road and must have been doing a lot of damage. This gun cleared the road, but the Germans were coming out of the houses on the right of the village and out of the back gardens. The rest of the gun's crew was using its rifles and bombs against these men. Boase was talking to them there and had a bomb burst between his legs, and shrapnel pellets, and went out to it. Next he remembered he was in a dressing station in Dernancourt.

Boase had got some of the men up upon the railway line and others waiting behind, ready. He had gone down thence to the M.G. down the foreslope. He and the others were throwing bombs at the Huns, who were just within 25 or 30 yds. - some of the Germans were standing up. A M.G. of the same platoon further right was covering the right of this post.

The last B Coy. saw of 47th Bn. they were still in position.

As soon as Boase was hit a man ran back to Capt. Fraser to say that he was killed. The telephones had gone. Fraser left his H.Q. and went up near the subway and settled down about 10 yds. to the left of the buffer, midway between the house and the subway, about 20 B.3.4. Sergt. Morrison was with Fraser. Things quietened considerably except for Minenwerfer fire. The infantry seemed to be quiet. They made one more ~~go~~ go to get through and were driven off. N.C.O.'s got their men to their feet - no officers were seen during the fight. Our M.G.'s and the 2 Stokes mortars, under Lieut. Williams, 13th L.T.M. battery, did good work.

Then, at 9.45, 5 men of 47th Bn. reported to A/Adj. C.S.M. Dalton at Coy. H.Q. and he came along to see Fraser. They said there was nothing left of their left Coy. - they had been blotted out. Fraser left the railway line - transferred a M.G. from Lieut. Bibby's platoon to look after the left flank, in the cemetery, and attached the 5 men to Morrison by the subway. Fraser wrote a message to Capt. Williams of right Coy. saying how he was situated and advising him to get back, and that Fraser's Coy. would stick as long as they could. Col. Witham had mentioned a line of trench in front of the C.C.S. where Kennedy was. They went on scrapping. M.G. fire was coming from the left along the embankment. Fraser's Coy. was getting a few casualties from there, though the bank of the Cemetery on their left saved them. It showed that the left flank had gone. We had run out of bombs - the fighting at the subway had accounted for this. The post at the subway was still holding. The right sector was perfectly safe, with about 400 yds. of good field of fire.

The finale was when the men who were on the subway broke and ran down from the top of the subway and up on the far side of the cemetery. Then Fraser gave orders for all the rest of the Coy. to retire for themselves. He himself dived for his H.Q., grabbed his Babb Code and papers and made straight back from his H.Q. along the sunken road past the west side of the cemetery with a couple of others, and then cut half-left towards the C.C.S. As they tried to get across the open a M.G. got them.

The Germans M.G.'s were on the railway line and sometimes missing it and hitting the hill behind.

The men were some of them twice wounded - hit a second time beyond the cemetery, by M.G. fire, as they were going back wounded.

Sergt. Murray and Boase were both sent on by Fraser for reward. Sergt. Murray was at the subway in charge of one of Boase's sections. Murray had been in the post with Boase. He was hit in the head but carried on - the rest of the men in the post seemed to have been scuppered. Murray was later put by Fraser in charge of a post right on top of the subway. (The bridge was stone and iron railings). Murray was hit, as he got back, in the groin and was captured ~~in~~ with Fraser.

BEAUREVOIR; 8th AUGUST; MONT ST. QUENTIN.

17th and 19th BATTALIONS.

20th BATTALION - August 8-12th.

JONCOURT

(Col. Sadlier - Lieut. Gill).

17th behind 18th. (as on map).

Orders were verbal. C.O. had to take barrage orders to Coys. about 10 minutes before Zero. While 17th. holding round Joncourt Germans put down a very heavy gas concentration on the village and the valley from 11.30 p.m., Oct. 2, to 4.30 a.m. On Oct. 3 to Etricourt trench. The men had to have a feed, be withdrawn, and taken to J.O. tape.

6.20 was zero. 8th Notts. and Derbys were on right and 5 Bdes. of F.A. behind. The barrage was good.

The Beaurevoir line was the first objective. 18th Bn. on right and 19th on left. 2nd. objective - 17th and 20th were ahead by Pomchaux (see on map). 17th Bn. had 300 rifles.

The Bn. was pulled out while gas was still being thrown - wearing gas helmets from 11.30 p.m. to J.O. German counter-barrage was gas - it was very dark, but fine.

Germans were holding first objective - a traced trench with two or three pillboxes and strongpoints at intervals.

Bn. got onto tape in first-class order.

On right the first objective was taken well by 18th. Bn. On left towards road they found that Estrees was not clear and 18th Bn. was held up. Consequently 17th Bn. were held up for about 2½ hours. They were lying out in front of the wire. They had heavy casualties, and the centre coy. was pretty well wiped out.

C (Capt. Wright)		
B (Capt. Ronald)		→
D (Capt. Mackenzie)		

Ronald was wounded 10 minutes after the show started.

The left Coy. about 2½ hours later worked through into 27 B. They were held up by M.G. fire from near La Motte farm and the heights ahead. 20th Bn. eventually got up the Torrens Canal.

Centre Coy. was so weak that some went with left Coy. and some with the right. All the officers of B Coy. except one were hit: Capt. Ronald, Lieut. Pettit, Lieut. Adams. Lieut. Richmond with his party got through in the end to 27B.

The right Coy. went forward very well and went through Wiencourt. By an hour after zero they were up in 29A on the high ground, with a tank, which was put out as soon as it got onto the high ground. This was the only tank 17 Bn. had - the others were late and did not take part.

The right Coy. was in touch with 8th Notts and Derbys on their right.

There was a gap between the two parties which were as marked on the map A and B.

The casualties had been heavy - and barely 200 rifles were now left.

The 18th Bn. were ordered up from 1st objective to fill the gap, but this help was slow in arriving. By midday the gas had begun to take effect. The men had begun to dribble back blind and sick.

By 4 p.m. there was only a handful of officers and men in either place.

With party A. Capt. Wright (C Coy.) was the only officer left.

With γ B party there were Lieuts. Sams, Tindale and Richmond. Wright was recalled to take charge of the Bn. in place of Col. Sadlier, who had been gassed. This left Sergt. J. M. Young, M.M. in charge of the party on the left, with only 10 men. They were just in potholes on the side of the hill - and the B party the same.

This was the situation when Col. Sadlier was evacuated.

The remnants of the 18th Bn. under Capt. Paine came up by 6 p.m. and filled in the gap.

24th and 22nd Bn. which had been near Bellicourt went up through Estrees. Arrangements were made on the phone about 6 for a jump-off at 6.30.

On 17th Bn. sector the 23rd Bn. moved through and dug in about 200 yds. ahead of the advanced position. The 17th Bn. line then became a support line.

At midnight Bn. was withdrawn to Etricourt, where it dug in.

WOUNDED: Col. Sadlier. His H.Q. was in a big pill-box at the east end of Joncourt - it was the only place where you could have a light, and it was hit six times in the night. The 18th Bn. H.Q. was a few hundred yards in the rear on the roadside - the Colonel had reconnoitred the area very thoroughly and they were the only places possible. The gas was falling all night; and stumbling about in the dark, if the show was to go, it was necessary to take off your gas helmet.

The Bn. consisted of 3 Coys. - B, C, D, - A having been cut out owing to shortage of numbers.

On H.Q. - <u>Lieut. Haig</u> , Adjt., since died.) Were all
<u>Lieut. McPhee</u> , Int. Off.) similarly
<u>Lieut. Masterson</u> , Asst. Int. Offr.) gassed.
<u>Lieut. Dark</u> , L.G. officer)
<u>Lieut. Blackford</u> , Sig. Offr.)

C Coy. - Lieut. Robertson, wounded in front of the wire
Lieut. Harries, gassed.
Lieut. Nicholson (on liaison with 32nd British Bde.)

B Coy. - Capt. Ronald (shell in front of wire, early)
Lieut. Phelps (in front of the wire, also early).
Lieut. Adam (about same time as Ronald - by a shell).
Captain H. T. Allan (on liaison with British 46th Divn. - gassed).

D Coy. - Captain Mackenzie, gassed
Lieut. Pettit, gassed
Lieut. Booth, gassed
Lieut. Moore, gassed
Capt. McLean, gassed.

A good many of these officers (e.g., Captain Mackenzie, Booth and Moore) were right up at the front at the extreme point before the gas disabled them. At H.Q. the C.O. was the last to go at 4 p.m. - none went before midday.

At Joncourt the Bn. was in the front line and could not be withdrawn. They had to be fed twice (they had no meal since the night before). They were very wretchedly sick. Had the Bn. been concentrated just behind the line there would have been less difficulty in escaping the gas. But with front-line troops it was impossible in any way to avoid it - it just had to be stuck. The officers who remained on duty were all gassed also.

The British on the right were heavily gassed right back to division.

On Oct. 3rd the 8th Notts and Derbys made a magnificent attack on right of 5th Bde. The two C.O.'s of the Bn. next to us were killed.

The 17th Bn. started with a frontage of about 1700 or 1600 yds., lengthening out at the final objective to about 3000 yds.

The tanks, which had been told that it was a 3-hour trip up to the start, took 13 hours - they had trouble in the Hindenburg line.

The barrage hours only arrived at Bn. H.Q. 20 mins. before Zero. The barrage was to be six mins. on the first objective - then lift to the high ground - then shoot on chosen points.

The British Bns. on the right were very full in strength and their objectives much smaller than ours.

19th BATTALION:- ESTREES - BEAUREVOIR.

(Col. Bateman).

one
Had ~~the~~ Coy. on right of road, three on left - went in with 4 Coys.

XXX

Capt. Sell / D
Capt Trennery / C
Lt Belcher / B
Capt Hinds / A

19th Bn. H.Q. was with 20th Bn. H.Q. (Col. Bateman and Col. Forbes) under the Rowan Road in the trench just west of Estrees.

4 tanks were allotted - two got ditched at Bellicourt. The other two were late (probably a quarter of an hour late) One of the tanks ditched had been allotted to the White House. On the previous day Lieut. Belcher had reported a lot of movement near the White Cottage on the road between the two lines of the Beaurevoir line. The objective of 19th Bn. was the Beaurevoir system for 1500 yds. north of the road. 20th Bn. was to pass through there and 19th Bn. to follow through 500 yds. ^{in rear as support.} ~~in support~~

There were about 15-20 gas casualties - it was not so bad as on the right.

Col. Bateman sent Lt. Vickers forward in rear of second wave with a phone to keep up information as to how the fight was going. He got in rear of C Coy. and got touch with the C.O. about 7.30 a.m. He reported that the attack had gone well, Beurevoir line clear and 20th Bn. were passing through 19th. C and D Coys. had gone through, but A and B were held up. They got up to the wire in 27A & C but it was very thick and not cleared. There they got very heavy M.G. fire from the White House - the left did not know that the right was held up, and so it went straight on. The 18th Bn. also reported that they had trouble on the right of the road.

Of the 12 officers who went over 8 were wounded. Almost all of these were wounded in the first half-hour. D Coy. on the left lost all its officers and sergts. In getting through Capt. Sells and Lieut. Hampson were hit by M.G. Both later died of wounds. (Sells was gassed also, and died of pneumonia). And when they came back that night there was a corporal in charge of the Coy. - the C.S.M. and all the sergts. had been killed or wounded.

When the source of the trouble was located, General Martin asked if it would be possible to get all the men away from that area around the German nest and strafe the cottage. This shoot was fixed for 11 p.m. The artillery was arranged for 300 yds. on either side of the road, front and support line. The two Coys. of 19th were to be ready to bomb up from either flank when the bombardment ceased. The cottage was heavily shot up - because when the parties worked round in the front trench practically no opposition was put up. 18 M.G.'s were got there.

The White Cottage surrendered - 6 officers and 200 prisoners were estimated from this area.

About 8 or 9 a.m. the whippet tanks came up on being sent for - but as they came out through the village they were very heavily met and all knocked.

20th Bn. got away up past La Motte Farm making towards the windmill and Beurevoir. Col. Forbes then issued instructions that they were not to go ~~farward~~ beyond the canal until the situation was cleared up. The line finally reached about La Motte Farm.

The 2 Coys. of 19th Bn. which had cleared (with some of 18th.) the first objective, pushed on to Gill up the gap between the left of 20th Bn. and right of 17th Bn.

About 4 p.m. 24th and 22nd. moved up past the NE outskirts of Estrees to the Beurevoir line N. of the road, awaiting orders. Eventually, about 5.45 p.m., Col. Wilshire and Col. James came down to 19th Bn. H.Q. and arranged the further advance there.

Their Zero hour was 6.30. The two C.O.'s left H.Q. 19th Bn. at 6.5. They got through with few casualties to the windmill and were in touch with 7th Bde. on left.

19th Bn. went in with about 230 rifles and had about 120 casualties, including 8 out of 12 officers.

19th Bn was relieved that night and came back west of Estrees. They were standing by for the taking of ~~Montbrechain~~ Montbrechain but were not used.

It was expected that the Beurevoir line would be fully dug from the way in which it was wired and the distinctness of the trenches on air photos.

Not a man was lost in the second attempt - the mapping up of the trenches. All the casualties were in the first hour.

The two Coys. of 19th Bn. which pushed through the first objective went on afterwards to the 20th Bn.'s left and made a flank along the Torrens Canal. The frontage was very big and this was why the left did not know of the position on the right.

The whippets were sent up on the strength of the information sent back that 20th Bn. had gone through on the left.

- A Coy. Capt. Hinds, wounded.
Lieut. Gordon, wounded.
- B Coy. Lieut. Hall.
- C Coy. 2 officers.
died of wounds
- D Coy. Capt. Sells (Who was original Bn. M.C.
(Morlancourt; bar Aug. 8, but didn't know it)
2/Lieut. Hampson, died of wounds. M.C. at
Mont St. Quentin and didn't know it).
Lieut. Maclean (since died from illness).

17th BATTALION: SOMME; MONT ST. QUENTIN.

(Lieut. Gill; Lieut. Crofts).

On morning of 29 August 17th Bn. started about 5.30 a.m. from a reserve position at Cappy down the Dompierre Road following 19th Bn. - to the trench system south of Frise (2 miles south of it). They then turned NE towards Mersancourt Wood and halted in the trench system running south from the centre of the south side of the wood. Here they came in touch with the rear Coy. of 19th Bn. and got into artillery formation there.

About 8.30 a.m. rear Coy. of 19th Bn. moved forward and 17th Bn. started again moving in artillery formation. They were now about in that day's new ground.

On reaching 21 Central 2 Coys. remained in Wilkind trench and Guerriers Alley. The two forward Coys. moved to a position in 22 A. & D. At Wilkind avenue they were followed by some R.H.A. who came under observation there from the heights near Mont St. Quentin and were shelled.

The two forward Coys. remained in 22 B and D. They presently moved into Guerriers Alley. By this time 19th Bn., with 18th Bn. on left, were fighting the enemy down the slopes in 23 and in the wood.

17th Bn. was instructed to stay there till further orders.

The Germans could be seen near east of Halle and East of Park Wood - horses, etc., moving. Later in the afternoon - about 6 p.m. - the Battn. Commanders interviewed the G.O.C. and it was decided to prepare an operation to attack Mont St. Quentin from this side of the river.

At Midnight G.O.C. Division came to a conference at 19th Bn. H.Q. in the quarry south of Feuilleres - and definite instructions were issued.

Engineers were sent to Omiecourt to prepare a crossing there and another at the junction of the canal du Nord and Somme canal. 18th Bn. was to effect the crossing at Omiecourt and establish bridgehead guards NE of the river.

Zero was at dawn. At dawn 20th Bn. was to cross at Omiecourt and attack Mont St. Quentin from NW.

17th Bn. was to cross at the junction and attack Mont St. Quentin from SW. Everything was prepared for this. The engineers were sent down. They reported, after making every effort, that it was absolutely impossible to erect suitable bridges.

About half an hour before Zero word was received that the operation was cancelled and that all Bns. except 19th Bn. would move back and take up positions in the trench system west of Mereaucourt Wood. 19th Bn. was to remain near Ormiecourt and defend that locality.

This move back was completed by 8 a.m. The Bn. had had no rest that night. They had not been shelled while in waiting position. On arriving in position a conference of Bn. C.O.'s was ordered ~~xxx~~ at Bde. H.Q. south of Frise.

17th Bn.: Orders were received to cross the river at Feuilleres; and on crossing it Bn. was to get into artillery formation and move practically along the north bank of the river towards Clery, following 20th Bn.

It was understood at this time that Clery was clear of the Germans. There was just time to inform O.C.'s Coys. Bn. started at 11 a.m., crossed the river, after a hot meal, moved along the north bank, and, on reaching the NW corner of the village, found that 20th Bn. had come in contact with the enemy. Just before reaching Clery the Bn. had to move up into the Neck which the road and the railway make there. Here it ran onto the tail of 20th Bn. halted - as they had hit on the Germans at the northern end of the village.

There was nothing to do except for 17th Bn. to get into the trenches just north of the embankment - Odce (?) Alley. The Bn. H.Q. was established in the embankment just west of Clery with 20th Bn. H.Q. beside it. Major Fussell, O.C., conferred with Col. Forbes. There was a lot of shellfire, and this end of the village was heavily shelled. The German seemed to be moving a great deal down the two old opposing front line systems - and each Bn. had artillery liaison officers with them. Information was sent to Bde. by phone.

About 4 p.m. instructions were received from Bde. to make an extra effort to push forward; 20th Bn. moved a little and took a few prisoners east of the village. But no definite move could be made owing to the maze of trenches east of the village.

3rd Div. was holding the high ground north of Clery - they were also said to be holding Berlingott trench.

The shelling in Clery was heavy. Our shelling was heavier still on the Germans - it was retaliation apparently. Artillery all round was very active.

About 9 p.m., after constant interchange of information by phone, etc., with Bde., information came that a conference was being held by Division which would probably result in a definite decision on the method of attack on Mont St. Quentin. They knew that they were going for Mont St. Quentin somehow.

At about midnight an operation order was issued by telephone. A great number of artillery brigades were co-operating. 17th Bn. was to move forward by 5 a.m., which was to be zero, to positions in I.7. B & D (in the old German front and ~~xxx~~ support line system). They were to be there by 5 a.m. (It was apparently known also by Division that it would mean fighting). About 12.30 a.m. a conference of Coy. Commanders was held and they were given first verbal instructions as to what was to be done; and at about 3 a.m. a written operation order was issued by Coy. Commanders - there was no time to send a written order from Bde. but it was dictated through phone. A rum ration arrived about then and was much appreciated by everyone.

There was still shelling, but after dark it had eased a lot.

About 3 a.m. the C.O. visited all the Coy. Commanders in their new positions.

They had reached these without much trouble and had taken about 20 prisoners.

The problem was this: At 5 a.m. the Bn. was to move off from the J.O. line with two Coys. in front and two in support. That meant (to reach this exact position) moving east from east end of village for about 500 yds.; then swinging south practically wheeling on the bend of the river; then wheeling left again and facing Mont. St. Quentin straight on.

Bn. started about 2 a.m. (?). It filed through Eleu Alley.

— C — B — A — D —→

Thus - in single file.

The front line east of Clery was at this time held by 20th Bn. which had bumped into Germans there in the afternoon and had cleared the trenches east of the village for about 500 yds.

20th Bn. were to be on left of 17th. in this attack, and had moved out of these trenches by the time 17th Bn. moved through them.

The Coys. of 17th Bn. were to reach their hopping-off position - the exact method of getting there had to be a matter for each Coy. Commander - and it had been decided by arrangement between them that they would do this by a lot of bluff. If they met any Germans they had arranged to make a lot of noise and rush at them - and bluff them.

The prisoners taken during the earlier hours had been of 80th. I.R. (?).

In working down the trenches beyond those that the 20th Bn. had reached, 17th Bn. came upon parties of Germans. Even the end, B, Coy., which was in front of C at the end of the procession, met a couple of Germans in part of this maze. B Coy. was then making down the road above the steep Somme Bank round the river bend. The forward Coys. who met some German posts were fired on but they came on them suddenly in the dense pitch darkness and made use of the bluff they had decided on.

They led out round near Freckles Wood and then faced east. The river was to be their guide.

B Coy. came to about 13 Central when dawn broke and the barrage descended on Mont St. Quentin. They broke out into artillery formation:

B| A| →
C| D|

The barrage came down near the village and the whole lot went straight for the village. They were extended now. Everyone could see Mont St. Quentin standing up and it was simply a case of getting for it as fast as possible.

When D and A were passing Park Wood, A Coy. Commandr. Capt. Allen, noticed that D Coy. was getting trouble from Park Wood; and he decided that it was too big to leave unguarded. Orders were to leave mopping up till later and simply go for Mont St. Quentin and get there - but this opposition on the right seemed pretty dangerous. Capt. Allen accordingly led off to the right through the wood and took a great many M.G.'s. The enemy ran for their lives from the wood - but a number were captured there.

Probably they did not realise how small the attack was. It was daylight now and the attack simply depended on its swiftness and determination. This Coy. lost very few here. The casualties of all Coys. were very light up to the village. The Germans whom Bn. was now meeting were the Alexander Regt. of the Guards who had come into the line that night. They seemed to be simply overcome by the pace of the attack and made very little opposition. (H.T. Allan had seen M.G. fire coming from that wood but when he got near the guns they ran, leaving their guns).

Allan worked through the wood quickly and then followed through on the right rear of the attack to Gott mit Uns trench.

The rest of the Bn. was practically in one line as it swept on towards the village - the fire was coming from the village; the trenches between Mont St. Quentin and the canal did not seem to be occupied.

The canal - which had been feared as a serious obstacle turned out to be dry and not an obstacle. The wire in I.15.A & C. was very thick - old German wire, concertina and other, very thick indeed, and the slope had become very steep. The pace was a fast walk - some had to trot.

They lay up for a breather in a trench a little way south of the junction of Agram Alley and the Mont St. Quentin Feuillact. road. They waited there a few minutes. Then (on someone blowing a whistle) they started off again. From there it was a rush.

The Germans were in Elsa trench. They fired a few shots and most of them cleared into the rubble and ruin of houses behind. A number were killed in or about Elsa trench. From there it became a scramble of different parties routing Germans who were in holes and corners in the ruins with M.G. positions scattered through them.

The orders were to get a footing at the village and make as much ground on the hill as they could. Numbers of parties got into the village - there was fighting going on in the village. Capt. Manfields party (D Coy.) went through the right portion of the village. The NE ~~corner~~ edge of the village was being shelled by our own artillery. Shortly after our troops reached the village the Germans shelled it also. When C Coy. got forward - it was originally right rear - it worked mainly in the centre.

By about 6.30 the troops were up in the village. Lieut. Croft, for example, with his men got up the Aziecourt Road on the N. of slope into the quarry. As parties found that they were isolated and disconnected they gradually formed their line on the edges of the village where Elsa trench gave them a line. Shortly after (?) A Coy. got into Gott mit Uns and Uber Alles trenches (?) - (more probably they mistook Agram Alley for these) - and 19th Bn. (who came up to form a defensive flank) were mingled in with the others near the objective. The left of Bn. was exactly opposite the opening of Elsa trench onto the road - across the road. At 10 a.m. Lieut. Small, O.C. C Coy., and Lieut. Richardson (one of his officers) brought the ~~remnants~~ remnants of C Coy. along Elsa trench and then led them out across the road and down ~~the~~ a short distance of trench in the direction of 9 Central. They found there was nothing there - 20th might have been there, but naturally in a fight like this all battalions would be intermixed on the objective - finding that flank completely in the air they turned back; and as Small and Richardson were walking up the road they were hit by a minenwerfer bomb and both killed.

These German minnies were heavies - some way beyond the wood probably. (not in the quarry, because a party of our own people under Lieut. Croft had been there when our barrage shifted them - about 12 Germans were captured on

the edge of the quarry, including a map-drawing section with a lot of maps). The Germans followed down this trench opposite Elsa trench. The left party was on the road bank about 10 yards further south, and was finally bombed into Elsa trench where the left rested. This would probably be about 11 a.m.

Bn. H.Q. knew about 9 a.m. by runners and by wounded men that they had got into the village, but the situation up there was not definite. No one at the start thought there was a ghost of a chance. When the vast numbers of prisoners came trooping down it was almost incredible - the Bn. had so few men that it seemed impossible they could have collected them. Bde. got 79 guns actually carried out afterwards (Park Wood was simply populated by machinegunners) The Alexander Regt. had just relieved or it would scarcely have allowed a man to get across the slopes north of Halle Wood. The Germans cannot have known how small our attacking force was.

About 11.30 the position in the village was still a bit indefinite at H.Q. But about this time the German artillery began to lay down a heavy strafe, especially on the western edge of the village and on the road. It was then that the casualties of Bn. really became numerous. This shelling went on all day. At the early stages German M.G. fire came from Johannes trench into Uber Alles and Gott mit Uns trench $\frac{1}{2}$ 1000 yds. in front of them.

A wire was sent to Bde. asking for artillery onto this trench far behind our front line.

There were isolated local counterattacks - 6 or 7. The Germans dribbled down to the road and into the ruins and got M.G.'s set up there firing very close.

Our artillery was very close up - 4/6-in. howitzers being on the road close behind Brags Alley in 12A.9.9. where 17th Bn. H.Q. was. There were very quickly field artillery in front of this H.Q. in 1 c. and 7 A. The main part of the German barrage in the early stages came down on the east edge of Clery and the Somme bank east of the bend - that made it clear where he expected us. All day the shelling with 5.9's and 4.2's was heavy there, 12 B & D.

The counterattacks did not move the line at all from where it was. There were no reserves in ~~the~~ the Brigade. During the earlier half of the day the left of 17th linked up with 20th Bn. just below the bend of the road. The line may generally be said to have been in the nearest trenches to the main road. Towards evening the shelling eased. It probably covered attempts at counterattack.

Knowing how unsafe the situation was, bombs, ammunition and machine gunners (Vickers and Lewis) were sent up.

18th Bn. had been in reserve. They moved up just before dusk into trenches in support of 17th Bn. (probably in Galatz and Agram Alley).

There the line remained until the next day. A meal (curry included) was sent up after dark - and rum.

SEPTEMBER 1st. Between 9 and 10 the 6th Bde. went through.

On left in St Quentin were Capt. Manifold, Lieut. Fitzallen, D. Coy., Lieut. Massey (hit by a whizzbang there), Lieut. Adam, Lieut. Nicholson, Lieut. Croft.

On right were Capt. Allen, Lieut. Phelps, Lieut. Robertson.

Lieut. McPhee was Int. Offr.

(Lieut. Napper, 19th. Bn., was killed near Croft, and Hampson also was there on left - since killed).

17th Bn. was withdrawn when 24th Bn. went through. This was much later than dawn - probably about 9 or 10 a.m. 24th Bn. came through the trenches up to 17th Bn. position and went over from there during the morning.

17th Bn. then came back half-way to Florina trench and Florina support, and into these trenches at dark.

Lieut.s. Small and Richardson, killed (as above).

Lieut. Worthington, wounded in the advance on the lower slopes by M.G.

Lieut. Mailler was also wounded about the same time by shell.

Lieut. Flood was wounded in the early stages. (M.C. for this for dash in settling Germans in early stage. He killed about 6 and was hit on the side of the head as he was going for a big German).

Lieut. Massey, wounded about midday by nosecap of a shell.

(Small was an original man, a New Guinea man, commissioned after Pozieres; a great favourite and very cheerful by disposition. It was he who led the counterattack at Morlancourt; a Sydney man.)

Lieut. Flood M.C. this stunt.

Croft got M.C. at Mont St. Quentin.

Capt. Manifold also got M.C. for this.


It was Sergt. Dolan who was surrounded by Germans on the top of the hill and ~~was~~ broke away.

Major Fussell commanded 17th Bn. in this.

AUGUST 8th - 19th BATTALION.

Col. Bateman took over on 3rd Aug. Bn. C.O.'s were told on 4th. General Monash's letter was read to Coys. at 5 p.m. in the Aubigay system behind Villers Bretonneux.

J.O. line of 19th Bn. was on right of 20th. Their right was on the road. Front about 1200 yds. Went over with about 280 rifles - i.e., miners, signallers, etc. 7th Bde. on right of 19th. This line was inside our old line. 24th Bn. held a screen in the Abancourt line covering the assembly. They had instructions to withdraw half an hour before Zero.



XXX

The assembly was very quiet. Bn. came up round north of Villers Bretonneux past the big camouflaged H.Q. and so on in. They lay in the open on tapes. The line was sited back a SW direction in order to conform to the movement on the right.

There was a very heavy fog. Each battn. had (?6) tanks on its front - the right number turned up. The 19th

Battn. objective was in the trench system 800 yds. west of Warfusee. The right Coy. under Lieut. Sell got 19 M.G.'s on its sector in posts along or beside the road, scattered very irregularly. The Boche could not see and they were right on him before he could fight. Any fire was wild and unaimed. The M.G.'s were well sited but the fog quite prevented them from being of use. There was no trench system - 2 or 3 M.G.'s and a little dugout for the crew in a short length of isolated trench.

During the early stage it was exceedingly hard to keep direction - Coys. got mixed - in some cases the tanks came back towards our line completely lost. About 5.30 Lieut. Satchel, Sig. Offr., who took out a phone, wired that the was out about 1000 yds. east of Abancourt trench. All M.G. fire had ceased and the German was doing no ~~shaking~~ shelling. It looked as if the German were getting away the guns in the Warfusee Valley - and this turned out so; the Germans got most of those guns clear by the time we reached that place.

xxx

C/A/
B/D/ →

About 6 a.m. word arrived that both front line Coys. were on their objective, and 17th Bn. had gone through followed by 8th Bde:

D Coy. - Sells.
A Coy. - Major Boyden.

At 6.30 Bn. H.Q., which had been in front of the tapes in a Coy. H.Q., moved forward to a trench on the road just west of the objective.

Battn. lost 42 altogether. Lieut. Griffiths was killed near one of the small German posts by the road - he evidently went straight for the M.G. and was killed about 6ft. from it; his body was almost in the trench.

Major Boyden was wounded in the leg. Receipts were obtained for over 300 prisoners. 38 M.G.'s and 12 M'werfers were sent back to the transport lines.

Supply tanks took up bombs and ammunition. As one of these was returning about 7 a.m. it went up on a land mine at about 27D.8.7. This burst the caterpillar and it ran off it. Another tank had struck a mine just south of this other one, near the road. There were two nests, 6 mines in a nest - and each nest was surrounded by a couple of strands of barbed wire. Inside this were in each case 6 things looking like kerosene tins with 3 or 4 inches sticking above ground.

xxx



One tank had hit each of these and the effect was the same in each case - the caterpillar rolled off. An R.E. Sergt. was later on these to keep people off them. In the supply tank, which was full of Australians and crew, no one was hurt. All scrambled out after a heavy explosion.

Bn. stayed there that night.

AUGUST 9th. - Next day, just before midday, the 19th. moved to support 17th Bn. in an attack on Framerville.

Just before Col. Bateman left H.Q. west of Warfusee a message came that 2nd Div. would continue the advance at 11.30 a.m. It was then about 11.15, but they were 2-3 hours march away from the Blue Line. Col. Bateman left Capt. McMeekin to bring Bn. on, and pushed up to a G.O.'s conference near Harbonnieres.

The order for attack was then given by Brigadier at the crucifix in 5 C. NW of Harbonnieres. Zero hour was given as 4.30 p.m.

20th	18th
19th	17th

Instructions to 19th were not to enter Framerville unless 17th Bn. were in difficulties.

They passed through 8th Bde. Instructions to Coys. were not to get nearer than 500 yds. to Framerville. They formed artillery formation as they came out of Morcourt gully. They stayed 500 yds. west of Framerville. At about 10 p.m. 19th Bn. was ordered back from here to the Blue line in support to 17th and 18th Bns.

Only 2 casualties this day.

On Aug. 11 there was a further advance, and 19th and 20th took part in this.

The J.O. position was just NE of Framerville. A line was taped in the Chateau grounds. Zero was 4 a.m. There was a mist early. There was a barrage. 7th Bde. and 20th Bn. attacked at same time. It was a good thick barrage but ragged. The German reply was heavies on Framerville and Vauvillers villages - not heavy on troops. The 20th Bn. had a difficult job as their flank was open. But 19th Bn. had no great difficulty - 150 prisoners were taken. They reached a line not quite so far as the objective on the east side of the gully, in touch with 7th Bde. The 20th Bn. had a difficult time, but by midday 19th Bn. linked with them - they were across on the west side of the gully. Rainecourt

About midday runners from beyond ~~Rainecourt~~ reported that they were getting sniped from Rainecourt. A party of 17th Bn. was sent up there and got a M.G. and 6 men.

There were about 50 casualties. The German machine gunners at this time seemed to be working differently. They would now hang on for a time and then drop back with their guns instead of hanging on to the finish. It was concluded by most of the officers facing them that they had instructions to inflict casualties and retire - typical rearguard casualties.

Night of Aug. 11.- 19th Bn. was relieved by 22nd. and 24th Bns. The 5th Bde. came back to the Blue Line. Bn. H.Q. for this attack had been in a cellar in Framerville. The barrage was practically all heavy artillery.

19th BATTALION: MONT ST. QUENTIN.

6th Bde. was holding the line on 28th Aug. Late in afternoon of 28th Aug. 6th Bde. definitely cleared the system SE of Frise. The bend of the river to north greatly increased the frontage. The 5th Bde. took over the part ~~of~~ North of the grid between

19 20 21 22 to 24 and
25 - 30.

7th Bde. took over to south of this line. The grid E and W between 13 and 19 squares was the Bn. boundary - 18th to north of it, 19th to south; each Bn. having thus 1000 yards of front.

20th 18th

17th 19th

The Frise trench system was clear about an hour before dusk. If 6th Bde. could clear these 18th Bn. were to work along the river and try and get bridgeheads at Feuilleres and Omiecourt. There was more opposition at Frise than had been expected, and it was now late on Aug. 28. 18th Bn. went through and after dark worked through Mereaucourt Wood and reached the Feuilleres-Herbecourt road by about midnight. About midnight the Germans blew up the Feuilleres bridges. This was the position at dawn. At dawn on Aug. 29th 19th Bn pushed up from Eclusier quarry where it had been during the night, got in touch with the right of 18th Bn. and moved due east along the plateau towards Somme, 2 Coys. in front, 1 in support, 1 in reserve. There was no opposition until they reached the high ground overlooking the Somme. The German was holding Bazincourt Wood on the slopes down to the river - here the Bn. came under observation from the hills behind Peronne. Lieut. Cecil Healy, the swimmer, was hit here in the leg by a M.G. He got up and pointed out the position in which this M.G. was firing - and was hit again through the neck and killed.

The wood had to be cleared of several M.G.'s. It was clear about midday. The M.G.'s were captured. But it is thought the gunners swam the river.

The next thing was to force a passage across the Somme. The only chance was the bridge near the junction of the Somme with the Canal du Nord. The arrangement was (Coy. Commanders knew) that if they could get the crossings they were to rush Mont St. Quentin next day, through Omiecourt and this southern crossing. They could cross the Somme canal by a bridge which had been partially destroyed - a wooden bridge. But on getting across you were faced by about 500 yds. of marsh. The causeway used by the Germans (a wooden construction north of the Nord Canal) had been broken in several places. It was later used by us for wagon traffic. The Nord Canal bank didn't exist. The Germans were in Halle and were pretty quiet - they didn't fire on our movement by the river.

Next thing was - the engineers had to bridge the marshes on the night of Aug. 29 to effect a crossing, while another was arranged at Omiecourt.

17th 19th. -----Halle
18th 20th. -----Omiecourt.

Everyone thought this was going to come off, but by 3 a.m. engineers decided that they couldn't get a crossing at either place. They brought material down by the roads to the river, but the further they went the more difficulties

there were.

19th Bn. was to cross at 5 a.m. on Aug. 30. The whole scheme was called off about 4.30 a.m.

17th, 18th and 20th went at once back to Feuilleres; 19th Bn. had to hold whole Bde. front. 19th Bn. extended from west side of Somme Canal in 17A.4.9. down to about 24D.9.1.

There were Germans in Omiecourt on 30 Aug. and in east of Clery also. Germans held Omiecourt bridge.

As 20th Bn. passed through Omiecourt bridgehead NE of Somme the Germans in Omiecourt cleared out. Col. Bateman on afternoon of 30th Aug., about 3 p.m., sent an officer and 30 men across the bridge over the Somme Canal at 17A.4.9., and they worked along the timbered country south of the Somme and reported Omiecourt clear but the East bank held. The Germans were out of the marshes SW of the Somme. (18th Bn. had previously on 29 Aug. effected a crossing at the same bridge at 17A.4.9., but met opposition in the woods south of the river).

The engineers undertook to have the Omiecourt bridge fit for traffic by 3.30 a.m. Col. Bateman did not at this time (on evening of Aug. 30) know that 19th Bn. would be in the attack. He sent one officer from each Coy. to reconnoitre the way down to the bridge in 17A.4.9. The Int. Offr. (Lieut. Armit) had himself reconnoitred (before the patrol of 19th Bn.) down towards Omiecourt by himself.

(The Germans offered a big reward - Iron Cross, 3 weeks' leave and money for the blowing up of this bridge, and they did attempt it - Armit later got the papers).

At 1.30 a.m. on Aug. 31st 19th Bn. C.O. got operation order by phone for the attack. Typed order arrived at 2.20 a.m. Bn. H.Q. was at the quarry in 15D.3.2. It looked a pretty hopeless job. Colonel sent message for Coy. commander to come to him, but 2nd. in commands to get their coys. moved down at once to the bridge.


The Coy. Commanders got orders for the attack. They left Bn. H.Q. at 3.30 walking - pitch black.

The information was that 7A and C were clear and that they had to cross the bridge at Omiecourt and be in assembly position 7B at 5 a.m.

Barrage was to fall on line roughly Halle, Park Wood and Pekin trench 5 - 5.30; lift from 5.30 to 6 on anvil wood Gott mit uns trench, Mont St. Quentin and Feuillacourt; 6 - 6.30 to lift onto Mont St. Quentin wood. It was to stand there.

20th Bn to take Feuillacourt; 17th Bn. Mont St. Quentin; 19th Bn. to protect flank in Uber Alles and Gott mit Uns trenches. 18th Bn. in reserve west of Clery.

Bn. crossed bridge and got to assembly position - as close to bank of river as they could get.



They got into position (D & A) under the big bank and the other two just inland. The four Coy. Commanders were the only ones who knew what the real idea really was. They had not time to convey it to the platoons, which were scattered. The commanders of B and D were both hit early in the fight.

They pushed on - getting away about 5 a.m. They got touch with 17th Bn. and from there on the whole advance seems to have been at the double. They made pretty well straight for the objective - the left Coy. of 19th. and right of 17th Bn. seem to have met in the NE head of Uber Alles trench. B Coy. was up there, D next to them; A Back along

Rothwell trench and Agram Alley, and C in Galatz Alley. The Coys. were well mixed up, but this was the place of the Coy. H.Q.

They found Germans strong in the aviation ground, and a whizzbang gun was firing point-blank from there. The casualties were light in getting there - the trouble was in hanging on. If Gott mit Uns trench was occupied it can only have been the head of it.

H.Q. moved across through Feuilleres for the quarry west of Clery. It was then about 5 a.m.

The Germans clearly thought that the attack was from the river, for his artillery pased the whole slope where the 19th Bn. had been. It was not till later that he pased the western slope.

Prisoners were coming down in droves after dawn - first lot about 6 a.m.

6.30. - Bn. H.Q. came up through village to near 20th Bn., 7A.5.0. A message had come that 20th Bn. was on objective (later in day they were driven back) in touch with 17th, who were in touch with 19th.

About 9 a.m. Capt. Ronald, 17th Bn., came down to 19th Bn. H.Q. He said the position was pretty anxious at the front. The line was thinly held, Germans were trying to get in between 17th and 20th Bns. and were trying to work round flank of 19th Bn.

Col. Bateman went to Col. Forbes close by and tried to get touch with Bde. - lines were all down.

18th Bn. was then under orders to push through 19th Bn. and link up Mont St. Quentin and St. Denis and cut off Peronne. Forbes and Bateman decided that it was best to hold onto what they had got. They saw Major Robertson, 18th Bn., and arranged with him to send 2 Coys. in support line between 17th and 20th. They let Bde. know as soon as possible. This action was confirmed.

There was nothing at the back between 9 a.m. and 2 p.m. If Germans had attacked in strength it was very critical. As it was they hung on. 6th Bde. and 14th Bde. came through early in afternoon around the river bend.

About 4 p.m. the river bend was alive with troops in the trenches and the big bank - pouring in from midday to 4 p.m.

The 19th were being sniped in the trenches from Mont St. Quentin all day. Word was received that 6th Bde. was relieving next morning. 23rd. Bn. went through 19th Bn.; 24th through 17th Bn.

During the night the Germans had worked back and occupied Florina trench. 23rd Bn. went through and was held up by fire from Anvil Wood.

19th Bn. had been instructed by C.O. not to leave their trenches on the Flank till the position was secure ahead. 6th Bde. made a second attack about 2 p.m. under heavy barrage on Mont St. Quentin wood. This succeeded.

19th Bn. was then brought back to Florina trench. H.Q. moved up there and they were in reserve.

Lieuts. Napper and Plummer were both killed near the wall at the head of Uber Alles trench.

Capt. McMeekin and Lieut. Pearce wounded.

19th Bn. lost 120 men here.

19th BATTALION:8 and 11th August.M.C.'s.

Capt. McMeekin
 Capt. Sell (Bar) - d. of w.
 Lieut. Hughes,
 Lieut. Fleming,
 Lieut. Satchell,
 Lieut. Gordon,
 Lieut. Pearce
 Lieut. Plummer (killed at Mont St. Quentin)

St. Quentin, 31 August.

Lieut. Hempson (d. of w.)
 Seaborn
 Hall
 Armit
 Hinds

October 3rd.

Lieut. Hayes,
 Fitzroy
 Vickers

On October 12th - 19th Bn. was broken up at Vignacourt:
 A Coy. to 17th; B Coy. to 18th; D Coy. to 20th; C platoon
 to each.

5th BRIGADE: AUGUST 8th.

Before 5th Bde. started the tank authorities decided to bring up their supply tanks to the orchard NE of Villers Bretonneux where an anti-tank gun was. Lieut. Little (Bde. transport officer) 5th Bde. when he heard it told Bde. and protested - and at once made arrangements for pack transport, as the place was so obvious and known to be strafed. About 3 p.m. Aug. 3 the Germans put a shell into these tanks - the third hit one and they began to burn. Opinions differ as to whether the tanks had been seen. Once it burnt the Germans began to shell the place heavily. An Australian artillery supply tank was there with some details camped by, and two sergts. in attempting to douse the flames with extinguishers were blown up by the explosion of the destructive charges in the tanks (to blow them up) and the Stokes mortar bombs. Lieut. Griffiths, Tank Corps, got one tank out though burning and with the next tank blazing, and two others got away. 17 were burnt. Griffith's tank (5th Bde. supply) was blown up next day by a mine in returning to do a second trip for the 7th Bde. This was the tank Col. Bateman, 19th Bn., saw go up.

One of a tank crew was blown clear through the door out of a tank - dead. The tanks burnt till dusk and looked as if they must give the secret away.

20th BATTALION - AUGUST 8th.

(Col. Forbes, Capt. Portman, Lieut. Cameron).

Came up from Aubigny line up Pioneer switch and led out onto J.O. line behind front line, held by 6th Bde., who withdrew two hours ~~later~~ before Zero. No difficulty in finding the way as 5th Bde. knew country well. It was very dark. The fog came down about half an hour before Zero and was so thick that you could lose even the runner who was with you.

xxx

Lt Oliver A / C
(Since Lt) / Capt Portman

Capt Moore D / B
Lt Cameron.

The Germans seemed mostly to be in the strongpoint 500 to 1000 yds. south of Tailloux Wood. There were a few Germans in potholes in front. We found that work had been going on on an unfinished fire trench south from Tailloux Wood - the tape was still there.

The Germans were actually met first in some trenches about 150 yards ahead of the junction of Aileen trench. In the next sunken road our artillery had been heavy - the Germans had cleared out of the banks in that road into the crop behind it - and were hopping up there wounded when the Bn. got along. The tanks came up along the road to the left - their officers arrived just as the Bn. moved off, and said that they would send the tanks along in that direction - the tanks on the left came up just after Bn. had its objective - along this road. When they pushed through the objective with a Bn. of 4th Div., which lost its way. When 20th Bn. got into the objective there were a number of Germans in a strongpoint ahead the existence of which was known to the officers beforehand. It was a collection of strongpoints which had been very heavily strafed. There were a great number of potholes about and almost everyone had been hit. As soon as left of Bn. got in Sergt. Sparkes of C Coy. went out straight away and scouted all around the strongpoint and came back to say that it was heavily held by the Germans. There had been a number of Germans in the objective also - but these had already been taken. This S/P was firing pretty heavily - it had about 6 M.G.'s in action. Just as Capt. Portman and his Coy. were going out against it Sparkes came in with his information. Portman was about 100 yds. out. He sent Sparkes and Lieut. Thomas around the left. They worked around the Germans. As soon as they were within 20 yds. the Germans surrendered. It was at this time the 4th Div. Bn. was going through. The tank there was the supply tank - she was probably mined - she was heeled over in a shellhole - she had come out of the re-entrant at the south end of the wood. About 65 Germans were in that strongpoint.

Out of the whole collection of strongpoints about 150 Germans were got, and about 150 out of the trench south of it - say 250 in all. It was a good line - but it looked as if they relied on the strongpoints. No tank had been at these trenches or at the strongpoint till long after the attack.

By this time the right of 20th Bn. was ahead in Warfusee. They were not sure of their objective in the mists. When 18th Bn. went through they went with them. A number of Germans were on the top by the road at 29 B.2.7. and there was a fight there in old gun positions - the Germans fought well. When advance got to the next steep valley, there the 20 under Portman became certain they had gone too far - and came back to proper position. 5th Div. (8th Bde.) had passed through and things were going well. There were guns in the Warfusee Valley - that was where they were first met with. They were dug in on the crest of the gully. Some of the sights were brought back - trails of these guns were laid on timber. The angles of fire were very wide indeed - and the floor of the gunpit boarded.

2/Lieut. Mackenzie was hit at the start by a M.G. bullet.

Lieut. Elkington was hit in taking a M.G. position in the objective - working down the trench - he was hit by a potato masher.

The fog had been too thick when the S/P was taken for them more than just see the tank about 100 yds. away.

20th Bn. stayed there for the day. That evening some huge bursts occurred just near the main road at Warfusee at quarter-hour intervals. They were taken for mines at first, but turned out to be huge shells. The first three

or four were near the road. The 5th or 6th - about dusk - fell right near the silhouetted traffic by the road. It killed two German prisoners who were coming down in a German waggon, and the two Tommies beside them in charge of the waggon, and cleared the traffic on a space of road - perhaps 50 yards. Only about six shells were fired. They came from NE (Somme Valley direction).

(Above authorities: Capt. Elliott & Lieut. Sharp).

On August 9th. - About 11 a.m. orders were received to attack at 11 a.m. The J.O. line was 8000 yds. away. The Bn. was sent on under Capt. Portman, while C.O., Col. Forbes, rode to the crucifix NW of Harbonnieres. The instructions for attack were there given but not the time.

The Bn. came up in artillery formation. East of La Motte as they came under fire they crossed the road and passed north of Bayonvillers.

On the tramline west of Morcourt Valley and Ashwell Wood they got their orders from C.O.

About 2 a.m. they crossed the gully which was under heavy shellfire - they decided to go straight ahead and got through without a casualty - and came just behind Blue Line and lay down in artillery formation. Bn. started to deploy and a number of German planes came over very low. Germans were shelling the blue line then. When the attacking troops (18th Bn. moved out of the Blue Line 20th Bn. moved into it. Stayed there till night of - 9th and took over the line from 18th Bn. on morning of Aug. 10. The line was then short of the factory - about 80 yds. short of it. At this time back at the dump on the other side of the road were 45th Bn. who were not attacking.

In regard to this flank, on afternoon of 9th, when 18th Bn. went ahead, Capt. Portman went out and had a look at the dump from the south side of the road. While Portman was looking at the dump (where he did so much of his work later) he saw ~~the~~ a pair of legs sticking out of a stack of wood there. He thought - "Hm! That must be one of our people!" It was an old English Major of artillery who had gone out there to have a look for some guns which he was searching for (to shoot at, I suppose).

Portman then saw that the flank was quite open as 45th Bn. were back behind the bomb and S.9 dump. He reported to Major ~~Robinson~~ Robinson, who told him to put in his Coy. to defend the flank.

Portman brought up 2 platoons into the dump which was a huge collection of timber stacks, and very good cover. He gave instructions to Lieut. Holmes to take out a platoon to about 25 D.7.9. and another at 26 C.7.9. to watch the flank. Holmes had to crawl out on his own and reconnoitre the position. He took his platoons out, also crawling, under M.G. fire from Proyart, and they dug in there.

That night Portman went up to push the western of these posts out towards Proyart. They reconnoitred the ground out there. Portman went back to 45th Bn. and saw Col. Johnson to tell him of the move of his posts, and he then heard that 45th Bn. had orders to push out that night. Holmes, Sergt. Clark and Capt. Portman then guided them up to the advanced post of the 20th and showed where the road corner was. But when 45th Bn. got up there they came under M.G. fire, so they swung back their flank to where the post was and thence to the road about 150 yds. in rear of left flank of 20th Bn. The posts of 20th Bn. then withdrew to the Blue Line.

That afternoon 3 M.G.'s were firing from Proyart. By next day about 10 could be seen.

(On the afternoon of the 10th Aug. 3 motor lorries and a box car came tooling along the road towards Proyart from the Blue line. They got within 500 yds. of Proyart when the dust began to be knocked up all around them. The

M.G.'s in Proyart all opened. All the men in the first three were killed. The 4th stopped for a while. § Suddenly he (box car) shunted back, turned, and came back for dear life along the road. He got in to the Blue line. The driver was shot through the lung and the other man killed).

AUGUST 10/11. - This night the German division opposite 20th Bn. was relieved and a new lot of troops came in (who provided the prisoners captured on 11 August).

Night of 10th Aug. 37th Bn. tried marching up the road with three tanks - 38th in rear and so on. Capt. Portman's Coy. was to follow and make a defensive flank along the road (very much like the flank he had made the other way) as far as the road in 28C.

Portman got up ahead as 37th was late, and had two parties, under Thomas and Holmes, on the south side of the road. They were waiting there (without any trouble - Portman had been up there that afternoon - crawling along the drain on the right of the road). As the parties waited they heard a whirring down the road - probably about the dump - a tremendous noise, no other sound in the night. (They had an armoured car also there). A few minutes later the head of 3rd Div. Column appeared coming out of La Flaque, marching in single file on either side of the road. The head of 3rd Div. Column got up to about the head of Portman's Coy. about 27 c.7.3. when the first tank passed them. When the head of the Column and the first tank had reached about 27 A.3.4. the M.G. fire (which had been erratic ~~from then~~ till then from Proyart) became tremendously heavy. This broke out from straight up the road and from the Proyart houses - knocking sparks out of the road. One of the tanks went off the road and presently a couple of M.G.'s began to speak from near Raine-court also. Portman moved his Coy. into the north side of the road where the drain gave better cover. At the moment some of the 37th Bn. began to come back down the road with the news that the Colonel and officers and H.Q. etc. had been knocked out.

Major Paine, of 38th Bn, took command of the column and sent back for orders to Bde. H.Q. 37th Bn. at the same time began to come back in pretty good order down the sides of the road, carrying wounded and dead.

The third tank remained. The other two tanks came back to it and the three lay together on the road.

Portman saw that it was all up with the stunt so he took his Coy. back to the dump and reported. 37th came to 37 c.2.4. and dug in on a little line just in front of La Flaque north of the road for 300 yds. north and south.

During the afternoon of 10th orders had been given for an attack by § 2nd Div. south of the road on morning of Aug. 11. It was the intention of the division on the left to come up in co-operation and conform. The J.O. line was to be the La Flaque-Framerville Road. The attack was by 3 Coys.

B| →
D| A|

D to mop up half of Raine-court. The E and W road through Raine-court was to divide 20th from 19th. C Coy. under Capt. Portman, was instructed, not relying on the people on the left conforming, they were to put in a defensive flank on the left (for the third time).

AUGUST 11.- The objective was not quite reached. They got into position on the Framerville-La Flaque Road at 3.30 am.

They hopped off at 4.20. There was a mist.

They met a number of advanced German M.G.'s which fired under the barrage till they were 300 yds. away. Then they shut up, sent up a flare and hopped back to another position. They carried on this all the way. These rearguard tactics were new and surprising and were well carried out (L.M.G.'s). A few Germans and a few heavy M.G.'s were taken near the objective. At the point where the slope begins to fall to the Herleville valley, 20th. Bn. dug in.

When daylight grew Lieut. Cameron, who was in charge of this flank, found he had nothing on his left and had lost one platoon - nothing could be seen of it. The platoon commander (Lieut. Richardson) had seen what the position was and had put in a post not far from Portman's Coy. on the road from Proyart to Raine-court (300 yds. south of main road).

All day long the M.G. fire was very heavy. There was a whizzbang gun just where the main road dips into the gully. It was specially placed the morning before (clearly as an anti-tank gun after the 3rd Div. attack). The Germans fired this gun till the Coy. reached its objective, and it was too close for the shells to burst. The crew were shot by our L.G.'s. The Germans had it covered with M.G.'s from the north of the road near Portman and from the house at the edge of the gully close to it (where the road begins to dip). We could not get the gun. The Germans brought up three teams to try and get it, but all were shot by our L.G. fire. (The Germans probably got this gun out early next morning when the 24th Bn. relieved).

All day M.G. fire was very heavy. The Germans were moving up and down the road from the gully all day. In the morning there had still been Germans on the Raine-court-St. Martin's Wood Road. The Coy. shot at them and they cleared out, some being shot. They were close in behind Cameron's position. 13 men were holding this position. Richardson ~~sk~~ had 7 at 33 B.7.9.

D Coy. (Lieut. Sharp) was to follow A Coy. (Lieut. Oliver was killed on the objective, sniped through the head straightening things out early in the morning). D Coy. was to follow and mop up north of Raine-court. Capt. Moore was gassed early before he had time to give these instructions to the Coy. So Lieut. Sharp took D Coy. on supporting A Coy. They went forward getting flanking fire from Raine-court and not being in contact with 19th Bn. Sharp moved the platoon out that way to pick up 19th. He left A Coy. to go forward and moved out. He went across the gully and found 19th Bn. and asked them where their objective was (as he did not know where his own objective was - and Oliver had been killed). Getting across the gully and up the other side they lost Lieut. Moss and Lieut. Gardner - both killed; Moss by M.G. and Gardner (a very fine officer) by a sniper. These M.G.'s were in the old trenches on the eastern side of the ridge. On getting up the east side they took 3 M.G.'s. As they got on top of the ridge they could see 19th Bn. They were beckoning Sharp to go back but he went on - by rushes. Sharp then found he was out of his place (he saw Lieut. Jones, 19th Bn.). He had to get back and his party linked up on the trenches on the east up-slope of the gully from where they could shoot north across the front of ~~the~~ Cameron's Coy., up the gully. A Coy. was on his right.

All day long the German shelled particularly heavily into the valley and Raine-court with big stuff.

On the left flank Portman and his Coy. started from east of the dump with the attack and went very fast up the

road to clear the shelling. They got up to about the previous night's position and 2 M.G.'s opened pointblank from the left of the road. They got into the drain - till the mist cleared when they saw two posts about 100 yds. north of the road. There were crops there so they slipped across into the crops and rushed them. One was a big post which had been a heavy gun position. 2 M.G.'s and 35 men were in it. The Proyart M.G.'s were playing across towards the road, so the Germans were just kicked out to run the gauntlet back to the 3rd Div. line near La Flaque. Then Portman and his platoon came back to the road and pushed up it with very heavy M.G. fire from straight ahead. At the crossroad, Proyart-Rainecourt they were stopped by a M.G. straight ahead. They stopped and started to sap.

Trying to get forward from there 15 men were killed by the gun. So the post was placed there.

The mist came down again, so Portman sent out a scout and found Richardson's post about 300 yds. south along the crossroad.

As they were sapping during the day M.G.'s opened on them from Rainecourt and also from Proyart. All day the stretcherbearers of both sides were moving about in the area between Rainecourt and the front line with Red Cross flags (our men white flags).

During the morning a lot of movement appeared in the crops about 28 Central. The Coy. had salvaged wire from the dump at La Flaque and run a wire back to H.Q. and got artillery onto these Huns. The men who had to lay these lines had to crawl the whole way as the whole surface was swept by M.G. fire from Proyart.

No tanks this day - 2 tanks from 9th Aug. (with 18th Bn.) were lying near Richardson's post. Guns in the St. Martin's Wood or near there were firing pointblank all day.

A man named Spies, a stretcherbearer in Portman's Coy., worked a stretcher on wheels up and down the main road all day, carrying wounded and dead. He was blown up two or three times with shells. In the end he was gassed and badly concussed.

There was crop between Rainecourt and the main road - and some of the Germans got away from Rainecourt through this. The German shelling on Rainecourt with 8-in. guns finished his own Machinegunners there.

Touch was lost with 19th Bn. soon after the start. They got through Rainecourt easily, the Lewis Gunners using their guns from the hip at what few Huns they saw. It was a walk from there to the west side of the gully. There getting to the edge they came under fire from the Germans M.G.'s on the near side of the gully. They fired till Oliver's Coy. got on top of them. Oliver was killed just as the objective was dug - by the row of trees on the Rainecourt - St. Martin Wood Road.

They then sent a patrol out to find 19th Bn. Sergt. McNevin went out. He found 19th Bn. He was fired on while crossing the gully - he was fired on from Herleville Wood. He reported back. A Coy. then dug in and settled down on the edge of Foch Gully - they were just south of Cameron and could just see the 19th opposite on the right. They got the fire of the anti-tank gun pointblank till it was stopped. The only communication with Bn. was by runner. There was a heavy M.G. barrage from the ~~opposite~~ opposite side and from Cameron's front. Lieut. Gardner was sniped when A Coy. got to its objective.

About 2 a.m. on morning of 12th they were relieved. On relief Bn. came back to the Blue line.

Throughout the morning no reports had been able to get back owing to runners being shot from Rainecourt, as

The road runs past a very high banks on left-hand side of the road. On the bank there was a M.G. A Coy. started to hunt for Germans there. While A Coy. was clearing this the rest of the Bn., D leading, struck off half-right to go through Freckles Wood. As soon as they got off the road they came on another party of Germans - they were surprised and gave no alarm. A light railway line was then met in the corner of 18B - and Capt. Manfield halted them there, as this looked like a good line for jumping off. There was a slight rise ahead. Manfield went up to the top of it - and from there looking down east he could see the mount. Bn. formed up in two waves with D Coy. on right on a one-platoon frontage and B Coy. left. C Coy. couldn't be found.

Oliver, killed.
Thomas, wounded.

xxx

17th BATTALION: MONT ST. QUENTIN.


(Capt. Manfield and anor.)

Capt. Manfield D Coy. was a leading Coy. They went round through Elen Alley as shelling was heavy in the village into St. Gond trench. Waited there all night - old French trench with dugouts. 20th. Bn. had struck trouble in the trenches of the old French front line ahead. Whole 17th Bn. was concentrated in St. Gond trench and those near it. At 3 a.m. the moved - down the Halle Rd. Bn. moved in single file, A Coy. having one platoon in groups ahead working as advance guard.



The road runs past a very high banks on left-hand side of the road. On the bank there was a M.G. A Coy. started to hunt for Germans there. While A Coy. was clearing this the rest of the Bn., D leading, struck off half-right to go through Freckles Wood. As soon as they got off the road they came on another party of Germans - they were surprised and gave no alarm. A light railway line was then met in the corner of 18B - and Capt. Manfield halted them there, as this looked like a good line for jumping off. There was a slight rise ahead. Manfield went up to the top of it - and from there looking down east he could see the mount. Bn. formed up in two waves with D Coy. on right on a one-platoon frontage and B Coy. left. C Coy. couldn't be found.

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Each Coy. had only two platoons. Later C Coy. followed the attack at a distance of about 500 yds. Their two officers were later killed and their position is not certain, but probably they got nearer down to the river on the flats.

A Coy. were at this time behind clearing out Germans;

later they went round to the right flank by Park Wood.

The two Coys. by the railway were simply given left turn on the line of the railway. After waiting to find C and A they decided to risk the J.O. although they were so few that they had doubts as to what was best. They went through Freckles Wood with Lost Ravine, etc., on their right

The pace was very fast - they doubled practically the whole way. It was 5.10 when they pushed off. When they started the artillery was on Gottlieb trench. It was a light shrapnel barrage. It did not form a mark in time or place.

There was no opposition except for a few Germans in a big ditch of the Canal du Nord. The Germans there were firing M.G.'s but it was rushed with a ~~max~~ bayonet - the idea being to rush all opposition and yell like mad. The Germans in the canal there were bayoneted or captured.

From there Capt. Manifold noticed that 20th Bn. further up the ditch to the left - they had not quite reached the ditch but were going well.

No more Germans were seen till Gottlieb trench, but in Kholm trench men of 19th Bn. were met. There the ~~2nd Bn.~~ two Bns. became mixed. The attack carried on to Gottlieb trench and as far as the railway line.

The fire there became very heavy and the whole right end of D Coy. got extended and threw themselves down into a firing line. (there was no railway bank). There were numerous targets in front. It was a clear morning - the slight mist had quickly cleared. D Coy. took on all the many targets ahead. (Gottlieb trench had been crossed over unheld but the Germans were in Galatz Alley and its system, pretty thick and right on the mount. They could be seen mounting their guns on the top of the mount, running back and forwards - a regular beehive disturbed. Under cover of D Coy. B Coy. went forward steadily, and when D saw them getting on D got up and the whole line drove the Germans, running like sheep, up the mount. The pace was still at the double - cheering and rushing every trench with the bayonet. The Germans in the Galatz system were either killed, captured or driven back onto the mount. Most of them were taken in Elsa trench. The attack went through across the road and into the village, and stopped on the forward slope of the hill behind the village.

The left flank was on the bend of the Bapaume road. 200 yds. across to left they could see 20th Bn. The line came from this bend east to the ruined house and mound - thence to the Cemetery and the little trench east of the wood. Then more men by the pond. Others in Vladimir (?) Alley. C Coy, which had come up on the right flank, was up on the main road on the slope towards Peronne. Capt. Manifold went along this line and tried to fix it there.

The Germans were seen massing due north of the village. (when Manifold was with C Coy. he got word of this; and he saw them massing SE in 16 central). They began trickling down the saps towards the village (Koros Alley, Krieg Alley, etc.). It was then that Manifold ordered a retirement of 17th Bn. to the line of the road.

There was a trench running just west of the road - a newly dug German trench with partly-finished dugouts running just west of the buildings on the west side of the road. It started from the little trench at 15A.9.9. to 15 D.9.9. Some of 19th Bn. were in the right of this trench. The counterattacks by the Germans ~~were~~ with bombs, T.M.'s and M.G.'s (regular trench attacks) came continuously down Koros and Krieg Alley and up Gott mit Uns trench.

At the same time at least 5 attacks of the same sort came down ~~Max~~ Varna trench and attempts were made to cross the road. The 2nd M.G. Bn. had 4 Vickers guns in the

trench held by 17th and 19th and these with L.G.'s stopped these attempts.

We certainly held Rothwell trench. Lieut. Napper, 19th Bn., was killed at the junction of Gott mit Uns and Uber Alles trenches - this was in the morning. He was sniped there and so was Plummer.

Capt. Allan was round on this flank with A Coy.

When 24th Bn. came through next day the line was at the same place. They came through about 7 a.m. on Sept. 1.

They tried to jump the trench in which the 17th Bn. was but the fire was too hot and they jumped back into it and reorganised there. They went on again in the afternoon.

The German was firing with rifle grenades and T.M.'s onto Elsa trench. But 17th Bn. was in a continuous line forward of this in which you could go the whole way to the right in the trench.

Capt. Manifold handed over to Capt. Bowden, 6th Bde., and came back by Galatz Alley. As this was fall of 21st Bn. he came back, turned down Elsa trench (which was full of dead Boche) and turned off down Agram Alley. This shows that the 17th Bn. were not in Elsa trench but a newer trench. You could throw a bomb from the 17th.'s trench into the road.

In the morning on the way over near the long wall on the road - (the wall was on the east side of the road and held up the gardens of the Chateau or buildings there) - on the top behind the wall were some dugouts. These dugouts were cleared by Capt. Manifold's Coy. H.Q. as they passed - and the Germans were sent to the rear.

As the 17th Bn. were retiring later through the village these Germans from the road and from the centre of the village attacked them again from the rear, and they had to fight them before they could get back. The Germans from the dugouts were signallers and had originally come out with their signal apparatus hanging round them. (A bomb had been thrown down and they tumbled out on the first occasion). One of the men went down these dugouts and reported them clear.

When the M.G.'s were firing from these Chateau buildings later the 17th could reach them with 36 grenades (160 yards range).

29th BATTALION

September 29th/30th, 1918.

Captain Read, Estrees Sugar Factory.

Captain Read of the 29th Battalion found Yeoman's of the 30th Battalion in a trench at 11B6.3 with a block in the trench at G11B8.4. Read was, at this time, bombing out along the Communication Trench towards Nauroy and the Tank Fort. Yeoman's had dealt with the Anti Tank Gun at 11C95.80. The Germans had run back from before him and were in the trench at 11D4.7 (all along that trench so that they were exactly behind Yeoman's other post). Yeoman's had another post out at 12A0.4 under an N.C.O. Yeoman's had also dealt with the Anti Tank gun at 11A4.1 and with the gun in the triangle between the road and trench at 11B80.35. There were two guns at the western end of Nauroy Wood which were dealt with by Sgt. Oliver of the 29th Battalion, so Read thinks. Read's Company (?A) had a tough fight up the communication trench towards the Anti Tank Fort. At 11B5.4 there were two Minenwerfers (lying at 11A7.7 and 11A60.95). The men had got it hot when they tried at first to advance across the open to attack the Catalet line. When the Anti Tank Fort was taken the 29th turned up the Nauroy Catalet line and a hot fight mostly with Lewis guns and some bombing. They got as far as the Railway crossing at 5D40.75 and there Read established his block. Very important. This block was where others say it was.

That night the line was advanced E of Nauroy in a very deep railway cutting. Read's Company occupied from G63.3 to G12A7.6. This cutting was 30 feet deep in the centre, but tapered out at the ends. Two German Minenwerfers were taken just behind the Railway bank at the end of it. At 2.58 p.m. Read had orders from Brigade to attack the Lamp Signal Station and to organise an attack on the Sugar Factory at 3p.m. Being told that a bombardment would be put down on the factory at 3 p.m. the bombardment had, of course, long lost its effect when this attack was made. As a matter of fact one of our 60-pdrs. was firing behind our own line so it was almost better that the bombardment had finished before the attack had started. At 3.22. the 3rd Company went over, hopping out roughly at about the sametime as one another. A, B & C. "D" Company had to look after the bomb block and small pivot (left Company). Read's Company had to take the Lamp Signal Station. The great obstacle here was the concrete dugout at G12A85.80 with 3 machine gun embrasures. The German infantry in a trench just behind it, the moment they saw Read's Company get out of the Railway cutting, held up their hands. They were about 30 yards behind the block house. The Germans in the block house opened fire at once. Fire also came from the Sugar factory and from the right; and Read's Company which came in 78 strong and had already lost men in bombing up to Nauroy and E. of Bellecourt, lost 32 men here. (No officer in this Division was lost - it only had two). The Company came out 38 strong. Sergt. Oliver (D.C.M. M.M. and Bar) had got out on the left. Afterwards, when the attack failed, Read had to get Oliver to come in-to the cutting again. Oliver had got so close that if the

- 2 -

German position had been rushed some of his men would have got into it for certain but Read thought it not worth while. There would not be enough of them for success.

Col. Temperley

NEW ZEALAND LANDING

Auckland and Canterbury landed together. Auckland was sent straight off to reinforce the Australians. They went over Plugge's Plateau and over on to Pope's, Quinns and Steele's. By the Afternoon they were holding Pope's, Quinns and Courtneys and Steele's mixed up with the Australians. One machine gun section of Canterbury got right away to Johnstone's Jolly. Of Canterbury, 2 Companys started, Auckland with one over Plugge's Plateau and dropped into Shrapnel Valley and moved past Pope's to the Nek. From there they went on to Baby 700 and towards Battleship Hill. Two Companys went on to the lower slopes of Walker's Ridge and got men on to No.1. Post and were later driven back and that same day held the lower slopes of Walkers Ridge by the evening. That night the Turks got across from No.1. Post towards Walkers Ridge. Captain Salmonson kept the men on to the lower slopes that night. He had about 30 men, they would have given way probably if he had not been there. Temperley guarded this position as very critical). Otago landed in the afternoon and went into Reserve on Plugge's Plateau. They were Divisional Reserve. Wellington landed that night and the 4th Australian Brigade landed mostly the next day.

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Capt. Towl - A Company 37th Battalion. -

Clery - sur - Somme.

(Account from Lieut. H.E. Bean, 39th Battalion in letter to C. E. W. Bean dated 24th December 1918)

I regret that I cannot give you much, for I was not in that fight, having been relieved by Capt. Towl a few days before I rejoined the Company (A Company 37th Battalion) the day after the show and got a little information then. It appears that A Company was on the right of the 37th Battalion and their approach march took them through Clery-sur-Somme village or all that was left of it, until they reached the Crucifix. They then turned to the left, towards Clery Copse and took up a line there.

The village (Clery) had been reported (mopped up) clear, but in the early morning Capt. Towl discovered that the Huns had a solid "strong point" only about 30 yards from the Crucifix. This strong point caused the Company a lot of trouble, for it fired at the Company from the rear. It was a marvellous thing that the Company got through the village at all.

In the morning when the Company had settled down (there were a number of prisoners with the Company at this time) it was discovered that the Huns were all round and within 30 yards of the position so that the Company was completely "cut off". Capt. Towl held a meeting (if one might call it that) and informed the men that they were "cut off". The meeting decided to "fight on," if the Huns came over about 100 strong (A Company's strength was then under 20) but if it was a big Hun attack they would have to surrender.

I was told by one of the men that a Hun officer tried to give information re strength of the Company to his men about 30 yards away, but one of A Company's men cut the information short by the early use of a rifle.

About this time the Company was only about 15 strong all told and they had a few wounded men with them also about 20 or 30 Huns. Early in the morning they had souvenired the Huns, but when they realised their position, they gave the Huns their "souvenirs"? back and buried other souvenirs, because they expected the Huns to get over and souvenir them (A Company). A little after this Lieut. C. Ashmead M.C. was killed and Capt. Towl was the only officer with the Company.

During the afternoon, troops (I think some of the 2nd Division) managed to get across the Somme River at Clery and they cleared the right flank. As soon as Capt Towl saw troops on his right, he, regardless of the Huns fire, made his way towards them, in order to discover who they were. It appears that they had been held up by the strong point near the Crucifix for some considerable time, this causing the delay.

About dark Capt. Towl got his Company out of their perilous position. They took out all their prisoners and wounded, and until they were relieved they acted as Reserve Company. I went over the ground a couple

of da

of days after this fight, with Capt Towl and we discovered that the Huns must have occupied the trenches after "A" Company had got out for they had buried Lieut. Ashmead very near the spot where he was killed. I may say that the Huns took the boots off every man killed in this "stunt".

I do not think I can give you any more information re this "stunt" but if you try this 10th A.I. Brigade H.Q. you may get more. I know Capt. Towl wrote an account of the "Stunt" and that one copy was sent to Brigade Headquarters and another went into the 37th Battalion records. It was in this "stunt" that Capt. Towl gained the D.S.O.

After this "stunt" the Battalion had a few days rest and then moved forward again to the TINCOURT-BERNES Area. We had tea at TINCOURT and afterwards Capt. Towl and three other Company o/c, went forward to make a reconnaissance of the new line near BERNES.

The Company went along about two hours later and on arrival we were informed that Capt. Towl had been seriously wounded. It appears he and an officer from the Company holding the line, went along examining the front and trying to get into touch with the people on the right and when in the village of BERNES an 8" shell fell near them wounding both. Capt. Towl was unconscious but the other officer was wounded in the leg. He managed to crawl to the trench (took him about 30 minutes) and had assistance sent out to Capt. Towl.

Capt. Towl was taken to the Dressing station from where he was removed to a Casualty Clearing Station near PERONNE but he died a couple of days later.

Capt. Towl was always a very efficient and popular officer, his loss was sincerely deplored by all ranks of the Battalion.

57th BATTALION - Aug. 8th
Aug. 9th
Flamicourt.
Bellicourt.

60th BATTALION - (ditto)

Col. Elliott was hit on the 25th April at Anzac extending Bn. - his H.Q. was in White Gully and he was extending Bn. across the Hill Southwards. Shot on the heel.

He was hit on Aug. 8th when speaking to a man in a tank.

57th BATTALION. August 8th. Col. Denehy.

The Germans certainly saw us forming up (saw the tanks Denehy thinks) and put down a barrage which fell, however, behind the forming up position - few casualties.

When 57th Bn. moved it was densely misty - and the 2 platoons on the left of the Bn. got across on to the right - otherwise there was little went wrong.

As they got near to the old German gun positions the Germans had 5.9 guns ?hows. firing direct over their sights at them. There was some fairly hard fighting in the old German gun positions.

That finished the heavy fighting for that day. After the 57th Bn. took up the fight all that they had was a pretty heavy barrage laid down by the German artillery - not direct fire this time - to pass through after leaving the halt line.

Then the cavalry came up and formed mass behind Harbonnieres. The Germans put up a M.G. fight at Harbonnieres. The 57th Bn. was moving in artillery formation and the cavalry moved through them. As the cavalry went on the guns were still barraging and some shorts caught them and emptied several saddles. The cavalry scooped a fair number of prisoners in the Harbonnieres Valley - and from that time on the fighting ahead of the 57th Bn. was done by the cavalry. Ahead of the 57th Bn. objective was the old ? German line. The 57th Bn. when it reached its objective did not stay still. It had been told to exploit if possible, so it went on and got into the old ? German line.

August 9th. Next day when the Canadians at 11 a.m. were to attack and our 1st Divn. on their left the 1st Divn. was many miles in rear - and so the 57th was just about to hop over when 60th Bn. was ordered to do so - and had some fairly tough fighting.


Peronne.

When 5th Divn. reached the Somme at the end of August 57th Bn. was to attempt the Somme Crossing. They and

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
the engineers did this by building a causeway, patrolling in punts and so on. The Germans let them build - the Canal was no difficulty - the difficulty was the 500 to 1,000 yards of marsh. They constructed a path (? mended an old German one). But the moment they tried to push men across it they were put off with direct whizzbang fire and M.G. fire. (General Elliott was leading a party of the Bde. himself when he fell into the water - he was also wounded in this stage of the fighting).

Eventually 57th Bn. was put in further North and relieved 54th Bn. in the S.W. of the town and 58th Bn. in the E. of the town. They had to tru and get away to Flamicourt on the S. side.





There was a causeway across the moat on the S. side and the German allowed them to get patrols across it on to the railway; but he would not allow them to send a party - and the moment they tried to do so they had ~~the~~ losses. (I think it was in this they lost one valuable officer and some men. They tried it at Gen. Elliott's urgent wish - against the Colonel's opinion). They also tried to get out E. of the town towards the railway cutting with a party (? under Capt. Mearer?) got out there but was seen by the Germans who dodged back through a tunnel, got on to the bank of the railway cutting and fired down at them. Our party had to scatter and got back in that way without loss.

The Germans after some days made up their minds to retire. As we noticed the retirement the crossing was attempted again from the E. of the town and also at the S.W. and was effected. The movement of the troops Southwards across the German front from the E. of Peronne was effected under cover of smoke shell the artillery using their remaining stocks (?remaining from when?)



Bellicourt - September 29th.

The 57th Bn. coming up from near Templeuz found a very heavy bombardment going on on the point where it was to form up (the hill crest looking down from the W. upon Bellicourt. The Colonel accordingly decided to get over the ridge (instead of staying there) as quickly as ever he could. They found a trench leading sideways over the ridge and worked through that and so down into the Bellicourt Valley. The advance was to have been by Coys. in artillery formation so



The Colonel took the two right Coys. -and someone else the other two and they worked separately down to the Hindenburg line. As they got

the Valley they got into dense smoke and fog - far thicker than that of August 8th - so thick that they could not see 10 yards ahead.

Their only guide was that they knew there was a line of telegraph poles which ran down the hill to Bellicourt - into the S. of Bellicourt. They didn't take the road because they knew it would be shelled. They struck these poles. The wires were trailing from the cross pieces; or else, when the top was entirely broken off, the wire was lying beside the poles on the ground. The C.O. got his half Bn. here into one single line - not a good formation for a battlefield but what else could he do. He and the I.O. went ahead stooping down to see the wires and follow them to the next post. When the post was reached the one ahead would shout "Found it," and they would come up to him.

They got through old wire - very tangled - and from the look of the place the C.O. guessed they must now be by the Hindenburg line. He accordingly halted the Bn. and struck off Northwards to see if he could find the road - which he knew was now N. of him - and which he ought to strike at a cutting. He found it about 100 or 200 yards away. He had given Bn. strict orders not to move, so he came back to them and found them where they had been. While they waited in the fog 3 Germans without arms suddenly stumbled in upon them. "Merci Pardon!" they began to cry. The men looked up at them laughing and motioned them the way to go - and off they went, very pleased, in the direction of our rear. Extended a line of men from them (in the ordinary way, each knocking the next man's back) from there to the road - and then marched by that line.

The fog cleared as they got to the road and the enemy just then began to shell it heavily. They got across quickly and into a good trench the other side which (he took it) must be the 2nd Hindenburg trench of the first system.

He got the men up it and just there in came their other two Coys. (who had been coming down separate) and also the 58th Bn. from further N. The 57th now worked round (where their route was intended to be) N. of the town.

In the trench where they had got to a party of about 10 Americans with bayonets came down the trench. Denehy asked who they were. They said they were moppers up, and they were dealing with dugouts. Denehy asked what trench this was - the Americans said it was the 2nd trench. This turned out to be right.

The Bn. was led off in two long single files through the wire of the system N. of Bellicourt. They had to go in this formation for the wire was very thick and there were few gaps.


As they came through it and clear of it, N. of the town, they saw ahead the mound of spoil from the Hindenburg tunnel. On top of this they could see men moving in bunches. Suddenly it became evident that one of these men was waving to them and trying to prevent them from coming. However, they went on. They found that these were Americans; and that they were occupying this embankment over the tunnel (which here, of course, is hidden 90 or 100 feet below in the bowels of the earth). There were a lot of others in the tunnel dugouts hopelessly at sea as to what was happening or what they were doing; and without any knowledge of what was happening ahead.

A few isolated groups could be seen ahead by the railway and about them a few bullets whizzed past from the rear. Col. Denehy told his men to dig in as fast as they could.

The 58th Bn. was in the 2nd Hindenburg trench on the left; the 59th Bn. could not be seen at all - they had (through this was not known) struck trouble away back by Quennemont or Malakoff Farm, and were fighting their way through.

The C.O. decided to dig in and report the position to Bde. The Bn. worked up to the isolated Americans ahead and reported. Then orders came from Divn to push on. The Americans clearly had failed (it was thought they had when news was so scarce in the early hours and when the few wounded men seemed to know nothing at all about it - prisoners and also passed early under absurdly strong guards according to our experience of Americans.

The order was given for an attack at 3 p.m. with a barrage. What happened to the barrage Denehy doesn't know - he thinks they fired on a wrong map reference (? were they prohibited by 4th Army from firing at all). Anyway, some men thought the guns fired somewhere else - they attacked. The tanks were all knocked out on the hill. The 57th got into the Nauroy line on the S. and S.W. of Cabaret Wood Farm; the 58th got some men into the trench on the N.W. of it. The C.O. of 58th kept insisting that they were in touch (but they were not) in the trench. What happened was that 58th had its night



out of the trench along a road and this was in touch with 57th Bns supports. The resistance from the Farm was very strong. But the men got into the trenches and there was bomb fighting going on in the gap between 57th and 58th.

[The right of 58th Bn. earlier in the day, had made a good advance under Mearner? by working around the railway cutting on the right when the left was held up).

A defensive flank was thrown back towards 59th Bn. by an advance of support Coys. (after the first advance towards Cabaret Wood Farm). (An American Bn. reported to C.O. 57th that night and was advised by him to make a flank echeloned on left rear). Next day (Sept. 30th) the 53rd Bn. came through and bombed up to the N. and cleared Cabaret Farm in the process, though there were Germans left behind in it.

on Sept. 1st. This day an advance was made ~~in~~ a long front slantwise from N.W. to S.E. (A.22 Central to H.15 Central) in order to give 2nd Divn. a good hopping off line.


The barrage was good and the objective was obtained without any difficulty. When it was obtained Colonel Denehy reported to Bde. that the troops could have gone much further. "Why didn't you do it?" said Elkiott - "Goodness! if you can go further, go further now!" They accordingly moved patrols out to the line of Bank Copse and Folempise Farm - and the troops moved up there. But by now the German was re-organised. Our line was on a forward slope, and the German shelled it mercilessly - casualties began to occur very quickly and Col. Denehy pulled his line back, at once, to the objective. Elliott said that this was wrong and the casualties didn't justify it, but Denehy said that the casualties though not many were happening in a very short space of time and his Bn. would be cut up by remaining.

Capt. Macdonald wounded early in the fight before leapfrog.

Lieut. Macfarlane wounded.

August 11th or 12th. - Capt. Snowball killed during move up to assembly position S. of Railway during move for proposed attack on Chaulnes. Died of wounds from shell.

57th BATTALION - August 8th.



Some losses in the barrage.

Direction difficult to maintain.

When Bn. got to Marcelcave shelling was heavy. Our barrage was still on the village S. of Railway. The German barrage on N. of railway was at very close range whizzbang. Not many casualties. Germans had a battery of 5.9 guns near Pierret Wood but just N. of railway, and some whizzbangs near dump just N. of them, and was probably firing direct on 26th Bn.

Part of Bn. was ahead of time and had plenty of time to reorganise at trench S. of Labastille Mill. Meara's Coy. had 3 mark S tanks. They were on 26th Bn. objective with liaison men inside - formation was perfect and time perfect.

Tanks went ahead with screen of infantry. On reaching about 400 yards from the chalkpit where 5.9s (howitzers) were they opened over direct/sights. The shells were very flat trajectory and burst in rear near H.Q. Could see guns and men firing them.

The centre tank went straight for the battery - which concentrated its attention on it - the men opened out haws. where tank was. When about 60 or 70 yards from it received a direct hit and was knocked out. Meantime

the other 2 tanks with infantry had got round the flanks and took the battery together with the crews.

This was in the gully (Southwards Valley) going up the next ~~xxx~~ rise one of our 60-pdrs. greatly impeded advance causing many casualties. Here we were ahead of the Canadians. 2 platoons lined railway bank and fired into the flank and rear of the Germans who were in rear of Pieuret Wood - several batteries of heavies were there - at time we could see Germans and knew there were guns there.

No great opposition then experienced. Shelling, M.G. (a little) and some minenwerfer fire from the railway sidings. After passing the Dump by the railway sidings (small batches of prisoners there) in the open they got very heavy direct M.G. fire from buildings in Guillacourt. Lost some few men. Action developed quickly - again both tanks went straight for M.G. fire (where they thought it came from) - Opposition concentrated on tank - as soon as tank got close the Germans ducked into cover or came out with hands up. Got 52 prisoners 2 or 3 officers and many M.Gs.

After Guillacourt they got to Redline without serious opposition. Cavalry came through about this time in dense formation - surprisingly so. They were probably obeying orders to go through us at Red line if possible.

Only paused on Redline. Bn. went straight on to Blue line. This was on the Sunken Road S.W. of Harbonnieres. (The Canadians were up to us as far as red line).

The cavalry were working with patrols in front now and getting a bad time. (Armoured cars and whippets went through about the red line - some whippets got beyond railway in 17.D. and some were knocked out there. The mass of the cavalry had early withdrawn to the Sunken Road (Blue line) and their patrols were getting M.G. fire.

At this stage, the line having been dug near the Sunken Road, 57th Bn. got word that the Germans were preparing to counter-attack. Cavalry dismounted and got Hotchkiss guns down on to road bank in 17.C - very strong with our Lewis and their Hotchkiss guns; but Germans didn't come over.

We understood that the Canadians were not beyond the Valley, and so we remained on the edge of the valley (blue line) instead of getting to the old Amiens line. Early next morning we pushed out and occupied the old Amiens defence line - the Canadians got there first but had not informed us of this.

August 9th - Canadians went forward at 11 a.m. 60th Bn. moved forward to protect their flank, through 57th Bn. pending arrival of 1st Divn. The Canadians got ahead first. Meara got orders to go if 60th didn't arrive. Just after 11 a.m. 60th Bn. was seen arriving; they took a little while forming and the Canadians got ahead first; 60th Bn. met heavy M.G. fire when they did start.

August 29th. 15th Brigade moved up in column of the route and artillery formation behind 8th Bde. 15th Bde. moved up to the intention of crossing through 8th Bde. but orders were cancelled. Went back to a line occupied previously behind Carbonnel. From there sideslipped to Carso and Gongoles trenches S. of Barleux. From there Meara, another O.C. Coy., and 2 scouts went out to reconnoitre near Eterpigny - but

these 4 came under fire from whizzbangs through open sights and O.C. 52nd Bn's Coy. was hit. These guns were on a rise overlooking railway embankment where patrol was Guns in 15.D.8.1.

From there they moved and relieved a Bn. of 7th Bde. in La Chapelle ~~later~~. The 2 front Coys. occupied line of Somme, and 2 rear Coys. were back in Conde's trench. The Coys. had posts on Canal in 9 A and C.

Repeated attempts were made to cross the canal. Bridges were thrown over Canal by night, pontoon bridges - (Canal easy) and attempts made by canvas boats and duckboards on piles to cross the swamp - from lagoon to lagoon.

One Coy. got a section across to within 100 yards of E. edge of swamp (about 9 B and 10 A). Of the section some were killed and the rest mostly wounded by a M.G. fired on them by day while making the track. They were under cover by rushes which grew there most of the way. But ~~th~~ once they reached open water the German M.G. in post on other side simply wiped them out at 50 yards range.

On day when 58th Bn. and 14th Bde. attacked Peronne 57th moved from La Chapelle through Peronne. 2nd Coy. relieved 58th on ramparts at E. edge; 2 Coys. relieved 54th Bn. back on the S.W. end of Peronne, near the Flamicourt Bridges. (This would be Sept. 2nd). This relief was in heavy shell and bomb fire, by night - town full of gas - most exhausting conditions. The bridges were mere planks in some places.

They remained in this position - rear Coys. trying to cross to Flamicourt, front Coys. in E. ramparts. Lieut. Marsen (a very fine officer) was killed on patrol near Flamicourt (Peronne) Railway Stn. There was fairly good cover to approach - but once they got to the open they had the M.G. right on them.

At E. end of the town patrols tried both front (E) and flank (S) but always met heavy M.G. fire and active sniping especially from Flamicourt and the railway embankment (then practically in rear). Patrols used to try to get out to the railway embankment - and get close to it. But the Germans looked down on them from the high ground in Flamicourt.

On the day of Sept. 3rd? a nest of M.Gs. was located in the railway embankment. A small reconnoitring patrol with Lieut. Meara stumbled right on to this. There was cover in the ~~reed~~ reeds. There were 5. They got to the bank without being fired at. They were on the embankment and discussed with Sergt. whether it was possible to put a post there. They arranged to go back in 2 parties - 3 to see if there were another track through the swamp. The party of 3 after going 30 or 40 yards walking along the bottom of the embankment found a tunnel (a stream culvert which had been planked over the top of the stream, with dugouts all round and M.G. post.) Both sides were so startled that they scattered and the Germans started sniping. Meara wanted to attack the place but it was decided to put the artillery on to it. The first shoot was not good, but towards evening. The F.O.O. was seen by Meara at Bn., and a splendid shoot was done on this information. As soon as it was finished (the Germans could be seen, by our people on the ramparts, running away) a platoon went straight forward to the railway bank. A patrol was sent to the tunnel where the post had been and another platoon protected the right flank of the platoon advancing. The position was occupied during the night and a patrol was sent forward to Darmsladt trench. It reached the trench but it was occupied - they were fired on by M.Gs. and flares fired over their heads - They reported this. On

Meara

this information Meara, who had ~~xxxx~~ intended to get into this trench during the night, decided to wait till daylight. (From the rear the information kept coming that the German was likely to retire).

At dawn on Sept. 4? Meara went forward to Darmsladt trench and found it could be approached under fair cover. He decided to take the Coy. up there, 2 men at a time at 100 paces interval. German was sniping at all exposed targets. (This part of trench was near the Cross Roads at 23 Central). Trench was shallow, but they worked to the right. M.G. fire from Doingt and the woods on the hill was very heavy. There was not much shelling. Near the road in 23 D. they took a post with a L.G. on to it, and 5 or 6 prisoners. They worked round Mannheim trench and got into about 30 A. There they were getting fire from all sides - they themselves had lots of good targets and engaged them. The opposition from direction of Flamicourt and Chair Wood lessened and they could see the Germans getting out from there towards Doingt. The 57th was now firing from front and rear at Doingt and Chair Wood over both sides of the trench. Reports were sent back and 57th made all haste to get to Doingt and cut off these Germans. They reached the edge of Doingt in Mannheim trench but our guns were still on Doingt. The German retreat was right across some of our M.G. posts which inflicted a lot of casualties. We were at 30.C.1.2 and the Germans were making through Doingt for the trench a few hundred yards further S, and had to exposethemselves.

The German M.Gs. in posts around the wood behind Baviere trench were firing heavily. We had some captured German M.Gs. and these and our own were brought on to the German guns and gradually got them down.

On e M.G. opened from a retiring party in the C.T. S.W. of Baviere trench. A Cpl, Kilgour, went out by himself with a revolver to find them - saw them, used his revolver without effect. He came back for assistance - one man went back with him. He got a German rifle, attacked the post. He killed 3, captured one, and put the rest to flight. He got close without being seen, fired 3 shots - dived in - grabbed one and the others ran. He got a D.C.M.

The other 2 Coys. of 57th came and mopped up Doingt pretty easily. Bn. then sideslipped and occupied a line on the high ground S. of the river and E. of the Le Mesnil Main Road. Next ~~xxxx~~ morning another division went through

In this last stage of the fight more casualties were certainly inflicted on the Germans than there were men in the Coy.

On August 29th. Lieut. Sellick wounded going up through 8th Bde. for proposed crossing at Bice, by shell.

Sept. 2nd?. Lieut. Marxsen killed at Flamicourt at Railway Stn.

57th BATTALION- BELLICOURT.

Sept. 27th? moved up by route march to Hargicourt. Stayed till morning 29th Sept.

Had reconnoitred routes etc. day before. Started early on 29th Sept. Intention was to start at J.O. line at 9? and move through Americans at 11 a.m. Were to move by 2 different routes, 2 Coys. on each. After some dist

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After some distance there was a fairly heavy fog and the 2 columns converged so as to be sure of the track. They reached the start line on time, but owing to heavy fog did not deploy there but went on to the tunnel in same formation. This fog seemed to be both fog and smoke. Direction was maintained though you could not see a man 5 yards away. They were in artillery formation and reached the Hindenburg Line. During this advance they had received pretty heavy shelling H.E. and gas and had a fair number of casualties. Lieut. J. Thompson died of wounds (later - received now) and Lieut. Morrison who had his arm blown right off.

Several small platoons of Americans were seen in Hindenburg Line. They were part of the mopping up Bn. but did not at all know what was going on in front. They waited in the Hindenburg Line for a bit - then went on - struck the big C.T. (which we saw with the tank ditched on it) and went beside this C.T. towards the tunnel. Getting to the tunnel some news was received that something was wrong in front. They received orders to dig in - which they did, on the tunnel, so as to be able to man it if the Germans attacked. A few isolated Americans were found there. They seemed to know very little. The visibility was now good. Patrols were also sent ahead to see if they could learn anything of the situation. Meanwhile they were being shelled a little, and enfiladed with M.G. fire from the left (58th Bn. were on left 59th unknown) M.Gs. were firing down along the rear side (W) of the tunnel bank.

The patrols found a few Americans in the railway drain about 300 yards ahead. Nothing definite could be got from these. The patrols were fired at from the Le Catelet - Nauroy line and from the railway to Nauroy.

It was now about midday. It was decided to attack at 3 p.m. Meanwhile a tank Commander had assembled about 10 tanks - whippets and mark 5 under the embankment and he was to co-operate in the attack. The attack started with a screen of scouts, tanks in front, remainder of infantry in artillery formation of Sections in file.

Immediately they crossed railway and came near Crest Line the Germans put down a very heavy M.G. barrage. (We were in 4 A) and was firing at very close range indeed with whizzbangs and 5.9s. It seemed to be directed all at the tanks, this artillery. Heavy artillery fire came from the immediate left flank and left rear, as well as the front.

As they got to about 4 A.8.0 the fire was so heavy, and the casualties so many - men simply getting from shell hole to shell hole and getting knocked on the way - and most of the tanks being hit - that Lieut. Meara with the right Coy. decided to make to the right and see whether there was protection there from this enfilade. The railway cutting there afforded some shelter, so the men were got over to it, 2 at a time, and thence into a newly dug trench on the S. slope of the hill. They continued the attack from there (5.C.2.7 - 2.0) and into the Le Catelet - Nauroy Line S. of the railway.

Meantime a Bn. of 8th Bde. near Nauroy had got into the same line. The O.C. of C Coy. came up - saw the position and brought his men up and worked to the left along the same trench. Of the other 2 Coys. one dug in about the V. shaped road in 4.B central - The other went back to the tunnel and remained there in reserve badly knocked about.

C Coy. (Capt. Keys) worked up the Gatelet trench and met the Germans and had a stiff bomb fight with them.

morning

September 30th. Next ~~day~~ a Bn. of 14th Bde. deployed facing N. and moved laterally up the direction of the Le Gatelet line past 57th Bn. Later on they had to get into the trench.

Keys left flank in the trench would be somewhere near Cabaret Wood Farm.

The 57th stayed where it was - the rest of the Bn. or part of it coming up on the left of the Coys. in the Le Gatelet line.

Any attempt made by 57th to get from Le Gatelet line forward was heavily fired at from Cabaret Farm and the high ground to N. and also from the high ground near the railway ahead.

On Oct. 1st we attacked from the Le Gatelet line. The right flank sidestepped N. so as to have its right on the junction of railway and trench at 5.D.4.7. The objective was the line from A.22 Central to H.15 Central. Tanks were present and there was a creeping barrage, which was perfect. They reached the objective without opposition. Germans fled in disorder. We fired on them by L.G. from hip and right Coy. alone got about 14 - 18 prisoners. These had taken shelter in deep dugouts in the road through 6.A. The right Coy. occupied some of the old trench in G 6.B. (This was a definite defence system of old trench.) Immediately barrage lifted a fighting patrol went forward to Folemprie Farm and the high ground N. of Estrees. They met no opposition, and took 3 prisoners. After being out about an hour they were very heavily fired on from the Bearevoir Line and from Field Guns which had been retiring and now unlimbered and came into action. The position had been reported - Germans retiring in disorder - Germans apparently going back past the Bearevoir Line but being collected and brought back to it in small parties. This seemed an opportunity for keeping him going, but at that time it was against the orders laid down. Layer - the order came to move forward to the ~~road~~ Road from Bank Copse S - but it was so heavily shelled that it was decided to withdraw and re-occupy it later after dark. (What had happened was that the Germans had had time to settle down in the meanwhile and get themselves organised - our men also were very tired after the first ~~ex~~ halt and the excitement which had now abated). 57th Bn. was relieved that night by 2nd Divn.

(Lt. J.S. Cotton in attack on Cabaret Wd. Farm.
Left Coys (Lt. Fleming in attack on Cabaret Wd. Farm.
(Lt. Duncan in attack on Cabaret Wd. Farm.
Lt. Cochrane (with Keys - hit on 29th and again later sometime after getting into Nauroy Line).


2/Lt. Pitcher wounded at assembly position near Hargicourt by shell.

There were other officer casualties - about 11 officers, 270 O.R.

No trace at all was ever found of the Americans ever having been beyond the railway. A few gained in from the tunnel (a L.H. Section) and came up to the Le Catelet Line, - and Keys also had a few. These were sent back later.

59th and 60th BATTALIONS.

August 8th.



59th was in position lying out when the tanks came up. There was a lot of shouting about 20 before zero - you couldn't hear the exhaust but the shouting. This brought down the German barrage - light stuff 4.2 and 77s - but it didn't fall on 59th. 57th got a bit of it but not 60th. At hop off fog and smoke was very thick; when 59th and 60th started ~~the~~ 1 hour after zero they were to advance in 1000 yards bounds so as to get through green line at Zero 4. Compass was the only guide. Result was that they dribbled through and reached the valley in rear of the green line with about 1/2-hour to ~~be~~ spare. This was badly needed for re-organisation. ~~Every Coy. was on the right direction - the compass brought them through. They were completely re-organised, in the little ravine short of Bayonvillers. All were in their proper frontage before Bns. moved off. The tanks were on the right flank refilling from their supply tanks - they came on across the flank and went straight on.~~

While Bn. was waiting an old R.E. 8 came over and a whole circus of Fritzes suddenly loomed out of the clouds at him. They came at him - our chap came circling down shooting all the way with one Fritz diving at him. The Lewis guns of all our troops opened as soon as ever they could see clear of our man - and Fritz was driven off. 59th Bn. had had no casualties till then.

60th Bn. had the railway to guide them (which made it easier. They too re-organised).

As soon as they cleared the green line over the crest on which it lay, they came at once under the direct fire of a battery of whizzbang guns. Two of the first shells each got a L.G. and crew. A couple of tanks manoeuvred to out-flank them. One or two of our ~~our~~ L.G. teams got fire on to the gun crews. Those who were not hit ran to their dugouts and were captured later. This Battery was in trees ^{immediately} S.W. of Bayonvillers.

Later on field gun was found between the roads in 10.A.5.7 - the horses were in the limber but had been shot. 58th Bn. tackled Bayonvillers - 59th skirted it without any ~~trouble~~ trouble. There was M.G. fire from isolated posts but the tanks in every case dealt with them - going straight over the positions. The gun last mentioned knocked out one of the tanks by cutting the tractor with a direct hit.

This was the first that Col. Scanlan saw knocked out. The 4 first guns didn't get any of the tanks.

The 59th Bn. went through Harbonnieres - one Coy. through and the other 2 round - the Bn. hung out a flag on the church (which is now in Australian War Museum).. At that time this was the furthest easterly advance. There were a few M.Gs. in Harbonnieres. The tanks went through with a party of moppers-up - tanks blazing into every house. They got a few M.Gs. in the town.

When they got through the town the 59th Bn. began to get heavy M.G. fire from the Amiens line on their left front. The cavalry picked up Bde. about 9.D and then massed and went out just N. of the railway.

The 59th came E. of the town and got into the Amiens Line N. of Harbonnieres Railway Station. Just behind the station the Germans had a post. We did not get this. The line swung off back along the railway which runs S. of Harbonnieres and joined with 57th Bn. there. The Germans in the pause had come back to the sapling copse near Harbonnieres Station - if the Bn. had been ordered to these trenches in the first place it could easily have done so. 59th Bn. reached its objective 3/4-hour before time. Harbonnieres was still supposed to be under heavy long range fire of our own guns, but nothing seemed to be falling there.

Later in the afternoon Gen. Elliott came up, and ordered a further advance. A tank was found in the streets of Harbonnieres with the crew asleep. It was arranged for it to go out S. along the railway line and then E. along the light railway track up to the Harbonnieres Station. But when he got to the trenches he developed engine troubles and came back.

After dark another attempt was made but the M.G. nests at Harbonnieres Station and about 18.B.2.2 and the Amiens Line stopped this and posts were only established a little closer to the Amiens Line.

August 9th. At 20 minutes before the Canadian zero orders were received from Brigade that 1st Aust. Divn. was late, and that 15th Bde. would conform to Canadian advance and protect their left flank. 58th and 60th were to leapfrog 59th and 57th. That was all the orders that were obtained. In order to confer with Col. Denehy, Col. Scanlan had to get across from his H.Q. S.W. of Harbonnieres to Denehy's in about 17.C Central, in a terrace bank. There was a lively barrage on across this space. Scanlan then established an advanced H.Q. about 12.D.7.8. He there found that 58th Bn. was still in the line held up the whole way along. They had no tanks nor artillery preparation and the M.G. fire held them. They moved soon after and Col. Scanlan took 59th out in support of them. It was not known that 8th Bde. had to attack - nor any objective - So. Col. Scanlan laid down a provisional objective for 58th and 59th - a little in advance of the Vanvillers Resieres Road. It was here that 1st Divn. overtook them with their tanks and passed through.

At first they were held up at Harbonnieres by the railway station post. The Germans fought a first rate M.G. scrap - they fought their M.G. till their guns opened and then withdrew their M.G. as fast as they could. It was then that our advance opened. The German 77 barrage was light and didn't keep our people back.

The 60th had started before the 58th - they were held up by a few M.G. which they overcame by manoeuvre. The 60th were approximately in touch to 58th Bn. between railway and road.

The green line was thus taken and was handed over to 1st Divn. when it came through.

59th followed because 58th had an open flank on the left.

The Canadians advanced very well - they had tanks with them.

August 9th. - Artillery Liaison Officer with 59th Bn. was hit by a bullet while waiting for attack to start. (Lt. Jones).

August 8th. - Lt. Stewart - By one of the 77 shells which wiped out L.G. team (severely).

Lt. Stevenson - I.O. sent forward as liaison with 2nd Div. wounded by M.G.

Lt. Mankey -) by M.G. fire from many directions soon
Capt. Southwall -) after arrival East of Harbonnieres.
Lt. Fincher -)

August 9th. - Lt. Dunkley blown up but remained on duty.

59th and 60th - Peronne. 8th Bde. followed Germans to Canal - the 4 Bns. abreast, 59th on left - extreme right on E.W. road, while 59th Bn. H.Q. was at the Y fork W. of Barleux Col. Scanlon was summoned to confer with the G.O.C. Gen. Elliott away out in front without a digger in front of them. This was to arrange an attack on the Germans across the Somme by crossing the Somme. The meeting was in Syntax Trench in 31 D or B - everyone on the parapet using glasses and maps.

The 15th Bde. was to relieve 8th Bde. next day to force a crossing at Boie(?) Haplincourt. The relief began just before dark. Leading Coy. of 59th was in touch with 8th Bde. Bn. and whole Bn. was on move, when it had to be recalled as the the move was cancelled.


August 30th. About 3 a.m. Col. Scanlon was sent to the same H.Q. where he got further orders dictated by Bde. I.O. whereby 7th Bde. was to force a crossing near Peronne, and 15th Bde. was to leapfrog ~~through~~ through them. They had to move at 6 (?) a.m. and be in position by 7.30 (?) a.m. ready to leapfrog.

7th Bde. found that the crossing was impossible; but 59th Bn. moved to 8 A (?) Varna Trench (?) and sat down there for the day. They had orders to relieve 7th Bde. that night, and during afternoon they reconnoitred. They relieved part of 28th and part of 26th (night of 30/31).

Nothing happened except that 59th Bn. pushed down posts to command the crossings in

- (1) the old fortifications near Bristol Bridge.
- (2) the Railway crossing.

On morning of Sept. 1st Brigade after personal reconnaissance ordered the attack on Flamincourt. 2 Coys. of 59th and whole of 58th were to go down to the river bank and to cross in the manner shown on the following page.



Lieut. Pentreath took 5 or 6 scouts down. They got over the foot-bridge, back to the railway, then worked along the bank. The railway bank gave them some cover up to the bend. But as they came round the bend a M.G. saw them and Pentreath was wounded in the leg and 2 men hit.

As a result of this reconnaissance it was realised that the attempt was impossible and it was cancelled.

That night Bn. was withdrawn to its original position - the Coy. was left in posts on E. side of the Canal from wooden Bridge to Railway.

September 2nd. At 4 a.m. C.Os. were called to Bde. H.Q. and orders given for an attack on Peronne by 14th Bde. and 2nd Aust. Div. - 15th Bde. to leapfrog 14th Bde. when they reached their objective, change direction right, and attack up the Flamicourt - Le Wesnil Spur. The wooden bridge had been completed by the engineers. 58th Bn. was to mop up Peronne after 14th Bde. 59th and 60th to move through it after 14th Bde. The attack (zero) was at 6 a.m. Bns. were scattered.

The Bridge at 33.A.9.9. was a mass of blown up girders. They simply had to scramble across it. By the time they reached Peronne (about 10 to 6) the Germans were shelling W. end of it and our people the E. end (barrage being at 5.30 a.m.)

They went up with Col. Scanlon at head as shown on my map to the Railway towards St. Denis, N. of Peronne. There they were getting reverse fire from the top of Mont St. Quentin (East of the 2nd Divn) and found remnants of 14th Bde. held up by very heavy fire from St. Denis.

Col. Scanlon had the artillery liaison officer (Lt. Sharp M.C.) with him and 4 orderlies, all hit with M.G. bullets from the rear. Situation was reported to Bde; and Bn. dug in. The 60th followed and formed near the Aerodrome (?). They stayed here all day - the shell-fire was as heavy as anything at Polygon - the Germans having complete and close observation.

That night orders came for 59th Bn. to relieve 55th and 56th; 60th Bn. was in support to 59th. Both under Col. Scanlon. The 60th with 2 Coys. leapfrogged that night and advanced the line towards St. Denis and established posts. By this time 58th Bn. had the battlements, and 58th pushed out posts that night towards the railway E. of Peronne.

September 3/4th. One Bn. of 8th Bde. was to relieve whole of 59th Bn. with one Coy. On relief the 59th had to move a Coy. way back near to Barleux. Just as the relief of 59th Bn. was complete, the relief order was cancelled. 60th Bn. had not been relieved and remained in their positions. The last of the men got back at 3.30 am. At 5.30 a.m. C.O. received orders to take the whole Bn. forward again to a position in close support of 57th Bn. They moved up to the earthworks in 33.B.5.1 and stayed there till 3 p.m. Then, owing to the advance of 57th Bn, it was considered advisable for 59th again to move to the battlements in I.22.D. On night of 4/5th Bde. was relieved and went into bivouacs in O.2.B.

60th Bn. on the day of the relief pushed their patrols

to Darmstadt Trench and East of it. Lieut. Malcolm Kirkham killed on the railway bank near St. Denis by a shell on first day of arriving there (Sept. 2.) Lieut. Pinkerton was wounded in the same place and R.O.D. (Sept. 2).

59th (& old 60th) Battalions.

BEE LICOURT.

Had moved out in column of route at 6.45 after a hot breakfast from West of Templeux Le Guerard in L.7.C. Moved from there in Column of Route by an overland track E of Templeux to Cross Roads in 28.C. 95.20 then due E. towards Malakoff Farm to the J.O.T. On moving E. they deployed into artillery formation, lines of platoons, H.Q. leading.

They came under M.G. fire before C.O. was satisfied that they were on the J.O.T. It came from the direction of Malakoff Farm.

It was a very foggy morning - artificial fog was put down and this made it hard to see - there was very little wind and the smoke made a ground fog.

They did not suspect anything wrong at this time. They put it down to bad mopping up on the part of the Yanks. Leading Coy. came under this and some artillery fire and suffered severe casualties.

As they got near Malakoff Farm they got M.G. fire from beyond it (it seemed like Malakoff Farm at first). The leading Coys. Commander, Capt. Hornby, had been killed by a burst (there were several guns) and all the officers except one had been wounded. The C.O. swung them round to act as flank guard while rest of Bn. went through - and meantime he seeing a big mark 5 star tank knocking about a little further back, went down to it and got the officer in charge of it to help - and came up in the tank himself to show it the way. C.O. took it to head of Column and then got out - tank went on and toured round - C Coy. under Lieut. Buckingham working independently.

Shooting was coming from left flank - and it stopped when tank went out. (A Bde. Major of some other Bde. got into the tank for a similar job - the tank ended up at Quennemont Farm and went off).

The C.O. led Bn. down in the bottom of the valley after this for protection.

C Coy. which had been swing round before C.O. went for tank worked out towards Quennemont Farm. When C.O. saw them coming back with 40 prisoners he for the first time realised that the Americans must have had a crash and things were wrong.

(C Coy. was under young Buckingham).

Bn. got over the top of the hill and into the Hindenburg Line at the Lamp Station (where the left dealt with a M.G. post). The right entered the trenches about A.27.C.5.9.

On getting here the fog had lifted a bit and the Germans could be clearly seen in the Catelet Line just W. and N.W. of Cabaret Farm. You could see about 100 of them. The C.O. sent A Coy. under Capt. Dickson down the C.T. (with the zig-zag bend in it) into the Hindenburg support line. D Coy. went over the open just N. of it (Capt. Neale M.C., O.C. of D Coy. had been killed

by shell fire in the advance and this Coy. was under ~~xx~~ Lieut. Parr) and getting into the trenches there established touch with 44th Bn.

Both these Coys. came under M.G. and minenwerfer fire from 3 directions, front, left flank, and left rear.

B Coy. under Capt. Roberts, less one platoon occupied bits of trench closely supporting Capt. Dickson.

One platoon of B Coy. under Lt. Chambers was kept in the main Hindenburg line with H.Q. with a platoon of 44th Bn, remnants of a platoon of 41st and bits of 108th American Regt.

Lt. Chambers put in ~~xxxxx~~ a bomb stop at about 27.A.5.8.

About noon the German bombed along the main line where H.Q. were, rushed the bomb stop, and broke through. He was driven back by a counter-attack, the men using German bombs, and our bomb stop was put in 50 yards further N. The Germans made a second attempt but this time they were repulsed without reaching the block by bombs and L.G.

At 1.30 Col. Clark C.O. 44th Bn., established a joint H.Q. with Col. Scanlon. At 4.30 p.m. Lt. Buckinghame reported personally that he, with 12 men, the remains of his Coy., were holding posts in Top Lane. There were 4 V. guns of 3rd M.G. Bn. in Quennemont Farm and 2 in Top Lane. This gave us our defensive flank. German artillery was in action in Dirk Valley.

There was still a pocket of Germans at the Junction of Top Lane and Hindenburg Line. C.O. 44th Bn. was arranging to deal with it.

44th Bn. had a Coy. also in the C.T. (towards the Tunnel and 28 Central).

That evening 59th Bn. was ordered to move to a position in the Hindenburg Line immediately S.E. of Mont Olympus.

September 30th. 59th moved to S. of Bellicourt (trenches in 10 A) near the "boiling down works." It was intended that they should attack the same day to attack the Lamp Signal Stn. in 6.D. Col. Scanlon had fixed zero for 3.30. He discovered ~~that~~ 29th Bn. H.Q. that they were under orders to do the same thing with zero at 4 p.m. These orders were then cancelled by telephone. (15th Bde. was not in touch with Divn. at this time).

At 10 p.m. they were called to Bde. (W. of Bellicourt) where orders were given for an attack at dawn by the Bde. in conjunction with an operation on the right (54th and 56th) and left (57th and 58th).

On October 1st. they moved out at 5 a.m. and formed in rear of Nauroy Catelet Line. The attack was covered by a creeping barrage and supported by tanks and the objective was reached with very little opposition. When they attempted to exploit the success and push on the Germans put down a very heavy artillery shoot and checked any further attempt to advance. By nightfall they had made good the line of the Gouy Estrees Road, which was handed over to 2 Divn. Relieved that night.

Capt. C.S. Roberts - just after leaving C.O. at noon 29th.

Capt. Neale - died of wounds

Capt. Hornby - killed.

2/Lt. Parr - died of wounds (he was hit by one of our own 60-pdr. shells on ~~xxxxxxx~~ morning of Oct. 1st in last advance.

2/Lt. Curtin - gassed.

Lt. A.J. Tacker died of wounds (with Hornby).

Wounded:

- W.W. Leggett by shell fire near Malakoff.
- H.E. Buckinghame about noon - hung on till 4 p.m. and reported.
- G.B. Bower by shell fire near Malakoff.
- 2/Lt. L.H. Parker with Hornby.
- Lt. R.W. Marshall with Hornby.
- Lt. C.H. Ashman.

Hornby was hit by a shell near Malakoff Farm early.

Lieut. Doyle A.F.A. Artillery Liaison Officer wounded. (Chambers was in charge of bombing when this was going on near 59th Bn. H.Q.)

186 O.R. killed and wounded.

59th and 60th BATTALIONS.

Turner and Facey.

On 4th September there was patrol work in Flamicourt. Bde. relief this night. 59th and 60th were to move to the rear. 57th then found that Germans were retiring. Orders for 59th and 60th to withdraw were not cancelled as they should have been. 59th and one Coy. 60th had already moved when Elliott rang up to try and stop them from 57th Bn. H.Q.

Next morning 4 a.m. 59th Bn. was ordered to reinforce. B Coy. paraded (Capt. MacDonald) refused to move. They said they were utterly done up. The other Coys. went (to Peronne) and officers of B Coy.; but B Coy. stayed. G.O.C. went to see them (Elliott). He said he realised that the men were being worked to death. He had been the first man in his Bde. to take a patrol into Peronne. But it was better to keep on working till they couldn't stand rather than let the Germans dig in on those hills. On Sept. 24th Elliott had been told of the Hindenburg Canal attack at a meeting of Brigadiers. 54th Bn. was to have been dissolved this morning - there was some trouble - men refusing to be dissolved.

On Sept. 25th evening came orders for break up of 60th. G.O.C. sent for Major Kerr (60th) Capt. (temp. Major) Smith 59th and told them that there was to be a composite Bn. made A and B Coys (60th) and C and D (59th) to be 59th Bn.

On 26th G.O.C. ordered combined parade. Found that 60th were ready to obey their own officers, but not 59th. - mild form of meeting. They were addressed by G.O.C.

and at end marched past under Scanlon who had returned (C.O. 59th).

27th Sept. Delegates from 37th and 54th Bns. were last night in lines. They told 60th Bn. that they were successful in their own case. 60th men ~~might~~ might be.

G.O.C. saw the men and told them it was only temporary - they would be demobilised afterwards. He told them that any man who refused to march would be disarmed and placed under guard. That he would not command men who had lost their respect for him and refused to obey his orders. When the time came for the march off there was not trouble. They wore their own colours.

One grievance was that they did not see why they should be picked out - they had no stain; whereas 59th had refused duty.

G.O.C. said you are being disbanded without a stain; no one could say it was because of misconduct. Whereas if I disbanded 59th because a few men with a genuine grievance paraded to me, it would be a stigma attaching to Bn. for ever.

The men said they did not mind going into the line; some of the older men were almost in tears - said it was like deserting the dead. They pointed out that after Fromelles and on the Somme they were weaker than they then were. They had never given up a yard of ground to Fritz - they were weaker and yet they advanced. (Of course so they would this time). But Elliott though he saw that the move was not necessary in 15th or 8th Bdes. saw that an order/ coming from higher authority must be obeyed or the force was done.

G.O.C. had a guard of nucleus under the Staff Captain standing by and would have had the men disarmed and put under guard and then resigned.

46th Battalion, August 8th -
September 18th.

46th Battalion.

Spent night before in old system W of Vaire Wood.

Fog was thickening when 46th Battalion moved at Zero plus 60. They moved by platoons along the road, closing up by Companys as the fog became thicker. It had been intended to cut early off to the left on a compass bearing to Brigade assembly position near Tailloux Wood. But as fog was so thick the road was kept as a guide to near Warfusee Abancourt when the trench was followed which leads N. to Tailloux Wood. As B Coy. got half way up this trench they heard firing through the fog ahead. Presently Germans were seen in the trenches at 22 D 9 5 - 9.1 and a few of them were shot. A tank had reached this place, about 30 yards from the Huns, and had broken down. The 3rd Division had not been seen by these Germans.

On the same road that 46th Battalion followed, in the old No Mans Land lay a mine. The officer leading a tank (of the 12 which went along the Div. Boundary) saw it and took his tank round it. But the next tank didn't see so far ahead as its predecessor, and ran over it (it looked like a boxlid) and it blew up.

The 46th and a party of 32nd Battalion mopped up these Germans (possibly 20).


Battalion got into its assembling position E. of Tailloux Woods with rest of Brigade. By time they moved off the fog had lifted.

Some of the tanks on account of the fog had decided to make their own way to the J. Off position and were ahead there when Battalion arrived. The others were at Tailloux assembling place.

From there these tanks moved on right flank of the Battalion when it moved.

From there to the J.O. position S.W. of Hazel Wood, Battalion struck no Germans. The third Division had got on well. Only 2 wounded men or so came back and the spirits of the Battalion were very high. They reached the J.O. position marching by plus in Arty. formation. On the J.O. position in 19 B & D the Battalion moved with 6 tanks .

xxx



There were also 12 tanks on the right flank between 4 7& 5 Divisions.

Battalion moved diagonally to strike the main road just west of Richmond Gully.

The 46 Battalion came on a dug out about 300 yards ahead

of the J.O. position. 30 Germans came out of here without fighting with their hands up. Battalion left us fighting near Begimald Wood. 46th Battalion met its first opposition from Susan Wood. This was the left Coy. Near here they got a couple of 4.2. howitzers which the Germans had been getting away - the Boche had gone.

The next opposition was S of Jean Wood from a few Germans who had dug in hurriedly that morning.

When they reached the N and S Road E of Valerie Wood, the two rear Coys. A & C leap frogged through the leading Coys. and led.

The trenches and wire shown in 28 B & D west of the Gully don't exist. As Battalion got past that point it came under a very heavy machine gun fire from the hospital on its final objective, and also from the 5th Division sector S. of the road. The armoured cars had not yet gone through. The 5th Div. were anything up to 1000 yards behind on the 46th Battalions right.

They had to make rushes by sections, making use of any cover.

At the edge of this gully the tanks were of no use for the moment as the gully was too steep. The German fire was coming from the red brick hospital opposite and from the hospital huts or camp across the road. A red cross flag was still flying from the hospital. The tanks did good service here lying on the opposite bank and firing into this hospital and possibly it was they who set fire to it. 2 heavy machine guns were later found in a bit of trench just W. of the house opposite the hospital huts.

The bank was so steep that a tank (of 5th Div?) trying to get down it S of the road rolled over and lay there.

Two of the tanks (46th Battalion) were hit, on the top of the Bank N is the road on which Gully's edge, by two sections of field guns firing, one pair from 30 D just N of the road, and one pair from about 19 A (or C?).

Of these guns those near the main road was cleared later, but those on the left front continued to fire while Battalion was on its objective. Two Lewis gunners got M.Ms for taking out a couple of L. guns to about 30 B 5.9. and playing on the guns to their left front and silencing them. As the Infantry went forward by section rushes to the Gully's edge there was fire not only from E of the Gully but from the banks and the thick scrub on our side of the Gully. There were about 100 Germans here, very hard to see; and they were firing over the roofs of their shelters. Captain Hall was killed just on the edge of the Gully with the leading Co. Captain Norths Coy. was just behind. He saw the trouble and moved straight up and took charge of Halls Coy. Hall had been working his Coy. splendidly with whistle and hand and was probably sniped on that account. (Hall is a Melbourne man - he is the 4th officer in command of that Coy. who has been killed).

North is a Brisbane Solicitor - he was in the fight at Bullecourt and lay out in the snow with a broken leg till rescued by the Adjutant, Captain Vanstan, by daylight next day. He went to Australia and got his M.C. at Saily Le Sec in the attack towards Saily Laurette, July 7/8; he was hit later by a shell at Lihons during one of the sudden German strafes.

When we had worked on the Gully side to within about 100 to 50 yards of the Germans they surrendered. The 46th Battalion moved across the valley and got no interference from the Germans further N who were busy with the 45th Battalion. The Germans had left the hospital by this time and run back. There were Germans in Richmond Wood. As

these Germans cleared the 46th Battalion moving up there could see Germans in another trench on the top of the bank 100 yds W of Hope Wood, firing on the 45th. They worked behind these and settled that opposition allowing 45 to get ahead.

As the Battalion worked out into the open past Hope and Richmond Woods the Germans in 30 D cleared out. Battalion moved to its objective objective just E of the house by the hut hospital. The 45th Battalion reached its objective about the same time. The 5th Div. on the right were not yet up, and 46th was able to get into the hospital huts where they found some very good lager and a German Officer.

It was as the Battalion was about moving up on the E side of the Gully by the red brick hospital that the armoured cars went through.

On the advance our heavies lifted from Gully to Gully at about 1/2 hr. intervals. The advance was so rapid that it used to reach the Gully before the heavies had lifted, and had to wait there.

One other tank of 46th Battalion was hit near the X roads in 30 A. otherwise the tanks got through. They eventually worked down into Richmond Gully with difficulty and the 12 Reserve Tanks seem to have lain up here to.

Casualties - Lieut. Hall. (as above)

Capt. Symons of left Coy - he was hit in front of Susan Wood.


46th Battalion, September, 38.

46th Battalion was just E of Soyecourt a good mile W of the Rly. which was 3/4 mile W. of the start.

They formed at 6.30, an hour after Zero. It was raining and miserable. Everyone was soaked while they were forming up. The men had had a hot breakfast at 3.a.m.

It was very misty. The 46th Battalion had 1500 yds of front to cover. It went over on a 2 Coy. front.

xxx



They moved from assembling position in artillery formation on this front.

After crossing the rly. there was a heavy belt of wire which was hardly cut at all, and the German barrage line was on the wire. The barrage opened just as the Battalion got there. The 2 leading Coys. were pushed through the gaps in the wire very quickly without serious casualties. The following Coys. had a few casualties but Battalion H.Q. following seemed to get the heaviest. The R.S.M. was hit, runner killed, 2 L. gunners wounded.

From there it was a good steady plod. The maps had become a pulp and were difficult to read - they picked up objects which they were looking for - Wood Cambresies and so on. They had to get in touch with 1st British Divn on the right, but from the start could not get in touch with anyone there.

They got into 48th Battalions Objective and first caught up our own troops here. 45 were just going on; 48 digging in; 46 arrived a bit before time and the men and the three were hard to distinguish. While 46th Battalion was organising, the fight was going on ahead with some posts over the crest.

45 moved out and 46 was to follow 600 yds in rear. A lot of the officers went out right on their tail and waved their arms to the men. When the men saw their own officers ahead they joined them up and the Battalion was easily reorganised ahead of 48 Battalion objective. Men recognising their own officers + what looked like a difficult job turned out easy.

By the foot of the slope of the next Gully 46th Battalion was closed up on 45th Battalion. They had to wait while 45th Battalion was getting the Germans out of the posts of the old British outpost line, and (most of them) out of Red Wood.

They followed 45th Battalion round S of Red Wood. The slope from Red Wood S.S.E. is very heavily wired with 3 belts of German wire and they had to pick their way through it.

While going through there they got in touch with the English on the right. The Tumulus on the right was a good guide. There had been no fighting at the Tumulus. Battalion got into the scratching trenches in M 2 A and the posts (better dug) N of it.

They started their show there.

The night before the C.O. sent for Coy. Commanders and told them (Col. Corrigan) and told them that owing to an altered decision of the division or Corps on the right the plans had been altered; and instead of making a definite attack on the Hindenburg outpost line they were to exploit as far as they could get.

At the same time the 4th Brigade had said that they intended to go on with their original plan; and therefore 46th Battalion had to make sure of protecting their flank. Right on time the 4th Brigade moved out on the left (10.10 - after 1/2 hrs. wait.)

As 46th Battalion had been waiting they could see pits and small pozzies ahead; and Germans were there wandering about or waving to us. The men were not allowed to go out and settle these as there was still a lot of artillery fire from a way back and fairly heavy machine gun fire. Lt. James, M.M. was wounded there by machine gun.

The pack mules were up here with their noses practically in the barrage - standing quite quietly, standing right in the open. These bombs and ammunition were for 46th Battalion.

It had been a very exhausting march. Everyone seemed done. The sun came out and with the rest seemed to put new heart into everyone.

Right on time the 4th Bde. moved out on the 46th Battalions left and left Coy. moved out with them.

The instructions were that 46th Battalion were to keep their left with 14th Battalion, and the other Coys. were to send out patrols to form posts echeloned back, and keep the right in touch with the Tommies.

2 platoons of the right Coy. followed in close succession. The other 2 platoons on right were told to hold on to the Tommies and not move till they got orders.

Going down into the valley a number of German guns were passed, and also many Germans, including 2 officers. Most of them were willing to surrender but they were not taken prisoners. They went straight through them and on. There were Machine guns firing from the right on the advancing troops all this time.

They got down the valley and up the ridge in 26 B & D. The Germans had machine guns sited to sweep down the gullies and Major Couchman's Coy. had about 30 wounded out of the Coy. going across. While they were there the contact plane came over. (They would be about on the central grid line). At this time the Tommies were seen by Major Couchman distinctly moving up S. of Pontruet moving in lines E-wards. He thought that it would be best to work up the sunken road in G 32 D90.10 to get touch. There was a battery of German guns there and a lot of ammunition. Some prisoners (3 men and an officer, later wounded and died), were here. He said there were 100 or 200 Germans waiting up in the trench on the hilltop and they were quite willing to surrender. He was a decent sort of fellow, and was speaking in disgust with his own troops. Probably with a barrage these Germans would have surrendered, but the fire was very hot from these trenches as there was nothing to keep it down.

46th Battalion still had the line along the road with a special patrol on the flank to keep touch with the English. They were in touch with the English who were at that time just E of the Tumulus. They had not exploited from there at all.

Couchman sent word back for the 2 remaining platoons of his (right) Coy. and for one patrol to come up. They came along across the vally. Close on them were 2 English officers, two game men of the Royal West Sussex (?). They had a very hard day. The Tommies did not leapfrog. The Battalion which started and which was in the trenches the night before had to go for all the objectives and did not leapfrog. C. met these two officers. Our platoons were coming down at this time. An officers of ours was putting them into position. Couchman, the two officers and a runner went up to a terrace ahead to reconnoitre. A shell burst close on their right. It killed the English Captain and badly wounded the subaltern.

(Our patrol had clearly got in touch with these 2 officers and they had come on to see what was doing. The Captain said to Couchman that he would bring his Company up. The Captain said to the British were not up on the right - as Pontruet village was knocking them to bits and that they had not got beyond the trenches S.W. of the village But they had certainly been seen by our people at about M.10.c. and been knocked back. When they were hit they were brought back behind a bank. Our men were then along the sunken road and thence in posts across the slope into

- 6 -

26 D. The left Coy. were in touch with the 4th Bde. They were meeting with fire over open ground - they had no sunken roads up there on the bare ridge. Lt. Wallace was in/c of D. Coy there (M.C. for this work) and was continually going round his posts over the open ground there. Lt. Byrne (B. Coy. platoon which had come up to reinforce) was shot there leading over the open ground. He had his platoon well in hand, it was doing exactly as ordered and had practically finished when he was shot. (He was a 1914 Officer just due to go to Australia). They were dribbling out posts to near the S.E. sunken Road. (it is only a small bank - no sunken Road really as on the map).

The orders of the night before were to get onto this same Sunken Road at any cost. The right Coy. also was then dribbled up by sections on to this road. On their way up this very steep bank they passed some dug-outs with Germans up the Bank leading N.W. and each platoon had a pot at them as they came out.

On this road were 11 trees (marked in the map in 3 3c) which were a splendid guide. The whole Coy. was lined out along the road - a thin belt of wire was on the near side of it. They got up the bank leading N.E. from the lower road to the top road and then dribbled along the road. Once they got to the top of the bank the German seemed not ready for them, and did not fire at first. But as they lined along the road bank which was only about 18 inches deep the Germans waked up and kept up a very heavy machine gun fire. You could not move.

There was long grass ahead - and it looked as if this wire were the obstacle in front of the trenches. But from the road there could be seen through the grass a very heavy belt of uncut wire close enough to touch apparently continuous from there to the trenches. The first disposition report was then sent back - that they were on the road but with very thick impassable wire ahead.

This report having been sent in a patrol was sent along the road to the left to get touch with Wallace's Coy. W. had sent saying that he was going up there. The patrol consisted of 3 men - 2 were killed and one wounded - working along the road into the open.

It then turned out that where the bank is shown on the map there is no bank. W's Coy had been unable to get actually into it (but was lying up as close as it could get to it.)

The L. gunners at this stage were doing wonderful work. They burrowed under the German wire and got their gun set up under it. Then every time a German gun opened up they tore into his parapet as fast as they could. This meant that they were constantly going, and it kept the German fire down a lot. They could see the guns. (Cpl. Greenwood was in/c of this team and the men were in fine spirits.)

The previous arrangements were that the heavies should play on to the Hindenburg outpost line for 5 hrs. after getting to the objective - this was the verbal instruction. Instead of this they opened at 5.p.m. The 46th Battalion was very close indeed and had several casualties and had to get out very quickly. They came back and ~~formed~~ formed along the sunken road which they were in before. This heavy gun fire was very heavy. The impression of the O.Cs was as above. The arrangement was that the heavies were to play all day on the British front not on ours - we were warned to watch for the heavies on the right flank. The field guns (a battery of A.F.A.) was supporting 46th Battalion. They came up to just S.W. of Heart Copse and saw men moving on the

crest of the next ridge. They unlimbered and had their 6 guns ready to fire when someone told them that the men they saw moving were Germans. They pulled out at once and went 1000 yds. back to E. of Dean Trench. They started to fire from there and it was at least an hour before this mistake could be rectified. The 46th Battalion, C.O. had wanted to get these guns on to the right where it was held up, but this delayed it.

When 46th had got on to 45th Battalions objective in the morning they saw a team being hooked into a gun on the old Roman Road over the Hinenburg Outpost Ridge. This must have been a gun from the valley which had had a horse hit on the way back over the hill. There were also 2 horses yoked to a gun behind a bank in 32A. One horse had been shot. The fieldgun had overturned and was pinning down the other horse which was alive - one of our men shot him.

The new position at the Sunken Road in rear was reported to Battalion Headquarters (The left was in pot holes as before the last advance.) The platoons had been reorganised. The Tommies were still back on their second objective. The Gully to Pontruet had to be watched - they knew that the Germans were strong in the valley. Dark fell.


About 8 p.m. orders arrived that Battalion would attack under a barrage at 11p.m.

A Coy which had been in reserve were to attack on the right and B Coy. on the left. (Lt. Deith, D.S.O. for this nights work). B Coy. had been put in to reinforce D. Coy in the afternoon. Battalion Headquarters arranged for hot rations, ammunition, etc. but these owing to casualties etc. did not reach the right Coy. till it was forming up at 10.40. Left Coy got theirs about about 9.30 but right Coy. hadnot time. The men had had a go at their iron rations, but not the hot food or tea. The barrage opened right on time at 11 p.m. 3 mins on wire, 2 mins on 1st objective (5 in all), 5 mins on 2 objectives and then 15 mins. on the further saps.

With the barrage were 24 machine guns which opened onto the 2nd objective for 2 mins and then beyond.

Dead on time came a very heavy downpour of rain. It was exceedingly heavy and opened with Zero.

One platoon of D Coy was to drop upon the left and one platoon of C Coy on the right.



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The Coys. organised during the 3 minutes of fire on the wire. Three quarters of an hour before they had moved out to form up on the road just in front of the German wire (which is nearer to the road than on the map). Directly the barrage lifted - while it was on the first trench they clambered through the wire which had been very little damaged and was still a good obstacle. It was still raining.

Then they hopped into the trench (the barrage lifted on to the second trench by then).

The left did exceedingly well - they kept their organisation and got into the trench together. Leith was wounded in the arm in the first trench by a German who was up there as a flare firer but he carried on and went to the second objective. Each fired their revolvers. They went straight on leaving a number of Germans in the first trench including a Colonel and many officers. The Colonel, who was on his dignity and would not go back without an officer was shot by Leith's batman. They had not expected the attack - much time, much rain, much distance, all deceived them - they had thought that we would attack in a couple of days and they had brought up all these troops in order to counter attack in the mg. They had come up in cars from 15 kilometers back. They had been clearly brought up in the afternoon and put in after dark.

B Company got into its 2nd objective alright. The platoon from D Company mopped up and this part of the trench was soon settled. There were numerous fights - the Germans were good troops and had had plenty of wine and were pretty aggressive when captured. There were many small scraps. One man was a prisoner for half an hour. Our were very few and the Germans far more numerous. We had about 150 all told on 1,500 yards.

D & C Coys that morning had gone over each about 100 strong (200 men).

The Right Company had its objective right off the Gully near Square Copse. Their left should be at Square Copse. They got well over to the left near Square Copse. They had nothing on their right. They were all in the cot of trenches in front of Square Copse. Lt. Muriel, M.C. (a Methodist Minister from Melbourne) in Charge of "A" Coy. went with a few men down towards Bell Copse and collected prisoners from the dugouts near there. The platoon of "C" Coy. under Lt. Storey, M.C. which was to mop up for them, went in behind "A" Coy. and sailed into Onoto trench which was full of Germans and had not yet been touched. They had a tough fight there, bombing, taking Germans, split up, working round the trench. They got the whole of the trench. Probably many German got away down the trenches towards Bellingtise and the S. They formed a block in Onoto Trench just E. of the Sunken Road. Another block had to be formed at the Junction of Onoto and Pen trench, blocking Pen trench. After about 1/2 hr. the Germans became very active there.

During this time a strong patrol of Germans came down due West to about 33C35.10. Major Couchman was at C Coy. Headquarters in the Sunken Road, only a few odds and ends were there. The bank was lined by these. C. sent a patrol up the N.E. bank to get behind these Germans. This patrol met Lt. Storey just coming back with a big batch of prisoners. (This was before the blocks had been put in and the position established). The patrol told Story that it was to get in behind these Germans and let them come in behind C. Headquarters. The patrol had one gun. Company Headquarters had a souvenired gun. A Cot of German prisoners were at Coy. Headquarters and it was thought when the German patrol got past Coy. Headquarters both guns could be put on to drive them up to 45th Battalion.

Storey, at once, with the patrol, cut in parallel to the St. Helene Road in near of the Germans. The Germans saw him and cleared out S. wds1 and got away. Both guns opened but probably about 100 Germans (that was the number estimated in the dark) got away. Storey was sure hh had got 1500 prisoners. At Headquarters a Lance Corporal was found to be sending the prisoners back. Storey's party of prisoners was there. One of the German officers was very stiff. C. told the Cpl. to get this officer back as straight away. The Officer knew what was said and resented it, but by keeping them on the move they were got away without mishap. One German Officer said "All I can say is you are some bloody soldiers".

In the meantime a Company of the 48th Battalion had been sent up to cover the right flank. They came up and were placed from the Tumulus up to the 46th Battalion's right. The Tommies were still back at the Tumulus so far as we knew - the 48th Battalion had met them moving up from there. Another Company was sent up under Major Couchman's orders - 2 platoons were put into the line in Onoto trench, and two in the Sunken Road by Coy. Headquarters.

At 11.45p.m. just after Storey had gone back with the prisoners Major Couchman, in the Gully immediately S. of Coy. Headquarters met a Tommy Colonel, and a number of men. They said they were going to hop over at 12 midnight (about 3A.20.10. this Colonel was). He said that St. Helene and Pontruet were very strongly held. The Tommies were then getting into position.

Major Couchman went back to Coy. Headquarters and found a message there to the same effect. Men were at once sent up to the trenches to let our people there know of the barrage. This arrived at about 11.57 and enabled them to ease to the left. The attack by the British took place ~~at right of Major Couchman~~ at 12. Major Couchman went over to see the start. The Tommies were lined in the Sunken Road near the gridline between Squares 2 and 3. They went over with a cheer. But they were very done. The Major lit a cigarette and a few minutes later came back. There were a few Tommies in the Sunken Road and they said that the others had come back and gone to the rear. A little later they too were gone.

The flank then depended on the Coy of 48th Battalion (It was quite safe. Coy. 48 was intended to be up with the 11p.m. barrage but had had a long way to go and were very late.


These Tommies were very done and were a lot affected by the loss of their Captain earlier in the day (the one mentioned above).

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Following night the 2 Coys. 48th Battalion up there were put in to take the trench to the point just beyond the objective in 33D. They put in a block and came out and overlapped onto the Tommies front in the 2nd Objective.

This night the front was ~~very well~~ reorganised. The Tommies held up to their boundary. 48th Battalion held up to 33 central. 46th Battalion held up the two ~~33 central~~ trenches.

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Here the 46th Division took over on night 21/22. This was a good relief. Battalion got out without a casualty. 46th Division was raided that night and lost prisoners. Their Divisional Commander was a D.C.M. and had a very thorough look round the whole front going out with Major Couchman with a rifle and poking out in front of 48th Battalion. Captured a lot of 46th Regiment Germans and were ret'd. by 46th Division. There was an immense amount of kit (new) in the trenches.

This was the office who asked if a counter attack were likely. Major Couchman said "No, he wont Counter-attack". The G.O.C. said "That's all very well - he mayn't counter attack you - but he may counter attack our chaps/". These trenches were left by us very clean.

- LOSSES:-
- Lt. Byrne - killed (as above)
 - Lt. Leith - wounded (as above)
 - Lt. Palstra - wounded in the advance to the J.O.
 - Lt. Carter - wounded in the 1st objective just after getting in - by a revolver.

SEPTEMBER, 19. When it got light it was very interesting finding out where the line was. There were parties of Germans still in the trenches between small posts of our men. These Germans seldom showed any fight - they never started a fight and a bomb always settled them. This day (September 19) the trenches were thoroughly mopped up - Germans still in the dugouts.

The Germans shelled us fairly heavily that day. The M.g. Battalion had some bad luck and 48th Battalion also.

The man who was captured by the Germans and recaptured was in the 1st objective with the first party ("A" Coy) - and was grabbed by the Germans and kept in a dugout. It was 35 mins. before the mopping up party came to this portion of the trench - "A" Coy. had gone straight on to the 2nd Objective. The right Coy. in the afternnon in Ascension valley captured 9 guns, 2/5.9, 1/6in. Howitzer, rest 77s.

Battalion went in about 4.30 strong all told.
 By night D Coy had 70 men
 C Coy " 40 "

Battalion was the about 270 strong going into the night fight - carrying and all told. About 150 of these would be fighting. They took 21 officers, 607 O.R. odd prisoners. Also 40 wounded passed this aid post in rear of old British Front line at Georges Post.

LOSSES - about 1 Officer - 20 M.N. killed.
 5 officers - 134 wounded (mostly only slight. (Mostly during afternoon of September 18th. About 80 Germans were estimated as killed.

383
- 11 -

Battalion took about 11 guns.

6/77s. 4/5.9 1/8in. 35 mgs.

The casualties in the night attack were about 10. Every m.g. the Germans had was trained on the gaps in the German wire, but the rain had put them off - and the barrage.
